

Securitization Theory Expanded
The Refugee Crisis in the United Kingdom and mainland Europe

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Dedicated to my grandparents

ii. Abstract

This thesis investigates the Copenhagen School of Thought's securitization theory. Addressing the roots of theory in constructivism and language theory, the argument is made that the theory lacks emphasis on contextual factors. Based on this criticism an experimental design for an extended version of securitization will be created. While emphasising the importance of the structure of the facilitating conditions on which securitization theory is built, the extended version of securitization theory expands the current theory by first introducing multiple streams theory, second a new framework of facilitating variables is set-up, and third the role of the audience is expended. This experimental extended theory will be tested by a case study on the securitization of the Refugee Crisis.

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1. Introduction

Securitization theory as established by Ole Waever in 1995 and further developed in ‘security a framework for analysis’ (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998), has become one of the more prominent analytical instruments when one studies ‘security’ (Diez & Huysmans, 2011, p. 2). Some prominent scholars like Philippe Bourbeau (2011) argue that there are some important shortcomings, within the theory, related to the role of the audience, power relations, and levels/degrees of securitization. However, his critique does not present an analytical framework by which one could analyse security in a qualitative manner. This thesis aims to bring securitization theory and Bourbeau’s critique together in an experimental extended version of securitization theory that is suitable for the analysis of issues related to security.

Securitization theory is the main theoretical concept under analysis in this thesis (Waever, 1995). Securitization theory entails the process of a person, state, or another subject becoming a matter of ‘security’. This, in turn, enables the use of extraordinary means or emergency measures in the name of security, surpassing any political or diplomatic arena. This is done by securitizing moves by securitizing actors. These actors are usually people with authority on the specific issue they try to securitize. For example, secretaries of state have authority on issues concerning foreign affairs, and leaders of labour unions have authority on issues concerning workers’ rights. This makes the chance of successfully securitizing a specific issue higher. It is important to keep in mind that issues that become securitized are not necessarily issues that are objectively the most threatening to the nation states, the society, or individuals. Rather, the issues which find their place on the security agenda represent the issues that someone managed to securitize successfully. Within securitization studies the aim is always to identify who securitizes (actor/entrepreneur), what the existential threat is, and who the audience is. Then the goal becomes to find out why this is the case, what the circumstances of the securitizing moves were, and what results in the end were achieved by the securitizing actor (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 12-24).

Scholars like Philippe Bourdeau (2011) have uncovered shortcomings within securitization theory. This thesis will aim to incorporate his critique to create an expanded version of securitization theory suitable for analysis. Securitization theory as established by Waever

(1995) engages with facilitating conditions¹ and language theory. With the latter being the use of speech acts in discourse and the facilitating conditions enabling the analysis of the impact of set speech acts by providing an analytical framework. This framework focusses on the internal structure of the securitizing argument: the existential threat, points of no return, and possible solutions. And on the external conditions facilitating the securitizing move: Is the treat convincing, and who or what is the securitizing actor (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31,33). According to Bourbeau (2011) securitization theory is not very precise in its use, because it only engages with facilitating conditions and not with contextual factors, and this problem needs to be addressed. Contextual factors that need to be incorporated in the theory are ‘the role of the audience’, ‘levels/degrees of securitization’, and ‘increased emphasis on the concept of power’ (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 39-43). First, within securitization theory the audience only has a role at the end of the securitizing process, either accepting or denying the securitizing move. This removes feedback and interaction from the equation, two factors that do play a role, and should be incorporated. Second, there are no levels of securitization. Not all issues are equally important, thus precision is lacking in the theory and this needs to be addressed. Third, the concept of ‘power’ is only employed in the relation between the securitizing actor and the audience, surpassing the fact that the audience, media, and other interest groups have forms of power as well. For example, by giving feedback or providing new insights and ideas.

Bourbeau (2011) provides critique but does not provide a development of securitization theory useful for analysis. Therefore, this thesis will establish an experimental framework of analysis incorporating his three main critiques on securitization theory. This extended version of securitization theory will be tested by analysing the Refugee Crisis that started in 2011. This will be done by answering the following main research question: What are the shortcomings of the current version of securitization theory, and what could be added to improve it? To analyse the theory, and set up an extended theory by analysing new contextual factors is a challenging and dynamic issue necessitating a broad understanding of all the factors that might play a role in both the Refugee Crisis and the securitization of set issue. Therefore this thesis works with the following hypothesis: The extended version of securitization theory provides additional information on where securitizing speech acts

¹ Facilitating conditions (explained p. 19) and facilitating variables (explained p. 26-27) are two different concepts with different meanings and implications for this thesis.

originate from and how securitizing actors interact with their audience and policy community. This is directly related to contextual factors, power relations, and the policy process.

The Refugee Crisis that started in 2011 is the case study that will be used to test the extended version of securitization theory for the following two reasons. First, over the last few years, migration as a whole, and the treatment of refugees in particular, has become a central topic of discussion in society, politics, and academics. Half of the Syrian population has been forcibly displaced due to the Syrian Civil War, putting even more emphasis on the movement of people. Though most refugees stay in the vicinity of their country of origin, increased globalization has led many refugees to seek asylum in Europe. This is what started the Refugee Crisis. The movement of these people is creating anxiety and unease, putting cultural identity, senses of belonging, and security in a state of uncertainty. In this context, strong language surrounding migration is growing in popularity. This leads to stronger rules and regulations surrounding migration for security reasons (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 1). Consequently, the new extended version of securitization theory should be applied to the 2011 Refugee Crisis.

The Refugee Crisis, as further mentioned in this thesis will be limited to the movement of people from Syria. The author recognises that this can be viewed as a political position influencing this paper, since others might choose to describe the situation as a migration or asylum crisis. However, it should be clear that the description 'refugee crisis' refers to the condition of those fleeing the Nation State of Syria, not the situation of the asylum system used in Europe. Within contemporary European politics the crisis concerning the civil war in Syria, and consequently the uprising of the Islamic state that has caused millions of people to flee, are issues of core importance. Additionally, political figures like Maria Stavropoulou (2016), and scholars like Charles Keely (1999) have defined this as a humanitarian disaster. The discussion on the movement of takes place at both at the EU level and in the nation state level.

The second reason why the Refugee Crisis is the perfect case study to test the extended version of securitization theory, is the association the theory has to the broadening of the security agenda. Traditionally within the scholarly debates surrounding security, the referent object is the state. With the referent object being the survival of set state (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 21). This traditional view on security has widened significantly since the end of the Cold War (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 21, 36; Walker, 1990, p. 22). Increasingly scholars have concluded that we should recognize that a 'threat' encompasses

more than state survival. The widening of 'security' has been most prominently addressed in the Copenhagen School of securitization theory (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998; Diez & Huysmans, 2007, p. 3). To engage with all the facets of the broadening security agenda a dynamic issue is needed to engage with it. As a case study, the Refugee Crisis provides a multitude of actors: the EU, individual nation states, migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and individuals within the nation states that play a constantly changing role. Securitization theory provides a dynamic way of looking at the perception and analysis of security in relation to this case.

To answer the main research question: What are the shortcomings of the current version of securitization theory, and what could be added to improve it? This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2: the theoretical framework, securitization theory as created by the Copenhagen School of Thought will be explored and explained. Section 2.2 will put emphasis on the strengths of the current theory. The focus will be on their introduction of language theory in security studies related academic fields. The incorporation of the notion that utterances by individuals can imply action, through 'language games' (Wittgenstein, 1967) and 'speech acts' (Austin, 1962) is securitization theory's core contribution to the academic security debate (Diez & Huysmans, 2007). Based on this constructivist theoretical foundation this thesis will explore what 'security' entails in this section. Together these parts will be the foundation of the exploration of the Copenhagen School of securitization theory. In section 2.3 the strong points and weaknesses of securitization theory will be analysed, cumulating in section 2.4, here the extended version of securitization theory will be established based on the theoretical framework.

Linked to the Copenhagen School's language based structure of securitization theory section 2.4 presents the changes the extended theory of securitization theory adds to Wæver his original structure. In which identities, interests, values, and norms are viewed as continuously changing based on interactions. By adding focus on contextual factors and institutional interests, the extended version of securitization theory becomes simultaneously broader and more specific in its analysis. The increased focus on the interconnected role of the audience, the notion of power, and a framework of facilitating variables² will enable this broader but more specifically structured analysis of the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995), the securitizing

² Facilitating conditions (explained p. 19) and facilitating variables (explained p. 26-27) are two different concepts with different meanings and implications for this thesis.

actors, and why certain securitizing moves are uttered at specific moments in time. This framework will be tested, after important concepts have been highlighted and the methods have been explained, in chapter 5 of this thesis.

After establishing the theoretical framework this thesis continues in chapter 3 by introducing and subsequently analysing important concepts that need to be taken into consideration before the extended version of securitization theory can be applied and tested. Since this thesis deals with the dynamics taking place within the international political arena, the focus will be on exploring the following concepts: The state, the nation, and nationalism. Then the focus will shift towards the dynamics of migration, clarifying what is being securitized, and why this is important. Last, this chapter will look at the Dublin Convention (EU regulation 604/2013). This convention regulates the allocation of refugees in Europe, and has a big impact on how the Refugee Crisis is perceived. Setting up these basic concepts is a necessity, because they play an important part as contextual factors, within the structure of extended securitization theory.

In chapter 4, the comparative case study by which the extended version of securitization theory will be tested is presented. In here the individual actors within respective nation states in Europe will be outlined. The focus is on five individual nation states and their reaction to the Refugee Crisis. These five countries are the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. Excluding Italy, these nation states are chosen because throughout history they have been the main immigration countries in European history. Italy is interesting because it became a country of immigration later than the others. Only once they got African colonies people started to migrate towards Italy. Since the beginning of the 21st century the flow of migration towards Italy has increased dramatically and has become the point of arrival for many migrants and refugees in Europe (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). Afterwards, in chapter 5 the framework will be tested, by analysing the Refugee Crisis in the United Kingdom and Mainland Europe.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the theoretical foundation for the extended version of securitization theory will be outlined. This by first establishing a theoretical foundation in section 2.2, to establish the basis on which to extend version of securitization theory can be built. Based on section 2.2, section 2.3 will focus on how security has developed as a concept by analysing what ‘security’ entails, subsequently focussing on how the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory inherently works.

After explaining conventional securitization theory in sub-section 2.3.1 and conceptualizing ‘security’ in sub-section 2.3.2, sub-section 2.3.3 puts forward an analysis of the main problems that securitization theory faces. All will come together in section 2.4. Here the new extended version of securitization theory will be outlined, with a core focus on the contextual factors that the Copenhagen School surpasses. These contextual factors are encompassed by: The role of the audience; a clear structure in which power relations can be analysed; and levels of securitization. To establish the theoretical foundation of set contextual factors an agenda-setting perspective provided by Kingdon (1995), and a framework on power distributions as set up by Jef Huysmans (2004) and Alessandra Buonfino (2004) will be implemented in the extended version of securitization theory. The levels of securitizations will be addressed by adding a framework of facilitating variables to the extended version of securitization theory. All of this to provide a framework wherein speech acts and policy streams can be examined together.

2.2 Constructivism: The Theoretical Foundation

This section will establish a theoretical foundation based on a constructivist approach focussed on the use of language in international relations. There are many approaches that can research international migration from a political science perspective. Therefore it is important to understand where securitization theory finds its theoretical roots. This first sub-section will establish how securitization theory is situated in the philosophy of science by establishing its ontological and epistemological position. The role of power is important in this, and therefore the second sub-section will focus on how power works in securitization. The third sub-section will focus on the importance of language theory for securitization theory. This will be done by exploring the importance of ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein, 1967) and ‘speech acts’ (Austin, 1969). This together creates the foundation on which securitization is built. Speech acts and

the structure of language games will be used to explain why issues, like the Refugee Crisis, become security issues.

2.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology

To expand on securitization theory, it is critical to understand its theoretical foundation. To start at the beginning, within political science the key point of discussion between different scholars often considers the following ontological question: ‘what is the nature of the political world’ (Marsh & Stoker, 2010, p. 7)? Defining what the political is, how knowledge is gathered and how the world is constructed is key to understanding any theory. For securitization theorists, as for any political theorists, there are two ways by which one can define what the political is. First, one can opt to do this by referencing a set of political institutions or a political arena. This approach is prevalent in behavioural, institutionalist, and rational choice theory based analysis of the political, and it makes sense considering that the commitment of these approaches is based on understanding the processes and procedures in politics on an international level and on the nation state level. These often positivist approaches establish logical interdependences of identities and institutions. Second, there are other approaches that focus on the general relationships positivists take for granted. (Fierke & Nicholson, 2001) These are approaches that define the political in terms of social processes. Politics here is more than the acts of governments, it is about power distributions within nation states. This approach is mainly employed in feminism, Marxism, and constructivism. The different theories of science named here are diverse in their individual approaches towards what the actual subject of study should be. What should be taken away is that in their core they all focus on the struggle over power (Marsh & Stoker, 2010).

Understanding the core theoretical position of securitization theory requires basic knowledge of the epistemological and ontological position taken. Being grounded in language theory, and based on speech act theory as established by Wittgenstein (1967) and Austin (1962), it seems clear that the ontological position is based on the notion that the world can be constructed and deconstructed continually by individual actors. The extended version of securitization theory will be grounded, like securitization theory by Buzan et al. (1998), on a constructivist foundation (Bryman, 2008; Furlong & Marsh, 2010).

When one believes that individuals can alter the status quo, using words and decision-making processes, the epistemological position can be evaluated as well. Based on the idea that the world is constructed and deconstructed all the time, a logical consequence should be to recognise that speeches and acts are open to interpretation for the knowledge gatherer.

Consequently, the knowledge gatherer is interpreting subjective meanings of actions taken in a social environment. Thus, all phenomena, decisions, and opinions expressed cannot be independently analysed. (Bryman, 2008; Furlong & Marsh, 2010).

2.2.2 The concept of 'power'

Bringing the theoretical argument to the political arena, it must be clear that constructivism stands apart from the dominant views of neoliberalism and neorealism on the political. This because rationalism is not an inherent value of constructivism. According to Alexander Wendt (1999) rational choice fundamentally implies that identity and interests of agents are 'exogenously given' (p. 391). He indicates that rationalism encompasses the analysis of processes and the institutions that guide these. This eventually congregates in behavioural changes, but identities and interests remain set in stone. Here, states are the dominant unit of analysis, and because of this they are the ones who decide what a security issue entails. Of course, neoliberals and neorealists have different viewpoints on certain aspects of the political spectrum, but it is their joint view on self-interest of states that puts them directly vis-à-vis constructivist scholars like Wendt (1999) and Fierke & Nicholson (2001). The problem of the rationalist focus is that it connects the issue of changing identities direct to interests within regimes. When you argue that identities and interests are a given, how can you possibly explain why regimes change through time? Since the collapse of the Soviet-Union many neoliberals have changed their views on the powers that individuals hold in society, and how these power relations influence nation state identities and interests. Among them Joseph Nye is a prime example. In his 2011 book 'The Future of Power' he creates room for the power of the individual, and regime change by incorporating notions of social power held by individual actors, in which he differentiates between behavioural power and power as a resource (p. 6, 10).

To continue with the concept of 'power': It is exactly in this concept that constructivism has proven to be under-developed, which shows in securitization theory as well (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 42). Therefore, it is necessary to explain how power will be treated in this thesis. In positivist approaches the logic of 'anarchy' in international politics is used to describe power relations. Anarchy is used to describe and analyse power relations, the international state-of-affairs, which is argued to be a free-for-all. Power relations here are focused on self-help and the notion that anarchy is structural. Returning to Wendt (1999) and his contribution to power in constructivism: Power politics are not structurally rooted in anarchy: they are produced by processes of interaction between the states in which anarchy is no more than a facilitator.

Because the extended version of securitization theory will be tested by analysing the refugee crisis, it makes sense to focus on constructivist analysis of power relations in a regional scope. For example, constructivists like Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) argue that power relations, within formed international organisations like the European Union, constitute ‘a redefinition of norms and forging of common identities through collective institutions’ (Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010, p. 732). To them there is no anarchy in the international state system when common identities and collective institutions are constructed.

2.2.3 Language games and speech acts

However, to paraphrase Fierke & Nicholson (2001): One must consider that constructivism is no theory by which phenomena, institutions, or concepts can be explored. When one focuses on the logic of language, constructivism is an ‘approach’. It is the search for, and identification of, clarity and meaning in the use of language. Here, language use becomes a system, and Ludwig von Wittgenstein (1967) was one of the first scholars to grasp that language and the meaning it can create should be understood as such a system. He invented the concept of ‘language games’, a metaphor for explaining the nature of what ‘language’ entails. To him, using language is like making moves and decisions in a game. This means that discourse and the use of language are a form of action in and of itself, but they are dependent on the rules of ‘the game’ to contain meaning. The ‘rules’ of the game can best be described as social or collective identities that guide our actions and our use of words in society (von Wittgenstein, 1967; Onuf, 1989). For example, the word ‘black’ changes its meaning depending on the context that it is used in. It might relate to the movie ‘Black’, someone whose name is ‘Black’, or to someone with a black skin tone.

Taking language out of the metaphorical games of Wittgenstein and in political reality, Murray Edelman (1977, 2001) provides an interesting perspective on the use of language in politics. For him the use of language is crucial in revealing how social change in societies takes place. Language and discourse help to determine what values in society are dominant at a given point in time, and what values will become popular in the future. Language and discourse also influence how certain groups within societies are portrayed: for example, shaping who are viewed as a credible threat (Edelman, 2001). Closely linked to the Refugee Crisis, immigrants from certain regions of the world are a specific example of this phenomenon Edelman describes.

The process in which language is used to securitize certain issues is what John Austin (1962) describes as ‘speech acts’. In short, speech acts are specific utterances (either sentences or

groups of words) that encompass an action. Examples are promising, evoking, and commanding. A prominent indicator for the use of speech acts is the use of imperatives (Austin, 1962; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). In politics, the use of speech acts is often linked to the shaping public opinions, to influence other actors in the political spectrum (Edelman, 2001). It is the use of the imperative in discourse that produces meaning or actions. Here Wittgenstein and Austin come together. This is illustrated by Max Black (1962), he explains that the ‘rules’ that guide the language game are constituted by their formulation. They are statements, constituted by imperative language. Thus, ‘a rule only has one function: conveying an imperative’ (Onuf, 1989, p. 80).

To sum up: The language games as explored by Wittgenstein, and speech act theory by Austin come together in the constructivist foundation formulised by Onuf in 1989. Here, rules guide our actions blindly; however, they are dependent on context, time, and space. Speech acts within these rules represent social interaction. It is within securitization theory established by Buzan, Wæver and other academics related to the Copenhagen School of Thought, that speech acts and the structure of language games are used to explain why issues, like the Refugee Crisis, reach the state of being discussed as security issues. The concept of security here interacts with the theories of Wittgenstein and Austin. Because security within securitization theory is established through actions undertaken by a securitizing actor with the goal to frame issues as being existential threats to the referent objects survival. Which implies moving the issue beyond the established political framework in to a security framework.

2.3 Security and Securitization Theory

2.3.1 A short introduction to securitization theory

To understand the social construction of securitization theory, the impact language has on the securitization process, and the shortcomings of securitization theory, its core needs to be understood. To reiterate, securitization theory involves the process of a person, state, or issue becoming a matter of security, enabling extraordinary means in the name of security. This to reach immediate results by surpassing diplomacy and other aspects of the political debate, mainly by emphasising a state of ‘crisis’. The surpassing of the political debate is done by securitizing actors and their securitizing speech acts. These issues are not necessarily the most threatening, on the contrary, issues on the security agenda represent successful securitizing moves. Therefore, the aim of securitization theory is to identify the securitizing actor, the existential threat portrayed and the audience. Subsequently the goal becomes to find out why

the (successful) securitization move took place, what the circumstances were and what way they were achieved (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 12-24).

This section will analyse securitization theory in detail. This to establish its shortcomings and set up a basis for the extended version of securitization theory. First, a short analysis of the social construction of security will be presented, to create the understanding that concepts of 'security' are contested. Second, the importance of language, discourse, and meaning will be emphasized. Third, the shortcomings of securitization theory will be brought into the limelight before solutions to these shortcomings will be tackled in section 2.3.4.

2.3.2 Social construction of security

Since the end of the Cold War, the field of security studies has become an area where realist approaches to the notion of security are being continually challenged by social constructivist approaches. This makes the definition of what the concept of 'security' precisely is, difficult. Because the state of anarchy between nation states, which used to be accepted as a given, is no longer unchallenged in the increasingly growing interdisciplinary security debate. To establish a working definition this thesis employs securitization theory by the 'Copenhagen School'. This because the 'Copenhagen School' has produced the most influential body of work on the social construction of security. Their early research focused on what encompasses 'security'. The result of this, according to Buzan and Waever, who are the two main contributors of the 'Copenhagen School', is that depending on the circumstances any issue can potentially be part of the security debate/agenda. Thus, the meaning of what 'security' is, depends on how it is used and how it is influenced by time and space (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998; Williams M. C., 2003). As stated by Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010): 'the nature of what 'security' is, is conceptually contested' (p. 76).

In practice securitization theory focuses on security by applying textual analysis. Even though one should primarily focus on the roots of securitization theory in relation to the concept of 'security', it is important to note that its foundation is based on the inherent belief that society is continually socially constructed and deconstructed. Michael Williams (2003) explained this very clearly: He states that 'security is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process' (p. 513), which makes the social construction of security vital to the understanding of the concept.

Additionally, within constructivism, language and meaning are the two central components of investigation. To understand the extended version of securitization theory employed in this

thesis we need to go beyond the theoretical foundation explored. This to explicate critical social constructivism. This thesis will employ constructivism as used by Fierke & Wiener (1999), Onuf (1989), and Black (1962). Their central interests are based on exploring the connection between security and identity, and how narratives and discourse surrounding these topics influences political actions at specific times and places. Here collective identities and cultures are unstable and vulnerable. This means that, as argued by Fierke & Wiener (1999), identities, interests, norms and values are actively altered by performative language (speech acts), contextual change, and institutional interests. The study of identity, therefore, becomes the study of varieties of illustrations of the plurality of identities that exist in a society. This helps to establish what the accurate position or view is. Sticking to this form of constructivism would imply that it is very difficult to establish ‘why’ things happen in society, since the focus of the investigation is put on the ‘how’ question. As in: How does change come about in a (particular) society (McDonald, 2013)?

2.3.3 Power relations

The relationship between culture and security shows crucial forms of power in relation to the production of security practices (Williams, 2007, p. 2). However, what is often overlooked by those researching links between power, culture, and the nation state, is that treating the state as one unified agent limits the scope by which one can analyse those that are in power. Since this would imply that everything depends on those who are in charge. Therefore, the state needs to be treated as a structure in which individual actors operate within the mental and physical boundaries of set state (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 33-36).

As expressed in the previous paragraph: Power as a concept is not easily definable in relation to the constructivist thought in general. For example, you cannot simply assess the power of a nation state by evaluating the strength of their army. Whereas other approaches, like Realism, might see this as an identifiable variable. Understanding what power and power relations entail within securitization theory and constructivism is to understand that politics of security are more than the linguistic basis of the speech act, or the contextual structure that nation states provide. It is the position that linguistic and contextual factors take within an institutional framework that make securitizing speech acts an effective possibility to move certain issues to the security agenda (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 21-23; Williams M., 2007, pp. 20-20, 64-68; Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 32-33).

Subsequently, it is important to have a position on power relations within this framework. Within securitization theory power relations play an integral part in the success a securitizing

move might have. The process of securitization depends on professionals of security practises, their authority, and the audience they try to reach and convince. The securitization move itself can be identified as a use of discourse by which a topic is portrayed as an existential threat, but has not been accepted yet by the audience (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 23-24). As Michael Williams (2007) states: ‘issues become securitized, treated as security issues, through these speech acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such’ (p. 513).

2.3.4 The shortcomings of securitization theory

Based on what has been discussed on securitization theory so far, a couple of shortcomings can be identified. These are the ignored contextual factors in combination with an underdeveloped role for the audience. Securitization theory focuses on the audience and mentions that their role is important, but never clearly defines what the specific audience of an equally specific speech act could be, and what actions they can undertake. Furthermore, securitization is focussed on facilitating conditions as both the main indicator and source of influence on speech acts, in combination with their success in securitizing an object. Facilitating conditions are important: they illustrate what components are essential to complete a successful securitizing move by a securitizing actor. An existential threat or crisis must be presented, emergency action needs to be undertaken, and the political realm must be surpassed due to the urgency related to the securitizing move; this both incorporates internal and external facilitating conditions (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 31, 33). Facilitating conditions are critical to understand how securitization theory and speech acts work, by providing a basis by which conditions for successful securitization move can be analysed. However, this basis of understanding, of how and why securitizing acts work or not, can and should be expanded by increased focus on contextual factors.

Philippe Bourbeau (2011) argues that within securitization theory contextual factors, that could limit or expand possibilities for securitization, are not sufficiently utilized. He proposes three contextual factors that need to be incorporated in securitizing theory: increased emphasis on the role of the audience, development of levels of securitization, and increased emphasis on the concept of power (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 39-43). These three complaints derive from his problems with a lack precision within securitization theory. Because Buzan, Waever, and their colleagues are vague in specifically determining these factors.

First, the role of the audience is represented in a misleading manner, because within securitization theory the audience is nothing more than a recipient at the end of the line. This

removes the importance of notions of feedback and interaction between audience and securitizing actor. To illustrate this point: Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde (1998) only discuss audiences in terms like 'relevant', 'significant', and 'sufficient'. This is a vague way to determine what the audience is comprised of and why this is the case (p. 27).

Second, in relation to the audience: Securitization theory only describes variation: securitization, desecuritization, and politicization. There is no room for variation within these different categories. Unfortunately, Bourbeau (2011) does not explain a better way of addressing this issue, making this uncovered ground. Therefore, this thesis will not take this into account, it will just be acknowledged. However, a new approach will be presented as part of the extended version of migration. This new framework will focus on defining potential identifiable securitizing themes and moves, and scale these by the three categories: The 'politics of exception', the 'politics of unease', and 'desecuritizing discourses'. This to determine what effective ways are to (de)securitize.

The third shortcoming of securitization theory is the lack of emphasis on the concept of power, in combination with its link to the audience. Securitization theory only uses the concept of power in relation to the securitizing actor and his/her ability to securitize. Surpassing the fact that the audience has power as well. Power that should be recognized. This power is the capacity to approve and influence securitizing actors and moves. For example, in relation to the role of the media: The media influences those that make decisions, but they are influenced by securitizing actors as well. This is a small example of the interdependence between audience and actor often surpassed in securitization theory (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 39-43; Jacobsen, 1996).

2.4 Securitization Theory Developed

2.4.1 A short introduction

Securitization theory does not move beyond the analysis of facilitating conditions. Therefore this section will focus on the contextual factors, the conditions that are neglected by the Copenhagen School. These contextual factors are: The role of the audience; a clear organizational structure through which power relations can be analysed; and levels of securitization (and politicization). To illustrate the importance of contextual factors the focus will be on an agenda-setting perspective provided by John Kingdon (1995). This perspective has the function of adding structure to the speech act analysis. Additionally, a framework on power distributions as set up by Jef Huysmans (2004) and Alessandra Buonfino (2004) will be implemented to provide a framework wherein speech acts and policy streams can be examined. The final part of this section will focus as a transition between the theoretical framework and the analysis of the Refugee Crisis. This will be done by establishing the facilitating variables and contextual factors that need to be considered in the analysis.

Based on the shortcomings of securitization theory related to contextual factors established in section 2.3, it is necessary to create ways by which power relations can be analysed in a structured and clear manner. Additionally, it is critical to have a better understanding of what the role of the audience is within securitization theory. It is Kingdon's (1995) analysis on agenda-setting processes that links undoubtedly to the critique put forward by Bourbeau. He does so by providing a framework that identifies effects, beliefs, and actions of individuals based on agenda-setting processes. Furthermore, he describes the policy environment where securitization moves take place, as a space where decision makers are actively 'looking for work' (Kingdon, 1995, Mazarr, 2007, p. 9). This is interesting because based on this it is possible to extend securitization theory. It seems that securitization theory perceives itself as a natural experiment: un-touched by the environment in which its operate. There is not enough emphasis on context, either the socio-historical, the cultural, or the role of other actors. It should not be forgotten that it is the agent that create, forge, and set-up social structures and institutions within nation states; whereas the structures themselves constrain and create boundaries. Therefore, the contextual factors, and the actors that move through them, are inseparable (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 44-45).

2.4.2 Agenda-Setting Theory

What Kingdon (1995) can add to securitization theory is a better structure. Agenda-setting, particularly his 'multiple streams theory' (Kingdon, 1995), and securitization are not that

different. Both analyse how certain topics are added to the political agenda. The core difference is that agenda-setting scholars focus on how an idea its time comes, whereas securitization focuses on how certain actors their securitizing moves end up creating existential threats. Agenda-setting processes tend to be more organized though, as they centre their analysis focusing on two ideas. Ideas that add to the concept of the securitizing actor. Because besides the securitizing actor, or the policy entrepreneur, the term used in multiple streams theory, Kingdon his theory brings in two additional concepts. These two are: 1) 'policy communities'. Encompassing the problem identification process and the creation of possible solutions (Kingdon, 1995 p. 139; Mazarr, 2007, p. 9-11). And 2) 'Focusing events' that create the opportunities to pursue and promote the policy implementation (Kingdon, 1995, p. 146; Mazarr, 2007, p. 13-15). Only the last step within agenda-setting theory is the 'policy entrepreneur': The securitizing actor who makes the move for the community, he or she represents (Mazarr, 2007, p. 15-16).

Kingdon's agenda-setting theory together with the language based foundation of securitization theory, encompasses most of the critique by Bourbeau. There are multiple reasons for this: The role of the audience becomes clearer. This because the structure provided by 'policy communities' explains why some socially constructed beliefs, norms, worldviews and policy options get constructed, contested, and deconstructed continuously through time. Policy communities are groups of people that discuss political ideas, waiting for the opportune moment to release them to the world, with the goal of making these a (political) reality. Within securitization theory this is uncovered ground, since the focus is on facilitating conditions: the construction of the arguments, and who the actor and the external threat are, and not on contextual factors (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 26, 32). Policy communities add a structural layer, expanding on our knowledge of where ideas of securitizing actors come from. Uncovering the way in which socially constructed norms and ideas can become national behaviour. Connected to this, agenda-setting process analysis provides securitization theory with the possibility to expand on why securitizing happens at specific moment in time, and not earlier or later, by putting emphasis on 'focussing events'. These focussing events can be identified as trigger events, and can also be described as windows of opportunity. According to agenda-setting theory, whenever a large event takes place in society there is a policy window in which policies and ideas developed by policy communities can be pushed through to greater acceptance than they normally would. Here, certain power relations become apparent as well. The policy communities and their

spokesperson, the securitizing actor, do not act independently but are mutually constructing and deconstructing narratives based on their ideas. Thus, what agenda-setting brings to securitization theory and its language foundation is the policy stream. This policy stream is of core importance and includes: Problem recognition and the search for solutions (policy communities), development of these options in relation to actual events taking place (focusing event), and the politics itself (policy entrepreneur/securitizing actor). Thus, it provides clear contextual factors for securitization theory to work with in addition to the analysis of speech acts.

2.4.3 Framework for power distribution

Having covered the additional benefit of agenda-setting theory to securitization theory, a framework is necessary to facilitate this. Huysmans (2004) and Buonfino (2004) provide connecting theories on how liberal democracies work based on power distribution. They add to the use of language (securitization theory) and policy streams (agenda-setting theory), the framework wherein these can function, based on a balance of power.

Huysmans (2004) focuses on the balance in society between ‘legality of government’, ‘representation’, and ‘civilians and the law’ (p. 325-327). Core in understanding this framework is its focus on the inherent role of power. Figure 1 shows the interplay of the Rule of Law, leadership, and the will of the people. These are the factors that influence the balance in a nation state. An example of how this figure works is the following: When




Figure 1 (Huysmans, 2004, p. 326)

the balance between the Rule of Law and Political Leadership shifts in the direction of the Political Leadership, then that will lead to arbitrary use of power in society. In short, if balances in figure 1 get distorted this might increase risk and lead to the system faltering (Huysmans, 2004, p. 327).

To give an example of how figure 1 works in practise the following practical example: In 2001 the prime-minister of Great-Britain, Tony Blair, stated the following in the wake of

9/11: 'Here in this country and in other nations around the world, laws will be changed, not to deny basic liberties but to prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom from terror' (Blair, 2001). In accordance with this quote a 'state of emergency' was declared to create a 'Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act', enabling the indefinite detainment of nationals from other states when they are under terrorist investigation (Huysmans, 2004, p. 325). Here, the rule of law was surpassed in favour of political leadership.

Ulrich Beck (2003) describes 9/11 as the 'complete collapse of language' (Beck, p. 39), illustrating that humankind now lives in a time where we can no longer control everything, and therefore 'risk calculation' has become the 'hegemonic' discourse (pp. 40-42). Buonfino (2004) adds to this the belief that this is bolstered by the socially constructed fear of 'losing one's identity' (Buonfino, p. 39). This implies that the social construction of the 'risk society' and the 'loss of identity' are interlinked. Discourses on political beliefs, economic consequences ethnicity, and nationality can now suddenly be identified of being part of the political system, rather than merely rooted in language.

The framework by Huysmans (2004) provides a framework wherein language use can be analysed. Additionally, Kingdon (1995) his analysis of how certain issues can become securitized because of securitizing actors and policy windows links very clearly to Huysmans and Buonfino their work on power relations. It does so by providing more depth in how to identify successful acts of securitization. Namely, the focus on hegemonic discourses, which refers to the social construction of a leading discourse in a field, is a means to identify how the predominant discourse changes in a field before and after a major event. For example, 9/11 as a focussing event, created a shift in the political discussion surrounding the 'dangers' of migration (Buonfino, 2004, p. 25).

2.4.4 The extended version of securitization theory

Based on what has been discussed so far in this section it is possible to establish the all-encompassing extended version of securitization theory that will be tested by analysing the Refugee Crisis. First, the basis is securitization theory focuses on how issues become matters of 'security'. Their theory is grounded in constructivism because their analysis of performative language implies that identities, interests, values, and norms are continuously altered. Their focus is on facilitating conditions emphasising the structure of arguments within speech acts and on who the securitizing actor and existential threat are.

Second, imminent critique by Bourbeau (2011) shows an underrepresentation of focus on contextual factors and institutional interests. Therefore, contextual factors will be given more attention by incorporating the agenda-setting theoretical structure as presented by Michael Mazarr (2007). His focus on policy windows and policy communities will add additional value to the language based securitization theory, by providing a clear policy stream. Thus, policy windows and policy communities will be situated in the same framework where securitizing actors and existential threats are already placed. The result of this is more information on the role of audiences and the interaction they have with the securitizing actor(s). Additionally, more information should be deducted on why securitizing moves are created at specific moments in time, due to the increased focus on policy windows. Furthermore, by adding the framework as presented by Huysmans (2004) and Buonfino (2004) the boundaries of the use of language and policy streams become clear. It provides a basis from where the impact of securitizing moves can be evaluated within society.

Third, as identified earlier, there is no proper way to analyse levels of securitization, politicization or desecuritization. However, it does not suffice to determine that an issue is securitized or not. Therefore, an experimental framework has been created to address what securitizing themes or moves are successful, this experimental framework is presented in table 1 (p. 26). To be specific, the purpose of the table will be to identify what themes in securitizing moves tend to come forth. Leading to a desired outcome for those expressing the securitizing move. Precision is necessary to determine how and when something is securitized, desecuritized or politicized. Since there is no method yet by which we can determine to what extend issues are securitized, I created table 1 so that one can systematically identify what forms of securitizing discourses are used as securitizing moves in a given situation.

Table 1 - Facilitating Variables <i>Potentially identifiable securitizing moves/themes, considering the securitization of migration</i>		
<i>The Politics of Exception (state related)</i>	<i>The Politics of Unease (policy areas)</i>	<i>Desecuritizing Discourses</i>
Terrorism (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008)	Crisis of the welfare state; access to social institutions (Geddes, 2015; Joppke, 1999)	Needs of asylum-seekers and refugees (Gibney, 2015)
State' internal security (Huysmans, 2000; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005)	Integration (Hollifield & Wong, 2015)	Human Rights (UNHCR, 1951 & 1967)
Sovereignty (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Joppke, 1999)	Ethnicity/race (Anderson, 2006; Hollifield & Wong 2015)	
	Distribution of refugees (Gibney, 2015)	Distribution of Refugees (Gibney, 2015)
	Nationalism (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2004)	

Table 1 differentiates between a multitude of discourses that could be used to establish an eventual hegemonic discourse, that in turn might lead to policy implementations. Furthermore, all the discourses are grounded in academic relevance. For in depth analysis of the securitizing themes in relation to migration to establish this new framework for analysis the focus will be based on the following facilitating variables that have been established by multiple scholars as having an important role in the current debate around the migration crisis: Internal security (Huysmans, 2000a); cultural security (Huysmans, 2000b; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005); crisis of the welfare state (Huysmans, , 2000); needs of the asylum-seekers/refugees (Gibney M. , 2015); nation state's history of migration (Gibney M. , 2015); impact on the national economy (Gibney M. , 2015); actions of other states on the issue (Gibney M. , 2015); unfair distribution of refugees (Gibney M. , 2015); ethnicity/race (Anderson, 2006; Hollifield & Wong, 2015); sovereign borders (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005); nationalism (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2004); globalization (Anderson, 2006); integration (Hollifield & Wong, 2015).

The structure of the 1 is based on how Huysmans & Buonfino (2008). They explain how asylum, and refugees can be part of the security debate within a society. They illustrate their argument by elaborating on ‘politics of exception’, and ‘politics of unease.’ ‘Politics of exception’ are closely related to discourses that address the condition of the nation state, particularly direct threats to the nation state. It includes discourse on the justification of policies of exception, that often influence the balance between security and liberty. ‘Politics of unease’ do not address existential threats to the sovereignty of nation states. However, it connects different policy areas, to create discourses of safety and unease in relation to topics of their interests (Huysmans, & Buonfino, pp. 766-768). ‘Discourses of desecuritization’ have been added to the framework since desecuritization should ultimately be an end goal in security policy, and it is a form of speech acts employed in the political arena. ‘Desecuritizing Discourses’ are speech acts employed to remove an issue from the security agenda, or make sure that it does not get on the security agenda. Some variables, like the distribution of refugees, can be used in multiple speech act structures. For example, to create unease by establishing an argument that links unfair distribution of refugees within Europe to the burden this creates on the welfare state. However, it can also be used in a desecuritizing discourse, by linking the distribution of refugees to their basic human rights and needs.

To conclude the set-up of the expanded version of securitization theory it must be clear that expanding speech acts analysis beyond notions of survival and urgency is important. It will lead to more information on what kind of securitizing moves are effective at what times, making securitization and desecuritization more strategically useable. Additionally, linked to all contextual factors mentioned, it is important to once more reiterate the importance of considering that the contextual factors and facilitating conditions addressed thus far are interconnected and influence one another to a large extent. This can be seen by first focusing on the notion of ‘hegemonic discourses’ as unifying principle. Because hegemonic discourses are created and contested by different policy communities and their respective securitizing actors, and are contested by other discourses in a power struggle with other discourses in society, and therefore this should always be remembered.

This extended version of securitization theory will be tested in chapter 5 of this thesis, whereas the following chapter will clarify important concepts related to security and migration.

Thus this chapter has established how this thesis develops securitization theory further. First, by emphasising the merits of securitization theory as established by Buzan, Waever, and their

colleagues of the Copenhagen School of Thought. Their dual focus on how issues become a matter of 'security', and establishment of the importance of facilitating conditions, related to the structure of arguments within speech acts, is of core importance to the extended version of securitization theory. Since it highlights the stylistic structure of the securitizing act: focus on survival and urgency.

Second, this thesis adds a new layer to the theory by investigating what the shortcomings of the conventional theory are, and what should be added to improve it. For this the following hypothesis has been set up based on this chapter: The extended version of securitization theory provides additional information on where securitizing speech acts originate from and how securitizing actors interact with their audience and policy community. This is directly related to contextual factors, power relations, and the policy process. This hypothesis will be tested in chapter 5.

This chapter has laid the theoretical basis grounded on the critique of Bourbeau (2011). Specifically, this chapter has identified that multiple streams theory by Kingdon (1995) would streamline policy windows, policy communities, and the securitizing actor in one policy stream. Additionally, the work on democracies and power relations by Huysmans (2004) and Buonfino (2004) provides a framework through which securitization theory and multiple streams theory can be applied to benefit analysis of securitizing speech acts. The last addition of the extended version securitization theory is a framework of facilitating variables. Based upon multiple scholars this third addition enables the analysis of different types of securitizing moves.

3. Nations, Nationalism, and Migration

3.1 Introduction

Having established the theoretical framework this thesis will continue by introducing and analysing important concepts that are important when analysing migration, but that are not directly related to securitization theory. Before one can analyse the Refugee Crisis by applying the extended version of securitization theory, the context of the crisis has to be clarified. To do this multiple factors have to be addressed. First, since the Refugee Crisis is an international affair, there needs to be a theoretical analysis of the international political playing field. Within the European Union it are the individual nation states that play the core role here. In relation to the theorization of migration in general and the Refugee Crisis in particular it are the concepts state, nation, and nation state that need to be introduced for contextualization in relation to migration and security.

After establishing the contextual relations of the three concepts in relation to migration and security, the focus will shift to an explanation of what migration, refugees, and asylum-seekers are. These definitions will provide a better understanding of what is being securitized, and why this is the case. Here, a clear definition of how migration will be viewed in this thesis will be set up, mainly based on the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its subsequent protocol of 1967. Lastly, an important contextual factor regarding the Migration/Refugee Crisis will be addressed. This factor, the Dublin Convention (EU regulation 604/2013), deals with the distribution of refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe, and has a clear problematic impact on the refugee distribution in Europe. Setting up these basic concepts will provide necessary context for the case study analysis that will follow in chapter 5.

As a jump off point: Throughout history Europe has been shaped by both immigration and emigration. Contrary to contemporary times, Europe even used to be a place of regular migratory movements of large groups of people. For example, from the middle of the 19th century until World War 1 more than 30 million people left Europe for America. Additionally, the concept of 'borders' is not comparable to how we view them today. There were not that many migrants that carried identification papers or birth certificates: Only after World War 1 this became of major importance. Therefore, borders as we know them today came into being in 1918. Going hand in hand with the emergence of the nation state (Bundy, 2016).

3.2 The State

The nation, state, and the nation state are important contextual factors when discussing issues relating to security and migration. Ernest Gellner (2004) has been one of the key scholars in the field of nationalism and he describes the state as the institution within society possessing the monopoly over legitimate violence. The state consists of institutions that are specifically concerned with the implementation and execution of law and order within a sovereign territory. States can be identified when the agencies that control this power are clearly separated from the rest of civil society. The nation and the nationalism by which the state is formed should be viewed as an imagined political community, made-up inherently and sovereign (Anderson, 2006, pp. 5-7). The roles of the nation and of nationalism are at the core of understanding security issues within society and therefore they should be considered equally important contextual factors as the state.

3.3 The Nation and Nationalism

Putting emphasis on the importance of nation, nationalism, and the nation state, Charles Keely (1996) argues that ‘those who control the levers of power in states can manipulate national and nationalist feeling to preserve their own power and privilege’ (p. 1050). What he describes here is a securitizing move. Here expressed by those who control power in society, they emphasise nationalistic feelings that might be present in large parts of his/her audience. This is critical to the links between security, power, and nationalism. Since it implies that one can elevate a certain topic to the security agenda based on an imagined concept: the nation. Viewing the nation as an ‘imagined community’ implies that material conditions exist that enable the imagination of collective and extended networks (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Nationalism should not be understood as a political ideology, since these are often consciously used, whereas nationalism is bound to the unconscious: an imagined community. Which puts it in the same category as religion and absolutism, which are other forms of political power. However, they are not forms of political ideologies (Anderson, 2006, pp. 12,18). As this thesis understands it nationalism stands apart, as establisher of political legitimacy in contemporary society. Nationalism is a sentiment, it is an imagined feeling that can be awakened when the principle is provoked (Gellner, 2004, pp. 1-3).

The advance of nationalism is a historical reaction established in the Age of Enlightenment. Filling the gap left by the diminishing of the unconditional belief in religion and absolutism, due to the dual challenges to the idea that there was one ontological truth or one divine ruler (Anderson, 2006, pp. 19-21, 36). Anderson (2006) and Gellner (2004) state that in the

Western world, these two now surpassed forms of political power, provided people with meaning in life. Nationalism took over this role. Filling the gap and unifying groups of people into nation states that still exist nowadays. The change from religion and absolutism to nationalism is not the awakening of a new force replacing the others. On the contrary, nationalism is the consequence of changes in social organisation. The development of an industrial society based on high-culture and education is what lead to the rise of nationalism (Anderson, 2006, pp. 11-12, 22; Gellner, 2004, pp. 42-48).

Gellner's (2004) description of the change from agricultural society to industrial society, and the subsequent rise of nationalism is based on three factors. First, the invention of the printing press made books and pamphlets more accessible to the common people, subsequently leading to increased literacy rates. Second, linked to the rise of literacy rates, is the genesis of the Reformation, creating an un-unified Christian faith. And third, it increased administrative centralization. These three factors combined had a huge impact on the manner states were governed (Anderson, 2006, pp. 37-40). In addition, nationalism became strongly rooted in society through its roots in language. This implies that nationalism, and the nation to which it is bound, can be identified by recognising a language, subsequently linking this to the territory that it is bound to (Anderson, 2006, p. 43). Language is critical to the imagined idea of what a nation is perceived to be.

Within the creation of nationalism it is not merely language that plays a role: variables like a common history, a shared religion, and a united territory are very important as well. But language stands apart because acquiring a profound understanding of a language requires the investment of a lot of time: the most valuable resource that we have. Time is limited and cannot be bought with money. There is a kind of isolation to languages and there is a limit to how many you can learn well, in the limited time we have on this planet. This shows why nations, as imagined communities hold so much power: It is very hard to join one, and even harder to switch multiple times during your lifespan, if at all. This makes nations very hard to enter for outsiders (Anderson, 2006, p. 148; Keely, 1996, p. 1046). Therefore, nations and nationalism are important contextual factors that you cannot ignore when studying the movement of people linked to security.

3.4 The Nation State

The nation and the state go hand in hand: As concepts, they cannot be evaluated apart from one another; They are interlinked, as explained in section 3.2: The nation is an imagined

community; the state is the collection of institutions within society dealing with the execution of law and the maintenance of order. What links the two is that the state has developed a function as nurturer of the national identity (Anderson, 2006). This, besides the function of executioner of law and order that it inherently possesses. According to Keely (1999) the promotion of a national identity exists to legitimize the state (p. 1051). Because it is this identity that forms the nation: automatically justifying the state as a concrete method to preserve the identity and way of life. Not just linking the nation and the state, but interlinking them (p. 1051).

The interplay between the nation and the state is not as straightforward as it seems. This, because nationalities and ethnicities influence the way the nation state functions. States often encompass multiple nations. To ensure maximum stability it would be ideal if states would only encompass one nation. There are numerous historical examples in which problems arose between multiple nations in one state: The civil war in Rwanda between the Hutus and the Tutsis; and the civil war in Yugoslavia where Croats, Serbs, and other ethnic groups were involved, are prime examples of this phenomenon. It would be short-sighted to state that these civil wars erupted just because a multitude of nationalities lived within one state. More variables are at play. Additionally, having multiple nationalities within one state does not have to be a problem. Governments can govern nationalities in a multitude of ways, the preferred result being the development of an all-encompassing national identity. A core example of this is the all-encompassing nationality of the United-States. The set-up of an all-encompassing nationality often brings forward the smallest amount of unrest between different nations living in one state. However, a state can also develop an identity based on the dominant or biggest nationality. Two other methods of dealing with a multi-national state are ethnic cleansing, or setting up a confederation. All four could potentially lead to ideological disagreements or state failure. Which in turn may lead to revolutions and migration flows, which is important to keep in mind (Keely, 1999, pp. 1051-1056).

This is the point where migration becomes a security issue for nation states. Since the international system consists of individual nation states, these states also try to regulate migration: The management of the movement of nations. Thus, we have an international system (the EU as an example), comprised out of individual nation states, each encompassing multiple nations, that all have a political power structure rooted in nationalism. Because of this combination of factors, the EU as an international system is unable to deal with migration flows of those that have dissimilar nationalities from their own. Hosting these new people,

with different cultural and national backgrounds will lead to increased problems managing nations in a multinational nation state. Eventually leading to increased uncertainty and unrest between the different groups, (Keely, 1996, p. 1057).

3.5 Migrants, Asylum-Seekers, and Refugees

Understanding differences between migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees and the different rules that apply to them on the European level. These are not as easy to specify, mainly because the academic and political realm use conflicting definitions. First, in July of 1951, in Geneva a Convention related to the status of refugees was adopted, and amended in 1967 with an additional protocol. The 1951 Convention on the treatment of refugees and their human rights was the first time in history that a discussion on this topic was formally put on paper. The Convention entails both the rights of refugees in terms of the treatment they deserve, in terms of direct aid and in terms of social rights. It defines who could or might be acknowledged as a refugee and who cannot. To this day, the Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 are the cornerstone of how the international community intends to protect the rights of individuals that are part of this treaty (UNHCR, 1951 & 1967). However, it is important to keep in mind that national governments have the final say in who are awarded asylum, and who are not.

To understand the treaty, it is essential to have a clear idea as to what it entails to be a refugee. In principle, they are vulnerable people, since the nation state where they belong to will no longer take care of them. This is the case when a revolution or a civil war is taking place. When humans suffer a violation of their human rights so severe that they are forced to flee their country of origin, the international community must step in to provide refuge and sanctuary. Furthermore, those that need sanctuary must be taken care of in the same way as nationals of the providing country: there must be an equal minimum standard of living. The difference between a refugee and an asylum-seeker is that in the latter's case, his/her status has not yet been determined. You can only be acknowledged as a refugee once you can prove that your life is endangered because of a war for example, or because your ethnicity, religion, nationality, or political position might lead to unfair persecution within your own state. A migrant on the other hand leaves his or her country for other reasons. These are generally considered to be of an economic nature, of a social nature (family- reunification), or study related. Such migrants remain under the protection of the government from which he/she emigrated (UNHCR, 1951 & 1967).

A problem with the treaty is that it does not deal with equal distribution of refugees across nation states. The European Union created Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, also known as the third version of the Dublin Convention. This regulation had as its main purpose the establishment of a mechanism and regulation for member states dealing with ‘third-country nationals or a stateless person’ (European Parliament and the Council, 2013).

3.6 Non-refoulement

Regulation 604/2013 seems very straightforward in theory, but in practise it does not work the way it was supposed to. Europe is divided on the issue of how to deal with the influx of migrants and refugees. The main problem is that Europe attracts people that face persecution, and based on international law they are entitled to protection. Countries that have signed the convention are not allowed to send asylum seekers back to states in which their lives would be in danger. However, due to unequal sharing of the burden within Europe, mistrust between nation states erupts (Gibney M., 2015, pp. 449-450; Türk, 2016, pp. 57-58; De Bruycker & Tsourdi, 2016, pp. 64-65). There is no common, all-encompassing European response to migration in general, and the Refugee Crisis in particular: all nation states have their own approach, this leads to negative consequences for the refugees involved. The source of this problem is based in the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ (UNHCR, 1951 & 1967). This principle rooted in the Convention of 1951 and its added Protocol, entails that states are not allowed to return a refugee to their country or origin if they are under threat from persecution or other harm. Thus, responsibility for these refugees rests with the nation state that is their (temporary) host (Gibney M., 2015). The Dublin system declares that the first country of arrival oversees the processing and housing of incoming refugees. This means that border countries like Italy usually host significantly more refugees than a country like the Netherlands for example. Additionally, most refugees do not want to travel to another continent. Therefore it is no surprise that most refugees from Syria end up in Jordan, and similar states in the global South, showing a schism between a fair distribution of refugees between the global South and global North (UNHCR, 2015; Türk, 2016, p. 59).

Problems related to handling asylum-seekers find their origin in the failure of the Dublin system to set up proper procedures to deal with set asylum-seekers. In sum, the political framework in which security issues arise because of migratory movement of refugees, economic migrants and stateless persons is for a large part based on the political power that is inherent to the imagined communities: the nation states.

3.7 Core definitions

This chapter dealt with exploring and explaining the scope of what is relevant when it comes to security and its relation to migration. To make sure that the most important concepts related to the extended version of securitization theory are clear as well. These will be outlined once more in this section.

Concept	Paraphrased Definition	Empirical Indicator	Source
Language games	A metaphor for explaining the nature of what 'language' entails. Using language is like making moves and decisions in a game. This implies that discourse and the use of language are a form of action in and of itself, but they are dependent on the rules of 'the game' to contain meaning	-	Wittgenstein, 1967
Speech acts	Speech acts are specific utterances (either sentences or groups of words) that encompass an action	The use of imperatives. For example: promising, evoking, or commanding	Austin, 1969
<i>Securitizing move</i>	A use of discourse by which a topic is portrayed as an existential threat, but has not been accepted as one yet by the intended audience. Has as similar language structure as the speech act, and can therefore be described as a securitizing speech act	The use of imperatives. For example: promising, evoking, or commanding	Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998

Securitization theory	Conveys how securitising actors can surpass the political arena by uttering a security argument, triggering extraordinary measures that transform the political debate in a security debate. This is done by referencing an existential threat, subsequently convincing an audience by using a speech act	The social construction of a specific threat, by a securitising actor to an audience, that leads to the surpassing of the political	Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998
Contextual factors	These are: 1) the role of the audience; 2) a clear structure in which power relations can be analysed; 3) the levels of securitization and politicization	-	Bourbeau, 2011
Facilitating conditions	Illustrates the components that are essential to complete a successful securitizing move by a securitizing actor: This both incorporates internal and external facilitating conditions	1) An existential threat must be presented; 2) emergency action must be undertaken; 3) the political realm must be surpassed, because of the urgency portrayed in the securitizing move	Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998
<i>Internal facilitating conditions</i>	The structure of the securitizing move	1) Existential threats; 2) points of no return; 3) a possible solution. Thus, there is a stylistic structure in which survival and urgency are key	Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998

<i>External facilitating conditions</i>	The external conditions enabling a successful securitizing move	1) Some issues are more convincingly portrayed as existential threats; 2) the securitizing actor must be an authority in the field in which he utters the securitizing move, otherwise the securitizing move will have no impact	Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde, 1998
Hegemonic discourse	The current mainstream idea on a certain policy issue	-	Kingdon, 1995
Multiple streams theory	Analyses how certain topics reach the political or security agenda. The core difference with securitization theory is that agenda-setting scholars focus on how an idea its time comes about, whereas securitization scholars focus on how certain actors their securitizing moves end up creating existential threats	-	Kingdon, 1995
<i>Policy entrepreneur</i>	Securitizing actor	Prominent public figure, advocating for a specific idea or policy	Kingdon, 1995
<i>Policy community</i>	Encompassing the problem identification process and the creation of possible solutions	Policy communities are groups of people with similar ideas on what should be the hegemonic discourse in their society. The policy entrepreneur	Kingdon, 1995

		is their spokesperson	
<i>Policy window</i>	Large events that shake up a society enabling (radical) change in the hegemonic discourse on (specific) issues	Major event	Kingdon, 1995
<i>Policy stream</i>	Brings together the policy community, policy entrepreneur, and the policy window providing an analysable structure	-	Kingdon, 1995
Politics of exception	Discourses that address the condition of the nation state, specifically to direct threats to the nation state	It includes discourse on the justification of policies of exceptions that often influence the balance between security and liberty	Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008
Politics of unease	Discourses that do not address existential threats to the sovereignty of nation states, instead opting to connect different policy areas	Discourses with the specific goal to connect safety and unease in relation to certain topics that were not there before	Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008

4. Methods

4.1 Introduction

To answer the research question: What are the shortcomings of the current version of securitization theory, and what could be added to improve it? The focus in this chapter will first rest on setting up the scope of the research. This thesis looks at more than government action, focussing on the power of speeches, and the actions following from this. To test the extended version of securitization theory a comparative case study framework has to be arranged, focussing on important individuals in respective nation states in Europe. For this thesis will focus on the European Refugee Crisis up till 2015. Specifically, the United-Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, France, and Italy will be analysed in the next chapter linked to the Refugee Crisis. To analyse this in practise by means of an extended theory of securitization, in chapter 4.2 the Refugee Crisis is further detailed as the case study under analysis.

In section 4.3 four questions will be answered to establish why migration provides a good case study to test the extended version of securitization theory. These questions are the following: First, how does migration become a security issue? Second, what role do material factors and ideational factors play in the securitization process? Third, who become effective securitizing actors? And fourth, what is the role of audiences in the securitization process? These questions need to be answered in order to set up the contextual factors and facilitating conditions that play a major part when analysing the case study in chapter 5.

4.2 Unit of analysis

Migration and security go hand-in-hand. The concept of ‘security’ is not stationary, it is implicitly used by actors through language and actions, to establish certain issues as more important than others. Migration, as a discussion point in politics, is a core example of an issue that has been moved from the political to the security debate, through framing (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, p. 23). Additionally, within Europe nation states have become interconnected to such an extent that research on one state would not provide adequate information representative for all of Europe. That is why this thesis opts for a comparative case study analysis of five nation states: The Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, and the United-Kingdom.

The focus of the analysis does not rest on the physical movement of refugees or on the decision-making processes regarding the Refugee Crisis. To test the extended version of

securitization theory this thesis will analyse the way in which discourse is used to influence social identities. In chapter 5 textual analysis will be applied to all speeches. This in relation to appropriate contextual factors. Additionally, by critically labelling statements for subjective meaning much information can be gathered, this because the analysis goes beyond government action by focussing on the power of language through speeches.

4.3 The extended version of securitization and migration

To test the extended version of securitization theory it is important to establish a manner by which to do this. Therefore, before delving into the analysis itself this theoretical chapter explain the link between securitization, refugees and migrants in general, and the Refugee Crisis specifically. To establish this, four points will be addressed in this section to set-up the facilitating conditions, and the contextual factors. First, how does migration become a security issue? Second, what role do material factors and ideational factors play in the securitization process? Third, who become effective securitizing actors? And fourth, what is the role of audiences in the securitization process? These questions will be answered to create an initial understanding on why migration is increasingly becoming an issue that is prone to being securitized. Determining the context and the contextual factors in play, immediately provides added information on how and why securitization takes place within in this specific policy structure: (im)migration. However, this will not suffice to draw any significant conclusions; this should be done by analysing the interplay of facilitating conditions through speech acts, and the framework as a whole by means of research on the contextual factors surrounding audiences and power relations.

First, how does migration become a security issue? When looking at how migration becomes a security issue, the movement of people historically, and the increased migration flows due to the Refugee Crisis, have created a state of uncertainty in nation states. Within this context, rough language surrounding migration is gaining popularity quickly. For security reasons, many people dislike migration, it is being posed as an existential threat to ‘our’ survival. Therefore, it gets securitized (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 5-7; Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). Coming from a realist perspective it is logical to evaluate the actions of the nation states considering survival in an international setting. However, securitization theory provides a broadening of the security agenda (Williams M. C., 2003). For Buzan et al. (1998) security is about survival as well, but survival stimulated by presenting something as an existential threat to a certain referent object, not merely to the nation state. The understanding of what securitized migration entails is limited at this point (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 7). If one relates

nation state transformation to migration it becomes obvious that sovereignty and citizenship are two core concepts that act as external facilitating conditions. Since it is inherent in the character of nation states that they decide who is allowed entry or not, citizenship becomes an important variable. Sovereignty, entails the control over a territory, making the notion of sovereignty more important than the nation (population) when it comes to definition of what territory belongs to whom (Joppke, 1999, pp. 4-8).

Second, what role do material and ideological factors play? Because, root-causes for growing uncertainty are related to cultural and ideational factors regarding nationalism, the role of material and ideological factors is significant. Because Western-European nation states have not been accustomed to immigrants for more than five decades, the structures of guiding migration have not been properly implemented so far (Freeman, 2006, pp. 228-229; Joppke, 1999, pp. 62-65). This links to the Dublin Convention, which has led to unfair distributions of migrants and refugees throughout Europe, which in turn has caused distrust between member-states of the European Union (Gibney M., 2015, p. 451; Stavropoulou, 2016, p. 7; De Bruycker & Tsourdi, 2016, p. 64; bin Talal, 2016, pp. 78-80). Moreover, to quote Jef Huysmans on the securitization of migration and its structural effect on a multiplicity of practises: 'If one wishes to interpret how this structural effect has been produced by the political, professional and social actors involved, one must focus on the relation between positions of these actors and the practices they perform' (Huysmans, 2000, p. 758). The full scope of the ideational and cultural factors can only be interpreted once the full research has been completed, once the actions of the core actors have been evaluated.

Third, who become successful securitizing actors? In short, those who have authority in a relevant field of inquiry. Which in relation to the analysis presented, is the field of security and/or migration. This can only be done when a securitization process is being analysed. Because this is the actor that is performing the speech act (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 40-41). In theory, everyone can be a securitizing actor, but in practise only a few can be effective securitizing actors. Linked directly to the notion of 'policy entrepreneurship' in agenda-setting theory, effective securitizing actors are those people that move an issue forward on the agenda, based on their expertise, authority, or leadership (Kingdon (1995, p. 180-181; Minstrom 2013, p. 442). Thus, securitizing actors push agenda's forward, are persistent when windows of opportunity present themselves by coupling problems to solutions (Kingdon, 1995, p. 182). Based on this premise, political leaders are a core example what embodies the concept of the securitizing actor.

And finally, what is the role of audiences in the securitization of migration? Within securitization theory it often acts as the audience of speech acts, either rejecting or accepting securitizing moves. However, in this thesis the role of audience has been expanded, as explained in chapter 2.

4.4 Comparative Case Study Design

Having established the extended version of securitization theory based on the research question of this thesis: What are the shortcomings of the current version of securitization theory, and what could be added to improve it? And having explained why the refugee crisis is the perfect event to test theory on, the specific methods by which the analysis will be conducted have to be outlined.

The United Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands, France, and Germany do all have their own policies and histories regarding migration. This makes a comparative analysis the ideal way to test the extended version of securitization theory. This thesis opts for a most similar case study design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970; Hopkins, 2010, p. 292). For this thesis this implies the possibility of a cross-national comparison when it comes to the four members of the European Union, and an internal comparison of the United Kingdom. According to Lijphart (1971) the comparative method can best be explained by comparing it with the scientific and statistical method (p. 683). Like the other scientific methods, the core of the comparative method is to ‘establish general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while other variables are controlled’ (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682). The comparative method should be used when the number of possible comparable cases is too low to establish partial correlation (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683).

The goal of the comparative case as presented in this thesis is to test the extended version of securitization theory. Therefore the analysis will be explanatory in nature. Here the aim is to explain how and why political leaders react the way they do (Yin, 2003, p. 5-27). Thus, there will be a search for differences in contextual factors and facilitating conditions between the nation states and the individual actors within set states.

The extended version of securitization theory can only be employed from a qualitative position, since inherently the focus is on discourse and language. Therefore, a constructivist worldview will be employed to uncover interpretative repertoires within the speech acts uttered by securitizing actors. This reflects a meso interpretation of the social production of texts (Vromen, 2010, p. 264). Based on textually based discourse analysis this thesis analyses

hegemonic discourses and power relations within a political context. Thus the theory will be tested by uncovering what the effects of the securitizing moves of the political leaders are on the wider society.

To make sure that the political context in all nation states that play role in this research is clear, a basic understanding of a country's history on migration in general and migration laws specifically, is necessary. Furthermore, having added power relations to the extended version of securitization theory allows for more control over the comparative aspect of this study in the most similar comparative case study design. It is necessary to be aware of the different power relations in place in the different nation states. This in order to draw correct conclusions on why securitizing moves are carried out, or not. The same applies to the determination of who is a credible securitizing actor, and whose move was doomed from the start.

Before going into important information on the five countries, the case evaluation scheme (table 2), portrayed on the next page, provides a visual summary of the comparative case study. In short, the historical position and policies are noted, as are the current policies in place. Additionally, the securitizing actors analysed in the chapter 5 are added to the scheme. The United Kingdom will be evaluated separately from the other four because it is not part of the European mainland, and has additionally chosen to separate itself from the European Union. Therefore, The United-Kingdom will be analysed internally in section 5.1. For France, The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy the heads of states or prime-ministers have been selected because they are comparable on the European level. Four far right politicians have been added as units of observation. This to make sure that the extended version of securitization theory is being analysed cross-national on the same category of actors. Since the United-Kingdom is analysed internally it are comparable political leaders that will be evaluated. Therefore, prime-minister David Cameron and member of his party Boris Johnson are compared. Additionally, Member of Parliament, and Labour party leader Corbyn will be analysed. Far right leader Nigel Farage of UKIP will not be analysed since he is not a Member of Parliament, and therefore holds a non-comparable position. Having a supranational case study and additionally an intra-national case study provides this thesis with a more comprehensive test for the extended version of securitization theory.

As established in chapter 2.3 the role the audience plays within the extended version of securitization theory is important. Here their roles are interlinked with other functions,

therefore the audience will be analysed in the role of as ‘securitizing actors’ or ‘columnists’ in this thesis.

Table 2: Case Selection Scheme				
Visual Summary				
Securitization of the Refugee Crisis				
The Comparative Cases: Five European nation states				
United Kingdom	Germany	The Netherlands	France	Italy
		Historically		
Anti-immigration	From reluctance to humanitarian	From emigration country, to reluctant immigration	From tolerance to zero-immigration	From emigration to reluctant immigration
		Policies in place		
Immigration Act, 2014	Immigration Act, 2005	Wet Modern Migratiebeleid, 2013	Migration & Integration Law, 2006	Bossi-Fini updated, 2008 -2009
		Historical Acts of note		
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962	Nationality Act, 2000	Vreemdelingenwet, 2000	Pasqua Law, 1993	Bossi-Fini, 2002
		Securitizing Actor		
Prime Minister David Cameron Member of Parliament Boris Johnson Member of Parliament Jeremy Corbyn	Chancellor Angela Merkel Right-wing party leader Frauke Petry	Prime Minister Mark Rutte Member of Parliament Geert Wilders	President Francois Hollande Member of Parliament Marine Le Pen	Prime Minister Matteo Renzi European Parliament Member Matteo Salvini
		Audiences investigated		
The securitizing actors, columnists	Securitizing actors	Securitizing actors, columnists	Securitizing actors	Securitizing actors

Having established the methods by which the extended version of securitization theory will be tested. The only step that needs to be taken before the discourse analysis of the securitizing actors takes place is clarifying the general situations in the five countries under investigation.

Therefore the next five sub-sections will detail the relationships of the countries with migration over the years


4.5 Migration in Numbers

To portray the urgency of the situation graph 1 shows the steep increase of displaced persons since the start of the conflict in Syria, in 2011. This graph gives an insight on what the world is currently experiencing in terms of refugee influx, especially in relation to the reactions of the different countries under investigation in this thesis.

Country/ territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES					Returned refugees ³	IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl. people in IDP- like situations ⁴	Returned IDPs ⁵	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁶	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁷	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ¹	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations	Of whom assisted by UNHCR	Asylum- seekers (pending cases) ⁸						
France	264,972	-	264,972	-	53,827	-	-	-	1,290	-	320,089
Germany	250,299	-	250,299	-	311,551	-	-	-	11,978	-	573,828
Netherlands ¹⁴	82,494	-	82,494	-	8,097	-	-	-	1,951	-	92,542
United Kingdom ¹⁴	117,234	-	117,234	-	37,829	-	-	-	16	-	155,079
Italy ¹⁴	93,715	-	93,715	-	48,307	-	-	-	606	-	142,628

Table 3 (UNHCR, 2015, pp. 15-17).

Additionally, Table 3 presents the 2015 mid-year trends on refugees as displayed by the UNHCR. Specifically, the most recent numbers on refugees, asylum-seekers, and stateless persons per country are important to this research, because it provides context for the speeches under evaluation in the next chapter. Germany, at the end of 2015 has the largest number of population of concern, mainly because they have the most pending asylum-seeker cases in Europe. The United Kingdom and France have approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the number of pending cases that Germany has. This even though they have a comparable capacity for asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2015). The Netherlands have the fewest amount of pending cases, however, compared to Italy and the United-Kingdom the total amount of ‘population of concern’ is high when one would compare the inhabitants of the three countries.



Graph 1 International Displaced Persons protected by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2015, p. 14)

When looking at the numbers in greater detail Germany has by far the most refugees seeking asylum, reaching almost 475.000 asylum-seekers. Italy follows with slightly more than 75000, and France follows has almost 60.000.³ These numbers do not add that much information to what has been established thus far. What is interesting is the information that the age groups provide. The Global Migration Database provides additional information on the different age groups of those seeking asylum in Europe. For example, most refugees that arrive in Italy come by boat, crossing the Mediterranean Sea. This could be a plausible explanation why the age group 18-34 is represented in Italy to a much greater extent than in any other country, this because countries are weary of having a disproportional amount of young-adult males entering their country.⁴ Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the overrepresentation of young people matches the characteristics of migration. Another interesting point is the difference between males and females travelling as asylum-seekers. Comparing Figure 3 and figure 4 shows that 75% of the immigrants are male, most of them are under the age of 35⁵. This gap is significant, but understandable. It makes sense for families to send young and able men ahead when fleeing from war-zones. Being quick and flexible they can find suitable countries to find long-term asylum. It enables the rest of the family to follow as one group, making the journey less of a risk for them.

³ See Appendix Q

⁴ See Appendix R


⁵ See Appendices Q & R

4.5.1 United Kingdom

Since the second World War, the United-Kingdom has experienced two major immigration events. Until 1962 Britain was very liberal in its immigration policies, since it allowed unobstructed migration from all parts of the Commonwealth, and from Ireland (Layton-Henry, 2004, p. 301). This changed later to deal with unexpected implications that migration had. However, since the beginning of the 1990s the migration policies of United-Kingdom cannot be seen as separate from European policies, because of British and European Union integration (Geddes, 2015, p. 723). However, the United Kingdom is known to be a reluctant country concerning immigration, between 1960 and 1980 never reaching a positive balance, ultimately having a negative immigration balance of one million (Joppke, 1999, p. 100). The logic of British policies of migration since the start of the decolonization can therefore be classified as restrictive, in order to keep migrants from the old colonies out.

Graph 2 shows that this restrictive foundation of policies on migration in the UK in the period 2005-2010, is still in place. And even though Europe is dealing with a refugee crisis the migration numbers go down around 2011, and only reach a high point in the third quarter of 2014. Graph 3 shows more detail on what kind of migrants entered the country. Refugees are part of the ‘other’ group, and in line with the data from the UNHCR, the number does not

UK, 2005 to 2015 (YE September 2015)



Graph 2 (Office for National Statistics, 2016, p. 20)

exceed the 50.000.


Acts. Dating back to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which was the first act that restricted migration towards the United Kingdom. The Act of 1962 restricted immigration just ‘state-issued work-

related’ migration (Parliament of *Graph 3 (Office for National Statistics, 2016, p. 8).*

the United Kingdom, 1962).

Throughout time this act has been expanded up to 14 times, the last time in 2014, when the ‘Immigration Act’ was issued as an expansion of the ‘Borders, Citizenships and Immigration Act’. In short, this latest iteration of the Immigration Act has the addition that private house owners are no longer allowed to rent out houses to foreigners without a status or illegals.

2005 to 2015 (YE September 2015)



4.5.2 Germany

Until June of 2002 Germany did not have a system to deal with migration. Foreigners in Germany who had a steady job and a house were permitted to bring over their families. Especially between the 1970s and 1990s awareness within German society grew due to many guest workers from Turkey coming in. This led to policies focusing on 'integration or return'. Eventually Germany turned into a reluctant country of migration, mainly because policies focusing on promoting reintegration of guest workers in their country of origin did not work out as anticipated (Martin, 2004, pp. 221-230).

In 2002 the Nationality Act was introduced, dealing directly with issues surrounding immigration and integration. No longer are a steady job and a house sufficient to acquire citizenship. The right of citizenship was now based mainly on *jus soli* (when you are born within German territory you are allowed the German nationality), and on *jus sanguinis*, (if your parents are German you acquire German citizenship as well) (Bundesministerium der Justiz und Für Verbraucherschutz, 2000).

As table 4 shows, since the fall of the Berlin Wall the number of immigrants have slowly outweighed the number of emigrants. Especially in the last few years the numbers of migrants have started to grow rapidly. Germany is the country that is most welcome to refugees from Syria within Europe. What is interesting though is how Germany is different in this from another 'reluctant' country of migration: the Netherlands. Economic reasons seem to outweigh the humanitarian considerations. Whereas Germany has, so far, chosen to put the humanitarian considerations first, the Netherlands did not do this. Additionally, Graph 4


Migration

Migration of foreign citizens between Germany and foreign countries 1991 to 2014

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Arrivals of asylum seekers ¹
2014	1,342,529	765,605	173,072
2013	1,108,068	657,604	109,580
2012	965,908	578,759	64,539
2011	841,695	538,837	45,741
2010	683,530	529,605	41,332
2009	606,314	578,808	27,649
2008	573,815	563,130	22,085
2007	574,752	475,749	19,164
2006	558,467	483,774	21,029
2005	579,301	483,584	28,914
2004	602,182	546,965	35,607
2003	601,759	499,063	50,563
2002	658,341	505,572	71,127
2001	685,259	496,987	88,287
2000	649,249	562,794	78,564
1999	673,873	555,638	95,113
1998	605,500	638,955	98,644
1997	615,298	637,066	104,353
1996	707,954	559,064	116,367
1995	792,701	567,441	127,937
1994	777,516	629,275	127,210
1993	989,847	710,659	322,599
1992	1,211,350	614,956	438,191
1991	925,345	497,540	256,112

Table 4 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees., 2016).


plots the number of asylum-seekers visually, and this representation puts the current Refugee Crisis in perspective to what happened in the 1990s in Yugoslavia.



Graph 4 New Asylum Applications in Germany (UNHCR, 2015, p. 10).


4.5.3. The Netherlands

The Netherlands has dealt with two major flows of immigration in the 20th century: one from Indonesia from 1945 to 1968, the other being Suriname in 1975. In these days, the Dutch society was organised in pillars. These are religious or political communities that lived side by side. This power-sharing mechanism within Dutch society has been disappearing over the last decades. Immigrants did not have their own pillars. When in the 1960s the demand for labour increased rapidly, labour migrants from initially Italy and Spain and later Morocco and Turkey were ignored and not integrated in society to a large extent. As the pillar-based society started to shift to socio-economic values Dutch values of tolerance and respect for other religions and societies started to decay (Maas, 2004, pp. 264-270).



Graph 5 Total amount of asylum requests in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013, p. 137)

From 1980 the migration debate and the laws concerning this topic became more restrictive with regards to immigration of aliens. In the 90s up to 70.000 asylum-seekers had to leave the Netherlands because they lost their asylum cases. This is a big change to the 7000 people that



Graph 6 Immigration of non-Dutch people by registered reason (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013, p. 202).

would have had to leave ten years earlier (Maas, 2004, p. 278). This makes sense

when investigating graph 5, showing a large peak in immigration from 1989 onwards. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Yugoslavian Civil War are probably the main reasons for this growth. Furthermore, from the year 2000 onwards the number of asylum requests has dropped significantly. Unfortunately, this graph does not contain a visualization of the increase that has happened since the Syrian conflict began. What it does show, is a large decrease in asylum applications since the year 2000. This is no coincidence, as a major Dutch law on immigration was passed in this year. This 'Alien Law', or 'Vreemdelingenwet' in

Dutch, was installed to reduce the number of asylum seekers and was a success. Graph 6 shows this same dynamic. The purpose of this law was not to reduce the number of people looking for labour, or make the unification of families impossible. The goal was clearly to lower the number of asylum-seekers (Ministerie van Justitie, 2000).

Additionally, in 2013 the latest big change to migration law in the Netherlands was passed in parliament. Major changes in this new 'Modern Migration Policy law', are mainly procedural. It concentrated on restricting the number of asylum-applications, and creating more rules strengthening law enforcement agencies when dealing with uncooperative asylum-seekers (Ministerie van Justitie, 2013). The Dutch laws are getting stricter and focus mainly on asylum-seekers. Not on those seeking family reunification, study, or jobs. Therefore, an important conclusion should be that the Dutch are trying to balance between creating stricter laws, while also taking into account the human rights of those seeking asylum.

4.5.4. France

What France distinguishes from other Western European countries was the willingness, from very early on to accept aliens as settlers. From the 1850s foreigners to France were very quickly integrated and immigrants were viewed as part of the population by the rest of society (Hollifield, 2004, pp. 183-184). Within France historical patterns of migration are mainly linked to industrialization, and the lack of population growth. But historically the rise of republicanism has had a huge influence on how the migration debate is conducted. The republican tradition in France is mainly based on egalitarian, anticlerical, and antimonarchical grounds. Therefore the rights of man, sovereignty, and citizenship based on soil and not blood became crucial in the French political and societal landscape (Hollifield, 2004, pp. 184-186). However, since the 1970s the focus on tolerance has started to shift. As

is portrayed in figure 6, until 1973 every year hundreds of thousands of migrants entered France. However, it was the 1993 immigration law created by Charles Pasqua, that would set the tone for French policy regarding issues of migration till today (Hollifield, 2004, pp. 199). The main points of the law included the toughening of visa requirements, reduction of the number of visas that were issued each year,

Figure 6. Immigrants in France by Category, 1946-1999 (Hollifield, 2004, p. 188) (in thousands)

	1946-55	1956-67	1968-73	1974-80	1981-87	1988-92	1993-99
Workers	353.2	1,205.9	801.3	192.9	27.9	118.6	121.6
Annual rate of immigration	32.5	109.6	133.6	27.6	27.9	23.7	17.4
% of total immigration	49.0	44.0	39.0	14.0	17.0	20.0	21.0
Seasonal workers	247.6	1,126.9	821.9	857.3	664.2	258.5*a	63.1*a
Annual rate of immigration	24.8	102.4	137.0	122.5	94.9	51.7	9.0
% of total immigration	37.0	41.0	40.0	61.0	59.0	43.0	12.0
Family member	91.7	404.2	423.2	351.0	260.2	169.9	263.3
Annual rate of immigration	9.2	36.7	70.5	50.1	37.2	34.0	37.6
% of total immigration	14.0	15.0	21.0	25.0	23.0	28.0	26.0
Total	664.4	2,737.1	2,046.5	1,401.2	1,120.0	601.1*b	687.9
Rate	66.4	248.8	341.1	200.2	160.0	120.2	98.3
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
*a As of 1992, the Spanish and Portuguese are no longer counted among seasonal workers							
*b Beginning in 1988, total immigration includes other groups, such as refugees, not listed here. Their annual rate for years 1988-1995 are inflated by the inclusion of flows of not counted in previous years. For a breakdown, see the annual SOPEMI reports on France.							

Figure 7. Immigrants in France by Nationality/Country of Origin (Hollifield, 2004, p. 187)

	1975	1982	1990
Total	3,920,430	4,071,109	4,195,952
Spanish	609,605	485,764	412,785
Italians	714,650	606,972	523,080
Portuguese	659,800	644,428	605,986
Algerians	571,925	617,993	571,997
Moroccans	244,945	358,296	446,872
Tunisians	151,125	177,544	182,478
Turks	59,515	108,708	158,907
Sub-Saharan Africa	-*a	123,392	182,479
Indochinese	-*a	124,420	158,075

Sources: Census data from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE); Tribalat 1997: 176

*a Formerly under French administration


and expansion of police power regarding illegal aliens. As can be seen in figure 7, the number of (seasonal) labourers went down in the 1993-1999 bracket. However, the law had a bigger influence on integration, since many inhabitants that used to be legal residents of France became illegal. Additionally,

figure 7 shows where France's migrants originate from. There has been no significant change in the influx of immigrants, not in total numbers and not in country of origin. Therefore, the hardening debate on migration, refugees, and asylum-seekers must be based on either the perception of threats within the nation state, or on the perceived basis that this is the case.

Furthermore, in 2006 the most recent addition to French immigration law was added. Herein a new strategy on immigration and integration was formed on the premise of 'selective immigration'. It included the forceful mandatory integration of immigrants that were going to stay for a long time, and co-development, implying that both the migrants and France should benefit from the integration process. With a core focus on the recruitment of foreign skilled labourers, better facilitation of foreign students, stricter rulings on family reunification and limiting the access to citizenship of undesired aliens, the purpose of the law is very clear (Assemblée Nationale, 2006). Namely, the creation of a selective migration system is the clear goal of the 2006 French government. This provides a good starting point for the research on how migration is dealt with in contemporary French society.

4.5.5. Italy

Italy is different from the other four countries in this case study. Especially in the decades after the Second World War, millions of Italians left for Northern Europe. Countries like Germany and the Netherlands had a huge demand for cheap labour, and millions of Italians moved to fill this gap. Since the 1980s this started to change. As figure 8 shows, the number of foreign residents in Italy has steadily grown till 2001 and because of this situation it became necessary for Italy to adapt. Resulting in laws that focus increasingly on immigration control.



A core law that was passed in 2002 is the Bossi-Fini law. This law was created by Umberto Bossi and Gianfranco Fini. Two politicians that were very much against immigration in Italy. This law set out to restrict the number of migrants coming to Italy. For example, it became a requirement that you need a job before you can apply for a visa in Italy. Having no legal

documentation became punishable by law, leading to a prison sentence (La Camera Dei deputati ed Senato della repubblica, 2002).

The criminalisation of immigration was new in Italian society and it is a security measure. This expanded in both 2008 and 2009, with laws specifying the requirements for asylum-seekers becoming recognised as refugees in Italian society. Case study analysis & results: The extended version of securitization theory: The Refugee Crisis in the United Kingdom and mainland Europe

5.1 The United Kingdom

5.1.1 Cameron's Politics of unease

We start the analysis with the United Kingdom. As it provides an interesting starting point for the research. Its position in the Refugee Crisis is different from the other four Nation States in this research project, mainly because the United Kingdom is not part of the European Mainland. As explained in the method chapter, it prefers to have the lowest number of immigrants possible, and this is reflected in their immigration laws. In relation to this, they are not part of Schengen, which implies that the United Kingdom does not allow EU inhabitants to travel across their borders unchecked. This makes their position within the framework of the Refugee Crisis interesting and unique when compared to that of the Nation States of mainland Europe which will be analysed in section 5.2.

*'Another big judgment calls to make is when a refugee crisis confronts our world. Like most people, I found it impossible to get the image of that poor Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi out of my mind. We know in our hearts our responsibilities to help those fleeing for their lives. **But we know, too, that we must keep our heads.** Let's start with a simple fact. Twelve million people have been made homeless by the conflict in Syria. And so far only 4 per cent of them have come to Europe. If we opened the door to every refugee, our country would be overwhelmed. The best thing Britain can do is help neighbouring countries, the Syrian people and the refugees in the camps'* (Cameron, 2015).⁶

This first quote from David Cameron on the Refugee crisis harbours one imperative.⁷ This imperative is a speech act that does not securitize a direct existential threat. David Cameron opts to politicize the stream of migrants fleeing to Europe. By emphasising that Britain would be 'overwhelmed' if they would open the door. This is followed by a solution: Helping in the conflict region, by aiding the neighbouring countries of Syria. Based on conventional securitization theory we could now conclude that David Cameron uses a speech act to bring forward his agenda in a very careful manner. Emphasising the position that the United Kingdom is in.

The additional contextual factors provided by the extended version of securitization theory provide additional information. First, at this point in time Cameron addresses the ongoing crisis as a Refugee Crisis and not a Migration Crisis. This together with his focus on

⁶ See appendices for the full (in detail analysed) versions of the speech fragments discussed here.

⁷ Displayed in bold.

distribution of refugees shows a thematic focus on ‘politics of unease’ as displayed in the framework of facilitating variables⁸. Here the discourse of his policy community, the Conservative Party, becomes visible. ‘Politics of unease’ do not antagonize perceived threats, instead the aim is to connect different policy areas, by means of discourse, ideally connecting them to feelings of unease regarding safety and security. The goal of Cameron becomes clear. A second quote from the same speech shows this perfectly:

‘We must play our part too. And we can, because of that commitment we made this summer: yes, we will spend two per cent of our GDP on defence – this year, next year, throughout this decade. In the coming years, we’ll be launching the biggest aircraft carriers in our history... ...a new class of Hunter Killer submarines... ...new Joint Strike Fighter jets; improved Apache helicopters; a new fleet of drones... ...and because our independent nuclear deterrent is our ultimate insurance policy – this Government will order four new trident submarines’ (Cameron, 2015).

Continuing in this speech, Cameron puts emphasis on what the United-Kingdom does to help refugees and what his country does to end the Civil War in Syria. Thematically the focus shifts to nationalism and internal defence. He directly links the Refugee Crisis to matters of internal security and nationalistic ideals. His aim to strengthen the feelings on unease in his audience. By creating a discourse surrounding nationalism, emphasising the problems of hosting to many refugees, and linking this to internal security issues. Then you are creating a discourse of unease based on multiple facilitating variables, strengthening the securitizing argument.

When state related dangers are presented through facilitating variables, these would normally fall under ‘Politics of Exception’. However, based on this quote we can draw the following conclusion: when no direct existential threat is presented, or when liberty and security are not directly addressed or problematized, then it strengthens discourses of unease. This is a point in which the first edition of the extended version of securitization theory is not clear enough and needs more development in the future.

Nevertheless, based on these first two quotes by David Cameron the added value of the extended version of securitization theory can be seen as well. Discourse linking nationalism, security, and the potential influx of refugees show the specific goals of David Cameron and

⁸ Table 1, p. 26).

his policy community, in combination with the discourse they try to make the hegemonic discourse of their country.

5.1.2 Cameron's Politics of Exception

*'Now third, the evolving threats to our security and the rise of the Daesh network mean that **we have to change the way we work to keep our people safe**. Security today is not only a matter of hard defence, of stopping tanks – it is also about rooting out terrorist networks, just as it is about detecting illegal immigrants, stopping human trafficking and organised crime. And that makes much closer security cooperation between our European nations essential' (Cameron, 2016b).*

'Our threat level is now at 'Severe', which means that an attack is 'highly likely'. Indeed, such an attack could happen at any time. But the threat has not only grown, it has changed in its nature' (Cameron, 2016b).

The two quotes displayed above, show a shift within the power relation structure. First, it is important to take note of an additional independent variable. David Cameron is faced a referendum on the United Kingdom and its membership of the EU, at the 23rd of June 2016. His position is that the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union. To make sure his side wins the referendum he chooses to intensify his arguments from discourse of politics of unease to discourse on politics of exception. He does this by shifting his use of facilitating variables from policy related to state related, discussing terrorism directly linked to internal national security. The sentence: 'we have to change the way we keep our people safe' (Cameron, 2016b), he does two things. 1) He links the growth of Daesh (ISIS) to internal security. Linking terrorism directly to security. 2) He emphasises a new form of security, one that is based on detection and prevention. By creating this securitizing speech act, Cameron tries to influence the interplay of power in society. By emphasising, in public, that security needs to evolve from physical defence to surveillance and detection, he wants to grant more power to the state (political leadership) by changing laws that protect privacy and freedoms of civilians.

One excerpt analysed from the multiple perspectives present in the extended version of securitization theory provides a lot of information. It shows how securitizing speech acts change depending on what happens in society. In this example, it is the setting up of a referendum that provides a policy window for change. This can be seen in his speeches in multiple ways. For example, Cameron has shifted from defining the events taking place as a

Refugee Crisis to a Migration Crisis.⁹ He describes human trafficking, illegal immigrants, and organized crime as core security issues. This contradicts his earlier speech in which he referred to refugees in this way: ‘We know in our hearts our responsibilities to help those fleeing for their lives’ (Cameron, 2015). His discourse has changed from one that deems migration an existential threat, because of the link made with terrorism.

Thus far, the Refugee Crisis as referent object and David Cameron as securitizing actor have been discussed. The third contextual factor, the enhanced role of the audience, has not yet been addressed. To address this a speech by Boris Johnson will be analysed:

5.1.3 Johnson’s Politics of Unease

*‘Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for some member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are intensifying and not diminishing. **In the next six weeks we must politely but relentlessly put the following questions to the Prime Minister and to the Remain campaign...** 1) How can you possibly control EU immigration into this country? 2) The Living Wage is an excellent policy, but how will you stop it being a big pull factor for uncontrolled EU migration, given that it is far higher than minimum wages in other EU countries? 3) How will you prevent the European Court from interfering further in immigration, asylum, human rights, and all kinds of matters which have nothing to do with the so-called Single Market? 4) Why did you give up the UK veto on further moves towards a fiscal and political union? 5) How can you stop us from being dragged in, and from being made to pay?’ (Johnson, 2016).*

Boris Johnson advocates in favour of the United Kingdom leaving the EU challenging the status quo in his country. David Cameron focussed on the link between security and terrorism. His goal is to strengthen the position of the government by verbally positioning the state as the protector of the population against the threat of terrorism. Johnson and his policy community see the same policy window as Cameron did, however they see a chance to challenge the hegemonic discourse presented by the Prime Minister advocating in favour of Brexit. Johnson directly challenges Cameron his judgment on issues of migration and the EU. He does this by stating that ‘Europe faces twin crises’ (Johnson 2016), these two being immigration and the euro. He continues with five questions, of which the first three fit the framework of facilitating variables. 1) He links migration control to sovereignty. 2) He links

⁹ See Appendix

migration/integration control to the welfare state and access to social institutions. 3) He connects immigration, asylum, and human rights to the European Monetary Union.

By basing his securitizing moves on facilitating variables like the welfare state, refugee distribution, and sovereignty related to immigration and the EU, he chooses to securitize based on politics of unease. Simultaneously setting him apart from Cameron and making him look less extreme. Subsequently it shows that the Conservative party is not just one policy community. Multiple policy communities can exist in one organisation, and these will come to the surface when a policy window opens.

What encompasses an audience becomes clear through analysing Johnson and Cameron side-by-side. Besides both being part of policy communities and being their respective securitizing actors, they are also each other their audience. They challenge and alter their messages based on what the other person utters. Thus, the role of the audience goes beyond accepting or denying securitizing moves, and the (dis)approving of the securitization of certain topics. Audiences are an interactive part of the policy stream, and therefore of the securitizing process. The framework is dynamic: Policy communities clash in their views and influence the securitizing speech acts uttered by one another. In this example, the shift made by Cameron to deal with the internal party critique he faces, demonstrates this.

5.1.4 The media as audience

The audience encompasses more than the interaction between different policy communities. Media, like news organisations have an important role to play as well. For example, the Guardian reported on the exchange between the Conservatives in the following way: ‘Johnson’s comments came just hours after the prime minister used his own speech to make the controversial claim that leaving the EU could increase the risk of war’ (Asthana, 2016). This described the exchange between Cameron and Johnson. It did not choose a side or try to influence readers directly. However, people who do not read the speeches by Cameron and Johnson in full will be influenced based on how media portray the different opinions voiced. In this example, Cameron is described as ‘controversial’. This is an article trying to explain the situation to its readers. An opinion piece is stronger in its language and will therefore have a bigger impact as can be seen in the following quote:

‘Yet, despite this, the overarching language and rhetoric around immigration and asylum are often confused and too often poisonous. During the debates around the current immigration bill the term “pull factor” has been used time and again. The Home Office has been explicit

about its wish to create “a hostile environment” for immigrants – the most vivid example being the “go home” vans that it sent out on the streets of London until the Liberal Democrats put a stop to it during the coalition government’ (Hamwee, 2016).

This excerpt from an opinion based article in the Guardian shows that newspapers are both an audience and an influencer at the same time. Their opinions are formed by securitizing moves of the policy entrepreneurs, however instead of simply accepting or denying the speech act they interact with it. In this example Hamwee chooses to challenge the government’s position. The roles of securitizing actors and the audience are different though. For example, David Cameron and Boris Johnson are leaders of policy communities, and have held positions of power. Their authority in relation to issues of national security, terrorism, and migration is stronger than writers like Sally Hamwee. However, this does not mean that Hamwee has no power. Her article is a clear indicator that she has a public that reads her work.

5.1.5 Jeremy Corbyn’s Desecuritizing Discourse

Besides Boris Johnson, Jeremy Cordon, the leader of the Labour party, also tried to interact with David Cameron. The following exchange of speeches took place before the discussion between Johnson and Cameron, and therefore the focus was on the Refugee Crisis as leading object, not as a policy window. However, you can already see Cameron adapting his language to prepare for the coming referendum:

*‘Of course, because of our special status in the European Union, **Britain is not part of the Schengen open border arrangements – and we’re not going to be joining.** We have our own border controls. And they apply to everyone trying to enter our country – including EU citizens. So people cannot travel through Greece or Italy onward to continental Europe and into Britain. And that will not change’ (Cameron, 2016a).*

Here, Cameron combines a speech act on the Schengen agreement directly to sovereignty and the migration of people through Greece and Italy towards the United Kingdom. Interesting about this speech is that his use of the speech act is very direct and state related. Directly linking migration to state security. This is reiterated twice more in the same speech: 1) When he states that in relation to the EU-Turkey refugee deal, ‘We have made our own decision which is to maintain our own borders. And we will not be giving that visa-free access.’ 2) ‘We will not be taking more refugees as a result of this deal’ (Cameron, 2006a). This speech by Cameron was held in congress, and where the first part of this speech was on the Refugee Crisis, in the second part he switches to discussing the situation of poor citizens of the United

Kingdom. Shifting to statements like: ‘So we must continue to cut the deficit, control the cost of welfare, and live within our means’ (Cameron, 2006a). By linking the situation of the poor directly to the Refugee Crisis, which he describes as the Migration Crisis, he puts the two against one another. This is a securitizing move based on discourses surrounding the politics of unease. By emphasising the problems the United Kingdom is facing in its welfare state with the problem of refugees and immigrants, he creates a speech act that combines multiple variables. Therefore this securitizing move has a lot of power behind it.

Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, responded directly after Cameron gave his speech in the House of Commons. He uses speech acts based on the notion of ‘duty’:

*‘As an advanced, democratic, civilised nation, we **have a duty** to reach out the hand of humanity, support and friendship to people who are going through the most disastrous time of their lives. We should also recognise that a disproportionate burden has been placed on Syria’s neighbours. Jordan and Lebanon have accepted a very large number of refugees, as has Turkey. Among the European countries, Italy and Greece, as border countries, have done far more than anyone else, but Germany and Sweden have taken a very large number of asylum seekers. There has not been a balanced response throughout Europe’* (Corbyn, 2016).

Using ‘duty’ in as securitizing move makes sense, since duty reflects morality. And his position on the Refugee Crisis stands opposite Cameron’s position. Therefore, it makes sense that he emphasises the moral duty the United Kingdom has to those that need help. His argument displayed above focuses on the distribution of refugees, human rights, and the needs of refugees, three core desecuritizing variables. He states that there is no balanced response in Europe, because some countries carry a heavier burden than others. Additionally, he mentions the lack of humanity, support and friendship from Cameron to those that need help. When looking at these speech acts it is important to keep in mind that Corbyn represents both a policy community and an audience. This because one the one hand he represents a large part of the British population with his Labour party, judging and ultimately accepting or rejecting Cameron’s speech acts. On the other hand, he is the securitizing actor for his policy community, the Labour Party. The following quote is a perfect example of Corbyn as a securitizing actor:

‘The Prime Minister will be well aware that many of those who seek asylum in other countries make the perilous journeys to which I have referred. They also end up in refugee camps with very limited facilities, despite the great work done by volunteers. I have visited the camps in

Calais and Dunkirk, which are in an appalling state. Those people are in a very perilous situation. They are all humans, to whom we must reach out the hand of friendship and support' (Corbyn, 2016).

He brings forward his argument on the needs of refugees by directly challenging the Prime Minister. Emphasising his own role as a securitizing actor, while also rejecting the securitizing move made by Cameron. Corbyn cannot do this if Cameron would have been successful in his securitizing move. If an issue has been successfully securitized as an existential threat, it becomes very difficult to desecuritize it. Corbyn could not have been rejecting the speech acts used by Cameron as hard as he does in this speech. That would have had a significant impact on his popularity. Once again the Refugee Crisis proves to be a policy window. The hegemonic discourse within the United Kingdom is challenged by another, completely different, political discourse.

Taking a closer look at the facilitating variables used by Corbyn, he tries to create a positive discourse, with the aim to create a desecurizing argument. His focus on the distribution of refugees is employed contra Cameron: He tries to de-antagonize migrants by not linking them to grass-roots terrorism, instead he links the unbalanced distribution of refugees to morality, duty, and human rights. However, he uses nationalism in the same manner as David Cameron:

'I recognise that the British Government have paid a great deal of money through the Department for International Development to support refugees in camps around the world. I recognise the work of the Royal Navy in plucking people from the sea and saving them from drowning' (Corbyn, 2016).

The role of nationalism is bigger than being just one of the facilitating variables. Within the state system nationalism is of critical importance. Based on the speeches by Johnson, Cameron, and Corbyn, it seems that nationalism is necessary in all securitizing speech acts on a national level. This links back to emphasis put on the important role nationalism plays in nation states in general. Within the international political arena it is the nation state that manages political relations. Therefore, to have political power, nationalism becomes a necessity, something that needs to be addressed no matter what it is your arguing in favour of.

To conclude this part on the United Kingdom, in the Financial Times Gideon Rachman describes the political landscape as follows: 'The Liberal Democrats were virtually wiped out at last year's general election. And civil war has broken out among the Tories, with several leading figures joining the Leave campaign.' Emphasising that the Euro Crisis and the

Refugee Crisis do not bode well for the 'Remain' side of the referendum. Being part of the audience of the speech acts uttered by different securitizing actors, Rachman describes the situation, with the Brexit Referendum coming closer, as problematic for both parties. The Conservatives are having internal power problems, and Corbyn is uncertain of his position. Both these factors have been identified in this chapter. A group within the Conservative policy community identified a policy window in which they could push their position. Furthermore, Labour identified the same policy window but they did not have a position in the referendum yet. Therefore, Corbyn, as their securitizing actor, did not mention the referendum in his speech. Instead he chooses to challenge Cameron on his treatment of Refugees. No mentions on Corbyn and his refugee position are addressed in this newspaper. This implies that his securitizing arguments stand distant from the hegemonic discourse, and have had not had any impact thus far.

Thus, we can conclude that the extended version of securitization theory does add to securitization theory when analysing the Refugee Crisis on the nation state level. It does this in three ways:

- 1) The lack of variation of securitizing, politicization, and desecuritization provided in normal securitization theory is tackled by the addition of facilitating variables. Enabling more in-depth classification of securitizing moves. Politics of exception (ex. State' internal security, sovereignty), politics of unease (ex. distribution of refugees, nationalism, social institutions), and politics of desecuritization are used in discourses to establish specific speech acts that challenge or reinforce the hegemonic discourse.

- 2) The policy stream, which incorporates the policy window and the role of the audience, is instrumental for addressing how, why and by whom securitizing moves are produced. The role of the audience has been expanded as well. This is exemplified by the speeches of Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn. Both proved to be securitizing actors and audience at the same time. Additionally, the columnists of the Guardian and the Financial Times showed that being an audience is more than accepting or rejecting securitization attempts.

- 3) This can only work when the analysis itself is put in the political power framework established by Huysmans (2004) and Buonfino (2004). Establishing facilitating variables in a framework is core for understanding how and why speech acts change their structure of argumentation. Additionally, the unifying factors of the hegemonic discourse and the

connection to the policy streams from a political position, enhance the language based analysis of speech acts.

The interactions between the different added contextual factors of the extended version of securitization theory have been shown here. Core remains the speech act, through which urgency is expressed. Additionally, the different facilitating variables identify what kinds of discourse based themes are uttered: identifying the aims of the policy community and the securitizing actor. The framework of facilitating variables also provides a distinction by which politics of unease and exception can be separated, enabling the recognition of intensifying securitizing moves. Furthermore, the framework on power relations enables the connection to reality. It allows the analysis of both the balance between leadership and political will, and leadership and the rule of law. Enabling the making of conclusions related to what effects securitizing moves have on society at a practical level.

5.2 The European Mainland

5.2.1 France: Desecuritization and Politics of Exception

The extended version of securitization theory has been applied to one nation state. Showing how the use of facilitating variables is based on context and power relations. Now we will shift to mainland Europe, analysing the added value of the extended version of securitization theory on the international level. Four members of the European Union will be analysed with the Refugee Crisis being the case study of analysis. We start the European analysis with Francois Hollande, the president of France:

'As regards population movements, we are facing immigration crises greater than any we have known since the end of the Second World War. This migration, these flows of refugees, which concern Europe, but not only Europe, are the tragic consequences of the growing number of conflicts' (Hollande, 2015).

In a lengthy speech, Hollande uses securitizing moves, linking migration and terrorism throughout. The first quote mentions the magnitude of the immigration flow towards Europe. For example, he utters that it is becoming easier to travel from Ghana to Europe. What is interesting though is that he does not mention that Europe has dealt with vaster amounts of immigrants in the past. In the 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Civil War in Yugoslavia the streams of migrants were bigger than the current streams of refugees from Iraq and Syria. By not telling the whole truth he securitizes the issue. Using both variables linking to politics of exception and politics of unease he links the incoming refugees to issues

surrounding state sovereignty, internal security, and the distribution of refugees. The following quote illustrates this:

*'Some would have us believe that re-establishing national borders would be a miracle solution. That is a con. But a con that may, briefly, seem convincing. **France needs to act at European and international level, with humanity, when it comes to those who are fleeing crises and wars, but also firmly, distinguishing between types of migration.** We need to respond to humanitarian emergencies, including the current ones, organize the reception of migrants and shoulder our responsibilities in terms of asylum, as well as ensuring the return of rejected migrants and combatting all smuggling networks'* (Hollande, 2015).

Hollande refers to the Refugee crisis as a Migration Crisis, indicating the hegemonic discourse he represents. Hollande uses speech act to securitize migration. Based on conventional securitization theory, the information and meaning we can extract from this statement is the following: Francois Hollande is the securitizing actor and the existential threat presented is terrorism. He directly links this existential threat to migration. What rests for conventional securitization theory is the identification of the audience and assess whether they accept or reject the securitizing move. The problem here is that the Refugee Crisis has not ended yet, and the influence of independent variables cannot be measured. For example, in the United Kingdom we saw that the Refugee Crisis and the Euro Crisis were (de)securitized by securitizing actors in relation to the upcoming Brexit referendum. Additionally, within France two terrorist attacks have taken place in quick succession. First in January 2015 concerning Charlie Hebdo, and in November 2015 130 people were killed in a single night in Paris. These incidents do have an impact and can be defined as policy windows. Therefore, it is important to look at more than just the speeches, securitizing moves, and acceptance or rejection.

*'**Firstly, we want to speed up the establishment of refugee centres in Italy and Greece, which will be responsible for, indeed obliged to, distinguish between asylum seekers, who must be registered, and migrants who come for other purposes but who cannot be accepted as they are. Secondly, we need to ensure that refugees are distributed fairly; at the moment, some countries in Europe are refusing to accept any**'* (Hollande, 2015).

The speech by Hollande was held in-between the two terrorist attacks. After the November 2015 Paris attacks he declared a state of emergency, closing the national borders. The intermediate period, and especially this speech, shows the balancing-act between internal

security, fear of terrorism, refugee protection, and the distribution of refugees. This quote illustrates the balance: The facilitating variables contradict each other. He states that he wants to establish better refugee centres in other countries. Therefore he creates a speech act securitizing the distribution of refugees. He follows this with a securitizing move on fair distribution, making it seem that he believes that countries other than France do not do their due diligence, when it comes to harbouring refugees.

This quote is very interesting when assessing two independent variables established and explained in this thesis. First, the Dublin system created to deal with the distribution of refugees, is not mentioned by Hollande. The reason for this being the following statement: he wants to ‘speed up the establishment of refugee centres in Italy and Greece’ (Hollande, 2016), essentially stating that he wants to keep refugees (and migrants in general) out of France. This is supported by the data from the Migration Data base and the UNHCR. Which shows that France had ‘only’ 57.345 pending asylum requests compared to Germany’s 474.675 (Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2015). However, in contradiction to the first part of this quote, the second securitizing move shows France’s historical heritage: The Republican tradition, based on sovereignty, citizenship, and rights of man. This made France a very tolerant country as explained in the method chapter. However, the last five decades this tolerant position has started to shift towards a harsher position. The unease surrounding migration has been impacted to such an extent by the terrorist attacks that the president of France is not even certain of his position. Therefore this quote is the perfect example of this transition that is taking place in French society.

‘I would like to conclude by discussing Europe. I have stated our main priority today: to be able to control migration, against a backdrop of international crises which we must resolve. To be able to deal with ongoing tensions which, as we know all too well, can be exploited by extremist movements. To be able to provide reassurance and protection at the same time. We have a duty to protect. To protect our territories, our populations, while remaining true to our principles of humanity and determination. We must do so as a country which must shoulder its responsibilities, do so within Europe, for Europe and with Europe, and this is the significance of the European Council meeting which must take key decisions, based on proposals which we have drawn up and which others can enhance’ (Hollande, 2015).

This third extract from his speech shows a continuation of this discrepancy. However, this time Hollande actually states the schism that is taking place: ‘We have a duty to protect. To protect our territories, our populations, while remaining true to our principles of humanity and

determination' (Hollande, 2015). He opens with an indicator of a securitizing move by emphasising 'duty'. He continues by focusing on sovereignty and internal security, only to immediately state that France must stay true to principles of humanity and determination, principles grounded in the Republican tradition. This shows that the use of facilitating variables in this speech is conflicting. He uses speech act to securitize and desecuritize at the same time. He combines facilitating variables representing politics of exception with discourses of desecuritization.

In this quote the power relations framework becomes visible as well. Within France President Hollande is 'the' political leader. Within the power relation framework, the balance between popular will (the people) and him (political leader) is the indicator of how he represents the French population. Based on his speech, the independent variables discussed, and the mix of facilitating variables used by him it is possible to conclude that France as a nation state does not know what position to take on the Refugee Crisis. On the one hand Hollande chooses to use strong language (speech acts) to present himself as a strong leader for France, on the other he shows uncertainty and fear by putting emphasis on the tolerant history that France has. He struggles with this discrepancy, and his country with him.

5.2.2 The Netherlands: unease into exception

*'Of course, I say that partly in the light of the most urgent issue we face at the moment: the continual flow of refugees from Syria, Iraq and other countries. It's crucial that the agreements we made with Turkey late last year are carried out fast, to relieve the pressure on our external borders. It's crucial to offer refugees a humanitarian alternative to risking their lives at sea in flimsy boats. **We need safe reception in the region. It's also crucial that we get Europe's borders under control, especially in Greece. And that the 'hotspots' we've agreed are put in place. And it's crucial to get the registration of refugees sorted out as soon as possible, as agreed, so that every member state can play its part. We're all in this together. It's precisely at difficult times like this that we need that shared sense of responsibility. Let me be clear: the current numbers aren't sustainable. We are running out of time. We need a sharp reduction in the coming six to eight weeks. So it is both logical and necessary that we devote a lot of our time and energy to the refugee crisis in the months ahead. That is a priority, and the Netherlands Presidency will give it as much focus as possible'** (Rutte, 2016).*

The speeches of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and the President of France show interesting differences and similarities. This extract from Mark Rutte shows two speech acts.

One focuses on the treatment of refugees, and one focuses on a reduction on the numbers of refugees. In the first securitizing move Rutte uses a discourse of unease to securitize migration. He wants to secure Europe's external borders, make sure that refugee registration within Europe is handled better, and make sure that the distribution of refugees between nation states gets streamlined. He must securitize the issues if he wants to achieve an outcome in these fields. What is interesting though is that he states that the 'current numbers are unsustainable', deeming the influx of refugees to Europe an existential threat to European survival. Taking his initial approach, his focus on creating unease to achieve his means, changes immediately into a discourse based on politics of exception.

This narrative fits the Dutch position on migration and refugees. Being a reluctant nation of immigration, the Dutch are not that welcoming to large groups of refugees in general. Therefore, Rutte, being the securitizing actor of his policy community, provides a clear policy stream towards his audience: the European Parliament. However, his audience was not receptive to his speech. Every six months a new European country acquires presidency of the EU. The Dutch presidency was not deemed to be important or significant. Most parliament members decided to leave, this makes the securitizing move by Rutte a failure (Kriek, 2016; Engelbart, 2016). As it turns out Mark Rutte is no leader or major securitizing actor within the European Union. His policy stream does function, but he does not manage to reach his intended audience, in this case the European parliament. Because even though he uses a clear structure in his securitizing argument, based on the framework on facilitating variables, he did not manage to get this message across.

5.2.3 Germany & Italy: two opposites

To once more proof the merit of the extended version of securitization theory, the positions of Angela Merkel of Germany and Matteo Renzi, the Italian Prime Minister will be analysed. Merkel her position stands out from the other European leaders, because she focuses on two facilitating variables of desecuritization, and does not securitize by means of politics of exception, or politics of unease.

'We must also send a clear signal today that this current period of reflection must be used in order to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria, including a cease-fire this is what the people expect – in order to actually drive the political process forward. All actors share responsibility for this – but above all the Assad regime, of course' (Merkel, 2016a).

This first quote is a securitizing move; however, it positions the refugees as the people under threat, not the nation state or its population. In this very short quote shows Merkel's position very clearly. Her audience are European leaders like her, because she is speaking at a European congress. Her goal here is to establish a European hegemonic discourse that emphasises the humanitarian side, thus not the security or safety of nation states. The following passage echoes this:

Firstly, we need a renewed global consensus on humanitarian principles. It is actually a disaster in itself that we have to talk about the need to respect international law. Nevertheless, we are seeing in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere that hospitals are being systematically bombed, health centres destroyed and doctors killed. Such actions are a flagrant breach of humanitarian principles. We must be successful in getting help to the places where it is needed. We must be successful in ensuring humanitarian work can be carried out on the ground. We must all work together to achieve this end (Merkel, 2016b).

Merkel produces two speech acts in this passage: one on humanitarian principles and humanitarian law, the second reinforces the first speech act by reiterating the importance of working together as one Europe. More than in her first speech she uses facilitating variables of desecuritization to construct her argument. This narrative fits the position that Germany is taken in the Refugee Crisis. With having more than 320.000 asylum applications, they have taken in the most refugees by a clear margin. Historically this narrative fits them as well. Having only established their first migration act in 2002, Germany has historically been very open to migrants.

To continue, Italy's position differs significantly from that of Germany, France, and the Netherlands in that they are a main point of arrival for refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean in search of a better life. Because of the Dublin System they have to deal with a large amount of the refugees that seek asylum. Because of this, it seems logical that Prime Minister Renzi, in his speeches, focuses on politics of unease or even exception. This to challenge the status quo that the Dublin System represents.

However, while lives are being saved we also know that there isn't enough room for everyone. Whoever has the right to asylum must be welcome in Europe, not just in Italy, despite the EU's Dublin regime. But it is inconceivable that one country should tackle the entirety of this problem on its own. Responsibility and solidarity are concepts that go hand in hand. Anyone who doesn't have the right to remain in Europe must be repatriated. And in

*those countries, the European Union – including Italy – must do more in terms of providing aid, to support international development projects, and cultural and technological exchange programmes. **But Europe must have a strategy.** And it needs to be clear. Today's uncertainty will lead to tomorrow's problems. This is what happened in Libya, where intervention put an end to a brutal dictatorship, but that intervention wasn't followed up with a strategy to deal with the aftermath. We are, as a consequence, now paying the price of this failure. More than 90% of migrants to Italy leave from a Libyan coast that is no longer guarded by the government' (Renzi, 2015).*

In this quote Renzi focuses on distribution of refugees within Europe, problems considering asylum-seekers and migrants, and a common European strategy. Based on the framework on facilitating variables these variables all fit within the politics of unease. Italy feels the burn on their welfare state, and their social institutions that treat and help refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants. Therefore, it makes sense to securitize the uneven distribution of refugees in Europe. As has been explored before, President Hollande made the argument the other way around. He argued that more refugee camps should be established in countries like Italy and Greece. Reluctant countries of immigration like France try to influence the hegemonic discourse by trying to stretch the importance of refugee camps in either the Middle-East or European border states like Italy. Whereas Prime Minister Renzi tries to influence the status quo: the Dublin System. By arguing in favour of equal distribution. Merkel's position tries to influence the hegemonic discourse by arguing from the perspective of those that need care and treatment, the refugees, the real victims of the Refugee Crisis created by the Syrian Civil War.

5.3 Right-wing parties: Exception and Unease

Right wing movements have been growing in popularity in both Europe and America over the last two decades. The main example of this being Donald Trump's victory in the American elections. Multiple European right wing leaders, like Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders have chances of winning elections in the near future as well. Therefore, it is interesting to take a closer look at the discourse they use, to see if and how they are different from government representatives.

Whereas Mark Rutte does not manage to reach his audience, Geert Wilders does. On the 11th of February 2016 he debated in a refugee debate in the Dutch parliament.¹⁰ His speech turned out to be one big speech act, based on a framework of politics of exception. He argued that refugees are a danger to our society, our internal security, and the welfare state. And even though in the debate it is pointed out that he is lying, this does not matter to him. He manages to reach his audience, the population of the Netherlands. He wants to get his message out to the people who vote in the political process, this to boost his popularity and create outside pressure on the ruling elite (De Vries, 2016).

Geert Wilders does not have the political power to change laws himself, however he challenges hegemonic discourses in a different way. His use of securitizing speech acts influences the government indirectly. He aims to influence a large part of the Dutch population, who in turn demand a reaction from the ruling elite. This changes the hegemonic discourse to encompass the demands made by the population. The power of securitizing moves is on display here, because lying is not necessarily a downfall. By populists like Wilders it is used to get their interests on the political agenda.

'We already have 7 million unemployed, 10 million poor, and 1.5 million households waiting for social housing. We cannot accommodate anyone. It is therefore absolutely vital to bring an end to the Schengen system, to allow each country to control its own borders' (Le Pen, 2016)

Marine Le Pen is comparable to Geert Wilders, in that she too leads a major right-wing party in her country. Her discourse is also comparable. This quote from her shows how she structures her securitizing argument. First she puts emphasis on the crisis of the welfare state in France, building on feelings of unease in the country. Then, in the second part she securitizes the importance of sovereignty of the state. Thus, she first employs a discourse of politics of unease, building on already existing feelings in France, she follows this up by creating a discourse of politics of exceptions. This results in an argument that combines multiple facilitating variables, on both sovereignty and the welfare state. Additionally, it builds on growing feelings of unease in society, while making sure that the state related sovereignty point is the referent object that needs to be protected.

¹⁰ Unfortunately, the whole speech is in Dutch and there are no translations available. Therefore, there are no quotes incorporated in the main body of this thesis. The full speech can be read (in Dutch) in the Appendix.

'The division is already there, [if] we have to talk about children in school not being able to do their swimming lessons together. If now we have to talk about separate bathing times in public swimming pools, it's not us creating division, the division is already there because there are different cultural backgrounds. And being a melting pot is okay. And Germany has been a melting pot for a very long time, but it is question of time and numbers, isn't it? And if I want to move into a new country, if I'm an immigrant, then I think that it is fairly obvious that I have to assimilate to a certain degree into the new country, if I want to be a part of it. This has always been like that' (Petry, 2016).

Besides speeches there are other ways through which right-wing politicians can voice their opinion. Frauke Petry represents the AfD right-wing party in Germany. In an interview in March of 2016 she had to defend her position in relation to her critique of the German melting-pot society. Being the representative from her policy community, she voices a discourse directly opposing Angela Merkel's desecuritizing narrative. With a clear focus on integration and ethnicity her opinion is solely based on 'politics of unease'. And even though she does not overtly emphasise her points as speech acts, she has a continued uttering of different facilitating variables in this interview. Matteo Salvini, a right-wing Italian European parliament member does this in a similar way:

'Is it going to review its own migration policies to make them more restrictive, including in consideration of the crisis conditions they are already causing in many European States?' (Salvini, 2015)

'What strategies is it setting in place to protect European citizens from the possibility of further attacks by Islamic terrorists?' (Salvini, 2015).

These two questions show a similar tendency. Whereas Salvini and Petry do not directly securitize by means of speech acts, they do voice a continuous, non-changing, discourse. By focussing on politics of exception and politics of unease they create a constant narrative that shows their intention, and it shows that they are reliable. It is clear that they will stick to their position. This cannot be uncovered by the Copenhagen School of thought's securitization theory. Whereas the focus on facilitating variables, as presented by the extended version of securitization, does show this.

Based on France and the Netherlands we can conclude that the extended version of securitization provides a lot of information on political power relations and on how and why securitizing arguments are constructed in the manner that they are. Explicitly, the

discrepancies in the speech act use of Francois Hollande and the audience interactions of both Wilders and Rutte can be explained and analysed by having a framework in which politics of unease, exception, and discourses of securitization are separated and divided in individual categories in the framework of facilitating conditions. Additionally, the agenda-setting framework that focuses on policy streams shows the process through which ideas end up on the political agenda. Enabling easier analysis of what ideas come from what policy community and what hegemonic discourse is that they challenge. Geert Wilders is an interesting example of this, because he and his PVV (his policy community) challenge the hegemonic discourse by not directly expecting results, but by influencing the population, who in turn put pressure on the hegemonic discourse. He influences the 'popular will', who in turn effect the balance between themselves and the 'political leadership', as explained in the framework on political power by both Huysmans (2004) and Buonfino (2004). All this together shows the merit of this experimental first edition of the extended version of securitization theory.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the following research question throughout this thesis: What are the shortcomings of the current version of securitization theory, and what could be added to improve it? To tackle this question the following hypothesis was established: The extended version of securitization theory provides additional information on where securitizing moves originate from and how securitizing actors interact with their audience and policy community. This is directly related to contextual factors, power relations, and the policy process.

The hypothesis has been supported throughout chapter 5, which cumulates in the following brief answer to the research question: The current version of securitization theory does not hold up, since it only focusses on facilitating conditions, neglecting contextual factors. The extended version of securitization theory improves on securitization theory as established by Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde (1998), by emphasising the importance of the role the audience plays, and by deducing more information related to context, power relations, and the policy stream.

The more in-depth answer to the research question starts by analysing the shortcomings of securitization theory. The sole emphasis in securitization theory is put on facilitating conditions: The stylistic structure of the argument which focuses on urgency and survival, the securitizing actor, and the existential threat. Not enough emphasis is put on context in general, and three contextual factors specifically. These contextual factors are the role of the audience, power, and the levels of securitization (Bourdeau, 2011). This thesis has incorporated the critique from mainly Bourbeau (2011), in an extended version of securitization theory that is better suited for analysis. As shown in chapter 5.

This thesis has created an initial and experimental structure for a new and further developed framework that analyses political motives and activities. First, based on a constructivist theoretical foundation and rooted in language theory, securitization theory has been updated with an agenda-setting framework, based on the multiple streams theory by Kingdon (1995), through which effects, beliefs, and individual actions can be placed and evaluated. The policy stream structure enables contextual analysis, by placing emphasis on policy communities and windows of opportunity policy change can be structurally analysed. Conventional securitization theory seems to forget that the context in which speeches are uttered is also influenced by the securitizing actors, and those communities they represent. Therefore, it is a mistake to not focus on power relations between policy communities and securitizing actors.

These power relations, that are socially constructed in every society, are directly related to the agenda-setting framework by Kingdon (1995). Adding real-world context to the framework of securitization theory. This is relevant since securitization theory has always focussed on the ‘how’ question. This implies that there is always a sole focus on how securitizing arguments have an effect. The new focus on power relations adds a ‘why’ and a ‘what’ to the theory. By focussing on what the implication of speech acts can be you can uncover why securitizing actors say what they say, and in what context they do this.

The increased focus on the policy stream and power relations has implications for the role of the audience in the extended version of securitization theory. Since there is additional information on the policy stream and the role of securitizing actors within these, the role of the audiences expands as well. They become more than accepters or rejecters of securitizing speech acts. Audiences can influence securitizing actors themselves, influencing the political directly.

The third contextual factor addressed in this thesis, the lack of variety in the levels of securitization theory is hard to address. Since measuring levels of securitization is not evident based on qualitative research methods. However, as shown in this thesis, it is possible to establish a framework of analysis on facilitating variables.¹¹ By focussing on politics of unease, politics of exception, and desecuritizing discourses, this framework enables the qualification of speech acts by different actors (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). This contextual factor enables the analysis of what kind of securitizing arguments are most successful. Therefore this contextual factor is also a method by which to make securitization theory more suitable for analysis of the context in which the speeches are uttered.

The Refugee Crisis provides many insights in the analytical potential of the extended version of securitization theory. It proved to be a policy window through which policy ideas, internal party struggles, and European decision-making processes are influenced. For example, in the United Kingdom the Refugee Crisis was securitized by emphasising facilitating variables like ‘internal security’ and ‘sovereignty’, considering the Brexit referendum. The different securitizing moves by Boris Johnson and David Cameron show that the Refugee Crisis is a policy window through which they can influence ideas about what the correct course of action is for the United Kingdom. The same can be seen in the speech by Matteo Renzi. He uses the Refugee Crisis as a policy window through which he attempts to influence the hegemonic

¹¹ Table 1, p. 26.

discourse that is represented by for example Hollande and Rutte. Renzi tries to establish a European narrative that emphasises that the Dublin system needs to change, whereas Hollande and Rutte argue the opposite, even stating that there should be extra refugee camps in European border countries.

The significance of this research does not lie in the role that the Refugee Crisis plays in national or European affairs, it is the benefit provided to methods of security analysis by the addition of a contextual structure. However, to claim that the extended version of securitization theory is the ideal way to provide securitization theory, as established by Buzan et al. (1998), with more means to analyse context, would be false. Further research into this topic is more than necessary, and I look forward to doing this. This thesis sets up an initial structure for an extended version of securitization theory, however more research into nationalism, could provide valuable information. The securitizing actors analysed in chapter 5 use it in their arguments, whereas race and ethnicity are ignored to a large extent. It would be interesting to investigate why they utilize arguments based on nationalism to such an extent, and if the impact of these nationalism based arguments is larger than using race or ethnicity for example.

Additionally, Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams theory provides great insights into how political agendas are set. However, there are other public policy scholars that have built on Kingdon his basis creating more in-depth frameworks. For example, Sabatier (1998) has set up an advocacy coalition framework in which there is an extensive framework in which value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of efficacy of policy instruments, and perceptions on the magnitude of the problem are incorporated (p. 99). Focussing, within agenda-setting theory beyond the policy stream, would enable the extended version of securitization theory to assess the behaviour of policy communities and securitizing actors over time, within the context of technical policy changes and changes in the hegemonic discourse.

Subsequently, the work of Baumgartner & Jones (1993), and Carter & Jones (2014) could be beneficial to the structural analysis of the policy stream within the extended version of securitization theory. Baumgartner & Jones (1993) argue within their 'punctuated equilibrium theory' that periods of stability and not the moment of sudden change (the window of opportunity) can teach us a lot about how issues are framed and how policy change comes about (p. 7-9). Carter & Jones (2014) argue that the combination of multiple streams theory and punctuated equilibrium theory would be ideal, since it would combine a focus on the

structures of an organisation, and the flexibility of analysis of securitizing actors in times of sudden change.

However, this thesis set out to identify the strengths and weaknesses of securitization theory, and built an experimental extended framework on top of it. This should be considered a first step in defining what could be valuable addition to securitization theory. Based on this initial research a second step could be undertaken. In my opinion, the creation of an in-depth agenda-setting framework to gain a broader understanding on how policy communities enable the creation and success of securitizing actors and their arguments, and what securitizing arguments are most or least successful would provide most valuable. I look forward to doing this in future research.

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7. Appendices

Legend:

The excerpt used in chapter 5 of this thesis are displayed in *cursive*

The speech acts/securitization moves are displayed in **Bold**

Facilitating variables that fit in the framework of set variables are underlined

8.1 Appendix A

Leader's speech – Except on migration - David Cameron (Conservative)

Manchester 7 October, 2015

Another big judgment call to make is when a refugee crisis confronts our world. Like most people, I found it impossible to get the image of that poor Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi out of my mind. We know in our hearts our responsibilities to help those fleeing for their lives. **But we know, too, that we must keep our heads.** Let's start with a simple fact. Twelve million people have been made homeless by the conflict in Syria. And so far only 4 per cent of them have come to Europe. If we opened the door to every refugee, our country would be overwhelmed. The best thing Britain can do is help neighbouring countries, the Syrian people and the refugees in the camps ...

...and when we do take refugees, to take them from the region, rather than acting in a way that encourages more to make that dangerous journey. As we do this, let's remember: we haven't only just started caring about Syrians. We've been helping them over the past four years, giving more in aid to that part of the world than any other country except America. And we have been able to do that because this party made a promise and kept a promise – to spend 0.7 per cent of our national income on aid. Other countries also made that promise. But they didn't keep it. I say to them: if Britain can keep her promises, so should you. But the real answer to the refugee crisis lies in helping countries like Syria become places where people actually want to live. **That means having a government that's not terrorising its people – and that's why Assad must go.** In its place, **we need a government that can be our ally in the defeat of ISIL...**

...because we will never be safe here in Britain until we eradicate that death cult. Some think we can contract that out to America. We shouldn't. *We must play our part too. And we can,*

because of that commitment we made this summer: yes, we will spend two per cent of our GDP on defence – this year, next year, throughout this decade. In the coming years, we'll be launching the biggest aircraft carriers in our history... ..a new class of Hunter Killer submarines... ..new Joint Strike Fighter jets; improved Apache helicopters; a new fleet of drones... ..and because our independent nuclear deterrent is our ultimate insurance policy – this Government will order four new trident submarines.

In government, I have a team who keep us safe at home and abroad... ..Justine Greening, Michael Fallon, Philip Hammond and Theresa May. But above all, we have Britain's Armed Forces. Let me tell you this: In the last year alone they tackled Ebola in West Africa; protected the skies over the Baltic; flew missions over Iraq. They built defences against ISIL in Lebanon; trained army officers in Afghanistan; and patrolled the seas around the Falklands. There they were, in the Pacific, flying supplies to cyclone victims; in the Atlantic, shipping assistance to those hit by hurricanes; in the Med, pulling people out of sinking dinghies. Little England? No. Never. Great Britain. And I'll tell you what, with Armed Forces like this, we can be even greater still. So let's stand and thank them for everything they do to keep us safe.

8.2 Appendix B

Excerpt from Speech on the UK's strength and security in the EU – David Cameron

9 May, 2016

...

Now third, the evolving threats to our security and the rise of the Daesh network mean that **we have to change the way we work to keep our people safe**. Security today is not only a matter of hard defence, of stopping tanks – it is also about rooting out terrorist networks, just as it is about detecting illegal immigrants, stopping human trafficking and organised crime. And that makes much closer security cooperation between our European nations essential.

I have no greater responsibility than the safety of the people of this country, and keeping us safe from the terrorist threat. As the Home Secretary said in her speech a fortnight ago: being in the EU helps to makes us safer. **We shouldn't put ourselves at risk by leaving**. One of her predecessors, Charles Clarke, reiterated that only this morning. And the message of Jonathan Evans and John Sawers, former heads of MI5 and MI6 respectively, is absolutely unmistakable: Britain is safer inside the European Union. During the last 6 years, the terrorist

threat against this country has grown. *Our threat level is now at 'Severe', which means that an attack is 'highly likely'. Indeed, such an attack could happen at any time. But the threat has not only grown, it has changed in its nature.*

The attacks in Paris and Brussels are a reminder that we face this threat together – and we will only succeed in overcoming it by working much more closely together. These terrorists operate throughout Europe; their networks use technology to spread their poison and to organise beyond geographical limits. People say that to keep our defences up, you need a border. And they're right. That's why we kept our borders, and we can check any passport – including for EU nationals – and we retain control over who we allow into our country. But against the modern threat, having a border isn't enough. You also need information, you need data, you need intelligence. You need to cooperate with others to create mechanisms for sharing this information.

And, just as the Home Secretary said a fortnight ago, I can tell you this: whether it's working together to share intelligence on suspected terrorists; whether it's strengthening aviation security; addressing the challenge of cybercrime; preventing cross-border trade in firearms; tackling the migration crisis; or enhancing our own border security, the EU is not some peripheral institution, or a hindrance we have to work around – it is now an absolutely central part of how Britain can get things done. Not by creating a vast new EU bureaucracy. Nor by sucking away the role and capabilities of our own world beating intelligence and law enforcement agencies. But because their superb work depends on much closer cooperation between European governments and much faster and more determined action across Europe to deal with this new threat.

As the historian Niall Ferguson observed, it takes a network to defeat a network. And European measures are a key weapon. The European Arrest Warrant allows us to bring criminals and terrorists, like one of the failed 21/7 Tube bombers who had fled to Italy, we can bring them back to the UK to face justice straight away. Our membership of Europol gives us access to important databases that help us to identify criminals. And we have begun to cooperate on DNA and fingerprint matching across borders, too. These tools help us in real-time, life-or-death situations. One of the Paris attackers, Salah Abdeslam, was only identified quickly after the attack because the French police were able to use EU powers to exchange DNA and fingerprints with the Belgians. Before this cooperation, DNA matching between 2 countries didn't take minutes, it could take over 4 months.

In the last few months alone, we have agreed a new Passenger Name Records directive, so that EU countries will have access to airline passenger data to enable us to identify those on terror watch-lists. These new arrangements will also provide crucial details about how the tickets were bought, the bank accounts used and the people they are travelling with. And the EU has recently switched on a new database, called SIS II, which is providing real-time alerts for suspected jihadists and other serious criminals. Now I don't argue that if we left we would lose any ability to cooperate with our neighbours on a bilateral basis, or even potentially through some EU mechanisms.

But it is clear that leaving the EU will make cooperation more legally complex – and make our access to vital information much slower and more difficult. Look at for instance Norway and Iceland: they began negotiating an extradition agreement with the EU in 2001 and yet today it is still not in force. And of course we will miss out on the benefits of these new arrangements, and any that develop in future. Now you can take the view that we don't need this cooperation – that we can just do without these extra capabilities.

That in my view is a totally complacent view. Especially in a world where the difference between a prevented attack and a successful attack can be just 1 missing piece of data; 1 piece of the jigsaw that the agencies found just too late. You can also decide, as some on the Leave side seriously do, that even though working together is helpful for keeping us safe, it involves giving up too much sovereignty and ceding too much power over security cooperation to the European Court of Justice.

My view is this: when terrorists are planning to kill and maim people on British streets, the closest possible security cooperation is far more important than sovereignty in its purest theoretical form. I want to give our country real power, not the illusion of power.

8.3 Appendix C

Excerpt from Boris Johnson's speech on the EU referendum

9 May, 2016

Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for some member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are intensifying and not diminishing.

In the next six weeks we must politely but relentlessly put the following questions to the Prime Minister and to the Remain campaign...

- 1) How can you possibly control EU immigration into this country?
- 2) The Living Wage is an excellent policy, but how will you stop it being a big pull factor for uncontrolled EU migration, given that it is far higher than minimum wages in other EU countries?
- 3) How will you prevent the European Court from interfering further in immigration, asylum, human rights, and all kinds of matters which have nothing to do with the so-called Single Market?
- 4) Why did you give up the UK veto on further moves towards a fiscal and political union?
- 5) How can you stop us from being dragged in, and from being made to pay?

The answer is that the Remain campaign have no answers to any of these questions, because they are asking us to remain in an EU that is wholly unreformed, and going in the wrong direction.

If we leave on June 23, we can still provide leadership in so many areas. We can help lead the discussions on security, on counter-terrorism, on foreign and defence policy, as we always have. But all those conversations can be conducted within an intergovernmental framework, and without the need for legal instruments enforced by the European Court of Justice. We will still be able to cooperate on the environment, on migration, on science and technology; we will still have exchanges of students.

We will trade as much as ever before, if not more. We will be able to love our fellow Europeans, marry them, live with them, share the joy of discovering our different cultures and languages – but we will not be subject to the jurisdiction of a single court and legal system that is proving increasingly erratic and that is imitated by no other trading group.

We will not lose influence in Europe or around the world – on the contrary, you could argue we will gain in clout. We are already drowned out around the table in Brussels; we are outvoted far more than any other country – 72 times in the last 20 years, and ever more regularly since 2010; and the Eurozone now has a built-in majority on all questions.

We will recapture or secure our voice – for the 5th biggest economy in the world – in international bodies such as the WTO or the IMF or the CITES, where the EU is increasingly

replacing us and laying a claim to speak on our behalf. If you want final and conclusive proof of our inability to “get our way” in Brussels – and the contempt with which we will be treated if we vote to Remain – look again at the UK deal and the total failure to secure any change of any significance.

Above all – to get to the third key point of the Remainers – if we leave the EU we will not, repeat not, be leaving Europe. Of all the arguments they make, this is the one that infuriates me the most. I am a child of Europe. I am a liberal cosmopolitan and my family is a genetic UN peacekeeping force.

8.4 Appendix D

Excerpt from Statement in House of Common on the European Council agreement about the migration crisis in Europe – David Cameron

21 March, 2016

With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on last week’s European Council, which focused on the migration crisis affecting continental Europe. Mr Speaker, the single biggest cause has of course been the war in Syria and the brutality of the Assad regime. But we have also seen huge growth in people coming to Southern Europe from Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Africa, all facilitated by the rapid growth of criminal networks of people smugglers. There are over 8,000 migrants still arriving in Greece every week. And there are signs that the numbers using the central Mediterranean route are on the rise again. So far 10,000 have come this year.

Of course, because of our special status in the European Union, **Britain is not part of the Schengen open border arrangements – and we’re not going to be joining.** We have our own border controls. And they apply to everyone trying to enter our country – including EU citizens. So people cannot travel through Greece or Italy onward to continental Europe and into Britain. And that will not change.

But it is in our national interest to help our European partners deal effectively with this enormous and destabilising challenge. We have argued for a consistent and clear approach right from the start. Ending the conflict in Syria. Supporting the refugees in the region. Securing European borders. Taking refugees directly from the camps and the neighbouring countries but not from Europe. Cracking down on people smuggling gangs. This approach –

of focusing on the problem upstream – has now been universally accepted in Europe. And at this Council it was taken forwards with a comprehensive plan for the first time. As part of this plan, the Council agreed to stop migrants from leaving Turkey in the first place to intercept those that do leave, while they are at sea, turning back their boats, and to return back to Turkey those that make it to Greece.

There can be no guarantee of success, but if this plan is properly and fully implemented, in my view it will be the best chance to make a difference. For the first time we have a plan that breaks the business model of the people smugglers, by breaking the link between getting in a boat and getting settlement. Mr Speaker, I want to be clear about what Britain is doing – and what we are not doing – as a result of this plan. What we are doing is contributing our expertise and our skilled officials to help with the large-scale operation now under way.

Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship Mounts Bay and Border Force vessels are already patrolling the Aegean. British asylum experts and interpreters are already working in Greece to help them process individual cases. At the Council I said that Britain stands ready to do even more to support these efforts.

Above all, what is needed – and what we have been pushing for – is a detailed plan to implement this agreement and to ensure that all the offers of support that are coming from around Europe are properly co-ordinated. And our share of the additional EU money which will go to helping refugees in Turkey under this agreement will come from our existing aid budget.

But Mr Speaker, let me also be clear what we are not doing. First, we are not giving visa-free access for Turks coming to the UK. Schengen countries are giving visa-free access to Turks. But because we are not part of Schengen, we are not bound by their decision. *We have made our own decision which is to maintain our own borders. And we will not be giving that visa-free access.*

Second, visa-free access to Schengen countries will not mean a back-door route to Britain. As the House knows, visa-free access only means the right to visit. It does not mean a right to work. It does not mean a right to settle. Just because for instance British citizens can enjoy visa-free travel for holidays to America, that does not mean they can work, let alone settle there. Neither will this give Turkish citizens those rights in the EU.

Third, we will not be taking more refugees as a result of this deal. A number of Syrians who are in camps in Turkey will be resettled into the Schengen countries of the EU. But again that does not apply to Britain. We have already got our resettlement programme and we are delivering on it. We said we would resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees over this Parliament, taking them directly from the camps. And that is what we are doing.

We promised 1,000 resettled here in time for last Christmas. And that is what we delivered. The other 27 EU countries agreed to 2 schemes. One to relocate 160,000 people within the EU, but by the time of last December's Council, only 208 had been relocated. The second to have a voluntary resettlement scheme for 22,500 from outside the EU, but by the end of last year, just 483 refugees had been resettled. **We said what we would do – and we are doing it.**

And Mr Speaker, Britain has given more money to support Syrians fleeing the war, and the countries hosting them, than any other European country. Indeed, we are doing more than any country in the world other than the United States – spending over £1 billion so far, with another £1.3 billion pledged. **We are fulfilling our moral responsibility.**

...

Mr Speaker, turning to other matters at the Council, I took the opportunity to deal with a long-standing issue we have had about the VAT rate on sanitary products. We have some EU wide VAT rules in order to make the single market work. But the system has been far too inflexible – and this causes understandable frustration. We said we would get this changed – and that is exactly what we've done.

The Council conclusions confirm that the European Commission will produce a proposal in the next few days to allow countries to extend the number of zero rates for VAT, including on sanitary products. This is an important breakthrough. It means that Britain will be able to have a zero rate for sanitary products – meaning the end of the tampon tax. And on this basis, the government will be accepting both the amendments put down to the Finance Bill tomorrow night.

Mr Speaker, my Rt Hon Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green spent almost a decade campaigning for welfare reform and spent the last 6 years implementing these policies in government.

In that time we have seen nearly half a million fewer children living in workless households, over 1 million fewer people on out of work benefits and nearly 2.4 million more people in work. And in spite of having to take difficult decisions on the deficit child poverty, inequality and pensioner poverty are all down. My Rt Hon Friend contributed an enormous amount to the work of this government and he can be proud of what he achieved.

And Mr Speaker, let me say this. This government will continue to give the highest priority to improving the life chances of the poorest in our country. **We will continue to reform our schools. We will continue to fund childcare and create the jobs. We will carry on cutting taxes for the lowest paid – in the last Parliament we took 4 million of the lowest paid out of income tax altogether and our further rises to the personal allowance will exempt millions more. Combined with this we will go on with our plans to rebuild sink estates to help those with mental health conditions to extend our troubled families programme to reform our prisons and to tackle discrimination for those whose life chances suffer because of the colour of their skin.**

And Mr Speaker in 2 weeks' time we will introduce the first ever National Living Wage – giving a pay rise to the poorest people in our country. All of this is driven by a deeply held conviction that everyone in Britain should have the chance to make the most of their lives. And Mr Speaker, let me add: none of this would be possible if it weren't for the actions of this government – and the work of my Rt Hon Friend the Chancellor – in turning our economy around. We can only improve life chances if our economy is secure and strong.

Without sound public finances you end up having to raise taxes or make even deeper cuts in spending. You don't get more opportunity, you get less. And it's working people who suffer. *So we **must continue** to cut the deficit, control the cost of welfare, and live within our means.* **We must not** burden our children and grandchildren with debts we didn't have the courage to pay off ourselves. Securing our economy, extending opportunity: We will continue with this approach in full because we are a modern, compassionate, one nation Conservative government.

And I commend this statement to the House.

8.5 Appendix E

Excerpt from Jeremy Corbyn his statement in response to Cameron's EU-Turkey Refugee Crisis Deal

21 March, 2016

I thank the Prime Minister for an advance copy of about half his statement. Let me deal with the points that he made in order.

The **refugee crisis** that Europe currently faces is the largest since the end of the second world war. There are more displaced people in the world now than there have been at any time in recorded history. Thousands of people have died making perilous journeys across the Mediterranean and in other places around the world.

As an advanced, democratic, civilised nation, we have **a duty** to reach out the hand of humanity, support and friendship to people who are going through the most disastrous time of their lives.

We should also recognise that a disproportionate burden has been placed on Syria's neighbours. Jordan and Lebanon have accepted a very large number of refugees, as has Turkey. Among the European countries, Italy and Greece, as border countries, have done far more than anyone else, but Germany and Sweden have taken a very large number of asylum seekers. There has not been a balanced response throughout Europe.

Has the Prime Minister had a chance to read the statement made by Amnesty International at the weekend, after the agreement was reached? Amnesty is normally noted for its cautious use of words and the careful way in which it describes things; it is, after all, an organisation dedicated to human rights and the rule of law. The statement reads as follows:

“Guarantees to scrupulously respect international law are incompatible with the touted return to Turkey of all irregular migrants arriving on the Greek islands as of Sunday. Turkey is not a safe country for refugees and migrants, and any return process predicated on its being so will be flawed, illegal”, and it goes on to register further concerns. I ask the Prime Minister to respond carefully to the very reasonable points put by Amnesty International.

Will the Prime Minister confirm that when Greece receives asylum seekers from Turkey, they will all be interviewed individually? Will he confirm that they will all have access to

interpreters, a right to a hearing and a right of appeal, even if the interviewing is done by officials who have come from other countries on behalf of the European Union? Will he confirm that those who are returned to Turkey will have similar rights there, and that they will, in turn, be properly treated? **He must be well aware of the deep concern that many people feel about the recent events in Turkey, particularly the imprisonment of journalists who have attempted to speak out about a number of matters.**

It is clear that the issue of the number of people seeking asylum in Europe is heavily bound up with the wars that have taken place, or continue to take place. The Prime Minister rightly spoke of the need for a political settlement in Syria and in Libya. Can he give us some information on progress that may have been made towards bringing about a political settlement in Syria that will enable people to return to their own homes, and to lead safe and secure lives? The situation in Libya is equally perilous for many people, especially those in insecure refugee camps.

The Prime Minister will be well aware that many of those who seek asylum in other countries make the perilous journeys to which I have referred. They also end up in refugee camps with very limited facilities, despite the great work done by volunteers. I have visited the camps in Calais and Dunkirk, which are in an appalling state. Those people are in a very perilous situation. They are all humans, to whom we must reach out the hand of friendship and support.

I recognise that the British Government have paid a great deal of money through the Department for International Development to support refugees in camps around the world. I recognise the work of the Royal Navy in plucking people from the sea and saving them from drowning. However, the Prime Minister still seems to be stuck in the narrative of saying that Britain will accept only 20,000 refugees over the next four years and that they will be taken from camps in the region, not from those facing problems as they get stuck while travelling across Europe. Can we not for once, please, Prime Minister, co-operate with every other European country on a European-wide response to the crisis engulfing the lives of so many people, rather than avoid our responsibilities?

8.6 Appendix F

Excerpt from Speech at opening of the Ambassador's week – Francois Hollande

25 August, 2015

France is preparing to host COP21 and this has been the focus of your work since Monday. It will be a major event and is fully mobilizing not only the highest level of government but also all government departments, all public actors and the many other actors who have a responsibility.

We have a duty to succeed because it is a global issue and because France is the country hosting this great event. Once again, our diplomatic service, under Laurent Fabius, is leading the way. Once again, our country, due to its position, role and influence, is responsible for taking part in negotiations that will decide the future of our planet.

But the planet is threatened not only by global warming, but also by a form of terrorism that is graver and more barbaric than any encountered in recent decades.

Our own country was attacked in January. It managed to react calmly and unitedly, and was supported in this tragedy by exceptional international solidarity, because, for the whole world, France represents freedom.

We are still at risk and the attack that happened on Friday on the Amsterdam-Paris Thalys train, which could have degenerated into horrific carnage, had it not been for a few courageous passengers, including American soldiers, to whom I awarded honours yesterday, that attack is further proof that we need to prepare ourselves for more attacks and protect ourselves.

Our security is decided, first and foremost, within our borders. That is why we launched Operation Sentinelle, which mobilizes police, gendarmes and 7000 soldiers. That is why we recruited more staff for our intelligence services and modernized our legislation, to take more effective action while respecting freedoms.

This is also necessary in order to tackle foreign combatants and to identify and monitor individuals who are linked to the fundamentalist movement.

Our security is also decided beyond our borders. Daesh is the greatest danger. This organization controls a vast swathe of territory in Syria and Iraq, has access to considerable

resources linked to trafficking of all kinds, and has a worldwide impact. This organization enrolls, indoctrinates and trains people in order to kill on a greater scale.

Muslims are the primary victims in Iraq, Syria, Kuwait and Libya, but minorities are systematically persecuted and tortured. That is why, in a few days, I will open the Conference on Eastern Christians and victims of ethnic and religious violence, organized in Paris by Laurent Fabius.

Daesh also destroys the common property of mankind: in Palmyra, the former director of the archaeological site was savagely beheaded, and last Sunday the Temple of Baalshamin was reduced to dust.

It does so with the same intention, to erase all traces of humanity, terrorize people through horrifying terrorist acts and images, and show that barbarism knows no bounds. **We must take action** against this too: ten years after the signing of the UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity, I have decided to place the President-Director of the Louvre Museum, Jean-Luc Martinez, at the head of an initiative to protect cultural property in armed conflicts.

France will take all the necessary steps to better protect works of art and sites and also to combat the trafficking which serves to finance terrorism, for behind the destruction of cultural sites there is a trade involving sellers, and therefore buyers.

In Africa, terrorism has taken the name of Boko Haram. Its acts of violence and suicide bombings have claimed many victims: 10,000 since the start of the year. The toll stood at 14,000 last year, including many women and children. All countries in the region are affected - Nigeria first and foremost, Cameroon, Chad and Niger - and we owe them our unfailing solidarity because they are our friends and because the stability of the whole of West Africa is at stake.

In a few days, I will host Nigeria's new president, Mr Buhari, and **I will confirm to him that France is ready to bring together all those who are combatting Boko Haram, as we did one year ago**. Not only do we need to coordinate our services and exchange information, but we also need to be able to take joint action in the region. The Minister of Defence is sufficiently aware of the issue to know what we need to do.

The action taken in Mali showed this. Yes, it is possible, with the help of the African Union, the countries of Europe, and the UN, to drive back terrorism. Though in a different form, we are pursuing the same objective with Operation Barkhane: driving back terrorism.

But now more than ever, we are calling on the Africans to build their own forces as quickly as possible. We are prepared to assist, support and train them, and also partially fund them, with the other European countries.

Similarly, we are assessing the challenge represented by Tunisia. That is where the Arab Spring was born. That is where an exemplary democratic transition took place and where terrorism has also struck, at the Bardo Museum and in Sousse, to deprive this country, a friend of France, of the tourism income that is crucial to its economy.

I have therefore appealed to the countries of Europe to move beyond the Deauville Partnership by giving it a security dimension, for we cannot leave this country to fight alone against an enemy that we all share.

Terrorism justifies the use of force, which is why I called on our armed forces to intervene in Mali and to take part in the coalition in Iraq.

The persistently high level of threat has also led us to review the military spending act and to allocate even more resources to this field, despite the current budget constraints. This will enable us to provide our armed forces with equipment and human resources in the long term.

Because if France is to continue leading the way, two conditions need to be met. **We must take responsibility when the situation requires and have the capacity to do so.** If there is a will but no way, what is the meaning of political action and public declarations? **We therefore need the means to shoulder our responsibility.**

At the same time, military action alone will never be enough, for terrorism thrives on political chaos. So it is up to our diplomatic corps to find exit routes from the crises that occur.

In Syria, the world took far too long to react. In summer 2012, France raised the alarm and, from the outset, declared its support for the Syrian opposition. I was even the first to consider it the only legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

A year later, we were ready to punish a regime that had, without doubt, used chemical weapons against its people. The international community's failure to act, after a red line was

deliberately crossed, proved very costly: Daesh established itself in Syria, where it had not previously existed in that form, while Bashar al-Assad continued to massacre his people and seems, unfortunately, to still be doing so.

What should we do? We need to loosen the grip of the terrorists without preserving Bashar al-Assad, for the two are hand in glove; at the same time, it is essential to seek a political transition in Syria. The Security Council acknowledged this by adopting a statement last week, the first in two years. This is an important step in the right direction. Russia voiced its support, and a dialogue can therefore be initiated. Conditions must be established.

The first of these is the neutralization of Bashar al-Assad, the second is to offer sound guarantees to all moderate opposition forces, including Sunnis and Kurds, and to preserve the state structures and the unity of Syria. Lastly, the final condition, which will no doubt prove decisive, is that all stakeholders should contribute to the solution. That means the Gulf States. That means Iran. That means Turkey, which needs to get involved in the fight against Daesh and open, or rather resume, a dialogue with the Kurds.

I am calling for widespread recognition of this major issue, which has played an important role in recent months. Terrorism is a threat not just to a few but to all actors in the region, all powers, and everyone must participate if the Syrian crisis is to be resolved. France is ready to play its part.

Until that time, we will continue to help the Syrian opposition that we consider to be moderate, and to participate in the coalition in Iraq, while endeavouring to improve its effectiveness, for there can be no question of mobilizing troops or maintaining a presence if we are not sure of the goals and the means of achieving them.

We will also support the reforms led by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr Abadi, to strengthen the institutions, preserve the state structure and the unity of Iraq, and bring together all the communities. In short, to do what was not done a few years ago in Libya, for which we are paying a high price, after failing to consolidate a State following a necessary armed intervention. Libya is a vast territory with a wealth of resources; these have not disappeared, they are taken, for purposes which, it is safe to say, do not always serve the development of the country, and the country is in chaos, and characterized by the fact that it has two governments. Which is at least one too many.

I support the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General towards establishing a national unity government which is able, with the support of the international community, to isolate extremist groups, secure the territory, control population movements and combat trafficking of all kinds.

As regards population movements, we are facing immigration crises greater than any we have known since the end of the Second World War. This migration, these flows of refugees, which concern Europe, but not only Europe, are the tragic consequences of the growing number of conflicts. A closer look at the causes shows that it is Syrians and Iraqis who have fled and taken refuge, initially, in countries in the region. Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are dealing with the arrival of at least 5 million refugees. Let us not forget the devastating situations in Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, which are a further source of migration, which in turn is facilitated by the chaos in Libya. As a result, over 350,000 irregular arrivals in the Schengen Area were recorded in recent months. It is hard to know how accurate these figures are.

Germany, meanwhile, has announced that it received 800,000 refugees in the past year. It is said to be an exceptional situation, and it is. Exceptional in terms of its scale, its gravity, its consequences, and the tensions that exist. In Europe, once again we can see walls being erected, tanks deployed, barbed wire put up, and refugee centres attacked; that is the reality of the situation and unfortunately, it looks very likely to last, given the conflicts at its root.

Some would have us believe that re-establishing national borders would be a miracle solution. That is a con. But a con that may, briefly, seem convincing. **France needs to act** at European and international level, with humanity, when it comes to those who are fleeing crises and wars, but also firmly, distinguishing between types of migration. We need to respond to humanitarian emergencies, including the current ones, organize the reception of migrants and shoulder our responsibilities in terms of asylum, as well as ensuring the return of rejected migrants and combatting all smuggling networks.

In June, Europe made some difficult decisions regarding the rescue of migrants in the Mediterranean. These were acted on effectively, which in fact led to more and more migrants crossing the Mediterranean, and unfortunately more and more smugglers too, some of whom leave their boats and the families stowed on them in fatal danger.

Today, disparities between national practices are creating an unbalanced situation for the countries that are facing mass influxes. These include, as we know, Italy and Greece. The

situation is also unbalanced for countries that receive a large proportion of the refugees or that must, like France, handle situations that arise on the borders of the Schengen Area, like in Calais.

Alongside Germany, we are putting forward proposals to ensure that Europe finds adequate solutions to the issue we are facing. The French and German Ministers of the Interior have drawn up a certain number of recommendations. I discussed this yesterday with Chancellor Merkel in Berlin and we made some proposals to our partners.

Firstly, we want to speed up the establishment of refugee centres in Italy and Greece, which will be responsible for, indeed obliged to, distinguish between asylum seekers, who must be registered, and migrants who come for other purposes but who cannot be accepted as they are.

Secondly, we need to ensure that refugees are distributed fairly; at the moment, some countries in Europe are refusing to accept any.

We also need to ensure that people who have entered a country illegally are returned in dignity; this is essential if our rules are to be effective and in order to protect the refugees and asylum seekers.

Lastly, we need a unified asylum system with shorter waiting periods and harmonized rules and benefits, and, within Europeans, we must also establish a common list of safe countries, for there are countries that do not meet the conditions required to provide asylum. We must give ourselves the shared means to combat smuggling networks and, in collaboration with the agency Frontex, introduce European border guards.

These proposals, which are in line both with our duties and with the resolute approach warranted by the dangers of this situation, **should be** discussed at a meeting of the European Council and it should then be possible to implement them rapidly.

The solution also requires an active development policy, and this will be on the agenda of a Europe-Africa summit that we have initiated, which will be held in November in Malta. France wants us to be able to create funds, as proposed by the European Commission: for the Sahel, €1 billion is needed to support the economies of regions affected by migration and to enable young people from these regions to stay there.

The issue of migration may cause disagreement between the North and South, in addition to the tension that it may generate in Europe and within each of our countries, and this could

cause great instability. **We need to avoid this. We need to work towards joint development, staff training, bringing Africa into line with energy standards, growth, and security.**

France, which has strong ties of friendship with Africa, needs to take the lead, in collaboration with its European partners. That is what we are going to propose.

...

I would like to conclude by discussing Europe. I have stated our main priority today: to be able to control migration, against a backdrop of international crises which we must resolve. To be able to deal with ongoing tensions which, as we know all too well, can be exploited by extremist movements. To be able to provide reassurance and protection at the same time. We have a duty to protect. To protect our territories, our populations, while remaining true to our principles of humanity and determination. We must do so as a country which must shoulder its responsibilities, do so within Europe, for Europe and with Europe, and this is the significance of the European Council meeting which must take key decisions, based on proposals which we have drawn up and which others can enhance.

But there is also growth in Europe. There too, there are signs of improvement. There has been a shift which was more growth-oriented than had been previously envisaged. The Juncker plan was launched.

...

We also want to welcome artists, students, researchers and entrepreneurs. We have simplified the visa system, and I would like to thank the Ministers behind that initiative. Although it is combating terrorism, must control migration and fulfil its duty towards refugees, France has a universal vocation. It must not retreat into itself, it must not be afraid to ensure that the world's best minds turn towards France to bring us ideas which were conceived in their own countries and which they want to share with the world through France. The battle of ideas is underway and once again France must be at the forefront.

Part of diplomacy means promoting our country, and I know that this is the job which you have been given. Territorial attractiveness must encourage investments which can generate innovation and employment.

There is also tourism, which is simply promoting our landscapes and heritage, as well as the dedicated tourism-industry professionals, not forgetting our gastronomy.

So far this year, France has received over 85 million visitors. We are on course for a record year, with France being the world's number one tourist destination. We must make this situation, which ultimately is also the result of hard work by all our committed professionals, a force and an asset.

Laurent Fabius has set in motion a reform of our external action, which I would like to mention here. This is an important initiative, because France's external policy goes beyond upholding its own interests. By virtue of history, our position in the world, our own will, our exemplary nature - I have mentioned energy transition - we have the ability to act, once we supply the resources to do so. We must take action for ourselves, for our interests, for the security of the French people, as well as for our ideals and the preservation of the planet. This is what we are doing through the Climate Conference. I once again mention the Conference because its success is inseparable from our action for development, for security and for peace.

It is because we uphold these values that terrorists want to attack us, but it is because we are the guardians of this great idea of progress, this great idea of France for the world, that many countries have expressed their solidarity and many peoples are grateful to us.

It is because we are aware of our responsibilities that we must work even harder to extend France's influence in the world.

Thank you.

8.7 Appendix G

Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Netherlands to the European Parliament,

20 January 2016

Mr President, Martin, ladies and gentlemen,

...

For younger generations, Europe doesn't carry the same emotional charge. If at all. The reality is that many people are slowly but surely growing sceptical about the EU. The way they see it, the EU interferes in their lives for no good reason, while achieving very few real results. Its benefits seem far removed from everyday life. At the same time – rightly or wrongly – the irritation people feel about rules made in 'Brussels' is never far away. There's only one way for you and me to counteract this: **we need to achieve concrete results and**

make sure they are visible. And we need to stick to areas where the EU can achieve more than member states can by themselves. In short, Europe must be relevant to people's daily lives. And over the next few months, the Netherlands wants to help make that happen. It's clear that the Netherlands is taking over the Presidency of the EU in difficult times. We're seeing a massive influx of refugees, fleeing a bloody conflict that's happening all too close by. The situation on our eastern border is also complex and fragile, and the EU's relations with Russia are troubled. The barbaric attacks in Paris have shown once again that we cannot take our free and democratic way of life for granted. And all this is going on while Europe is recovering from the worst economic crisis since the Second World War. Far too many people are still unemployed. None of these problems can be solved by a single country acting alone. The countries of Europe share a big responsibility.

...

This is the tradition in which we will fulfil our duties as Presidency holder. The tradition of cooperation that transcends what countries can achieve alone. The tradition of working, step by step, towards a goal. **We must be committed and determined**, but also pragmatic and realistic. That's the approach we want. **And I promise** you that we'll put our long Dutch experience of coalition-building and consultation to full use. There's plenty for us to build upon. Take the political priorities of the European Commission. Or the strategic agenda of the European Council. And let's not forget the calculation made by this parliament: that we're missing out on up to 1.25 trillion euros a year by not making full use of the single market – for example in the digital domain. In short, **Europe doesn't need new lofty ideals or grand visions. It needs results. It needs to deliver. And for that, we first need to follow up on what we've agreed.** Keeping promises and sticking to agreements should be the new normal in Europe. A deal is a deal. That's a key principle for the Dutch Presidency.

Of course, I say that partly in the light of the most urgent issue we face at the moment: the continual flow of refugees from Syria, Iraq and other countries. It's crucial that the agreements we made with Turkey late last year are carried out fast, to relieve the pressure on our external borders. It's crucial to offer refugees a humanitarian alternative to risking their lives at sea in flimsy boats. **We need safe reception in the region. It's also crucial that we get Europe's borders under control, especially in Greece. And that the 'hotspots' we've agreed are put in place. And it's crucial to get the registration of refugees sorted out as soon as possible, as agreed, so that every member state can play its part. We're all in this together.** It's precisely at difficult times like this that we need that shared sense of

responsibility. Let me be clear: the current numbers aren't sustainable. We are running out of time. **We need a sharp reduction in the coming six to eight weeks. So it is both logical and necessary that we devote a lot of our time and energy to the refugee crisis in the months ahead.** That is a priority, and the Netherlands Presidency will give it as much focus as possible.

Ladies and gentlemen, the debate on the future of our European institutions is going on – in one way or other – in almost every member state. **I believe there is growing consensus that the EU needs to focus on areas where cooperation is either essential, such as the migration issue, or clearly adds value, such as the single market. ‘Focus’ includes cutting back the excessive regulations that restrict people and companies.** Our Presidency fully endorses the Commission's priorities and work programme, which are founded on these principles. It's good that we are debating the Union's future so openly. And I say that, of course, with particular reference to the position of the UK. The UK is a very important partner. Leaving the EU would be bad for the UK and for the EU. But we should not reduce that debate to the question of ‘more or less Europe?’ The question is how to build a better Europe: a Europe that makes the best choices and achieves the most benefits for its people.

...

Dirk Stikker was right: European cooperation is not a simple thing, accomplished with a bit of good will and the stroke of a pen. In many cases, the EU doesn't have ready-made solutions for the problems we face. Every country has its own interests and considerations, and negotiations can be tough. But it's like a football match: it's not the style of play that matters, but the final result. And as we all know: Europe scores most of its goals in injury time.

Europe has shown that it can tackle major crises. The financial and economic crisis prompted us to step up oversight of our banks and to place our currency on a more solid footing. We've taken a common line on Russia's actions in Ukraine. And we've closed a deal with Turkey on the refugee crisis. Step by step we're moving forward. That's in keeping with the European tradition, and it is in that conviction that the Netherlands is looking ahead to its Presidency.

8.8 Appendix H

Excerpt from debate on immigration (in Dutch) – Geert Wilders

11 Februari – 2016

De Nederlanders worden in de steek gelaten. Hun zorgen over de niet aflatende asieliinstroom worden niet serieus genomen. Premier Rutte laat onze grenzen wagenwijd open staan. En dat is de reden waarom de Nederlanders boos zijn. Maandenlang houdt de premier de cijfers over de asieltsunami onder de pet. Hij houdt informatie achter. Al op 16 september wist hij dat de prognose voor de volgende 5 jaar 93.000 asielzoekers per jaar zou kunnen zijn, maar hij heeft het de Kamer niet verteld. Hij wist het de dag van de Algemene Beschouwingen maar heeft het niet verteld. Dat is echt ongehoord. En deze week komt hij weer met foute informatie. Hij zegt dat er nog maar “enkele honderden” migranten vanuit Turkije naar Griekenland komen. Maar maandag waren het er bijna 2500 en dinsdag meer dan 3600. Is deze premier nog wel te vertrouwen? Ondertussen blijven de asielzoekers gewoon komen. Ook terugkerende Syriegangers laat de premier gewoon ons land binnen zonder dat hij ze vast zet. Deze Minister-President speelt met vuur, met mensenlevens, zijn beleid brengt Nederlanders in groot gevaar en dat neem ik hem zeer kwalijk. Onze samenleving raakt verscheurd, raakt verdeeld door een politieke elite die de terechte zorgen, wanhoop en woede van de bevolking negeert, bagatelliseert. Men voelt zich onveilig en snapt niet dat we zoveel mensen binnenlaten, waarom we zoveel geld aan vreemdelingen uitgeven, dat ze gratis zorg krijgen, dat ze gratis woningen krijgen, terwijl bij Nederlanders juist wordt gekort op bijvoorbeeld de zorg en de pensioenen. Als we in Nederland een directe democratie hadden gehad, zoals in Zwitserland, en nu een referendum zouden houden over het asielbeleid dan denk ik dat de uitkomst zou zijn dat het kabinet zou zijn gecorrigeerd. Dan hadden we onze grenzen nu wel gesloten voor asielzoekers.

Voorzitter,

Nederland wordt met de dag onveiliger. Alleen al 4500 politiemeldingen in en rond de AZC's. De cijfers die we nu hebben zijn niet compleet, het is alleen in en rondom de AZC's. De andere incidenten zijn daar niet eens bij opgenomen. 10% van onze politiecapaciteit gaat inmiddels op aan asielzoekers. Het totaal ligt dus veel hoger. 1 zedenzaak per week, 6 geweldsincidenten per dag. Maar liefst tien procent van de Nederlandse politiecapaciteit wordt besteed aan de invasie van gelukszoekers. Veel vrouwen voelen zich ook hier onveilig, durven 's avonds de straat niet meer op of hun dochters naar school laten gaan en mogen zich niet eens verdedigen met pepperspray.

En dan heb ik het nog niet eens over de terreurdreiging. Er is maar 1 oplossing. En dat de nationale variant. Hou op met kletsen in Europa zeg ik tegen de premier, we hebben geen behoefte aan een Europees plan A of B of een plan Samsom of een deal met de Turken die zich de Europese Unie in chanteren en wat ons miljarden gaan kosten. En als ik Reuters en VK mag geloven, heeft de Turkse president vandaag gezegd dat de Turkse president binnenkort de poorten open zet voor vluchtelingen naar Europa. Een dag nadat de Turkse premier hier is geweest, zegt hij dat gewoon. Hier hebben wij mee te maken. Wij moeten met een eigen plan komen, een plan N. Het plan Nederland. We zeggen nee tegen de EU, nee tegen de asieltsunami en nee tegen de islamisering. Maar we zeggen ja tegen Nederland en ja tegen onze eigen mensen. Wat ons betreft is dat het plan van onze grenzen dicht. En wel nu.

8.9 Appendix I

Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel at the opening of the Supporting Syria and the Region conference in London on 4 February 2016

4 February, 2016

Allow me also to thank David Cameron and the British Government for their hospitality here in London.

Ladies and gentlemen, the film that we saw at the beginning serves as another striking reminder to us of the tragedy that is unfolding in Syria. The film's final words, "We must act now", are nothing less than an urgent appeal, an appeal that we intend to respond to at this conference today. There is really no more time to lose.

Three hundred thousand people have already lost their lives and millions have been uprooted. **This catastrophe must end.** As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has already said, we need a political process. I would therefore like to offer my sincere thanks to Ban Ki-moon and Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, as well as to all of the other negotiators for their work to promote a political process.

We must also send a clear signal today that this current period of reflection must be used in order to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria, including a cease-fire - this is what the people expect – in order to actually drive the political process forward. All actors share responsibility for this – but above all the Assad regime, of course.

Today, the priority is to ease suffering and to offer prospects for the people seeking refuge in Syria and neighbouring countries. This should be a day of hope for these people. I would like, first of all, to express my sincere thanks for the willingness shown by countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey to offer refugees shelter. **They need our support.**

As regards the most essential aid - daily food rations - we saw in the past year how cutbacks were made that were unbearable and how this forced people to flee. This is why the Federal Government is pledging a total of one billion euros to the humanitarian aid programmes of the United Nations for 2016. We would like to contribute 570 million euros of this sum to the World Food Programme - this is approximately 50 per cent of the funds that the World Food Programme needs for these three countries this year - so that we will hopefully be able, at the end of today, to say that we no longer have to worry about food rations.

We want to do more, of course. We want to provide food, clothes, accommodation and employment. This is why we are also supporting the Partnership for Prospects programme. Examples of projects in the context of this programme include community centres, schools and hospitals that are built by the refugees themselves, thereby helping them to find gainful employment. In 2016, Germany will contribute 200 million euros to this programme, thereby taking our support for this year to 1.2 billion euros.

Another aim behind this is to establish a measure of security for the coming years, of course. This is why we will be making a further 1.1 billion euros available in 2017 and 2018, which will bring Germany's contribution to a total of 2.3 billion euros. I am also most delighted that the European Union has gone that extra mile by agreeing to make a total of three billion euros available to Turkey for projects to help refugees.

I would like to mention a further aspect that we intend to get under way, namely partnerships between municipalities. We will set up an Internet-based communication platform for this and encourage the Länder and cities of Germany to enter into partnerships with cities in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in order to offer them their help. Perhaps you could also promote this initiative in your countries. Moreover, we will also offer 1,900 higher education scholarships for Syrian refugees so that they can further their training.

Ladies and gentlemen, if we all work together and if we all do our part, then this can be a day of hope today - hope for people who have experienced, and unfortunately continue to experience, so many terrible things. While this day will not replace the political process, it can offer a measure of humanity and hope. I hope that we will achieve this much. Thank you.

8.10 Appendix J

Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel during the plenary of the World Humanitarian Summit on Monday, 23 May 2016, in Istanbul

23 May, 2016

Conflicts and disasters cause immeasurable suffering and create new challenges for humanitarian assistance. The truth is that to this day we do not have a sustainable humanitarian system. Many people are thus following our meeting here in Istanbul very closely. For this reason, I would like to thank the UN Secretary-General for taking on this painful topic and, after carefully preparing the Summit, launching our efforts today. I would like to thank Turkey for its hospitality and for making it possible to hold this Summit here in Istanbul.

What do we need?

Firstly, we need a renewed global consensus on humanitarian principles. It is actually a disaster in itself that we have to talk about the need to respect international law. Nevertheless, we are seeing in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere that hospitals are being systematically bombed, health centres destroyed and doctors killed. Such actions are a flagrant breach of humanitarian principles. We must be successful in getting help to the places where it is needed. We must be successful in ensuring humanitarian work can be carried out on the ground. We must all work together to achieve this end.

Secondly, the priority has to be to make aid function as smoothly as possible. We must not simply go from one situation to the next, from one disaster to the next. What we need is a cohesive system of humanitarian aid. Above all, we need those supporting humanitarian assistance to be reliable. Many a pledge is made without the money arriving in the project. That must change.

Germany supports the proposal to increase the volume of the Central Emergency Response Fund to one billion US dollars. Also on the German side, **we are going to spend more money on humanitarian assistance. We need operative crisis facilities and not just action when disaster strikes.**

Thirdly, we need to break new ground. We need to learn from one another here. Every time we need to identify and implement the most efficient and best methods. I would advocate that

we also give insurance models a chance alongside classic financing, for example, insurance models connected to the risks associated with climate change or global epidemics. The advantage is that assistance can be given quickly. Those with an insurance claim are no longer perceived as people with their hand out but as people who have claims. Insurance models could thus really bring a turnaround.

Fourthly, it is a matter of networking our activities. Prevention, development cooperation and implementing Agenda 2030 that was adopted last year have to go hand in hand. Today, monocausal explanations of conflicts are no longer valid. Conflicts have multiple causes – from climate change to hunger, civil war and many other factors. That is why we need to tackle the problem from different angles. And that is why the tools need to be dovetailed.

Today the implementation of an inclusive system for global action is being launched to help people in need and to make clear: We all live on one planet, we all have one life, we all have the right to live this life sustainably and sensibly. That is why we need to give everyone opportunities. There are too many today who do not have these opportunities.

8.11 Appendix K

The Mediterranean migrant emergency is not Italy's. It is Europe's – Matteo Renzi

23 June, 2015

The search for peace and food that is forcing thousands of women and men, often with their young children in tow, to risk their lives reaching Europe didn't begin today, and it won't end tomorrow. Anyone who thinks this crisis can be solved with a tweet or a Facebook post lives in a parallel universe. The history of humanity has been marked by migration flows, but it is fear that allows shallow demagoguery, and sometimes open racism, increasingly to inhabit Europe's politics – to the extent that it has been the decisive factor in several recent elections.

But we must respond to fear with political courage.

The country I represent, Italy, has saved countless human lives over the past months. I'd like to pay tribute to the women and men, both military and civilian, who even now are displaying solidarity and courage in keeping our fellow human beings alive. Aboard the ships of our navy and coastguard, three babies have been born in the past six months.

These “angels of the sea” are making Europe a better place. I used to be the mayor of Florence. The identity of this great region stems from the masterpieces of past geniuses, from

Michelangelo to Leonardo, from Galileo to Brunelleschi, from the Uffizi to the Palazzo Vecchio. But when I used to speak to elderly people in cafes or in the streets, they would tell me that the thing they were proudest of wasn't the ancient masterpieces, but having helped to save lives and protect artworks during the flood of 1966. We used to call these people the "angels of the mud". Today, Italy is proud of its angels of the sea, just as Florence was of its angels of the mud.

However, while lives are being saved we also know that there isn't enough room for everyone. **Whoever has the right to asylum must be welcome in Europe, not just in Italy, despite the EU's Dublin regime.** But it is inconceivable that one country should tackle the entirety of this problem on its own. Responsibility and solidarity are concepts that go hand in hand.

Anyone who doesn't have the right to remain in Europe must be repatriated. And in those countries, the European Union – including Italy – must do more in terms of providing aid, to support international development projects, and cultural and technological exchange programmes.

But Europe must have a strategy. And it needs to be clear. Today's uncertainty will lead to tomorrow's problems. This is what happened in Libya, where intervention put an end to a brutal dictatorship, but that intervention wasn't followed up with a strategy to deal with the aftermath. We are, as a consequence, now paying the price of this failure. More than 90% of migrants to Italy leave from a Libyan coast that is no longer guarded by the government.

Today's problem isn't about Italy facing this emergency alone. We're a great country that will not fall into hysteria just because one year we have a few thousand more refugees than expected. If forced to do it alone, we would not shy away from the challenge. We will not stop saving lives, because on our shoulders we have centuries of civilisation. We will not turn our backs on that just to improve our ratings in the opinion polls: human life matters more than approval.

However, an EU-wide response is needed by Europe far more than it is needed by Italy. Italy could go it alone in the Mediterranean. But it's Europe that cannot afford to let this happen. That's the political point. It's Europe that needs to demonstrate the values it believes in and stands for. Europe isn't a bundle of economic ties, it's a community of people, a shared destiny, and ideals. If this common purpose is diminished, we lose our European identity.

We want to fight for a set of values, for civility and peace. This is why the European Union was founded – not for bond spreads and stability pacts, but for these values. If we ignore them now, while the Mediterranean seethes, and children drown, it is Europe itself that we lose.

We are at a crossroads and we need to decide if events in the Mediterranean are everyone's problem, or only that of the countries in the region. If solidarity and responsibility prevail, solutions can be found: from the number of people to be admitted, to identification and readmission operations, and funding. However, if selfishness and fear prevail, we risk losing the noble idea underpinning the European project.

For my generation, Europe's identity begins with the fall of the Berlin Wall. I was 14 at the time. Today, my son is 14 and I don't want the symbol of European identity to be a wall between Hungary and Serbia, nor a wall of distrust between the countries of Europe. We need clear rules, and we need to respect them. **Anyone who has the right to stay must be welcomed, and anyone who doesn't should be sent home. But everyone must be saved and helped. For us, for Italy, Europe should be a beacon of civilisation, not a wall of fear.**

8.12 Appendix L

Marine Le Pen: "The Peoples of Europe Hear my Words!" - Marine Le Pen

23 September, 2015

Mr President, fellow parliamentarians. In late August, Angela Merkel flung open Germany's borders. She declared her wish to accommodate 800,000 migrants. Fifteen days later, the German Chancellor slammed into a brick wall called reality. She was obliged to perform an impressive U-turn, suspending the Schengen Agreement. And sent police to Germany's borders, in order to stop the influx of illegal migrants. You EU obsessives have triggered a phenomenon you cannot cope with, and which now threatens to overwhelm us! The verdict of history will hold YOU responsible. This madness must stop! **We need a firm and clear-cut policy instead, the same applied by Australia. One which arrests the inflow, while there is still time;** and yet the chaos continues! When you are in the wrong, you try to stop me from speaking. **But believe me, the peoples of Europe hear my words!** On Monday, we had the emergency meeting of interior ministers at the European Council, on the migration crisis. It resulted in total disarray between those who want to impose migrant quotas, and those who

refuse them. Germany, through its interior minister, immediately threatened severe financial sanctions against those objecting. This blackmail is absolutely indecent. Now it is the turn of our Socialist parliamentary president, Mr Schulz. In an intolerable undemocratic stroke, he has imposed an emergency vote on migrant quotas in this chamber, with the complicity of the PES and EPP. But France — forgive me, because France interests me most — already has very large assimilation problems. *We already have 7 million unemployed, 10 million poor, and 1.5 million households waiting for social housing. We cannot accommodate anyone. It is therefore absolutely vital to bring an end to the Schengen system, to allow each country to control its own borders.* Before you... Before you, Europe was at peace! Today we witness wars of influence, an economic war, and antagonisms and conflicts between European countries. What a great success, indeed!

8.13 Appendix M

Parliamentary questions – Matteo Salvini

5 March, 2015

The recent dramatic events in Australia, where an Islamic extremist took a large number of customers hostage in a café, killing two of them and eventually being stopped only when the police intervened, mean that we have to think about the fact that all western countries, and particularly the EU Member States, are at risk of attacks.

Given that ever-increasing immigration from third countries in which Islamic extremism is particularly established is undoubtedly a factor that increases the risk of terrorist incidents in Europe, can the Commission answer the following questions:

Is it going to review its own migration policies to make them more restrictive, including in consideration of the crisis conditions they are already causing in many European States?

What strategies is it setting in place to protect European citizens from the possibility of further attacks by Islamic terrorists?

8.14 Appendix N

Tim Sebastian interviews Frauke Petry – Frauka Petry

21 March, 2016

Sebastian: But why this obsession with where is the boundary between what is ours and what is foreign to us? Countries are melting pots these days, aren't they?

Petry: Countries have always been melting pots, but being a melting pot...

Sebastian: Why do you have to say 'This is ours and that's theirs'. Why do [you] cause divisions like this?

Petry: The division is already there, [if] we have to talk about children in school not being able to do their swimming lessons together. If now we have to talk about separate bathing times in public swimming pools, it's not us creating division, the division is already there because there are different cultural backgrounds. And being a melting pot is okay. And Germany has been a melting pot for a very long time, but it is question of time and numbers, isn't it? And if I want to move into a new country, if I'm an immigrant, then I think that it is fairly obvious that I have to assimilate to a certain degree into the new country, if I want to be a part of it. This has always been like that.

Sebastian: 'But the health of our own nation is in danger because millions of people from all sorts of countries are streaming toward us.' This was Björn Höcke, your party leader in Thuringa. Is that really the case? You are really so in danger? Really so fragile? So under threat?

Petry: You see, these are not the words I use. But I think if we think that being a liberal country, being a democratic country, means that we can live without borders, then we are going to be capable...

Sebastian: I wasn't talking about living about borders.

Petry: But deciding about who is migrating and who is not, who is going to be part of a new country is in the end a question of borders, whether you see them or whether you don't. When I go to France I don't see the border, but I know it's there and accept it, be it in terms of speeding limits or be it in terms of laws and legislation.

Sebastian: We are not talking about speeding limits. We are talking about repressing one culture in order to strengthen the other, aren't we?

Petry: No we don't, unless you tell me that we repress anyone.

Sebastian: Well, you don't want minarets and you don't want people wearing Burkas.

Petry: Oh, that's interesting, that's interesting. If we have laws in Germany and want that these German laws are being stuck to, we repress someone? Is that what you are telling me?

Sebastian: Not being able to have a minaret, not being able to dress the way you want, isn't that repression? You think that's normal?

Petry: So you think that Burkas and veils should be worn in public everywhere in Germany?

Sebastian: Why shouldn't they? Tell me why! Why shouldn't they? Why shouldn't they?

Petry: Why should they? No, I think they don't have to!

Sebastian: Don't have to. But you ban them.

Petry: No, we think that in German public, at schools, we've had this discussion before in Germany that this sort of religious costume should not be worn.

8.15 Appendix O: Where the world's refugees come from (Figure 2)




Figure 2 Where the world's refugees come from (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6).

8.16 Appendix P: Major Refugee-hosting countries (Figure 3)




Figure 3 Major refugee-hosting Nation States (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7).

8.17 Appendix Q: Total number of Asylum application by age (Figure 4)




Figure 4 (Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2015)

8.18 Appendix R: Total number of male Asylum Application by age (Figure 5)




Figure 5 (Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2015)