

The Lesser of Two Evils

Addressing Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Through the Involvement of Private Military Security Companies



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0.1 Abstract

Being met with immense operational challenges and lack-lustre commitments from developed nations, UN peacekeeping operations struggle to fulfil the high expectations pushed upon it from a global populace seeking human security. This study addresses such challenges by suggesting a controversial venue for bridging security gaps and enabling more efficient peacekeeping operations, namely the private security industry. Through a wider historical context and a review of its contemporary usage, this study argues that the private sector does indeed hold the ability to off-set many of the operational challenges present in 21st century peacekeeping, and while not the ideal solution, it is a viable one. The study argues that by adhering to external guidelines on best-practices and enforcing such self-regulatory mindsets on the industry, then they, in conjunction with organisational oversight mechanisms and leadership, will be able to step in, where the system falls short.

Keywords: *PMSC, PMC, Mercenaries, UN, Peacekeeping, R2P, Intervention, Security*

0.2 Preface

My interest in the private security industry has, to a large extent, been ingrained in me for the last seven years. Ever since my deployment to Helmand, Afghanistan as part of the Danish ISAF commitments where I, for the first time, encountered and worked alongside PMSCs. Through these experiences, I have grown increasingly interested in explaining what I initially believed to be an anomaly in contemporary security, but that I by now, have gained a more comprehensive understanding and justification for. The private security sector has thus become a recurring topic in my academic career, addressed from various angles and perspectives, and at this time it has become an interesting tool to be used in addressing other another passionate topic of mine, namely Human Security.

Naturally the process of working on this extensive study has been arduous as limited time and great ambitions have paved the way for ever-increasing stress levels. Luckily, I have benefited greatly from a vast support structure who in each their own way has cheered me on, offered guidance or simply provided solid intellectual sparring during the process. As such I would like to thank my supervisor **Peter van Ham** (*The Clingendael Institute*) for enabling me to have such a high level of ownership and independence under his, at times quite critical, guidance. **Ragnhild Drange** (*Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs*) for always having time for a coffee and a motivational talk. **Stef Wittendorp** (*Institute of Security and Global Affairs*) for confirming that my hunches on the changes in UN discourse was indeed significant and in turn, how I should address this topic. **Nadja Elnef** for letting me exploit her vast design skills. My parents, **Annelise Borum** and **Jørgen Kolding**, who has always supported me in my, at times risky, endeavours. My siblings, **Rebekka**, **Asger**, **Kristoffer** and **William** who have always had my back. My thesis study-buddies **Carl Tobias Reichert** and **Nicholas Welsh** who have always been good for academic sparring and occasional procrastination. The **KV Foundation** in Denmark who has supported my academic efforts here at Leiden University and lastly friends from across the world who have cheered me on from the side-line. Without your combined efforts, I am sure this project would not have been possible!

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1. Introduction

During the 1998 Ditchley Foundation Lecture, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Kofi Annan stated

"...Some have even suggested that private security firms, like the one which recently helped restore the elected President to power in Sierra Leone, might play a role in providing the United Nations with the rapid reaction capacity it needs. When we had need of skilled soldiers to separate fighters from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, I even considered the possibility of engaging a private firm. But the world may not be ready to privatize peace."

(UNDPI, 1998)

The world, in 1998, might have not been ready to privatize peace, but much has changed in the nineteen passing years since Kofi Annan contemplated the potential that he saw in the involvement of the private military company Executive Outcomes, in Sierra Leone during the mid-nineties. In contemporary conflicts, we have seen the private sector establish itself as an indispensable partner for conventional military forces, to whom it provides a vast array of security related services. With this widespread involvement, it has only become natural to consider the validity of large-scale integrations of private contractors into UN peacekeeping operations, to off-set some of the key challenges that 21st century peacekeeping is plagued by. This notion has become the overarching theme for this study as it establishes a utilitarian argument stating that the privatization of peace might not be the best available solution, but rather a viable solution that, while being a lesser evil, would stay off an even greater evil; doing nothing at all.

This study initially provides a historical context for how ingrained the private security industry has been in western history, displaying how the ebb and flow of nationalism in Europe coincides with the disappearance of the historical mercenaries and the emergence of the modern private military security companies. At the same time the historical context uncovers that growing expectations of the UN as a security provider, along with increasingly hard conflict environments are exacerbated by asymmetric burdens on developing nations for troop contributions. This asymmetry correlates

with the ongoing crisis of nationalism in the developed world, where the general populace is unwilling to fight and to support military endeavours. With an understanding of where the general challenges stem from and how the private sector fits into the wider security context, this study reveals interesting developments in UN organizational discourse and more importantly, in its actions. Through a time-based study and through data-mining official UN procurement reports, this study establishes an increasing openness towards private sector inclusion in security related roles through UN reports on this topic, and further through data-mining we can establish that the UN is already reliant on private security contractors to maintain its operations. Such results pave the way for a study of the key operational challenges we find to UN peacekeeping, and in turn uncover how the private sector has already proven track-records in fulfilling such specific security gaps. Naturally, as the title alludes, this study does acknowledge that the private sector is indeed not the most optimal solution, as further commitments from western powers would be preferable. This notion is partially tied to the many problems that have been experienced with private contractors in past conflicts. Such concerns are investigated and briefly compared to similar cases involving peacekeeping forces, before addressing how such concerns can be alleviated and minimized.

This overall approach is unique in the sense that addresses several critiques of contemporary literature on the topic of private security, notably by avoiding a US/UK centric focus, investigating outsourcing beyond the state, and not focusing entirely specific aspects such as the regulation, control and accountability of contractors (van Meegdenburg, 2015). Instead this study is intended to provide a holistic approach to an unconventional and complex topic, addressing multiple important facets in a pragmatic and applicable fashion.

1.1 Research Problem

As the introduction alludes, then this study will seek to prescribe the use of non-conventional forces as a potential solution for several operational challenges present in 21st century peacekeeping operations. Conventional solutions have so far proven unviable due to a general lack of political will to ensure that contemporary peacekeeping operations has access to the full range of personnel and material that it needs. As such this thesis will present an unconventional solution in the form of a utilitarian argument for outsourcing efforts in UN interventions. This central argument can be defined under an overarching research question:

RQ Under what conditions, and to what extent can the integration of Private Military Security Companies into a United Nations peacekeeping framework provide a viable solution to key operational challenges, notably regarding capacity building and the rapid-response difficulties that the contemporary operational structures suffers from?

To better address such a complex question, four distinct arguments form the hypothetical framework in an effort to segment the research question into more approachable sub-topics.

HP1 Progressive changes in the rhetoric's and actions of the United Nations is a positive indicator for a systemic shift towards the possibility of employing and deploying private security contractors in United Nations peacekeeping operations

HP2 The inclusion of Private Military Security Companies in the operational frameworks for United Nations peacekeeping can facilitate clear-cut rapid response capabilities.

HP3 Private Military Security Companies would be able to fill key capacity gaps in United Nations Peacekeeping operations.

HP4 Key concerns for private sector inclusion can be off-set by adhering to strict oversight mechanisms, comprehensive codes of conduct and international standards for best practices in a transparent and regulated contractual environment.

1.2 Research Design

The scope of, and approach towards, the overarching research question would indicate a prescriptive research framework, supported heavily by descriptive and explanatory means to firmly provide the necessary information to fully encompass the vast and complex nature of the topic, and provide an explanation of how developments related to private sector inclusion has come to pass.

The thesis itself is based around four core discussions. The first outlines the historical context for mercenary culture in western history and the role of the UN as a security provider until contemporary history. This is followed by discussion and analysis of how the UN has changed not only its rhetoric, but also its actions when it comes to outsourcing security to the private security industry. A natural follow-up to this discussion comes in the form of a utilitarian study of the challenges facing the UN that would warrant private sector inclusion, and in turn, what potential the private sector has when it comes to fulfilling security gaps for the UN. Lastly, the thesis addresses numerous concerns over what implications the privatization of warfare and peacekeeping might have with an overview and discussion of key scandals entailing private actors in recent conflicts, and as a comparable measure, discusses similar cases related to UN peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, this chapter will also discuss appropriate developments in terms of ensuring that such events will not take place in the form of basic regulatory approaches. Each discussion will, for the sake of continuity and interrelated topics, contain short sub-analyses focused on answering the hypothetical framework in the form of the specific central agreements illustrated earlier.

The overall method of addressing these topics has been a qualitatively driven yet quantitatively supported approach, but as the quantitative date has been approached primarily using methods tied to data visualisation rather than quantitative modelling then, despite the proximity, it cannot be truly claimed to be mixed methods. In this setting, qualitative research is in this context defined as an interpretive research toolset that attempts to capture a holistic overview of social phenomenon (Creswell, 2003). Comparatively, quantitative research is defined as a statistical research method where patterns can be distinguished through interpretation of large-sum data collections (Creswell, 2003). Data visualization, or descriptive statistics as it is also

known, is a simplified approach to quantitative research where, *in lieu* of complex modelling, quantitative data is simply used to facilitate easily accessible overviews through visual means (Mann, 2012).

The overarching research design of this study is, at its core, a case study focusing on private sector inclusion into UN Peacekeeping operations, with supportive external case studies of outsourcing in conventional conflicts. Robert K. Yin explains case-studies as an inquiry of an empirical nature, seeking to address a contemporary phenomenon within a wider real-life context, often in cases where the interlinks between phenomenon and context are not entirely obvious and where multiple sources or layers of evidence are used (Yin, 2009). Due to the scope and scale of this case, it has been divided into the four central discussions mentioned earlier, addressing key facets of an otherwise complicated topic in a segmented manner. This approach of dividing the overarching topic into smaller individual segments has the added benefit of enabling a much clearer research approach to dealing with the diverse range of hypotheticals in an empirical manner, using tailored theoretical approaches to help uncover motivations, contexts or patterns that an observatory study would be unable to discern. This approach can be regarded as a multiple-case design, as inclusiveness towards complimentary, countering or supplementary cases beyond our primary case increases the validity and robustness of the overall study (Zainal, 2007). This approach also addresses a key concern about single-case studies lacking in soundness due to the issues of reproducing results and to the narrow research focus. To offset this, a multi-case study has been chosen, as important data regarding PMSC inclusion is found outside of the UN paradigm that constitutes the primary case study (Yin, 2009).

To a large extent this study is focused around compiling data from contemporary sources through reviews of the extensive literature on the overall topic of PMSCs. This topic as an academic field can still be considered to have a fledgling status, as discourse on the topic is relatively new, and has taken years to gain its contemporary momentum. Early studies conducted by Herbert Howe and Kevin O'Brien, focusing on mercenary activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, paved the way for academic and professional approaches to an ever-expanding field, as outsourcing of war has become increasingly common place (Howe, 1998) (Howe, 1998) (O'Brien, 1998).

In contemporary times, notably in the post-war on terror era, important scholars in the field of private security and their role in contemporary security such as Peter W. Singer, Christopher Kinsey and David Isenberg have all cemented their positions as leading scholars on the field by providing exhaustive and highly-respected studies of the contemporary iteration of mercenary culture, inclusive of the wider historical context of mercenary activities. (Singer, 2007) (Kinsey, 2006) (Isenberg, 2008). More specialized studies have naturally also been carried out, such as Scott Fitzsimmons and Molly Dunigan's research onto the theoretical and technical value of private sector inclusion *vis-à-vis* overall military effectiveness in complex public-private partnerships (Dunigan, 2011). Others, such as Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, have instead focused on establishing well-rounded analytical frameworks of the industry's impact on international relations theory perspectives and its impacts on globalization and on notions of sovereignty; balance of power; and state functions (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010). Naturally, considering the controversial nature of PMSCs, the field also retains several highly critical scholars such as Deborah Avant and Åse G. Østensen who argue against any notion of integration into peacekeeping frameworks. Such critique, while valid, does share characteristics with similar concerns over conventional peacekeeping forces, a fact that this study seeks to address to gain a more coherent perspective of the practical effects than a more focused study would reveal (Avant, 2005) (Østensen, 2011).

While a qualitatively driven approach is central to this study, namely in the form of a vast review of applicable literature, supportive measures have been taken to add further depth to the study. Critical discourse analysis has been conducted, reviewing official UN reports to the General Assembly on the use of mercenaries. This analysis has been entirely focused on bridging categorization efforts of non-state actors in conflicts (*namely mercenaries, private military security contractors or foreign fighters*), all categorizations used by the UN working group on the use of mercenaries. Through this study, key defining attributes have been data-mined from the reports in a qualitative format, and held against a wider social context to extrapolate meanings. This method is described in detail under the discussion on changing UN views in Ch. 3. A further complimentary approach has been to include supportive quantitative data

as much as possible in order to further support qualitative claims and create a more substantial overall discussion.

When considering sources, a clear effort has been put on maintaining a balance between primary and secondary sources. Notably, the use of primary sources has been paramount to understanding the UN as a key stakeholder in this study, as this firmly outlines the operational paradigm appropriate for private sector inclusion in UN operations, and further provides the best possible overview of the contemporary status of UNDPKO operations. Such sources are all first-hand sources, obtained through official channels, namely in the form of reports. While these sources have all been of immense value, secondary sources in the form of applicable literature, scholarly works, news segments and private sector data have enabled a much higher level of analytical depth, and have uncovered several central concepts that primary sources alone could have not provided. This wide approach ensures a higher degree of construct validity, as the inclusion of a wide range of sources enables a level of generalizability in cases of similar phenomena (*in this case, PMSCs*), which positively affects the overall quality of the study (Leung, 2015).

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Several theoretical frameworks are applied during this study, namely to address and reason for key conceptual questions that guide the overarching study of PMSCs and their interlink with state- and organisational security. Furthermore, applying multiple theories enables us to better understand the responses that we have seen in different stakeholders, and to better comprehend the obstacles and enabling factors of private sector inclusion in both conventional and peacekeeping operation.

1.3.a Outsourcing of security

When considering the topic of the privatization of warfare in a contemporary context, then it is only natural to turn to the realist paradigm of international relations. Realist theories are often state-centric approaches, where the concepts of power and sovereignty are paramount. Power can be defined in different manners, and a comprehensive definition is provided by Viotti and Kauppi, who explain power as;

“the means by which a state or other actor wields or can assert actual or potential influence or coercion relative to other states and non-state actors because of the political, geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural, or other capabilities it possesses” (Viotti & Kauppi, 2013, p. 202).

However, as we are specifically discussing power within international structures, using non-state actors as power facilitators, then it quickly becomes clear that conventional realist theories are too limited when it comes to acknowledging the complex international system. As such, this study will follow the notions of Keohane’s modified structural realism, an adapted form of neorealism that is more applicable to the overall context of this study (Keohane, 1986). In modified structural realism, we find a more open realist approach to dealing with non-state actors in the international system. In it, it is acknowledged that states are indeed the primary actors on the international stage, but that they are by no means alone, as international organisations and other non-state actors play important secondary roles (Keohane, 1986). When it comes state interests under Keohane’s framework, then it is assumed that states are rational unitary actors, pursuing national interests. Such interests are however affected by the international system and further by internal factors such as public opinion. Such factors however, do not shape state behaviour, rather behaviour is shaped by the anarchic nature of the international system. A further important notion under Keohane’s framework is the approach to power, where it is assumed that states will attempt to maximize military power, but it is acknowledged that states also maintain an interest in pursuing alternate types of power, such as soft or smart power (Keohane, 1986). This framework forms a basis for understanding the overall theoretical background for pursuing outsourcing efforts in the contemporary security paradigm, and is further supported by the economic theory of rational choice. Rational choice is a fitting supplement to modified structural realism as an explanatory factor that can assist in providing a reasoning for outsourcing efforts made by states by entering such a context into a utility-maximizing framework (Janoska, 2012). This framework would indicate an effort by states to ensure maximum gains from the least possible investment, a notion that is of use when considering the impact of public opinion on national interests later in this study.

1.3.b Shifting UN views on PMSCs

Over time, the United Nations has shifted its views on what has historically been considered as mercenary activities in conflicts, and in doing so has attempted to distinguish between different types of actors falling within this framework. These actors, be they mercenaries, private military security contractors or foreign fighters, are thus eventually clearly separated from one-another and addressed in each their own manner. This change has, to a large extent, been facilitated by external actors, namely states and private actors. For states, the effects of military downsizing in the post-cold-war era have adversely affected their ability to engage in conflicts, and as illustrated in later chapters, this has shaped a culture where military outsourcing is common place and necessary. The private sector, motivated by profit, has helped in shaping these changes, positioning themselves so that they might fulfil systemic military gaps in various conflict settings. This shift in social context can to a large degree be explained through regime theory, a theory seeks to explain the motivation for establishing norms and values that coincide with state interests based on contextual changes (Stoyanov, 2012). Stephen D. Krasner argues

“Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. When norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change to a new regime or a disappearance of regimes from a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1998, p. 188).

This explanation thus fits with the conceptualization of shifting state capabilities and state interests in retaining a high level of military readiness and power. Further, this can be helpful in explaining why the UN has been forced to adopt an open policy towards private sector security, despite its initial reluctance.

1.3.c The Problem of PMSCs

Several challenges present themselves when considering the implications of outsourcing security, particularly in UN peacekeeping. Such concerns can largely be tied to two theoretical concepts, namely Max Webers theory on the monopoly of violence and the Augustinian ideas of just war theory. The Weberian principle behind the monopoly of violence is to a large extent tied to the sovereignty of states and the legitimacy that states inheritably maintain. In his essay “Politics as a vocation”, Weber states

“Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919, p. 1)

This principle is often taken out of context and is used as an argument for states being the only actors able to wield legitimized force. This is however a misconception, as Weber further states

“Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it” (Weber, 1919, p. 1)

This addendum is of importance, as it opens up for non-state actors being empowered by states to wield legitimate force on its behalf; a notion that is important both for UN operations and for legitimizing private contractors in an otherwise state-centric environment. Legitimacy also ties in with the Augustinian notions of just war theory, a military tradition that frames the necessary components for the right to go to war (*jus ad bellum*) and the right conduct of war (*jus in bello*). In this study, the focus is directly linked to UN peacekeeping operations, engagements that, sanctioned by the global community, must follow the highest levels of *jus ad bellum* by nature (Elshtain, 1991). However, when considering the implications and concerns over private sector inclusion into UN operations, the key notion of *jus in bello* becomes challenged. These challenges stem from the core principles of *jus in bello*, namely the concepts of proportional military response and military methods of evil (*malum in se*), that could be challenged by private contractors (Elshtain, 1991). In this sense, just war theory thus becomes directly tied to agency theory; a theoretical framework that explains the relationship between principals (*hiring entities/structures*), and agents (*actors who are hired to provide to produce or facilitate a service for its host*). In this context, the concept of the principal-agent problem lies at the core of the discussion as it addresses the underlying self-interests of both principal and agent, self-interests that are at times miss-matched and can thus produce results that are not in the interest of the governing body (Vaubel, 2006). This theory serves as a supplement to both the Weberian notions of the monopoly of violence and the Augustinian principles of just war theory, as despite the best intentions, agents who are legitimized by states may

respond to conflict events in manner that is not in the interest of its principals, and thus constitute a breach of the core principals of *jus in bello*.

1.3.d PMSCs as Force Multipliers

Two core theories are applied to uncover and explain the force multiplying effects that are commonly tied to private sector integrations, into already well-established military structures. The primary theory used will be Scott Fitzsimmons normative theory of military performance, a constructivist approach to explaining efficiency through a focus on norms and culture, and secondly his approach to neorealist combat balance theory, focusing more keenly on pragmatic aspects of efficiency (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Both theories are applied to this study under the precondition that all UN peacekeeping operations will, by nature, be asymmetric. Asymmetric warfare can be defined as

“the use of innovative strategies, tactics and technologies by a weaker state or a sub-state adversary that are intended to avoid the strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of a larger and technologically superior opponent. This includes two aspects. Firstly, the selective use of weapons or military resources by a state or sub-state group to counter, deter, or possibly defeat a numerically or technologically superior force; and secondly, the use of diplomatic and other non-military resources or tactics by a state or sub-state group to discourage or constrain military operations by a superior force” (Dixit, 2010)

The challenges and prospects of asymmetric warfare are acknowledged in UN frameworks as a reality of contemporary peacekeeping operations, and while the UN acknowledges that it is unable to address all associated challenges, namely regarding counter-terrorism, it still finds itself increasingly embedded in counter-insurgency scenarios (UN, 2015) (Abilova & Boutellis, 2016).

2. Historical Context

The employment of soldiers of fortune throughout history has been a natural way of supplementing or bolstering conventional, national forces. Before the advent of true national militaries, such solutions were both practical and necessary, as retaining vast professional armies were an economic burden that states could seldom bear. While *Levée en masse* was an alternative option, it did not always provide the well trained and well equipped troops that at times were necessary for the successful conduct of warfare. In this sense, history has repeated itself, and while we now no longer speak of Swiss Pikemen, German Landsknechts or Italian Condottieri, we speak of the private military establishment, where corporate warriors are eager to engage in peacekeeping operations and conflicts on behalf of states and international organisations. This is an industry that might, once again, bolster and supplement both national and transnational armies in wars of values and beliefs instead of wars for resources and territory.

2.1 A Mercenary Culture

While the inclusion of mercenary forces has been a recurring theme throughout ancient history, it is sensible to look at the way that they have ingrained themselves in the military history of the western world. A key period of interaction was the late-medieval, early-renaissance period, where images of (*often romanticized*) mercenary companies roaming European battlefields come to mind. These companies, often resembling modern day private military companies, provided well-trained specialists, unique battlefield solutions and capabilities not retained by conventional troops and their auxiliary forces. The golden age of mercenaries can largely be found in the period between the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The peace accords struck at Brétigny saw the end of the Hundred Years War, and with this peace came gradual improvements to revenue generation through enhanced tax systems in mainland Europe. This revenue, alongside a budding sense of national identity, saw increasing changes in the ability of European rulers to retain and employ forces, firstly through the establishment of military cores of national forces, but further, in times of war, by having the option of employing vast cadres of trained professionals from abroad who, in return for wealth, could provide the force needed

to enforce the military aspirations set by their employers (Homila, 2012). These developments thus gave way for the Free Companies, large groups of trained professionals who were willing to risk life and limb in search for monetary gains. Such troops found themselves in an ideal environment to offer such services, as both wealth and conflicts were plentiful in Europe. These irregular bands of mercenaries slowly gave way to more uniform and specialized troops, following the examples of the Swiss Pikemen. The Swiss Reisläufer, or Swiss mercenaries were, to a large extent, a by-product of efforts to ensure the longevity of the Swiss federated cantons (Singer, 2007). Here, each canton was tasked with producing effective units of militiamen, who unlike traditional militias would be well-trained, uniform and able to operate freely within a predetermined strategic framework. For the Swiss, this meant the adoption of the Pike, a long type of spear that was cheap, easy to use and enabled multiple rows of troops to fight simultaneously in well-drilled, tightly packed formations resembling the Greek Phalanx. This development, enforced by strict discipline, meant that the Swiss were soon discovered to be an admirable foe on the battlefield, as their hedgehog styled formations enabled them to take on both infantry and cavalry formations much larger than their own, and defeat them with only limited losses. This is most notable in the battles of Sempach and Näfels, where outnumbered Swiss Pikemen defeated Austrian armies up to four times their own size. Soon after, the Swiss cantons garnered increasing interest from foreign rulers interested in employing militia units across the European theatre (Singer, 2007). This gave way for an organized mercenary industry, where entire militias would uproot and migrate to nations across the continent and would, for a time, come to dominate the battlefields they set foot on. Other nations did however take notice of such events, and sought to emulate the Swiss mercenary endeavours. With Hapsburger support, areas of Germany and Austria followed suit, and paved the way for the famous Landsknecht culture. The Landsknechts would eventually come to surpass their Swiss predecessors as they, compared to the Pikemen, sought to create a more versatile and adaptable fighting force that would – based on battlefield conditions and technological developments - acclimate to changes at a much higher rate than the tried-and-true tactics of the Pikemen. This form of mercenary culture saw a heavier reliance on providing encompassing solutions, fielding specialist forces such as sappers, artilleryists, medics

and commanders alongside rank-and-file infantry. Despite the more complex solutions provided by the Landsknechts, they were unable to retain their domination of the conduct of war in Europe. Societal developments would eventually force them into obsolescence as national armies took to the battlefields of Post-Westphalian Europe (Homila, 2012) (Singer, 2007).

The treaty of Westphalia meant more than a cessation of the Thirty Years' War. It also shifted the European continent towards an era of national identity, where personal empire building gave way to sovereign states, entitled to maintain their internal affairs in the manner they saw fit without the meddling of foreign powers. Naturally, sovereignty is a concept that must be enforced and protected, first and foremost through a monopoly of violence, but further through the development and maintenance of power to deter the great unknowns beyond national borders (Singer, 2007). These sentiments, alongside technological advances in military hardware, paved the way for conscripted national armies. Through these developments, states could produce vast citizen armies with relative ease, motivated by ideas of nationalism and meagre wages instead of pure monetary gains. A natural result of the advent of national armies was that mercenary companies saw their market value dwindle, and the massive industry could no longer sustain itself. Instead they found themselves put on the backburner, and would for a time serve less prestigious roles, often covert in nature, as proxies or supplements to conventional forces. Such was the case with Hessian mercenaries deployed to the American colonies by the British during their war of independence, as the British Empire simply lacked the available manpower to divert its own forces to the American theatre. The sporadic use of on-demand mercenary forces would continue in such a manner for a few hundred years, until the 1990s eventually brought mercenaries into the limelight once again, and paved the way for a second renaissance of mercenary culture (Singer, 2007) (Homila, 2012).

2.2 United Nations, A Fledgling Security Provider

With the mercenary industry on the backburner, the western world changed immensely over the coming centuries, and with two world wars and countless military engagements across the world, society was bound to develop and adapt to the new global reality. One such development was the efforts made to establish a global

community through the League of Nations, the predecessor for the modern day United Nations, whose founding principle was to ensure and maintain world peace. While it is hard to claim that the league, or later the UN, have been able to reach this lofty goal, the UN has become a *de facto* implementer of globally sanctioned interventions, addressing threats to international peace in both inter- and intra-state conflicts. As a global actor, the UN does not maintain its own peacekeeping forces; rather it is entirely reliant on Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), who donate personnel and material at the request of the United Nations Security Council for each specific operation. Traditionally, such operations have had limited mandates for enforcing peace, putting a focus on peacekeeping through presence rather than through the threat of violence. Early missions retained *Hammar skjöldian* ideals, with a strong foundation in peace through presence, relying on the prestige and status of the global community to avoid escalations of conflicts by simply being present in conflict zones. This approach often meant strict rules of engagement, where peacekeeping forces would be hard-pressed to even consider the use of force in self-defence, much less in the protection of others (Findlay, 2002). Over time, these ideals would be forced to give way for more substantial mandates, mandates that enabled peacekeepers to intervene, though only with the minimum level of force required, to ensure security and peace within their areas of responsibility. This initially meant adherence to strict situational rules of engagement that would ensure minimal and reluctant use of force in scenarios requiring UN intervention (Findlay, 2002). Such limited mandates eventually proved to be incompatible with the developing security threats within UN operational frameworks, resulting in a gradual shift towards more robust mandates that enabled more substantial responses to rising threats and operational challenges. As outlined in documents such as the 1992 report by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali “*An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*”, these mandates added an extended focus on increasing the capabilities of UN peacekeepers through the use of military force, and defined more clearly the necessity for peace enforcement units who, with better training and heavier military hardware, were able to ensure compliance with ceasefire agreements and peace accords (UNSG, 1992). Such considerations have paved the way for a concept known as robust peacekeeping, a framework which acknowledges the use of force in UN operational mandates as a

necessary development to firstly ensure the effectiveness of UN interventions, and secondly as a necessary approach to filling the UN’s credibility gap (Tardy, 2011). This reliability gap has to a large extent been exacerbated through some of the more noticeable UN failures to provide human security in instances such as the Rwandan Genocide and the Srebrenica massacre. This meant that, to many stakeholders, the UN had proven itself to be an incapable actor when it came to providing the fundamental levels of security that its peacekeeping forces were intended to supply (Tardy, 2011). As one might expect, such sentiments adds a dimension of pressure on the UN to improve in terms of capabilities, but also in terms of capacity, to avoid widening the gap of credibility. However, in contemporary operations, such endeavours have met with several key obstacles, namely an asymmetric burden on developing nations when it comes to providing peacekeeping forces (IPI, 2017). This inequality is abundantly clear when considering that the top ten TCCs in the period 2000-2017 are all developing nations, while the western world’s contributions are meagre; as can be noted in Figure 1 below and in Figure 2 on the following page.




FIGURE 1 - TOP 10 TCCs 2000-2017 (IPI, 2017)

Figure 1 visualizes the large-scale contributions provided by key developing nations, namely in South Asia and Africa, where Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal stand out as key contributors for UN operations. When looking further at the global contributions in Figure 2, the asymmetric levels of contributions become quite clear, and thus underline a major concern for 21st century peacekeeping. (IPI, 2017)

Data on troop contributions to peacekeeping operations does retain a high level of correlation with what could be considered a crisis of nationalism in the western world, and with it, severe implications when it comes to engaging in conflicts based on both tangible and intangible interests. Such an implication can be noticed in a 2015 WIN/Gallup study, focusing on the willingness of citizens from 64 countries to actively engage in defending their home-countries from external aggression (WIN/Gallup, 2015). Across the study, an average of 61% stated a willingness to act, with a notably higher willingness to fight in non-western nations (*avg. 68%*) compared to western nations (*avg. 35%*). Naturally, this statistical framework is based around a tangible concept of direct national defence against an aggressive external force, a notion that has an immediate impact on both personal and national interests (WIN/Gallup, 2015). However, when considering the crisis on nationalism in a wider UN context, then it is only sensible to draw parallels from the tangible concepts of national defence, to more intangible concepts such as engaging in conflicts based on norms and values around the globe. In such settings, personal motivation for entering conflicts are likely to suffer similar or worse levels of support, notably since the direct impacts of remote conflicts, from a western perspective, are unlikely to be substantial. With a relatively high reluctance to serve in conflict scenarios, it is not unsurprising that we can notice a correlative schism when considering the visualized data in Figure 2 and 3 on the following page. In such a comparison, the top TCCs clearly display higher levels of nationalism *vis-à-vis* the willingness to act in national defence, while lower levels of willingness are typically found with the lesser contributors. Such figures also lend credence to common concerns over western involvement in UN operations, where national interests to a large extent must overlap with UN operations. This comes into play through several inhibiting variables typically tied to political, economic and security concerns. With low levels of domestic support, only minor impacts on national security and an increasing gap between UN compensation and the costs of training and arming troops for UN missions, it is can only be anticipated that we meet heavy reluctance in contributing to UN operations, unless such operations overlaps further with national interests. Such rationalizations are further supported by the higher levels of engagement that southern European nations display, as several UN missions overlap with historical ties, national interests and stronger security implications (Bellamy & Williams, 2013).




FIGURE 3 - GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR MILITARY DEFENCE (WIN/GALLUP, 2015)

With such a framework in mind, ample opportunity has emerged for a second renaissance of mercenary culture, where non-state actors can re-enter the security paradigm and fill security gaps that conventional forces are unable or unwilling to fill. In conventional conflicts, this has been a growing trend since the private security sector stepped into the limelight, when private military companies such as Executive Outcomes were engaged in the conflicts of Sierra Leone and Angola in the 1990s. Since then, the private sector has established themselves firmly as potential security providers who could provide greatly needed solutions, positions which the UN is seeking to fulfil.

2.3 Analysis

History has a way of repeating itself, and when considering what we could call the second renaissance for mercenary culture, it is interesting to draw a number of parallels between the historical context and contemporary developments. A key parallel is the notion that the concept of nationalism has a correlation with the integration of mercenary culture. As illustrated in the historical context, the rise of nationalism and national identity in Europe became a nail in the coffin for the mercenary companies of the era, while in contemporary history, we see a re-emergence of its modern iteration correlating with the crisis of nationalism. From a modified structural realist perspective, states have a clear interest in power, but as noted, state interests are shaped by different variables, and one such variable is public opinion (Keohane, 1986). In this sense, Figure 3 provides us with a road-map for public opinion on the general willingness to engage in conflicts. With this in mind, we can correlate the general levels of unwillingness with military downsizing, and we are left with results that would indicate a mismatch between national and public interest. Public opinion thus shapes state interests by limiting it, and states, who pursue power, will have to adjust to these limitations by whatever means are available to them. This paves the way for a rational choice model where states must seek to maximize the utility value of the investments they make in their pursuit of maximizing relative power, and to this end, the outsourcing of war becomes a cost-effective option. Through such endeavours, limited defence budgets can be directed at providing for essential military functions, while the vast support structures necessary for military

operations can be outsourced to the private sector. The same rationale could be used in UN settings, where western nations could be presented with an alternative to the oft declined requests for troop contributions by offering to become sponsors of private entities who are able to provide valuable contributions to UN missions. Such an option would provide a lower contributinal threshold for states that find themselves unable to commit forces to UN operations, but who still wishes to contribute to fulfil their international obligations.

3. Changes in UN stance

The United Nations has historically taken a staunch stance against what they consider mercenary involvement in conflicts. This resistance has largely been the focal point of the UN *Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination* (WGM) under the Office of the High-Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite this stance, the UN does in fact employ private military security companies, primarily in force protection roles both inside and outside of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) frameworks. These actions, alongside a noticeable shift in rhetoric and several systemic needs in humanitarian operations, establish a firm basis for an argument for ripeness, when we consider private sector inclusion as a potential solution for addressing operational challenges in peacekeeping missions.

The central idea of ripeness is a concept borrowed from negotiations theory, where timing and necessary preconditions pave the way for finding possible solutions to disputes. The theory is largely tied to the realization of both stakeholders being engaged in a mutually hurting stalemate from which the possibility of a positive outcome deteriorates with the threat of a catastrophic failure or breakdown on the horizon (Zartman, 2000). In such scenarios, stakeholders will find themselves committed to a conflict from which escalations and withdrawals will be too costly to engage in, and where remaining in a painful deadlock is likewise inadvisable due to the sustained costs of such efforts (Zartman, 2008). Through a cost-benefit analysis of the situation, both parties will thus realize that the best hope for an acceptable outcome will be tied to seeking a compromise as an alternative to what they might perceive as

an optimal solution. In this instance, the theory will not be applied to negotiations framework, but rather to a policy and decision making framework, exploring how key stakeholders are engaged in a mutually hurting stalemate, and how notable preconditions for engaging the private security sector *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping operations has become a valid compromise.

3.1 Shifting United Nations Views

To a large extent, the UN, and notably the UN secretariat, attempts to keep the touchy subject of PMC inclusion within its organizational framework as a “*don’t ask, don’t tell*” topic (Pingeot, 2012). Such a stance naturally impedes on the ability to uncover any notion of an official UN stance on the topic. However, when considering the WGM under OHCHR, then we are able to find a key organizational stakeholder when it comes to maintaining the wider UN stance on the use of private contractors (Pingeot, 2012).

To explore these changes in the UN stance towards private security, it is appropriate to study the WGM reports facilitated to the UN General Assembly on the topics of mercenaries, private military security companies, and in recent years, the concept of foreign fighters. The study of these reports has been conducted by applying critical discourse analysis (CDA) to core segments of the texts. The objective of CDA is to perceive language as a social practice, as part of a wider contextual framework. This means a coupling of the textual structures of the WGM reports to the social context that lays a foundation for the discourse itself. CDA as a method can be addressed in a wide range of manners tailored to the individual case-studies. In Juraj Horváth’s report on Obamas political speeches, Teun A van Dijk, a renowned scholar in this field, states

“(CDA) is obviously not a homogenous model, nor a school or a paradigm, but at most a shared perspective on doing linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis” (Horváth, 2009, p. 45)

A notable aspect of CDA that distinguishes it from other approaches to text and speech analysis is its focus on critical aspects tied to the social context of the discourse. In a critical analysis, one goal is specifically to underline connections and correlations, which are not always transparent, to a wider social framework. In this application, the reporting years 1995, 2000, 2006, 2010 and 2015 all correlate the developing UN

stance, with a wider institutional or international context. This context, namely in the form of key events and developments, helps to shape the discourse of the working group, in some cases out of necessity, and in others by simply shifting the focus of the working group.

This critical analysis of WGM reports to the UN General Assembly will focus on the terminology and associations used in categorizing the non-state actors within its framework. In doing so, it is possible to extrapolate a shifting, over-time, perspective. These changes in categorizations are further supported by report specific arguments and claims, while being held against the wider social-context of the central thematic of the reports. This approach to CDA is largely based on the framework provided by Norman Fairclough, as he outlines key aspects that must be addressed, namely internal- and external relations. Internal relations are tied to the internal meaning of the text in the form of vocabulary and grammar, while external relations are tied to the wider context for which the discourse fits. Due to the specific focus of this analysis, namely the focus on categorizations and context, this analysis will focus on persuasive declarations as a means for internal relations, while external relations will focus on appropriate shifts in social structures, practices and events (Fairclough, 2012). For further details on this analysis, please see Appendix 1.

3.1.1 Key takeaways from WGM Reports 1995-2015

Initial reports on mercenary activities to the UN General Assembly can to a large extent be considered as providing staunch opposition to any notion of mercenary involvement in conflicts. It is important to note that the social context shifts across a structural line between A/50/390 of 1995 & A/55/334 of 2000 when compared to later reports, as the initial reports were largely facilitated by the special rapporteur on the use of mercenaries Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, while later reports were facilitated by a dedicated working group. Both initial reports share a common approach to vilifying mercenary forces, linking them to a several concepts of organized crime, terrorism and aggression (UNGA, 1995) (UNGA, 2000). A/50/390 is almost entirely focused on mercenary activities, establishing a key stance against the re-emergence of mercenary culture through the involvement of the well-known PMC Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. The report does however also make

a mention of an emergence of foreign fighters in the form of Mujahidin fighters participating in the then conflict in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but initially suggests excluding such a concept from the working groups focus unless it is tied to motivations related to personal gain. However, the report does not address the emerging private security sector in any way, using simply the negatively laden word 'mercenary' as a catch-all term for any such concepts. A key notion in the report is also the explicit goal of preventing the recruitment and usage of mercenary forces in conflicts, a notion that is largely tied to the negative connotations of the term 'mercenary' in the report (UNGA, 1995).

In the following report A/55/334 from 2000, the recurring topic of mercenary activities remains predominant, and once again reiterates several negative traits focusing on the linkages between mercenaries and organized crime. It does however include a further range of transgressions associated with mercenary activities, namely regarding terrorism, destabilization efforts against legitimate states and the forcible control of natural resources in conflict theatres. It also clearly notes that mercenary forces should be considered a human security risk that works against peace, political stability, law and democracy. This report does mention the emerging concept of PMSCs, underlining that private actors make up an important role in contemporary security, but warning that they must not be allowed to replace inherited state functions. Furthermore, the report links PMSCs to mercenary activities, but unlike conventional mercenaries, it does not suggest an elimination of the industry, rather it advises the creation of legal norms and for increased regulation (UNGA, 2000).

In A/61/341 from 2006, the distinct concepts of mercenaries and PMSCs become an increasing focus for the working groups' efforts. For both concepts, the report suggests that clear definitions must be made to avoid any overlap between what it considers two separate forms of non-state security actors. Mercenary forces are still tied to a growing range of criminal offences encompassing further forms of human rights violations, and for all intents and purposes the report maintains its stance against the recruitment and usage of any such forces. For PMSCs, the report acknowledges the heavy reliance of UN institutions on PMSCs for addressing its security needs, and further acknowledges that the industry itself is placed within a legal grey zone, lacking

accountability, regulation and oversight. The increased demands for legal measures to regulate the industry correlates with the establishment of the Swiss initiative, a measure by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Government to establish a framework approach to addressing the outsourcing of security functions to the private sector. This was necessary precaution, as the industry had become connected to human rights violations in Iraq, and these events had underlined the lack of accountability in such instances (UNGA, 2006).

Report A/65/325 from 2010 does, to a large extent, lean on the newly released results of the Swiss Initiative, namely in the form of the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. These documents present a framework for best practices and proper conduct for states, organizations and the industry itself, fitting well with the ever-increasing reliance on private security in conventional conflicts and UN frameworks (*a fact that the report severely underlines*). The report provides only brief mentions of mercenary activities, linking the recruitment of mercenaries to PMSCs and noting ongoing issues with mercenary activities being a destabilizing factor, notably in Africa. Its main focus is, however, PMSCs, an industry that by this point has become so ingrained in security that it warns of overdependence on private actors, an overdependence that erodes the state monopoly of force and continuously has proven a challenging target for regulation and oversight. Such a level of dependence is not only tied to state actors, as the report clearly addresses the UNs own reliance on such forces, advocating a strong system-wide policy on outsourcing security. In this context, an inter-agency network was being created in the reporting year to establish a firm UN stance on the privatization of security functions for its operations. This approach is reconfirmed not to seek the elimination of private sector security in UN operations, as the UN Department of Safety and Security argues that the organizational security needs are impossible to meet without outsourcing key functions to private actors. However, while this is an organizational need that must be met, the report warns against the possible effect that such approaches might have for the organizations image (ICRC-FDFA, 2008) (UNGA, 2010).

In A/70/330 from 2015, the clear focus has shifted entirely away from the concept of PMSCs, and almost exclusively focuses on the concept of foreign fighters *vis-à-vis* the ongoing conflicts in the middle-east, notably in Iraq and Syria. The report still addresses the notions of mercenaries, linking them briefly to their recruitment into PMSCs, but retains a focus on the criminal links that mercenary forces has to terrorism and organized crime. Despite a brief mention of mercenary activities, the report is dedicated to the returning concept of foreign volunteers, transnational insurgents and mujahidin fighters entering inter- and intra-state conflicts, a concept known from the Yugoslav Wars and in Afghanistan. The report takes a dualistic approach to the re-emergence of this concept, acknowledging that foreign fighters may contribute to the right of peoples to self-determination, but that its observations of on-going conflicts would seem to indicate an overall impediment of human rights. Such impediments of human rights are tied to several gross violations and aspects of organized crime, largely linked to a radicalization of warfare and several illicit methods for incentivizing or funding their operations in conflicts (UNGA, 2015).

3.1.2 Summary findings of WGM Reports

When taking a birds-eye-view over the WGM reports studied in the period of 1995-2015, it becomes quite clear that the overall stance against the basic notion of outsourcing security has shifted immensely across the study period. Initial reports paint a highly negative picture of anything related to mercenary activities, including the emerging private security sector. But over time it becomes clear that the WGM, despite an inability to firmly classify the distinct types of non-state security actors, increasingly remains open towards the notions of such outsourcing. This must however be held against a wider context, where societal developments in not only states, but the UN itself, necessitate the inclusion of the private sector to meet specific security needs. This is further underlined by inter-agency discussions on the topic, where notable internal actor in the UN, the UNDSS, quite adamantly insists that without private security contractors, the department would quickly find itself hard-pressed to provide the necessary security for UN delegations, installations and operations. This notion is further addressed in the most recent 2016 report A/71/318, where PMSC inclusion is more directly tied their ability to act as “*Force Multipliers*”,

meaning that their inclusion enables more effective security operations than without. Overall, the conditional openness towards private actors is naturally tied to the wider context of security outsourcing as illustrated in Figures 4 and 6, where both states and the UN display a remarkable level of dependence on private contractors for their operations. Naturally, this underlines the fact that the wider context helps to shape the discourse to a large degree (UNGA, 1995-2016).

3.2 United Nations, Subcontracting and PMC usage

Actions speaks louder than words, and while the minute changes in rhetoric do give credence to a shift in sentiment within the UN system, it is important to also consider what the organization does, compared to what it says. A firm starting point for reviewing the levels of involvement that private security providers have in the wider UN framework is a review of UN Annual Statistical Reports of Procurement (ASRs). These reports cover subcontracting and equipment procurements with a minimum value of \$30,000 in any given financial year. In these reports, numerous entries can be found to subcontracts in the field of security services, and by extracting data from ASRs from 2000-2015, we are able to gain an overview of UN expenditures for private security contractors. Important for this review is the changing methodologies that the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has used to create these reports. Later versions contain compiled data on total expenditures within a specific field, with the notable exception of the report from 2013 where compiled data was not made available, despite it appearing in previous and later versions. This shift is noticeable in the study, as the compiled data might encompass subcontracts that fall short of the margin of inclusion for such reports and possibly include supportive costs tied to procurement. It is also important to note that in early reports the designation used to encompass private security forces is simply known as “*Security Services*”, while in more recent reports from 2012 and onwards, the term “*Security and Safety Services and Public Order*” emerges. Such a distinction, while tied to discourse, does add further value to the overall argument that the UN perception of what private actors may provide in terms of services, as security, safety services, and upholding public order each carries different connotations when it comes to the specifics of services rendered.

When considering the annual expenditure reports, it becomes quite apparent that the 21st century has seen a steady rise in private sector inclusion, seen in Figure 4.




FIGURE 4 - UN EXPENDITURES, SECURITY SERVICES, 2000-2015 (UNOPS, 2000-2015)

As Figure 4 demonstrates, much has changed in terms of private sector inclusion in UN security during this timeframe. In the early period of study, we can note a quite low level of reliance on security subcontractors, but from 2008 onwards, we notice a surge in subcontracts being placed for security, safety and public order. When faced with such developments, it is important to consider what intervening factors might explain the rising levels of private sector inclusion in this field. An initial concern would be shifting methodologies of UN statistical reporting, but the impact of such reporting shifts should only provide minute impacts that should not have an adverse effect on studies of this scale (UNOPS, 2000-2015). A more appropriate correlation would, however, be severe changes in mission commitments, where a similar, gradual rise in conventional personnel commitments to UN missions would explain the increased role of the private sector as a proportional response. However, this is not the case when considering the combined UN deployments of troops, observers and police in this period, as noted in Figure 5.




FIGURE 5 - UN PERSONNEL COMMITMENTS, 2000-2015

When comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5, we notice that while both forms of deployments experience a boom, then conventional deployments ballooned from 2003 and onwards, while the private sector spike only became apparent from 2008 on. This would indicate that private sector inclusion is indeed not a proportional response, but rather indicates an increased reliance over time. This seems to suggest that the UN is suffering from an asymmetric relationship between the supply and demand of security forces in its operations. This would mean that if conventional sources, namely states, are unwilling or unable to meet UN demands, then alternate sources such as the private sector have been engaged. Such endeavours can both serve to implicate private actors in more active roles than simply providing static security, as the terminology “*public order*” in the ASRs would indicate. These approaches would free up conventional peacekeeping forces, who in turn would be able to focus on more demanding duties such as frontline operations or operations in hostile areas. However, when looking at the actual deployment scenarios that private contractors face in UN settings, then their involvement is not limited to low-risk scenarios, but rather they already perform tasks typically reserved for conventional forces.

3.2.1 United Nations & the role of Contractors

Private military security companies provide numerous services for the UN, limited not only to guard duties, but also in encompassing complex security functions such as training, consultancy, technical expertise and mobile security for convoys and delegations. This wide range of involvement is important to further explore, as it helps to underline the extent of services rendered by PMSCs in the wider UN framework, and in turn establishes a wider precedence for further inclusion in peacekeeping operations.

3.2.1.a Force Protection

Force Protection is a military term that encompasses a general approach to measures taken to mitigate hostile actions to friendly personnel, resources, facilities and critical information (DOD, 2017). In this framework, such tasks would generally translate into providing static security for UN offices, camps, installations and protection teams, ensuring the personal safety of UN representatives, delegations and convoys. It is safe assumption that the clear majority of security services in force protection frameworks are tied to the common perception of security guards in domestic settings, where unarmed contractors provide rudimentary services at offices, shops, factories or similar. Such inclusion, while of importance to the central arguments are however not the focus of this study. Rather the focus shifts towards the militarized versions of force protection, where armed security details can respond to threats with force. Such versions have become increasingly common in UN frameworks, with notable instances of armed private contractors being employed or offered employment in a wide range of conflicts. A notable attempt of private sector engagement into humanitarian operations was conducted during the Somalian Civil War in the early 1990s. Here UN officials reached out for help to Alastair Morrison, a former Special forces colonel from the British Special Air Service (SAS), who in 1981 helped found Defense Systems Limited (DSL), a Private Military Company based around a core of former SAS operatives and a wide portfolio of cold war warriors, notably Ghurkha troops who had served in the British Army at the time. Their request was simple, yet high risk. The UN wanted DSL to provide security for its humanitarian convoys under regular attacks by local warlords, and here it was anticipated that DSL would be forced to respond to threats with force, to repeal their assailants so vital aid would be able to reach the

civilian population. In the end, DSL decided against the offer; the associated risks and available support from the UN for such an endeavour outweighed the possible compensations (Pingeot, 2012) (Østensen, 2011) (Singer, 2007). DSL would later that year be contracted by the UNDPKO for providing support for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, where they, alongside other major PMCs, would supply the UN forces with crucial services. Here DSL was contracted to deploy 425 operatives from 24 countries and facilitate several tasks, notably close protection of UN personnel, border security and of special note, the acquisition and operation of armoured vehicles. For DSL, this meant accessing vast cold-war stockpiles of Soviet BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers in Czech Republic, shipping them in-theatre and providing the maintenance and operational capacities for them (Østensen, 2013). The reasons for such an endeavour were two-fold; first and foremost, the UN acknowledged that the security situation warranted heavier military hardware than simple “*soft-skin*” vehicles, which offered little protection from the often-encountered small arms fire in the mission. The second key element of this decision was the lack of capabilities of the Asian and African Peacekeepers in operating such hardware, and who had thus only committed light mechanized infantry. This translated into a distinct gap of capacity and capacities for their operations, and as a result DSL was engaged to off-set and bridge the gap so that these forces could perform the military operations requested of them. This also meant that DSL contractors would, in UN civilian uniforms and wearing UN badges, serve alongside conventional peacekeepers during their operations (HC FAC, 2002). Such proactive roles, taken up by private contractors in UN operations, would become even more widespread after the Congolese student riots targeting UN staff and the attacks on UN offices in Baghdad, Beirut and Algiers in 2004-2007. These events shifted focus towards increased force protection measures to ensure the safety of UN representatives and installations, and in numerous instances proved necessary, as in the case of the 2010 Herat Attack. In this instance, the Nepalese based PMC IDG Security provided close protection and static security for a UN Compound in the heart of the Herat Province, Afghanistan. Here they responded to a Taliban attack on the compound after a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VB-IED) was rammed into the front gates and detonated, enabling a group of attackers to enter the perimeter armed with suicide vests and small arms. Upon entry,

the Taliban assailants were met by sustained fire from armed IDG guards, who successfully overcame the threat before the attackers could enter the UN compound and detonate their vests (Kittleson, 2010) (AP, 2010).

3.2.1.b Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Consultancy

Private security contractors serve a wider range of functions than simply providing security guards of varying forms; they also provide several highly-specialized functions, that are essential to the successful conduct of military operations. Such functions can, in broad swipes, be categorized as fitting within the fields of combat support, combat service support and various forms of military consultancy. Combat support and combat service support is at their core; the provisioning of services that enable combat operations, such as specialists able to address chemical, biological, atomic and nuclear (CBRN) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) threats, providing logistical support in the form of resupplies, maintenance and medical care. And further, providing varying levels of intelligence and signal services such as recognizance, cryptography, communication and translator services. Furthermore, private actors have also proved capable of addressing root causes of security gaps in national frameworks, as they here can facilitate training of conventional military and police forces, restructure military paradigms and assist in establishing suitable strategic approaches for conflict scenarios. This wide range of supportive services has enabled the private sector to take up increasing levels of responsibilities in contemporary conflicts, as their inclusion into conventional forces has been freed up for combat arms functions, meaning highly militarized frontline functions. Much is the same in UN frameworks, where the UN has a long history of outsourcing specialist functions to private contractors, as the conventional forces committed to UN operations were not always able to provide such expert roles themselves. A prime example of such engagement can be found in the UN Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS) itself, as the UN in this case contracted an undisclosed Private Military Firm to assess, assist and advise on how the UNDSS should be structured and, in a more general sense, operate. These recommendations also included a division of responsibility when it came to security personnel, which is naturally interesting when considering the private sectors active interests in establishing a beneficiary, from the security industry's point of view, system for subcontracting (UNOIOS, 2008) (Pingeot, 2012) (Østensen, 2013). Another instance of

private sector engagement in expert roles for UN operations can be found in EOIND5648, a 2010 UN procurement notice from the UN Secretariat, requesting expressions of interest from private entities, for providing UN personnel with Safety Awareness Induction Training (SAIT) for UN operatives in the UN assistance mission to Iraq (UNAMI) (Dias, 2010). SAIT training was intended as a method of establishing a basic framework for operational awareness and security so that UN operatives could conduct functions in a safe and efficient manner. A \$1.143.682 contract for providing such training was awarded to Hart Security, a UK based private military firm focusing on risk assessments and advanced security training, translating into a cost-per-person of \$3500 when considering the size of the UN commitments to UNAMI. An often-occurring procurement is tied to operational needs for services that UN TCCs are unable to contribute with themselves. These needs often correlate with the poor armaments, equipment and training that TCC, generally developing nations, provide for UN missions. In these instances, private contractors are often asked to provide airlift, air-reconnaissance, armour or naval capabilities as seen in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Iraq and Somalia, amongst others (Pingeot, 2012). A similar approach is taken when it comes to EOD/de-mining efforts, as the expert skillsets required to perform such duties in operational frameworks pushes the requirements on personnel, in terms of training and expertise, outside of what is possible for many of the key TCCs to provide to UN missions. Developments of such skills are costly and time-consuming, and most often such skills are in great demand in both military and civilian systems. This leaves notable safety gaps in UN missions, and again this capacity gap has enabled the private sector to successfully place themselves as a security provider in such settings. Notable instances include the PMC EOD efforts in the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), where the combined efforts of Capricorn Systems International, Saracen International and Shibata Security established a precedence for almost entirely outsourcing such services in all UN operations since the mid-1990s (HCFCO, 2002) (Isenberg, 2009) (Sheehy, Maogoto, & Newell, 2008). These supportive endeavours have enabled private actors, who at their core follow a PMC business model to legitimize themselves, notably through demining efforts, as humanitarian service providers. Such a distinction naturally makes further outsourcing more

palatable for the procurement offices and the host institutions (Adebajo & Sriram , 2001).

3.3 Analysis

Through both developments in terms of UN actions and rhetoric it is clear that private sector inclusion in UN security is already an empirical reality. As Figures 4 and 5 show, both demands for conventional peacekeeping forces and for unconventional security providers have exploded in the 21st century, and by this point it is unlikely that either trends will dissipate in the coming years due to the institutional commitments to peace and the heavy reliance already placed upon the private security sector. This reliance can be tied to a developing regime facilitated by state interests, but also private sector initiatives such as the ISOA green paper from 2002. This green paper produced for the UK government provides a central narrative of how the private security sector could position itself as an alternative provider in wider peacekeeping frameworks and exemplifies the private sectors clear will to establish itself as a reliable, legitimate and viable industry for security services (Brooks, 2002). For states, the interest in developing a regime that enables it to legitimize outsourcing in warfare is tied to the structural limitations discussed in the previous chapter. As public opinion shapes national interest, states have circumvented traditional security structures to maximize their utility through private sector integration. An effort that Christopher Kinsey argues for this very rationale behind private sector outsourcing and states that such efforts;

“can still be seen as a form of reluctance: ‘the reluctance of politicians to commit soldiers to conflicts where there are no national interests at stake”
(Kinsey, 2006, p. 95)

And with such a sentiment in mind, it is only natural that when we experience a threat to such efforts via UN conventions, that they are naturally met in kind with a counter-push from key state stakeholders such as the United States, who argue for further UN outsourcing. One such example can be found in a 2005 U.S Senate report by the committees of appropriations, notably departments of commerce, justice and state, who advice an increased fiscal commitment to support an explosive growth in

peacekeeping operations but recommends pressure for cost-effective solutions to such missions in their statement:

“The Committee is aware that, in some cases, private companies can carry out effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the funding the United Nations requires to carry out the same missions. At a minimum such companies should be utilized to supplement the number of blue berets and blue helmets which, in these turbulent times, the United Nations is having a difficult time recruiting. The United Nations can no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings that private companies with proven records of good service and good behaviour can offer” (USS, 2004)

As uncovered through a study of WGM reports and through data-mining of ASRs, it is quite clear that notions such as the ones expressed in the U.S Senate report have been successful, as the UN has grown increasingly reliant on, and has displayed an internal will to also employ private actors in their operations. However, a paradigm shift is still necessary to establish a conclusive and comprehensive approach to further integration. This necessity is primarily tied to the “*don’t ask, don’t tell*” policy retained by the UN Secretariat, as such a stance is detrimental to long-term integration efforts. However, through this study we can argue that there is a ripeness for such a paradigm shift in the UN system, as the organisation itself has displayed, through action and rhetoric, an increased openness towards PMSCs operating within the UN organisational framework. Through this we can argue for a conditional ripeness, as it is still clear that the UN does not currently have a clear internal policy nor appropriate oversight mechanisms established to facilitate larger-scale integration efforts.

4. Challenges, UN Operations and PMC Potential

As the early 1990s ushered in the fall of the Soviet Union, so did they usher in massive changes for the cold war security paradigm. No longer could vast national armies be justified as the imposing threat from the east diminished and the high constant threat of war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the west and the Warsaw Pact to the east fell into obscurity and gave way for a period of relative peaceful coexistence. The natural result of this paradigm shift was a gradual military downsizing, refocusing efforts on more peaceful endeavours (US-OTA, 1992). It is through this gradual process that we see the enabling factors for the second

renaissance of mercenary culture and the emergence of the modern security service industry.

The private sector has since its re-emergence provided a vast range of services to different stakeholders around the world, and has effectively established a certain level of reliance between their offered services and the wide range of hosts that employ their services. In the 21st century this reliance has reached an all-time high, and in contemporary security strategies the notion of subcontracting the vast support structures necessary for military operations is entirely ingrained. Furthermore, outsourcing key military functions that blur the difference between supportive and tip-of-the-spear roles are becoming increasingly common, namely in the fields of armed close protection and static defences, and further in highly sensitive fields such as command and control, intelligence and communications (Singer, 2007) (Hagedorn, 2014) (Dunigan, 2011). This high level of inclusion can in many ways be tied to the post-9/11 world order, and the subsequent war on terror in two of the primary theatres of this extensive military security campaign, namely Iraq and Afghanistan. Both conflicts saw unprecedented levels of private sector inclusion into complex military frameworks and underline a historical repetition of European military history, as western powers once again were forced to look beyond conventional forces, to facilitate and maximize efficient military operations. At its core, the scope and scale of private sector inclusion in these military operations are reactive measures to several variables in the planning and execution of both missions. These underlying causes are exemplified heavily in the United States military framework of the era, as the U.S here took up the mantle of responsibility when it came to being the driving force behind both engagements, cementing itself as a front-runner for outsourcing and integration of private sector actors in military operations (Isenberg, 2011).

David Isenberg, a U.S scholar who has worked extensively on the topic of private sector inclusion in contemporary conflicts, provides an explanation for this influx of private contractors by arguing that the U.S government's choice of geopolitical role suffered greatly from a distinct lack of support from its constituency, as such, privatizing the war-effort simply became the most viable route to secure operational successes in Iraq and Afghanistan as exemplified in his statement below.

“Rather, the U.S government’s huge and growing reliance on private contractors is an attempt to fix a mismatch between goals and resources. The U.S government has assumed the role of guarantor of global security at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy. Private contractors fill the gap between geopolitical goals and political means” (Isenberg, 2011)

Isenberg’s statement echoes the conceptual crisis of nationalism in the western world, as illustrated by the 2015 WIN/Gallup study (see Ch.1, Figure 3) as he here stresses a reluctance from the public to commit resources and troops to conflicts. To overcome the gap between supply and demand when it came to aims versus resources, the U.S opted to bridge the gap by integrating non-traditional actors into its core military framework. This approach was in many ways facilitated by the prospects of a cheap yet effective solution *vis-à-vis* private sector inclusion, as the often-higher operational costs were alleviated by the non-existent cost of training, maintaining and caring for contractors in comparison with conventional troops. The result of this was a surge in private sector involvement under the U.S Department of Defence (DOD), as a review of their Quarterly Contractor Census Reports displays in Figure 6 below (U.S CENTCOM, 2008-2017).




FIGURE 6 – DOD CONTRACTORS IN IQ, AF, 2008-2017 (U.S CENTCOM, 2008-2017)

These values emphasize the scope and scale of private sector integration into the conventional military framework, especially when held against NATO data on total troop contributions to Afghanistan when it peaked in 2011, as the private contractors in-theatre eclipsed even the 132,457 NATO soldiers committed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at its peak during this period (NATO, 2011). In this sense, despite concerns over private sector inclusion, the U.S opted for a clearly

utilitarian strategy, where the importance of operational goals evidently outweighed any such concerns. Such a stance might be prudent given the operational challenges that the UN is currently faced with in its peacekeeping operations.

4.1 Obstacles for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

While the UN operational framework suffers immensely under a cumbersome bureaucracy and institutional limitations *vis-à-vis* lacking commitments to the UN charter, indecisiveness in the UN Security Council and often limited political engagements by the UN General Assembly, there are still severe concerns over notable challenges in its operational environments. Top level challenges are likely to stay in place without systemic reforms, but operational challenges are possible to address and off-set either through conventional means or through privatization efforts.

The severity of the operational challenges for UN operations is to a large extent tied to the growing expectations of the UN as a security provider, and to the ever-changing battlefields that it is forced to conduct its operations in. The increasing expectations of the UN as a security provider are to a large extent tied to the globalization of human rights concepts in the post-cold-war era and its subsequent impact on the non-traditional security concept of human security (Karns, Mingst, & Stiles, 2015). This widespread understanding of fundamental rights and the securitization of such, has led to a public expectation that the UN, as a *de facto* representative of the international community, must address and respond to threats to human security and gross violations of human rights. Naturally, when considering the UN framework, the UN, through its commitments to a multitude of charters, conventions, protocols, statutes and declarations, is designed to promote and expand upon such rights (UN, 1945) (UN, 1948) (UN, 1948) (UN, 1949) (UN, 1966) (UN, 1966) (UN, 1998). However, expectations for the enforcement and protection of such ideals have given birth to notable concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the idea of humanitarian interventions. The inclusion of such concepts stresses the organisation, not only regarding prevention, reacting and rebuilding *vis-à-vis* humanitarian conflicts, but also in the sense that its solutions must be appropriate, effective and legitimate. Quite simply, the United Nations cannot afford another Rwandan genocide, nor another Srebrenica massacre where the UN, despite having forces in place, are unable

to provide the security needed to protect the civilian populations (ICISS, 2001). A second factor, adding to the complexities of UN mission parameters and thus adding to the operational challenges, is the specific mission environments themselves. 21st century warfare has, to a large extent, become an asymmetric affair, where non-state actors blur the realities of war and where combat intensity has shifted from large-scale military engagements to sustained wars of attrition. In such settings, conventional troops largely engage in counter-insurgency operations (COIN) while attempting to secure popular support, whilst the often fragmented and irregular adversaries lean on the blurred lines of non-combatants and combatants to mask their operations and in turn employ various forms of guerrilla and insurgency warfare to wear down their opposition (Paul, 1994) (Allen & Fordham, 2011) (de Wolf, Dorn, Ponzio, Flaspöler, & DCS - MINUSMA, 2017).

Such threats and the increasing commitments for UN peacekeepers have naturally come at a cost; as conflict intensity has seen a steady increase, so have UN losses. This tendency is illustrated in FIGURE 7, where we can gain a clear overview of UN losses in UNDPKO/peacekeeping operations.




FIGURE 7 - UN OPERATIONAL FATALITIES, 1949-2015 (UNDPKO, 2017)

This increasingly hazardous conflict climate, along with a steady increase in conflict occurrences as illustrated in Figure 8., means that the work is already cut out for UN peacekeepers, as everything indicates that the future will continue to require increasing commitments by the international community to uphold the values and foundations of the United Nations.




FIGURE 8 - OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT OCCURRENCES 1990-2015 (CROICU & SUNDBERG, 2015)

However, with both conflict instances and conflict intensity on the rise, it becomes as important as ever to ensure that when UN peacekeepers are deployed, they in turn are thoroughly trained, geared and supported so that they can meet the expectations placed upon them and perform their duties in an effective and cost-effective manner. However, in its current form several operational challenges to providing such efficient solutions are apparent, and without addressing such challenges it is unlikely that the UN can meet the expectations placed upon it by the public.

4.1.1 Challenges

Many of the operational challenges to UN peacekeeping can be traced to two notable UN publications: the so-called Brahimi Report, an assessment report on UN peacekeeping operation new millennium, and the subsequent HIPPO report. The initial report was spearheaded by UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, from whom the report takes its colloquial name, and found a wide range of issues and concerns during its in-depth discussion of the readiness and capabilities of its peacekeeping forces in the 21st century (UN, 2000). These issues were, to a large extent, echoed in its follow-up, as despite improvements being made in the fifteen-year gap, challenges remained (UN, 2015). While the primary focus of these reports was directed at issues on a systemic or political level, they did touch upon numerous associated challenges

found on the operational level of UN engagements; namely in the lacking ability to act swiftly and concisely to imminent security threats as to better meet the public expectations of the UN as an actor.

4.1.1.a Rapid Response Capabilities

A clear challenge to UN operations is the distinct lack of rapid response capabilities, a concern noted in both UN assessments of peacekeeping operations and through numerous other sources (UN, 2000) (UN, 2015) (Reykers, 2016) (Langille, 2014). In effect, it is expected that the UN as a human security provider is both responsible and able to respond to emerging security threats. However, with a standard estimated deployment time of peacekeeping contingents of six to twelve months, the impact of such endeavours is questionable at best, particularly when considering the potential extent of genocidal campaigns can have in just a limited timespan as seen in Rwanda in the mid-1990s (Langille, 2014) (HRW, 1994). This challenge is largely tied to UN system itself, as the UN has so far been unable to establish a sustainable standing rapid response force. Sir Adam Roberts notes:

“by almost universal consent, improvement in the international community’s rapid response capability is needed. The nub of the issue is: what is realistically achievable in a world where the demand for UN rapid response forces is likely to be huge, the interest of states in responding to that demand is not unlimited, and the capacity of the Security Council to manage crisis effectively is often questioned?” (Roberts, 2008, p. 100)

As stated, there is a well-accepted need for the UN to respond to threats in a timely fashion, but as noted by Sir Adam Roberts, there are also notable systemic obstacles in place before the UN itself might be able to provide for such a capacity. Hybrid solutions that merge UN and multilateral approaches have however been explored with some success. A prime example is the establishment of the Danish-led Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) throughout 1996-2009 as a response to the lack of international commitments to stop the Rwandan Genocide. Throughout its lifespan, SHIRBRIG was deployed to seven UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa with a deployment timeframe of only fifteen to thirty days, in sharp contrast to the UN’s regular deployment rates. While meeting operational successes, SHIRBRIG proved to be unsustainable and was

dissolved in 2009. The reasons for its dissolution was tied to its operational costs, lack of commitments from participating states, limited usage and a shifting focus to regional security solutions *in lieu* of cumbersome UN solutions (Koops & Varwick, 2008) (Vigsø, 2008). The SHIRBRIG closure left in its wake a new gap for rapid response options for the UN, and while having inspired similar initiatives within an African Union framework, so far no initiatives have provided a solution to the UN's systemic needs.

4.1.1.b Personnel Capacities & Operational Support

A recurring topic, primarily in external sources, is the troop commitments to UN operations. The concerns here are two-fold; first and foremost the UN suffers under a general lack of troop commitments, notably from the well-trained western armies. Subsequently, the troops committed to UN operations are often lacking the skillsets and training required to provide comprehensive security solutions, such as specialist skills that serve as force enablers or proper training enabling effective security operations. The HIPPO report touches on the lack of specialist support namely in the fields of engineering, medical services and mobility solutions, and further touches upon the tender internal issue of peacekeeper performance concerns. In the case of specialist skillsets, the HIPPO report acknowledges a clear challenge in obtaining such expertise's through conventional means and suggests finding alternative solutions to these requirements by enabling member states to contribute short/medium term specialists, be they uniformed or not (UN, 2015). Furthermore, the HIPPO report also underlines key concerns over the lacking capabilities of the UN when faced with asymmetric threats, as peacekeeping forces are not considered suited to engage in military counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations. However, the report does acknowledge that such threats are now, more than ever, a reality in UN operational frameworks, and as such it is paramount that if such threats are present, the UN forces are provided with training, equipment, intelligence and support to ensure their ability to carry out their mission (UN, 2015). When considering contemporary conflicts, notably the technological leaps made in the 21st century, it is also a noticeable obstacle that specialist technical skills are often entirely lacking in UN operational frameworks, as it is often the case that troops committed to UN missions hail from developing nations for whom network-centric warfare, the hallmark of the information age battlefield, is only a far-flung concept from science fiction (Alberts,

Garstka, Hayes, & Signori, 2001). These lacking technical capabilities provide severe operational limitations on peacekeepers, as they do not have access to important military technologies that have proven important in COIN based conflicts (Piesing, 2011). Such a limitation becomes even more apparent when considering that insurgent groups in contemporary conflicts have already taken to the use of technology as a method of war, embracing easy-to-use communication systems, drones and other emerging technologies as force multipliers against better armed, asymmetric opponents (Gramer, 2017) (Walker, 2017) (Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015). In terms of operational support, then we may also note a distinct lack of specialized skillsets also related to the lacking technological capabilities, notably when considering the complex field of C4ISR. Behind this acronym hides a wide range of capabilities; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), capabilities that when combined, provide forces with battlespace awareness and agility. These concepts at their core refer to an ability to understand and swiftly react to developments during military operations (UN, 2015) (AFCEA, 2009). Such skillsets serve as *'force multipliers'*, a military concept defined by the US DOD as

"a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment" (US DOD, 2007, p. 394)

Should these capabilities be made available to UN peacekeepers, it would be expected that despite limited capabilities, UN troops would be able to provide more effective and efficient security solutions.

4.1.1.c Material Requirements

A recurring problem for the UN is tied to material commitments from TCCs. More often than not, UN missions are only supplied with the bare essentials as developing nations, being the major suppliers of troops, often lack the capacity to provide properly equipped forces. The lack of necessary operational hardware is largely tied to three central fields; Air support, Armour and Logistics. Air support, in the forms of strategic and tactical airlifts, refers to the transportation of troops, material and arms in either long-range deployments or in-theatre precision insertions and extractions, notably in

the specific sub-field of medical/casualty evacuations (UN, 2015) (UN DPKO/OMA, 2015). It also includes close air support and air assault functions, meaning the engagement of hostile forces in either proximity to UN forces, or in long-range operations (UN DPKO/OMA, 2015), and in supportive fields such as reconnaissance and surveillance, where valuable information can be facilities to the mission specific command and control units so that the UN force can respond to any developments as needed (UN DPKO/OMA, 2015) (UN, 2015). Furthermore, an oft occurring problem is the lack of military grade hardware in volatile UN missions, where armoured personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles are necessary components in enforcing peace between warring parties (Annan, 2013). In such scenarios, the threat of mines, IEDs, rocket propelled grenades and even basic small arms fire poses an immense risk for soft-skin convoys and patrols (Long, 2016) (Bosetti, Cooper, de Boer, & Munshey, 2016) (Sieff & Gowan, 2017). With increasing cost of lives in UN missions, as seen in Figure 7, it is clear that this is an ongoing issue that the UN suffers immensely from. But, lacking material commitments and a general lack of training in operating such heavy material, the systemic constraints of current TCCs and the lack of political will to alleviate such issues through the commitment of the vastly superior troops (*vis-à-vis training, equipment and hardware*) from developed nations, that the UN will be unable to meet today's demanding standards when it comes to operating in hostile asymmetric battlefields.

4.2 What can the private sector offer

The private sector has so far been able to market itself as a strong security service provider in a variety of fields ranging from operation support to dedicated military functions. This has enabled the industry to successfully embed itself into the contemporary security paradigm, in which conventional armies have grown reliant on privatizing core aspects of their military functions to the security industry (Borum, 2015). Through private sector integration, conventional forces have been able to work around stringent defence budgets by shifting security capacities to other national institutions, who in turn becomes security or support providers for traditional military endeavours for western powers. Examples of such budgetary shifts can be found in the dissolution of the Royal Danish Army force protection training programmes,

resulting in a shift from conventional protection teams to private security, and in the Dutch usage of its inter-ministerial fund; the Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation to cover associated costs for private contractors in support and security roles (AIV, 2007) (FPT, 2014) (DK MoD, 2008). Such high levels of integration into conventional conflict operations naturally creates a strong basis for looking at the specific solutions that the private sector can supply *vis-à-vis* UN peacekeeping operations and the challenges here-to.

4.2.1 Interim PMC Peacekeepers

While a controversial notion, the private sector has been known to provide complex yet effective military solutions to conflicts. Such services could in a sense be considered an “*army-in-a-box*” type of solution, e.g. a complete package of paramilitary forces, command and control structures with specialized subsections, heavy military hardware, air-support and vast support structures. In the past, individual private military companies have supplied complex solutions such as these by retaining vast databases of thousands retired military specialists with an expressed interest in engaging in corporate endeavours. Through this, such companies can tailor mission specific packages, and thus maximize their contractual impact (Singer, 2007). However, due to the scope and scale of such operations, it would be more appropriate to consider consortium based solutions, where a group of companies would band together, proposing a unified solution to such tenders. Such an approach could be used to provide the UN with a readily available, rapid response option, that could be deployed in times where conventional peacekeeping deployments are too slow or insufficient to solve the immediate security needs under UN command. In that sense, it becomes appropriate to look at such complex solutions from past engagements, and here, one of the prime cases of providing such services comes from the South African PMC, Executive Outcomes (EO).

4.2.1.a The Case of Executive Outcomes

EO is often referred to as one of the prime front-runners for the re-emergence of mercenary culture, helped to establish the private military security industry, and has, through its engagements in Angola and Sierra Leone, become one of the best-known examples of a modern, corporate army (Singer, 2007) (GC, 2017). Despite being a

posterchild for complex, privatized security solutions, EO was simply a cog in a grand military service framework under the South African venture-capital firm; Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC). SRC, much like EO itself, was based in Pretoria, S.A, from where it managed approximately twenty companies with ties to the military service industry. EO itself was here apart of a cluster of actual PMSCs, but with ties to a wide range of military support firms under the SRC, who could supply most, if not all, services required for military operations. EO itself stands out as a tip-of-the-spear security provider, meaning that its focus was deployments into high intensity conflict scenarios, from where it would provide a wide range of services (Singer, 2007). These services were officially focused on providing training, consultancy and assistance, with actual military operations being downplayed in the company profiles (EO, 1998). Its sister-companies under the SRC, Saracen International, Lifeguard and Teleservices were instead focused on asset-protection in post-conflict scenarios, so that when EO would leave conflict these sister companies would enter to provide follow-up security services. Furthermore, the SRC corporate framework also contained notable support companies, such as the engineering and logistics companies Steelpact & Falconer and Bridge International, and of particular note; Ibis Air, who formed a corporate air-support wing. Ibis Air maintained a modest fleet of civilian cargo and passenger planes, including two Boeing 727s, used primarily for charters. However Ibis Air also maintained an impressive fleet of military aircraft, such as Mig-23 fighter-bombers, converted Pilatus PC-7s for close-air-support, Mi-24 attack helicopters, Mi-17 armed transport helicopter and Mi-8 cargo helicopters (Venter, 1996) (Pech, 1999) (Singer, 2007). Ibis Air further had access to well-trained veteran pilots and could provide African nations with much needed expertise. Such was the case in Angola, where Soviet patronage had facilitated advanced military hardware in the form of Mig-27 ground-attack crafts and Su-25 close-support bombers, but did not maintain the necessary training and expertise to properly use such advanced jets (Singer, 2007). While not linked to military operations, the SRC also maintained a range of companies who, from an economic standpoint, were supportive of its endeavours in its primary area of operations; Africa. These companies focused primarily on revenue generation, some through tourism, but more interestingly, through resource extraction (Pech, 1999). These companies play a large role in complicating the overview of SRC holdings, as a

corporate interlink between two distinct entities begins to form and to a large extent merge. With the SRC in South Africa on one hand, we have the British Branch-Heritage Group on the other, who in a similar corporate setup, retained a vast array of resource and energy extraction companies, supplemented by another famous PMC; Sandline International. Waters between the two holding companies becomes further muddled by shared stakes in subsidiaries, shared contracts, personnel and addresses and though mutually beneficial treatment of the associated, yet publicly distinct, companies under each their own corporate framework (Pech, 1999) (Singer, 2007).




FIGURE 9 - CORPORATE HOLDINGS, SRC/BHG, (PECH, 1999) (SINGER, 2007)

When focusing on the SRC/EO constellations heritage, the strong ties to the South African Defence Force (SADF) quickly become apparent. Its founder Eben Barlow was former assistant commander of the apartheid era 32nd “Buffalo” Battalion, an elite strike force under the SADF, and later an agent under the South African Cooperation Bureau (CCB), a clandestine operations organisation for the apartheid government in

South Africa. With the regimes fall in 1989, a vast number of experienced veterans from the SADF found themselves unemployed and unwanted. Barlow, through his vast professional contracts, used this pool of military specialists as the basis for EO operations. These cast-out veterans from the elite units of the old regime were compensated well, received excellent medical coverage and a standardized life insurance, and for many, the prospects of once again being praised for their services and abilities stood in stark contrast to the unwelcome treatment that the transitional government of South Africa extended to the former enforcers of the apartheid regime (Singer, 2007). Having access to a uniform pool of employees who shared a similar background enabled EO to field highly effective units with specialized skillsets, at short notice. This capability made EO an interesting partner for several operations, but two major engagements stand out due to their complexity; namely EOs employment by the Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments.

4.2.1.A.1 ANGOLA

With its massive resource reserves, namely in the form of oil, gas, diamonds and uranium, Angola had attracted several outside investors, interested in the extraction prospects that the Angolan underground offered. However, a key caveat for such investors laid in the ongoing civil war between the warring guerrilla factions hailing from its war of independence from Portugal. In the wake of its independence, the *Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA) had successfully seized control of the country with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba, while staunch opposition was provided by the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), who received support from the United States and South Africa (Kinsey, 2006). For many in EO's employment pool of SADF veterans, the Angolan theatre was already a common sight, as they in their conventional careers had intervened on behalf of the UNITA rebels to ensure South African interests in the conflict. This meant that when Sonogal Oil and Branch-Heritage Oil approached EO to recapture and secure the vast corporate investments attached to the Soyo oil fields on behalf of the Angolan Army, it would be a familiar return for many (Singer, 2007). EO responded quickly and deployed an 80-man strong commando force to the outskirts of the town of Soyo, where it engaged the UNITA rebels who had taken control of the city and its oil refineries. The assault was vicious yet highly successful and sent ripples through not

only Angola, but also through the international community as amazed observers now noticed the high levels of military effectiveness provided by “rag-tag” mercenaries, and as such, the potential offered by military firms in conflict scenarios. As EO withdrew from their fulfilled contractual obligations, the *Forças Armadas Angolanas* (FAA) took over security of the area, and lost it back to the UNITA rebels shortly after. These events facilitated a new contract for EO, this time directly at the behest of the Angolan President who, in a \$40 million, twelve-month contract, required EO to provide training and guidance for the FAA. This led to the reestablishment of the 16th Brigade, formed around a 5,000-man infantry and support core, and further supported by 30 pilots, all of whom were trained and guided by 500 EO employees. Besides training, EO also assisted the FAA with several operational tasks, notably commanding FAA operations, providing combat air-support and commando operations against UNITA held positions. The strategic implications of EO training and the tactical operations they facilitated meant that the EO/FAA joint force rapidly gained ground against UNITA, who before had pushed the MPLA government to the brink of collapse. Initial focus was paid to recapture important resource districts and the major cities, providing the MPLA with the ability to procure arms and armaments from abroad for its forces. These developments eventually forced UNITA to the negotiation table, where they reluctantly accepted the Lusaka peace accord in 1994. UNITA did however require the MPLA to let go of their contracted dogs of war, an unwelcome prospect for the MPLA who continued to retain the EO for another year, until external pressure from the US and UN eventually forced them to cease the contractual relationship and welcome a UN peacekeeping force. However, as the deployed UN force did not retain the characteristics, determination and equipment needed for peace enforcement, Angola soon descended into another stage of bloody civil war for another eight years.

4.2.1.A.2 SIERRA LEONE

With the events in Angola in mind, it was not long before another government opened a dialogue with EO to facilitate battlefield victories and to ensure the longevity of the hard-pressed regime in Sierra Leone. As such, contacts were facilitated to Valentine Strasser, the Head of State of Sierra Leone, who had heard of EO's public operations in Angola from Anthony Buckingham of the Heritage Mining Company, who had strong ties to EO through a wide range of discrete partnerships (Cilliers & Mason, 1999). As

the Strasser regime was unable to meet the contractual costs of engaging EO, Buckingham opted for funding the endeavour in return for lucrative diamond mining concessions in territories held by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). This opened up for an initial twelve-month contract, in which EO would supply an initial 160 contractors with the aim of re-establishing control over the important resource deposits in rebel hands. Within a month, EO deployed its force to the Sierra Leonean theatre, ready to engage in a three-month operational plan to secure their contractual targets and rout the RUF forces (Singer, 2007). Within days, EO cleared the capital of insurgents, and shortly after pushed any opposition to the jungle outskirts, maximizing the use of helicopter gun-ships and air support for their COIN operations. Soon, EO had retaken important diamond mines, dismantled key RUF strongholds and successfully routed the RUF forces. The successful campaign against the RUF eventually forced them to accept the results of the 1996 presidential elections, and subsequently sign a peace accord with the government (Singer, 2007). But once again, it was a clear demand from the opposition that EO should cease any operations in the country as a precondition for peace. As such RUF, and immense international pressure forced the newly elected President Kabbah to terminate the EO contract prematurely, under the firm expectations of a sizeable deployment of UN peacekeepers to ensure and maintain the peace between the once warring factions. However, limited interest in supplying troops or fronting the bills for such operations meant that no peacekeepers were deployed (Singer, 2007). An intervention force did however arrive at the behest of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the form of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Upon their exit, EO warned President Kabbah of an impending coup, which its intelligence department estimated would take place within a hundred-day period (Singer, 2007) (Kinsey, 2006). To counter this, EO offered to establish a battalion sized paramilitary force, supported by an EO intelligence unit, to ensure the safety of the government. The offer was never accepted, and not long after the RUF, supported by deserters from the army, initiated Operation Pay Yourself and Operation No Living Thing, initially pillaging the capital and later sweeping the countryside in a bloody and systemic genocidal campaign. ECOMOG forces, unwilling and unable to engage in such violent conflict, retreated to their safe havens, leaving the civilian population to fend

for themselves until the government contracted the PMC Sandline International to re-establish control of the country (Singer, 2007).

4.2.1.A.3 THE END OF EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES

Despite its success in branding itself as a valuable, effective partner for securing national interests and suppressing numerically superior foes, EO would eventually disband. Several reasons lie at the core of these events, tied to an effective counter-marketing campaign by several external actors. including the UN, all of whom were adamantly against what they saw as mercenary inclusion into African security. At the same time, regulatory frameworks continued to hamper EO operations, notably through the South African Regulation for Foreign Military Assistance Act that would force EO to have all operations sanctioned by the South African government. As such, EO publicly disbanded at the start of 1999 and for all intents and purposes ceased its operations. However, the SRC continue to provide similar services, using the veteran EO personnel, through other subsidiaries or affiliate companies, and through several external successor companies (Kinsey, 2006) (Singer, 2007).

4.2.2 PMCs as a Supplement to Peacekeepers

While private entities are arguably able to provide complex *“army-in-a-box”* type products as seen in the case of Executive Outcomes, a more likely scenario is to see a wider inclusion of private contractors in support of conventional peacekeepers. Such endeavours would fit with the current modus operandi of the UN, where it has attempted to fill expertise and material gaps by pursuing services provided by non-state actors. As much is evident in cases of external service providers such as DSL providing the UN with much needed armour support in Bosnia (Østensen, 2013) (Pingeot, 2012) and further cases of PMC hardware expertise being used by contracting states in Sub-Saharan Africa, stepping in and effectively commandeering heavy military hardware received from Cold-War era patrons. A contemporary example of such is the employment of Dyncorp, a defence service provider and well-known PMC under the Africa Peacekeeping Program for the U.S government. In this \$173 million contract, Dyncorp and its partner OTT Technologies have been tasked to provide 115 Puma APCs to the UN MINUSMA mission in Mali, in support of peacekeepers hailing from the African Union. Part of this contract necessitates that

the receiving West-African troops will undergo specialized training in the operations of the mine resistant vehicles (Martin & Nkala, 2014). As noted earlier, the UN also faces immense problems with the facilitation of aircraft for its missions due to the limitations of key TCCs. This fact has already resulted in private sector integration when it comes to securing such vital components for military and peacekeeping operations, and with numerous companies offering such services, this represents a viable method of circumventing TCC limitations. Here private entities such as AAR Airlift, Miami Air International and Volga-Dnepr Airlines could provide much needed strategic lift capabilities, while companies such as Discovery Air Defense could provide tactical lift capabilities, close-air-support and long-range air reconnaissance (DefenceWeb, 2015) (MA, 2017) (VDG, 2017) (DAD, 2017). Beyond providing military hardware capabilities, or simply the expertise required to operate such technical systems, the private sector also maintains a proven track record in providing force multiplying or simply operation-enabling services. Certain services are already deeply ingrained in UN operations, such as close-protection services, static defences and de-mining operations, while other services vital to efficient operations are lacking within the framework. A notable service in this setting is tied to the force multiplying effects of C4ISR. Within this field, several private actors can provide a much needed and oft marginalized service to UN peacekeeping operations and provide its forces with the information needed to conduct efficient peacekeeping operations. While the UN already have an established civilian/military structure designed to meet the organisations intelligence needs in the form of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), it often falls short of providing the necessary intelligence due to limited resources and mandates (Ramjoué, 2011). During an International Peace Institute (IPI) panel discussion in conjunction with the launch of the IPI report *Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine*, Matthew Rycroft, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations underlined the need for improved intelligence capabilities by stating;

“It would enable us to better ensure the safety and security of our peacekeepers and assets; it will enable us to better plan our missions; and it will enable us to better carry out our mandates and protect civilians,” (IPI, 2016)

While JMAC does manage to provide valuable intelligence reports for UN operations, it is also severely hampered by the very nature of the international intelligence culture, as information is tightly held by national intelligence agencies who are often unwilling to provide the necessary information due to a lack of trust in the UN structure (Shetler-Jones, 2008). The importance of intelligence and the unwillingness to share information between actors has paved the way for wide-scale private sector integration into conventional, national intelligence structures. In the U.S, large-scale integration of intelligence contractors is commonplace, such as in the Defense Intelligence Agencies (DIA) where reports of private intelligence contractors outnumbering conventional personnel are apparent (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). In operational settings, the private sector has provided several in-theatre intelligence services, notably during the war on terror in Iraq. Here companies such as Dyncorp, Titan Corporation, L-3 Communications and International Intelligence Limited performed a variety of tasks related to C4ISR, associated with various forms of intelligence work, namely human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT), each type corresponding to the method of information acquisition. Often, such endeavours have been pursued to facilitate important translation and interpretation skills that conventional forces could not be expected to possess, but have over time branched out to provide dedicated intelligence gathering through various methods, and further to include the management of its personnel and operations (Krahmann, 2010) (Singer, 2007). A further option for private sector inclusions lies with its ability to facilitate utility maximization, an economic concept tied to the ability to maximize the value derived from available resources (BD, 2017). A key method of providing such utility maximization is through military consultancy, where strategic advice in the form of reforms, designs and training paves the way for increasing the overall military/security capabilities of already established- or newly created forces. While multitudes of such private military consultancy companies are in existence, one firm stands out as an industry front-runner, much akin to the well-known private military company; Executive Outcomes.

[4.2.2.a The Case of Military Professional Resources Incorporated](#)

Just as EO was important for bringing the concept of battlefield mercenaries back into the public eye, MPRI has been similarly influential when it comes to the potential

offered by the military consultancy sector and the effect their services might have on a nation's capability to engage in successful military operations. MPRI, much like EO, was established in the wake of the ending cold-war, addressing a security gap left behind by the gradual demilitarization of U.S forces in the period. Its founding was spearheaded by eight senior officers from the U.S military and was established near the Pentagon in Virginia. It, like EO, maintained a vast database of veteran soldiers and officers from the U.S military branches. Its formation and employee basis created a naturally occurring tie with the Pentagon, with which most of the senior staff had been previously employed. Such ties gave MPRI an extended leeway for its corporate endeavours, as a high level of trust was shared between the U.S government and its board of directors, a distinct advantage that enabled MPRI to serve as a facilitator of U.S sanctioned support to foreign governments across the world. Initially their role as consultants *vis-à-vis* the implementation of cutting edge defence technologies were the primary focus of the company, but over time, the combined military expertise of the company took the limelight. As such MPRI shifted its focus further and further towards the development and implementation of military doctrines, reforms and both strategic and tactical training for military personnel. A key engagement by MPRI was found in one of its early international commitments during the Yugoslav Wars, where it cemented the ability of military consultancy in transforming “rag-tag” militias into effective and modern military forces.

4.2.2.A.1 FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS

With an initial contract in the former Yugoslavia, where MPRI provided a small border monitoring mission for the U.S State Department, MPRI was already in place to take on a much larger and more extensive contract facilitated by the U.S government to the Republic of Croatia. This contract obligated MPRI to facilitate the development and transition for its state forces from militia to a modern military. From a U.S perspective, the intent of facilitating such a contract was to seek to balance the U.S-friendly Croatian and Bosnian forces against Serbia, but during the mid-1990s both military groupings were in an abysmal state compared to NATO standards (Singer, 2007). Due to UN imposed sanctions on arming and training the warring factions, the U.S were unable to provide the necessary guidance themselves. MPRI was thus, under U.S governmental accept, engaged to provide the Croatian Ministry of Defence with

consultancy mission, enabling strategic long-term capabilities as part of a wider Democracy Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) (Silverstein, 2000). DTAP was focused on implementing democratic values, norms and principles from Western frameworks into the traditional Soviet-bloc organisational model employed by the Croats. This approach was justified by the necessity to look at long-term options for the Balkans, namely ensuring that the former Yugoslav republics would reach rudimentary NATO standards, enabling the eligibility for candidacies for the Partnership for Peace program (Singer, 2007) (Silverstein, 2000). The full extent of the scope that the MPRI advisory role had on the Croat Forces became evident when they engaged in Operation Storm in August 1995, a major offensive into the Serbian held Krajina region within Bosnia proper. Within a week, Croat forces had subdued the paramilitary forces occupying the territory in what has been called a “*text-book NATO operation*” by high-ranking UN observers (Silber & Little, 1997). Operation Storm, while breaking the UN cease-fire agreement, did shift the balance of power, and facilitated the Dayton Agreement later that year under the precondition that neighbouring Bosnia received a similar program for its Ministry of Defence. MPRI publicly stated that its role in Operation Storm had been non-existent, but numerous sources points to the correlation of MPRI involvement and the massive changes to Croat military capabilities as key to the sudden developments. This is most notable when considering the complex NATO style manoeuvres which had been employed to destroy the Serbian command structure, leaning more towards the US Air-Land 2000 doctrine than Warsaw doctrines (Singer, 2007). After the Dayton Agreement, a similar program was set up in the form of the Military Stabilization Program (MSP) for the Bosnian federal forces; a tender that MPRI won against rivalling Braddock, Dunn & McDonald (BDM) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (Singer, 2007). This contract was unique in the sense that MPRI had to undertake the massive challenge of combining two military entities under the Bosnian federal flag, namely the Muslim based *Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* (ARBiH) and the Croat based *Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane* (HVO), into the *Vojska Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine*, the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Singer, 2007). This approach was intended to bridge any rivalries between the domestic factions and provide the Bosnians with an effective fighting force (Lamb, Arkin, & Scudder, 2014). While the

MSP was considered largely successful despite immense systemic obstacles, it was also controversial and fell under a heavy international critique. The critique was not aimed at the MSP nor its results, but rather at the U.S Train and Equip approach, as many external actors saw a great inherited risk in providing Bosnia with arms and training. MPRI did however, due to its strong U.S ties, adhere strictly to a responsible and fostering training regime, orienting the Bosnian forces towards defensive doctrines and internal cooperation despite the ethnic cleavages present (Lamb, Arkin, & Scudder, 2014). The main success of the MPRI engagement in Bosnia was not tied to the vast improvements of military effectiveness as in the case of Croatia, rather it was the movement towards integration and reconciliation formed in the rivalling ethnic military forces in the country (Lamb, Arkin, & Scudder, 2014). Its successes in the Balkans firmly established the corporate ability to provide immense military consultancy services to those in need, and those willing to pay the fees.

4.2.2.A.2 BEYOND THE YUGOSLAV WARS

In the years after its engagements in the Balkans, MPRI effectively branched out its operations across the globe. With a wide range of operational success in military consultancy in Europe, MENA, SAHEL, Asia and Latin America, and with its strong ties to the U.S government and Pentagon, MPRI has been able to cement its industry position as a “go-to” source of military assistance for U.S friendly states. This status naturally made MPRI’s ventures highly profitable, and with the prospects of an increasingly lucrative market being further expanded by western privatization efforts, it was an expected development that MPRI would eventually enter a series of mergers. In the end, MPRI was absorbed into a wider corporate setting with its competitor L-3 Technologies as L-3 MPRI, and currently in the form of the Engility Corporation alongside several other industry leaders in the government service and consulting sector (Singer, 2007) (EC, 2017).

4.2.3 Analysis

It is clear that UN peacekeepers are hard-pressed to adjust to the increasingly hostile conflict climates and the threats posed by contemporary irregular tactics in asymmetric conflicts. Such threats, while inherently applicable to conventional forces, are felt at a greater degree within UN frameworks due to the problems associated with

TCC commitments. These troop commitments often only supply regular infantry, often from poorly developed militaries in the developing world. Such troops are not always able to provide the robustness and expertise required for complex threat scenarios such as we might experience in COIN-based conflicts. This problem is further exacerbated by the increased expectations of the UN to provide effective human security and reaffirm its role as a legitimate and reliable guardian for human rights across the globe. Through these expectations and the empirical state of contemporary conflicts the UN is thus left with a massive challenge, and with no indications for a sudden influx of dedicated commitments to UN operations stemming from the developed world, it is imperative that the UN seeks alternative venues for bridging the gap. One such alternative is the private sector, who to a large extent has established a proven and applicable track-record across a wide range of security related fields, including intense asymmetric conflicts.

When considering the lack of UN capabilities for rapid responses, then it is not far-fetched to look at the case of Executive Outcomes as a potential solution to such a capability gap. In scenarios where a conventional UN deployment would not be able to respond in time and partnerships with regional security organizations would be unviable, then a PMSC interim force could be deployed *in lieu* of a conventional intervention force. Within a peacekeeping framework, such a solution would naturally have to go under direct UN command and work in close cooperation with national security forces in an effort to establish static safe zones for civilians, and as a method of bolstering conventional forces to ensure the maximization of the force multiplier effects that PMSCs have been noted to have in conflicts. History has shown how large an impact a few hundred private security operators can have on conflict dynamics, and with clear and concise mandates from the UNDPKO it is likely that the private sector could provide much needed security in response to imminent security threats in more contemporary settings.

When addressing the oft encountered expertise and material gaps, we are struck with two key notions, namely the empirical evidence for an already established UN reliance on the private sector to provide important capabilities such as demining and air support, and further, that the private sector by now has a proven track-record of

successfully providing numerous other services that are essential for effective military operations. A notable problem area is here the tech-heavy fields such as maintenance, operations and C4ISR, areas where UN field personnel and external observers alike note major challenges. Such a notion was of heavy debate during the 2017 Future Force conference where a breakout session dedicated to the challenges to 21st century featured a report on the immediate operational needs for the ongoing MINUSMA mission. Here it was uncovered that the mission was short-staffed for conventional operations, and that vast parts of the support structure for peacekeeping operations were lacking, if at all there (de Wolf, Dorn, Ponzio, Flaspöler, & DCS - MINUSMA, 2017). Notably these challenges were tied specifically to lack-lustre troop commitments citing a direct need for an additional three thousand troops, special operations capabilities and C4ISR support. The notion of engaging in COIN operations without proper C4ISR support is, to anyone with operational experiences in such settings, an appalling notion, as battlespace awareness is simply crucial for ensuring the security of deployed troops and for successful operations. When faced with such limitations to peacekeeping operations, along with the rising fatality levels, then it also becomes a further obstacle for future troop contributions, as deploying troops into weak structural frameworks, such as seen in UN peacekeeping operations, puts troops at an increased risk. As such, the value-adding effect of outsourcing becomes more apparent, as the private sector could guarantee that the operational structures would indeed meet required standards, which in turn could minimize risk-based obstacles for potential TCCs.

With such options in mind, we can in turn discuss why PMSC integration efforts have proven to be a viable solution in contemporary conflicts. Gunner Lind of the Saxo Institute framed the historical and contemporary significance of private contractor efficiency during a conference on PMSCs with the Royal Danish Defence College in 2012, stating;

“Militariness is very high seen from the cultural point of view. However, the fighting capabilities of good state-armed forces are much higher than those of the private companies, even on a man-for-man basis, because of advantages in equipment and sometimes training. Even if private military corporations

seem to compare well with third-world fighting forces, they do not occupy the top rank in this measure of militariness as the old corporations did.” (Lind, 2012, p. 27)

The concept of militariness is a term coined by Pierre Bourdieu, a renowned French sociologist, and focuses on the level of military or warrior culture embedded in a social context, be it state, organisation or company. This is in a sense a specific form of professionalization, in which individuals engage in a social process of improving skills, expertise and capabilities to rise within professional hierarchies (Lind, 2012) (Bourdieu, 1985). Lind's statement touches upon two theoretical approaches to determine military efficiency, tying the concept of militariness to the notion of military culture as set out in Scott Fitzsimmons normative theory of military performance, and the impact of quantifiable objects such as weapons, material, equipment and hardware on the ability to engage in efficient warfare as noted in neorealist combat balance theory.

When discussing military culture, then Lind notes that the private sector does indeed retain high levels of militariness, a notion similarly found in professional western armies. This may be explained by the strong ties between conventional armies and PMSCs, as the individual contractors will have strong military backgrounds and often multiple military deployments behind them before being employed. Military culture thus comes from an indoctrination effort for military norms and behaviour that is tied to the individual contractors' background, but is further fostered in corporate settings (Fitzsimmons, 2013). A key difference is however the merge between military and corporate cultures, as often cumbersome military approaches are discarded in corporate settings, enabling much swifter decision-making processes more akin to streamlined special operations frameworks than regular military structure (Fitzsimmons, 2013). This enables higher levels of readiness and responsiveness, a fact that can be noted in the ability of PMSCs to deploy large scale operations within very limited timeframes (Singer, 2007). When considering the integration of PMSCs into peacekeeping operations, it thus becomes prudent to emphasize the importance of military culture also when hiring and integrating non-conventional forces such as

PMSCs. Scott Fitzsimmons specifically addresses this importance during outsourcing efforts, stating;

“These findings suggest that the potential clients of mercenary forces, including governments, international organizations, corporations, and non-governmental organizations, should attempt to ascertain the military culture of the mercenary forces vying for their business before deciding whether to hire a particular force” (Fitzsimmons, 2013, p. 306).

From a normative perspective, military culture is thus of vital importance, a fact that is tied directly to the inconclusive results of PMSC efficiency from a neorealist combat balance stance. This inconclusiveness is largely tied to a central expectation that private actors are unable to field military grade equipment and hardware to the same extent as states and thus would be force to engaged enemies with a decreased level of asymmetric force than conventional military forces from developed nations. This material centric approach can be illustrated by the figure below, outlining a key criterion for estimated military performance.

Naturally, such an approach is largely tied to the actual services rendered, as we have seen private actors deploy impressive arsenals of military hardware into conflict theatres; hardware that would indeed positively impact the material combat balance compared to their numerically superior adversaries.




FIGURE 10 - MODEL OF COMBAT BALANCE THEORY (FITZSIMMONS, 2013)

Overall, we can argue that PMSCs are quite capable of providing a wide range of services in an efficient and comprehensive manner. Such solutions when pitted against asymmetric opponents have been successful mainly due to superior military culture, but in some cases also due to the private sectors ability to field military hardware such as aircrafts and armour. However, despite its efficiency, it is unlikely that PMSCs would be as effective as conventional troops from developed nations, as the levels of military

culture would be similar and such armies have access to far more impressive arsenals of military hardware.

5. The Problem of PMSCs

As one might expect, the notion of private contractors engaging in roles typically tied to conventional military forces is by nature a controversial sentiment. To some, the very idea of such approaches undermines key notions of state sovereignty, namely the state monopoly of force. This idea is widely shared by several contemporary scholars, who remain opposed to any notion of private sector inclusion, in UN Peacekeeping operations, or within paradigms of conventional warfare (Avant, 2005)(Østensen, 2011) (Snell, 2011). Such considerations are shared by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries (WGM), who refer to the Weberian concept of the state monopoly of violence as a central argument in their legal critique of the use of PMCs by UN member states, and by default, in UN operations. In a 2010 regional consultation in Geneva, the WGM refereed specifically to this concept by stating

“Since Peace of Westphalia (1648) the existence of the state has been based on the exercise of the legitimate use of force...” (UN WGM, 2010, p. 51).

The WGM idea of monopoly of violence is an oft referred to concept in their framework for a UN convention on the use of mercenaries, and ties directly to a more elaborate understanding of what functions are inheritably state function and cannot be outsourced; typically functions that are tied to combat operations, policy making, intelligence and policing (UN WGM, 2010). A further emphasis is placed on key scandals involving private military contractors, notably in the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the misconduct of PMCs attached to the U.S DOD underlines major concerns over the legitimacy, operational transparency and accountability for private contractors in conflict scenarios.

5.1 The Blackwater Incident

On September 16, 2007, a convoy of U.S State Department Representatives protected by contractors hailing from the now infamous PMC Blackwater Worldwide (*later Xe Services, now Academi*) responded to a remote VB-IED strike north of their convoy in

the Mansour district of Baghdad by rerouting their convoy to the fortified Green Zone (Snukal & Gilbert, 2015). On their way back to safety, the convey entered the Nisour Square, where a closing civilian vehicle disregarded signals from local security forces to make way for the convoy and later disregarded warning shots fired by the Blackwater contractors. Fearing another VB-IED strike, the escort gunners opened fire with lethal intent and deployed stun-grenades to clear the ensuring chaos surrounding the event. Local forces mistakenly found themselves under attack by fragmentation grenades and opened fire on the convoy, to which the Blackwater contractors, entrusted with convoy security, responded in kind, as the conflict had shown that Iraqi insurgents would at times use uniforms to disguise themselves during ambushes. After a 15-minute exchange of small-arms fire, seventeen civilians were dead, and an additional twenty were wounded (Snukal & Gilbert, 2015) (Lam, 2009). Accounts of what happened at Nisour Square on that day are heavily contested; Blackwater representatives maintain that they were engaged by a possible VB-IED and by sporadic small-arms fire at the square, and reacted with an appropriate level of force to subdue the attackers, thus enabling an exfiltration of their precious cargo. Eyewitness reports paints a different story, stating that the Blackwater escort fired without provocation and indiscriminately, even as the crowd dispersed in fear (NYT, 2014). Eventually four of the involved Blackwater would be convicted of three cases of manslaughter and one case of murder in a U.S Federal Court ruling, supporting the claims of a disproportionate response to the otherwise complex security situation in Iraq at the time (Snukal & Gilbert, 2015).

5.2 The Abu Ghraib Scandal

The Abu Ghraib Prison was already infamous before its refurbishing as a military prison under U.S command during the war in Iraq, as it had formerly housed upwards of 50.000 ill-treated prisoners under Saddam Hussein's regime. Before the U.S invasion, the prison was known for gross human rights violations, torture and mass-executions of convicts, but as the regime fell the prison had been shut down, looted and eventually taken over by U.S forces for use as a detention centre for criminals, insurgents and malcontents. While the prison was under the command of the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade, the DOD had contracted two PMSCs; CACI International

and Titan Corporation (*Later L-3, now Engility Corporation*) to provide interrogation and translation services for the U.S forces there. To a large degree, the shift to implementing these companies into the detention structure of Abu Ghraib was based around the immediate and practical needs of the U.S MP, as they themselves lacked the capacities to interrogate Iraqi prisoners due to language barriers. Over time, CACI and Titan became so ingrained in these interrogation efforts that more and more responsibility for gaining information from the inmates and prisoners of war was placed upon them (Frulli, 2010) (Hersh, 2004). At the same time, the 800th MP Brigade was under staggering pressure to produce valuable intelligence for U.S and coalition forces, a pressure that potentially paved the way for the widespread abuses outlined in a 2003 Amnesty International report (AI, 2003). This report painted a grim picture of systemic abuse, torture and human degradation conducted by U.S officers and their attached CACI/Titan contractors. Despite little initial interest, the media eventually picked up on the case and by spring 2004 it became a full-blown scandal, focusing mainly on CACI International whom had supplied interrogators and only to a lesser extent on Titan Corp. who had supplied translators for the detention centre (McCarthy & Merle, 2004). The case was partially settled out of court in 2013, as L-3/Engility paid a settlement of \$5.8 million to a group of former inmates from Abu Ghraib suing CACI/Titan over the abuses they had participated in. The case is however still being revisited in U.S Federal Courts based on the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, with several dismissals and resurgences of the ongoing case to this day (BHRRRC, 2017).

5.3 Further cases of PMC abuse

As one might expect, further cases of less than desirable PMC actions have occurred throughout modern history. These offences ranging from unethical services to murder, while uncommon, do underline the concerns that many share for private sector inclusion into conflict scenarios. The UN WGM refers to unethical business practices of private security consultants from Mitchell Jessen & Associates, Global Risk Solutions Inc. and Special Intervention Group providing technical torture training to several state actors such as the U.S Central Intelligence Agency and to the Mexican federal police (UN WGM, 2010). Furthermore, several cases of unprovoked or unfounded killings exist, implicating such PMCs as Unity Resources Group, Erinys International, Triple

Canopy and Aegis Defence Services during their engagements under U.S or coalition forces under the Iraq war in the early 2000s, typically in response to perceived VB- or Suicide-IED threats in the complex COIN-based security environment in Iraq at the time (McNeill , 2007) (Townsend, 2009) (Chivers, 2006) (Rayment, 2005). A further concern is the recurring allegations tied to human trafficking, sexual abuse, unethical conduct and rape that have occurred in several conflicts. A well-known case of such conduct can be noted in the DynCorp engagement in Bosnia during the 1990s Yugoslav Wars, where contractors allegedly held several women captive, as young as twelve, under conditions reminiscent of sexual slavery (Snell, 2011). Or the numerous cases of human trafficking, abuse or rape in the Iraq war, a decade later, as illustrated in the extensive list of documents released in the wake of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union by the U.S Department of State (ACLU, 2017).

5.4 Misc. Peacekeeper cases

As one might expect, abuse and human rights violations are by no means isolated only to private sector actors, as history has shown both conventional- and peacekeeping forces have engaged in disreputable conduct with a wide range of cases underlining such regrettable problems. In 2015, 99 cases of rape, sexual abuse or severe sexual violations emerged in UN Peacekeeping settings, across mission theatres such as Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali and Sudan (Foroohar, 2016) (Kriedemann & Sapieka, 2017) (Kumar, 2016). The combined weight of such cases has severely undermined the image and legitimacy of UN peacekeepers as beacons of hope for beleaguered populations, fearing infractions on human security from assailing actors, only to find themselves preyed upon by their very protectors (Newman, 2016). Cases of murder at the hands of UN peacekeepers are also not unheard of, such the 2016 uncovering of a mass-grave outside of a UN base in the Central African Republic, where the corpses of twelve persons detained by Congolese peacekeepers were found (HRW, 2016). Further issues have arisen in other cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Somalia and Mali (AFP, 2016) (Grover, 2013). Naturally, when considering cases of peacekeeper abuse, it is clear that similar truths would be applicable for conventional troops. Peacekeepers are, after all, simply

committed troops from national frameworks, sent on behalf of TCCs to engage in missions under UN command, as illustrated in the overview of sexual abuse cases in conflicts in Figure 11 below, underlining the systemic problems occurring in all conflict settings.




FIGURE 11 - TIMELINE OF SEXUAL ABUSE CASES PR. YEAR (COHEN & NORDÅS, 2014)

5.5 Analysis

Naturally, with concerns as to the legitimacy, accountability and transparency of private sector inclusion in conflicts, efforts have already been made to address such concerns. In this sense, the private security industry itself has been forthcoming in establishing norms covering their field of operation as a method of legitimizing the industry itself. To this end, a key private actor has been the industry branch organization, the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) (*formerly known as the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)*). ISOA has become a large player in attempting to secure a legitimate position for the private security industry by cooperating with several governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. These efforts have been two-fold as ISOA has initially focused on mapping the expectations of key stakeholders, and later translated these expectations to an encompassing code of conduct for its corporate member base. The

ISOA Code of Conduct (ISOA CoC) is a short document with the expressed aim stating that it

“... seeks to establish consistent ethical standards for members of International Stability Operations Association operating in complex environments so that they may contribute their valuable services for the benefit of international peace and human security.” (ISOA, 2011).

While meagre in form, the ISOA CoC does refer to the adherence to several external documents framing the extended scope of responsibilities for signatories, as illustrated in Figure 11 to the right. Two of these external documents are of particular interest as they are both recent approaches to addressing the contemporary role that the private security industry plays in contemporary security, namely the Montreux document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) (ICRC-FDFA, 2008) (ICoCA, 2010).

The Montreux document and the ICoC are two complimentary documents under the so-called “*Swiss Initiative*” from 2006, addressing the topic of private security sector integration from two distinct angles. The Montreux document focuses on the role of the states and international organisations in adhering to best practices *vis-à-vis* their dealings with PMSCs, reaffirming commitments to pertinent international obligations and respect for humanitarian and human rights law. Of importance is also the documents’ confirmation of the legal status of PMSCs and their personnel, as the document distinguishes corporate entities as falling under national legalisation, while their personnel fall under international- humanitarian and human rights law. The document further encourages contracting states and organisations to

- [Universal Declaration of Human Rights \(1948\)](#)

- [Geneva Conventions \(1949\)](#)

- [Convention against Torture \(1975\)](#)

- [Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions \(1977\)](#)

- [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act \(1977\)](#)

- [Chemical Weapons Convention \(1993\)](#)

- [Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights \(2000\)](#)

- [Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies \(2008\)](#)

- [International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers \(2010\)](#)

- [UK Bribery Act \(2010\)](#)

FIGURE 12 - ISOA CoC STANDARDS

establish comprehensive oversight mechanisms supported by concise regulation for the industry (ICRC-FDFA, 2008).

However, understanding that such efforts could not be encompassing without an extended focus on the private sector itself, the Swiss Initiative helped to facilitate the ICoC, outlining a similar approach to best practices, responsibilities and obligations for the industry proper (van Amstel & Rodenhäuser, 2016). These approaches are divided into two key aspects; first and foremost PMSC conduct, outlining commitments to international- humanitarian and human rights law, rules on the use of force and a general commitment to humane conduct. Further, it outlines best practices for the management of PMSCs, notably regarding personnel vetting, policies for arms and equipment and incident/grievance reporting (ICoCA, 2010). Both documents are by nature based around self-regulation, yet no firm international oversight mechanism has been established. Despite this contemporary short-coming, the results of the Swiss initiative have been highly praised from all stakeholders as a substantial contribution to legitimizing and regulating the industry (Messner, 2008) (Isenberg, 2008) (AI, 2008) (UN-WGM, 2010).

While both documents form a strong, self-regulatory approach and enjoy support from the UN through its working group on mercenaries, it is still important to mention the ongoing WGM efforts to establish a convention on private military and security companies. This convention is intended as a binding legal instrument seeking to establish minimum international standards for states and organisations for providing regulatory frameworks and oversight for the private security industry. Progress on the establishment of this convention has been underway since 2009, where a draft convention was circulated. Following this draft, the WGM reported annually on its progress to the UN General Assembly until the end of 2013 where a shift in focus took place to address the emerging concept of foreign fighters in the Middle East, and currently it only reports its progress to the UN Human Rights Council (UN-WGM, 2017).

6. Results

Through this study, we have uncovered several important notions that tie together in answering not only the overarching research question, but also addressing the central arguments born from it.

Of initial importance to answering the research question is the argument for ripeness *vis-à-vis* large-scale engagements of private security contractors in UN peacekeeping frameworks. This notion has been addressed by analysing UN reports on the use of mercenaries and further through a qualitative study of both primary and secondary sources. Through a critical analysis of UN reports we are left with a clear indication that despite of UN reservations, the organisation maintains an overall openness towards PMSCs operating under the UN. This is both tied to the pragmatic needs of the organization *vis-à-vis* its lacking capacities to fulfil such needs through conventional means, but is also facilitated by an emerging regime in which the private sector is naturally ingrained in the way we engage in conflicts. Furthermore, we can trace increasing trends towards a heavy reliance on the private sector by data-mining financial reports and reviewing studies of PMSC usage in the UN proper. These efforts provide a clear support for the argument that the UN is indeed ready to further implement PMSCs into its operations.

However, such implementation efforts would be dependent on the viability of PMSCs as effective and capable of meeting the direct organisational needs of the UN. Through a study of the private sectors track-record in modern history, we are faced with an industry that has proved to be highly efficient in fielding several complex security solutions in several scenarios, and who has displayed an ability rapidly deploy such solutions in a fraction of the time that conventional peacekeeping forces require to mobilize and deploy. Thus, confirming two central arguments tied to the validity of investigating the industry as an alternative to conventional troops.

A last concern is thus the recurring concerns over private actors engaging in conflicts, notably regarding its impact on sovereignty and further regarding occurrences of miss-

conduct. For both concerns it must be noted that things are not simply black and white. Sovereignty concerns, while valid, also impede on states right to self-determination, as states themselves are fully able to legitimize actors to act on their behalf, a notion that in a UN setting should ring a bell as the organization itself is reliant on such legitimization efforts. Furthermore, when addressing concerns of a principal-agent nature *vis-à-vis* PMSC involvement, then we must make a firm note of the fact that in any complex conflict scenario, mistakes will simply happen. This notion is not a justification but a mere fact of the operational realities that conventional troops and contractors alike are forced to operate in. As such, these concerns are not strictly tied to PMSCs, as we can see similar cases with conventional forces and peacekeepers. Still, we must acknowledge that transparency, legitimacy and accountability are key notions for further integration effort and as such the UN must further develop its efforts to create concise internal policies, oversight mechanisms and ensure that such companies adhere to already established self-regulatory frameworks.

As such, we can argue that when combined, these central arguments provide a solid basis of support for the overarching research question, acknowledging that despite shortcomings, that the private sector is indeed a viable choice for addressing the operational challenges found in 21st century peacekeeping operations.

7. Conclusion

Indeed, much has changed since Kofi Annan in the 1990s initially considered employing private actors to provide security in Rwanda on behalf of the UN. From being a re-emerging concept, the private security industry has by now become a vast operation, providing assets, personnel and hardware to states, organisations and companies across the globe. With ever-increasing security demands, it is clear that the private security sector is here to stay when considering their level of integration into the contemporary security paradigm.

In a UN setting, we can notice an already established openness towards private security contractors from key organisational stakeholders, but we are faced with concerns over a lack of transparency and honesty set by the highest echelons of UN leadership when it comes to facilitating an open organisational discourse on the topic.

This poses a major conditional obstacle for the overarching research question, as the UN system will need to establish clear and concise policies towards how further integration should be facilitated. This not only includes the adoption of key self-regulatory documents, such as the Montreux document and the ICoC, it also requires the creation of oversight institutions, doctrine adjustments and considerations for how and when large-scale private sector deployments should be considered. These preconditions will enable the UN to tap into vast private sector resources and to offer alternative options for states unwilling to commit troops to UN operations.

As this study shows, the private security sector has already proven to be a versatile and effective partner in hostile environments, providing swift security solutions to complex problems in a variety of theatres. This expertise is sorely needed in contemporary peacekeeping settings, due to the limited and reluctant contributions of developed nations in facilitating the necessary specialists for complex intervention scenarios. Anyone with operational conflict experiences will acknowledge that engaging in complex security operations without a proper support structure backing you will pose immense threats to personnel, material and to the civilian population present in the battlespace. To this end, we must look to the private security sector as a viable and effective option that, despite its flaws, is able to provide exactly what the UN needs in the 21st century.

With this in mind, we must further consider what is more important for the UN and its member states. Is it more important to retain the status quo, relying on commitments from nations that are unlikely to be met, or do we seek out alternative solutions to the challenges that we are faced with? Can the international community afford to stand idly by while the UN fails to respond to another developing genocide or do we put personal preferences aside and seek a pragmatic solution where we suffer a minor evil to ward off an even greater one?

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Appendices

Appendix I – Categorizations & Concepts in WGM Reports on mercenary activities

A/50/390 – Report on the use of Mercenaries – 1995

Mercenaries

- Organized crime
 - Drug trafficking
 - Human trafficking
 - Arms smuggling
- Terrorism
- Aggressive behaviour
- Associated with the vilest of crimes

A/55/334 – Report on the use of Mercenaries – 2000

Mercenaries

- Organized crime
 - Arms trafficking
 - Drug trafficking
 - Terrorism
 - Destabilization of legitimate governments
 - Forcible control of natural resources
 - Bears criminal responsibility
- Mercenaries are a danger to people
 - Works against peace, political stability, law and democracy

Private Military Security Companies

- Lacks legal definition
 - Consensus on prevention of mercenaries must apply to PMSCs
 - Prevention does not equal elimination
 - Must be regulated
 - Legal norms required
- PMSCs as a new definition
 - Plays important role for contemporary security
 - Must not be allowed to replace inherited state functions
 - Concealed ties between PMSCs and mercenary activities

A/61/341 – Report on the use of Mercenaries – 2006

Mercenaries

- Distinction of Mercenaries

- New trends warrant a reconsideration for the definitions used, to avoid overlap with PMSCs
- The use of mercenary forces should be prevented and activities criminalized
- Links between mercenary forces and PMSCs
- Crime
 - Child soldiers
 - Human rights violations
 - Population displacement
 - Executions
 - Torture
 - Human, Drug and Arms trafficking
 - Terrorism
 - Clandestine operations (covert operations, assassinations, sabotage)
 - Unlawful control over natural resources
 - Potential possession of nuclear and biological weapons

Private Military Security Companies

- A developing definition
 - Increased WGM focus on the emerging security industry
 - Still links between the concepts of mercenaries versus private contractors
 - Increasing reliance of UN institutions on PMSCs
- Legal considerations
 - Industry still considered grey-area
 - Continuous lack of regulation and understanding of the industry
 - Lack of accountability in contemporary conflicts (Iraq/Afghanistan)
 - Demands for oversight
- Criminal Links
 - Human rights violations
 - Murder
 - Violations of economics rights vis-à-vis natural resources

A/65/325– Report on the use of Mercenaries – 2010

Mercenaries

- Contemporary status
 - Link between PMSCs and the recruitment of mercenaries
 - Lack of accountability
 - Mercenaries as a destabilizing factor, notably in Africa

Private Military Security Companies

- Privatization of Security
 - Extensive dependency on private security actors
 - PMSCs provide a wide range of services
 - Personnel protection
 - Site security
 - Convoy security
 - Policing
 - Security protection services

- Intelligence
 - Data collection
 - Prison administration
 - Interrogation
 - Covert Operations
- Certain PMSCs has grown too powerful and has become indispensable
- Hardship in distinguishing the different military and paramilitary actors in conflicts
- Legal Limitations
 - Continuous lack of regulation and oversight
 - Lack of Transparency
 - Lack of accountability
 - Lack of oversight
 - Infringement on state functions
 - Erosion of state monopoly of force
 - PMSC diversification to humanitarian fields to legitimize their operations
- Crime
 - Human rights violations
 - Reinforcement of inequalities between rich and poor
- PMSCS and the UN
 - Widespread reliance in UN structure on private security contractors
 - Lack of a system-wide policy
 - UN DSS increasingly confronted with higher security needs, necessitating outsourcing
 - UN interagency network created to develop systemic policy
 - PMSC usage may have a negative impact on the organizational image

A/70/330 – Report on the use of Mercenaries – 2015

Mercenaries

- Contemporary status
 - Links to PMSCs in the form of recruitment
 - Possible links to concept of Foreign Fighters
 - Links to terrorism
 - New trends indicate that mercenary activities have taken new form and new aspects
 - Lack of a clear definition of a mercenary
- Criminal links
 - Terrorism
 - Extreme violence
 - Hatred & intolerance
 - Possible links to human rights infractions
 - Human, Drug, Arms trafficking

Private Military Security Companies

No Mentions

Foreign Fighters

- Emerging definition
 - Not a new concept (Yugoslav Wars, Afghanistan)
 - Increasing concept (Syria/Iraq)
 - Encompasses foreign volunteers, transnational insurgents and Mujahidin's
 - In intrastate conflicts does not enjoy combat or legal immunity
 - May both impede or contribute to the right of peoples to self-determination
 - UN observations indication that foreign fighters typically impede on human rights
 - Motivational factors
 - Desire for belonging
 - Peer acceptance
 - Boredom
 - Alienation
 - Ideology
 - Humanitarian concerns
 - Payment might be an incentive
 - People, not states, are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination
 - WGM will not address of the legitimacy of force vis-à-vis self-determination
- Criminal Links
 - Illegal border crossings
 - Drug, Arms and Human trafficking
 - Creation/Procurement of falsified documents
 - Illegal sources of income
 - Radical method of warfare
 - Targeting civilian populations
 - Fostering sectarian violence
 - Examples of brutal conduct
 - Gross human rights violations
 - War crimes
 - Crimes against humanity
 - Genocide
 - Sexual slavery
 - Rape
 - Sexual/gender-based violence
 - Torture
 - Mutilation
 - Forcible displacement
 - Enforced disappearances
 - Wanton destruction of cultural property
 - Enlistment and forced recruitment of children

Appendix II – Overview of UN Procurements, data-mined totals

Year	Expenditure
2000	\$361.139,00
2001	\$433.571,00
2002	\$925.150,00
2003	\$1.222.862,00
2004	\$8.182.623,00
2005	\$19.643.180,00
2006	\$11.098.904,00
2007	\$19.415.739,00
2008	\$14.500.241,00
2009	\$44.255.000,00
2010	\$75.702.000,00
2011	\$113.885.000,00
2012	\$124.300.000,00
2013	\$61.483.021,00
2014	\$231.479.000,00
2015	\$174.211.000,00

Appendix III – Overview of DOD Contractors Q3-08 to Q2-17

Date	Quarter	Year	Iraq	Afghanistan
01-08-2008	q3	2008	162.428	41.232
01-11-2008	q4	2008	163.446	68.252
01-02-2009	q1	2009	148.050	71.755
01-05-2009	q2	2009	132.610	68.197
01-08-2009	q3	2009	119.706	73.968
01-11-2009	q4	2009	113.731	104.101
01-02-2010	q1	2010	100.035	107.292
01-05-2010	q2	2010	95.461	112.082
01-05-2010	q3	2010	79.621	107.479
01-09-2010	q4	2010	74.106	70.599
01-01-2011	q1	2011	71.142	87.483
01-04-2011	q2	2011	64.253	90.339
01-07-2011	q3	2011	62.689	93.118
01-10-2011	q4	2011	52.637	101.789
01-01-2012	q1	2012	23.886	113.491
01-04-2012	q2	2012	10.967	117.227
01-07-2012	q3	2012	7.336	113.736
01-10-2012	q4	2012	9.000	109.564
01-01-2013	q1	2013	8.449	110.404
01-04-2013	q2	2013	7.905	107.796
01-07-2013	q3	2013	7.735	101.855
01-10-2013	q4	2013	6.624	85.828
01-01-2014	q1	2014	3.234	78.136
01-04-2014	q2	2014	-	61.452
01-07-2014	q3	2014	-	51.489
01-10-2014	q4	2014	-	45.349
01-01-2015	q1	2015	5.000	39.609
01-04-2015	q2	2015	6.300	30.820
01-07-2015	q3	2015	1.349	28.931
01-10-2015	q4	2015	1.403	30.211
01-01-2016	q1	2016	2.028	30.455
01-04-2015	q2	2016	2.619	28.626
01-07-2016	q3	2016	2.485	26.435
01-10-2016	q4	2016	2.992	25.197
01-01-2017	q1	2017	3.592	26.022
01-04-2017	q2	2017	3.795	24.900