EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF TRUST ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

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FOREWORD

There are a few people I would like to thank that have contributed significantly to the completion of this thesis and the graduation that results from it. First of all, I'd like to thank my parents who have supported me endlessly during my journey as a student, encouraged me to broaden my curriculum and to undertake various internships, even though this meant postponing my graduation. The result of this multidisciplinary curriculum has come together nicely in this thesis project; integrating various disciplines and academic perspectives I've had the privilege of studying; at the University of Amsterdam, Leiden University, The Royal Netherlands Defense Academy and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Furthermore, I'd like to thank the two most important David's in my life; for allowing me access to the University Library in Amsterdam where most of this thesis came together; and for endless support, brainstorming efforts and fun moments of distraction.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation. Due to a gap in the current literature within the field of Intelligence Studies, this thesis aims to provide a multidimensional theoretical framework, complemented with insights from other disciplines within the Social Sciences, that is applicable in analysing the influence of trust on international intelligence liaison. Tested by analysing the framework according to a variety of memoires from former US intelligence personnel on trust and international intelligence cooperation, this thesis claims the current state of the literature from the field of Intelligence Studies is not sufficiently equipped to thoroughly explain the decision-making process actors engage in when deciding if they feel confident to establish trusting relationships, as well as the influence the specific features of that relationship have on international intelligence cooperation, and suggests the adopted framework is subjected to further testing in order to further establish its validity and applicability.

Key words: international intelligence cooperation, liaison, trust

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1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of May 2017, CNN headlines reported: 'How US intelligence leaks upset two allies in one week - a trend that is raising concerns around potentially jeopardizing the trust of key information-sharing partners'. After being accused of revealing classified Israeli intelligence to Russian officials earlier that week, intelligence sharing between the United States and United Kingdom was shortly suspended after President Trump reportedly allowed for the disclosure of secret information about the terrorist attacks in Manchester that occurred earlier that month.

In that same article, several influential opinion makers spoke out about the possible harm the leaks could do to the intelligence sharing relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. On that incident, Senator Chris Coons from the Democratic party representing the state of Delaware stated "[The United States has] got a very close intelligence and defense partnership with the UK, and that news … suggest[s] that we have even more close allies who are questioning whether we can be trusted with vital intelligence" (Cohen, 2017). On the same incident, General Mark Hertling, military analyst for CNN, claimed "it eliminates trust between nations, and that's the coin of the realm in terms of doing things for the betterment of the nation. You are not going to have the best capabilities to defend the nation if other countries aren't going to share as much with you"(Cohen, 2017). Although the (temporary) suspension of intelligence sharing by partners is not a new phenomenon, questions do arise about the significance and importance of trust in the intelligence sharing process, as it appears to be an element mentioned very often in the media.

In the literature on intelligence and international intelligence cooperation more specifically, trust is a theme that referred to on a regular basis as an enabler or essential component or condition of (international) intelligence cooperation (Lefebvre, 2003; Clough, 2004; Aldrich, 2009; Svendsen, 2009; Hermann, 2010). However, except for the work of Walsh (2006), past academic efforts on this topic have been very limited; providing some insights but failing to provide a detailed analysis of and discussion on the significance, alleged importance and role of trust in the intelligence sharing process. Although scholars have acknowledged the importance and, for some, essentiality or vital importance of trust in intelligence cooperation, it has clearly been understudied. Despite a very limited definition offered by Walsh (2006), trust in international intelligence cooperation has not been defined yet. It has instead been used as a bulk concept, thereby impeding thorough analysis and development of this field of study.

Despite its alleged importance by scholars and its prominence in the political debate on international intelligence cooperation, the influence of trust within international intelligence cooperation appears to be a gap in the Intelligence Studies literature. However, other fields within the Social Sciences provide elaborate conceptualizations and theory on the influence of trust within cooperation that might enable scholars and students of Intelligence Studies to better understand and analyze the significance of trust within their field of study. This thesis aims to fill the gap in the

existing intelligence literature by answering the following research question: what the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation? It will do so by reviewing a variety of perspectives on trust from the academic field of Intelligence Studies as well as from five other disciplines within in the Social Sciences, as well as the influence of trust on cooperation. By reviewing academic work concerning the interplay between trust and cooperation from other disciplines such as Sociology and Psychology, but also Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies, an extensive theoretic framework will be constructed, meant to improve theoretical understanding of trust and its influence on international intelligence cooperation.

This framework, built on theoretical constructs from other academic traditions, will be tested by a systematic review of empirical sources deriving from various memoires written by highly ranked, former intelligence officials from the United States. The analysis of the memoires will serve to clarify the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation and test the applicability of the framework. By exploring the concept of trust in relation to cooperation and information-sharing within the Social Sciences combined with information resulting from the memoires, this thesis will feature a discussion of the proposed conceptual framework catching the significance and alleged importance trust in international intelligence cooperation based on empirical evidence.

The analysis of the extensive literature research will serve to answer the following research question: 'What is the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation?' Answering this research question will contribute to the developing field of Intelligence Studies and the topic of international intelligence cooperation more specifically, by clarifying a widely used, but under researched element: trust. Furthermore, it is of societal relevance as it provides a deeper understanding of trust providing an alternative to the abstract understanding of trust that is currently used in the media.

What follows after this introduction is a chapter on the theoretical framework needed in order to answer the research question. This chapter roughly consists out of two parts. First, it will shortly introduce the academic field of Intelligence Studies, the topic of international intelligence cooperation and will touch upon the alleged importance and significance of trust in in the existing literature on international intelligence cooperation. It will provide a theoretical framework on the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation based on the literature from Intelligence Studies so far. Second, this chapter includes a systemic literature review of five other traditions within the Social Sciences that have reflected on the relationship between trust and cooperation. Insights from this review will also be processed into an alternative theoretical framework. The methodology chapter that follows will inform the reader about the methods and structures used to answer the research question, and reflect upon the strengths and limitations of the research design. The next chapter will naturally evolve out of the previous and embodies the analysis of the thesis. It includes a content analysis of memoires from former US Intelligence personnel focusing on the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation. The memoires will be analyzed using the proposed framework resulting out of the literature review. The analysis chapter will conclude upon

the quality of the proposed framework. The concluding chapter will describe the research process and the results but will also reflect upon the research and pose suggestions for further research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter includes a reflection upon the current academic literature that is available on the topic of this thesis and consists out of two parts. The first part will position the research in the context of Intelligence Studies by reflecting upon on the academic field of Intelligence Studies, the specific study of international intelligence cooperation as well as a systemic literature review of the current academic perspectives on the relationship between trust and international intelligence cooperation. The second part consists out of a systemic literature review on various traditions within the Social Sciences regarding the significance of trust and the relationship between trust and cooperation. The output of this review produces a theoretical framework that will be reflected upon in the chapter on analysis. In general, this theoretical framework serves to provide the reader with a sufficient amount of contextual understanding to reflect upon the analysis and conclusion.

This chapter uses an exploratory research approach into the influence of trust within international intelligence cooperation and cooperation within the Social Sciences. Exploratory research is often conducted for a problem that has not been clearly defined yet, in order to gather preliminary information that will help define problems and suggest hypotheses for future research (Mittal 2010: 1). Due to the lack of research on the influence of trust, exploratory research in this study serves to provide insight into this understudied phenomenon, establish priorities, develop operational definitions and guide further research. It is considered to be very suitable in analysing social phenomena and helpful in producing conceptual frameworks, which is the output of this chapter.

A systematic form literature review was conducted in order to reduce the possible appearance of bias in selecting or reviewing the literature on trust and cooperation. Several criteria have been established to select the academic works featured in the review. Regardless of research design, research strategy or time period, the most influential and founding works were selected by analysing literature overviews of the specific tradition, as these overviews tend to engage on the key articles and books. Other than influence or key importance, relevance was a key criteria that differentiated among the various fields in the Social Sciences. Several traditions lacked overview articles because research on the topic is considered limited or a niche. In those cases, all articles on the topic were reviewed and incorporated in the literature review based on their relevance.

As the concept of Social Sciences is used as an umbrella for a large amount of academic traditions, five of them have been selected based on their relevance to the study of trust and the field of Intelligence Studies. The five disciplines are structured ranging from broad to specific and of increasing similarity to the field of Intelligence Studies. The relevance funnelled from the relationship between trust and cooperation in general, to trust and inter-organizational cooperation, to trust and international cooperation and finally to trust and international information sharing in the world of security. First of all, literature from Psychology and Sociology was selected as these

disciplines provide the most thorough insight into the nature and influence of trust within cooperation. In order to understand the phenomenon of trust, these traditions provide a necessary basis. Second, the necessary organizational dimensions and insights were added by including the field of Public Administration. After all, Intelligence Studies are public institutions, despite having an exceptional status. These inter-organizational insights were directed towards an international context by including the field of International Relations which has a very distinct way of studying trust between actors in the international system, providing essential insights. Finally moving closer to the Intelligence paradigm, the influence of trust on cooperation in relation to intelligence liaison within the field of Security Studies was analysed. Insights from international law enforcement cooperation and multinational military operations were included, providing a view on trust by partners of the Intelligence services and thereby providing essential insights into the study of the phenomenon of trust in international intelligence cooperation as well as the risky environment or security context.

In order to accumulate the necessary articles and journals for the literature review, electronic bibliographical databases from three different universities in the Netherlands (University of Amsterdam, Leiden University, Royal Netherlands Defense Academy) were consulted in order to gain access and construct a complete overview. In addition, Google Scholar and other online search engines were consulted in order to gather insight into possible relevant literature.

2.1 Intelligence Studies and International Intelligence Cooperation

This paragraph serves to briefly clarify and position the tradition of Intelligence Studies within the academic world. Not only is intelligence as a subject enjoying an increasing amount of attention in the public and political debates; it is gaining an increasing amount of attention in academic research too. It is a relatively young but fast-developing discipline within the academic field of Social Sciences which has created a substantial body of knowledge (Van Puyvelde & Curtis, 2016: 1040). A dominant feature throughout the study of Intelligence and of relevance to this thesis is the context of secrecy and a lack of publicly available records or empirical information due to the confidential nature of the phenomenon that is studied in this discipline. Despite this limitation in access to information, the field of Intelligence Studies has been able to transform itself into a distinct field of study.

Following the creation of intelligence services including the CIA in the United States, the BVD (now AIVD) in the Netherlands and the Bundesnachtrichtendienst and Budesambt für Verfassungsschutz in Germany around the second half of the 20th century, a new era of intelligence emerged. This new era included first efforts in establishing a distinct academic field of Intelligence Studies as Kent published his 'Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949). Two of the most influential journals that have shaped the academic tradition of Intelligence Studies are *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.*

However, as the discipline has evolved, more journals have been established, including the *International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*, the *Journal of Intelligence Analysis*, and the *Journal of Intelligence History*, the *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and CounterTerrorism*. The development of the field of Intelligence Studies has not only been marked by a variety of influential historical events and intelligence failures, but also by a variety of perspectives and multidisciplinary academic traditions. This has resulted in various dominant topics, the intelligence process being the main subject of study (Van Puyvelde & Curtis, 2016: 1046).

International intelligence cooperation in this thesis refers to a conscious partnership between various intelligence services from different countries, in order to achieve goals by engaging in the exchange or supply of information, capabilities and resources. Relations between handlers from a certain agency and agents reporting in other countries are not seen as part of international intelligence liaison in this thesis, as they either lack an equal partner from an intelligence service or involve unconscious partnerships.

International intelligence cooperation belongs to the most underexposed topics of intelligence studies (Van Puyvelde & Curtis, 2016, Bradford Westerfield, 1996). Due to the classified character and limited access to gather empirical information - Aldrich (2008: 7) even argues that international intelligence cooperation is concerned with the highest amount of secrecy - most research in this field is focused on distinguishing the various types and forms of international intelligence cooperation, along with their advantages and disadvantages and suggestions for improvement. Historical approaches as well as perspectives from the academic tradition of International Relations on international intelligence cooperation are also apparent in this body of research, so are the works of scholars focusing on several elements of the cooperation, such as ethics, information management and legal challenges. In the past two decades, authors such as Sims (2006), Svendsen (2008, 2009, 2010), Lander (2004), Clough (2004), Reveron (2006) Seagle (2015), Aldrich (2004, 2009) and Jeffreys-Jones (2013) have contributed significantly to developing (international) intelligence cooperation as a field of study. Another term for international intelligence cooperation is international intelligence liaison, as practioners call it (Aldrich, 2008: 3). Despite a possible discussion regarding a different focus in both terms, both concepts will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

In order to understand the dynamics of international intelligence liaison, its various forms and types, costs and benefits as well as its conditions will be shortly touched upon in this paragraph. Several types of international intelligence cooperation can be roughly distinguished from the available literature, namely bilateral or multilateral, such as the 'Five Eyes' arrangement between Australia, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand; institutionalized forms such as collaboration within NATO or the EU, or more loosely forms of cooperation such as coalitions of the willing or international communities of interest; simple and complex forms, as well as symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of cooperation between partners (Aldrich, 2008: 7; Sims, 2006: 196-202). Also, the content of liaison arrangements may differ; cooperation surpasses mere

information sharing on strategic, operational and tactical levels. Support when it comes to hosting and facilities, training and capacity-building as well as finance and equipment is also part of international intelligence liaison, so are joint covert operations (Lefebvre, 2003: 533).

Intelligence liaison can generate several advantages and disadvantages; risks and gains. Costs can range from a loss of independence, ethical dilemmas, disinformation and manipulation to security concerns (Lefebvre, 2003: 534-536). Benefits from international intelligence cooperation on the operational level can be increases in efficiency and effectiveness, learning and secrecy (Lefebvre, 2003: 534). On the political level, international intelligence cooperation can serve to exercise influence or the possibility of shadow diplomacy (Lefebvre, 2003: 534). From the literature on international intelligence liaison, several conditions for success can be distilled. Among these conditions, the following are cited the most throughout the literature on international intelligence cooperation; common interests and threat perceptions, dependency, hierarchy, bureaucratic will, culture and trust. It is this last condition, trust, that is the focus of this research.

2.2 International Intelligence Cooperation and Trust

When studying the literature on international intelligence cooperation, what becomes clear is that a lot of scholars argue trust is the, or one of the main building blocks of cooperation between services: 'There is the key importance of trustworthiness' (Hermann, 2010: 9). 'For these enhanced relationships to work well, confidence and trust are essential ingredients' (Lefebvre, 2003: 528). 'The universal currency of intelligence is trust' (Aldrich, 2009: 124). 'Throughout, mutual trust is the most important factor' (Clough, 2004: 603). '[..] trust, [is] the central component for undertaking the most effective intelligence liaison' (Svendsen, 2009: 715). 'Foreign Intelligence services, whose cooperation is often crucial, will not enter into liaison relationships if they cannot trust the CIA to protect basic secrets' (Moran, 2016: 5). When talking about multinational intelligence constructs for intelligence cooperation, Gill, a widely-cited scholar of Political Science and intelligence, argues that for collective action to succeed, trust is essential. 'It must have rules, but ultimately it involves trust and legitimacy. Imposed rules don't work. No regime has ever survived on the basis of rules but no trust.' (Gill in Tuzuner, 2010: 152). Another author reflecting on trust is De Boer, who argues that mistrust or distrust – the opposite of trust – 'is the key barrier to fully effective intelligence-sharing' (2015: 412).

Outside of the academic spectrum, official government documents and statements underline the relationship between trust and cooperation. The US National Intelligence Strategy reflects the importance of trust in intelligence partnerships in the following quote: 'The level of trust, value of intelligence, and the type of diplomatic relationships with other countries will determine the extent to which intelligence is shared' (Reveron, 2006: 457). A joint statement by the Heads of State in Brussels claimed the intelligence partnership between Europe and the United States "must be based on respect and trust" and that "a lack of trust could prejudice the necessary cooperation in the field

of intelligence gathering" (European Council, 2013), reacting on the alleged monitoring of German Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel. Even recently published CIA policy documents emphasize the importance of trust in foreign intelligence gathering activities (CIA, 2001). In a reaction to a proposed amendment restricting U.S. government employees from giving gifts that exceed the amount of 50 dollars, the CIA claims it would hinder foreign intelligence gathering activities as the practice of gift-giving in order to establish relationships of trust in foreign intelligence liaison activities, could be strained (CIA, 2001).

Some authors argue that international intelligence liaison is possible without trust. Based on empirical research, Vestermark (2017: 113) illustrates this point by referring to the United States – Pakistani intelligence liaison. "[It] is known for its high level of mutual mistrust and even contempt. However, the relationship has persevered, even during times of hardship." "The argument is that if two states trust each other a lot, they'll cooperate. That does happen, but that is not the only source or cause of cooperation", Walsh claims, reflecting upon other enablers for intelligence cooperation as mentioned in this review (Walsh in Tuzuner, 2010: 155).

What has become clear from the above quotes from academic literature, policy documents and statements is scholars of Intelligence Studies claim that trust is one of the building blocks of international intelligence liaison. Mistrust or distrust, the opposite of trust, is claimed to function as a barrier. However, the various authors differ in addressing weight to the importance or essentiality of trust as an enabler, and the depth of the cooperation that is related to it. Another feature that the above reflections upon trust and cooperation have in common, is a lack of definition and depth concerning the concept of trust. Most scholars treat trust as absolute entity; it is either apparent or not and only engage upon trust in a couple of sentences. Findings from the above review are portrayed in the figure below. The figure shows all the possible conditions or enablers of trust put forward in the literature stated above, but does not reflect upon on the weight of trust or one of the other elements.


Figure 1. Elements leading to international intelligence cooperation

However, there are a few articles and books that provide a slightly deeper insight into the relationship between trust and international intelligence cooperation. In 'Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis' De Boer (2015) makes the distinction between several types of intelligence and trust: 'The exchange of intelligence is usually restricted to the exchange of strategic intelligence: the more developed the trust relationship is between countries, the higher the chance that there will also be exchange of tactical and operational intelligence' (2015: 412). This is interesting as De Boer claims there are actual levels of development in trust; that it is a relative concept which makes it not as black and white. Plus, she claims that the level of trust determines the type of intelligence shared. The higher the development of trust, the more types of intelligence will be shared.

Apart from the levels in the development of trust, possibly ranking from low to high, short-term to long-term, Svendsen (2009) distinguishes various types of depth in intelligence liaisons in 'Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations'. '[..] Deep intelligence liaison requires the development of trust [..]. Intelligence may be exchanged on an ad hoc basis for reasons of convenience at short notice, but few really meaningful intelligence relationships have been developed with any speed (2009: 710)'. This means trust may now not only be connected to the types of intelligence exchanged, but also the depth of the intelligence cooperation connected to development over time and its effectiveness.

The authors discussed above only devote less than a paragraph to the notion of trust in (international) intelligence cooperation. They provide some insights, but fail to provide a definition of trust. There is one author, however, who has discussed trust and intelligence cooperation more deeply. James Walsh (2006) argues that mistrust between EU Member States in the form of divergent policy interests is the key barrier to intelligence sharing in his article 'Intelligence Sharing in the European Union: Institutions are not enough'. According to Walsh (2006: 628), trust exists when the interests of a first actor match the interests of a second actor. Walsh builds his argument on what he calls diverse research traditions that show that similar interests between actors are a necessary condition for one actor to trust the information communicated to him by a second actor (2006: 628). 'A sending state is more likely to share intelligence with a receiving state if it trusts the latter to treat the intelligence securely and to use it to act in a manner consistent with its interests' (2006: 629). Walsh braids two necessary elements for trust in this claim; (1) that interests need to converge and (2) that the receiving state must treat the intelligence securely. He goes on stating several boundaries in actor interaction from both the sender and the receiver of information that can lead to mistrust, and claims that institutions and certain regulations can aid in fostering trust.

There is another article from the field of Intelligence Cooperation that is able to explain another feature of trust. In the article 'US-European Intelligence Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion' (2009), Richard J. Aldrich explains what he calls

paradoxical relations between countries that have disagreed in public but closely worked together in the intelligence realm by claiming that intelligence cooperation is a kind of 'low politics' that is focused on practical arrangements on the operational level as opposed to the 'high' level politics of foreign policy and strategy. When applying Aldrichs (2009) thesis to trust, one could argue that there can be different levels of trust within national intelligence and political communities where, at the political level trust may be low while at the operational level trust may be high and vice versa. One could also for example distinguish political trust from intelligence trust, or strategic trust from operational and tactical trust. This makes sense because the worlds of policy makers and intelligence professionals do not only differ in their tasks and responsibilities, but also in their mind-sets, as explored by scholars such as Lowenthal (2010). This perspective adds another dimension to those from the previous paragraphs by distinguishing the various parties and different levels of analysis that are at play in intelligence cooperation which influence and are influenced by trust.

The concluding chapter of 'Intelligence Cooperation: Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing' (2010) features a wrap-up discussion between the several authors that contributed to the book. Some of these authors and former intelligence personnel present reflect upon the notion of trust and international intelligence cooperation. Parvez, who served as director-general of Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency, claims that for actors to engage in the sharing intelligence, two elements are vital; trust and reciprocity, two elements that need time to develop (Tuzuner, 2010: 150). This quote connects trust as a vital element to another, namely reciprocity, and claims that trust develops over time.

What becomes clear from the above literature review on the use of trust in the literature on intelligence cooperation is that although authors have acknowledged the importance and, for some, essentiality or vital importance of trust in intelligence cooperation, it has been understudied. Despite a very limited definition offered by Walsh, trust in international intelligence cooperation has not been defined yet. It has instead been used as a bulk concept, thereby impeding thorough analysis and development of this field of study. Five insights can be concluded from the above review, namely that (1) there can be a variety of depth in trust and cooperation between the intelligence services, ranging from low to high and from ad-hoc to structural, (2) that the depth of a trusting relationship can determine the amount and depth of information shared (strategic/operational/tactical), (3) that trust is based upon converging interests and the belief that the trustee treats the information securely (4) that institutions, rules and procedures can aid in fostering trust and finally (5) that different forms of cooperation can on different levels can relate to differ forms and versions of trust. The findings from this literature review are summarized in the figure below.

Figure 2. Conceptual framework of trust and international intelligence cooperation based on the literature review of Intelligence Studies

Figure 2 reflects the literature by visualising there is a certain input generates or stimulates trust. The trust that results from the input has several features and can result into international intelligence cooperation. When it does, it influences its depth, forms and content as well. It does not have to, as illustrated by Vestermark (2017). Other enablers, as portrayed in Figure 1, can also lead to international intelligence cooperation. What this figure, and thereby the current literature from the field of Intelligence Studies lacks, is insight into the decision-making process of an actor on which it bases its confidence to express trust, as well as a deeper understanding of the relationship between trust and international intelligence cooperation.

2.3 Insights from the Social Sciences clarifying the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation

To start exploring the significance of trust in intelligence more thoroughly, this thesis will draw upon concepts of and theories regarding trust and cooperation from other, similar traditions within the Social Sciences where it has been subjected to more extensive research. This paragraph aims to develop a conceptual framework enlightened by the insights from the various Social Sciences on the significance of trust and its relationship with international intelligence cooperation.

In the last decade of the 20th century, there has been an increase in interest among social scientists that concerned the influence of trust in organizational processes (Coleman 1990, Fukuyama 1995, Kramer & Tyler 1996, Kramer 1999, Mayer et al. 1995, Putnam 1993, Misztal 1996, Seligman 1997, Sitkin & Roth 1993). This increase of interest resulted in a similar growth of emerging research regarding the application of emerging trust theory to various organizational problems (Brown 1994, Carnevale 1995, Zand 1997). The following paragraphs each concern a review of effort from a field within the Social Sciences regarding the development of trust theory vis

a vis cooperation, as part of organizational behaviour. Note that there is a large body of research on intra-organizational trust (such as Van de Bunt, Wittek and De Klepper, 2005) which could be of interest when studying trust within the national intelligence cycle, however for the sake of brevity and focus, this review will focus on inter-organizational trust, as this thesis deals with cooperation between intelligence services from different countries.

2.3.1: Sociology and Psychology

In order to gain a thorough understanding of the underpinnings of trust in intelligence cooperation, it is relevant to review the academic traditions that focus exclusively on phenomena that occur in social interactions and the behaviour related to it. Scholars of Sociology and Psychology have widely acknowledged that trust can lead to cooperative behaviour amongst individuals and groups (Axelrod, 1984; Gambetta, 1988; Mayer et al 1995; McAllister, 1995). The meaning of trust has been studied in different social contexts and its conditions and determinants have been clarified. However, despite efforts by a variety of scholars, there is no universally accepted definition of trust. As Kramer (1999, 571) argues, some definitions focus on social and ethical facets of trust, while others emphasize the strategic and calculative dimensions of trust. These distinctions are visible throughout the literature on trust put forward in this thesis, in spite of the academic tradition or perspective connected to it.

Rousseau et al. (1998) have established the following definition of trust based on multiple disciplines: 'trust is a psychological state compromising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions of the behaviour of another'. This definition embraces trust as a psychological state. Despite the differences in focus, most scholars of Psychology and Sociology would agree with Rousseau and categorize trust as a psychological state (Kramer, 1999). Some of the authors describing trust as a psychological state, argue that trust is choice behaviour, based on rational choice theory and relational models of trust. This, as well as two other competing bodies of research are two of three perspectives on trust within Psychology and Sociology and will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

The first perspective, in line with the definition by Rousseau (1998) mentioned above, that claims trust includes a state of perceived vulnerability or risk which flows out of an individuals' uncertainty regarding the motives, intentions and possible actions of the others on whom he or she depends (Kramer, 1999: 571). Robinson proposes another definition in this perspective by arguing trust is composed of someone's "expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that another's future actions will be beneficial, favourable or at least not harmful to one's interests" (1996: 576). Trust, in this view, can be seen as an expression of confidence between two or more parties including an exchange of some kind. Confidence in this sense can mean two things (1) the idea that one party will not be harmed or put at risk by actions of the other party or (2) the idea that a partner in the exchange will not exploit the vulnerability of the others (Axelrod, 1984;). Mayer et

al. (1995: 712) have defined trust as 'the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party'. According to Mayer et al. (1995) there are several characteristics of the trustor and the trustee (for example benevolence and integrity) that can lead to trust in the trustee. This perspective shows that actors in the trust-game perform some sort of risk-analysis, managing the risk of the exchange in order to optimize the benefits that follow from cooperation. Trust in this perspective leads to a set of behavioural expectations among people (Jones & George, 1998: 532). In other words, this perspective focuses on behavioural considerations by the actors, between vulnerability (risk) and positive outcome (benefit). Plus, it touches upon the role of expectations of the other.

The second perspective of academic research claims trust is an attitude or expectancy about other people and the social systems that they are part of. One of the most influential works in this perspective is by Barber, who has stated trust is composed of "socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, and of the national and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for their lives (1983: 165). This perspective stresses the influence of morality, motivation, culture and emotions and engages with the influence of social context and experiences on judgements concerning trust.

However, the largest body of research and the third perspective argue that trust is a complex, multidimensional concept. Merely cognitive, strategic and risk-based definitions of trust are not sufficient, as affective and motivational concepts should be considered as well (Kramer, 1999: 571). Trust also deals with cultural meanings, emotional responses and social relations. This perspective is best summarized by Fine and Holyfield, who claim that 'one not only thinks trust, but feels trust' (1996: 25). Jones & George (1998) engage upon several examples of its multidimensionality, such as the difference between global aspects of trust versus situational trust as studied by Driscoll (1978) and Scott (1980), the different conditions that foster trust as studied by Butler (1991) as well as elements of morality, cognitivism and emotionality as studied by Barber (1983). In line with the largest body of sociologists and psychologists, this thesis will work towards a multidisciplinary definition of trust that encompasses both the calculative acceptance of risk, but also takes into consideration how social and situational factors influence these calculations.

The third, multidimensional perspective has produced interesting insights regarding the significance of trust in cooperation between actors that will be reviewed in more depth here. In 'The Experience and Evolution of Trust: Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork' (1998) Jones & George analyse the concept of trust based on a theoretical framework formed by values, attitudes and moods and emotions as well as the underlying feelings, beliefs and meanings. Jones & George (1998: 532) claim that a person's value system guides their behaviour as well as the interpretation of experience by creating several criteria that enable a person to evaluate and make sense of the world. It is the value system that creates what someone thinks of as desirable or undesirable. What follows

from past research, according to Jones & George (1998:532), is that what people think of as desirable or ideal, conditions the experience of trust. Shared values, for example, help create relationships where trust exists, and in turn, trust serves to maintain and express the shared values that trust originates from (Barber, 1983).

Another element in trust, according to the Jones & George study, is attitude. Not only can trust be created through values, trust can also be experienced by individuals as part of an attitude towards another person, based on knowledge, beliefs and feelings about the nature of the other person (McAllister, 1995; Robinson, 1996). As Jones & George (1998: 533) explain, the attitudes that people have and form towards other people in an organizational context, are likely to contain information concerning the other party's trustworthiness. People's attitudes both define and structure social interactions and the experience of trust in relationships that are ongoing. Important is that attitudes are much more specific than values; attitudes are object specific and responsive to past and ongoing experiences with the object.

Emotions and moods are also fundamental aspects of the experience of trust because the experience of trust includes affect (strong or subtle feelings), one's current affective state may influence one's experience of trust, and trust is built on expectations that are partly emotional (Jones & George, 1998: 534). Even more than values and attitudes, moods and emotions change over time and thereby change the experience of trust. Moods and emotions can be both general and specific; specific to the person, interaction or relationship, and general in the sense that the same feeling can be experienced again across people and situations (Jones & George, 1998: 534). The point at which parties to an exchange have confidence in each other's values and trustworthiness, have favourable attitudes towards each other and experience positive affect in the context of the relationship is crucial in the evolution of trust. Trust can therefore evolve and dissolve. This perspective is interesting, because it elaborates on the evolution of trust and breaks the black and white perspective of trust being static.

Other than insights on the process of establishing or building trust, Sociological and Psychological studies also provide insights regarding the various forms it can take. Jones & George (1998) claim there are roughly three forms of trust that can evolve into one another; distrust, conditional trust and unconditional trust. Dibben et al. (2000) distinguish three other forms of trust; (1) dispositional trust which can be understood as is the personality trait of a person to be trusting or not, not modifiable; (2) learnt trust which is an actors' tendency to trust or not to trust another specific person, which is modifiable; and (3) situational trust in which trust depends on the context and cues that modify the expression of generalized tendencies, modifiable (Dibben et al, 2000: 56). Situational trust, Dibben et al. (2000) argue, determines an actors' behaviour at a certain time, emerging from experience. It can change as a result of individuals 'comparing, finding again and designating the situational cues received' (Dibben et al, 2000: 56). It is the direct outcome of interaction between individuals over time. The necessary time to build situational trust between two actors depends on the disposition to trust each of the individuals, the history of the relationship and

the nature of the situation. This perspective shows that despite trust does not only change over time, but can be context and situation specific.

The above insights from Sociological and Psychological traditions on trust have added to our understanding of the phenomenon trust in relation to cooperation. There is no universally accepted definition, and most research can be characterized as either focusing on social or ethical components or calculative and strategic elements of trust. What is needed for the holistic approach to this thesis is a perspective that takes into account all the elements. This is the multidimensional perception of trust, as argued by Jones & George (1998) amongst others. A perspective that includes risk analysis and the attached behavioural expectations, but also the role of values, attitudes, moods and emotions (as well as underlying feelings, beliefs and meanings). Furthermore, insights from these academic fields in the Social Sciences have provided insight into the idea that trust comes in various forms, being dispositional, learnt and situational, conditional or unconditional and is known to develop over time instead of being static.

2.3.2: Public Administration

Public Administration is a field within the Social Sciences with many similarities to Intelligence Studies. It's study of trust within and between institutions (intra- and inter-organizational) provide the necessary clarity regarding the establishing of framework for assessing the significance of trust between international intelligence institutions. As this study focuses on cooperation between various institutions, the focus within this paragraph will be on efforts within the tradition of Public Administration to conceptualize and explain the role of inter-organizational trust.

Within the academic field of Public Administration, Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) draw upon the importance of studying inter-organizational trust. According to their main argument, to solve an increasing amount of complex policy problems transgressing the boundaries of the traditional single organizations, trust is needed as intercompany cooperation and (network) governance are on the rise. In their work 'Studying inter-organizational trust in Public Administration' (2014), Oomsels and Bouckaert aim to design a conceptual framework for inter-organizational trust in public administration. They start by offering a detailed description of definitions of trust from a range of fields within the Social Sciences, namely sociology, social psychology, organization studies, economics, psychology, management, political science and public administration itself.

There are two existing definitions of trust within the field of public administration, namely that of Choudhury who has defined trust as 'a voluntary act that is based on a psychological state of positive expectation in the face of vulnerability and risk' (2008: 590). In this definition, trust is a psychological state and elements such as expectations regarding the outcome and the risk-analysis in the light of vulnerability reoccur. The other definition by Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn (2010: 4) states that trust is 'a stable positive expectation that actor A has (or predicts he has) of the

intentions and motives of actor B in refraining from opportunistic behaviour, even if the opportunity arises. Trust is based on the expectation that A will take the interests of actor B into account'. Both definitions include elements of the risk-analysis as well as the expectation of the intentions, motives and actions of the actor that is to be trusted.

Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) summarize all literature on trust by stating that trust 'stems from both cognition and affection (McAllister, 1995), is required in risky or contingent situations (Luhman, 1979; Das & Teng, 2001), is characterized by a willingness to be vulnerable (Carrall & Judge, 1995), leads to risk-taking behaviour (Lewis & Weigert, 1995) and is based on positive expectations of a counterpart (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). This deconstruction of trust clearly results from the multidimensional perspective from Sociology and Psychology. These five elements lead them to adapt the following definition of trust: 'the intentional and behavioural suspension of vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of positive expectations of a trustee' (2014: 7).

Other than proposing a definition and providing insight into the processes leading to trust, Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) make an interesting contribution by engaging upon various features of trust. They argue trust is a reciprocal and self-reinforcing phenomenon. Trust is self-reinforcing, because if actor A trusts actor B, actor A is likely to be willing to put aside it's vulnerability and take risks in relationships instead. The information that flows out of the cooperation and the relationship is the basis on which actor A decides whether to trust actor B. The fact that it is self-reinforcing can lead to vicious circles of trust and vicious circles of distrust as well (Vlaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2007). Trust is also reciprocal, because if actor A decides to take the risk and trust actor B, the risk-taking of actor A can be interpreted by actor B as a sign that A might be trustworthy (Ostrom & Walker, 2003).

Another interesting finding from the Oomsels and Bouckaert article (2014) is their discussion on trust in relation to distrust. They argue both trust and distrust can be functional or dysfunctional for public administration. Trust is functional because it leads to increased cooperation and other elements that can result in unpredictable but potential gains and cost-efficiency (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 11). However, it can be dysfunctional as well, as the vulnerability that comes with it can be abused, which can result in costs. When it comes to distrust, it can be functional as avoidance of risk can inspire regulation and behavioural control, which in turn can protect actors against possible abuse of their vulnerability and result in predictable transaction costs and gains. Dysfunctional distrust, avoiding risk and inspiring regulation and behavioural control, can result in foregone opportunities and high opportunity costs (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 11). These findings, they argue, result in possible situations where inter-organizational trust can be functional in public administration. However, trust should not be presented as a merely beneficial concept, in the sense that both trust and distrust can lead to desirable outcomes. Neither trust or distrust is desirable or undesirable in itself, as desirability depends on the social value they provide (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014).

Another interesting finding is that the authors argue trust and distrust can both be apparent in a relationship between actors. As argued by Lewicki et al. (1998), they state that authors in complex interactions which occur in public administration, can have multidimensional attitudinal values. This means that in a relationship between actor A and actor B, the actors might trust each other when it comes to certain parts of their relationship, but distrust each other on other parts. In relation to this argument, they argue that the presence of trust does not mean distrust is absent in that situation, because both concepts result from different antecedents and have different characteristics (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014).

The authors also include multiple levels of analysis as they stress the role of individuals in inter-organizational trust. They claim that boundary-spanning civil servants, or the people that act on behalf of their institution or organization in a certain interaction with others, are central in public administration. These boundary-spanning civil servants have two faces; a private and an organizational one. These two faces allow the civil servant to act in discretionary authority, and the subjective evaluations of these civil servants are based on their personal and organizational considerations. These considerations, are the basis of inter-organizational trust (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014). Trust and distrust, they argue, between organizations and the individuals within them, can be analysed at three different levels, namely 'the micro level of specific individual characteristics, the meso level of concrete interaction characteristics, [and] the macro-level of socializing institutional arrangements' (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 18).

The above literature review on inter-organizational trust within the academic field of Public Administration has resulted in some interesting additions that can foster our understanding about the phenomenon and aid towards creating a framework for analysing trust in international intelligence cooperation. The review has added to our understanding of the necessary multidimensional elements in the conceptualization of trust and reaffirm the cognitive and affective basis, the risky context, the vulnerability involved, the risk-analysis and the expectations involved. Plus, it has contributed some characteristics of trust that are vital to the study of it; trust can be reciprocal and self-reinforcing, functional and dysfunctional which results in trust or distrust being neither desirable or undesirable and both trust and distrust can be apparent in different aspects of a relationship and can therefore co-exist. Especially the role and importance of the individual in the institution as the boundary spanner is a vital contribution to the understanding of trust in international intelligence cooperation, as it can be highly structured and formal, or network-based and informal. Lastly, the proposed levels of analysis by Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) foster in understanding the role of trust in inter-institutional arrangements, as it is connected to the theory as proposed by Aldrich (2016) and outlined earlier in this chapter.

2.3.3: International Relations

This chapter focuses on the influence of trust in International Relations, a field within the Social Sciences that is very relevant to the study of international intelligence cooperation. It takes institutions to an international context in which different influences and structures are at play. International Relations scholars argue that, in line with those from Public Administration that when it comes to their own academic field, the explicit study of trust is still within a developing stage (Ruzicka & Keating, 2015; Rathbun, 2018).

Some authors, mainly realist scholars believing the international system is ruled by anarchy, question whether trust has a role in the international system at all, such as Mearsheimer (1990). To understand IR's complicated relationship with trust, it is important to understand the realist paradigm. Realist scholars of IR regard international relations as a system guided by anarchy, that is, the absence of a supreme, overarching authority that can impose rule, contract or law. It is this state of anarchy that differentiates the international level from the national level, because the domestic field is largely regulated through hierarchy. The idea of anarchy has functioned as a barrier for IR scholars to study the notion of trust in IR. Anarchy, as argued, prevents or poses barriers to creating a relationship between states in which trust is present. As Hoffman (2006: 35) argues, the absence of a legitimate central power in the system, combined with self-interest as key motivator creates possibility that other states can act opportunistically and have a chance of simply getting away with it, destroys any expectations of trustworthiness. Furthermore, the state of anarchy leads to a state of suspicion between actors in the system (Hoffman, 2007: 311).

Ruzicka & Keating (2015) argue that it is due to these realist arguments, trust in IR is subject to a form of structural pressure. 'Trust researchers outside [IR] rarely consider this pressure, because they typically examine processes within hierarchical realms' (Ruzicka & Keating, 2015: 4). This does not mean that there is no role or room for trust being studied by realist theorists or within the system of anarchy. As Alexander Wendt stated, 'anarchy is what states make of it' (1992), states do have some control within the international system. Plus, empirical as well as theoretical research by a variety of scholars has resulted in a variety of case studies in which trusting relationships were apparent (Hoffman, 2006; Wheeler, 2009).

Arguably, the unique characteristics of the international system provide little opportunity for trust-building if compared to the domestic sphere. However, it is this absolute definition of trust, as introduced in the first paragraphs of this thesis, it being either apparent or not, that is problematic and leads to the belief that trust cannot exist in IR. Trust has played a role in IR since its inception and comes in various forms, despite being implicit (Rathbun, 2018). As argued by Ruzicka & Keating, despite the idea that trust might be more difficult in the international arena, 'even Mearsheimer's sceptical assessment does not completely rule out the possibility of trust among states' (2015: 2). Instead, scholars of International Relations have started to pay a growing amount of attention to the role and concept of trust in the international community.

Not only have theories of International Relations been used to study the motives behind international intelligence cooperation, its reflections on the significance of trust in the international arena are vital to the construction of our framework for assessing international intelligence cooperation. Explaining the significance of trust in International Relations has been attempted in order to unravel using several IR theories; realist, constructivist, rationalist and liberal theories being the main sources.

In line with Michel (2012) and Kramer (1999) and comparable to the field of Sociology and Psychology, we argue that scholars of IR that have studied trust can be divided into two separate categories, each focusing on different elements of trust. The first, Rational Choice perspective, is the most dominant, focusing on strategic elements to trust. The second perspective views trust as sociological and psychological phenomena, and focuses on moralistic aspects of trust, as trust includes emotions and moral attitudes. Both perspectives are outlined below.

Thusfar, studying trust within IR has mainly been dominated by a rationalist view of trust. Rationalist or Rational Choice theory attempts to offer insight in a state's decision-making processes within the international system. Decision making processes are guided by problems of uncertainty and commitment, by focusing on a state's expectations and preferences by using matrices of rationally calculable pay-offs. Research in this field is mainly guided by experiments and modelling. Central to the study of trust in IR is the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Assurance Game. When Deutsch (1958: 266) introduced the Prisoner's Dilemma, he argued 'there is no possibility for rational behaviour [in the prisoner's dilemma] unless the conditions for mutual trust exist', trust being an actor's expectation of an occurrence. Kydd (2010) draws on these insights combined with insights from sociology. Throughout his works he uses three definitions of trust, ranging from an 'estimate how likely it is that the other [state] is status quo oriented, rather than revisionist' (2001: 810), as states who attempt to change the world order are prone to defection and untrustworthy behaviour, as 'a belief that the other side is [...] willing to reciprocate cooperation' (2005: 3), as a belief towards the other states intentions on how to generate gains form mutual cooperation or possibilities of circumvention, and finally as 'having confidence that one's interests are not in too much conflict with the other side' drawing upon converging interests (2010: 2680). What binds these definitions together is the idea that trust is a rational prediction regarding the nature of the other state. Trust, in rationalist terms, can thus be characterized as the belief that the other actor has assurance game instead of prisoner's dilemma game preferences (Kydd, 2005: 3). In other words, that the other is willing to mutually cooperate instead of defect or exploit the relationship.

When talking about the nature of the other state, Kydd (2005) makes an interesting contribution by arguing that trust is not only about uncertainty regarding the probability another state will cooperate, but also a belief regarding the preferences of the other side; even trustworthy actors can fail to cooperate. Kydd (2005: 41) argues that cooperation is only possible, when the level of trust exceeds a minimum threshold for each party, the minimal threshold being the range of

probabilities of trust where the expected value of cooperation is positive. In the international system, this range is influenced by external factors (Ruzicka & Keating, 2015: 8).

In conclusion, rational choice theorists argue that trust in the international system is a weighed choice based on the beliefs about others interests. This view can be summarized as strategic trust, as introduced by Uslaner (2002). This form of trust has no moral force; it his highly structural. In order to promote this form of trust, rationalist work focuses on changing the structure of the strategic environment. From a strategic trust perspective it is distrust that drives the establishment of international organizations, which in turn produce strategic trust and cooperation. Koremenos et al. (2001) have argued that the greater the problems of distrust, the more authoritative and hierarchical the institutions are.

A growing body of IR scholars has opposed the rational choice perspective on trust by arguing that trust needs to be studied as a social phenomenon. These scholars distinguish trust from risk and define trust as confidence in expectations that the other will do 'what is right' (Hoffman, 2006: 20). Apart from a trustor making mere rationally motivated choice, placing a bet or taking a leap of faith, trustors believe that trustees fulfil a certain responsibility to fulfil the trust placed in them, even if fulfilling this commitment might lead to the sacrifice of their own benefits. Trust, he argues, is not merely concerned with risk, but also with commitment, promises and obligation. In line with Hoffman (2006), Booth & Wheeler (2008) have argued that the rational choice approach overlooks the human factor in trust. Feelings of trust therefore cannot be imposed (Offe, 1999). Trust, this field of study argues, is based on the beliefs of honesty and integrity of potential partners and is therefore characterized as moralistic trust, or fiduciary trust (Hoffman, 2002: 20).

Scholars focusing on trust as a psychological phenomenon focus on the interplay between agents and structures, the individual actors who act on behalf of collective units, being states, groups or NGO's. The psychological dimension of trust is key to its role in international relations, as predispositions, values and emotions of actors take on a prominent role in building and maintaining trust between actors in the international arena. This research is largely shaped by authors such as Jervis (1976) and Mercer (1996) who draw upon the importance of psychological factors shaping perceptions, judgments and opinions within the world international politics.

As introduced by Larson (1997) trust is not merely driven by rational expectations, but also by predictability, credibility and good intentions of actors. Ideological beliefs, cognitive biases and historical narratives shape perceptions and are therefore able to create trust or mistrust. In order to perform trust, Larson (1997) argues, actors perform the acts of interpretation and judgement. However, these acts are impossible without taking into account psychological factors. Decisions to trust can bound rationality – as argued by Head (2012), actors can make decisions against all odds based on underlying emotions.

In line with this thought, Rathbun (2009) introduces the concept of generalized trust, which results from individual actors or leaders' dispositions. Generalized trust, he argues, 'rests on a general belief in the honesty and benevolent character of others' (Rathbun, 2011: 5). It is not an

assessment of their personal interests (Ruzicka & Keating, 2015: 16), it is moralistic and non-calculative. Opposed to generalized trust, particularized trust, in which there is the belief within a relationship that a specific other or group is inherently trustworthy, in a moralistic sense (Rathbun, 2011). Generalized trust can be characterized as dispositional; particularized trust is more relational. According to Rathbun (2012), 'generalized trustors' are the actors that promote and engage in qualitative multilateralism: an institutional form in which relations are coordinated among several states based on generalized codes of conduct, being security guarantees and commitment to peaceful conflict resolution. In these institutional forms, reciprocity is key.

This chapter has studied the international dimension of inter-organizational trust and cooperation by reviewing the dominant perspectives within the academic field of International Relations on the role and influence of trust. It explains why trust has always been apparent but due to the dominance of the realist paradigm only recently has started to enjoy an increasing amount of attention amongst IR scholars. In line with the Psychologist and Sociologist traditions, two perspectives can be distinguished in the study of trust in IR. The strategic perspective based on rational choice theory, and the moralist perspective based on human factor, emotions and a more sociological tradition. The rational choice perspective adds to our understanding of trust because it provides insights into the role that conflicting interests play, as well as the idea that trust is not simply a prediction about the actions of the other, but also its nature. It takes into account the interests and preferences of the other, not only the probability. Also, the rational choice perspective has provided insights into the role that distrust has on the institutionalization of international cooperation, as distrust tends to increase the amount of rules, procedures and standardization.

The moralist perspective includes interesting insights on the link between trust and moral choices and the idea of commitment. It emphasizes the importance of individuals and the presence of interpretation and judgement, as every individual has his or her own perceptions, shaped by ideology, historical narratives and cognitive biases. The moralist theories on trust have also brought forward new forms, such as generalized trust which is a characteristic of an actor, versus particularized trust which is situation-specific. These perspectives also discuss the role of reciprocity and the influence of trust on the establishment of international institutions. This perspective has proven to be of vital importance for the establishment of a framework on international intelligence cooperation, because it provides insights into the nature of cooperation and the extent to which cooperation in the international sphere is institutionalized.

2.3.4: Security Studies

Within the academic field of Security Studies, the study of trust between organizations in the international sphere is a niche as well. However, the limited amount of scholarly work on this topic is able to provide us with essential insights. The first part focuses on law enforcement and the influence of trust in transnational policing systems. Plus, this chapter provides insights from the

academic field of Military Studies, as the sharing of information in international military operations and the influence of trust will be discussed. Both traditions are very similar and close to international intelligence liaison, as they are often partners, clients or even part of the intelligence community.

2.3.4.1: Law Enforcement Studies

> *"As with transnational crime, transnational police cooperation takes place under difficult and even hostile conditions. Furthermore, the cultural heterogeneity inherent in transnational cooperation has the potential to aggravate the ever-present lack of trust in police subcultures."*
>
> (Lemieux & Perras, 2016: 305)

The above quote serves to illustrate the similarities between the fields of transnational police cooperation and international intelligence cooperation. Professionals from these fields often act in hostile and difficult conditions and under clandestine circumstances. The cultural heterogeneity Lemieux and Perras (2016) refer to is also apparent in international intelligence organizations as outlined by De Graaff & Nyce (2016). Similar to intelligence agencies, transnational policing is characterized by the use of liaison officers. According to Aden (2016: 322) and Joyal (2012), the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 led to new forms of information sharing across policing agencies; information sharing being a core element of transnational cooperation. As a result, the transnational exchange of police information has been regulated increasingly, which has been limited by a lack of trust between these agencies (Aden, 2016: 323).

An interesting article by Joyal (2012) 'How far have we come? Information sharing, interagency collaboration, and trust within the law enforcement community' draws upon interviews with individuals working in state fusion centres of law enforcement agencies and the federal government of the United States. She argues that interpersonal relationships and trust are the core towards enhanced information sharing and interagency collaboration. Trust – defined as confidence in another team member's competence and honesty – according to her respondents, is crucial to a collaborative, successful work environment and the exchange of information.

Trust, as Aden (2016) argues, has been present in all types and forms of transnational police cooperation. Trust in a partner does not only facilitate communication, it also reduces the complexity of the relationship (Luhmann, 2000: 27). The judgment of externally received police information is based on trust when assessing the relevance and reliability of the information. Furthermore, the decision of police agency A to share information with other police agencies is based on the amount of personal and systemic (or institutional) trust placed in them. Aden (2016) argues that trust in this respect is related to two things; the institutional setting as trust relates to the degree to which the cooperation between the agencies has been institutionalized. Second, trust is related to personal networks. Both elements of trust depend upon the degree of institutional

homogeneity. Therefore, Aden (2016) argues that personal networks and trust are harder to build in an international sphere than in cases of regional cooperation.

The importance of trust in international police cooperation is also reflected throughout a several reports of the European Commission regarding the importance of integration of the Member States administrative and judicial systems. For example, the European Council stated in it's The Hague Program (2005: 10) that "strengthening police cooperation requires focused attention on mutual trust and confidence building". In its Stockholm Program, 5 years later, the Council (2010: 5) stated that "mutual trust between authorities and services in the different Member States and decision-makers is the basis for efficient cooperation in this area. Ensuring trust and finding new ways to increase reliance on, and mutual understanding between, the different legal systems […] will thus be one of the main challenges for the future".

Aden (2016) distinguishes two types of police information exchanges. There are centralized approaches in which capacity tools are developed that facilitate the sharing of information between various law enforcement agencies internationally. An example of a centralized system is the SIS, or Schengen Information System. SIS is characterized by a high level of systemic trust in the reliability of the information shared. Advantages of the centralized approach are that content is easily accessible and largely standardized and confidence in the reliability of the information that is shared is assured by general rules for new entries into the databases (Aden, 2016; Brouwer, 2008). These features enlarge systemic trust as trust is institutionalized. However, there are also disadvantages, such as the integration of systems that takes a long time and the growing data quantity.

In contrast to centralized approaches stand the network-based approaches that can be both formal and informal. Network-based approaches are occasions in which officers from different countries get together and use these contacts to exchange information during transnational investigations (Aden, 2016: 330). A formal version of this approach are liaison officers, or the establishment of police and customs cooperation centres on border regions. However, informal networks also exist, especially on topics that are sensitive, classified and 'governed by mistrust' (Aden, 2016: 331). Overall, network-based approaches include actors from within the field who have connected through common professional activities. This approach, in contrast to the centralized version, relies more on personal trust instead of systemic, institutionalized trust.

2.3.4.2: Military Studies

Within the field of military studies, the phenomenon of trust is often studied in relation to society or within groups or teams. However, in the book 'Information Sharing in Military Operations' Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) reflect on the vital importance of information sharing to multinational and multi-agency military, humanitarian and counterterrorism operations. Secrecy, they argue, is an important part of military success as many victories have been won by surprise (2017: 8). Secrecy is an important element to military operations that they share with the world of

intelligence; as secrecy is vital to the latter (Turner, 2006; Clough, 2004). Information sharing can be problematic; even among partners or allies, it increases risk and chances of failure as information may be forwarded to third parties (Walsh, 2014). The field of Military Studies and the topic of information-sharing in this context is of vital importance to our goal of establishing a framework for assessing trust within international intelligence cooperation, as military intelligence sharing during multinational operations is part of the overall sphere of intelligence.

The authors draw upon the importance of trust for knowledge exchange, and claim that despite its vital importance, the dynamics of trust are often poorly understood when it comes to information sharing (Dulin, 2009; Stouffer, 2008). The authors define trust as a willingness to risk being vulnerable to another entity because one has a positive expectation that the other will provide something important when one requires it (2017: 82). They adopt a more rationalist perspective in arguing that the decision to trust includes a prediction and a leap of faith, based on four dimensions of trustworthiness: competence (perceived skills, knowledge, abilities), benevolence (unselfishness), integrity (common values and principles) and predictability (behavioural consistency) (2017: 82).

Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) distinguish two ways in which trust develops. Category-based trust is based on the categories the other represents or the role the other plays and often develops quickly (Kramer, 1999). Person-based trust develops gradually over time as direct experience develops. The authors distinguish various forms of trust, such as calculative trust, in which trust is based on assessments of the risks and benefits of trusting the other. Knowledge-based trust, in which there is a history of positive interactions and consistent behaviour, which in turn can lead to a more intrinsic, relation-based trust. The deepest form of trust, identification-based trust, occurs when common core values and intentions are revealed and a deeper shared understanding and even collective identity emerge. These forms develop gradually or presumptive, and have different norms; in early stages of relationships of information sharing, forms of trust come with demands of reciprocity, which fades as the relationship deepens.

Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) also discuss trust repair mechanisms. Increases in uncertainty and risk can result in situations where actors re-evaluate their relationships and trust in one another. Breaking of trust can be repaired by mechanisms such as introduced by Tomlinson et al (2004), however this can either take a long time or prove to be unrepairable, depending on the stage of the relationship. An example Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) offer is the intelligence sharing relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom which has been very close after their joint success in WWII. However, the relationship was damaged due to several intelligence failures and the exposure of double-agents and moles, resulting in a recovered relationship only after a considerate amount of time (Lander, 2004).

After discussing trust and its significance, Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) also draw upon the mechanisms of how trust affects information sharing. It is these insights that are particularly valuable to addressing trust in international intelligence cooperation. They draw upon arguments by Gray (2001) in arguing that 'when individuals ask others for information, they expose

their vulnerability and become dependent on the other by acknowledging that they do not have information the other party has' (Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean, 2017: 84). This leads to interesting dynamics with the four essential components of trust introduced earlier; benevolence, integrity, predictability and competence. First of all, when someone requests information, the requestor must believe that the information provided by the other is not deceptive (predictability), that it is accurate (competence) and so on. On the side of the provider, he or she must believe that the requestor will treat the information in an appropriate manner, will not disseminate the information to parties not agreed upon, and that he or she will reciprocate in the future (Ostrom and Walker, 2003).

Multi-nationality has effects on trust and information-sharing. Diversity can be an advantage because it increases knowledge, skills and resources, but it also means differences in cultures and organizations, which can decrease communication and increase conflict and thereby negatively influence trust and information-sharing. Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) argue that long-standing multinational military coalitions such as NATO have developed standardized rules, agreements, processes and procedures which leads to shared understanding and improved coordination. However, ad-hoc or other arrangement lack these processes, as well as high-turnover of personnel within military services contributes to an ongoing lack of uniformity, impeding information-sharing and trust. They also draw upon the influence of negative individual as well as organizational reputations on establishing (category-based) trust, and the influence of negative individual and organizational interactions on establishing (personal) trust. Olson and Gregorian (2007) also describe desires for autonomy, ego and competition for resources and agency profile as being active in the field of multinational information-sharing.

Challenges to trust and information-sharing increase when the information to be shared is sensitive or secret. Sandoval (2013) shows that interagency personnel in diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, homeland security and law enforcement rate the protection of the intelligence they have shared with their peers to be the most important element of their job. Lahneman (2010: 202) illustrates this argument by stating that agencies that deal with secret and sensitive information have traditions and organizational cultures that emphasize secrecy, not knowledge-sharing. As Sims (2006: 196) argues, these organizations have cultures that are inherently competitive and secretive, even among allies. In addition, the variety of security classifications of documents amongst allies impede information-sharing. As a result, Clough (2004), LeFebvre (2003) and Sims (2006) argue that intelligence relationships are mostly bilateral, due to the idea that the flow of information (and thereby trust) between two countries is easier to manage than within multinational relations.

The insights from Security Studies and the topics of international law enforcement cooperation and multinational military cooperation are important to the study of trust within international intelligence cooperation as they often overlap. Both the law enforcement and military paradigm focus on an element of cooperation which makes up the largest part of international intelligence cooperation, namely information sharing.

The law enforcement paradigm provides insight into the working conditions and context, being difficult or hostile. Furthermore, it acknowledges that information-sharing is a key element in international cooperation, and distinguishes two forms of trust; personal and systemic, and relates them to the reliability of the information exchanged or transferred. Plus, it provides insights into the earlier findings from IR theory that institutional homogeneity impedes information sharing and trust, which can be promoted by personal networks and institutionalization. These two account for the centralized and network-based approaches to information-sharing.

The military perspective provides insight into the role of secrecy and into the decision-making model of trust by arguing competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability are key elements. Furthermore, theory from multinational military operations clarifies ways in which trust develops; person-based or category-based. It distinguishes four forms of trust ranging from shallow and short-term to deep and long-term, being calculative, knowledge-based, relation-based and identification-based trust, and sets consequences for the possibilities of trust repair. In addition, it elaborates on the risk of the trustor and the trustee in a relationship, stresses the importance of institutional homogeneity and standardization for trust and cooperation and reflects upon the role that individual or institutional reputations and interactions play in developing and maintaining trusting relationships. Lastly, it provides insight into the culture of military and intelligence organizations and their emphasis on secrecy instead of sharing which has consequences for the establishment of trusting relationships.

2.4 Developing a definition and analytical framework regarding influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation

What becomes clear from the above literature review on the influence of trust and cooperation from other traditions in the Social Sciences is that there is so much more to trust than meets the eye. Insights from Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies might be very helpful in constructing a theoretical framework that might exploring the influence of trust in the special field of intelligence. In this thesis, based on insights from Jones & George (1998), Oomsels & Bouckaert (2014) and Soeters & Dean (2017), a multidimensional perspective on the significance of trust in relation to cooperation is used which will be reflected throughout the framework. This perspective has been adopted due to its multidisciplinary nature. The previous paragraphs have enlightened its various dimensions. The conceptual framework proposed at the end of this chapter aims to clarify the multidimensionality of the concept of trust and its influence on international intelligence cooperation.

Despite its many similarities with regular governmental organizations, intelligence has a few special features, especially when it comes to trust, that are worthy of discussing here. After comparing intelligence to the domains studied in the literature review, one needs to elaborate upon its differences as well in order to construct a suitable methodological framework.

First of all, there are famous quotes and sayings about trust being impossible in the field of intelligence. We have tackled such claims with the analysis in the previous paragraphs, suggesting there are levels and gradations in trust, that trust and distrust can be part of the same relationship and at a variety of levels of analysis and thereby argue that trust is actually possible, to a certain degree or level within the spheres of international intelligence cooperation.

As touched upon in the literature review, the culture of Intelligence is all about secrecy and work in a hostile or difficult context. As argued by Lahneman (2010) agencies that deal with secret and sensitive information have traditions and organizational cultures that emphasize secrecy, not knowledge-sharing. As Sims (2006: 196) argues, intelligence organizations have cultures that are inherently competitive and secretive, even among allies. In a secretive environment, protecting information and sources are vital. Lahneman (2010) confirms this by showing that interagency intelligence personnel claimed protection of the intelligence shared was the most important element of their job. According to Hermann (Hermann in Tuzuner, 2010: 155) the most important reason for lack of trust within the sphere of intelligence is source protection. 'In intelligence you need to protect your sources, and you need to trust that the people you're cooperating with will give equal importance to protecting your sources' (2010: 155).

A challenging claim distinguishing the world of intelligence from other organizations is the pessimistic outlook of its professionals. A famous joke in intelligence circles, 'when they [the intelligence professionals, ed.] smell flowers, they look for a funeral' (New York Times, 1998), illustrates this pessimism. Are the Sociologist and Psychologist, Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies theories on trust, based on social interaction or organizational trust too optimistic for the world of intelligence? According to Jones & George (1998) there is a paradoxical beginning to the experience of trust. When a social encounter takes place, people do not immediately assume the other person is trustworthy or has similar values. However, they suspend the belief that the other person is not trustworthy, and act as if the other person has the same values and can therefore be trusted (1998: 535). Luhmann (1980) confirms this view by arguing initial trust is often preferred over distrust because trust is an easier option. Deutsch (1958, 1960) argues that it would take too much time and energy if a person was to discover the entire nature and value system of the other person. Therefore, this belief is suspended at initial social encounters establishing trust. This does not mean that people do not use their value system to decide if they want to trust another person or not; incongruent value perceptions can lead to distrust quite quickly (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In other words, this means that people approach social interactions based on their own value system, and if there is no obvious sign for value incongruence, they suspend their beliefs of distrust. In the world of intelligence, the suspension of distrust might be impeded by the pessimistic outlook of its professionals. There might be more barriers to trust than in normal organizations and relationships due to the specific value system of intelligence professionals and organizations.

The above literature review results in a diverse but at the same time congruent overview on the significance of trust in cooperation, by illustrating central elements, forms, characteristics, input and outcome. Resulting from insights from other traditions within the Social Sciences, this figure allows for a deeper understanding of the decision-making processes actors engage upon when deciding to trust other actors, as well as a more thorough understanding of the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation and its various forms. Furthermore, it has integrated the importance of personal networks as a condition fostering trust and integrated the ability to keep secrets into the process of risk-analysis. These central findings are summarized in the theoretical framework presented below.


Figure 3. Theoretical Framework on the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation based on insights from Intelligence Studies, Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies

Trust in international intelligence cooperation is (1) stimulated by converging interests, institutional homogeneity and personal networks, (2) incorporates a risk analysis combined with psychological and social factors that (3) can result in various types and forms of trust, (4) having various features and being (5) subjected to different perspectives and levels of analysis which (5) in turn can lead to various types of information sharing processes and information shared, in a heterogenetic and risky context characterized by cultures of secrecy and competition.

As shown in the framework, there is a variety of arrows representing the relationships between several steps in the process that result from the literature review. The dotted arrows represent transitions into next phases that can result out of the previous phase, but do not necessary have to. For example, trust does not necessary need to result in international intelligence liaison, as other elements are at play too, as outlined in figure 1. The lined arrows represent a more direct relationship, where the literature has been more united in suggesting that there is an effect between two elements. For example, the conditions fostering trust lead to the decision-making process on whether to engage in trusting relationships, and the characteristics of that trusting relationship have known to affect the characteristics of international intelligence liaison.

The above translation of the concept of trust as well as of the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation into a theoretical framework leads us to adopt the following definition of trust in this context: trust is the expression of confidence based on a process of risk-analysis and influenced by psychological factors, determining the competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability of the other, possibly resulting in international intelligence cooperation.

3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter will elaborate on how research methods executed in the selection and analysis of data will serve answer the research question 'what is the significance of trust in international intelligence cooperation?' and will reflect on the possible limitations to the research conducted.

When considering the research strategy of this thesis, both elements of induction and deduction are at play. These elements guide the relationship between theory and research. First of all, relevant findings from other Social Sciences were combined in a theoretical framework in the previous chapter, which is an inductive approach as it makes an effort to produce theory out of observations made. However, the proposed theoretical framework is tested analysing memoires literature on international intelligence cooperation, which mainly deductive. Lastly, the implications from the analysis are inferred for the theoretical framework that prompted the analysis, which is again an inductive movement. Overall, it can be argued that this thesis includes mostly inductive elements, as it tries to draw generalizable inferences out of observations made and thereby generates theory.

Linked to the inductive research strategy, a chosen interpretivist epistemological position and constructionist ontological position is the qualitative research approach to this thesis. The qualitative research approach guides the collection and analysis of the text and documents analysed. The epistemological and ontological positions leaning towards a more qualitative research approach, and this approach furthermore fosters description and emphasis on contextual understanding, as well as the ability to thoroughly describe and analyse processes and relations using rich and deep data (Bryman, 2008: 393). A complete understanding of these elements and processes is central in answering the research question of this thesis, thereby explaining the choice for a qualitative research approach. When it comes to measuring qualitative research on issues such as validity and reliability, qualitative approaches in general are known to suffer from allegations of being too subjective, difficult to replicate and generalize, as well as lacking in transparency (Bryman, 2008: 392). These issues, as discussed later in this chapter, are also apparent in this research. However, qualitative research is known for its strengths concerning the internal and ecological validity (Bryman, 2008: 393) and thereby able to make a significant contribution to the understanding of complex processes such as trust in international intelligence cooperation and its resemblance to the world.

The research design of this thesis can be characterized as a case study design, as detailed and intensive analysis of a single case is conducted. The design is holistic as it focuses on a single unit of analysis, namely trust in international intelligence cooperation, while the unit of observation is constructed out of an analysis of memoires literature. In other words, it aims to produce theory on the complexity and nature of the trust in the community of international intelligence cooperation as a whole, by examining memoires literature from former US intelligence personnel as a case.

Relating to their qualitative nature, case study research designs often suffer from limited generalizability or external validity (Bryman, 2008: 55). Arguably, it is often problematic to conclude that a single case represents an entire group or community. Several arguments can be made in order to support the decision for this research design. Despite its possible limitations regarding external validity, the single case of trust in international intelligence cooperation from the American point of view has been chosen because it exemplifies a broader category of which it is a member, namely the international intelligence community. The United States is an active member of various multilateral intelligence sharing relationships, such as the Five Eyes Alliance and NATO and it undertakes substantial bilateral sharing activities within the international intelligence community. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence sharing has increased and gained more importance as the United States Intelligence community's priority shifted from the Cold War to terrorism (Lieberthal, 2009: 7; Turner, 2005: 146). Liaison relationships have become of increasing importance as the priority for our intelligence has shifted from the Cold War to terrorism. The lack of available data has also guided the choice for a single case study design, as most of the memoires literature generally is produced by former US intelligence personnel. Furthermore, this research design allows for thorough examination of key social processes which is essential for grasping the significance of trust and therefore provides a suitable context for answering the research question.

Resulting from the qualitative research approach, the sources of data used are documents. The research method used is content analysis of memoires, in this case of former US intelligence personnel, as the primary source of data. This research method was conducted due to the lack of availability regarding other primary sources and empirical information due to the closed culture of the intelligence community. Over the past years, the number of memoires written by former Intelligence personnel has steadily increased, thereby posing an excellent unit of observation in to include an insider perspective into the analysis and thereby foster internal validity (Shane, 2005). In order to allow for this insider perspective and to increase the authenticity of the analysis, only memoires were studied and biographies were not.

Several doubts have been raised concerning the academic use of 'spy memoires' by historians who discredit them as a source due to factual contamination and mendacity as well as the lack of possibilities regarding verifiability. As Moran (2016: 11) puts it: "Why after all, should anyone believe a word of what a spy has to say? They are trained to lie, deceive and dissemble.". Furthermore, memoires are often written after a career in Intelligence, which increases the time between the events and the moment of writing, thereby increasing the likelihood the author's memory has been subjected to erosion (Moran, 2016: 11). Other than being able to provide insights into a world covered by secrecy, an advantage of the use of memoires, or autobiographies is the non-reactive nature of the documents. As they were not created for the purposes of social research, their non-reactive nature increases the validity of the research as the data remains static. Another advantage of memoires is the authenticity as the origin of the document is clear. However, it should be noted that there is an increasing use of ghost-writers by former personnel to aid in writing the

memoire that could possibly compromise the authenticity of the document. Despite these connotations, when it comes to the credibility of the memoire, it is highly likely that the observations mentioned are the actual observations of the author and reflect their feelings. Furthermore, when analysing these kind of sources, one should also keep in mind the author might have a certain goal in writing the memoire which can influence the content.

To tackle the issue of representativeness, multiple memoires from authors in multiple positions have been analysed, including those of female authors. Another possible limitation to the validity of this research is the amount of data that was studied in the analysis. As research into trust within international intelligence cooperation is considered a niche in the academic community, so is reflecting upon trust within international intelligence cooperation in memoires. However, the analysis engages upon extracts from five different sources that each provide their own insight into the subject of this thesis, and therefore are able to provide body to the analysis and reflecting the US perspective on trust within international intelligence cooperation. Issues of credibility, authenticity and representativeness have been taken into account during the analysis of the memoire literature.

The use of memoires in order to make sense of phenomena in the world of intelligence is not new. As argued by Haire (2014: 758), the use of memoirs can be a vital way of overcoming a shortage of current sources, offering insights into the attitudes and motivations of persons as well as their reflection upon events. 'Particularly in the study of intelligence liaison which addresses the kinds of personal and cultural aspects which are often especially well illuminated through autobiographical writing (2014: 758)', the study of memoires seems to be an appropriate method.

The data in this thesis is sampled through purposive sampling in which the units of observation are selected that are of direct reference to the research question asked in the introduction. A list of US memoire literature to be analysed was constructed based on the CIA Intelligence reading list (2011), the Intelligence bibliography by the International Association for Intelligence Education in Europe (2016) and through desk research (Figure 5, appendix). All the memoire literature on the constructed list was studied, thereby strengthening the internal validity. All US memoire literature was included as international intelligence cooperation and trust are a niche and it is not clear at first sight whether memoires engage on the subject or not. Furthermore, no specific time period was selected due to the limited amount of data available. This could impact the internal validity due to the fact that despite international intelligence cooperation has existed for a long time, it has significantly increased during the 21st century as outlined in the literature review (Turner, 2005, Lieberthal 2009) and might therefore not accurately reflect the current state of the topic. However, various recent memoires were included in the analysis to limit this possible weakness in internal validity.

The literature was selectively scanned for insights and anecdotes on trust in international intelligence cooperation, using the indicators from the operationalization scheme as portrayed below. Indicators in this sense were words that were used by the authors of the memoire in order to search for the appearance of reflections upon trust. These indicators were based on the definition of

trust provided in the previous chapter, central elements of the theoretical framework as well as concepts that reoccurred in the literature review of the Social Sciences concerning the relationship between trust and cooperation.

Trust is the expression of confidence based on a process of risk-analysis and influenced by psychological factors, determining the competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability of the other, possibly resulting in international intelligence cooperation.		
Unit of analysis	**Concept**	**Indicator**
Trust in International Intelligence Cooperation	Trust	trust, distrust, mistrust, friend(ship), relation(ship), personal, institutional
	Risk-analysis	risk, vulnerability, capability, interests, source protection, (common) interests, confidentiality, competence secrecy, predictability, integrity, skills, knowledge
	Psychological factors	belief, benevolence, morals, values
	International Intelligence Cooperation	bilateral, multilateral, multinational, international, liaison, cooperation, community, ally, information sharing, information exchange, covert action, assisting, support, partner

Figure 4. Operationalization of trust in international intelligence liaison

By systematically scanning the literature for indicators of trust in international intelligence relationship, several extracts have been selected that provide insights into the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation. The content analysis of the data, as portrayed in the next chapter, is structured according to the following outline. The data collected from each memoire is grouped per memoire in order to address the context including the author and time period, which is of great importance to the understanding of the data and its possible implications. What follows is an analysis of the data according to the theoretical framework established in the previous chapter in order to test whether elements of that framework as well as relations portrayed in the framework are reflected in the data. The analysis for each memoire results in a general analysis at the end of the

chapter which concludes whether the established framework accurately reflects the world of international intelligence cooperation as portrayed in the memoire literature of former US intelligence personnel.

In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the inductive strategy, qualitative approach, case study design, and content analysis of memoire literature as a methodology to this thesis in order to answer the research question. Furthermore, it has provided insight into the limitations regarding the validity and reliability of this research. What follows is the analysis of the data in the next chapter.

4. ANALYSIS

There is a growing amount of biographies and memoires of former intelligence personnel that provide an interesting contribution intelligence literature that is available today. Most of these works focus on former employees of the American intelligence community, while there is also a significant, growing amount of British ex-intelligence personnel drafting up their memories (International Association for Intelligence Education in Europe, 2016). As noted above, distinctions in the literature can be made between intelligence personnel of various. Plus, there is a significant amount of (mainly American) former intelligence personnel that pursued a political career afterwards, the latter being the subject of a memoire more than the career in intelligence. Finally, distinctions can be made between the various functions of the intelligence employees, for example ranging from staff officer to Director of National Intelligence.

In short, this paragraph will enhance upon the intelligence community of the United States to introduce the case studied. Unlike many other countries, the intelligence community in the US is fragmented and based on competition between a broad variety of agencies. The office of the director of national intelligence is an overarching function, directly reporting to the President. Within the intelligence community, there are several key institutions, as well as departments and services who engage in several parts of the intelligence cycle. Several of those services engage in liaison activities with their counterparts from other countries. As reflected throughout the memoires literature (figure 5, appendix) the Central Intelligence Agency is one of the main players when it comes to foreign intelligence liaison. The Agency's mission is to collect, analyse, evaluate and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and his government in decision-making processes regarding national security (CIA, 2018).

When reading the literature, trust seems to be a recurrent theme. Almost every biography or memoire deals with relationships of trust. The most recurrent of these relationships are mutual trust between the various national intelligence services in the United States, trust between the public and the intelligence community, trust between the political and intelligence domains and trust between the agent and his or her handler. Similar to the academic literature on intelligence, intelligence liaison or international intelligence cooperation enjoys relatively little attention in biographies or memoires of former employees. However, there are some valuable works reflecting on international intelligence cooperation in relation to trust. The paragraphs below are a presentation of the relevant findings regarding the influence of trust on the realm of international intelligence cooperation.

4.1: Burn Before Reading by Stansfield Turner

The first extracts reflecting upon trust derive from the memoire by Stansfield Turner, who was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the United States between 1977 and 1981. The DCI was the head of the CIA and principal intelligence advisor to the US President, the US National Security Council and the coordinator of all US intelligence activities among its agencies. As from 2005, this office was split into the Director of national Intelligence (DNI) as head of the intelligence community, and the Director of the CIA (D/CIA) as head of the CIA. The DCI was largely responsible for the policy oversight of international intelligence liaison (Sims, 2006: 200). In 'Burn Before Reading' (2005) Stansfield Turner encourages foreign intelligence cooperation in one of the last chapters dealing with his recommendations regarding the future of US intelligence.

> *"That is we should [not] rely less on cooperation with foreign intelligence services. Surely there are hazards in foreign liaison. Many foreign intelligence services cannot keep secrets. Many have quite different agendas from ours. Yet for us to have our own agents in every remote area of the world where terrorists may plot and train is unrealistic. Moving into an antiterrorism mode has forced us to rely more, not less, on […] foreign intelligence networks."*
>
> (Turner, 2005: 144)

Turner here draws on the widespread call within the international security community of enhanced cooperation and intelligence sharing after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks exposed a vulnerability in the US intelligence community when it came to intelligence sharing. Even though Turner does not use the word trust, he does engage upon two central conditions fostering trust, in line with theory from the field of Intelligence Studies by Walsh (2006), and provides insight into the decision-making process regarding trust. Turner identifies diverging interests, or different agendas, as a main hazard to foreign liaison, thereby reaffirming converging interests as a condition fostering trust. Furthermore, Turner addresses the inability to keep secrets as a restraint on international intelligence cooperation, which according to Walsh (2016) is the second vital element fostering trust.

Other than touching upon these elements, Turners reasoning resembles the process of a risk-analysis towards trust as brought forward in the literature review on Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration and International Relations as one of the main perspectives on trust. He refers to risks, being the different agendas and inability to keep secrets, and connects them to benefits, being informed and able to divert or prevent terrorist attacks.

4.2 The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World by Alan Dulles

Allen Dulles, who published this memoire in 1959, is known as the first civilian Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He was also the longest-serving DCI to date, serving from 1953 to 1961. Prior to his function as DCI, Dulles served as Deputy DCI from 1951 to 1953. During the Second World War, Dulles was stationed in Bern, Switzerland at the Office of Strategic Services, the US wartime intelligence agency and predecessor of the CIA. In his memoires, Dulles reflects upon wartime cooperation between the various allied intelligence services and his contact with those officers.

> *"This wartime cooperation contributed, I believe, toward creating among the Intelligence services of the Free World a measure of unity of purpose, and after the war a free Western Germany has made a substantial intelligence contribution. All this has helped us to counter the massive attacks which the intelligence and security services of the Communist bloc countries are making against us today."*
> *"On the Allied side, in opposition to the common enemy, there was collaboration between intelligence services that is without parallel in history and which had a most welcome outcome."*
> *"I had the privilege of working with the British service and developed close and personal service relationships which remained intact after the war."*
>
> (Dulles, 1959: 26-27)

While not directly using the concept of trust, but when talking about unity of purpose and a common enemy, Dulles reflects on converging interests between partners which flow from the literature as one of the building blocks of trust and cooperation. It also reflects upon how increased cooperation and intelligence sharing can lead to beneficial outcomes, such countering the 'massive attacks'. This quote also relates to the development of trust as positive experiences from the past are beneficial to trust and cooperation, thereby reflecting upon the psychological factors at play in the process phase of the theoretical framework, as outlined by Larson (1997), Barber (1983) and Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017).

The last part of this quote illustrates the influence of relationships in fostering international intelligence cooperation between individuals on a personal level. In line with Aden (2016) the framework suggests that personal networks foster trust, which could suggest that in combination with the other indicators, it is likely some form of trust was apparent regarding the relationship between Dulles and his British colleagues. In addition, this quote provides insight into the different levels of analysis trust integrated into the framework that can be at play as illustrated by Oomsels & Bouckaert (2014); in cooperative relationships amongst Intelligence services 'of the Free world' on the institutional level and in cooperative relationships amongst individual, intelligence officers on the individual level.

4.3 Playing to the Edge – American Intelligence in the Age of Terror by Michael Hayden

In 'Playing to the Edge – American Intelligence in the Age of Terror' (2016), Michael Hayden, who served as Director of the CIA (D/CIA) between 2006 and 2009, and Director of the NSA (D/NSA) between 1999 and 2005 after serving the United States Air Force for 41 years, reflects on international liaison partnerships during his career in intelligence and the military.

> *"These partnerships are an exchange of capabilities [...] We trade off each other for mutual benefit, even when there isn't much agreement at the policy level between governments. In fact these relationships are remarkably durable, operating below the surface, even when political relations are stormy. That's because they enable mutually valuable exchanges between professionals who face common problems, between intelligence establishments that will still be in business and will still be expected to perform when policies and political leaders change."*
>
> (Hayden, 2016: 239)

This extract is very relevant because it contains various indicators for trust in international intelligence cooperation. First of all, it addresses one of its features, reciprocity, as outlined by Ostrom & Walker (2003), Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017), Rathbun (2012), Kydd (2010), Oomsels & Bouckaert (2014) and Tuzuner (2010) when addressing the trade off and exchanges between partners in a liaison relationship.

Furthermore, this extract illustrates the various levels of analysis in which trust can be at play within international intelligence cooperation. Relating to the theory as introduced by Aldrich (2009) that trust is at play at various levels within the intelligence domain, this quote reflects the interaction and differences between the political and the intelligence level, the so-called high politics versus low politics hypothesis. While there might be little agreement at the policy level, international intelligence cooperation continues.

In addition, Hayden illustrates the importance of mutual interests when addressing the common problems intelligence professionals face, which is one of the key conditions resulting in trust. Furthermore, Hayden touches upon the development of relationships when Hayden refers to the durability of relationships, implying on category-based developed trust between professionals as introduced by Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017).

> *"These liaison relationships are also based on a large helping of personal trust. That's why you invite the head of service to your home for dinner, or spend an extra afternoon in his capital so that he can personally show you the sights. That's why you follow your mom's advice and eat every (exotic) thing on your plate – and like it. And that's why you clear your calendar to meet with liaison despite other demands."*
>
> (Hayden, 2016: 239)

In this quote, Hayden directly addresses the importance of trust in international intelligence liaison. He reflects upon the influence of personal trust in order to achieve cooperation

between two actors, as outlined in the framework by Aden (2016). The establishment of personal trust positively influences the involved attitudes, beliefs, moods emotions and feelings which in turn shape the values of both actors (Jones & George, 1998). In other words, these efforts Hayden reflects upon shape reputations and perceptions, central to interpretation and judgement of the other in a trusting relationship. These are part of the psychological factors that are part of the process of decision-making on trust, as referred to in the literature review on Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies.

Furthermore, by naming examples of ways in which he tried to establish personal trust, Hayden illustrates the theoretical statements on the development of person-based trust as introduced by Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017, which is further illustrated by the quote below.

> *"Such friendships were a real bonus, but what we were really doing was building a precious level of confidence —the kind built on shared experience and personal contacts, not on formal memos or minutes."*

(Hayden, 2016: 239)

Several types of trust can be distinguished from the above quote. Again, this quote illustrates efforts on the development of person-based trust between actors. Moreover, it illustrates a relation-based form of trust as introduced by Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) by labelling these relations as friendships, implying a variety of depth in relationships of trust. Furthermore, Hayden contrasts person-based and network-based trust, by referring to friendships on the individual level, with centralized trust based on institutionalization by referring to formal memos or minutes, arguing the latter is less successful in the building of confidence. Lastly, the above extract reflects upon the importance of confidence as outcome of the decision-making process on trust as touched upon by Lefebvre (2003), Kramer (1999), Jones & George (1998), Kydd (2010), Hoffman (2006), Joyal (2012), Aden (2016) and Brouwer (2008). There are many quotes in this memoire that describe the importance of personal, network-based forms of cooperation on trust and international intelligence cooperation. The following anecdote from Hayden's memoire are perhaps the most striking:

> *"A case in point involved a CIA station chief accompanying a cabinet officer to a meeting with a major Middle East partner. At the end of the session, it was agreed that some important data would be exchanged, and the cabinet official said he would have his staff draw up some memos on the arrangement. The head of the foreign service leaned forward, smiled at the official while gently putting his hand on the forearm of the CIA escort, and objected, "Friends do not need memos"."*
> *"I would emphasize the importance of these kind of [personal]ties to our station chiefs at every opportunity. When I met with them during outbound interviews, I told them to make use of Steve and me to help cement these ties. […] what I really wanted to do was to suggest that he [the foreign liaison officer] and I were old buddies. That would enhance his stock when he got back to the station'."*
> *"With all this liaison activity, it is surprising that neither Steve nor I went to Moscow during our time together. Old habits die hard I guess. We had little trust in the Russians and in the one area where we should have common interest: terrorism. […] The Russian resident, the senior intelligence officer at their Washington embassy, came to the agency once for lunch and discussions. It was pleasant enough, but my chief of staff had the security folks sweep the dining room and my office for bugs after the Russian left."*

(Hayden, 2016: 241)

(Hayden, 2016: 250)

The above quote illustrates the influence of converging interests as conditions fostering trust, as claimed by Kydd (2010), Klijn, Edelenbos & Stijn (2010) and Walsh (2006). However, converging interests are not enough; as perceptions, past experiences, moods, beliefs, values, emotions and attitudes shape judgements (Jones & George, 1998), as do reputations (Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017): old habits die hard. Therefore, this extract provides information into the psychological factors that influence the decision-making process on trust and the establishment of confidence. It also addresses the feature that trust is not static and develops over time. Furthermore, this quote illustrates the findings by Jones & George (1998) that a trust and distrust can co-exist in different aspects of the same relationship, however, this was not the case of the Russian relationship as described by Hayden, despite the converging interests.

4.4 The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a life in the CIA's Clandestine Service by Henry A. Crumpton

In 'The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a life in the CIA's clandestine service' (2013), Henry A. Crumpton reflects on the period around 9/11 when he served as an operations officer at the CIA's headquarters and abroad working on foreign field assignments as Chief of Station. He also served as Deputy Chief of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and led the CIA's Afghan campaign in 2001-2002.

> *"In the decade after 9/11, European allies joined the anti-intelligence political fray, indicting CIA officers while ignoring their own intelligence officers' complicity in joint operations gone sour. Italy serves as the prime example. The CIA wondered about the reliability of foreign intelligence partners and their political masters. Meanwhile, foreign intelligence and security services pondered whom they could trust in the U.S. intelligence community. They debated among themselves which U.S. agency had what responsibility. Who could blame them, with all the press leaks and the confused proliferation of senior intelligence officers and various agencies and departments with a bewildering set of roles and overlapping authorities?".*

(Crumpton, 2013: 6)

The above reflection upon the period after 9/11 features some interesting insights into the role of trust in international intelligence cooperation. First of all, it addresses the reliability of partners, an indicator to the decision-making process of trust in international intelligence liaison and a key element of trust as described by Aden (2016). Furthermore, one can establish various levels of analysis in international intelligence cooperation in line with Aldrich (2009) low politics versus high politics hypothesis as Crumpton differentiates its intelligence partners from the political masters. Lastly, the quote reflects on the role of reputations and on judgements of trustworthiness

as part of the Psychological factors in the process of decision-making on trust and supports Lemieux & Perras' thesis that heterogeneity in organizations, or in this case 'the bewildering set of roles and overlapping authorities', impedes trust and cooperation.

> *"CTC's [CIA's Counterterrorism Center] leadership role throughout the globe spawned many cross-cutting cooperative relationships. CTC brought law enforcement, military, and intelligence services across the world into a growing collaborative network. I wanted to take it a step further. […] CTC could advance regional CY cooperation through regional conferences, a means of building better understanding and trust among our partners. […] There was no better way to learn than to spend a couple of days with our foreign partners in a multilateral setting, listening to stories of their success and failure. More than just data or information, we developed an empathetic sense for their mission. We shared frustrations and aspirations. And we facilitated our allies' regional cooperation."*
>
> (Crumpton, 2013: 314)

Despite confirming the positive effects and relevance of international intelligence cooperation, this quote also reflects the process of developing of trusting relationship systematically and personally as introduced by Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017). Furthermore, it addresses the psychological factors that are at play in the decision-making process on trust; the role of moods, emotions and attitudes and belief as introduced by Jones & George (1998) and the overarching importance of personal trust when referring to the development of empathy and understanding. Lastly, Crumpton provides insights into person-based trust-building activities such as network-based, regional conferences in order to foster information sharing and cooperation as mentioned by Aden (2016).

4.5 Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA by Melissa Boyle Mahle

In 'Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA' (2005), Melissa Boyle Mahle reflects upon her sixteen-year career ending in 2002 as a covert operative for the CIA in the Middle East and the political and operational culture of the agency.

> *"In February, the CIA entered into a direct negotiating role with the Iranians – significantly deepening the CIA role with the hopes of exerting better operational control. The CIA did not want to deal with Manucher Ghorbanifar, one of the Iranian intermediaries, because of past negative experiences with him. In fact, the CIA had issued a "burn notice" on Ghorbanifar – a notice to all field stations and some friendly liaison services stating that he was a fabricator and not to be trusted. CIA objections to Ghorbanifar would be overruled. A similar burn notice would go out on Ahmed Chalabi many years later, which, too would be ignored by the politicians."*
>
> (Boyle Mahle, 2005: 27)

The extract from the memoire by Boyle Mayle serves to illustrate the influence of past experiences regarding the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation, as introduced by of Jones & George (1998) and Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017) and included in the theoretical framework. The quote below illustrates two other characteristics of trust that influence international intelligence liaison.

> "[…] during trilateral security meetings […] we mediated disputes around the table. As with everything, personalities and history play a role. […] Focused on security and security alone, we tried to forge a level of cooperation on the ground, separate from the political fray taking place between Ramallah and Tel Aviv"
>
> (Boyle Mahle, 2005: 262)

First of all, Boyle Mahle directly addresses the importance of the influence of personalities and history on the establishment of relations on trust, as included in the theoretical framework under psychological factors according to insights derived from Jones & George (1998) and Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017). Furthermore, in line with the high-low politics hypothesis as developed by Aldrich (2009), Boyle Mahle distinguishes various levels of analysis, included in the theoretical framework as characteristics of trust; the cooperation between intelligence services on the ground, versus the political cooperation at state level.

4.6 A Life for a Life: A Memoir: My Career in Espionage Working for the CIA by Howard Phillips Hart

In 'A Life for a Life: A Memoir: My Career in Espionage Working for the Central Intelligence Agency' (2015), Howard Phillips Hart reflects upon his 25-year career with the CIA from 1965 to 1990 in which he served as a chief of station in Pakistan, India, Iran and Germany as well as the founding director of the Crime and Counter-narcotics Centre.

> "Sometimes, this can be done unilaterally, but very often, perhaps usually, it involved the closest possible cooperation with intelligence, police and military liaison services. It was always tricky to do this. […] In terms of liaison, the business of building trustworthy liaison capabilities was a long-term effort which would take several years to bring to fruition. Neither Rome nor an effective counter narcotics effort could be built in a day."
>
> (Hart, 2015: 132)

Reflecting on counter-narcotics in Colombia during his time as the director of the Crime and Counter-narcotics Centre, Hart describes the risky context of international intelligence liaison, as reflected throughout the literature on Security Studies. Furthermore, he addresses the importance of trust in international intelligence liaison, and a feature of trust regarding the development of these relations as the long-term efforts.

4.7 Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence by James R. Clapper

'Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence' is a memoire written by James R. Clapper and co-written by Trey Brown. Clapper has had a long career in the US Intelligence community, serving as Director of National Intelligence from 2010-2017, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from 2007 to 2010, Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from 2001-2006 and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 1995. Reflecting on the impact of Edward Snowden's leaks, Clapper claims the following.

> "[…] we'd lost the trust of some foreign governments, which were truly surprised we were surveilling them, not to mention many more who feigned surprise, because, as we both knew, they were also surveilling us; we'd lost the trust of some foreign intelligence partners, who questioned our ability to keep their secrets as they lost their own capabilities to Snowden's leaks […]"
>
> (Clapper, 2018: 369)

He does not only confirm that trust plays a role in international intelligence cooperation, but also distinguishes between various levels of analysis in line with Aldrich (2009) high-low politics hypothesis, as he differentiates between trust between governments and trust between foreign intelligence partners. Furthermore, he provides insight into the one of the conditions fostering trust, namely the ability to keep secrets as introduced by Walsh (2006). The quote below illustrates some other facets of the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation.

> "Pakistan was a key ally in the Afghan war […] yet we didn't trust the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency-at all. In fact, they had a history of tipping off targets (targets for us, proxies for them) ahead of raids. At the same time, the Pakistanis were very suspicious about US intelligence."
>
> (Clapper, 2018: 276)

Clapper names Pakistan as a key US ally, referring to common values in the specific context of the Afghan war and thereby possibly referring to situational trust, as studied by Dibben et al (2000), Driscoll (1978) and Scott (1980). Furthermore, Clapper engages upon the importance of past experiences as psychological factors that influence the decision-making process of trust as illustrated by Goldenberg, Soeters & Dean (2017).

4.8 Discussion

This paragraph will discuss the results of the analysis of the selected excerpts from seven memoires of former US intelligence personnel. The first part will engage upon what insights from the field of Intelligence Studies on international intelligence cooperation and trust were apparent in the analysis. The second part will discuss what elements from the analysis could be related to the

framework introduced in the fourth chapter based on insights from five other disciplines within the Social Sciences, in order to discuss the applicability value of the framework and involving insights from other studies into the study of the influence of trust on international intelligence cooperation.

The intelligence literature on trust and intelligence cooperation has provided insights on how certain input leads to trust, and how trust in turn can lead to international intelligence cooperation. The observations by Walsh (2006) in which he claims that converging interests and the idea that the trustee treats the intel securely is reflected throughout the memoires literature. Furthermore, the divide between low politics and high politics as provided by Aldrich (2009), has provided insight into multiple levels of analysis that were visible throughout the memoires literature, describing the often sturdy intelligence relationships opposed to rocky relationships at the political level. Even though one might argue that the political level is not part of intelligence, the two are often closely related as shown in the memoires literature. Aldrich's thesis has not been applied to trust specifically in the international intelligence cooperation yet, his theory seems to be highly applicable to this field of study within the discipline of Intelligence Studies. Furthermore, the intelligence literature on trust has underlined the importance of trust as an enabler of international intelligence cooperation. The quotes in the analysis, either consisting of indicators or directly addressing the importance of trust in international intelligence liaison, serve to endorse this theoretical observation.

The combination of the various literature on international intelligence cooperation seems to be able to explain some vital elements explaining the influence of trust; its enablers, the various levels at which it is at play, its influences international cooperation and its development over time. However, what the current state of the literature is lacking, is insight into the decision-making process that provide actors with the confidence to engage in trusting relationships with others. The memoires do reflect elements of this decision-making process and demonstrate that both elements of the strategic, risk-based, rational choice process, as well as the psychological, moralist and emotional process leading to trust are both apparent. The memoires literature thereby confirms the multidimensional vision of trust that was applied in the framework, incorporating both strategic as well as moralist elements. Furthermore, due to the incorporation of insights from the other Social Sciences, the framework is able to explain various types and forms of trust that came forward in the memoires literature, as well as the type of intelligence cooperation that is connected to that. It provides a more thorough understanding of its enablers and the development of trust in a relationship, as well as its features. In addition, the framework has been able to explain the importance of personal relations in establishing trust, which was lacking in the current literature from Intelligence Studies on the influence of trust in cooperation, and reflected throughout the memoires literature.

As explained in the chapter on methodology, the amount of memoire literature studied in this thesis is limited due to the lack of available, insider-sources on international intelligence cooperation which is considered one of the most sensitive areas of intelligence. It is therefore not

peculiar that certain elements that are part of the framework did not come forward in the memoires literature. This concerns various types of trust, as well as dysfunctional elements of trust. It could very well be that these elements have a very limited role or are not apparent in the world of intelligence liaison, but it could also be that authors simply do not reflect on them. Furthermore, the excerpts from the memoires mainly discuss information sharing when talking about liaison activities. The other activities that are part of liaison, are therefore not exposed. Despite the limited empirical information, the analysis shows the strength of including insights from different academic fields into the study of trust and its influence on intelligence cooperation. Therefore, the it can be concluded that the theoretical framework as proposed in the second chapter allows for a more thorough understanding of the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation, and deserves to be subjected to future research in order to further validate its strength as well as applicability to the world of intelligence.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored the influence of trust on international intelligence liaison by designing a theoretical framework based on insights from Intelligence Studies on the phenomenon of trust and its relation to international intelligence cooperation, complemented by insights from five other disciplines within the Social Sciences, pertaining to provide more insight into this understudied phenomenon. Using empirical information systematically derived and analyzed from memoires literature of former US intelligence personnel, the framework was tested concerning its applicability and validity.

What can be concluded from the analysis is that even though different authors from the field of Intelligence do reflect on several basic elements and features of trust as well as and its influence on international intelligence cooperation, their combined knowledge does not provide sufficient understanding into the decision-making process actors engage in to feel confident and establish

trusting relationships of international intelligence cooperation. It is vital to understand this process, as its results have shown to influence international intelligence cooperation. In other words, insights from the other Social Sciences, where the subject has been studied in depth, provide scholars with new and deeper understandings regarding the various paradigms, types, forms, ways of development and features of trust, and, important in the light of the research question, the influence of these elements on the type, form and depth of international intelligence liaison.

This thesis has explored the influence of trust on international intelligence liaison and compose a theoretical framework that was able to decompose the complex phenomenon of trust and allow for a thorough understanding of its influence on international intelligence cooperation. This theoretical innovation impedes the use of trust as a bulk concept or in black and white terms and allows for analysis of international intelligence relationships regarding the role of trust and its influence on cooperation. The analysis of memoires has added to the strength of the framework based on the available empirical knowledge by confirming several central elements of the framework as well as the additional value of insights from other academic traditions.

However, as referred to in the chapter on methodology, the available empirical knowledge resulting from the memoires literature in this case is limited, which in turn influences the validity of the theoretical framework. The selection of this particular case allows for the largest amount of empirical data, thereby making an effort to represent the case as elaborate as possible. As this thesis adopts exploratory research, it has succeeded in defining key elements, relations and priorities on the topic of trust and the influence on international intelligence cooperation.

Future research into the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation should seek to test the validity of this framework by studying specific elements of the framework that were not part of the analysis and a diverse variety of sources of empirical material, such as expert interviews if the opportunity presents itself in order to enhance the internal validity. Also, studying different geographical cases in testing the framework would serve to allow for a greater external validity, as the global intelligence community is characterized by homogeneous cultures. Furthermore, options for further research could also include quantitative research methods. Aydinli & Tuzuner (2011) have explored the use of quantitative research methods in studying international intelligence cooperation, which could in the future also be applied to the study of trust in international intelligence cooperation to provide new insights.

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7. APPENDIX

Figure 1. Elements leading to international intelligence cooperation

Figure 2. Conceptual framework of trust and international intelligence cooperation based on the literature review of Intelligence Studies

Figure 3. Theoretical Framework on the influence of trust in international intelligence cooperation based on insights from Intelligence Studies, Sociology, Psychology, Public Administration, International Relations and Security Studies

Figure 4. Operationalization of trust in international intelligence liaison

Trust is the expression of confidence based on a process of risk-analysis and influenced by psychological factors, determining the competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability of the other, possibly resulting in international intelligence cooperation.		
Unit of analysis	**Concept**	**Indicator**
Trust in International Intelligence Cooperation	Trust	trust, distrust, mistrust, friend(ship), relation(ship), personal, institutional
	Risk-analysis	risk, vulnerability, capability, interests, source protection, (common) interests, confidentiality, competence secrecy, predictability, integrity, skills, knowledge
	Psychological factors	belief, benevolence, morals, values
	International Intelligence Cooperation	bilateral, multilateral, multinational, international, liaison, cooperation, community, ally, information sharing, information exchange, covert action, assisting, support, partner

Figure 5: Overview of all United States Intelligence Memoires Studied

AUTHOR(S)	TITLE	YEAR
Agee, P.	Inside the Company: CIA Diary	1975
Bearden, M. & Risen, J.	The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB	2004
Bencroft, M.	Autobiography of a Spy	1983
Berntsen, G. & Pezzulo, R.	Jawbreaker: the attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander	2006
Boyle Mahle, M.	Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA	2005
Burdick, J. G.	A Sphinx: the Memoires of a Reluctant Spy in Vietnam	2008
Burke, T.	Stories from the Secret War – CIA Special Ops in Laos	2012
Burkholder Smith, J.	Portrait of a Cold Warrior	1976
Chauhan, S. S.	Inside CIA: Lessons in Intelligence	2005
Clapper, J. R. & Brown, T.	Facts and Fears: hard truths from a life in Intelligence	2018
Clarridge, D.R. & Diehl, D.	A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA	2004
Colby, W. & Forbath, P.	Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA	1978
Colby, W. & McCargar, J.	Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam	1989
Crumpton, H. A.	The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a life in the CIA's Clandestine Service	2013
Defourneaux, R. J.	The Winking Fox: Twenty-Two Years in Military Intelligence	2000
Devine, J.	Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story	2014

Devlin, L.	Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone	2008
Doyle, D. W.	True Men And Traitors: From the OSS To The CIA, My Life in the Shadows	2004
Drumheller, T.	On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White house Compromised American Intelligence	2006
Dulles, A.W.	The Craft of Intelligence: America's legendary spy master on the fundamentals of intelligence gathering in a free world.	1959
Gates, R. M.	From the Shadows: the ultimate insider's story of five Presidents and how they won the Cold War	2007
Gilligan, T.	CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency	1991
Gregg, D. P.	Pot Shards: Fragments of a life lived in CIA, the White house and the Two Koreas	2014
Grenier, R. L.	88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary	2016
Hart, H. P.	A Life for a Life: A Memoir: My Career in Espionage Working for the CIA	2015
Hayden, M. V.	Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror	2017
Hayden, M. V.	The Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies	2018
Helms, R. & Hood, W.	A Look Over My Shoulder: a life in the CIA	2004
Holm, R. L.	The American Agent: My Life in the CIA	2003
Holm, R. L.	The Craft We Chose: My Life in the CIA	2011
Jones, I.	The Human Factor: inside the CIA's dysfunctional Intelligence culture	2010
Kennon, P. E.	The Twilight of Democracy	1995
Kirikou, J. & Ruby, M.	Relunctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA's War on Terror	2012
Kloman, E. H.	Assignment Algiers: With the OSS in the Mediterranean Theater	2005
Laux, D. & Pezzullo, R.	Left of Boom: how a young CIA case officer penetrated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda	2017
Lee, O. B.	The Formative Years of an African-American Spy: a memoir	2012
Lilley, J. & Lilley, J.	China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage and Diplomacy	2004
Lynch, C.	The C.I. Desk: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence as seen from my cublicle	2010
Mendez, A. J.	The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA	1999
Methven, S. A.	Laughter in the Shadows: a CIA memoir	2008
Moran, L.	Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy	2005
O'Hern, S. K.	The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad	2008
Odom, W. E.	Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America	2004
Paget, K. M.	Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret Campagin to Enroll American Studens in the Crusade Against Communism	2015
Panetta, L. & Newton, J.	Worthy Fights: a Memoir of leadership in war and peace	2014

Paseman, F.	A Spy's Journey: A CIA Memoir	2005
Peterson, M. D.	The Widow Spy	2012
Phillips, D. A.	The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service	1977
Plame Wilson, V.	Fair Game: How a Top CIA Agent Was Betrayed by Her own Government	2008
Rizzo, J.	Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA	2014
Roosevelt, A.	For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer	1988
Rossmiller, A. J.	Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, from Baghdad to the Pentagon	2008
Ruth, S.	My Twenty Years as a CIA Officer, It's All About the Mission	2011
Schlesinger, J.	America at Century's End	1989
Schroen, G.	First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan	2006
Shackley, T.	Spymaster: My Life in the CIA	2006
Snepp, F.	Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam	1977
Tenet, G. & Harlow, B.	At the Center of the Storm: my years in the CIA	2007
Turner, S.	Secrecy and Democracy – the CIA in Transition	1985
Turner, S.	Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret Intelligence	2005
Waters, T. J.	Class 11: My Story Inside the CIA's First Post-9/11 Spy Class	2007