

The Factors of Influence on Multilateral Intelligence Liaison: A Case Study of the Netherlands

MSc Thesis

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Preface,

When in February 2017, I decided to research the complicated but interesting field of intelligence liaison, I must admit I underestimated the complicity of researching the topic. The limited amount of primary data has caused me to shift the design of the research several times, just so that the forcefulness of the thesis would be as high as possible. It was thanks to the guidance of my supervisor Constant Hijzen, that I eventually managed to create a finished thesis.

Additionally, I am sincerely thankful to my friends, family, and girlfriend, for the mental support they provided throughout the period of writing my thesis.

I hope that this thesis will not only be enjoyable to read, but also provides you with some new insights into the complicated world of intelligence liaison.

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Abstract

The topic of intelligence liaison is one of the most underdeveloped topics within the field of intelligence studies. Often mistaken for intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is a form of intelligence gathering, in which intelligence from other agencies, both national or international, are used. The academic literature on intelligence liaison is consistent in the assumption that bilateral intelligence liaison is a preferred form of intelligence liaison compared to multilateral intelligence liaison. However, thoroughly analysing the analytical literature on intelligence liaison, does show that there are several factors that seem to positively and negatively affect the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. However, as argued by the scholars in the field of intelligence liaison, these positive factors rarely able to outweigh the negative factors.

After conducting a case study on the Dutch intelligence agencies through three different perspectives, the study has been able to identify one positive factor that is continuously mentioned in relation to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. The factor of ‘combatting as shared threat or issue more effectively’.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The European continent has been confronted with two periods of enhanced Islamic terrorist activity over the past fifteen years. In the period after the 9/11 attacks, Western Europe saw two large scale terrorist attacks. The 2004 train bombings in Madrid, and the 2005 subway and bus bombings in London. On a smaller scale, individual terrorists performed attacks on specific individuals, such as the 2004 shooting of Theo van Gogh. More recently, Western Europe was struck by another wave of Islamic terrorist activity, when large scale attacks were conducted in 2015 and 2016. Attacks such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the November 13 attacks in Paris, the 2015 attacks in Brussels, the 2016 attack in Berlin, and the 2017 attack in London. After the terrorist attacks, a question that people are often left with, is whether the attack could have been prevented. One of the first organizations that is mentioned on this issue are the intelligence agencies. Where were the terrorists from, and where they on the radar of any of the European intelligence agencies?

Since the latest wave of Islamic terrorist attacks, the conclusion that more and more politicians seem to draw, is the inability of individual intelligence agencies to co-operate with each other, as one of the reasons why an attack occurred. The Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs for example, Mr. Bert Koenders, acknowledged after the attacks on Paris and Brussels, that intelligence information had not been properly shared between the individual intelligence agencies. According to Koenders, the pieces of the puzzle to prevent such an attack were present within the different agencies, but appeared to have been stuck because of complex processes (Koenders, 2016).

Simultaneously, within the media the same topic also seems to increase in popularity. The terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 seem to have instigated also the media to investigate why attacks have not been prevented. Media outlets such as Politico, also came to the conclusion that intelligence sharing and intelligence co-operation continues to be a large problem in the European attempt to combat terrorism (de La Baume & Paravicini, 2015).

1.1 Thesis Topic

This thesis sets out to examine the concept of intelligence liaison, which is a term that is often used to comprehend the gathering of intelligence through co-operation, sharing, and exchange

(Svendsen, 2009, p. 700). The concept will be explained and disseminated more extensively in Chapter 2. The thesis will set out to examine the existing academic literature on the factors that influence nations to participate in the many different types of international intelligence liaison. Not only within the media and politics is there a seemingly renewed interest in intelligence cooperation and intelligence sharing, but also the intelligence agencies themselves seem to be increasingly focussed on the topic. When looking at annual reports of the Dutch intelligence agencies, the concept seems to be linked to transnational threats, and the fact that intelligence is increasingly important to maintain security within a state (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2004). This renewed interest in intelligence liaison makes one wonder once again which factors, both positive and negative, are of importance to the participation in international intelligence liaison. With the developments mentioned above, the question is whether there could be new evidence that support or contradict these existing factors on intelligence liaison.

The goal of this thesis is to create a thorough literature assessment on the topic, and create an overview of factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison, which is a type of intelligence liaison. Such a literature overview on intelligence liaison is currently non-existent, and could provide for interesting insights into why the multilateral form of intelligence liaison is taking place, or why it is not taking place. Secondly, through a case study of the Dutch intelligence agencies, the thesis sets out to examine whether these factors can explain the current status of multilateral intelligence liaison within the Netherlands. To what extent can evidence of multilateral intelligence liaison be found, and which factors are able to explain this found evidence? By testing the different theories on multilateral intelligence liaison to the newly found evidence, possible blind spots in the existing literature on the factors influencing participation in multilateral intelligence liaison could be highlighted.

1.2 Research Question

In order to achieve the pre-set goals of the thesis, the following research question has been formulated.

“Which factors, as found in academic literature on international multilateral intelligence liaison, have influenced multilateral intelligence liaison practices of the Netherlands from 2003 up until 2016?”

The reasoning behind the selection of the Netherlands as a case, and the timeframe can be found in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

1.3 Relevance

The relevance of the research does not only lie within the mapping of the Dutch intelligence agencies and their use of multilateral intelligence liaison, but also within a more academic and societal relevance as well.

1.3.1 Status of academic literature on intelligence liaison

Intelligence studies is often considered to be an underdeveloped field of academics within the larger security and international relations research. One of the reasons for this, is the fact that intelligence agencies, which are the main research object in the field of intelligence studies, tend to be closed for outside researchers. According to Lander, intelligence itself is almost by nature a manifestation of individual state power and national self-interest (Lander, 2004, p. 481). Agencies active in the field of intelligence are therefore hesitant to provide insight into their motivations, methods of operating, and especially their activities in the field, making intelligence studies a difficult field for research (O'Connell, 2004, pp. 191-192).

As a result, the academic community is deals with limited information and little available empirical data on their research object. This issue causes the existing research on intelligence to be too repetitive, as researchers often solely depend on existing research from other scholars. As a result, the overall research on intelligence is far from cumulative. As Marrin (2016) explains it: “To mix a couple of metaphors, instead of standing on the shoulders of giants and creating an academic discipline, intelligence scholars seem to be re-inventing the conceptual wheel every 15 years or so without really making advances in terms of disciplinary knowledge” (Marrin, 2016, p. 269).

Within this field of academics on intelligence, there are several terms or concepts that play an important role. One of such terms, is intelligence liaison, which will be the main research topic of this thesis. Often considered a synonym of intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is used to define enhanced collection methods of intelligence agencies by means of co-operating with national or international intelligence partners. This not only the sharing of information, but also through platforms, sensors, processing, and data exfiltration (Sims, 2006, pp. 214-215). In 1996, it was already acknowledged by Westerfield that intelligence liaison was one of the least

sufficiently studied fields in American intelligence research (Westerfield, 1996, p. 523). Since then, researchers such as Jennifer Sims and Richard Aldrich have devoted articles to the national and international intelligence liaison activities, mostly from a United States perspective. However, in these studies the focus is on unilateral intelligence gathering and bilateral intelligence liaison (Aldrich, 2009, pp. 122-139) (Sims, 2006, pp. 195-217). Multilateral intelligence liaison is mentioned sporadically. It is therefore safe to say, that when it comes to international multilateral intelligence liaison, a proper academic overview and update is currently missing within the academic community. It is also for this reason, that the thesis aims to look specifically at multilateral intelligence liaison, instead of bilateral intelligence liaison. Multilateral intelligence liaison, unlike bilateral intelligence liaison, has gained little attention in academic literature, although it might be of similar importance in current day intelligence gathering.

1.3.2 Academic Relevance

As mentioned, both the field of intelligence studies itself, as well as the concept of multilateral intelligence liaison seem to have been quite underdeveloped compared to other fields within security studies and international relations. First, the thesis sets out to examine the factors within the existing literature that influence multilateral intelligence liaison, creating an overview of the different theories on the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison. Such an overview is currently non-existent, and could already be helpful to the academic community as there are currently only a limited amount of theories on intelligence liaison.

Second, by re-examining the existing theories with new evidence from a case study, the thesis also sets out to possibly add to the existing limited literature on multilateral intelligence liaison. Not only will the thesis provide for a thorough re-examination of existing knowledge, but it could also provide new insights into the concept of multilateral intelligence liaison. In turn, the new findings could assist in the creation of new theories on intelligence liaison or highlight blind spots in existing theory. Additionally, the existing intelligence liaison literature is mainly focussed on US national and international liaison, whereas this thesis sets out to examine intelligence liaison from a European perspective.

1.3.3 Societal Relevance

By examining to what extent the existing assumptions on multilateral intelligence liaison remain valid, the outcome of the thesis can also influence society. As the thesis examines the developments and participation of international multilateral intelligence liaison, possible new insights could be found on how currently intelligence agencies are trying to combat international crimes. Multilateral intelligence liaison often seems to be linked to combatting terrorism, but whether this is actually a viable option for intelligence agencies in the battle against such threats remains unknown. When the evidence shows that to a larger extent intelligence liaison is taking place on a multilateral level than suggested in the literature, it means that perhaps we are better protected from crimes such as terrorism than we might think.

Also, the topic of multilateral intelligence liaison is closely linked to a public discussion which is especially gaining attention within the EU. In the EU, but also on a more national level, several politicians have been raising the question on whether creating a centralized European intelligence agency could be used as a method to improve efforts in preventing terrorist attacks. For example, Euro-parliamentarian and former Belgian prime minister Verhofstadt called upon creating such an organization several times in order to combat the terrorist threat (de La Baume & Paravicini, 2015). Creating such an agency would highly depend on the willingness of intelligence agencies to participate and use multilateral intelligence liaison. Depending on the outcome, this thesis could therefore also create new insights into this discussion and whether such a centralized European intelligence agency can be considered as a realistic option for future efforts against terrorism.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

The purpose of the following chapter, is to provide an overview of the current theoretical debates and conclusions on the concept of intelligence liaison. The chapter sets out to discuss two theoretical components of the concept. The first being the definitional debate that exists within the academic community on the two important aspects of the term. These important aspects are ‘intelligence’ and ‘intelligence liaison’. Second, the chapter set out to create an overview of the different types of intelligence liaison that have been distinguished in the literature, of which multilateral intelligence liaison will prove to be one. Only after this division, a clear understanding can be made as to why this thesis sets out to examine multilateral intelligence liaison in specific, instead of other types of intelligence liaison. However, before this overview is provided, it is important to discuss the general difficulties within intelligence studies when it comes to theory building, as this will also explain why there are little available theories on intelligence liaison.

2.1 General lack of theory

According to Svendsen (2009), one of the problems related to intelligence liaison is the fact that researching the concept brings about methodological complications. Intelligence liaison, is considered a ‘fenced-off’ subject by intelligence agencies, which makes studying the concept in a contemporary context extremely difficult (Svendsen, 2009, p. 707). Because of this, the general body on the theoretical foundations of intelligence liaison is limited, a problem that is not that uncommon within intelligence studies.

Thirty years ago, the same issues were present within other forms of intelligence studies, as democratic principles were less common throughout the world. As a result, the academic literature of intelligence studies had two main sources; the United States and the United Kingdom (Gill, Marrin, & Phythian, 2008, pp. 1-2). However, with the increasing democratization throughout the world, slowly but steadily more information on the intelligence agencies is becoming available, and therefore slowly theory building has been increasingly taking place. Despite this improvement in historical research and legal research on intelligence, scholars such as Gill, Marrin, and Phythian remain under the impression that conceptual and theoretical thinking on intelligence has remained underdeveloped (Gill, Marrin, & Phythian, 2008, p. 2).

As mentioned in the introduction, intelligence studies is considered to be repetitive, rather than cumulative (Marrin, 2016, p. 269). As a result, there are perhaps less different insights and theories available compared to other academic disciplines. Scholars are more likely to maintain existing theories due to the difficulties of creating new theories, caused by the fenced-off nature of intelligence agencies and their products. Despite that, even within the academic field of intelligence there are definitional debates on concepts, including the concept of intelligence liaison.

2.2 Definitional debate on intelligence liaison

As with almost any type of concept within academic disciplines, the concept of intelligence and intelligence liaison in specific are subjected to definitional debates. Different scholars have argued for different definitions, that sometimes differ vastly in the way they conceptualize both concepts. In order to discuss some of the different elements of the concepts, found within the academic literature, several definitions of scholars will be discussed and analysed in order to provide a proper understanding of which aspects are involved in the concepts of intelligence and intelligence liaison. In order to do so, both concepts will be discussed separately in the following two intermediate headers 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

2.2.1 What is intelligence?

One scholar who has been involved in the definitional debate surrounding intelligence is Alan Breakspear. In his 2013 article, Breakspear discusses the definitional debate, and creates a new definition that is according to Breakspear a complete definition of the term. Breakspear defines intelligence as: “Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change, which may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat.” (Breakspear, 2013, p. 688). According to Breakspear, an important aspect that defines intelligence, is the fact that the intent is to identify impending change. In other words, the purpose of intelligence is to foresee or foreknow certain changes, in order to act upon these changes. Other than regular information, intelligence can be considered a type of information that is used within that purpose of foreknowing and foreseeing upcoming positive or negative changes (Breakspear, 2013, pp. 688-689).

This definition of Breakspear is however quite broad, in the sense that it mainly seems to differentiate intelligence from information through the difference in purpose. It is an important distinction nonetheless, highlighted by many other scholars. However, other scholars have highlighted other aspects that are seemingly important as well. An understanding of some of the public applications of intelligence, can be generated from Sims (2006), who highlights the fact that in theory, intelligence systems or agencies are there to collect, analyse and disseminate information on behalf of decision-makers who are engaged in the protection and advancement of the state and its interests in the international system (Sims, 2006, p. 196) Highlighting, the fact that intelligence is processed information that serves a purpose. What Sims seems to add in her definition of intelligence agencies, is the purpose for whom intelligence is created. According to Sims, the purpose of foreseeing and foreknowing is to help policy-makers in their decisions to advance the nation state.

The idea that foreknowing and foreseeing upcoming possibilities and threats is an important aspect of the concept of intelligence, is partly shared by Loch Johnson (2007). Johnson states that this is only an important aspect of one type of intelligence, which he defines as strategic intelligence. Besides strategic intelligence, there is also a type of tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence is focused on warzone and battlefield intelligence (Johnson, 2007, p. 1). This type of intelligence, which is used to assess information such as military movement and military capability of other states or groups, is not as involved in the foreseeing aspect of intelligence as strategic intelligence. Johnson adds to the definition of intelligence another aspect that has not been discussed before, but is definitely worth mentioning.

Where Breakspear distinguishes the difference between information and intelligence through the difference in purpose, Johnson distinguishes intelligence information from regular information through another important aspect of intelligence, the secrecy aspect of intelligence. Although often only a fraction of the intelligence information is gathered from closed sources, public intelligence agencies have the capabilities and mandate to gather information through closed sources. The use of this closed source information, is what makes both the intelligence itself as well as the gathering methods of intelligence agencies secretive, and therefore distinguishable with regular information (Johnson, 2007, p. 2)

There have been many other authors involved in the discussion around the definition of intelligence, but through discussing the three above, the main elements of the discussion have been dealt with. These being the distinction between intelligence and information, the purpose of intelligence, and the secretive aspect that makes intelligence valuable to nation states.

2.2.2 What is intelligence liaison?

Intelligence liaison, although this might seem the case, is not a type of intelligence product. Rather, intelligence liaison is an activity, which involves intelligence. What the liaison aspect entails, is similarly to the debate on intelligence subjected to definitional debate, and will therefore be discussed.

As mentioned above, intelligence systems or agencies are there to simply to collect, analyse, and disseminate information on behalf of decision-makers who are engaged in the protection and advancement of the state and its interests in the international system (Sims, 2006, p. 196). What can be concluded from the different articles on intelligence liaison, which are not that abundant within the academic community, is that although intelligence liaison is not mentioned in the intelligence cycle, it can be considered a form of gathering intelligence. Or, as Sims defines it: “Although sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.” (Sims, 2006, p. 196). In other words, using intelligence gained through barter, which has been collected by others as a part of the intelligence collection process. The debate within the concept of intelligence liaison however lies within the question as to what then all constitutes as intelligence liaison, and where the concept ends.

As Sims already highlights, intelligence liaison is sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, which is an opinion shared by other scholars. As also suggested by Svendsen (2009), intelligence liaison is more than simply the sharing of intelligence among different actors. Svendsen in fact, broadens the concept, by stating that intelligence liaison can be explained as: “intelligence co-operation, intelligence sharing, and intelligence exchange.” (Svendsen, 2009, p. 700). This definition in turn, is broader, including not only the sharing of intelligence, but also the co-operation and exchange of intelligence. This somewhat simplistic definition does show that intelligence liaison is indeed more than just the sharing of intelligence. To what extent the concept of intelligence liaison covers the co-operation between different agencies is however still open for debate.

H. Bradford Westerfield (1996), argues that intelligence liaison constitutes to almost all forms of intelligence co-operation, including activities such as the co-operation in training or analysis methods (Westerfield, 1996, pp. 523-560). For Sims however, this definition of intelligence liaison is somewhat too inclusive. Sims argues that although things such as training and analysis co-operation can be considered to be part of an intelligence relationship, the co-operation in these fields does not contribute to the gathering of intelligence. Westerfield’s broad definition

seems to mix motives, and obscures the values of intelligence liaison. When co-operating with other agencies, and for example sharing the way in which you have analysed the information at hand, the trustworthiness of the intelligence cannot be measured. Without all the information, such as the source of the information, sharing only the analysis is insufficient for other agencies to accept the intelligence (Sims, 2006, p. 214).

As there are only a few scholars who have participated in the debate on the definition of intelligence liaison, it remains difficult to assess to what extent a form of intelligence co-operation can be considered intelligence liaison. What seems to be considered important in this debate, as stressed by Sims, is the fact that it to be considered a part of the intelligence collection process. Something that is according to her not the case when co-operating in for example training. Although eventually one could benefit in the collection of intelligence through training co-operation, that does not directly contribute to the gathering of intelligence.

2.3 The different types of intelligence liaison

Besides the definitional attention to intelligence liaison within academics, a few scholars have also defined some distinctions between the type of intelligence liaison relationships that can be found throughout the intelligence domain. The main distinctions that can be found in the literature, are the distinction between national and international intelligence liaison, the distinction between the number of involved actors in the relationship, and the distinction between institutionalized intelligence liaison relationships or ad hoc relationships. These will therefore be further discussed in the following intermediate headers.

2.3.1 National vs. international

The first distinction that can be made in intelligence liaison relationships, is between national intelligence liaison and international intelligence liaison. The way in which intelligence agencies are institutionalized within national governments differ throughout the world. Where one country only has a single intelligence agency, other might have two or even more. This form of institutional cohesion not only makes intelligence agencies different throughout the world, they also determine the amount of centralization or fragmentation of the entire intelligence apparatus of a state (O'Connell, 2004, p. 195). For example, within the United States government, there are multiple national intelligence agencies, including the CIA, NSA, NRO, and the NGA. Besides these national intelligence agencies, the US also has several

agencies that gather intelligence for specific departments, such as the defence department (Richelson, 2012, p. 17).

According to some scholars, the co-operation among these multiple intelligence agencies from the same nation can also be considered a type of intelligence liaison. National intelligence liaison is therefore solely focussed on inter-agency intelligence liaison by intelligence agencies from the same state (Svendsen, 2012, p. 101). Nations that have only a single intelligence agency, will not encounter such national inter-agency intelligence liaison.

Contrary to the national type of intelligence liaison, is the international form of the concept. The concept is similar, however, in this case the level of the relationship is on the international level. Referring to the intelligence liaison relationship between intelligence agencies from different states. This form of co-operation between states is considered a more complicated form of liaison, as national interests come in play. As mentioned in the introduction and the relevance, intelligence itself is almost by nature considered a manifestation of individual state power and national self-interest (Lander, 2004, p. 481). Making international intelligence liaison somewhat of an oxymoron. Despite that, international intelligence liaison is an important aspect of the intelligence world.

2.3.2 Two actors vs. multiple actors

Another way in which intelligence liaison relationships can differ, is through the number of involved actors. As intelligence liaison is a form of collaboration among intelligence agencies, a distinction is often made between two different types of intelligence liaison, being either bilateral intelligence liaison or multilateral intelligence liaison. Bilateral intelligence liaison revolves around the idea that the liaison relationship involves two actors, and no more than two. According to Lefebvre (2011), there are several bilateral intelligence liaison relationships known within the academic community, such as the bilateral intelligence co-operation that the United States for example has been maintaining with German counterparts since the Second World War (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 533).

Multilateral intelligence liaison differs with bilateral intelligence liaison through the number of actors. Multilateral intelligence liaison is defined by McGruddy (2013) through looking at the definition of a multilateral agreement. According to McGruddy a multilateral agreement is: “an accord among three or more parties, agencies, or national governments.” (McGruddy, 2013, p. 214). The minimal number of involved actors to therefore have a multilateral intelligence

liaison relationship is three, and no maximum number of actors to constitute to a multilateral intelligence liaison relationship.

2.3.3 Institutional vs. ad hoc

A final way in which intelligence liaison can differ, is in the foundation of the intelligence liaison relationship. Intelligence liaison relationships can occur through an institutional platform, such as NATO, the European Union, or organizations which are specifically designed for intelligence liaison. The organizations serve as a platform upon which states can formalize agreements on intelligence liaison. Within the EU for example, there are several sub-organizations which have been created to stimulate more systematic intelligence liaison, such as the European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (European Union External Action, 2017).

More secretive and less known, are the so-called 'ad hoc' intelligence liaison relationships. This type of intelligence liaison is more informal. The existence of such ad hoc relationships is by itself not a secret, however in what kind of way they exist is kept secret by the intelligence agencies throughout the world. Through the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks, one of such ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison relationships became known. A signals intelligence group, comprised of 14 member states, called the SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR). It is more commonly known to this day as the 'fourteen eyes', in which the intelligence agencies of fourteen states actively co-operate and exchange signals intelligence (National Security Agency, 2013, p. 2). This SSEUR group would be considered an ad hoc international multilateral intelligence liaison relationship.

2.4 Academic attention to intelligence liaison

The academic body of literature on the conceptual qualifications of intelligence liaison, can be considered weak. As can be seen from the above academic discussion, the number of different scholars writing on the concept of intelligence liaison is limited. As Sims acknowledges, the concept of intelligence liaison has over the past decades been predominantly studied from a historical perspective, rather than a from an analytical perspective (Sims, 2006, p. 195). Historically, scholars such as Haire, and Munton and Matjova have studied the intelligence liaison relationships between states. However, without analytically discussing the concept and

discussing what it entails, but rather from a historical perspective where the relationship itself is studied (Haire, 2014, pp. 758-777) (Munton & Matejova, 2012, pp. 739-760).

However, with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the attention towards a more analytical approach of intelligence liaison was instigated. Sims (2006), for example classifies the events as a turning point in the intelligence field, where, since the events, international intelligence liaison has taken the centre stage of the global war on terror (Sims, 2006, p. 195). One of the reasons for this increased importance, was the outcome of the official report on the events of 9/11. The report concluded that one of the reasons which allowed for the attacks to happen, was an insufficiently functioning international intelligence liaison relationship between the U.S. and some of its liaison partners. The U.S. intelligence agencies had been focusing too much on unilateral intelligence gathering, and insufficiently acknowledged it was in need of intelligence from liaison partners (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 415). The recommendations allowed for the US agencies to increase and improve their intelligence liaison capabilities, which in turn also instigated the academic community to further investigate a phenomenon that was to serve as an important method of gathering intelligence.

The focus of these few scholars who have written analytically on intelligence liaison, has been on bilateral intelligence liaison. Despite acknowledging the fact that multilateral intelligence liaison takes place, many scholars seem to highlight the fact that bilateral intelligence liaison is a preferred method of conducting intelligence liaison over multilateral intelligence liaison. Examples of such statements can be found in the articles of Sims (2006), Lefebvre (2003), Aldrich (2009), and Clough (2004). However, the reason for why this is indeed the case, is not always provided, and when it is, it usually is not explained extensively. Analytical articles specifically focussing on multilateral intelligence liaison simply do not exist, in current intelligence studies. Despite the increased attention to intelligence liaison after the attacks of September 11, 2001. An overview of multilateral intelligence liaison, and some of the factors that influence the use and participation in multilateral intelligence liaison seems to be one of the important aspects of intelligence liaison studies that is currently missing.

Chapter 3: Research Design

This chapter discusses the framework of the conducted research. This includes the research design and the applied research methods. Furthermore, the case selection and timeframe are discussed in more detail. Finally, this chapter elaborates on the forcefulness of the analysis and to what extent the findings are relatable to the presented theory.

3.1 Research set-up

The proposed research follows an inductive and qualitative research design. By following a non-linear and more fluid research path, the findings can steer the research throughout the entire process. Since specific information in the literature is limited such an approach enables researchers to adapt the hypothesis throughout the process. This cannot be done within with a deductive research approach, because the hypothesis cannot be changed anymore (Neuman, 2014, p. 195). As mentioned before, this thesis includes not only an extensive overview of the existing literature, but also researches the activity and developments of multilateral intelligence liaison within the Netherlands. The reasoning for the selection of this case is explained in section 3.3 of this chapter. Since there is only one single case, the research is qualitative (Neuman, 2014, p. 16).

This thesis consists out of two types of research. First, an analysis of the current, existing literature on intelligence liaison. From this are the factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison derived. Second, a case study on the Dutch intelligence agencies participation in multilateral intelligence liaison over the period from 2003 up until 2016 has been conducted. Both types of research types have different research methods, which are discussed in more detail in the next section.

3.2 Research methods

As mentioned above, the thesis uses multiple research methods. This depends mainly on which part of the research is conducted. The different parts of the research are therefore individually discussed in relation to the methodology of the two parts of the research.

3.2.1 Literature review

For the literature review of the research, the goal is to find some of the factors that are of influence on the existence and participation on multilateral intelligence liaison. As there is no research conducted on this topic before, and no articles exist that specifically focus on multilateral intelligence liaison, the literature review research mainly sets out how to examine the research on intelligence liaison itself. By analysing different assumptions and theories on intelligence liaison, an overview of the conditions of influence to intelligence liaison is created and to what extent these conditions influence the use and participation of multilateral intelligence liaison.

The research method that is selected to conduct this literature review, is the document analysis method. The document analysis method is based on the analysis of secondary data that is located within the existing scholarly articles on the related topic of intelligence liaison (Neuman, 2014, p. 49). By analysing the existing academic literature on intelligence liaison and the factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison, an overview can be created of the current status of the theory on multilateral intelligence liaison. This means, that although authors may specifically write about intelligence liaison in general, or even other forms of intelligence liaison such as bilateral intelligence liaison, these authors can still provide interesting new insights into the factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison.

3.2.2 Case study

To see which of the factors isolated through the literature review can also be found within the case of the Dutch intelligence agencies, the case study analysis is comprised of three parts. These three parts being a study of the intelligence agencies perspective, the media perspective, and the political perspective. The main reason for having three different sub-analyses to conduct the case analysis is because of the nature of the studied object. Intelligence agencies, including the Dutch intelligence agencies are closed organizations to researchers. Throughout the research, several attempts have been made to contact someone from within the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD, without any result. There has been contact with someone from the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, but accessing information or interviews was not possible. As a result of this closed society of organizations, triangulation has been used in order to obtain enough information to make some conclusions of the case

study. Additionally, the triangulation method is also used to improve the reliability of the findings, as external communication of the intelligence agencies could not only provide a full insight, but also be politically motivated. In the reliability section of this chapter more information is provided on this.

The scholar Norman Denzin has been publishing articles on the concept of triangulation for several decades. According to Denzin, triangulation is simply the combination of methods used to study the same phenomenon. This in order to gain a thorough understanding of the studied object. Methodological triangulation could also include a difference between qualitative and quantitative approaches to researching the studied phenomenon (Denzin, 2012, pp. 81-82). Analysing the published documents of the Dutch organizations involved in intelligence, provides an insight into their multilateral intelligence liaison activities. However, the available primary sources are limited, which makes the source base of the analysis weak. To strengthen the findings of the analysis, the triangulation method has therefore been selected, and the case analysis therefore sets out to examine the Dutch involvement in multilateral intelligence liaison from three perspectives. This being from the perspective of the intelligence agencies themselves, through the perspective of the Dutch media, and through the perspective of the Dutch parliament. The intelligence agencies perspective provides an insight of the developments according to the involved organizations themselves, analysing their external communication on the topic. By analysing the Dutch media on the media attention to multilateral intelligence liaison, an insight is created in the amount of attention multilateral intelligence liaison has gotten over the studied period. By doing so, an external perspective on how the interest in the topic has been changing is created. The parliamentary perspective is to show the interest and attitude towards multilateral intelligence liaison from within the political sphere of the Netherlands.

3.2.3 Qualitative and quantitative research

To analyse the use of multilateral intelligence liaison through the intelligence agencies, a research method known as process tracing has been used. Process tracing, according to Collier (2011), can be defined as a research method in which evidence is systematically selected and analysed. This has been done to conduct a within-case analysis (Collier, 2011, p. 823). A large section of the analysis is based on a systematic analysis of the annually published reports of the intelligence agencies. Through these annually published reports, the developments within the use of multilateral intelligence liaison are analysed. Reoccurrences and developments within

involved organizations are monitored per annual report in order to find trends and developments. Next to the systematic approach of process tracing, the analysis is completed with additional statements and acknowledgements that have been found through analysing the annual reports, as well as other primary sources such as reports from the Dutch oversight committee and investigations by commissions. This will be conducted through a qualitative content analysis of the individual documents. In Appendix 1, a table presents the different steps for the document analysis.

Where the within-case analysis of the intelligence agencies is considered a qualitative approach to analysing the case, both the media and the political analysis requires a quantitative approach. First, for both the media and the political perspective a qualitative content analysis is conducted to obtain as many documents related to the topic of intelligence liaison. A quantitative content analysis is used to quantitatively analyse findings that have been generated from a source other than the data to be analysed (Forman & Damschroder, 2008, pp. 39-40). The findings are quantitatively assessed by analysing their occurrence within the studied period and the number of occurrences each year. However, obtaining the data requires the creation of categories or indicators through which the texts are selected be then quantitatively be assessed. Assessing whether the indicator is present within both the media and the parliamentary documentation, relies on the interpretation, and can therefore be a time-consuming method (Macnamara, 2005, p. 5). Because of that, for both perspectives, selection rules and search terms are used to make obtaining the data feasible within the limited time frame. The selection rules and search terms are discussed in section 3.2.4.

The categories created for the analysis of the media and the political perspective are similar, since consistency within the analysis of the different perspectives is important. All articles generated through the selection rules and search terms are analysed according to a category system. This category system is a sequence of steps that allow for a differentiation among the many different articles and parliamentary documents.

The idea of a category system is to structure the different documents in into different categories that have been defined in advance. According to Mayring (2014), the category system is based on a starting with fundamental structuring dimension. This fundamental structuring dimension decides which documents are to be used. The dimensions are then in turn sub-divided into individual features or values (Mayring, 2014, p. 95). In the case of the political and media analysis, the fundamental structuring dimension is the reference to intelligence liaison within the documents. The documents are then sub-divided into the type of intelligence liaison that is

being referred to in the documents, the tone of the documents towards intelligence liaison searched for, as well as reasoning or context that is used in the documents to address the topic of intelligence liaison. Similar to the document analysis, all the articles found have been systematically assessed through certain steps, which can be found in Appendix 2. However, as mentioned before, the analysis of the content is dependent on the interpretation of the author. Once all the documents have been categorized, a quantitative analysis is held on both the media perspective and the political perspective.

3.2.4 Selection rules and search terms

The Dutch intelligence agencies produce annual reports on their practices and developments, in which they spend some attention to their activities in multilateral intelligence liaison. These documents are therefore analysed for these sections. However, as the research should not be too dependent on the views of the intelligence agencies, as these can be politically motivated or misleading, the oversight reports are also to be included. When one speaks of intelligence cooperation, intelligence sharing, or intelligence exchange, this will be interpreted as intelligence liaison. However, as also stated in the literature, the intent of these forms is to be on the intelligence gathering process.

Within each different perspective, there are many different documents that could potentially hold information on multilateral intelligence liaison. Especially for the media and political analysis there are thousands of articles or parliamentary publications that could potentially contain valuable information. Because of this large number of documents and a limited time to conduct the research, selection rules and search terms were used to narrow the number of documents to analyse.

Compared to the limited availability of documentation by the intelligence agencies, both the Dutch media and the Dutch government have provided large amounts of documents, which makes distilling relevant information difficult. In order to maintain a feasible research approach, the media and political analysis have been simplified through the creation of selection rules and search terms, which are to help narrow the number of documents.

For the media analysis, the selection rules have been set at analysing only three newspapers; being NRC, De Volkskrant, and De Telegraaf. The reason for choosing these newspapers over other Dutch newspapers is because of several reasons. First, all three newspapers are national newspapers, which are spread throughout the entire nation and produce newspapers on a daily

basis. Second, the three newspapers are owned by different media corporations, which makes it less likely that the one of the other studied papers has influenced the other newspaper. Third, the three newspapers are in the top 4 of the Netherlands when it comes to the number of newspapers in circulation in 2016 (Bakker, 2017).

For the political analysis, the relevant documents have been selected out of documents on parliamentary enquiries (in Dutch: Kamervragen). Parliamentary debates come about through different ways, of which the parliamentary enquiries is one. The reason for choosing these documents for the political analysis because the documents can contain two perspectives. These being the perspective of the questioner and of the answerer. This often provides the insight of both the opposition and the cabinet, although this is not necessarily always the case. Through the inclusion of the opposition, an additional new perspective is included in the analysis. Also, including the opposition could also allow for a more differentiated tone towards intelligence liaison.

The search terms used for the media analysis have been derived from the theoretical framework. As intelligence liaison is often referred to as intelligence sharing, co-operation, or exchange, the similar terms will be used for the searches within the different newspapers. As the theoretical framework shows, intelligence is something more than information, which is why for the search of intelligence liaison, the search term information is not used. Instead 'intelligence' in combination with any of the three forms of intelligence liaison are as search terms. In Dutch, the search terms were: Inlichtingen samenwerking, Inlichtingen uitwisseling, and Inlichtingen delen. Additionally, also intelligence liaison itself is used as a search term, which rendered no new results.

For the political analysis, a similar approach will be conducted in terms of the search entry. The same search terms are used, with the only exception being that the search term intelligence sharing derives a result of over 500 documents. Therefore, an additional search term to intelligence sharing, which is the term 'foreign' is included to further limit the search result and derive a feasible number of documents. In Dutch, the search terms were: Inlichtingen samenwerking, Inlichtingen uitwisseling, and Inlichtingen delen buitenland.

As the search terms can generate an overlap in results, the search results used later in the analysis derive less new documents than the first used search term. By using these different but simultaneously closely related search terms, the outcome of the search is more likely to cover as much documents related to a select topic such as intelligence liaison.

3.3 Case selection and time frame

3.3.1 The Netherlands as a case

The reasoning behind the selection of the Netherlands as the single case of this thesis is derived from both a theoretical perspective, as well as a practical perspective. As mentioned above, the existing literature on intelligence liaison is mainly conducted from an American perspective. This thesis aimed at researching this from a European perspective, which also meant a case which was from the EU and therefore also involved in some of the multilateral intelligence liaison organizations that have been created through the EU. Secondly, a nation with a relatively small intelligence apparatus was deemed preferable, as their intelligence capability should be lower. This made the chances of finding proof of the use of multilateral intelligence liaison more likely, as the likeliness of a state with a small intelligence apparatus to participate in such relationships was deemed more likely than states with a large intelligence apparatus. Why the Netherlands in specific was chosen over other states with a small intelligence apparatus, was based on mainly practical reasoning. After having researched some of the different official sources from the different countries, the Dutch intelligence agencies turned out to be one of the few who had been producing annual reports throughout the entire selected time frame.

3.3.2 Time frame

As mentioned in the introduction, the European continent has been witnessing two waves of increased terrorist activity. Often in the debates surrounding these terrorist attacks, the role of intelligence agencies and their willingness to participate in intelligence liaison seemed to be increasing. By selecting the period from 2003 up until 2016, the time frame covers both waves of terrorist activity in Europe. Second, the starting year of 2003, has been selected as it is after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, after which some adjustments had been made to the use of intelligence liaison among many Western states. Although perhaps not all of the adjustments had been finalized by 2003, it is the year furthest from 2001, and closest to 2004. As the thesis aims to minimize the influence of the terrorist attack in the United States, the year 2003 had been selected. The year 2016 is chosen as last included year, since this the last year covered with annual reports.

3.4. Forcefulness of the research

3.4.1 Validity

As this thesis is to research an extremely closed and shady field of intelligence studies, being able to validate the findings of the thesis will decide if this thesis is a contribution to academics or merely a collection hollow findings and conclusions. When it comes to a thorough literature review and a case study, one of the strengths of the research will be the conceptual validity, in which one tries to find the essential meaning in abstract theory of concepts or variables (Neuman, 2014, p. 42). The concept of multilateral intelligence liaison will be tested through a literature review and a case study, which will help support the later claims in the theory on the concept. Not only will this mean that there is a high conceptual validity to support the thesis, but also by itself, be beneficial to the academic community, as it contributes to the overall knowledge on the concept.

Second, of equal importance, is the measurement validity for this thesis. Most of the empirical evidence on multilateral intelligence sharing is marked as confidential information and therefore not available for this research. The little empirical evidence that is available in open sources must therefore be carefully examined as to how well the empirical indicator “fits” with the concept (Neuman, 2014, p. 215). The primary sources such as the annual reports are therefore carefully examined, as explained before.

As the research is focussed around a single case, the external validity of the research will be low. As the findings of the case analysis is specific to the Netherlands, with triangulation within the case, the internal validity is increased. To what extent the thesis outcome is generalizable is difficult to assess at the beginning of the research, as it will depend on the outcome. If there are no new theories created or adaptations advised, this aspect of the thesis is considered less important (Neuman, 2014, p. 221). However, if there are any new findings related to the existing theory, the external validity can only be proven by testing it to other, for example similar situations in the same time period, but through different cases. As that has not been done thus far, the outcome of future research will determine the external validity of the theoretical findings of this thesis.

3.4.2 Reliability

The primary sources provided by the intelligence agencies themselves are obviously worth analysing. The sources could provide for valuable information when it comes to the reasoning

for using multilateral intelligence liaison. However, the author acknowledges that these sources might not communicate all of the internal information due to confidentiality or third party rule reasons. Also, could it well be possible that these sources might communicate what is politically desirable, or even twist their communication in order to make them appear more favourable towards the external audience. For that reason, in order to generate more reliability to the findings of the case analysis, the triangulation method is used. By analysing the case not only from the perspective of the intelligence agencies themselves, but simultaneously through politics and the media coverage, an overlap is could be found that matches the findings of the intelligence perspective. By doing so, the reliability of the findings is increased.

3.4.3 Pitfalls

The proposed research possesses some possible pitfalls and possible ethical issues that are worth mentioning. The first issue with this proposed research is the availability of sources on the topic of multilateral intelligence liaison. In both academics as well as open source information the concept is often mentioned only briefly. This has made the production of an extensive overview of the various factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison a time-consuming activity that had to be done. By using the triangulation method for the case analysis, the reliability and forcefulness of the research is improved, compared to only analysing from an intelligence agency perspective. Nonetheless, the nature of intelligence agencies is one of secrecy, and obtaining an insight into the real reasoning behind the use of multilateral intelligence liaison can only be found when conducting an internal analysis. As that is impossible for researchers, an external analysis is the only method of researching a topic such as multilateral intelligence liaison. However, the author strongly believes that even an external analysis, conducted through the triangulation method should provide some realistic insights into the factors that influence the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison. The forcefulness of the outcome is limited, as it remains an external analysis, but despite the limitations could provide for interesting conclusions that can be discussed and compared with the findings of the literature review.

Ethically, the analysis of the case also depends highly on the interpretation of the author, when analysing documents for proof of multilateral intelligence liaison. As the author will analyse the documents to his best ability, the odds remain that other researchers might interpret certain information in the documents differently. By conducting the analysis of the individual cases in a systematic manner, the analysis is conducted as objectively as possible. For example, when

there was no clear distinction between the type of liaison, or the reasoning within the documents, then these were also specified as such. As can be seen in the findings in the Appendix. Also, as there can be political opinions in play within the different documents, the analysis has used the information on the tone and the reasoning separately, never combining the outcome of these findings together. Meaning that reasoning and tone have not been used simultaneously in the analysis and discussion on intelligence liaison. Both tone and reasoning have been used separately in combination with the type of liaison, which is far less dependent on the political background of the author of the document. Despite these checks, both the analysis of tone and reasoning are subjected to the authors interpretation, and therefore limit the internal validity of the research.

As the case analysis requires one to select certain sources such as the newspapers and parliamentary questions and answers, the change of missing other valuable information for the case study is viable. However, in order to maintain a feasible research within the provided time period, this is a necessary decision.

Chapter 4: Literature research

In the following chapter, the different perspectives presented by scholars on intelligence liaison will be discussed. As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter, there have only been a limited number of scholars, who have been analytically researching intelligence liaison. Therefore, the research in this chapter sets out to first discuss several of the different perspectives, which provide insights that should also be of influence on the existence and use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Only after this discussion on intelligence liaison, certain aspects of the discussion can be used to formulate the factors that are of influence on multilateral intelligence liaison. The outcome of this literature research is then to be tested against the findings of the case study.

4.1 Different scholars, with different perspectives

The following section is to discuss some of the different perspectives that have been introduced by scholars in relation to the circumstances under which intelligence liaison takes place. It is within these perspectives, that some of the important factors influencing the use of multilateral intelligence liaison can be found.

4.1.1 Intelligence liaison as barter

As mentioned before, Jennifer Sims (2006), uses the following explanation for the concept of intelligence liaison: “Although sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.” (Sims, 2006, p. 196). Where in chapter 2, the focus was on the subcontracted intelligence collection method, the focus is now in the final part of the statement when she highlights the importance of barter. Sims in fact considers the co-operation between intelligence agencies in the form of intelligence liaison, as a form of trade, in which the intelligence is considered a good. According to Sims, the process of intelligence gathering is situated in a global system that is to be one of self-help and anarchy. As a result, so-called ‘friendships’ among nations have a limited duration, and shared interests can quickly turn into conflicting interests between allied states. True alliances are therefore non-existent, and with that the gathering of intelligence is inherently competitive and secretive in nature. However, according to Sims, these temporary alliances do allow for states to start intelligence co-operation, in which

deals are made and assets are traded. The purpose of this intelligence co-operation is to achieve net gains (Sims, 2006, p. 196).

Sims argues that there are two different types of intelligence liaison: 'simple' and 'complex'. Simple intelligence liaison is based on the idea that despite a perhaps complex system of intelligence relationships, the barter only influences the intelligence collection capabilities of a state. For example, when two countries are interested in the same person, the intelligence agencies can share intelligence with one another on that potential target. When both states have the same amount of interest in the target, the barter is to be equal, and intelligence liaison relationship is symmetric and simultaneously limited (Sims, 2006, p. 197).

Complex intelligence liaison involves not just intelligence collection capabilities, but also involves other aspects such as the political, economic, or military sphere. In other words, the barter not only influences the intelligence collection capabilities, but also other fields within government or society. An example of such a complex intelligence liaison that Sims provides, is when one state provides for goods and services to protect a foreign political leader, when in return the foreign state provides the other state access to their intelligence network. What makes this type of intelligence liaison complex, is the fact that the co-operation involves more than just intelligence. This in turn makes assessing the co-operation on symmetry complex and difficult (Sims, 2006, p. 197).

4.1.2 The cost benefit analysis

Like Sims, Clough (2004), also discusses the fact that intelligence liaison is based on an exchange. Clough highlights the fact that there are also 'drivers' that stimulate international intelligence liaison. These drivers can be for example shared threats, in which intelligence agencies can share burdens to minimize costs, or for example the benefit of having a second opinion (Clough, 2004, pp. 602-605). Central in the international intelligence liaison relationship, is the saying of "quid pro quo". The Latin saying literally means "something for something" or "one for the other". In intelligence liaison, this implies that intelligence liaison is always an exchange, in which one party provides something and in turn receives something from the liaison partner. Importantly though, Clough stresses the fact that the exchange is not necessarily balanced, but that mutual benefits in the long term are to be gained by the involved parties (Clough, 2004, p. 601).

Complicating this exchange between intelligence agencies, is the symmetry and asymmetry assessment that intelligence agencies make before participating in an intelligence liaison relationship. Symmetric intelligence liaison is at most cases the preferred method, as states are unlikely to participate in intelligence liaison relationships in which the gains for the other state are higher. It is only when there is an institutional dependency or when the gains are masked by one of the involved actor's due to proper counterintelligence activities, that asymmetric intelligence liaison relationships are started (Sims, 2006, p. 198).

In the end, what it comes down to with intelligence liaison relationships, is a complex cost benefit analysis conducted by the involved parties. Even when the costs can initially outweigh the benefits of an exchange, involved parties must continue to evaluate the liaison relationship, to see whether future benefits can be made. Without any possible benefits to an intelligence liaison relationship for an involved party, the intelligence liaison relationship will not be started or continued (Sims, 2006, p. 205). According to Sims, this cost benefit analysis is the main reasons why multilateral intelligence liaison is deemed undesired over bilateral intelligence liaison (Sims, 2006, p. 202).

4.1.3 Non-reciprocal intelligence liaison

Contrary to the type of intelligence liaison based on quid pro quo and barter, is intelligence liaison on a non-reciprocal basis. According to Lefebvre (2003), intelligence liaison relationships can be based on non-reciprocal relationships. One of such a non-reciprocal intelligence liaison relationship, is the Kilowatt Group. This group exchanges information on terrorists and terrorist-groups on a non-reciprocal basis (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 531). What makes these states share information on such a basis is according to Lefebvre a commonality in a threat perception. When states perceive the same thing as threat, such as terrorism or a type of organized crime, intelligence agencies are able to co-operate on this non-reciprocal basis. Additionally, this can also come from shared interests, that are not necessarily perceived as threats (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 529).

Another scholar who has argued for the existence of such non-reciprocal intelligence liaison relationships, is Svendsen (2009). In his article, Svendsen analyses intelligence studies and intelligence liaison in specific from a theoretical perspective, in which he examined how intelligence liaison would fit within the existing theories of international relations. According to Svendsen, the realist pursuit of security, as can be found in international relations theory, can

probably best explain why states decide to proceed in intelligence liaison relationships. This is mainly because when they do not, their security might be at stake. Simultaneously, this pursuit of security is also why states are sometimes not willing to participate in intelligence liaison relationships, as sharing or co-operating might pose a risk to the security of the state. When treats are shared by states, such as the threats during the global war on terror, intelligence liaison has a strong chance of taking place within the realist perspective (Svendsen, 2009, p. 717).

However, as Svendsen argues, non-reciprocal sharing is difficult to explain from a realist perspective. Instead, Svendsen uses the liberalist perspective of international relations theory, to provide an insight into another reason why non-reciprocal intelligence liaison relationships could exist. In a liberalist perspective, states are less competitive, and sometimes share intangible features such as norms and values. According to Svendsen, intelligence liaison relationships can also be based on shared ethical principles and regulatory similarities. Such commonalities allow for intelligence co-operation, and is less fixed on the gains of the individual state. A good example of such an intelligence relationship is the UKUSA agreement. One could argue, that this agreement between five states has been able to form because of the states have similar constitutions and share ethical principles (Svendsen, 2009, pp. 717-718).

Where Sims argues that the cost benefit analysis and the idea that intelligence liaison is based on barter, discourages multilateral intelligence liaison, the reasoning for non-reciprocal intelligence liaison seems to provide with some insights as to why multilateral intelligence liaison does take place. After all, as argued by Lefebvre, multilateral intelligence liaison relationships are good examples of non-reciprocal liaison relationships (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 531).

4.2 Factors influencing the cost benefit analysis of multilateral intelligence liaison

As stated before, many scholars such as Sims (2006), Lefebvre (2003), Aldrich (2009), and Clough (2004), have argued that multilateral intelligence liaison is an undesired form of intelligence liaison. However, simultaneously acknowledging the fact that despite it being an undesired form, multilateral intelligence liaison does in fact take place. Some of these factors can be deducted from the discussion above, whilst other factors can be found in separate discussions. In order to address the different positive and negative factors influencing the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison, the analytical cost benefit approach by Sims,

can be used to provide a framework for the different factors. Placing some of the negative influences under costs, and the positive under benefits.

4.2.1 Costs of multilateral intelligence liaison

As most scholars argue for bilateral intelligence liaison over multilateral intelligence liaison, first the negative influences or 'costs' that influence the participation in international multilateral intelligence liaison are discussed.

Increased risks

One of the most dominant reasons why intelligence liaison on a multilateral level is deemed to be unwanted by intelligence agencies, is the risk that comes with intelligence liaison. According to scholars such as Herman (1996), every intelligence exchange or co-operation is considered to be a risk. One allows outside intelligence agencies closer access in one form or the other, which causes a certain loss of control over the intelligence one has gathered. Herman for example, uses this increased risk to explain why intelligence liaison on a multilateral level is considered undesirable. As soon as the number of actors increase, the amount of risk one intelligence agency takes also increases (Herman, 1996, pp. 207-208).

This higher level of risk is, according to Sims, one of the reason why the cost in the cost benefit analysis, increases substantially when intelligence agencies commence in multilateral liaison relationships. When the costs are high and the benefits substantially lower, a negative cost benefit analysis will determine that multilateral intelligence liaison is undesired. As a result, intelligence agencies are increasingly inclined to commence in bilateral relationships. In bilateral relationships, the risks are limited to a single organisation, which allows for easier risk control. Also, when participating in bilateral intelligence liaison relationships, the competitive advantage or relative gains one tries to maintain within the intelligence liaison relationship is easier to control when participating in bilateral intelligence liaison relationships (Sims, 2006, p. 202).

What is interesting in this argument, is the use of the concept 'risk'. What are these risk to intelligence agencies when conducting intelligence liaison, and why would they increase when the amount of intelligence liaison participants increases? An important role in the answer to these questions, can be found in the secretive aspect of intelligence itself. As explained by Warner (2012), the secrecy aspect of intelligence is highly important to not only the intelligence

agencies themselves, but also to politicians and policy-makers. Knowing something other states do not know creates a comparative advantage. This is usually expressed in the form of decision advantage, in which agencies and policy-makers can make earlier or better decisions based on the information that one knows and other do not (Warner, 2012, pp. 224-226).

Another way in which multilateral intelligence liaison can pose a larger risk than bilateral intelligence liaison could be due to the increased risk in source and methods protection. Several scholars argue that a continuous risk within intelligence liaison is the protection of an intelligence agencies sources and intelligence gathering methods. When exchanging intelligence, as was highlighted before by Sims, it is only of value when one also shares how and through whom the intelligence was obtained. This in order for the receiving party to assess the value and truthfulness of the received intelligence (Sims, 2006, pp. 214-215).

When exchanging this type of information, it is of high importance to the states that the secrecy of the source and method remain secret. This is important for example to guarantee safety to human sources, or to keep special gathering methods secret to those who are considered a threat to the state. When a state participates in intelligence liaison, there are several risks at the receiving end of the exchange, over which the sending state has no influence. These are risks such as a system penetration, careless handling, or public leaking. Also, a deliberate use of the same information in a liaison exchange between the receiving state and another, perhaps unfriendly third party, is considered as a risk to intelligence agencies (Herman, 1996, pp. 207-208).

Because of all such risks, analysing the costs and benefits of an intelligence liaison relationship is not as simple as one might think. There are strategic, political, and sometimes economic considerations taken into account when making the cost benefit analysis of a liaison relationship. Because of the increased risk in a multilateral intelligence liaison relationship, the costs tend to be higher than the benefits. As a result, bilateral arrangements are preferred over multilateral arrangements. When multilateral intelligence liaison is taking place, intelligence agencies are often more cautious at what they share with the other parties, which in turn often causes the multilateral intelligence liaison to often be quite hollow (Sims, 2006, p. 202).

Increased management difficulties

A threat that is commonly feared by intelligence agencies throughout the world, is the threat of ‘circular reasoning’. Circular reasoning is a common mistake that can happen within news reporting, academic writing, and importantly within intelligence gathering. What circular reasoning entails, is that false information can be created, both purposely or by accident, which is then copied or used by another (Rips, 2002, pp. 767-768). Within intelligence liaison, this is a known threat, even within bilateral arrangements. Imagine three states having independent bilateral liaison arrangements, where the intelligence of state “A” is passed on to state “B”. State B then exchanges that information with state “C”, who then exchanges it with state A again. State A basically receives back their own intelligence, but now think that state C also gathered that same intelligence, causing state A to think their own intelligence is now validated by state C. According to Clough, this threat of circular reasoning or circular reporting as Clough call it, is always present within intelligence liaison. However, when participating in multilateral intelligence liaison, the situation will become increasingly complex, and risk of circular reporting is significantly higher than in bilateral intelligence liaison (Clough, 2004, p. 606).

The reason for the increased possibility of circular reasoning is that intelligence travels faster between multiple states, and keeping track of where the information travels next is increasingly difficult when the amount of parties involved increases. Managing the information stream is therefore a difficulty that could cause intelligence agencies to be weary of participating in multilateral intelligence liaison relationships, and rather use bilateral intelligence liaison relationships. However, the idea of a single party having “ownership” of a particular piece of intelligence is lost in both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Managing the risk of circular reasoning is however more difficult in multilateral arrangements (Clough, 2004, p. 606).

4.2.2 Benefits of multilateral intelligence liaison.

Despite the fact that there seem to be quite some cost factors that could influence the cost benefit analysis negatively for multinational intelligence liaison, there are also some benefits to multilateral intelligence liaison, that could potentially outweigh the costs. Many of which can be found in the reasoning behind the non-reciprocal intelligence liaison.

Combatting common threats more effectively

One of the most commonly provided reasons by the different scholars on why multilateral intelligence liaison is occurring, is because of a common threat perception among the many different parties involved in the liaison relationship. When states share a common threat, such as the threat of international terrorism or even a state, then it could turn out to be beneficial to co-operate with the many states on a multilateral level. In such a setting, intelligence can be exchanged to many different states in a single moment, which in turn could help combat the shared threat quicker and more effectively (Svendsen, 2009, pp. 702-703).

Lefebvre (2003), highlights probably the most well-known example of the past decades when discussing common threat perceptions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is according to Lefebvre, one of the clearest examples of an international governmental organization which was formed out of a common threat. The Soviet Union was considered as a threat to many North Atlantic nations, who then united to form a block against the communist Soviet Union. Part of NATO, was the co-operation between the allied states in intelligence. During the Cold War, NATO members actively shared large amounts of intelligence on the Soviet Union on a multilateral basis (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 529).

Svendsen (2009), has similarly argued that a common threat perception could be one of the most likely reasons why intelligence agencies might co-operate on a multilateral level. This also, because it allows for multilateral intelligence liaison to be explained from realist perspective. A perspective that is predominantly against international co-operation. Threats cause insecurity within a state, and as states strive for security within an anarchic international system, they would be willing to co-operate when it benefits their internal security (Svendsen, 2009, pp. 716-717).

Dependency or strategy

When returning to the article by Sims (2006), another more strategical explanation for multilateral intelligence liaison can be found. In her article, Sims is quite clear on her stance that when looking at intelligence liaison as a form of barter, a multilateral arrangement is to be considered far from optimal by the intelligence agencies. However, as Sims also acknowledges the fact that multilateral intelligence liaison takes place, she provides another more strategical explanation.

According to Sims, states are drawn into asymmetric intelligence liaison relationships out of strategic reasoning. Multilateral intelligence liaison can be considered a form of asymmetric intelligence liaison, as the co-operation input is not as equal between the involved states (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 531). The reasons that Sims uses to explain why asymmetric intelligence liaison takes place, is therefore also a reason to explain multilateral intelligence liaison. According to Sims, asymmetric intelligence takes place because of either dependency or out of strategic motivations (Sims, 2006, p. 199). States participate in asymmetrical or even non-reciprocal intelligence liaison, when they consider the liaison relationship to be worth the risk in the longer term. In such a setting, a single exchange or non-reciprocal sharing is deemed less important than the long-term relationship. This can either be because an intelligence agency is unable to gather necessary intelligence and hopes that a multilateral intelligence liaison relationship might in the long term provide them with a steady income of needed intelligence (Sims, 2006, pp. 203-205).

Another way in which Sims argues in favour of asymmetrical intelligence liaison, can be out of strategic purposes, in which asymmetrical liaison relationships are deliberately formed in order to have a liaison relationship. For example, to perform counterintelligence efforts on the receiving party (Sims, 2006, p. 198). The same could be true for participating in multilateral arrangements, in which a sharing state only does so in order to perform counterintelligence activities afterwards.

4.2.3 The differences and similarities in intelligence and strategic culture

Besides the possible costs and benefits that can be weighed against each other, the arguments by Svendsen (2009) also provides a different approach to the possible use of multilateral intelligence liaison. A more cultural approach to intelligence liaison, in which non-reciprocal intelligence liaison is achieved through the more ethical and constitutional similarities between states. It is therefore important to address these arguments again briefly, and explore whether the literature provides any other insights to this approach towards intelligence liaison.

Svendsen argues that ethical principles and constitutional similarities could explain why such types of intelligence liaison occur. When according to Svendsen states share a certain ethical principle, for example certain principles on human rights and the morality to protect them, then intelligence on for example crimes against these human rights might be shared with likeminded

states. This not necessarily for the state's own gain, but rather because it feels a moral obligation to contribute in the preservation of these rights.

Importantly also, according to Svendsen, is the role of the legal or constitutional basis of the states (Svendsen, 2009, p. 718). When the constitution of a state highlights certain values such as freedom or the right to something, then states with similar constitutional principles might feel more inclined to help other states in preserving these similar constitutional principles. As mentioned before, the original 'five eyes' intelligence agreement between several states of the Commonwealth is a good example. As the member-states (U.K., U.S., Canada, New-Zealand, and Australia) all share a history of U.K. involvement, their ethical values and constitutional principles are quite similar, which could explain the creation of the UKUSA agreement (Svendsen, 2009, p. 718).

Arguing this from a European perspective is possible, although historically speaking the members of the EU seem to have widely different histories, in which differences often seem more obvious than commonalities. However, even among the vastly different states of the EU, there are certain ethical similarities. Proof of which is the European Convention on Human Rights, in which the EU members all acknowledged that humans have certain universal rights, which are to be enforced upon by the EU Member States (Council of Europe, 2010, p. 5).

However, the same argument can be used as negative factor influencing the use and existence of multilateral intelligence liaison. One of the scholars who has been extensively researching the impact of different intelligence cultures and strategic cultures to an intelligence liaison relationship is Richard Aldrich. What Aldrich in his 2009 article argues, is that when looking at the approaches to for example terrorism among different states, that there are vastly different approaches observable. Where the U.S. considers terrorism to be an external problem, many European states consider terrorism an internal problem (Aldrich, 2009, pp. 122-123).

Although the strategic culture might be different between the many states, according to Aldrich, this is hardly ever a reason for intelligence agencies to co-operate in both bilateral or multilateral liaison relationships. According to Aldrich the world of intelligence is broken up into many different smaller parts, where for example states have multiple intelligence agencies which in turn have several, sometimes autonomous, departments. This causes differences between ideals and strategy to be quite common, and therefore have less influence on intelligence co-operation relationships (Aldrich, 2009, p. 124).

So, what then is it about the differences in intelligence and strategic culture, that negatively influences intelligence liaison relationships? One of the ways according to Aldrich, is the fact that the difference in these ideals and strategy might not be an issue for the agencies themselves, but that they are to the societies of the states. Most Western states, such as the U.S. and EU member states, have to deal with oversight committees monitoring their intelligence activities. The accountability mechanisms in place within these states, could therefore pose a serious threat to the co-operation between states which have different intelligence or strategic cultures, as societal or political unrest can be caused due to the oversight reporting (Aldrich, 2009, p. 125).

Applying this logic to the debate on bilateral versus multilateral intelligence liaison, one could easily understand why allowing more than two parties in an intelligence liaison relationship would be problematic in the sense of having different intelligence and strategic cultures. The problem of conflicting ideals and strategies will only increase, as the number of parties involved increase. Causing a higher likelihood to participate in bilateral intelligence liaison than in multilateral intelligence liaison.

4.3 Conclusion

To finalize the extensive literature review on intelligence liaison, and in order to proceed to the second part of the thesis, the several findings of the literature review will be concluded, and a short overview of the different factors influencing multilateral intelligence liaison is provided.

It proves to be quite difficult to fully answer this question from one perspective, as the literature review has shown that when it comes to intelligence liaison, there are several different ways one can look at the role, functioning, and reasoning behind intelligence liaison. Where scholars such as Clough (2004) and Sims (2006) consider intelligence liaison as a form of barter between intelligence agencies, other scholars such as Svendsen (2009) and Aldrich (2009) focus less on this trait. Despite that, one can confidently argue that within intelligence liaison, the idea of making exchanges between agencies is an important aspect. This exchange, whether it be of equal value or not, is often influenced by strategic, political, and even economic motives.

Due to this, assessing the value of an exchange is to be considered a complex and often highly secretive business. When it comes to multilateral intelligence liaison, the nature of such an intelligence liaison seems contradictory to this barter, as it often involves asymmetric or even non-reciprocal intelligence sharing. Reasons for why this type of intelligence liaison is therefore

considered desired or undesired depends highly on the costs and benefits that each multilateral intelligence liaison relationship holds.

Important costs are the increased risks of multilateral intelligence liaison compared to bilateral intelligence liaison. Certain risks, such as a negative comparative decision advantage, and leaking of sources and methods, are argued to increase when intelligence liaison is conducted on a multilateral level. This increasing the costs of the cost benefit analysis in a negative way, which causes states to be less likely to participate in the relationship.

Another cost highlighted in the literature which can negatively influence the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison are the management difficulties within intelligence liaison. The chances of circular reasoning is always present within intelligence liaison, but again seem to increase when the number of actors are increased. This also negatively influencing the cost benefit analysis.

Contrary to these, the literature also provides some benefits that could potentially outweigh the costs, when it comes to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. One of the more commonly named positive benefits is the fact that multiple states can consider the same things as a threat to their state, which in turn allows them to co-operate in order to combat these threats. When doing this in a multilateral setting, possible important intelligence can be shared among a larger amount of states quicker and easier, which in turn could increase effectiveness in combatting the shared threat.

Also, from a strategical perspective it could be considered useful to participate in multilateral intelligence liaison. This either out of dependency because an intelligence agency lacks the means to find their own intelligence, or because of more dubious reasons such as gaining access in order to perform counterintelligence actions.

Apart from the cost benefit analysis is the argument that states who share commonalities in ethical or moral principles. Also constitutional similarities are argued to positively influence the existence and use of multilateral intelligence liaison. However, as other scholars have pointed out, differences in strategy or intelligence culture, could diminish such ethical and constitutional similarities, as democratic checks could lead to potential risks for the intelligence agencies.

The following table creates an overview of the different found factors of influences on the use and existence of multilateral intelligence liaison. Now that the overview has been created, the

second part of the research can be conducted. By analysing the developments and activities of the Dutch intelligence agencies in multilateral intelligence liaison, the case hopes to find which of the above-mentioned factors has been able to explain the Dutch participation in multilateral intelligence liaison from 2003 up until 2016.

Factors of influence on multilateral intelligence liaison	
POSITIVE FACTORS	NEGATIVE FACTORS
Combatting a common threat more effectively	Increased risks
Dependency or Strategy	Increased Management difficulties
Ethical or constitutional similarities	Differences in strategic or intelligence culture

Chapter 5: Case Analysis

In the following chapter, the analysis of the three different perspectives is presented. The findings of the research will be presented for each of the different angles of observation. Starting with the perspective of the intelligence agencies in section 5.1 and 5.2, then the perspective of the media in section 5.3, and finally the political perspective in section 5.4. In section 5.5 some definite conclusions from the analysis will be made, which in turn will be used in the discussion chapter.

5.1 The status of multilateral intelligence liaison before 2003

The following section briefly discusses the status of multilateral intelligence liaison by the Netherlands, two years before the initial major terrorist attack occurred in Europe. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the role of intelligence liaison seemed to have increased substantially as can be seen in the literature review. By starting at the year 2002, the research focuses on the period just after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but several years before the first wave of terrorist attacks in Europe. By analysing the status of intelligence liaison up until 2002, an understanding can be later made on the developments over the following years.

5.1.1 Dutch legislation on intelligence liaison

In the Netherlands, the year 2002 appears to have been an important year within the intelligence community of the country. It was in the year 2002, that the previously existing intelligence agencies of the Netherlands, the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst) and the MID (Militaire Inlichtingendienst), were transformed into the intelligence known to this day in the Netherlands. These being the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) and the MIVD (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst). This mainly due to the fact that a new legislation on intelligence agencies was put into action by the Dutch government, known as WIV 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002). In this legislation, the legal basis has been formulated by the Dutch government which both of the Dutch intelligence agencies are to maintain. Mentioned in this WIV 2002, is to what extent the Dutch government allows for the agencies to participate co-operation with international intelligence partners. Article 36 of the WIV 2002 states that the intelligence agencies of the Netherlands are allowed to share intelligence with eligible intelligence and security agencies of other nations (Wiv 2002). The

conditions and regulations on intelligence exchange are highlighted in several articles, such as articles 37, 41, and 42 of the WIV 2002. What is stated in article 37 is of interest to this thesis, as it states that intelligence exchanged or shared with other agencies, as mentioned in article 36, are not allowed to share the provided intelligence with others. Also, as stated in article 59 of the WIV 2002, the heads of the intelligence agencies are responsible for maintaining the relationships with other nations' intelligence agencies (Wiv 2002).

5.1.2 Multilateral intelligence liaison up until 2002

In the annual report by the AIVD of 2002, there is already a mention the participation in several multilateral intelligence liaison relationships. These relationships include the following multilateral intelligence organizations and platforms: the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), the Middle European Conference (MEC), the NATO Special Committee, and Europol. Within the NATO Special Committee, the AIVD co-operated on a multilateral level through the ad hoc Analytical Cell, and within Europol through the Counter Terrorism Taskforce. Within the European Union, the AIVD used the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) as a platform to which intelligence was shared with other nations. The CTG gathered four times in 2002 (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2003, pp. 100-102). The MIVD, in their annual report on the year 2002, specifically highlight the close multilateral intelligence co-operation and exchange through NATO (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2003). Publicly, the AIVD or the MIVD do not mention being part of, or participating in, any other multilateral intelligence liaison platforms or relationships before the year before the year 2003.

5.2 The developments in the Netherlands according to the intelligence agencies

Now that an insight is provided as to the status of multilateral intelligence liaison in the Netherlands, an analysis of the developments can be held. By looking at the official documents provided by the Dutch organizations involved in intelligence, one can find out to what extent the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison has been evolving over the period from 2003 up until 2016. By looking at the official documentation from different perspectives, one should be able to obtain a clear understanding as to what extent the intelligence agencies themselves have been participating in multilateral intelligence liaison. The first perspective is the involvement by the agencies in multilateral intelligence liaison organizations. The second perspective, is the developments within the organizations as highlighted by the Dutch agencies.

In the third perspective, the analysis will focus on acknowledgements of the necessity or actual increase in participation within multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch organizations. In these acknowledgements, possible reasons for the developments can be found, as well as possible information on the developments of ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison.

5.2.1 Involvement in multilateral intelligence liaison

When going through the existing official documentation released by the Dutch AIVD, MIVD, and the Dutch oversight committee (CTIVD)¹, there are some interesting developments noticeable when it comes to the Dutch participation in several of the existing organizations multilateral intelligence liaison. The AIVD devotes short sections to the AIVD's participation in the various organizations involved in multilateral intelligence liaison over the past years, which can shed an insight into which organizations the AIVD in that specific year is involved in. The agency has also reported about the developments within the organizations, which are discussed in section 5.2.2.

When analysing the annual reports of the first five years of the period from 2003 up until 2016 (2003-2007), the reports highlight the several multilateral intelligence liaison organizations the AIVD has been involved in for each year. Interestingly, in the report of 2003, the AIVD highlights the involvement in setting up a new workgroup, in which an operational handbook is created that is to improve the creation of ad-hoc multinational teams to combat terrorism. The ability to create these ad-hoc multinational teams already existed in 2002, but in practice this ability seemed not to have been used. The handbook was to improve the creation of such multilateral teams among EU members, but was not yet created in 2003 (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2004, p. 97). In the reports of the following years, the AIVD mentions the different organizations separately, in which they highlight their participation. Up until 2007, the AIVD continues to highlight the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison through the Club of Berne, CTG, MEC, SitCen, and NATO.

A negative development on the AIVD's participation in multilateral intelligence liaison, is the AIVD's decreased interest in the MEC (Middle-Europe Conference). As acknowledged by the AIVD in the 2005 annual report, the MEC required too much time and effort, which is why the AIVD decided to substantially decrease the participation in the MEC from 2005 onward. The decreased involvement is also repeated in the 2007 annual report of the AIVD, and the 2009

¹ See Appendix 1 for complete overview of findings per year for both AIVD and MIVD.

CTIVD report on the co-operation between the AIVD and foreign intelligence agencies (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006, p. 97) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008, p. 102) (CTIVD, 2009, p. 42).

Also, to be found within the annual report of 2007, is the existence of a multilateral intelligence liaison organization called “Forum”, which is comprised of the civilian intelligence agencies of all EU member states. It highlights a new organization in which the AIVD is involved in multilateral intelligence liaison. One that had not been mentioned before. However, within no other official documentation by the AIVD, MIVD, or CTIVD on this organization, the new organization seemed not to have been used in any other year than 2007 (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008, p. 102).

After the annual report of 2007, the following nine available reports (2008-2016) seem to show a decline in the participation in several of the previously highlighted multilateral intelligence liaison organizations. In 2009, the CTIVD published an extensive report on the co-operation between the AIVD and foreign intelligence agencies. A special chapter was devoted to multilateral co-operation, in which the CTIVD clearly highlights the AIVD’s active participation in multilateral intelligence liaison in the Club of Berne, the CTG, and the SitCen. (CTIVD, 2009, pp. 40-42). However, from 2008 onward, the annual reports of the AIVD seem to show less active participation in especially the Club of Berne. After 2007, there is no more reporting on participation in any of the annual reports. Also, since 2007, participation in SitCen is only reported once more in the annual report of 2010 (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2011, p. 33).

The AIVD brings no new organizations to light over the same period, but does almost yearly mention the active participation in multilateral intelligence liaison through the Counter Terrorist Group and NATO (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2007) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2009) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2010) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2012) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2013) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2014) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2015) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016a) (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2017).

The MIVD has also been publishing annual reports during the period between 2003 and 2017, in which several developments in multilateral intelligence liaison are highlighted. With military intelligence as their field of expertise, the MIVD reports focus mainly on the multilateral co-

operation and liaison through the EU and NATO. In the annual reports of the MIVD, both the NATO and the EU are continuously highlighted as the organizations through which multilateral intelligence liaison takes place. No other new international organizations that serve as multilateral intelligence liaison platforms are included in the reports over the past years. The amount organizations in which the MIVD was involved during the studied period, has therefore remained the same (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2004) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2005) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2007) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2009) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2010) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2011) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2012) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2013) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2014) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2015) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2017).

The in 2015 produced oversight report by the CTIVD on the intelligence co-operation with other nations, came to the same conclusion, that the only two official organizations in which the MIVD was involved in multilateral intelligence liaison were through NATO and the EU (CTIVD, 2015, pp. 40-42). However, the description of their involvement within the organizations is more extensive, which improves the available information on the development of the organizations themselves when it comes to multilateral intelligence liaison. The developments within the organizations are to be discussed separately per organization.

5.2.2 Developments within the organizations

A second way in which the development of the use of multilateral intelligence liaison in the Netherlands is analysed, is through looking at the developments within the organizations in which the Dutch intelligence agencies are involved. Several developments within the organizations related to multilateral intelligence liaison are highlighted by the agencies themselves, and therefore show in which ways the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison has been changing over the period from 2003 up until 2016.

Club of Berne

As mentioned before, the Club of Berne was of seemingly high importance to the Dutch AIVD up until the year 2007, after which the AIVD no longer reported using the Club of Berne when

discussing their activities in multilateral intelligence liaison. This does however not mean that the Club of Berne is no longer used since 2007. However, when researching official documents from other states, one can find a reason why the Club of Berne has been getting increasingly less attention in the Dutch intelligence agencies reports. In 2004, a press statement by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police explained that during the 2004 meeting of the Club of Berne, it was agreed among the member states that the Counter Terrorist Group is to serve as the interface between the EU and the heads of member states' intelligence agencies (Federal Department of Justice and Police, 2004). With that, the CTG has become an increasingly more important over the Club of Berne as a platform to conduct multilateral intelligence liaison activities. That being said, in 2011 Andrew Rettman from the EU Observer acknowledged that, despite the possible decrease of importance of the Club of Berne, the 'Club' was still gathering annually (Rettman, 2011).

Counter Terrorist Group

The Counter Terrorist Group, has remained an important platform for especially the AIVD when it comes to participating in multilateral intelligence liaison, since it is one of the few organizations that is continuously highlighted as one of the used platforms in the period between 2003 and 2017. According to Van Buuren (2007), an important improvement to the CTG, was the created connection between the CTG and SitCen in 2004. Intelligence processed and exchanged through the CTG, would from 2004 onwards also be forwarded to the SitCen. This in order to improve the exchange of the intelligence further within the EU related organization SitCen (Van Buuren, 2009, p. 11).

A second important development the AIVD highlights in the annual report of 2015, is the AIVD's active steering to set up a new database and platform to improve intelligence exchange within the CTG. The developments accelerated in 2015, partly due to the terrorist attacks of November 13th, 2015 in Paris (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016a, p. 38). In 2015, the discussion was led by the Dutch, and in January 2016, the AIVD announced in a press release that from July 1st, 2016 onward, the Counter Terrorist Group would be using a new platform that was to enhance and accelerate the exchange of intelligence amongst the members of the CTG (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016b). According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, the platform is located in the headquarters of the AIVD in Zoetermeer (Diehl, 2016).

According to the AIVD annual report on 2016, the platform is a serious improvement when it comes to multilateral intelligence sharing, as the physical platform allows for everyday meetings between the employees of the different national intelligence agencies (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2017, p. 5). Where before 2003, the CTG only gathered once every three months, the creation of the physical platform can be considered a substantial improvement when it comes to multilateral intelligence liaison. An improvement in which the Dutch AIVD has been playing a very active role.

Middle European Conference

Contrary to the developments of the CTG, are the developments related to the MEC. Although not a lot of information on the members of the MEC was ever made public, the AIVD has acknowledged being a member of the MEC in the years prior to 2003. As mentioned before, the AIVD significantly decreased the participation in the MEC in 2005 (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006). As of that moment, the AIVD has stopped reporting on the MEC, and no further information on the development was produced by the AIVD. The lost interest in the MEC can be considered as a negative development when it comes to the development of Dutch participation in multilateral intelligence liaison.

European Union

Throughout the period between 2003 and 2017, the European Union has been continuously referred to by both the AIVD and the MIVD. Even though the AIVD seems to refer less to using the EU organizations than the MIVD, for both organizations the EU based Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) remains quite important throughout the studied period. However, no developments within the SitCen are mentioned by either the AIVD or the MIVD, which indicates that the SitCen most likely functions under the same conditions as before the studied period. However, one of the developments mentioned by the AIVD, is that there have been some developments concerning the implementation of other organizations with SitCen.

As mentioned above, in 2004 the CTG was connected to SitCen, which granted SitCen with more intelligence which had been shared through the CTG. Also, in the annual report on 2007, the AIVD acknowledges that SitCen is also been sharing the information with Europol, again spreading the intelligence further within different multilateral organizations (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008, p. 101). In 2008, the MIVD also acknowledges the agencies involvement in both SitCen and the EUMS Intelligence Division/Directorate. In 2008, the EUMS Intelligence Support System was introduced, which was especially designed to

improve the intelligence co-operation between the members of EUMS (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2009, p. 55). Other developments within EUMS Intelligence Division/Directorate, is the appointment of a High Representative for the External Action Service, of which the EUMS is a part. This was agreed through the 2010 Lisbon Treaty, and therefore further formalizes and strengthens the position of the EUMS within the European Union.

A final development noticeable within the EU in multilateral intelligence liaison, is through the European Defence Agency. In 2007, the MIVD introduces the participation of a project through the EDA, called Team Intelligence. This project is designed improve intelligence co-operation and increase intelligence exchange within the members of the EDA (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008, p. 53). However, this project group is only reported on by the MIVD from 2007 up until 2011. Further research of the current status of the project team rendered no results.

NATO

Between 2003 and 2017, NATO has witnessed developments that influence the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison. One of the first developments noticeable through the Dutch intelligence agencies, is in 2004. Together with the member states of NATO, the AIVD founded and participated in the TTIU (Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit). This unit was founded to bundle both civilian and military intelligence in order to combat the increased terrorist threat. As a result, the ad-hoc organization called Analytical Cell was dismantled and replaced by the TTIU (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst , 2005, p. 103).

A second development within NATO, came one year later, when the MIVD assisted in the creation of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). A centre designed to share intelligence among NATO member states, and thus provide for an improvement in multilateral intelligence liaison (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006, p. 15). The NIFC became fully operational in the year 2007, according to the MIVD (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2008, p. 53).

Another important platform has been developing within NATO over the studied period, is the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). This system, although already created by the nations before 2003, has been further developed by the NATO members, in order to increase and streamline the flow of intelligence towards the system. In 2008, the MIVD spoke of a significant expansion and development of the BICES, which in turn led to a

high increase in the usage of the system (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2009, p. 54). Also, in both the annual reports of 2015 and 2016, the MIVD reports of an agreement among NATO members to further develop BICES in order to increase multilateral intelligence liaison (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016, p. 63) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2017, p. 44).

A final important development within NATO worth mentioning, is the development in 2014 of the Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR). This agreement is based on the principle of “need to share”, instead of the traditional “need to know”. Meaning that the agreement sets out to improve multilateral intelligence liaison, by including all of the member states of NATO instead of only those who need to be included (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2015, pp. 63-64).

Europol

When it comes to Europol, the annual reports and the oversight reports are surprisingly limited as to their involvement within Europol. Besides the previously mentioned exchange of intelligence between SitCen and Europol, and the CTG and Europol, the reports make no further notice of the multilateral intelligence liaison that takes place through Europol. The Counter Terrorism Taskforce that was mentioned in 2002, is not mentioned again in any of the reports from 2003 till 2017. The reason for why there is little mention of Europol in the reports can be due to the fact that the intelligence liaison takes place in SitCen and the CTG, and are then transferred to Europol. As a result, there is possibly little direct contact between the intelligence agencies and Europol. However, further research into the developments within Europol does show that also within the organization, efforts have been made to increase multilateral intelligence liaison. The best example of this is the, in 2016 created, European Counter Terrorism Centre. The terrorist threat among the member states of the European Union, has been the root of the creation of this new centre, which, besides many other things, also focusses on the improvement of intelligence sharing (Europol, 2017).

5.2.3. Statements and acknowledgements

The third way in which one can look at the developments of multilateral intelligence liaison from the perspective of the intelligence agencies themselves, is through the agencies statements on the subject. Within the annual reports and several oversight reports, some statements are made on the idea of participating in multilateral intelligence liaison. The perspective of the

agencies towards multilateral intelligence liaison is important to discuss, as their perspective also indicates to what extent the agencies are willing to participate in multilateral intelligence liaison. Compared to the previous findings, this can also provide information on the developments when it comes to ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison.

The AIVD

In the annual report of 2003, the AIVD states that due to the increased threats, such as the war in Iraq and international terrorism, the demand for international co-operation has increased. These increased threats have mainly influenced the development of bilateral liaison relationships, with expansions throughout the world of the AIVD bilateral liaison network (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2004, p. 98). This is again affirmed by the AIVD two years later, as it states that the most prominent role in the AIVD's international co-operation is fulfilled by the bilateral liaison relationships (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006, pp. 98-100).

No new statements on the willingness to participate or improve ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison is made up until 2010. In that year, the AIVD acknowledges that with a select group of intelligence agencies intelligence was shared on individuals who were performing intelligence activities against the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2011, p. 21). The annual report of 2012 adds a new incentive by the AIVD to improve intelligence liaison relationships, namely the increasing speed in which technological advancements are made within modern society. To keep up with all the advancements, the AIVD has been increasingly exchanging and co-operating with a select group of foreign intelligence agencies (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2013, p. 14).

Contrary to that is the acknowledgement in 2013, that the co-operation and therefore liaison remains based on a principle of *Quid Pro Quo*, in which intelligence liaison is only fruitful when the AIVD is also willing to share with others. In the same report, it highlights the importance of a shared cause upon which a liaison relationship is based (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2014, p. 33). In 2016 however, with the founding of a new data platform in the CTG, the AIVD acknowledges that the events of 2016 (referring to the several terrorist attacks in Europe) have shown that combatting terrorism is impossible without international co-operation in intelligence. Resulting in the improvement of multilateral intelligence liaison through the CTG (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2017, p. 5).

The MIVD

Throughout its annual reports, the MIVD refers to their willingness to participate in multilateral intelligence liaison multiple times. In the 2004 annual report of the MIVD, the agency clearly specifies that most of the conducted intelligence liaison is conducted through bilateral relationships with international partners, outside of the NATO and the EU (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2005, p. 13). The preference of bilateral intelligence liaison over the multilateral variant is again highlighted in the annual report of 2006, in which the MIVD states that the third-party rule of intelligence liaison prevents the occurrence and willingness to participate in multilateral intelligence liaison (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2007, p. 54).

However, especially from 2008 onwards, the MIVD shares more information on improvements in multilateral intelligence liaison participation through NATO and the EU. In 2009, the MIVD also confirms the use and importance of ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison. In so-called communities of interest, ad hoc liaison takes place between several partners, within a defined framework of themes and regions in which it co-operates. In a time in which the threats becoming increasingly asymmetric, this type of intelligence liaison seems to become the trend (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2010, p. 66). Moving forward towards 2015, the MIVD acknowledges that due to the increasing threat at both the eastern and southern borders of the NATO community, the importance of multilateral intelligence liaison has increased. As a result, the multilateral intelligence co-operation has increased through NATO organizations, which have led to an improvement for multilateral intelligence liaison (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2016, p. 63).

Oversight committees and parliamentary reports

A final way in which the progress of multilateral intelligence liaison is analysed, is through the several reports created by the Dutch government oversight committee on intelligence agencies and some of the ad hoc reports investigating the intelligence agencies. In the report by the Commission Davids (2010), which investigated the role of the AIVD and MIVD in the intelligence related to the war in Iraq, the commission concluded that between 2002 and 2003, the agencies mainly participated in bilateral intelligence liaison when gathering intelligence on the weapons programme of Iraq (Davids, 2010, p. 284). Due to the failed intelligence related to the weapons programme of Iraq, mainly because it was based on intelligence gained from the United States and the United Kingdom, the commission also stressed the importance of the

ability of the agencies to gather their own intelligence. Stressing the danger of becoming too dependent on the intelligence gained through liaison (Davids, 2010, pp. 328-339).

The conclusion of the Commission Davids was confirmed in the report by Commission Dessens, who evaluated the legislation on the intelligence agencies (Wiv 2002) (Dessens, 2013, p. 9). The CTIVD oversight reports on the co-operation between foreign intelligence agencies shed an affirming insight when it comes to the use of both bilateral and multilateral intelligence liaison. The 2009 CTIVD report affirms the use of the several institutional multilateral intelligence liaison platforms mentioned above by the AIVD. However, next to that the CTIVD states that the main method of intelligence liaison remains bilateral. The main reason provided by the CTIVD for this preference is because the intelligence through bilateral intelligence liaison is limitedly available, compared to multilaterally exchanged intelligence. According to the CTIVD, limitedly available intelligence is more valuable than broadly accessible intelligence, creating a preference for bilateral intelligence liaison over multilateral intelligence liaison. This is mainly because of the Quid Pro Quo rule, that is often maintained within bilateral intelligence liaison relationships (CTIVD, 2015, p. 40).

However, despite the continuing importance of bilateral intelligence liaison, the commission also increasingly notices the use of ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison. This especially in the context of combatting terrorism. This because the nations share the same interest, when it comes to combatting terrorism (CTIVD, 2009, pp. 40-41). A similar report by the CTIVD on the MIVD's liaison relationships with foreign agencies, expands further on the use of multilateral intelligence liaison and the reasons why it is used. According to the CTIVD, multilateral intelligence liaison takes place when there is a shared purpose, in which the exchange of intelligence and co-operation is to benefit the shared purpose. This is especially useful in crisis management operations, such as counterterrorism and anti-piracy. Something that can be done through the more institutionalized platforms such as NATO and the EU, but also through ad hoc relationships. The commission has observed that in an increasing fashion, this type of multilateral liaison has been used (CTIVD, 2015, pp. 40-43).

5.2.4 Conclusion

Having analysed the developments in multilateral intelligence liaison according to the Dutch agencies through several perspectives, namely the changes in the number of involved organizations, the developments within these organizations, and the acknowledgements by the

intelligence agencies and the governmental committees, the general developments concerning the use of multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch intelligence agencies can be concluded.

Analysing the number of organizations in which the Dutch agencies are involved, a funnelling process can be observed. The amount of observable organizations through which the agencies have been active in multilateral intelligence liaison has decreased, however during the same period, the organizations in which the Dutch agencies have been involved in multilateral intelligence liaison have continuously developed new networks, workgroups, and centres through which multilateral intelligence liaison is stimulated.

Highlighted by the agencies themselves, is the active role of the Dutch agencies in the development of such new platforms, of which the AIVD's effort to improve multilateral intelligence liaison through the CTG is most actively communicated. Also, the MIVD and the oversight reports acknowledge some of the proactive stances by the Dutch agencies in the establishment process of improved multilateral intelligence liaison. Additionally, not only by the agencies themselves, but also by the several committees, the increased use over the studied period of ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison relationships has been acknowledged.

Contrary to these developments is the acknowledgement by the MIVD, that within intelligence liaison, bilateral intelligence liaison is considered a preferred method of intelligence liaison over the multilateral variant. Also, the Commission Dessens concluded that the ability of the Dutch agencies to gather their own intelligence remains of vital importance, as a state should not become too dependent on using intelligence liaison as a means of gathering intelligence.

Throughout the analysis of the many different documents, a single reason appears to continuously be used as the main motivation for this positive development in the use and participation in multilateral intelligence liaison. Although not always specified, several annual reports have indicated the increased shared threat, such as the terrorist threat or geopolitical threats, as a reason for why states have agreed to improve their intelligence liaison. Where the terrorist threat seems to have been the main motivator for the improvements within the CTG, the increased geopolitical threats on the eastern and southern borders of the EU and NATO have been the reason for improvements in multilateral intelligence liaison through NATO and EU organizations such as SitCen and EUMS. Also, the increased use of ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison as highlighted by the CTIVD is motivated according to the committee due to the increased terrorist threat.

This makes the conclusion of the intelligence perspective relatively simple. Although the agencies and oversight reports continue to perceive bilateral intelligence liaison as the preferred method of intelligence liaison, the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison has increased over the period between 2003 and 2016.

5.3 Developments in media coverage

As mentioned in chapter 3, the perspective of the intelligence agencies themselves is important, but it does not necessarily depict the developments in multilateral intelligence liaison properly. As a result, the analysis also focuses on the developments within the media when it comes to multilateral intelligence liaison. This in order to see whether the same development is observable, and to gain a deeper understanding of the reasoning behind the developments. The findings of the newspaper analysis are therefore presented.

5.3.1 The NRC

Having analysed the articles which came forward from the used search terms, the NRC delivered around 60 different articles. Having analysed the articles, there were several articles that related to the use of intelligence liaison, both bilateral and multilateral². Out of those articles, several of them were about increasing the use of intelligence liaison without specifying what type of liaison. Other articles argue for an increased or improved use of bilateral intelligence liaison or multilateral intelligence liaison specifically. Out of all of the articles, a handful were about improving or increasing the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Interestingly, there was not a single article, that specified diminishing or decreasing the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Some articles, especially around the time of the Snowden leaks, were questioning the special bilateral relationships the Dutch have with for example the United States. However, none of these articles mentioned the use of multilateral intelligence liaison, and therefore do not serve a purpose in analysing the developments of multilateral intelligence liaison³.

The following table shows the figures for the NRC media coverage on the demand for increased or improved use of intelligence liaison:

² For entire overview of findings, please see Appendix 3

³ All references to used NRC articles can be found in the Reference List under author: NRC

Table 1: Number of NRC articles per year, specified per type of intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Arguing for more bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison	0	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
Total	0	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	5

Table 1 shows, that the demand for more multilateral intelligence liaison is divided over two periods. This is in the period around 2004, and in the period between 2014 and 2016. As there are no articles in the NRC found that argue for less use of multilateral intelligence liaison, the opinion pieces, or the opinions of those quoted in the articles, seem to resemble a positive development when it comes to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison.

However, when comparing the number of articles arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison, to the number of articles that argue for more intelligence liaison, bilateral, multilateral, or unspecified, the percentage of articles arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison is 33% in 2004. For the period between 2014 and 2016, this percentage is higher, at 71.43%. Also, the actual number of articles arguing for multilateral intelligence liaison is also higher. This could mean, that from a media perspective, the perception of using multilateral intelligence liaison as a form of liaison, has been increasing significantly comparing the two periods between 2003 and 2016. Where in 2004 the argument for multilateral intelligence liaison was only opted for in 1 out of three times, in the period between 2014 and 2016, over two-third of the articles argued for an increase in multilateral intelligence liaison.

Also, the difference between the number of articles arguing for bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison is changing between the two periods. In the 2004 period there were still six articles promoting bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison, against three articles promoting multilateral intelligence liaison. In the period between 2014 and 2016, this difference has

shifted in favour of multilateral intelligence liaison, with only two articles arguing for more bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison, against five articles arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison.

5.3.2 De Volkskrant

A similar analysis has been conducted on the second Dutch newspaper, De Volkskrant. Using the same search terms as the ones used for the NRC, the number of different articles that came up were somewhat lower than those of the NRC, and totalled around 40 articles. As a result, the number of articles related to the use of intelligence liaison were somewhat lower as well. Again, there were no articles that argued against the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Just with the NRC, the only articles discussing a review of intelligence liaison relationships, were related to bilateral liaison relationships in the wake of the Snowden leaks ⁴. Out of the analysis, the following figures were obtained when it came to the Dutch participation in multilateral intelligence liaison⁵:

Table 2: Number of Volkskrant articles per year, specified per type of intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Arguing for more bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
Arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Total	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	4

Just like in the NRC, the articles on multilateral intelligence liaison are focussed around the period between 2003 till 2005, and the years 2015 and 2016. Again here, there were no articles

⁴ For entire overview of findings, please see Appendix 3
⁵ All references to used Volkskrant articles can be found in the Reference List under author: Volkskrant

found that argued against the use of multilateral intelligence liaison, which indicates the positive attitude towards multilateral intelligence liaison by the media. The actual number of articles arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison doubled between the first and the second period, showing an increasingly positive attitude from the media on the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. This seems to be confirmed when comparing the number of articles on multilateral intelligence liaison to all of the articles that argue for more intelligence liaison in general. In the first period, 50% of the articles on intelligence liaison were arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison. In the second period, this percentage was at 80%. Showing that multilateral intelligence liaison is increasingly considered by the media as the type of intelligence liaison that is to increase or improve.

5.3.3 De Telegraaf

The following figures were obtained after the conducting the same analysis on the newspaper De Telegraaf. The outcome was similar to that of the other newspapers, with no articles negatively discussing the use of multilateral intelligence liaison⁶. Out of the three newspapers, De Telegraaf generated the least number of articles on intelligence liaison⁷.

Table 3: Number of Telegraaf articles per year, specified per type of intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Arguing for more bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4

⁶ All references to used Telegraaf articles can be found in the Reference List under author: Telegraaf
⁷ For entire overview of findings, please see Appendix 3

What can be observed from the following data, is that when it comes to the articles of De Telegraaf, there was only one year in which the newspaper argued for more multilateral intelligence liaison, being in 2016. Compared to the other newspapers, there was nothing written in the period between 2003 and 2005, on multilateral intelligence liaison. Over the studied period, the development in the actual number of articles is therefore slightly positive. As there were no articles arguing negatively against multilateral intelligence liaison, the balance between negative and positive articles is also slightly positive, although it is only minimal. What is interesting to see, when also looking at the number of articles that argue for an increase in intelligence liaison itself, that in the years 2003 and 2004, there have been two articles written on the subject. However, multilateral intelligence liaison was not argued as an option for improvement or development. In the period of the years 2015 and 2016, there were also articles on intelligence liaison, of which some were arguing for more multilateral intelligence liaison. However, the total number of articles on intelligence liaison itself had also more than doubled, in that period, which in turn could explain why there is also a rise in the argumentation for multilateral intelligence liaison.


5.3.4 Reasoning in the media and timing

Besides the actual numbers of articles, the analysis of the articles also aimed to find the reasoning mentioned in the articles for why multilateral intelligence liaison is to be improved or intensified. Not all the articles specified a specific reason for why intelligence liaison is to improve, but most of them did a reason. Having analysed all the mentioned reasons for improved or enhanced intelligence liaison, both bilateral or unspecified and multilateral, four categories for reasons can be formulated⁸. These being:

- Sharing a common threat
- Sharing a military mission
- Being dependent on other states for intelligence
- Current multilateral intelligence liaison being inefficient

⁸ See Appendix 3 for full overview of the media analysis

Figure 1: Percentage of reasons per type of intelligence liaison for each different category



As can be seen in figure 1, the reason of a shared problem or threat has been used almost solely when arguing for more intelligence liaison, both for the bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison, as well as the multilateral intelligence liaison. For the improvement or increased use of multilateral intelligence liaison the percentage was 86%. Quite often, the threat or problem that was referred to in the articles as a reason to increase multilateral intelligence liaison was the threat of terrorism. The article by Javier Solana (2004) in NRC for example, in which he describes three ways to restrain terrorism, multilateral intelligence liaison is stressed as something that needs to be improved, for example through the European Union. This indicates that multilateral liaison is needed as one of the ways to combat terrorism (Solana, 2004). If provided, the reason for the use of multilateral intelligence liaison was almost always derived from a terrorist threat perspective. Only two articles on multilateral intelligence liaison were not related to the terrorist threat, one was related to the UN peace mission in Mali in 2014, and the other was related to the ineffective functioning of Europol back in 2003.


Also, the timing of the articles on multilateral intelligence liaison, and the fact that they all seem to appear within the same periods, cannot be considered independent from the terrorist threat. As shown above, the reasoning provided within the articles to improve or increase the use of multilateral intelligence liaison is often the shared or increased terrorist threat. As mentioned before, the European continent was struck with two waves of terrorist attacks over the studied period. This in 2004 and 2005, with the large-scale attacks in Madrid and London, and the attack on Theo van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands. The second period being the period of 2015 up until now, with the several attacks France, Belgium, and Germany. When comparing

these waves of terror with the appearance of these articles on multilateral intelligence liaison, which have been peaking in the same periods,

5.3.5 Conclusion

As can be seen from figure 2, the media attention and demand for increased multilateral intelligence liaison occurred in two periods. These periods, as can be observed in figure two were the period from 2003 up until 2006 and from 2013 up until 2016.

Figure 2: Articles on multilateral intelligence liaison of all three newspapers



The three newspapers seem to spend no attention to the topic during the period between 2006 and 2013. Bilateral intelligence liaison is in that period a point of discussion, however the articles do not seem to link the discussion of bilateral intelligence liaison to multilateral intelligence liaison. This limits the media analysis as it does not provide the possibility to include and compare the more critical articles on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison. This simply because these articles have no critical articles on multilateral intelligence liaison to compare them with. As a result, looking at the numbers only, the simple conclusion can be drawn that from a media perspective, the demand for multilateral intelligence liaison has peaked in two periods, and that compared to bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison, multilateral intelligence liaison is becoming a more popular method of intelligence liaison.

Figure 3: Number of articles on multilateral intelligence liaison within the total number of articles on intelligence liaison




Figure 3 shows, when one compares the two periods, is that a clear development can be distinguished in the amount of attention the articles pay to the improvement or increased use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Where in the first period, most of the articles were on improving liaison without specifically referring to multilateral intelligence liaison, the second period has seen more attention and demand for multilateral intelligence liaison within the discussion on the use of intelligence liaison. As can be seen in the graph, the discussion on increased use intelligence liaison has almost been completely dominated by the demand for better multilateral intelligence liaison in the second period. Something that was not the case at the earlier period around 2004.

A second, and perhaps equally important aspect on the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison, was derived from the reasoning each article gave for the use of both types of intelligence liaison. Although a difference between bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison and multilateral intelligence liaison cannot be observed, the demand for an increased or improved use of both types of intelligence liaison seems to be highly motivated by sharing a common threat with other states. Especially the shared terrorist threat seems to be the motivator for the media to argue for an increased or improved use of both bilateral or multilateral intelligence liaison.

5.4 The developments in political opinion

A third way in which this thesis sets out to examine the developments of multilateral intelligence liaison and the conditions in which it takes place, is by looking at the political perspective towards the concept. Intelligence agencies are public organizations and therefore reflect to some degree the political perspective towards multilateral intelligence liaison, which has already been discussed. However, the level of analysis is different, as many politicians do not know what exactly takes place within the intelligence agencies. Also, only a few politicians are included within the decision-making process of the Dutch intelligence agencies. As a result, an analysis of the parliamentary discussions on multilateral intelligence liaison will provide with an additional perspective on the concept.

5.4.1 Parliamentary interest

To assess the amount of interest within the Dutch parliament on the topic of multilateral intelligence liaison, an analysis has been made on the parliamentary debates on the topic of intelligence liaison and the presence of multilateral intelligence liaison. This by analysing the documentation on the questions asked by the opposition, and the answers provided to the questions by the cabinet. Having used several search terms as defined in chapter 3, the number of documents to study totalled at 127. Out of these, 45 documents or parliamentary discussions were related to the use of or participation in intelligence liaison. In several cases, the parliamentary debate revolved around a bilateral relationship, whilst other were unspecified as to a specific type of intelligence liaison and focused on the concept of intelligence liaison itself. Out of the 45 documents, 18 documents clearly specified the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. What makes analysing the parliamentary discussion interesting, is the fact that within politics, criticism on government activities is expressed. This criticism allows for a new perspective on the debate on intelligence liaison and the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. After having analysed all documents, the following figures can be presented^{9 10}.

⁹ For entire overview of political analysis and findings on Type, please see Appendix 4


¹⁰ For all references to parliamentary documents, please see Reference List

Table 4: Debates on intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Bilateral or Unspecified	3	3	1	0	1	1	2	0	2	3	1	4	3	3
Multilateral	1	3	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	3	3
Total	4	6	3	0	2	2	2	1	2	3	4	4	6	6

As can be seen in figure 4, a trend line is more difficult to observe compared to the media analysis when it comes to the spread of documents on intelligence liaison. Both documents on bilateral and multilateral intelligence liaison seem to be more evenly spread over the studied period. The highest number of documents are found in both the early period between 2003 and 2005, and the later period between 2013 and 2016. The differences in numbers between the middle period (from 2006 up until 2012) and the earlier and later period are minimal, but can be observed in the total number of documents on intelligence liaison. An odd year in the observed documents is the year 2014, in which four parliamentary discussions entailed intelligence liaison, but none of the discussions included the use or participation in multilateral intelligence liaison.

Figure 4: Total number for each year on parliamentary documents per category



5.4.2 Tone of the parliamentary debates

Analysing the documents in more detail, a distinction has been made in to what extent the parliamentary debates offer critics to the use of intelligence liaison, maintain a more neutral perspective, or show a positive development in the use of multilateral intelligence liaison. Both types of intelligence liaison (bilateral or unspecified and multilateral) have been judged according to the tone of the debate. For example, when the debate consisted of critical questions on an existing intelligence liaison relationship, the debate was characterized as critical. When for example intelligence liaison was explained as a solution to an issue, the debate had a positive perspective towards intelligence liaison. Neutral perspectives towards intelligence liaison also occurred, when for example a reference was made to already existing intelligence liaison relationships, or when the answer to the question included a statement referring to the successful use of intelligence liaison ¹¹. The following numbers were obtained from the analysis ¹².

Table 5: Tone of documents for Bilateral/ unspecified intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Critical	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	3
Neutral	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	1	0
Positive	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0


Table 6: Tone of documents for Multilateral intelligence liaison

	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16
Critical	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Neutral	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Positive	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	3	1

¹¹ For all references to parliamentary documents, please see Reference List

¹² For entire overview of political analysis and findings on Tone, please see Appendix 4

Figure 5: Difference in positive and critical tone for both types of intelligence liaison



When comparing the differences between the two types of intelligence liaison through the tone of the debate, an interesting development can be observed. When it comes to the number of positive debates, most of the debates involve the use on multilateral intelligence liaison. Similar to other analyses, the graph of the positive tone debates, show two clear peaks within the studied period, this again being the early period around 2004, and the later period around 2015. The periods of increased international terrorist activity within the European continent. The number of positive perceptions on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison is surprisingly low compared to the number of multilateral intelligence liaison.

Contrary to the positive debates are the critical debates, in which criticism on the use of intelligence liaison is expressed. Comparing the types of intelligence liaison within this category, an opposite trend can be observed. The number of critical debates on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison appears to be significantly higher than the critical debates on multilateral intelligence liaison. The graph shows three peak moments, instead of the two that were observed before. The criticism towards bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison seems to be high in the early period around 2004, the late period around 2015, and in the period around 2012. Critical debates on the use of multilateral intelligence liaison have occurred less frequent, with one debate in 2007, and interestingly two in 2016.

5.4.3 Context of the debates

A final way in which the debates have been analysed, is through which reasoning is behind the presence of intelligence liaison in the debate. In other words, in what context is intelligence liaison discussed? Having analysed all debates, most, but not all, of the debates clearly showed

why intelligence liaison was included in the debate. The contexts found in the debates can be categorized in six different categories ¹³. These are:

- Using intelligence liaison in combatting a shared problem or threat
- Using intelligence liaison for military conflict situations
- Changes to the intelligence capability of the Netherlands and the role of intelligence liaison
- Possible intelligence leak through intelligence liaison
- Possible political manipulation through intelligence liaison
- Possible unethical intelligence liaison relationships with states who do not match the Dutch criteria for intelligence liaison.

Placing the debates with a clear context into these categories, the results show a clear show in which context both types of intelligence liaison were used ¹⁴. Figure 6 shows the percentages for both types of intelligence liaison in relation to their context.

Figure 6: Percentage of debates per type of intelligence liaison for each different category




Figure 6 clearly shows that for both the bilateral or unspecified and the multilateral type of intelligence liaison, the concept was used in the context of combatting a shared problem or

¹³ For all references to parliamentary documents, please see Reference List

¹⁴ For entire overview of political analysis and findings on Context, please see Appendix 4

threat. In fact, 61% of the debates on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison took place within the context of combatting shared threats, such as international crime, terrorism, or the rallying of new foreign fighters. For the debates on multilateral intelligence liaison, the percentage is even higher at 77% (See appendix for all exact percentages per category). Bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison is sometimes categorized in the context of possible leaking of intelligence and possible unethical intelligence liaison relationships. Two contexts in which the multilateral version of intelligence liaison does not seem to appear. The only other contexts besides the combatting of a shared problem or threat, in which multilateral intelligence liaison is mentioned, is in relation to conflict intelligence liaison, changes in intelligence capability, and possible manipulation through intelligence liaison. This for example in the current Dutch UN peacebuilding mission to Mali. However, the percentages of occurrence in these contexts are significantly lower than the context of combatting a shared problem or threat.

5.4.4 Conclusion

Having looked at the many parliamentary debates on the use of intelligence liaison and the role of multilateral intelligence liaison within these debates, the analysis has provided with new interesting insights. Simply looking at the numbers of occurrence within the parliamentary debates, one can see that the numbers are more equally spread throughout the observed period compared to the attention in the media. However, despite this more equal spread, the two peak moments are similarly to the media analysis located within the periods 2003 up until 2005, and from 2013 up until 2016. These peaks can be especially observed when it comes to the debates on multilateral intelligence liaison, with only 2014 being showing an unexpected low amount of debates on multilateral intelligence liaison. Only to increase again in 2015, and remaining that level in 2016.

More interesting in the political perspective analysis, is the outcome after a differentiation has been made in the tone of the debate towards both bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison and multilateral intelligence liaison. As there are critical and positive debates on multilateral intelligence liaison, a comparison could be made with critical and positive debates on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison. This differentiation showed that when it comes to multilateral intelligence liaison, the debates have overall been predominantly positive, whereas the debates on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison was predominantly critical. Showing a more positive attitude by politicians when it comes to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison compared to bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison. Although the numbers between

the early period and the later period are quite similar, the criticism towards multilateral intelligence liaison seems to have increased in 2016, a year in which there were several terrorist attacks in Europe. In the earlier mentioned wave of terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005, from the parliament there seems to have been criticism on only bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison. What this potentially shows, is that the implemented multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch government with European partners after the first wave of terrorist attacks, seemed to have been unable to prevent the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016. This in turn has led to criticism on the use of multilateral intelligence liaison as an effective tool to prevent terrorist attacks.

That the debates on multilateral intelligence liaison are closely linked to terrorism and other forms of shared threats and problems, has become evident from the final part of the political analysis, in which the context of the debates was analysed. This part of the analysis shows that the debates on multilateral intelligence liaison, was predominantly held within the context of discussing some of the issues and threats the Dutch are faced with. Threats and issues that the Dutch share with other states, and that require international co-operation to counter. It is within that context that the politicians of the Netherlands often seek to discuss the role of multilateral intelligence liaison.

5.5 Conclusion of the analysis

Although the analysis above examines the extremely secretive subject of multilateral intelligence liaison from an outside perspective, there are some general conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis above. When it comes to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison over the period between 2003 and 2016, the analysis has shown that it has been used by the Dutch intelligence agencies as a way to gather intelligence. Indicating whether the use has increased during the studied period is not possible, as it would require an internal perspective which cannot be obtained within the Dutch intelligence apparatus. However, the above analysis does provide some interesting insights, on multilateral intelligence liaison, that can be used in the following chapter, in which the conclusions of the analysis is compared with the existing theory.

If we are to believe the acknowledgements and statements by the Dutch intelligence agencies, the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison has increased. Both through the existing institutional multilateral liaison platforms, as well as through ad hoc relationships. Unfortunately, this conclusion is impossible to triangulate through the media and political analysis, as it requires an internal assessment of the intelligence agencies.

A more broadly supported conclusion, which can be drawn from the analysis, and is perhaps more important for the discussion, is the fact that multilateral intelligence liaison seems to be predominantly viewed as a tool to combat a shared issue or threat. Looking at the developments within the organizations, and the Dutch participation in them, one can clearly differentiate the Dutch involvement in the CTG, EUMS, SitCen, and NATO. As mentioned, the Dutch actively participated in the development of the CTG, which, by simply looking at the name, seems to strive for a clear purpose. This purpose obviously being the countering of terrorism.

On a geopolitical level, as highlighted by the MIVD, developments within NATO and the EU have been made in terms of multilateral intelligence liaison. The threats to the southern and eastern borders of both NATO allies as well as the EU seem to have been motivating these developments, again showing that shared threats have been the reason for this development. Also, as mentioned before, the CTIVD has acknowledged that due to the increased terrorist threat the involvement in ad hoc multilateral intelligence liaison relationships has increased over the years included in the studied period.

The media analysis shows that not only the media attention to the topic has been increasing over the studied period, but also the overlap it seemingly has with the two waves of terrorist

attacks in Europe. The analysed newspapers seem to argue for more multilateral intelligence liaison in both the period of 2004 and 2005, as well as the period from 2014 up until 2016, overlapping with the years of the terrorist attacks. Interestingly, within the debate on improved intelligence liaison, the role of multilateral intelligence liaison has been taking an increasingly bigger role. The media analysis also shows that when analysing the reasoning within the media for improved multilateral intelligence liaison was in 86% of the time categorized as due to a shared issue or threat.

The political analysis showed a similar result, in which the debates on multilateral intelligence liaison were in 77% of the time held within the context of combatting a shared issue or threat. Although less specific towards the terrorist threat, the debates were also on geopolitical threats, and cyber threats. Next to that, the political analysis showed that the critical debates on multilateral intelligence liaison occurred in 2016, and revolved around the fact that multilateral intelligence liaison seemed to have failed in preventing the terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016. Again, showing that also from a political perspective, multilateral intelligence liaison is often considered an important tool in combatting a shared threat such as terrorism.

Although the conclusions are based on an outside analysis of an extremely secretive activity, the conclusions above have been tested through different perspectives. Not only do the agencies themselves support the conclusions in their outward communication, but also from a political and media perspective, the conclusions are supported and therefore strengthened. Although analysing from an internal perspective would be significantly better as a basis for conclusions, the nature of the studied object simply prevents that from ever occurring. Therefore, the conclusions of the analysis will be used in a discussion to see to what extent the conclusions fit within the findings of the literature review.

Chapter 6: Discussion

In this final chapter of the thesis, the outcome of the analysis is compared with the outcome of the literature review. This in order to see to what extent the theory is able to explain the outcome of the analysis, and simultaneously discuss where the theory might be wrong or insufficient. In the end, the discussion should answer the main research question of the thesis: *“Which factors, as found in academic literature on international multilateral intelligence liaison, have influenced multilateral intelligence liaison practices of the Netherlands from 2003 up until 2016?”*. However, before that, some of the assumptions from the theory are discussed through a comparison with the outcome of the analysis of the Dutch intelligence agencies.

6.1 Bilateral over multilateral intelligence liaison

As highlighted in the literature review, within the academic body of knowledge on intelligence liaison one of the most commonly reappearing arguments is the fact that bilateral intelligence liaison is a preferred method over multilateral intelligence liaison. This was highlighted by the many scholars such as Clough, Aldrich, and Sims. What is important, is that the scholars argue this from a perspective of the intelligence agencies. Although bilateral intelligence liaison is preferred according to the scholars, the scholars also acknowledge that multilateral intelligence liaison does take place within the intelligence community.

Having analysed the perspective of the Dutch intelligence agencies themselves, no contradicting evidence was found within the analysis that would disprove this assumption within the theory. As a matter of fact, although occasionally, this assumption was confirmed by for example the MIVD in their 2006 annual report. From the perspectives of the Dutch intelligence agencies, there is therefore no evidence that contradicts the assumption that bilateral intelligence liaison is a preferred method of intelligence liaison.

Although the agencies and CTIVD discuss the preference of bilateral over multilateral intelligence liaison occasionally, the reasoning they provide seems to match one of the negative factors that was also extracted from the literature. Both the AIVD and the CTIVD have highlighted the importance of the Quid Pro Quo rule of intelligence liaison. As multilateral intelligence liaison, especially on a large scale, contradicts the Quid Pro Quo rule, the more fruitful relationships seem to be created in bilateral or small multilateral intelligence liaison relationships. This acknowledgement by both an intelligence agency and the oversight

committee, seems to match the assumption in the theory of a negative cost benefit analysis. The cost of sharing intelligence with a large number of recipients, does not seem to outweigh the limited quality of the received intelligence through multilateral intelligence liaison. A factor that was stressed by both Clough and Sims.

The analysis of both the media's perspective and the political perspective, are unable to strengthen these findings from the intelligence perspective. Externally it is impossible to find out to what extent any form of intelligence liaison is preferred over the other. What is interesting to see, is that after having analysed both societal perspectives, multilateral intelligence liaison is quite positively assessed throughout society. The use of multilateral intelligence liaison seems to have gained increased positive attention within the larger debate on intelligence liaison, as was shown in the media and political analysis. Whilst bilateral intelligence liaison has more often been critically discussed within parliament, and during the studied period in decreasing manner mentioned as a possible method within the debate on increasing use of intelligence liaison. However, as the media and politicians are perhaps less informed about some of the benefits bilateral intelligence liaison has over multilateral intelligence liaison, the outcome of this analysis is not enough to argue for a false assumption or blind spot within the existing literature.

6.2 The positive factors causing multilateral intelligence liaison

Despite the fact that bilateral intelligence liaison is considered a preferred type of intelligence liaison, both scholars and the analysis has shown that multilateral intelligence liaison has taken place between the Dutch intelligence agencies and international partners. What has caused this multilateral intelligence liaison to take place can be found in the literature as well.

The positive factors influencing the use of multilateral intelligence liaison that have been isolated from the vast body of literature were: combatting common threats more effectively, strategy or dependency, and ethical and constitutional similarities. Having analysed the use of Dutch multilateral intelligence liaison over the period between 2003 and 2016, the analysis shows that out of these three positive factors the "combatting common threats more effectively" factor, is the only factor of influence to the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison.

Again, it remains important to note, that one could wonder what the forcefulness of the analysis is when it comes to the true reasoning behind the use of multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch agencies, but out of the known positive factors within the literature, this factor is the only

factor that keeps reoccurring. Within all three perspectives of the analysis, the use of multilateral intelligence liaison is reasoned within the context of combatting a problem or threat. A threat that is considered a common threat to many other states. Most predominantly, the shared threat of terrorism is used as the motivator for the use of multilateral intelligence liaison.

The factor of a shared threat or problem has been reoccurring throughout the annual reports of the intelligence agencies and oversight reports, as a motivation for participating in multilateral intelligence liaison and the improvement of organizations providing a platform for multilateral intelligence liaison. The most obvious example is the AIVD's active participation and proactive stance towards the Counter Terrorist Group, an organization that is focussed on the combat and prevention of terrorist attacks within the member states. Another clear example is the MIVD's involvement in the EUMS, SitCen, and NATO, referring to the shared geopolitical threats on the eastern and southern borders of the EU and NATO.

Besides the evidence from the intelligence agencies themselves, the parliamentary debates and media attention have shown a similar reasoning when arguing for more or improved multilateral intelligence liaison. As the analysis has shown, both in the parliamentary debates, as well as the media, a large majority of the reasoning was based on combatting a common threat or issue. Additionally, political analysis showed a firm increase in critical debates on multilateral intelligence liaison in 2016, when multiple terrorist attacks occurred within Europe. It was in 2016 that politicians were increasingly critical to the fact that multilateral intelligence liaison had been unable to prevent the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016.

However, as the analysis is conducted from an outside perspective, the fact that only evidence for one positive factor has been found, does not automatically mean that this also the only positive factor of influence on the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison. The positive factor of strategy or dependency, is something that an intelligence agency or an oversight committee will probably never publicly express, and could therefore just as well be another positive factor of influence for the Dutch use of multilateral intelligence liaison.

However, it must be said that there has not been a single politician or expert on intelligence, that has expressed, through a parliamentary debate or one of the studied newspapers, that the Dutch agencies are involved in multilateral intelligence liaison because of a strategical purpose or dependency or out of ethical or constitutional similarities.

6.3 Explaining the developments in multilateral intelligence liaison

Having been able to explain the occurrence of multilateral intelligence liaison through the found theory, one final question remains. To what extent can the found positive factor also explain the developments of multilateral intelligence liaison as is being argued by the intelligence agencies? Despite the fact that this development cannot be verified through other methods, it remains interesting to discuss to what extent this argued development can be explained by the theory.

The factor of having a common threat with other states seemed to have been the main motivator for the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch intelligence agencies. The analysis of the documentation of the intelligence agencies and the oversight committee showed that over the studied period of 2003 up until 2016, the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison by the Dutch agencies has intensified through some of the international organizations, as well as on an ad hoc basis. Within several of the official documents of the Dutch organizations, not only the acknowledgement of this increased and improved use of multilateral intelligence liaison is provided, but also the reasoning of these developments is often provided. As can be seen in the analysis of the organizations, the AIVD, MIVD, and the CTIVD, argue that the threats such as terrorism or geopolitical threats have increased throughout the studied period.

As a result, both the AIVD and the MIVD have been increasing the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison. Additionally, the Dutch agencies have, because of the same increased threats, actively participated in the further development of existing organizations such as the CTG, EUMS, SitCen, and NATO, to improve multilateral intelligence liaison.

This link between an increased threat and an increased attention for multilateral intelligence liaison was also observed in both the political and media analysis. Arguing for increased use of intelligence liaison seemed to peak in the media in the period around 2004 and 2005, and in the period of 2015 and 2016. Both periods in which there was increased terrorist activity within the European continent. That the terrorist threat was increasing throughout the period between 2003 and 2016, could also explain why multilateral intelligence liaison was argued for more often during the second period of terrorist attacks in Europe. Compared to the first peak in media attention, the second peak of increased argumentation for intelligence liaison seemed to focus more on multilateral intelligence liaison than in the first peak, where most of the articles were focussing on bilateral or unspecified intelligence liaison.

6.4 Conclusion

Returning to the cost benefit analysis of intelligence liaison, which was according to the literature review one of the important methods for determining the participation in an intelligence liaison relationship, the discussion shows that there is only one positive factor found within the analysis that could influence this cost benefit analysis. In the battle against common threats, intelligence agencies might participate in multilateral intelligence liaison relationships. The Dutch intelligence agencies themselves claim that the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison has increased because of this reason, and the analysis confirmed the close relation between multilateral intelligence liaison and combatting a shared threat more effectively.

If indeed the participation in multilateral intelligence liaison has increased, as argued by the agencies, it seems that increasing threats are able to shift the cost benefit analysis in favour of multilateral intelligence liaison.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

The research, and the way it has been conducted, has tried to research one of the most difficult and grey areas of intelligence studies. As often labelled as a fenced-off area for researchers, this research has tried to help further develop the limited existing academic knowledge on intelligence liaison, and multilateral intelligence liaison in specific. By creating an extensive overview of the existing literature on the topic of intelligence liaison, the research was able to pinpoint some features of intelligence liaison that that are influential to the existence and participation of states in multilateral intelligence liaison. By analysing the analytical debate on intelligence liaison, the literature research resulted in three positive factors, and three negative factors. The positive factors being: ‘Combatting a common threat more effectively’, ‘Dependency or Strategy’, and ‘Ethical or constitutional similarities’. Whilst the negative factors were labelled as: ‘Increased risks’, ‘Increased Management difficulties’, and ‘Differences in strategic or intelligence culture’.

Through a case analysis of the Dutch intelligence agencies, conducted through three different perspectives, the analysis showed that multilateral intelligence liaison is argued by the agencies to have increased over the studied period from 2003 up until 2016. Although it remains debatable to what extent this is also true in practice, the arguments were at times confirmed by some of the democratic oversight mechanisms.

More importantly, the case analysis was able to show through multiple perspectives that the use of multilateral intelligence liaison was often linked to the idea of combatting a shared threat or issue with multiple states at the same time. Especially in the discussion on combatting the terrorist threat, the use of multilateral intelligence liaison seemed to be considered as an important method. Something that was not only argued by the agencies themselves, but confirmed by an analysis of both the Dutch media and the Dutch parliamentary debates.

Contrary to the positive factors, the agencies continue to argue that through bilateral intelligence liaison more valuable intelligence can be obtained, and that factors such as *Quid Pro Quo* continue to be a part of the intelligence liaison process. However, as the threats such as terrorism are increasing within the European continent, the cost benefit analysis which has been limiting the use of multilateral intelligence liaison in the past, might sometimes be shifting in its favour.

7.2 Strengths and weaknesses

As mentioned quite often throughout the thesis, the research was conducted from an external perspective, on an extremely shielded topic. The forcefulness of the outcome of the research is therefore limited. Intelligence agency documentation might not always be as trustworthy. When it comes to their activities, their publications are nearly the only type of primary source one can use. By not only including the oversight committee reports in the analysis, but also the perspective of the media and politics, the thesis aimed to strengthen the findings of the analysis. The quantitative content analysis used for the media and political analysis complicates the internal validity of the research due to its high dependency on the researcher's interpretation. By including a schematic approach to the analysis, and separating some of the findings, objectivity was to be as high as possible. Also, the limited timeframe in which the research had to be conducted might have had an impact on validity of the findings. It was because of the limited time frame that only a single case could be analysed as thoroughly. By being thorough, and analysing from multiple perspectives, the forcefulness of the findings was somewhat strengthened.

Despite a lack of forcefulness, the research has for the first time specifically identified positive factors of influence to the use of multilateral intelligence liaison from an analytical perspective. The case study has shown that out of these factors abstracted from the literature, the factor of combatting a shared threat or issue more effectively has been of great influence on the case. The close link between this positive factor and the use of multilateral intelligence liaison was not only identified by the agencies and oversight committee themselves, but also observed within the media and political analysis..

7.3 Recommendations

The main recommendation, now that the research has been completed, is to conduct further research on the status of multilateral intelligence liaison throughout the world. By conducting a similar research but with other cases, both European and non-European, further research on the developments could indicate to what extent the findings of these research have been correct. By further exploring the seeming link between multilateral intelligence liaison and combatting a shared threat or issue, further research would be able to show that this factor is indeed of great importance to the presence of multilateral intelligence liaison. Something that in the future could help further develop the field of intelligence liaison studies.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Research scheme and findings of process tracing official government documents

Research Scheme

	Step 1: Which Type?	Step 2: What type of development?	Step 3: What kind of change?	Step 4: Which reasoning for change can be found?
			Decrease	Any of the negative factors found in literature?
	Ad hoc		Increase	Any of the positive factors found in literature?
Indicators for multilateral intelligence liaison?				
			New organizations	Any of the positive factors found in literature?
		Change of organizations	Same organizations	
			Less organizations	Any of the negative factors found in literature?
	Institutionalized			
			Positive developments	Any of the positive factors found in literature?
		Change within organizations		
			Negative developments	Any of the negative factors found in literature?

Findings

NL: AIVD Annual report	2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New committee of experts on terrorism (STATEMENT) - NATO - Werkgroep Terrorisme: Working on creating a handbook to improve MIL - AIVD acknowledges that increased threats such as the war in Iraq and terrorism have caused for an increase in the use of BIL. (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Club de Berne - MEC - CTG - SitCen - NATO: TTIU Founded
NL: AIVD Annual report	2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Club de Berne - MEC → Less involvement after 10 intensive years MEC! - CTG - SitCen - NATO
NL: AIVD Annual report	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG - Club de Berne - SitCen - NATO
NL: AIVD Annual report	2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SitCen → shares it with Europol - CTG - Forum - Club de Berne - MEC → little activity - NATO
NL: AIVD Annual report	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG
CTIVD Report	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG → - Club de Berne → Clearly highlighted as MIL - MEC (very limited)→ - SitCen → - Also highlights the quid pro quo arrangement. (STATEMENT) - CTIVD acknowledges that ad hoc MIL is increasingly used as a form of intelligence liaison!! (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG - Less specific as to how, but international multilateral intelligence exchange to counter espionage in the Netherlands (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO - SitCen

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less specific as to how, but international multilateral intelligence exchange to counter espionage in the Netherlands (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG - Less specific as to how, but international multilateral intelligence exchange to counter espionage in the Netherlands (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less specific as to how, but international multilateral intelligence exchange to counter espionage in the Netherlands (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment in co-operation due to Syria - QUID PRO QUO (STATEMENT)
NL: AIVD Annual report	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO → Civil intelligence committee - Reference to CTIVD-report - Reference to court hearing on AIVD-NSA co-operation.
NL: AIVD Annual report	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG → active AIVD steering towards a new database and platform for intelligence sharing. - NATO → against Russian influences
NL: AIVD Annual report	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTG

NL: MIVD Annual report	2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: the new TTIU - EU: developments that are to obtain more structural shape in 2005 - MAINLY BILATERAL (STATEMENT)
NL: MIVD Annual report	2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIVD helped in the creation of the NIFC (NATO) which is designed to share intelligence among NATO members. - NATO: TTIU - MIVD focussed on enhancing intelligence position by intensifying international co-operation (STATEMENT)
NL: MIVD Annual report	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilateral is not done as intensively as bilateral. This because of third party rule (STATEMENT) - NATO: Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) - EU: SitCen - EUMS: Intelligence division
NL: MIVD Annual report	2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: NIFC, became fully operational in 2007. - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS - EU EDA: Project Team Intelligence: also to improve multilateral intelligence exchange p.53
NL: MIVD Annual report	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System) network for intelligence exchange. USAGE INTENSIFIED (STATEMENT) - EU: EUMS: Intelligence division - Eu: SitCen - EU EDA: Project Team Intelligence

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase in both EUMS and SitCen activity (STATEMENT) Both of them fall under the SIAC (Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity)
NL: MIVD Annual report	2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communities of interest: limited multilateral co-operation → due to asymmetric threats, this seems to become the trend compared to the more institutionalized versions. - NATO: Intelligence Board - NATO: BICES - NATO NIFC - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS Intelligence division - EU: EDA Project Team Intelligence
NL: MIVD Annual report	2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: Intelligence Committee (formally known as Intelligence board) - NATO BICES - NATO NIFC - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS Intelligence division - EU: EDA Project Team Intelligence
NL: MIVD Annual report	2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: BICES - NATO: Intelligence committee - NATO: NIFC - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS Intelligence division - EU: EDA Project Team Intelligence
NL: MIVD Annual report	2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: Intelligence committee: for the second time in history a collective threat assessment has been created on military and civil threats - NATO: BICES - NATO: NIFC - EU: EUMS → intelligence demand increases (STATEMENT), ALSO! EUMS is to be more formalized - EU: Sitcen
NL: MIVD Annual report	2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: BICES - NATO: Intelligence committee - NATO: NIFC - ALSO: MIVD has helped to increase streamlining the intelligence processes within NATO (STATEMENT) - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS Intelligence division
NL: MIVD Annual report	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: Intelligence committee - NATO: (JISR) Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance development → based on the principle of “need to share” - NATO: BICES - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS Intelligence division

NL: MIVD Annual report	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Due to increased threats on eastern and southern borders of NATO, MIL is becoming increasingly important (STATEMENT) - NATO: BICES, improvements for intel sharing (STATEMENT) - NATO: creating of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) have led to an increasing demand of MIL in order to sustain these organizations with intelligence (STATEMENT)
CTIVD report	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MIL on a large scale is undesired over bilateral or small scale MIL because limitedly available intelligence is more valuable than broadly accessible intelligence. (STATEMENT) - Next to institutionalized MIL through NATO and EU, there is also ad hoc MIL. (STATEMENT) - CTIVD acknowledges that ad hoc MIL is increasingly used as a form of intelligence liaison!! (STATEMENT) - CTIVD also acknowledges that these ad hoc type of MIL are often smaller. This because a common threat or interest, which are easier to establish in smaller MIL relationships. Because of this, MIL tends to take a little longer in setting up the relationship. (STATEMENT) - Other than that, the CTIVD affirms that the MIVD is involved in MIL through NATO and the EU. (STATEMENT) - The MIL shared through NATO and the EU is usually ‘all-source’ intelligence. ‘single source’ intelligence such as humint or sigint are often done through BIL or small MIL (ad hoc) relationships. (STATEMENT) - NATO: NIFC - NATO: Intelligence committee - NATO: BICES - EU: EUMS intelligence division - EU: SitCen
NL: MIVD Annual report	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO: BICES is to be further developed over the coming years to increase MIL - NATO: Intelligence Committee - NATO: Highlights the importance of MIL because of JEF, VJTF and increased threats - EU: SitCen - EU: EUMS intelligence division

Appendix 2: Research scheme of media and political study

	Step 1: What type of intelligence liaison can be found?	Step 2: What tone towards intelligence liaison can be identified?	Step 3: What reasoning/context is used within the debate on intelligence liaison?
		Positive	Any of the positive factors found in literature?
		Neutral	
	Bilateral or Unspecified	Critical	Any of the negative factors found in literature?
What type of intelligence liaison?			
	Multilateral	Positive	Any of the positive factors found in literature?
		Neutral	
		Critical	Any of the negative factors found in literature?

Appendix 3: Findings of media study

Findings media study NRC:

Artikel	Zoekterm	Datum	Criteria 1	Criteria 2	Reden
EU: samenwerken	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	15-3-2004	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Drie manieren om terroristen te bedwingen ; Een Europese CIA is	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	25-3-2004	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Geheime diensten moeten over eigen schaduw springen ; Inlichting	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	3-8-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Minste geweld beste aanpak terreur' ; EU-topman Robert Cooper c	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	28-9-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Hoezo winnen 'we' strijd tegen terreur?	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	14-10-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
MIVD-chef: meer internationale samenwerking inlichtingendienst	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	4-11-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
EU werkt samen tegen terreur, zeker op papier	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	12-7-2005	Ja	Nee	Toename bedreiging
EU verstrikt in eigen netten ; Geen van de veiligheidsdiensten in d	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	7-12-2005	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Jihadisten gaan de grens over, de inlichtingendiensten niet	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	2-6-2014	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Europese 'CIA' is heel ver weg	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	25-3-2016	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Samen tegen terreur, maar niet heus	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	26-3-2016	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Rumoer na uitzetting El Bakraoui	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	25-3-2016	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Zelfs over successen wil AIVD niet praten ; Kritiek commissie-Have	Inlichtingen samenwerking	17-11-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
AIVD-chef: politiek luisterde nooit echt	Inlichtingen samenwerking	31-12-2004	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Best fatsoenlijk, die geheime diensten	Inlichtingen samenwerking	19-4-2012	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Zitten er wel of niet IS ers tussen migranten?	Inlichtingen samenwerking	12-7-2016	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Investeer in inlichtingen, niet in Europese luchtvaartserij	Inlichtingen samenwerking	23-11-2016	Ja	Ja	Niet aanwezig
Samen spioneren	Inlichtingen delen	19-11-2004	Ja	Ja	Toename bedreiging
Een Afrikaanse missie in een Afrikaans tempo; Inlichtingen delen	Inlichtingen delen	18-10-2014	Ja	Ja	Gezamenlijke vredesmissie

Findings media study Volkskrant:

Artikel	Zoekterm	Datum	Criteria 1	Criteria 2	Reden
De agent als diplomaat ; Europol wil meer zijn dan informatiecentr	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	31-5-2003	Ja	Ja	Ineffectief
Inlichtingendiensten vaak karig met info' ; Interview	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	4-11-2004	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
AIVD staat voor bijna onmogelijke taak ; Achtergrond	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	9-11-2004	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
De naschok van Londen	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	14-6-2005	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
EU-landen: maximaal inlichtingen uitwisselen	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	21-11-2015	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Waarom delen geheime diensten zo weinig?	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	31-3-2016	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Kamer is juist vol verwachtingen	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	7-1-2016	Ja	Ja	Toename dreigingen
EU doet te weinig tegen terreur	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	24-3-2016	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
De angst voor terreur is doorgeslagen'	Inlichtingen uitwisseling	15-1-2016	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Computergebruiker te goed van vertrouwen'; Gevoelige economis	Inlichtingen samenwerking	16-11-2010	Ja	Nee	Toename cyber dreiging
Journalist mag geen geheim agent zijn'; Interview SP-kamerlid Ror	Inlichtingen samenwerking	28-7-2011	Ja	Nee	Niet aanwezig
Spionnen staan niet boven maar naast de wet	Inlichtingen samenwerking	17-6-2013	Ja	Nee	Afhankelijkheid

Findings media study Telegraaf:

Artikel	Zoekterm	Datum	Criteria 1	Criteria 2	Reden
Al-Qaeda dreigt Europa met chemische aanvallen	Inlichtigen uitwisseling	3-7-2004	Ja	Nee	Toegenomen dreiging
Duitsers tegen Europese CIA	Inlichtigen uitwisseling	4-4-2016	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
'Waterdichte beveiliging kan niet'	Inlichtigen uitwisseling	30-6-2016	Ja	Nee	Toegenomen dreiging
Chaos in Brussel	Inlichtigen uitwisseling	3-5-2016	Ja	Nee	Toegenomen dreiging
Geen vertrouwen in AIVD	Inlichtingen samenwerking	10-12-2015	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
EU-diensten delen hun geheimen	Inlichtingen delen	11-6-2016	Ja	Ja	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging
Handen ineen tegen terrorisme'	Inlichtingen delen	20-11-2003	Ja	Nee	Gemeenschappelijke dreiging

Appendix 4: Findings political study

Document	Date	Type of intelligence liaison	Type of remark	Reason	Tone	Search term
Vragen van het lid Vos (GroenLinks) aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de oprichting van een Nationale Signit Organisatie (NSO) bij de AIVD. (Ingezonden 5 maart 2003)	5-3-2003	Unspecified	Question on how intelligence liaison is going to be dealt with	Increased intelligence capability	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Wilders en Hirsi Ali (beiden VVD) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over ronselpraktijken voor de Jihad. (Ingezonden 26 maart 2003)	26-3-2003	Unspecified	Policy promoting intelligence liaison	Combating recruitment	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Schippers (VVD) aan de ministers van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport en van Justitie over mogelijke namaakmedicijnen. (Ingezonden 12 september 2003)	12-9-2003	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Positive government activity in liaison	Combating international crime	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) aan de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, van Justitie en van Buitenlandse Zaken over inlichtingendiensten inzake de strijd tegen Al-Qaida. (Ingezonden 4 december 2003)	4-12-2003	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Positive government activity in liaison	Combating terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Karimi (GroenLinks) aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over de Nederlandse en Israëlische inlichtingendiensten. (Ingezonden 6 februari 2004)	6-2-2004	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Possible manipulation through intelligence liaison	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Bommel (SP) aan de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Defensie over het rapport van de Amerikaanse senaatscommissie over het onderzoek naar kwaliteit werk van de CIA inzake massavernietigingswapens in Irak. (Ingezonden 15 juli 2004)	15-7-2004	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Possible manipulation through intelligence liaison	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Koenders (PvdA) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de informatievergaring en de beoordeling daarvan in de aanloop van de oorlog in Irak. (Ingezonden 14 juli 2004)	14-7-2004	Bilateral intelligence liaison and multilateral intelligence liaison	Question of the status of intelligence liaison	Possible manipulation through intelligence liaison	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van der Ham (D66) aan de minister van Justitie over mogelijke onderschatting van drugsproblematiek in de regio, de 100% controle en overige uitlatingen van de hoofdofficier van Roermond. (Ingezonden 22 juli 2004)	22-7-2004	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Question of the status of intelligence liaison	Combating crimes related to drugs	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van der Laan (D66) aan de ministers van Justitie, van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Buitenlandse Zaken over intelligence verkregen door marteling. (Ingezonden 29 oktober 2004)	29-10-2004	Unspecified	No adjustments in existing liaison relationships	Combating threats such as terrorism	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) aan de minister van Defensie over de uitbreiding van het schotelpark NSO in Buum. (Ingezonden 13 juli 2005)	13-7-2005	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Question on how intelligence liaison is going to be dealt with	Increased intelligence capability	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Wilders (Groep Wilders) aan de minister van Defensie over de magere intelligence-bestaafing van Nederland in Afghanistan. (Ingezonden 19 juli 2005)	19-7-2005	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Positive status of MIL in Afghanistan	Combating in conflict	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Bommel (SP) aan de ministers van Justitie, van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de mogelijke overdracht van persoonsgegevens door Nederlandse instanties aan Syrië. (Ingezonden 5 oktober 2005)	5-10-2005	Bilaterale intelligence liaison	Question to review relationship	Bad intelligence liaison relationship	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Pechtold (D66) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking over het aftreden van het hoofd van de politietrainingssite in Afghanistan van de Europese Unie. (Ingezonden 18 september 2007)	18-9-2007	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Negative developments in multilateral intelligence liaison between EU and NATO	Combating in conflict	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Kuiken en Van Dam (beiden PvdA) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over activiteiten van de CIA op Nederlands grondgebied. (Ingezonden 16 juni 2008)	16-6-2008	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Clarification relationship with CIA	Bad intelligence liaison relationship	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Raak (SP) aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over een Europees rapport over de positie van de nationale veiligheidsdiensten. (Ingezonden 11 augustus 2008)	11-8-2008	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Positioning of national intelligence agencies within Europe	Combat terrorism and international crime	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Eijssink, Heerts (beiden PvdA) en Van Velzen (SP) aan de ministers van Defensie en van Justitie over ingesteld onderzoek door de CTIVD naar de rol van de MIVD bij de schorsing van medewerkers. (Ingezonden 25 mei 2009)	25-5-2009	Unspecified	Positive government perspective on intelligence liaison and the importance of Dutch intelligence position	N.A.	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Halsema (GroenLinks) aan de minister-president, minister van Algemene Zaken, en de minister van Defensie over inlichtingen omtrent de inval in Irak. (Ingezonden 29 juni 2009)	29-6-2009	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Question on role of dutch intelligence liaison in relation to war in Iraq	N.A.	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid De Roon (PVV) aan de ministers van Justitie en van Buitenlandse Zaken over visumverlening aan de aanslagpleger op de vlucht Amsterdam-Detroit (Ingezonden 2 februari 2010).	2-2-2010	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Improvement of multilateral intelligence liaison in commercial air traffic	Combat terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Raak (SP) aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de samenwerking van de AIVD met de veiligheidsdiensten in Marokko (Ingezonden 7 juni 2011).	7-6-2011	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning bilateral intelligence liaison with states that torture	Intelligence relationship with marocco	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Coriuz (CDA) aan de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Veiligheid en Justitie over meerdere Nederlanders die in het buitenland actief deelnemen aan de jihad (Ingezonden 15 september 2011)	15-9-2011	Unspecified	Acknowledgement of necessity of intelligence liaison	combat foreign fighters travelling to conflict territory	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking

Vragen van het lid Lucassen (PVV) aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over het bericht dat gegevens van de veiligheidsdienst van Curaçao zijn verstrekt aan derden (ingezonden 6 maart 2012).	6-3-2012	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Possible leak	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Lucassen (PVV) aan de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over het lekken van gegevens door de Veiligheidsdienst Curaçao (ingezonden 26 maart 2012).	26-3-2012	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Possible leak	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden De Roon en Wilders (beiden PVV) aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over weigering van de EU om Hezbollah als terroristische organisatie aan te merken (ingezonden 27 juli 2012).	27-7-2012	Unspecified	Positive government activity in liaison	Combat terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Bonis, Oosenbrug en Eijssink (allen PvdA) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Veiligheid en Justitie en van Defensie over het Mandiant Intelligence Center-rapport over massale cyber-spionage in de Verenigde Staten door een groep hackers (APT1) in Shanghai (ingezonden 25 februari 2013).	25-2-2013	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Positive government activity in liaison	Combat cyber crime	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Schouw en Sjoerdsma (beiden D66) aan de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Buitenlandse Zaken over het bericht dat Russische spionnen erg actief zijn in Nederland (ingezonden 10 april 2013).	10-4-2013	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Acknowledgement of activities in multilateral intelligence liaison	Combat espionage	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Schouw en Koolmees (beiden D66) aan de minister van Veiligheid en Justitie over het bericht dat financiële data-analyse nauwelijks terreur voorkomt (ingezonden 9 september 2013).	9-9-2013	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Positive development in multilateral intelligence liaison	Combat financing of terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid De Roon (PVV) aan de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over samenwerking met Turkije bij terrorismebestrijding (ingezonden 18 februari 2014).	18-2-2014	Bilaterale intelligence liaison	Co-operation with Turkey	Combatting jihadist terrorism	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Van Bommel, Jasper van Dijk, Van Raak (allen SP) en Sjoerdsma (D66) aan de Ministers van Defensie, van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over het bericht dat Nederlandse data mogelijk zijn gebruikt bij drone-aanvallen (ingezonden 13 maart 2014).	13-3-2014	Bilaterale intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Combatting piracy	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Van Klaveren en Bontes (beiden Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren) aan de Ministers van Veiligheid en Justitie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over potentiële jihadisten op luchthavens (ingezonden 7 oktober 2014).	7-10-2014	Bilaterale intelligence liaison	Question on co-operation with Belgium	Combatting terrorism	Neutral	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Bernds-Jansen en Schouw (beiden D66) aan de Ministers van Veiligheid en Justitie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over extra maatregelen tegen terreur (ingezonden 26 januari 2015).	26-1-2015	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding improvement for multilateral intelligence liaison to improve problems highlighted by Europol in 2013	Combatting terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
BRIEF VAN DE MINISTERS VAN VEILIGHEID EN JUSTITIE, VAN BINNENLANDSE ZAKEN EN KONINKRIJKSRELATIES EN VAN DEFENSIE; Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (ingezonden 5 februari 2015)	5-2-2015	Multilateral intelligence liaison	in multilateral intelligence liaison to improve combat against terrorism	Combatting terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Raak (SP) aan de Ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en van Veiligheid en Justitie over de uitlatingen van Snowden over Nederland en de NSA (ingezonden 23 januari 2015).	23-1-2015	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding review	Co-operation with the US after Snowden leaks	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Van Raak (SP) aan de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de uitspraken van het hoofd van de AIVD over Edward Snowden (ingezonden 7 mei 2015).	7-5-2015	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning bilateral intelligence liaison with US after Snowden statements	Co-operation with the US after Snowden leaks	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Aukje deVries en Tellegen (beiden VVD) aan de Ministers van Financiën en van Veiligheid en Justitie over «financiële sector let te weinig op terrorisme, zegt DNB» (ingezonden 20 november 2015).	20-11-2015	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Demanding enhanced methods to combat threat	Combatting financing of terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Koşer Kaya (D66) aan de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de samenwerking van de AIVD in Europees verband via de Counter Terrorism Group (ingezonden 4 februari 2016).	4-2-2016	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning the use of multilateral intelligence liaison through CTG	Combatting terrorism	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Wilders (PVV) aan de Minister-President over het nieuws dat de FBI vooraf zou hebben geweten van de aanslag in Garland op 3 mei 2015 (ingezonden 9 augustus 2016).	9-8-2016	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning of use of bilateral intelligence liaison		Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden Pechtold en Swinkels (beiden D66) aan de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie over het bericht dat een terreurverdachte op het vliegtuig naar Turkije kon stappen (ingezonden 12 juli 2016).	12-7-2016	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning on the seemingly failed multilateral intelligence liaison	Combatting foreign fighters	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van de leden De Roon en Wilders (beiden PVV) aan de Ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie over Turkse steun voor jihad's en een Turks verzoek om de inzet van inlichtingendiensten voor de jacht op opposenten van Erdogan (ingezonden 23 augustus 2016).	23-8-2016	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning the bilateral relationship with Turkey	Combatting terrorism	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Pechtold (D66) aan de Minister-President en de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over activiteiten van de Turkse geheime dienst in Nederland (ingezonden 26 augustus 2016).	26-8-2016	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Questioning the bilateral relationship with Turkey	Combatting terrorism	Critical	Inlichtingen samenwerking
Vragen van het lid Koenders (PvdA) aan de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over de informatievergaring en de beoordeling daarvan in de aanloop van de oorlog in Irak. (ingezonden 14 juli 2004)	14-7-2004	Multilateral intelligence liaison	Intensifying multilateral intelligence liaison	Combatting terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen uitwisseling
Vragen van de leden Oskam en Van Helvert (beiden CDA) aan de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie over het bericht «Terrorism in moskee» (ingezonden 10 juli 2015).	10-7-2015	Unspecified	Question on the use intelligence liaison	Combatting illegal funding	Neutral	Inlichtingen uitwisseling
Vragen van het lid Swinkels (D66) aan de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie over de World Check databank (ingezonden 1 maart 2016).	1-3-2016	Multilateral intelligence liaison	acknowledgement of improved multilateral intelligence liaison	Combatting terrorism	Positive	Inlichtingen uitwisseling

Vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) aan de minister van Defensie over verlies van gevoelige informatie zoals USB sticks. (Ingezonden 4 oktober 2007)	4-11-2007	Bilateral intelligence liaison	Acknowledgement on dependency of intelligence liaison	Conflict situations	Positive	Inlichtingen delen buitenland
Vragen van het lid Dijkhoff (VVD) aan de ministers van Veiligheid en Justitie en van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties over het bericht «Angst om lot jihadtiens» (Ingezonden 19 april 2013)	19-4-2013	Unspecified	Acknowledgement on the use of intelligence liaison	Combatting jihadist free movement	Neutral	Inlichtingen delen buitenland
Vragen van het lid Omtzigt (CDA) aan de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over ISIS en Jabat Al Nusra als terroristische organisatie (Ingezonden 12 juni 2014).	12-6-2014	Unspecified	Acknowledgement on the use of intelligence liaison	Combatting terrorism	Neutral	Inlichtingen delen buitenland