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Understanding Motivations behind States' Participations to the UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study of Indonesia



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Figures on the Cover page (from left to right, captions as taken from UN Photo Library):

1. “Officers from the Indonesian contingent of the UNAMID stand in formation during a ceremony for the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers, in El Fasher, Sudan.” (UN Photo/Albert González Farran).
2. “First Lieutenant Sigit Jatmiko, a member of Indonesia's Formed Police Unit serving with UNAMID, interacts with children in the Abu Shouk IDP Camp during his morning patrol.” (UN Photo/Albert González Farran).
3. “First Sergeant Bahari, a member of Indonesia's Formed Police Unit serving with UNAMID, arrives at the Community Policing Centre of the Abu Shouk IDP Camp during his morning patrol.” (UN Photo/Albert González Farran).

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Abstract

The study aimed to address the phenomenon of states' participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO), by analysing the motivations behind a state's increased participation in UNPKO. The phenomenon was approached multi-dimensionally by applying a comprehensive theoretical model of Bellamy and Williams (2013), which introduced five rationales that influence state's participation in UNPKO. Indonesia was selected as a typical case because of its characteristics and behaviour of significantly increasing the participation since 2004. Data collection process consisted of interviews with relevant officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry and analysis of high-level speeches, legal documents, and news articles. After the data was gathered, the study applied the model of Bellamy and Williams to interpret the findings; and an analysis using middle power theory was performed to further the understanding of the phenomenon.

The result showed that state deploys its personnel to UNPKO when it is perceived as beneficial to further its interests and ideology. State deploys its personnel to UNPKO in order to further its foreign policy goals (increase its national prestige and accelerate its role in international cooperation so that its voice can be heard), to further its interest to contain conflicts not to spread from their roots, to gain military advantages (international military experience, increase interoperability, legitimize the armed force), and to further its ideology of being a supportive humanitarian state. The study argued that state does not participate simply for financial advantage, because the result found that state would still participate even though it does not gain significant benefit economically (on the contrary, state is burdened by training and standby costs).

This behaviour is in line with the characteristics of middle powers, in which middle powers perceives prestige and positive image as important and tend to get involved in the maintenance of peace and security for humanitarian purposes. Therefore, the study concluded that the status as middle power influences state to participate more in UNPKO.

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
G-20	Group 20
G-77	Group 77
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMT	International Monitoring Team (of Southern Philippines)
IO	International Organisation
IPSC	Indonesia Peace and Security Centre
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
TKMPP	<i>Tim Koordinasi Misi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian</i> /Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India And Pakistan
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPCRS	United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
UNPF	United Nations Peace Forces
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

I. Introduction

“UN Peacekeeping is an investment in global peace, security, and prosperity. The Blue Helmets are a concrete expression of the Charter’s determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”



Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General¹

Peacekeeping is necessary for positive conflict transformation, according to many conflict resolution theorists (Woodhouse, 2015: 27), and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) is the key instrument in maintaining world peace and order (Hutabarat, 2014: 184). By the end of March 2018,² there are 14 active UN (United Nations) peacekeeping missions in the world.³ The UN openly ‘calls upon’ its member states to take part in maintaining international peace and security by contributing to UNPKO according to the Article 43(1) of the UN Charter (Moelle, 2017: 25).

There are two ways for the UN member states to contribute to UNPKO: financially and personnel-wise (participation). Financial contribution is binding for all UN member states, and each state pays differently according to the UN General Assembly’s scale of assessment (Global Policy Forum, 2017). On the other hand, personnel contribution is voluntary. This type of contribution is usually referred to as “troops contribution” even though there are various types of personnel, not just troops (there are police and civilians personnel as well). As of 31 March 2018, 124 out of 193 UN member states contribute troops to UNPKO.⁴ It is worth to note that the states which contribute the most to UNPKO in terms of troops are not neutral states which are known for conflict management strategy, but rather developing states, mostly from Asia and Africa (Ramsbotham, 2011: 136).

¹ On his remarks to the Security Council Thematic Debate: “Peacekeeping Operations Review”.

² The timeframe period of this study is 2004-March 2018, therefore, the most recent data and information used are as of 31 March 2018.

³ Data taken from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>.

⁴ Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_ranking.pdf.

A troop-contributing state that is interesting to observe is Indonesia, because it suddenly increased its participation in UNPKO since 2004. Indonesia is not a new player, as it has been contributing to UNPKO since 1957 when it deployed its troops to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2015). However, the number of its personnel contribution was always ‘humble’. This ‘humble’ personnel contribution of Indonesia was increased in 2004, when Indonesia sent 188 troops to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Hutabarat, 2014: 187). This number might seem small in comparison to the contribution of the top-ten contributing states at that time; however, this is a historical point for Indonesia and it marks the continuous increase of Indonesia’s personnel contribution in UNPKO. Since then, Indonesia keeps growing the number of its personnel deployment in UNPKO. Also, in recent years, Indonesia began to openly state its personnel contribution to UNPKO as one of its foreign policy priority. By the end of March 2018, Indonesia has deployed 2,695 troops in nine missions, which positions itself in rank 8 out of 124 troop-contributing states.⁵

The motivation behind personnel contribution⁶ of a state, like Indonesia, is appealing to analyse, because why would a state deploy its armed force and other personnel, even at some point significantly increase that deployment, to deal with someone else’s conflict? Why bother spending more money to deploy your nationals and risking their lives?

I. 1. The Research Question and Its Relevance

This phenomenon leads to a research question of *What motivates state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO?* This research uses a case study of Indonesia to answer that question. Therefore, the research question is refined into *What has been motivating Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004?* It is an explanatory (retrospective) question, as it tries to explain a real-life phenomenon and reveal causal mechanisms. The research focuses on the period of post-2004 because the initial spark to participate more significantly in UNPKO has begun in 2004 for Indonesia. As the phenomenon is still going on and the number of troops deployed keeps changing (mostly growing), this research only limits its period of time to the most recent possible (31 March 2018).

⁵ Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_1.pdf.

⁶ later simply referred to as ‘participation’, to avoid confusion with ‘financial contribution’.

The argument proposed is that Indonesia's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO is influenced by its status as a middle power, and that the most dominant reasons are mainly political and economic. Politically, Indonesia uses its participation in UNPKO as an instrument to further its other foreign policy goals. Economically, Indonesia enjoys the benefit of gaining incentives from the UN by participating, which is financially advantageous in national, institutional and individual level.

As a case study, this research is directly relevant to Indonesian policymakers. The findings offer an objective academic perspective reflecting on current foreign policy, which can be utilized by policymakers to refine their policy and formulate relevant policies in the future. The analysis on Indonesia's motivation to shift its policy regarding UNPKO can also be important for its neighbours as well as other states that need to negotiate with Indonesia. Moreover, at certain points, a comprehensive understanding of states' motivation to participate is also contributive to the UN, in terms of monitoring and evaluation on states' participations in UNPKO.

Academically, this research contributes in answering why certain states decide to participate more to peacekeeping activities in general, and UNPKO specifically, by addressing the phenomenon multidimensionally. There are several researches I encountered on this topic, mostly case studies. Some address the phenomenon as a one-dimensional problem, while some other focus on certain dimensions but not comprehensively cover more comprehensive dimensions necessary (namely political, economic, security, civil-military relations, and ideological dimensions). Understanding this gap, this research utilized the most recent, more inclusive model of Bellamy and Williams (2013) in analysing the phenomenon and offers a more comprehensive answer to the research question by applying the model into the case study.

The decision to choose Indonesia as the object of analysis is optimal because there are only a few researches that specifically focus on Indonesia. Furthermore, what makes this research more robust than the previous ones is that it takes into account an important thing that is missing in previous researches, which is Indonesia's status as a middle power and how it can affect its participation in UNPKO. The results of the study are also applicable at some points for analysing the motivations of other participating states, as Indonesia possesses several features which might exist as well in other participating states, especially those which are also middle powers.

I. 2. The Research Procedure and Findings

This research uses a qualitative approach; and the interpretative and explanatory case study is the most feasible research design to be applied, as it is close to real-life situation and helps to develop a nuanced view of reality. This research is a within-case study which aims to identify causal relationship between variables and utilizes congruence method as the methodology.

The data is gathered mainly by performing semi-structured, elite interviews with open-ended questions to relevant government officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry and Indonesian Defence Ministry, as well as by analysing some reliable written sources. After the data is gathered, Bellamy and Williams' model is applied. A comprehensive check and explanation is performed in seeing how the model explains the phenomenon and which Bellamy and Williams' rationales fit Indonesia better than the others. After that, an analytical discussion provides further understanding on explaining why Indonesia ends up with the decision to increase its participation in UNPKO, by taking into account the theory of middle power behaviour.

The study later found that Indonesia's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 is mostly driven by political and institutional motives. Politically, Indonesia perceives its participation as an effective instrument to further several foreign policy goals, namely to increase its national prestige, leverage and voice in the UN. Institutionally, the participation is perceived as militarily beneficial to give Indonesia's personnel an international experience, and to give Indonesia an opportunity to increase its military interoperability and legitimizing its military.

Besides, Indonesia's motivations to contain conflicts and to further its ideology to be a good humanitarian state are also present. It is also found that even though the deployment is not proven as financially beneficial (which means that the initial argument about economic motive is not supported), Indonesia still decided to increase the participation in UNPKO, because the political benefits gained from participating is far more invaluable than the financial costs Indonesia must face to participate. This reasoning of Indonesia reflects a behaviour of middle powers. Middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their role in international politics.

II. Literature Review

The chapter aims to provide discussion on relevant previous literature and how this case study can contribute by reflecting on the literature. However, sufficient background information is needed in order to be able to view the phenomenon of states' participation in UNPKO comprehensively. Therefore, before discussing the relevant literature, a subchapter is presented to provide the background information. This chapter then consists of two main subchapters: the one that provides background information on the topic and the one that discusses literature on why states choose to participate in UNPKO.

II. 1. Background Information on the Topic

The subchapter provides background information on UNPKO and the mechanism of financial and troops contribution. It also elaborates background information on Indonesia, including its main characteristics and history of its participation in UNPKO.

II. 1. 1. Overview on UNPKO

There is no direct legal basis for the deployment of UNPKO. However, there is a legal framework inside Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter that can be used for UNPKO deployment, that is for the UN to take action towards 'threats to peace' and acts of aggression. This notion of 'threat to peace' is always used as the foundation for the UN Security Council (UNSC) in giving mandate to UN peacekeeping missions (Moelle, 2017: 25-26). Furthermore, as the UN is not reinforced by its own army, it openly 'calls upon' its member states to voluntarily deploy their personnel under the UN blue helmet as an act of taking part in maintaining international peace and security. As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, it is legally based on the Article 43(1) of the UN Charter.

The traditional and essential purpose of UN peacekeeping is to "contain violence and prevent it from escalating to war; to limit the intensity, geographical spread and duration of war once it has broken out; and to consolidate a ceasefire and create space for reconstruction after the

end of a war” (Ramsbotham, 2011: 133). It is also important to note that a peacekeeping mission can only be deployed when there is a consent from the host state (Moelle, 2017: 26).

Over the years, UNPKO has developed and evolved, not only in terms of number but also in terms of mandate and purpose. This development is caused by the shifting in the nature of the conflicts itself (in which peacekeeping used to deal with inter-states conflict, but now it has evolved into dealing with intra-state conflicts, such as armed conflict with rebel or separatism group) and by the experiences the UNSC has learned in the past operations. In terms of mandate and purpose, its traditional purpose has now expanded. Not only focuses in security mandate, it now holds humanitarian and political objectives as well. This expansion impacts the composition of personnel deployed in the UNPKO, in which now it is more diverse as it consists of not only military but also civilian police and diplomatic personnel (Ramsbotham, 2011: 136). In other words, the classic peacekeeping mandate is now evolving into “multifaceted operations” which includes not only military but also civil components with a wider mandate (Moelle, 2017: 7).

In terms of quantity, the number of operations grew rapidly, particularly after the end of the Cold War. Since 1945, there have been 71 operations in total; and forty-eight of them take place in between 1991-now. This escalation, of course, goes hand in hand with the increasing number of troops deployed. The graphic below illustrates the trend on how the number of UNPKO personnel tends to relatively increase in the last 20 years (within 5 years gap observation).




Figure II.1. The trend of the number of UNPKO personnel deployment

As mentioned earlier, there are two ways for the UN member states to contribute to the UNPKO: financially and participation-wise. Standing under Article 17 of the UN Charter as its legal umbrella, financial contribution to peacekeeping missions is a collective responsibility of all UN member states. The amount of financial contribution is different from one state to another, because it is based on the scale of assessment which has been agreed by all member states under the UN General Assembly meetings. As for the five permanent members of the UNSC, they are obliged to “pay a larger share” because they have extra responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. By the end of March 2018, the top-ten financial contributors are (in ranking order) USA, China, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Russia, Italy, Canada and Spain (Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 2018).

The UN peacekeeping annual budgeting cycle is the period of 1 July - 30 June. For the last cycle, 1 July 2017 - 30 June 2018, UNPKO has the approved budget of US\$6.8 billion. It is less than 0.5% of world military expenditure, which is estimated as US\$1,747 billion (Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 2018). The budget amount is different from cycle to cycle, and it can increase or decrease based on economic growth of member states (on which the scale of assessment is updated). Each peacekeeping operation is given the budget based on its mandate (how much budget it needs to achieve its objectives). The budget is used for financing the operational costs, including paying the compensation incentives (see the next paragraph) to those states which deploy their personnel in UNPKO.

The second type of contribution is personnel contribution (or simply referred to as ‘participation’), which is the focus of this study. Different from financial contribution, this one is voluntary, even for the permanent members of the UNSC (the P-5). As the UN does not have military forces, it invites member states to participate in UNPKO by deploying their personnel. It provides an individual compensation incentive of US\$1,410 per personnel per month. Furthermore, the UN gives incentive for those states that provide military equipment to the operations. All of the administrative agreements (including logistics and financial incentives) between the UN and a contributing state is legally written under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Each deployment has one MoU.

Per 31 March 2018, there are 14 active UN peacekeeping operations which consist of 91,058 personnel from 124 contributing states.⁷ The top-ten participating states as of the end of March 2018 are (in ranking order) Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Rwanda, Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt,

⁷ Data taken from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-0>

Indonesia, Tanzania and Ghana. The detail information on the current operations can be observed in the following table.

Mission	Location and Starting Year	Number of Personnel	Biggest Troop Contributor
MINUJUSTH	Haiti, 2017	1,117	India
MINURSO	Western Sahara, 1991	470	Bangladesh
MINUSCA	Central African Republic, 2014	14,094	Pakistan
MINUSMA	Mali, 2013	15,156	Pakistan
MONUSCO	D.R. of the Congo, 2010	20,654	Pakistan
UNAMID	Darfur, 2007	15,321	Ethiopia
UNDOF	Golan, 1974	1,144	Nepal
UNFICYP	Cyprus, 1964	1,013	United Kingdom
UNIFIL	Lebanon, 1978	11,297	Indonesia
UNISFA	Abyei, 2011	4,765	Ethiopia
UNMIK	Kosovo, 1999	355	Czech Republic
UNMISS	South Sudan, 2011	17,965	Rwanda
UNMOGIP	India and Pakistan, 1949	113	Croatia
UNTSO	Middle East, 1948	374	Finland

Table II.1. Current UN peacekeeping operations (as of 31 March 2018)⁸

II. 1. 2. Overview on Indonesia

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world with more than 17,000 islands. With the population of more than 245 million people (which consists of more than 300 ethnic groups), it is the fourth most populous state on earth. Furthermore, even though Indonesia is a state with the biggest Muslim population in the world, it is not an Islamic state. The government recognizes six religions/beliefs, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. This fact on geographic and ethnic-social conditions of Indonesia is important to mention here because it makes this state conflict-prone (mostly between ethnic groups and religious groups) and challenging to manage. It has experienced a number of internal armed conflicts in the past, which makes Indonesia a proper example in conflict management and solution.

⁸ Data compiled from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>.

It is also worth mentioning that Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. According to the 2017 Democracy Index, it ranks 68 out of 167 states with a score of 6.39. This score and rank position Indonesia as a flawed democracy. Indonesia oftentimes uses its status as a democracy and its experience in dealing with conflicts to build its public identity. One of its way is by initiating and annually conducting the Bali Democracy Forum; a capacity building and experience sharing forum for all types of democracy. Economic-wise, Indonesia is the largest economy⁹ in South-East Asia and the only South-East Asian state which belongs to the G-20. By 2030, it is predicted to be the 7th largest economy in the world.

With all these facts, Indonesia fits to be a middle power that actively cooperates in regional and international organizations,¹⁰ and Indonesia increasingly accepts this status as its international identity. Not to left behind that Indonesia was one of the initiators of 1955 Asian-African Conference and one of the founding members of ASEAN, NAM, G-77 and OIC. International organizations seem to be the important core of Indonesia's cooperation in international forum, as it is now member of more than 200 IOs. In the world politics, Indonesia positions itself as a bridge-builder between its fellow developing states and the developed states.

Indonesia's Participation in UNPKO

The general national legal framework for Indonesia to participate in UNPKO can be found in the Preamble of its Constitution, its Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, Law No. 34/2004 on the Reform of Indonesian Armed Forces, Law No. 2/2002 on Indonesian State's Police, and Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence (Hutabarat, 2014: 186). As elaborated earlier, Indonesia's participation was suddenly increased in 2004, when it sent 188 troops to MONUC (Hutabarat, 2014: 187). Since then, Indonesia keeps growing the number of its troops deployed in UNPKO. Now, Indonesia has sent thousands of peacekeepers to several operations, which positions itself in rank 8 out of 124 troop contribution states.¹¹

⁹ GDP-wise.

¹⁰ Further discussion on middle powers is provided in the next Chapter.

¹¹ Data taken from

https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_by_country_mission_and_post.pdf.




Figure II.2. Trend of the deployment of Indonesia's personnel¹²

Graphic II.2 shows a relatively positive trend regarding Indonesia's decision in deploying its personnel to UNPKO. This increasing number of deployment goes hand-in-hand with the policy shift. In recent years, Indonesia began to openly state the importance of participation in UNPKO as one of its foreign policy priority. There are four important decisions (among many efforts) which support the increasing number of deployment. First, in 2011, Indonesia established a Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions (*Tim Koordinasi Misi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian/TKMPP*) under Presidential Decree No. 85 of 2011 (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2016). The mandate of TKMPP is to prepare policies and manage crucial steps regarding Indonesia's contribution in UNPKO. It has the functions to:

“a). coordinate the planning, preparation, execution, and termination of Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping missions; b). prepare a comprehensive study and recommendations on policy related to Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping missions; c). prepare and formulate positions and strategies in the negotiations on Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping missions; d). monitor and evaluate Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping missions.” (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2015)

This formulation is a response to the phenomenon of how UNPKO mandate has become more multidimensional. TKMPP is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and consists of the heads of relevant governmental institutions, namely Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security, Minister of National Development Planning, Minister of Law and Human Rights,

¹² No ranking system available before year 2000.

Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance, Chief of National Police and State Intelligence Agency, Army Commander, and the Cabinet Secretary.

Second, in 2012, Indonesia established the National Army Peacekeeping Training Centre in its Peace and Security Centre. This is aimed to prepare Indonesian army to meet the UN standard before being deployed as peacekeepers, and at the same time functions as a bilateral or regional training/workshop ground with other participating states. In the future, Indonesian National Police will also establish a Police Training Centre to prepare its personnel for deployment in UNPKO.

Third, in 2014, Indonesia set an ambitious goal to have 4,000 UN peacekeepers by 2019. This goal is supported by a “Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019” document, which is a legal national document based on the Foreign Ministry Regulation no. 5 of 2015. It acts as a “strategic guideline to materialize the Vision” (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2016). Fourth, in 2015, the government firms a solid and direct legal basis for the deployment of Indonesian peacekeepers by issuing the Presidential Decree no. 86 of 2015. With this Presidential Decree, the decision-making process to deploy troops in certain peacekeeping missions is more coordinated and more legitimate in terms of national law. Before the presence of this legal basis, the government laid the deployment of peacekeepers on the general laws, as elaborated earlier in this overview.

With all the efforts the government puts to support the increase of Indonesian peacekeepers deployment, by the end of March 2018, there are 2,695 personnel deployed in nine operations. This number puts Indonesia as the 8th biggest participating state out of 124. The following chart provides detail information of the disbursement of current Indonesian personnel.




Figure II.3. Disbursement of Indonesian Peacekeepers, as of 31 March 2018

II. 2. Relevant Literature on Why States Participate

The subchapter elaborates on recent and relevant literature regarding the reason behind states' participations in UNPKO. There are two kinds of researches explains in this writing, the general researches (which analyse states' participations in general by using large-N data) and case studies on several states, including Indonesia. This subchapter ends with a reflection on what this study offers after analysing previous researches.

II. 2. 1. General Researches

There have been efforts to understand motivations behind states' participations in UNPKO, and to formulate a generalized theory in explaining those motivations. The most common ones are coming from the perspectives of realist, liberalist, public good theory, and civil-military relations (institutionalist). According to a realist perspective, states participate in UNPKO only if it is in line with their national interests. Consequently, states would not support a peacekeeping operation if it is contradictive with their national interest (Neack, 1995: 182). Liberalist perspective explains this phenomenon by using its democratic peace theory. It emphasizes that democracies are more likely to participate in UNPKO than non-democracies, because democracies see UNPKO as an effective instrument to spread democratic values, particularly after the end of the Cold War (Daniel et al, 2008: 27).

Public good theory views UNPKO as impure public goods. Therefore, states' participations in UNPKO is the provision of impure public goods. It means that states are willing to deploy their personnel when the deployment provides them with private benefits for the states themselves; as well as for the personnel deployed (Bellamy and Williams, 2013: 14). Lastly, according to the perspective of civil-military relations, the motivation behind states' participations to UNPKO lays in the hand of states' military institutions. If the military institution is willing to send its personnel to UNPKO because it sees the deployment as militarily beneficial, then the state participates in UNPKO; and vice versa (Velazquez, 2010: 162).

As each of the above-mentioned perspectives stands alone, they do contribute to the literature by explaining states' reasons behind their contributions to UNPKO according to different perspectives. However, decision to deploy personnel to UNPKO is not a result of one-dimensional decision-making process; the process ideally takes into account different perspectives (political, economic, institutional, security and ideological perspectives). Therefore, to comprehensively understand states' reasons behind their participations in

UNPKO, it is important to address the phenomenon multidimensionally. Also, it is necessary to consider the fact that the theory to explain one state's motivations might not be able to fully explain other state's, because a certain state at certain period makes decisions based on relevant internal and external situation at current moment.

Departing from this understanding, and to offer a multidimensional perspective in addressing this phenomenon, Bellamy and Williams (2013) propose five rationales that can be applied to understand motivations behind states' participations in UNPKO. They acknowledge the four aforementioned one-dimensional perspectives, but they see them as problematic because each of those perspectives explains the phenomenon one-dimensionally. According to them, there are political, economic, security, institutional and normative aspects that need to be addressed to understand motivations behind states' participations in UNPKO.

The first rationale, political, argues that states see their participations to UNPKO as an effective instrument to achieve political objectives. The economic rationale argues that states participate in UNPKO to pursue economic incentives. As the UN provides compensation payments for troop-contributing states, in national level (especially for small states) it can be useful to support national budgets; in institutional level, the payments can be directly used to expand defence and security budget; at individual levels, the personnel (military, police or civilian) can benefit economically from being deployed, as they receive US\$1,410 per month; national corporations can also take advantage by providing goods, weapons and transportation to the UNPKO through UN procurement procedure.

Security rationale argues that states participate in UNPKO when the addressed conflict threatens their security interests (not necessarily core national security interests). The institutional rationale, also known as civil-military relations explains how a state's decision to participate in UNPKO is influenced by the bureaucratic dynamic between the core institutions and how the military institution views participation in UNPKO. Lastly, normative rationale argues that states participate only for normative reasons, such as to further their ideology to be good international citizens.

These rationales are a result of comprehensive case studies on fourteen different states (the P-5 states, top-five UNPKO troop contributors in 2000-2010¹³, and four rising troop contributors

¹³ Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Ghana, Nepal and Uruguay.

for the same period¹⁴). I use these rationales of Bellamy and Williams as a theoretical model for this study. Further elaboration on this is provided in the next Chapter.

II. 2. 2. Case Studies

Attention was paid to some case studies on different states (in-depth and comparative case studies). I found no case studies which apply Bellamy and Williams' multidimensional rationales and thus their theoretical model. This is probably because their writing is only published four years ago.

Academic attention to Indonesia itself is not very extensive yet. I chose two most recent and comprehensive researches to be included in this review. The first one is a comparative case study between Indonesia's and Malaysia's motivations to participate in peacekeeping activities (Cook, 2014). The argument regarding Indonesia is that Indonesia's participation is driven by several motivations, which are military, economic and political (Cook, 2014: 165). The reasons behind Indonesia's participation in world peacekeeping mechanisms is to gain international military experience, to run its 'free and active' foreign policy, to gain financial benefits from UN incentives payment, to further the then-President Yudhoyono's ambition for Indonesia to actively participate in peace operations, and to use and expand the market of the weapons and Armored Personnel Carriers produced by Indonesia (Cook, 2014: 165).

Although this research provides a comprehensive explanation from several dimensions (military, economic and political), it does not touch upon more necessary dimensions.¹⁵ It left out potential influences from Indonesia's possible interest to contain (or perhaps maintain) conflicts and Indonesia's ideology to maintain world peace and be a good citizen of the world. Also, this research focuses on peacekeeping and conflict management in general (it also discusses the ad-hoc peacekeeping team in Southern Philippines, the notion for ASEAN to have its own peacekeepers, and other bilateral efforts of conflict management; not only UNPKO), so it does not specifically provide reasons why or why not Indonesia participate in UNPKO.

Capie (2016) shares similar arguments regarding economic motive. However, he pointed out two other important factors. First, the civil-military relations of Indonesia plays a big role in

¹⁴ Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and Japan.

¹⁵ By 'more' I mean comprehensively address five dimensions: political, economic, security, institutional and normative; as introduced by Bellamy and Williams.

the fast-changing situation since 2011.¹⁶ Second, that Indonesia participates for the sake of international recognition as a democracy that is “ready to play a larger role on the international stage” (Capie, 2016: 11). This research does not put sufficient attention to the foreign political goal, as it focuses only on identity as a democracy but neglects other political factors such as whether there are certain foreign policy goals Indonesia wants to achieve by participating to the UNPKO. In other words, like the previous research, this one cannot explain the phenomenon through more necessary dimensions, but only institutional, economic and political dimensions.

Besides those two, there are non-Indonesia’s case studies which are interesting to observe. The first one compares China’s and Japan’s increased participation in UNPKO. It is argued that both China and Japan position themselves as ‘frustrated great powers’, a term which refers to states with great power but still feel insecure about its position in international forum. Therefore, those ‘frustrated great powers’ feel the need to assure their positions by gaining recognition from other states in order to be seen as ‘legitimate great power’ (Suzuki, 2008).

The findings of this study elaborate that both China and Japan utilize UNPKO as an instrument to build public image to different audiences. For China, the ‘audience’ is the Western great powers. With its status as a rising hegemon in the region, China seems to see itself as leader of the Third World states. However, it still carries a marginalized ‘legitimate great power’ status for the Western states after the Cold War. This situation leads to China playing ‘recognition games’ (one way of it is to participate more in UNPKO) to upgrade its status in international society (Suzuki, 2008: 58). Japan, on the other hand, seems to be accepted as equal by the Western great powers. Its ‘audience’ in building public image through participation in UNPKO is non-Western states. According to this research, Japan seeks recognitions from its fellow non-Western states, particularly with its status as former colony before the end of the Second World War (Suzuki, 2008: 59).

For both China and Japan, participation in UNPKO allows them to demonstrate their willingness and commitment to fulfil ‘legitimate great powers’ responsibility, which is beneficial to maintain their good images to their respective audience and tackling negative criticisms towards them (Suzuki, 2008: 54-55). This research addresses the phenomenon in its political dimension and provides in-depth discussion on current international political situation and how it affects the increased contributions of China and Japan. It left out the other

¹⁶ It is unclear why the author put 2011 as a starting point.

dimensions economic, institutional, security and normative). Also, it does not explain why both states choose UNPKO as an instrument to upgrade their international status and increase their positive public images.

The second case study performs a controlled comparison between three Latin American states: Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. It addresses the issue using civil-military approach and argues that there are three variants of military doctrines that explain why a state participate or not to UNPKO (Velazques: 2010). The first one is external doctrine, which manifested in how military forces use to “protect the state against external security threats” (Velazques, 2010: 173), states with this doctrine usually participate in UNPKO. The second one is internal doctrine or national security doctrines, where armed forces are deployed domestically to maintain national stability. States with this doctrine are most likely to be resistant in sending troops to UNPKO. The last one is mixed doctrine, that is in the middle of the first and second doctrine and produces unclear orientations. States with this doctrine might participate in UNPKO.

According to the three doctrines, it is concluded that Argentina has external doctrine, Mexico has internal doctrine and Brazil has the mixed one (Velazques, 2010: 174-175). This explains why Argentina is the most participating one among these three states, while Brazil positions in second place and Mexico is the least participating one. This research focuses only on institutional dimension of states’ participation in UNPKO. As UNPKO is not only beneficial for the military institution, it should have considered other factors that might drive a state to participate in UNPKO; such as political constellation of the conflicts dealt by missions in which those three Latin American states choose to (or not to) participate in and other foreign policy goals that they have which can (or cannot) be furthered by deploying personnel in UNPKO; also other rationales to participate (economic, security and normative).

The third case study is Khrisnasamy’s case study on Bangladesh’s motivation to participate in UNPKO. Bangladesh is one of top participating states in UNPKO. This research positions Bangladesh as a small, poor state that eagerly participates in UNPKO to enhance its global image, “as part of its overall strategy of attracting greater economic assistance and foreign investment” (Khrisnasamy, 2003: 25). It provides four motivations of Bangladesh’s participation.

First, Bangladesh participates as an act of goodwill; to be able to contribute in promoting international peace and security. As a former colony, Bangladesh grows empathy to other states

with unstable political and security condition. Second, Bangladesh's participation is seen as an instrument to develop its economy. The UN allocates certain amount of payment per soldier to participating state, which can be used for increasing national income.

Third, Bangladesh hopes that its participation can enhance its positive international image, which will attract more international support and foreign investment that can help boosting its economy. Lastly, by sending its troop to UNPKO, the military can be free of being politized and interfere in Bangladesh's domestic affairs. It is also important to "keep the troops occupied" and reduces the changes for a military coup to happen (Khrisnasamy, 2003: 37). Even though this research provides interesting findings, it does not provide all necessary factors, particularly possible political motives (from Bangladesh's foreign policy goals) and Bangladesh's interest to contain conflicts in the region as well as internationally.

II. 2. 3. Reflection

Bellamy and Williams' model of rationales is currently the most relevant and comprehensive model to explain states' motivations by pointing out five necessary aspects on what motivate state to participate and/or to increase its participation. For the case studies, all which I encountered addressed the phenomenon as a one (or only several) dimensional problem but no one explored the participation in five dimensions comprehensively. This is unfortunate, because state's decision to participate in UNPKO is led by more than one factors.

I am aware that one-dimensional analysis cannot be considered as significant weakness of a study. However, in this topic of explaining the phenomenon of state's participation in UNPKO, a multi-dimensional analysis is necessary, because state's decision to participate in UNPKO is not a result of the consideration of only one aspect. Of course, one can say that one dimension influences a state to participate more in UNPKO, but does a government really make a decision only based on one dimension? How can we understand the bigger picture comprehensively if we only finger-point one or two or three aspect(s) that the government considers during the decision-making process?

Therefore, in order to address this multi-dimensional phenomenon, I believe that a multi-dimensional approach is needed. Currently, the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams is the most relevant one, as it consists of five dimensions (political, economic, security, institutional and normative) in looking and trying to explain motivations behind state's participation realistically as one big picture.

Furthermore, it might be argued that by combining all relevant previous studies discussed in this Chapter, one can simply conclude state's motivations through all dimensions; but I do not think one can do that. To be able to explain a phenomenon (one state's participation in UNPKO during a certain period of time), it is necessary to address all five aspects at one time, using one methodology and within one analytical time frame. In other words, all necessary aspects must be tested within one framework in order to get more comprehensive findings. Besides, by addressing all aspects simultaneously, the researcher can further learn how those aspects interact and influence one another.

Reflecting on these aspects, this case study of Indonesia's increased participation in UNPKO for the period of 2004-2018 offers a comprehensive and tailor-made study to be contributed to the literature. All necessary perspectives are taken into account in this study, addressed simultaneously within one method and one time of analysis. It applies Bellamy and Williams' model to explain the motivations behind participation in UNPKO; and to extend the understanding, middle powers theory is used to interpret the findings.¹⁷ This case study optimally contributes to the literature because (1) according to what I found, there has not been an application on Bellamy and Williams' model into case studies, and (2) there have not been studies which addresses Indonesia's motivations to participate in UNPKO multidimensionally (comprehensively using all five rationales), particularly for that period of time.

¹⁷ The reason on why I use middle powers theory can be found in the next Chapter, apart from the fact that I did not encounter any previous researches on Indonesia that use this theory to interpret the results.

III. Theoretical Model

To approach the phenomenon multi-dimensionally, this research explains state's motivation by applying the model of five rationales introduced by Bellamy and Williams (2013) to the case study chosen. These rationales are considered as the most suitable model that can be utilized, not only because it is a case-studies-based model which offers a multidimensional approach, but also because this approach is the most comprehensive one so far, as it is quite recent (in 2013) that it reflects the current situation of UNPKO and states' participations in it. Therefore, it is necessary to apply this model and see whether it fits and explains well Indonesia's increased participation in UNPKO since 2004. After analysing how those rationales apply in the case study, the results will be interpreted using the perspective of middle power behaviour. Middle power status affects how states interact with others; and when a state perceives itself (and/or if it is perceived) as middle power, it might influence its foreign policy and decision-making process; including the decision to participate in UNPKO.

III. 1. Bellamy and Williams' Model

There are five rationales proposed by Bellamy and Williams, and each of them consists of motivations (why states choose to participate) and inhibitors (why states choose not to participate). The rationales are political, economic, security, institutional and normative rationales. The decision whether state chooses to participate (or increase its participation) in UNPKO or not depends on the state's preference between those motivations and inhibitors.

In *political rationale*, participation in UNPKO is seen as an instrument to achieve political objectives. By participating, states hope to increase its national prestige as well as its leverage in international affairs. In a long run, the participation can function as a tool to achieve or protect state's other foreign policy goals (for example, seeking supports from other member states for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC). On the other hand, a state will be reluctant to provide peacekeepers if there are other more strategic priorities that it must face (such as internal conflict or direct, immediate threat to its national security). Furthermore, state might hesitate to contribute if it is worried of its reputation, in which can be damaged by, e.g. the

failure of certain operation in which it decided to deploy its troop and the presence of abusive or violating act of its peacekeepers (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 419).

The second one, *economic rationale*, indicates that the incentive payment system offered by the UN allures states to participate in UNPKO. The benefit from receiving this payment is not only experienced by the national government (particularly small, poor states that need extra money to accelerate its national budget) but also by the armed forces institution (to increase its budgeting), individuals or the peacekeepers themselves (as they are paid properly) and firms or corporations that provide military needs by joining UN procurement (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 19). However, when this compensation is smaller than the actual troop deploying costs (in which state must prepare its personnel to meet the UN standard in terms of training, capability and equipment), state is reluctant to participate more (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 421).

Security rationale explains that states tend to participate if they feel the actual need to protect its security from a conflict (does not have to be core national security interests) that they decide to take part in containing and solving the conflict (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 20). On the other hand, if there is doubt and institutional antipathy towards the UN, that it cannot further their security interests at minimum cost, they will prefer to participate in other missions or taking unilateral actions (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 421).

Fourth, *institutional rationale*, points out that civil-military relations influences state's decision to participate or not to UNPKO. A state is more likely to participate when military institution can take advantage from the contribution, for example, if armed forces think that joining UNPKO provides vast international experience for its troop, state might send more peacekeepers; as it is a better option than having their military interfere to domestic affairs and being politicized (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 20). However, if the military institution is antipathy to the UN (because of negative experience in the past in cooperating with the UN), there will be a strong resistance to participate more in UNPKO. Furthermore, the presence of internal rewards for peacekeepers inside the armed forces, such as extra payment or career promotion, can help increase the enthusiasm of the military personnel to be peacekeepers and hence increase the state's participation in UNPKO (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 422).

Lastly, *normative rationale*, explains that states participate in UNPKO because they see it as the right decision to take normatively. According to this rationale, the decision to participate (also to increase the participation) in UNPKO is not fully driven by the interests, but by

ideology and goodwill. This is reflected by the motivations of the rationale, namely ‘to be good Samaritan/humanitarian’ and ‘to support the UN system’. In other words, state would be more likely to increase its participation when it perceives UNPKO as a strategic way to further its ideology of being good humanitarian state and when it is willing to support the UN system. On the other hand, state will draw back from its participation (by reducing the troops deployed or not participating at all) when the mandate and agenda of UNPKO is not in line with the state’s ideology. States’ main ideology here is to support the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN framework, so that they can be good international citizens (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 20).

The summary of those rationales, along with the motivations and inhibitors, is as shown in the table below.

Rationale	Motivation	Inhibitor
<i>Political</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National prestige - Voice in international affairs/UN - Further other foreign policy goals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alternative priorities - Exceptionalism - Difficult domestic politics - Damage to national reputation
<i>Economic</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial rewards: states, ministries, militaries, individuals, and firms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Imposes additional costs
<i>Security</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resolve regional conflicts - Contribute to global peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preference for non-UN solutions
<i>Institutional</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gain operational experience - Prevent military involvement in domestic politics - Improve interoperability - Legitimize armed forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military antipathy to UN - No internal incentives for UN peacekeeping
<i>Normative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good Samaritan/Humanitarian - Support UN system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discomfort with normative agenda - Discomfort with ‘robust’ peacekeeping

Table III. 1. Rationales of state’s participation in UNPKO¹⁸

III. 2. Middle Powers Theory

Middle powers theory is utilized in this study to extend the understanding of its findings. After applying Bellamy and Williams’ model of rationales to the case, the behaviour of Indonesia is

¹⁸ Adapted from Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 423.

interpreted using middle powers theory. The argument here is that middle powers tend to actively participate in UNPKO, and that the model of Bellamy and Williams explains why the states choose to participate. The study has no intention at all to test the theory of middle powers, but to use it as an instrument to interpret the application of Bellamy and Williams' model.

Middle powers are states with the level of global capabilities behind great power states but above the small power states (Manicom & Reeves, 2014: 27). There are no fixed criteria for a state to become a middle power. However, middle powers are often argued as the ones with average material capability, proactive behaviour and ideational belief to use multilateral forum to pursue their interests while at the same time being a good citizen of the world.

The main characteristic of middle powers' foreign policy is that it is influenced by their positions in the global system (Jordaan, 2003: 166). Middle powers are known as having an interest in maintaining global stability and preserving the status quo for the sake of their own foreign policy goals. This interest, however, seems selfless and therefore help create the image of middle powers as good global citizens. Most middle powers actively interfere in international issues in a proactive way (compared to least-powerful states than the middle powers), even though the issues are not their immediate or direct concern (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).

In protecting stability, middle powers place conflict management as an important part of their foreign policy. They like to be involved in mediation and peacebuilding activities as a form of their contribution to international peace, as well as a way to pursue their self-interests (Manicom & Reeves, 2014: 28, 31). Their positive image as neutral states or 'honest broker' is advantageous for them in this case. Typically, they use international organizations as channels to get involved in conflict management and resolution.

Middle powers utilize international organizations as the main instrument in achieving their foreign policy goals. They perceive international law as beneficial to protect their interests, and international organizations provide security for them in this case. Furthermore, within international organizations, middle powers can get stronger voice by cooperating with like-minded states (Jordaan, 2003: 169).

There are two types of middle powers, the traditional ones and emerging ones. They basically share similar features in terms of characteristics, but some of their key differences make them behave differently in some issues. Traditional middle powers are those Western middle powers born during the World War II (e.g. Australia, Canada and the Netherlands). They are politically

and economically stable, and their further main role was to create balance in the Cold War between two great power states at that time (Jordaan, 2003: 172). Today, most traditional middle powers are active in the international cooperation on world climate and possess significant position in economic cooperation.

On the other hand, emerging middle powers are those ex-colonies, non-Western states born right after the World War II. With this background, they are mostly young democracies with low to medium economic power. They play dominant role regionally and tend to cooperate with other like-minded non-Western middle powers in international organizations (Jordaan, 2003: 174-177). Indonesia is considered as the latter type of middle power: an emerging one (e.g. in terms of population size, economic growth, role in regional forums) (Holbraad, 1984, Ping, 2005, and Manicom & Reeves, 2014).¹⁹

Middle powers and UNPKO share a close history. After the World War II, it was the traditional middle powers who pioneered the UNPKO (Cooper & Dal, 2016: 517), and saw it as a proper instrument to emphasize their roles in international cooperation on security and peace. In other words, UNPKO is a tool created by middle powers to show their existence and importance in terms of international politics and security (Neack, 1996). Today, most of the UNPKO participating states are emerging middle powers (as the traditional ones more focus on economic and climate change cooperation). They tend to fill the gaps in international cooperation where great powers avoid participation because of exceptionalist way of thinking.

III. 3. Central Argument and Hypotheses

The central argument of this research is that the status as middle power influences a state's behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their prestige in international politics. The motivations in all Bellamy and Williams' rationales support what is important for a middle power. Therefore, as each rationale consists of motivations and inhibitors, a state's preference towards the motivations and inhibitors affects the decision on whether that state decides to participate more or not. Some rationales might be

¹⁹ Further explanation on Indonesia's status of middle power and its active participation in UNPKO is elaborated in the next Chapter.

more dominant than others, it depends on the situation of each state's internal political condition and its status in global politics.

In the case of Indonesia, my argument is that the motivations for Indonesia to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 are affected by each one of the rationales, even though some rationales might be more dominant than the others. Past studies would lead us to assume that political and economic rationales might be the dominant ones for Indonesia. Its status as middle power and the relatively stable political and security situation (internally and regionally) also influence Indonesia's decision to participate more to UNPKO.

Based on the central argument, this research provides five hypotheses to explain why states participate more to UNPKO. To be fitted to the case study, the terms 'state' below can simply be adjusted into 'Indonesia' in order to make the hypotheses more contextual.

The main purpose for a state to cooperate in international forum is to protect the national interests. These interests can be perceived as something wide, but one of the most important interests is the political one. State's behaviour in international cooperation is driven by political foreign policy goals, because when you achieve your political goals, the other goals such as economic can follow as spill-over effect. The interest to achieve national prestige, positive image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are reflected as foreign policy goals which can be pursued through participation in UNPKO. Therefore: *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective instrument to pursue its foreign policy goal(s), state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 1).*

Most of the troops contributors in UNPKO are relatively new-born, developing states that are former-colonies. Increasing financial income is important for a state to develop the economy. Not to mention that getting foreign currency for most non-Western developing countries is a niche way to gain extra income. Considering this, financial rewards that are offered by the UN and received at the level of institutions, individuals and firms of the state affects its decisions to participate more. Therefore: *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as financially beneficial because of its financial rewards, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 2).*

As stability is a key to build and develop economy, states possess a tendency to avoid the spreading of conflicts and maintain peace and order. Participation in UNPKO can be seen as an effective instrument to contain conflicts, therefore: *When participation in UNPKO is*

perceived as an effective tool to maintain peace by containing conflicts, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 3).

A foreign policy's decision-making procedure is a reflection of a state's domestic situation. In the case of participation in UNPKO, state can consider internal aspect in terms of military advantages. In this case, state perceives its participation as an instrument to achieve internal military advantages for its military institution, such as gaining operational experience, improving interoperability, legitimizing armed forces and preventing the military to involve in domestic politics. Therefore: *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as militarily advantageous, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 4).*

A state might have a special interest on humanitarian issues, because of its unpleasant experience in dealing with colonialization and armed conflicts or simply its ideology of having a world that is socially justice. It sees cooperation in international organizations as a positive way to address humanitarian issues. Therefore: *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility under the UN system, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 5).*

As the hypotheses are based on Bellamy and Williams' rationales, they are affected by the state's preference between motivations and inhibitors of each rationale. If it is found that in certain rationale the motivations are more dominant than inhibitors, then the hypothesis related to that rationale is supported; and vice versa.

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IV. Methodology

To answer the research question, this research uses a qualitative approach. Interpretative and explanatory case study is the most suitable research design, as it applies a theoretical model in explaining the case (Vennesson, 2008: 227) and helps in analysing a real-life phenomenon of which the researcher does not have control of (Yin, 2009: 6). Besides, a case study is close to real-life situation and helps to develop a nuanced view of reality. Even though it is believed that the findings of a case study are difficult to be generalized, there is always something to learn from those findings, especially if the case is typical or well-illustrated.

As a within-case study which aims to identify causal interpretation, congruence method is utilized as the methodology. The data is gathered mainly by performing semi-structured, elite interviews with open-ended questions to relevant government officials, as well as by analysing some reliable written sources to increase the validity of the study.

IV. 1. Case Selection

Being a within-case study, the case to analyse is selected to be the typical one. A typical case, according to Seawright and Gerring, is a representative of the population, which helps the researcher to “better explore the causal mechanisms at work in a general, cross-case relationship” (2008: 297 & 299). Indonesia is selected to be the typical case for this study. It is a good representative of the ‘population’ of UNPKO’s troop-contributing countries. It shares similar values with the other troop-contributing countries, despite of its interesting profile, which makes Indonesia a proper typical case to analyse. By choosing Indonesia, this study contributes to the literature by validating on how a causal mechanism explained by Bellamy and Williams’ model can be applied on a representative: Indonesia.

Indonesia has an interesting profile as an emerging middle power. It has a long history of being former colony of the Dutch (as well as the Portuguese and the Japanese at some points) and experienced in dealing with natural disaster (such as the Tsunami in Aceh in 2004) as well as with internal conflicts with separatist groups (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* in Aceh, *Organisasi*

Papua Merdeka in West Papua, and other separatist groups in Moluccas, Java, etc.). This background forms a unique identity of Indonesia as a state which experienced in conflict and disaster management.

Regionally, Indonesia is an active player in ASEAN. Not only being one of the founding members, Indonesia also always puts ASEAN as the core of its foreign policy. It believes that regional cooperation can increase stability in the region, therefore helps the South East Asian states to grow. With this belief, Indonesia actively involved in containing conflict in the region in order to maintain regional peace (such as assisting the Philippines and Myanmar in dealing with their internal conflicts).

Indonesia is also active multilaterally. As a middle power, interactions in international organizations are important for Indonesia to protect its foreign policy in multilateral cooperation. Indonesia is member to more than 200 international organizations, in which it tries to fill strategic positions so that its voice can be heard. Indonesia is known to position itself as a bridge-builder between its fellow developing states and the developed states.

In terms of economic development, after being able to deal with economic crisis and internal conflicts, its economy keeps developing and it is predicted to be one of the strongest economy in the region by 2030. Currently, with its growing GDP, Indonesia is the only member of G-20 in South East Asia.²⁰

Indonesia shares some relatable features with other UNPKO's participating states (which makes it a good typical case), such as its status as a developing state with long history as a former colony. As mentioned earlier in this paper, most of the states that participate in UNPKO are developing states from Asia and Africa. Most troop-contributing states of UNPKO share similar ideology with Indonesia, on colonialization and similar perspective in dealing with conflicts. Like some participating states, Indonesia plays an active role in South-South cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

I am aware that the results of a case study do not always necessarily have to be generalized. However, there is always something to learn from a case study; because of the nature of case study, that provides a concrete context-dependent knowledge which is valuable for the literature (Flyberrg, 2011: 3). Therefore, the result of this study can be useful at some points to

²⁰ <http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/>

analyse the motivations of most other UNPKO participating states, as they might share some of the features that Indonesia possesses.

Indonesia's increasing participation in UNPKO since 2004 is the most interesting factor to study. Its significant policy shift from before and after 2004²¹, creates a big room for interpretation and further analysis on the motivation behind it. As explained in the Introduction, Indonesia has set an ambitious goal to have 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019, so that it can place itself among the top-ten troop-contributing countries. This increasing number (from only hundreds to thousands) proves a significant foreign policy shift for Indonesia in perceiving the importance of UNPKO participation. By focusing on Indonesia's participation in UNPKO, this case study seeks to further contribute academically by addressing the state's behaviour multidimensionally. Furthermore, the decision to choose Indonesia is prime, because currently there are not so many researches in this topic that focus in Indonesia.

IV. 2. Variables

The dependent variable of this research is "state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO". This variable is operationalized by observing the trend of meaningful increasing number (minimum 50 personnel per increase) of Indonesia's deployed personnel since 2004. The trend itself can be derived from the public monthly data on the official UN peacekeeping website.

There are three concepts in this variable, namely 'decision', 'participation', and 'UNPKO'. 'Decision' refers/related to foreign policy. Foreign policy is "general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states" (Britannica Academic, 2009). In this research, 'decision' is the result of a thorough coordination between Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defence Ministry, and other relevant governmental institutions that guide state's participation in UNPKO. 'Decision' can be direct, such as the pledge to deploy certain number of troops, and indirect, such as formulation of certain Acts (or other legal documents) as well as bilateral/regional cooperation documents or the rise of military budget, which support the increasing number of the troops deployed.

²¹ in which in the beginning of 2004 the number of personnel deployed was 188 and by the end of 2017 the number is rocketed into 2,688.

‘Participation’ refers to personnel contribution to the UNPKO (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, Daniel, 2008, and Moritz, 2017). The personnel contribution in ‘participation’ can be in the form of military, police and/or civilian contribution. In this paper, this term is interchangeable with ‘troops contribution’. Lastly, ‘UNPKO’ is the “operations involving military personnel, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.” (the UN, 1996: 4).

This research utilized five independent variables, as follows:

1. *Foreign policy goals*; it is a political variable that covers all political purposes of foreign policy that can be furthered by state’s participation in UNPKO, such as gaining national prestige and gaining voice or legitimacy in the UN. For Indonesia, my preliminary assumption is that the candidature for non-permanent seat in the UNSC is a foreign policy goal which Indonesia tries to achieve by participating in UNPKO. Other foreign policy goals might be observed in the data collection process. Data regarding this variable is gained from interviews and analysis on other secondary data sources.
2. *Financial rewards*; it is an economic variable that refers to the compensation incentives received from the UN if a state participates in UNPKO. The benefits of this incentives can reach state, institutional, individual and company level. This variable can be measured by observing the type, amount and frequency of the UN compensation incentives Indonesia has received. Information on this variable is gained through interviews and data observation from relevant ministries.
3. *Interest to contain conflict*; refers to the attention given by state to keep an armed conflict from spreading outside its root. In this research, it is a security variable that refers to state’s goals in containing armed conflicts outside its territory which are considered as threat to national, regional and global peace. This variable is measured by observing whether Indonesia’s perception of ‘peace’ includes containing conflicts which are geographically distant from it. Information on this variable is gained through interviews and observation on Indonesia’s Constitution.
4. *Military advantages*; it is an institutional variable that refers to all military benefits gained by a state’s armed force from participating in UNPKO. The advantages include gaining operational experience, improving interoperability, legitimizing armed forces and preventing military involvement in domestic politics. This variable is measured by

finding out which and how much advantages Indonesia has gained, if any. Information on this variable is gained through interviews.

5. *Goodwill to be a humanitarian state*; it is a normative variable which explains that participation to UNPKO is considered as a way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility as a good UN member state. It is measured by gaining information from interviews and analysing Indonesia's official speeches regarding UNPKO.

IV. 3. Hypotheses Testing

As each hypothesis is directly related to one variable, the hypotheses (which are already mentioned and explained in the previous Chapter) are tested by exploring the causal relations between the dependent variable and particular independent variable.

For Hypothesis 1, the independent variable is *foreign policy goal(s)*. To test this hypothesis, firstly I need to seek whether there are Indonesia's foreign policy goal(s) that can be furthered, directly or indirectly, by participating in UNPKO. The goals are the reflection of the motivations of Political rationale. Therefore, I need to seek whether any inhibitors also exist in the case of Indonesia, and then analyse Indonesia's preference between the inhibitors and the goals (motivations). When Indonesia's preference tends to lean to the motivations (the goals) than the inhibitors, this hypothesis is supported. Indonesia's preference (for this hypothesis as well as for the other four ones) is judged based on the findings gathered from interviews and speeches analysis.

For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable is *financial rewards*. This variable represents the motivation of Economic rationale. To test this hypothesis, I need to seek what kind of financial rewards Indonesia has received and what kind of inhibitors might be present, and then analyse Indonesia's preference. When the financial rewards Indonesia has received are higher than the deploying costs it has to pay, then this hypothesis is supported.

For Hypothesis 3, the independent variable is *interest to contain conflict*. To test the hypothesis, the information on how Indonesia perceives global peace and whether Indonesia feels the need to be involved in other states' conflicts in order to manage them and prevent them from spreading must firstly be gained, as it reflects the motivations of the Security rationale. Then the information is weighed with whether Indonesia decides to be involved in other states' conflicts and to choose a non-UN solution if possible, to see whether this hypothesis is

supported. When Indonesia's preference on the motivations is more dominant, then the hypothesis is supported.

For Hypothesis 4, the independent variable is *military advantages*. To test the hypothesis, I need to seek whether there are advantages for Indonesia's military force by participating in UNPKO, in the forms of those as mentioned in the motivations of the Institutional rationale. These advantages are then compared to the inhibitors of the same rationale, to see which ones are more dominant. If Indonesia perceives that it has a stronger preference for the military advantages it can gain compared to disadvantages, the hypothesis is then supported.

For the last hypothesis, the independent variable is *goodwill to be a humanitarian state*. To test this hypothesis, I need to seek information on how Indonesia positions itself in UNPKO and whether taking duty to fulfil humanitarian responsibility is important for Indonesia. This variable reflects the motivations of Normative rationale. Therefore, it is then compared to the inhibitors (on how Indonesia perceives the reform of UNPKO's mandate and agenda). When fulfilling humanitarian responsibility is important for Indonesia and it has no significant objections on the mandate and agenda of UNPKO (no inhibitors), then this hypothesis is supported.

IV. 4. Data Collection and Analysis

The research digs up as much relevant information as possible, mainly from the government of Indonesia. As the primary tool, Interviews were performed to relevant officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The data expected to be collected from interviewing those institutions was an official, insight information regarding Indonesia's motivations.

All of the interviews were performed in a semi-structured, elite interviewing style with open-ended questions, as that style is the best one to gather the data for this research. Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions provide the possibility for the interviewer to gain a "detail, depth and an insider's perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing" (Leech, 2002: 665). In the elite interviewing style, the respondent is treated as an expert of the topic (Leech, 2002: 663), so the interviewer is opened to any possibilities of gaining new relevant information.

Data triangulation is applied in order to raise the validity of this study. This research analyses all relevant, accessible written information. The focus is in the official statements and speeches of the state's leader, but attention is paid as well to reliable news articles (directly taken from Indonesian media with good reputation and/or news from official websites of the government).

As mentioned earlier, this research deploys congruence method in analysing the data. It is the most relevant and suitable methodology for this case study, as it supports study which "begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome" (George & Bennet: 2005, 181); and I begin with application of the model of Bellamy and Williams' and middle power behaviour to explain the motivation behind Indonesia's increased participation in UNPKO since 2004, in which my predictions are reflected in the hypotheses. With congruence method, I am able to predict the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables, without having to trace causal process that leads from the independent ones. A comprehensive check and explanation is performed in seeing which Bellamy and Williams' rationales fit Indonesia better than the others. After that, a discussion will provide further information on explaining why Indonesia ends up with the decision to increase its participation in UNPKO, by taking into account the theory of middle power behaviour to interpret the findings.

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V. Findings and Discussion

V. 1. Findings

This part elaborates the research findings, which are presented objectively without any interpretation or analysis from the author. The findings are mostly gathered by performing interviews to relevant officials of Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry, although some information is gathered from secondary data source, namely a number of relevant Indonesia's legislations and regulations, as well as high-level speeches and credible news articles. Regarding the interviews, I interviewed seven officials in total (three from the Defence Ministry and four from the Foreign Affairs Ministry). Most of the interviewees I encountered requested to be referred as anonymous, they wished to be referred in this paper as 'diplomats who are in charge of relevant areas' and 'officials of Ministry of Defence'. The only interviewee who does not mind being not anonymous is the Director-General of Defence Strategy of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence.

The findings consist of information on the very main reason of Indonesia's participation, the triggers of increased participation, the decision-making process of participation, the deployment process of the personnel, as well as advantages and disadvantages of participation.

V. 1. 1. Indonesia's Perception on World Peace and UNPKO

The prime source on how Indonesia defines 'world peace' and how it positions itself in international cooperation in peace and security is the Preamble of its 1945 Constitution, which points out that "...in order to form a Government of the State of Indonesia that shall... to contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice..." (Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, pp. 4). Through this paragraph, the founding fathers of Indonesia had legally mandated the government to actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. However, Indonesia did not participate in UNPKO until 1957, it is due to the unstable internal political and economic situation from 1945-1957, in which Indonesia was still struggling as a newly independent state.

For Indonesia, world peace means “international stability”. Depart from the Preamble of its Constitution, Indonesia views world peace in an international sense (not only regional), which means that every conflict in the world must be managed so that an international stability can be achieved. In other words, Indonesia is willing to take part in managing conflicts geographically far from its region in order to make sure that the international stability is maintained. This point of view is as stated during the interviews, by the Indonesian diplomat in charge for international security affairs, and agreed by relevant officials in the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, according to the Director-General of Defence Strategy, Indonesia’s participation in UNPKO is perceived as a concrete reflection of a goal to “actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security”, as mandated in the above-mentioned Preamble.²² UNPKO is not the only instrument to further the goal, as there are other conflict management mechanisms other than the UN (take for instance, ASEAN, as a regional forum in which Indonesia also actively contributes, and the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in the Southern Philippines). However, Indonesia views UNPKO as the most strategic one in addressing conflicts, due to the authority of UN²³ to cover all regions in the world. Therefore, Indonesia has been willingly deployed its troops from time to time, since 1950.

Indonesia’s ideology to contribute to the maintenance of world peace is further reflected in several legal documents regarding deployment of Indonesian peacekeepers. In the Presidential Decree number 85 year 2011 on the Establishment of TKMPP²⁴, Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015 on the Deployment of Indonesian Peacekeepers, Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 05 year 2015 on the Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019, and Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 01 year 2017 on the Revision of the Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019, the importance for Indonesia to contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security places the first and utmost point of the Consideration part.

Furthermore, the Indonesian President, Joko Widodo, has emphasized this ideology several times on his speeches and interviews. The most current one was when President Widodo delivered his introductory remarks on the Working Meeting of the Representatives of the Government of Indonesia with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he mentioned several

²² This point is also legally stated in the Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 01 year 2017, page 5.

²³ In this case, it refers to the authority of the UNSC to decide in which conflicts the UNPKO should operate.

²⁴ The Indonesian Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions; as introduced in the Literature Review.

times that Indonesian diplomats must conduct “a diplomacy that can contribute to world peace and prosperity” (setkab.go.id, 2018).

V. 1. 2. The Trigger to Increase Participation

Even though the main foundation for Indonesia to participate in UNPKO has been already created since 1945 through its Constitution, both officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence agree that the significant increase of troop’s deployment began in the era of the then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (year 2004). Looking at the history of Indonesia’s domestic politics, only since the era of President Yudhoyono that Indonesia was ready to take bigger step on the participation in UNPKO. There are two main factors that has built Yudhoyono’s perspective towards UNPKO, in which he perceives participation in UNPKO is important.

The first factor is his military background. He is a retired General before taking the position as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in 2001-2004 and running his candidature as President of Indonesia for the period of 2004-2009 (and then got elected for the second time for the period of 2009-2014). Peacekeeping is one of his military achievement during his career in the army, as he had been appointed as Chief Military Observer of the UN Peace Forces (UNPF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 (VIVA, 2008). His experience as a former-peacekeeper influences his ideology as the leader of Indonesia at that time. According to the Director-General of Strategic Defence, with his own positive image of UNPKO, Yudhoyono views participation in UNPKO as a strategic field experience for Indonesian army as well as to increase Indonesian military’s leverage, and then he encouraged Indonesia’s military institution to deploy its troop as many as possible.

The second factor is his tendency to put positive image as one of the ultimate goals of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Yudhoyono was ambitious in building a positive image of Indonesia as a helpful, able and cooperative country in international conflict management. The main reason is that Indonesia in the beginning of his presidency in 2004 was a very young democracy²⁵ which struggled to rebuild its identity after having a reputation of an authoritarian state with a lot of human rights violation issues. He views multilateral forum (particularly the UN) as a strategic instrument to build such positive image, and participation in UNPKO is one

²⁵ Before the political reformation of 1999, Indonesia was under the authoritarian regime of Soeharto for 32 years.

of the effective ways to show international forum how Indonesia has become a good citizen of the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).

These factors deeply influenced the decision-making process in Indonesia's foreign policy at that time. Within ten years of his presidency, he created a big leap of Indonesia's participation in UNPKO. First, Indonesia's participation has started to increase from tens to hundred. Second, under his leadership, Indonesia has vowed to deploy 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 so that it will sit in the top-ten troop-contributing states of UNPKO. Second, in 2011, Indonesia has created the TKMPP to make coordination between relevant ministries in deploying Indonesian peacekeepers easier and faster.

Third, in 2012, Indonesia has built the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre (IPSC), which is completed with a peacekeepers training centre, to train its troops and prepare logistics needed accordingly based on the UN standard. The facility is claimed to be the largest in South East Asia, and from time to time is used for bilateral, regional or multilateral joint military (peacekeeping) exercises. With this mechanism, the number of Indonesian peacekeepers



UN Photo/ Eskinder Debebe

Picture V. 1. The then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon delivers a lecture at the IPSC during the opening of the IPSC. Yudhoyono is there on the stage as well. This shows how Yudhoyono perceives UNPKO as important, by establishing the IPSC and inviting Ban Ki-moon himself to the opening.

increased significantly from 201 personnel in the beginning of his leadership in 2004 (which put Indonesia as rank 42nd out of 102 troop-contributing states) to 1,844 personnel in the end of his leadership in 2014 (rank 16th out of 122 troop-contributing states).

As explained by the Director-General of Defence Strategy to the author, when the next president, Joko Widodo, was elected in 2014, he brought a different ideology than his predecessor. If Yudhoyono emphasized positive image building as the main foreign policy goal, Widodo focuses on the economic development; that international cooperation should contribute to the national economy.

He continues Yudhoyono's vision on having 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 for different reasons. As mentioned earlier, Yudhoyono perceives participation in UNPKO as an effective instrument to build a positive image for Indonesia and to provide international experience for Indonesian army. On the other hand, according to the personal interview with an official of the Defence Ministry, Widodo is known as "the president who cares more about economic development than a good image". This is supported by one of his remarks during the Limited Meeting on Nation Branding in 2017, he emphasized that the nation branding should be able to help Indonesia to gain more trade and investment (setkab.go.id, 2017).

Therefore, besides furthering Indonesian ideology to contribute to the world peace, his other motivation to keep sending troops to UNPKO is more likely financial. Also, UNPKO is strategic for Indonesian-made military equipment to be promoted and marketed. The more elaborated explanation on these benefits is provided later in this Chapter. Not only that participation in UNPKO makes the army 'happier' because it gives a better financial situation for the Indonesian peacekeepers individually (because of the monthly financial incentive provided by the UN), which is good for the stability of the civil-military relations.

V. 1. 3. The Decision-Making and Deployment Procedure

The decision-making process to deploy personnel in UNPKO is done through the TKMPP, and through the accordance of the House of Parliament (Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015, Article 4(1)). As elaborated earlier in the Introduction, TKMPP consists of relevant governmental institutions and is mandated to consider and prepare Indonesia's participation in UNPKO. TKMPP provides recommendations and prepare reports to the President (Presidential Decree number 85 year 2011).

The procedure is currently as follows. First, Indonesia receives formal request from the UN that a mission needs a specific number of personnel. Indonesia, like other UN member states, does not have the authority to choose which missions they wish to participate. However, based on personal interview with one of the Indonesian diplomats in relevant area of charge, member states can still do an informal negotiation to which missions they wish to be deployed; even though this negotiation does not always succeed. If that happens, Indonesia would still send its troops as long as the mandates of the missions are in line with Indonesia's ideology and interests. The personnel deployment to the missions is only based on the opening published by the UN itself.

After receiving the request from the UN, TKMPP then analyses it, to see whether Indonesia should and can participate in that mission. Five considerations for Indonesia on whether to deploy its troops or not are: national interests, political consideration, basic principles of the UNPKO (consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except for self-defence), safety and security of the personnel deployed, and the availability of personnel, material, equipment and budgeting supports (Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015, Article 6). In this analysis process, the main factors to consider are whether the mandate of the mission is in line with Indonesia's ideology to maintain stability and protect the world peace, the number of personnel the mission needs (to see how big the mission is), and whether the Indonesian army (and police, in some cases) is ready to provide the number of peacekeepers as requested by the UN.

After concluding Indonesia's position regarding the request, TKMPP submits a recommendation to the President (mostly positive recommendations that Indonesia should participate). If the President agrees and signed a presidential decree to participate, the Defence Ministry will prepare the troops and train them at the IPSC and at the same time prepare the main weaponry system needed as well as other logistics; the Finance Ministry will prepare the budget needed for the deployment costs; and the Foreign Affairs Ministry will confirm and announce Indonesia's pledge to participate.

From this step, the UN will start its procedure, called the UN Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System (UNPCRS). The UN will then send its officials to check the deployment preparation. If Indonesia seems to ready, then a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is prepared and negotiated between Indonesia and the UN. For Indonesia, the content of the MoU is not significantly different from one deployment to another (as every deployment possesses

its own MoU). This is because Indonesia does not have any specific rules of engagement for its peacekeepers, unless for emphasizing that its peacekeepers are neutral and not aggressive. After the MoU is signed, the UN will pay a pre-deployment visit, as a final check before the deployment.

Even though possessing no specific rules of engagement, Indonesia has a clear legal procedure to withdraw its peacekeepers from a mission. According to the Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015, Indonesia is eligible to withdraw its peacekeepers if the mandate of the mission changes, in which if the mandate is not in line with the basic principles of peacekeeping and contradictive with Indonesian ideology (Setiawan, 2015). So far, this withdrawal has never happened.

V. 1. 4. The Advantages of Participation in UNPKO

From the interviews with relevant government officials, UNPKO provides several advantages that Indonesia gains. *First, politically*, by participating in UNPKO, Indonesia can prove itself as a peace-loving state that is eligible for its voice to be heard by sitting as non-permanent member of the UNSC and as a member of UN Peace Building Commission (UNPBC); not to set aside the fact that peacekeeping is an interesting issue that can be used to gain trust and sympathy from Indonesian people. Regarding the image as a peace-loving state, it is emphasized a lot of time during the interview that Indonesia perceives positive international image as an important foreign policy goal. The government believes that participation in UNPKO increases a positive image, not only that Indonesia is supportive on the maintenance of world peace, but also that Indonesian peacekeepers show good performance in the field.

Regarding the legitimacy and voice in the international cooperation, Indonesia utilizes participation in UNPKO as an instrument to be a member of the UNPBC; because one way to be a member of UNPBC is by sitting at the top-five position in UNPKO troop-contributing states. Furthermore, a bigger political advantage of participating to UNPKO is to use it as a strategic instrument to campaign Indonesia's candidacy as the non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020. By actively involved in UNPKO, Indonesia shows the UN member states that "we know our business in maintaining world peace, we know what we are doing, and we take it seriously," therefore Indonesia is eligible to sit in the UNSC. By being

member to UNPBC and UNSC, Indonesia can increase its leverage in international forum and its voice can be heard more.




Figure V. 2. Screenshot taken from the homepage of the official campaign website of Indonesia's candidacy to the UNSC 2019-2020, showing the distribution of Indonesia's peacekeepers in UNPKO. This shows how Indonesia uses participation in UNPKO as a campaign tool.

Regarding peacekeeping as an interesting issue internally, the officials believe that peacekeeping can be a good campaign tool for the presidential candidates to embrace Indonesian army and Indonesian people in general. Peacekeeping, particularly participation in UNPKO, is perceived as “trendy and sexy” that Indonesian troops are deployed abroad and being heroes under the name of Indonesia.

Second, economically, participation in UNPKO is advantageous in three ways: to give opportunity for each Indonesian army deployed in gaining extra income in the form of foreign currency, to provide a way for Indonesian strategic industries in military equipment to join procurements on every mission Indonesia participates, and to promote Indonesian made military equipment to other South-South states.

Regarding the foreign currency received by Indonesian peacekeepers, it is related to the UN reimbursed incentive in which each peacekeeper is paid around one thousand US dollars per month. For a state that is still economically growing like Indonesia, the incentive is beneficial for the peacekeepers to increase their wealth and living standards.

Regarding the procurements in which Indonesian strategic industries join, these small firms provide Indonesian troops with uniform, arms, food supply and military vehicles. This provision is then reimbursed by the UN as one form of its legal incentive. This helps small

Indonesian firms in the military field to survive and increase production. For those Indonesian military industries which provide arms and military vehicles, not only that they enjoy the above-mentioned benefit, but also UNPKO is a strategic way to promote their products to fellow peacekeeping states. So far, Indonesia has actively 'advertise' its arms and military vehicles which are in line with the UN standard to other states which are also troops contributors. The spirit of this promotion is to develop Indonesian military vehicles and arms production as well as enhance cooperation with other developing states in terms of military equipment. However, according to personal interview with a diplomat and another one with an official of Defence Ministry, the promotion of Indonesian-made equipment has not made any successful selling yet so far.

Third, militarily, participation in UNPKO is a good instrument for Indonesian army to gain international experience and to gain extra points for the promotion of their military career. Individually, the international experience gained by Indonesian peacekeepers from sharing best practices with fellow peacekeepers from other states is invaluable. Not only that they can build network from this sharing best practices, the Indonesian military institution also finds this useful as a way to evaluate and improve the quality of Indonesian troops by comparing them with peacekeepers from other states. Furthermore, by improving the quality of Indonesian peacekeepers, Indonesia can increase its opportunity to cooperate with host country and build a good relationship, at least militarily. Also, the better the quality of its peacekeepers, the more Indonesia can invite other troop-contributing states to train in IPSC, which is claimed to be the biggest in South East Asia.

On the other hand, the extra points gained by each peacekeeper for the promotion of his/her military career is something arranged by the Ministry of Defence to increase the enthusiasm for Indonesian army to be deployed in UNPKO. Even though the benefit is perceived as individual benefit, the officials see this as still significantly beneficial. Each peacekeeper will gain military reward after his/her deployment, in the form of extra point to be noted as an individual achievement, depends on his/her military position in the mission. It will significantly help him/her to promote his/her military career faster than others who are not deployed as Indonesian peacekeepers in UNPKO.

V. 1 .5. The (Potential) Disadvantages of Participation in UNPKO

According to the interviews, there are two kinds of disadvantage that Indonesia faces regarding its participation in UNPKO, namely the happening one and the potential one.²⁶ The happening disadvantage that Indonesia faces currently is economic. Due to the US decision to reduce its financial contribution to UNPKO, UNPKO now is facing a difficulty on its budgeting.²⁷ Because of that, the UN Peacekeeping Department rearranged the procedure of troop's deployment. In the past, when UNPKO requested a state to provide troops for a mission, the UN deployed the troops immediately when the state was ready; but now, after a state is ready to provide its troops, it still has to wait for the actual deployment, which can be months in length. This waiting period is called 'standby time' and any costs produced during this period are not reimbursed by the UN.

The problem faced by Indonesia regarding this situation is that its peacekeeper candidates come from different islands of Indonesia. They are mobilized and trained in the IPSC in Sentul, West Java, right after Indonesia pledged its readiness to provide troops for certain missions. The costs of sending them from different parts of Indonesia and their living costs during the standby time are quite burdening economically. There are even times when the government must bring the troops back to their original units (usually outside Java) during the standby time because they are needed in their units. In paper, these standby costs are heavier than the economic advantages Indonesia has gained.

Facing this disadvantage, Indonesia does not reduce, let alone stop, the troop's deployment to UNPKO. Instead, the TKMPP is working on finding a solution so that Indonesia can still gain significant economic advantages from its participation in UNPKO. Besides, according to the diplomat interviewed by the author, the political advantages Indonesia has gained is way more invaluable than the economic disadvantages.

Beside of that factual economic disadvantage, there are two potential disadvantages that Indonesia is concerned of: the reformed mandate of UNPKO and the possibility of its peacekeepers' behaviour that can damage Indonesia's reputation. Let us talk about the reformed mandate of UNPKO first.

²⁶ The (potential) disadvantages above are economic, normative (ideological) and political. No findings encountered for security and institutional disadvantages.

²⁷ Since the US is the biggest financial contributor, this decision to reduce its contribution significantly affects UNPKO.

This mandate reform is a response to the Cruz Report²⁸ which highly-recommends the UNSC to reform the mandates of several UNPKO missions, particularly the ones in Africa, in order to reduce casualties number of the UN peacekeepers and to address the conflicting parties more aggressively.²⁹ The UNSC then decided that some missions, namely MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA, are classified into “Category 5” of peacekeeping which is more robust. That means the mandate allows peacekeepers not to be neutral and to attack the parties if necessary. The effect of this reform is troop-contributing states must change their peacekeepers’ training program from training them to be neutral and protecting civilians into being not neutral, to be “ready to go to a war”, and to be equipped with proper weaponry. Most developing states are concerned with this reform, but the UNSC has already made the decision.³⁰

On this, Indonesia finds it challenging, because its peacekeepers must do more than protecting, which is attacking. Ideologically, Indonesia does not wish to attack a group of people (for example, a rebel group in a host country), only because of the operation’s mandate says so. It would be a bad political investment for Indonesia in the future if the group ends up governing the conflicting country and put Indonesian peacekeepers attack as a negative point of their bilateral relations. Therefore, the government views that it is important for Indonesia to take a very close attention on a mission’s mandates before pledging to deploy its troops. Besides, it is on Indonesia’s Constitution not to support any kinds of colonialization and to be neutral in international interactions. This issue is addressed in the Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 01 year 2017, that Indonesia should be more careful in deploying its troops in certain missions.

The second potential disadvantage is misbehaved peacekeepers that can damage Indonesia’s reputation. This one is not as tricky as the above one. So far, Indonesian peacekeepers in general behave according to the rules. However, the concern remains. To make sure that Indonesian peacekeepers behave correctly, discipline and cultural lessons become a part of their training before being deployed. Furthermore, the Defence Ministry provides a set of rules to punish a peacekeeper who behaves not accordingly and breaking the law. Internationally, Indonesia actively promotes the importance of preventing misbehaved peacekeepers. On the High-Level Meeting on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in New York, 18 September 2017, Indonesia was one of 73 states that signed the initiative. This shows a political

²⁸ A report of the Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, the Head of Mission in MONUSCO.

²⁹ If the parties use force and refuse to negotiate with UN peacekeepers, the peacekeepers must be ready to use force at them as well.

³⁰ Information on this paragraph is compiled from the interviews, observation on the Cruz Report, and an analysis of a writing by Henke (theglobalobservatory.org, 2018).

commitment of Indonesia to prevent the misbehaved peacekeepers, particularly in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse.

V. 2. Discussion

This subchapter is divided into three parts. The first one is the application of Bellamy and Williams' model of rationales into the findings, the second one is the explanation of Indonesia's behaviour interpreted using the theory of middle powers, and the third one links the findings and discussion with previous relevant literature. On the contrary with the previous subchapter, this one mostly consists of the author's interpretation on the phenomenon, based on the findings. Some findings are also briefly mentioned at some points of the discussion to emphasize the context of the analysis.

V. 2. 1. The Application of Bellamy and Williams' Model

There are five rationales in this model, in which every rationale directly related to each variable and hypothesis accordingly.

a. Political Rationale

Foreign policy goals (the motivations to participate) that Indonesia hopes to achieve by participating in UNPKO can be clearly analysed, they are to increase national prestige and to increase its leverage and voice in international forum. The early motivation is to achieve national prestige. What I meant by *early* is the period of Yudhoyono's presidency (2004-2014), in which at that time, according to the findings, Indonesia perceives good international image as necessary and that increasing national prestige is one of the agendas of its foreign policy. Participation in UNPKO is viewed as a strategic instrument to further that goal; to create a positive image in international security cooperation and national prestige as a world-peace loving state. After 2014, building a positive international image and increase national prestige is no longer a priority (even though it is still considered as important), as President Widodo puts more attention in economic development.

What has been consistently present in the presidencies of Yudhoyono and Widodo is the effort to increase Indonesia's leverage and voice in international forum; in fact, it is not only simply present but also increasing. This can be observed from the candidacies of Indonesia as non-

permanent member of the UNSC, for the period of 2007-2008 and 2019-2020, and the membership of Indonesia to the UNPBC.

Let us discuss the candidacies as non-permanent member of the UNSC first. Being a non-permanent member of the UNSC is not only prestigious but also strategic. By sitting there, even though only for one period, Indonesia can increase its role in the maintenance of peace and security, as well as protecting its national interests. It can even take part in deciding the future of each mission in UNPKO and vote for important decisions in the Council. In other words, Indonesia can further its goal to have 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 by ‘taking control’ on the missions, take part in the UNSC to decide whether particular mission needs more troops or even need to be concluded.

For each candidacy, the government of Indonesia usually starts the campaign minimum two years before the election year. Therefore, for the candidacy in the period of 2007-2008, in which the election took place in 2006, Indonesia began to campaign and collect supports from other UN member states at least in 2004 (the start of Yudhoyono’s presidency). It is not a coincidence that Indonesia started to increase its participation in UNPKO at the time when Indonesia began its campaign. By ‘selling’ an image as an actively contributing state to the UNPKO, Indonesia successfully won the election for the period of 2007-2008.

Seen this as a good campaign strategy, Indonesia then uses the same pattern for its candidacy in the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020. Pledging its vision to deploy 4,000 peacekeepers in 2019 is related to this candidacy, which election will be held in June 2018. Indonesia is currently active in promoting its image as a big troop-contributing state as the main campaign instrument. This campaign is more robust than the previous one, it can even be seen in its official campaign website, that most of the content of this online website is Indonesia’s active participation in UNPKO, as illustrated in the Findings.

Observing this pattern, it can be further interpreted that Indonesia sees participation in UNPKO as an effective campaign method to show the world that Indonesia is cooperative in the maintenance of world peace and security, an important characteristic for a non-permanent member of the UNSC. This is supported by the statements of three diplomats I personally interviewed, that by increasing its participation in UNPKO and pledging to have 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019, Indonesia wants the world to see that Indonesia is fully-committed in maintaining world peace and willingly cooperate under the UN framework; the message between the line: Indonesia was (and is) eligible for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.

Another way for Indonesia to have its voice heard is being a member of the UNPBC. As explained in Findings, when a state is positioned in top-five troop contributors of UNPKO, it automatically becomes member of the UNPBC. Being member of UNPBC is politically strategic, because Indonesia can level up its contribution to the maintenance of world peace from only peacekeeping (through participation in UNPKO) to peacebuilding activities. There are several ways for a state to be able to become member of the UNPBC, namely through the election in the UNGA (just like the election of non-permanent members of the UNSC and other UN bodies), directly elected by the P-5, directly elected by the ECOSOC, and automatically elected by being in the top-five troop contributors. Currently, Indonesia is member of the UNPBC, and was elected through the election in the UNGA. Obviously, it will be beneficial for Indonesia to be automatically elected by keep increasing the number of personnel deployed in UNPKO and sits in the top-five rank. That way, Indonesia does not have to prepare a separate candidacy to be UNPBC member, which is costly and takes extra effort.

According to the Findings, there are no other foreign policy goals found that Indonesia tries to achieve through its participation in UNPKO, except the foreign policy goals in terms of increasing national prestige by creating good image and escalating Indonesia's voice in international forum by being member of the UNSC and UNPBC. Therefore, the last motivation of the political rationale, 'to further other foreign policy goals', is not applicable in the case of Indonesia.

Apart from those observed motivations, there are potential inhibitors that must be analysed. In the case of Indonesia, there is no alternative priorities, difficult domestic politics, and exceptionalist way of thinking found. However, there is a small concern on the potential of participation in UNPKO in damaging national reputation. Even though maintaining good international image is not a priority in the era of President Widodo, Indonesia cannot afford damage of its reputation. As elaborated in the Findings, the government is worried that misbehaved peacekeepers can be a possible damaging factor for Indonesia's reputation. However, as each of the interviewee emphasizes that this issue is "not a big deal" because the government can still prevent it and it does not affect the number of troops deployed, it makes Indonesia possesses no significant inhibitors in the political rationale.

As there are no alternative priorities other than UNPKO for Indonesia to contribute to the peacekeeping and conflict management activities in certain areas in the world in which Indonesia is now deploying its troops, the inhibitor 'alternative priorities' of the political

rationale is not applicable. The summary of the presence of motivations and inhibitors under this rationale is as pointed out on the following table.

Political Rationale	
Motivations	Inhibitors
1. National prestige: Present, even though only significant in the 2004-2014.	1. Alternative priorities: n/a.
2. Voice in international affairs/UN: Present, in the form of membership of the UNSC and UNPBC.	2. Exceptionalism: Absent.
3. Further other foreign policy goals: n/a.	3. Difficult domestic politics: Absent.
	4. Damage to national reputation: Present, but not significant.

Table V.1. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Political Rationale

Taking into account the analysis above, and the understanding of Indonesia's preference on those motivations and inhibitors, it can be observed that for Indonesia foreign policy goals that can be furthered by participation in UNPKO exist in the form of gaining national prestige and voice/legitimacy in the UN. The causal relation between foreign policy goals (independent variable 1) and state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (dependent variable) is positive, as Indonesia tends to deploy more troops after 2004 because it perceives that the participation: (1) plays a role in lifting Indonesia's prestige as an actively contributing country to the world peace³¹, (2) is highly contributive in the campaign of Indonesia's candidacy to be a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2007-2008, in which Indonesia was successfully elected by more than 80% of the UN member states³², and (3) gives Indonesia a strategic opportunity to be member of UNPBC automatically without candidacy needed. The positive causal relation is strengthened by the non-significant present of the inhibitors.

It is then concluded that the first hypothesis of *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective instrument to pursue its foreign policy goal(s), state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO* is supported in the case of Indonesia. In other words, Indonesia's perception of its participation in UNPKO as an effective instrument to further foreign policy goals has been motivating the increase of its participation since 2004.

³¹ As the interviewees emphasize a lot of times during the interviews.

³² If Indonesia does not see it as 'highly contributive', it would not use the same strategy for the candidacy for the UNSC non-permanent seat period 2019-2020.

b. Economic Rationale

As elaborated in the Findings, the financial rewards Indonesia gains at the individuals level is highly beneficial. The peacekeepers gain financial benefit by being monthly paid according to the UN incentive payment system, and this is good for their individual wealth. Also, the financial benefit is also gained by the Indonesian firms which produce military logistics (from uniforms to weaponry), as they benefited from the UN procurement incentive system.

However, these financial rewards are not experienced at the national and institutional level. In other words, the deployment does not directly help Indonesia's economic development, nor increasing the annual budget received by the Defence Ministry or Indonesian Armed Forces. It is true that the Indonesian government can make use of the participation in UNPKO as an instrument to promote Indonesian-produced military equipment. Nevertheless, according to the data shown to the author by a relevant official, there is no record of military equipment selling to other troop-contributing states under the promotion framework of UNPKO. Hence, the promotion takes place under the UNPKO circumstances has not been proven financially beneficial yet.

On the other hand, Indonesia has to face the standby costs, the transportation and living costs of Indonesian peacekeepers ready to be deployed but still waiting for the UNSC's decision when to deploy them. Unlike the regular deploying costs, these costs are not reimbursed by the UN. Therefore, these standby costs can be classified as the inhibitor of the economic rationale in Indonesia's case, as it is imposed to the government to pay them all. As the length of the standby time cannot be predicted (it depends on the decision made by the UNSC), the budget spent by the government for the standby costs is also unpredictable; at times it can be lower or higher with the benefit gained by the firms and the peacekeepers.

Even though the observation shows that the participation in UNPKO is not really economically beneficial, as the standby costs can be higher than the financial rewards and that the financial rewards are only enjoyed at the individual and firm level, Indonesia keeps sending their troops to UNPKO. According to one of the officials of Foreign Affairs Ministry, "the political benefits gained by participation in UNPKO is far more valuable than the costs Indonesia has to pay." This is an interesting point that shows that in the case of UNPKO, Indonesia cares more about political gain than economic one, despite President Widodo's perception on nation branding.

The summary of the presence of motivations and inhibitors under this rationale is as presented on the following table.

Economic Rationale	
Motivations	Inhibitors
Financial rewards—states, ministries, militaries, individuals and firms: Present, only at the level of individuals and firms.	Imposes additional costs: Present.

Table V. 2. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Economic Rationale

According to the above analysis, the financial rewards Indonesia experiences is not comprehensively present at all levels. Also, there is no causal relation proven between the financial rewards (independent variable 2) and state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (dependent variable), as Indonesia continues to increase its participation despite of the lack of financial rewards at the level of ministries and militaries and the presence of imposes additional costs that Indonesia must face. The opportunity to promote Indonesian-made military equipment might be viewed as an economic investment for the future (if it is proven effective), but it cannot be counted as financially benefited so far as Indonesia has not made any sells yet from this promotion.

This fact that Indonesia keeps increasing the number of its peacekeepers deployed despite of this financial disadvantage, and as mentioned by the Indonesian diplomat³³ that Indonesia perceives the costs spent are lower than the political advantages gained, shows that the second hypothesis of *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as financially beneficial because of its financial rewards, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO* is not supported. In other words, Indonesia keeps increasing its participation in UNPKO even though it does not perceive the participation as financially beneficial.

c. Security Rationale

Understanding Indonesia's perception of world peace is the first key to understand its interest to contain conflict. Looking at Indonesia's perception of world peace, as elaborated in the Findings, it can be interpreted that Indonesia has the characteristic of being contributive to global peace and tries to prove this by participating in UNPKO. However, it is interesting to note that the legal mandate of 1945 Constitution for Indonesia to actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace has already existed since a long time ago (and Indonesia has always been participating in UNPKO since 1957), but the significant increase of troop's

³³ During the personal interview with the author.

deployment has only started in 2004. In other words, significant attention has been paid to UNPKO only since 2004. This, I argue, is caused by the internal situation of Indonesia.

In order to understand this, it is necessary to draw the line long before 2004. Since its independence (year 1945) until 1965, the internal situation of Indonesia was unstable due to political and economic situation as a new-born country, and the rise and fall of Communism. Then in 1966-1999, Indonesia was under the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto. In this era, the Indonesian army was deliberately involved in domestic politics to maintain the regime; therefore, there was no interest for the government to further the mandate of the 1945 Constitution.

Furthermore in 2000-2003, Indonesia was in another new-born phase as a new democracy, with riots and separatist movements to deal with in several parts of the country. Therefore, in this period of time, the army was fully-occupied to bring back internal stability. Only since 2004, when Indonesia started to get politically stable and that the economy began to develop, it has time to actualize the mandate of the 1945 Constitution to actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace. Therefore, it can be assumed that internal stability is important for a state to contribute externally. Through participation in UNPKO, Indonesia can further its interest to contain conflicts and preserve world stability and order. Therefore, it began to increase its participation.

Regarding the other motivation, namely ‘the will to resolve regional conflicts’, it is not applicable for Indonesia in the time period of 2004-2018. The reason is not that there is no military conflict in the region (South East Asia), but because there are no UN missions take place in South East Asia during that time. Therefore, when Indonesia decided to increase its participation to UNPKO in 2004, the reason was most likely not the will to resolve regional conflicts. For the conflicts in the region, Indonesia plays an active role to manage and resolve them, outside the UN framework; for example, by sending its troops and civilians to the Southern Philippines under the framework of the International Monitoring Team (IMT).

The inhibitor, ‘preference for non-UN solutions’, is also not applicable. According to the personal interview with the official of Defence Ministry, Indonesia is not involved in any other organizations with peacekeeping mechanism, particularly the ones related to those missions Indonesia has participated since 2004. There is conflict management procedure in ASEAN, but ASEAN does not have peacekeeping mechanism and the current conflicts handled by UNPKO are not in South East Asian. The only other peacekeeping mechanism Indonesia involved in is

the IMT, and it is an ad-hoc mechanism led by Malaysia. Indonesia also never acts unilaterally in peacekeeping, even though it acts as a mediator here and there from time to time, whether inside its region or for its fellow South-South countries.

Here is the summary of the presence of each motivation and inhibitor for this rationale:

Security Rationale	
Motivations	Inhibitor
1. Resolve regional conflicts: n/a	1. Preference for non-UN solutions: n/a
2. Contribute to global peace: Present	

Table V. 3. The Motivations and Inhibitor: Security Rationale

According to the analysis above and understanding Indonesia’s preference on the motivations and inhibitor of the security rationale, the interest to contain conflicts exists as Indonesia eagerly contribute to global peace. Indonesia’s perception on global peace also shows that this interest can be widely applied, not to be narrowed by geographical distance between Indonesia and the conflicting areas. The causal relation between the interest to contain conflicts (independent variable 3) and state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (independent variable) is proven positive, as (1) there is no inhibitor presence in this rationale and (2) the primary and secondary sources strongly support Indonesia’s perception that participating in UNPKO is a good way to further its interest to contribute to global peace.

Therefore, the third hypothesis of *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective tool to maintain peace by containing conflicts, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO* is supported. As explained in the finding, Indonesia perceives its participation in UNPKO as an effective and strategic instrument to further its legally mandated interest to maintain world peace (by containing conflicts) in general, even though Indonesia does not have the authority to decide which conflicts it wishes to contain by its participation. Therefore, Indonesia has decided to increase its participation since 2004, when it is ready, and the internal situation is relatively stable.

d. Institutional Rationale

The military benefits that Indonesia has gained are mostly at the individual level. It is whether the Indonesian peacekeepers gain invaluable international experience, or they got promoted after coming back from their deployment, as the Defence Ministry and the Indonesian Armed Forces have rewarding procedure for Indonesian peacekeepers. Further paragraphs in the Finding section show that Indonesia sees internationally experienced peacekeepers as military

assets to gain influence in the region, at least to be able to legitimately invite the neighbouring states to have joint peacekeeping training or workshop on peacekeeping at the IPSC.

The points above can be interpreted further this way. As its personnel are getting more experienced after the deployment and Indonesia becomes a good example of troop-contributing state in terms of the quality of the peacekeepers so that Indonesia can host related events and military exercise, Indonesia is at the same time enjoy the improvement of its military interoperability. As Indonesia is not member of any joint-military international (or regional) organizations, its participation in UNPKO is the most strategic way to improve its interoperability. Military interoperability does not have to be joint-military actions or equipment-sharing. By being able to communicate, interact and share common mandate with the peacekeepers from other troop-contributing states, Indonesia is improving the interoperability of its military personnel.

The more personnel deployed in UNPKO and the more Indonesian-made military equipment used mostly by Indonesian peacekeepers, the more Indonesia can learn and improve its military interoperability. Therefore, increasing the number of personnel deployed is strategic in this perspective. This, at the same time, can be a way for Indonesia to internationally legitimize its armed force without having to be involved in certain war with the consequences of violating international law.

Considering the fact that Indonesia has an unfortunate authoritarian regime experience of Soeharto for around 32 years, I argue that another reason to send the army abroad under the framework of UNPKO is to maintain the status quo of not having its army involved in domestic politics anymore. It is true that there is no explicit finding the author encountered can be directly related to this issue. However, the fact that Indonesian Law no. 34/2004 on the Reform of Indonesian Armed Forces used to be a legal basis for Indonesia to deploy its troops in UNPKO before it formulated a more specific legal basis (see Literature Review, under Overview on Indonesia) speaks more. Also, by understanding the past of Indonesia, particularly during the Soeharto regime, there is a tendency for the government of Indonesia to learn from the past and not letting the army (who are supposed to protect Indonesians) end up being misused a 'tool' for the leader to show his/her power and bring terror and insecurity inside the country.³⁴

³⁴ This situation is relatable to several states, take for example Saddam Hussein's regime who misused his power to control the military to maintain the authoritarian regime.

Looking at the above-mentioned explanation, it is just understandable why the Indonesian government does not possess military antipathy to the UN (at least not in the terms of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict management). When the participation in UNPKO is perceived as advantageous for the military, how can Indonesia military have antipathy towards it? The absence of military antipathy towards UNPKO is also reflected in the MoUs Indonesia has agreed with the UN Peacekeeping Department, in which Indonesia does not require any specific rules of engagement for its deployed troops. It is as if Indonesia believes in the ideology and mandate of the UNPKO. Furthermore, the explanation also answers why the Indonesian military institution willingly provides internal incentives for the personnel who have been deployed in UNPKO. The more peacekeepers deployed, the more advantages Indonesia's military can gain.

The summary of the presence or absence of motivations and inhibitors of this rationale is as shown in the table below.

Institutional Rationale	
Motivations	Inhibitors
1. Gain operational experience: Present.	1. Military antipathy to the UN: Absent
2. Prevent military involvement in domestic politics: Present.	2. No internal incentives for UN peacekeepers: Absent.
3. Improve interoperability: Present.	
4. Legitimize armed forces: Present.	

Table V. 4. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Institutional Rationale

After conducting the analysis above and understanding Indonesia's preference of motivations and inhibitors, it is clear that Indonesia gained a number of military advantages by participating in UNPKO. The causal relation between military advantages (independent variable 4) and state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (dependent variable) is proven positive. As Indonesia enjoys the international operational experience, improvement of the interoperability of its troops, international legitimacy of the armed forces and the prevention of military involvement in domestic politics by participating in UNPKO, the Defence Ministry as the key military institution in Indonesian government's decision-making regarding participation in UNPKO fully supports the increase of Indonesia's participation. This, at the same time, encourages the Ministry to provide internal incentives for Indonesian military personnel who are deployed in UNPKO.

Therefore, the fourth hypothesis, *when participation in UNPKO is perceived as militarily advantageous, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO* is supported.

In other words, Indonesia can clearly feel the military advantages of participating in UNPKO, therefore it decided to increase its participation.

e. Normative Rationale

Normative rationale is slightly different from the other rationales, because according to it, the decision to participate (also to increase the participation) in UNPKO is not only driven by national interests, but also by ideology and goodwill. The findings show that the founding fathers of Indonesia proclaimed in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution that Indonesia supports international peace which is based on several aspects, and one of them is social justice. As the social injustice in the world is reflected mostly in humanitarian issues (Fleurbaey, 2017), it just makes sense that Indonesia tries to be involved in UNPKO because its mandate requires it to deal with humanitarian issues. Therefore, UNPKO is a strategic instrument for Indonesia to further its ideology to contribute in the maintenance of world peace which is based on social justice. By doing this, Indonesia can be a good humanitarian state, as mandated in its 1945 Constitution.

As elaborated earlier in the case selection, and emphasized through the Findings section, Indonesia perceives international organizations as important instruments to cooperate with other like-minded states. Indonesia itself is currently member of more than 200 international organizations in the world. With its bodies and subsidiary organs, the UN can be seen as the most comprehensive and biggest international organization. Based on this perspective, Indonesia would pay a lot of attention to be involved in the cooperation under the UN framework and support the UN system, as participation in the UN (in any form) can be perceived as directly or indirectly beneficial for Indonesia, whether to further its interests or ideology. Regarding the participation in UNPKO, Indonesia's participation is then in line with this perspective. As Indonesia supports the UN system, the more troops deployed in the UNPKO, the more support it can show to the UN system.

However, this support in the form of participation in UNPKO, can be reluctantly be furthered if Indonesia feels the discomfort as elaborated earlier. The findings provide no evidence of Indonesia's discomfort with the normative agenda of the UNPKO. However, there are concerns from the government of Indonesia regarding the robust mandate of some peacekeeping missions, that active and aggressive Indonesian peacekeepers can be a backlash in the future relations between Indonesia and the host country. The concerns raised by the government is a

reflection of discomfort feeling towards the robust peacekeeping mandate. However, before jumping into conclusion that Indonesia will be more likely to decrease its participation in UNPKO because of the concern, it is important to understand the degree of discomfort Indonesia is experiencing at the moment.

According to the personal interview the author has conducted, Indonesia views this reformed mandate of UNPKO as “challenging”, as it would not only breach the ideology of Indonesia to protect stability and maintain world peace but also be a malign political investment in the future relationship with the host country. Even though the Indonesian government addresses this robust peacekeeping mandate as concerning, there are no signs that Indonesia will withdraw or decrease the troops deployed in UNPKO; only that Indonesia would take a closer look on each mission’s mandate before deciding to deploy the troops.

From this, it can be interpreted that the robust mandate of UNPKO will not significantly affect the decision of Indonesia to reduce its participation in UNPKO. It will, of course, affect Indonesia to decide to not participate in certain missions (by not answering the request of the UN to provide troops for those certain missions). However, in the bigger picture, Indonesia’s support to the UNPKO will be the same, reflected by the eagerness shown by Indonesia to increase its participation even though it might choose to participate more in certain missions and participate less in other missions. Also, the number of missions with robust mandates are not as many as the ones with traditional mandate.

On the other hand, no ‘discomfort with normative agenda’ is found in the case of Indonesia. The table below presents the summary of the motivations and inhibitors of this rationale:

Normative Rationale	
Motivations	Inhibitors
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Good Samaritan/Humanitarian: Present 2. Support UN system: Present 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discomfort with normative agenda: n/a. 2. Discomfort with ‘robust’ peacekeeping: Present

Table V. 5. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Normative Rationale

After understanding Indonesia’s preference of those motivation and inhibitors, Indonesia possesses a goodwill to be a humanitarian state; it is not only legally mentioned in its Constitution but also emphasized in related legal documents and official speeches of the President. This goodwill to be a humanitarian state (independent variable 5) is proven to have a positive causal relation with state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO

(dependent variable), as it is claimed as Indonesia's main purpose to increase the number of the troops deployed. The presence of discomfort with robust peacekeeping agenda does not significantly influence the positive causal relation, as proven by solution that the Indonesian government has provided by carefully considering a mission's mandate before deploying the troops. This is a fair solution, as Indonesia can simply reduce or withdraw its peacekeepers if there is concern from the government regarding the mandate, but Indonesia chooses not to do that.

Therefore, the last hypothesis of *When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility under the UN system, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO* is supported. It can be concluded that Indonesia believes that the UN system has made UNPKO an effective tool to further its national ideology to contribute to social justice in the form of humanitarian responsibility. Despite of its presence, the discomfort with robust peacekeeping mandate does not influence much on this decision because currently it is only at the small degree which still can be handled by the government by being more careful in responding the UN's request to deploy troops in certain missions.

V. 2. 2. Indonesia's Behaviour in UNPKO as Explained by Middle Powers Theory

After conducting an analysis towards the findings by applying Bellamy and Williams' model of rationales, it can be concluded that four out of five hypotheses proposed are supported. Indonesia's motivations to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 are political (to further its foreign policy goals), security (to further its interest to contain conflicts), institutional (to gain military advantages for its armed forces), and normative (to further its ideology in the world humanitarian issues). The only hypothesis which is not supported is regarding economic motive. According to the analysis, Indonesia's increased participation is not proven to be driven by economic motive, as Indonesia has not gained significant financial gains from its participation (except for the individual financial rewards which the peacekeepers receive). On the contrary, Indonesia must prepare 'extra budget' on its national budgeting plan to arrange the standby time of its peacekeepers. And yet, Indonesia keeps increasing its participation despite of this economic disadvantage.

Among the four proven hypotheses, I argue that the most dominant ones are those related to political and institutional motives. During the interviews, the interviewees keep emphasizing

the political motives (on how Indonesia perceives its participation as a good investment to achieve its political goals, particularly increasing national prestige and membership in the UNSC and PBC) as well as military advantages (that the participation gives direct benefits to Indonesian military institution, to enhance the quality of each personnel and the quality of Indonesian military in general). The arguments from both officials of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Defence Ministry are in line, so that the message is clear that these political and institutional motives are Indonesia's prime motives to participate. This is supported by the speeches of the President, Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry, as well as news sources which are already mentioned in the Findings, that reflects Indonesia's political and institutional motivations in its participation in UNPKO.

This, however, does not understate the security and normative motives. Those two are still essential for Indonesia, because they are legally mandated in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. Therefore, it will always be the basic foundation for Indonesia's participation in UNPKO. The political and institutional motives are the dominant ones for this case (period of 2004-2018), because they change from time to time. A state might behave differently in different times, which causes shifting in their priority foreign policy goals and what important for their military power.

In the case of Indonesia since 2004, the political and institutional motives to participate in UNPKO are driven by Indonesia's status as an emerging middle power. As elaborated in Literature Review and Methodology sections of this paper, other states as well as academicians put the emerging middle power status onto Indonesia since it begins to show development in terms of economy, active role in regional diplomacy, and cooperation under international organizations. The development is supported by the characteristics Indonesia has, from its historical background as former-colony to its successful experiences in dealing with inter-religious groups' conflicts and separatism groups in its territory. Indonesia perceives this emerging middle power status the world has given to it as an acceleration of its status in international politics.

For Indonesia, being a middle power is prestigious, and it motivates Indonesia to try playing a more important role in the world. As stated by its Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, that Indonesia "will play a role as a middle power... and will remain to contribute and take an important role in maintaining world peace and security," (Setiawan, 2015).³⁵ The status as

³⁵ Public statement from the Foreign Minister after her first speech in 2015.

middle power is also mentioned in every national legal basis of Indonesian peacekeepers deployment, that by participating in UNPKO, Indonesia is trying to escalate its global role through ‘middle power diplomacy’, in which Indonesia views itself as a “regional power with a selective global involvement”.

This behaviour of Indonesia is in line with the proposed central argument of this paper, that the status as middle power influences a state’s behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their role in international politics. The proposed argument that the motivations for Indonesia to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 are affected by each one of the rationales, even though some rationales might be more dominant than the others is also half-supported by the findings. Even though it turns out that Indonesia does not possess strong economical motive under its participation in UNPKO since 2004, some rationales are indeed more dominant than the others. Also, its status as middle power and the relatively stable political and security situation (internally and regionally) do influence Indonesia’s decision to participate more to UNPKO.

Looking at this argument through the political motives, Indonesia’s status as a middle power drives it to perceive positive image as necessary in international politics. As it does not have sufficient material power to be hegemons, middle powers like Indonesia perceive national prestige and positive image as elements of non-material power which are important for them in interacting with other states. The state feels the need to reassure its importance in international affairs, have its voice heard and gaining influence (Holbraad, 1984: 203). Middle powers are “especially keen to reaffirm their status and identity and are therefore particularly sensitive to prestige and image issues which might be advanced through peacekeeping” (Bellamy and Williams, 418). For Indonesia, the interest to achieve national prestige, positive image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are reflected as foreign policy goals which are pursued through its participation in UNPKO. This explains how its status as middle power influences Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO, in the perspective of political rationale.

In terms of institutional motive, even though usually has an active foreign policy, a middle power at certain points can make decision based on its domestic reasons (Holbraad, 1984: 7). In the case of participation in UNPKO, Indonesia considers internal aspect in terms of military advantages. It perceives its participation as an instrument to achieve internal military

advantages for its military institution, such as gaining operational experience, improving interoperability, legitimizing armed forces and preventing the military to involve in domestic politics. Also, even though more likely internal, the motive to gain military advantage can be perceived as a way for Indonesia to accelerate its image as a militarily experienced state, albeit the experiences are non-war ones.

For the other two rationales which exist but not as dominant as political and institutional ones, my interpretation is as follows. A middle power is a supporter of international organizations and almost always don a “moral mantel” in its foreign policy acts (Holbraad, 1984: 70, 205). It tries to create balance and assist other states through cooperation in international organizations. Humanitarian issue is one of the issues perceived important for a middle power. This is why, in the perspective of normative motive, Indonesia is eager to increase its participation in UNPKO.

On the other hand, in the perspective of the security motive, middle powers are known for their roles as mediators between two conflicting parties and active in “peacekeeping under United Nations auspices” (Holbraad, 1984: 71). Not only that middle power plays active role in the region (to contain conflicts and maintain peace), it also has a tendency to act together with other middle powers and perform collective security in maintaining to global peace (Holbraad, 1984: 4, 68, 69). This characteristic reflects Indonesia as an emerging middle power. Perceiving participation in UNPKO as a strategic way to contain conflicts, Indonesia decides to increase its participation.

To conclude, all of the supported hypotheses are in line with the middle power theory, as those hypotheses reflect the known characteristics of middle powers explained in the literature.³⁶ Also, according to what I have encountered, no middle powers theory argues about the how middle powers perceive the importance of financial advantages of their actions in international cooperation. Therefore, I interpret from the analysis of Hypothesis 2, that even though middle powers (just like any other states, realistically) might look for direct economic advantages from its cooperation in international forum, these advantages are not always the priority, as there are a number of other priorities that must be fulfilled, such as protecting national image and furthering foreign policy goals.

³⁶ Information on this is provided in Theoretical Framework.

V. 2. 3. Relations with Previous Literature

The result of this study shows confirmations as well as contradictions with previous case studies which are mentioned in the Literature Review. Looking at the result general,³⁷ the realist argument that a state only participates when the participation is in line with its national interests³⁸ is confirmed by this study. Although the realist argument does not specify what kind of interests a state can further by participating in UNPKO, the result of this case study which shows that Indonesia participates in order to further its foreign policy goals and its interest to contain conflict, as well as to gain military advantages, confirms that Indonesia does participate in order to protect its national interests. This, at the same time, confirms the argument by the public good theorists that a state participates in UNPKO to gain benefits of the impure public good provision.³⁹ The result shows how Indonesia perceives its participation in UNPKO as beneficial, so the argument is confirmed.

Looking at the result specifically, the most confirmed argument is the military one, which points out that state participates in UNPKO in order to gain military advantages in the form of personnel's experience⁴⁰ and prevention of military forces to be involved in domestic politics⁴¹. The second confirmed argument is that state participates in UNPKO to increase its leverage and build positive national image.⁴² The argument which points out that state participates to further its ideology to be involved in humanitarian issues⁴³ is also confirmed in this study, as it is found that Indonesia participates not only to protect its national interests but also to further its ideology to contribute in social justice issues.

On the other hand, there is a contradictive result between this study and Cook (2014) and Capie (2016); and all use Indonesia as the case. The result of this case study points out that Indonesia does not participate in UNPKO for economic reason, that the participation is not financially advantageous for Indonesia (even though it might be beneficial for the peacekeepers individually) because it has to pay for the standby costs which are unpredictable in terms of length of time and it is not covered under the UN incentive reimbursement system. The previous studies by Cook and Capie do not analyse the weighing between the standby costs

³⁷ Not specifically pointing out one rationale.

³⁸ Neack (2013).

³⁹ Bellamy and Williams (2013).

⁴⁰ In line with Cook (2014), Capie (2016), Velazques (2010), and Khrisnasamy (2003).

⁴¹ In line with Velazques (2010) and Khrisnasamy (2003).

⁴² Also elaborated by Cook (2014) and Khrisnasamy (2003).

⁴³ Khrisnasamy (2003).

and the financial benefits, as it only mentions several financial benefits that Indonesia has gained by participating.

Moreover, there are two arguments from previous literature are not applicable to this case study. The first one, the liberalist argument which argues that democracies participate more than non-democracies because they tend to use UNPKO as an instrument to spread democratic values,⁴⁴ is not found in this case study. Even though Indonesia is a democracy, no evidence shows that Indonesia participates in UNPKO to spread certain values, particularly democratic values. Also, the methodology of this study is not suitable to test the argument, because this is a within-case study, not a comparative case study or large-N study where the author can compare which state participate more than the others and why. The second argument that is not applicable is the one raised in the comparative case study of China and Japan, which concludes that both states use UNPKO as a tool to accelerate their prestige and good image from 'frustrated great powers' into 'legitimate great powers'.⁴⁵ This argument is irrelevant because even though Indonesia does try to gain positive image and national prestige by participating in UNPKO, Indonesia is identified as middle power, not a great power. Also, no results indicate that Indonesia is trying to accelerate its status from middle into great power.

Beside those confirmed and contradictive results and arguments, the study contributes to the literature by raising several issues that are not mentioned in previous studies, namely the membership at the UNSC and UNPBC, the notion of robust peacekeeping mandate, the military interoperability and legitimacy of the armed forces, and the extended analysis using middle powers theory. The first one, Indonesia's candidacies for the UNSC (period of 2007-2008 and 2019-2020) and its automatic membership in UNPBC if it is in the top-five contributor rank are the concrete reflection of how Indonesia can gain political advantages (directly and indirectly) by participating in UNPKO. Even though these issues are typical (not only relatable to Indonesia) these are missed in the previous studies of Indonesia, as well as the case studies on other states.

The notion of robust peacekeeping mandate as the reformation of UNPKO is also missed to be discussed in previous studies, although this is not a new issue as it is a part of the bigger picture of the UN reform; in which developing states are trying to fight for; for the better and fairer UN. It means that this issue does not only concern Indonesia, but also a lot of developing states

⁴⁴ Daniel (2008).

⁴⁵ Suzuki (2008).

which are also troop-contributing states to UNPKO. The military interoperability and legitimacy of the armed forces is also a new issue brought by this case study. The previous studies do not touch upon these when analysing military advantages.

The decision for this case study to use middle power theory to further interpret the results is also something new, as the previous studies that I encountered conclude at pointing out one or two (or sometimes three) aspects that cause a state to participate in UNPKO. I can say that this case study is more comprehensive because it ties the findings together to explain the phenomenon in a bigger picture, that all of Indonesia's behaviour regarding UNPKO is affected by its status as middle power.

There are limitations of this study. In terms of data collection, it would be more eligible if it consists of a visit to the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre to interview peacekeepers on training as well as interview with Indonesian National Police.⁴⁶ If this case study had extra information from those sides, the discussion would be more fruitful. Now, the analysis only covers military personnel's deployment, and leaving aside participation of Indonesian Police and civilians as peacekeepers in UNPKO.

⁴⁶ As the number of Indonesia's Police personnel deployed as peacekeepers is also growing.

VI. Conclusion

Raising a topic of motivations behind states' participations in UNPKO and selecting Indonesia as the focus of the study, this paper proposed a research question of *What motivates state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO?*⁴⁷ The topic, case and research question were carefully formulated after a thorough review of previous literature. It was found that previous researches tended to address the phenomenon one-dimensionally (sometimes two or three), which created a gap in comprehensively understanding a government's decision-making process to participate (and increase its participation) in UNPKO. There was no research encountered that viewed this phenomenon multi-dimensionally, therefore no comprehensive understanding gained on what actually motivates a state to participate in UNPKO. Reflecting from this, this case study offered a more inclusive analysis on state's motivation to participate more in UNPKO.

What is meant by 'more-inclusive' is that this study viewed the phenomenon multi-dimensionally by applying the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams, which consists of five rationales behind state's decision to participate in UNPKO. The rationales are political, economic, security, institutional and normative. The theory of middle powers was also utilized in order to further the understanding towards this phenomenon, by interpreting the application of Bellamy and Williams' model using that theory.

This study argued that the status as middle power influences a state's behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their prestige in international politics. The motivations in all Bellamy and Williams' rationales support what is important for a middle power.

Five hypotheses were proposed, to see the causal relations between the dependent variable of 'state's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO' and five independent variables ('foreign policy goals', 'financial rewards', 'interest to contain conflicts', 'military

⁴⁷ It was then refined into "What has been motivating Indonesia's decision to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004?" in order to fit the case selection.

advantages’, and ‘goodwill to be a humanitarian state’). Those hypotheses and variables reflected Bellamy and Williams’ model of rationales.

The research question was answered by performing a within-case study with congruency method. The research was performed by conducting data collection and analysis. Data collection process consisted of interviews with seven officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry, as well as analysis of secondary source of information (official high-rank speeches, relevant laws and reliable news articles). The findings were then analysed by applying the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams to reveal the causal relations between the dependent variable and each independent one. The result of this process was interpreted by using middle powers theory.

After conducting the analysis, it was found that state motivations to participate in UNPKO are political (to further foreign policy goals), security (to contain conflicts from spreading), institutional (for the military institutions to gain military advantages), and normative (to further ideology to be good humanitarian state). It was also found in this case study that there is no strong economic motive, in which state keeps sending its troops to UNPKO even though the participation is not financially beneficial. State chooses to still participate because it perceives that the political and military benefits from participating as more invaluable than the economic disadvantage it must face.

Furthermore, interpreting from the interviews and other secondary data analysis, it was found that the presence of political and institutional rationales is more dominant than other rationales. The political and institutional motives to participate in UNPKO are driven by status as an emerging middle power. In political motives, this status urges state to perceive positive image as necessary in international politics. For middle power, the interest to achieve national prestige, positive image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are reflected as foreign policy goals which are pursued through its participation in UNPKO. In terms of institutional motive, even though usually has an active foreign policy, a middle power at certain points can make decision based on its domestic reasons (Holbraad, 1984: 7). In the case of participation in UNPKO, state considers internal aspect in terms of military advantages. Also, even though more likely internal, the motive to gain military advantage can be perceived as a way for state to accelerate its image as a militarily experienced state, albeit the experiences are non-war ones.

For the other two rationales which exist but not as dominant as political and institutional ones, the interpretation was that middle power tries to create balance and assist other states through cooperation in international organizations. Humanitarian issue is one of the issues perceived important for a middle power. Therefore, in the perspective of normative motive, a middle power is eager to increase its participation in UNPKO. On the other hand, in the perspective of the security motive, middle powers are known for their roles as mediators between conflicting parties. Perceiving participation in UNPKO as a strategic way to contain conflicts, state decides to increase its participation.

This behaviour is in line with the proposed argument of this study, that the status as middle power influences a state's behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their role in international politics. The proposed argument that the motivations to increase its participation in UNPKO are affected by each one of the rationales, even though some rationales might be more dominant than the others is also half-supported by the Findings. Even though it turned out that state does not possess strong economical motive under its participation in UNPKO since 2004, some rationales are indeed more dominant than the others. Also, status as middle power and the relatively stable political and security situation (internally and regionally) influence state's decision to participate more to UNPKO.

The study contributed to the literature by raising the issues of: state's candidacy and membership in the UNSC and UNPBC, the standby time and its costs, the notion of robust peacekeeping mandate, the military interoperability and legitimacy of the armed forces, and the extended analysis using middle powers theory. The study should have approached other relevant government institutions, namely the National Police and Peace and Security Centre. If this case study had extra information from those three sides, the results would be more fruitful. Now, the analysis only covers military personnel's deployment, and leaving aside participation of Police and civilians as peacekeepers in UNPKO. This limitation can be a reflection for future case studies in this topic. A way more comprehensive analysis on the deployment of military personnel, police and experts (civilians) in UNPKO will contribute more to the literature.

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Appendix

This is the excerpt from the interviews performed during data collection process. I arranged this excerpt based on the questions asked, not by the interviewees, because some questions (and answers) are redundant. It is also safe to do this because no answers are contradictive to one another, they are either similar answers or complementary. For the same reason, just because I mentioned in this excerpt that an answer is provided from one of the Ministry (MD or MFA), does not mean that the other Ministry does not have opinions on the issue. To make everything compact, I chose the most comprehensive statements among those officials, because the essence of their answers is pretty much the same.

This excerpt might not be able to cover everything mentioned in Findings and Discussion chapter, because it would be too long to attach them here. However, I choose the most highlighted issues.

Notes:

MFA: Official(s) from the Foreign Affairs Ministry

MD: Official(s) from the Defence Ministry (including the Director-General of Defence Strategy).

1. What does ‘international peace’ mean to Indonesia?

- **MFA:** “For Indonesia, the meaning of international peace can be referred to the 1945 Constitution: ‘to be contributive in the maintenance of the world peace’. Our founding fathers at that time were already aware to involve Indonesia in maintain the stability of the world order. Indonesia sees UNPKO as a way to maintain the stability, particularly in areas of the world which armed conflicts are already started.”
- **MD:** “International peace means international, not regional. One conflict in a far-away place, for example Africa, can spread and directly or indirectly affect other parts of the world, even to Indonesia. That is why it is necessary to contain armed conflicts. For Indonesia, UNPKO is currently the effective way to contain conflicts and maintain stability. For example, UNIFIL maintains stability of the relationship between Lebanon and Israel and MINUSTAH maintains stability between the rebel group and the government.

2. In what ways Indonesia contribute to the maintenance of international peace?

- **MD:** “We can classify the contribution into UNPKO and non-UNPKO. Within UNPKO, Indonesia contribute by supporting the UN system of peacekeeping and at the same time build cooperation with fellow peacekeepers from other countries by sharing best practices. Also, [by contributing through UNPKO participation] Indonesia can start peace and security cooperation with host country, for example by helping the national police of the host country to provide internal security. Outside

UNPKO, Indonesia is active in regional cooperation under ASEAN (through ASEAN Regional Forum) and the ad-hoc IMT in the Southern Philippines.”

- **MFA:** “The main focus is through international organizations, and UNPKO is the biggest. Besides, Indonesia also actively get involved in conflict management bilaterally. It does not necessarily have to be armed conflict. For instance, a few years ago when Iran and Arab Saudi experienced conflict, Indonesia sent its Foreign Affairs Minister to offer mediation between them. Indonesia was one of the first countries offering the help. This is to show the world that Indonesia wants to be seen as a helpful country in conflict management, does not matter whether the conflict is near of far geographically.”

3. What does participation in UNPKO mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy?

- **MFA:** “Seeing it through the political lens, we see that this participation as a political statement from Indonesia as a middle power. We are proud of the status as middle power because it means that our identity is ‘leveled-up’ from the rest of the developing countries, and we are maintaining it. We are now conducting middle power diplomacy. Please take a look at legal documents on our participation in UNPKO, it is openly mentioned there. More participation means more legitimacy to hold onto that status.”

4. What advantages does Indonesia gain from being in the top-ten rank of troop-contributing states?

- **MFA:** “First, image-wise, the participation is proven good to increase status and good image as a helpful country in conflict management and peacekeeping. Second, economy-wise, the peacekeepers gains [US] dollars from participating, which is good for his/her individual and family wealth. Also for the small firms that provides parts for military equipment and weaponry, because when you deploy troops, you provide the equipment by yourself. Third, military-wise, [the participation is] good for building a strong and positive military image that Indonesian military has good performance; and the peacekeepers get international military experience which is good for his/her career.”
- **MFA:** “Aside from that, economically, the participation might have something else for Indonesia. It’s a ‘might’ because it depends on how we look at it. By using our own military equipment and weaponry, we can at the same time use our peacekeepers as a marketer to ‘advertise’ those. Indonesia promotes its equipment and weaponry to other troop-contributing countries. In the promotion we try to convince them that not only Indonesia’s equipment and weaponry are UN-standard products, but also that it is better if they buy Indonesia’s products in ‘friendly’ price instead of keep renting equipment and weaponry from developed countries. Most of the troop-contributors rent their equipment and weaponry from developed countries, such as the UK. However Indonesia has not gained anything yet from this promotion.”
- **MFA:** “It enhances Indonesia’s role in international organizations. Indonesia is now in the top-ten rank [of troop-contributing countries]. Later if Indonesia managed to be

in the top-five, Indonesia will be automatically a member of UNPBC. No candidacy, no election needed. Also, it is a good campaign tool for Indonesia's candidacy in the UNSC."

5. How does Indonesia perceive possible disadvantages of sending its troops to UNPKO (damage on national reputation)?

- **MD:** "Indonesia's peacekeepers are known for its good performance. There are indeed a small number of problematic peacekeepers, but we handle it quickly. The way we handle our problematic peacekeepers is respected by the UN. Indonesia also has a preventive act by including culture and moral lessons in the pre-deployment training program."
- **MFA:** "Indonesia is involved in the High-Level Meeting of Violence Act last September, you better check it later, because in the Meeting, one of the discussions was violence by peacekeepers. This act of Indonesia shows a serious commitment in handling problematic peacekeepers.

There is actually another possible disadvantage which is more significant for Indonesia: the standby period. Because of the reduced financial contribution from the USA, now the UNPKO has a 'standby mechanism' in which peacekeepers who are ready to be deployed after the pre-deployment training cannot be directly send to their missions. The UN deploys peacekeepers when it is financially ready. Hence there is now a gap between after-training time and deploying time, called the standby period. In this period, the peacekeepers are 'stranded' in IPSC, waiting to be called by the UNPKO. It can take months, and during that period, Indonesia must finance their living costs—and sometimes transportation costs when they wait too long and need to go back to their units because the units need more personnel; and these costs are not reimbursed by the UN. We keep increase the participation anyways, because the political benefits gained is far more valuable than the costs Indonesia has to pay." *[Interviewee shows me a file, which I cannot share publicly, that shows the amount of costs Indonesia must face—bigger than the financial advantages gain.]*

6. How do you relate Indonesia's participation in UNPKO with its candidacy as a non-permanent member of UNSC?

- **MFA:** "Indonesia is currently running for a candidacy as non-permanent member of the UNSC. This is the priority candidacy for Indonesia right now. Active participation in UNPKO increases Indonesia's chance to win the election, because it shows Indonesia's credibility to the maintenance of peace and security under the UN system. It is like we are saying to the UN member states that 'we know our business, we know what we are doing, and we take it seriously. This will work, as it worked several years ago during Indonesia's previous candidacy in the UNSC.'"
- **MFA:** "We are showing our commitment to the maintenance of peace by participating more and more to the UNPKO. The UNSC, as well as the UN member states, can see that Indonesia's participation are not only great in terms of number but also quality, because some of our peacekeepers have strategic military positions in their missions.

By proving this commitment, Indonesia promotes itself to be the non-permanent member of the UNSC. And when Indonesia wins, it will be very beneficial because our voice in international security affairs will be more relevant.”

7. What does Indonesia think of the reform of UNPKO?

- **MFA:** “The robust mandate of not only protecting but also attacking is tricky for Indonesia. Ideologically, Indonesia refuses to attack a group only because of instruction from the head of mission. In the end, it is Indonesian peacekeepers who perform the attack, despite of the blue helmet they are wearing. If someday the group ends up leading the conflicting country, it becomes a disadvantage for Indonesia because it can destroy the relationship between Indonesia and that country. It will be silly if Indonesia has problem in the future because of its current effort to maintain world order. This, however, does not make Indonesia withdraw its peacekeepers or stop sending them. Indonesia is now carefully considering the mandate of each mission before pledging its deployment, just to make sure that the mandate is not contradictory with our ideology.”

8. Most of the top-ten troops contributing states are from the Third World, how does Indonesia accept that while on the other hand it tries to elevate its status as a big state which plays important role in regional and international politics?

- **MD:** “It does not matter, especially considering the positive points we have discussed. Indonesia has a vision of deploying 4,000 peacekeepers in 2020, Indonesia needs to focus on that. Also, being known at the same status as Third World countries is not a problem, as long as Indonesia can be a good UN member states. No need to be ashamed or want to be different.”
- **MD:** “This should not be a concern for Indonesia. Peacekeeping is a trendy and sexy issue externally and internally. Externally, it helps Indonesia increase its image as a good UN member, internally it is something that can be used for politicians to gain sympathy of Indonesian people. Also, the army is enthusiast on being deployed in UNPKO, not only because of the international experience they can gain but also the extra dollars they can get.

9. Could you explain the decision-making process of Indonesian troop deployment in UNPKO?

- **MD:** “After the UN announces the request for the member states to deploy troops in certain mission, the TKMPP will study the mandate of the mission and analyse the importance of Indonesia to participate in the mission. If the TKMPP reaches to a conclusion that Indonesia should participate, a recommendation will be submitted to the President. If the President approves TKMPP’s recommendation, he will sign a Presidential Decree for Indonesia to participate, so that the Defense Ministry, National Police and other relevant institutions can prepare the personnel and the pre-deployment training, the Finance Ministry prepares the budgeting (every cost is paid by Indonesia

first, the UN reimburses it later; except for the standby costs), and the Foreign Affairs Ministry announces Indonesia's pledge to send its troop to the UN. The UN, under the UNPCRS mechanism, will continuously check the personnel's readiness to be deployed. When everything is ready, Indonesia and UN sign an agreed MoU."

- **MD:** "You must note that member state cannot freely choose in which missions it wants to deploy troop. Everything depends on the requests from the UN. We can do informal lobby to get certain mission, but it does not always work, but Indonesia is fine with that as long as the mandate is in line with our Constitution."

10. How does the military institution feel on the decision to increase of Indonesia's participation in UNPKO?

- **MD:** "We fully-support the decision because this is beneficial for the army. At glance, you may think that the benefits the army gain is only felt individually, which is when the Indonesian peacekeepers gain international military experience and networking. But it's more beyond that. By sending the peacekeepers, completed with Indonesia's own equipment and weaponry, we can see and compare the ability of our army with the other troop-contributing states. We can also learn from them. The more personnel sent, the more Indonesia can learn. Also, the participation caused the establishment of IPSC, we could not be prouder of it because it is the largest one in South-East Asia, and peacekeepers from other states come to our training centre to train. In short, the participation is positive for Indonesia's military development and to show the world that Indonesian military is professional.

11. Why do you think participation in UNPKO is beneficial for each troop deployed?

- **MD:** "Because at least the peacekeeper will get three individual benefits. First, extra income in USD. Second, invaluable international experience. Third, internal military rewards; after they finish their deployment, they gain points that is recorder by our Human Resources Division. The points will significantly help them to accelerate their careers, either simply getting promoted, being deployed again but with higher positions, or getting chosen to be Indonesian military attachés in some countries.
