An Analysis of South-Asia in light of Regional Integration

Investigation of the Kashmir Conflict and Prospects of International Mediation

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Abbreviations

ADB   Asian Development Bank

ASEAN   Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

AICHR   ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights

BBIN   Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal

BCIM   Bangladesh China India Myanmar

BIMSTEC   Bay of Bengal Initiative in MultiSectoral Technical & Economic Cooperation

BJP   Bharatiya Janta Party

BRICS   Brazil Russia India China South-Africa

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

CSF   Coalition Support Funding

EDA   Excess Defense Articles

ESF   Economic Support Funds

EU   European Union

FDI   Foreign Direct Investment

FMF   Foreign Military Financing

FTA   Free Trade Agreement

GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council

IMF   International Monetary Fund

IR   International Relations

IT   Information Technology

KLB	Kerry Lugar Berman Bill
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEO	Mutually Enticing Opportunities
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
SAARC	SouthAsian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asia Free Trade Agreement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
PD	Public Diplomacy
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
VNSA	Violent Non State Actors

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

South-Asia is widely referred to as the least integrated region in the world. Moreover, although most states within the region have maintained consistent economic growth over the recent years, the region is still redolent of conflicts and poor records of human development. Regional integration is a highly complex phenomenon, with subjective variations in different (sub) regional contexts. The South-Asian region faces significant dilemmas for regional integration, owing primarily to the prevalent security concerns between India and Pakistan. The conflict in Kashmir is one of the most intractable and vehement conflicts in the world, which commenced in the second-half of the twentieth century, and has continued well into the twenty-first. Different scenarios are taking place around the globe in this second decade of the twenty-first century. The international community continues to witness advancements in a multitude of areas such as conventional and nuclear arms race, information revolution and subsequent cyber security and warfare, globalization of the economy, institutional glory and valor, the accentuation of normative vigor of ideas and perceptions, terrorist activities, piracy, and so on.

The simultaneous rise in these various phenomena and more, pose an incrementally challenging burden on the singular explanatory and descriptive power of the mainstream schools of international relations theory. This is especially true in studying certain phenomena such as regional integration, where multiple schools of IR are at play, and this inhibits the dominion of one or even two modes of IR theory. Consequently, "a natural division of labor has emerged, wherein realists tend to focus upon the likelihood of war and stability, liberals on the conditions

leading to peace, and constructivists on the foundations of long-lasting or positive peace and the emergence of pluralistic security communities."[1] Hence the goal is to move away from the "war of paradigms" to address regional transformation through an intra- and inter-paradigmatic exchange.[2] Regional processes may also vary in terms of the level of political or economic integration, which may impact the level of stability, and the ability of states and regional organizations to manage disputes within a region.[3] For instance, the regional scenario in Europe is characterized as advanced in terms of integration, with institutions for specific purposes, including a common market, monetary policy, legal affairs, as well as conflict management. In contrast, the regional scenario in East Asia, and South-Asia is not as institutionalized, or integrated, as states in these regions have a very high regard for state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states.

This study will illustrate the regional scenario in South-Asia, along with its nature and characteristics. The South-Asian region is at a delicate juncture today, largely due to the existence of an intractable conflict between the two regional powers i.e. India and Pakistan. Additionally, the integration scenario is interesting as the region is, in addition to being a significant security concern, also a nuclear hotspot between the two regional powers, with consistent operation of transnational terrorist organizations. Additionally, despite its existence as a regional organization, the South Asian Association for regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been unable to provide, or contribute towards regional cooperation and security. The dormancy

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[1] Paul, T. V ed., (2012). Strategies and Mechanisms of Regional Change. p-283.

[2] The expression "war of paradigms" was coined by Harry Eckstein but was applied to the field of comparative politics, see Eckstein, H. (1998). *Unfinished Business*, pp.505-534.

[3] Paul, T. V ed., (2012). Strategies and Mechanisms of Regional Change. pp. 283-298.

of SAARC can be elucidated largely from the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the complex domestic political landscapes within the regional powers also add a sense of volatility for regional integration to manifest. Furthermore, elements of structural and cultural violence are predominant in the domestic structures of the rival nuclear powers.

With a declining Western influence, today's international system is incrementally being defined by interactions between regions and regional powers. Regional peace and a sense of community, which have been firmly established in the North Americas and Western Europe can be explained due to the lack (or resolution) of an intractable conflict between the major powers of those regions. It is difficult to imagine the EU, without resolution of the protracted conflict between France and Germany. It could thus be inductively argued that for regions to exist in peaceful manifestations, the rivalry between regional powers must be pacified. In other words, regional stability and community is contingent upon a positive peace between regional powers. Additionally, deductive reasoning suggests that for regional integration and transformation to materialize in South Asia, it is vital that the differences between India and Pakistan are peacefully resolved, either bilaterally, via international mediation, or through SAARC (with international support). A major portion of this study is therefore directed towards an investigation of the Kashmir conflict, and the prospects of international mediation towards its resolution.

The proposal pertaining resolution of the Kashmir conflict is radical, but as this is not the objective of this study, it is outlined in Appendix 1. It essentially concerns converting Kashmir into a joint autonomous federal protectorate of India and Pakistan. Administration and governance will be based on representation, and funding from both parent states (including international funding). This option is proposed as both India and Pakistan claim Kashmir in its

entirety, and neither seem to be able to govern Kashmir and provide the necessary public goods, and establish a positive peace simultaneously. It could thus be a good idea to turn divergence into convergence.

Additionally, it must be noted that mediation can only occur with the consent of India and Pakistan. And for this to happen, there needs to be mutually enticing opportunities for both countries, which regards cooperation and the benefits that come along as a far better option than continuing the conflict. For instance, the ECSC made cooperation between France and Germany more attractive, and relegated continuance of hostilities as unattractive. The difference between Europe and South-Asia is that the former was devastated after two world wars and hence a sense of desperation was prevalent for cooperation. Contrastingly, India and Pakistan seem to be accustomed to the manifest negative peace. Nevertheless, the desperation, or the ripe time for reconciliation is prevalent also in South-Asia like it was in Europe. This is mainly due to: structural violence, poor records of human development in the region, denial of human rights to the Kashmiri populace, and the inherent instability of Pakistan's vastly growing nuclear arsenal in the backdrop of Jihadi terrorism. As this study will indicate, the terrorist scenario and its link with Pakistan's intelligence agencies is complicated, and these violent non state actors often act during times of diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Furthermore, this study will verify that hard power, i.e. economic and military might, has proved largely fruitless in the context of South-Asia. Billions of dollars worth of American aid (both economic and military) have proven largely futile, although not absolutely. In a similar vein, the hard power endowments of India, in the economic and military domains have also proved unable in generating New Delhi's preferred outcomes from Islamabad. Therefore, it is important to

address the future of power in the region, demonstrating the apposite kinds of power, i.e. soft and smart power, which will be crucial prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. Bilaterally, the efforts of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir conflict have proved futile so far, and cannot be expected to materialize anytime soon. Therefore, mediation either through SAARC, or the apposite coalition of third-party mediators is expected to be the panacea for resolving the Kashmir conflict. This leads to the research question this study aims to explore.

What are the prerequisites for the manifestation of regional integration in South-Asia?

This study will seek to answer this research question by utilizing a multi-paradigmatic or eclectic approach, simultaneously composed of more than two schools of IR thought.

The reason behind the choice of such an approach is to cast a wider theoretical net, as this study contains concepts, theories, and overall literature from a wide range of schools within the realm of IR. This approach will be further distributed in a top-down approach (which essentially entails elites and state governments), and a bottom-up approach (which entails the wider population). It is believed that a positive peace between India and Pakistan, resolution of the Kashmir conflict, and international mediation to materialize the resolution are vital prerequisites for regional integration in South-Asia. Additionally, soft and smart power will play a crucial role in regional integration, and eventual transformation.

1.2. Conceptualization of important elements

1.2.1. Conceptualizing regional integration

For the purposes of this study, it is essential to identify the characteristics of a region, and consequently define it as a "cluster of states that are proximate to each other and are interconnected in spatial, cultural, and ideational terms in a significant and distinguishable manner" as developed by T.V. Paul.[4] Additionally, in accordance with Buzan and Wæver, the geographical element is also crucial in the conceptualization of a region.[5] Thus, the South-Asian region encapsulates its eight constituent states, namely: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This conceptualization is substantiated by the establishment of the regional organization SAARC in 1985.[6]

Semantic confusion often arises in the study of regional integration, which is confounded with overlapping cognate activities. In order to ensure evaluative clarity, it is fundamental to a scholar of regional integration to exclude these other pursuits.[7] In other words, it is important to distinguish between regional integration and other competing terms such as regionalism, regional cooperation, regional organization, regional movements, regional systems, or regional subsystems of a global system.[8] "Regional cooperation, organization, systems, and subsystems

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[4] Paul, T. V. (2012). *International Relations Theory And Regional Transformation*. pp.283-298.

[5] Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and powers*.

[6] It is noteworthy that Afghanistan joined the organization in 2005, owing primarily to India's bidding.

[7] Ernst B. Haas (1970). *The Study of Regional Integration*, pp.606-646.

[8] For a representative agenda of topics and articles illustrating the rubrics of the aforementioned competing terms such as regionalism, regional cooperation, regional organization, regional movements, regional systems, etc., see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.) (1968). *International Regionalism: Readings*.

may help describe steps on the way, but they should not be confused with the resulting condition."[9] Thus, as regional integration is unique and discrete from all previous systematic studies of political unification, for the purpose of conceptual clarity in this study, regional integration is conceptualized as a "non-coercive" process, as developed by Ernst Haas.[10] In accordance with Haas, it is evaluated as a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms. This entails cooperation between regional members through regional institutions and common practices.

Regional integration without reconciliation between India and Pakistan will manifest negative peace. Consequently, negative peace without reconciliation leads to structural violence. The appeasement of animosity between New Delhi and Islamabad will contribute towards abatement of structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace, i.e positive peace. In other words, regional integration in South-Asia is analogous with abatement of structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace. Without the reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad, the salient negative peace and structural violence will continue unhindered. In other words, without regional integration in South-Asia, structural violence will not be abated, and structural peace will not be manifested (and vice-versa, i.e without abatement of structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace, there will be no regional integration in South-Asia). The absence of personal as well as structural violence will make salient positive peace in South-Asia. The continuance of negative peace (absence of personal violence), and structural violence will inhibit regional integration. Without the absence of personal as well as structural violence, there

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[9] Nye, J. S. (1968). *Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement*, pp. 856-858.

[10] Ernst B. Haas (1970). *The Study of Regional Integration*. pp. 606-646.

will be no manifestation of positive peace. By means of abating structural violence, regional integration will contribute towards manifesting structural peace.

1.2.2. Conceptualizing violence and peace

Johan Galtung asserts "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations."[11] This is relevant with Kashmir, India, and Pakistan (as well as the region). This can be operationalized by the poor records of human development, and chronic poverty. Initially, Galtung developed two types of violence, namely: personal, and structural violence. Personal violence pertains after-war and/or between-war periods, including periods of negative peace, akin to frozen conflicts such as Kashmir. Furthermore, as the period protracts sufficiently for the outburst of personal violence to be partly forgotten, one could expect a concentration on structural violence.[12] Galtung conceives of structural violence as something that shows a certain stability, whereas personal violence shows tremendous fluctuations over time. The condition of structural violence is often referred to as social injustice. The current scenario in Kashmir, in which human rights and property are violated, inhibiting their actual potential, is thus analogous with structural violence. The present study will not delve into the difference between personal and structural violence here, and instead recommend an overview of Galtung's study.

With this brief distinction the notion of violence becomes two-sided, as does the notion of peace, which is conceived of as the absence of violence. In Galtung's words "an extended concept of

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[11] See Galtung, J. (1969). *Violence, Peace, and Peace research*. p-169.

[12] See Galtung, J. (1969). pp.167-191.

violence leads to an extended concept of peace." Akin to a coin with two sides, one side alone being only one aspect of the coin, not the complete coin, peace also has two sides: absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence.[13] These in turn are referred to as *negative peace* and *positive peace*.

Galtung also posits that peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but also with development theory. These two kinds of peace are pointed out, owing to the fact that the situation in Kashmir can be characterized by negative peace, and the aim of this this study is to search for a solution that allows positive peace. The third type of violence, i.e. cultural violence was developed essentially as a follow-up of Galtung's introduction of the concept of structural violence. Cultural violence is defined as "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form."[14] Cultural violence pertains those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of existence which is exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.[15] Moreover, "the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society."[16] In other words, how the resource draining arms race in the face of poverty and poor human development is justified to domestic constituencies. In agreement with Galtung, violence can be characterized as "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially

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[13] Ibid. p-183.

[14] Galtung, J. (1990). *Cultural Violence*. pp.291-305.

[15] Ibid. p-291.

[16] Ibid.

possible." Despite the symmetries there is a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, remaining essentially the same for long periods.[17] Additionally, as per the conflict cycle developed by Michael Lund, the Kashmir conflict is currently at a phase of unstable peace, arguably deeming it frozen.[18] Such an attribute is analogous to negative peace.

1.2.3. Conceptualizing intractability and protraction

Zartman asserts, "true intractability would mean that the subject area would always be in conflict. Nonetheless, some conditions of intractability may be longer lasting and less manipulable than others."[19] To begin with, the five internal characteristics developed by Zartman which combine to identify intractable conflicts are (1) protracted time; (2) identity denigration; (3) conflict profitability; (4) absence of ripeness; and (5) solution polarization. These are not causal elements for the conflict's initiation but rather processual features that evolve as the conflict continues and serve to develop and reinforce its intractability.[20] These characteristics may be considered as causal elements in the conflict's intractability, but they are more appropriately considered as definitional elements that elucidate the challenge and complexity of

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[17] Galtung, J. (1977). Chapter-9.

[18] Lund, M. (1996). p-38.

[19] Zartman, I.W. (2005). *Analyzing Intractability*. pp.47-64. The author discusses a set of contextual characteristics associated with the mediation process plus a structural or geographic characteristic as well.

[20] Ibid. pp. 47-64.

intractability.[21] Zartman suggests that its also beneficial to perceive these as obstructing characteristics that makes any effort to resolve, or transform such conflicts extremely difficult. In addition, he asserts that another significant feature of all these characteristics is their evolving and self-reinforcing nature. Even as identified, they are not static, i.e they grow, in both degree and nature, extending and defending themselves, so that efforts to overcome them must penetrate several layers and deal with their protective dynamics.[22]

As it is redolent of scholarly analyses regarding the conflict in Kashmir as protracted in nature, a brief examination of the phenomena is in order. As Zartman asserts, protraction is a definitional characteristic of intractable conflict and is self-reinforcing, "intractability feeds on intractability and grows with the feeding." Hence, a definition of the characteristic of protraction is in line, as developed by Zartman. He posits that a conflict is not really intractable until it has gone on for a while and resisted attempts to render it tractable. This is reminiscent of the scenario in Kashmir and attempts from New Delhi and Islamabad. "The importance of protraction, however, lies not in its numerical duration but in that duration's effect."[23] Duration paves the path for incremental hurdles which add to the problems of making such conflicts tractable. Conflicts are "ingrained into the history and mythology of the parties, an ideological explanation for national efforts and problems, and so parties become reliant on them and are loath to part with them."[24] This is reminiscent of the state of affairs between India and Pakistan, in light of domestic public opinion, political opposition, and (manipulable) public outcry.

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[21] Mandel, R, and Clarke, S. (1982). *Intractability and International Bargaining*

[22] Zartman, I.W. (2005). p.48.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Rosoux, V. (2000). *Les usages de Ia memoire dans les relations internationals*. Brussels: Bruylant.

They become institutionalized by the parties as subjects of perverse routines for carrying out the conflict economically, stretching from alliances and resolutions to hotlines and border regimes.[25] Meerts asserts "they become the subjects of sunken costs, the vehicles of entrapment, which blind the parties to possible cooperation and solution."[26] As a result, parties become insulated against the perception of stalemate and the costs attached to it. Instead, the conflicting parties look for opportunities to escalate the conflict to possible unilateral advantage (transitive escalation), and at the same time become vulnerable to internal and external dynamics of the conflict to escalate on its own (intransitive escalation).[27]

1.2.4. Conceptualizing conflict resolution and transformation

Just as regional integration has several overlapping and cognate activities mentioned earlier, so does conflict resolution. These are transformation, management, settlement, containment, regulation, and so on.[28] Hence, for the sake of clarity and precision, it is useful to state at the outset that this study is concerned primarily with two of these overlapping terms, i.e. resolution, and transformation. It is theorized that the first major step or goal is resolution (considering other activities have proved to be largely fruitless), which will pave the way for regional integration in South-Asia, and SAARC will prove to set the centre-stage for regional cooperation. Transformation of the conflict in Kashmir, on the other hand, would lead to regional

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[25] Kriesberg, L. (2005). *Nature, Dynamics and Phases of Intractability,* pp. 65-98.

[26] Meerts, P. (2004). *Entrapment and Escalation*

[27] See for instance, Smoke, R. (1977). *War.*; Zartman, I. W. (2004). *The Dynamics of Escalation*.

[28] For definitions of these terms, see Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). pp.30-32.

transformation, whereby South-Asia will act as a single political entity with relatively smooth decision-making, consensus, and cooperation in issues of mutual concern.

Conflict resolution can be perceived as a top-down approach in the eclectic framework of this study, and transformation as a bottom-up approach. The former pertains to elite decision making and consensus, and the latter requires socialization process pertaining people (such as education, people to people contact, exchange of ideas, etc).

Defining these two concepts are now in order. Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are adequately addressed, i.e cessation of violent behavior, hostile attitudes, and a change in the structure of the conflict.[29] "Conflict transformation is a significant step beyond conflict resolution, which represents its deepest level. It implies a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural peace-building."[30] It must be noted that transformation cannot be ascertained, or achieved, and neither is the objective of this study. It is a phenomena that can only occur naturally with the passage of time and practice. Furthermore, conflict resolution can be perceived as a top-down (elite and state driven) process, whereas transformation as a bottom-up (wider public and civil society driven) process. Studies indicate both top-down and bottom-up approaches are necessary for conflict resolution and eventual transformation.[31]

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[29] Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). pp.3-32.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Lederach, J. P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse University Press.; Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.; Ury, W. L. (2000). *The third side: Why we fight and how we can stop,* New York: Penguin books pp.4-17.; Ury, W. L. (1987). Strengthening international mediation. *Negotiation Journal,* 3(3), pp.225-229.;

1.2.5. Conceptualizing international mediation

Prominent scholars of the field describe mediation as a "mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the conflicting parties find a solution that they cannot find by themselves."[32] When two conflicting parties are dealing with each other's actions and issues, it is not difficult to imagine a spiral of (mutual) hostility between them. Therefore, it is widely believed that the entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behavior of the disputants.[33] Additionally, depending on the resources of the mediator, the conflicting parties may also be induced by being presented with attractive inducements (economic aid, FDI, tariff reduction, among others), which is more attractive than continuing the conflict. Mediation essentially involves the voluntary intervention of one or more third parties, depending on the specific context. It is a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome, although it is often combined with positive and negative inducements (mediation with muscle via carrots and sticks).[34] This study will further elaborate on mediation in the designated section.

1.2.6. Conceptualizing cooperation

Cooperation can be characterized as "a situation where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for each of the participants that would be unavailable to them by unilateral action, at

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[32] Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (2006). p-428.

[33] Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). p-21.

[34] See for instance Vuković, S. (2012). pp.265-293.

some cost."[35] Cooperation is thus fundamental not only for the functioning of regional organizations as mediators, but also for a coalition of third parties to mediate the Kashmir conflict in an effective manner. "It implies a dynamic through which parties with competing interests decide to pool their resources and capabilities in order to attain common gains. Cooperation is not coincidental, as it represents a conscious and planned course of action through which participants reach an agreement to overcome their incompatibility by working together."[36] One explanation of why cooperation takes place is the existence of interdependence.[37] From the perspective of negotiation, "cooperation is a process in which participating actors combine competing interests to obtain common ones."[38] By exchanging the necessary information about interests and needs, conflicting parties redefine their incompatibilities by seeking to create joint gains.[39]

Scholars posit establishing joint gains requires abandonment of maximalist goals, along with formulation of solutions which are based on mutually beneficial compromise.[40] Furthermore, the element of reciprocity is also integral to the process, as the creation of joint gains through cooperation is only possible if parties are willing to reciprocate. Reciprocity is essentially an assurance that cooperative behavior will be rewarded with a similar behavior in the future.[41]

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[35] Zartman, I. W. and Touval, S. (2010). *International cooperation*, p1.

[36] Vuković, S. (2015). p.46.

[37] Keohane, R,. and Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and Interdependence,* pp. 132-134.

[38] Hopmann, P. T. (2010). pp.95-110.

[39] Vuković, S. (2015). p.47.

[40] Hopmann, P. T. (2001). p.219.

[41] Vuković, S. (2015) p-47.

"Parties reciprocate cooperation not so much because they expect an immediate reward but because they have a relationship built upon trust in which they can expect the other to reciprocate whenever necessary at any indefinite time in the future."[42] One of the forthcoming sections of this study pertaining multiparty mediation will elaborate a bit more on cooperation.

1.2.7. Conceptualizing the notion of success

The final element that needs to be addressed is the notion of success, which is challenging to conceptualize or define, as the evidence of success or failure is rather vague. Additionally, as Bercovitch described "what appears successful to one person may be seen as unsuccessful by others. Mediation may seem successful at one time only to be seen as totally unsuccessful months or years later."[43] Such reasoning can also be applied to the Kashmir conflict and mediation effects on India and Pakistan. In the past, ceasefire agreements, removal of armed personnel, observation, and investigation lasted initially, no matter the duration, thus being successful in these accounts. The aversion of another war in 1999 and continuation of official dialogue can be perceived as additional successes.[44] Nevertheless, the conflict, and the region demands renewed mediation efforts towards a positive peace. Hence, success is theorized to be grounded on attaining a positive peace, and regional integration in South-Asia. Additionally, success would also be pertinent to satisfying the core needs and interests of all parties concerned, i.e. the Kashmiri people, New Delhi, and Islamabad.

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[42] Hopmann, P. T. (2010). pp. 103-104.

[43] Bercovitch, J. (2007), p.31.

[44] The current author has addressed these points for a term paper for the course: *conflict, civil wars and mediation*.

1.3. Literature Review

As the primary objective of this study is to illustrate the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, it is vital to investigate the prospects of international mediation in resolving the Kashmir conflict. Additional important elements are soft and smart power. This indicates that several schools of literature have played an instrumental part in this study. In other words, separate modes of IR literature are clubbed together for obtaining the goals of this study. For the sake of clarity, different schools or modes of literature will be addressed separately, with references to the commendable contributions out there.

The integration, or rather transformation of Western Europe into a pluralistic security community of states via resolution of an intractable conflict between the two continental major powers has contributed to an upsurge in the systematic study of regions.[45] Consequently, studies have been conducted for the efforts at community building in Southeast Asia.[46] A study on East Asia indicates a distinctive set of regional institutions, which characterize a regional society of states.[47] Another study on the Middle East found sufficient differentiation from the global level to see a distinct regional society, i.e. League of Arab States.[48] Comprehensive systematic studies with a focus on South-Asia are abundant in the scholarly literature, but whats arguably lacking is a systematic multifaceted theoretical perspective which addresses the diverse regional dynamics.

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[45] T.V. Paul (2012). *Regional Transformation in International Relations*. pp.283-298.

[46] Acharya, A. (2014). *Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*.; Wei-Yen, D. H. (2007). *Brick by brick: the building of an ASEAN economic community.*

[47] Buzan, B and Zhang, Y. (2009). International Society and East Asia: English School Theory at the Regional Level

[48] Buzan, B and Gonzalez-Peláez, A. (2009). *International Society and the Middle East*, pp.226-50.

As examining a region is advantageous, more information about regional processes is desirable. For instance, knowing whether regional peace-keeping machinery is more effective than UN procedures is important for conflict resolution purposes.[49] Moreover, the study of regional integration allows a comparative study of foreign policies with domestic policies, and also to connect it with international processes.[50]

The generalizability of the approaches used in previous studies is questionable. In all fairness, it is difficult to generalize approaches or findings from different regional contexts, which are fraught with subjective explanatory or deductive capacities; facts, issues, and interpretations. The unique characteristic of the approach utilized in this study lies in the multi-paradigmatic or eclectic account, which could serve as a theoretical umbrella to study other regions, with tailor-made region specific dynamics. Hence, it makes such an approach replicable in other regional contexts without much challenges. Additionally, modifications can be made according to subjective regional dynamics.

Within the realm of IR, different scholars use divergent theories, integrationist or otherwise, and some are even antithetical. For Europe, scholars theorize the legitimacy of supra-national organizations via integrationist theories focusing on cooperation and integration. Scholars seem to have exhausted neo-functionalism as a theoretical framework, led by this theory's explanatory might in examining Western Europe, only to find the lack of complementarity in other regional contexts.[51] Ernst Haas posits this theory's applicability in the developing or third world as

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[49] Haas, E. (1970). pp.607-646.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

unsuitable. Nevertheless, if cooperation in any one sector or issue area leads to cooperation in another, this theory passes its test in applicability. The inter-governmentalist approach of Stanley Hoffman is relevant in the context of South-Asia, which regards national governments of states as a significant factor related to regional integration.

As noted earlier, the surge in regional integration studies is a significant development in international relations. It can be argued that every country today is now virtually a member of at least one regional institution. The existing literature contains several remarkable studies which examine the regional scenario in South-Asia.[52] These comprehensive studies comparatively utilize theories of trade, security, great-power influence, and domestic political theories to examine South-Asia. Nevertheless, there is little research on a comprehensive account that contains external as well as internal factors in a regional context. It should also be noted that regional subgroups (such as BBIN, BCIM, BIMSTEC), will not be touched upon, and instead SAARC would be focused upon, which encompasses all regional members in one institution.

Detailed studies have attempted to analyze South Asia vis-a-vis SAARC, presenting insights of its impact on regional integration, or lack thereof.[53] Additional accounts are also available, which address trade and economic aspects of regional integration. One study evaluates SAARC beyond

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[52] See, Dossani, R., Sneider, D. and Sood, V. (2010). Does South Asia exist?. Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.; Francois, J., Rana, P. and Wignaraja, G. (2009). *National Strategies for Regional Integration: South and East Asian Case Studies.* London, UK: Anthem Press.; Razzaque, M. and Basnett, Y. (eds.) (2014). *Regional Integration in South Asia: Trends, Challenges and Prospects,* Commonwealth Secretariat, London.; Ganguly, S. (2006). *South Asia.* New York: New York University Press.; Chari, P., Cheema, P. and Cohen, S. (2003). *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990.* London: Routledge Curzon.; Kumaraswamy, P. and Copland, I. (2009). *South Asia: The Spectre of Terrorism.* New Delhi: Routledge.; Hagerty, D. (2005). *South Asia in World Politics.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.; Shastri, A. and Wilson, A. (2013). *The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Political and Constitutional Problems.* Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

[53] See for instance: Dash, K. (2008). *Regionalism in South Asia: negotiating cooperation, institutional structures.* London: Routledge; Saez, L. (2012). *The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) : An emerging collaboration architecture.* Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.

economic integration to present a detailed appraisal of cooperation in environmental security, human welfare, and cooperation in security matters.[54] Another volume examines human development and well-being, and reveals in light of the current trajectory, the alarming impact on the region, as well as the wider international community.[55] All of these aforementioned studies consistently argue that any progress towards regional integration in South-Asia hinges on the cooperation between India and Pakistan.

Furthermore, several noteworthy studies address aptly, the intractable conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.[56] For instance, Sumit Ganguly analyzes the dynamics of the region since the advent of partition of the subcontinent.[57] In another study, he demonstrates the erosion of singular claims of both India and Pakistan. In case of the former, the erosion of secularity and rigging of elections in the 1980s; for the latter, the atrocities, plight, and eventual break-up of East from West Pakistan meant that sympathy towards Kashmir was not based solely on religion.[58] Additional important matters have also been examined in previous studies, namely, the

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[54] Ahmed, Z. (2013). *Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC.* Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

[55] Najam, A. and Yusuf, M. (2013). *South Asia 2060 : Envisioning Regional Futures.* London: Anthem Press.

[56] See for instance, Ganguly, S. (2016). *Deadly impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century.* S.l.: Cambridge University Press.; Cohen, S. (2013). *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.; Ganguly, S. and Thompson, W. (2011). *Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-level Games.* Stanford, California.: Stanford Security Series.; Schofield, V. (2003). *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War.* London: I.B. Tauris.; Chari, P., Cheema, P. and Cohen, S. (2003). *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990.* London: Routledge Curzon.; Hakeem, A. (2014). *Paradise on Fire: Syed Ali Geelani and the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir.* Kube Publishers.; Davis, Z. (2011). *The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South Asia.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[57] Ganguly, S. (2013). *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947.* New York: Columbia University Press.

[58] Ganguly, S. (2004). *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect.* Routledge. London: Frank Cass. *See also*, Widmalm, S. (2014). *Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India.* London: Routledge/Curzon.

evolution of American policy,[59] the dangers of nuclear escalation,[60] and the insurgency scenario in the disputed lands.[61]

The approach of this study owes to the fact that previous analyses and proposals have neither accentuated greater regional integration, nor resolution of the conflict in Kashmir. Previous contributions have focused too much on the causes, persistence, and other details about the conflict itself, without a realistic and applicable proposal for resolution on a equitable basis. This study aspires to fill this gap by presenting a fresh outlook, along with a proposal which might change the trajectory of regional integration in South-Asia. Additionally, as soft and smart power have an instrumental role as prerequisites, insights will be inferred and borrowed from Joseph Nye Jr, the progenitor of these concepts. In terms of mediation and conflict management literature, prominent scholars footnoted accordingly will be relied upon.

Lessons learnt from Europe, North America, and Southeast Asia (to an extent) indicate that either cooperation between two powerhouse states in a region, or the legitimate leadership of one can be the best guarantor of regional stability and integration. Hence the devotion of particular

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[59] Riedel, B. (2013). *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.; Ganguly, S. and Fair, C. (2008). *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces.* New York: Oxford University Press.; Chari, P., Cheema, P. and Cohen, S. (2007). *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

[60] Ganguly, S. and Kapur, S. (2010). *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia.* New York: Columbia University Press.; Ganguly, S. and Hagerty, D. (2005). *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.; Khan, S. (2009). *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan.* London: Routledge.; Hagerty, D. (1998). *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia.* Cambridge, Massachusetts.: MIT Press.; Wirsing, R. (2003). *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe

[61] Ganguly, S. and Fidler, D. (2009). *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned.* London: Routledge.

attention to India elucidates the extent of its impact on regional integration in South-Asia.[62]

Studies also reveal India's pursuance of predominantly hegemonic strategies, which inhibit New Delhi to generate a perspective of genuine leadership among regional neighbors.[63] Similarly, studies also demonstrate Pakistan's troubled history of jihadi militancy and terrorism, military coups, dictators, insurgences, and harboring terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, which inhibit the generation of genuine trust from observers in Washington to New Delhi.[64]

Much information is also available about Kashmir, its history, and also the current situation. Scholarly accounts are also redolent of the justifications of India and Pakistan, and which of these states should Kashmir be a part of.[65]

The elements of regional integration, Kashmir conflict and its resolution, smart power, and international multiparty mediation exist as components of the eclectic approach. This study merges these elements in investigating regional integration in South-Asia. In other words, these elements within the realm of IR are merged to find a diplomatic solution to the Kashmir conflict, which is in turn believed to accentuate regional integration in South-Asia.

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[62] Mazumdar, A. (2015). *Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia.* Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis.; Michael, A. (2013). *India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism.* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.; Siddiqui, A. (2007). *India and South Asia: Economic Developments in the Age of Globalization.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

[63] Destradi, S. (2012). *Indian Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia: Regional Power Strategies.* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.; see also, Ogden, C. (2014). *Indian Foreign Policy.* Cambridge: John Wiley and Sons.

[64] For a detailed account, see Fair, C. and Watson, S. (2015). *Pakistan's Enduring Challenges.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

[65] See for instance, Ganguly, S. (2004). *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect.* Routledge. London: Frank Cass.; Cohen, S. (2004). *The idea of Pakistan.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.; Mohan, C. Raja, Rizvi, H. A., Schaffer, H, and Kathwari, M. (2009). "How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia." CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations website.

1.4. A multi-paradigmatic or eclectic framework

This thesis project aims to investigate the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. Essentially, it is an investigation of the impact of a protracted conflict on regional integration, and its resolution (through mediation) on the regions future trajectory. As indicated in the introduction, a multi-paradigmatic approach will be adopted to guide the theoretical framework of this study, in which variables linked with different IR theories will be utilized. It could be regarded as a typological theory of sorts. Such a framework will be supplementary in considering a broader spectrum of alternative explanations by wielding a much wider theoretical reach.[66]

Furthermore, analytical eclecticism as a strategy for theoretical innovation is based on the grounds that "the complex links between power, interests, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm."[67] Consequently, proponents of an eclectic approach postulate that more variables should be considered for analyzing empirical puzzles, rather than striving for a "parsimonious and often incomplete explanations."[68] Analytic eclecticism is defined as comprising "an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners."[69]

The study of regional integration in South-Asia, or any other region in the world for that matter, is rather diverse theoretically in today's time, owing to the variety of forces at play. Hence it would be unwise to ignore the mainstream modes of IR thought. Therefore, Norrin Ripsman's

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[66] Paul, T. V. (2012). pp. 3-22.

[67] Katzenstein, P. and Okawara, N. (2002). pp.153-185.

[68] Hlatky, S. V. (2012). pp.283-298.

[69] Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2010). *Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics,* pp.411-431.

eclectic or multi-paradigmatic account will be employed, in which he combines different IR theories and provides an analysis of regional transformation.[70] Essentially, this transitional approach relies on realist and statist mechanisms in the first stage, and liberal, constructivist, and societal mechanisms in the second stage as part of a comprehensive account.[71] This will supplement the identification of theoretical prescriptions for ending protracted conflict in South-Asia, i.e. Kashmir. The aforementioned stages are based on bottom-up theories (liberal and constructivist) on one hand, and top-down theories (realist and statist) on the other hand. "Bottom-up approaches to peacemaking seek to make the societies of the belligerent states the engine of conflict resolution, in the conviction that they can rein in their governments and restrain conflict if they so desire."[72] In contrast, top-down approaches view the state, rather than society, as the panacea for peacemaking.[73]

Scholarly views on regional integration range largely on perceptions of the phenomena either as a terminal condition, or a process.[74] In accordance with Haas, this study evaluates integration as a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms. It

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[70] Ripsman, N. (2005). pp. 669-693. For other similar accounts see Sheehan, J. (2008). *Where have all the soldiers gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; Katzenstein, P. (2005). *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; Miller, B. (2007). *States, nations, and the great powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[71] Hall, J. and Paul, T. V. (1999).pp. 67-77. Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2010). *Beyond Paradigms: Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*.

[72] Ripsman, N. (2012). Top-down peacemaking: why peace begins with states and not societies. In: T. V. Paul, ed., *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p-258.

[73] Ibid, pp.260-262.

[74] For a recapitulation of definitions, see Etzioni, A. (1965). *Political unification*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Chapters 1 and 2; Jacob, P. and Toscano, J. (1964). *The integration of political communities*. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

will rely on Haas's seminal work on the study of regional integration, and briefly look at one of the three schools of pre-theorizing prescribed in that study, i.e. Neo-Functionalism.[75] Haas asserts neo-functional theorizing as "consistently contingent and phenomenological, which consequently avoids normative assertion and systemic generalization."[76] Additionally, one limitation which inhibits generalization is embedded in the very source of the approach, i.e. the modern pluralistic-industrial democratic polity, which hinders application in South-Asia. This presents a rationale for studying integration in Western Europe,[77] but application to the developing world in general presents further systematic difficulties. Nevertheless, this approach does prefer observation of bargaining styles, strategies, and organizational growth or decay as basic data, which is crucial for this study. Thus, only certain elements of the neo-functionalist approach will be incorporated in the eclectic framework, i.e. the collective cooperation in certain areas of mutual concern which will yield tangible benefits, and subsequent cooperation in other areas of mutual concern.

In terms of regional integration theories, Stanley Hoffman's intergovernmentalist approach will also be adopted in the eclectic theoretical toolkit, which essentially treats states as the primary actors in the integration process. This theory's predictions in the process of integration in South-

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[75] Haas, E. (1970). The Study of Regional Integration. pp.607-646.

[76] Ibid, pp. 627-628.

[77] Application of neo-functionalist approach met with challenges in examining European integration as well, especially when Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair" politics paralyzed the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community. This led Haas to assert that the approach is obsolete, which he later revoked. For a detailed account, see Haas, E (1975). *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California; Haas, E. (2004). *Introduction: Institutionalism or constructivism?*, in Haas, Ernst B. (1957). The uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 3rd ed., Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. p-3.

Asia is apposite because of the importance of government initiatives for conflict resolution, as well as regional integration. As Uwe Puetter argues, "the strength of this theory lies in the appropriateness and legitimacy of policy decisions which are derived from a reasoned consensus and open discourse through negotiated policy coordination, and we can trace the competing logics of interaction."[78] It highlights how policy adjustments are deliberate through the process of 'coordinated negotiation.' Nevertheless, this theory is limited by it exclusive focus on ministers and heads of states, or governments with regard to economic, security and foreign policy.[79]

The liberal viewpoints of this study is focused on the conditions that lead to a peaceful regional order via the three mechanisms of democracy, economic interdependence, and institutions.[80] Additionally, liberal institutionalism as an alternative to neorealist mode of thought rejects the latter's assumptions of international politics as a struggle for state power as top priority and prescribes "actors other than states participate directly in global politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues do not exist, and force is an ineffective instrument of policy."[81] Liberal institutionalism places emphasis on global governance and international organizations to prescribe IR thought. Nonetheless, the shortcomings of this mode of thought is also prevalent in South-Asia due to the inability of international as well as regional organizations, i.e. U.N and SAARC to stimulate integration. As the UN did not succeed in finding a lasting solution since the first war after independence to ensure positive peace and maintenance of a ceasefire, the

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[78] Puetter, Uwe. (2012). *Europe's deliberative intergovernmentalism*, p-164.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Russett, B., Oneal, J. and Davis, D. (1998). pp.441-467; Oneal, J. and Russett, B. (1999). pp.423-442.

[81] Keohane, R and Nye, J (1977). *Power and Interdependence*, p-24.

shortcomings of the international organization is salient. Lack of the SAARC's ability to promote integration, or cooperation between India and Pakistan illustrates the fragility of a regional organization. Theoretical output indicates effective functioning of SAARC is contingent upon the cooperation between India and Pakistan, and resolution of Kashmir. But it might very well be the case that for India and Pakistan to cooperate, and resolve Kashmir, SAARC should present itself as a more attractive option than continuance of conflict.

In a nutshell, neorealist dynamics in the region are also prevalent, largely characteristic of the devotion on state power by India and Pakistan. This is manifested by the conventional and nuclear arms race, in addition to the alliances with external parties. Despite the lucid asymmetry between the belligerents, three full scale wars, countless skirmishes and ceasefire violations illustrate the shortcomings of neorealist theorization of the regional dynamics. Since partition of the subcontinent, bilateral relations of India and Pakistan are fraught with realist inferences from IR theory. The enduring and intractable conflict in Kashmir has had wide ranging implications on regional integration. Rivalry between the powerful states in the region has inhibited domestic as well as region-wide growth and development. Although mediation so far has achieved a *negative peace* in Galtung's term, the manifestation of a *positive peace* is pivotal for a lasting solution.

This very notion of a positive peace could provide the balance and momentum required for regional stability and integration. The current trajectory in the South-Asian region makes salient that development and growth will continue to be impeded in the absence of political (top-down), and social (bottom-up) settlements. In light of a detailed analysis of the past and present trajectories of South-Asia, this study illustrates that major power rivalry within a region hinders

regional integration. This in turn might also have spillover effects on neighboring regions, thereby projecting a threat on international peace and security.

This study also investigates the conflict in Kashmir, and examines the prospects of international mediation towards its resolution. Conflict resolution as a defined specialist field came of age in the post-Cold War era. It is a noteworthy point, as external involvement in Kashmir was mitigated by the Shimla Agreement in 1972. Therefore, it can be inferred, with the advancements and dynamism within the field, future initiatives at mediation would (need to) be comprehensive, to say the least. It is believed, with the right 'package deal' for resolution, presented through an apposite negotiation strategy, with mutually enticing opportunities would persuade New Delhi and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir.

1.5. Independent variables and hypotheses

This section essentially presents the relevant independent variables which will be used to correlate the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia.

The first independent variable is the official position of the Indian and Pakistani governments regarding resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Examining the relevant official documents, leaders' perspectives, and narrative operationalizes the variable. In lieu of the partition of the subcontinent, the accession of Kashmir to India in the backdrop of militant insurgency from Pakistan was not final, as summed up by Nehru's statement:

"We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given (and the Maharaja has supported it) not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared, when peace and order have been established, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the U.N. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict."[82]

Furthermore, one significantly relevant document is the 1972 Shimla agreement. This document entails that India and Pakistan are to bilaterally resolve all of their conflicts, including Kashmir. Additionally, neither is to take unilateral action regarding Kashmir despite respective mutual differences and legal interpretations. In other words, according to this document, both India and Pakistan have agreed to bilaterally resolve the Kashmir conflict, thus deeming bilateral efforts as

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[82] Nehru's official telegram. Primin 304, Dated 8th November 1947.

their official position.[83] Nevertheless, India's official position regarding the referendum or plebiscite has been controversial, as the 1980s witnessed Indian hegemony, rigging of elections, and human rights violations by the army in Kashmir. Thus, it could be argued that this official position is subject to change or influence from more beneficial options, offered by the apposite coalition of international mediators. It is vital for this independent variable to be addressed at the outset, and will be kept under consideration during the entire course of this study. This variable will not be addressed in more detail in forthcoming sections.

The second independent variable is the position of the Indian and Pakistani governments towards international mediation of the Kashmir conflict. A minimal record of third party intervention in Kashmir is owing to India's aversion to outside interference.[84] New Delhi consistently deems it a bilateral issue, as stated in the aforementioned Simla agreement of 1972, which mitigated the role of the UN. Conventional wisdom proclaims that domestic public opinion, prevalent in domestic constituencies of both India and Pakistan, inhibits a liberal perspective from decision-makers. It is also believed for this very reason, mediation could provide political cover when decision makers face high domestic audience costs for unpopular, although potentially prudent concessions.[85] Contrastingly, Islamabad is open to, and indeed welcomes international mediation in Kashmir.

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[83] The Shimla Agreement (1972). Official Document. http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla +Agreement+July+2+1972

[84] Schaffer, H. B., and Schaffer, T. C. (2005). *Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place*, p-295.

[85] Beardsley, K. (2011). *The Mediation Dilemma*, p.38.

The third independent variable is endogenous or domestic factors, in order to elucidate the domestic public opinion of India and Pakistan toward Kashmir, and towards one another. This study will engage a little deeper and also try to illustrate the causes behind indoctrinated public opinion towards Kashmir, as well as regional integration. This variable will be operationalized by utilizing relevant indicators such as: role of elites, human development index (HDI), literacy rate, domestic public opinion, socialization process, and religion and identity. The respective operationalizations of these indicators will be determined in the case study of which they are a part of.

The fourth independent variable is the exogenous or external factors, which elucidates the impact of external countries of mutual concern and relevance to both India and Pakistan. This variable is operationalized by examining in detail, the impact or influence of the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia on India and Pakistan. This will highlight the dynamics of bilateral relations with these external states, and also justify their potential mediatory capacities.

The fifth independent variable is the regional dynamics of South-Asia, which will be operationalized by examining the diplomatic relations of the constituent member states of the region. The bilateral relations in light of India and Pakistan's rivalry over Kashmir, as well as individual bilateral relations will present fundamental insights for regional integration. Additionally, examining bilateral relations will also illustrate prospective mediation capacities of states within the region. This will in turn elucidate the mediatory capacity of SAARC, and members who have a potential role within SAARC as mediators of the Kashmir conflict.

The sixth independent variable is institutional dynamics and insights for SAARC. It will be operationalized by a case study which will compare two relatively successful regional organizations, one in the developed world, and the other in the developing world, i.e. EU and ASEAN. This will in turn present insights pertaining institutional capacity of SAARC, and potential areas of attention, as well as acumen for strengthening the institution for it to act as a meditator and manager of regional conflicts.

The seventh independent variable is the future of power in South-Asia, i.e. soft and smart power, which is believed to be necessary components of the future trajectory of the region. These will be operationalized by definition and conceptualization, in addition to specific strategies for power conversion as part of top-down and bottom-up approaches mentioned in the theoretical framework. An entire chapter is dedicated to this crucial independent variable, which is believed to be a fundamental prerequisite of regional integration in South-Asia.

The eight and final independent variable is prospects of international mediation, which will be operationalized on the basis of: a) the need for mediation to resolve the conflict in Kashmir; b) the kind and context of mediation, including the apposite number of mediators; c) adversarial relationship of the conflicting parties, which hinders bilateral initiatives at resolution; d) strategies, power, and bias within mediation; and e) the mediatory capacity of a regional organization, i.e. SAARC. These five heuristically created variables will help determine the prospects of international mediation.

Substantiating the theoretical framework, the hypotheses for the research question of this study pertaining prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, and its current predicament so far in light of the Kashmir conflict are as follows:

Null hypothesis: Reconciliation between the regional powers leads to regional integration.

Alternate hypothesis 1: Regional integration leads to reconciliation between regional powers.

Null Hypothesis: Reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad will lead to abatement of structural violence, and manifestation of positive peace.

Alternate Hypothesis 2: Resolution of the Kashmir conflict will contribute towards abatement of structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace (and regional integration). This in turn will lead to incremental cooperation on regional matters of mutual concern, including conflict management in South-Asia (most notably, in Afghanistan).

Null Hypothesis: Apposite initiatives by New Delhi and Islamabad will lead to effective mediation in the Kashmir conflict.

Alternate Hypothesis 3: Effective mediation of the Kashmir conflict will lead to reconciliation between India and Pakistan, which in turn would lead to regional integration in South-Asia.

Null hypothesis: As long as South-Asia is not deeply integrated, the SAARC cannot be expected to be effective in regional conflict management.

Alternate hypothesis 4: Regional integration in South-Asia will lead to reconciliation and cooperation, which in turn will enable SAARC to mediate in regional conflicts.

1.6. Method of analysis and data collection

Method of analysis

This study does not singularly rely on one specific research methodology. Instead, a few tools of qualitative methods will be utilized to address the research question of this study. Most of the empirical research of this study will rely on process tracing analysis, which identifies the key events, individuals, relationships and decisions that link causal conditions to outcomes.[86] Process tracing is significant as it allows a demonstration of causal relationship between dependent and independent variables. Additionally, this technique also allows to make deductions from the theoretical framework. George and Bennett posit "process tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal process, the causal chain and causal mechanism between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable." [87] This will be useful to subsequently investigate causal links between the rivalry amidst India and Pakistan and regional integration in South-Asia. The time frame ranges from the advent of partition of the subcontinent, to the present time.

Another qualitative tool utilized is content analysis, which is applied throughout the study. Content analysis essentially refers to a family of techniques for studying the "mute evidence" of texts.[88] It is not very different from the methodology so far, and its sort of a formal name for the technique to analyze documents and texts in general. Holsti groups fifteen uses of content

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[86] Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005); Bennett, A. (2008).

[87] Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. p.206.

[88] Hodder, I. (1994). *The interpretation of documents and material culture*. p. 155.

analysis into three basic categories: a) make inferences about the antecedents of a communication; b) describe and make inferences about characteristics of a communication; and c) make inferences about the effects of a communication.[89] This is therefore useful in the analysis of various sorts of communication, including media sources.

To address the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, a comparative case study of the regional powers India and Pakistan will be conducted, which will pursue the method of "structured, focused comparison." According to the pioneers of this method, "the method is 'structured' in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 'focused' in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined."[90] Furthermore, this method is relevant to this study as it was devised in order to yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems.[91] As public opinion, and external influence plays an important role in determining the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, this case study is expected to yield relevant information.

This case study contains an analysis of (heuristically created mini variables) domestic factors such as: role of elites on decision making, human development index, literacy rate, domestic public opinion, socialization process, and religion and identity. All these independent variables will be applied across both cases, namely India and Pakistan. The case study also contains an

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[89] Holsti, Ole R. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*.

[90] Bennett, A., and George, A. L. (2005). p-67.

[91] Ibid.

analysis of the impact or influence of external states on India and Pakistan. The objective of this case-study is to determine the external and internal factors that impact public opinion on policy making. To be clear, the class or subclass of events here is the impact of public opinion on policy making, and both external as well as internal factors will be analyzed for inductive and deductive reasoning. The broader goal of this case study is to determine the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia (the main dependent variable). By understanding the factors contingent upon public opinion, apposite strategies can be constructed to influence the same towards the benefits of regional integration.

A second case study will be conducted using the same method of structured, focused comparison. The second case study concerns two example regional organizations, i.e. EU and ASEAN. The purpose of this case study is to draw insights for SAARC. By comparing the two successful examples of regional organizations, one from the developed and the other from the developing world, important insights can be gained that could help overcome the challenges faced in SAARC, and reinforce the institution as an effective mediator in regional conflicts. Case studies are preferred as they are useful for theory development across different schools of thought and they can incorporate both 'material and ideational variables.'[92] Additionally, the method of case-studies aspire cumulative theoretical knowledge, which is useful in studying discourses, identities, and interactions systematically.[93] It compliments well with the eclectic or multi-paradigmatic framework of this study. Furthermore, one of the main advantages of case-studies

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[92] Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. p.9.

[93] Ibid.

is their ability to serve the heuristic purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and generating hypotheses.[94]

Data collection

This section will develop a model for data collection. Using process tracing and content analysis, the study will formally examine the scholarly literature, official documents, archives, statements, and also media sources in detail. The general knowledge acquired by the researcher throughout the research process of this study via "soaking and poking," often leads to the construction of a chronological narrative that helps both the researcher and subsequent readers understand the basic outlines of the case.[95] Additionally, the method of structured, focused comparison emphasizes discipline in the way one collects data, i.e. a systematic collection of the same information, and the same variables across the selected units of analysis. The procedure of systematic data compilation also entails that the questions asked of each case must be of a general nature, i.e. "they should not be couched in overly specific terms that are relevant to only one case but should be applicable to all cases within the class or subclass of events."[96] In this method, the investigator "defines and standardizes the data requirements of case studies by formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case."[97] In

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[94] Eckstein, H. (1975). *Case Studies and Theory in Political Science*, pp.79-138.; George, A. L. (1979). *Case Studies and Theory Development* pp.43-69.

[95] Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. p-89.

[96] Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). p.86.

[97] Ibid. p.41.

other words, general questions reflecting the research objective are asked of each case to guide and standardize data collection, which allows systematic comparison.

Data will be collected largely from the existing scholarly literature, including books, documents, journal articles, essays, speeches, lectures, media sources, think-tanks, as well as some unpublished papers. Additionally, historical data will be recorded from primary and secondary sources, and official documents. Every piece of information gathered contributes to specific observable implications in the theoretical framework. Furthermore, observations will also be made on empirical data. With the data gathered and inferences generated through the aforementioned formal techniques, this study illustrates the regional integration scenario in South-Asia and determines the prerequisites for a stable regional order. Additionally, it aims to to reveal the prospects of international mediation on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, and its consequent impact on regional integration.

The quest for data collection in this study rests upon a lot of documents, which are referred to as written texts that highlight "evidence that in all its forms represent political, cultural, and social construction, and which cannot be subjected to an interview or focus group."[98] Furthermore, this evidence, "unlike the spoken word, endures physically and thus cannot be separated across space and time from its author, producer, or user."[99]

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[98] Onwuegbuzie, A., Leech, N. L., & Collins, K. M. T. (2010). Innovative data collection strategies in qualitative research. pp.696-726.

[99] Hodder, I. (2005). *The interpretation of documents and material culture*. pp.703- 715.

2. Prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia

2.1. Resolution of the intractable conflict in Kashmir

Brief historical background

Although a considerable list is footnoted in the literature review, a brief outline of the important facts are in order here, in order to devise a lasting solution or positive peace through mediation. Partition of the subcontinent from British rule aggravated the differences between Hindus and Muslims, which turned into a bitter rivalry. As evidence suggests, Kashmir is claimed, or more appropriately contested vehemently by both India and Pakistan since partition in 1947. Regarding the accession to India by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir at the time Maharaja Hari Singh, some believe his reign to be unpopular.[100] This could be traced back to the fact that the region of Kashmir was sold by the British to the Dogra rulers, who helped the former in their wars against the Afghans and Sikhs. It could also be due to unpopular reign and lack of traditional roots of the ruler, coupled with the advent of a new home for Muslims, the tribal offensive from Pakistan took place. Nevertheless, in exchange for military reinforcements from India to oust an invasion of Pathtun tribal raiders with tacit support from Pakistan, the ruler acceded to India. The reasons

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[100] See Khan, G. H. (1980). *Freedom Movement in Kashmir: 1931-1940*; For a comprehensive account of the nature of the Dogra rule and the movement against it, see Bazaz, P. N. (1954). *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir*; Saraf, M. Y. (1977). *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, Lahore, Ferozsons Ltd., Vol. I.; also see the text of Governor General Lord Mountbatten's Letter Dated 27 October 1947 to the maharaja of Kashmir in response to his offer of accession to the Indian Union, in Lakhanpal, P. L. (1958). *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute,* p. 56.

for this contestation are valid, and justified from the perspectives of New Delhi as well as Islamabad, which in turn accentuates the intractable nature of the conflict.

The primary reason for Islamabad to bring this territory under its ambit is not just a matter of territory, but more importantly, of identity, and nationalism. Owing to the fact that Kashmir is a muslim majority state, and Pakistan was created as the home for muslims of the subcontinent, it was believed to be a part of this new state for muslims. The very idea of Pakistan was conceived of as Kashmir being a part of it, i.e. the K in Pakistan, stands for Kashmir. On the other side of the same coin, Kashmir was a not just a matter of territory for New Delhi, but of the secular Indian identity, and nationalism. Thus, in the most crucial aspects, India and Pakistan's perspectives of Kashmir was, and still is essentially the same. One regards Kashmir as part of its muslim identity and nationalism, whereas the other regards it as a part of it secular identity and nationalism. Thus, Kashmir has been described as "a hardy perennial in the catalog of international disputes, often serving as a kind of metaphor for the broader problems that plague India and Pakistan."[101]

This conflict has led to violent engagement between India and Pakistan, and stands as a severe impediment to regional integration in South-Asia and human development of well over one and a half billion people. There is not going to be any development and growth in South-Asia unless a positive peace between the regional powers is ascertained. This conflict is the principal underlying root of hostility between India and Pakistan, which inhibits bilateral, as well as regional cooperation. In other words, for South-Asia to emerge from the developing world, the resolution of this conflict is fundamental.

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[101] Schaffer, H. B., & Schaffer, T. C. (2005). p-295.

Despite India's secular commitment of Kashmir's future to "be settled by a reference to its people,"[102] certain actions have contributed to erode a genuine claim, and has accentuated popular mistrust. For instance, the special provision of Kashmir as prescribed in the Indian constitution was eroded,[103] and electoral rigging, non-functional democracy, and repression by the Indian state reinforce the Kashmiri people's claim for the right to self-determination.[104] Furthermore, UN Security Council resolutions also endorsed the will of the Kashmiri people as the final dispensation, which was to be determined via a plebiscite or referendum.[105] Since 1980s, the local residents of the Kashmir Valley have been involved in rebellion and violence against Indian occupancy with tacit support from Pakistan's intelligence agencies and militant groups alike. In lieu of this, New Delhi and Islamabad have engaged in a vehement resource draining process pertaining procurement of conventional and nuclear arms. The fate of the major portions of Indian and Pakistani people living in poverty, in addition to the poor records of human development could be traced back to these actions.

As indicated earlier, Kashmir pertains personal, structural, and cultural violence. Effective management of ethnic, separatist, and religious conflicts by civil and international authorities "presupposes an understanding of their nature, their causes, and the outcomes of past efforts at management."[106] It is redolent in scholarly analyses that the conflict in Kashmir is one of the

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[102] Wirsing, Robert. G. (1994). *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute,* pp.54-56.

[103] Sheikh, M. A. (1965). "Kashmir, India and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs.* For the politics of the plebiscite, see also Lockwood, D. E. (1969). pp. 382–96.

[104] Baba, N. A. (2012). *Democracy and governance in Kashmir*

[105] For a list, see UN Resolutions on Kashmir. (1994). in *Philosophy and Social Action,* pp. 1–39.

[106] Gurr, T. R. (2007). *Minorities, Nationalists and Islamists,* pp.131-160.

most intractable conflicts of our time. The largely fruitless attempts at mediation so far, and the continuance of hostilities along the border, and polarization of one another by India and Pakistan have deemed this conflict as truly intractable. The conflict in Kashmir has typified the fundamental from of destructive conflicts, which implies a methodological employment of various forms of violence, ranging from physical to cultural and structural.[107] In accordance with Galtung's perspective, the Kashmir conflict has developed to a condition of negative peace, entailing cessation of direct violence. However, a positive peace yet remains to be achieved for a lasting settlement, which means overcoming structural and cultural violence as well.

Resolution of the Kashmir conflict would mean the abatement of protracted hostility between the two key regional powers. As Kashmir is currently the overarching concern on matters both bilateral and region-wide,[108] its resolution will undoubtedly lead to genuine cooperation, and consequent integration of the South-Asian region. Furthermore, resolution would lead to abatement of structural violence and manifestation of structural peace, or *positive peace,* which is currently lacking. As per the previously mentioned two-sides of the same coin example, resolution (analogous with peace) would mean absence of personal, as well as structural violence. In other words, resolution of the intractable conflict in Kashmir would evolve the currently manifest negative peace (absence of personal violence) into positive peace (absence of personal, and structural violence), by abating structural violence.

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[107] See Galtung, J. (1969). *Violence, peace, and peace research*. pp.167-191; Galtung, J. (1990). *Cultural violence* pp.291-305.

[108] Among many others, see Jetly, R. (2003). pp.53-76; Baba, N. A. (2014). *Resolving Kashmir,* pp.66-80.

2.2. Case study: India and Pakistan

As the theoretical framework of this study indicates that regional integration is contingent upon cordial bilateral relations between the two regional powers, this case study will examine the internal dynamics of public opinion pertaining India and Pakistan, as well as the influence of external third parties on New Delhi and Islamabad. The endogenous or internal factors will help to determine the causes of indoctrinated domestic public opinion. As part of a bottom-up approach, this will be crucial in the construction of an adept strategy to impact domestic public opinion towards the benefits of integration. The exogenous or external factors will help determine the influence of external third parties on India and Pakistan. This is in the ambit of a top-down approach, and will also present insights pertaining potential mediating capacities. The findings from this case study will be supplementary in the broader goals of determining the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, as well as the prospects of international mediation on resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

2.2.1. Endogenous or internal factors

Role of elites: Elites play a crucial role in defining the narratives of nationalist and religious sentiment in India and Pakistan, especially due to the conflict in Kashmir. A lot of hindus and muslims alike have been killed in Kashmir, for which a large portion of domestic elites in India and Pakistan largely blame one another. John Zaller in a seminal book on public opinion argues that "elites play a central role in framing complex issues as shaping their presentation in mass media and public discourse."[109] Additionally, although elite role is fundamental for advanced

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[109] Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. p.92.

industrialized democracies, their role is even greater in developing countries with relatively low literacy rates. In developing countries, political elites as well as media elites can exercise greater control over information.[110] Elites (civilian, political, and military) on either side seem adamant on blaming the other for misdeeds. Additionally, military and right-wing leaders and journalists promote antagonism towards the other. For instance, when the Pakistan based affiliate of the Islamic State claimed responsibility for a blast that killed around 40 people in May last year, the government was quick to blame India's intelligence agency for the atrocity.[111] On the other hand, Indian elites largely ignore the atrocities and breach of human rights of Kashmiris by the Indian military presence there. Records of rigged elections, suppression, and human rights violations are continually justified on the actions of violent non state acts of terrorism, and secessionist elements. Elite opinions are consistently shaped by mutual suspicion. For instance, diplomatic engagement was cancelled in 2014 due to perceived suspicion.[112] Although leaders such as Modi and Sharif have the potential toward some sort of cooperation, such efforts are also inhibited by terrorist acts who aim to derail any peace process. For example, the terrorist attack on Pathankot, an Indian air field base in early 2016 impeded the ongoing bilateral diplomatic engagement between the two states. Nevertheless, multilateral events avail the opportunity for leaders to meet and discuss one another's concerns.[113]

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[110] Kaltenthaler, K., and Miller, W. J. (2015). *Partner or Enemy*. p-232.

[111] *The World Post*. (2015). "How Pakistan Hurts Its People By Blaming India," May 15.

[112] *The Times of India*. (2014). "Pakistani envoy meets Kashmiri separatists, India calls off bilateral talks," August 18; *The Dawn*. (2014). "No breakthrough expected on bilateral dialogue with India: Sartaj Aziz," December 3.

[113] *The New York Times*. (2016). "India-Pakistan Meeting Raises Hopes for Improved Relations," April 26.

Human development index: The HDI is a noteworthy indicator of countries' performances in areas of human development, such as life expectancy, education, and income per capita. Conducted by the UNDP, a country scores higher HDI when the life expectancy at birth is longer, the education period is longer, and the income per capita is higher.[114] It is also used to characterize a particular country is developed, developing, or underdeveloped. The inherent human development approach is about "expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy in which human beings live, and is thus is focused on people and their opportunities and choices."[115]

Ironically enough, HDI (a global index) will be operationalized as per the index which was developed by renowned economists Amartya Sen (Indian) and Mahbub ul Haq (Pakistani) in 1990. As per the latest HDI estimates of 2015, India is ranked 130 in the world, and Pakistan is ranked 147.[116] The irony of HDI is salient in the context of India and Pakistan. The manifest structural and cultural violence inhibits people in both countries from their true potential; and the deprivation of opportunities can be traced to the inherent structural violence. A strong case can be made that cooperation in terms of human development in South-Asia has the potential to buttress cooperation in other areas, such as poverty alleviation, literacy rate, etc. From a top-down approach, cooperation between policymakers in India and Pakistan can produce spill-over effects into other areas of potential cooperation.

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[114] UNDP. (2015). *About Human Development: What is human development?* UNDP website. Accessed on May 7.

[115] Ibid.

[116] UNDP. (2015). International Human Development Indicators. Accessed on May 7.

Literacy rate: One of the primary indicators justifying the lack of will towards regional integration can be examined by the literacy rate or education level of the domestic population of a country. Studies demonstrate that the higher educated and professional layers of the population, of all ages, are consistently in favor of intensified integration.[117] Additionally, those most satisfied with their standard of living also tend to be pro integration. In short, pro integration attitudes characterize the most successful and most "modern" segments of the population.[118] Therefore, examining these indicators in the context of India and Pakistan entails vital insights, as people need to be educated in order to understand the benefits of integration.

Literacy rate will be operationalized as per the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) with 2015 estimates based on people aged 15 or over who can read and write. The data is collated mostly by using surveys within the last ten years which are self-declared by the persons in question.[119] According to UIS 2015 estimates, literacy rate is 72.1 percent in India, and 58.7 percent in Pakistan. As per the same indicators, there is a remarkable difference between the literacy rate in India and Pakistan, from the global literacy at 86.3 percent, and for developed nations at 99.2 percent.[120] Furthermore, the website of the World bank says that a larger share of the world's illiterate adults are found in South Asia. Therefore, it can be inferred that with an increase in literacy rate, and incremental education, public opinion might change in favor of regional integration.

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[117] Inglehart, R. (1967). pp. 91-105.

[118] Ibid.

[119] UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2015). Data is collected from the website of UIS. Available at. http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT_DS&popupcustomise=true&lang=en#

[120] Ibid.

Domestic public opinion: This heuristic variable elucidates how the Indian and Pakistani people perceive one another, and is operationalized through opinion polls and surveys. Generally speaking, keeping aside Kashmir and the tainted political picture, the domestic populace of each country indeed seem very similar.[121] Despite conservative right-wing elements in both countries who have strong reservations against the other, it should not be ignored that there are signs of mutual regard too. One Indian journalist's account on her visit to Islamabad sums up the positive vibe of the ordinary people of Pakistan towards Indians.[122] Another account by an Indian delegate of the South Asia peoples union at Pakistan further demonstrates the goodwill of Pakistani people, including members of parliament, cabinet ministers, supreme court lawyers, and so on.[123]

It is noteworthy that opinions as recorded by polls may vary, essentially due to the occurrence of events that magnify the inherent antagonism. An opinion poll of the Indian and Pakistani publics reveals that half or more are open to a range of possible outcomes for Kashmir. Its analyst notes, "given the deep roots of the conflict over Kashmir, it is surprising that the conflict does not muster clearly polarized majorities in Pakistan and India, falling in line behind their governments' positions. Instead, many show openness to considering different possibilities for resolving the conflict."[124] Despite some positive glimmers of people to people perception, a major portion of Indians and Pakistanis have largely negative views towards each other,

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[121] *The Dawn*. (2014). "6 surprises that greet a Pakistani in India," October 7; *The Dawn*. (2014). "7 things that make a Pakistani feel at home in India," October 1.

[122] *The Dawn*. (2015). "Pakistanis seem to love Indians. Do Indians feel the same way?" March 31.

[123] *The Dawn*. (2014). "Crossing borders: Why every Indian should visit Pakistan," December 3.

[124] *World Public Opinion*. (2008). Indian and Pakistani Publics Show Flexibility on Kashmir, July 16. Available at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/511.php

especially after the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai. According to a poll the year after, most Pakistanis viewed India as a big threat (although in some regions, Taliban and al-Qaeda were seen as bigger threats).[125] Many also deem importance to the resolution of the conflict in Kashmir, which is seen as an obstacle to better relations, and nine out of every ten people think it is important for this to happen. Furthermore, majorities also seem to believe in good relations, and hence deem importance to improve relations between the two countries.[126] According to a recent poll, although Indians seem wary about the threat emanating from Pakistan, a majority would like to see improved relations between the two countries, and encourage more trade and more talks.[127] These accounts paint a mixed and fluctuating picture of public perceptions towards each other. Therefore, an appropriate political solution in Kashmir may offer the necessary momentum towards peace and a lasting solution. In sum, although opinions seem to fluctuate, the underlying fact is that Indians and Pakistanis are essentially very similar people, and a political solution can provide the impetus for better relations, as well as regional integration.

Socialization process: Owing to the tainted political picture which is redolent of mistrust and suspicion, antagonism is systematically inculcated in the minds of young Indians and Pakistanis through school textbooks, jingoistic films and television shows, and 'anti-other' literature. Although the information revolution has changed a lot in the world, this breakthrough has not

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[125] *Pew Research Centre*. (2009). "Pakistani Public Opinion: Growing Concerns about Extremism, Continuing Discontent with U.S." August 13. Access: http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/chapter-5-relations-with-india/

[126] Ibid.

[127] *Pew Research Centre*. (2014). "Indians Reflect on Their Country & the World: Troubled by Economic Problems, Corruption, Pakistan and China," March 31.

occurred for most people in India and Pakistan due to indoctrination in the socialization process. For instance, a look at any middle school geography textbook in India and Pakistan will demonstrate the indigenous version of the map of Kashmir. Largely due to an indoctrinated socialization process, the formalized norm is to antagonize the other.

This can be changed by combining a top-down and bottom-up approach this study indicates. Once the benefits of cooperation and integration are realized, specific policies can make amends in centralized middle and high school literature, news media, people to people interaction, ease on visa regulations, and so on. Via a bottom up approach, amends can be made via NGO initiatives, sport, entertainment, literary, film and TV shows, and so on. Furthermore, education can play a crucial role in connecting people and in changing perceptions. School and university exchanges are a potential panacea in this domain. Currently, most Indian and Pakistani students get acquainted to one another during their education in third countries. The potential of exchange programs and student to student connections is summed up in an op-ed by two students at Harvard from India and Pakistan.[128] Student exchanges also contribute tremendously towards the soft power of the host nation. For example, the open for all university education in the US has a significant effect on its soft power. Despite the fierce competition between America and China, the doors to renowned American universities is open to all, including Chinese students, changing minds for the better (a crucial pillar of soft power).[129]

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[128] Bagaria, Renu. S,. and Akbar, Malik, S. (2014). "A dream of open borders," and "Learning from each other" *The Times of India*, December 31.

[129] Mahbubani, Kishore. (2015). "Do Not Wish For the Collapse of the Chinese Communist Party," Albert H. Gordon Lecture delivered at the JFK Forum, *The Citizen: Student newspaper of the Harvard Kennedy School*.

Religion and identity related issues: This indicator is also relevant in the context of prerequisites of regional integration in SouthAsia, which will be operationalized by prevalent domestic conditions. Both India and Pakistan face major domestic challenges pertaining religious and communal issues. As per reports of the Home Ministry of India, an approximate 25 percent rise in religious and communal has been recorded in 2015. Additionally an increase in the number of incidents, as well as number of deaths resulting from these incidents have also been reported.[130] These incidents occur in a lot of states or provinces within India, and the central government blames the state (or provincial) governments for these incidents, and vice versa.

Additionally, the USCIRF, a U.S. government body that monitors religious freedoms in different countries posits that India is on a negative trajectory in terms of religious freedom. As per its findings, "in 2015 religious tolerance deteriorated and religious freedom violations increased in India. Minority communities, especially Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs, experienced numerous incidents of intimidation, harassment, and violence, largely at the hands of Hindu nationalist groups."[131] The commission concludes further monitoring of the situation will be done to determine if India should be recommended to the U.S. State Department for designation as a "country of particular concern," under the International Religious Freedom Act for systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom.[132] It should be noted that such incidents occur in India no matter the ruling party at New Delhi. This can be remedied by education, and

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[130] Sharma, A. (2015). "Communal violence in the country up by 25% in first five months of 2015," *The Economic Times*, July 21; For a list containing numerous religious incidents throughout India between 2015 and 2016, see http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/communal-violence

[131] Malik, S., and Ford, A. (2016). "U.S. Report: Religious tolerance deteriorating in India," The SouthAsia Daily, *Foreign Policy*, May 4.

[132] Ibid.

an enhanced socialization process that does not indoctrinate people to antagonize the other (structural peace).

Pakistan has witnessed religious intolerance too in recent years. It is redolent of the religious diaspora in Pakistan, a Sunni Muslim majority country with Shia Muslim, Christian, and Hindu minorities being consistently convulsed by sectarian violence. Thousands of people have been killed in sectarian attacks since 2008, and sectarian killings rose by more than a fifth from 2012.[133] In the recent past, Pakistan has witnessed attacks on Christian colonies, incidents of arson in mosques, and cases are often registered against members of minority communities, with accusations of blasphemy. According to some observers, there is a problem with the society's 'collective mindset.'[134] The structural violence is made salient by the general religious bigotry in the ordinary population, which manifests against minorities. This cultural set up gives religion extreme reverence and cultivates an identity based on it, which is extraordinarily sensitive on religious matters.[135] The roots of sectarianism in India and Pakistan, towards religious minority populations can be traced back to partition of the subcontinent.

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[133] Ispahani, F. (2014). "Religious Intolerance in Pakistan and the Plight of Religious Minorities," Lecture delivered at the Wilson Centre. Washington DC.: Woodrow Wilson Centre.

[134] *Huffington Post Religion*. (2015). "The Problem of Religious Intolerance in Pakistan," December 2.

[135] Ibid.

2.2.2. Exogenous or external factors

America's relations and influence vis-a-vis Pakistan and India.

Washington's relations with Islamabad, as well as New Delhi can be characterized as mixed at best. From a historical lens, America tried maintaining cordial relations with both India and Pakistan, whilst pursuing broader aims which undermined Pakistani interests.[136] The same can be said about ties between America and India, which were barely existent till the 1990s. This study will focus on relations since 9/11, after which Pakistan was perceived as a crucial base for the war effort in Afghanistan owing to its geopolitical proximity. America thus got directly involved in South-Asia. Washington and Islamabad weren't on cordial terms immediately after 9/11, which can be traced back to the imposition of military and economic sanctions in response to Pakistan's nuclear program, and the military coup in 1999. The turn of events can thus be traced back to 9/11, as sanctions were swept away in exchange for cooperation, and Pakistan provided unprecedented access to ports, military bases, airspace, and ground lines of control, and its security forces also provided security for American assets.[137] In return Pakistan regained access to international funding and favor, and arms sales and aid to the Pakistan army and air force surged, expanding its entrenched power.[138]

Pakistan received several forms of military aid via initiatives such as the CSF, FMF, and EDA. Development and economic aid came through ESF and KLB, which were increased substantially.

[136] Kux, Dennis. (2001). *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*.

[137] Fair, C. Christine. (2004). *The Countertenor Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*. Santa Monica, California.: RAND.

[138] Nawaz, Shuja. (2008). *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Support was also provided for governance and civil society initiatives.[139] Additionally, PCF was established to provide assistance in anti-militant operations.[140] America provided some $28 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2014 to Pakistan via various programs.[141] Pakistan's military delivered by achieving several objectives and helped America in vanquishing al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, things became controversial as information became available about Pakistan's affiliation with the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba among others, while also rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal.[142] Although American policymakers knew funding Pakistan was antithetical to national interests, ceasing the funding would be even more damaging. "All key American decision makers agree that the Pakistan of late 2014, towards the end of the war in Afghanistan, is likely to be a greater danger to itself, its neighbors, and the US than it was in 2001."[143]

Furthermore, the Pakistani public began viewing their army with contempt led by the impression that it was for hire at the behest of Washington.[144] On the other hand, Americans increasingly complained too, as they weren't obtaining preferred outcomes either. Amidst consistent tensions, the US raid on Osama bin Laden's hiding spot in Abbottabad strained relations further. Despite Pakistani criticisms, not only has the US supplied immense financial and military assistance, it has also been an important vote of support at multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World

[139] Staniland, P.aul. (2015). pp.210-212.

[140] Schmitt, E., and Shanker, T. (2009). "Pentagon Seeks $3 Billion for Pakistani Military." *New York Times*, April 2.

[141] Congressional Research Service. (2014). *Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015*. March 26.

[142] Joscelyn, T. (2011). "Admiral Mullen: Pakistani ISI sponsoring Haqqani Attacks." *Long War Journal*.

[143] Fair, C. and Watson, S. (2015). *Pakistan's Enduring Challenges*. p8

[144] U.S. Embassy Islamabad. (2011). Embassy cable no. 188670, January 24, 2009.

Bank, and ADB.[145] Washington's crucial role in these and other institutions provides significant leverage over Islamabad. America and Pakistan are still struggling to recalibrate ties, and while neither side seems to like the other, there appears to be no exit for either.[146]

India's strategic partnership with the USSR undermined relations with Washington since Cold War days. Additionally, Washington's affinity towards Pakistan also undermined its relations with New Delhi. With the end of the Cold War, and the dramatic surge in the Indian economy caused by reforms in the 1990s which opened the country's previously closed economy, spurred American interest. India's current growth trajectory makes it important, especially as substantial U.S. national interests are aimed at China.[147] Notable scholars posit that India will be a valuable American partner, as part of its mix of cooperation and containment with China.[148] India is also an attractive source of economic growth in the backdrop of Western economic decline. Furthermore, the Americans fear that Pakistan's nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of militants, either through theft, or with the connivance of the military.[149] It can be inferred that this fear is shared by Indians too. Therefore, its in the best interests of America and India to try and resolve Kashmir either via mediation, via SAARC, or bilaterally. Owing to its influence, America has leverage over Pakistan, and shares cordial ties with India, and can thus be a

[145] Fair, C. and Watson, S. (2015). p-12.

[146] Markley, D. (2013). *No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad*.

[147] Gilboy, George J., and Heginbotham, Eric. (2012). *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[148] See for instance Mohan, C. Raja. (2004). *Crossing The Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy.*; Ganguly, Sumit. (2006). Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise?. pp.45-56.

[149] Kaltenthaler, K., and Miller, W. J. (2015). Partner or Enemy, p.228.

potential mediator. Additionally, Washington's status as an observer nation presents opportunities for reinforcing SAARC (like it did for the EU).

China's Relations and influence vis-a-vis India and Pakistan

Bilateral relations between China and India can be characterized as mixed, with periods of cooperation as well as turmoil. Although from a historical lens both nations share civilizational ties dating back millennia, the border war in 1962 altered this trajectory and severely strained bilateral relations (till the 1980s). Despite periodic tensions, both nations have deepened bilateral ties during the first and second decade of the twenty-first century, emerging as significant trading partners.[150] Nonetheless, suspicion looms large as a recent survey revealed India's concern pertaining territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to military conflict.[151] New Delhi and Beijing have also tried to augment bilateral ties towards deeper strategic and military cooperation.[152]

In the ambit of multilateral institutions, India and China have much to gain via cooperation in BRICs and ADB. As the two most populous countries with consistent economic growth, it could be inferred that China and India do not have much to gain from conflict with one another. Although border disputes keep popping up time and again, they seem to regard one another's sovereignty, by shelving disputes to maintain bilateral ties. Albeit, if push comes to shove, mutual nuclear deterrence acts as an insurance policy. Moreover, India's recent standpoint on the

150 Embassy of India. (2014). "India-China Bilateral Relations: Economic and Trade Relations," Beijing, China.

151 Pew Research Center. (2014). Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other.

152 *The Economic Times*. 2012. "China wants to deepen strategic cooperation with India: Hu Jintao," March 30.

South China Sea dispute is indicative of goodwill and harmony towards China, which came at the expense of American exasperation.[153]

China and Pakistan share commendable bilateral relations. Pakistan regards China as its closest ally, and devotes considerable attention in shaping its domestic and foreign policy in that regard. A recent survey concluded that Pakistanis view the Chinese most favorably after China itself.[154] Beijing is perceived as Islamabad's strategic ally for obvious reasons: 1) geopolitical proximity; 2) Chinese military and economic resources; and 3) China and India share antagonistic relations after the border war in 1962. Ever since, China has been a credible military source and by 1982, "Chinese weapons systems formed the backbone of the Pakistani military arsenal, composing 75 percent of the tank force and 65 percent of the air force."[155] Furthermore, Islamabad is among the main purchasers of Chinese weapons.[156] Additionally, the Karakoram Highway serves mutual import and export needs, as well as a Chinese roadway to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and Central Asia.[157]

Although bilateral relations are largely asymmetric, Pakistan and China share a codependency. As a bridge to the Muslim world, Pakistan helped China build trade and diplomatic ties with Muslim states in the Middle-East and Southeast-Asia. China also benefited from its partnership with Pakistan owing to its access to American technology and equipment.[158] Additionally, as

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[153] *The Diplomat* (2016). "Foreign Ministers of Russia, India, China Meet in Moscow," April 19.

[154] Pew Research Center. (2015). Opinion of China. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/

[155] Vertzberger, Y. (1983). The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963-82. pp.637-652.

[156] Lipin, M. (2013). "Pakistani Buying of Chinese Arms Makes Beijing 5th Biggest Exporter."

[157] Krondstadt, A., and Epstein, S. (2013). *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*. Congressional Research Service.

[158] Pande, Aparna. (2015). pp.256-273.

"China has a large Muslim minority in its western region, having a friendly Muslim neighbor was seen as strategically and diplomatically useful."[159] Economic ties between both countries have grown steadily throughout the relationship, especially after signing a FTA in 2006.[160] Furthermore, China provides military and nuclear technology and equipment to Pakistan in lieu of containing India's growth and American preponderance. Analysts argue that "China has supplied Pakistan with a wide variety of nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to reactors."[161] A report of the U.S director of central intelligence deemed China as "the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan."[162]

Despite solid ties, recent years have witnessed underlying tensions between the two countries as a) Beijing is wary of Chinese Uighurs fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and b) Militant proxies on its territory makes Pakistan less useful for China as a security partner, and as a conduit for investments and trade.[163]

As per current trends, Beijing seems to share mutually beneficial ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad. It is highly unlikely that China would get involved in a conflict between India and Pakistan, as "China encourages Pakistan to formalize the status quo with India in Kashmir, urges

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[159] Ibid.

[160] Details containing trade and investment between China and Pakistan are available one the website of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2757/2758/.

[161] See publications of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California. Accessible at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/sasia.htm.; see also *Wall Street Journal*. 2001. "Beijing's Broken Promises." August 20.

[162] DCI (U.S. Director of Central Intelligence). 1997. *The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July-December 1996*. Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency. https:/www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/wmd/htm.

[163] Pande, Aparna. (2015). p-270.

to take its domestic Islamist terrorism seriously, and rebukes its support for islamist terrorists."[164]

Additionally, Beijing's standpoint can also be traced back to its lack of support during the Kargil conflict in 1999 between India and Pakistan.

The salient asymmetry in size, economic, and military resources verifies that Pakistan is more dependent on Chinese assistance than vice versa. It can also be deductively argued that Beijing does not desire a complete breakdown between Washington and Islamabad, as replacing the formers expensive role would be a tedious task for any country. For a well written and detailed account of the dynamics between Beijing and Islamabad, a recent publication on the topic is highly recommended.[165] As a potential mediator in the Kashmir conflict, although Pakistan would gladly endorse China, but India's standpoint remains unclear owing to Beijing's own stakes involved in Kashmir.

Saudi Arabia's relations and influence vis-a-vis Pakistan and India

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan share ties in the ideological, military, and economic domains. Bilateral relations have remained consistent over the decades, and as a fellow muslim country revered as the guardian of Islam's holy lands, Saudi Arabia is perceived by Pakistan as an ideal ideological ally.[166] In addition to ideological and symbolic support, Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with various loans, emergency aid, grants, political sanctuary to leaders, disaster relief funds, etc. Saudi Arabia benefits from military assistance, as "Pakistan has sporadically offered military

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[164] Fair, C. and Watson, S. (2015). pp.12-13

[165] See Small, A. (2015). *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics,* London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

[166] Pande, Aparna. (2015). "Friends of Last Resort." pp.257-258.

manpower to Riyadh and its Gulf Arab allies in return for financing purchases of military equipment."[167]

Saudi Arabia and India also share cordial bilateral relations, mainly in the economic, but also in strategic and cultural domains. Although from a historical perspective ties date back millennia, recent bilateral relations between Riyadh and New Delhi have also witnessed turmoil, which can be traced to the formers support of Pakistan's stance regarding Kashmir. Additionally, Riyadh supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 at the expense of bilateral relations with India.[168] Nevertheless, enhanced mutual relations of recent years can be traced back to highest-level official visits. Furthermore, India is a key market for oil exports, and one of the top purchasers of crude oil from Riyadh.[169]

As a provider of ideological and tangible resources, Riyadh also has notable influence over domestic political parties in Pakistan. Additionally, cooperation also extends to the nuclear domain.[170] This can be traced back to the high level official visits from Riyadh to Pakistan's nuclear facilities.[171] Islamabad and Riyadh have also agreed to establish a military force for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), augmented by Pakistani manpower to deter Iran.[172] Despite

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[167] Pande, Aparna. (2015). p-261.

[168] Mudiam, P. R. (1994). *India and the Middle East*. pp. 88–94.

[169] *The Hindu*. (2014). "India to Enhance Crude Oil, LPG Supplies from Saudi Arabia." January 17.

[170] *BBS Newsnight*. (2013). "Saudi Nuclear Weapons on Order from Pakistan." November 6.

[171] See Levy, Adrian,. and Clark, Catherine S. (2007). *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. pp.173-174, 225-226, 494. See also Mir, A. (2005). "Terror and the Bomb: Dangerous Cocktail." *South Asia Intelligence Review*.

[172] *Al-Monitor*. (2014). "Saudi Strategy Includes Alliance with Pakistan.", January 8; *The Dawn*. (2014). "S. Arabia, Pakistan Pledge Regional Cooperation." January 8; *World Tribune*. (2014). "Saudi Arabia Hires Cash-Strapped Pakistan to Bolster Security." January 8.

notable strategic ties, Islamabad and Riyadh share a seemingly asymmetric relationship as the former seems more dependent on the latter than vice-versa. A closer look at the history and trajectory of bilateral relation makes this point salient. Pakistan secures domestic energy needs by importing from the Gulf at signifiant concessions. With Riyadh's consent, Islamabad has also benefited from OPEC countries' special funds.[173] Nevertheless, as Riyadh gains military manpower via friendly ties with Islamabad, bilateral relations are geared to continue on a positive trend.

In the current era, India is rated among the top investors in Saudi Arabia, with projects in diverse sectors in management and consultancy services, construction projects, telecommunications, information technology, pharmaceuticals, media, culture, agriculture, tourism, and health among others.[174] Enhanced cooperation in political, economic, security and defense related issues are enshrined in joint statements such as: New Delhi Declaration of 2006, and Riyadh Declaration of 2010.[175] Bilateral ties have also increased consistently over the years in defense and counterterrorism fronts.[176] The mutually beneficial ties between New Delhi and Riyadh are salient, making long term prospects reasonable. For India, in addition to being the largest supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia is among the largest trading partners. In lieu of the projected increase in India's energy needs, Riyadh is seen as a dependable source. India can also benefit from Riyadh's petroleum expertise in developing domestic oil infrastructure by collaborating

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[173] Burke, S. M., and Lawrence Ziring. (1990). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis*. London: Oxford University Press. pp.422-423.

[174] *Business Standard*. (2015). "India-Saudi Arabia discussing joint investment fund," May, 28.

[175] Ministry of External Affairs. (2015). http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Saudi_2015_07_09.pdf

[176] *Press Trust of India*. (2012). "Saudi Arabia Deports Alleged Terrorist Wanted by Kerala." October 22.

with Saudi Aramco, the globally largest petroleum company.[177] Riyadh's interest in India is substantiated by consistent economic growth. Therefore, in order to manifest longer term mutual benefits, the interests of both New Delhi and Riyadh lie in maintaining solid bilateral ties. In the event of mediation, it is difficult to infer Riyadh's preferences. Although it can be argued that Riyadh will be accepted as a mediator by Islamabad, New Delhi's position is unclear. Nevertheless, its potential mediatory capacity should not be discarded.

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[177] *The Diplomat*. (2016). "The Future of India-Saudi Arabia Relations: With complementary needs in trade and investment, New Delhi and Riyadh can take their relationship to the next level." April 30.

2.3. Analyzing the regional dynamics of South-Asia

SouthAsia is referred as the least integrated region in the world not only in terms of intraregional trade, but also in people to people contact and interchange of ideas.[178] In the past two decades, exports *from* South Asia have doubled and risen, whereas exports *in* South Asia have been rather low at below 5 percent.[179] The idea of institutionalizing regional integration was first conceived in 1980 by the President of Bangladesh.[180] This can be traced back to the poor economic impetus of the region in a post-colonial environment. As mutual economic benefit was a common expectation, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka swiftly accepted the proposal of institutionalizing regional cooperation. Although things were perceived differently by the two regional powers as neither of them were interested in the idea of regional integration,[181] they agreed upon insistence of regional members and SAARC was established in 1985. This section will examine intra-regional relations in light of regional integration, as well as India-Pakistan dynamics with SAARC members.

Intra-regional dynamics

There is a salient asymmetry in terms of size, power, and resources in South-Asia. India's military, economic, demographic, and geopolitical endowments are a consistent source of concern for South-Asian states, especially from a Westphalian perspective. Consequently, a major hurdle for integration is caused by the hegemonic perception of India. Scholars posit

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[178] Ahmed, S., and Ghani, E. (2007). *South Asia Growth and Regional Integration*.

[179] Wilson, J., Otsuki, T. (2007). *Regional Integration In South Asia: What Role For Trade Facilitation?*

[180] Dash, Kishore C. (1996). The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia, p.186.

[181] Ibid. p-187.

hegemonic states may be necessary and must take the lead in production of global (in this case, regional) public goods because smaller states lack the incentives or the capacity to do so.[182] This is also relevant in regional contexts where such conditions apply, as hegemony on a regional level can be less intimidating than on a global level. Additionally, regional hegemons can be constrained by institutional rules and frameworks.

Scholars demonstrate the potential in international institutions to solve problems of coordination and free riding in the period after hegemony.[183] This is relevant in the context of South-Asia, vis-a-vis SAARC. For instance, it is aptly argued that although American power after WWII rested on a network of institutions that constrained it, but also increased its power to act with others.[184] This is an important point in assessing power of nations in the current international system.[185] Perceived Indian hegemony can be mitigated by members as well as observer States. As South-Asian states perceive India as a hegemon, the other alternative is strengthening the institutional capacity of SAARC. Efforts in this direction will reap benefits for the entire region, but it is easier said than done, owing to bilateral tensions. Nevertheless, integration could provide the panacea for these tensions. There are examples of smaller states with antagonistic relations with regional hegemons, who benefited from regional integration. e.g. Poland and Germany.

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[182] Nye, J. S. (2011). p-214.

[183] Snidal, D. (1985). The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, pp.580-614. See also Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.*

[184] Ikenberry, G. J. (2006). *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition,*

[185] Slaughter, A. M. (2009). *America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century,* pp.94-113.

The nature of foreign relations within the region

As the highest generator of per capita income and literacy rate in South-Asia, **Sri Lanka** is an influential country in regional dynamics. From a historical perspective, India and Sri Lanka share deep ties along socio-cultural, ethnic, historical, and linguistic domains. Nevertheless, the intense civil war in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009 strained bilateral relations. The antagonism between Tamils and buddhists sparked an involvement by India, owing largely to the affluential southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.[186] Indian Tamils were perceived as sympathetic to the LTTE, who were designated terrorists fighting for the creation of a separate state for Sri Lankan Tamils.[187] As involvement caused severe complexities pertaining domestic separatist Tamils, as well as the Sri Lankan government, India refused any subsequent involvement in the conflict.[188] Although bilateral relations have improved since, disputes regarding fishing in the waters of Palk Strait[189] keep erupting time and again.[190] On the other hand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka share close bilateral ties in the economic and military domains. Islamabad assisted Colombo by supplying hight-tech military equipment during the civil war.[191] Bilateral relations have grown stronger over the recent years, culminating in the signing of a civil nuclear energy deal in 2015.

As a constituent part of the subcontinent before its partition, **Bangladesh** shares close historical ties with both India and Pakistan. Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India are based on

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[186] Bajoria, J. (2008). *RAW: India's External Intelligence Agency*

[187] O'Ballance, Edgar (1989). pp.90-100.

[188] *BBC News*. (2000). "India rules out Sri Lanka help," May 3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/734357.stm

[189] The Palk Strait is where India and Sri Lanka are separated by 12 nautical miles. It is a rare case for UNCLOS, India and Sri Lanka are struggling till date for the mutually acceptable designation and regulation of fishing activity.

[190] Rumley, D. (2009). Fisheries Exploitation in the Indian Ocean. p. 166.

[191] De Silva, K. M. (1995). *Regional powers and small state security*

civilizational ties, who share common heritage, music, art, literature, language, culture, costume, consonant, and so on. Although India played a major role in the independence of Bangladesh, sovereignty related issues strained bilateral relations. Tensions concerning a myriad of issues such as legal migration, insurgency, border and water disputes, and the Moore island in the Bay of Bengal.[192] Nevertheless, signing of the historic land boundary agreement in 2015 marked a new era in bilateral relations, which also alleviated border disputes. Economic relations between India and Bangladesh are significant, making them solid partners within South-Asia. Cooperation has been enhanced further by a trade deal which allows the two nations to use each other's land and water routes for sending goods to a third country, removing a long-standing barrier in regional trade.[193]

Bangladesh and Pakistan share complicated bilateral dynamics. Despite consistent trade relations, inherent tensions can be traced back to the liberation war. Additionally, despite persistent efforts from Dhaka in seeking Islamabad to acknowledge the genocide committed by its army in 1971, and apologize for crimes against humanity, Pakistan has failed to deliver.[194] It can be argued that although a majority of people in both nations sympathize with one another owing to shared ethnic and cultural ties, official bilateral ties are limited. Relations are also often strained by terrorist links, as numerous Pakistan based terrorist groups train and operate in Bangladesh. Furthermore, prominent events in the recent years have strained bilateral relations.

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[192] Lewis, D. (2011). *Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society*. p.31; *Human Rights Watch*. (2010). "India/ Bangladesh: Indiscriminate Killings, Abuse by Border Officers," HRW Website. December 9.

[193] *The Economic Times*. (2015). "Bangladesh Cabinet approves revised trade agreement with India," April 7.

[194] see Heitzman, J., and Worden, R. (1989). *The War for Bangladeshi Independence*. pp. 30–31.; *The New York Times*. (2013). "Pakistan's State of Denial," December 26.

For instance, the execution of Abdul Quader Molla for war crimes in 1971 caused outbursts in Pakistan.[195] Additionally, recent eviction of two Pakistani diplomats from the High Commission in Dhaka who were allegedly funding terrorist activities, caused further diplomatic rifts.[196] Pakistan has similarly expelled a Bangladeshi diplomat from Islamabad earlier this year.[197] Current bilateral relations are scarred by these recent diplomatic incidents.

Maldives is the other island nation besides Sri Lanka in South-Asia, whose geopolitical location makes it strategically significant in the Indian ocean. The bilateral relations between Maldives and India are characterized as "beneficial bilateralism," as the two countries share close ties in the economic, cultural, military, and strategic domains.[198] India and Maldives have apparently forged an alliance based on the strategic interests and mutual benefit of one another.[199] Maldives also shares cordial bilateral relations with Pakistan, with enhanced cooperation in recent times.[200] As a founding member of SAARC, and South Asian Economic Union, and signatory to SAFTA, it can be argued that Maldives will accept and endorse deeper regional integration. As a matter of fact, based on close ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad, Male could also be a potential mediator in the Kashmir conflict, if the need arises.

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[195] *Gatestone Institute*. (2014). Genocide and Justice in Bangladesh

[196] See for instance, *Reuters* (2016). "Bangladesh summons Pakistani diplomat to lodge protest in worsening row," edition: India, February 2; *The Dawn*. (2015). "Diplomat back from BD after terror funding allegation," February 5; *The Indian Express* (2015). "Pakistan withdraws diplomat from Bangladesh: foreign ministry," December 25.

[197] *The Dawn*. (2016). "Pakistan-Bangladesh 'spy' row: Expelled diplomat leaves for Dhaka," January 7.

[198] see Mohammed, B. A. (2015). "Strategic Perspective of India-Maldives Relations," *CLAWS*, October 28.

[199] See Hagerty, Devin. T. (2005). *South Asia in World Politics*. pp.102–103.; India-Maldives Relations (2015). Website of the Ministry of External Affairs.

[200] *The Dawn*. (2015). "Pakistan, Maldives sign four MoUs," May 7.

Bhutan shares cordial bilateral relations with India, Pakistan, and pretty much all the states in South-Asia other than Nepal, with whom it has witnessed diplomatic rifts owing to refugee crises.[201] Bhutan and India share significant bilateral ties in the economic, cultural, and military domains. Bilateral economic and trade ties are also notable between these two neighboring states, as India is Bhutan's largest trading partner, stimulated by the bilateral FTA. Additionally, Bhutan is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid and investment from India. Ties also extend to educational and cultural exchange, tourism, IT, hydropower and so on. India supports Bhutan with security and defense related issues, in addition to training Bhutanese armed forces and police.[202] Additionally, ties are projected to become better in the near future.[203] Bhutan also shares cordial bilateral relations with Pakistan, but the two countries do not have an embassy or commission in one another's territory. Bhutan is highly likely to support regional integration.

Nepal shares notable bilateral relations with India due to close historical, cultural, religious, and ethnic ties. As fellow hindu majority countries, India and Nepal share a unique relationship of mutual friendship and cooperation, characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-people contact.[204] In lieu of the earthquakes in 2015, the Indian government provided medical as well as disaster response teams and special aircrafts with rescue and relief materials to various

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[201] See *Human Rights Watch* (2008). "Bhutan's ethnic cleansing," HRW. February 1.; *BBC News*. (2015). "Bhutan Profile: Timeline," May 20.; For details regarding the refugee crisis see Hart, J. (n.d.) "Bhutan: Conflict, Displacement and Children," (A discussion document prepared for UNICEF Regional Office South Asia, unpublished paper), *Refugee Studies Centre*, University of Oxford: UK.

[202] For official details about bilateral relations, see Embassy of India at Thimpu (2015). *India-Bhutan Relations*, Access: http://www.indianembassythimphu.bt/pages.php?id=83

[203] *The Hindu*. (2014). "Losing the Dragon — India-Bhutan relations one year after Modi's historic visit," June 16.

[204] *Embassy of India*. (2015). "India-Nepal Relations: Overview," Kathmandu, Nepal. Accessed on May 12, 2016.

parts in Nepal, in addition to millions of dollars worth aid.[205] Bilateral trade is also significant,

coupled with foreign aid and investment from India in numerous sectors and projects in Nepal.

Nevertheless, the recent Madhesi crisis regarding differences in Nepal's newly framed

constitution, strained bilateral ties.[206] This crisis contributed in the culmination of an 'anti-India'

sentiment in Nepal, which is prevalent in current bilateral relations.[207]

Nepal and Pakistan have maintained cordial relations over recent decades, and mutually regard

each other's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and peaceful development.[208] Minimal trade can be

traced back to the fact that these two countries do not share common borders. Furthermore, in

light of recent tensions regarding monarchy, and amidst alienation from India and the Western

world, Nepal developed closer bilateral ties with Pakistan.[209] In light of regional integration, it is

highly unlikely that Nepal will have objections, owing to domestic benefits and founding

membership of SAARC.

Although the newest member of SAARC, **Afghanistan** is of significant relevance to India and

Pakistan. In light of regional integration, the security scenario in Afghanistan is fundamental for

both regional powers. Afghanistan and India share solid bilateral relations based on historical and

cultural ties, which can be traced back to the Indus valley civilization. In terms of economic

relations, India has contributed billions of dollars in various aid and infrastructure related

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[205] Ibid.

[206] *BBC News*. (2015). "UN: Nepal blockade puts millions of children at risk," November 30. Access: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34968252

[207] *The Indian Express* (2015). "Concerned over anti-India sentiments in Nepal: Indian envoy," Kathmandu, November 4.

[208] Embassy of Nepal in Pakistan. Accessed on 12 May 2016. http://www.nepalembassy.pk/nepal-pakistan-relations

[209] *BBC News*. (2005). "Nepal, Pakistan in Economy Talks," Kathmandu, Nepal. March 29.

projects, making Afghanistan one of the major recipients of foreign aid from India.[210] Bilateral

relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been complicated of late,[211] due to a host of

issues such as the Durand line, border issues, water sharing, the insurgency war, among others.

Nevertheless, the two Islamic republics share strong cultural and historical ties. Furthermore, in

the backdrop of NATO and U.S troop withdrawal, the stability and maintenance of the currently

fragile Afghan democracy hinges on the cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Eminent jihadi threats are also prevalent for the international community.[212] A smaller

international security presence will embolden terrorist networks, and worsen the fragile security

scenario.[213] In this, and a wider regional context, it is fundamental for India to reconcile with

Pakistan and resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully, in order to maintain its investments, and

also to increase bilateral trade via transit routes to Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit

trade agreement presents tremendous opportunities for these three SAARC members.

Furthermore, a closer look at Afghanistan illustrates a mutual respect for the others strategic

interests. For instance, despite a security pact with Afghanistan,[214] India has provided limited

training to Afghan forces, that too on Indian territory, in order to avoid instigating Pakistan. This

could be traced as India's regard for Pakistan's strategic concerns in its immediate regional

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[210] For further details on economic and bilateral relations, see Ministry of External Affairs (2014). India-Afghanistan Relations, *Government of India*, Access: http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Afghnistan_Dec2014.pdf

[211] See, Thier, Alexander, J. (2008). "On the Issues: Afghanistan/Pakistan," *United States Institute of Peace*, USIP Publications.; *The Dawn* (2015). "Pak-Afghan relations: Hanging by a thread," September 12.

[212] UN Doc SC/RES/11817 (2015).

[213] Ayres, A. (2015). *Why the United States Should Work With India to Stabilize Afghanistan*

[214] The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed in 2011 is a pact between Afghanistan and India. Access: http://mfa.gov.af/content/files/agreement%20on%20strategic%20partnership%20between%20afghanistan%20and %20india%20-%20english.pdf

sphere, as the latter considers itself as the legitimate regional influence in Afghanistan. Kabul's requests of arms deals from India have also been dropped, essentially not to exacerbate tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.[215] Greater security in Afghanistan is also in Pakistan's domestic interests. Afghanistan has the potential for tremendous gains via regional integration, but the security provisions could only be manifested by cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad. In other words, without the latter's assistance, the former cannot provide and maintain security, and vice versa. It can be asserted that cooperation between the regional powers in Afghanistan could be a prerequisite of regional integration in South-Asia.

It should now be clear what kind of codependence India and Pakistan share with their regional neighbors. India has a major role to play, but in order for the region to develop and benefit from integration, Pakistan's consent is crucial.

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[215] Ayres, Alyssa. (2015). CFR.

2.4. Comparing the EU and ASEAN: insights for SAARC

This case study will compare the regional organizations EU and ASEAN, to draw insights for SAARC. The EU is regarded as the most advanced manifestation of regional integration in the world, and is proposed as a putative regional model.[216] Although a relatively new institution, ASEAN is chosen for its prominence in the developing world. This case study will apply the method of structured, focused comparison, based on the premises that the same general questions will be asked of both cases, and the same independent variables will be employed across both cases. Although, as noted earlier, insights for SAARC is one of the main abstract independent variables for this study, its operationalization hinges on this case study, which employs further compact heuristic IVs of its own. Comparisons between the EU and ASEAN does not imply that SAARC, or other regional organizations have to learn from the EU, and ASEAN. Rather, all regional organizations actively look for solutions to distinct problems of collective action and policy coordination between member states.[217]

Different regions have unique intra-regional dynamics, balance of power politics, and a distinct set of conflicts. Thus it is difficult to compare regions, although that is not the goal here. Instead, the goal is to draw insights from the regional integration experiences of the EU and ASEAN. Therefore, keeping aside complexities and differences between EU and ASEAN, the primary goal of this section is to present insights for SAARC (dependent variable). The five heuristically developed IVs for this case study are: basic objectives, regional structures or institutions, economic integration, state sovereignty, and transnational civil society actors.

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[216] Rosamond, B. (2005). "Conceptualizing the EU model of governance in world politics." pp.463–478.

[217] Rosamond, B., and Alex, Warleigh-Lack. (2011). Studying regions comparatively: back to the future? pp.18–35.; Camroux, D. (2011). Interregionalism, a critique: the four levels of EU-ASEAN relations, pp.201–271.

2.4.1. Basic Objectives

The basic objectives denote the fundamental purpose of a regional organization, for which it is established. In other words, although different regional organizations entail distinct historical backgrounds and characteristics, region specific dynamics, and a set of conflicts amidst member states, it can be argued that regional organizations are established to maintain peace and order in a region, deepen economic and political interdependence, and present an opportunity for cooperation and consensus building among regional neighbors. It can be strongly argued that such basic objectives of regional organizations are universal.

Although some regional organizations may differ from others in structure, level of institutionalism, and decision-making among others, basic principles essentially remain the same. For instance, the EU's basis of economic integration as a means towards political reconciliation and integration is not very relevant to ASEAN's culture of non-interference in the context of newly independent states, who guard their sovereignty in the face of disputes regarding territorial claims (such as coup d'état in Thailand, and South-China sea, among others).[218] But this does not mean EU and ASEAN were established for very different reasons. Both these organizations (including SAARC) were established to institutionalize economic and political interdependence among members, to resolve conflict through peaceful dialogue and consensus, and to increase people to people contact and exchange of ideas for social progress. Another basic objective (or prerequisite) of regional organizations is cooperation between members, specially the regional powers. Even if regional powers are antagonistic and do not desire to cooperate, they are provided with a common platform to get involved in exchange of

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[218] Wong, R. (2012). Model power or reference point? The EU and the ASEAN Charter. pp.669-682.

dialogue and consensus building. The system for this may differ in different organizations, but it is arguably based on the same idea.

2.4.2. Regional structures or institutions

In must be stated at the outset that although national priorities remain significant in any regional organization, regional institutional structures have a remarkable impact on community, or society building in a region. Additionally, specific institutions present the opportunity to address specific issues of regional concern. The institutionalization examples of the EU are noteworthy, which has established a plethora of institutions for different purposes, e.g. common market, bank, atomic energy cooperation, legal institutions, educational institutions, and defense, among many others. Such institutionalization has also led, or rather inspired ASEAN to develop under its ambit, distinct regional institutions for specific purposes. Some examples regarding establishment of ASEAN institutions are: AICHR in 2009, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012, ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Minorities in 2010, and Committee of Permanent Representatives from the ASEAN member states. Consequently, scholars have indicated that this can be attributed to the EU's reference as a 'model power.'[219] Furthermore, European policymakers have asserted that the EU model, which holds important lessons for the wider world, should be promoted not as a super power, but rather as a "model power."[220] Scholarly

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[219] See for instance Jetschke, Anja. (2009). Institutionalizing ASEAN, pp.407–426.; Zielonka, Jan. (2008). "Europe as a global actor: empire by example?" pp.471–484.; Lenz, Tobias. (2008). "Problematizing the EU's model export to Mercosur: strategies and motivations," Paper presented at the GARNET conference on the European Union in International Affairs, Brussels, 24–26 April.; Jokela, Juha. (2009). "The European Union as an international actor: Europeanization and institutional changes in the light of the EU's Asia policies' pp.37–53.

[220] Zielonka, Jan. (2008). pp.482-484.; Miliband, David. (2007). "Europe 2030: model power not superpower," Speech delivered at the College of Europe, Bruges, 15 November.

views are divergent, as some acknowledge the EU as an inspiration and reference for ASEANs institutional modernization, whereas see the EU as an inspiration, not a model.[221] Nevertheless, in terms of institutionalization, the EU experience has been rather exemplary in the institutional design and evolution of ASEAN, and holds important insights for SAARC. It is redolent of scholarly analyses that intraregional trade within ASEAN, and SAARC is not as significant, or even comparable to EU. The extensive intraregional trade in the EU is supplemented by a common market, regulations, monetary policy, a bank, parliament, commission, as well as a court. EU is referred to as the most advanced regional institution for its distinct institutional structures. In contrast, ASEAN has so far been unable to make full use of its region-wide FTA, i.e., AFTA and prefers free trade on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral basis. The same can be said for SAARC, as the existence of a regional FTA, i.e. SAFTA has not contributed to significant increase in intra-regional trade. Despite the existence of SAFTA, trade within the region remains at a bare minimum. It can thus be inferred that regional institutions are fundamental.

Additional features of institutionalization of ASEAN include the summit meetings twice every year; designation of Foreign Ministers of member states as the ASEAN Coordinating Council; Chairmanship for high-level ASEAN bodies; and the formation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, based in Jakarta, the de facto capital of the organization, akin to Brussels.[222] Similarly, SAARC too has manifested a certain level of institutionalization, i.e.

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[221] See for instance Yeo, George. (2007). Europe in 21st century Asia, pp.9–12.; Chalermpalanupap, Termsak. (2010). Life in ASEAN after the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, pp.45–65.; Acharya, Amitav. (2009). Arguing about ASEAN: what do we disagree about? pp.493–499.

[222] ASEAN. (2008a). ASEAN Charter, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/ASEAN_Charter.pdf Article 12. accessed on 16 May 2016.

designated yearly summits, a secretariat, standing committee, technical and action committees, and an economic union. Some notable agreements are: the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) signed in 1993, and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) signed in 2004. Nevertheless, for these to work at par with advanced regional organizations such as EU, deeper institutionalization is fundamental. For instance, as is the case with EU and ASEAN, there is no committee or council of SAARC permanent representatives based in the de facto capital of Kathmandu. Member states can thus cut off diplomatic ties in lieu of bilateral conflicts, as redolent of India and Pakistan relations as SAARC members. Without permanent representatives in the de facto capital, it is difficult to maintain consistent communication for matters pertaining regional concern.

Furthermore, as it is widely believed that the EU functions on its doctrine of a rules-based organization which strictly adheres to the rule of law in any and every situation, as compared to ASEANs norm based culture of mutual dialogue and consensus building. This is substantiated by the fact that distinct legal institutions are existent in the EU, which addresses issues of regional concern. These are lacking in ASEAN and SAARC. Although there is a commitment to a more formalized structure in the ASEAN Charter, scholarly views differ as to "ASEAN's value in promoting regional integration and further institution building, as its mandate and influence are limited."[223] Therefore, although institutions are deemed important, "ASEAN patterns of inter-

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[223] Stanley Foundation and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies of The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education. (2008). *Challenges to Effective Multilateralism: Comparing Asian and European Experiences*. Sweden: Sigtuna. p.9.

state cooperation are looser and less regulated than the EU's codified methods of decision making."[224] The same can be said about SAARC.

2.4.3. Economic integration

Economic integration is a crucial aspect of regional integration in any region, with tangible economic benefits for regional members. This is summed up by the former Secretary-General of ASEAN, who posits, "like Europe, a regional consciousness in ASEAN must first aim at the integration of the regional economy."[225] Economic integration is one of the basic objectives of regional integration, as noted earlier. However, the level of integration depends on the organization itself, along with region specific dynamics. It can be inferred that EU maintains significant levels of intraregional trade owing to its advanced institutions and supranational capacity to support it. A common bank, monetary policy, and regular meetings of representatives of member states makes this possible. On the other hand, ASEAN maintains a decent account of intraregional trade, but not comparable to EU. The difference gets starker in light of SAARC intraregional trade, accounting for 5 percent of total trade in the region, as compared to over 55 percent in the EU, and approximately 22 percent in ASEAN.[226] This is peculiar in the context of SAARC, as countries in the region have individually maintained consistent economic growth over the past years, but with negligent growth per capita. Therefore, it could be inferred that economic integration might play a strong role in further gross domestic growth, as well as

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[224] Murray, P. (2010). *Comparative regional integration in the EU and East Asia,* p.312.

[225] Severino, Rodolfo. (2008). *ASEAN, Southeast Asia Background Series 10,* Singapore: ISEAS.

[226] Salze-Lozach, V., Merchant, N., Vega, K. Loh, and Alexander, S. (2013). Regional Integration: Asia's New Frontier, *The Asia Foundation,* January 9.

growth in the per capita aspect. Additionally, economic integration presents tangible benefits for countries in South-Asia which do not share borders, but share cordial bilateral relations. Furthermore, whereas the EU works on a system based on having its own budget and resources, this is not the case in ASEAN (and SAARC). Although ASEAN has been effective in generating increased intraregional trade, its not as significant as EU, as most manufactured products are exported to developed nations outside ASEAN.[227] In EU, "the commitment to agreed economic policies complements the single market and the common currency, the euro, and market and regulatory mechanisms are key features of EU economic integration."[228] One of the significant benefits of economic integration is an increase in intra-regional trade. This has been personified as a major success of the EU, and an emerging success for ASEAN (as it lacks a singular or common economic ideology).

2.4.4. State sovereignty

While the EU can be characterized as post-Westphalian, ASEAN (and SAARC) remains firmly Westphalian. The EU's strength lies in the pooling of sovereignty of member states, and the organization functions on the basis of the rule of law. For the construction of an advanced supranational entity, the individual European states pooled in their singular sovereign capacities to devise a collective capacity. On the other hand, ASEAN functions on the basis of consensus, respect for the sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states. Therefore, the role of the individual states is crucial, as non-interference is one of the fundamental norms of

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[227] Ruland, J. and Jetschke, A. (2008). 40 years of ASEAN, pp.397–409.

[228] Murray, P. (2010). pp.308-323.

the organization. In other words, in ASEAN, national sovereignty is the basis as well as focus of cooperation, as per the intergovernmental nature of the ASEAN Charter.[229] It can thus be inferred that EU is a rules based organization, whereas ASEAN is norms based. For instance, in light of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the EU intervened as a collective entity (albeit with the politics of other member states, but the point is collective action). In comparison, the recent coup d'état in Thailand witnessed that the members of ASEAN did not take any action to intervene in Thailand's domestic affairs.

Therefore, although there are certain similarities between EU and ASEAN as basic objectives, but the major point of difference is the fundamental doctrine of state sovereignty and collective identity based on which these regional organizations function. The key characteristics of consensus and consultation in the ASEAN charter[230] marks a stark difference with EU's style of collective action via qualified or weighted majority. Sovereignty is most important for ASEAN, which recognizes "the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity."[231] A similar inference can be made about SAARC, which is similar to ASEAN vis-a-vis non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and newly gained independence. This can be traced back to the fact that "nation and state-building are largely completed projects in Europe but incomplete or recent completions in most ASEAN countries."[232] Furthermore, in ASEAN, "the US role was to instigate a hub and spokes relationship with the nations of East

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[229] ASEAN. (2008). ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2016.

[230] Ibid. ASEAN Charter Article 20, Chapter VII: Decision-Making.

[231] ASEAN. (2008b). ASEAN: An overview. Accessed on 16 May 2016.

[232] Murray, P. (2010). *International Politics*, p.317.

Asia."[233] In other words, there were no American provisions of political or financial support for the creation of a regional entity in East Asia, in stark contrast to Europe.

2.4.5. Transnational civil society actors in a globalized world

In today's globalized and interconnected world, coexistence and interdependence are vital, and regional organizations of all hues address, or intend to address these factors. The same can be said for the EU as well as ASEAN. Furthermore, the operation of transnational civil society networks and NGOs are crucial, alongside political processes between states of a region. For instance, in the backdrop of globalization, some see unifying outlooks in East Asia, coupled with "increased awareness of globalization, the development of broader perspectives, such as commitments to democracy, human rights, cooperation, friendship among nations, and finally, common values against war, exploitation, racism and injustice."[234] Furthermore, scholars incrementally regard regional organizations as a means for dealing with the challenges of globalization.[235]

Some scholars argue, "no matter when they began, all processes of regionalization in the contemporary global political economy can be understood as products of member state adaptations to globalization, with particular dynamics dictated by the interplay of national interests, culture, norms and geopolitical context."[236] Ravenhill relates growing interdependence

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[233] Calder, K.E. and Fukuyama, F. (2008). pp. 1–12.

[234] Levine, S. (2007) Asian values and the Asia pacific community, pp.102–135.

[235] See for instance Acharya, A. (2007). The emerging regional architecture of world politics. pp.629–652.; Cooper, A.F., Hughes, C.W. and De Lombaerde, P. (eds.) (2008) *Regionalisation and Global Governance: The Taming of Globalisation?*; Acharya, A. and Johnston, A.I. (2007). Comparing regional institutions, pp. 1–31.

[236] Warleigh-Lack, A. (2008) The EU, ASEAN and APEC in comparative perspective. pp. 23–41.

to "increasingly open domestic economies and changing perceptions of states' identities and interests, and to the political decision to pursue interdependence."[237] Additionally, the emergence of NGOs and the attempts at the construction of global civil society networks are important features.[238] In East Asia, there are several transnational NGOs and civil society networks with a distinct Asian character. In Pempel's terminology, the relationship between interdependence and connectedness is evident in both Europe and East Asia, and connectedness is an increasingly important theme in East Asia in terms of culture, NGOs and business.[239] He compares the pan-Asian interest in cultural activities such as karaoke and multinational singing groups with the political tendencies towards interdependence, connectedness and cohesiveness based on trade, investment, and environmental cooperation among others.[240] Regions are thus the product of both top-down and bottom-up processes. Transnational civil society actors are negligent in South-Asia, as the region is redolent of top-down approaches in light of regional processes. This presents important insights to include transnational NGOs, civil society actors and networks as part of a bottom-up approach.

[237] Ravenhill, J. (2001). *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*. pp.12-15.

[238] Rumford, C. and Murray, P. (2003) Globalization and the limitations of European integration studies, pp.85–93.

[239] Pempel, T.J. (2005) Emerging webs of regional connectness, pp. 1–28.

[240] Ibid.

3. The Future of Power in South-Asia

3.1. A general overview

As the title of this chapter indicates, insights will be drawn heavily from Joseph Nye's study, for the specific types of power in South-Asia which are crucial prerequisites for regional integration. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the importance of soft and smart power as core prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. More specifically, and in addition to the utility of these two types of power in the context of the entire region, it will emphasize on their validity regarding the resolution of conflict in Kashmir. In South-Asia, the power asymmetry is salient in general, i.e between the regional powers India and Pakistan, and also between India and the other regional states to a more extreme measure. An overview of the geopolitical structure of the South-Asian region illustrates the immense asymmetries, which have made for an asymmetrical power structure in South Asia, coupled with wariness among the smaller SAARC countries of India's potential dominance in the region.[241]

In terms of size, India accounts for approximately 72 percent of the region's area, approx. 77 percent of the population, and generates approx. 76 percent of the total exports in the region.[242] This makes it absolutely clear that conventional or hard power endowments of New Delhi on their own are insufficient to maintain order and cooperation in the region via integration. Although effective military force remains one of the key power resources in international affairs,

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[241] Hussain, Mushadid. (1993). 'Indian power projection in South Asia and the regional states' reaction', in Hafeez Malik (ed.) *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan*, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 152–63.

[242] Jetly, R. (2003). Conflict management strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC. p-64.

the world is no longer akin to nineteenth-century Europe when historians characterized a "great power" as one capable of prevailing in war.[243] India's prevalence in three full scale wars have proven arguably insufficient in manifesting structural peace, especially in Kashmir. The salient structural violence can be cured through soft power in a smart strategy. Furthermore, economic power is of little relevance in the context of India and Pakistan as there is no substantial trade which could act as deterrence.

Strong States are often presented with the need to bulk up their capabilities in other variants of power, namely soft and smart power.[244] As Nye recalls in his book, the French deal of selling a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan in the mid-1970s that could extract plutonium, was cancelled by the U.S through trust and persuasion.[245] As a matter of fact, hard power witnesses adverse affects in due course of time, as made evident in global affairs, for e.g. US involvement in Iraq, Russia's in Georgia, China's in Tibet, and so on.

A CSIS commission concluded that it is necessary to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope.[246] Pure hard power resources, essentially meaning military and economic resources do not necessarily provide preferred outcomes, especially in the long run. In agreement with Nye, power needs to be understood under the conditions of a revolutionized information technology and globalization in this second decade of the twenty-first century. Conventional

[243] Taylor, A. J. P. (1954). p-xxix.

[244] White House Press Office, "Inaugural Address by President Barack Hussein Obama," January 20. (2009). www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address; National Public Radio, "Transcript of Clinton's Confirmation Hearing," January 13. (2009). www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99290981 ; see also Nye, J. S and Wang Jisi. (2009). p-28.

[245] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*, p-x.

[246] Armitage, R, and Nye, J. S. (2007). "CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America", Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age it may be the state (or non states) with the best story that wins.[247] This statement places emphasis on soft power, which in turn is manifested by a strategy of smart power to obtain preferred outcomes. As the case with India demonstrates, wielding soft power resources is different from converting those resources into desired outcomes. In order not to digress from the main issue here, this section will not focus on India's soft power resources, but instead recommend the volumes already available on that topic.[248] The objective is instead to take a closer look at *conversion* of soft-power resources into desired outcomes via a smart power strategy. But in order to construct a smart power strategy, it is fundamental to understand the sources of soft power, and avenues for conversion into implementable strategies and consequent policies.

3.2. Conceptualizing soft and smart power

Power is a surprisingly elusive and contested concept, which makes it challenging to measure and operationalize. As a result, any attempt to develop a single index of power should maintain that power depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts.[249] While some define power as the ability to make or resist change, others define it as the ability to get what we want.[250] In short, power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes. It is not much different at the

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[247] Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (1999). pp.ix-xii.

[248] See for instance Thussu, D. K. (2013). *Communicating India's Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood,* Palgrave, US. Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy; Tharoor, S. (2012). *Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century*, New Delhi: Allen Lane.

[249] Stefano Guzzini argues that the dependence of power on theory means that "there is no single concept of power applicable to every type of explanation." Guzzini, S. (1993). "Structural Power: The Limits of Neo-realist Power Analysis," *International Organization,* 47, no. 3, p-446.

[250] Boulding, K. E. (1989). *Three Faces of Power*, p-15.

level of nation states, as a notable book on foreign policy defines power as "getting people or groups do what they don't want to do."[251] "From a policy-oriented perspective, a concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us who gets what, how, where, and when."[252] Additionally, "soft power is the ability to affect others through co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes."[253] Furthermore, Nye defines smart power as "the able combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction into effective strategy to be implemented in varying contexts."[254] Thus, it essentially concerns a strategy to implement policy by combining hard and soft power resources. In order to effectively utilize soft-power and avoid backfires it is vital to elucidate its sources, and means of conversion.

3.3. Sources of soft power

As Nye posits, "the soft power of a country rests heavily on three basic resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)."[255] Nye emphasizes on the parenthetical conditions as key to determining whether soft power resources translate into the desired behavior of attraction that can influence desirable outcomes. In soft power, what the recipient thinks is particularly important, and matters as much

[251] Gelb, Leslie. (2009). p-28.

[252] Lasswell, H., and Kaplan, A. (1950). *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*

[253] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power,* p21.

[254] Ibid.

[255] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power,* p84.

as the agent itself, because attraction and persuasion are socially constructed.[256] If India and Pakistan are to become mutually attractive with one another, the prospects of damaging conflicts will be reduced. Soft power need not be a zero sum game in which India's gain is necessarily Pakistan's loss, or Pakistan's gain is India's loss.

As soft power is widely known as the power of attraction, at the level of States, three clusters of qualities of the agent and action are central to attraction namely: benignity, competence, and charisma.[257] "Benignity is an aspect of how an agent relates to others, and being perceived as such tends to generate sympathy, trust, credibility, and acquiescence; Competence refers to how an agent does things, and produces admiration, respect, and emulation; Charisma is an aspect of an agent's relations to ideals, values, and vision, and it tends to produce inspiration and adherence."[258] These clusters of qualities are crucial for converting resources such as cultures, values, and policies into power behavior. Additionally, the production or generation of soft power by attraction hinges on the qualities of the agent in addition to how these are perceived by the intended audiences. The lack of these perceived qualities may create adverse effects such as indifference and revulsion, the opposite of soft power.[259]

Attraction is thus an important aspect of soft power. Another equally important aspect is persuasion, which is closely related to attraction. Nye regards persuasion as the use of argument to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threat of force or promise of payment.

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[256] Ibid.

[257] Alexander L. Vuving, (2009). "How Soft Power Works," paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, pp.7-8.

[258] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*.

[259] Ibid. p-94.

"In persuasion, rational argument appealing to facts, beliefs about causality, and normative premises are mixed with the framing of issues in attractive ways and the use of emotional appeals."[260] In turn, framing of an agenda is closely related to persuasion, as an attractively framed argument is more likely to be persuasive, if perceived as legitimate by the recipient.[261] Moreover, much persuasion is indirect, and is mediated through large audiences rather than solely by elites. This is why bottom-up approaches is a crucial part of the eclectic framework of this study. Perceptions of legitimacy may also involve third-party audiences, and indirect attempts at persuasion often involve efforts to persuade with emotional appeals in narratives rather than pure logic.[262] To reiterate, perception is crucial in soft-power. This evaluation is also relevant in the context of international mediation of the Kashmir conflict by third parties.

3.4. Conversion of soft power

When India's rising power is discussed, the focus tends to be on the large populations and increased economic and military resources. But whether those resources can actually be converted into preferred outcomes hinges on New Delhi's skill in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes. Conversion of power can either be done directly by government initiatives, or through ordinary people, but its best when done by both. Nye regards soft power mostly as government initiatives, placing it within the ambit of a top-down

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[260] Keohane, R. O. (2009). "Subversive Realism and the Problem of Persuasion" (paper delivered at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, December 3-5.

[261] Petty, R. E., and Wegener, D. T. (1991). Thought Systems, Argument Quality, and Persuasion, pp.147-162; Johnson, B. T., and Eagly, A. H. (1989). "Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-analysis," pp.290-314.

[262] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power,* pp.93-94.

approach. In other words, a top-down approach of soft power essentially entails leaders' and elites' decision making, policies, actions, and behavior. Shashi Tharoor builds upon Nye's concept, and concludes that soft power is partly related to governance, and partly despite governance.[263] This places his version of soft-power within the ambit of bottom-up approaches which concerns larger publics and civil societies, such as news media, film and television, culture, consonant, costume, custom, and so on. Additionally, networks composed of NGOs, civil society networks and organizations, inter-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, think tanks, etc is also crucial to facilitate a synthesis of ideas. Therefore, it can be inferred that soft power works best as a combination of a top-down, as well as bottom-up approach.

Additionally, Nye presents two models that elucidate how soft power affects its targets, namely: direct and indirect. These two models are analogous with the top-down, and bottom-up approaches of this study. The first or direct model is essentially a top-down approach, in which leaders may be attracted and persuaded by the qualities (benignity, competence, and charisma) of other leaders. The second or indirect model is more common, which involves a two-step model in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they in turn effect leaders decisions.[264]

Regarding the usage of soft power by governments or States, one study suggests three necessary conditions for effective use via the second model pertaining public opinion: 1) communicating to an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas; 2) persuading the target to change its attitude on a political issue, and; 3) ensuring the new attitude influences political outcomes.[265]

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[263] Tharoor, S. (2012). *Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century.*

[264] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power,* pp.94-95.

[265] Kroenig, M., McAdam, M., and Weber, S. (2009). "Taking Soft Power Seriously," unpublished paper, February 23.

These are important aspects to change another government's policy through soft power. Such an approach represents civil society and non state actors, which are often seen as credible. For instance, NGOs, sports events and Bollywood can contribute significantly towards India's soft power in the Pakistani society than most government initiatives. Tharoor talks in detail about non-government initiatives in soft power in a book footnoted earlier. The proceeding section will address public diplomacy as a means for States to manifest soft power in civil societies abroad.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy essentially entails states' capacity to communicate with the publics of other countries in an effort to indirectly influence their government. States' efforts to influence foreign publics is not new. For instance, the French government in the late nineteenth century created the Alliance Française to popularize French culture. The American government during the world war organized tours and persuaded Hollywood to make films that portrayed the U.S in a positive light.[266] The conversion of soft power by governments can be operationalized by public diplomacy means such as state commissioned films, televised shows, exchange and training programs. These can be measured in turn by opinion polls and surveys by NGOs and IGOs.

Additionally, as Nye argues, narratives are the currency of soft power. Furthermore, conveying information and selling a positive image are part of public diplomacy, but it also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.[267] To put it simply, the effectiveness of PD is measured by minds changed in a positive light.

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[266] Rosenberg, E. (1981). *Spreading the American Dream*, pp.79-100.

[267] For a thorough survey of American public diplomacy, see Nakamura, K., and Matthew Weed, M. (2009). *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

As a strategy, the centralized mass media approach to PD plays a vital role as its main strength is its audience reach and ability to generate public awareness and set the agenda.[268] Furthermore, the greater flexibility of NGOs in using networks has given rise to the *new public diplomacy,* which is "no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad."[269] As per this new approach to PD, government policy is aimed at 'promoting and participating in, rather than controlling' such networks across borders.[270] The evolution of public diplomacy from one-way communications to a two-way dialogue model treats publics as peer-to-peer co-creators of meaning and communication.[271]

A smart power narrative for the twenty-first century South-Asia is about finding ways to combine resources for much needed region-wide development through public goods. As the largest power in the region, Indian leadership remains important in regional affairs, but narratives such as *India's backyard,* and *Indian hegemony* are misleading about the type pf strategy that will be necessary for integration. The appropriate usage of PD and the implementation of top-down and bottom-up approaches are crucial.

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[268] Zaharna, R. S. (2007). "The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2, p-221.

[269] Mellissen, J. (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, pp.22-23.

[270] Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*, p-108.

[271] Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2007). *"Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective,"* p-203.

4. Prospects of international mediation

4.1. Need for mediation

India and Pakistan have endured strained relations for several decades. Owing to the colonial past, both states' foreign policies determine the prevalence of a Westphalian perspective in their international relations. Additionally, cutting off diplomatic ties, mutual expulsion of diplomats, cancellation of meetings and sports events alike are redolent characteristics of bilateral affairs. Although there is a power asymmetry, both nations are at a mutually hurting statement due to mutual antagonism and negative peace. While there hasn't been outright war in the twenty-first century, both countries face a signifiant portion of domestic population living in poverty, with poor records of human development.

Bilateral state of affairs have been, and continues to be perceived as intolerable, and neither New Delhi, nor Islamabad have been able to unilaterally break the stalemate. Asymmetric hard power resources, and outright victory in war have also proved unable to coerce a lasting settlement. Bercovitch identified four conditions for the likelihood of mediation to address an international dispute: "(a) a dispute is long and complex; (b) the parties' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; (c) neither party is prepared to countenance further costs or loss of life; and (d) both parties are prepared to cooperate to break their stalemate."[272] Analyzing Kashmir under these conditions verifies the underlying degree of intolerance of both parties. Its been going on for nearly seven decades, and talks at the highest echelons of government have been fruitless to devise a lasting solution. Additional facts such as poor GDP per capita records, low

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[272] Bercovitch, J. (1992). "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," pp.1-29.

literacy, and human development add on to the veracity, as well as urgency for reconciliation between the two regional powers. South-Asian states will continue struggling individually to maintain their economies in the face of poverty, unless a positive peace between the regional powers is ascertained.

Moreover, scholars have indicated that the security of Pakistan's substantially growing nuclear arsenal might be compromised, which add to the urgency for resolution. Americans fear that Pakistan's nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of militants, either through theft, or with the connivance of the intelligence agencies or military.[273] It can be inferred that this fear is shared by Indians too. Owing to the factual predicaments noted above, the ripeness of timing has been manifest for quite some time, and is still salient. The point is to find the right "deal," which is acceptable to all parties concerned. Owing to the comparative case study between India and Pakistan in this study, it can be argued that any single state (or non-state) actor would fall short of being able to provide an acceptable deal, and a coalition of third party mediators would be adept to garner prospects for international mediation. This is mainly due to the indication in the case study that singularly, neither the US, nor China would be accepted by both India and Pakistan, due to their bilateral dynamics. Nevertheless, they could be part of a coalition, if accepted by the conflicting parties.

Records of previous diplomatic engagement to devise a potential solution has been largely fruitless, which in turn have not been successful in satisfying the needs and interests of all parties concerned, i.e. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people.[274] The current border which was the

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[273] Kaltenthaler, K., and Miller, W. J. (2015). "Partner or Enemy," p.228.

[274] For a concise description of the principal attempts at conflict resolution, see Wirsing, R. G. (1994). Appendix 1.

culmination of UN negotiation in 1948, the so called LOC or cease-fire line, has been violated virtually a countless number of times over the years. As India and Pakistan have already got on the edge of nuclear war before,[275] coupled with the fact that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal can fall prey to islamic militants,[276] it can be asserted that mediation is needed, and the time is indeed "ripe" for mediation.

Furthermore, the civilian population of Kashmir have endured a terrible fate in the past, which has continued till the present time. They have witnessed a military occupation by India in the Vale of Kashmir, and human rights violations by both militants and Indian forces have been documented by noted observers.[277] The situation is intolerable for the Kashmiris. Additionally, as indicated earlier, regional cooperation, technology exchange, security, and overall human development are at a standstill. And in a nuclear era, India and Pakistan can neither afford to continue this conflict, nor a full scale war. On the other hand, economic, human development, and overall benefits are of immense potential. The need for resolution is clearly evident, and firm in context.

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[275] Hersh, S. M. (1993). "On the Nuclear Edge," *The New Yorker,* March 29.

[276] Clary, C. (2015). "The Safety and Security of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal," pp. 98-123.

[277] Key factual material concerning human rights violations by government troops and militant groups was obtained especially from two investigatory documents: International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights in Kashmir: Report of a Mission (Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists, 1995) 18-25; see also Asia Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, The Human Rights Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity, New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1993: pp.26-35.

4.2. International multiparty mediation

As per the prospects of international mediation in the Kashmir conflict, it is believed that multiparty mediation will be apposite in terms of increasing such prospects. Scholars regard multiparty mediation as a very practical solution to conflicts, which incrementally demand inflated commitments at management.[278] This is compounded by the fact that any single entity (whether a State, regional or international organization, NGO, or prominent individual) is rarely either willing (as mediation is a voluntary process), or able to invest as per the demands or requirements of a conflict, especially an intractable one like Kashmir.

Additionally, as previous attempts at mediation involved the UN, USSR, and US which were unable to devise a lasting solution. Therefore it can be inferred that more than one party will be needed. Consequently, forming a collation of apposite actors who are interested, as well as accepted by disputing parties, personifies an attractive alternative.[279] In such a scenario, it is likely that each of the disputing parties will have solid ties with at least one, or two members of the coalition. Furthermore, as by joining a multiparty effort enables actors to pool in their resources and skills, it consequently increases the overall leverage that can be applied in the mediation process.[280] This also allows the coalition to expand the pie by adding more and more attractive inducements, e.g. increased trade, security provision, FDI, among others. Moreover, regarding the risks associated with involvement in external conflict within domestic

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[278] See for instance, Vuković, S. (2015). *International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management*, p.40.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Crocker et al. (2001). p.59.

constituencies of mediators, acting in a coalition generates smaller shares of fiscal burden and political risk.[281]

Any potential mediator in the coalition must have at least cordial bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan. Additionally, they must be legitimate, as well as credible, in order follow up on the attractive inducements which were presented during the negotiations. It must be noted that this does not mean small states cannot act as effective mediators. As studies have demonstrated, small states too are able to mediate effectively, including with the use of coercive and manipulative strategies.[282] Owing to the comparative case study, it can be inferred that small states such as Maldives, and Bhutan can also be potential mediators (especially within the ambit of SAARC).

Moreover, prominent scholars have argued that, "mediators will intervene only when a conflict threatens their interests, or when they see an opportunity to advance them."[283] Additionally, factors related to the domestic contexts of the parties and the wider international context should also be taken into account. In the backdrop of the security architecture in the region, (most notably Afghanistan), a mediated resolution (that would ultimately lead to resolution) would be in the best interests of significant players such the United States, and NATO members, in addition to every other country with an inclination towards economic prosperity.

There will be real prospects of mediation only when a coalition of mediators who allow the parties to see the conflict through alternative frameworks are part of the mediation process.

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[281] Bohmelt, T. (2011). *Disaggregating Mediations: The impact of multiparty mediation*, pp.859-881.

[282] Vuković, S. (2015). pp.414-443.

[283] Touval, S,. and Zartman, I. W. (1989). "Mediation in International Conflicts," pp.115-137.

Additionally, owing to the fact that too many third parties in a mediation process are predicated with challenges of their own,[284] an apposite coalition would include three to four mediating third parties. This can be supported by the old dictum: *too many cooks spoil the broth.*

Additionally, two crucial challenges that must be overcome in multiparty mediation processes include: 1) achievement of adequate cooperation among the mediators; and 2) consequent coordination of their activities in the mediation process.[285] Cooperation is essentially "a situation where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for each of the participants unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost."[286] According to Zartman, cooperation pertains three elements that parties take into consideration. "The first one is the "effectiveness" of cooperation as opposed to more conflictual strategies. The second is the cost-benefit calculation of cooperating. Finally, actors must consider "playback effects" the reputational costs that an actor may suffer for noncooperative behavior. Each one of these elements plays a crucial role in parties' decisions for or against cooperation."[287] Cooperation should thus be perceived to be beneficial in terms of self-interest of parties.

Another related element is coordination, which is not very different from cooperation. "Coordination represents a subset dynamic of a larger cooperation process. A precondition for successful cooperation is that all parties recognize the mutual benefits of working in concert. In other words, coordination is the next step in the process of achieving *full* cooperation, as parties

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[284] See for instance Vuković, S. (2015). Chapter 2.; Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F. O., and Aall, P. (2001). pp.51–67.; Bohmelt, T. (2011). pp.859-881.

[285] Vuković, S. (2012). pp. 265-293.

[286] Zartman, I. W. and Touval, S. (2010). p.1.

[287] Zartman, I. W. (2010). pp.161-181, quoted from Vuković, S. (2012). p.268.

make sure that they do not cross purposes or stumble over each other in their efforts to accomplish their shared cooperative goals."[288]

4.2.1 Context of mediation process: timing and ripeness

Studies have demonstrated, along with the substance of a proposal of peaceful settlement, another equally important aspect of mediation is the timing.[289] The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.[290] Furthermore, "the concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or *Way Out*."[291] Being a perceptual event, while ripeness has not always been seized upon to open negotiations, analysts and practitioners have verified relevant occasions.[292] Touval's work on the Middle East played a significant role in the inception of the idea of ripeness.[293]

In light of the bilateral inability of New Delhi and Islamabad to extricate themselves from a mutually hurting deadlock, a mutually hurting stalemate now exists vis-a-vis Kashmir. As neither of the conflicting parties is unable to "achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or to win the

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[288] For a detailed account see Vuković, S. (2012). *International Negotiation*, pp.265-293.

[289] For details, see Zartman, I. W. (2001). *Timing of Peace Initiatives*, pp. 8-18.

[290] Zartman, I. W. and Berman, M. (1982). pp.66-78;   Touval, S,. and Zartman, I. W. (1985). pp.258-60

[291] Zartman, I. W. (2001). p.9.

[292] Crocker, C. A. (1992). *High Noon in Southern Africa*;   DeSoto, A. (1999). *Multiparty Mediation, El Salvador*.

[293] Touval, S. (1982). *The Peace Brokers*, pp.228-32.

conflict by itself," such a situation may drive them to "reevaluate their policies."[294] Realistically, both regional powers see that their available alternatives either unilateral or bilaterally are unlikely to achieve underlying interests or strategic objectives.[295] Furthermore, "if the parties do not recognize clear evidence that they are in an impasse, a MHS has not (yet) occurred, and if they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the 'evidence', the MHS is present."[296] Therefore it is fundamental that the mediating coalition demonstrate the hurting stalemate to the parties. This holds especially for India, who does not welcome mediation, and it would be a challenging endeavor to persuade New Delhi in making concessions.

Additionally, as an extension to the concept of MHS, another notable concept is that of mutually enticing opportunities (MEO). As per Zartman, this essentially entails a context where the continuance of conflict is presented as a depassé through MHS, and enticing opportunities are presented to the parties as an attractive 'way out.' This can be traced to the fact that negotiations completed by the push of a MHS alone are unlikely to be stable, and lead to a more enduring settlement.[297] In MEO, the negotiators present inducements for a more attractive future to pull the disputing parties out of their conflict, after a MHS has pushed them into a negotiation process. "The seeds of the pull factor begin with the *Way Out* that the parties vaguely perceive as part of the initial ripeness, but that general sense of possibility needs to be developed and fleshed

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[294] Ibid.

[295] Zartman, W. I. and Touval, S. (1992). *Third Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking*

[296] Zartman, W. I. (2001). p9.

[297] See Ohlson, T. (1998). *Power Politics and Peace Politics*.; Pruitt, D. G., ed. (1997). *The Oslo Negotiations*, p.2.; Pruitt, D. G. and Olczak, P. V. (1995). *Approaches to Resolving Seemingly Intractable Conflict*.

out into the vehicle for an agreement, a formula for settlement and a prospect of reconciliation that the negotiating parties design during negotiations."[298] Mutually enticing opportunities may range between significant interests or foreign policy objectives of the disputing countries, i.e. from aid, FDI, and enhanced economic relations, to support in multilateral institutions.

MEOs cant be determined objectively, which could apply in any and every situation. It is a subjective percept, and a deep contextual knowledge of the interests and desires of conflicting parties can reveal the appropriate inducements. For instance, to be able to persuade India in making Kashmir a joint autonomic protectorate under jurisdiction of both Islamabad and New Delhi, there needs to be a significantly enticing offer. Considering the Westphalian perspectives of IR in South-Asia, this is a big concession from New Delhi, and would require a big inducement, such as permanent membership in the UN security council.[299]

Furthermore, Zartman argues that when mutually enticing opportunities, or attractive options are not developed in the negotiations, the process essentially remains truncated and unstable, even if parties have agreed to suspend violence. The objective here is just to outline these phenomena, which are crucial elements for the prospects of mediation aimed at resolving Kashmir. For a detailed account of these elements, an overview of the prominent scholars noted in this study is recommended. In sum, in addition to the apposite coalition of mediating third parties, the elements of ripeness, mutually hurting stalemate, and mutually enticing opportunities are fundamental determinants for any true prospects of international mediation at resolving the Kashmir conflict.

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[298] Zartman, I. W. (2001). p.14.

[299] See Appendix 1.

4.3. Adversarial nature of relationship between disputing parties

As the conflict has been endured for a prolonged period of time, one cannot underestimate the high threshold for tolerance, in the backdrop of core religious issues, and indoctrinated political values. The public rhetoric of India and Pakistan are essentially reminiscent of classic Westphalian dynamics, deeming preference to the territory of Kashmir and the image of which state acquires it and controls it. In the context of Kashmir, and wider India-Pakistan dynamics, the conflict has proven to be the embodiment of structural and cultural violence, as noted earlier in this study. In other words, this intractable conflict which kept feeding on its own intractability, to use Zartman's terminology, has institutionalized a history of noncooperation, which provides the impetus and justification for military modernization and proliferation (a vested interest in the continuation of conflict). These factors severely impede de-escalation.[300] Furthermore, power asymmetry between India and Pakistan inhibit decision makers in New Delhi from making concessions, and 'losing face' in the domestic constituency and wider society. Nevertheless, these are nullified in a nuclear era, especially when the security of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal is not guaranteed.

A minimal record of third party intervention in the Kashmir conflict is often justified from India's aversion to outside interference.[301] New Delhi consistently deems it a bilateral issue, as stated in the Simla declaration of 1972.[302] This agreement has transformed the previously manifest multilateral context of UN intervention (since the advent of independence), into a

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[300] Kreisberg, L. (1991). Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors, pp.7-9.

[301] Schaffer, H. B., and Schaffer, T. C. (2005). Kashmir: Fifty Years of Running in Place, p-295.

[302] The Simla Declaration. Official Document. http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972

bilateral context. This bilateralism was extended to all matters of bilateral concern, including Kashmir.

As a victor in the 1971 war, India was able to coerce Pakistan into signing this agreement from a position of strength (in return for large swathes of Pakistani land and POWs). In other words, the Shimla agreement mitigated the UN mediation role, including its peacekeeping role in Kashmir. This was also antithetical to Pakistan's territorial claims, which were contingent upon international guarantees and involvement. This in turn, instead of altering the status quo of Kashmir, contributed to feed on the intractability of the conflict. Additionally, domestic public opinion, political opposition prevalent in domestic constituencies of both India and Pakistan, and (manipulable) public outcry contribute to inhibit a liberal perspective from decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad. For this very reason, mediation could provide political cover when disputants face high domestic audience costs for unpopular, although potentially prudent concessions.[303]

Conventional wisdom implies that the domestic context largely impeded previous bilateral diplomatic engagement, which also largely affected past efforts at international mediation.[304] It is widely believed that any sign of weakness in negotiating Kashmir can arouse public outcry and vigorous political opposition, and domestic pressure can encourage "government leaders to assert demands against adversaries that handicap de-escalation."[305] Additionally, New Delhi has serious reservations against secessionist movements that challenge India's secular democracy. Nevertheless, this study counters such conventional assertions, and instead argues that the right

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[303] Beardsley, K. (2011). *The Mediation Dilemma*, p-38.

[304] For an outline of previous attempts at mediation, See Appendix I.

[305] Kreisberg, L. (1991). Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors, p.7.

deal wasn't devised, i.e. opportunities weren't enticing enough, which couldn't simply be refused by either India or Pakistan.

4.4. Strategies, power and bias in mediation

Strategies

A fruitful outcome from mediation would require commitment, in addition to effective strategy and planning. In terms of strategy, this study primarily relies on Touval and Zartman's typology of mediation strategies. They identify three discrete categories of third party behavior, on an ascending level of involvement, that describes the full range of mediation techniques. This typology is a) derived deductively from a general framework of mediation relationship that includes information, decision-making and influence; b) it can be examined empirically (through observations or post mediation documents); and c) it includes all dimensions of mediator behavior. These three broad strategies are namely: communication–facilitation, formulation, and manipulation respectively.[306] Analysis in light of this typology illustrates that mediation efforts in the Kashmir conflict has been largely facilitative, and formulative so far. As the current situation on the ground makes salient the inherent weakness of the strategies adopted in the past, it logically calls for enhanced formulation, and a (persuasive) manipulative strategy in future attempts, with the use of inducements or 'carrots.'

The use of sticks, or muscle will be unlikely to be able to obtain preferred outcomes. Scholars have proposed another conceptualization of mediation styles, which concerns two distinct forms: 1) *Pure mediation;* based on "reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of

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306 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1985). International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder: Westview Press.

alternatives"; and 2) *Power mediation:* like the name itself suggests, mediation with muscle, where mediators use leverage or coercion to incentivize the parties to move toward a settlement.[307] Although proponents of the former claim that power mediation is simply not mediation, holistic observers who endorse the utility of leverage in mediation do not dismiss the 'pure' forms of mediation out of hand.[308] Using Touval and Zartman's typology, these fall under less invasive mediation strategies of facilitation and formulation, noted earlier.

The situation in Kashmir is rather dedicate, hence even narrative of coercion might sabotage the negotiation process. For instance, China's human rights records is a widely known justification for India's actions in Kashmir in an attempt to vanquish the secessionist movement. Hence, narratives of such inclinations are not likely to be welcomed by New Delhi. To reiterate, a future negotiation strategy would still be facilitative to being with, but with more formulation (expansion of pie, discussion, MEOs), and manipulation in order to sell the proposed solution by presenting enticing opportunities or inducements. Manipulation is important as it allows to translate the mediators' power resources by developing a zone of possible agreement. Additionally, the coalition of mediators to resolve Kashmir could be composed of pure, as well as power mediators. As a matter of fact, inclusion of both these types of mediators might have a positive impact on the negotiation process. Examples of pure mediators could be Maldives and Bhutan, whereas examples of powerful mediators are the P5 members of the security council. And to reiterate, power resources and its conversion is crucial for success, if that entails

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[307] Fisher, R., and Keashly, L. (1991). pp.29–42.

[308] Vuković, S. (2015). *International Neogitation,* pp.414-443.

resolution on a equitable basis, that fulfills the interests and needs of all parties concerned, i.e. the Kashmiri people, India, and Pakistan.

Power and leverage in mediation

Studies have identified that in order to elicit concessions from conflicting parties, mediators also need to exercise influence by creating pressure and providing incentives for compromise.[309] Such influence pertains mediators' resources (both soft and hard power resources), which is translated into leverage or bargaining power to obtain desired outcomes in the mediation process.[310] Leverage is believed to be an important element in a mediation process as it "enhances the mediator's ability to influence an outcome."[311] Mediation could thus be seen as a "process involving the exercise of power."[312] Nevertheless, owing to the previous investigation on the future of power in South-Asia, it can be argued that although mediators need to possess power and leverage, but these need to be channeled via a smart strategy, i.e. through soft power of attraction and persuasion. Using power by means of coercion is unlikely to work to convince neither India, nor Pakistan. In other words, in the context of Kashmir, hard power resources need to be converted through soft power of persuasion. Coercion may threaten the fragile security scenario in Pakistan, and disenchant India from negotiations altogether. Additionally, it might

[309] See for instance Touval, S. (1992). pp. 232-248.; Zartman, I. W. (1989). pp. 1-17.; Carnevale, P. J. (2002). pp. 25-41.; Favretto, K.(2009). pp. 248-263.; Betts, R.K. (1994). pp. 20-33.

[310] Touval, S. and Zartman, I.W. (2006). pp. 427-443.

[311] Bercovitch et al. (1991). p-15

[312] Smith, J. D. (1994). pp.445-450.

also impede economic relations between New Delhi and the mediators. Therefore, although power and leverage are important, equally important is a soft sell, or the conversion of power.

The biased mediator

Traditional definitions of mediation encompasses impartiality, as one of the strong attributes of a prospective mediator, as embodied in the first chapter and paragraph of the UN Charter.[313] Lack of vested interest and prestige are believed to be cornerstones of UN mediation. Nevertheless, in the context of the Cold War, affluential powers increasingly mediated conflicts, precisely due to vested interests. This is also salient in the case of South-Asia. The U.S maintained solid relations with Pakistan, whereas USSR and India shared significant ties. Scholars posit, "mediators are no less motivated by self-interest than by humanitarian impulses. The mediator is a player in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict, and has some interest in the outcome (else it would not mediate)"[314] Additionally, Touval has cited at least 104 international conflicts that were not mediated by UN, but rather by the US, or the USSR, or both jointly, from 1945-1989.[315] Moreover, several scholars have verified the unlikelihood of a third state party to accept to be a mediator without its own interests, adding substance to the notion of mediator bias. Rubin observed "the inclusion of a third party, thus invites the formulation of a coalition between one disputant and the third party, as when the third party favors (or is believed to favor) the position

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[313] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/ Accessed on May 19, 2016.

[314] Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1985). p-8.

[315] See Touval, S. (1992). pp. 232-248.

of one [party] over the other."[316] Indeed such bias is identified by noted scholars as a potential factor that can facilitate the conduct of mediation itself.[317] Additionally, as noted by Touval, "it appears safer to have a superpower play the mediator than risk that superpower aligning itself with one's enemy."[318] He also remarks "the additional perception of bias strengthens the mediator's leverage, since the party that considers itself favored by the mediator will seek to preserve its good relations and prevent a rapprochement between the third party and the adversary. The party that views the mediator as favoring its antagonist will seek to reverse the relationship and win the mediator's sympathy, and one may assume that sympathy seeking can preclude escalatory behaviors and possibly encompass de-escalatory ones."[319]

There can be two types of bias in mediation, namely bias of content, and bias of outcome. As each mediator is driven by a specific set of interest and goals, bias of outcome can be regarded as an intrinsic characteristic of any mediator.[320] Therefore, if bias is seen by one of the conflicting parties as severely antithetical to its self interests, it is not likely to accept mediation by that particular actor. More details on bias, and the exact process of mediation itself is beyond the scope of this study, which limits itself to the prospects of international mediation. It is fundamental to note however that no matter how biased or unbiased, mediation is voluntary, and mediators must be agreed upon by the parties.

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[316] Rubin, ed. (1981). Dynamics of Third Party Intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, New York: Praeger Publishers, p-6.

[317] See for example, Smith, W. P. (1985). pp.363-372; Touval, S. (1985).; Touval, S and Zartman, I. W. (1985).

[318] Touval, S. (1992). The superpowers as mediators, pp. 232-248.

[319] Touval, S. (1995). The Context of Mediation, p-376.

[320] Vuković, S. (2015). pp.414-443.

4.5. Mediatory capacity of a regional organization

Empirical studies have shown that legitimate power is more commonly attributed to international organizations than to individual states.[321] Nevertheless, this depends fundamentally on the type and purpose of the organization. For instance, UN and EU see conflict management and resolution as fundamental functions, as outlined in their charters. The EU's involvement in Montenegro is an illustration of legitimate power, as legitimacy was derived from the belief that the EU represented a socio-political community that shares particular norms and values and was able to prescribe specific behavior.[322]

Nevertheless, things may be different for regional organizations in different regional contexts and region specific dynamics. For instance, as the case study demonstrated earlier, although ASEAN and SAARC are legitimate as regional organizations, their charter and principles prohibit involvement in sovereignty related issues, including territorial disputes. Considering high regard for mutual non-interference in domestic issues, the legitimacy of the organization would be severely compromised if member states attempt to do so without consent and invitation. Mediation thus requires the voluntary willingness of mediators in addition to acceptance by the parties. According to some scholars, regional organizations are commonly classified as pure mediators owing to limited institutions, resources, and mandates.[323] It can thus be inferred that regional organizations have to resort to facilitation and formation strategies. In

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[321] Touval, S. (1992). p-244.

[322] For details, see Vuković, S. (2015). pp.414-443.

[323] Svensson, I. (2007). *Mediation with Muscles or Minds* p.230.

the context of South-Asia, although SAARC can provide the platform for mediation, but without the ability to manipulate.

Additionally, "while pure mediators might not carry a specific bias toward one of the parties in conflict, they will inevitably possess a bias of outcome they aim to achieve. This bias should not be overlooked, as it provides structure and clarity to the parties in dispute on what they may expect from the ongoing peacemaking process."[324] Therefore it could also act as an impediment, as mediation is voluntary, and sometimes parties to a conflict may reject biased mediators (especially if they are pure mediators), who do not have the means to present desired tangible benefits.

SAARC is one of the least institutionalized manifestations of regional integration. For SAARC to be an effective mediator in regional conflicts, the cessation of hostilities, and cooperation between the two key regional powers is fundamental. This is mainly because without the efforts of the two most powerful states of the region, the organization is severely limited in terms of power, resources, and legitimacy. For instance, the reconciliation between France and Germany was made possible by the formation of the European coal and steel community. In other words, ECSC reconciled France and Germany, and facilitated a platform for the cessation of hostilities, and eventual cooperation. Consequently, cooperation spilled over into other areas of cooperation and the EU was formulated. It was not the French and Germans who decided to end their hostilities and establish the ECSC. It was quite the contrary, as the ECSC made the reconciliation possible. Essentially then, the French and Germans found a utility in the ECSC (in the backdrop of American support) that was attractive as well as convincing enough for them to reconcile.

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[324] Vuković, S. (2015). p.439.

Similarly, there needs to be a utility in SAARC for India and Pakistan to benefit, which can attract the two regional powers into reconciliation, and cooperation. One potential avenue for making SAARC attractive is through substantial financing and security provision from the US, and NATO allies who have significant security interests in the region. Institutional expertise and financing from experienced and advanced sources could be the panacea for reinforcing the capacity of SAARC.

The necessary elements pertaining the prospects for international mediation to resolve the Kashmir conflict have been noted, namely a) the need for mediation; b) the number of mediators apposite for a solution; c) the adversarial context of bilateral relations; d) strategies and bias in a mediation process; and e) the capacity of a regional organization, i.e. SAARC. It can be concluded that all these elements must be addressed for the prospects of international mediation to resolve Kashmir. To go further into the intricacies of mediation is limited by the scope of this study. As noted earlier, without the consent of both conflict parties to accept mediation, there will be no prospects for international mediation. Although Islamabad welcomes mediation, this stance is not shared by New Delhi. Countering conventional wisdom that domestic politics, i.e. political opposition, and public outcry are the impediments of India's non-acceptance of mediation, this study asserts that the apposite offer has not been made yet, an offer that New Delhi and Islamabad cannot refuse. Additionally, the mediation process have become ever more dynamic, bolstered by novel academic insights compared to the last attempt at mediation. A proposal that aptly addresses the interests of India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri populace, which is backed by significant international support and backing will prove to be sufficient for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

Conclusions and findings

This study analyses regional integration in South-Asia, by investigating the core issues in the region which have played a crucial role in impeding the integration process. Broadly, these are: a) regional power rivalry due to the intractable conflict in Kashmir; b) antagonistic foreign relations within the region; c) power dynamics within the region; and d) the limitations of the regional organization SAARC. As the study of regional integration is very broad and includes several elements from different modes of IR thought, this study utilizes a multi paradigmatic or eclectic theoretical framework to address its relevant objectives.

Regional integration is severely hampered by the rivalry between the two regional powers, India and Pakistan. Although there is no occurrence of war or direct violence, the structural violence still persists, resulting in the prevalent negative peace. Positive peace can only be ascertained with the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Kashmir. This can be done via international mediation. Additionally, it finds that antagonistic foreign relations of regional member states also derails the integration process in South-Asia. In order to alleviate tensions, it is necessary to invest in SAARC, and devise platforms for regular dialogue and cooperation.

This study investigates the bilateral dynamics of the regional powers India and Pakistan, and examines the indoctrinated domestic public opinion that hampers political reconciliation (and regional integration). It also analyzes the causes of such domestic public opinion, such as role of elites, average literacy, socialization process, bare minimum of human development, and so on. This study endorses cooperation in these very areas for further cooperation and cessation of hostilities. Additionally, influence of external state actors of mutual concern to both India and Pakistan were analyzed, which demonstrated the nature of bilateral ties, as well as potential

mediatory capacities. Essentially, the US is very likely to engage as a mediator, Saudi Arabia is also very likely, but China's potential role is unclear, owing to its own stakes in Kashmir.

Furthermore, this study compares two successful versions of regional organizations that embody regional integration in Europe and East Asia, i.e EU and ASEAN, and draws some insights for SAARC. These insights present and imply direct policy initiatives from the member states, i.e. a) a committee of permanent representatives from each member state in the de facto capital in order to enhance communication, as well as to serve as a platform for dialogue; b) endorsement of bottom-up approaches which includes educational, cultural, entertainment and sporting events, NGOs and civil society actors and networks that involve the entire region; c) development, or rather reinforcement of regional institutions to support intraregional dynamics including trade.

This study also also finds that international help and asissitace will be crucial for the integration of South-Asia. Just as Europe after WWII was provided with significant assistance in developing its economy and maintaining defense, the same also applies to South-Asia. SAARC in particular demands significant assistance in institution building and expertise. In the context of SAARC, the organization needs to be perceived as an attractive avenue for development, that could benefit both India and Pakistan. These benefits should also be tangible which should in turn be perceived as more advantageous over war or antagonism. Several prominent states in the international system are observer states of SAARC, and they have an incremental role to play in the development of institutions for specific purposes. Apart from financial assistance and funding from these affluent states who have prevalent security interests in the region, expertise in norm formalization, rule of law, education, health care, human rights, among others can be beneficial for SAARC. As an example, if half of the amount of assistance provided to Pakistan by the US

were to be invested in SAARC, it can be strongly argued that such a course of action would have reaped tangible benefits by now. Having noted that, it its not too late, and significant investments in SAARC is as welcome as necessary.

This study investigates the prevalent power dynamics in the region, and examines the future modes of power, i.e. soft and smart power, that would act as crucial prerequisites for regional integration in South-Asia. As part of a smart strategy to utilize soft power, states can utilize public diplomacy as a means to import its image in order to change hearts and minds, as well as to indirectly influence the recipient country's government. Furthermore, it reveals that conversion of soft power only as top-down government initiatives will be insufficient to obtain desired outcomes, i.e. lasting or positive peace. Equally important are bottom-up approaches which include wider civil society networks, transnational NGOs and civil-society actors. Potential avenues in this direction are universities, educational and cultural exchanges, sports (cricket in particular), film and television, regional entertainment contests, think-tanks, etc. Besides government initiatives and policies that aim at regional integration and cooperation, ordinary people should also be involved in a regional process.

This study finds and affirms that a smart power approach by India in particular will be apposite to achieve objectives pertaining regional integration. Based on the premises that soft power of a country is based on the "moral authority of its foreign policy," and how attractive it is perceived by others, it finds that an equitable resolution of the Kashmir conflict will be apposite for its resolution, and future transformation. A novel proposal is outlined in appendix I, which essentially entails transforming the entire region of Kashmir into a joint federal protectorate of India and Pakistan. The new entity will be funded by both India and Pakistan, in addition to

foreign aid and financing from other states. Additionally, it is important that the new entity cannot accede to either India, or Pakistan (or any third state) and can claim statehood only after crossing certain thresholds.

International mediation will only be possible with the consent of India and Pakistan, and the apposite coalition of mediators will be able to resolve the Kashmir conflict. This can be done by either of the following two options: a) either a coalition of third party mediators engage in a process with India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir conflict; and b) a coalition of third party mediators who are also SAARC observer states work within the ambit of SAARC to resolve the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.

This study also finds that resolution of the Kashmir conflict will be intensely challenging, and transforming the indoctrinated public opinion from a phase of structural violence will take time, in addition to initiatives (both governmental as well as societal). It is believed that resolution, and regional integration can be characterized as a movement, in which states and decision makers (top-down approach) work in tandem with the wider civil society and its networks (bottom-up approach) in achieving preferred outcomes.

Furthermore, in either of these options, mutually enticing opportunities for India and Pakistan must be significant, for the realization that positive peace is more beneficial (including tangibly) than antagonism and subsequent structural violence. In sum, the elements of ripeness, mutually hurting stalemate, and mutually enticing opportunities are necessary determinants for the prospects of international mediation at resolving the Kashmir conflict. As ripeness is a perceptual phenomena, it must be seized to demonstrate the hurting stalemate to the conflicting parties (poor per capita growth, poverty, human development, among others), and mutually enticing

opportunities must be presented which are attractive enough to reconcile (such as infrastructure aid for SAARC, bilateral FDI's, educational exchanges, institutions, and so on).

This study concludes that the prerequisites of regional integration are: positive peace between the regional powers, resolution of Kashmir, institutional development of SAARC, soft and smart power in international relations of South-Asia, and international multiparty mediation (to resolve the Kashmir conflict). Additionally, there are significant prospects for international mediation in the resolution and future transformation of Kashmir, as well as South-Asa. But in order for these prospects to be materialized, the elements addressed in this study are fundamental to keep under consideration. Manifesting a positive peace thus ultimately depends upon making an offer that cannot, or wont be rejected by either Pakistan or India.

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Appendix I

Geographical distribution

Today, Kashmir denotes the region whose parts are administered by India, Pakistan, and China. The Indian administered portion is known as "Jammu and Kashmir" which includes Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh. The Pakistan administered sphere is known as "Azad Kashmir" and the northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. A portion of Ladakh, i.e. the Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram tract falls under Chinese control and administration. A map of the region is attached in the following pages, in Appendix II.

A record for previous mediation attempts

Every previous attempt at mediation took place during the latter half of the twentieth century. The two superpowers during the Cold War were involved once each in the mediation process pertaining Kashmir. The USSR acted as the mediator in Tashkent in 1966. The United States played a mediatory role in 1990. Since the advent of the first war between India and Pakistan after independence, the United Nations was the chief mediator, from 1948-1958. The line of control (LOC) that separates India and Pakistan was also devised by the UN. Nevertheless, the Shimla Agreement signed in 1972 after the Bangladesh Liberation War, mitigated any international involvement between the domestic issues of India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. In other words, the international or UN's role from Kashmir was alleviated with this agreement. Although severely antithetical to its interests, Pakistan was coerced to sign this agreement (in return for prisoners of war and large swathes of Pakistani territory), as India was the victor in the

war in 1971. Islamabad thus had little choice and never consented to this decision. It can be argued that this agreement has, indeed further substantiated the intractable nature of the conflict.

A potential proposal

It is a challenging endeavor to devise a proposal for the resolution of Kashmir on an equitable basis, which is also in the best interests of the Kashmiri populace, India, and Pakistan. This means that all parties need to make serious concessions for the larger picture and future trajectory of the region. The proposal this thesis project committed to make essentially entails transforming the entire region of Kashmir (Pakistan and India administered) into a joint autonomous protectorate of India and Pakistan.[325] This will be a unique political undertaking, wherein governance will be provided by select committees from India and Pakistan. Major decisions need to be made on the basis of local parliamentary consensus and representation. But the main governing council or committee would pertain permanent representation from India and Pakistan, in order to maintain and strengthen consensus. The intricacies of the internal mechanism of such an autonomous protectorate is open to debate, and will undoubtedly require a lot of time and discussion between the main parties India and Pakistan, in addition to the mediating coalition of third parties. Nevertheless, the idea is to essentially transform Kashmir as a completely new political entity, referred here as the autonomous protectorate. It is by and large an idea based on soft power, which seems relevant, as decades of hard power projection and usage have proved fruitless in obtaining preferred outcomes. Furthermore, taking into account the cultural and historical affinities, an opportunity should be extended towards manifesting a

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[325] This proposal is a lucid intellectual undertaking, which is not meant in any way to offense any religious of ideational sentiment.

lasting and positive peace. Furthermore, it is vital that Pakistan demonstrates a genuine will (with international assistance if need arises) in eradicating islamist terrorism. The objective is to transform Kashmir into a bastion of peace and justice, an embodiment of the collective efforts of the international community in stabilizing a nuclear hotspot, and one of the most intractable conflicts in the world.

It is believed to be a political experiment of sorts, which will verify whether India and Pakistan can establish a positive peace. Security is to be provided in most part as per the agreement reached in the negotiation process vis-a-vis Kashmir. International security presence is considered to be fundamental, owing to inherent mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan. Additionally, international investment will be fundamental, and key to strengthening existing institutions, establishing new ones for specific purposes, and financial aid for reconstruction and development. Establishment of international civil society and NGO actors will be core contributions towards generation of soft power.

Furthermore, the autonomous protectorate cannot be allowed to accede to India, Pakistan, or any third state party, as such an action can sabotage the entire peace process. It can claim independence only after institutions have strongly been grounded, and governance capacity is demonstrated to the consent of India and Pakistan (if need arises, also the coalition of mediators). If such an outcome is reached, it is expected to stimulate regional integration, by demonstrating a genuine measure of soft power from the regional powers India and Pakistan. As a result, the Kashmiri people will ascertain much deserved autonomy in their native land; Pakistan will gain international praise and favor, and benefit tremendously from the consequent regional integration and; India would consequently attain permanent membership at the UN security council.

Appendix II

Map of the Kashmir region

Map developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Downloaded from: http:// www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_region_2004.jpg