Master Thesis

Crisis and Security Management

State-Building for Long-Term Counter-Terrorism – The Case of Libya

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Foreword

This thesis serves as the final research project in the context of the MSc program Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University. The program is focused on security concerns in its various forms and offers insights into the equally diverse means of tackling these issues. In today's social and political environment, security concerns no longer solely stem from local issues. Instead, inter- and transnational threats are increasingly prominent and the governance of those crises becomes increasingly important.

The subject of this thesis, the Libyan conflict, was chosen because of its relevance for not only national security, but the far-reaching implications it can – and already does – have on the broader North African, as well as European security landscape. Having studied the involvement of international actors in the Kosovo conflict for my Bachelor thesis, the aim for this Master thesis was to take the general idea of foreign support even further. Instead of solely focusing on the aid offered to local actors in their conflict resolution efforts, this thesis adds the component of terrorist movements, and whether statebuilding can contribute to the combat of actors that operate beyond the scope of the state and its institutions.

"You break it, you own it …
If you break a government, if you cause it to come down, by invading or other means, remember that you are now the government. You have a responsibility to take care of the people of that country."

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell at *The Atlantic*'s 2015 Washington Ideas Forum (Gilsinan, 2015)

Abstract

Since 2011, Libya has been on a turbulent path to statehood, struggling to find itself after decades of organized repression. Following the NATO-led intervention and ousting of the Gaddafi-regime, the international community aimed to fix its past errors from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, settling for a "light footprint" approach of post-conflict involvement instead. The years under Gaddafi, however, had left the country without viable state institutions and void of any sense of political self-determination and cohesion. Lacking the basic structures for statehood, the country's liberation thus soon turned into an odyssey from one interim governing authority to the next and internal differences left the country's security landscape entirely scattered. Using the emerging power vacuum, radical Islamist terrorist movements arrived and quickly gained a large following. Based on the assumption that weak statehood fosters terrorism, this thesis looks at foreign support for local actors in their state-building efforts and assesses the role these incentives have played in the fight against the Islamic State and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya since 2011.

Key words

Libya, State-Building, Fragile State, Terrorism, Security

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2014, Oct.	Islamic Youth Shura Council pledge of allegiance to Islamic State
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2014, Nov.	Islamic State establishes Libyan headquarter in Derna
Late 2014	Death of Ansar a-Sharia leader
2015, March	Islamic State takes control of Sirte
2016. Dec.	Islamic State is defeated in Sirte
2017, May	Dissolution of Ansar al-Sharia
2017, July	Libyan National Army drives Islamists out of Benghazi
2017, July	Islamic State regroups

Main Actors in Libya 2011 – 2017[1]

International	United Nations / United Nations Support Mission for Libya
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Libyan	National Transitional Council
	General National Congress
	House of Representatives
	Government of National Accord
Non-State	Libyan National Army
	Ansar al-Sharia
	Islamic State
	Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries
	Benghazi Defense Brigades

[1] Figure 1, offering a simplified overview of the conflict dynamics between the main actors, and Figure 2, presenting a timeline of when those actors appeared on the Libyan political stage, can be found in the Annex.

Map of Libya[2]

Map No. 3787 Rev. 10 United Nations
November 2015

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

[2] Available online at http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/libya.pdf

List of Acronyms

ASL	Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BSCR	Benghazi Shura Council of Revolutionaries
EU	European Union
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNC	General National Congress
GPC	General People's Congress
HoR	House of Representatives
IS	Islamic State
ISRT	International Stabilization Response Team
LNA	Libyan National Army
LPA	Libyan Political Agreement
LSF	Libya Shield Force
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSG	National Salvation Government
NTC	National Transitional Council
PFG	Petroleum Facilities Guard
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SCBR	Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries
SSC	Supreme Security Council
UN	United Nations
UNCCT	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya

1. Introduction

1.1. Problem Outline

While the Arab Spring initially seemed to indicate a departure from oppressive regimes across the Middle East and North Africa, it did not fulfil this promise. Several states did not transition towards democracy, inclusion and social justice, but rather fell into total chaos and civil wars. While currently much, and perhaps most, attention in politics, the media and academia is placed on the war in Syria and Iraq, Libya is another state that cannot be overlooked. Shaken by similar issues, affected by civil war, political instability and the presence of terrorist movements, and directly affecting the refugee crisis, it is crucial to not disregard this conflict and its developments. Although Libya was a relatively stable state throughout the decade-long rule of Muammar Gaddafi, it was far from democratic. The 2011 Arab Spring successes in Egypt and Tunisia inspired protests across Libya, but the regime resisted. What followed was a much-contested intervention by the international community, which by some was framed as a "model intervention" (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Rasmussen, 2016), while others called it a debacle that failed to provide sufficient support to a country that was left internally damaged and divided (Kuperman, 2015). Whereas military interventions have proven to lead to better results that other ways of ending wars, they often solely reduce violence while conflict persists (Kreutz, 2016). This phenomenon was clearly visible in post-intervention Libya. The fall of Gaddafi was quickly overshadowed by an ongoing civil war and the absence of a capable and stable new government. Learning from previous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan led the international community to employ a light footprint approach of limited post-conflict aid and assistance, with the intention of thereby allowing the Libyan public to regain control over their country (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.15). However, rather than leading to a stable state, this ultimately left the weakened country in a state of limbo.

The instability in the region and within Libya allowed radical jihadist movements, including the Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) and the Islamic State (IS[3]) to gain foothold by exploiting the power vacuum. If disregarded, the rise of terrorist movements could become a problem on a scale similar to what is happening in Syria, only in direct proximity of Europe. Fighting terrorist movements has long been a top policy priority, especially since the 9/11

[3] Amongst scholars, politicians and the media, there is no consensus on which abbreviation shall be used when referring to the Islamic State group. While it is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, all those terms imply a regional link to the Middle East and the historical region surrounding Syria. Since this thesis looks at the Islamic State in Libya and the name ISIL could be mistaken for the Levant rather than Libya, the thesis thus solely employs the acronym IS when referring to the group and its local affiliates.

attacks and the war on terror that followed. Counterterrorism if often associated with addressing factors leading to the initial success of those movements either by punitive means, directly targeting individuals and their resources, or by employing a "hearts and minds" approach of upholding the values that are under attack and addressing the perceived injustices that lead people to join such movements (Mihalka, 2006, pp.132-133). Yet, as studies propose a correlation between state failure and terrorism (ibid., p.133; Crocker, 2003), while these measures certainly tackle the immediate issues, they rarely lead to lasting peace and stability. Thus, a more comprehensive approach including state-building measures is appropriate. Strengthening state institutions, engaging with local authorities and the public and building a more resilient civil society are crucial to *lastingly* tackle terrorist movements. In the case of Libya, this is a complex endeavor. Since 2011, the country's various groups, previously united in their fight against Gaddafi, are separated anew. The country currently effectively deals with three different governments, a large number of militant and tribal groups, as well as the presence of jihadist movements. With Libya at the center of the North African region and in close proximity to Europe, it is in the international community's interest to prevent an overspill of war and terrorism, jeopardizing not only the stability not only of those states, but also impacting the security of the Mediterranean region. Thus, this thesis aims to form an understanding as to how international actors, including the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia collaborate with local authorities in efforts to re-build the Libyan state and in how far this addresses the issue of the correlation between state-failure and terrorism. Above this debate, however, the issue of incorporating local authorities is addressed. Inclusion and respect for national ownership are crucial for the establishment of structures that are respected by and useful for the whole of the Libyan population, rather than solely considering certain elites as has been an issue throughout the country's history.

1.2. Research Question

In order to achieve those research objectives, this thesis sets out to answer the following question: *How has the international community been supporting Libya in its state-building efforts and thereby addressed the issue of terrorist movements since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011?*

1.3. Sub-Questions

- *Which factors led to Libya's consistently deteriorating security situation?*

- *What conditions allow terrorist movements to gain support and then maintain control over a region?*
- *In how far can external intervention in weak states contribute to lasting stability?*

1.4. Reading Guide

Assuming that to lastingly keep citizens from joining terrorist movements, the international community must provide support to the fragile state for the creation of a stable one that people can trust to ensure their security (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009, p.27). It thus is the ultimate goal of this thesis to follow this line of reasoning, studying the case of Libya. Chapter 2 first outlines the methodology employed for this study. It explains the reasoning behind conducting a single-case study, the relevance of the particular case of Libya, as well as the thesis' main terms and concepts. Chapter 3 then introduces the theoretical background necessary to answer the research question. Based in the overall field of peacebuilding, this chapter offers an overview of the theory. In this regard, it has been recognized that rather than being a distinct theoretical framework, peacebuilding measures often overlap with state-building efforts that in turn can contribute to the creation of lasting stability if local actors are engaged in the process (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). Laying the foundations for the debate on how this can be observed in the case of Libya, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 introduce the historical background to this case study. To understand the context of the Libyan war, this analysis is threefold: Chapter 4 looks at the Libyan political and security situation under Muammar Gaddafi, in order to form an understanding of what led to the regime's fall and current events. Next, Chapter 5 first focuses on the period immediately following the regime's fall, and lastly and most crucially studies the changing security environment since the political uncertainty since the 2014 elections and emergence of the Islamic State. It further maps the main actors and conflict parties that are relevant for this thesis. Thereafter, Chapter 6 assesses the efforts made by national and international actors in the conflict resolution efforts, elaborating in more detail their interests, intentions and actions. Building up on the findings of the previous chapters, the discussion further offers insights into how the international community's state-building efforts in Libya do or do not contribute to the fight of terrorism and aims to provide recommendations for factors that should not be disregarded in the transition process. This chapter and the conclusion in Chapter 7 set out to answer the research question, reconnecting the discussion with the theoretical background and critically debating the assumption that in order to lastingly fight terrorism, support for the creation of the state and security institutions is crucial.

2. Methodology

Within the field of crisis and security management, the handling of international security crises is a highly relevant, yet contested topic. There is no "one size fits all" approach and cases vary widely. Thus, tackling those issues both effectively and efficiently requires a wide selection of measures, including diplomatic dialogue, military intervention, humanitarian assistance and much more. The biggest problem actors face in this context is finding a lasting solution rather than short-term fixes, leading to this thesis' focus on peace- and state-building as means to achieve not only stability, but also lastingly combat terrorism in fragile states. Over the past two decades, terrorist movements have continuously emerged and been able to not only gain followers, but also take control over territories and thereby challenge existing norms of legitimacy, leading to questions on what is considered a terrorist movement, how to tackle them and in how far dissidents could actually be incorporated into legitimate state structures. Thus, aiming to develop a debate that brings together several theoretical and social concepts, including peace- and state-building, counter-terrorism and respect for national ownership is a complex endeavor.

2.1. Case Study Design, Case Selection and Societal Relevance

In order to tackle this challenge and develop a study that is able to answer the guiding research question, this thesis employs a qualitative and intrinsic single-case study design. Recently, scholarly interest in studies of single countries has increased, showing the commitment of explaining phenomena on a global level, while at the same time respecting that each case is different and can seldom be perfectly compared to another case (Hantrais, 2014, p.134). This design allows for a study of contemporary phenomena in depth and in their real-life context in cases where the relation between phenomenon and context are not entirely clear (Yin, 2009, p.14). While a comparative study of several civil wars that fostered terrorism and the international reaction would be interesting, this thesis' limited framework does not allow for such a discussion. Thus, a single-country case study design is most useful to get an in-depth understanding of a contemporary conflict and the way it is handled by the international community, with this thesis focusing the Libyan war. The biggest benefit of using such a design is that it allows for a more detailed assessment of the crisis at hand, bearing in mind the complexity of such a conflict and the surrounding causal factors influencing a conflict's outcome (Alaranta, 2006, p.2). Moreover, especially with regard to terrorist movements, it is crucial to bear in mind local factors that led to the success or failure of such groups. Rather than solely establishing that state failure and weak statehood automatically lead to terrorism, the

social and political environment must be studied side-by-side since not every weak state is a useful host to terrorist organizations.

When looking at counterterrorism, often issues such as radicalization or combat in the form of military intervention are studied. However, there is a lack of work on the establishment of authorities not with regards to bringing together, or creating a peaceful arrangement for groups within the state (such as the example of Kosovo), but harmful movements. Terrorist groups can hardly be incorporated into a state-solution and therefore the main objective in the long-run should be the maintenance of stability through local authorities that can prevent those movements from disrupting social order and gaining control over state territories. The struggle between various interest groups in weak states leads to a decentralization of power and thus lacking control over territories. These circumstances are fertile grounds for insurgencies and ideologically motivated terrorism to gain momentum and expand their prominence and power, and tackling the threats posed by international terrorism requires counter-efforts by the international community. In most cases, foreign intervention is seen only in military terms and while military intervention can certainly help in the short-term combat of terrorism, peace-building is aimed at the endurance of a secure and stable environment. To secure the long-term stability of these states and prevent a resurfacing of harmful movements as well as a spread of terrorism to neighboring and equally weak states, it is necessary to support or even build authorities and structures within countries to manage (re)-arising insurgencies and keep terrorism at bay. Looking at this issue is therefore highly relevant for the field of crisis and security management both in academic and social terms, since it furthers existing literature beyond the study of military intervention in the short-term and studies what can be done to lastingly ensure security and stability in weak states.

The reasons for choosing to study the fight against terrorism in Libya through outside support for local actors are diverse. They are, as a starting point, based on the assumption that weak states foster terrorism and that in turn, state-building and support for local security forces can help in the long-term combat of terrorist movements, but also are founded on the social and political realities in Libya that create a hospital environment for those groups. Since the mid-20th century, the North African region had been relatively stable, with politics hardly varying in many of the states. Following colonialization, they long resisted any waves of democratization that arose in various other regions across the globe, leading to questions regarding these authoritarian regimes' resilience. The late-2010 and 2011 unrests thus seemingly came out of nowhere, quickly overturning regimes that had been unshakable for such a long time (Fishman, 2015, pp.9-10). While the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes soon collapsed,

Libyan transition was different and introduces one of the reasons why this country was selected as a case study for the present thesis: As citizens were unable to overthrow the Gaddafi regime by their own power, the international community first stepped into the picture in 2011, ultimately leading to the regime's fall. However, rather than leading to a peaceful transition towards a democratic form of governance, the failed Libyan revolution is a poster example of how a previously stable state can quickly descend into chaos. In the case of Libya, the initial focus of foreign involvement was neither placed on, nor bore in mind the impact of terrorist movements. Instead, the 2011 NATO mission was predominantly concerned with ousting the Gaddafi regime, with a frequent criticism being that social realities in the country were disregarded and there was no proper plan for the post-Gaddafi era (Lacher, 2017, p.139). The fall of the regime led to the escalation of the situation and the disintegration of Libyan state and security institutions, leading to the current problem that this thesis seeks to address: The state and its institutions have been weakened to an extent that allowed terrorist organizations to exploit the power vacuum, highlighting the need for outside support in order to re-stabilize the state. Drawing from experiences in Afghanistan has highlighted a paradox in this regard. Fighting insurgencies, or in this case terrorist movements, depends on a high-capacity regime, but external state-building efforts are likely to prevent the emergence of a truly strong local regime in the first place (Goodhand & Hakimi, 2014, p.3). Thus, the international community has adapted their mode of reaction in Libya, limiting direct involvement and rather offering a helping hand to local authorities in various ways. While there was no peacekeeping mission deployed, the United Nations and NATO have made an effort to politically support the state through peace- and state-building means by offering amongst others training to security forces and working for the re-establishment of vital security structures.

Neither the initial NATO campaign, nor the creation of the UN Support Mission in Libya were intended for the combat of terrorism in the country, making it interesting to see in how far these missions do tackle the issue. What distinguishes Libya from Syria and Iraq are the constant and rapid developments surrounding terrorism in the country: Established in 2011, the organization Ansar al-Sharia recently released a statement announcing that it will end its operation (Al Jazeera, 2017a), while the Islamic State has been struggling to maintain first its control over Sirte, later Benghazi and most recently the eastern Libyan city of Derna, apparently determined to maintain its prominence in the country, while simultaneously unable to do so (Al Jazeera, 2017b). This comes despite the fact that the country is currently lacking both the institutional structures that can adequately provide security, as well as a common aim to unite the public, leaving Libya in limbo. It is thus to be assessed how the involvement of international

actors in Libya, as well as local forces' peace- and state-building measures have possibly contributed to successes in the fight against terrorism and can be used in the future.

The final reason for choosing Libya as the case study for this thesis becomes clear when looking at the region's geography. Much current attention appears to lie with the war in Syria, the different factions fighting each other, and as a result the refugee crisis that has been affecting the European Union. However, not unlike Syria, Libya is at the heart of a very fragile region, surrounded by states that are just as prone to conflict and faces many of the same issues. Its highly important geostrategic location with Europe, as well as the Middle East on its sides makes the country a melting pot of different cultures. Any civil war can have devastating impacts on not only that country's citizens, but also those around it. While this certainly applies to several past and present conflicts, Libya is a powder keg in immediate proximity to Europe, which similar to Syria has been an issue in terms of waves of asylum seekers trying to reach Europe in order to flee from the war and instability in their home country. Despite the geographical proximity to Europe, the wave of refugees fleeing across the Mediterranean and the remaining relative instabilities in other states, it can be stated that Libya has been disregarded to some extent by the international community. Most attention has been placed on interest-based problems, such as the most immediate issue that can directly affect Europe, namely the inflow of refugees over the Mediterranean. Larger issues revolving around the post-conflict stabilization of the country has been tackled rather inconsistently. This comes despite the fact that Libya is a resource rich country and once united and under strong governance could be a valuable political and economic partner for the West. Thus, seeing how the Libyan conflict can have far-reaching implications for regional and international security make it a case that is highly relevant for this thesis, as well as future studies.

2.2. Data Collection – State of the Research

Another reason for selecting Libya as this thesis' case study is the clear academic relevance and overall knowledge gap regarding the issue. The intervention in Afghanistan, the outcomes of the Arab Spring in Egypt or the effects of state-failure in Somalia are frequently studied issues, but despite the West's initial eagerness to intervene in Libya, today both public and scholarly attention on the Libyan conflict is limited (Schnelzer, 2016, p.17). Many institutes of global and security studies have instead focused on Tunisia and Egypt in the context of the Arab Spring, and Iraq and Afghanistan with regards to terrorism and insurgencies. While this can be considered as a limitation due to a lack of openly available sources, it also reinforces the need to conduct the present study. The lack of academic work on Libya has a variety of reasons, both

pre- and post-Gaddafi. In the years of the rule of the Gaddafi regime, access to Libyan sources was limited as the government "made an active effort to prevent social-scientific research" and a national archive simply did not exist (ibid.). The situation did not improve after the fall of the regime. Due to the chaos that followed and the civil war that has been ongoing in waves ever since, scholars have had difficulties conducting fieldwork.

Several scholars have worked to establish a full picture of Libya's history up until 2011 (St John, 2011; St John, 2015; Vandewalle, 2008; Vandewalle, 2012), studying the social and political backgrounds of the transition from colony, over monarchy to centralist state under Gaddafi that finally led to the revolution. Following the revolution and increased involvement of the international community, the 2011 NATO intervention has also become a contested and much-studied topic (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Gazzini, 2011; Kuperman, 2015), with focus being placed on whether or not the intervention was justified, in how far it may have contributed to the deterioration of the situation and how the international community has lacked an adequate response to the question on "what happens after?". Yet, while there certainly has been academic discourse surrounding the overall conflict, the responsibility to protect and the execution of the military intervention, the context of terrorism in Libya is still relatively new, with only few scholars conducting studies in this field. One main author in the field is Wolfram Lacher, who has conducted several recent studies on the topic of Libya, many on the basis of field work, interviews with local actors and a variety of Arabic sources. From studying the initial consequences of the revolution (Lacher, 2011b), over Libya serving as a growth market for jihadism (Lacher, 2015) up until an analysis of most recent developments regarding state-structures and terrorist movements (Lacher, 2017), he has followed the conflict throughout the years and been able to establish a meaningful body of work. The constant developments make it hard to adequately analyze the situation and really create a full picture. Boeke and de Roy van Zuidewijn (2016) conducted a study on the transition from military intervention to long-term counter-terrorism policy that will serve as one of the starting points for this thesis and Chivvis (2016) specifically focuses on the fight against the Islamic State in Libya.

To answer the research question, a qualitative document analysis of a variety of sources is employed, helping to understand the measures taken by the international community and their incorporation of local Libyan authorities through several different instead of just one lens. First, academic work by the abovementioned scholars, previously conducted surveys and interviews serve as a starting point to understand the backdrop of the current security situation in Libya and are most useful for establishing the historic background. Further, policy documents from involved agencies and organizations are taken into account to understand the measures taken

with regard to state-building and re-establishment of security institutions in Libya. As discussed in Chapter 5, the analysis looks at several actors, with a main focused being placed on the United Nations and NATO, while also taking into consideration the role played by individual nations, including Russia and Egypt. While there are more players that could be studied, this analysis focuses on the largest forces. A more detailed discussion of the geopolitical correlations can be included in further research. Special emphasis is placed on NATO's 2011 mission, its limited involvement following Gaddafi's fall and its recent dialogue with and support offer for the GNA's Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, and on the ongoing UN Support Mission in Libya, both of which are crucial for the study of state-building and the improvement of the Libyan security situation. In the context of this thesis, the UN's work is particularly interesting. Pillar III of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy aims to "build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in this regard", taking a strategic approach in the short, medium and long term with special focus of states in the Middle East and Africa (UNCCT, n.d.). This connects theory to practice, bridging the gap between state-building and its relation to counter-terrorism. Moreover, both officially declassified, as well as by now published documents and correspondence will be taken into account. Especially exchanges between politicians in the months of NATO's intervention and the international efforts in the ousting of Gaddafi can be of importance since they present a less idealized picture of the situation. Due to ongoing developments, in order to understand the current situation especially with regards to terrorist movements in Libya, a combination of media and news outlets, as well as a number of social media accounts are studied. Especially certain Twitter accounts of scholars, journalists and think tanks[4] have contributed to the data collection process as they are concerned with screening news and social media for recent developments in Libya and developments regarding the Islamic State. They offer close to real-time news coverage and provide information that is otherwise only available in Arabic.

2.3. Shortcomings of the Design

Conducting a single-case study with focus on a country like Libya is not without pitfalls that need to be acknowledged, and can possibly be addressed in future research on this topic. First, having established that research on the case of Libya is limited, this brings about the challenge of creating a full enough picture. Not only the scope of this thesis, but the overall current

[4] Relevant Twitter accounts include (Eljahr [Eljarh]; Fitzgerald [MaryFitzger]; Lacher [w_lacher]; Libya Herald [libyaherald]; MENA Stream [MENASTREAM]; Terrorism Tracker [Track_Terrorism]; Wehrey [FWehrey])

situation does not allow for interviews and surveys which would reflect the perspective of those directly involved. Moreover, and in the most basic terms, there are obvious language-restrictions. Due to a lack of understanding of the Arabic language, documents can only be taken into account in English, German and French, which does allow for a broad selection of sources, but may still lead to a bias in favor of the international community's actions and intentions. Another shortcoming lies with using a single-case-study design is that the findings it produces cannot be easily replicated onto other cases. While the general idea of bringing state-building measures in relation with counter-terrorism is promising, this should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Libyan case is highly complex and the situation in the country is ever-changing, which both highlights the need for the present study, as well as limits its scope since it is virtually impossible to take into consideration all recent developments. Further, looking at a state that does not have a long background as neither its own state, nor as a nation leads to issues that cannot be compared to the conflict in a region where the ethnonational identity is strong, such as in Kosovo. Further, looking into a correlation between state-building successes and long-term counter-terrorism policies, this thesis faces the risk of slipping into too speculative fields. This shall be reduced by starting from a historical perspective. By gaining a basic understanding of the social and political backgrounds of the Libyan conflict and the motivations behind citizens joining or rejecting terrorist movements, conclusions can be drawn to understand what is necessary to successfully prevent future instabilities. Lastly, and possibly most importantly, the design limits the study's external validity, since whatever holds right in Libya may not be applicable to other cases, such as Syria. The countries' social and political backgrounds need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, seeing how reasons for conflicts may vary significantly.

2.4. Conceptualizing the Study's Key Terms

To be able to adequately develop a perspective in the debate surrounding the thesis' research question, it is crucial to define and clarify certain often-contested key concepts that guide this study in the following section. The starting point of the analysis is Libya as a fragile state, looking into its security situation under Gaddafi and following the Arab Spring. Studying the underlying causes of the conflict and the country's basic weaknesses allows for an understanding as to how terrorist movements are able to exploit the situation. Moreover, the solutions offered by the international community can be placed in the context of why the Islamic State, despite its incredible success in other war-torn states, including Syria and Iraq, has been seemingly unable to gain an equally strong grip over the Libyan territory. Following this

analysis, the thesis aims to look at the international community's state- and peacebuilding efforts in Libya and in how far they have addressed the threat posed by terrorist organizations and how this can thus be used for long-term counter-terrorism policies.

2.4.1. Fragile State

Other than the Human Development Index, which frequently ranks Libya in the high category (United Nations Development Programme, 2016, p.198), the Fund for Peace annually publishes a list, ranking states by their overall fragility rather than whether they are a developed or developing nation. Over the past decade, Libya has been the "most-worsened" country on the list, and since the 2011 revolutions, Libya's rank has continuously worsened, with only Syria and Mali having developed even more negatively (Fund for Peace, 2017a; Fund for Peace, 2017b). On this list, Libya is ranked in the "alert" category, indicating that the country's security situation is not sustainable, highlighting the urgency for both national and international actors to take measures to increase its stability. The Fund for Peace uses a variety of indicators to measure the level of risk in countries, many of which are applicable to the post-Arab Spring security situation and which are of relevance for this thesis and can be put in the broader context of state-building measures. Factors including a country's economic strength and long-term development, as well as socio-political factors such as demographic pressures, the number of refugees, provision of public services and the respect for human rights are certainly relevant and crucial in strengthening a fragile state and thus combatting terrorism in the long-term. Especially economic development has played an important role in Libyan politics since the discovery and boom of the oil industry in the mid-20th century, and while this will be briefly mentioned in this analysis, those factors are not the main focus of this thesis both due to the unavailability of reliable sources and data and the complexity of their analysis and can thus be addressed in future research. Instead, this thesis focuses on a number of cohesion indicators and the overarching factor of external intervention (Fund for Peace, 2017c), assessing in how far the following factors have developed since the 2011 revolution and how they are addressed in Libya by the international community.

Indicator	**Description**
Security Apparatus	"The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism … [it] may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize

	political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition ... As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state's monopoly of the use of force."
Factionalized Elites	"The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as and brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions, and where elections occur will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class)"
Group Grievance	"The Group Grievance Indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group's role in society and relationships with other groups."
External Intervention	"The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning … of a state." Intervention may include, but is not limited to: "*Political Intervention* – Is there external support for factions opposed to the government? *Force Intervention* – Are foreign troops present? Are military attacks from other countries occurring? Is there external military assistance? Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states? Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground? Is there external support for police training? Are covert operations taking place?"

2.4.2. Terrorism and Terrorist Movements

Despite the growing academic discourse on terrorism, the term has been fiercely debated. Gupta (2008b, p.10) notes that there is nothing can can be clearly defined as "terrorism", it is much rather a label used to describe "activities of which *we* do not approve", leading to often blurred

lines between actions of guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, civil wars or even genocide. Schmid (2012) determines that terrorism refers to

> "on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties; Terrorism as a tactic is employed in *three main contexts*: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors".

Terrorist movements thus refer to organized networks that act in these ways, in the case of Libya mainly for state repression purposes, aiming to gain control over territory, disregarding or not acknowledging the legitimate rulers. Along the lines of reasoning that a weak state can serve as a breeding ground for terrorist movements, it is important to take into account the development of terrorist movements across Libya in the past decades: Under Gaddafi, only 16 terrorist incidents were registered in Libya and the West even considered Libya as a potential local ally in the war on terrorism in the Middle East (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.21). Following the regime's overthrow, however, the country soon descended into chaos, giving way for extremist Islamist movements. What makes "terrorism" such a contested term in this context is that especially under civil war circumstances, many groups turn to violence to achieve their aims, and making a distinction between militias and terrorist groups is close to impossible. As laid down by Gupta (2008a, pp.73-74), in circumstances of strong perceived grievances, citizens are likely to seek security from other movements. While people's frustrations can be easily utilized, strong leadership is necessary. These can take various forms, with previously economically instable countries being prone to rising Communist movements and those with historical grievances between ethnic groups being sensitive to nationalist sentiments. And in Islamic societies, people perceive a strong sense of *Ummah* – community – from the shared religion, giving way for organizations that in the name of Islam commit political violence. While there have been indications of Al-Qaeda-related activity in Libya, the organization there never came together as one group. Thus, for this thesis, only two movements are of relevance: The organization Ansar al-Sharia, which came into being during the 2011 civil war and officially announced its dissolution in May 2017 (Reuters, 2017), and the Islamic State in Libya, which flared up in the country in 2014 and has been struggling for territories and supporters since then, with frequent defeats and resurgences (Lewis, 2017a).

2.4.3. International Community

While "the international community" is an elastic term, referring to a collective of states and governments, former UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan has defined it as a community being united by their "shared vision of a better world for all people" (United Nations, 1999). Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of the complex situation not only amongst the Libyan actors, but also gives a more elaborate overview of those external actors diplomatically and militarily involved in the Libyan peace- and state-building process. Sharing the view that the situation in Libya was close to escalation in 2011 and recognizing the need to take action rather than let the conflict further run its course, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 in line with its responsibility to protect doctrine. It initiated the 2011 military intervention Operation Unified Protector in Libya under NATO command (NATO, 2015; UNSC, 2011a, S/RES/1973). In the following years, while no peace*keeping* force was set up and a light-footprint approach was adhered to, the international community did take measures that fall within this thesis' state-building framework, which is further elaborated in Chapter 3. Aiming for support of the Libyan people and the promotion of peace in the war-torn country, UN-backed action fell in line with the UN peacebuilding agenda's respect for local ownership (UN Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010). The United Nations Support Mission in Libya was deployed as a political rather than military mission, providing support to local authorities. Moreover, the country's rival factions signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) to create a UN-backed transition government in an effort to allow for the development of stable new state structures, the Government of National Accord (Al Jazeera, 2015a). However, recent developments complicate the concept of the *international community* as a collective that has a "shared vision", specifically with regards to UNSC permanent member Russia now taking a different stance. Despite having the internationally backed government currently in place, Russia has since been liaising with high-ranking military officials affiliated with the previously elected House of Representatives, one of the rival parties that was to be united by the new GNA (Ali & Stewart, 2017). Against the backdrop of the highly complex Libyan civil war, these developments are crucial in the question of how to engage local elites in state-building efforts in order to create structures that are stable enough to withstand harmful movements.

3. Theoretical Framework

In recent decades and especially since 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, terrorism and the origins of terrorist movements have increasingly occupied policy-makers and scholars alike. The primal debate surrounds the question on why people join terrorist movements: Whether they motivated by ideology, poverty, a lack of education or are merely "crazy" (Gupta, 2008b, p.12), especially the last point has been disproven and the overall idea remains that terrorists are above all rational actors striving to achieve a specific aim. And moving beyond the individual and looking at the bigger picture, questions arise as to how a whole movement can form, gain momentum and paralyze or even overpower other state- and non-state actors. In this context, state failure and weak statehood have been frequently noted to pose a threat to both national and international security and are said to promote transnational terrorism. In states where the government is incapable of enforcing the law, terrorist organizations can operate outside any legal structure with significantly less fear of punishment, with perceived benefits outweighing the costs of participating in those activities (Gupta, 2008b; Krasner & Pascual, 2008; Piazza, 2008), leading to the main assumption behind this thesis: In order to lastingly tackle terrorism, it is crucial to stabilize states to an extent that allows them to withstand those movements by themselves through a strong state and security apparatus. Here, it is important to bear in mind that this argument is not a black-and-white explanation and not every weak or fragile state is automatically a breeding ground for terrorism. Instead, a variety of endo- and exogenous factors plays a role in the rise and success of terrorist movements, which is even recognized within the main debate on state failure and terrorism.

Coggins (2015, p.457) notes that "terrorism is most likely to occur within, and be produced by, countries whose failure is due to violent political instability", rather than due to human security or state capacity failure, which both do not show a strong correlation with the occurrence of domestic and international terrorism. States in which a regime faces violent political challenges or where it is unable to maintain its authority have been observed to be most critical in terms of the rise of terrorism. Thus, in order to tackle terrorism, the international community ought to focus its attention on first and foremost combating political instability rather than securitizing other factors of state failure. It is in the international community's interest to alleviate conditions of instability by moving beyond traditional military peacekeeping, but instead aim at influencing the choice of political system and internal security in a fragile state (Krasner & Pascual, 2008, p.153). Thus, bearing in mind that in Libya terrorism was not the primal threat following the fall of the Gaddafi-regime and no peace*keeping* mission

was deployed, this thesis studies the international community's efforts in addressing the political instability in Libya through peace- and state-building and political support.

In order to see how these efforts are relevant in the case of Libya, it is crucial to first understand what is meant by those concepts. Moving beyond peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, peacebuilding can be considered as a post-war effort. It includes "everything from preventive diplomacy and humanitarian aid to different types of civilian assistance, military operations, development activities, and post-conflict reconstruction" (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.5). The ultimate aim of peacebuilding is not only the creation of peace, but to prevent future conflicts. Its focus lies on post-conflict environments, and a necessary condition for lasting stability is the existence of basic state and security structures. Here, it becomes clear that, as previously noted, peace- and state-building are not two separate concepts. Much rather, they are two sides of the same coin, one crucial for the success of the other and it is impossible to study a case in the context of one, disregarding the other. Statebuilding "is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" (Fukuyama, 2004, p. ix) and can thus be regarded as an element at the very basis of peace-building. There is no clear consensus on what state-building entails. Much rather, it refers to the "construction of legitimate governmental institutions", requiring cooperation with and respect for the civil society (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.14). Along the same line of reasoning, Barnett and Zürcher (2009, pp.32-36) note that in order to lastingly create peace, a comprehensive approach is necessary. International actors should actively seek cooperation with and support for local authorities, as well as aim for the inclusion of sub-national elites that could otherwise threaten the regime in their state-building efforts.

While certainly the inclusion of citizens plays a large role, state-building is not synonymous to nation-building, as its main emphasis is the creation of public institutions rather than providing a national sense of belonging. The increased legitimacy in operations actively integrating local authorities has been recognized (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Narten, 2008) and there have been arguments supporting the idea that peace- and state-building heavily depend on an interplay between international capacities, local capacities and hostilities in the country (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Observations of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan show the hardships of trying to impose a form of governance upon a country with a vastly different social, cultural and political background. Thus, considering those past experiences, the complexities of a fragile state and internal struggles that may challenge the creation of state and security structures, such as localism and tribalism, this thesis looks at how terrorist movements exploit those weaknesses and how this is addressed by the international community. One factor

playing into this is that "sometimes, the decisive factor is the hospitality … of the local 'authorities' rather than the absence of state structures" (Newman, 2007, p.483). A positive relationship with those in power, for example due to shared interests or common state- and non-state opponents, can influence the success of terrorist groups. This leads to complications in the relationship between international intervening powers and local actors, something that should be taken into account when assessing state-building measures.

The theory of state-building does not directly integrate the factor of terrorism. Yet, overall, this thesis assumes that counterterrorism policies and actions are part of those broader concepts, and that state-building efforts can be considered as a form of long-term counterterrorism strategy since only a well-functioning state with strong state structures can prevent terrorist organizations from gaining foothold. While this logic was employed in for example Afghanistan post-9/11 where al-Qaeda was able to benefit from the state's failure, with debatable success, the case of Libya is interesting since it did not start out as a breeding ground for terrorists, but very much faces the risk of slipping there. Instead of testing a specific theory in this field, this thesis is placed within the broader framework of state-building theory, seeking to explore how the indicators on cohesion and intervention laid down by the Fund for Peace (2017c), which are further elaborated in Chapter 2.4 of this thesis' methodology, are then put in relation to the international community's actions in Libya. Seeing how state-building is not a quick process and the ultimate idea behind this research is the lasting fight of terrorism, there is no way to assess the effectiveness of the international community's effort within the scope of this thesis. Instead, it addresses the specific measures taken and assumes that through these tools, a long-term solution is possible by reducing the circumstances allowing terrorist groups to thrive, something that may be addressed in future research further down the road.

4. Country and Conflict – The Context of the Libyan War

In hindsight, the Libyan conflict and rise of terrorist movements hardly came out of nowhere, yet their extent and lasting impact on the country were not predictable (Lacher, 2017, p.140). A variety of historical and societal factors led to those developments. Over the past century, Libya had undergone several changes: From Ottoman backwater, over Italian colony to independent monarchy, socialist and oppressed state under Gaddafi, up to a revolution and questions on "what is next" for this state-less state. The revolution led to the Libyan people having to deal with issues that had previously been challenging even for politicians from different camps. In 2011, Libyans for the first time held their future in their own hands – a task that arguably was overwhelming for a country that had continuously struggled with an odyssey of state- and nation-building and a population that had been left on the sidelines of these processes. Previously guided by a long string of both foreign and local rulers and their interests, people lacked a sense of national belonging that would facilitate the creation of a state. For Libyans, localism, tribalism and religion always played a bigger role than nationalism.

In fact, it was only in 1929 that Italy united the three provinces Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan under one governor and it took until 1934 for Italy to adopt the name Libya for its colony, a name used by the Greeks for all of North Africa and never specifically referring to the Libyan territory (Schnelzer, 2016, p.31). With the Saharan plateau making up around nine tenths of Libya, the country's populated areas are largely separated by the desert, which partly explains the lacking national identity (Pargeter, 2009, p.1033). Even after the unification of the three provinces under Italian rule, people continued to identify themselves with their region, or more prominently with their families and tribes. From the creation of the monarchy onward, there have been tensions between the maintenance of the political community based on family and tribe, and the challenges brought about by the creation of a modern state that would reduce the relevance of such ties. To this day, tribal and personal connections are a highly important component of Libyan society and still often determine who is part of the country's elite (Vandewalle, 2012, p.41). As Lacher (2011a, p.140) notes, the fall of Gaddafi brought back those struggles. Where previously over 20 major tribes were united in their fight against the regime, they are now struggling for power and resources, complicating the process of politically integrating all of the Libyan public. Beyond local and tribal connections, one unifying factor has been the Libyan people's identification with Islamic rather than Arabic symbolism and ideology (St John, 2015, p.22). In Libya, as in other North African states, Islam is a core component of people's identity, even in the more secular parts of society (Pargeter, 2009, p.1038). In this regard, localism again plays a large role, with radical Islam being highly

prominent in the east of the country where people are historically more receptive to the ideology and generally more conservative. And even within those regions, one can distinguish between different branches, with some neighborhoods of Benghazi for example following the interpretation of Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood, while others are rather known to be home to more militant bent. Not only can radicalization be traced to Cyrenaica, with a vast majority of Libyan foreign fighters originating in the eastern cities of Derna and Benghazi, but the localized mindset has even led to martyrs' funerals being previously frequently held in the east for those fighters who went to and died in Iraq (ibid., pp.1043-1044). Thus, although up until the revolution the country has not been much confronted by terrorist attacks and organizations, the country has a complex history with Islam in its various forms. These concepts of localism, tribalism and Islam would therefore play a large role throughout the country's history and are highly crucial also in the context of this study.

4.1. From Monarchy to Jamahiriya – Libya under Gaddafi

When Libya gained independence in 1951, it was not the result of a long ideologically motivated struggle like in its neighboring countries that would create a sense of national identity, but a decision made by the Great Powers that pulled Libya closer into the Western camp (Vandewalle, 2012, p.43). The country's three provinces became a federal monarchy under the country's first king, Idris al-Sanusi. Similar to the monarchs in Morocco and Jordan, the Sanusis were descendants of Prophet Muhammad, basing his claim for power on religious grounds (St John, 2011, p.225). Al-Saunsi faced a number of political and economic difficulties. There was neither a pre-existing sense of political loyalty to the newly instated monarch, nor a common sense of national identity among the provinces' citizens and their wishes for the new country were diverse and often contradictory. Moreover, the king made repeated calls to focus his rule on his native Cyrenaica and threatened to resign, showing that even among the elite there were anti-state sentiments (Vandewalle, 2012, p.72). The issue of federalism versus unitary state became problematic already in the 1952 elections which were likely manipulated in order to avoid a transfer of the power center from the king's native Cyrenaica to Tripolitania, where a majority of the population lived (St John, 2011, p.223). The country's federalist structure with largely independently administered provinces during the state's first years in combination with a king who himself did not feel like the head of the whole state proved to be main factors in the monarchy's demise. The 1963 constitutional changes towards a more centralized government and administration of the three provinces led to power being held by a small circle and state institutions and bureaucracy largely lacking a real purpose.

In the early days of its independence, Libya's economy was struggling. The majority of the population was engaged in agriculture, which due to the country's geography with little rain and tired soil and the outdated production methods was unfruitful, and other sectors, such as the industrial one, were just as unpromising (St John, 2011, p.221). Throughout the 1950s, several governments formed and all of them were too weak, poor and inexperienced to establish a clear domestic and foreign policy and Libya heavily depended on Western support. The country thus was faced with the challenges of balancing the interests of the Western powers, and those of the growing sentiment of Arab nationalism (ibid., p.223). The discovery of oil in 1959 caused an extreme change for Libya, moving from impoverished desert state to a global oil-exporter, leading Libyans to seek a comprehensive ideology to explain for this new path and looking at Nasser's Egypt, Arab nationalism appeared to be the solution (Vandewalle, 2012, p.44). However, the monarchy disregarded the need for ideological fulfillment, and pre-existing tribal, provincial, religious and pan-Arabic loyalties remained, leading to a conflict between people and leadership, which the monarchy addressed by strengthening the central government rather than increasing public participation (Schnelzer, 2016, p.32). Political parties were banned, newspapers censored, and the opposition suppressed. To protect the regime and ensure economic success, power was delegated to some families who controlled both local and long-distance trade routes and Libyans realized that control over the country, its economy and its future lay in the hands of only few (ibid.) Thus, rather than gaining legitimacy from his religious heritage, the king's political authority was based largely on a secular network of tribal connections and loyalties, which in retrospect were not strong foundations for his power. The unequal distribution of power and wealth were main factors on which Gaddafi based his coup d'état on September 1, 1969 under the slogan "Freedom, Socialism and Unity" (ibid.).

The new leadership faced the dilemma how to tackle the political, economic and social issues the monarchy had left unresolved. In September 1969, Libya had only been a unitary state for six years and during that time, Libyans had not developed a national identity or a wish for modern statehood. The swift and bloodless coup did not involve the participation of civilians and was militarily planned, organized and executed. Its success could be attributed more to the issues of the old system than the support it had among the public. Representing a stark contrast to the previous leadership, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) followed a populist rhetoric as it consisted of young men who almost all came from a middle-class background from less prestigious tribes and had graduated from the country's Military Academy merely six years before the coup (Vandewalle, 2012, p.78). Gaddafi was quickly announced as the regime's commander in chief, and not only was he the face of the revolution, but the

leadership's policies were strongly marked by his thinking. They can be directly traced back to his deep-rooted admiration for Egyptian President Nasser, his Islamist roots and his wish for pan-Arab unity rather than Libyan nationalism (ibid., pp.78-79; St John, 2011, pp.261-262). However, standing in contrast to the initially radical calls for change and revolution, the new leadership lacked the skills and knowledge to lead a country and had to use the monarchy's previously acquired tools and expertise, largely following the old regime's policies (ibid., p.60).

While it was clear to the revolutionary group that wealth was not distributed fairly and reform was needed, the first few months of the RCC's rule saw only cautious developments in the economic sector. None of the RCC members had experience in economic management and reform policies were thus implemented slowly. A main concern was the Libyan economy's dualistic nature: Around 99% of the country's revenues came from oil exports, but other – inefficient – sectors employed 99% of the active Libyan population (ibid., p.88), meaning that the revolution's egalitarian credos could not be met. To solve this issue, the RCC reduced oil production, increased prices and used the revenues to develop other sectors (St. John, 2011, pp.275-278). Like in other North African revolutions that occurred in the twentieth century, socialism played a large role in the Libyan revolution and the RCC soon turned to socialist policies. The uneven distribution of wealth was a main issue under Sanusi rule, leading the RCC to begin distributing wealth across the population in a conscious effort to not only eliminate this flaw, but also to gain legitimacy for the regime. Private ownership was viewed with suspicion by the RCC, leading to conscious efforts to bring substantial parts of different sectors under state instead of private control (Vandewalle, 2012, p.91). Moreover, public spending was increased in the housing, education and health care sectors to directly benefit both consumers and workers through measures such as increased minimum wages and free housing for the poorest members of society (ibid.). While on the surface, these measures did benefit the Libyan public, the ultimate aim of especially the educational reforms was not education itself, but more so "to create a new man, supportive of the new regime" (St. John, 2011, p.280).

From 1969 until 1793, the RCC had achieved a number of their initial promises. British and American military bases had been evicted, large parts of the country's bureaucracy had been replaced and the power of the traditionally powerful noble and tribal families been reduced. In creating new administrative structures, the RCC had managed to reduce previous loyalties along tribal lines, and a large body of young people that were not previously affiliated with the monarchy had been drawn into the political process (Vandewalle, 2012, p.93). Beyond administrative issues, the Gaddafi regime also placed a high emphasis on ideology and the role of Arab unity due to Gaddafi's admiration for Egyptian President Nasser, who he saw as a

dedicated Arab revolutionary with the potential to re-strengthen the Arab world. Thus, revolutionizing the Libyan political sphere was merely a step on the way to achieve Arab unity beyond the Libya (ibid., p.79). Gaddafi sought the unification of all Arab countries, proposing federations with Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Tunisia, but soon realized that those attempts would not be futile in the near future (St. John, 2011, p.283). The cultural cohesion among Arab countries can be interlinked with the prevalence of Islam in the region. Despite the often connected concepts, Arab unity cannot be equated to pan-Islamism. Gaddafi increasingly incorporated his ideology's Islamic roots into Libyan policies and much of the RCC's program contained references to Islam, but they were cautious when it came to the direct link between politics and religion. Acknowledging that Islam is a personal experience and should only affect an individual and his connection to Allah, Gaddafi did not *directly* use religion for political purposes. Instead, the RCC's policies merely followed the guidelines of Islam and re-introduced Islamic criminal penalties (Vandewalle, 2012, p.87).

Despite – or because of – the efforts of using Islam and Arab rather than Libyan nationalism to create a sense of belonging, the RCC still faced the prominently difficult task of how to achieve more public political enthusiasm. In practical terms regarding leadership style, the RCC made a conscious, yet cautious, effort to remove all traces of the previous regime. In December 1969, the RCC was declared the highest political authority in Libya and by October 1970, all ministries but the Ministry of Oil, which required a level of expertise the RCC was unable to acquire in such a short time, were run by RCC members (ibid., p.81). Having strengthened the RCC's own position, Gaddafi announced in 1971 the move towards popular rule and attempted to reduce the tribal and regional identification in favor of a nation-wide power structure to support the revolutionary goals. However, in face of the political apathy amongst the Libyan people, the proposed system that foresaw a Popular Congress that would appoint representatives to the Libyan parliament was quickly overhauled in favor of a more controlled system under the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) which was based on the Egyptian example. The ASU as a party was intended as a link between people and government, giving them a voice, while at the same time still very much under government control. Local, provincial and national assemblies for the ASU were set up in order to break up traditional identities that shaped Libyan politics. However, while political activity and participation were major objectives, in 1972 a law was passed that prohibited any political activity outside the ASU and breaking the law could be punished by death (ibid., p.82). In introducing this policy, the RCC followed the direct footsteps of the monarchy, suppressing political engagement that did not fall in line with the revolutionary regime's objectives. Like the Popular Congress,

however, the ASU soon was considered a failure as it merely drew in those citizens who were politically neutral. Not only in terms of social classes were political differences obvious. With the Sanusi order's previous strong link to Cyrenaica and the support for a rather radical version of Islam shaping the identity of the east, Gaddafi's coup was considered as a direct attack on the east and an attempt to overrule the region (Pargeter, 2009, p.1036). Combined with his very personal brand of Islam and Arab nationalism, the revolution was seen as less of a positive change towards popular participation, but more as another attempt by a ruler to impose his own ideas and ideologies onto the public. Since Gaddafi focused mainly on Arab rather than Libyan unity and attempted to wipe out tribal and regional structures rather than addressing and incorporating them, no Libyan national sense of belonging emerged, just like under the previous regime. Moreover, despite his efforts to reduce tribal allegiances, Libyan politics remained highly personalized, with the country's elite almost entirely consisting of members of Gaddafi's tribe and associated tribes, as well as people who had personal relationships with him (ibid.).

Having aimed to brand the take-over of 1969 less as a military coup d'état and more as a revolution, it was crucial to tackle the issue of political apathy in Libya, leading to the proposed solution that the people shall govern themselves. On 15 April 1973, Gaddafi announced a Five Point Program that would initiate a popular, bottom-up rather than top-down revolution. In the spirit of the coup four years earlier, its aim was to mobilize the people in support of the RCC, build a new type of leadership that was loyal to the regime, and allowing people to shape society by establishing rules themselves. The Program consisted of the repeal of all existing laws, the removal of opponents of the revolution, the elimination of all forms of bureaucracy, the armament of the general public in order to defend the revolution, and lastly the initiation of a cultural revolution that would eliminate "imported" ideas in order to reach the Libyan people's full potential (St. John, 2011, p.288). This was marked by distrust towards the traditional forces inside and outside Libya and by the rejection of both communism and capitalism. To Gaddafi, both the US, as well as the Soviet Union were not to be trusted since they were seen as imperialist states that merely try to extend their spheres of influence in the region (ibid.). As both those systems did not seem suitable for Libya, a third path was introduced, rejecting liberal democracy and advocating socialism. The Third Universal Theory was ultimately summarized across three volumes in the *Green Book*. This was sparked by an attempted coup by members of the RCC who had turned against the regime in August 1975. Gaddafi used this opportunity to return to the revolutionary agenda and push forward his "utopian ideas on what Libya's social, political, and economic organization should look like" only weeks after the failed coup (Vandewalle, 2012, p.101). The *Green Book*'s ideas ultimately

led up to the creation of the Jamahiriya – the direct governance of the people themselves without intermediary powers, the solution to the regime's hesitance towards top-down governance. Similar to the initial revolutionary ideas, the concepts of nationalism and religion were recurring themes but the new ideas were often contradictory and overwhelmed the country.

Structured into three parts, the first offers a "Solution of the Problem of Democracy" (al-Gaddafi, 1999, p.3). Gaddafi elaborates how liberal democracies are ultimately not the best instrument for public representation. He argues that democratic elections do not lead to fair representation, but rather culminate in dictatorship since vast parts of the electorate end up not being represented since they voted for another person or party. While parliaments promise the people's representation, they are ultimately undemocratic since democracy means "the power of the people, and not power vested in members of an assembly" (ibid., p.4). He continues to similarly criticize political parties as dictatorial instruments of government, and likens them to tribal structures, made up of individuals sharing the same interests and ideas that end up governing non-members (ibid., p.8). The offered solution was a system of direct democracy based on the establishment of people's conferences and committees across Libya. Seeing how it would simply not be possible to bring together all people of the country, the creation of committees everywhere was presented as the only way to ensure direct democracy and fair representation of every citizen (ibid., p.17). Yet, Gaddafi himself noted that theory and practice often diverge: "Theoretically, this is the genuine democracy, but in reality, the strong always rule: that is to say those who are strongest in society hold the reigns of government" (ibid., p.27). This acknowledgement can be considered as very telling for the political realities in the years to follow. Despite his advocacy for direct democracy, the political landscape was determined by Gaddafi, his advisors and people close to him and his tribe.

Second, Gaddafi (1999, p.31) addresses the economic problem, determining that socialism as the right alternative to communism and capitalism for Libya. Despite any advancements and developments, "workers are but slaves to the masters who hire them" (ibid., p.32). The solution to this problem would be the abolition of the wage system and a return to the natural laws that brought together workers and masters before a system of social classes in order to create an egalitarian society. As people are driven by their needs, humanity can only achieve emancipation through the fulfillment of needs. Thus, people should either work for themselves to secure their own material needs, work for a collectively shared establishment where they are partners sharing the production, or enter public service (ibid., p.40). Through the fulfilment of needs, the public's happiness and freedom were the ultimate aim of a socialist society. Further issues addressed are the management of housing and transportation, including

the prohibition of private ownership of another home or car for the purpose of renting it, since those are basic needs that every person shall own in order to not be dependent on another. As such, for example employing maids or hiring taxis became illegal since those were not considered productive economic activity, as a result drastically changing Libya's private sector. Overall, however, while the second part of the *Green Book* did lead to changes of various industries, Gaddafi's ideas were rather simplistic and presented a utopian view of socialism.

In the *Green Book*'s final part, Gaddafi (1999, p.51) addresses the "Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory", where Arab nationalism is a main argument again. Social struggles are considered history's driving force, and as communities are the basis of survival, only nations with a shared identity can thrive. In this regard, religion can play a main part. While it is acknowledged that religions can – and do – divide people in reality and is a main force driving many conflicts, the common support for religion is what can create communities and harmony across national borders. Following this line of reasoning, Gaddafi's previous support for Arab over Libyan nationalism becomes understandable. On a smaller scale, "to an individual, the family is more important than the state" since families are natural entities necessary for society to thrive as a whole whereas states are artificial constructs (Gaddafi, 1999, p.56). The tribe is similarly important, since it merely is a more remote network of relatives – and with time, tribes have developed into nations. The further this network extends, the weaker the bonds and the weaker the sense of belonging (ibid., p.58). Thus, nations are entities that are based on a felt community, whereas states are political entities that were created for political, economic and military purposes. While the establishment of states has been necessitated by political incentives, the focus in terms of cohesion should always be on the family (ibid., p.63).

Following the publication of the *Green Book*, the *Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* was created in 1977, "a political community marked by consultation, rather than representation" (Vandewalle, 2012, p.101). In reality, the *Green Book*'s three parts were successful to varying extents and it was a manifesto that would shape the country's future. The longest-lasting and most vigorously implemented aspects were taken from the book's first part regarding the governance of Libya. The failed 1975 coup allowed Gaddafi to pursue his idea of the stateless society and initiated the RCC's demise, which in 1977 was finalized with its replacement by the General Secretariat of the General People's Conference and the General People's Congress (GPC), which replaced the ASU (ibid., p.103; St John, 2011, p.308). Rather than occupying an official post, Gaddafi proclaimed himself as Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution, a post that was intended to merely symbolic (Al Jazeera, 2011). Yet, this "destroyed any pretense of collegial decision-making" and moved Libya towards one-man rule

(St John, 2011, p.308). The People's Congresses and Committees across the country was supposed to be a bottom-up system encouraging popular participation, but their competences were limited. The GPC technically appointed the General Secretariat, but in reality Secretaries were mostly appointed by the regime, which was problematic since the Secretariat was responsible for determining the GPC's agenda. While initially the Secretariat submitted major domestic and foreign policy decisions to the GPC for ratification, issues such as foreign policy, control over the army, the police, the Libyan budget and the oil sector were later moved beyond the GPC's competences (ibid., p.309; Vandewalle, 2012, p.104). Thus, while popular rule was a major aim of the regime, it turned out to be a means for the regime to control rather than mobilize the public, silence dissidents, shape the political agenda, and solidify its own position.

The creation of the Revolutionary Authority in 1979 led to a twofold power structure in the country that has shaped Libyan society and politics until the 2011 revolution: A formal structure of government centered around the GPC and Committees, and the informal one where power was held by a small circle close to Gaddafi, which was supported and protected by security sector institutions and the Revolutionary Committees. With the security sector, as well as the economic sphere and questions of budgeting outside the Jamahiriya system, the ultimate power remained at the top, rather than allowing actual bottom-up leadership by the people (Vandewalle, 2012, pp.117-118). The people's authority, while constantly highlighted in the *Green Book*, was ultimately challenged by the emergence of the 1977 Revolutionary Committees, consisting of a small group directly selected by and solely responsive to Gaddafi outside the control of the GPC. While officially the GPC was in power, the Revolutionary Committees were supposed to "guide" the revolution, holding the authority to replace members of the Basic People's Congresses that were deemed unacceptable, thus allowing Gaddafi to ultimately appoint the people he preferred to be in power (ibid.). Moreover, the Libyan legal system was increasingly manipulated as the Revolutionary Committees were given authority on the use of violence and revolutionary courts were created based on the "law of the revolution". While previously the sharia was laid down as the source of law in Libya, its clear rules and remedies were no longer suitable for the ever-changing and increasingly arbitrary actions of the regime. Gaddafi "argued that Islamic legal rules could no longer be used as a guideline for economic and political relations in modern societies" (ibid., p.121). The GPC had issued a statement that all legal codes were based on the Quran, following the *Green Book*'s previous emphasis on the importance the sacred and universally applicable law of Islam. Yet, while never openly acknowledged, secular policies replaced religion as the source of law (ibid.,

p.124; Metz, 1987). These changes led to a parallel system of justice in which regular courts were bypassed, human rights and the regime focused on protecting itself (St. John, 2011, p.319).

After 1969, Libya underwent a socialist revolution in terms of redistribution of wealth and resources, especially in the second half of the 1970s. The oil boom of 1973 tested the regime's capability of implementing their directives into reality. The rapid inflow of revenue from the oil sector was as challenging to the regime as the previous capital scarcity. While initially the widespread redistribution of wealth and power led to substantial support for the regime and the desired ideological revolution in the 1970s, the regime's austerity policies, in combination with radical foreign policies later caused increasing dissatisfaction and opposition (ibid., p.318; Vandewalle, 2012, pp.133-134). Gaddafi's regime faced opposition not only within, but also on the outside. While commercial relations with the United States were normal for much of the 1970s due to their economic dependence, diplomatic relations between the countries were mostly cautious and of pragmatic nature. It was in the US' interest to keep Libya as neutral as possible and avoid them being drawn into the Soviet camp, but several issues complicated their bilateral relations. Not only did Libya indeed heavily rely on Soviet weapon supplies, the US also frequently accused Libya of supporting terrorism and boycotting the peace process in the Middle East due to Gaddafi's open criticism of Israel and support for Palestine. The Jamahiriya policies were regarded as a threat not only to Libya and its stability, but also that of the broader North African region. The combination of allegations of support for terrorism and Gaddafi's pan-Arab ambitions and support for revolutionary factions that threatened to weaken other regional governments led to a halt in US-Libyan relations by the 1980s, while simultaneously leading to closer security ties to the Soviet Union (Siebens & Case, 2012, p.11; St. John, 2011, pp.323-326; Vandewalle, 2012, pp.129-131). The tensions between the United States, Libya and the international community escalated in the late 1980s when first, in retaliation for an attack on a Berlin nightclub that was suspected to have been carried out by a Libyan agent, the United States attacked Tripoli, and later due to Libyan involvement in the bombing of a Pan Am flight, the UN imposed sanctions upon Libya (ibid., p.137).

The next decades highlighted the revolution's weaknesses and adjustments were made to handle the growing level of dissatisfaction, including a reform of the economic sector by removing certain restrictions that had been initiated with the *Green Book*. These measures left the Jamahiriya's basic power structures untouched and did not address the bigger question of how to handle the economic and diplomatic isolation (ibid., p.139). As with any government, the Libyan regime's legitimacy relied mostly on its ability to provide citizens with a certain standard of living. During the 1980s and 1990s, the regime's restrictive policies, lack of

transparency, accountability and rule of law, and the restrictions imposed upon Libya by the international community led to increasing dissatisfaction. Rapprochement only occurred after the turn of the century, when in 2003 Libya accepted responsibility for the bombing and Gaddafi agreed to end the Libyan weapons of mass destruction program, leading the UN to lift its sanctions (Siebens & Case, 2012, p.12). Rather than considering Libya as a sponsor of terrorism, in 2006 the US declared relations with Libya had been resumed and they would continue to cooperate in global counterterrorism efforts (US Department of State, 2006). Gaddafi changed his regional approach, from openly sponsoring subversion to achieve pan-Arab unity, towards diplomacy and African rather than Arab cooperation, which was met by American appraisal. With Gaddafi now partaking in international meetings, Western scholars changed their view of the Libyan leader: Praising Gaddafi's flexibility and willingness to move away from socialism, isolation and opposition to transparency, Libya could join the global community. Barber (2007) notes that Gaddafi's Libya may be "the first Arab state to transition peacefully and without overt Western intervention to a stable, non-autocratic government" and that Libya could be a valuable partner to the West as it has "gas and oil resources, a pristine Mediterranean shoreline, a non-Islamist Muslim population, and intelligence capacities crucial to the war on terrorism". This opinion summarizes the reasons why the West was willing to put up with the man who was previously regarded as the Mad Dog of the Middle East. Despite all the flaws in Gaddafi's Libya, experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the country would only be useful to the West if cooperation rather than collision was possible, possibly explaining Gaddafi's belief that his revolution was now complete. Despite these reconciliations, the Libyan regime had continuously pursued policies that collided with Western interests and challenged Western hegemony. Gaddafi's policies of the past decades had created an insuperable gab between Libya and the West. This would soon play a role in the lacking support that Gaddafi would have needed over the course of the Arab Spring.

4.2. The Jamahiriya's Flaws

With the 1969 coup and the *Green Book*, it became increasingly clear that the new Libyan leaders, like the rulers before them, were trying to avoid the process of state-building by not further extending bureaucratic mechanisms, but rather returning to a pre-state society. Several institutions of the country were informal, the security sector lacked accountability and the economy was managed without adequate institutions and rather focused on the social contract that placed individuals – the people Gaddafi envisioned to benefit from it – behind the general idea of the revolution. The version of statelessness that Gaddafi envisioned for Libya was thus

strongly marked by a sense of nostalgia, highlighting instead the importance of family and tribe for a sense of solidarity and egalitarianism (Vandewalle, 2012, p.3). Further, Roberts (2001) notes that although the revolutionary government modernized Libya in certain aspects, it failed to let the country evolve into a republic. Where Robespierre argued that the aim of a revolutionary government is to lay the foundations for the creation of a republic, the Libyan revolution was not a state of transition, but turned out to be permanent. Its objectives and ideas were not precise, the ultimate aim was not the creation of a law-bound and constitutional government and there was no blueprint as to who or what would politically guide the country after the revolutionary regime (ibid.). The history of Libya under Ottoman rule, as a colony and later as an artificially created monarchy under a king who lacked interest in the country as a whole, as well as the rapid economic advancement in the mid-20th century contributed to the revolutionaries' idea that statelessness was the desirable solution for the country. The political and social stage that was created instead of a modern state is what ultimately led to a level of public dissatisfaction that would soon cause the regime's demise. Despite the initial promises for a state of the masses, the reality turned out different. Rather than controlling their own fate, Libyans were merely contained by an autocratic regime that held all power and conducted politics far away from the actual public. When Libya around the turn of the century made efforts to re-integrate in the international system, it became clear that the previous hesitance to establish modern state structures had to a large extent made the country incompatible with the surrounding forces. The Jamahiriya system, by being based upon the rule of the people themselves, had made opposition impossible and in order to tackle the issues amassed during Gaddafi's regime, a more radical change of political system became necessary.

5. Mapping the Scene in Libya – Internal and External Actors After 2011

With Libya increasingly reintegrated into the international community, Gaddafi had seemingly succeeded in solidifying his regime's position. However, where in 1969 the regime had envisioned a fair state in which people controlled their own lives, where everybody was equal and people should directly reap the benefits of their work, it had now turned into a system that orbited around Gaddafi alone. Libya had become a state in which opposition was suppressed, the expression of interests discouraged and individual rights disregarded. Despite ongoing claims of popular participation, it was impossible for people to actually participate in and shape political processes and while the revolution had initially brought about some improvements, it had become irrelevant to most people as it had failed to create a sense of national belonging.

On the surface Libya seemed like a relatively unshakable state under Gaddafi, with the Fund for Peace (2011) ranking it as 111th out of 177 countries up until 2011, defining it as a moderately stable state. Boeke and de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2016, p.21) point out that while the broader Arab Spring movements and the arrest of human rights activist Fathi Terbil in February 2011 were the proximate causes of the Libyan Civil War, there were larger causes lingering in the background. The uprisings starting on February 15 can be attributed to the way in which Gaddafi had decided to structure and lead Libya in the past decades. Despite the regime's egalitarian ideas, like the monarchy before it, the revolutionary regime had continued to treat the three regions differently leading to internal divisions between them. Especially the eastern region of Cyrenaica, where the protests began in Benghazi, had continued to follow Islamic extremism and may, as a result of Gaddafi's anti-Islamist stances, have been kept underdeveloped in comparison to the other two (ibid.). Further, under Gaddafi no proper state had developed. The economy still relied heavily on the oil industry and there was no apparent need to diversify, and the political system, despite preaching socialism and public participation, was centered around Gaddafi and a select group of people close to him. The vast majority of people was excluded from any process that could shape the Libyan socio-political sphere since they were not part of those networks and would later form the anti-Gaddafi camp to support the regime's overthrow (ibid., p.22). The combined lack of national sentiment or statehood ultimately led to the escalation of the situation. By February 17, demonstrations were reported across the whole country. The groups of rebels brought together a wide variety of people who felt oppressed by the regime, many of them from an educated background, including doctors, students and lawyers, but NATO confirmed that there were indicators of some terrorist activity and supporters of Al-Qaeda among the rebels (Garcia-Navarro, 2011; Winnett & Gardham, 2011). Gaddafi forces responded to the protests by firing at the crowds, killing dozens of

citizens, and Gaddafi was reported to have paid prisoners and mercenaries in order to supplement his security forces and suppress the opposition (Al Jazeera, 2017c). Protesters were soon able to gain control over Benghazi and despite Gaddafi's counter-efforts, his forces were unable to recapture the city, but these early successes were not indicative of the future of the conflict. Where in Egypt and Tunisia the revolutions remained largely peaceful and soon resulted in the ousting of their governments, the Libyans did not succeed as quickly and Gaddafi began to lead a war against his own people, actively bombing the rebels.

Gaddafi's ruthlessness caused a widespread international response. The UNSC issued a statement, condemning his use of force against civilians and calling on "Libyan authorities to act with restraint, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law" and to "respect the freedom of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the press" (UNSC, 2011b). The League of Arab States suspended Libya's membership on the same date, which, despite his previous repeated calls for Arab unity caused Gaddafi to later state back that "the Arab League is finished", disregarding the international criticism (Gates, 2014, p.549; Reuters, 2011). Initially, however, the international community was hesitant to intervene. The European financial crisis on the one hand, and the past experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan had led to a lack of public and political support for another mission. Then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates implied that it would be crazy for any defense secretary to again deploy troops into the Middle East (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.23) and the United States were indeed cautious about entering the conflict since they did not have any national interests in Libya that would warrant an intervention (Vandewalle, 2012, p.204). However, this non-interventionist stance was dismissed when Gaddafi called upon his forces to "cleanse Libya" to drive out the "rats". Increasing reports about the worsening situation in Cyrenaica and especially Benghazi prompted the international community to follow the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which stipulate the use of peaceful means as far as possible and only allows the use of force in case a population is at risk of war crimes (ibid.; Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.24). The UNSC ultimately adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17 after more moderate calls for Libya to end violence had failed. In order to get full UNSC support, the proposal for action had to make it clear that no foreign occupying force would be deployed, the regional actors were to be involved as much as possible and most importantly it was to be based on the R2P doctrine.

Resolution 1973 authorized Member States "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory" (UNSC, 2011a). By late March the mission was officially transferred to NATO, allowing the US to commit to its previous

stance of limited intervention and instead putting an organization in charge that had the capacities to coordinate international efforts. The resolution did not refer to regime change and first and foremost focused on the protection of civilians, thus following the narrative of a both time- and scope-limited mission. However, while it did call only for a no-fly zone, it also authorized Member States to take "all necessary measures" to achieve their objective of protecting civilians. In doing so, it left open the option of extending the mission if this was deemed necessary at a later point. The biggest issue of the Resolution was its lack of foresight, which fell in line with the country's internal struggles. Bearing in mind the long-standing differences between the regions and complicated history between Cyrenaica in the east and Tripolitania in the west, where support for Gaddafi was traditionally strong, led to internal uncertainty, with the options being either overpowering of the west by the eastern rebels or the separation of the country into two smaller states (Vandewalle, 2012, p.206). While Resolution 1973 called for whatever means were needed to protect the Libyans, it also did not propose a final solution to the Libyan problem. Western leaders did note that for "transition to succeed, [G]addafi must go and go for good" (Obama, Cameron & Sarkozy, 2011). But any more specific mentions of intended regime overthrow or toppling of Gaddafi in the actual Resolution would have led to vetoes from China or Russia, with the latter even stating in its foreign policy statement that attempts to overthrow "legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting civilian population" would threaten world peace (Russian Federation, 2013). The effects of this unclear resolution are still visible today and Russia's stance can explain for some of the peace- and statebuilding issues arising over the following six years.

Following the passing of Resolution 1973, allied forces began to prepare for air strikes in light of a rapidly worsening security situation in Benghazi. Where the Resolution had called for the implementation of a no-fly zone, it was clear that actually meant attacks on Libyan air defenses in order to ensure that NATO could safely fly over Libya without fearing a counter attack (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.32). Over the course of the next weeks and months, it became increasingly difficult for the allies to differ between rebels and regime forces and targets were carefully selected and main infrastructure avoided in light of the mission's objective of primarily protecting civilians. In order to be able to make fast and informed decisions at NATO, France and the UK led the decision-making process by first meeting bilaterally and then aligning with other allies to be able to present an agreed upon position that could then easily be adopted. NATO action focused on the campaign's air component, but France, the UK and especially Qatar supporting the rebels did indeed take action on the ground outside this framework (ibid., p.35). Internally, Libya had begun to reorganize as well, with

Gaddafi-opponents forming the National Transitional Council (NTC), or Interim Transitional National Council, on February 27, 2011, which was intended to be the face of the revolution rather than being an interim government and based its claims of legitimacy on local councils formed by the rebels. Over its first months, the NTC began laying down ground rules on how rebels should behave in order to show its respect for the rule of law. Further, in an effort to provide some structure, rebels in the liberated areas formed councils that were similar to those under Gaddafi. As St. John (2011, p.490) notes, the hesitance of people to participate in them under Gaddafi was not reflected under the NTC. Instead, the previous decades had allowed people to gain experience and expertise in order to manage local government institutions. The NTC's formation and their aim to liberate other Libyan cities, especially Tripoli, were supported by the international community and following a meeting between representatives from NATO, UN and EU, as well as the Arab League and Libya, a Libya Contact Group was established in order to "provide leadership and overall political direction to the international effort to support Libya … [and a focal point] for contact with the Libyan parties" (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011). By June, Gaddafi's troops were increasingly on the defensive and had not been able to make any significant wins over the past months as their resources and options were consistently decreasing.

Two months later, Gaddafi's forces had lost vast parts of the Libyan territory, including the surrounding areas of Tripoli, allowing rebels to encircle the Gaddafi-controlled capital. NATO-supported opposition cells inside the city began an uprising and soon rebel forces were able to enter the town, renaming the city's Green Square into Martyrs' Square (Al Jazeera, 2017c). As it had become increasingly clear that Gaddafi would not be able to regain control over the country, in early August the NTC issued a draft constitution for Libya. It reiterated the NTC's belief that the revolution and creation of the NTC were the appropriate means for the Libyans to achieve democracy and a stable state based on transparent institutions, as well as a society of "citizenship, justice, equality … wherein there is no place for injustice, tyranny, despotism, exploitation and dictatorship" (Interim Transitional National Council, 2011). Calling for elections to be held shortly after the "announcement of liberation" and the creation of a united and independent state with its capital in Tripoli, sharia as the source of law and Arabic as the country's official language, it can be said to be aimed at addressing as much of the Libyan public as possible, while at the same time maintaining certain traditional provisions. However, St. John (2011, p.491) notes that here differences between interest groups within the rebel movement became clear. Issues included the question of whether to allow previously high-ranking figures who had been in exile to return to public posts in Libya, or whether the

new government should consist of fresh faces only, or in how far Islamist elements of the rebel movement should be represented in the new interim government. Further, beyond the traditional east-west divide, a new regionalism emerges with Misurata and Zintan demanding more power due to the role they had played in the fight against Gaddafi's forces. These early concerns showed that the transition towards democratic representation would not come easily.

The country's liberation followed in October 2011 when Sirte, Gaddafi's hometown, was captured and it was announced that Gaddafi had died after being captured. From the beginning, the NTC had made it clear that it did not intend on staying in power indefinitely and mainly focused on working itself out of its job by organizing and executing the timetable for reforms within a year from liberation. While the initial goal of freeing Libya from the Gaddafi regime was achieved, it brought about a number of bigger issues that the transitional authorities had to tackle. In a country that did not know political dialogue, but consisted of various interest groups, the NTC had to address the question how to manage the people's competing interests and bring together Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, establish institutions that were both legitimate and functional, and address the interests of militias and extremists.

5.1. 2011 – 2014: Rocky Start of the Journey to Statehood

While the death of Gaddafi was celebrated by Libyans and international community alike, the declaration of liberation initiated a transition period which observers soon predicted to turn into a long and winding road. Starting in the fall of 2011, Libya began a complex process of both state- and nation-building it had never undergone before, and the interplay of regional, national, international and transnational actors has sometimes aided, but often also further complicated this endeavor. While the Libyan rebels and the NTC had put considerable efforts into winning back their country, the toppling of Gaddafi arguable would not have been possible if NATO's Operation Unified Protector had not been deployed. Throughout the summer of 2011, the international community aimed at limiting involvement wherever possible, only aiding the rebels and intervening in cases where civilian lives were at risk, but the damage done, in combination with the country's internal fragility led to later issues. The emergence of the NTC and the acceptance of the Council as the legitimate governing body of Libya by foreign powers – including even Russia – even before the Libyan leader's death strongly influenced the further course of action (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.39). With the NTC in line to take charge of the country's transitional process, the international community's previous worries about heavy involvement such as in Iraq and Afghanistan were seemingly resolved as a national organ was available and set to take ownership of the post-war situation.

A term that has since been frequently brought up in the context of NATO's involvement in Libya is the "light-footprint strategy" (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.15; Chivvis et al, 2012). In contrast to previous wars, the Western powers sought cooperation with national, as well as regional actors in order to facilitate the process and avoid reoccurring instability due to new questions of legitimacy. Due to the success in the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the international community was optimistic about the developments in Libya and believed this would create a supportive environment around Libya (Chivvis et al., 2012, p.2). The interim government was still struggling to win the support of certain factions of the Libyan population and more foreign troops on the ground in the conflict's aftermath would have given the people the impression again that they were not in charge of their country's future. According to leaked intelligence insights from sources close to the NTC, the Council recognized the need to resolve the differences between the groups to reduce conflict among ethnic and regional militias that had so far been united in their fight against Gaddafi. Further, Libya was in no position to go "back to business" right away and the NTC was dealing with the pressure of providing basic services to the Libyan public as quickly as possible to avoid disenchantment even before any notable achievements. NATO military planners had been careful to avoid unnecessary to the Libyan infrastructure and the country did have sufficient resources to in theory quickly achieve economic stability and independence again without having to rely on foreign financial aid.

Not only NATO, but also other states were eager to facilitate the transition process without having to send a peacekeeping force to Libya, and extensive political planning had been done in the months leading up to Gaddafi's death. The United Kingdom deployed an International Stabilization Response Team (ISRT) to Libya, consisting of experts from different professional backgrounds to assess Libya's future needs and provide analysis for rapid use by the Libyan leaders and international community (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.39; ISRT, 2011). Defining stabilization as "the process of establishing an environment in which there is sufficient space and security for political dialogue" and "in which people and key institutions are protected, the rule of law can be re-established and basic and social services are provided" (ISRT, 2011, p.4). The report pointed out early on the need to bring together the different militias under one civilian authority to create a single security force and to lead inclusive dialogue and supports the NTC's plan to increase engagement with the civil society in order to gain popular support for the interim government. In terms of international involvement, the ISRT (ibid., p.9) foresaw continued and extensive monitoring of different Libyan actors, support in terms of emergency communication and provision of emergency services, as well as continued transition planning in line with the Libyan processes. While

overall the report remained vague in terms of *actual* measures to be taken, it becomes clear that it envisioned a political settlement of the conflict rather than one that involves intervention and support should be focused on the provision of basic services and the restoration of the Libyan economy, infrastructure and the security sector.

Where previously the UN had deployed peacekeeping forces to both African, as well as Middle Eastern post-conflict zones, following the careful drafting of Resolution 1973 it had become clear that there was no intention of sending peacekeeping troops to Libya. Then UNSG Ban Ki-Moon described the UN's intention to increase their work in the field of preventive diplomacy rather than military involvement, stating that "in the face of political tensions or escalating crises, preventive diplomacy is often one of the few options available, short of coercive measures", calling it a possible "high-return investment" (UNSC, 2011c, p.5). In line with this reasoning and in an effort to achieve a democratic transition in Libya, the UNSC reaffirmed the UN's leadership role in international conflict resolution processes and its focus on supporting nationally led peace- and state-building processes. It adopted Resolution 2009, establishing the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which is a political rather than military mission. On September 16, 2011 UNSMIL was initially created as an integrated special political mission at the request of Libyan authorities to support them in their post-conflict work (UNSMIL, n.d.). Initially set up for only a period of three months, its mandate included the assistance and support to the NTC to restore public security, undertake political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, strengthening newly emerging state institutions, and coordinate support that Libya may request from other actors (UNSC, 2011d). The mission mandate is formulated with high regard for the concept of national ownership, showing the United Nations' caution when it comes to foreign intervention in intra-state conflicts. Since its creation, the mission's mandate has been extended by the UNSC in a number of resolutions, with the most recent extension being valid until 15 September 2017 (UNSMIL, n.d.). The frequent extensions can be interpreted as both a success of the mission, while also highlighting the difficulties in the Libyan state-building process that became clear even in the transition's earliest days, showing that NTC officials were overwhelmed with the task of guiding Libya towards a new state.

Even before the declaration of liberation, comments were made that NTC officials were observers rather than actors in the country's transition, they resorted to "passive analysis rather than aggressive forward thinking" (Abedin, 2011). Following this assessment, despite the success in the fight against the Gaddafi regime, the interim government had to work hard to maintain its legitimacy and prevent a power vacuum that militias and other interest groups

would exploit. After the war had ended, many militias were unwilling to lay down their arms. They declared themselves the "guardians of the revolution" (Kirkpatrick, 2011), and the NTC recognized that in order to bring together those different groups under centralized command in a manner that would not jeopardize the NTC's legitimacy and cause another outbreak of civil war (Blumenthal, 2011). In an effort to maintain safety and control, Libya's security sector evolved into a hybrid arrangement between national military and police and locally organized, state-sponsored forces, as the NTC brought those groups together under the Libya Shield Force and Supreme Security Committee (Wehrey, 2014). However, this system was not viable, as regional and ideological differences led to polarization and conflict within the security institutions. The fragility of the system the NCT had created became increasingly clear not long after liberation and 2012 turned out to be a pivotal year for the future of the Libyan state.

In January, protesters who had previously supported the NTC's revolutionary efforts stormed the Council's center in Benghazi. Main sources of discontent were that the NCT was still employing officials who had been active under Gaddafi, the lack of transparency of government processes, as well as their hesitance to officially make Islam the new Libyan state's national religion under the country's new constitution (Al Tommy, 2012; Blumenthal, 2012). This attack constituted the first serious event to shake the self-appointed Council. Moreover, NTC officials in Benghazi began to prepare a campaign to regain autonomy over the eastern region, bringing up the old east-west divide again and causing increased tensions with the central NTC in Tripoli (BBC, 2017). Despite these protests and hindrances to the NTC's work, the Council was able to adhere to the timetable laid down in the draft constitution's plan for transition, and elections were held on July 7, 2012. In the months leading up to the election, the NTC had made conscious attempts of integrating the public as much as possible in the process, while at the same time carefully planning the elections in order to guide the country to stability. The new government consisted of a coalition of mainly liberal parties, with Islamic groups – especially the Muslim Brotherhood – failing to gain much support in the election.

Following the initial euphoria of the country's first successful post-Gaddafi election, the transition began to shake significantly throughout the summer of 2012 and the country's internal divisions broke up anew, leading to a fragmentation that still persists today. It is this fragmentation that can, to a large extent, explain for the rise of terrorist movements in Libya. In these months, not only a new government took over, but one of the largest terrorist networks of Libya appeared. While initially splinters of Ansar al-Sharia were formed during the Civil War, the organization rose to prominence as a group in June 2012 and continuously gained support and prominence over the following months (Irshaid, 2014). Made up of a number of

former rebels from different militias based largely in Cyrenaica, its main area of operation initially focused on Benghazi, where the group led a rally of armed trucks through the city, demanding the imposition of sharia law throughout Libya (ibid.). While Gaddafi frequently highlighted the importance of Islam, under his rule any form of organized movements, including more radical Islamist groups, outside the Jamahiriya framework was crushed down immediately and fighters of the Libyan Fighting Group arrested. The formation of terrorist networks post-Gaddafi under the NTC's rule highlight two issues: First, it shows again the struggle between the regions, with the east being traditionally critical of Gaddafi's policies, since people felt that power was centralized in Tripoli, disregarding Cyrenaica, and this had seemingly not changed under the NTC. It also shows that the NCT lacked the legitimacy to take adequate action to either stay in control of the situation despite these groups, to integrate them properly into the national security force or include them in the broader political process.

In August, the NTC formally transferred their power to the General National Congress (GNC), leading to the transitional Council's official dissolution and the country's first peaceful governmental transition since the country's creation. The GNC, again, was not intended to be a final government for Libya, but much rather another interim solution tasked with setting up a constitution for the country within the next eighteen months. Following this period, elections planned for the summer of 2014 after which the GNC was to be replaced by a Council of Deputies, or House of Representatives (HoR). Due to the short timeframe between the NTC's takeover of the country and the handover to the GNC, no proper mechanisms were in place to ensure the rule of law and maintain public order (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.41). The GNC experienced its first blow a month after being put in charge. Chivvis et al. (2012, p.2) note that elections do not automatically guarantee peace, but may in fact lead to a return of conflict. The government focused less on bringing the different militias under central control, and the tension became increasingly clear on September 11, 2012, when the American consulate in Benghazi was attacked by a number of armed groups, killing the US ambassador, finally demonstrating the security sector's deficiencies. While the organization did not immediately take responsibility for the attack, the US government[5] quickly received intelligence that indicated that ASL was responsible for the attack and had directly aimed it at American high-ranking subjects as a demonstration that the GNC "cannot protect its non-Islamic friends" (US Official, 2012). The UN responded with a statement rejecting "defamation of religion in all forms", reminding the Libyan government to protect diplomatic facilities and staff, and

[5] For confidentiality reasons, the sender of the information was censored prior to the release of the e-mail exchange with then-Secretary of State Clinton.

reiterating that the UN continues to support Libya in its efforts to bring stability back to the country (UNSG, 2012). Rather than taking stricter measures, such as through the adoption of another resolution, the UN decided to offer support to the local authorities rather than punishing them. This incident demonstrated a crucial dilemma: On the one hand, the GNC was in no position to prevent the attack. It lacked security capacities and institutions to control or integrate those taking up arms to achieve their aims, highlighting the need for support in the government's post-war efforts. At the same time, it showed that certain (powerful) parts of the population saw the involvement of the GNC with Western, non-Muslim, governments with suspicion, complicating even the international community's "light footprint" approach. The initial view that Libyan officials were ready to establish a Libyan state by themselves had proven to be a misjudgment. Libya's political landscape lacked both functioning institutions, as well as political momentum amongst the public and the shattered scene not only made statebuilding from within close to impossible, but it had allowed terrorist movements to gain foothold in the country, too.

What became clear in 2012 was that the country's main issue lay in the fragmentation of its security sector. Where previously militant groups were united in their fight against Gaddafi, his fall did not lead to them putting down their arms. Instead, different groups began pursuing different agendas, complicating the process of transitioning from autocratic to democratic Libyan regime. Chivvis et al. (2012, p.4) note that "in the absence of state territorial control … conflicts that had been suppressed by [G]addafi have flared up", including the east-west divide and the struggles between anti-Islamists and those seeking to establish a state based on Islamic law. Both struggles combined led to a flare-up of jihadist activity in the traditionally more radical east of Libya. The NTC, as well as the GNC have been unable to take charge of the situation and efforts to bring together military power under the government's control have failed. Ultimately, three main security groupings emerged: The Libyan National Army (LNA), consisting of many ex-regime soldiers who had defected early on during the revolution and had formed the country's main security force, Libya Shield Force (LSF), a national guard that is independent and does not respond to the LNA, and lastly the Supreme Security Council (SSC) which was created by the NTC to bring together various revolutionary groups in an effort to create a police force (ibid.; Lacher & Cole, 2014, p.11). While these groups did emerge as a response to the fragile security situation and showed the recognition that a certain level of coordination was necessary, they ultimately did not strengthen the young Libyan state since all of them sought to follow their own agendas. The inability of the NTC and later GNC to take charge of the situation and to create one security force rather than allowing several groups to

operate, has ultimately made it possible for non-state groups, including terrorist movements, to not only gain followers, but even be in full control over whole cities and regions.

5.2. 2014 – 2017: One Country, Three Governments and the Rise of Jihadism

The smooth transition envisioned by the NTC officials after the country's liberation finally failed in 2014. In February, protests erupted as a response to the GNC's proclamation that it sought to not disband after its mandate expires and a new House of Representatives would be elected in the summer (BBC, 2017). Internal divisions in Libya between the different camps further became clear in May, when the LNA unilaterally launched Operation Dignity. Over the past months, there had been increased ASL activity across Libya, with the organization managing to take advantage of the lack of state control and establishing local community branches in Derna, Sirte and especially Benghazi. Both Libyan, as well as international observers saw this with grave concern, with the UNSC issuing a resolution showing its concern at the presence of terrorist groups operating in Libya and calling on the Libyan authorities to tackle the issue (UNSC, 2014). Rather than taking coordinated action under the GNC umbrella, the LNA carried out extensive attacks against the SCBR, which brought together groups including ASL and the LSF, in Benghazi under former army colonel Khalifa Haftar's orders. The GNC condemned as a "coup against the revolution" since the LNA had acted on Haftar's, rather than the legitimate government's instructions, with Haftar on the other hand accusing the government of subjecting itself to Islamist groups rather than fighting them (BBC, 2014a). Haftar followed and still follows a strongly anti-Islamist policy and is one of the most active opponents of jihadist organizations in Libya, supported by foreign powers, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The attacks on Benghazi, however, solely further escalated the situation, with ASL launching large-scale counter attacks over the next weeks and accusing Haftar of being an "American traitor" and puppet of the states supporting him (Deutsche Welle, 2014). The launch of Operation Dignity initiated a lengthy conflict between pro- and anti-Islamist fighters that turned into the 2014 Civil War that has been ongoing ever since. Despite the government's weaknesses and divisions within the population, the country's factions until this point had simply been in control of areas of cities and the country.

The July elections further proved that the Libyan population had become increasingly disenchanted by the political transition process since the revolution. The aim of the election was to strengthen the central government after Haftar's successes with Operation Dignity, but the GNC experienced a clear defeat in the elections. While observers saw the election as Libya's final chance to end the post-Gaddafi anarchy, a mere 630,000 Libyans voted in the elections,

decreasing voter turnout to 18% compared to 60% in the 2012 elections (Elumami & al-Warfalli, 2014). The low turnout was partly attributed to security concerns, as polling stations in the eastern Libyan city Derna, which had developed into an Islamist hotspot, remained closed, and throughout the country and especially in Benghazi violent struggles between government forces, fighters loyal to the GNC, Haftar-supporters and Islamists broke out, killing several people (ibid.). With Islamists again failing to succeed in the elections, after months of deadlock within the GNC, the election of the new HoR that was to replace the old government was unable to resolve those issues (Collumbier, 2016, p.30). Daragahi (2015, p.46) notes that as Haftar's offensive in Cyrenaica inspired allies in the West and the elections led to favorable results especially for anti-Islamist politicians, Islamist militias gained significant support across the country. Moreover, further divisions within the Islamist community arose as the moderate Islamist faction had been relatively well-represented in the GNC government, whereas ASL and affiliated groups were marginalized and sought – but failed to achieve – more political influence. As a consequence of the rapidly worsening security situation, UN staff and diplomats were pulled out of the country and foreigners advised to leave the country.

As the newly emergent institutions quickly found themselves in deadlock, GNC-forces launched their own offensive as a response to Operation Dignity in August (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, pp.41-42). Operation Dawn, representing the Islamist faction, re-established the GNC, took over Tripoli and forced the officially elected House of Representatives to move their seat to Tobruk, where it has remained until now. By October 2014, the internal Libyan power struggles had led to the emergence of effectively two rival governments. Both had entirely separate military forces and claimed to be the legitimate government, with the Tripoli-based and Islamist-controlled Supreme Court, however, ruling in November that the HoR's election was not valid despite the HoR's international recognition (BBC, 2014b; Lacher & Cole, 2014, p.11). With Libya Dawn cooperating with remnants of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, it has been receiving support by Qatar and Turkey, while the UAE and Egypt decided to back Haftar in an effort to control the Muslim Brotherhood's ambitions in yet another state. As both sides follow entirely opposite agendas and are backed by both internal and external players, the country descended even further into anarchy and chaos than it had in 2011 or 2012.

Despite the official "pro"- and "anti"-Islamist rhetoric of both sides, ideology did not play a big part in the separation between the camps. Due to Libya's traditionally religious society, Islam was important for not only Libya Dawn and GNC-supporters. Collumbier (2016, p.49) argues that everybody adheres to sharia and Islamic law, but the debate surrounds more

the question of whether to base not only personal, but also political life on religion. Instead, the rift can be attributed to classical power struggles, the fear of losing control and being subject to repression from the other camp. In order to protect its legitimacy and avoid even more international opposition, the Islamist Libya Dawn camp rejected ASL's offer to form an alliance, announcing "its rejection of terrorism and extremism, and stresses that it does not belong to a terrorist organization" (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). Amid the chaotic situation that had evolved since mid-2014, Islamic State supporters arrived in Libya and were able to establish a local branch of the organization. Like in its other host countries, according to Moubayed (2015, pp.204), IS gained supporters and territory in Libya due to a combination of opportunism and ideology. With the country shaken by civil war and the authorities more concerned with fighting one another than establishing stable institutions, IS fighters, many of them returnees from Libya's neighboring countries who had fought in Syria, were able to use the void and gain power by both spreading fear and promising improvements to the population.

Despite IS' main regional focus on Syria and Iraq, Libya became a gateway to the broader North African region, as well as an opportunity to perpetuate IS ideology on Europe's doorstep. While first militias pledged allegiance to IS as early as June, IS-leader al-Baghdadi only accepted those in November, announcing that the group was officially expanding to Libya (ibid.; Reuters, 2014a). Following the announcement, IS made rapid advancements in Libya, with the eastern Libyan city Derna – which had been excluded from the elections due to its reputation as an Islamist hub – being installed as IS headquarter in Libya. Despite the promising situation in Libya, al-Baghdadi was unwilling to send weapons, money or troops to the country, instead sending aides who would support the Libyan IS branch in establishing and controlling their state (Moubayed, 2015, p.205). This course of action made one issue particularly clear: Despite the west's designation of IS as a terrorist organization, implying that its main aim is the spread of fear in order to achieve its objectives, al-Baghdadi acts very much as a rational rather than erratic politician who weighed the costs and benefits of focusing on Libya, ultimately deciding to avoid overstretch. Sending fighters to Libya would not have guaranteed success and the risk would have been high to instead lose main lands in Syria. Over the course of 2014 and 2015, IS carried out various attacks on both Libyans and foreigners, the most prominent one being the killing of Egyptian Copts (Kirkpatrick & Callimachi, 2015). It further gained control over Sirte, located in the middle of the power vacuum between GNC in Tripoli and HoR in Tobruk. The organizations choice of areas to seize control over and its very public attacks show that for IS the spread to North Africa is less about the actual territory, but more about perception and publicity. In occupying cities by the Mediterranean and actively killing

Christians, IS sent a sign that it was expanding beyond Syria and Iraq and that a threat to Europe was real. Looking at how IS was rising in Libya, it can be argued that its success would have been limited if the NTC had produced strong institutions and leaders after the Arab Spring.

The arrival of IS in late 2014 and the announcement of the death of ASL leader al-Zahawi in early 2015 further complicated the power network in Libya. Next to the competing governments, two competing non-state actors emerged that were struggling for power and influence in a similar manner. However, IS and ASL did not seek to achieve the same objectives. Where ASL had the primary objective of implementing the sharia in Libya and opposed the GNC's rather moderate way of politically propagating Islam through democratic means (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.), IS did not seek internal expansion inside Libya, but rather saw the country as a gateway for spreading across North Africa and possibly Europe by reaching out to other extremist groups in the region (Qsiyer, 2015, p.3). Yet, the modus operandi of both ASL and IS is similar in a certain regard and differs from previously observed al-Qaeda strategies: Where al-Qaeda to a large extent based its brand on attacks on foreign soil in order to sell the brand to locals, IS and ASL in Libya took a more pragmatic approach by first and foremost locally presenting citizens with a standard of living that the government is seemingly unable to provide, and using violence within Libya as a second-tier strategy to ensure cooperation (ibid., p.5). IS in Libya has benefitted from a combination of several factors. On the one hand, Operation Dignity was focused on the combat against ASL, while on the other, the Islamist GNC long denied the presence of and threat posed by IS and has downplayed the group's influence (Engel, 2015). Rather than blaming ignorance or lack of insight, the hesitance of the GNC to take action can possibly be attributed to its hopes that fights between IS and Haftar's forces would ultimately weaken the Tobruk camp and solidify the GNC's own position. Moreover, abovementioned shared pragmatism of ASL and IS has helped the Islamic State with its expansion since fighters from ASL and affiliated militias merely needed to change brands, adopting that of IS. Its rapid successes across the east, the apparent benefits that it brought to citizens, its similar ideology, as well as the death of ASL-leader al-Zahawi led many ASL fighters to defect to IS. Following the significant defeats and losses it had experienced, in May 2017, ASL officially announced its dissolution (Reuters, 2017). However, seeing how IS has managed to regroup, restructure and regain control again and again in the course of the conflict, it remains to be seen whether ASL will attempt – and achieve – the same.

With Libya torn between two governments and the rise of IS, the international community's attention seemingly was drawn to Libya again after having left the country largely to itself since the 2012 elections. In October 2014, then UNSG Ban Ki-Moon made an

unannounced visit to Tripoli to urge the two governments to cease to fight in order to stabilize the country. Stating that "there is no alternative to dialogue", he however also noted that the process of peacebuilding would be lengthy and difficult and thus offered the UN's support in organizing talks between the GNC and HoR (Reuters, 2014b). The negotiation efforts made by the UN were seemingly successful when the Libyan army and Tripoli-based militia reached a partial ceasefire in January 2015 and in December the UN brokered a deal between the parties, leading to the signature of the Libyan Political Agreement (Al Jazeera, 2015a; Al Jazeera, 2015b). The agreement clearly indicated the UN's disapproval of the situation that had developed since the 2014 elections, thus applauding the parties' willingness to place the "Libyan State above narrow self-interest" (LPA, 2015). The UN also aimed to deescalate the tensions by acknowledging the contribution of the NTC, GNC and HoR, as well as armed groups, tribal leaders and other organizations to the political dialogue over the past three years. The agreement serves as the basis for the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA) that was intended to serve as yet another interim solution from January 2016 onwards. Despite the United Nations' efforts to bring together the conflicting parties, however, both the Tobruk and Tripoli governments are defiant to recognize the GNA's authority. Although the GNC did announce in spring 2016 that it would be stepping down, affiliates and supporters of the group have been continuously trying to revive it and established local new factions, rather than joining the peace process and seeking cooperation with the other two (Reuters, 2016).

Almost six years since the fall of Gaddafi, Libya's political, social and security landscape is more scattered than ever and rather than having created a unitary state that represents all people, the revolution led to local, tribal and ideological fault lines emerging clearer than before. Moving from one interim government to the next, Libya has been unable to develop stable enough institutions that would serve as a starting point and allow the country to develop into both a state and a nation by itself. Despite repeated efforts by outside actors to mediate between the different government authorities, the country is now effectively entangled in a web of three governments that follow different, often conflicting, interests and are supported by a variety of militias, defense brigades, army branches and international actors[6]. These internal struggles have allowed militias and jihadist organizations to increasingly gain support amongst the Libyan public since they offer to provide services that the official governments are unwilling or unable to provide due to their own struggles.

[6] Figure 1, which can be found in the Annex, portrays a simplified model of the complex web of relations between the different actors and dynamics in the Libyan conflict.

6. Defeating Terrorism Through State-Building – Cooperation Between Local and International Actors in Libya

The previous chapter offers an overview of the developments in Libya since the fall of Gaddafi and briefly introduces the main actors that now determine the daily political and social life in Libya. The rise of terrorist movements amid the chaos that has emerged in Libya itself is not surprising and there are a multitude of reasons explaining for this phenomenon, with most issues arising over several decades rather than suddenly manifesting after the regime's collapse. They fall in line with the broader theoretical framework of state-failure and the indicators introduced in Chapter 2.4.1. are clearly applicable, with Libya struggling especially in terms of incapable and unstructured security apparatus, clearly factionalized elites struggling for power, as well as group grievance arising due to fault lines within society.

Under Gaddafi, any form of opposition was suppressed and thus terrorist movements had no chance to evolve and gain foothold in the country and between 1970 and 2011, there were only sixteen registered terrorist attacks in Libya (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.21). The country was ranked 90th in the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), but by 2015 it had risen to be 10th (GTI, 2016, pp.17-18). With the NTC and subsequent government authorities unable and unwilling to suppress these groups, rebel movements, militias and terrorist groups managed to increasingly control Libyan territory and influence daily lives. What further complicates the security apparatus situation in Libya is that while some militias are not officially affiliated with ASL or IS, they do fight for the same aim. The arrival of IS in Libya was initially largely ignored by the GNC and Libya Dawn camp due to their hopes that Operation Dignity would be weakened by their fight against yet another group of Islamists. It has further been reported that Libyan authorities support militias both by tolerating, as well as openly sponsoring them, with even the UN-brokered GNA, falling in line with the Fund for Peace's definition of "state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents" (Fund for Peace, 2017c; Pancevski, 2017). Moreover, the clear separation between the different camps military support systems leads to an increase in security threats for the Libyan state as a whole. Following the end of the Gaddafi-regime, the Libyan security sphere collapsed since security sector reform was not given high priority by the international community and only gained the foreign forces' attention following the election-debacle.

Following the 2014 election, the fractionalization between the country's elites and ruling parties became clear. The indicator measures in how far power struggles and political competition take place. While the HoR was supposed to be the legally elected new governing authority in Libya, the GNC's disappointment about the election turnout led to even bigger gaps

between the two camps. Despite the international community's recognition of the election result, the GNC was unwilling to give up power and quickly re-instated itself as the National Salvation Government, basing their claim to legitimacy solely on the membership of former GNC-members that legally came into power in 2012 (Wehrey & Lacher, 2014). While the situation under the NTC and subsequently the GNC was fragile already, the creation of an entire rival government that even forced the elected and internationally recognized authority out of the capital led to a complete escalation of the situation and initiated the Civil War that has been ongoing since 2014. When looking at the timeline of events in Libya, the creation of a second government coincides with the appearance of the Islamic State in Libya and a noticeable increase in terrorist activity ever since[7]. 2014 saw a 256 per cent increase in deaths from the previous year, with IS becoming the most active terrorist organization in the country (GTI, 2016, p.34). Despite having only arrived few months earlier, the group was responsible for 42 per cent of all terrorist incidents measured in 2015 (ibid., p.18).

Lastly, the group grievance indicator assesses divisions between different social groups, and the role those divisions can play in the access to services and resources and the inclusion in the country's political process (Fund for Peace, 2017c). In Libya, divisions between different groups of the society were present already in the mid-20th century, but those differences only became clearer after 2011. Where different groups were previously united in their common rejection of the Gaddafi-rule, the country's liberation deprived those groups of the one thing they had in common. Especially the more strictly Islamist part of Libyan society had long felt marginalized. This perceived exclusion and resulting dissatisfaction led to the GNC and Libya Dawn factions to create the alternate government. With the government institutions effectively in deadlock from mid-2014 onwards, the quality of life along deteriorated along with the Libyan security situation. As a result, ASL and IS were quickly able to attract people due to their Islamist ideology, by promising an alternative in which sharia and Islam are respected more than they would be under the elected government. While ideology alone may explain people's attraction to and interest in these groups, it would not have led to such an obvious growth of those movements if the governments had been able to present an alternative and provide people with a high quality of life. Rather than solely forming a religious following, ASL and IS made a conscious effort to present themselves as actual alternatives to the GNC and HoR by providing services for which usually the state is responsible. Former UNSMIL Head Martin Kobler used to joke that unlike the country's now three governments, the GNA, GNC and HoR, the Islamic

[7] For a better overview, Figure 2 in the Annex offers a timeline of main actors in the course of the Libyan war.

State was the only functioning government in Libya, as, despite its harsh rhetoric and often brutal attacks, the organization did provide public services and ensured security in the regions it controlled (Nordland & Youssef, 2016). ASL, as well as IS, has been propagating images that show their government efforts in order to make their power, influence and abilities public and attract an even larger following (Joscelyn, 2015; Libya Security Monitor, 2015). There is no question of whether or not IS and ASL are just and democratic systems of government, as their "good" work is solely part of a well-planned strategy, half of which at least relies on the spread of fear through brutality. Yet, with both IS and ASL providing services to the public, organizing police forces and offering social and commercial incentives, the actual governments' work is markedly devalued. Citizens do not see the added value of supporting a government that may or may not be overthrown by one of its rivals any time, and instead support the terrorist networks that are in fact able and willing to ensure a high quality of life to the people it controls.

These three indicators and their applicability to the Libyan case support this thesis' assumption that state-failure and fragility can be directly related to the rise and success of terrorist movements, allowing for assessment of foreign support and its counter-terrorism potential. The External Intervention indicator presented by the Fund for Peace (2017c) takes into account the impact that external actors have on the state's functioning. It includes political intervention, meaning foreign support for factions within the country and possibly even opposed to the government, and force intervention, addressing the presence of foreign troops or a peacekeeping mission inside the country, whether attacks from the outside take place and whether there is military and police training support for the local forces.

6.1. NATO Intervention and Later Support

When in 2011 Resolution 1973 was adopted, this initiated international involvement in the Libyan war. NATO, with the backing of even outside forces, including several Arab states, was the first foreign force to take action. Following calls from France, the US and UK to take action, the NATO mission allowed for a more organized and centralized line of action. Operation Unified Protector was intended to be limited both in terms of time and scope and its aim was to spare civilian lives and avoid the destruction of the country's main infrastructure. Presenting the mission as nothing but an answer to the UN call for support and protection for the Libyans, then NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said that the strikes were carried out so accurately, that civilians were not harmed (NATO, 2011). The mission's commander further highlighted the role that the Libyan rebels themselves had played, stating that they had managed to build a force that was able to topple the regime where previously only a disorganized group of regime-

opponents had been, and applauded NATO's success in bringing people together and giving them a common objective (ibid.). It is this statement that foreshadows future conflicts, since with the fall of Gaddafi, the objective had been met and a new common goal was not in sight. Following the end of the Operation, NATO noticeably moved to the background and did not actively intervene further in the Libyan conflict. Following the 2012 elections, NATO issued a statement by its Secretary General, congratulating the citizens on their first successful elections in half a century and refers to them as "an impressive step forward in Libya's transition to democracy after forty years of dictatorship" (NATO, 2012). It further reiterated the role NATO played in the process and noted that NATO is prepared to assist, upon request, in building the modern security and defense institutions that are crucial in the new Libya.

Over the following two years, NATO frequently assured Libya of its support and offered to use its expertise in the area of security sector reform. In the summer of 2013, Libya did request the organization's advice in the security field and NATO assured the country of its support, stating that the first objective would be to advise Libyan authorities on the establishment of vital structures and arrangements that would allow them to develop a national security strategy (NATO, 2013; NATO, 2014). While offering support, the alliance made it clear that the advisory mission was not intended to develop into a full-time presence within Libya and would instead seek dialogue with national authorities, the European Border Assistance Mission and the UN Support Mission. What complicated the reform of the security sector was a combination of weak national leadership and a possibly *too* light footprint strategy that led to an unwillingness or inability of the new Libyan government to adequately tackle its security issues (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.44). Throughout these years, NATO's initial hesitance to become over-involved strongly shaped the organization's course of action. Despite worsening clashes between rival government and non-state actors in Libya, the organization adhered to the principle of national ownership and instead offered support without pressing Libyan authorities to adopt Western policies. It was only in 2015 following the signature of the LPA that NATO again addressed developments in Libya and stated its intention to closely cooperate with the UN-brokered GNA under Prime Minister al-Sarraj. Again, NATO offered its support for the creation of the country's security institutions, on the one hand applauding the GNA for its successes in the fight against IS, while at the same time noting the need for further improvements. Al-Sarraj and the GNA took up the offer, and at a press conference in June 2017, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg noted that the organization had agreed to help Libya with its stabilization process and a team of experts had met with Libyan officials to discuss the improvement of Libyan defense and security institutions (NATO, 2017).

In order to adequately tackle the threat posed by terrorist organizations in Libya and achieve sustainable peace, the country needs intelligence, military and defense institutions, which it so far has been unable to develop. In terms of the Fund for Peace's indicators for External Intervention, despite the organization's cautious approach to aiding Libya, NATO's work falls in both under political and force intervention. Politically, while the GNA is indeed now the internationally recognized legitimate government, the other factions still lay claim to that authority as well. Supporting all three factions is simply not possible, but by offering support to the GNA, which still faces clear opposition within the country and is not the strongest force, NATO is in fact contributing to some extent to the ongoing conflict. And although NATO did not send troops into Libya, support for training in Libya is regarded as force intervention as it serves to impose a certain system of managing a state upon the struggling country.

6.2. United Nations Involvement

Having mandated NATO's mission in the spring of 2012, it first seemed like the UNSC would not stand on the sidelines of yet another conflict in the MENA region, allowing the country's population to suffer. With the recognition of the NTC, however, it seemed like the country was capable of leading the post-revolutionary efforts itself. Thus, the United Nations later decided that rather than sending a peacekeeping force to Libya, it would support the country and its newly emerged NTC authorities through political means – following the same light-footprint approach that NATO had taken. Initially established in September 2011 for a period of three months, the United Nations Support Mission for Libya's mandate has been modified and renewed six times so far, with the current mandate being valid until 15 September 2017. When the mission was created, it's mandate laid down that its main tasks were to "assist and support Libyan national efforts" (UNSC, 2011d). As Boeke and de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2016, p.44) put it, while UNSMIL "did provide carrots to entice cooperation of local actors, there was no 'stick' to ensure that outliers conformed to policy". In the first months of the NTC being in control of post-liberation Libya, UNSMIL provided advice and insights regarding the reform of the country's security sector to the new government, but Libyan authorities were reluctant to implement any of those policies and UNSMIL lacked the authority to enforce anything. The unwillingness of the Libyan new government and the lack of foresight from the UNSC regarding the mission's mandate can partially explain the collapse if the Libyan security sector in 2012. The situation hardly improved over the next years and in 2015, then-UNSMIL Head Léon noted that the state's weak and fragmented institutions, the political polarization within

the government authorities and predominance of armed groups have led to the breakdown of whatever state functions were left in Libya by then (UNSC, 2015).

In September 2014, UNSMIL had initiated political dialogue between the opposing parties in an effort to resolve the deadlock between the institutions. A frequent criticism of UNSMIL's efforts at mediating were its close ties to the Tripoli government and political elite, which would be resolvable through the inclusion of a wider variety of actors. While these efforts aimed at bringing together actors from the rival political camps, it disregarded representatives from the armed groups and local communities (Collumbier, 2016, p.31). While certainly small-scale conflicts cannot be likened to the mediation process on government-level, the involvement of influential people from the local civil society had proven beneficial for the resolution of local conflicts. In the internationally mediated policy sphere, however, those figures were not taken into account, which can possibly be attributed to a simple lack of understanding of the Libyan social sphere – a mistake that had been made in Afghanistan already. In late 2014, the significant developments on the national political and military scene triggered another attempt at achieving political dialogue in the conflict surrounding the Nafusa Mountains. The UN-led dialogue brought together GNC- and HoR-representatives, but it was opened up further to allow the participation of other political figures from non-governmental and local camps (ibid., p.33). The United Nations mission's strategy aimed at bringing together more moderate forces from the fighting Dawn and Dignity camps and lead them to form a new alliance that would distance itself from the more radical groups (ibid.). To a certain extent, UNSMIL's efforts at the regional level were successful. The lack of international interest in the conflict made local actors' involvement more attractive, as well as necessary. While local leaders only have a limited capacity for large-scale conflict resolution, their potential was recognized. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the UN proposed a downscaling of the mission, but the increasing activity of IS and ASL in Libya led to the assessment that a continuation of the support would be necessary. Bearing in mind the principle of national ownership, Resolution 2323 again extends the mission's mandate and tasks UNSMIL with mediating and supporting the LPA's implementation and subsequent phases of the transition process (UNSC, 2016). Moreover, the UN mission is directly tasked with providing assistance to GNA efforts in stabilizing post-conflict zones, including those that were previously under IS control.

Beyond UNSMIL, the United Nations have frequently tried to bring together the members of the opposing governments in order to achieve an improvement of the security situation. Following the re-establishment of the GNC as a rival to the elected HoR, the UNSG noted that Libyan authorities lacked the political will and efforts that would be necessary to

promote security dialogue and allow for consensus regarding national ownership (Boeke & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016, p.51). Without this consensus, a reform of the security sector would not be possible and the political landscape would be at risk of splintering even more. The signature of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement can thus be regarded as a milestone, since efforts to reach such an agreement had been ongoing for the past one-and-a-half years. Following an agreed ceasefire between the Dawn and Dignity camps in January 2015, the UN began preparing new talks between both sides in order to set up a plan for the establishment of a unity government (Al Jazeera, 2015b). However, finding common grounds was not easy and it took until December for the HoR and GNC to sign a peace agreement that would lead to the establishment of a Presidential Council and State Council, as well as the Government of National Accord that would replace both HoR and GNC (LPA, 2015). Brokered by the United Nations, the GNA moved its headquarter to Tripoli and replaced the HoR as the internationally recognized legitimate government of Libya, with the HoR supposed to operate within the new political framework. The creation of one unitary government was met with appraisal from other international actors, including UNSMIL Head Kobler and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mogherini, highlighting the importance of the LPA for the Libyan peace process and counter-terrorism efforts (Asher-Schapiro, 2016).

Despite the initial successes, in summer the HoR did not pass a vote of confidence on the GNA. With Haftar still in control of the LNA and having established a firm rule in Cyrenaica which had again created a rival government, the GNA had thus far been unable to extend its power and authority far beyond Tripoli and the formerly GNC-controlled regions (Al Jazeera, 2016). The international community saw these developments with concern since they had hoped that the GNA would be able to fill Libya's power vacuum. The situation has still not been resolved as of July 2017. While there have been further peace-talks between Haftar and al-Sarraj, as well as with the UNSMIL chief and frequent assertions of ceasefires and the recognized need for a peaceful solution to end the Libyan Civil War, the situation inside Libya is far from resolved. Al-Sarraj and Haftar most recently met with French President Macron's support in late July 2017, where both sides agreed that the Libyan conflict requires a political rather than military solution that incorporates all Libyans in the political dialogue and seeks further support from the UNSC and UNSMIL (France Diplomatie, 2017). This meeting, as well as a draft constitution for Libya that was adopted shortly afterwards, may indicate a path towards more stability in Libya and an improvement of the country's power distribution[8]. While

[8] The Annex includes an overview of the distribution of power in Libya between the rival government and non-government actors in 2015 versus 2017, which are presented in Figure 3 and 4, respectively.

the split between GNC and HoR and the resulting power vacuum shows a clear link to increased terrorist activity, the emergence of the GNA did not have a similar effect, despite the ongoing rivalries.

Over the past months, Haftar's camp has been able to achieve significant wins. Since 2014, Operation Dignity has constantly fought Islamist movements and by now has a firm grip over Cyrenaica. Most recently, Haftar's forces have been able to declare the Battle for Benghazi for finished after they drove the last Islamist groups out of the city, ending the almost three-year long battle for the city (Al-Warfalli, 2017). The Haftar-controlled LNA had long been fighting a number of extremist groups surrounding the SCBR, ASL and IS and due to the regrouping, emergence, disappearance and reemergence of various groups, as well as the simultaneous struggles between Dignity and anti-Dignity camps, the conflict's end was hard to predict. Even the most recent successes should not be taken as a clear indicator for a victory of Libyan forces over terrorist movements, since their flexibility and opportunism have previously led to a re-shuffle of groups across the country. The Islamic State had previously controlled the traditionally radical city Derna until mid-2015 and had then relocated to Sirte, where it had managed to establish a strong base. After clashes with the Dignity forces, IS militants fled from Sirte in late 2016 and again relocated to Benghazi, which had been under siege since May and has been an Islamist hotspot ever since (Amara, 2016). In March 2017, the LNA announced that it was now in the final stages of retaking Benghazi from the Shura Council and the process was facilitated by both ASL and BDB announcements that they would dissolve (Ben Ibrahim, 2017). Despite the tense situation in Libya's east, the GNA and affiliated parties had remained on the sidelines of the conflict and following the announcement of Benghazi's liberation, al-Sarraj solely congratulated the people for recapturing their city rather than acknowledging the role played by his opponent's forces (Mahmoud, 2017). Moreover, enthusiasm about Haftar's success seemed dampened from UN-side. Haftar's forces had received significant support from the UAE and Saudi Arabia and the UN criticized the UAE involvement, noting that it violates the arms embargo placed on Libya (Lewis, 2017b).

The UN report is problematic for two reasons: Haftar's forces are the ones fighting terrorist networks within Libya most rigorously and rather than supporting his forces, the United Nations maintains its stern support for only the GNA. It has to be acknowledged that although a rivalry between two camps is less than ideal, General Haftar is in fact a strong political player and has been successful in mobilizing troops, as well as gain and maintain control over large territories. The support provided by the UAE has not only helped him to gain the upper hand in the GNA-HoR struggle in the region, but it did in fact also give Haftar the

means to fight a large number of terrorist movements with the support of mainly his own army, rather than relying on a number of militias that might switch teams after achieving a short-term goal. While there is an arms embargo in place and foreign powers should adhere to it, using this argument is questionable from the UN-side and highlights a double-standard when dealing with Haftar versus the UN-backed GNA. Not only did the GNA also breach the embargo only a few weeks before. Since November, European naval forces have repeatedly intercepted a ship that was chartered by the GNA and was carrying weapons from Misrata to Benghazi. According to Western intelligence services, the arms were likely handed over to Islamist militias affiliated with IS that were fighting alongside the SCBR against Haftar's army (Pancevski, 2017). The UN's unshakeable support for al-Sarraj thus is questionable in terms of its effects on the fight against terrorism in Libya.

The UN's peace- and statebuilding efforts in Libya fall clearly within the Fund for Peace's Political Intervention indicator. Rather than having deployed a peacekeeping operation, as has been done in other MENA states, including Mali and Syria, the UN decided on a political approach that is based on mediation and dialogue rather than the use of force. When assessing the UN's actions in light of the "statebuilding can help to fight terrorism" hypothesis, however, the measures taken show an ambivalent picture. UNSMIL certainly has helped to mediate between different parties on the ground. The UN's presence and concern for smaller scale conflicts have contributed to militias recognizing that joining together in more moderate groups offers an alternative to following the hardline camps and involvement of local parties has led to the peaceful resolution of certain issues. However, UNSMIL's closeness to the Tripoli-based governments, as well as its lack of authority over the Libyan institutions has led to mixed results since the course of action is strongly influenced by the Tripoli-camps. The same dilemma holds true for the UN's support for the GNA. The GNA's emergence did not lead to an increase of terrorist activity and despite their ongoing differences, al-Sarraj and Haftar have been willing to engage in political dialogue, possibly paving the way towards a stable Libyan government, but in the past 20 months, al-Sarraj's government has failed to produce the envisioned results and his authority still falls short of that of Haftar. Yet, the United Nations are possibly too close to the GNA, supporting *their* government rather than seeking a *Libyan* solution. The GNA follows policies that are more traditional and more oriented towards Islam, leading to a certain risk of the GNA supporting affiliates of Islamist terrorist organizations. Haftar, on the other hand, follows a clear anti-Islamist logic, which may on the one hand disengage vast parts of the Libyan population and cause those people to feel marginalized in the political process. On the other hand, in fighting any group that is affiliated with Islamist movements, Haftar has been

able to achieve clear victories in the fight against IS and ASL, with the latter even announcing its dissolution after having persisted since the end of the Gaddafi-regime.

6.3. Efforts by Individual States

Due to this thesis' limitations, the main focus was placed on NATO and UN support for local authorities. A more extensive study of other individual states' actions and interests in the Libyan conflict can be conducted in future research, but their involvement should not and cannot be disregarded entirely in the context of this thesis and a brief overview of foreign support for the different camps can help to present a more complete picture of the current situation. The GNA is mainly backed by the United Nations, European Union and NATO and has been receiving the least covert support from outside forces. International organizations and alliances are openly seeking dialogue with al-Sarraj and offering their support to the UN-brokered government.

While the GNC officially no longer operates in Libya, it still maintains a supporter base among the Libyan public. In the past, the Islamist group had been backed by countries including Qatar and Turkey, whereas the anti-Islamist HoR until 2016 was backed by the international community as it was legally elected in the 2014 elections. Since then, it still has support from Russia, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as to some extent France. The two camps have become increasingly interesting in the past weeks as Qatar and the UAE until now have been waging only a proxy-war in Libya that has now emerged as an open conflict in the Gulf region. The war inside Libya has turned into a geopolitical struggle in which the Gulf states have been playing pivotal roles (Cafiero & Wagner, 2015). Each of the foreign powers is ultimately following their own agenda: Qatar has long been accused of having links with the Muslim Brotherhood, explaining for Qatari opposition to Haftar's anti-Islamist forces, whereas the UAE have long followed a strictly anti-Islamist foreign policy (ibid.). The same holds true for Egypt, which due to its own history with the Muslim Brotherhood and the geographical proximity to Libya seeks to limit the Islamist network's power and influence in the region. For Russia, Libya is a gateway to the Mediterranean. Haftar, as opposed to UN-backed al-Sarraj, is a neutral, yet rational actor who can use Russian support to his own advantage and is therefore open for cooperation. A more complex case that goes beyond this thesis' framework is France. Despite its backing for the UN-, EU- and NATO-endorsed GNA, France had sent military experts to Libya to support Haftar in the east. While there had been allegations about French officials cooperating with Libya for several months, the country only admitted to their presence following a helicopter crash in Benghazi that caused the death of three French officials (Libya Herald, 2016). With the international community politically backing the GNA, while at the

same time providing expertise and weapons to the HoR, foreign powers are not only contradicting themselves. They are actively hindering the Libyan peace process, transition to democratic governance, the establishment of vital and powerful institutions and as a result deterred the fight against terrorist movements.

6.4. Concluding Remarks

The state-building efforts by the international community have led to mixed results, not only in terms of the actual creation of a Libyan state, but also with regards to this thesis' focus on counter-terrorism. The international community's light-footprint approach left the entirely unprepared authorities more or less to themselves, leading to a fast descend into chaos. The intervening powers failed to address some main issues in Libya that had persisted for decades and already caused troubles in the mid-20th century under King Idris. The regional and ideological differences had long internally divided a country that had never developed into its own nation and that had never been in charge of its own political process, thus leading to a political uncertainty regarding the *quo vadis* question. In the years 2011 until 2014, which country slipped into chaos that by the time the international community sought to address it, was too bad to fix easily. In 2011, Ansar al-Sharia was the first movement to make use of the emerging post-Gaddafi power vacuum as the Libyan transitional government was unable to either integrate or control the Islamist militias that joined the group. By the time elections in 2014 had failed, the Islamic State had advanced into Libya. In terms of the hypothesis that weak statehood fosters terrorism and in turn statebuilding can help to fight terrorism, the international community's inaction in the first years may have contributed to the rise of those movements.

The UN Support Mission in Libya had lacked the mandate to enforce its recommendations for the Libyan security institutions, the UN-supported political dialogue never truly involved all conflict parties and NATO's offers for support also did not lead to the final creation of a stable security apparatus. Rather than cooperating with and listening to the Libyan civilian population, the country has again become a playground for a number of national and international actors that now determine people's daily lives. If the transition process towards democratic governance of Libya is to be concluded, inclusion is the most important element that the intervening forces need to improve. The fault lines that have broken up since 2011 largely stem from a perceived misrepresentation of certain groups or of the perception that political participation leads to less favorable outcomes than joining militias or terrorist movements. These concerns, ironically, mirror those that the people had already experienced both under the monarchy and later Gaddafi.

7. Conclusion

"You break it, you own it …
If you break a government, if you cause it to come down, by invading or other means, remember that you are now the government. You have a responsibility to take care of the people of that country"
- Former Secretary of State Colin Powell (Gilsinan, 2015)

When in 2011 the international community agreed that the revolutionary uprisings in Libya needed to come to an end, this marked the beginning of Libya's long and winding road to statehood. In retrospect, it is easy to find the flaws in the approach back then. Colin Powell has noted in 2015 that "as we learned, especially in Libya, when you remove the top and the whole thing falls apart [and] there is nothing underneath it, you get chaos" (ibid.). Following the international community's recognition of the NTC as the country's legitimate government, it became clear that the primary aim for the intervention would be to set an end to the Gaddafi regime. What was lacking, however, was a plan for an end game. Neither the intervening forces, nor the NTC itself had a clear plan of what was to come after Gaddafi. When the foreign powers decided on a course of action for Libya, they aimed to fix past mistakes that were made in interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. While it is laudable that the West recognized the Libyan population's right to self-determination rather than imposing Western ideals upon them, they disregarded another set of mistakes that had previously been made.

In the history of Libya, the country had never been in charge of its own fate. It had evolved from Ottoman empire, over European colony to artificially created monarchy and finally Jamahiriya under Gaddafi, which had been initiated through a coup that came from the military rather than the broader civilian population. In these years, the country had not developed a sense of self, of national belonging and of being part of a Libyan state. Neither did the political system under Gaddafi encourage political participation or the establishment of modern state structures. In all those years and under all those regimes, the Libyan public had struggled with several main issues: The prevalence of regional and tribal rather than national ties, the role of Islam, Islamism and Arab nationalism in Libyan politics and the lack of public representation in the political process. Both the revolution in 1969 and 2011 were partly initiated due to a lack of social and political inclusion. In the 2011 revolution, the Libyan population was able for the first time to overcome those differences and fight against a common "other", the revolutionary leader who had promised to fix all those issues and had instead turned into a dictator. With the fall of Gaddafi, the Libyan people lacked that common other to define themselves against and there was no common vision as to what alternative there was.

Now almost six years after Gaddafi's fall, Libya's social, political and security landscape is more fragmented than ever. The institutions that have emerged in the meantime are weak, and rather than providing a certain level of stability, they themselves are a source of instability and uncertainty. Chivvis et al. (2012, p.4) note that "the sine qua non of post-conflict resolution is that without security, all other necessary nation-building and statebuilding tasks become nearly impossible". The Libyan security landscape offers a perfect example for this, with the NTC unable to provide basic security and efforts by the international community remaining largely fruitless. Since 2011, a variety of actors have taken actions to support Libya in its state-building efforts. This thesis has focused specifically on NATO and the United Nations, both of them following a similar logic. Having learnt from lessons in previous wars, the solution seemed to be the employment of a light-footprint approach. However, this approach had left the entirely unprepared NTC officials with the unsolvable task of creating a Libyan state without either experience or equipment.

The Libyan conflict can best be considered as a "trial and error" case. Overcompensating the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the strategy was forcing intervention and foreign support onto the local population, the approach in Libya was to do practically nothing but offer support upon request after the ousting of the Gaddafi-regime. In the years from 2011 until 2014, international actors frequently assured Libya of their willingness to provide support upon request. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya aimed to provide support on the ground, while allowing Libyan authorities to find their own path. However, the intervening powers had overestimated the Libyan capabilities after decades of being suppressed in a stateless state. While in general the respect for national ownership and allowing the Libyans to determine their own future seemed like the right way to take, there was no pressure for the Libyan authorities to take up the support offer. As a result, Libyan authorities' efforts to build institutions themselves failed and the chaos that evolved in this time can be attributed to a large extent to the foreign powers' hesitance to take too harsh measures and impose a course of action upon the new Libyan state. By the time the foreign powers re-entered the scene, the country had long descended into chaos and there were no proper mechanisms and institutions in place to stop the downward spiral. This approach thus turned out to not have been the ideal solution either, and now NATO and UN are aiming for a middle ground of seeking cooperation.

The scattered political landscape from 2011 onwards was a futile feeding ground for terrorist movements and Ansar al-Sharia emerged during the Libyan Civil War. It began its rise in the following year, showing that the political and social landscape after Gaddafi's fall was a

feeding ground for radical ideologies. At the same time, the transitional government was unable to either control or adequately integrate the militias that joined the movement, leading to Libya's first experiences with large scale terrorist activity. By the time elections took place in 2014 and the transitional government refused to make space for the newly elected body, the international efforts to mediate between the rival camps came too late and the arrival of IS in Libya further shook the country's security sphere. The 2016 appointment of the GNA did not lead to the desired unification of Libya under one government. The GNA, like the NTC, GNC and HoR before it, faces a few main issues. First, it is merely another government that was imposed upon the Libyan population and does not represent the people. Second, ideological and regional differences make it close to impossible for the GNA to control Libya as a whole and gain the support of the majority of the population. And third, due to the remaining instabilities in the country, it is often unable to provide basic services to the public, leading citizens to join terrorist movements, militias and regional groups that are in fact able to protect the people and provide them with services to fulfil their basic needs.

The only national Libyan actor that has been able to achieve a number of victories in the fight against ASL and IS is Khalifa Haftar, leading to questions as to why the international community is hesitant to support him and build security institutions around the HoR and the LNA's general. The intervening powers' support for different factions in the Libyan war further complicates the political reconciliation process, especially as those states and organizations do not operate selflessly, but pursue interest-based issues, such as the containment of the flow of refugees or the rapid re-establishment of the Libyan oil sector. As a whole, the international state-building efforts have led to mixed results. The light-footprint approach should have been given up earlier in order to prevent the country from slipping too deep into chaos. However, the acknowledgement of the importance of national ownership and the role of local actors, as has been recognized by UNSMIL, as well as the offers of NATO to support the country's security sector reform, are crucial for the future peace- and statebuilding process in Libya. Beyond this, however, the international community must try to bridge the differences between Haftar and al-Sarraj, since Haftar currently is the only actor able to contain the spread of jihadism in Libya and rather than fighting a war at all fronts, resources could be used much more efficiently if action was more guided towards a common "other".

When referring back to the initial research question "*How has the international community been supporting Libya in its state-building efforts and thereby addressed the issue of terrorist movements since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011?",* the results from this analysis may appear rather pessimistic, but they do offer insights into what is necessary in order

to tackle both the Libyan political instability and the success of terrorist movements in the country. Not only has this analysis highlighted that indeed the indicators for state fragility can be applied to the Libyan case, but it has moreover found that the emergence of terrorist movements in the country coincides with certain political developments that in turn directly relate back to those indicators. The statebuilding efforts and support offered by the international actors have thus far have not led to the desired outcome, namely a democratic Libyan state in which the rule of law and inclusion dominate. However, if the issues of security apparatus, group grievance and factionalized elites, in combination with economic development and reintegration into the international community, are adequately addressed, it can be assumed that terrorist movements will no longer have the same power over entire territories as they do now.

Annex

Figure 1 – Simplified model of the conflict dynamics between the main actors in Libya



Figure 2 – Timeline of actors in post-2011 Libya



Control over Libyan territories 2015 – 2017[9]

Figure 3 – Control of Libya in 2015



Figure 4 – Control of Libya in 2017



[9] Available on http://eyeonisisinlibya.com/.

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