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Wartime Sexual Violence: the Missing Link in Successful Peacebuilding?

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List of Abbreviations

LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

Chapter 1. Introduction

The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to prevent the resurgence of war, ensure sustainable peace and security, and restore trust within communities and institutions (Diehl and Balas, 2014; Lambourne, 2009; von Hehn, 2011). In order to do so, it is imperative that we understand the factors that can impede post-conflict reconstruction, including the aftermath of such type of factors, and learn how to mitigate their impact. In this regard, scholars have investigated a large pool of both endogenous and exogenous elements that can affect peacebuilding success, notably, *inter alia*: ethno-cultural identity, natural resource availability and dependence, democratization process, and international aid (Aitken, 2007; Green, 2015; Ottaway, 2007; Pouligny, 2005). For example, Aitken (2007, p. 263) argues that during the peace and institution-building process, policy-makers should take note of the transformation of identity meaning and salience during and after a conflict. By applying centripetal principles to institutional design, this avoids incentives for ethnic mobilization in the short-term and may potentially empower the emergence of new identities and political mobilization (*ibid*). Foregoing this recommendation would potentially result in the resurgence of war as polarized ethnic identities become institutionalized, with those dominating larger groups continuing to subjugate smaller groups (*ibid*, p. 262).

Despite the amount of research surrounding peacebuilding, and the factors affecting its success, there is one area that has been critically under-researched: wartime sexual violence. According to Cohen and Nordås (2014, p. 419), sexual violence is comprised of seven key components: (1) sexual slavery, (2) sexual mutilation, (3) sexual torture, (4) rape, (5) forced prostitution, (6) forced pregnancy, and finally (7) forced sterilization and/or abortion. Wartime sexual violence in the framework of peacebuilding has only recently begun to draw attention with the passing of United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1820 (2008, p. 2) which stated: "sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations…may impede the restoration of international peace and security". The resolution also affirmed that responding effectively to the occurrence of sexual violence in conflict "can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security" (*ibid*).

The extant literature on wartime sexual violence has predominantly focused on examining its purpose (Haer, Hecker, and Maedl, 2015), specifically the purpose of rape as a weapon of war during conflict (Maedl, 2011), with some also examining the variation in its pattern of

use during civil wars (Wood, 2009; Cohen, 2013). Other research has tended to focus on the micro and meso-level effects of wartime sexual violence, which include, *inter alia*: the spread of sexually transmitted infections (Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 193), psychological consequences such as depression (Verelst et al., 2014, p. 1139), social ostracism (Dossa et al., 2014, p. 244), and community disintegration (Leiby, 2009, p. 451). What is lacking in this area of research is a systematic study on the effects of sexual violence on the macro-level, particularly on peacebuilding efforts. Research into this area is particularly crucial given that consequences of wartime sexual violence are highly destructive and likely to permeate into and hinder the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Copleon, 1994, p. 256; Vinck et al., 2007, p. 543; Leiby, 2009, p. 451; Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151). Indeed, in comparison to other human rights abuses, the psychological, social, and physical damages as a result of the use of wartime sexual violence continue to pervade long after the end of armed conflict, potentially hampering the ability of societies to rebuild in its wake (Guterres, 2017, p. 7; Cohen, 2013, p. 462; Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266; Vinck et al., 2007, p. 543; Chitsike and Nkuuhe, 2014, p. 48).

Given the great potential for wartime sexual violence to impede peacebuilding efforts, it is puzzling that these two areas of study have not been connected. In order to increase the probability of success of future peacebuilding efforts, and decrease the chance of relapse into conflict, it is therefore imperative that "ways of dealing with wartime sexual violence are incorporated into the policy planning of these [international peacebuilding] operations" (Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 81). Accordingly, this research purports to investigate the explanatory research question: *How does wartime sexual violence affect peacebuilding efforts?* Through the investigation of this research question, this research thus fills a gap in literature – thereby contributing to the scientific discourse of war and gender – as well as aids policy-makers and practitioners in their efforts to build sustainable peace for war-affected societies.

1.1 Overview of thesis structure

This thesis contains six chapters and proceeds as follows: chapter 2 gives an overview of the relevant extant literature on peacebuilding and sexual violence, combined with the theoretical framework guiding the research, and presents the hypothesis to be tested. Chapter 3 gives details about the main research strategy used to investigate the research question and test the proposed hypothesis. Chapter 4 presents and critically analyses the results of the quantitative large-N study by linking the theoretical expectations with the empirical evidence. Chapter 5

presents the chosen deviant case study that is derived from the results of the quantitative research. Finally, chapter 6 contains a summary of the findings and their implications for literature and policy, along with the limitations of this investigation, and explores avenues for potential future research.

Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Peacebuilding

The term 'peacebuilding' is often conflated with a variety of other conflict resolution terms such as 'peacemaking', 'peacekeeping' or 'peace-enforcement'; however each of these terms has decidedly different meanings. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 779), as it currently stands "peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution". Peacemaking is defined as the move made by involved parties away from violent conflict to cooperation and dispute settlement (Bartoli, 2011, p. 546; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2005, p. 30). Peacekeeping is the intervention of foreign military personnel, typically with the consent of the host state, with a view to securing peace and decreasing the changes of continued violence (Beardsley, 2011, p. 1052). Accordingly peacebuilding, the critical concept for this research, refers to the process in post-conflict reconstruction during which the structural issues and the long term relations of the parties are addressed, thereby supporting the work accomplished during the peacemaking and peacekeeping phases (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2005, p. 30). International peacebuilding can be divided into four different kinds of mandated operations: (1) monitoring or observer mission, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) multidimensional peacekeeping, and (4) peace enforcement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). Each of these international peacebuilding strategies, though individually designed for specific situations, must address four general parameters found in most conflicts, namely: "the local sources of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change" (*ibid*).

Understanding what are the determining factors of successful peacebuilding has been a subject of interest in conflict resolution literature. Research has looked into a number of potential determining factors including, *inter alia*, natural resource availability and dependence and conflict type to name a couple (Ross, 2006, p. 266; Sambanis, 2010, p. 152; Fortna, 2003; Gartner, 2016). For example, research by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, p. 17) has

shown that countries that are dependent on primary commodity exports have an increased risk of conflict, making peacebuilding success less likely. This is because rebel organizations are able to finance themselves using the "revenue from the informal taxation of the rents on primary commodity exports – diamonds, cocaine, and timber are notable examples" (*ibid*). Additionally, resource dependent countries may weaken state institutions and render the nation more vulnerable to the effect of trade shocks, thereby facilitating rebellion and inciting separatism in resource abundant areas (Ross, 2006, p. 266). Regarding conflict type, Fortna's (2003, p. 112) research has found that, in contradiction to conventional wisdom, maintaining peace after civil wars is much the same to maintaining peace after interstate wars. That is, the peacebuilding dynamics of the two types of wars are not as different as previously believed. However, this finding is still highly contested with authors such as Gartner (2012, p. 72-73) citing that the comparative difficulty of resolving intrastate wars is much higher than interstate wars due to: significant power asymmetries, status difference, and zero-sum issues. Paris (2016, p. 510) concurs with this line of argument by citing that civil wars have a higher likelihood of conflict resurgence in comparison to interstate wars, as evidenced by 'repeat civil war' being the most recurrent type of conflict.

Of most relevance for this research, however, is wartime violence (of which sexual violence is a subset) as a determining factor of peacebuilding success. Violence during conflict manifests itself in a varied number of forms, with each form entailing differing but occasionally intertwining effects (Reychler, 2001, p. 5). It is therefore important to make a distinction between them in order to properly define the scope of this research. Structural violence is a subtle form of violence that occurs when particular members of society are deprived of their 'human need satisfaction' through economic and political structures (Christie, 1997, p. 315). If the structural violence experienced during war is not redressed during the post-conflict peacebuilding process, then the likelihood of successful peacebuilding diminishes (Richmond, 2014). This is because continued structural violence "may provoke more inequality, which weakens the links between civil society, solidarity, social justice, human rights and democracy" (*ibid*, p. 462). Rectifying structural violence is part of the larger peacebuilding effort of changing the perceptions and attitudes of post-conflict societies towards one another, thereby fostering sustainable peace (Staud et al., 2005, p. 300). Accordingly, as argued by Galtung (1969), the halting and prevention of structural violence is associated with the establishment of a more sustainable form of peacebuilding: the establishment of 'positive peace'. It should be noted that addressing this form of violence

during peacebuilding is challenging, particularly in authoritarian regimes, because it directly threatens the prevailing status quo (Noor, 2009, p. 307).

Another form of violence that may occur during wartime is psychological violence. Psychological violence is comprised of behaviors or threats of behaviors aiming to demean, demoralize, and/or intimidate by harming another person's psyche (MacNair, 2012, p. 90; Gitau, 2018, p. 109; Reychler, 2006, p. 137). This type of violence can be just as harmful as direct physical violence (Augustin, 2013, p. 59). The presence of psychological violence during conflict produces "a constant state of fear, characterized by intense trepidation and anxiety" (Konstantinović-Vilić, 2000, p. 102). In post-conflict societies, victims of psychological violence may suffer from depression, stress, suicidal thoughts, and have intense desire for revenge (*ibid*, p. 102-105). Addressing the consequences of wartime psychological violence increases the probability of successful peacebuilding because victims are less likely to participate in post-conflict 'defensive' violence (Staud et al., 2005, p. 300).

Lastly armed or physical violence, the most overt form of violence, is intended "to deter, coerce, wound, and even kill people" (Reychler, 2001, p. 5). This type of 'direct' violence is most often investigated in peacebuilding research through proxies such as number of deaths and displacements (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Other factors that have been investigated as conducive to increasing the level of direct violence, because they increase the level of hostility, include the number of factions and war duration (Gurses and Rost, 2013; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009). The number of opposing factions present during the peacebuilding process has been found to impact the likelihood of its success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 65). Each and every singular faction has its own set of needs and interests that must be taken into consideration during peacebuilding. Accordingly when the number of factions increases, so does the amount of differing needs and interests, thereby complicating coordination and cooperation amongst them and increasing tensions and hostilities (Sambanis, 2010, p. 152). Additionally, another obstacle related to factional reconciliation during the peacebuilding process is that of faction leaders (Jan, 2001, p. 63). Faction leaders, sometimes referred to as 'warlords', can 'spoil' peacebuilding efforts because their power emanates from protecting the interests of their 'constituents', including the control of land, against others (*ibid*). Thus, reconciliation and peace pose a threat to their power and they may continue to incite violence and provoke the resurgence of war in order to safeguard their position.

Extant literature on the impact of the duration of a conflict on peace is decisively divided. Some authors like Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001, p. 190) posit the argument that protracted wars actually increase the probability of stable peace after war because belligerents will have grown fatigued of fighting and believe their chances of winning to diminish as the conflict continues. Mason and Fett (1996, p. 552) support this line of reasoning by arguing that the estimate net utility of victory of parties lowers as the conflict endures because the estimate of the accumulated costs of conflict grows. Thus, during peacebuilding belligerents have no interest in the recurrence of war because it would simply mean a return to a stalemate with mounting costs and a diminished probability of defeating the opponent. Conversely, Walter's (2004, p. 384) research found that war duration was significantly associated with triggering the onset of a new war because previously fought wars that were long revealed information about the opponent's willingness to fight and concede, thereby removing the uncertainty of war initiation. Furthermore, longer wars can also foster distrust between the belligerents making peacebuilding less likely (Roehner, 2012, p. 50). It should be noted that it is difficult to measure the impact of solely war duration on peacebuilding because it is so strongly associated with other factors like the intensity of war as well as party polarization (*ibid*).

'Direct violence' is of further particular interest as a determinant factor of peacebuilding success because it engenders costs that are suffered by both the combatants and supporters of the conflict. The 'costs' of war typically refer to the human costs – often measured by the amount of deaths suffered – and have been found to negatively impact peacebuilding, because high levels of casualties may solidify animosity and mistrust between the parties (Manson and Quinn, 2006, p. 23). Indeed, the desire for vengeance may persist following the end of war and incentivize the recurrence of conflict in order to exact retribution (Walter, 2004, p. 373 in *ibid*). However, it is arguable that wars which experienced higher costs – human or otherwise – are less vulnerable to war recurrence because the available capabilities (i.e. supplies and amount of fighting bodies) are depleted (Walter, 2004, p. 373, citing Rosen, 1972). Research into the effects of the human costs of war has predominantly chosen to focus on deaths simply because it can more easily be measured than sexual violence (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 20, cited in Cohen, 2013, p. 462). Yet, arguably, the effects of sexual violence might have a larger impact than other forms of direct violence since perpetrators are often not identified and/or prosecuted (McKay, 1998, p. 386; Sharratt, 2011, p. ix).

2.2 Sexual violence

The paragraphs above have outlined several factors, most importantly direct violence, that have been identified with peacebuilding failure and/or success. As evidenced, however, critically missing from the discussion of violence is the distinct phenomenon of wartime *sexual* violence. Sexual violence has been used during war since the earliest historical eras, transcending both time and culture (Dillon, 2006, p. 260; Brownmiller, 2013; Farwell, 2004, p. 389, 391). Its use stretches as far back as the ancient Romans during the Dacian Wars, to most famously the Hutus in the Rwandan Civil War 1990-1994 (Dillon, 2006, p. 260). The knowledge of the occurrence of sexual violence during war is not novel, but this topic has only recently begun to draw attention in the context of peacebuilding (Farwell, 2004, p. 390). Sexual violence, according to Cohen and Nordås (2014, p. 419), is comprised of seven key components: (1) sexual slavery, (2) sexual mutilation, (3) sexual torture, (4) rape, (5) forced prostitution, (6) forced pregnancy, and finally (7) forced sterilization and/or abortion. This definition focuses on actions that include direct force or physical violence, and is gender neutral both in regards to sexual violence victims, as well the perpetrators of sexual violence (*ibid*).

Within the sexual violence discourse researches have generally been divided into two areas: (a) the motives of wartime sexual violence, particularly rape, and (b) the consequences of wartime sexual violence. Historically the narrative of wartime sexual violence, which has tended to focus specifically on rape, was one of an unavoidable by-product of conflict; "a matter of poor discipline, the inevitable bad behavior of soldiers revved up, needy, and briefly out of control" (Copelon, 1995, p. 197). Current approaches have created debate within the topic by arguing for a shift in the perception of wartime rape to a planned and targeted policy, resulting in discussions of 'rape as a weapon of war' (Buss, 2009, p. 145; Bergoffen, 2009; Cannon, 2012). This term "provides a way to articulate the systematic, pervasive, and orchestrated nature of wartime sexual violence that marks it as integral rather than incidental to war" (Buss, 2009, p. 145).

For example, Maedl's (2011, p. 145) study of the perceptions of Congolese survivors of rape identified that rape served a multitude of different purposes including: the displacement of communities, installation of fear, transmission of diseases, and impregnation. Salzman (1998, p. 349) wrote about the systematically planned and strategically executed use of rape by political and military leaders from Serbia for ethnic cleansing with an aim of forming a

homogenous Serbian nation with one religion, culture, and language. According to Cohen (2013, p. 468) wartime rape also serves the function of galvanizing and socializing soldiers to establish a bond between them, as was the case with Guatemalan soldiers during the Guatemalan Civil War 1960-1996 (Sanford, Álvarez-Arenas and Dill, 2016 p. 39; Pankhurst, 2010, p. 152). Research by Cohen (2013, p. 464-465) and Schneider, Banholzer and Albarracin (2015, p. 1358) have found that bonding through rape is particularly likely to happen in circumstances where the recruitment mechanism was forceful and random – i.e. the soldiers were abducted or pressganged. Within these circumstances the social ties and cohesions amongst the soldiers are weak, thus participating in the gang rape of a victim establishes trust and builds camaraderie that may not otherwise occur spontaneously (Cohen, 2013, p. 464).

For some authors, however, the occurrence of wartime sexual violence is not a result of strategy but rather opportunity (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 505; Enloe, 2000, p. 111; Goldstein, 2001, p. 365-366). During wartime, the societal norms and structures that normally prevent or reduce the likelihood of sexual violence from occurring breakdown, and a climate of impunity develops (Gerecke, 2010, p. 140; Kearns and Young, 2014, p. 262). Accordingly, the setting of war provides an opportunity for perpetrators of sexual violence to transgress and act out their previously repressed biologically driven (hetero)sexual needs and urges (Baaz and Stern, 2014, p. 586). In line with the biological-impunity argument is the sexual gratification reasoning (Al Boukhary, 2017, p. 101). This strand of thought stipulates that war prevents men from satisfying their sexual needs that were previously attended to during peace; accordingly, they resort to sexual violence (*ibid*). Though the sexual gratification that men seek is partly driven by male biology, it is the socio-cultural notions of masculinity primarily push them to commit acts of sexual violence (Brewer, 2010, p. 82). Indeed, the association of the vulnerability of women and control over them with the sexual acts perpetuates the commitment of wartime sexual violence (*ibid*).

Related to the opportunism discourse, some authors have propositioned greed as a motive for wartime sexual violence (Cohen, 2013, p. 462-463). Weinstein (2007, p. 309) makes a distinction between two kinds of armed groups: ‘justice-oriented’ and ‘greed-oriented’. It is theorized that the latter, which has access to material resources, attracts a type of people who are more prone to violence (Cohen, 2013, p. 462-463). The resulting violence is carried out in an indiscriminate and ruthless manner, which then causes civilian populations to fight back in

resistance ultimately creating a vicious cycle of repression and resistance (Weinstein, 2007, p. 309). Additionally, the organizational structure of this group lacks cohesion and discipline thereby permitting the occurrence of this unrestrained violence (Balcells, 2015, 380-381). Arguably, the RUF in Sierra Leone are a prime example of a greed-oriented armed group, facilitated by external support, which committed mass violence including sexual violence (Merger, 2016, p. 104; Duriesmith, 2013, p. 246).

These strands of theory are criticized by feminist literature, which comment on the ignorance of structural influences, female perpetrators, and male victims of sexual violence (Henry, 2005; Ferrales and McElrath, 2014; Al Boukhary, 2017, p. 101; Merger, 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, the opportunism discourse perpetuates the view that wartime sexual violence is an unfortunate yet unavoidable part of war; which research by Wood (2010) has disputed. Whilst acknowledging that wartime sexual violence is widespread and frequent, Wood (2010, p. 161) has found the existence of an asymmetrical pattern in the use of sexual violence in conflict. Utilizing the secessionist Sri Lankan LTTE as a case study, she investigated why there was a comparative lack of sexual violence by this armed group, and found that the LTTE military hierarchy had a firm grip on their troops and ensured punishment for disobedience of orders (i.e. not to commit sexual violence) (Wood, 2009, p. 131, 152). This research signifies that "rape [and consequently sexual violence] is not inevitable in war", thereby reinforcing the efforts made "to end sexual violence and other violations of the laws of war" (*ibid*, p. 153).

Within societies the consequences of wartime sexual violence on victims are evident on the micro (individual), meso (communal), macro (national) levels. Indeed, individual victims of sexual violence can suffer from a range of sequelae. Wartime sexual violence often results in the spread of HIV/AIDS as well as other sexually transmitted diseases (Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 193). The spread of diseases can also be associated with a number of war-related factors including, *inter alia*, population displacement, as was the case in 1987 Angola, heightened levels of sexual risk behavior like the El Salvadorian Civil War 1980-1992, or purposeful military use similar to the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 (Hankins et al., 2002, p. 2246). Women have been found to disproportionally at risk of contracting diseases as a result of wartime sexual violence due to the change in household structure during war (Brouwer, 2005, p. 34; Barberet, 2014 p. 103). Victims of sexual violence – female and male – suffering

from sexually transmitted infections and related diseases often do not seek proper care and treatment because of the shame associated with admitting the assault (Kirchner, 2008 p. 21).

Other physical injuries resulting from sexual violence include those inflicted during the carrying out of the sexual violence, namely broken bones, head trauma, and lacerations (Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 192-193). The variety of injuries that victims can sustain as a result of wartime sexual violence can impede them from working and gaining income after the conflict has ended (Chitsike and Nkuuhe, 2014, p. 48). The physical consequences of wartime sexual violence are not limited to the sustaining of injuries and frequently culminate in pregnancy and childbirth (Carpenter, 2010, p. 21). These pregnancies as Copleon (1994, p. 256) explains, "whether or not aborted, continues [*sic*] the initial torture in a most intimate and invasive form; and the fact of bearing the child of rape, whether or not the child is placed for adoption, has a potentially life-long impact on the woman and her place in the community". In turn, those children that are born of wartime sexual victims suffer themselves from many of the similar psychological and social consequences that their mothers do (Seto, 2013; Denov, 2015).

In addition to affecting the victim's body through the maiming of the flesh, wartime sexual violence can also affect the mind through the maiming of the memory (Denov, 2006, p. 327). Psychological consequences might include depression, withdrawal, anxiety, and poor self-esteem particularly in communities where women's honor is dependent on sexual purity (Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 193; Leiby, 2009, p. 451; Kurtz and Diggs, 2015, p. 191). The societal taboos regarding sexuality often mean that victims suffer in silence (Dossa et al., 2014, p. 244). Some victims of sexual violence resort to self-medication through the abuse of substances like drugs and alcohol in order to manage these effects (Onyango and Hampanda, 2011, p. 243). Adding to these sequelae is the social ostracism suffered by individual victims (Harding, 2011, p. 95). The stigma has been found to further aggravate the mental health effect of sexual violence as it may lead to depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Verelst et al., 2014, p. 1139). These psychological consequences pervade long after the end of conflict as illustrated by Vinck et al.'s (2007, p. 543) research conducted in war-affected Northern Uganda, which found that subjects suffering from symptoms of PTSD, as a result of exposure to war crimes, have a higher likelihood of being favor of ending the conflict through violence rather than nonviolence. Similarly to the physical injuries, the stigmatization of wartime sexual violence victims can result in difficulty of

finding employment in post-conflict life (Pagitt et al., 2013, p. 88-89). In some instances, both the women who suffered wartime sexual violence and their children turn to the sex trade in order to sustain themselves (Dietrich, 2007, p. 266).

Wartime sexual violence also has consequences for victims at the meso-level; whilst perpetrators can also suffer consequences, the following discussion focuses only on victims (Leiby, 2009, p. 449; Diken and Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111; Cohen, 2013, p. 465). Within many communities women are often symbols of culture, and the ability to protect the women is associated with that culture's strength or weakness (Seifert, 1996, p. 39; Kelly, 2010, p. 122). Women also often hold a role of producing and maintaining family and community cohesion (McDevitt-Murphy, Casey, and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293-294). Therefore an attack on women is also an attack on the community as a whole, present and future (Dossa et al., 2014, p. 241; Diken and Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111). Accordingly, wartime sexual violence has the potential to disintegrate an entire community's social fabric, thereby threatening its survival (Leiby, 2009, p. 451). Particularly in ethnic conflicts, sexual violence against women resulting in the birth of children of a differing ethnicity can serve to completely negate their own identity and consequently that of the community (Barberet, 2014, p. 106; Diken and Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111). As Eisenstein (2000, p. 47) explains in the case of the Bosnian War 1992-1995, the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims by the Serbs required the destruction of Muslim women's identities. Children born to Serb father and Muslim mothers were considered to be purely Serb, thereby negating the women's identity entirely (*ibid*). It should be noted that communities themselves contribute adversely to sexual violence consequences by adhering to and perpetuating norms, values, and beliefs that place the culpability on victim rather than perpetrators (Dossa et al., 2014, p. 244, 252). Indeed, the victims of sexual violence are deemed soiled and less worthy and often equated to adulterers in line with cultural norms valuing purity (*ibid*).

Whilst the previous paragraphs have predominantly focused on the consequences of wartime sexual violence on female victims, male victims also merit attention. The inclusion of men and boys in the discourse of sexual violence, particularly in its conceptualization, is a relatively new phenomenon (Touquet and Gorris, 2016, p. 36). Little research exists on the experiences of male victims of sexual violence primarily "due to under-reporting, lack of institutional detection, lack of a legal framework and a narrowed focus on sexual violence against women" (Solangon and Patel, 2012, p. 422). Yet, male victims of wartime sexual

violence suffer from many of the same physical, psychological, and social consequences as female victims (Dennis, 2011, p. 34; Turchik and Edwards, 2012, p. 215). Onyango and Hampanda (2011, p. 237, 240) argue that men may suffer even more from these consequences than female victims, due to the socio-cultural hegemonic hetero-normative values regarding sexuality and masculinity within communities. For example, by having been victims of sexual violence by another male, male victims could be stripped of their heterosexual identity and presumed homosexual, and accordingly encounter further discrimination and/or humiliation from other members of society (Campbell-Ruggaard and Van Ryswyk, 2001, p. 294; Jausoro Alzola and Marino, 2015, p. 19; Priddy, 2014, p. 277). Furthermore, because of the association of vulnerability with femininity, male victims of sexual violence may be denied their masculine statuses in society and deemed frail, subservient, and inferior (Gear, 2010, p. 320; Weiss, 2010, p. 277; Javaid, 2016, p. 284). Consequently, victimhood and masculinity are deemed incompatible (Priddy, 2015, p. 683). Interestingly however, the perspective is reversed when speaking about the perpetrator of male-on-male sexual violence – i.e. the heterosexual and masculine identity of male perpetrators of sexual violence is actually bolstered (Jones, 2006, p. 459). As Segal (1990, p. 247) poignantly stated "a male who fucks another male is a double male".

Finally, the consequences of wartime sexual violence are evident on the macro (national) level in fields other than, but strongly linked to, peacebuilding (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 265; O'Reilly, 2018, p. 66-68). Successful post-conflict peacebuilding is reliant on the establishment of democratic and effective state-institutions (Ottaway, 2007). In turn, this is dependent on the restoration of trust between the newly created state-institutions and its citizens (Kelman, 2005). This is key to the building of sustainable peace, because if citizens do not trust state-institutions then the reestablishment of effective state authority and accountable governance are weakened (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 266). The trial and prosecution of human rights violators is particularly helpful in rebuilding trust in state-institutions and consequently the rule of law (Özerdem and Lee, 2016, p. 134; Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151). In post-conflict societies, victims of sexual violence (especially women) often feel pressured not to report the crimes committed against them due to stigma, fear, and cultural norms, which combined devalue their identities as victims (Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151; Jones et al., 2014, p. 5; O'Reilly, 2018, p. 68). Yet it is crucial that transitional justice mechanisms provide these victims, regardless of gender, with the avenues to report wartime sexual violence and then effectively investigate and prosecute the criminals in order for peace

to be reestablished and remain (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266). Indeed, not only will the participation of wartime sexual violence victims enable the design and implementation of effective measures of delivering justice, it will also (re)affirm the status of survivors as crucial actors in the transitional justice process (O'Reilly, 2018, p. 67). Failing to give victims the ability to advance justice claims could jeopardize the peacebuilding process by harming "the delicate process of instilling a culture of respect for the rule of law" (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266).

Furthermore, the failure to re-instill trust in in the newly created state-institutions may affect political and civic participation (Ricigliano, 2016, p. 98; Cox, 2009, p. 23). The participation of citizens in all aspects of the peacebuilding process, social and political, is central because it helps establish and legitimize democracy (Söderström, 2015, p. 56; Leach, Coxall and Robins, 2011, p. 57). Some researchers have even likened the level of citizen participation to the quality of democracy (Lijphart, 1999; Vanhanen, 2004). Democracy, in turn, is intrinsically linked to peacebuilding, specifically peacebuilding success (Heldt, 2004; Ottoway, 2007; Reychler, 2001). Indeed, "democracy is seen as important for universal individual rights, but also for generating good governance, which is expected to benefit economic growth, improve the efficiency of development aid, and decrease the risks of civil conflict"; all of which are crucial for successful peacebuilding (Heldt, 2011, p. 47). Moreover, the lack of participation in political and social life has a further ripple effect of perpetuating gender inequality in post-conflict societies (Olsson and Gizelis, 2015, p. 5). Equality in society and politics requires the active participation of all citizens (Porter, 2007, p. 191). Successful peacebuilding in particular, has been shown to necessitate the inclusion of women in political and economic decision-making (Gizelis, 2011, p. 522, 525; Gizelis, 2009, p. 509; Väyrynen, 2010, p. 142). The international community took note of this importance when it passed UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000, p. 1) reaffirming the importance of women in the peacebuilding process. This has been proven in cases like Sierra Leone where the status of women in post-conflict reconstruction was found to have a positive effect on peacebuilding success (Gizelis, 2011, p. 538).

As the previous paragraphs have outlined, wartime sexual violence has consequences that continue to affect victims and communities on the micro, meso, and macro levels even after the conflict has ended. For example, a victim of wartime sexual violence may have difficulty finding a job due to the social ostracism they experience at the hand of their community,

which in turn disintegrates the societal fabric (Pagitt et al., 2013, p. 88-89; Leiby, 2009, p. 451). They may also feel unable to report the crime committed against them to the authorities because of the feeling of shame, thereby causing their perpetrator to not be prosecuted and thusly weakening their trust with the state (Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151; Özerdem and Lee, 2016, p. 134). Evidently, the interplay of the consequences on all three levels is likely to affect the peacebuilding process and failure to address them will affect the three indispensable components of successful peacebuilding: social stability, economic recovery, and effective state authority (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 265). As the current UN Secretary-General (UNSG) stated: "For peacebuilding and reconciliation to take root, justice must be done, and be seen to be done, for sexual violence survivors. Otherwise, the trauma, disease, perceived dishonour, and desire for vengeance will fester within communities" (Guterres, 2017, p. 7).

H_1: the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, the lower the probability of successful peacebuilding.

Chapter 3. Research Design

3.1 Methodology

This research employs a mix-methods research strategy, merging both quantitative and qualitative methods for the purposes of complementarity (Lamont, 2015, p. 115). Firstly, I begin by conducting a quantitative large-N observational study on cross-sectional data. Doing so enables me to determine if the distribution of the outcome conforms to the pattern of the theory – higher prevalence of wartime sexual violence lower the probability of successful peacebuilding – and if any correlations can be estimated between the variables under investigation from the patterns of variation. To complement the research findings from the large-N study, a brief deviant case study is also conducted. "Deviant case study research designs focus on observed empirical anomalies in existing theoretical propositions, with the aim of explaining *why* the case deviates from theoretical expectations and in the process refining the existing theory and generating additional hypotheses." (Levy, 2008, p. 3). Deviant case studies are particularly suitable in tandem to quantitative research "since the most significant deviations from the regression line in a statistical analysis are ideal cases for selection for more thorough examination by case studies" (*ibid*, p. 13). By refining the theory through the identification of previously omitted variables, researchers aim to generate a new hypothesis that can be applied to and explain other deviant cases, eventually resulting in a general proposition (Gerring, 2017, p. 77; George and Bennett, 2004, p. 111). Thus, the

analysis of deviant case studies can actually improve theoretical propositions that inform typical case studies (Rubin and Babbie, 2010, p. 148; Orvis and Drogus, 2015, p. 10). However, it should be noted that the analysis of a deviant case study might conclude that said deviant case *does not* contravene the established theory (Levy, 2008, p. 3). Indeed, as Alexander Jr. (2010, p. 76) contends, one single case may not provide enough proof to repudiate a theory.

The cross-sectional data that is analyzed as part of the quantitative large-N study is derived from a newly created data set. The newly created data set merges information provided by the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) database, created by Cohen and Nordås (2014), the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Polity IV Project (2016), and finally the World Bank (2018). It consists of 51 conflicts, the observational unit of analysis, during the period of 1989-2009. The three different types of conflicts included within this research are derived from Cohen and Nordås' (2014) SVAC database. These include, "(1) *Intrastate armed conflict*, which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states; (2) *Internationalized internal armed conflict*, which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides; and (3) *Interstate conflicts*, which occurs between the governments of two states" (Cohen and Nordås, 2013, p. 5-6).

3.2 Dependent variable

The dependent variable that is measured is the 'peacebuilding outcome' of each conflict. The conceptualization and operationalization of the success or failure of peacebuilding efforts is inspired by work from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). In their research of 125 civil wars from 1944-1997, these authors used the outcome of three intermediate variables, namely, end of war, no residual violence, and democracy, to construct a lenient and strict definition of peacebuilding success or failure two and five years after the end of each conflict (*ibid*, p. 783, 798). Specific information on the coding guideline for their dependent peacebuilding variable is available in appendix C of their article (*ibid*).

For this research, basing myself off the work of Doyle and Sambanis' (2000), I construct my own dependent variable using the outcome of two intermediate variables: recurrence of violence and democracy. These intermediate variables are the same as two of three

intermediate variables Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 798) used in the construction of their dependent variable; however the information for them stems from different sources to those used by Doyle and Sambanis (*ibid*). Specifically, information for the recurrence of violence comes from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and information for democracy comes from the Polity IV Project (2016). Similarly to Doyle and Sambanis (*ibid*) I construct the 'peacebuilding outcome' variable within a 2 and 5-year period following the end of each conflict; however, unlike Doyle and Sambanis (*ibid*) the threshold for determining peacebuilding success remains the same for both time periods. Hence I create a dependent variable with two different time variations, which strengthens the robustness of the quantitative study because it evidences whether the passage of time impacts the outcome of the intermediate variables, and hence the peacebuilding outcome variable. In this research, the construction of the dependent variable 'peacebuilding outcome' is done in the following four steps, as inspired by Doyle and Sambanis (*ibid*).

Step 1: Determine the 'end date' of each conflict. The 'end date' of each conflict signifies the first year that a peacebuilding attempt was made, marked by the signing of a final agreement or accords by the warring parties rather than ceasefire agreements. Indeed, "in the context of liberal peacebuilding, sources of declared intentions are collective intentions prescribed in peace agreements, UN resolutions, and other policy documents, which constitute their ideological bedrock and represent the reference point against which peacebuilding performativity takes place" (Visoka, 2016, p. 54). Note that some conflicts can have multiple peacebuilding attempts but this research only focuses on the first attempt. Research on each individual conflict was done using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and from there the 'end date' was determined. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia was chosen as the source for this step because the conflicts included in SVAC database also stem from the UCDP.

Step 2. Was there a recurrence of violence within the 2-year period following the 'end date' of each conflict? If no, code *recurrence2 as* 0, if yes code *recurrence2* as 1. Was there a recurrence of violence within the 5-year period following the end of each conflict? If no, code *recurrence5 as* 0, if yes code *recurrence5* as 1. To determine if violence recurred post 'end date' for each conflict, the UCDP threshold of 25 battle deaths or more per year was used.

Step 3: What was the level of democratization of the territory in which the conflict was fought 2 years following the 'end date' of each conflict? What was the level of democratization of the territory in which the conflict was fought 5 years following the 'end date' of each conflict? The source for this comes from the Polity IV Project (2016). For example the Rwandan Civil War (conflict ID 179) has an 'end date' of 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed; accordingly the Polity score for Rwanda in 1995 (*dem2*) and 1998 (*dem5*) respectively are recorded. The territory in which each conflict was fought is determined by the variable 'GWNO' (Gleditsch/Ward country ID) in the SVAC database. In cases where a conflict had multiple territories recorded, the mode territory was used.

It should be noted that the specific variable used within the Polity IV Project (2016) to determine the level of democratization was the 'POLITY2' variable. The 'POLITY2' variable "is a modified version of the POLITY variable… [that] modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or 'fix', to convert instances of 'standardized authority scores' (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10)" (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017, p. 17). However, in cases where the authority score of the POLITY variable was -66, this was then treated as missing information within the Polity IV Project (2016) (*ibid*). Accordingly, within the newly created data of this research that sources information from the 'POLITY2' variable, some conflicts have missing information on the level of democratization. Consequently, the peacebuilding variable becomes skewed in conflicts with missing information on the level of democratization, because the peacebuilding variable becomes reliant only on the recurrence of violence. Despite this, the data set still includes the conflicts with missing information on the level of democratization in order to not further reduce the number of observations.

Step 4: Peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period following the 'end date' of each conflict is coded as 1 (successful) if: *recurrence2* = 0, and *dem2* $\geq$ 6. Otherwise, *pb2* is coded as 0 (failure). Peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period following the 'end date' of each conflict is coded as 1 (successful) if: *recurrence5* = 0, and *dem5* $\geq$ 6. Otherwise, *pb5* is coded as 0 (failure). A threshold of 6 or higher is used as an indicator for high level of democracy because, as indicated by the Polity IV Project (2016), "scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested three part categorization of 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and 'democracies' (+6 to

+10)". Given that the dependent variable of interest is binary, the hypothesis is tested through the use of logistic regressions.

3.3 Independent variable

The main independent variable of interest is the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The SVAC database uses three different sources, namely, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US State Department, to provide measurements on this variable (Cohen and Nordås, 2014, p. 421). The variable "captures the reported severity of [wartime] sexual violence perpetration by an armed actor in a given year" per conflict for each of the three sources (*ibid*, p. 419). Accordingly, this research uses the highest level of sexual violence reported by any of the groups for any year per conflict across all three sources. Recall that each conflict is assigned an 'end date' signifying the first year that a peacebuilding attempt was made. Thus, this research calculates the highest level of reported sexual violence for each conflict up to and including that 'end date' and ignore the following years (given that they surpass the 'peacebuilding moment'). For more information on how this variable is measured see table 1 on page 26.

3.4 Control variables

Due to the limited number of observations, this research utilizes only two control variables. As Strickland (2017, p. 43) and others explain, there is typically a recommended ratio of 10 cases per independent variable in order to increase the accuracy of the statistical analysis (Warner, 2013, p. 1034; Mertler and Reinhart, 2017, p. 311). Leech, Barrett and Morgan (2015, p. 167) recommend as many as 20 cases per independent variable. Whilst Warner (2013, p. 1034) explains that factors other than the number of cases can impact the statistical power in multivariate analyses – including the correlation between independent variables and the level of association between each independent variable and the dependent variable – it was nonetheless decided to only use two control variables to increase the statistical accuracy.

The control variables that are included in the statistical analysis are 'targeting of victims' and the net official development assistance (ODA) received per capita (current US$). 'Targeting of victims' refers to whether the sexual violence experienced during each individual conflict was selective (i.e. against particular groups) or random (Cohen and Nordås, 2014, p. 420). The SVAC database provides measurements on this variable for each armed actor engaged in a conflict in a particular year. It is coded as follows: 0 signifies that the wartime sexual

violence was not used selectively while 1 signifies it was (Cohen and Nordås, 2013, p.12). Accordingly, this research uses the overall mean of the targeting of victims per conflict. The net ODA received per capita (current US$), which stems from the World Bank (2018), refers to the amount of net ODA per capita the territory in which the conflict was fought received on the 'end date' of each conflict. These two independent or control variables were chosen because Doyle and Sambanis' (2000, p. 786) research found that similar variables were shown to be significant in either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of peacebuilding success. Specifically, their research showed – both in the strict and lenient models of peacebuilding – that higher levels of the variable "net current transfers per capita" increase the likelihood of successful peacebuilding whilst "identity wars" lower it (*ibid*, p. 786-787).

3.5 Potential deviant case study

The chosen deviant case study that complements the large-N observational study is determined by the results of the latter. This is because the aim of deviant case studies is to test theory by examining a case that does not conform to the expected pattern (Moses and Knutsen, 2007, p. 133). For example, if the large-N study confirms the current hypothesis – the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, the lower the probability of successful peacebuilding – then a potential deviant case study could be the Bosnian War (1992-1995); which had massive reports of wartime sexual violence yet has remained at peace since the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 (Amnesty International, 2017). Potential data sources for the analysis of the deviant case study include: journal articles, newspapers, reports, and surveys.

3.6 Limitations of data set and research strategy

The SVAC database originally includes 129 conflicts. This research only includes 51 of those 129 conflicts for two reasons. Firstly, a number of the conflicts have not had any peacebuilding attempts and therefore cannot be used for the purposes of this research. Secondly, the SVAC database ends in 2009 yet a number of the conflicts had peacebuilding attempts after that date. In the latter case, those conflicts were also excluded because the information on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence is incomplete; thusly the full extent of the impact of wartime sexual violence on peacebuilding efforts cannot be accurately measured. It is unfortunately not possible to code the prevalence of wartime sexual violence for the conflicts that had peacebuilding attempts after 2009, because the SVAC database (which codes prevalence categorically) does not indicate how many acts of sexual violence

they consider to fit into the categories. Additionally, by choosing to aggregate the data and change the unit of observation from *conflict-actor-year* in the SVAC database to simply *conflict*, further data was lost.

As a consequence of having a limited number of observations within the data set, any results and conclusions drawn from the analyses of the logistic regression are tenuous. Importantly, when analyzing and discussing the results the term 'correlation' rather than 'causation' must be employed. Indeed, the phrase 'correlation does not imply causation' is crucial in any social science research but particularly so in cases with a small data set (Fiedler and Kareev, 2008, p. 153). As McKillup (2005, p. 28) explains, "the correlation may have occurred by chance, or a third unmeasured factor might determine the numbers of the variables studied". Furthermore, a small data set also poses problems for the generalizability of the inferences made (Druckman, 2005, p. 41). This is because the data set may be bias due to missing information that could impact the outcome of the statistical analysis (Vogt, 2007, p. 176-179). Similarly, the data may be bias due to overrepresentation (Engel and Schutt, 2012, p. 452). *In casu*, the newly created data set analyzed in the large-N study is geographically concentrated in Africa with 26 of the 51 conflicts located in that continent. As depicted in figure 1 on page 25, the conflicts located within the African territory had particularly high levels of wartime sexual violence; thereby potentially skewing the data. Though the inclusion of two control variables mitigates in part for omitted variable bias, it does not eliminate it entirely. Undeniably, as Menard (2002, p. 69) states, the research could "have failed to identify all of the relevant predictors or causes of a dependent variable, or because theoretically relevant variables have been omitted".

Figure 1: Map of conflict territories included in the dataset with their highest level of reported wartime sexual violence



Source: created by the author with the use of Tableau Public

This research includes three types of conflicts: intrastate armed conflict, internationalized internal armed conflict, and interstate conflicts. All three types of conflicts are included within the data set in order to not further diminish the number of observations. This decision, however, may impact the outcome of the results. As aforementioned, some research affirms that the type of conflict impacts peacebuilding efforts (Gartner, 2012, p. 72-73; Paris, 2016, p. 510). Indeed, Gartner (2012, p. 72-73) explains that the comparative difficulty of resolving intrastate wars is much higher than interstate wars due to: significant power asymmetries, status difference, and zero-sum issues. Paris (2016, p. 510) concurs with this line of argument by citing that civil wars have a higher likelihood of conflict resurgence in comparison to interstate wars, as evidenced by 'repeat civil war' being the most recurrent type of conflict.

Table 1. Data set overview

Variable		Measurement	Source(s)
Dependent	Peacebuilding outcome	Qualitative categorical dummy; peacebuilding outcome within a 2 and 5-year period following the 'end date' of each conflict 0 = failure 1 = success	UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia Polity IV Project (2016)
Independent	Prevalence of wartime sexual violence	Qualitative categorical variable 0 = no reports of sexual violence 1 = isolated reports of sexual violence 2 = numerous reports of sexual violence 3 = massive reports of sexual violence	Cohen and Nordås (2014)
	Targeting of victims	Quantitative interval variable ranging from 0 to 0.25	Cohen and Nordås (2014)
	The net ODA received per capita (current US$)	Quantitative interval variable ranging from 0 to 251.27	The World Bank (2018)

Chapter 4. Quantitative Large-N Study

4.1 Descriptive statistics and graphs

Table 2 below shows the information for the two variants of the dependent variable and the three independent variables in the dataset. The bar charts 1, 2, and 3 on page 27 graphically depict the descriptive statistics for the two variants of the dependent variable and the main independent variable respectively. The mean of 0.33 for the peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period signifies that approximately 33% of the conflicts had a successful peacebuilding outcome; whereas approximately 37% of the conflicts had a successful peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. With a mean of 1.27, most conflicts experienced isolated levels of wartime sexual violence. Targeting of victims has a mean of 0.06, a value extremely close to 0 thereby signifying that the wartime sexual violence was not used selectively in most conflicts. A do-file containing information on how to replicate all of the tables in chapter 4 is available upon request. Note that all values in the tables in chapter 4 have been rounded to the nearest second decimal place to improve legibility.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Number of observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Peacebuilding 2-year	51	0.33	0.48	0	1
Peacebuilding 5-year	51	0.37	0.49	0	1
Prevalence	51	1.27	1.04	0	3
Targeting	51	0.06	0.08	0	0.25
Net ODA per capita	51	42.19	45.68	0	251.27







If any of the predictors used in the analysis had collinearity then they would need to be excluded from the research (Kleinbaum et al., 2014, p. 371). However, as shown in tables 3 and 4 below, none of the correlation coefficients arrive at the absolute value of 1; accordingly the three explanatory variables are retained.

Table 3. Correlation matrix for 2-year period

	Peacebuilding 2-year	Prevalence	Targeting	ODA per capita
Peacebuilding 2-year	1.0000			
Prevalence	0.0538	1.0000		
Targeting	0.0840	0.3365	1.0000	
Net ODA per capita	0.1186	0.2394	0.1608	1.0000

Table 4. Correlation matrix for 5-year period

	Peacebuilding 5-year	Prevalence	Targeting	ODA per capita
Peacebuilding 5-year	1.0000			
Prevalence	-0.0478	1.0000		
Targeting	-0.0208	0.3365	1.0000	
Net ODA per capita	0.0516	0.2394	0.1608	1.0000

4.2 Simple logistic regressions

A simple logistic regression is run to initially establish the association between the prevalence of wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome. Tables 5 and 6 on pages 28 and 29 show the results for the 2 and 5-year periods of the dependent variable respectively. Accordingly, logit models for each simple logistic regression are created. Both logit models are written in terms of the log of odds and can be found in the appendix on page 46.

Table 5. Simple logistic regression for 2-year period

Peacebuilding 2-year	**Coef. (Std. Err.)**
Prevalence	0.11 (0.29)
Constant	-0.84 (0.48)
Number of observations = 51	
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0023	
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.39	
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001	

The simple logistic regression for the 2-year period shows a $b > 0$, indicating that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period *increases* when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence *increases*. Expressing the logit model in terms of probabilities allows for the prediction of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period depending on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. See the appendix on page 46 for the formula.

It is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period if a conflict had *isolated* levels of wartime sexual violence equals approximately 33%. Conversely if a conflict had *massive* levels of wartime sexual violence, it is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period equals approximately 38%. Overall, the probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period *increases* by 5 percentage points when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases.

However, a z-value of 0.38 signifies that at a 5% significance level (95% confidence level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected because z falls within the critical values of -2 and 2 and p (0.701) is greater than 0.05. This finding is further confirmed given that the confidence

intervals include 0; meaning that the prevalence of wartime sexual violence could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period. Furthermore, the strength of association between these two variables is insubstantial as indicated by the pseudo r-squared value of 0.0023. See appendix on page 46 for a table showing the strength of association coefficient of determination and a full version of table 5.

Table 6. Simple logistic regression for 5-year period

Peacebuilding 5-year	**Coef. (Std. Err.)**
Prevalence	-0.10 (0.28)
Constant	-0.40 (0.46)
Number of observations = 51	
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0017	
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.62	
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001	

The simple logistic regression for the 5-year period shows a $b < 0$, indicating that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period *decreases* when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence *increases*. Expressing the logit model in terms of probabilities allows for the prediction of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period depending on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. See the appendix on page 46 for the formula.

It is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period if a country had *isolated* levels of wartime sexual violence equal approximately 38%. Conversely if a country had *massive* levels of wartime sexual violence, it is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period equal approximately 33%. Overall, the probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period *decreases* by 5 percentage points when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases.

However, a *z*-value of -0.34 signifies that at a 5% significance level (95% confidence level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected because *z* falls within the critical values of -2 and 2 and *p* (0.733) is greater than 0.05. This finding is further confirmed given that the confidence intervals include 0; meaning that the prevalence of wartime sexual violence could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. Furthermore, the strength of

association between these two variables is insubstantial as indicated by the pseudo r-squared value of 0.0017. See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 6.

4.3 Multivariate logistic regressions

The simple logistic regressions, as shown in tables 5 and 6, for the 2 and 5-year period explain 0.23% and 0.17% respectively of the variation in peacebuilding outcome. Accordingly, the control variables 'targeting of victims' and the net ODA received per capita (current US$) are added into the analysis to account for competing explanations of variation in peacebuilding outcome. The results for the two different time variations are presented in tables 7 and 8 on pages 30 and 31 respectively.

Table 7. Multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period

Peacebuilding 2-year	**Coef. (Std. Err.)**
Prevalence	0.01 (0.31)
Targeting	1.78 (4.12)
Net ODA per capita	0.005 (0.007)
Constant	-1.03 (0.53)
Number of observations = 51	
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0140	
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.01	
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001	

The multivariate logistic regression for the 2-year period explains 1.4% of the variation in peacebuilding outcome; a 1.17 percentage point increase from the simple logistic regression model for the 2-year period. Similarly to the simple logistic regression model for the 2-year period, table 7 shows a $b > 0$ for the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The same holds true for the two control variables 'targeting of victims' and the net ODA received per capita (current US$). Accordingly, this result indicates that – when holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period increases when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, selective targeting of victims, and the net ODA received per capita (current US$) increase.

However, the independent and control variables in the multivariate logistic regression for the 2-year period have *z*-values that fall within the critical values of -2 and 2. Additionally, all of

the *p*-values are greater than 0.05. This signifies that at a 95% confidence level (a 5% significance level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. This finding is further confirmed given that all of the confidence intervals include 0; meaning that each one of the independent and control variables could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period. See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 7.

By expressing the logit model for the multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period in terms of probabilities, we can predict the probability of peacebuilding success if conflict *A* had: (1) massive levels of wartime sexual violence, (2) predominantly selective targeting of victims, and (3) received a net ODA per capita of 10 US$.

$$\hat{p}(y=1) = \frac{\exp(-1.03+0.01(3)+1.78(0.7)+0.005(10))}{\exp(-1.03+0.01(3)+1.78(0.7)+0.005(10))+1} \approx 58\%$$

Given the aforementioned information, it is predicted that probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period for Conflict *A* equals approximately 58%.

Table 8. Multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period

Peacebuilding 5-year	**Coef. (Std. Err.)**
Prevalence	-0.12 (0.31)
Targeting	-0.31 (4.12)
Net ODA per capita	0.003 (0.007)
Constant	-0.48 (0.50)
Number of observations = 51	
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0050	
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.51	
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001	

The multivariate logistic regression for the 5-year period explains 0.5% of the variation in peacebuilding outcome; a 0.33 percentage point increase from the simple logistic regression model for the 5-year period. Similarly to the simple logistic regression model for the 5-year period, table 8 shows a $b < 0$ for the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The same holds true for the variable 'targeting of victims' but not the net ODA received per capita (current US$). Accordingly, this result indicates that – when holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period decreases when the prevalence

of wartime sexual violence and selective targeting of victims increase. However, the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period increases when the net ODA received per capita (current US$) increases, holding other variables constant.

However, the independent and control variables in the multivariate logistic regression for the 5-year period have *z*-values that fall within the critical values of -2 and 2. Additionally, all of the *p*-values are greater than 0.05. This signifies that at a 95% confidence level (a 5% significance level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. This finding is further confirmed given that all of the confidence intervals include 0; meaning that each one of the independent and control variables could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 8.

By expressing the logit model for the multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period in terms of probabilities, we can predict the probability of peacebuilding success if conflict *A* had: (1) massive levels of wartime sexual violence, (2) predominantly selective targeting of victims, and (3) received a net ODA per capita of 10 US$.

$$\hat{p}(y=1) = \frac{\exp\left(-0.48+-0.12(3)+-0.31(0.7)+0.003(10)\right)}{\exp(-0.48+-0.12(3)+-0.31(0.7)+0.003(10))+1} \approx 26\%$$

Given the aforementioned information, it is predicted that probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period for Conflict *A* equals approximately 26%.

4.4 Analysis of the simple and multivariate logistic regressions

In both the simple and multivariate logistic regression models for the 2-year period the results suggest that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period *increases* when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence *increases*. Conversely, in both the simple and multivariate logistic regression models for the 5-year period the results imply that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period *decreases* when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence *increases*. These findings were illustrated through the example of Conflict *A* whose probability of peacebuilding success diminished by just over half from 58% within a 2-year period, to 26% within a 5-year period – holding all other variables constant. These results suggest that the lapse of time following the end of a conflict may have an impact on peacebuilding outcome. Sambanis (2008, p. 30) reached a similar conclusion in his study on

UN peace operations, which comprise a key component of peacebuilding efforts. Specifically, he found that "UN missions have a robust positive effect on peacebuilding outcomes, particularly participatory peace, but the effects occur mainly in the short run" (*ibid*).

Arguably, peacebuilding efforts are more likely to be successful in the short-term rather than in the long-term (Quarantelli's, 1988, p. 16). Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of a conflict there tends to be a strong desire for peace within society that has grown fatigued of war (Ward and Perrottet, 2013, p. 58; Voorhoeve, 2007, p. 53). Additionally, if a conflict has garnered international attention the campaign for peace is extended outside of the conflict borders – often evidenced through stickers, slogan t-shirts, and the modern day 'hasthtags' on Twitter – and pressure mounts on the belligerents to build and sustain peace, at least in the short-term (Lötter, 1997, p. 105). These conditions can help foster the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms that are necessary for peace and reconciliation to consolidate, particularly in conflicts that experienced war crimes (of which wartime sexual violence is a component) (Futamura, 2014, p. 23; United Nations, 2018). Against this backdrop victims of wartime sexual violence may find themselves encouraged to come forward and seek reparations that, especially when done early stages, will promote sustainable peace through the reinforcement of trust and accountability between the victims and the state (García-Godos, 2015, p. 341). Accordingly, the logic follows that if a conflict had high levels of wartime sexual violence, peacebuilding success would be more likely particularly in the initial post-conflict years.

However, as Quarantelli's (1988, p. 16) remarks: "while there often is a period of high solidarity, morale and consensus immediately after a disaster, as time passes, new disagreements and conflicts generated by the relief effort as well as pre-impact group, organizational and community differences, cleavages and hostilities, will all surface again". Indeed, if the peacebuilding efforts of transitional justice mechanisms are not supported and sustained with the passing of time then in the long-term lasting peace will not be secure (Davidian and Kenney, 2017, p. 185); thereby reflecting the results of the 5-year logistic regression models. Moreover, short-term needs and objectives of peacebuilding efforts may potentially contravene long-term goals (Kühne, 2001, p. 383). Kühne (2001, p. 383) cites a key example of this as the disarmament of combatants to prevent violence resurgence and the necessity for long-term reintegration into working society. Ultimately, the initial post-conflict

period is a 'window of opportunity' for peacebuilding efforts to create and foster the conditions for sustainable peace (Byrd, 2008, p. 82). During this time it is critical that countries "develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth" which will not only contribute to sustainable peace but democracy as well (Sambanis, 2008, p. 9, 31).

The variable 'targeting of victims' follows the same pattern as the prevalence of wartime sexual violence within the different time periods. That is, when holding other variables constant, the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period *increases* when the selective targeting of victims *increases*. Yet, when holding other variables constant, the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period *decreases* when the selective targeting of victims *increases*. If the sexual violence experienced during a conflict is selective (i.e. against particular groups) this can be indicative of so-called 'identity wars' – i.e. wars with religious and ethnic origins (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 783). The salience of ethno-cultural identities between and amongst groups has often been linked to the origins and intractability of conflicts (Gurr, 2007, p. 136). If communal groups perceive that they are at a comparative disadvantage from others due to their shared identity then they are likely to start defining "their interests in ethno-cultural terms" and mobilize in order to "seek gains or redress of [the perceived] grievances for their collectivity" (*ibid*, p. 137-140). However, the impact of ethno-cultural identities can also be found later in the conflict cycle in the post-conflict phase, because how ethno-cultural identities are treated during the peacebuilding process has the potential to impact the likelihood of its success (Kaye and Béland, 2009). Whilst differences and grievances amongst belligerents may initially be set aside in the aftermath of a conflict, if those involved in the peacebuilding process fail to de-politicize ethno-cultural identities in the long-term by creating new relationships not based on ethnic solidarity, then the reconciliation of differences becomes harder and the likelihood of war resurgence increases (*ibid*, p. 191; Kaufman, 1996).

Interestingly, the effect of the net ODA received per capita (current US$) on peacebuilding success remained consistent across the multivariate logistic regression models for the 2 and 5 year-periods. That is, the results show that within both a 2 and 5-year period the probability of successful peacebuilding *increases* when the net ODA received per capita (current US$) *increases*. In this research the net ODA received per capita (current US$) acted as a proxy for 'international capacities', similarly to Doyle and Sambanis' (2000, p. 783, 788) research that used the net current account transfers per capita (current US$). International capacities are

essentially the involvement from the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding through financial assistance and/or peace operations (*ibid*, p. 782-783). The (high) level of international capacity available to a post-conflict country is regarded as one of the key determinants of successful peacebuilding (Groß, 2017, p. 20; Dobbins et al., 2007, p. xxii).

More specifically for peace operations, it is the mandates that reflect the level of strength and commitment to peacebuilding (Sambanis, 2008, p. 14). Peace operations that are multidimensional in nature – i.e. "with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight" – have the highest likelihood of improving peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 791). Mandate effectiveness, however, is contingent upon adequate resource allocation (Holt and Boucher, 2011, p. 29). Restricting the resources of UN operations can severely hinder the implementation of peace accords and weaken the peacebuilding process as a whole, potentially leading to war resurgence, as was the case with UNAMIR in 1993 Rwanda (Caplan, 2007, p. 26; Bellamy, 2015, p. 52).

Aid in the form of financial assistance also greatly increases the probability of peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 786). In a post-conflict environment, financial assistance supports the transitions to liberal democracy, promotes security, and assists social and economic development (von der Schulenburg, 2017, p. 39; Groß, 2017, p. 44). Importantly, when giving financial assistance to post-conflict societies it is essential that local grassroots communities be involved in tandem with non-governmental organizations and governments in the creation of "funding categories that are related to a new vision of thinking and peace building [*sic*]" (Byrne, 2009, p. 121; Patrick, 2001, p. 49). However, there is a crucial caveat to the relationship between financial assistance and peacebuilding. Prior to the reduction of foreign financial assistance, countries must ensure the development of local human resources that maintain policies initiated under national development strategies in order to prolong peace (Filipov, 2006, p. 7-8; OECD, 2011, p. 86).

It is important to note that the above results, and the inferences drawn from them, are tenuous at best. None of the logistic regressions that were run showed any significance at any level. The insubstantial pseudo r-squares also highlight the inability of all the models to explain the variation in peacebuilding outcome. The lack of statistical significance is in part due to the limited number of observations that were included in this research (Finkelstein and Levin,

2001, p. 376). Accordingly claiming correlation, let alone causation, between the prevalence of wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome is highly questionable.

Chapter 5. Deviant Case Study

5.1 Justification of chosen deviant case study

Following the results of the quantitative large-N study, the deviant case study briefly detailed in this chapter is the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The Bosnian War was chosen because there were massive levels of sexual violence, particularly rape, that were committed in a systematic and strategic manner (McDevitt-Murphy, Casey and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293; Seto, 2013, p. 31). The acts of sexual violence were predominantly targeted against Bosnian Muslim women with a goal to ethnically cleanse the territory and create a homogenous Serbian nation (Helms, 2013, p. 3; Salzman, 1998, p. 349). Despite this, since the signing the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 – commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement – Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained at relatively stable and at peace; thereby contracting the results from the large-N observational research which found that the probability of peacebuilding success *decreases* as more time passes following the end of a conflict (Morus, 2016, p. xliv; Pugh, 2001, p. 195). Given that the Bosnian War deviates from the expected pattern of theory established – i.e. the peacebuilding efforts proved successful in both the short and long-term rather than only in the immediate post-war years – analyzing this case could reveal information that will help refine the theory of the relationship between wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome (Axinn and Pearce, 2006, p. 88).

5.2 The Bosnian War (1992-1995)

In order to better understand what makes the Bosnian War a unique deviant case we must first establish the historical background of Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to provide context for the succession of developments throughout the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina was originally one of six constituent republics of a country known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see figure 2 on page 37 for a map), which was formed in 1918 out of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Slavic regions of the dissolved Austro-Hungarian Empire (Skutsch, 2005, p. 1325). Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious conglomerate under the communist leadership of Jozef Broz Tito (Kubicek, 2016, p. 56; Amstutz, 2013, p. 22). The various ethnic minorities within Yugoslavia had a long turbulent history of conflict and mutual acrimony that predated the relatively new and artificially created country

(Daalder, 1996, p. 37; Somerville, 2012, p. 65). Despite the hostilities, under Tito's authoritarian regime the country was unified and "the common Yugoslav identity was forged through socialism and suppression of all particular or confessional identities" (Keränen, 2017, p. 94).

Figure 2: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Source: Office of the Historian (2018)

In May of 1980 Tito's death marked a historical political turning point for Yugoslavia (Biondich, 2005, p. 433; Seibert, 2018, p. 50). The power vacuum created after his death ushered in the (re)-emergence of virulent ethnic nationalism across the six constituent republics (Tucker, 2016, p. 506; Daalder, 1996, p. 37; Schwartz, 2010, p. 118). The former system of dictatorial leadership was succeeded by a presidential council comprised of representatives from each republic with a yearly rotating chairmanship (Hall, 2014, p. 359; Bennett, 2014, p. 98). This new political system, however, was unable to cope with the revival of societal divisions and the economic decline that characterized the 1980s. Indeed, by the early 1980s Yugoslavia experienced "periodic shortages in consumer and producer goods… falling growth rates (negative by 1983), decreasing real income and rising inflation" (Todorovic, 1996, p. 175). As for the government, it simply mirrored the flailing economy (Archer, 2007, p. 313). The presidential council lacked unity, consequently weakening the federal government's authority and compounding the mounting ethnic and political tensions across the country (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 83; Amstutz, 2013, p. 22).

The absence of unity and effective political governance was most evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Seaman, 2018, p. 231). This republic was the most culturally diverse with "a numerically similar population of Muslims (44 per cent), Serbians (37 per cent) and Croatians (15 per cent, but with cross-border support from Croatia much larger), with Muslims concentrated in cities and Serbians in the countryside" (Rogel, 2004, p. 27; Kumar, 2012, p. 607). This heterogeneity was reflected in the outcome of the 1990 general elections, with each political party's size and nationality mirroring the country's diverse populace (Kollander, 2004, p. 11). Against a backdrop of unrest and conflict within and amongst the other republics, unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina became increasingly unlikely, particularly as the ethnic populations' support for their respective 'motherlands' grew in hopes of reunifying with them (*ibid*). A pivotal moment in the lead up to the outbreak of war came in March 1992 during the referendum on independence (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 8, 24). Faced with probable independence from the Yugoslav federation due to the Muslim and Croat alliance, and thus minority status in a newly independent state, the Serbs chose to boycott the referendum and refuted the results (Pickering, 2007, p. 26; O'Ballance, 1995, p. 9; Brigety II, 2007, p. 100; Gow, 2003, p. 173).

Shortly after the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to delay recognition from the international community by instigating conflict and "creating a military *fait accompli*" (Lukic and Lynch, 1996, p. 205). However, the delay attempts failed and following international recognition in April of 1992 a full-scale war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bieber, 2006, p. 26). The war years were characterized by the strategic and systemic use of wartime sexual violence, primarily against Bosnian Muslim women (Simić, 2012, p. 85). The main goal of Bosnian Serbs was to ethnically cleanse the country through the instruments of rape and other forms of sexual violence against Muslim and Croatian women (Skinner, 2004, p. 28; Konradi and Schmidt, 2004, p. 676). It should be noted that whilst members of all ethnicities perpetrated acts of wartime sexual violence, it was "the Serbs [that] possessed a greater military force, and it was they who initiated rape as a strategy of war within the broader context of ethnic cleansing or the forceful removal of civilian Muslims from conquered territory to establish a Greater Serbia" (Snyder et al., 2006, p. 189-190; MacDonald, 2008, p. 173).

In particular, to facilitate the implementation of the ethnic cleansing policy Serb forces created what they termed concentration or detention camps that in effect served as rape

camps (Pierpaoli Jr., 2016, p. 184). The locations of the rape camps were numerous and varied, ranging from schools and hotels to commandeered private homes, and even animal stalls in barns (Schott, 2003, p. 103; Wood, 2013, p. 140; Totten and Bartrop, 2008, p. 356; Daniel-Wrabetz, 2007, p. 23). Within these rape camps, women and girls were subjected to repeated incidents of rape as part of the torture process in order to humiliate and terrorize them (LeBor, 2006, p. 150; Weisband, 2018, p. 336). The suffering caused by these acts reverberated onto society outside of the camps, because the violation of a community's women equated the destruction of the groups' identity (Williams, 2015, p. 30). In addition to subjugation and degradation, the rape camps also sought to deliberately and forcefully impregnate the captive Muslim and Croat women (Brouwer, 2005, p. 9; Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 220; Salzman, 1998, p. 358). Rather than be the simple byproduct of rape, these pregnancies were an integral part of the Serbian ethnic cleansing policy because the birth of these children, considered to be Serbs, would propagate the Serbian population across Bosnia and Herzegovina (Allen, 2000, p. 624; Short, 2003, p. 514; Seto, 2013, p. 31).

Though not as prevalent, men were also victims of sexual violence during the war, and particularly within the concentration camps (Sobreiro Sigora, Nassif Avellar and Carneiro Ribeiro, 2012, p. 252; MacKinnon, 2005, p. 315; Wood, 2013, p. 140). Similarly to female victims, males suffered not only rape, but also the mutilation and castration of genitalia (Simić, 2015, p. 243; Gerecke, 2010, p. 142). Male victims had acts of sexual violence committed against them by military forces, and were sometimes forced themselves to commit acts of sexual violence against other detainees (Vojdik, 2014, p. 924; Loncar, Henigsberg and Hrabac, 2010, p. 200). Men who were raped were "feminized by their subjugation and powerlessness, because [of the] stereotypical gender identities inhere in the dynamics of power that attend the commission of these atrocities" (Abreu, 2005, p. 6). As Skjelsbæk (2001, p. 225) argues, it was not only men's masculinities that were feminized but also their ethnic identities; while Serb identities in turn were masculinized given their role as the predominant perpetrators of sexual violence.

Despite the foregoing, the world remained largely passive in its stance towards the ongoing war until 1995 (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 28). Whilst the end of the Cold War brought about "a more enlightened policy towards international intervention" based on humanitarianism – which hitherto had been tainted with "the prism of an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism" – unfolding events elsewhere in the 1990s created obstacles to a

rapid intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Parish, 2010, p. 3-4). The war in Somalia in particular, which broke out following the ousting of General Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, created a shortage of food and growing famine in that country (DiPrizio, 2002, p. 44-45). Mounting criticism from regional organizations and the public to intervene and alleviate the widespread suffering caused by starvation and insecurity ultimately pressured the UN to launch Operation 'Restore Hope' in late 1992 (Wheeler, 2000, p. 175; Lepard, 2002, p. 11; Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2004, p. 56). However, the mission proved disastrous and the US eventually instilled a volte-face policy and withdrew from Somalia following the death of 18 American soldiers in October 1993(Parish, 2010, p. 4). In the throes of this fiasco, the international community proved hesitant to send troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a pre-emptive peacekeeping mission in early 1992, prior to the referendum on independence (*ibid*). A UN Protection Force was eventually deployed in 1993, but could do little to keep a non-existent peace; especially with a weak mandate (Dumbrell, 2009, p. 83). The continual failure by the UN to restore peace and protect civilians culminated in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, where it is estimated that over 7,600 Muslims were killed by Serb forces (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010, p. 109). These killings, coupled with the sexual violence and other atrocities taking place in close proximity to Western Europe, served as a catalyst and led to a material intervention by the international community in the conflict (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 28).

Indeed, in the wake of the Srebrenica tragedy NATO – which had been involved in the Bosnian conflict but to a similar if not lesser extent than the UN – launched an air campaign dubbed Operation 'Deliberate Force'; this action marked a transition from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement (Fenton, 2004, p. 171). The offensive involved hundreds of aircrafts and thousands of personnel from approximately 15 countries and targeted Serb forces (Hallams, 2010, p. 31; Byman and Waxman, 2001, p. 257). It should be acknowledged that this considerable action was not only a response to the disastrous loss of life incurred from the Srebrenica massacre (Krieg, 2013, p. 88); as a protracted conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina – and the Balkans as a whole – would also be detrimental to the rest of Western Europe and its regional geo-strategic interests (*ibid*). While Operation Deliberate Force effectively brought an end to the Bosnian War, by this time "there was a widespread perception that the international community bore significant responsibility for the extent of the Bosnia catastrophe, due to mismanagement, hesitancy and bungling" (Parish, 2010, p. 5).

Accordingly, the peacebuilding efforts during the following decade in Bosnia and Herzegovina saw an unprecedented amount of international assistance – some estimates indicating over 5 billion US$ amounting to as much as 1,000 US$ per capita (Björkdahl, 2013, p. 83; Friedman, 2004, p. 105; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis, 2006, p. 78; Welfens, 2001, p. 133), compared to little over $56 per capita in development assistance for Rwanda in 1993 according to World Bank estimates (The World Bank, 2018). Initially, much of the aid was focused on rebuilding basic infrastructure that had been completely destroyed by the war (Cousens and Cater, 2001, p. 89). The international community also made a significant effort to subsequently normalize Bosnia and Herzegovina's international relations through integration into various global financial institutions (The World Bank, 1997, p. 6). This enabled Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish economic policies and channels through which foreign aid could be funneled and "limit the fiscal deficit of the consolidated public sector to levels compatible with available sources of foreign financing" (*ibid*).

In addition to said financial aid, emphasis was placed on fostering reconciliation through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms at the national and international levels in the form of War Crimes Chambers and an International Criminal Tribunal (Fischer, 2014, p. 107; Somun, 2010, p. 57). These were of paramount importance in light of the pervasive and extensive war crimes that were committed along ethnic lines (Orentlicher, 2018, p. 94). Based on the theory of retributive justice, the international community believed it could individualize guilt for the wartime atrocities, thereby creating an environment favorable to the (re)building of relations between the wider ethnic communities (Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2009, p. 195). In tandem, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent a democratization process that was highly subject to international involvement (Chandler, 2000, p. 154). In accordance with the Dayton Agreement, the Office of the High Representative enforced a multiethnic consociational democracy (Miller, 2013, p. 102). When the 1996 elections brought to power the same pre-war parties, the Peace Implementation Council consequently decided to expand the powers of the High Representative, now enabling him to set laws and terminate officials (Keil and Perry, 2015, p. 6). Whilst some condemn the expansion and (indefinite) extension of the High Representative's powers, "these powers have been [continuously] used to challenge the hold of the leading nationalist parties and encourage the emergence of non-nationalist politics" (Jenne, 2010, p. 86; Chandler, 2000, p. 113-114)

In sum, as it has been shown the international efforts in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to cover all facets of peacebuilding. Despite some criticisms of the consequences of the high level of international intervention – including the long-term effectiveness of the financial aid to the economy, remnants of socio-ethnic tensions due to a thin conception of reconciliation, and fragmented political system – Bosnia and Herzegovina has nonetheless remained at peace since the signing of the Dayton Agreement (Kostić, 2008, p. 409; Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2009, p. 195; Hill, 2011, p. 99). Arguably, were it not for the extensive level of outside involvement that followed after the war had ended, it is unlikely that the peacebuiding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been as successful, and war could have recurred in the later years as suggested by the large-N study. Accordingly, the analysis of the circumstances surrounding this deviant case study shows that it has not refuted the patterns of theory established in the large-N study – that peacebuilding success *decreases* as more time passes following the end of a conflict – but rather confirmed one of its key findings; namely that international assistance, particularly in the form of financial aid, greatly increases the probability of peacebuilding success in both the short and long-term.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary and implications of the main findings

This research set out to investigate whether the prevalence of wartime sexual violence affects peacebuilding outcome. After establishing the theoretical propositions that inform the investigation, it was hypothesized that the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, the lower the probability of successful peacebuilding. A large-N study of 51 conflicts during the period of 1989-2009 confirmed the hypothesis, but only within a 2-year period after the end of a war. It was found that the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period *decreases* when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence *increases*. The control variable 'targeting of victims' followed a similar pattern as the prevalence of wartime sexual violence: *increasing* the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period but *decreasing* it within a 5-year period. Accordingly, these results suggest that the lapse of time following the end of a conflict may be an important factor on the outcome of peacebuilding. The effect of the other control variable, net ODA received per capita (current US$), on peacebuilding outcome remained constant throughout both time periods; i.e. within both a 2 and 5-year period the probability of successful peacebuilding *increases* when the net ODA received per capita (current US$) *increases*.

To further refine the theoretical propositions of this research, a brief deviant case study was also conducted. The deviant case analyzed was the Bosnian War (1992-1995). This case lent itself particularly well for evaluation because despite the massive levels of sexual violence, particularly rape, that were committed in a systematic and strategic manner, the peacebuilding efforts have proved successful in both the short and long-term (McDevitt-Murphy, Casey and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293; Seto, 2013, p. 31). The analysis of the Bosnian War concluded that were it not for the extensive level of outside involvement that followed after the war had ended, it is unlikely that the peacebuiding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been as successful, and war could have quickly recurred. Thus, rather than refute the patterns of theory established in the large-N study, the deviant case analysis confirmed one of its key findings, namely that international assistance, particularly in the form of financial aid, greatly increases the probability of peacebuilding success.

The main findings of this research have important implications for policy-makers and practitioners alike. It appears that the current claims made by numerous international organizations in stating the importance of bringing support and restitution to victims, as well as justice by convicting perpetrators of wartime sexual violence are substantiated; particularly for lasting sustainable peace (Pruitt, 2012, p. 304; Wallström, 2012, p. 2; Boesten, 2014, p. 99). In other words, the provision of differing types of care and services for victims of wartime sexual violence has to be immediate *and* sustained (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2018). Whilst this particularly difficult in post-conflict societies where state institutions are often non-functioning and "pre-existing health structures may have been uprooted", the provision of international assistance can alleviate this strain thereby contributing to sustainable peace (Arieff, 2010, p.11; Heyzer, 2006, p. 353; Hout, 2013, p. 144; Wake, 2008, p. 125). Indeed, sustained international assistance to conflict-emerging countries can support peacebuilding efforts through the promotion of democracy and reconstruction of civil society, especially if executed in a concerted and complimentary manner (Abdushukurova, 2008, p. 191; Tschirgi and de Coning, 2018, p. 445). In addition to supporting the importance of backward-looking mechanisms, such findings also highlight the necessity of establishing forward-looking mechanisms with the objective of avoiding future conflict and fostering new societal relations (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015, p. 175).

By combining both mechanisms, society would experience a transformation "and adoption of psychosocial, political and economic, as well as legal, perspectives on justice" (Lambourne

and Rodriguez Carreon, 2016, p. 86). The increased participation of women in the post-conflict peacebuilding process can also promote the creation of a culture of peace (Njoku, 2014, p. 113; Karam, 2000, p. 12). As Ban Ki-moon the former UNSG (2010, p. 3) explains, women's participation reinforces economic recovery, societal unity, governmental authority; otherwise known as the three pillars of sustainable peace (Aroussi, 2017, p. vii). The beneficial effect of women's participation in the aftermath of conflicts is clearly evidenced in Sierra Leone (Pruitt, 2012, p. 309). Their involvement in the design of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission "helped lead to numerous important outcomes, including support for women's organizations' submissions to the truth commission, allowing witnesses to choose between public or private venues, and instituting a witness protection program for those impacted by crimes of gender-based violence" (*ibid*).

Nonetheless as Dolan (2014, p. 83) notes, any and all responses to wartime sexual violence – particularly those that yield significant power like UNSCR – must be gender-inclusive in order to address all facets of this security and peace problem. That is, in our effort to include women we must ensure that men are not forgotten. Particularly within the area of wartime sexual violence, victimhood has tended to be gendered and synonymous with womanhood (Sjoberg, 2016, p. 139). Indeed, victims are often feminized whilst perpetrators are masculinized with few acknowledgements to the contrary (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 89). Though women are undeniably to a greater extent the victims of wartime sexual violence, as Gorris (2015, p. 421) argues, international law and legal policy's "blindness to conflict-related male sexual victimization not only impedes our understanding of the gendered dynamics of genocides, wars and armed conflict, but also prevents access to support services and justice for male victims".

In sum, giving wartime sexual violence the centrality it deserves in peacebuilding is essential in order to stabilize post-conflict societies and ultimately build sustainable peace by preventing the resurgence of war due to unaddressed grievances (Hague, 2012a, cited in Crawford, 2017, p. 130). Importantly, the establishment of enduring peace and security in post-conflict societies is truly a global affair given that the larger regional and international security of neighboring nations could be threatened if war were to recur (Hazen, 2013, p. 181).

6.2 Research limitations and potential future research

Any research involving the subject of wartime sexual violence must necessarily acknowledge that this phenomenon is difficult to both study and measure accurately (Hultman and Johansson, 2017, p. 146). The social stigma and cultural taboos that often accompany sexual violence leads to vast under-reporting by victims, particularly male survivors (Onyango and Hampanda, 2011, p. 238; Wood, 2010, p. 163; Priddy, 2014, p. 272). However, the research limitations surrounding wartime sexual violence are not limited to micro-level (Palermo and Peterman, 2011, p. 924). Structural obstacles include inaccessible or non-existing authorities to report to and what Berry (2017, p. 833) terms the 'political settlement structure' that creates hierarchies of victimhood (Ferrales and McElrath, 2014, p. 683; Henry, 2009, p. 124). As a consequence of under-reporting governments have been able "to downplay the problem, with the result that rape and related crimes have tended to be treated as an unfortunate form of collateral damage" (Human Security Centre, 2006, p. 108). Methodological limitations, such as the conceptualization of wartime sexual violence and incentive bias, can also impede the investigation and collection of information regarding this topic (Aoláin, 2016, p. 95). Despite these difficulties, wartime sexual violence continues to be a pertinent and persistent issue that can no longer be overlooked or negated (Reis and Vann, 2006, p. 19). Continual research is thus necessary in order to improve our understanding of wartime sexual violence and its potential impact on post-conflict peacebuilding. Rather than focus on peacebuilding as a whole – a concept that can prove difficult to operationalize – future research could limit itself to investigating the impact of wartime sexual violence on one specific aspect of the peacebuilding process such as democratization or nation-building.

Appendix

Logit model in terms of the log of odds: simple logistic regression for 2-year period

$$ln\left[\frac{P(Y=1)}{1-P(Y=1)}\right] = -0.84 + 0.11X$$

Logit model in terms of probabilities: simple logistic regression for 2-year period

$$\hat{p}(y=1) = \frac{\exp(-0.84 + 0.11X)}{\exp(-0.84 + 0.11X) + 1}$$

Logit model in terms of the log of odds: simple logistic regression for 5-year period

$$ln\left[\frac{P(Y=1)}{1-P(Y=1)}\right] = -0.40 + -0.10X$$

Logit model in terms of probabilities: simple logistic regression for 5-year period

$$\hat{p}(y=1) = \frac{\exp(-0.40 + -0.10X)}{\exp(-0.40 + -0.10X) + 1}$$

Strength of association coefficient of determination	
> 0.5	High
0.3 – 0.5	Moderate
0.1 – 0.3	Low
0 – 0.1	Insubstantial

Full version of Table 5. Simple logistic regression for 2-year period

Peacebuilding 2-year	**Coef. (Std. Err.)**	**z**	**P>z**	**[95% Confidence Interval]**	
Prevalence	0.11 (0.29)	0.38	0.701	-0.45	0.67
Constant	-0.84 (0.48)	-1.74	0.082	-1.78	0.11
Number of observations = 51					
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0023					
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.39					
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001					

Full version of Table 6. Simple logistic regression for 5-year period

Peacebuilding 5-year	Coef. (Std. Err.)	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Prevalence	-0.10 (0.28)	-0.34	0.733	-0.65	0.46
Constant	-0.40 (0.46)	-0.87	0.382	-1.29	0.50
Number of observations = 51					
Pseudo r^2 = 0.0017					
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.62					
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001					

Full version of Table 7. Multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period

Peacebuilding 2-year	Coef. (Std. Err.)	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Prevalence	0.01 (0.31)	0.04	0.964	-0.60	0.63
Targeting	1.78 (4.12)	0.43	0.665	-6.29	9.85
ODA	0.005 (0.007)	0.71	0.475	-0.008	0.018
Constant	-1.03 (0.53)	-1.92	0.055	-2.07	0.02
Number of observations = 51					
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0140					
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.01					
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001					

Full version of Table 8. Multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period

Peacebuilding 5-year	Coef. (Std. Err.)	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Prevalence	-0.12 (0.31)	-0.40	0.692	-0.73	0.48
Targeting	-0.31 (4.12)	-0.07	0.941	-8.38	7.76
ODA	0.003 (0.007)	0.47	0.639	-0.010	0.016
Constant	-0.48 (0.50)	-0.96	0.338	-1.47	0.50
Number of observations = 51					
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0050					
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.51					
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001					

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