

**The Dutch fighters that defended the Pontifical States (1860-1870):
Problem and solution perceptions of the then Dutch government**



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
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Dutch fighters in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870): a familial connection

In 1860, the Pontifical States under Pope Pius IX were threatened by Italians fighting for unity of the Mediterranean island. A multinational fighting force consisting of thousands of young Catholics from various continents left their homes to fight for the Pope.¹ Between 1866 and 1870, my great-great-great grandfather Matthijs Walta and his two brothers Bauke and Douwe Walta (see front page) left Friesland, the Netherlands, to participate in the defense of the Pontifical States. With my ancestors leaving the Netherlands to join an armed struggle abroad 150 years ago, a phenomenon that is still highly relevant today, the topic raised my interest to research the defense of the Pontifical States as a historical case more in depth in this Master Thesis.



¹ Howard Marraro, 'Canadian and American Zouaves in the Papal Army, 1868-1870', *Canadian Catholic Historical Association (CCHA) Report* 12 (1944-45), 83-102, 83.

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Introduction

With the rise (and by now military defeat) of the so-called ‘caliphate’ in Syria/Iraq of terrorist network ISIL/Daesh² in 2014, thousands of young people from all over the world left their home countries to join ISIL/Daesh and to defend and expand the proclaimed caliphate in a struggle against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.³

In the 1860s Pope Pius IX saw the territory over which he ruled, the Pontifical States, threatened by Italian fighters battling for unity of the various kingdoms and duchies that we now call Italy. Therefore in 1860, pope Pius IX called on young Catholic men across the world to defend the Pontifical territory against this enemy. Between 1860 and 1870, young men from a wide variety of countries including but not limited to Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States formed a multinational fighting force of thousands of men that aimed to defend the Pontifical States from their demise.⁴ Between 1860-1870, a little over 3.000 Dutch men volunteered and left their homes to fight for the Pontifical territory.⁵ Thus, the phenomenon of people leaving their home country to fight for a cause abroad is not a recent development; the past has known similar events, as shown by the case of the Pontifical States in the 1860s.

As a response nowadays, governments across the world actively develop local, national, and international policies to counter the recruitment, departure and return of ‘foreign fighters’, who can be defined as “noncitizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts”.⁶ Research shows that the contemporary foreign fighter phenomenon to ISIL/Daesh in Syria/Iraq has led to the implementation of certain policies. In the case of

² According to the Global Coalition against Daesh, an international coalition of 75 members formed in 2014 to degrading and defeating Daesh, Daesh spreads an ideology of destructive and hateful messages, which e.g. attract people from all over the world travelling to the Syria/Iraq region to join Daesh. See: The Global Coalition against Daesh, ‘Mission’, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/mission-en/#preventing-the-movement-of-foreign-fighters> (30 May 2018).

³ United States Department of State, ‘Update: Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’ (version 4 August 2017), <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273198.htm> (27 March 2018).

⁴ Marraro, ‘Canadian and American Zouaves in the Papal Army, 1868-1870’, 83.

⁵ Zouavenmuseum, ‘Zouavenregister’, <http://zouavenmuseum.nl/museum-documentatie/zouavenregister/> (20 February 2018).

⁶ David Malet, *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts* (New York 2013) 9.

European countries, these include establishing prevention policies and reintegration programs, as well as judicial measure, such as prosecution.⁷

With up to 280 Dutch persons since 2012 leaving for Syria/Iraq⁸, the government of the Netherlands actively intervenes in the early stages of (alleged) foreign fighters to prevent them from leaving their homes to join a terrorist network. In addition, the Dutch government possesses a range of policies to deal with these individuals in case they return to their home country.⁹ These current policies illustrate to a large extent the current perception of the Dutch government: the (alleged) joining of Dutch persons with a terrorist group poses an issue that requires a solution from the government. This leads to the question whether, in the case of the (returning) Dutch fighters to the Pontifical States (1860-1870), the then Dutch government perceived a problem and solution.

To a large extent we can illustrate the phenomenon of the (Dutch) fighters that defended the Pontifical States between 1860-1870, as previous research has focused on religious aspects, motivations, recruitment, and the course of events of the fighters' defence of the Pontifical States. What has, however, remained underexposed in the research are the perceptions of the then Dutch government in relation to the (returning) Dutch fighters that defended the Pontifical States.

Previous research on the then Dutch government in relation to the (returning) Dutch fighters has focused only on the procedures applied by the then government.¹⁰ These procedures, which will be explored in this research, do not state the problem and solution perception of the then Dutch government in regard to the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. Moreover, the question arises whether other findings next to the procedures of the then Dutch government provide insights into the problem and solution perception of the then Dutch government in regard to the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. This matter is central to this thesis, which will be addressed with the following main explorative research question: *To what extent did the then Dutch government perceive a*

⁷ Alastair Reed, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, 'Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un) Intended Consequences', *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* (2015), 8-10.

⁸ The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 'The Dutch Jihadist Foreign Terrorist Fighter Monitor' (version 17 November 2017), <https://hcss.nl/news/dutch-jihadist-foreign-terrorist-fighter-monitor> (20 May 2018).

⁹ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (hereafter: NCTV), Ministry of Justice and Security, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (hereafter: MSZW), *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism* (2014) https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm32-83910.pdf.

¹⁰ See: Br. Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse zouaven* (Nijmegen 1947).

problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and how can we explain this?

This research is relevant in two ways. First, from a societal perspective: the then government's perceptions regarding (returning) foreign fighters will provide insights into the perceptions of the current Dutch government regarding (returning) foreign fighters. This research will thus indicate similarities and differences between the perceptions of the current Dutch government and the perceptions of the then Dutch government regarding (returning) foreign fighters.

Second, from an academic perspective, this research will prove its relevance within the historiography of the particular case at hand. With limited research on the procedures of the Dutch government, a full account of the perceptions of the Dutch government, which is central to this research, will complement the historiography on the (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860 and 1870.

The main research question - *To what extent did the then Dutch government perceive a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and how can we explain this?* - will be answered through a number of subsections. The first chapter will provide an overview of the body of knowledge on the Dutch (returning) fighters that defended the Pontifical States between 1860-1870. Subsequently, the first chapter will point to the knowledge gap addressed in this research, and provide the analytical framework through which the concepts of problem perception and solution perception will be addressed. Lastly, the first chapter will reflect on the methodology and research design of this research.

The second chapter will provide a detailed description of the historical case central to this research. The chapter will focus on the run up to 1860, the events between 1860-1870, and its aftermath. In all subsections, relevant international geopolitical developments as well as relevant developments in the Netherlands and the Pontifical States will be addressed.

The third chapter will look into the perceptions of the Dutch government on the (returning) Dutch fighters that defended the Pontifical States. It will do so along the lines of three dimensions. First, the government's procedural role is explored, based on existing knowledge from previous research. The second dimension that will be presented is the press, based on an analysis of newspaper sources that spoke of the (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States in relation to the Dutch government. The third dimension presented in this chapter is the then Dutch parliament, based on an analysis

of proceedings of the Dutch House of Representatives that spoke of the (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States.

Furthermore, chapter three will analyze all three dimensions through the problem and solution perception framework established in the first chapter. This will provide an answer to the main research question as to what extent the then Dutch government perceived a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870). The third chapter will be finalized with a reflection on the current and past perceptions of the Dutch government regarding (returning) foreign fighters. A conclusion will finalize this thesis.

1. Analytical Framework & Research Design

Chapter one will provide an overview of the body of knowledge on the Dutch (returning) fighters that defended the Pontifical States between 1860-1870. Subsequently, this first chapter will point to the research gap that is addressed in this research, and provide the analytical framework, which incorporates the concepts of problem perception and solution perception. Lastly, this chapter will reflect on the design and methodological justifications of this research.

1.1 Body of Knowledge and Research Gap

Central to this research is the historical case of (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860 and 1870. Therefore, this first section will present the historiography on this case, and point to the research gap addressed in the subsequent chapters. First, it is important to note that the body of knowledge on this historical case is fairly limited; only a handful of works have written about the particularities of this specific case. Second, it is important to note that the body of knowledge will be further elaborated on in the following chapter of this research.

Van Essen (1998) provides a general overview of the history of the Dutch fighters in the defense of the Pontifical States. In honoring the 50-year anniversary of the Dutch Zouaves¹¹ Museum in Oudenbosch (the Netherlands), Van Essen touches upon the geopolitical context in Italy before and after 1860, the position of the Catholic Church in the Netherlands at the end of the nineteenth century, and provides a detailed account on the recruitment, departure, and return of the Dutch fighters that defended the Pontifical States.¹²

Next to the more general insights gained from Van Essen, a number of works contextualize specific aspects of the fighters in the defense of the Pontifical States. The experiences and motivations of the fighters in the Pope's army become clear through firsthand accounts in personal diaries of certain fighters. A good example of such an account is that of Joseph Powell (1871), a British fighter who wrote a narrative of his travel and

¹¹ 'Zouaves' is the generally accepted term to refer to the fighters that participated in the defence of the Pontifical States (1860-1870). The term 'Zouaves' stems from an earlier infantry regiment part of the French Army serving between 1830 and 1962 in French North Africa. In addition, a regiment of Polish Zouaves has fought against Russia in 1863-64. To prevent any confusion with other regiments of 'Zouaves', this research will instead refer to the 'Dutch (returning) fighters that participated in the defence of the Pontifical States (1860-1870)' or, short: 'Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States'.

¹² Petra van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870* (Oudenbosch 1998) 1-2.

residence in the two years that he participated in the defense of the Pontifical States.¹³

A second personal account is provided by Wouters (1986), who captures the letters and memoirs from his great-uncle and Dutch fighter Theodorus van Wees (1839-1916). In this work, Wouters records Wees' experiences in Rome, his trips to religious sites, and his view on social manners in Italy.¹⁴ Another personal account on the defense of the Pontifical States is provided by Schraag (2005), who draws up the travel diary of Dutch fighter Cornelis Witte (1869-1925), who describes the towns and villages he encounters during patrols and detachments, and the battles and lootings that he witnesses.¹⁵

Specific insights are also provided by several works on demographic features of the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States. In his Masters thesis, Rozema (2010) provides a detailed and statistical account of the age, origin, and profession of the Dutch fighters.¹⁶ A demographic focus can also be found in several works on Dutch fighters from specific areas in the Netherlands. For example, De Boer (1994) provides an overview of the ample 200 Dutch fighters from the Vecht and Eem area in the middle of the Netherlands.¹⁷

Next to these general and specific accounts of the phenomenon of Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States, there is one notable work that touches upon the Dutch fighters that defended the Pontifical States in relation to procedures of the Dutch government. This is the work of Brother Christofoor (deceased in 1968), a leading figure in the historiography on this particular case. Christofoor was connected to the Saint Louis church in Oudenbosch, which served as one of the main collection points before the Dutch fighters would begin their journey to the Pontifical States.

After having established a museum on the Dutch fighters in Oudenbosch in 1946, Christofoor wrote an extensive account of the Dutch fighters in 1947. In this work, called *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, Christofoor touches upon various aspects of the Dutch fighters in the defense of the Pontifical States.¹⁸

¹³ See: Joseph Powell, *Two years in the Pontifical Zouaves: a narrative of travel, residence, and experience in the Roman States* (London 1871).

¹⁴ Frans Wouters, *Een handbreed kleiner dan de heer* (Nijmegen 1986) 17-46.

¹⁵ Sjaak Schraag, *Texelaars in het leger van de Paus: het reisverslag van Cornelis Witte, Zoeaaf van 1866-1868* (Texel 2006) 64-123.

¹⁶ See: Jan Willem Rozema, 'Op, Neerlands jeugd! Naar 't heilig, heilig Rome!' Een studie naar enkele demografische kenmerken van de Nederlandse pauselijke zouaven 1860-1870 (Master Thesis Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Rotterdam 2010).

¹⁷ G.L. De Boer sr., *Zouaven tussen Vecht en Eem (1860-1870)* (Laren 1994) 212-218.

¹⁸ See: Christofoor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*.

Moreover, Christoffor provides an insight into the procedures applied by the then Dutch government in regard to the Dutch fighters. This insight is based on the governmental archive research that he conducted in the 1940s. His archive research presents primary government sources, through which he demonstrates that there was correspondence concerning the Dutch fighters between the national (ministries), provincial (public prosecutors, commissioners of the King), and the municipal (mayor) levels of the then Dutch government.¹⁹ Christoffor's study thus provides an extensive overview of concrete procedures implemented regarding the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860-1870.

Next to Christoffor's work, Koolen (2015), as part of a broader study on Dutch fighters in holy wars, touches upon the religious climate in the Netherlands around 1860, the situation in the Pontifical States, the background and motivation of Dutch fighters, as well as briefly on the political and public view on the Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States, for which he uses a number of press sources.²⁰

With the limited amount of authors that have looked into the Dutch (returning) fighters of the Pontifical States in relation to the then Dutch government, the latter deserves further attention. Moreover, the limited existing research does not indicate whether the then Dutch government perceived a problem and solution in regard to the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. This leads to the question if other findings next to the procedures of the then Dutch government provide insights into the problem and solution perception of the then Dutch government in regard to the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. As noted above, this research question will be addressed through the main research question: *To what extent did the then Dutch government perceive a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and how can we explain this?*

1.2 Analytical Framework

Two central concepts of the research question are 'problem perception' and 'solution

¹⁹ Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 220-248.

²⁰ Ben Koolen, 'God wil het! – de zoeaven', in Maurits S. Berger (eds.), *Nederlanders in de heilige oorlog: zoeaven, brigadisten en jihadisten* (The Hague 2015) 9-38, 21-32.

perception' by the government. The next section presents the analytical framework through which these concepts will be defined and used in this research.

'Problem perception': the Securitization Theory

The notion of 'problem perception' can be studied through the securitization theory, which provides insight into why certain challenges become security problems. One of the notable accounts in this field is credited to the work of Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde (1998), during their presence at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. In their work *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), Buzan et al. have collected a number of ideas from their earlier works²¹, and introduce the concept of 'securitization', which refers to the main question of why certain challenges become security issues in international relations while others do not.²² In exploring what makes something an international security issue, Buzan et al. take a traditional military-political understanding of security: addressing an existential threat to a designated referent object. This view thus displays security as a matter of survival, justifying extraordinary measures to block the threatening development.²³

Buzan et al. explain that securitization is not the same as politicization; rather, it is a more extreme version of politicization. Security is a "special kind of politics or above politics": any public issue can be located on the spectrum of non-politicized (the state does not deal with it, nor is it part of public debate), to politicized (the state deals with it, and it is part of public debate), to securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat, justifying actions outside of the normal procedures).²⁴ As underscored by Buzan et al., securitization is not so much about what people consciously think the concept means, but more how people use it in some ways and not in others. Thus, an issue might not necessarily be a real existential threat, but merely be presented as such a threat.²⁵

With this, Buzan et al. argue that securitization is essentially an inter-subjective process: there is no such thing as an objective (real) threat. Rather, there is a perceived threat

²¹ See for example: Ole Waever et al. (eds.), *European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East West Confrontation* (New York 1989); Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London 1990); Barry Buzan et al., *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London 1990), and; Ole Waever et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London 1993).

²² Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Colorado 1998) 21.

²³ Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 21.

²⁴ Ibidem, 23-24.

²⁵ Ibidem, 24.

that depends on the definition of different actors. As Buzan et al. emphasize: “the distinction between subjective and objective is useful for highlighting the fact that we want to avoid a view of security that is given objectively and emphasize that security is determined by actors and in this respect is subjective”.²⁶

Thus, Buzan et al. define securitization as the social construction of threats: the process of an actor defining – perceiving - something or someone as a threat. To further clarify this process, it can be helpful to distinguish three main components. Firstly, the component of the *securitizing actor*, who is “someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups”.²⁷ The second main component in the process of securitization is the *referent object*, which is defined as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”.²⁸ These elements of securitization have become the central thought in what has been coined by McSweeney (1996) as the ‘Copenhagen School’ of thought.²⁹

For the third main component in the process of securitization, we turn to the work of Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka (2016). Balzacq et al. take the definition of securitization given by Buzan et al. a step further, by emphasizing additional features in securitization, such as the audience, context, and distinctive policy adoption during and as a result of securitization. More extensively than Buzan et al., Balzacq et al. include these features in their definition of securitization: “the key idea underlying securitization is that an issue is given sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, which enables those who are authorized to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem most appropriate”.³⁰

Next to these specific features, Balzacq et al. articulate another central aspect of the securitization process, which forms the third main component next to the securitizing actor and the referent object. This is the *referent subject*, meaning “the entity that is threatening (...) which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion”.³¹ Thus, the core of the securitization process entails three components: the securitizing actor, the referent object, and

²⁶ Ibidem, 31.

²⁷ Ibidem, 40.

²⁸ Ibidem, 36.

²⁹ Bill McSweeney, ‘Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996), 81-93, 81.

³⁰ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard and Jan Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases”, *International Relations* 30 (2016) 4, 494-531, 495.

³¹ Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases”, 495.

the referent subject, which leads to certain challenges becoming a security problem. The three components of the securitization process thus provide a good lens through which the above mentioned ‘problem perception’ can be defined.

Subsequently, the second concept central to the main research question – ‘solution perception’ by the government – needs to be defined.

‘Solution perception’: the current approach of the Dutch government

As briefly noted in the introduction of this research, the role of the Dutch government has become a central focus over the past years, with Dutch (returning) foreign fighters that went to and from Syria/Iraq to join ISIL/Daesh. The current approach of the Dutch government provides insights into the Dutch current government’s perceived solutions in regard to (returning) foreign fighters. However, it is firstly important to understand why (returning) foreign fighters are challenging to deal with for governments.

The contemporary phenomenon of (returning) foreign fighters poses three notable difficulties. First, the character of the foreign fighter phenomenon is not static, as research from De Roy van Zijndewijn and Bakker (2014) on foreign fighters that joined Afghanistan (in the 1980s), Bosnia (in the 1990s), and Somalia (in the 1990s and onwards) shows. In this research, De Roy van Zijndewijn and Bakker demonstrate that there are large differences between the nature of these three conflicts, between the local and foreign fighters that took part in these conflicts, and between the individual fighters in all three conflicts.³²

Second, research shows that the pathways of foreign fighters differ once the conflicts that they joined ended. Foreign fighters have a variety of options once a conflict is over: they can stay and join other terrorist groups, leave and peacefully integrate elsewhere, or take up terrorist activities elsewhere.³³ The various pathways can lead to various subsequent steps: a foreign fighter can stay in the country, fight with - or otherwise support - the terrorist group, or leave the terrorist group to for example join another group. Furthermore, a foreign fighter can leave the country of original destination to return to its home country, another western country, or a non-western country.³⁴

³² Jeanine de Roy van Zijndewijn and Edwin Bakker, ‘Returning Western foreign fighters: The case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia’, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* (2014), 2-9.

³³ See for a full overview of various pathways: Reed, De Roy van Zijndewijn and Bakker, ‘Pathways of foreign fighters: Policy options and their (un) intended consequences’, 2.

³⁴ Ibidem, 3-6.

This is where the third difficulty lies in dealing with foreign fighters: determining the threat level of a foreign fighter once it has returned. In the case of return to a home or other Western country, many subsequent steps can follow: peaceful integration is an option, but so is the possibility for engagement in terrorist activity, or the joining of other conflicts - to name only a few options.³⁵

With these three challenges, governments across the globe worry that returned foreign fighters utilize the knowledge and physical skills learned on the battlefield, and apply it in their home countries. Heads of states and other high-level government officials have vocally expressed such concerns. In the Netherlands, former Foreign Minister Bert Koenders recently reiterated the increased concerns of Dutch national authorities as, “in the future, returning fighters are likely to pose an even greater threat. They will be more battle-hardened and traumatized. They will have developed extremist networks. They pose a serious risk, and their activities could range from radicalizing and recruiting others to planning and carrying out attacks”.³⁶

In 2014, research showed that there had been few concrete cases of returning foreign fighters staging an attack in Europe. As Bakker, Paulussen and Entemann (2014) underscored, the attack in Brussels in May 2014 and in Toulouse in March 2012 were then the only two recent cases.³⁷ Attacks and plots in Paris (2015), the Amsterdam-Paris Thalys train (2015) and in Belgium (in Verviers in 2015, and in Brussels in 2016) involving returned foreign fighters seemed to prove the early warnings right, as noted by Coolsaet and Renard (2018).³⁸ However, as Coolsaet and Renard explain, among the returnees are not (mostly) the feared seasoned fighters, but also women, children, and families, who can be victimized, radicalized from the battlefield they left behind, or both.³⁹ With these challenges, recent terrorist attacks, and the difficulty in determining whether a returned person from the

³⁵ Ibidem, 2.

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Toespraak Minister Koenders tijdens bijeenkomst Foreign Terrorist Fighter-werkgroep’ (version 18 May 2017), <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2017/05/18/toespraak-minister-koenders-tijdens-bijeenkomst-foreign-terrorist-fighter-werkgroep> (27 April 2018), 5.

³⁷ Edwin Bakker, Christophe Paulussen and Eva Entemann, ‘Returning jihadist foreign fighters: Challenges pertaining to threat assessment and governance of this pan-European problem’, *Security and Human Rights* 25 (2014) 1, 11-32, 16-18.

³⁸ Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard, ‘The Homecoming of Foreign Fighters in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium: Policies and Challenges’ (version 11 April 2018), <https://icct.nl/publication/the-homecoming-of-foreign-fighters-in-the-netherlands-germany-and-belgium-policies-and-challenges/> (27 May 2018).

³⁹ Coolsaet and Renard, ‘The Homecoming of Foreign Fighters in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium: Policies and Challenges’.

battlefield poses a threat, governments remain focused on determining apt policies and instruments to deal with this.

Instruments of the Dutch government

Dealing with (returning) foreign fighters is full of complexities for governments, so where does this leave the ‘solution’ end of the problem? The Dutch government provides insights into how they perceive the ways to deal with (returning) foreign fighters with the tools and instruments adopted in the *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism*, published by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security’s National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in 2014.⁴⁰ In addition, the recent NCTV’s Fact Sheet on Returnees (2017) provides insights on instruments available to deal with returning foreign fighters.⁴¹

In *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism*, a range of instruments is presented that aim to result in a robust, offensive, and comprehensive program that addresses combatting jihadists⁴², with the main objective to protect democracy and the rule of law in the Netherlands.⁴³ The instruments listed in the action program are characterized as administrative, penal, or preventive. Five categories can be distinguished: 1) risk reduction regarding jihadist travellers; 2) travel interventions; 3) radicalization; 4) social media, and; 5) information sharing and cooperation.

The five categories listed in the action program can be divided in three types of instruments: ‘hard’ instruments (measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals), ‘soft’ instruments (measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals), and reintegration and rehabilitation efforts (instruments pertaining to those who return from a terrorist area back to the Netherlands).

Hard instruments

⁴⁰ NCTV and MSZW, *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism*.

⁴¹ NCTV, ‘Factsheet Returnees’ (version 14 February 2017), <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/Aanpak%20terugkeerders.aspx> (27 May 2018).

⁴² Defined as “an individual who sees him-/herself as part of the jihadists movement and endorses jihadists teachings”. NCTV and MSZW, *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism*, 32; Jihadist movement is defined as “the whole of (international) networks, groups, cells and individuals who are active supporters of the ideology and strategy of jihadism”. Ibidem, 32.

⁴³ Ibidem, 2.

Of the instruments that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals – the ‘hard’ type of instruments - reducing the risk of jihadist travellers⁴⁴ is the first category, which includes administrative and penal measures. Administratively, the Dutch government can take away the Dutch nationality from verified travellers who join terrorist militias. These persons will then be declared undesirable foreign nationals for the Schengen area. If there is merely an assumption that a traveller has joined terrorist militia, the person’s Dutch documents are refused or declared invalid. Verified travellers are placed on the national terrorism list, and are removed from the Persons Database, to stop financial allowance and other benefits.⁴⁵ Other administrative measures concern options for disillusioned or traumatized jihadists who wish to leave the jihadist movement. These persons can reach Dutch embassies in bordering countries, and receive consular assistance.⁴⁶

Penal measures to reduce the risk of jihadist travellers include the ability to initiate a criminal law intervention on persons recruiting for the armed struggle or inciting violence in an extremist context. In addition, penal measures include placing verified travellers who join terrorist militias under criminal investigation, and suspects and persons convicted for terrorist crimes are prisoned in the terrorist ward. Upon ruling of the court, returnees can be placed under long-term supervision.⁴⁷

The second category of hard instruments concerns the disruption of travel intentions of those who might depart⁴⁸, which also includes both administrative and penal measures. Administrative measures to disrupt travel intentions can be taken by the mayor who alerts a person’s immediate circle in order to stop departure. Administrative measures are also taken in case a minor is involved in a suspected departure, on which the Child Care and Protection Board initiate an investigation, or juvenile criminal law can be applied.⁴⁹ Penal actions to disrupt travel intentions concern arresting a suspected potential traveller, either long before the person wishes to leave the country, or at border control.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Defined as “a person who travels or has travelled to join a terrorist organisation in a jihadist conflict zone”: Ibidem, 32.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, 6-7.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 8.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, 5.

⁴⁸ *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism* uses the term ‘departure’ for a person who intends to travel from the Netherlands in order to join a terrorist organisation in a jihadist conflict zone. See: Ibidem, 33.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, 11.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, 11.

Soft instruments

The goal of preventing radicalization through disrupting disseminators of jihadist propaganda, the first category under soft instruments, is reached through the disruption of the distributors of jihadist propaganda, both online and offline. As noted above, persons inciting extremism can face criminal charges. Next to this, information is shared with for example local case management teams, and verified facilitators of extremism can be placed on the national terrorism list. In addition, the government aims to cooperate closely with mosques and imams in the Netherlands.⁵¹

Along the same lines, the government also aims to prevent radicalization on social media platforms, the second category under soft instruments. In the Netherlands, a specialized team at the National Police combats jihadist content together with the Public Prosecution Office.⁵² Furthermore, information on producers and distributors of online jihadist propaganda is shared with institutions who are authorized to intercept content, as well as with relevant service providers.

Countering social tensions is the third category under soft instruments. This is done to take away the breeding ground for radicalization, inter alia through strengthening existing networks of local and national key figures in the Muslim community. Additionally, the government provides support to educational institutions, and to those who are concerned.⁵³ Along the same lines, the fourth category under soft instruments is mobilizing societal opposition and enhancing resilience against radicalization and tensions. This is conducted through the creation and dissemination of alternative, oppositional views to repudiate the jihadist ideological message. This is done for example by disseminating information from ex-jihadists about negative experiences with jihadism, or by highlighting (foreign) authoritative scholars' opposition to the jihadist movement.⁵⁴

Information sharing and cooperation concerns the fifth and last category under soft instruments. On the local, national, and international level, the Netherlands focuses on various counterterrorism efforts, ranging from countering the finance of jihadists, increasing expertise in the operational implementation of tackling jihadism, and intensifying international cooperation and information sharing within multilateral fora regarding

⁵¹ Ibidem, 13-14.

⁵² Ibidem, 23.

⁵³ Ibidem, 17.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, 17-20.

(returning) jihadist travellers.⁵⁵

Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts

A (returning) jihadist traveller is signaled as early as possible to limit the potential threat. Various governmental bodies such as the Public Prosecutors Office, the National Police, and potentially the intelligence service will initiate an investigation on those persons that are known to have left the country to join terrorist militia. On the international level, information is exchanged between countries and via embassies to have such returnees in sight on time to have the Dutch Royal Military Police escorting the returnees.⁵⁶

Upon arrival in the Netherlands, all returnees are subject to interrogation, and subject to a criminal investigation. On all returnees, an estimate is made of the threat he or she poses, which will be discussed in a multidisciplinary case consultation between the municipality, National Police, Public Prosecutor and other local and national organizations. The multidisciplinary case consultation aims to determine interventions that decrease the threat from a returnee. Such interventions are based on a case-by-case approach to determine the specific measures, which can include criminal prosecution, a restraining order, a mental health program or de-radicalization program.⁵⁷

The above overview of instruments shows that the Dutch government possesses an extensive set of soft and hard instruments. From this set of instruments, the government approach towards terrorist threats, and specifically on the issue of (returning) foreign fighters, has a strong preventative character: the Dutch government embraces a pragmatic approach by favoring preventing potential issues, complemented with the ability to respond with penal and administrative measures. From this, the Dutch government's solution perception on (returning) foreign fighters becomes clear: the set of instruments indicate a balanced, comprehensive, and integrated approach on the (returning) foreign fighter phenomenon.

Taking the above outlined notion of problem perception, the difficulties of dealing with foreign fighters, and the notion of solution perception, the following analytical framework can be created with the current perceptions of the Dutch government:

⁵⁵ Ibidem, 26-28.

⁵⁶ NCTV, 'Factsheet Returnees'.

⁵⁷ Ibidem.

Type	Concept	Description	<i>Current perceptions of the Dutch government</i>
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>The Dutch government, specifically the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the NCTV.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>The democracy and rule of law in the Netherlands.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>Returned foreign fighters utilize the knowledge and physical skills learned on the battlefield, and apply it in their home countries.</i>
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Reducing the risk of jihadist travellers, and disrupt the travel intentions of those who might depart.</i>
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Disrupt disseminators of jihadist propaganda, preventing radicalization on social media platforms, countering social tensions, and information sharing and international cooperation in multilateral fora.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>Conducting a criminal investigation; a case-by-case approach that can lead to various measures, or a de-radicalization program.</i>

1.3 Research Design and Methodological Justifications

The following section will elaborate on the methodological justification of this research, and explain the steps taken to answer the main **explorative research question**: *To what extent did the then Dutch government perceive a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and how can we explain this?* With this research question, the following research designs are applicable:

- A **case study design**, as the research will focus on the single case of the Dutch fighters in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870);
- A **cross sectional design**, as this research will analyze a single period, or a single point in time: the government's problem perception and solution perception on the (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860-1870.

Through the research question, this research will look into the extent to which the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States were perceived as a problem by the government, and what potential solutions the government offered. It will do so by presenting three dimensions: a procedural dimension, a press dimension, and a parliamentary dimension. These dimensions will be explained in detail here below.

Data collection and analysis

The **unit of analysis** in this research is the Dutch (returning) fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870). The demonstrably limited research on the role of the Dutch government in the historiography of the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States leads to an analysis in this research that is guided by **primary sources** from archives. Therefore, the **unit of observation** is archival material to explore the unit of analysis in relation to Dutch governmental matters.

Timeframe: case and data

Another aspect that is important to highlight is the **timeframe** concerning the case and the data. As said, the case - the Dutch (returning) fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States – provides for the timeframe 1860-1870. The data that is offered in all three dimensions (procedural, press, and parliament), however, concerns a much broader timespan: from 1815-1970. This research will adhere to this broad timespan to collect and analyze data

on the case in relation to Dutch governmental matters, because of three reasons: i) the data is limited in the procedural and parliamentary dimension, which makes it feasible to explore all available data; ii) the data in the press dimension is more in size, but it is feasible to look into as this data features only a handful of sources that cover the relation to Dutch governmental matters, and; iii) taking this broad timespan in the collection and analysis will improve the quality of the conclusion with which chapter three is concluded.

The ‘then government’, central in the main research question, thus does not represent one single administration. Rather, the ‘then government’ in the research question represents the perception of the Dutch government around the turn of the twentieth century. The below paragraphs and tables will reflect on the dimensions chosen for this research, and the way that various types of data were collected and analyzed.

Procedural dimension:

Because Christoffor has conducted archival research on the procedural role of the Dutch government in relation to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States nearly 80 years ago, and to see if additional sources can be found, the Dutch National Archive (NA) was inquired for this research. A central reason to look into the NA is because it provides insights into the bureaucratic administrative structures that form the basis of **(foreign) policies and actions** of the government.⁵⁸ These structures are the focus of the first, procedural, dimension in this research. The following archives and sources will be used in the procedural dimension, to be outlined in detail in chapter three:

Br. Christoffor, <i>Uit het Epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven</i> (Nijmegen 1947). (Primary/secondary source)	Pages 220-248 from Christoffor’s work reflect on the legal procedures of the Dutch government regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States, based on archival research conducted by Christoffor in the 1940s.
National Archive,	The NA includes five inventories in which the Dutch fighters from

⁵⁸ John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History* (Harlow 2010) 99-100.

<p>The Hague, the Netherlands. (Primary sources)</p>	<p>the Pontifical States appear:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inventory 2.05.01: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (inventory numbers 3406 and 3581) - Inventory 2.22.15: Collection Prints (inventory number 3782) - Inventory 2.04.44: Ministry of the Interior: Division National Militia (inventory number 128) - Inventory 2.02.05.02: Council of Ministers (inventory number 38) - Inventory 2.21.044: Collection 107 Cremers (inventory number 173) <p>With these, the findings of Christoffor were partly traced back, and a few procedural documents not mentioned by Christoffor were added.</p>
<p>Catholic Documentation Centre (KDC), Nijmegen, the Netherlands. (Primary sources)</p>	<p>Archive of Jan Beekmans (BEEJ), a personal archive belonging to the category “Clerical and religious life”. In the archive of Beekmans, various materials on the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States are included, such as lists of names, enrolment forms, information on fighters from certain Dutch villages, but also materials specifically related to the Dutch government found in the inventory BEEJ 910: correspondence of the Ministry of Justice (inventory number 329).</p>
<p>Zouavenmuseum, Oudenbosch, the Netherlands. (Primary sources)</p>	<p>Next to the numerous original documents and materials available at the Zouavenmuseum regarding the Dutch fighters, the Museum provided a number of documents related to governmental procedures that were not found in the above mentioned other archives.</p>

Press dimension:

The second dimension that will be featured in chapter three is the press dimension, containing sources from the Dutch press regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States (1860-1870). The press is chosen as a useful dimension in this research, because newspaper articles record the **political and social views**, and – editorial bias of the paper in question taken into account – newspapers provide the establishment opinion, as well as

present results of enquiries beyond the scope of routine news reporting.⁵⁹

<p>Ben Koolen, ‘God wil het! – de zoeaven’, in Maurits S. Berger (red.), <i>Nederlanders in de heilige oorlog: zoeaven, brigadisten en jihadisten</i> (The Hague 2015). (Secondary source)</p>	<p>Pages 9-38: Koolen has looked into how press wrote about the fighters, by dominantly exploring press sources from 1860-1870 (37 out of 40 sources). He has looked into local newspapers (<i>Maas- en Roerbode</i>), as well as leading newspapers (<i>NRC</i>, <i>Algemeen Handelsblad</i>), and the magazine of Catholic NL <i>De Tijd</i>. From these efforts, Koolen illustrates the run up to the Pope’s call for fighters, the recruitment of fighters facilitated by catholic platforms and press, the Italian unification movement, the fall of Rome, and the motivation of the fighters.</p>
<p>Dutch newspaper archives <i>Delpher</i> (www.delpher.nl). (Primary sources)</p>	<p>Search term “Zouaven”: chosen because this is the generally accepted concept in (official and unofficial) Dutch writings when referring to the Dutch fighters of the Pontifical States. Searching on www.delpher.nl on the term “Zouaven” (Zouaves) and on the term “Pauselijke strijders” (Papal fighters) generates in total $25.113 + 710 = 25.823$ results (not taking into account overlap of results), over the nineteenth and twentieth century:</p> <p><u>Topics nineteenth century results:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 1830-1859, Delpher provides newspaper articles on the Zouaves of the battle in French Algeria; - Between 1860-1869, the timespan in which the defense of the Pontifical States took place, Delpher provides a segment of newspaper articles on the French-Algerian Zouaves, on the Polish Zouaves force in Russia, but also on the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States, mainly providing reports

⁵⁹ Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, 97.

	<p>based on telegrams received from Rome on the arrival of Papal fighters and on military aspects of the Papal armed forces. In addition, newspapers published (outcomes of) fundraising actions for the Papal fighters;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 1870-1899, Delpher provides newspaper sources in which obituaries of Papal fighters (Dutch and other nationals) are published. Most articles in this timespan feature the established association of returned Dutch fighters, <i>Fidei et Vertuti</i> and on other established associations of returned Dutch fighters. <p><u>Topics twentieth century results:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 1900-1950, Delpher provides newspaper articles that feature the same topics of the Dutch returned fighters as the newspaper articles featured between 1870-1899: reports on the meetings of the associations and, with the passing of time, more obituaries; - Between 1950-1979, Delpher provides newspaper articles of which a few concern the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. These few articles feature a reflection on individual Dutch fighters, and anniversaries of matters related to the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. <p>From these results, a handful of articles notably between 1866 and 1872 – with a few exceptions of articles from 1906 and 1952 - report on governmental matters related to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. Chapter three will firstly include a brief overview on the more general newspaper articles that by far make up the largest part of the</p>
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	newspaper articles on the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States, after which an overview and reflection on the newspaper articles featuring governmental matters related to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States will be provided.
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With this dimension, it is important to note that the findings from press sources do not provide an indication of the governmental perceptions – the press independently reflects on events. The press sources as presented in the second dimension will, however, produce findings that provide insights into the proceedings of the government as viewed by the press.

Parliamentary dimension:

The third, and last, dimension that will be featured in chapter three is the parliamentary dimension, containing sources from the Dutch States General (Senate and the House of Representatives) regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States (1860-1870). The parliament is chosen as a useful dimension in this research as the verbatim reporting of the parliamentary debates provides insights into the **political discourse**.⁶⁰

Archives Dutch States General (Senate and House of Representatives) (www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl) (Primary sources).	Search term “Zouaven”: chosen because this is the generally accepted concept in (official and unofficial) Dutch writings when referring to the Dutch fighters of the Pontifical States. Searching in www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl on the term “Zouaven” and on the term “Pauselijke strijders” generates 24 + 21 = 45 results (not taking into account overlap of results), over the nineteenth and twentieth century. These results will be explored in chapter three.
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Subsequently, the three dimensions – the procedural dimension, the press dimension, and the

⁶⁰ Ibidem, 96.

parliamentary dimension – will be mirrored to the analytical framework developed in §1.2, to develop an **interpretation** of the problem and solution perception of the then Dutch government regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870).

In applying the dimensions to the analytical framework, the following scheme arises, which will be completed as part of the analysis in chapter three:

Type	Concept	Description	<i>Procedural dimension</i>	<i>Press dimension</i>	<i>Parliamentary dimension</i>
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.			
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.			
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.			
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.			
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals.			
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.			

Methodological Justifications and Limitations

The research methodology is **qualitative**, because the research will provide an intensive study on the context and particularities of the topic (chapter two), and provide a detailed account of the available material on the role of the government in this particular case (chapter three).

In addition, it is important to note that since the case at hand is historical, this qualitative research will be conducted from a **historical perspective**; this research aims to

develop an understanding of the historical case through the examination of evidence presented in the three dimensions.

Limitations of the analytical framework:

- *Problem perception*

The literature used to explore the securitization theory proves there is much more to be written about this particular theory. As this research, however, does not aim to test the securitization theory, but merely use it as a lens to look at various dimensions, this research will be limited to using the core concepts (securitizing actor, referent object, and referent subject) from the securitization theory.

- *Solution perception*

The documents used to explore the solution perception are based on the instruments of the current government of the Netherlands towards (returning) foreign fighters. Whilst these documents provide an extensive overview, it is worth noting that the solution perception as part of the analytical framework is thus based on the instruments of one country only.

Operational limitations: As the focus of this research lies on exploring a historical case, the overview on the current Dutch government is limited to exploring its instruments, through which a brief reflection can be provided at the end of this research. Therefore, the overview on the instruments of the current Dutch government does not take into account other sources (such as from the media or parliament).

Reliability and Validity

With the detailed overview here above of primary sources gathered and chosen for this research, the research is repeatable. This increases the **reliability** of this research. However, it is important to underscore that the analysis in this research is based on **interpretation**. Someone else may interpret data and findings differently. In addition, it is important to note that all primary sources are written in old Dutch, and the process of translating to English is also interpretative. Furthermore, the data of the three dimensions is analysed through **discourse analysis**: the pattern of language, which contains a form of power and knowledge.⁶¹ As the analysis in this research concerns the same process as what is looked for in the data – patterns of language that contain a form of power and knowledge – the

⁶¹ Ibidem, 196-197.

interpretative aspect also plays a role there.

This research features the analysis of various archival materials: governmental procedural documents, newspapers, and parliamentary debates. Within these archival materials, multiple sources and inventories are analyzed. This broad scope strengthens the **internal validity** of the outcome, as the research is based on various sources (units of observation).

The analysis conducted in this research is specifically tailored to one historical case, being the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States (1860-1870). With the particularities and timeframe of this case, the research is not generalizable to other cases. To a certain extent, however, the research is generalizable (**external validity**): the procedural dimension will provide insights into government proceedings that may be applicable to other historical cases in which fighters from the Netherlands took part in combat abroad.

2. Case Description




Figure 1: The Pontifical States in 1815 (left) and in 1860 and 1870 (right).⁶²

2.1 The run-up to the defense of the Pontifical States

Much differently from the situation after 1870, the Pope reigned over an extensive territory of Pontifical States at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This territory covered the regions of Romagna, Le Marche, Umbria, Rome and its surroundings on the west coast (see *Figure 1*). The Pontifical States were one amongst many other independent kingdoms and grand duchies in what we now call Italy. The kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia was in the hands of Austria.⁶³

This geographical situation was the consequence of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. The basis for this Congress – rather a range of decisions than one meeting – was the shift of borders on the European map as a result of the French Revolution (1789) under the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), when France had expanded its territory by annexing parts of what we now deem the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland.

With the (approaching) defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815 (by then Emperor Napoleon I of France), the victorious powers Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the United Kingdom wished to reshape Europe's political borders. With this desire, the Congress of

⁶² Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 'Papal States, 1815-70' <https://www.britannica.com/place/Papal-States> (20 March 2018).

⁶³ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 3.

Vienna determined the establishment of a confederation of German states, in the Mediterranean additions of land to the King of Sardinia, and a new kingdom of the Netherlands, which included both Belgium and the Dutch provinces. The sovereign rule of the Pope was acknowledged without much debate, as this had been the situation long prior to the French domination. Ever since King of the Franks Pepin de Short (714-768) donated a number of areas in mid-Italy to the then Pope in 754, the Popes in the following centuries have made efforts to maintain this geographical and worldly power.

The meaning and legacy of the decisions made at the Congress of Vienna are multifaceted. First, the Congress can be seen as the result of the search for effective barriers against a repetition of imperialism – particularly that of France.⁶⁴ Second, the Congress is widely noted as proof that there was a will in Europe to provide security, a balance of power as the alternative to the previous decades of warfare.⁶⁵ Third, the Congress of Vienna can be seen as an example of displaying peace and power to the public, to whom the statesmen of Vienna partially stood in dialogue through the printed, visual, musical, and material culture surrounding the Congress.⁶⁶

Leading up to the 1830s, ideologies started to play more and more a central role in the direction that European countries were heading in. Roughly speaking, a growing divide emerged between constitutional and liberal states on the one hand, and the despotisms of Eastern Europe on the other hand.⁶⁷ Throughout the entire European continent, however, a revolutionary spirit emerged. On the Mediterranean island, (underground) alliances and networks emerged that strived for unification of the separate kingdoms, of which one of the foremen, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) would become the personification of the strive for this unification.⁶⁸

The different sentiments across the continent were followed by a series of revolutions in 1848. In February that year, the monarchy in Paris, established in 1830, was overthrown and a republic was proclaimed. Not only in France, but also throughout Germany, Milan, Venice, Prague, and Budapest revolutions sprung. Even though one revolution followed the

⁶⁴ John Roberts, 'Revolution from Above and Below: European Politics from the French Revolution to the First World War', in T.C.W. Blanning (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern Europe* (New York 2000), 15-45, 24.

⁶⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', *The American Historical Review* 97 (1992) 3, 683.

⁶⁶ Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge 2014) 66.

⁶⁷ Roberts, 'Revolution from Above and Below: European Politics from the French Revolution to the First World War', 28-29.

⁶⁸ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 5.

other, the revolutionaries were divided in what they were after. Sentiments of conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism put the revolutions from the far left to the far right on the political spectrum.⁶⁹ The 1848 revolutions therefore represent a set of inferences based on situational opportunities and probabilities, rather than the result of a rational and calculated plan.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, the 1848 revolutions can be seen as the starting point of a new Europe, in which the landscape of nation-states emerged, marking the end of monarchy, aristocracy, and clericalism across Europe and giving rise to the characteristics of the individual countries.⁷¹ According to Riall (2007), Garibaldi profiled himself as a political hero, embodying a political ideal and national identity in striving for a unitary republic of the kingdoms and duchies on the Mediterranean island.⁷² Subsequently, both the nationalist spirits that were spreading across Europe and the endeavors of Garibaldi would affect the position of the Pope in the 1840s and 1850s at two instances.

The first instance occurred in 1848, two years after the appointment of Pope Pius IX (1792-1878). The Italian kingdoms were confronted with the revolutionary aspirations of Austria, who was in possession of the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. As a result, the King of Sardinia Victor Emanuel II (1820-1878) declared war to Austria. The Pope, however, refused to join this declaration of war. As a result, the liberal, unification striving, segment of Italy but also common Italians lost faith in the Pope.⁷³

The second instance occurred in 1859, when separatist movements in the northern Romagna region reached a height. Officially part of the Pontifical States, the Romagna region experienced increased separatist movements throughout the entire 1850s. When in 1859, Austria and France clashed over the occupation of other northern Italian provinces, King of Sardinia Victor Emanuel II decided to step in. In exchange for getting two western provinces (Savoye and Nice), France supported the King of Sardinia's control over the turbulent Romagna region. In addition, the King of Sardinia gained Lombardy, and left Venetia to Austria. This fundamentally reshaped the map of the Italian island, leaving Naples and the Pontifical States - minus Romagna – as the only two independent Italian kingdoms left.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Roberts, 'Revolution from Above and Below: European Politics from the French Revolution to the First World War', 28-29.

⁷⁰ Kurt Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848* (New York 2014) 103.

⁷¹ Dieter Dowe et al. (eds.), *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform* (New York 2000) 2.

⁷² Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven 2007) 20.

⁷³ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 10.

⁷⁴ Ibidem, 10.

2.2 The establishment of the Pope's army

In the months after, Pope Pius IX would continue to lose territory due to the forces of unification led by Garibaldi on the one hand, and the expansionist route of Victor Emanuel II on the other hand. With Garibaldi seizing control over Naples after its king died, the two men fought out their confrontation over the remaining territory that separated them: the Pontifical States.⁷⁵

As was the case before, the King of Sardinia gained the support of France in the conquest for the Pontifical States based on the condition that the *Patrimonium Petri* – the core surroundings of Rome – would remain territory of the Pope. Supported by French troops, the Sardinians overruled Garibaldi by seizing the Pope's territory in Le Marche and Umbria, up to the Patrimoneum Petri.⁷⁶ In 1861, the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, consisting of the current territory of Italy minus Venetia (of Austria) and the downsized Pontifical States (see *Figure I*).

In two decades, the territory of the Pope had shrunk dramatically. It was the revolutionary spirits of Austria in 1848 that provoked the King of Sardinia and resulted in a loss of faith in the Pope as he did not join the declaration of war, but the politics of France in the 1850s towards the Italian kingdoms were of no help either. On the one hand, and in order to fend off Austria, France provided support to the King of Sardinia. On the other hand, to ensure support of the Catholic French people, France sympathized with the Pope.

In settling its geopolitical interests as well as its domestic affairs, France provided on and off military support to both the King of Sardinia and the Pope throughout the 1840s and 1850s. The Pontifical States were only safe with the support of French troops, because the Pope lacked a sufficient army of his own. When in 1864, France decided to withdraw its troops from the Pontifical States within two years, Pope Pius IX realized that he was left on his own with his own infantry to defend his territory.⁷⁷

Already in 1860, the Vatican appointed a new General and Minister of War to strengthen the state of the army. Furthermore, initiatives from abroad to help the Pope remain his territory emerged. The Papal army was officially established in 1861 when the different

⁷⁵ Koolen, 'God wil het! – de zoeaven', 12.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, 13.

⁷⁷ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 15-17.

volunteering groups uniting in one army, the *Zouavi Pontifici*, and the Pope called on young Catholic men across the globe to join the defense.⁷⁸

The total of 11.000 Papal fighters that contributed to the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860 and 1870 consisted of fighters from over the world. The smaller amounts of fighters came from Ireland, Great Britain, Spain, Switzerland, Poland, Scotland, Russia, and the United States. The larger amounts of fighters came from Germany (250), Canada (500), Italy (750), Belgium (1650), and France (2950). With the official number of 3181 fighters, the Netherlands provided the largest contribution to the Papal army.⁷⁹

2.3 Constitutional and Religious Developments in the Netherlands

To understand the substantial partaking of Dutch Catholic men to the Papal army, it is important to first zoom in on the political and religious developments in the Netherlands in the 1840s and 1850s.

Also in the Netherlands, 1848 marked the year of societal unrest and, moreover, political change. Already a few years before, in 1844, this change was initiated. In December 1844, members of the Dutch House of Representatives submitted an initiative to change the constitution. The most important propositions were direct elections for the House of Representatives, and – as was proposed before – the proposition for the ultimate responsibility of governing to lie with the Ministers, instead of the King of the Netherlands.

Lacking sufficient votes within the House of Representatives, the initiative was not even taken into consideration. According to Van der Meulen (2013), however, the initiative incited change in the social climate of the Netherlands, with both local and national Dutch newspapers expressing desires for change following the failed political initiative.⁸⁰ Food shortages and riots in 1846 and 1847 encouraged reformists to revolt, and it became clear that the conservatives were being pushed to the background – as they were elsewhere in Europe.

Subsequently, references to reforms were made already in the 1847 speech of King William II (1792-1849), and shortly after, the King appointed a commission to look into a ‘royal program of reforms’.⁸¹ As explained by van der Meulen (2013), this proposal clashed with the view of the King’s son, William the Prince of Orange (1817-1890), whose conservatism led him to resolutely decline the idea of constitutional change. Even when in

⁷⁸ Ibidem, 13.

⁷⁹ Ibidem, 21.

⁸⁰ Dik van der Meulen, *Koning Willem III 1817-1890* (Amsterdam 2013) 166-167.

⁸¹ Van der Meulen, *Koning Willem III 1817-1890*, 168.

February 1848, members of cabinet received the news of the unrest in Paris and elsewhere in Europe and realized that change was needed; the Prince of Orange expressed his aversion against political reforms.⁸²

Nevertheless, on 13 March 1848, King William II requested the chairman of the House of Representatives for a revised constitution. With the constitution commission led by the liberal Dr. Mr. Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872), minister of state between 1866-1872, the Dutch constitution was rewritten. According to Van der Meulen (2013), the new constitution of 1848 provided the basis for four profound political changes.

First, a new electoral system established the direct election of members of the House of Representatives by 'adult Dutch men, who fully enjoyed civil rights and paid sufficient taxes'. Second, the new constitution granted the House of Representatives the right to amendment and to take polls. Third, the King was now inviolable; all responsibility for the proceedings of the government would lie with the ministers. Fourth, the new constitution installed the freedom of religion.⁸³ With the death of his father King William II one year later; the Prince of Orange reigned from 1849 until his death in 1890 as King William III.

The freedom of religion established in the amended constitution of 1848 was preceded by developments in the decades before. As a result of 1796, when the Batavian Republic was proclaimed, freedom of religion was announced. Unlike before 1796, Catholics now were deemed part of public life next to Protestants, who dominated the greater part of the Netherlands. The nineteenth century in the Netherlands thus started off with the opportunity for Catholics to be openly religious in Dutch society, following nearly three centuries that Catholicism could not be practiced openly as a result of the Protestant Reformation.⁸⁴

With the freedom of religion officially incorporated in the Dutch constitution of 1848, the Pope wished to officially re-install the hierarchy of the bishops in the Netherlands 'in the same way as it had been in the past decades of the Catholic Church'.⁸⁵ This meant that the Netherlands changed from one of the Pope's mission areas, to officially re-installing the hierarchy of bishops and dioceses, as it had been in the ages before the reformation. In 1853, five dioceses were installed in the Netherlands, with the archbishop being placed in the

⁸² Ibidem, 168-169.

⁸³ Ibidem, 177-178.

⁸⁴ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 59.

⁸⁵ J.A. Bornewasser, 'De 19^e-eeuwse katholiek in de spiegel van protestantse tijdgenoten', *Spiegel Historiael: maandblad voor geschiedenis en archeologie* (December 1978), 750-758, 750.

diocese of Utrecht. According to Bornewasser (1978), the re-installment of the bishop tradition gave the Dutch Catholic minority an injection of revival and self-development, which would mean an important step towards their emancipation in the Netherlands.⁸⁶

Although this empowered the identity of the Dutch Catholics in the Netherlands, there was also a growing resistance to the re-installment of the bishop hierarchy amongst Dutch Protestants. As Bornewasser (1978) describes it, the Protestants felt that the social-cultural status quo was now threatened by a powerful, growing group. Protestants felt that this group, the Catholics, were manifesting themselves on the basis of patriotic freedom and strange biblical notions.⁸⁷ These expressions of fear and conservatism were also found elsewhere in Europe. Notably in the United Kingdom, where the bishops' hierarchy was re-installed in 1850, non-Catholics spoke of the 'Papal aggression'.⁸⁸ In the Netherlands, 1853 marked a culmination in the growing resentment among Protestants. In April 1853, Protestants signed a petition against the new religious reality.

Known as the April movement of 1853, the Protestant petition was brought to King William III with the request to decline the re-installment of the bishop hierarchy.⁸⁹ The liberal Thorbecke-cabinet had advised the King to decline the petition. This advice was grounded in the 1848 constitution that dictated the separation of church and state and thus restrained the government to meddle in religious affairs.⁹⁰

King William III, however, refused to put the petition aside as he sympathized with the movement, which led to a constitutional crisis in the days after. The cabinet debated for days on how to move forward. Convinced of the importance to adhere to what the constitution dictated, and the refusal to accept that the King contradicted government policies, the cabinet requested its resignation. Shortly after, King William III fired four out of seven ministers, amongst whom Thorbecke.

With the constitutional religious developments in the 1840s and 1850s, the Catholic belief in the Netherlands in the second half of the nineteenth century increased in popularity not only among bishops, but also among common men. From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, popularity of the Catholic religion increased with the focus on

⁸⁶ Bornewasser, 'De 19^e-eeuwse katholieke in de spiegel van protestantse tijdgenoten', 751.

⁸⁷ Ibidem, 751.

⁸⁸ Van der Meulen, *Koning Willem III 1817-1890*, 272.

⁸⁹ J.P. de Valk, *Roomser dan de paus? Studies over de betrekkingen tussen de Heilige Stoel en het Nederlands katholicisme, 1815-1940* (Voorburg 1998) 48.

⁹⁰ Van der Meulen, *Koning Willem III 1817-1890*, 274.

Rome as the embodiment of the Catholic faith.⁹¹ The Pope created this embodiment in three ways. First, in general, Pope Pius IX presented his achievements to the outside world through celebrations and festivities; second, the battle of Pope Pius IX against unifying forces in Italy increased sympathy with Catholic communities abroad; and third, Dutch bishops actively brought translated Papal encyclicals to Dutch Catholics.⁹² Through the network of bishops, the Pope's popularity in the Netherlands increased. According to De Valk (1992), this success can be seen as the result of ideological and doctrinal impulses from Rome, but also as an autonomous achievement of the Dutch bishops as they kept ecclesiastical administrative arrangements in their own hands.⁹³ With the internal developments in the Netherlands prior to the call of the Pope, and the territory of the Pontifical States in dire circumstances, Dutch male Catholics were eager to demonstrate their support to the Pope.

2.4 Recruitment, Motivations, and Fighting

In the first half of the 1860s, only a few hundred Dutch men went to Italy on their own account. As the Pope's circumstances changed mid 1860s, he was in dire need of more manpower to build his own army. Hence, from 1865 the recruitment of Dutch fighters intensified. In the recruitment of Dutch fighters, a number of clerical figures from the Netherlands took a leading role. Firstly, Father De Kruijf, based in Amsterdam, steered on active recruitment by writing all priests he knew with the request to call on qualified young men to fulfill their Catholic obligation. More in the south, recruitment intensified with notable efforts of Priest Hellemons, who formed the spill in the network in the province of Noord-Brabant.⁹⁴

The active recruitment was paying off, through which the need for a streamlined travel to Rome emerged. De Kruijf and Hellemons joined efforts, and the town of Oudenbosch became the gathering place from which groups of men departed to Rome. Specifically, the Institute St. Louis was used as a gathering and support place for future fighters.

⁹¹ Hans de Valk, 'From Shepherd to King. Changes in the Image and the Position of the Papacy Among the Dutch Catholics in the Nineteenth Century', in Peter van Kessel (eds.), *The Power of Imagery. Essays on Rome, Italy & Imagination* (Rome 1992), 231-246, 232.

⁹² Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 62.

⁹³ De Valk, 'From Shepherd to King. Changes in the Image and the Position of the Papacy Among the Dutch Catholics in the Nineteenth Century', 239-242.

⁹⁴ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 25.

When in 1866 it became clear that no other foreign armed forces would support the Pope, the recruitment of Papal fighters increased significantly.⁹⁵ Between 1864-1870, large numbers of young men arrived in Oudenbosch, with up to a hundred young men per week during the height in 1867. Their travel to Rome went via Brussels, where another medical check was performed. There were a number of requirements that potential fighters needed to fulfill in Brussels: a testimonial of the priest that one was a good Catholic; a certificate of birth, including the names of the parents; proof that one was exempted from military duty, or dismissed from the armed forces; proof of good health after a medical check; a minimum age of seventeen years old, a maximum age of 35 years old; a minimum height of 1.57 meter; unmarried status or a widow without any children; and minors (below the age of 23) needed permission from their parents.⁹⁶ Their journey continued to Paris, Marseille, Civitavecchia, and lastly to Rome.

Apart from their young age, there were varieties between the Dutch fighters. In his Master Thesis, Rozema (2010) shows that the average age of the Dutch fighters was twenty four years old, that they did not per se originate from dense Catholic areas in the Netherlands, and that they practiced a great variety of professions.⁹⁷ Knowledge on their motivations is largely based on letters they sent to family. Koolen (2015) distinguishes four reasons for the young men to go.

First, a free trip to a place so far away as Rome was appealing. Second, improving their military experience during their time away could turn into new chances in the Dutch military service once they returned home. Third, the 1853 Protestant uprising in the Netherlands formed the motivation for a part of the fighters. Joining the Pope's army would provide the chance to trump the Protestants with pride. Lastly, the Catholic religion provided the main source of inspiration to fight.⁹⁸

By 1867, the Pope would need his growing army much more than the years before. The Pontifical States were threatened from multiple sides: rebellion troops under Garibaldi drew closer; the Kingdom of Italy under Victor Emanuel II was looking for a reason to annex the Pontifical States; and the people of Rome were fed up with the Papal regime. These

⁹⁵ Ibidem, 19-21.

⁹⁶ See: Annex no.1 for an example of an application form of Mr. Bauke Walta.

⁹⁷ Jan Willem Rozema, 'Op, Neerlands jeugd! Naar 't heilig, heilig Rome!' Een studie naar enkele demografische kenmerken van de Nederlandse pauselijke zouaven 1860-1870, 64.

⁹⁸ Koolen, 'God wil het! – de zoeaven', 26-27.

various groups had the same goal: seizing control over Rome.⁹⁹ At this stage, Garibaldi had created one major army of an ample 15.000 men out of the various factions and gangs that fought separately before. In the re-emergence of Garibaldi's forces, Napoleon III had decided to stick by its Italian ally and – despite his earlier wish to withdraw – send French troops to assist the Papal fighters.

On 3 November 1867, Garibaldi's army and the Papal army together with French troops would fight over the area of Mentana, just outside of Rome. The combined forces of the Papal and French army would eventually lead to the success of conquering Mentana, and the defeat of Garibaldi and his army. Pope Pius IX expressed his gratitude to his fighters by giving them a silver cross, engraved with the words 'loyalty and bravery' (*Fidei et Virtuti*).¹⁰⁰

The battle of Mentana led to another increase in volunteers that joined the Pope's army. The last reason can be seen as part of the policy of ultramontanism and the Pope's infallible status gained in 1869-1870. Firstly, as from 1852 onwards, Pius IX appointed cardinal Antonelli (1806-1878) as his right hand. This cardinal created pontifical policies that would increase the power of the Pope, notably by improving ultramontanism, which translates to consolidating power and rule in Rome over those Catholic areas that did not have a strong bishop tradition. The Pontifical authorities had established a strong form of ultramontanism after the so-called victory of the religion. With this, the infallibility of Pope Pius IX was proposed in December 1869. No longer only the church as institute was deemed infallible, but also the personification of the church – the Pope himself. On 18 July 1870, the proposition was made official.¹⁰¹

The increased focus on the devotion of the Pope itself, instead of merely the Church, changed the image of the Pope at the end of the nineteenth century. According to De Valk (1992), the Pope changed from shepherd to king; from guiding a flock to engaging directly in a cosmological design and representing the earthly mystical body.¹⁰²

According to Koolen (2015), letters from the fighters to the home front reflected a view in which the cause for the Pope was seen as a cause for God against the arch villain, the antichrist Garibaldi. In fact, the nationalist movement under Garibaldi and the Papal defense were much the same a cult of the martyr. Riall (2010) states that both movements glorified a

⁹⁹ Ibidem, 17-18.

¹⁰⁰ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 43.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, 45.

¹⁰² De Valk, 'From Shepherd to King. Changes in the Image and the Position of the Papacy Among the Dutch Catholics in the Nineteenth Century', 231.

form of martyrdom, as they both represented a symbol of collective identity, either through protecting the pope or striving towards Italian unification: “the cult of the martyr could either be a call to arms to fight the pope or express undying devotion to his defense”.¹⁰³

Letters and songs of the fighters expressed this glorification of martyrdom. “We are all willing to appear before God, and I am burning with desire to shed my blood for the cause of Jesus Christ, for Pius IX, his Deputy; never in my life will I find such a wonderful opportunity to earn the eternal paradise”, said the letter of Dutch fighter Frans Vandonck to his mother.¹⁰⁴ Another letter said: “He died like a Christian hero, happy to see his blood flow from his fifteen wounds for the glory of the Church. We are living in an atmosphere all redolent of Christian glory and martyrdom”.¹⁰⁵ English fighters would sing: “Dishonor our swords shall not tarnish, we draw them for Rome and for the Pope; Victor still, whether living or dying, for the Martyr’s bright crown is our hope”.¹⁰⁶

As De Valk (1992) states, the challenges that the pontificate of Pope Pius IX faced in the 1850s and 1860s together with the selling of the infallible status of Pius IX (the “pope-martyr”) offered Dutch Catholics a focal point for group consciousness and solidarity.¹⁰⁷ According to De Valk (1992), the pope-martyr was not only an attractive outlook for young Dutch men. Mothers, too, celebrated ‘the good fortune that her son had been allowed to die for the pope’, and families of those killed were congratulated from all sides and that the ‘faithful nation looked upon the dead as martyrs for a holy cause’.¹⁰⁸

2.5 Aftermath: The Fall of Rome

With the defeat of Garibaldi, the threat from rebellion groups significantly diminished, which created a period of relative calmness. The Pope’s successes in Mentana also ensured that no threats came from King Victor Emanuel II, and the domestic support of Catholics led France to maintaining its troops in the surroundings of Rome. As a result, the battle of Mentana would grant the Pope another three years before the Pontifical States would

¹⁰³ Lucy Riall, ‘Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy’, *The Journal of Modern History* 82 (2010) 2, 255-287, 285.

¹⁰⁴ Alfons Dekkers, *De Pauselijke Zouaven te Castelfidardo* (Antwerpen s.d.) 206.

¹⁰⁵ Powell, *Two years in the Pontifical Zouaves: a narrative of travel, residence, and experience in the Roman States*, 38.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, flyleaf.

¹⁰⁷ De Valk, ‘From Shepherd to King. Changes in the Image and the Position of the Papacy Among the Dutch Catholics in the Nineteenth Century’, 246.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem, 241.

eventually fall.¹⁰⁹ In July 1870, war broke out between France and Prussia. For Napoleon III, this meant that he needed to withdraw his troops from Rome. With this, the Pope no longer enjoyed the protection of the great number of French troops. For King Victor Emanuel II, this posed the chance to go after Rome after all.

Between 18 and 20 September 1870, Victor Emanuel's army of 50.000 men surrounded the city of Rome.¹¹⁰ When the Italians seized *Porta Pia*, one of the gates to the city, Pope Pius IX wished no more bloodshed and losses among his fighters and raised a white flag. On 20 September 1870, Rome officially fell, and was seized by Victor Emanuel II.¹¹¹ In January 1871, Rome was officially proclaimed as capital of the united Italy. From that moment on, the Pope's Pontifical States consisted of the territory of the Vatican.

After the siege of Rome, the remaining Dutch fighters returned home or continued to fight in other battles. They took part of foreign armed forces and the army of the Dutch Indies. Some men joined former French fighters in the Franco-Prussian war. Some men joined the armed forces of Catholic pretender to the throne Don Carlos of Spain. Furthermore, some former Dutch fighters joined Belgian former fighters in their defense of the missionaries in Africa.¹¹²

In 1870, when the attention of the Dutch government and press turned to the Franco-Prussia war, Dutch Catholics expressed a final effort in the aftermath of the defeat of the Pontifical States. They – unsuccessfully – demanded the Dutch government to advocate for the re-installment of the sovereignty of the Pope over the former the Pontifical States.¹¹³

The Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States that returned home felt connected through their unique past. Many brotherhoods and associations emerged, such as *Fidei et Virtuti* in Amsterdam, named after the silver cross gifted by the Pope after the battle of Mentana in 1867. Despite their internal companionship, after return to the Netherlands, many ex-fighters found it difficult to pick up their old lives. They were not warmly welcomed everywhere; some former employers refused to take them back. The spirit of heroism thus

¹⁰⁹ Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 45.

¹¹⁰ See: Annex no. 02 for correspondence of Dutch government on this. NA, The Hague (hereafter: NATH), 2.05.01, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1813-1870, inventory number 3581, telegram 20 September 1870, Dutch consulate-general, Florence (Italy), to Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.

¹¹¹ See: Annex no. 03 for correspondence of the Dutch government on this. NATH, 2.05.01, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1813-1870, inventory number 3581, telegram 22 September 1870, Dutch embassy, Rome, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.

¹¹² Van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven, 1860-1870*, 51.

¹¹³ Ibidem, 63.

quickly vanished.¹¹⁴ This was particularly apparent when it seemed that most of them had lost their Dutch citizenship. The next section will elaborate further on this judicial aspect, and more generally the procedures of the Dutch government on the (returned) Dutch fighters.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, 51.

3. Perceptions of the Then Dutch Government: Three Dimensions

3.1 The Procedural Dimension

As noted above, Christoffor's work *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven* (1947) touches upon the procedures of the Dutch government in relation to the (returning) Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States. Christoffor gained most information on the government's procedures through his contact with Mr. J.M.I.A. Simons, who worked for the Department of Justice and was specialized in Dutch citizenship and the loss of nationality. In addition, Christoffor conducted archival research himself in the 1940s.

This research formed the basis of what we thus far know about the role of the government in regard to (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. His findings present ministerial documents, documents of the Public Prosecutors' offices, and local municipal records. The following section will elaborate on his findings, which can be divided in three themes: the loss of Dutch citizenship and the role of the mayor, the role of King William III, and the return of the Dutch fighters.

The loss of Dutch citizenship and the role of the mayor

The first and foremost governmental procedure Christoffor outlines relates to the consequences of fighting within the Papal army. Without the official permission of the King of the Netherlands, partaking in foreign armed forces was met with the loss of Dutch citizenship. As explained by Christoffor, this judicial procedure was established in the Civil Code of 1837 as well as the Act on Dutch Citizenship of 1850.

Article 9.2 of the Civil Code of 1837 dictated that: "the capacity of Dutchman is lost through, without permission of the King, partaking in foreign armed forces".¹¹⁵ This article of the Civil Code was complemented by the Act on Dutch Citizenship in 1850. As Leenders (2007) explains, the creation of a specific Act on Dutch Citizenship finds its roots in the decade preceding it. As part of the 1848 constitutional amendments, the development of an Act on Dutchmen was proposed. Based on the 1838 Civil Code, the Act on Dutch Citizenship was created in 1850 on the basis of the civil rights such as the right to vote and the right to be

¹¹⁵ See: Art. 9 par. 2 BW (1837).

appointed to public offices.¹¹⁶ Losing the Dutch citizenship, by partaking in foreign armed forces, would from 1850 onwards thus mean losing the right to vote and the right to be appointed to public functions. As shown by Christofoor, fighting in the Papal army was seen as partaking in foreign armed forces, as underscored by the Minister for Interior Affairs in 1868.¹¹⁷

The loss of Dutch citizenship was also a topic on the local, municipal, level. As Christofoor shows, some Dutch mayors inquired with their inhabitants if they were aware of the consequences of taking part in foreign armed forces, such as a mayor in Friesland. In 1868, the mayor of Haarlemmermeer gave the candidate fighters the advice to ask for permission of the King, as he deemed it important for the government to decide “if they would let numerous young men fight in foreign armed forces, whilst the homeland might need these men for their own armed forces at a certain stage. The recent report of the Minister of the Marine stated that even with the gift of 100 guilders, the Marine Corps could not acquire personnel. Thus, it is necessary to firstly fill these and other Corps ranks, before young men take part in foreign armed forces. Also outside of the Military ranks, there is a lack of young men in the agricultural sector, and it would be a shame that young men would be abroad risking death, while the homeland needs their help”.¹¹⁸

To exercise some form of control on the state of the Dutch armed forces, the Minister of the Interior made an inquiry with Commissioners of the King (provincial level). One example of this is the Minister’s request in January 1868 with the Commissioner of the King of the province of Overijssel to provide a report on the youngsters that did not show up for the yearly military draw and “who are deemed to have joined the foreign [Papal] armed forces without the granted permission of the King”.¹¹⁹ Subsequently, the respective Commissioner forwarded this request to the mayors of the municipalities in Overijssel¹²⁰, after which the mayor provided the Minister of the Interior with answers – like the mayor of Kampen did.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Marij Leenders, ‘Loyaliteit en Nederlanderschap. Staatsburgerschapswetgeving tussen 1850 en 1985’, in: Carla van Baalen et al. (eds), *Jaarboek Parlementaire Geschiedenis* (Nijmegen 2007) 57-68, 59.

¹¹⁷ Christofoor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 220-221.

¹¹⁸ Ibidem, 223.

¹¹⁹ Zouavenmuseum, 5758, letter 19 January 1868, Minister of the Interior, The Hague, to Commissioner of the King, Overijssel. See: Annex no. 04.

¹²⁰ Zouavenmuseum, 5759, letter 23 January 1868, Commissioner of the King, Overijssel, to mayors of Overijssel municipalities. See: Annex no. 05.

¹²¹ Zouavenmuseum, 5760, letter 3 March 1868 of mayor of Kampen, Overijssel, to Minister of the Interior, The Hague. See: Annex no. 06.

The same year, a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the Interior stated that the Dutch representative in Rome had relayed “that the resignation was given to Petrus de Bruyn, in order for him to be able to carry out his military obligations here in the Netherlands as soon as possible”.¹²²

Approval of the King

Christofoor’s research shows that from the 3181 Dutch fighters, there were 118 petitions of candidate fighters to request the King’s permission. Two out of the 118 requests were denied, based on the obligatory military service that was not yet fulfilled. In that case, the applicant received a letter on behalf of the King, from the Minister of the Interior, Minister of War, Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the request was denied.¹²³ 116 of these 118 candidate fighters received permission by King William III through a Royal Decree¹²⁴, in order for the candidate fighters to retain Dutch citizenship. One of these 118 candidate fighters was Adolf Antonius Engelbertus Otto Baron van Lamsweerde from Arnhem. With this example, Christofoor illustrates the procedures that were put in place to deal with such a request to the King.

Van Lamsweerde’s father had sent the King a petition on 12 January 1864 to ask permission for his son to join the foreign armed forces of the Pope. The Director of the King’s Cabinet asked for advice on this from the Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Justice subsequently asked the Attorney General (AG) of Gelderland for further information. The AG asked for the advice of the public prosecutor of Arnhem, who answered in a letter to the AG that the young man was unmarried, had fulfilled obligatory military service in the Netherlands, and had the permission of his parents to join the service of the Pope.¹²⁵ The AG provided all information to the Minister of Justice. Together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice wrote a positive advice

¹²² NATH, 2.05.01, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1813-1870, inventory number 3406, letter 9 September 1868, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, to Minister of the Interior, The Hague. See: Annex no. 07.

¹²³ NATH, 2.04.44, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Nationale Militia, 1865-1911, inventory number 128, letter 15 June 1870, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War, Minister of the Interior, The Hague, to Mr. Martinus Hoonen. See: Annex no. 08.

¹²⁴ See: Annex no. 09 for an example of a Royal Decree. KDC, 910, BEEJ, Kerkelijk en godsdienstig leven, inventory number 329, 20 October 1867, Royal Decree King William III.

¹²⁵ KDC, 910, BEEJ, Kerkelijk en godsdienstig leven, inventory number 329, letter 29 February 1864, Public Prosecutor, Arnhem, to Attorney General, Gelderland. See: Annex no. 10.

to the Cabinet of the King. This led to the King granting permission to Van Lamsweerde on 12 March 1864 to join the Pope's armed forces.¹²⁶

Even though King William III signed off on nearly all of the petitions, a change in the approvals of the King emerged in 1866, when on 22 June the Minister of Foreign Affairs speaks to his colleagues in the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "seen the current circumstances, it is desired to advice His Royal Highness to not grant any permission to Dutch men who wish to join foreign armed forces".¹²⁷ On 13 July 1866, the Council of Ministers discussed the outbreak of the war between Prussia and Austria, and their doubt whether Bismarck's strive for unity would stop at the Dutch border, after which the Minister of War proposed measures to strengthen the fortresses on the Dutch southeast border. With this, the candidate fighters risked a decreased chance on approval from the King – at least as long as Austria and Prussia were at war.¹²⁸

Furthermore, Christoffor notes that King William III expressed his appreciation and proudness on the Dutch fighters, with or without his approval. The King stated that the fighters were defending the cause of the rightful and suppressed, and that it was an honor to be their sovereign: "Let the boys go to Rome, if they fight for the Pope, they will fight for me whenever it should be needed."¹²⁹

The question arises: why did not *all* fighters ask the King for permission? Christoffor states that this question cannot be easily answered, noting, however, that the Dutch fighters were mostly average young men who were uninformed and unaware on the details of Dutch laws. Moreover, as Christoffor explains, voting was privileged to those men who paid a fair amount of taxes. Most families of Dutch fighters did not belong to these privileged circles. In addition, the young men left to fight and die for the Pope; hence, the loss of civil rights was of no concern to them.¹³⁰

Return and the process of naturalization

On 20 September 1870, Earl Du Chastel, the then Dutch representative to the Holy See, wrote a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in The Hague concerning the fall of Rome. In

¹²⁶ Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 225-226.

¹²⁷ NATH, 2.05.01, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1813-1870, inventory number 3406, notes 22 June 1866, Council of Ministers. See: Annex no. 11.

¹²⁸ Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 229-230.

¹²⁹ Ibidem, 139, 240-241.

¹³⁰ Ibidem, 235-237.

his correspondence, Du Chastel expressed pride of the Dutch fighters' defense in Rome: "I do not yet have the details of the Papal defense, but it must have been brilliant, because the general in chief has told us that he granted all the honors of the war to the strong garrison existing of only 6.000 men against 60.000. The Papal fighters defended the breach. Given the fact that a great number of Hollanders were amongst the defenders, they have shown themselves to be worthy children of the Netherlands".¹³¹

The government in The Hague, however, was mostly preoccupied with dealing with those Dutch fighters that returned to the Netherlands. Christoffoor's research shows that already in 1868, the Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs debated over whether to allow the ex-fighters back into the Netherlands after the fall of Rome. With the majority (3063 out of 3181) of the Dutch fighters not having asked for the King's permission, the fighters would strictly be deemed as aliens upon their return. In addition, the Papal government had communicated that the remaining Dutch fighters would not be allowed the nationality of the Pontifical States if the foreigner did not intend to settle there.¹³²

The government in The Hague decided to adhere to the Dutch Civil Code of 1838 and the Act on Dutch Citizenship of 1850. With this, the Dutch fighters who had not asked the King's permission in advance – the vast majority – were deemed stateless upon their return. The Dutch government, however, decided on a 'human' approach to this issue, by at least allowing the returning fighters back into the country.¹³³ Already in 1866, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a letter to the Minister of Justice, expressed this 'human' take on permitting a returning Dutch fighter, Mr. Pauwels, back into the country: "It appears to me that reasons of humanity advocate to consent in this [permitting Mr. Pauwels back into the Netherlands]".¹³⁴

After the fall of Rome in 1870, the government continued this human approach to returning fighters by taking three measures. Firstly, all returned fighters were granted a travel and accommodation pass, through which they were allowed into the country as an alien. Secondly, the returned fighters were allowed to move freely in the Netherlands.¹³⁵

¹³¹ NATH, 2.05.01, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1813-1870, inventory number 3581, letter 20 September 1870, Ambassador Dutch embassy, Rome, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. See: Annex no. 12.

¹³² Christoffoor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 241.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, 242.

¹³⁴ KDC, 910, BEEJ, Kerkelijk en godsdienstig leven, inventory number 329, letter 24 December 1866, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, to Minister of Justice, The Hague. See: Annex no. 13.

¹³⁵ Christoffoor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 242-243.

Lastly, the returned fighters could gain official permission to settle in the Netherlands, by formally asking for naturalization.¹³⁶ Upon having lived in the Netherlands for five consecutive years, and fulfilling a payment of 100 guilders, naturalization was granted. Those who gained permission became a Dutch citizen again, but they were still denied of their civil rights. Only a handful of returned fighters made use of the offer of the government: in 1875 only twelve persons. Those twelve regained their civil rights in 1892, when a new Act on Dutch Citizenship provided a transition measure to provide the requested persons with their full rights.¹³⁷

A well-known example of one of the twelve naturalized former fighters is that of Mr. Antoine Arts. Mr. Arts, a returned fighter who departed in 1866 without Royal Permission, wished to run in the municipal election of Tilburg, but was removed from the electoral list as he lacked the Dutch citizenship. He asked for naturalization in 1896, which he received in 1897 from the Minister of Justice on behalf of Queen Emma.¹³⁸ From 1901-1922, Mr. Arts fulfilled a seat in the House of Representatives.¹³⁹ In 1891, the Vatican announced to hand out the Papal distinction the *Bene Merenti* (Latin for ‘a deserving person’) medal, a Papal distinction granted to those who served the Church and society in a meritorious way.¹⁴⁰

3.2 Analysis

The findings of Christoffor provide insights into the procedures of the government regarding the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. More specifically, with these findings, it is possible to detect the perceptions of the Dutch government along the lines of the elements in the analytical framework, as set out in §1.2.

The **securitizing actors** that appear from the findings of Christoffor are ministers, and provincial and municipal officials who mainly expressed that the Dutch fighters who joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without permission of King William III (**referent subject**) threatened the power of the Dutch armed forces (**referent object**). Ministers, and provincial and municipal officials thus deemed the joining of foreign armed forces without the King’s approval a problem because of the obligatory national military service. A mayor

¹³⁶ See: Annex no. 14 for an example of a naturalization request. Zouavenmuseum, 03311, draft letter 21 January 1895, Mr. L. van der Maat, Mijdrecht, to Minister of the Interior, The Hague.

¹³⁷ Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 243-248.

¹³⁸ Zouavenmuseum, 00838, official statute 20 January 1897, Minister of Justice, The Hague, to Mr. Antoine Arts. See: Annex no.15.

¹³⁹ Christoffor, *Uit het epos der 3000 Nederlandse Zouaven*, 245-247.

¹⁴⁰ See: Annex no.16 for an example of such an announcement to Mr. Matthijs Walta.

mentioned shortages in the Royal Netherlands Navy, and those men who had not yet fulfilled the obligatory national military service in the Netherlands were called back.

If the obligatory national military service was fulfilled, the King granted permission. The King approved nearly all applicants. However, as noted by Christoffor, most Dutch fighters (3063 out of 3181) did not ask for the King's approval, with which it remained unclear if these men had already fulfilled the obligatory national military service, or if they were supposed to be serving in the national army instead of joining foreign armed forces. Inquiries on this were made on this with the help of provincial and municipal records.

Furthermore, Christoffor's findings show that this unclear situation was deemed a problem because there was a need to mobilize the Dutch Army in the 1860s to protect the country against potential external threats, such as the rising tensions between Prussia and Austria, and later on the Franco-Prussian war. With this, ministers advised the King to put a halt to approving applications.

Interesting to note, though not a central focus in this analysis, is the position of King William III. Appearing from Christoffor's findings, two notable aspects of the King can be briefly mentioned. First, the fact that the King could approve men to leave the Netherlands to fight abroad (in case these men had fulfilled the obligatory national military service), without any consequences, shows the mere existence of the option to fight abroad for a different cause than that of the Kingdom of the Netherlands – this option was not condemned by the government or the King to begin with.

Second, next to the formal power to approve applications to join the Pope's army, the King expressed enthusiasm for the Dutch fighters who chose to fight for the Pope, as he expected the young men to also fight for him in case it was needed. Without going into more detail on the role of the King, these two aspects show that the King should be placed outside of the ministers, and provincial and municipal officials who shared concerns over the national armed forces that the King did not have.

Looking at the first element of solution perception, the Dutch government imposed measures that directly targeted the returning Dutch fighters (**hard instruments**) in legal terms: in case of having joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without the King's approval, the loss of Dutch citizenship, the loss of the right to vote, and the loss of the right to fulfil a public function were the consequences. In addition, the municipal officials imposed measures that indirectly targeted the Dutch fighters (**soft instruments**) with some mayors inquiring with their inhabitants on their knowledge on the consequences of joining the Pope's

army without the King's approval, and advising them to ask the King's permission in advance.

Lastly, the findings of Christoffor show that the Dutch government expressed **reintegration and rehabilitation efforts** in two ways. First, with the granting of accommodation and travel passes, the government applied special procedures and a 'human' view on the concept 'aliens' to the approximately 3000 returned fighters that had lost the Dutch citizenship, and were deemed stateless. Second, the government demonstrated reintegration and rehabilitation offers by having an administrative and legal framework in place for naturalization of fighters who wished to regain their Dutch citizenship.

With this, the analytical framework, complemented with the procedural dimension, looks as follows:

Type	Concept	Description	<i>Procedural dimension</i>
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>Ministers, and provincial and municipal officials.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>The state of the Dutch armed forces, and its mobilization capacity.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>The Dutch fighters that had left the Netherlands and joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without permission of King William III.</i>
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>The loss of Dutch citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to fulfil a public function upon return to the Netherlands in case of having joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without the King's approval.</i>
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Some mayors inquired in advance whether men understood the consequences of partaking in foreign armed forces without the King's approval; some mayors advised men to ask for the King's approval in advance.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>Special procedures and a human approach to the concept of 'aliens'; A legal and administrative framework for naturalization.</i>

As a result, the first – procedural – dimension thus shows that the then Dutch government perceived the (returning) Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States as a problem in military terms. The then government found solutions to deal with the (returning) Dutch fighters in the legal sphere.

3.3 The Press Dimension

Between 1860 and 1870, press sources described a variety of aspects concerning the Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States. As explained by Koolen (2015), until the Papal army increased in size from the mid 1860s on, the Dutch press – also Catholic journals – barely paid attention to the affairs in the Pontifical States.¹⁴¹ From 1866 onwards, the Dutch press started to write about the Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States, for example with brief reports on the developments and encounters of the Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States.

A few examples are newspaper articles based on telegrams received from Rome, that feature information on the arrival of the Dutch fighters there. On 30 July 1869, *De Noord-Brabander* reported a telegram from abroad: “Rome, 24 July. According to messages from Mazano and Campagnario, troops from Garibaldi were seen in the surroundings. A division of the Zouaves has been ordered to eliminate this gang. Last week, again young men arrived from the Netherlands and Belgium, to partake in the Papal Zouaves service”.¹⁴²

Similarly, the *Rotterdamsche Courant* wrote on 12 December 1866: “Rome, 11 December. A regiment of Papal Zouaves has arrived here yesterday”.¹⁴³ Updates on the military composition of the Papal fighters were also provided, for example in the *Rotterdamsche Courant* of 14 March 1861: “Marseille, 12 March. The colonel of the Papal Zouaves Becdelièvre has been replaced by the Swiss Alletz”.¹⁴⁴

Other newspaper articles featured the outcomes of clerical fund raising that were intended to support the Dutch future and returned fighters in their travel to the Pontifical

¹⁴¹ Koolen, ‘God wil het! – de zoeaven’, 14.

¹⁴² ‘Pauselijke Staten’, *De Noord-Brabander*, 30 July 1869, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010080768:mpeg21:pdf> (2 May 2018). See: Annex no. 17.

¹⁴³ ‘Telegrammen’, *Rotterdamsche Courant*, 12 December 1866, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010390037:mpeg21:pdf> (2 May 2018). See: Annex no. 18.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Per Telegraaf’, *Rotterdamsche Courant*, 14 March 1861, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010980981:mpeg21:pdf> (2 May 2018). See: Annex no. 19.

States. Notably *De Tijd*, a prominent Catholic magazine, frequently published such messages. On 29 March 1866, *De Tijd* announced that five guilders were donated: “For the Zouaves. (...) In the hopes of continuation f 5.-.”¹⁴⁵ In addition, newspapers posted advertisements on the Papal fighters, notably when there was new material available, such as photographs. *De Tijd* posted on 17 February 1866: “PAPAL ZOUAVES. NEW PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES OF TWO ZOUAVES FROM THE NETHERLANDS. Price of this group: f 75,-.”¹⁴⁶

Furthermore, *De Tijd* published articles in which it supported or countered the views of other newspapers. In 1867, *De Tijd* proudly published an excerpt from a French newspaper in which the Dutch fighters were admired and supported by the Catholics from France¹⁴⁷, whilst in an article from 1866, *De Tijd* criticized another newspaper that published about the supposed unwillingness of the Dutch fighters to be fighting in the Pontifical States.¹⁴⁸

After the fall of Rome in 1870, newspapers continued to write about the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. One notable aspect that is described in newspaper articles after 1870 are the associations established by the returned Dutch fighters. The *Tilburgsche Courant* wrote on 24 May 1877 that the association of the returned fighters had sent a telegram to the Pope as part of his golden anniversary: “The Zouaves Brotherhood ‘Fidei et Virtuti’ from Rotterdam, eager to take each opportunity to provide a sign of her heartfelt devotion, offers under gratefulness and praying look up to God all the ever expressed wishes multiplied a thousand times as a bouquet for the occasion of Your Holiness’ Golden Anniversary”.¹⁴⁹

Also later on, in 1896, newspapers reported on the associations of the returned Dutch fighters. *De Maasbode* wrote on 26 January 1896 about the fund that is set up “for the former fighters of the Papal army, who excel in good conduct, but who are now in dire circumstances due to illness and elderly and are not capable of earning their own bread”.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ ‘Nagekomen giften voor Z.H. Pius IX’, *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 29 March 1866, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254300:mpeg21:pdf> (22 March 2018). See: Annex no. 20.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Advertentiën’, *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 17 February 1866, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254266:mpeg21:pdf> (22 March 2018). See: Annex no. 21.

¹⁴⁷ ‘Korte aanhalingen van het artikel “Les zouaves Hollandais de l’armée du Pape”’, *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 23 December 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254823:mpeg21:pdf> (10 March 2018). See: Annex no. 22.

¹⁴⁸ ‘Amsterdam, 8 Maart’, *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 9 March 1866, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254283:mpeg21:pdf> (3 March 2018). See: Annex no. 23.

¹⁴⁹ ‘Het jubilé van den Paus. Vervolg’, *Tilburgsche Courant. Algemeen Nieuws- en Advertentieblad*, 24 May 1877, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010186988:mpeg21:pdf> (3 March 2018). See: Annex no. 24.

¹⁵⁰ ‘Zouaven’, *De Maasbode*, 26 January 1896, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB04:000182881:mpeg21:pdf> (3 March 2018). See: Annex no. 25.

The newspaper articles on the Dutch returned fighters from the Pontifical States written in the first decades of the twentieth century, generally featured updates on the fighters who were still alive. The *Tilburgsche Courant* of 30 November 1927 provided information on a veteran list of approximately 200 still living Dutch former fighters of the Pontifical States.¹⁵¹ A little over ten years later, on 27 March 1940, the *Nieuwe Tilburgsche Courant* published an obituary of the 95-year old Mr. Th. Mooiekind, “one of the very last Zouaves”.¹⁵²

The 1950s and 1960s include a small number of articles in newspaper that feature the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. In 1955, *De Tijd* published an announcement regarding the basilica in Oudenbosch, which was consecrated 75 years ago in 1955 and became a basilica in 1912, when the monument for the Zouaves was revealed.¹⁵³ In 1966, on 8 October, the *Algemeen Handelsblad* published an article about Dutch fighter Pieter Janszoon Jong, who died after he by himself had killed fourteen enemies, and who had become a true hero amongst Catholics due to the wide distribution of an illustration of Mr. Janszoon Jong.¹⁵⁴

Whilst this reporting is useful to gain detailed knowledge on the press perspective on the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States, these sources do not provide a sense of how the press viewed the (returning) Dutch fighters in relation to Dutch governmental matters. There are, however, a handful of newspaper articles that report on governmental matters related to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. These articles were written mainly between 1866 and 1872 – with a few exceptions of articles from 1899, 1906, and 1952.

From these articles, we can distinguish four categories of subtopics in the press regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in relation to Dutch governmental matters: praise and criticism, debate over the main purpose of the fighters’

¹⁵¹ ‘De nog levende Nederlandsche oud-Zouaven’, *Tilburgsche Courant. Dagblad van het zuiden*, 30 November 1927, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010193135:mpeg21:pdf> (4 March 2018). See: Annex no. 26.

¹⁵² ‘Oud-Zouaaf overleden’, *Nieuwe Tilburgsche Courant. Tilburgsch Dagblad*, 27 March 1940, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010250159:mpeg21:pdf> (4 March 2018). See: Annex no. 27.

¹⁵³ ‘Basiliek van Oudenbosch binnenkort 75 jaar’, *De Tijd. Dagblad voor Nederland*, 14 July 1955, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011203448:mpeg21:pdf> (4 March 2018). See: Annex no. 28.

¹⁵⁴ ‘De held van Lutjebroek als actualiteit’, *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 8 October 1966, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000034401:mpeg21:pdf> (4 March 2018). See Annex: source 29.

defense, debate over the implementation of the loss on Dutch citizenship, and debate over the interpretation of the King's permission to the Dutch fighters.

Praise for - and criticism on - the Dutch government

On 9 November 1867, the *Java-bode* – newspaper for the Dutch Indies – featured an article of the special correspondent from the residence regarding meetings on the exercise of military science that had begun to take place there. The article states that in one of these meetings, the circumstances of the wounded and the arrangements of the medical service was discussed, “the least pleasant aspect of the war”.¹⁵⁵ The correspondent continued this topic by referring to the Papal fighters and their return to the Netherlands: “and the worst is, that when these misled youngsters return home, they will realize that they have lost their Dutch citizenship. When Mr. Borret¹⁵⁶ would not have been such an enlightened Catholic (...), he would have already warned them long before; but now he denies his duty as Minister of Justice because of his interests as a Catholic”.¹⁵⁷

Newspapers also featured articles in which they praised the Dutch government, and in which this praise was debated. In an article from 19 February 1872, the *Arnhemsche Courant* debates the praise that *De Tijd* gave to Earl du Chastel, then Dutch representative to the Holy See. The *Arnhemsche Courant* includes a piece of the praise of *De Tijd*, which states that with the approaching fall of Rome in September 1870, “Rome was being protected by our zouaves and by Earl du Chastel. While our zouaves were fighting like lions, Earl du Chastel succeeded, as a non-suspicious minister of a Protestant country, to post a telegram in Naples, that was soon in the hands of the Papal nuncio in Paris. Shortly after, the condition [of Rome] was known in entire France, through which the French Emperor was constrained to pronounce his then still legitimate veto”.¹⁵⁸ The *Arnhemsche Courant*, states, however, that Du Chastel, as a Dutch government official, did not strictly adhere to the neutral foreign policy of the Netherlands: “As a private person, (...) it was permitted to Du Chastel to give all

¹⁵⁵ ‘Nederland’, *Java-bode*, 21 December 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010484272:mpeg21:pdf> (20 April 2018). See: Annex no. 30.

¹⁵⁶ Mr. Borret was a conservative Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1849-1867, and Minister of Justice in 1866-1867. ‘Mr. E.J.H. Borret’, Parlement & Politiek, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lkyhygzs/e_j_h_borret (30 May 2018).

¹⁵⁷ *Java-bode*, ‘Nederland’.

¹⁵⁸ ‘Arnhem, 17 Februarij’, *Arnhemsche Courant*, 19 February 1872, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB08:000090412:mpeg21:pdf> (20 April 2018). See: Annex no. 31.

his sympathy to the Pope and his cause, but as official of the Netherlands, the strictest neutrality was his plight”.¹⁵⁹

Thus, press articles wrote about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in general terms, and in terms of criticism and praise. Taking into account editorial bias (*De Tijd* being a Catholic magazine for example) these two pieces of criticism and praise nevertheless demonstrate that the press featured newspaper articles that included enquiries beyond the scope of routine news reporting. In addition, these two examples demonstrate that newspaper articles on the Dutch (former) fighters from the Pontifical States featured Dutch governmental matters.

The fighters’ defense: for the Pope or for the Netherlands?

For the returned fighters themselves, it was clear that they defended the Pope and the Pontifical States, but that there was gratitude towards the Netherlands, too. On 28 September 1899, a meeting of one of the associations of the returned Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States is described in an article of the *Tilburgsche Courant*. This article reports that, this meeting was a protest gathering of the General Dutch Zouaves association. At this meeting, the returned fighters shared speeches and memories in a protest meeting against “the robbery of 20 September” and against “them, who have deprived the Pope of his State”.¹⁶⁰ In the memories shared, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government are briefly mentioned as well, on which warm feelings were expressed: “When the Zouave is given the right to defend, we owe this to the law. For that, my sincerest gratitude to our Queen Wilhelmina, and our gratitude to our government (applause)”.¹⁶¹ This indicates that the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States themselves took a positive stance towards the Dutch royalty and the Dutch government.

Nonetheless, newspapers debated over whether the fighters’ defense in Rome could be related to a defense of the Netherlands, too. On 21 November 1867, the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* (NRC) stated that the law of 1850 was unambiguous regarding what foreign or non-foreign armed service means, “the argument that the Catholic defends his church could be a basis for the King to grant him permission or not, but it has nothing to do with the fact that the Pontifical armed forces are, for the Netherlands, foreign. The

¹⁵⁹ Arnhemsche Courant, ‘Arnhem, 17 Februarij’.

¹⁶⁰ ‘Protestmeeting der Alg. Nederlandsche Zouavenbond te Helmond’, *Tilburgsche Courant*, 28 September 1899, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010186307:mpeg21:pdf> (21 April 2018). See: Annex no. 32.

¹⁶¹ *Tilburgsche Courant*, ‘Protestmeeting der Alg. Nederlandsche Zouavenbond te Helmond’.

Netherlands does not have one ruling belief; the Netherlands is neither a Catholic, nor a Protestant country – it is neutral towards all churches. That the Netherlands would be defended in Rome by Dutch armed forces thus does not apply. In addition, one must acknowledge that with the Pontifical armed forces being foreign to the Netherlands, he who is part of these forces without the King's approval loses thus his Dutch citizenship".¹⁶²

The *NRC*'s article was a response to an article in *De Tijd* a few days earlier. In that article, *De Tijd* stated that the Catholic fighters defended their rights and goods in a fight for the Pope, not for a foreign state. *De Tijd* substantiated this by emphasizing, "us Catholics are co-owners in Italy of a state, the Pontifical States. One is wrong when one means, that this state is the Pope's. The state belongs to the Catholic Church; the Pope is merely the owner of it. Logically, he who attacks the Pontifical States, the oldest and most lawful ownership in the world, attacks our rights, and as we are co-founders, we are permitted to resistance".¹⁶³ With this, *De Tijd* substantiated that the Catholics who go to Rome, do not enter foreign armed forces – they defended, under the rightful owner the Pope, their rights and goods.¹⁶⁴

The discussion between the *De Tijd* and the liberal *NRC* ends with a final reply of the former, stating, "the attitude proves that the liberal party in the Netherlands is the Garibaldist in Italy, and that its newspapers therefore do not support the principles of freedom, but support violence and suppression".¹⁶⁵ In addition, *De Tijd* underscored that the fighters are and remain Dutchmen, on whom the country should be proud, and that the fighters are willing to sacrifice their lives for the Pope and for the Netherlands.¹⁶⁶

Furthermore, press sources illustrate that intentions and the conscience played a role in determining the foreignness of the fighters' defense. An article of the *Arnhemsche Courant* stated that no one would blame Dutch Catholics that they deem the Pope in Rome, Head of the clerical community, as the supreme authority, emphasizing that the Dutch law leaves the conscious wholly free: "the Catholic has equal rights, in terms of belief, to adhere to the Pope's regulations, as the Protestant has the equal right to follow orthodox doctrines, as the Dutch subordinates in the Indies have equal rights to adhere to Mahomet and the established

¹⁶² 'Binnenland', *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, 21 November 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010116091:mpeg21:pdf> (21 April 2018). See: Annex no. 33.

¹⁶³ 'Onze Zouaven', *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 18 November 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254793:mpeg21:pdf> (21 April 2018). See: Annex no. 34.

¹⁶⁴ *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 'Onze Zouaven'.

¹⁶⁵ 'Amsterdam, 28 November', *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 29 November 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010254803:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 35.

¹⁶⁶ *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*, 'Amsterdam, 28 November'.

Buddhist-Chinese are free to see the Dalai Lama of Tibet as their spiritual ruler. In that respect, every Dutchman can do as he wants. But the Dutch Catholic has just as little as the Protestant, the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, the rights, except the worldly sovereign in the Netherlands, to adhere to another worldly sovereign abroad nor to pretend that serving the Pope with the weaponry would be the same as the Dutch state and defending Dutch soil”.¹⁶⁷

Lastly, with an article of the *Dagblad van Zuidholland en 's Gravenhage* on 20 November 1867, the defense of the Dutch fighters in the Pontifical States was not so much a question for whom. According to this newspaper, it was the neutrality of the Netherlands regarding religious affairs that needed to be adhered to: “It would provoke no one, if the King would grant permission to one or a few to take on arms outside the borders of the homeland; but when this permission (...), would be granted to hundreds at the same time, the Netherlands would step out of its neutrality, which it needs to uphold in its well understood interest”.¹⁶⁸

Differences in the implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship

The loss of Dutch citizenship was a topic of debate, too, as press sources indicate two aspects: the difference in the awareness of this measure amongst the Dutch fighters, and the municipal differences in the practical implementation of this measure.

Regarding the difference in the awareness of this measure amongst the Dutch fighters, the *Utrechts Provinciaal en Stedelijk Dagblad* noted on 12 December 1867 that it hoped that the regulation of the article 10 law, the consequences of joining foreign armed forces without the King’s approval, would be made aware and strongly supervised for those who wished to do so: “Our Dutch young men ought to know which plight weighs the heaviest for them. They live under institutions that permit them wholly free of choice, but they need to think about what they sacrifice in their homeland with their dedication to a foreign cause”.¹⁶⁹

On the other hand, the Catholic newspaper *De Tijd* stated in its 18 November 1867 article that the Dutch fighters were fully aware of the laws pertaining to military servants in foreign armed forces. The article states that it was sure the message was “announced in all

¹⁶⁷ ‘Arnhem, 13 Februarij’, *Arnhemsche Courant*, 14 February 1866, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB08:000087824:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 36.

¹⁶⁸ ‘Binnenland’, *Dagblad van Zuidholland en 's Gravenhage*, 20 November 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:000025226:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 37.

¹⁶⁹ ‘Het treden in vreemde dienst’, *Utrechts Provinciaal en Stedelijk Dagblad*, 12 December 1867, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010806001:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 38.

magazines, and thus throughout the whole country, from city to village, was circulated and known. Not only Nijmegen, but the whole of the Netherlands was now ought to be familiarized with the law pertaining to military servants in foreign armed forces”.¹⁷⁰

Second, on the municipal differences in the practical implementation of this measure, Koolen (2015) also briefly underscores this topic in the press, pointing to a letter from a former Dutch fighter, in which it is stated that the issue of loss of citizenship was quite differently applied per municipality.¹⁷¹ Koolen furthermore states that most municipal secretaries were probably not aware of the statelessness of a certain amount of inhabitants.¹⁷²

Indeed, Koolen’s findings resonate with other newspaper articles on the topic of municipal application of the loss on Dutch citizenship. On 5 April 1878, the *Deftsche Courant* published an article on proceedings within the House of Representatives, on which the newspaper stated that members of the House were surprised with the fact that a returned fighter from the Pontifical States (who left without the King’s permission) was included in the Dutch royal military police.¹⁷³

On the municipal secretaries unawareness of the statelessness of some inhabitants, a magazine of the Foundation Old Obdam-Hensbroek wrote an article in 2012 about Mr. Hendrik Tamis, a fighter who returned to Obdam after his participation in the defense of the Pontifical States. Not having requested permission in advance to join the Pope’s army, Mr. Tamis was unable to serve a public function upon his return. As the article states, however, when in 1877 one of the city councilors died, Mr. Tamis elected himself to take the open spot. With a large majority, he was elected as city councilor on 4 October 1877. When a few weeks later one of Mr. Tamis’ fellow city councilors noticed that he had served in foreign armed forces without the King’s permission, his appointment to city councilor was suspended. The commissary of the King was informed, and subsequently, on 20 November 1877, the King denied Mr. Tamis’ appointment as city councilor. He requested naturalization, which was granted in 1880, after which he worked for the city council from 1882 and several years after.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ ‘Onze Zouaven’, *De Tijd. Noord-Hollandsche Courant*. See: Annex no. 34; Koolen, ‘God wil het! – de zoeaven’, 29.

¹⁷¹ Koolen, ‘God wil het! – de zoeaven’, 30.

¹⁷² Ibidem, 32.

¹⁷³ ‘Binnenlandsche Berigten’, *Delftsche Courant*, 5 April 1878,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB08:000114396:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 39.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Hendrik Tamis’, *Magazine Stichting Oud Obdam-Hensbroek* 20 (2012), 23-25.

On 9 June 1906, *De Tijd* stated that municipal differences in the implementation of the loss of Dutch citizenship were not only apparent in the fulfillment of public functions but also concerning the right of former fighters – who had lost citizenship - to wear their military decorations. As *De Tijd* stated, “In this whole matter, the former fighters are dependent on the randomness, *bon plaisir*, and the party interests of municipal governors and everyone involved”.¹⁷⁵

Difficulties in interpreting the King’s permission

On 2 June 1906, *De Tijd* published a submitted letter from Dr. Nuyens, who wrote on behalf of seven former fighters who left for Rome between 1866-1869. In his letter, Dr. Nuyens argued that in fact, the King had given the approval to these six fighters. Dr. Nuyens provided three arguments for this. Firstly, he stated that the respective fighters had asked permission with the mayor, which was provided on paper, which convinced the fighters that the King approved their departure. Secondly, even if the first argument would fail to make its point, dr. Nuyens continued, then the King had given permission during the fighters’ leave in Rome, as the King had sent a note to the fighters to thank them for their birthday wishes, followed by his expression of gratitude to the fighters from the Netherlands. A third proof for the King’s approval lay according to dr. Nuyens in the fact that the King had approved the former fighters to wear the crucifix that they had received from the Pope.¹⁷⁶

3.4 Analysis

The newspaper sources provide insights into the perceptions of the press regarding the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States in relation to the Dutch government, with which it is possible to detect the perceptions of the press along the lines of the elements in the analytical framework. Before doing so, it is important to note that a fair amount of press sources wrote about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in very general terms.

As shown here above, newspaper articles included reports, based on telegrams received from Rome or Marseille (en route to the Pontifical States). In addition, newspaper articles included announcements and results of fundraising actions for the Dutch Papal

¹⁷⁵ ‘Ingezonden Stukken. Het Nederlandschap der Oud-Zouaven’, *De Tijd*, 9 June 1906, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010529511:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 40.

¹⁷⁶ ‘De Pauselijke Zouaven en het kiesrecht’, *De Tijd*, 2 June 1906, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010529506:mpeg21:pdf> (3 May 2018). See: Annex no. 41.

fighters. What the articles on the Dutch (returning) fighters also demonstrate is that newspapers criticized or supported other newspapers' articles.

In the support and criticism it is important to take into account the editorial bias of certain newspapers. As noted above, for example, *De Tijd* expressed a supportive stance towards the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States. This is not surprising, as *De Tijd* was a Catholic magazine. On the other hand, newspapers such as *de NRC* demonstrated a stricter stance towards the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States, which is not surprising for a non-religious/liberal newspaper.

After the fall of Rome in 1870, newspapers continued to publish general articles on the returned Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States, notably on the gatherings of various associations established by the returned fighters. The more time passed since 1870, the more obituaries from deceased fighters were posted in newspapers.

Next to this, the findings from newspapers also provide insights into the extent to which the press perceived a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States. With these insights, it is possible to detect the perceptions of the Dutch government along the lines of the elements in the analytical framework, as set out in §1.2.

The **securitizing actor** in this dimension is the press, represented by various Dutch newspapers, who most elaborately expressed that a consistent (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship (**referent object**), was threatened by the **referent subjects**: inconsistencies regarding the (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship. Three main inconsistencies appear from the newspaper articles.

First, the differences in the (un) awareness of the respective law amongst municipal secretariats. Second, the differences in municipal information regarding the (un) awareness of the law amongst the fighters. Third, and last, the differences in interpreting the King's permission as the mayoral permission, a letter from the King to the Dutch fighters in Rome, and the King's approval to the returned fighters to wear their insignia were perceived as formal permission of the King.

Subsequently, the newspaper articles provide an indication of the solution perception, which can be found in the debate over the purpose of the fighters' defense. On the one hand, the *NRC* demonstrated a strict interpretation, stating that the fighters' defense was a defense of the Pontifical States, but not a defense of the Netherlands as a state. With that, the *NRC*

argued for a strict interpretation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship, which can be seen as the first element of solution perception - measures that directly targeted an individual and/or group of individuals (**hard instruments**).

On the other hand, other newspaper articles, such as those from *De Tijd*, demonstrated a loose interpretation, stating that the fighters' defense was not a foreign defense, as the Catholics did not regard the Pope as foreign. With that, *De Tijd* interprets the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship as redundant. Thus, a measure that indirectly targets an individual and/or group of individuals (**soft instruments**) can be seen in *De Tijd*'s subjective interpretation of the foreignness of the fighters' defense. Lastly, the newspaper articles do not show that the press specifically perceived a solution in **reintegration and rehabilitation efforts**, as the main emphasis in the newspaper articles lay on pointing to difficulties and issues regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.

With this, the analytical framework, complemented with the press dimension, looks as follows:

Type	Concept	Description	Press dimension
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>Dutch newspapers that wrote about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>A consistent (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>Inconsistencies regarding the (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Difference in the (un) awareness of the law amongst municipal secretariats;</i> - <i>Differences in municipal information regarding the (un) awareness of the law amongst the fighters;</i> - <i>Differences in interpreting the King's permission.</i>
Solution	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Defense of the Pontifical state, but no defense of the Netherlands as a state – strict interpretation of the law on foreign armed forces.</i>
	Soft	Measures that indirectly	<i>Defense of the Pontifical States and defense of</i>

perception	instruments	target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>the Netherlands – loose interpretation of the law on foreign armed forces.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>X</i>

3.5 The Parliamentary Dimension

The discussion in the Dutch parliament regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States unfolded notably after 1870. Before 1870, the House of Representatives sporadically spoke about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. In 1864, the earliest debate that included the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States, the House of Representatives spoke of the creation of a volunteer army for the Pope as a positive development.

The House of Representatives spoke about the Dutch armed forces, in light of the decrease of voluntary applications for the army (277 less applications than in 1863). On 16 December 1864, Mr. de Bieberstein¹⁷⁷ stated: “I do not know any means to encourage the recruitment [of volunteers for the army], nevertheless, attempts are needed to gain volunteers, not only for our army here in the country, but also for that in the [Dutch] Indies; because what would happen if we would end up in the case that unrest arises in the East, like the 1826 uprising of Diepo Negoro, when a division of 2000 men was send that way? In Belgium a corps of voluntary hunters was recruited in a few months; when here something similar is being tested under the name of Zouaves, I believe it would be acclaimed, and I will let the Minister decide on that”.¹⁷⁸

Also after 1870, when the topic of Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States would appear in debates more frequently than the years before, members of the House of Representatives expressed a sense of pride. In 1871, the House of Representatives spoke about Christian school education and the influence of this on the degree of morality in a nation. Mr. de Bieberstein stated that the Christian educated citizen of a nation is fearless,

¹⁷⁷ Mr. de Bieberstein was a liberal Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1858-1880, and primarily spoke about military affairs, the railways, water management and trade. “Ch.A. baron de Bieberstein Rogalla Zawadsky,” Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lky36kya/ch_a_baron_de_bieberstein_rogalla.

¹⁷⁸ *Report of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the States General* (hereafter: *PHR*) 1864-1865, 428. See: Annex no. 42.

also concerning the Christian educated soldier. In this respect, Mr. de Bieberstein reflected on the bravery of the Dutch fighters of the Pontifical States: “Mister Chairman, the Christian educated soldier is not cowardly: I have experienced this in my career frequently. Have the Papal Zouaves and the small army under the brave [commander in chief of the Papal fighters] Lamoricière not proven, when they were fighting there for three days one [man] against ten [men], and has Mentana not proven how brave our Dutch youngsters fought against the Garibaldist red shirts who stormed towards Rome?”¹⁷⁹

A similar sense of pride was expressed in parliamentary debates that took place in the first decades of the twentieth century, in which the topic of the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States was included. In 1902, member of the House of Representatives – and former Dutch fighter in the Pontifical States – Mr. Arts¹⁸⁰ took the floor in a debate over the establishment of a Criminal Code and the Military Discipline, and the presence of cursing in the military. Mr. Arts explained that he had witnessed more swearing amongst militaries in one of the greater barracks in the Netherlands where he had spent eight days, than in his five years spent in various ranks of the Papal army. Mr. Arts states: “Nevertheless, the regiment to which I belonged was composed of the same elements as our [Dutch] army: simple Dutch boys, no saints, but well willing, who (...) far away from their home country and with a foreign people always established the fame of Dutch courage, Dutch policy and Dutch loyalty”.¹⁸¹

Ten years later, in 1912, a summary of the House of Representative’s commission of rapporteurs regarding the Act on obligations for the militia shows the same pride. With the establishment of a code of conduct, the moral spirit in the army is addressed. The summary states: “Our [Dutch] people are not obsequious nor yielding in character, but our people can create good discipline and are capable of adding value. It has proven this during Napoleon in 1830, and the Dutchmen who have distinguished themselves as Papal Zouave have proved it. And it is continuously proven by the army in the [Dutch] Indies”.¹⁸²

The last instance when this sense of pride was expressed was in a Senate debate in 1928 regarding the pensions for veterans of the Royal Dutch Indies Army. In this debate, Mr.

¹⁷⁹ *PHR* 1870-1871, 694. See: Annex no. 43.

¹⁸⁰ Mr. Arts was a Roman-Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1901-1922, and primarily spoke about water management, justice, military affairs, employment and finances. “A.H.A. (Antoine) Arts,” Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lkxhsqq7/a_h_a_antoine_arts.

¹⁸¹ *PHR* 1901-1902, 1370. See: Annex no. 44.

¹⁸² *PHR* 1912-1913, 164. See: Annex no. 45.

Verkouteren¹⁸³, stated that these veterans have been forgotten and that their pensions deserve to be increased. In his speech, he referred to the glorious past of the Dutch colonial history of war: “There is no colonial army, that has a more glorious war history than ours, and in that army it is usually the Dutch boys who are the best, who excel above all others. Also in the Papal army, there were no better Zouaves than the Dutch ones”.¹⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States were also a topic of debate and concerns. The discussion in parliament regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States unfolded notably after 1870 around two main topics: (dis) continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See after the fall of Rome, and the implications of the loss of Dutch citizenship.

(Dis) continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See after 1870

Debates in parliament over whether or not to continue the Dutch diplomatic representation to the Holy See started a few months after the siege of Rome in 1870. The reason for these debates was a petition brought to parliament by Catholics in the Netherlands. The petition concerned the overthrow of the Pontifical States by the King of Italy, with which the Catholics requested the government to meddle in this in order to reinstall the Papal sovereignty in the Pontifical States.

The policy of the Dutch government in this regard was clear: remaining neutral in terms of religious affairs - based on the 1848 Constitution, and the freedom of religion therein established. Meddling in the affairs in Rome to re-install the Papal sovereignty in the Pontifical States, would thus contradict this core principle of neutrality. Mister Mulken¹⁸⁵ underscored this in a debate held on 19 December 1870 in the House of Representatives, and thereby decided to not support the restoration of the Pope as the sovereign in the Pontifical States.¹⁸⁶ Member of the House Mr. Kerstens¹⁸⁷ offered a different view. He served a motion

¹⁸³ Mr. Verkouteren was a conservative Orthodox member of the Senate from 1923-1930, and primarily spoke about education, justice, foreign affairs, defence, and affairs of the Dutch Indies. “Mr. H. Verkouteren,” Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llbvoha3/h_verkouteren.

¹⁸⁴ *Report of the Proceedings of the Senate of the States General 1927-1928*, 845. See: Annex no. 46.

¹⁸⁵ Mr. Mulken was a liberal Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1862-1879 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim from 12 December 1870-18 January 1871. “J.J. van Mulken,” Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09ll3ijyi3/j_j_van_mulken.

¹⁸⁶ *PHR 1870-1871*, 216. See: Annex no. 47.

against Mr. Mulken's stance, stating that the Dutch government should undertake steps to restore the Papal sovereignty.¹⁸⁸ He withdrew his motion shortly afterwards, under the pressure of his fellow liberal party members.

The question of Rome also appeared when on 16 November 1871, members of the House debated over the (dis) continuing of the Dutch representation to the Holy See. This matter was initially discussed from a financial perspective, as the debate mainly revolved around establishing the State's budget for the Department of Foreign Affairs for the year 1872. Mr. Jonckbloet¹⁸⁹ stated that continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See would implicitly be a sign of supporting the newly established Italian government, which would contradict the neutrality of the Dutch government.¹⁹⁰

The discussion took a turn, when Mr. Jonckbloet referred to the social circumstances in the Netherlands that needed to be taken into account, as "when the reign of the Pope would be affected, the credibility of the Dutch government would suffer from this as well".¹⁹¹ Herewith, the House referred to the petition of the Catholics for the government to meddle in the Pope's position in Rome. In this respect, it was argued that the continuing of the Dutch representation to the Holy See would be needed, to ensure the Dutch returned fighters from the Pontifical States would keep their heart and spirit up for the Netherlands, not for the Pope. Mr. Jonckbloet expressed the possibility "that the Pope's former soldiers, who are currently wearing Dutch uniforms, could – depending on the decision we are taking here – trade this for their Papal uniform".¹⁹²

In 1871, the Dutch parliament chose to terminate the diplomatic representation to the Holy See (until 1915). According to Graham (1951), this was a political decision - against the desires of government officials charged with foreign relations.¹⁹³

The loss of Dutch citizenship

¹⁸⁷ Mr. Kerstens was a liberal Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1860-1871, and primarily spoke about the railways and taxes. "H.C.F. Kerstens," Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg091l27icqh/h_c_f_kerstens.

¹⁸⁸ PHR 1870-1871, 216. See: Annex no. 48.

¹⁸⁹ Mr. Jonckbloet was a liberal Puttian member of the House of Representatives from 1864-1877, and primarily spoke about education, health, the arts, and military affairs. "Dr.W.J.A. Jonckbloet," Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg091l204ezh/w_j_a_jonckbloet.

¹⁹⁰ PHR 1871-1872, 232-233. See: Annex no. 49.

¹⁹¹ PHR 1871-1872, 232-233. See: Annex no. 49.

¹⁹² PHR 1871-1872, 232-233. See: Annex no. 49.

¹⁹³ Robert A. Graham, *The Rise of the Double Diplomatic Corps in Rome: A Study in International Practice (1870-1875)* (The Hague 1951) 60.

A second central topic in the House of Representatives related to the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States was their loss of Dutch citizenship - applicable to the largest part of the Dutch returned fighters from the Pontifical States upon not having requested the permission of the King to join the Pope's armed forces. The House of Representatives discussed this topic from various perspectives.

Firstly, on 11 March 1875, the House spoke about the conditions on agreements with foreign powers concerning the extradition of foreigners. In this debate, the central topic at hand was the former Dutch fighters that joined Don Carlos of Spain without the King's permission, and the consequences upon their return to the Netherlands. Members of the House spoke of article 2 of the criminal code, which stated that civic criminals cannot be extradited. The assumption here is made that stateless criminals can, however, be extradited. This would have implications for the when the Dutch former fighters who joined the army of Spain's Don Carlos without the King's permission would return to the Netherlands, as Mr. Cremers¹⁹⁴ stated: "these young men will continue to be exposed to extradition to the Spanish government, as they are at least complicit to crimes mentioned in article 2 [which included crimes such as the wrecking of public infrastructure]"¹⁹⁵

On 29 November that same year, the loss of Dutch citizenship was again a topic of debate in the House of Representatives. This time in relation to the establishment of the association of the returned Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States, *Fidei et Vertuti*. There was uncertainty on the nature and intent of the *Fidei et Vertuti* association, as, according to the House of Representatives, its statutes were not clear on this. The statutes merely stated, that the association's aim was to "preserve the right and the law".¹⁹⁶

This led certain members of the House of Representatives to interpret *Fidei et Vertuti* as a political association. In that case, taking into account the laws pertaining to establishing an association, all members should be Dutch citizens. However, not all returned fighters from the Pontifical States were Dutch citizens as they had left the Netherlands without the King's permission. Hence, this fact together with the statutes of the association led to the discussion to which the Commission for petitions was ordered to look into.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Mr. Cremers was a liberal Catholic member of the House of Representatives from 1864-1896, and primarily spoke about education and foreign affairs. "Mr. E.J.J.B. (Eppo) Cremers," Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lkzjh4zm/e_j_j_b_eppo_cremers.

¹⁹⁵ PHR 1874-1875, 1022. See: Annex no. 50.

¹⁹⁶ PHR 1875-1876, 517. See: Annex no. 51.

¹⁹⁷ PHR 1875-1876, 517. See: Annex no. 51.

On 2 May 1877, the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship was again discussed in the House of Representatives. This time, it concerned an extensive debate about how strictly article 10 from the 1850 Civil Code (pertaining to the naturalization after the loss of Dutch citizenship) should be applied. Reason to debate this emerged from the individual case discussed in the debate. A former fighter, Mr. P. J. H. Welters, requested for his naturalization after he had joined the Pope's army without the King's approval.

That Mr. Welters' request for naturalization was not automatically accepted and processed, is because Members of the House were discussing whether or not Mr. Welters had committed an illegal act by joining the Pope's army without the King's permission, and thus could be prevented from being naturalized. Members of the House agreed that Mr. Welters had acted according to the freedom of the law, and that he would lose the Dutch citizenship, as he was free to join foreign armed forces, and that Mr. Welters had thus not committed an illegal act with his decision.¹⁹⁸

This discussion on the legality of the choice of Mr. Welters was given in by findings of the commission of rapporteurs, a body that researches a bill and its propositions in depth. The commission – of the opinion that indeed an illegal act had been done - suggested looking into Mr. Welters' request for naturalization more extensively as he had not relayed his passport to the Dutch government. The handing over of a passport would count as proof of resignation from the foreign armed forces.¹⁹⁹ The commission added, "Currently, the Pope is no longer worldly Sovereign, no longer the head of a State, and his army is dissolved. However, there is a possibility that the Pontifical States will resurrect".²⁰⁰

Members of the House commented that, whether the commission saw this resurrection beforehand, this does not change the fact that right now the Pontifical States were not present and did not have an army. "If this State will again be present, most likely its army will resurrect as well. Mr. Welters would possible travel there again, one cannot know. Should we then not naturalize him at this moment for this instance?"²⁰¹

The commission replied that the combination of Mr. Welters not handing over his passport to the Dutch government, as well as the petition of the Dutch Catholics to ask the government to reinstall the Pope as Sovereign of the Pontifical States, should raise doubts

¹⁹⁸ *PHR 1876-1877*, 1313. See: Annex no. 52.

¹⁹⁹ *PHR 1876-1877*, 1313. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰⁰ *PHR 1876-1877*, 1313. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰¹ *PHR 1876-1877*, 1313. See: Annex no. 52.

over the fact that returned ex-fighters would indeed stay in the Netherlands: “what guarantees do we have, if those [men] who previously served the Papal army (...) would deem it necessary, and if the circumstances ask for it, to return to that [Papal] army?”.²⁰² The commission added that naturalization should be a favor, not granted to those persons that have dismissed their nationality by free choice, and of whom it is uncertain that they will remain Dutchmen: “there is a great difference between foreigners that come here and request political rights and freedom, and those that own the Dutch citizenship but did not appreciate it”.²⁰³

On the other hand, the Minister of Interior Affairs argued that there would be no reason to deprive someone from the law on naturalization, “only because one means to see a presumption, that his attachment to its homeland would be less great; that his heart would tilt towards a foreign government. If a person later on returns, and shows with costs and efforts that he wishes to have his nationality back, then we who attach great value to our nationality should adopt him into our ranks.”²⁰⁴

Member of the House Mr. Cremers agreed that the law of 1850 indeed permitted the possibility for naturalization, but he questioned the way that the law should be interpreted. “It is permitted that he who lost his citizenship by joining foreign armed forces without permission, can become a Dutchman through naturalization. This is not against the letter of the law of 1850; whether this is not somehow against the spirit of the law is less certain”.²⁰⁵ Additionally, he noted that it was odd that the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that when the ex-fighter returns to the Netherlands “as a grieving sinner, that we take him back as such”.²⁰⁶

Mr. Cremers added that it was decided in 1850, upon creating the law on naturalization, that with each naturalization request the legislative powers should determine whether the person is in a particular situation that the right to be a native can be denied, or whether the State has an interest to include the person into its society. With this, Mr. Cremers stated that naturalization should not be granted to Mr. Welters, as it is uncertain whether Mr. Welters had fully detached himself from the Papal affairs in Rome. Mr. Cremers concluded his argument by noting the difficulty to take into account that the Catholics do not regard the

²⁰² *PHR* 1876-1877, 1314. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰³ *PHR* 1876-1877, 1314. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰⁴ *PHR* 1876-1877, 1314. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰⁵ *PHR* 1876-1877, 1315. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰⁶ *PHR* 1876-1877, 1314. See: Annex no. 52.

Pope as a ‘foreign’ Sovereign. In the end, the House of Representatives accepted Mr. Welters’ request for naturalization, with only one member of the commission of rapporteurs voting against.²⁰⁷

A third, and final way that the loss of citizenship was discussed in the House of Representatives, was in light of the employment of the former fighters. As noted previously, according to the law of 1850, those that had not asked for the King’s permission to join foreign armed forces lost their Dutch citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to fulfill public positions. Notably this last aspect, the denial of fulfilling public positions, was discussed in the House of Representatives on 4 April 1878.

The discussion unfolded between Member of the House Mr. de Bieberstein and the Minister of Justice Mr. Smidt.²⁰⁸ The reason for this discussion was the request for naturalization of a dozen former fighters, amongst which Mr. Bucker – former fighter and at the moment of this debate (1878) serving the Dutch military police corps. Two matters were discussed. Firstly, the fact that Mr. Bucker should have not been included in the Dutch military police corps, as he had lost his Dutch citizenship. Secondly, that Mr. Bucker and his fellow former fighters should have been seen as still loyal to the Papal service and its army, as they did not yet own a Dutch passport.

On the first matter – Mr. Bucker joining the Dutch military police corps – Minister of Justice Mr. Smidt stated that “after all, the fact that those persons that apply for the Dutch military service prove that they have resigned themselves from their previous services”.²⁰⁹ Regarding the second matter, Mr. de Bieberstein stated that it was nonsense to believe that the former fighters would still be loyal to the Papal service and army, as the power of the Pope was severely diminished: “who could call the former fighters to pick up the arms, the Pope - who is left only with the interior of the Vatican territory?”.²¹⁰

3.6 Analysis

The parliamentary sources provide insights into the debate in parliament regarding the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States, with which it is possible to detect the

²⁰⁷ *PHR* 1876-1877, 1314. See: Annex no. 52.

²⁰⁸ Mr. Smidt was a liberal Dutch Reformed member of the House of Representatives from 1871-1894, and Minister of Justice from 1877-1879. Mr. Smidt primarily spoke about water management, judicial topics, Suriname and education. “Mr. H.J. Smidt,” Parlement & Politiek, accessed May 30, 2018, https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09118ywc5/h_j_smidt.

²⁰⁹ *PHR* 1877-1878, 571. See: Annex no. 53.

²¹⁰ *PHR* 1877-1878, 571. See: Annex no. 53.

perceptions of the parliament along the lines of the elements in the analytical framework. Before doing so, it is important to note that a fair amount of parliamentary debates demonstrate a positive, proud, perception of members of the House of Representatives on the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States.

This positive perception was detected in three ways. First, the recruitment of the voluntary army for the Pope was perceived as a good example for the Dutch army, wherein the numbers of volunteers had decreased over 1863-1864. Second, the good conduct of the Dutch Papal fighters was emphasized in debates about the Christian and general conduct in the military. Lastly, the Dutch Papal fighters were mentioned in a debate over the strength of Dutch armies abroad and in colonies. In the above findings, both Catholic (Mr. Arts and Mr. de Bieberstein) and non-Catholic (Mr. Verkouteren, orthodox) Members of the House of Representatives expressed this sense of pride over the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States.

Next to this, the parliamentary findings also provide insights into the extent to which parliament – notably the House of Representatives – perceived a problem and solution in regard to the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. With these insights, it is possible to detect the perceptions of the Dutch government along the lines of the elements in the analytical framework, as set out in §2.2.

The **securitizing actor** is the Dutch parliament, notably the House of Representatives, who expressed that the social circumstances in the Netherlands (given the Catholic petition to support the re-installment of the Pope's sovereignty), the **referent subject**, were threatened by two **referent objects**: the statelessness of the largest part of the Dutch returned fighters in relation to bilateral extradition laws, and, more prominently, the intentions of the Dutch returned fighters that joined the Papal army. The intentions that were perceived as threatening are two-fold: the intentions of individual returned fighters and the extent to which they were detached from the Papal army, but also the intentions of the returned fighters as a group regarding the political character of their association.

Following an elaborate view on the problem perception, the parliamentary dimension does not provide an indication for the first element of solution perception, measures that directly targeted an individual and/or group of individuals (**hard instruments**). This indicates that parliament perceived a problem in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the

Pontifical States, but did not counter this with hard measures. The parliamentary dimension does, however, indicate that the House of Representatives spoke of measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals (**soft instruments**), by discussing the option to continue the Dutch representation to the Holy See, which was perceived as a way to ensure returned fighters would stay in the Netherlands. As it was decided to discontinue the Dutch representation to the Holy See, this soft measure was merely spoken of – not implemented.

Lastly, the parliamentary findings show that the House of Representatives perceived a solution in **reintegration and rehabilitation efforts**, as members advocated for a case-by-case approach; not granting naturalization to those who have not detached themselves from the Papal army – in formal and intentional sense. The example mentioned above, when members of the House of Representatives discuss the case of Mr. Welters, illustrates this case-by-case approach, as members of the House of Representatives were unsure of his formal and intentional detachment from the Papal army.

With this, the analytical framework, complemented with the parliamentary dimension, looks as follows:

Type	Concept	Description	Parliamentary dimension
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>The Dutch parliament, notably the House of Representatives.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>The social circumstances in the Netherlands, given the Catholic petition to support the re-installment of the Pope's sovereignty.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>The intentions of the Dutch returned fighters that joined the Papal army (1860-1870):</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Intentions of individual returned fighters (degree of detachment from the Papal army);</i> - <i>Intentions of returned fighters as a group (the political character of their</i>

			<i>association);</i> <i>The statelessness of the largest part of Dutch returned fighters in relation to bilateral extradition laws.</i>
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>X</i>
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Possibility of continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See, which would ensure former fighters to stay in the Netherlands;</i> <i>Volunteers for the Papal army as example for increasing volunteers in Dutch army.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>A case-by-case approach; not granting naturalization to those who have not detached themselves -in formal and intentional sense - from the Papal army.</i>

3.7 Perceptions of the then Dutch government on the (returning) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States

This paragraph will look into the relations, similarities, and differences between all three dimensions. To do so, all three dimensions as explored here above can be put next to each other in the analytical framework:

Type	Concept	Description	<i>Procedural dimension</i>	<i>Press dimension</i>	<i>Parliamentary dimension</i>
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>Ministers, and provincial and municipal officials.</i>	<i>Dutch newspapers that wrote about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.</i>	<i>The Dutch parliament, notably the House of Representatives.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>The state of the Dutch armed forces, and its mobilization capacity.</i>	<i>A consistent (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	<i>The social circumstances in the Netherlands, given the Catholic petition to support the re-installment of the Pope's sovereignty.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>The Dutch fighters that had left the Netherlands and joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without permission of King William III.</i>	<i>Inconsistencies regarding the (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Differences in the (un) awareness of the respective law amongst municipal secretariats;</i> - <i>Differences in municipal information regarding the (un) awareness of the law</i> 	<i>The intentions of the Dutch returned fighters that joined the Papal army (1860-1870):</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Intentions of individual returned fighters (degree of detachment from the Papal army);</i> - <i>Intentions of returned fighters as a group (the</i>

				<p>amongst the fighters;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in interpreting the King's permission. 	<p>political character of their association).</p> <p>The statelessness of the largest part of Dutch returned fighters in relation to bilateral extradition laws.</p>
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>The loss of Dutch citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to fulfill a public function upon return to the Netherlands in case of having joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without the King's approval.</i>	<i>Defense of the Pontifical States, but no defense of the Netherlands as a state. Defense with a foreign army and for a foreign cause – strict interpretation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	X
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>Some mayors inquired in advance whether men understood the consequences of partaking in foreign armed forces without the</i>	<i>Defense of the Pontifical States is not foreign – loose interpretation of the on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	<p>Possibility of continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See, which would ensure former fighters to stay in the Netherlands;</p> <p>Volunteers for the Papal army as example for</p>

			<i>King's approval; some mayors advised men to ask for the King's approval in advance.</i>		<i>increasing volunteers in Dutch army.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>Special procedures and a human approach to the concept of 'aliens'; A legal and administrative framework for naturalization.</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>A case-by-case approach; not granting naturalization to those who have not detached themselves -in formal and intentional sense - from the Papal army.</i>

The above framework with all three dimensions complemented can be analysed in a horizontal way (focusing on the concepts and detecting similarities and differences between dimensions) and in a diagonal way (across the concepts and dimensions).

Before doing so, it is important to note that problem and solution perception were quite prominent in the findings of the procedural dimension. In the press and parliamentary dimension, however, also a positive and proud view was expressed as shown in the daily reports on the fighters' developments, and in the parliamentary debates that referenced to the Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States. Problem and solution perception, the focus of this research, are apparent only in a small portion of the press and parliament findings.

Horizontal analysis of the analytical framework's concepts

By analyzing the completed above framework in a horizontal manner, a comparison of views between the three dimensions can be made for all concepts of problem and solution perception. With the procedural, parliament, and press as **securitizing actors**, a complete overview of the perceptions of the government on the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States is generated, as these dimensions include the official stance (procedural dimension), reflections (press dimension), and debates (parliamentary dimension).

All three dimensions perceived different things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (the **referent objects**). First, the procedural dimension notably viewed the Dutch armed forces as threatened, which produces a military interpretation of the referent object. This military interpretation is not detected in the referent objects of the press and parliamentary dimension. Second, the press dimension notably viewed the consistent implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship as threatened, which produces a policy implementation interpretation of the referent object. This policy implementation interpretation is not detected in the referent objects of the procedural and parliamentary dimension.

Lastly, the parliamentary dimension notably viewed the social circumstances in the Netherlands as threatened, which produces a social interpretation of the referent object. This social interpretation is not detected in the referent objects of the procedural and press dimension. The differences among the views on the referent object show that there was no static conception of the referent object; there were multiple and various things that were seen to be threatened.

The entities that are threatening (**referent subjects**) in the case of this research were perceived both similarly and differently in all three dimensions. First, the procedural dimension notably viewed the Dutch fighters that had left the Netherlands to go to the Pontifical States without the King's permission as the threatening entity. This view of the referent subject is not perceived in the press dimension. It is, however, perceived in the parliamentary dimension to the extent that this dimension also perceived the Dutch fighters as the threatening entity.

A major difference between the procedural and parliamentary view of the Dutch fighters as the threatening entity is, however, that the parliamentary dimension viewed the returned fighters as a threatening entity, whereas the procedural dimension viewed the fighters that had left as a threatening entity. A similarity is that both the procedural and parliamentary dimension viewed the fighters individually and as a group a threatening entity, as they respectively viewed the consequences of the departed and returned fighters a threat to the armed forces of and social circumstances in the Netherlands.

The referent subject notably viewed in the press dimension, the inconsistent implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship, was not detected in the procedural dimension. The inconsistencies regarding the loss of Dutch citizenship were mentioned in parliament, but it was merely discussed as part of the intentions of the returned fighters from the Pontifical States and the social circumstances (referent object) – not as a threatening entity on its own.

Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals, the **hard instruments**, were adopted by the procedural dimension, in which the emphasis lay on the loss of Dutch citizenship, the loss of the right to vote, and the denial of a public function. In the parliamentary dimension, these measures indicated by the procedural dimension were merely discussed as part of the intentions of the returned fighters, and thus indicated as part of the referent subject as noted here above. The press dimension emphasized the loss of Dutch citizenship according to the law as well, as it perceived the purpose of the defense that Dutch fighters participated in, as a defense solely for the Pope and the Pontifical States – not for the Netherlands as a state. With this, the procedural and press dimension show similar hard instruments.

All three dimensions perceive the measures that indirectly target an individual and/or group of individual, the **soft instruments**, differently. The procedural dimension has shown that some Dutch mayors inquired with or gave advice to their inhabitants concerning the

consequences of joining the Papal army without the permission of King William III. The mayoral advice, a preventative measure, was not detected in the press or parliamentary dimension, which indicates that preventing the Dutch fighters to the Pontifical States was not an overall priority of the then Dutch government.

The parliamentary dimension shows a different conception of soft measures, namely by discussing the option to maintain the Dutch representation to the Holy See as a way to ensure that returned fighters from the Pontifical States would in the future remain in the Netherlands instead of going back whenever the Pope would be in dire circumstances. Even though this option was not chosen, it shows an international approach to implementing measures that indirectly target individuals and/or groups of individuals, in this case the returned fighters from the Pontifical States.

Furthermore, the parliamentary dimension shows that the voluntarism with which Dutch Catholic young men joined the Papal army was viewed as an example to increase the volunteers for the national Dutch army. This proposal demonstrates a soft approach to the returned fighters from the Pontifical States.

Lastly, the instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands – the **reintegration and rehabilitation efforts** - were perceived by the procedural and parliamentary dimension. The procedural dimension indicated special (“human”) procedures of the government towards the statelessness of the returned fighters from the Pontifical States who had not requested the King’s permission in advance, by showing that the government allowed the returned fighters free movement and travel and accommodation passes in the Netherlands. In addition, the procedural dimension showed reintegration and rehabilitation efforts by showing that the government had the administrative and legal framework for naturalization in place.

The parliamentary dimension also indicated naturalization as an instrument pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands. However, differently than the administrative and legal view of naturalization that was detected in the procedural dimension, the parliamentary dimension showed that the aspect of detachment was deemed important in granting or denying naturalization to those returned fighters that had requested for it. A request for naturalization was denied when it was perceived that the returned fighter was not detached from the Papal army in two ways: the formal sense (if a returned fighter could or did not hand over his passport with his request for naturalization), and in the intentional sense (if a returned fighter would possibly still pledge allegiance to the Pope, with which the returned

fighter's allegiance to the Dutch King was questioned). The parliamentary dimension thus shows a case-by-case approach to returned fighters.

The procedural dimension, based on procedural documents and previous archive research conducted by Christoffor, has thus far been the only source of information available through which this research looked at the then Dutch government's perception of problem and solution in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. With the above findings, the procedural dimension shows that the government mainly perceived the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States as a military problem, as their leaving negatively affected the state of the Dutch army.

This military problem perception can be complemented with the interpretations arising from the press and parliamentary dimensions. With the above findings, the press dimension shows that the main problem perceived in newspaper articles was the lack of a consistent (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship, applicable to the largest part of the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. The press dimension, thus, did not perceive a military problem, but more a policy implementation problem.

The military and policy implementation problem perception can be complemented by the interpretation of the parliamentary dimension. With the above findings, the parliamentary dimension shows that the main problem perceived in the House of Representatives were the intentions - unsure of the detachment - of the returned fighters, which were seen to affect the social circumstances in the Netherlands (given the 1870 Catholic petition to the King with a request to support the re-installment of the Pope's sovereignty in Rome). The parliamentary dimension, thus, did not perceive a military or policy implementation problem, but rather a social problem.

With this, it is possible to state that the then Dutch government perceived a problem in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States not only in a military, but also in a policy implementation and social sense.

Subsequently, with the above findings, the procedural dimension shows that the government mainly perceived a solution to deal with the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in the legal domain: aside from the special procedures applied to let the returning fighters back into the Netherlands, the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship and the

neutralization possibility were perceived as main solutions to deal with the Dutch (returned) fighters from the Pontifical States.

Apart from debate over the strictness of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship, the findings from the press dimension do not provide a complementary way in which solutions in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States were perceived. The parliamentary dimension does, however, complement the procedural dimension. With discussing the option to maintain the Dutch representation to the Holy See as a way to ensure that returned fighters from the Pontifical States would in the future remain in the Netherlands, and the detachment of the returned fighter taken into account in the denial or granting of naturalization, the parliamentary approach demonstrates an international and case-by-case perception of the solution in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. With this, it is possible to state that the then Dutch government perceived a solution in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States not only in a legal, but also in an international and case-by-case approach.

Diagonal analysis of problem and solution perceptions

With the perception of the problem from a military, policy implementation, and social perspective, and the perception of the solution from a legal, international, and case-by-case perspective, a few brief remarks can be made when looking at the complemented analytical framework diagonally.

The military problem perception indicated in the procedural dimension, appears in the parliamentary dimension as a perceived solution. In other words, the procedural dimension viewed the phenomenon of Dutch men leaving the Netherlands to join a foreign army as threatening to the state of the Dutch army, whilst the parliamentary dimension showed that the phenomenon of Dutch men leaving the Netherlands to join a foreign army was perceived as a positive example for the state of the Dutch army.

Furthermore, the legal solution perception indicated in the procedural dimension, appears in the press dimension as a perceived problem. In other words, the procedural dimension viewed the legal framework a solution to the (returned) Dutch fighters from the Pontifical States, whilst the press dimension perceived the legal framework rather as a problem. This shows that certain perceptions overlap the problem and solution perception.

3.8 Perceptions: Then and Now

This paragraph will reflect on the three dimensions in relation to the perceptions of the current Dutch government, as set out in §1.2. To do so, all three dimensions and the current perceptions of the Dutch government can be put next to each other in the analytical framework:

Type	Concept	Description	Procedural dimension	Press dimension	Parliamentary dimension	Current Dutch government
Problem perception	Securitizing Actor	Someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act.	<i>Ministers, and provincial and municipal officials.</i>	<i>Dutch newspapers that wrote about the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.</i>	<i>The Dutch parliament, notably the House of Representatives.</i>	<i>The Dutch government, specifically the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the NCTV.</i>
	Referent Object	Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.	<i>The state of the Dutch armed forces, and its mobilization capacity.</i>	<i>A consistent (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	<i>The social circumstances in the Netherlands, given the Catholic petition to support the re-installment of the Pope's sovereignty.</i>	<i>The democracy and rule of law in the Netherlands.</i>
	Referent Subject	The entity that is threatening, which receives an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion.	<i>The Dutch fighters that had left the Netherlands and joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without permission of King</i>	<i>Inconsistencies regarding the (local) implementation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship:</i> - <i>Differences in the (un)awareness of the respective law</i>	<i>The intentions of the Dutch returned fighters that joined the Papal army (1860-1870):</i> - <i>Intentions of individual returned fighters (degree of detachment from the Papal</i>	<i>Returned foreign fighters that utilize the knowledge and physical skills learned on the battlefield, and apply it in their</i>

			<i>William III.</i>	<p><i>amongst municipal secretariats;</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Differences in municipal information regarding the (un) awareness of the law amongst the fighters;</i> - <i>Differences in interpreting the King's permission</i> 	<p><i>army);</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Intentions of returned fighters as a group (the political character of their association).</i> <p><i>The statelessness of the largest part of Dutch returned fighters in relation to bilateral extradition laws.</i></p>	<i>home countries.</i>
Solution perception	Hard instruments	Measures that directly target an individual and/or group of individuals.	<i>The loss of Dutch citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to fulfill a public function upon return to the Netherlands in case of having joined the foreign armed forces of the Pope without the King's approval.</i>	<i>Defense of the Pontifical States, but no defense of the Netherlands as a state. Defense with a foreign army and for a foreign cause – strict interpretation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Reducing the risk of jihadist travellers, and disrupt the travel intentions of those who might depart.</i>
	Soft instruments	Measures that indirectly target an individual and/or	<i>Some mayors inquired in advance whether men</i>	<i>Defense of the Pontifical States is not foreign – loose interpretation of the law on the loss of Dutch citizenship.</i>	<i>Possibility of continuing the Dutch representation to the Holy See, which would</i>	<i>Disrupt disseminators of jihadist propaganda,</i>

		group of individuals.	<i>understood the consequences of partaking in foreign armed forces without the King's approval; some mayors advised men to ask for the King's approval in advance.</i>		<i>ensure former fighters to stay in the Netherlands.</i>	<i>preventing radicalization on social media platforms, countering social tensions, and information sharing and international cooperation in multilateral fora.</i>
	Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts	Instruments pertaining to those who return back to the Netherlands.	<i>Special procedures and a human approach to the concept of 'aliens'; the legal and administrative framework for naturalization.</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>A case-by-case approach; not granting naturalization to those who have not detached themselves from the Papal army – in formal and intentional sense.</i>	<i>Conducting a criminal investigation; a case-by-case approach that can lead to various measures, or a de-radicalization program.</i>

With the problem and solution perception of the current Dutch government complemented in the above framework, it is possible to conclude this chapter with a brief contextualized comparison between the problem and solution perception of the Dutch government dealing with the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and the problem and solution perception of the current government regarding the (returning) foreign fighters phenomenon which has developed in the recent years with the emergence of ISIL/Daesh in Iraq (2014-present).

It is firstly necessary to point to a number of important aspects before conducting this comparison, as there are major differences between the (returning) foreign fighters phenomenon of 'then' and 'now'. Despite similar mechanisms - youngsters leaving the Netherlands to join a violent struggle abroad in the name of a religion - the youngsters who left for Syria/Iraq joined a battle that is inherently different in character than the youngsters who left to the Pontifical States. As indicated, the jihadist character of the battle that youngsters joined in Syria and Iraq is aimed at expanding a Caliphate in a struggle against the West, with violence as a means to rebuke infidels. This has been seen in Syria/Iraq itself, and with terrorist attacks in the West the past years. This leads governments to a challenge, as this struggle is aimed against their countries.

The youngsters that left the Netherlands in the 1860s to join the Papal army fought for a cause that concerned the territorial defense of the Pope and the Pontifical States from the unification forces in Italy. This led the government to a different challenge than we see nowadays, as this past struggle was not aimed against other (or the fighters' own home) countries. Nevertheless, the mechanism of youngsters leaving the Netherlands to join a violent struggle abroad in the name of a religion remains a main similarity between then and now. Therefore, it is interesting to see the differences and similarities between the above outlined problem and solution perceptions of then and now.

Looking at the problem perception, the then Dutch government mainly perceived a problem in the military, policy implementation, and social sense. Taking into account the complemented framework here above, the current government does not perceive a military or policy implementation problem in the youngsters leaving the Netherlands to join a terrorist organization abroad. The current government does, however, perceive a problem in the social sense. The idea that the returned fighter can affect societal structures is present within the then government and current government.

The difference though is that the then government perceived the intentions of the returned fighters as unsure, in the sense that their allegiance was not clear – the Pope or the Dutch King, whereas the current government perceives the intentions of returned fighters a problem in a more elaborate way: the returned fighter could possess both knowledge and violent and recruiting skills to affect others. Moreover, the current government perceives the rule of law and democracy as threatened – a perception that was not apparent within the then government.

Looking at the solution perception, the then Dutch government mainly perceived a solution in the legal, international, and case-by-case sense. The current government perceives a similar legal solution to deal with the recent (returning) foreign fighters phenomenon in the consequence of joining foreign armed forces has on the Dutch nationality, in which the role of the Dutch King is not mentioned. Without focusing too much on the judicial details in this analysis, the current government revokes the Dutch citizenship of a person that is convicted of a crime against the safety of the Kingdom – for example a crime with a terrorist motive – when a combination of factual actions and intentions of a person for the purpose of a terrorist organization can be proven.²¹¹

The naturalization framework is the other legal aspect, which was a key solution perception of the then government. Although the naturalization framework is still an instrument of the Dutch government nowadays²¹², it was not specific solution perceived by the current government as set out above in §1.2. A legal instrument that appears as a perceived solution within the current government, but not in the then government, is the criminal investigation that is conducted when a foreign fighter returns to the Netherlands. As shown above, the current government looks at the criminal consequences, and deems it important to determine the potential threat, of a returned foreign fighter immediately at the point of return in the Netherlands.

An international perception of the solution is also apparent within the current Dutch government, as was the case within the then government. The difference is though that, the then government perceived a solution in the option to (dis) continue an embassy in relation to social circumstances in the Netherlands, whereas the current government perceives the

²¹¹ See for more information: Immigration and Naturalisation Service, ‘Loss and the Revoking of Dutch Nationality’, <https://ind.nl/en/dutch-citizenship/Pages/Loss-and-the-revoking-of-Dutch-nationality.aspx> (2 June 2018).

²¹² See for more information: Immigration and Naturalisation Service, ‘Naturalisation’, <https://ind.nl/en/dutch-citizenship/Pages/Naturalisation.aspx> (2 June 2018).

international solution more from a cooperative perspective: within international organizations, and multilateral fora.

A case-by-case approach, the last perceived solution of the then government, is also seen within the current government's solution perception. The then government applied a case-by-case approach in the naturalization granting process, whilst the current government applies a case-by-case approach to seek which specific measures are applicable to the returned fighter. Nevertheless, the detachment from the cause fought for is both in the then and current government a reason to apply a case-by-case approach.

Another aspect of the solution perception of the then government, albeit in small representations, was the mayoral advice to inhabitants on the consequences of joining the defense of the Pontifical States without the King's permission. The role of the mayor is, in the current government's perceptions, also important. Nowadays, the role of the mayor has further reaching purposes: informing the families from someone who is about to join a foreign armed struggle, with the aim to prevent this person.

The preventive role is, overall, more visible in the current government's perception than those of the then government in regard to the Dutch fighters of the Pontifical States. The then government, despite a few mayoral advices, did not stop their citizens from leaving the Netherlands. The current travel prevention, propaganda disruption, and de-radicalization programs that are part of the current government's instruments show that the current solution perception of the government is much more preventive than that of the then government that dealt with the (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.

Conclusion

Between 1860 and 1870, a multinational fighting force arose to defend the Pontifical States under Pope Pius IX. Part of the revolutionary and nationalist spirits throughout Europe in the 1840s and 1850s, the Pontifical States had come under threat of forces that were striving for the unification of the various kingdoms and duchies on the Mediterranean island. When near 1860 it became clear that these unifying forces were steadily approaching the Pontifical States, the Pope united a multinational 11.000 men strong army.

In the Netherlands, constitutional and religious developments in the 1840s and 1850s had contributed to a more prominent position of Catholicism and increased popularity of the Pope. With the highest contribution to the Papal army, 3181 young Catholic Dutch men took part in the defense of the Pontifical States over the course of 1860-1870. Nevertheless, on 20 September 1870, Rome fell in the hands of Victor Emanuel II and the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, leaving the Pope only with the territory of the Vatican.

This research has looked into the stance of the then Dutch government in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters that took part in the defense of the Pontifical States. This has been researched through the main research question: *To what extent did the then Dutch government perceive a problem and solution in regard to the Dutch fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States (1860-1870), and how can we explain this?* With this main question, the historical case central to this research – Dutch (returning) fighters that participated in the defense of the Pontifical States between 1860 and 1870 – has been researched through a conceptual framework of problem perception and solution perception.

Problem perception has been defined through the lens of the securitization theory. In general terms, this theory states that a securitizing actor determines whether an issue becomes a security issue through the use of a referent object and referent subject. Solution perception has been defined through the lens of the current approach of the Dutch government, as adopted in *The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism* (2014). This action program lists measures to deal with the present (returning) foreign fighters phenomenon. In this research, the measures of the action program were divided in three categories: hard instruments, soft instruments, and rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.

This conceptual framework has been applied on the historical case central to this research by looking into three different dimensions: the procedural dimension (official stance of the then Dutch government on the case), the press dimension (newspaper articles that

featured the case), and the parliamentary dimension (proceedings of the parliament that included the case). Through these dimensions, the problem perception of the then Dutch government has become clear: the then Dutch government perceived specific and limited problems in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States. Through these dimensions, the solution perception of the then Dutch government has become clear as well.

The hard instruments, soft instruments, and rehabilitation and reintegration efforts established in the conceptual framework were to some extent detected in the historical case of this research: with more emphasis on the hard instruments, the soft instruments and reintegration efforts – which form the largest part of the current solution perception – were less visible in the stance of the then Dutch government in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States.

How can we explain this, and what does this say about the problem and solution perception of the then Dutch government? First, it tells us that the current Dutch government presents a comprehensive, all-encompassing, view in the action program as the democracy and rule of law in the Netherlands is seen to be existentially threatened and has a legitimate claim to survival. Second, the then Dutch government did not adopt such a comprehensive, all-encompassing, view. Rather, the then Dutch government adopted a pragmatic perception: not the democracy and rule of law in the Netherlands, but practical aspects regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States were perceived as the problem.

After this general conclusion, the following section will summarize the specifics of this research. The pragmatic view of the then Dutch government regarding the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States was detected in the following ways within the problem perception and solution perception. The then Dutch government perceived a problem in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in a military sense (diminishing the strength of the Dutch armed forces), in a policy implementation sense (creating inconsistencies in local policy implementation), and in a social sense (leading to social tensions between Dutch Catholics and non-Catholics). The then Dutch government perceived a solution in the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States in a legal sense (the loss of Dutch citizenship), in a case-by-case approach (taking into account the intentions of returned fighters), and in an international sense (debating the continuity of the Dutch embassy in Rome after 1870).

After answering the research question and explaining the specifics, we now turn to the discussion on the applicability of the conceptual framework. In this section, it is important to

note that the solution perception established in the conceptual framework is based on the comprehensive action program of the current Dutch government. This comprehensive action program is developed from a specific lens: the threatened democracy and rule of law in the Netherlands. This specific lens, however, was in this research applied on a problem that was viewed pragmatically by the then Dutch government. To date, there is no other comprehensive framework available than the comprehensive action program. Therefore, the comprehensive action program provided the most specific framework for this research. With that, this research assumes the application of this comprehensive solution perception framework on a problem that was perceived pragmatically.

In particular, the pragmatic stance of the then Dutch government is visible as Dutch men could request permission with the Dutch King to take part in the defense of the Pontifical States for another sovereign, the Pope. With permission granted by the King, these men did not face any consequences upon their return to the Netherlands afterwards. Furthermore, the pragmatic stance of the then Dutch government is visible with regards to the Dutch citizenship. The current Dutch government revokes the Dutch citizenship when a combination of factual actions and intentions of a person for the purpose of a terrorist organization can be proven. In contrast, the then Dutch government in regard to the Dutch (returning) fighters from the Pontifical States automatically declared the loss of Dutch citizenship to those persons lacking the King's permission (the vast majority) without any particular considerations.

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Annex (separate)