


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Masters Thesis conflict Analysis

Thesis capstone project-conflict dynamics



Abstract

This capstone thesis aims to study what factors play a role before and during a conflict and how conflicts move from one conflict phase to the next. This particular thesis uses the case study of the Rhodesian Bush War a conflict waged from 1965 to 1980 in the now know republic of Zimbabwe. This thesis starts by giving a general overview of the entire conflict by looking at the role of the Rhodesian government, military as well as the political and military developments of both guerrilla movements (ZAPU/ZANU). After which an analysis will be done based on the criteria of the capstone project (context, state, and non-state) focusing on the factors that influenced the conflict, and coming to a general conclusion. After which a joint analysis and conclusion will be presented to see the similarities in two other case studies conducted for this capstone project, these being the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the Sendero in Peru.

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1. Joint Introduction

“So why do we study war? I think most obviously, simply to survive. In the 20th century, a hundred and fifty million people, a hundred and fifty million people died as a result of war. Hundreds, millions, were disfigured, wounded or had their homes destroyed. War, has this horrific capacity. War is something that when it comes to us, we might not survive it, and as our capacity to impose violence on each other we had better understand exactly what it is” – Miguel Centeno (Coursera, 2016).

As Miguel Centeno argues in the above quote, it is extremely important to study war, not only to understand it, but also to prevent it from happening. This paper will contribute to this effort by not only focusing on why a war starts or ends, but also by focusing on what happens *during* the war. What actions and decision by which specific actor escalated or de-escalated the war? Or why does one group suddenly decide to kill another group it lived with peacefully for years? This paper will especially focus on these questions in the following conflicts: 1) the Rhodesian Bush War, 2) the Internal Conflict in Peru and 3) The Troubles in Ireland.

The Rhodesian Bush War was a civil war which lasted from July 4, 1964 to December 12, 1979 which led to universal suffrage, the end of the white minority-rule in Rhodesia and the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The main actors during this war were the white-government under the leadership of Ian Smith who fought against Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and against Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The war which would last more than fifteen years, would cost more than 30.000 lives (New World Encoclopedia, 2016).

The Internal Conflict in Peru began in 1980, on the eve of the first election Peru after more than seventeen years of military rule. After the Maoist organization, Sendero Luminoso, was led by a charismatic leader called Abimael Guzmán, burned the ballot papers in a small town in Peru’s countryside. What followed was a twenty-year internal conflict which would cost between the 30.000 to 70.000 lives (Peru Support Group, 2016)

The Troubles was a violent thirty-year conflict that was framed by a civil rights march in Londonderry on 5 October 1968 and later the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998. At the heart of this conflict lay the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It was a war characterized by many actors who all engaged in killings. Eventually the death toll exceeded 3.600 people, and 50.000 more were wounded (BBC History, 2016).

This thesis will have a slightly different structure than a “normal” thesis. The first part is a joint literature review and methodology which is the foundation of this paper. The second part contains the three internal conflicts, each researched and analyzed individually. The third


part of this paper will contain the joint analysis where the main differences and similarities between these three conflicts will be highlighted. Finally, the last section of this paper contains the main findings and conclusions on the basis of which policy advise is suggested.

2. Literature review

2.1 Underlying theories of conflict

In this literary review we will explore the various theories and concepts surrounding conflict studies following the various stages as outlined by the graph below. We begin with latent conflict where the conflict has not yet begun but underlying tensions are beginning to be shown. This is then followed by conflict emergence where these tensions are now openly shown in the wider public space and some small acts of violence begin to occur, this in turn results in conflict escalation where violence and war occurs. However, as the conflict drags on a stalemate or a hurting stalemate occurs where none of the parties involved benefit anymore from the conflict and seek for a way out. This eventually leads to a de-escalation of the conflict and a start of negotiations in the hope of creating a settlement, which would result in a dispute settlement, which should end the conflict. The final phase of the conflict then transpires where peace building is conducted so that underlying tensions are resolved and stability can return to a country. It must however be noted that while we use this model to outline the various theories and concepts throughout a conflict, the conflict itself can vary where after a hurting stalemate instead of de-escalation occurring, conflict escalation re-occurs again. With that noted we begin with the latent conflict. By splitting up the concepts and theories in the literature review by each phase it allows us to adequately use the concepts in the relevant phase during our own conflict analysis and thus give deeper insights. Additionally, by doing so in the literary review there will not be any future confusion where each theory and concept belongs as opposed to debating it in our conflict analysis.

Conflict phases model (Eric Brahm, <http://www.beyondintractability.org>)



2.2 General definitions and terms

Irregular warfare

Irregular warfare also known by various other degree of names (such asymmetric, guerrilla, unconventional warfare etc) is often referred to when mentioning a conflict where conventional military force is not used or irregular forces are used against a conventional military force. While the term is hard to define as it encompasses many various things the US Department of Defence has used two main forms of defining irregular warfare the first is “A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favours indirect approaches, though it may apply the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approach, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.” (Eric Larson, 10)

However because the definition still did not encompass the full scope of irregular warfare a second definition was needed stated as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence of the relevant populations. IW (Irregular Warfare) favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will...” (Larson, 10) While debate still ranges on if both these definitions full encompass the concept many argue that combined they form the basic definition of what irregular warfare is. Additionally by knowing what the definition is it can be linked back to the various groups and non-state actors which will be presented throughout the thesis.

Geopolitical Conflicts: Proxy wars and foreign intervention

Geopolitical conflicts are often described as political conflicts where geography plays an important role. However, while this is the generally excepted definition authors up to this day have questioned the accuracy of such a description especially in regards to the term geopolitics. Author Klaus Dodds in his book “Geopolitics” argues that there are two main understandings of the term geopolitics. Firstly he argues that geopolitics is just a reference to the world as seen today and often described by metaphors such as “iron curtain” “Third World” etc, to be able to create a simple model of the world. (Klaus Dodds, 4) However, the author argues that this form of simplistic explanation is too Western orientated and more often used by new sources to describe major events. (Dodds, 4)

The second understanding of the term Geopolitical which the author provides is that geopolitics aims to "...focus our attention on how geopolitics actually works as an academic and popular practice...(and) proceed to question how they generate particular understandings of places, communities, and accompanying identities". (Dodds, 5) In that sense while geopolitical conflicts is hard to define it is in the general definition conflict where geography and politics become embroiled.

Proxy warfare is a perfect example of this, where the concept refers to a war conducted by small groups against each other, are supported by larger states whom provide foreign intervention to a group they support. Foreign intervention is described as a third party not involved in a conflict aiding or helping another party militarily, financially, or via material goods. As Adam Lockyet describes foreign intervention as "...the transfer of resources from an external state to a contesting party in a civil war. Resources are broadly defined as any funds, weapons, equipment, material or personnel that have immediate or potential coercive value." (2339).

Proxy wars were often used to further geopolitical (see previous concept) influence within a region and therefore hurt the opposing force. Andrew Mumford author of the book "proxy wars: war and conflict in the modern world" described proxy wars as "...the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence the strategic outcome...proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct costly and bloody warfare. " (11) Additionally, the author cites Karl Deutsch the original author who coined the term whom defined it as "an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country and using some of that countries manpower, resources and territory as means to achieving foreign goals and ...strategies." (Mumford, 13)

Insurgency

Insurgent violence can take different forms which include revolutions, coup d'états, Leninist Revolution, guerrilla wars and terrorism. Each form will shortly be described. It is important to make a distinction between these kinds of insurgency since they shape the conflict each in its own way. Some forms of insurgency are more sudden waves of intense violence with lots of casualties, while others may show a more prolonged conflict that takes multiple years.

Coup D'état

A coup d'état is a sudden and powerful stroke in politics and often results in the forcible overthrow of a government. Thus it can be described as the seizure of power by an individual or a small group of persons who control an important position in the state's machinery. A coup is often planned in such a way that the overthrow will be swift. Regardless of its success it is a brief event, but it can sometimes lead to long wars with lots of casualties. In sum a coup d'état can be characterized as a planned insurgency at a high level of the state's ranks by a few people and involve little violence during a very brief period of time (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, p. 19).

Leninist Revolution

A revolution is, unlike a coup d'état, a change of the system rather than just a strategy to gain power. Revolutions sometimes are non-violent, but in most other instances they have resulted in huge casualties and bloodshed. Some were quick and some took years. Here we focus on the Leninist revolution where the violence was meant to be brief but where the actual seizure of power resulted in immense violence. The Leninist revolution model is characterized by a huge preparation before the final confrontation where lots of people were recruiting, educating and organizing the revolutionaries. It can thus be argued that this model is an insurgency from below that involves numerous people where the preparation stage was very long, but the violent confrontation is expected to be brief (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, pp. 20-21)

Guerilla War

Guerilla war is a diffuse type of war that is fought in relatively small formations against a stronger enemy. In many insurrections in history this kind of warfare has been the main form of resistance to the more powerful enemy. Its strategy is to avoid direct and decisive battles against a more powerful enemy and opt instead for a longer and more small scale type of engagement. Guerilla war can be used a method to wear the enemy out, or to gain time to build a regular army that could win in a conventional conflict. An important characteristic for guerilla warfare is that they adopt a flexible style of warfare with many hit and run operations. They utilize the terrain, blend into the population and sometimes launch their attacks from neighboring countries. This makes this kind of warfare very difficult for the enemy's forces to win against a much smaller enemy (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, p. 21).

Terrorism as a form of Insurgency

Terrorism as a form of insurgency is different from guerilla, conventional war and riots. They are carried out systematically and constitute a distinct strategy of insurgency. When we think of terrorism we think of actions like the 9/11 attacks in 2001 or the London bombings in 2005 not of guerilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Merari, 1993, p. 12). What defines terrorism as a strategy the most is that it is based, more than other forms of insurgency, on psychological impact. Describing the strategy of terrorism as a form of psychological warfare does not specifically explain how terrorists hope to win by it. Although terrorists have been rarely clear enough as to lay down a complete, coherent strategic plan, it is possible to discern several strategic ideas that terrorists have held as the cardinal practical concept of their struggle.

Causes of Terrorism

In the article “The Causes of Terrorism”, Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorism is not per se a reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society. It is more than often a dissatisfaction of a small fragment of a population that acts on the behalf of a majority that is unwilling or unaware of their grievances. Given some source of dissatisfaction in the modern state with its bland bureaucracies, lack of responsiveness to demands is omnipresent-terrorism has become an attractive strategy for small organizations of diverse ideological persuasions who want to attract attention for their cause, provoke the government, intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy, impress an audience, or promote the adherence of the faithful. They have the idea that there is an absence of choice and reason that there is no other alternative than committing terrorist attacks. Terrorism is thus the result of a steady growth of engagement and opposition and described as a group development that depends on government action (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 396)

2.3 Latent conflict

Patterns of conflict

First proposed by Richard E. Barringer, Barringer proposed that certain “patterns of factors exist that variously condition the origin, development, and termination of conflict...” (7) Additionally, he argues that these patterns are not purely militarily but also “social, political, economic, technological, military and psychological.” (Barringer, 7) He further continues by debating that by observing past conflicts, these patterns can be observed in conflicts and their impact towards the conflict analyzed.

Researchers of the air staff and command college whom created a viewable model of Barringers conflict patterns later expanded upon his model and added a few extra details such as the post-conflict stage, additionally transition stages as well as. However, what the model lacks is the escalation and descalation sub-phases thus while the model is a good referencing point to patterns of conflict it should not be regarded as what Barringer himself proposed. (Sam Allotey, 100).

Conflict resolution Framework (Sam Allotey, 100)




Figure 1. Conflict Resolution Framework

Weak Governance

One of the main causes of violent conflict is weak governance institutions which are often distinguished by low levels of institutionalization (UN DEA, 2010: 25). A breakdown in state constrain in the latent conflict stage can bring about the emergence of actual conflict. An effective government with working institutions is able to prevent or reduce the intensity of conflicts even while robust motivations to start a conflict exist. A weak governance may be unable to restrain underlying violent conflict which allows conflicts to erupt and increase (Hampson & Malone, 2002: 115). Weak governance is not only a problem in the latent phase of a conflict, it may also be a reason for conflicts to escalate again within the conflict or to recur after a peace agreement is signed. It is therefore of utmost importance to transform governance and governance institutions in post-conflict situations (UN DEA, 2010: 25). Here it is therefore useful to assess the strength of the government involved to see how a conflict was able to erupt after the latent stage and if or how the strength of the government was increased during or after the conflict to prevent another episode of escalation.

Polarization

Identity and cleavages are known causes for conflicts and polarization helps to understand them. Research has shown that economic, religious as well as ideological polarization between groups is a sizable cause of violent conflicts. Moreover, the magnitude of polarization has an expanding influence on the level of conflict (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 132). Polarization itself can be defined as “*the extent to which the population is clustered around a small number of distant poles*” (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 133). It can therefore be seen as divisions within society. When multiple cleavages overlap it causes division in society to be mutually reinforced while cross-cutting cleavages may counterbalance each other. The manner in which society is polarized around certain cleavages is therefore important to know. Polarization therefore revolves around the idea that friction in society is caused by two simultaneous processes. The first being identification with people within one’s own group and the second being the process of distancing oneself from people belonging to other groups (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 133). The concepts of cleavages and polarization are important for this thesis as they are important factors in letting the conflict escalate as well as de-escalate a conflict when polarization is decreased.

2.4 Conflict Emergence

Conflict Emergence

After a conflict has remained latent for some time, if the underlying grievances or frustrations are strong enough, a "triggering event" marks the emergence or the "eruption" phase of the conflict. This event or episode may be the first appearance of the conflict, or it may be a confrontation that erupts in the context of a protracted, but dormant, or low-level conflict (Kriesberg, 2003).

Political violence

In this stage it is important to understand the universe of political violence. In theory there are uncountable ways to classify political violence. But here we identify the following as seen in table 1:

- 1: *States against States*, here we see violence of states directed towards other states by using sizable regular armies and military strategies. All acts are reflecting the capability of a large bureaucracy and are carefully organized and planned.
- 2: *States against Citizens*, violence from states against its citizens by legal and illegal laws that enforce oppression.
- 3: *Citizens against Citizens*, examples of politically motivated violence here are racial or ethnic attacks.
- 4: *Citizens against the State*, this kind of violence can be spontaneous or organized and is mostly aimed to overthrow the ruling party (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, pp. 17-18)

Political violence graph (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, 17-18)

		<i>Target</i>	
		<i>State</i>	<i>Citizens</i>
<i>Initiator</i>	<i>State</i>	Full-scale war; belligerent activity in peacetime.	Legal and illegal law enforcement oppression
	<i>Citizens</i>	Guerilla war; insurgent terrorism; coup d'état; Leninist revolution	Vigilante terrorism; ethnic terrorism

Table 1 A Basic Classification of Political Violence

The Commitment Problem

The commitment problem is commonly used to explain why states are unable to come to a pre-war arrangement, which could have prevented conflict (Rider & Owsiak, 2015: 509). Wars or conflict in general are always costly to all groups involved even when one of the parties gains more advantage than the others. Additionally, all sides to a conflict are aware of the costs the conflict will bring about. (Fearon, 1995: 6). The commitment problem encapsulates the inability of groups to commit themselves to a mutually favorable outcome that can prevent the cost of conflict. The parties to a conflict will defect from commitments because of a lack of trust the others will hold their end of the deal (Moran, 2012: 55). The commitment problem is important for this thesis as it can help explain why conflicts emerge or escalate even when they could have been prevented.

According to Fearon, the commitment problem arises when three conditions are met: “ (1) the groups interact in anarchy, without a third party able to guarantee and enforce agreements between them; (2) one of the groups anticipates that its ability to secede or otherwise withdraw from joint arrangements will decline in the near future; and (3) for this group, fighting in the present is preferable to the worst political outcome it could face if it chose continued interaction “ (Fearon, 1995: 10). The absence of a third party that can insure agreements is therefore an important part of a commitment problem as well as major shifts in the expected distribution of power (Blattman & Miguel, 2010: 13). The dilemma here is that when these circumstances are present a conflict will develop, regardless of the fact that all groups would be better off if one could abstain from exploiting the other after the other’s decline of power (Fearon, 1995: 10).

Karl Marx

Karl Marx one of the first proponents of conflict theory proposes that conflict often orientate from class struggle and when a conflict does erupt it has a large and ever resounding impact. According to Lewis A. Coser Marx argues that “...conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict.” (200) Additionally, author R.J Rummel argues that Marx uses six elements, which outline class conflict:

- Classes are authority relationships based on property ownership,
- A class defines groupings of individuals with shared life situations thus interests,
- Classes are naturally antagonistic by virtue of their interests,

- Imminent within modern society is the growth of two antagonistic classes and their struggle, which eventually absorbs all social relations,
- Political organization and power is an instrumentality of class struggle and reigning ideas are its reflection,
- Structural change is a consequence of the class struggle (1977)

In all while Karl Marx main focus lies within the societies social changes though class struggle by conflict he does not look at how conflicts change or how social struggles come into play during a conflict. As he argues his main focus is in bringing about social change through violence and often through the lower classes. However, it is important to cite the author as he does explain why a latent conflict may escalate into a full-blown conflict.

Game theory

Game theory plays a central role when it comes to peace and conflict studies. First proposed by Anatol Rapoport who argues that game theory should be defined as "...a theory of rational decisions during conflict situations." (1) The theory aims to separate a conflict into four categories (players, strategies, outcomes and payoffs) and by doing so calculate the rational choices leaders make in determining whether or not to go to war. Throughout the years this theory has been further expanded to include other factors which may have an impact on rational thinking, author Katarzyna Zbiec states that author Thomas Shelling determined that credible deterrence such as trade agreements, and early mobilization of a single party may have a profound impact on the rational choices. (42-44) Further points he brings up is the segregation of the population as well as, mutual distrust between various countries also wither down the rational thinking of countries and thus increase the escalation of war. (Zbiec, 44-46) This idea is again seen in Van Fearon's proposal on rational explanations of war as well as Karl Von Clausewitz ideas.

Karl von Clausewitz was a general in the Prussian army and he was also a military theorist. As such, he developed one of the most influential theories of war, more specifically on the political philosophy of war in his work *On War* (Heywood, 2011: 243). Clausewitz is famous for describing war as *the continuation of politics by other means* as well as defining war as "*an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will*" (Williams, 2008: 188). Clausewitz argued that going to war was is rational decision, similiary related to game theory where rational decisions are taken into account when deciding whether or not to go to war. Additionally he argued that a simple cost-benefit analysis should be made by the political authorities concerned whether or not going to war is in their best interest or not

(Heywood, 2011: 243). In this sense, war was thus viewed as a legitimate state policy instrument.

The importance of including game theory in research regarding conflict studies is not necessarily that it will be used but that many social theories have used to theory to formulate their own ideas such as the case with Clausewitz and Fearon to the decisions which are made by individuals during conflict situations.

Besides game theory and predicting that war was a rational choice for political entities to make as shown under game theory he also presented a number of other theories which help explain conflict studies. The first of which is the Clausewitz trinity or the idea that war is occurs due to the three elements the first being; blind instinct set about by hatred, animosity and primal instinct to turn towards violence. (75) The second being the probability and chance of which a person or entity decides to go to war, while finally the third being the “subordinate nature of a political instrument” (Clausewitz, 75-76) These three elements can be split up into three other categories.: People with their primal instinct to turn to violence, the army which looks at chances for war and the probability of success, while the final entity is politics/government whom decided to go to war and where the army and people must obey.

Another which Clausewitz highlights is the fog of war, here he argues that a times it will be impossible to see the conflict for what it is either during or after a conflict has occurred. This may be due to a variety of reasons such as planning while it is going on, confusion on the battle field etc. He highlight that the only way for the fog of war to be lifted and data to be revealed is by expressed talent or by chance. (Clausewitz, 180)

Rise of the Conflict

Conflict emerges when individuals and groups that depend on one another for valuable outcomes and deprive one another of such valued outcomes through their independent actions. Conflicts between groups can emerge when the attributes of one group will have the feeling that they are falling below a reasonable standard in comparison by another group their actions or inactions. Reasons for conflict could be tangible goods such as money, territory but can also be intangible goods like status, religion and respect. When one of the groups in a society gets the feeling they are not getting the respect or money they are entitled to, then social conflict is likely to emerge (De Dreu, 2010).

Security Dilemma

The security dilemma is a concept that argues that: what one does to enhance one's own security causes reaction that, in the end can make one less secure (Posen, 1993, p. 28). This

problem is often overlooked by statesmen that not recognize that this problem exists. They do not empathize with their neighbors and do not understand that some of their actions are threatening for the other party. This dilemma is especially intense when offensive and defensive military forces are more or less identical, states cannot signal their defensive intent. States can use for example armored forces to defend their borders against an attack by other armored forces but the neighbor can also see it as a threat because of the offensive potential of armored forces. In a security dilemma states always assume the worst. But also during a time where it is known that an offensive is more effective than defensive, states will often choose the offensive if they wish to survive. This can cause the pre-emptive war to prevent the other force to strike first (Posen, 1993). Important to understand in this dilemma is the fear of being exploited, states don't want to be in a vulnerable position and that it is likely when two states which support the status quo but do not understand this security dilemma will end up in war or in a hostile relationship (Jervis, 1978).

Security Dilemmas in Ethnic Wars

This problem that barriers cooperation at the international level of politics also applies to problems that arise as central authority collapses in multi-ethnic empires. Regardless of the origins of ethnic strife, once violence reaches the points that ethnic communities cannot rely on the state to protect them, each community must mobilize to take responsibility for its own security (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 147). This causes a real threat because the mobilization is often accompanied by nationalist rhetoric that often seems threatening to other groups and also because going on the offensive is more effective in an inter-community conflict because settlements and towns that are multi-ethnic are harder to hold than to take (Kaufmann, 1996, pp. 147-148) Additionally, it is important to note that the severity of security dilemmas is most intense when the demography is very intermixed and is more limited when they are very separated. When communities are very intermixed, both sides are vulnerable to attack, and since it is almost impossible to defend it is only "logical" to kill or drive out the enemy population before they do the same (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 148). Finally the security dilemma argues that once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, this war will not end until the populations are separated into defensible and homogeneous regions because neither group will trust the other. An attack will also become less likely because it requires much more effort (Kaufmann, 1996).

2.5 Conflict escalation

Escalation

While outlining his theory regarding patterns of conflict Barringer also explored in detail the concept of escalation regarding conflicts. According to him, escalation is defined as “any intensification or moderation, respectively, of the scale or scope of ongoing hostilities that constitutes a fundamental change in the “rules of the game” governing their conduct”. In other words, an escalation doesn’t necessarily need to be an escalation in violence but can also occur if another factor/pattern is applied or changed. E.g sanctions are placed upon a certain group which makes them more desperate and therefore result in a change of strategy (a change in the rules of the game)

Social Interdependence Theory

The social interdependence theory fits into the conflict escalation phase because it points to certain factors that have the power to escalate a conflict into a one that is violent and destructive. The social interdependence theory builds on the work done by Kurt Lewin who argued that the essence of group dynamics is the interdependence among groups members. Common goals generate motivation towards the accomplishment of these same goals which makes the group an interdependent whole (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). Deutsch extended Lewin’s work by specifying two categories of social interdependence, namely positive and negative interdependence. Positive interdependence occurs when it is perceived by individuals that “*they can attain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are cooperatively linked attain their goals*” (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). Negative interdependence on the other hand occurs when it is perceived that individuals “*can obtain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are competitively linked fail to obtain their goals*” (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). When these two categories are applied to conflict, it can say something about the processes and conditions of constructive conflicts in which a mutual problem is tackled collectively and it can say something about destructive conflicts in which conflicts are framed as a zero-sum game (Vallacher et al., 2013: 35).

Deutsch furthermore identified a couple of factors that influence a conflict in becoming either constructive or destructive, the difference being that a constructive conflict is solved before it can escalate into a real violent conflict, while a destructive conflict escalates in violence. The first factor is the nature of the conflict. A zero-sum view of the conflict will quickly escalate towards a destructive conflict. Large conflicts about basic principles, identity

and substantive issues are furthermore more likely to become destructive than small ones. The specific context may also affect the conflict seeing as cultural differences can lead to misunderstandings and can increase in-group, out-group thinking which can cause even more polarization (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998). Therefore, the social interdependence theory is important for the thesis seeing as the existence of certain factors can point to a conflict becoming a constructive one without much escalation or a destructive conflict which does escalate. It is important to recognize what factors make the conflict a destructive one so work can be done to de-escalate and turn the conflict into one with positive interdependence.

2.6 Stalemate

Stalemate

Once a conflict escalates it will sooner or later often reach a stalemate. The occurrence of stalemates is a common feature of international interactions. A large part of militarized disputes (40%) over the period 1816-2001 resulted in a stalemate. A stalemate occurs where there is neither a clear victory of one party nor an effective conflict resolution mechanism (Caruso, 2007, p. 2). Stalemates emerge for a number of reasons: 1: failed tactics, 2: depletion of available resources to fuel the conflict, 3. A reduction in support of the conflict by group members or allies and 4. costs are becoming too high to continue the fighting (Brahm, 2003). It is often argued that the phase of stalemate is an important moment to mediate between the warring parties, like Kissinger argued when he said: “Stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement” (Zartman, 2001, p. 8). In this stage they seek an alternative policy or a way out. The concept is based in cost-benefit analysis which assumes that a group or state will pick the alternative which it prefers and that states and groups at some point in the conflict realize that the current status quo or no negotiation is a negative-sum situation. To avoid the outcomes of this negative sum- situation they will explore the positive-sum outcomes. (Zartman, 2001, pp. 9-10). It is thus important that the fighting parties need to have some sense and willingness to search for a solution and the realization that the other party shares that sense and willingness to search.

Duel concern theory

Duel concern theory is considered a predictability theory of choice and strategy depending on certain conditions within a conflict (Robin Vallecher, 37). The theory centers on a particular group and their outcome as well as their rivals. Depending on the outcome of a certain action

and the strength and weakness of themselves and their opponents groups may decide to take certain actions such as yielding, avoiding, contenting, compromising etc. (Vallecher, 37) This theory fits in with the Ripeness theory where parties at one point enter a hurting stalemate and it is decided to enter negotiations however before that the duel-concern theory may be applied to assess the strengths and weakness of the group and their rival.

Ripeness theory

The Ripeness theory as proposed by William Zartman is formulated to explain why negotiations for an end to a conflict occur, and in doing so the author additionally explains when parties are ready to negotiate a settlement towards the conflict. (228) According to the author there are two elements which determine when conflicting parties are ready to enter a negotiated conflict. Firstly a “mutually hurting stalemate” must occur. This concept defined as “...when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them.” (Zartman, 228) indicates that neither side will likely win the conflict. The second element according to the author is the perception that there is a way out. (Zartman, 288) although in reality of the situation doesn't necessarily have to be true as long as the perception is there a move towards a resolution will be established.

This theory combined with the duel concern theory is essential when applying it to conflict analysis. While duel concern theory helps analysts measure the impact of actions by a group or nation, ripeness theory is applied once an action results in a hurting stalemate therefore resulting in the application of the theory.

Political Will

To end a stalemate in a peaceful resolution it is important that the fighting parties themselves can exercise the political will necessary to reach a solution (Theofilopoulou, 2007). However, in conflicts there are groups or individuals at both sides that have built up an interest in keeping the conflict going. This happens when the conflict has brought them political power or economic opportunities that they did not have before the conflict (Brahm, 2003). But political will to continue the conflict is also based on the fact that when the war ends they can be held accountable. A relevant observation was made by Norpoth when he said: “war and economics have few rivals when it comes to making or breaking governments” (de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995, p. 841). It is assumed that political leaders of both warring parties are intent on maintaining themselves in power and use the available tools of power and rules to accomplish this end. This results in cases where political leaders, especially authoritarian, are inclined to fight wars longer to keep themselves in power (de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).

2.7 Conflict de-escalation-negotiation

De-escalation

Conflict de-escalation refers to a significant decrease in the severity of violence or coercive means that are being used between the adversaries. The conflict is thus becoming less intense and is becoming less violent. De-escalation is often not the consequence of a single event but a process that goes step-by-step by negotiating and earlier made agreements (Maiese M. , 2004). Important to understand here is that the methods used by the adversaries eventually may become too costly or ineffective, supporters may cease to support and external pressure can become too burdensome (Kriesberg, 2003). When a conflict has reached this point, one side typically makes an important conciliatory gesture. Hostility decreases, the tendency to retaliate lessens, and the level of coerciveness declines. Eventually adversaries may begin to confer benefits on each other and reward each other for cooperating. All of these factors initiate the process of de-escalation. Once initiated, de-escalation tends to proceed slowly and requires much effort (Maiese M. , 2004)

Conciliatory Gestures

Very important in the stage of de-escalation are conciliatory gestures. These kind of gestures are often necessary to stop and interrupt a conflict that has been ongoing for a long time and can help transform the conflict. These gestures are, however, not easy to carry out and their success depends heavily on many factors such as the relations between the adversaries. In addition these actions need to be precise, appropriate and seem fresh and fitting in the situation of the conflict (Kriesberg, De-escalation Stage, 2003). When these conciliatory gestures appear to be effective they often are a prelude to formal negotiations. There are several features of gestures that increase the likelihood of successful conciliation according to Mitchell (2000, pp. 285-286):

- 1: the gesture represents a major change from the past;
- 2: it is novel;
- 3: it fits into the target's orientation;
- 4: it is made in an undeniable manner;
- 5: it involves costs and risks for the initiator;
- 6: it is made unconditionally and voluntarily;
- 7: it is made so that it would be difficult or impossible to reverse; and

8: it is structured so that the other side can easily respond positively.

It should be stressed about these gestures that a single one does not suffice to end or interrupt a conflict. Effectiveness is more likely if the gesture is convincing and appears to be widely supported and binding for the future (Kriesberg, 2003).

Negotiation

Negotiation in its simplest form is a discussion between two or more parties who are trying to work out a solution to their problem. These negotiations can happen on all kinds of levels, from two individuals at the local level or between two states at the international level. The goal is often to achieve a goal that they were not able to achieve on their own and prefer to search for an agreement than to fight or give in (Maiese, Negotiation, 2003).

Power Dependence Theory

Another important theory for this thesis in understanding conflict dynamics is the power dependence theory. As can be seen from the graph which shows the different phases of conflicts, after a hurting stalemate the de-escalation or negotiation phase begins. The parties entering this phase are, however, not always equal partners in these negotiations due to power differences. According to Emerson, “*the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B on A*” (Emerson, 1962: 33). Dependence in negotiation situations is based on two variables. The first variable states that the manner of dependence of A on B is directly related to the value A attributes to outcomes in which B mediates. The second variable argues that the dependence of A upon B is inversely proportional to the possibility of attaining A’s goals without the help of B (Emerson, 1962: 32; Vallacher et al., 2013: 38).

Understanding the power differences between conflicting parties is important for understanding if and how a conflict de-escalates or how the negotiations will unfold. Unequal dependencies can lead to power imbalances or power abuse which can in turn lead to the conflict re-escalating again (Molm, 2007). The power dependence theory can therefore be of help in understanding how negotiations begin, how the content of the negotiations can be influenced by differences in power and why not all de-escalations and negotiations within conflict last and are able to prevent another escalation phase.

External Pressure

De-escalation can also happen because of the roles played by outside parties and the ways in which they relate to the fighting parties to foster the de-escalation and/or pressure them into negotiations (Maiese, 2004). External pressure can translate to international intervention which has three broad forms: *non-coercive intervention*, *coercive intervention*, and *third-party mediation* during both the negotiation and implementation stages. *Non-coercive interventions* show a sense of alarm over the violation of minority rights taking place in other countries and has at times outside states and multilateral organizations exerted pressure on the transgressors (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 65). *Coercive interventions* can help bring warring parties to the bargaining table and enforce the resulting terms. A key requirement for these interventions is that there is true international commitment. Without the commitment the peace created by the intervention will not last for a longer period of time. (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 42). *External mediation* is helpful in bringing about de-escalation, but it is unlikely to be successful in the absence of expectancy revision by either one or both adversaries or policy entrepreneurs. Shocks (transitional situations that can instigate a major period of change in adversarial relations by altering key expectancies) play an important role here since external mediators are well aware that certain periods are more ripe for bringing about de-escalation or negotiation than other times (Rasler, 2000, pp. 702-703).

Termination of the conflict

The termination of a conflict is always difficult to determine, more often than not once a conflict “official” ends there is a tendency for the conflict to either re-emerge or continue on. As William Flavin states “Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict.” (96). Flavin therefore makes a distinction between conflict termination and conflict resolution arguing that conflict resolution is “...a long process. It is primarily a civil problem that may require military support. Through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the condition for successful conflict resolution” (96). Additionally, as the author highlights often the termination of the conflict is seen through the lens of some type of military intervention or military action, while conflict resolution is considered in the spectrum of civilian operations. (See concept of conflict resolution)

Greed and Grievances

This concept argues that rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions in society. In political science rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest (Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2004, p. 563). In

contrast there is an economic approach argues that rebellion occurs in the pursuit of self-interested material gain. Oil, diamonds, timber and other primary commodities form the basis of the contestable resources over which rebels fight their governments. A strong resource base can thus serve as a mechanism for mobilization. (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 319). Important here is the feasibility hypothesis created by Collier & Hoeffler which is a variant of Hirshleifer Machiavelli Theorem, which proposes that no profitable opportunity for violence, would go unused (Hirschleifer, 2001). The feasibility hypothesis proposed that where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur. It leaves the motivation of the rebels unspecified and its initial agenda being determined by the preferences of the social entrepreneur who is first to occupy the niche. This will sometimes be a not-for-profit organization with a political or religious agenda and sometimes a for-profit organization. (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2008, p. 2) There are thus two prevalent rebel motivation explanations, greed and grievances. They provide a common explanation-'opportunity' and 'viability' describe the common conditions sufficient for profit-seeking, or not-for-profit, rebel organizations to exist (Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2004, p. 565).

2.8 Dispute settlement

Peace Process

Peace process is defined by Harold Saunders as “*a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means*” (Saunders, 1996: 483). The peace process of conflicts does not only contain official negotiations and signing a peace agreement, however. The peace process plays out in different phases of the conflict and in different arenas. According to Saunders firstly the pre-negotiation phase starts in which it is the purpose to begin or nourish the peace process by paving the way through changing relationships. Conflicts are often caused by incompatible interests over which people do not want to negotiate. The goal of pre-negotiations is therefore to “*start a political process that can change relationships and lead to the end of violence, to peace and to reconciliation*” (Saunders 1996: 421).

Seeing as the aim of a peace process is to end the violent conflict through improving relationships among groups, public participation in this process next to the official arena is very important. Saunders has therefore identified four arenas in which the peace process simultaneously unfolds: the official arena, the quasi-official arena, the public peace processes and civil society (Burgess, 2004). Saunders also came up with five cyclical phases in peace processes. In the first phase officials and the people agree they want to work towards peace by defining the main problem within the conflict. In the second phase relationships and issues are

mapped clearly. The next phase uses public dialogue to solidify the desire to implement collective solutions. Phase four is the phase in which actual negotiations take place and in the last phase citizens and officials together implement their agreed decisions (Saunders, 1996).

Another typology of peace processes is given by Nicole Ball which breaks the peace process down in two stages with each stage comprising of two other phases. The figure below shows the objectives in each phase of the conflict (Burgess, 2004).

Stages of peace process (Burgess, 2004)

The Peace Process in Countries with Negotiated Peace Settlements

STAGES	Cessation of Conflict		Peacebuilding	
PHASES	<i>Negotiations</i>	<i>Cessation of Hostilities</i>	<i>Transition</i>	<i>Consolidation</i>
MAIN OBJECTIVES	Agreeing on key issues to enable fighting to stop	Signing peace accords Establishing cease-fire Separating forces	Establishing a government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively Implementing reforms to build political institutions and establish security Inaugurating economic and social revitalization Promoting societal reconciliation	Continuing and deepening reform process Continuing economic and social recovery efforts Continuing promotion of societal reconciliation

As can be derived from the above, implementing a peace agreement takes a long time. That being said, the peace process does not end with the peace agreement. Other work such as disarmament and building new relations and institutions are also part of the peace process as a whole (Burgess, 2004). For this thesis it is important to recognize who does what in which phase of the peace process to know why some peace initiatives fail and others succeed in de-escalating the conflict.

Spoilers

As has been stated before, conflicts are often caused by incompatible interest, which is why the peace process is such a complicated business. Peace processes are fragile journeys to peace and the longer a peace process takes the more likely it will relapse into conflict again because of spoilers (Wallensteen, 2012: 136). Stephen Stedman defines spoilers as “*leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it*” (Stedman, 1996: 369). This means spoilers are actors who intentionally try to undermine the peace process and conflict settlement. Identifying spoilers within peace processes is therefore important for this thesis.

Spoilers occur for the reason that it is unusual for all parties to simultaneously see peace as advantageous (Stedman, 2000: 7). The existence of spoilers do not, however, automatically suggest a peace process is doomed to fail (Newman & Richmond, 2006: 101). It is, however, important to recognize the existence of spoilers and how they influence the peace process which when failed can lead to escalation of the conflict again.

Stedman identifies four different dimensions in which spoilers form a problem to the peace process. The first regards the position of the spoiler; whether it is inside or outside the peace process. Inside spoilers are likely to use strategies of stealth while outside spoilers generally adopt violent strategies (Stedman, 2000: 8). The reason for these different methods is that inside spoilers spoil because their expectations of the peace process are not met while the outsiders spoil because their very existence is challenged by the peace process (Zahar, 2003). A second dimension regards the number of spoilers. More often than not multiple spoilers will try to challenge the peace process which complicates the strategies to deal with them as marginalizing one spoiler may reinforce others (Stedman, 2000: 9). Stedman also recognized that spoilers vary in their goals and commitment to undermining a peace process which is why he identified three types of spoilers: limited, greedy, and total (Stedman, 2000: 10). Whether or not the type of spoilers can change during the peace process depends on the locus of the spoiler. When the locus of the spoiler is a leader, change in type is much more likely than when it comes from followers (Stedman, 2000: 11).

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution can be seen as the process in which a peaceful ending to a conflict is facilitated. Wallensteen defines conflict resolution as “*a situation where the conflicting*

parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other" (Wallensteen, 2012: 8). Three common approaches to conflict resolution are negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Negotiation means the conflicting parties will try to come to a resolution themselves. With mediation, the conflicting parties communicate through a neutral third party which can recommend of a non-binding nature. With arbitration, the conflicting parties declare to carry out the recommendations of a third party (Goltsman et al., 2009: 1397).

Conflicts differ from disputes in that they often last longer and are caused by more than incompatible interests. Fundamental differences and non-negotiable issues generally lie at the heart of conflicts which is why conflict resolution should go beyond only fulfilling group's interests. To truly resolve a long-term conflict, the underlying causes of the conflict must be found and dealt with while at the same time underlying identities and values must be respected (Spanger, 2003). Dispute settlement, however, is only aimed at resolving a dispute as swiftly as possible. It therefore can happen that disputes within the context of a conflict are resolved while the conflict itself and its underlying causes are not (Spanger, 2003). For this thesis it is therefore crucial to determine what the underlying causes of conflicts are and when they are successfully resolved so as to stop the conflict from escalating again.

2.9 Post-conflict peacebuilding

Normalization Process

The normalization process is part of the post-conflict peacebuilding phase and can be seen as a stage within a conflict in which it coincides with peace agreement making and the reconciliation process. It can be seen as response of structural peacebuilding in which the relations between different groups are normalized through confidence building measure (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 16).

Resilience Theory

The theory of community resilience is of special importance in the aftermath of conflicts since it can help understand why some conflict won't start again, even when both sides committed atrocities. It argues that communities have the potential to function effectively and adapt successfully in the aftermath of disasters and wars. It is a process that links a certain network of adaptive capacities (these are resources with dynamic characteristics) to adaptation after a certain disasters or crisis. To build collective resilience communities there is a need to reduce risk, engage local people in mitigation, create organizational linkages, boost and protect social

supports and reduce resource inequities. This requires flexibility, decision-making skills and reliable sources of information in difficult and unpredictable circumstances (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008, p. 1). The theory of resilience provides an excellent framework for enhancing community resilience after cases like chronic civil wars or other disasters to buffer the adverse effects of disasters and promote community wellbeing. It is suggested to ensure commitment to engage the entire system of the community in an inclusive process by identifying scripts, themes and patterns across generations and community history; foster creativity as the central process of healing maintaining sensitivity to issues of culture, gender and spirituality; and to encourage access to all natural and ancillary resources (Somasundaram & Sambasivamoorthy, 2013). Other factors mentioned include building on existing resources; collaborating and networking across all systems; relating program needs to goals, future and best interests of the community; encouraging natural change agents and leadership within the community; empowering families and communities; and developing ownership by the community. Norris et al. (2008) identify four primary sets of adaptive capacities for community resilience — economic development, social capital, information and communication, and community competence. Community competence here refers to the capacity, resources and skills within the community to act together, cooperatively and effectively, to meet challenges. Unfortunately in disaster situations, particularly chronic war contexts, some or many of these resources and support systems would be affected, dysfunctional or not available especially after a war (Masten & Narayan, 2012).

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a term often used in the field of conflict resolution and it refers to a process that tries to assist in turning the conflict settlements into a lasting end of the conflict (Haus, 2003). In short, reconciliation means *“finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately”* (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 12). It can therefore be defined as a process which conflicting parties must follow to *“move from a divided past to a shared future”* (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 12). It is also commonly acknowledged that reconciliation encompasses at a minimum the components truth, justice, mercy, and peace as identified by John Lederach (Haus, 2003). Ideally reconciliation has a backward-looking and a forward-looking dimensions as it should bring about personal healing

to past struggles as well as enable groups to get on with their life in a shared society (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 19).

Reconciliation after peace agreements is of vital importance seeing as without reconciliation fighting between the parties can break out again. This is because, as Fen Osler Hampson terms it, a lot of peace agreements are “orphaned”. This means that the peace agreement that was reached did stop the fighting, but a stable peace was not reached which means an agreement was made without addressing the problems that lay at the heart of the rise of the conflict (Hamson, 1996). For the purpose of this thesis, finding out whether or not reconciliation has taken place is therefore important in understanding whether the conflict has truly de-escalated. The UN IDEA has identified three non-linear stages of reconciliation after conflicts. Stage 1. Replacing Fear by Non-Violent Coexistence. Stage 2. When Fear No Longer Rules: Building Confidence and Trust. Stage 3. Towards Empathy (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 19-21). Concluding, all conflicts should go through a reconciliation process for them to put an end to violence once and for all for if this does not happen violent conflict is a reasonable prospect, even if a conflict settlement was reached (Brahm,

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Central Research Question

To understand conflict dynamics and what factors are involved in influencing the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict a central research question for these thesis was asked. What causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflicts? This question would guide us when looking into each of the three case studies and creating the methodology for our research.

3.2 Quantative vs Qualitative research

When debating what type of research to use for these theses it was decided to use qualitative research. There are a number of reasons for this, as can be seen through the literature review almost all authors have used qualitative research to explain phases or stages of a conflict. For example, Ricard E. Barringer, author of the book "Patterns of Conflict" used empirical qualitative research to argue when a conflict occurs and when it enters a different phase. He further uses qualitative research to explore what factors influence how a conflict ends. Other authors who have not looked at the conflict as a whole but rather at different stages of a conflict have also used qualitative research to come to their conclusions - such as Joan Esteban and Gerald Schneider who looked at polarization within a conflict (131-138), or Lewis A. Coser who tried to use theories of Karl Marx and class struggle to look at the role of class conflict. (197-205).

Other authors who have attempted to use quantitative data such as Paul R Pillar (not present in the literature review) use quantitative methods to attempt to determine why a conflict ends but only from the perspective that it ends due to negotiations between warring parties as opposed to any other means. (3) Pillar argues that while quantitative data does provide a lot of insight into a certain phase it is also extremely limited to a single focus depending on the research question. (Paul Pillar, 3-4) Furthermore, author Geoff Coyle argues that uncertain principles that often appear in system dynamics make it difficult to show clear and understandable results because not everything is known (226-227); Coyle therefore argues that inaccurate data can result in incorrect conclusions. Accordingly, since

these theses cover a large number of topics and various stages of a conflict which may contain uncertainties, focus on a qualitative research paper was better suited.

A final argument why the authors of these theses have used qualitative as opposed to quantitative research is due to all these theses having to be compared to one another and discovering if there are factors or incidents in each case study which resulted in similar or different outcomes. As author John Gerring argues, the only way to do so properly is via the method of “qualitative comparative analysis” which stipulates that if comparing multiple non-linear case studies, qualitative research methods are best suited. (4)

3.3 Historical case study analyses

Having established why these theses use qualitative research to study each conflict it will now be explained what type of qualitative research we used. In all three theses, historical case study analysis was used in order to compare historical conflicts to one another. As cited by Jack S. Levy, “(Alexander) George argued that case study researchers should adapt the method of the historian but convert descriptive explanations of particular outcomes to analytical explanations based on variables” (2). Levy further cited George by arguing that a case “is an instance of a class of events” and a case study as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” (Levy, 2) Falling in line with the definition provided by Alexander George, the three theses all follow a similar pattern, choosing a historical episode and then observing and analysing to see if there are various different or similar comparisons between each of the events. Furthermore, as these theses focus on various historical phases, the changes and comparisons need to be made over time.

Additionally, to further expand on comparing various historical case studies, all three theses fall in line with the definition given by Ingo Rohlfing, who states “...the key elements of Comparative Historical Methodology are: it aims to provide comprehensive explanations of outcomes in specific cases; it has a particular emphasis on well-crafted concepts and valid measurements...” (16-17) This is done during the joint analysis section of the theses where all three cases studies are observed and explanations of the various outcomes are provided.

Therefore, historical case studies provide the necessary tools towards these theses to provide thorough analysis and come to comprehensive and comparative conclusions in regards to all three conflicts.

3.4 Analytical framework

Understanding conflict dynamics


To fully understand conflict dynamics, broad research was conducted to learn about previous studies and academic ideas. The literature review presents a brief overview of what the authors of the theses believe to be the most important literature into the study of conflict dynamics. Using the model presented by Eric Brahm where he outlines the various stages of conflict, the literature is split up to highlight the different phases of the conflict, which the author of a certain text attempts to explain. (2003) By doing so a clearer picture is presented which highlights the research already done within the study of conflict dynamics and what issues arise during each conflict phase, which makes it move onto the next phase in the model. For example, Esteban & Schneider focused heavily on polarization and how larger and larger splits within society resulted in hostility towards each other therefore escalating a conflict. (2008). Meanwhile, other authors such as William Zartman focused on the ripeness theory and when hostilities eventually turn towards a stalemate in a conflict. (228)

By exploring the different phases and the literature attached to them, a clearer understanding of conflict dynamics can be given. By doing so, a structured analytical framework can be created. In the case of the three theses, the analytical focus was placed on three actors within the conflict: The context, the state, and the non-state actors.

Structure Analytical framework

The analytical framework was split up into three categories: The context of a conflict, State actors and Non-state actors. Depending on the conflict and the theory, different factors were placed within each of the three categories. For example, in regards to the context of the conflict following the theory of polarization by Esteban & Schneider, social cleavages and fractionalization were to be explored within each of the three conflicts and eventually compared to each other (this will be further explained in the next section). Below you can see the full separation of factors within each of the three actors.

Factors of each actor (Diagram created by authors)



The Context

Why do conflicts begin, why do they erupt, and why do they end? Understanding this is imperative to understanding the drivers of a conflict and therefore answering the research question. The contextual factors highlight the underlying causes of a conflict and why a conflict may continue or end. The factors that are associated with the context of a conflict are in most cases underlying disagreements or dissatisfaction within society, and while Rappaport may argue that leaders make rational choices to go to war, there has to be a cause which encourages them to make that choice. (1) This brings to use the factors highlighted in regards to the context of the conflict.

Social cleavages

As mentioned previously, the idea of social cleavages and conflict came from the theories developed by Esteban & Schneider, who argued that with an increase in polarization within society the higher the chance that violence may occur within society. (133) They further expand on the idea arguing that religion, economics or ethnic factors may result in parts of society beginning to recognize themselves as independent or separate from mainstream society, which results in a higher chance of conflict occurring. (133) The authors of the three theses wanted to observe whether this was in fact also the case in regards to the three case studies. Therefore, we began observing social cleavages within each of the three conflicts and whether these changed throughout the conflict, or if social cleavages were a driver of the conflict.

Popular Support

Another underlying context is popular support (or lack thereof). While social cleavages may provide the dissatisfaction with society it is leaders (according to Rappaport game theory) who decide to go to war and who make the choices during a conflict. (1) Furthermore, Mesquita & Siverson argue that leaders are the ones who may continue or maintain a conflict, in order to stay within political power and use all the tools necessary in order to accomplish this goal. (1995) Nevertheless, how does someone gain the power and tools to conduct a war or maintain one for that matter? One of the most important factors is manpower, and in order to keep oneself in power popular support from parts of the population. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how popular support or lack of popular

support regarding the leaders of the state and non-state actors influenced and drove the conflict further.

Grievances

Collier & Hoeffler established that grievances play a significant role within a conflict. They argued that severe grievances, such as high inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions in society are sufficiently acute enough that people are willing to engage in violent protests. (563) Similar to polarization and social cleavages, established by Esteban & Schneider, grievances play a role in the polarization of a society and therefore the creation of social cleavages. Nonetheless, unlike social cleavages which splits up society based on ethnicity religion etc, grievances focuses especially on criticisms towards the state or non-state actors. Therefore, it is important to see how grievances played a role and whether or not conflicts end once these grievances are addressed within a conflict.

Local politics-National politics

As within any conflict, local or national politics may play a role in regards to the context of a conflict. Not addressing grievances by other parts of society, social cleavages and popular support all influence how politicians react to moments within a conflict. One theory, which rings especially true, is the power dependence theory that argues if there is an imbalance of power between the warring parties a stalemate with a conflict may or may not be broken. (Emmerson, 32) (Vallacher, 38). Another theory that relates to local and national politics is the concept of spoilers, where leaders who believe a peace process may threaten their power undermine it through violent means. (Stedman, 369) Consequently, it is necessary to compare and observe the impact which local and national politics has on the case study conflicts.

International politics/support

Besides local and national politics, conflicts may not only have an impact on the country itself but also on those around it – this results in international actors becoming involved. This

can come in the form of external pressure, as described by Lake & Rothchild either through non-coercive intervention, coercive intervention, or third party mediation. (65) Depending on what form of intervention, the conflict can move to various different phases and therefore influence the conflict as a whole. Thus, it has a need to be included into the study of conflict dynamics.

State

Separate from the context of a conflict, one of the main actors of a conflict is of course the state itself fighting against a non-state actor.

Coercive force

If we are to believe the writings of Thomas Hobbes in his book “Leviathan”, then the state should have the monopoly on violence. Nonetheless, when citizens rise up against the state they may have to use this force to quell a conflict. This falls in line with Clausewitz’s theory who argues that “an act of violence (is) intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will” (Williams, 188). In this case, to force the non-state actor to cease hostilities so that the state can maintain the status quo. It is necessary to observe whether or not coercive force by the state has an impact on conflict dynamics and the phases of the conflict. In doing so it can be established whether or not it is easier for states to look for policy solutions or to instead maintain pressure onto the non-state actors.

Policy solutions

As mentioned in the previous factor, besides from using coercive force in order to end the conflict, policy solutions, which address some of the factors regarding contexts, may be an alternative solution. Although, most theories such as ripeness theory (Zartmann, 288) deal with resolving a conflict through policy solutions, they mostly occur during a stalemate phase of a conflict. Nonetheless, policy solutions are an integral part when it comes to escalating or de-escalation a conflict, and must therefore be taken into account when comparing the three case studies.

Capacity of State forces

In order for a state to conduct war it needs the capacity and manpower to actually conduct it. Although this factor does not relate back to any particular theory in the literature review, it is necessary to explore what the resources of the state were in comparison to the resources and capacities of the non-state actor. By doing so, a comparison can be done on the scope of the conflict, as well as how it influences the various different phases of the conflict.

Weak vs Strong government

Related to local and national politics, it is important to establish what sort of government was in charge during the various phases of the conflict, and if the government changed during these phases. In the literature review, weak governance has been argued to be the cause for a conflict to move from a latent period towards an emergent conflict if state institutions are weak and therefore unable to address underlying problems within society. (Hampson & Malone, 115). Nonetheless, it may also appear that if a strong government is unwilling to compromise it may result in a prolonging or extension of a conflict. Thus, once again it is necessary to explore this factor within the three case studies.

Non-State

Non-state actors are the polar opposite of the state actors when it comes to internal conflict dynamics and have been split up into factors as labelled below.

Strategy of armed groups

The strategy of the armed groups involves how or via what measures a non-state actor hopes to accomplish its goals. Strategy according to the Duel Concern theory is where armed groups take certain actions depending on those conducted by the opposing actor (Robin Vallecher, 37). Armed groups may attempt to enter negotiated settlements, violent struggles etc. Nonetheless the strategy of armed groups does not always have to be reactionary, they may also at times follow their own strategy if there is the belief they may win a conflict. It is

necessary to observe different ways in which different non-state actors attempt to obtain their goals in order to establish if there is a set pattern in how a conflict may be resolved.

Capacity of armed groups

Identical to state actors, non-state actors need capacity and manpower to conduct violent conflict. Again this factor does not relate back to any particular theory in the literature review, but needs to be explored nonetheless to make a comparison to the capacities of the state actor. In doing so, a comparison can be done on the scope of the conflict, as well as how it influences the various different phases of conflict.

Factionalization

Is the process of a group splitting apart due to social cleavages or grievances that may occur within a non-state actor's faction or group. In this process, similar to social cleavages that occur within a society, the group may split due to ethical, culture, religious, political etc differences. Almost all theories related to social cleavages, as well as popular support play a role within factionalization of a group. However, unlike social cleavages and popular support which may increase the chances of a conflict occurring, factionalization may result in a decrease or increase in violent conflict between state and non-state actors, as infighting may remove them of the will to fight. It is therefore important to understand the group dynamics and the issues which play a role within non-state actors groups to create a better understanding of each of them and how they influenced conflict dynamics and phases.

Criminalisation

Criminalisation refers to the fact where different groups stray from their original goal in order to make profit from criminal enterprises. Although this is not explored among theories presented in the literature review, it is nonetheless an important aspect to observe and see if non-state actors move away from their original goal.

3.5 Method of data-gathering

This research has two separate components, each component has uses a different method of data-gathering. The first component is the literature review, which is a collection of different methods, theories and viewpoints on studying conflict dynamics. By performing such a literature review one can find the most useful theory or method for studying conflict dynamics but also shows the huge amount of theories and escalatory factors available in the study of conflict dynamics. This huge amount of theories and factors gives many opportunities but also makes this research more difficult because one can overlook certain essential theories and factors. The goal of this research is to combine all the used theories and factors in one general theoretical framework. This framework will consist of three dimensions which are: the state, the non-state and the context dimension. The ultimate aim of this research is to gain new relevant data and to add new insights in the overall resources of conflict dynamics. Finally, the the second part will consist of gathering of data will be done by focusing on deskop research, gathering information from secondary literature like academic texts and research. But also primary sources will be used, like newspaper articles or biographies of persons who played an important role during the conflict.

Case Study Selection

Three cases are selected to show insight into the conflict dynamics. To make a visible comparison we need to discover similarities between the cases. All three conflicts are irregular armed conflicts and share the fact that it were conflicts between a state and a non-state actor. The non-state actors in the chosen conflicts are insurgent groups who aim to gain control over certain territory. The means to achieve this goal are often accompanied with guerilla and terrorist tactics. Furthermore it was important that the conflict had a duration for longer than five years and that they were recent (after 1945).

The Peruvian Conflict

The Peruvian Conflict started in 1980 after the Maoist group Sendero Luminoso burned the ballot boxes during the elections. This action, largely ignored by the central government of Peru, was the start of many other small-scale attacks in the rural highlands of Peru. The newly elected Peruvian government was still weak and inexperienced because of the previous military dictatorships and feared to use the army to crush Sendero. When the government did finally act with a brutal repressive campaign the conflict escalated significantly. The

insurgents found many support by using the grievances of the local Indians in Peru who were ignored and badly treated by the racist central government. As a result of both this big base of support, a clear strategy, a strong leader and a weak government apparatus the Peruvian state collapsed into conflict with the insurgents even appearing to win during the end of the 1980s. The war would last almost 20 years, although there the fighting largely stopped after 1993, there were still some large attacks. By 2000 most of the leaders and supporters were captured or killed, but the group still remains at large in Peru, even in present day.

The Peruvian state has a long colonial history. The area of present Peru was discovered by the Spanish in the 16th century and would result in the occupation by the Spaniards for almost three centuries. Although Peru already became independent (1826) quite long before the internal conflict started, the root of this war can still be traced back to the effects of the time under Spanish Colonial Rule.

The Rhodesian Conflict

The Rhodesian conflict started in 1965 after Ian Smith declared Rhodesia an independent nation to the British public and the citizens of Rhodesia. This move was met with a lot of resentment both internationally and nationally and it was expected that this new state would soon fall. However, this did not happen at all and what followed were fifteen years of brutal conflict between the largely white Rhodesian army apparatus and the two black rebel military groups : the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIRPA). During the first years the black rebel groups were no match for the much more experienced and funded army of the Rhodesian government and were crushed during the fighting. However, the Rhodesian armed forces were not able to deliver a final blow to the rebel forces which were becoming more and more organized and internationally funded which led to a significant increase in fighting and led to a stalemate. After this short-lived stalemate the fighting reached a new level of intensity not seen before in this conflict, leading to the final defeat of the Rhodesian government which was followed by Mugabe coming to power in 1980.

The conflict of Rhodesia can be seen as an indirect result of the British decolonization of its African colonies during the 1950s and 1960s and the coming into power of black majority rule governments. Another interesting aspect of this conflict is the constant escalation of the

conflict and the sudden and unexpected end during the most intense part of the conflict in 1980.

The Troubles

The Troubles, or internationally known as the Northern Ireland Conflict was a thirty-year conflict that started after a civil rights march in 1968 and ended after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The main reason for the conflict to emerge was the status of Northern Ireland as part of Britain instead of being part of the Republic of Ireland. Although often regarded as religious conflict, it was territorial conflict. During the conflict all parties, the republican and loyalist paramilitaries, the British security forces, were all guilty of killings which eventually would reach the number of 3600 killed and 50.000 wounded when the conflict ended in 1998.

The conflict went on for almost three decades and would spread to Great-Britain, the Republic of Ireland and even Gibraltar. Especially the bomb-attacks from the IRA would leave a significant impact on this conflict. Finally this conflict is interesting because, in comparison with the other two conflicts, there were multiple attempts to find a political solution to the conflict. Although this often failed, it would eventually succeed with the Good Friday Agreement which brought an end to the Troubles and resulted in Northern-Ireland remaining part of Britain. (BBC History, 2016)

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4. Individual Masters Thesis-A Conflict Analysis of the Rhodesian Bush War



4.1 Introduction-Rhodesian case study

“Now I would like to say a few words to you...we have this day assumed our sovereign independence” (Paul Halsall, 1997) were the words used by Ian Smith when he declared Rhodesia an independent nation to the British public and the citizens of Rhodesia. His declaration was met with much international as well as internal condemnation, with many predicting that the government of Ian Smith would fall within a matter of weeks as opposed to months. However, what no one could have foreseen was a conflict that would last almost 15 years and result in some of the most gruesome fighting imaginable. This thesis will examine four phases of the Rhodesian Bush war by looking at actions committed by the Rhodesian government, the Rhodesian military, as well as the main rebel military groups - the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIRPA). After the introduction and a background regarding the conflict the phases will be split as follows: The honeymoon period between 1965 and 1970 where the country was mostly stable both economically and security wise, while the rebels were unorganized and untrained. The next period was from 1970 till mid-1974 where the conflict began to escalate, the rebels became organized and the first major fighting broke out. Following the escalation of the conflict there will be enter a brief phase of de-escalation and stalemate phase of the conflict from mid-1974 till 1976, followed afterwards by a massive increase in violence and conflict. Finally concluding the conflict with the peace process between 1977 till 1980, resulting in the official end of the conflict. While the exact starting date of the Rhodesian Bush War is disputed, this thesis will focus from the point of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), as that was the moment when the colonial government was determined to fight it out and the rebel movements realized that they would not be able to gain power through majority voting and thus began an armed struggle. While the end of the Rhodesian Bush wars conclusion will be Mugabe coming to power in 1980.

After all phases of the conflict have been observed and examined, analysis will be given on various factors of the conflict such as its context, state-actors and non-state actors. Within these factors are various sub-indicators which should provide insight into what some of the reasons are as to why the conflict went through its various stages of conflict. This analysis will then later be used in the joint section of this paper to compare the other two conflicts. (The troubles in Northern Ireland and the Shinning path in Peru)

4.2 Background to the conflict-Road to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

The role of the Rhodesian government

As British rule around the world came to an abrupt end after the end of World War Two, the British government began the long process of decolonizing most of their former colonies, especially in Africa. During the period of 1950's till the 1960's most British colonies were dismantled with black majority rule governments coming into power and removing either the white minority settlers or colonial government of Great Britain, with the notable exception of South Africa, which had already declared its independence in 1931. With independence in Zambia and the dissolution of Rhodesia's northern neighbor Northern Rhodesia & Nyasaland, it was expected that the colony of Southern Rhodesia (aka Rhodesia) would soon follow suit into becoming a country with majority black rule. However, as events would have it a nationalist party known as the Rhodesian Front or RF for short was formed who were opposed to any change in the structure of government towards black majority rule. They subsequently won the election that same year, resulting in them gaining power in the country and Winston Field becoming prime minister (David Martin and Phyllis Jhonson, xv) At first the Rhodesian front attempted to gain a settlement with the British government, with Winston Field stating that he did not visualize any immediate unilateral action, unless the British government gave them cause to. (James Barber, 192) For example by refusing to negotiate with Rhodesia, or attempting to pressure Rhodesia with the use of military or economic pressure. Eventually Winston's refusal to accept independence for Rhodesia was his undoing. The Rhodesian Front forced his resignation and on April 13th 1964 the more radical Ian Smith took power whom subsequently lead his country to independence. (Barber, 192-193) With talks between Britain and Rhodesia eventually breaking down, Ian Smith declared independence for his country on November 11th 1965.

The Role of the majority black rule

While UDI was the tipping point for the armed struggle, black parties had in the past attempted to gain more legitimacy and power through legal political means. The first of such parties was the NDP lead by Joshua Nkomo and established in 1960, but it was quickly banned a year later by the white ruled government in 1961. (Martin, xiv) Nkomo quickly formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union or ZAPU but was once again banned in September the following year in 1962. (Martin, xv) Members of Nkomo's party eventually became dissatisfied with his rule but mostly split due to a difference in the approach to removing the white minority government and formed an alternative party, the ZANU lead by Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole. (Paresh Pandya, 40). These difference were that Nkomo believed that in order to take control of Rhodesia it had do so with the support of the international community. (Pandya, 40) The ZANU on the other hand had begun to believe that the only way to remove the white minority government was to physically attack the whites and their property. (Kees Maxey, 5)


With this difference in policy came the realization that they would not be able to win through political means alone. The ZANU then formed the ZANLA the militant wing of the party and send members to begin training in China. Nkomo on the other hand still attempted to take the legal political path and created another party the PCC or People's Caretaking Party. (Martin, xv) Finally, with the dismissal of Fields and Ian Smith taking control of the Rhodesian Front, both the PCC and ZANU were banned and NKomo, Sithole and Mugabe were sent to prison for crimes against the state in 1964. (Martin, xv) Having their leaders thrown in jail and being once again effectively banned from partaking in any of the countries politics by the white minority government, many of the parties' members now saw no other options but to take up arms and begin an armed struggle.

4.3 The honeymoon period 1965-1970

With Rhodesia's declaration of independence Rhodesia became the second colony to do so in British history (The first being the United States of America). Internationally Rhodesia was viewed as an isolated country that was unable to maintain its status quo and its fall was expected to approach soon – nonetheless, domestically this was not the case. Despite both diplomatic and economic isolation attempts by the British and most of the international community, Rhodesia for the first 9 to 10 years of its lifespan managed to maintain its economy, military domination, and government without much interference from outside or inside pressure. Inside pressure was almost non-existent, as guerilla and rebel movements within the country remained largely inactive and disorganized due to lack of leadership and internal conflict within the parties. Thus, this period in time was adequately named the honeymoon period for the Rhodesian government.

Geopolitical situation Rhodesia 1965

(Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)



Key

Dark blue: Portugal

Light blue: South Africa

Green: Rhodesia

Red: Zambia -Communist/supporting guerillas

Government's role


When Ian Smith made his declaration of Independence in November, the international community was quick to react. The biggest worry for Ian Smith's government at the time of their declaration of independence wasn't necessarily the guerilla movements, which would happen in later years, but the possible invasion by the UK to restore authority within the region. While many newly independent African states as well as the guerilla groups within Rhodesia called for the UK to restore order, the UK refused to send troops fearing that UK soldiers would refuse to fight "kith and kin", as well as that the UK government had hoped that by not pursuing a military path, Central African Leaders and leaders of the ZAPU and ZANU would enter talks with the Rhodesian Front to come to a settlement. (Phillip Murphy, 2006) However, while the UK may have been unwilling to send troops to the colony of Rhodesia to quell the rebellion. They instead sought to economically isolate the country in hopes that with economic downturn, it would eventually result in the country losing its appetite for rebellion where they would inevitably hand over their power back to the British administration. It did so via the means of the UN Security Council, which firstly called upon all states not to recognizing the "illegal and racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia" (UN resolution 216, 1965). Secondly, calling for member states to refrain from helping Rhodesia, economically and militarily - especially with the supply of oil and petrol to the nation. (UN resolution 217, 1965). Finally imposing mandatory economic sanctions in 1966 in resolution 232. (UN, 1966)

However, while Rhodesia may have been internationally isolated both economically and diplomatically, it maintained those relations with its neighboring countries. Both Portugal and South Africa maintained economic and diplomatic relations, especially since both countries were facing guerilla movements within their own territories - with Portugal having insurgencies in both Mozambique and Angola, while South Africa would soon begin facing its own version of the Rhodesian Bush war called the "South African border war". Thus, Rhodesia which at the time had one of the most well equipped fighting forces on the continent as well as some of the most experienced combat soldiers in the world despite its size, was a valuable ally to have. As

a result, trade between Portugal and South Africa ran rich and military equipment and support was given to Rhodesia by the South Africans. (Moorcraft 95)

Besides the international dimension, domestically speaking Ian Smith enjoyed wide spread support from the local population. With the support of the white Rhodesian community, as well as from business leaders, he managed to lessen the blow of the sanctions on the economy. (Robert Mckinnel, 563) In addition, one of his biggest accomplishments was the reversal of emigration of whites from Rhodesia due to the stability in the county. As seen in the graph below up until the 1975 (when large scale fighting eventually broke out) more skilled whites were coming into the country providing economic benefit, military expertise, as well as giving more support to the white government as a whole. (Josiah Brownell, 125) While the whites would never come near as close the numbers of blacks living in Rhodesia, it did boost the support amongst the whites towards the government of Ian Smith. (See second graph)

Immigration and emmigration through Rhodesian history (Josiah Brownell, 75)



Military Role

At the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the military' was also in good shape, while still possibly worried about a British intervention into the country, the army was general well organized and prepared. Although the size of the security forces was relatively small one with the army only holding around 3400 active soldiers at the start of UDI and the air force fielded about 1000 active personnel. (Maxey, 31, 38) The Rhodesian armed forces main strength was that it had extensive combat experience both from World War Two, as well as in more recent history the Malayan crisis. The Malaya crisis in particular, which was a communist insurgency campaign, taught the Rhodesian army to fight against insurgencies especially in regards to insurgencies using communist tactics'. (Ian Beckett, John pimlott, 176) This in turn allowed the Rhodesian soldiers to create an effective counterinsurgency campaign, which was shown through their experience in combat. Meanwhile the Rhodesian air force gained much needed experience during the conflict in Kuwait and the Gulf of Aden between 1958 and 1961. (Beckett, 176) - which provided the Rhodesian armed forces with much needed experience in combating insurgencies within the country.

Besides having the combat experience to fight communist insurgencies, the Rhodesians also had the major advantage of having neighboring support. South Africa provided direct support towards the Rhodesians after a ZAPU raid co-joined by ANC guerillas failed (see section regarding guerillas 1965-1970), while Portugal was fighting its own war in Mozambique and Angola - thus preventing the ZAPU and ZANU from using those countries as staging areas. This was especially true in regards to Mozambique, which had a direct Eastern border with Rhodesia. This support by Portugal and South Africa, was deeply needed not only to combat the insurgencies but also to provide weapons to the Rhodesian armed forces. Not only were the sanctions regarding economic activity easy to circumvent due to neighboring support but also in regards to military equipment, where South Africa provided loans or sold many of its weapons and equipment to the Rhodesian forces. (Moorcraft, 96)

Additionally, while the Rhodesian forces may have had outdated weapons they were still far more militarily superior compared to Guerilla forces during this period. Although it was difficult for the Rhodesian to gain more modern equipment due to sanctions, they were still far more superior to anything the guerillas had at the

beginning of the war, whom mostly had a few basic explosives and machine guns. The Rhodesians on the other hand had a sophisticated air force with helicopters and jet planes which could be used for bombing runs and CION operations (Counter-insurgency Operations).

Finally, the Rhodesian security forces had an easy time at patrolling and controlling the actual border where guerilla activities were taking place. While Zambia did have a large border with Rhodesia, much of it was covered by Lake Kariba which thus hindered guerilla activities and only allowed them two crossings. However, due to the tensions between both the ZAPU and the ZANU both groups were located at opposite ends of this river thus allowing security forces to concentrate on area specific operations. In addition to this, in order for the guerillas to attack white Rhodesian areas they had to pass through land owned by the Tonga people that were hostile towards the rebels movement - therefore confining the rebels to use certain routes which were easily track able by the security forces. (Richard Wood, 24th May 1995)

The security forces at the start of this period had a lot of superiority over the guerillas. While relatively small, the security forces had previous experience in combating communist insurgencies, were supported by neighboring states especially South Africa whom supplied weapons and resources and only had to patrol one border in order to keep an eye on guerilla activities. Together with the disorganization of the guerillas themselves (see next section) the security forces had a dominate position during this phase of the war.

Guerilla role

Though an invasion by the British would have been the ultimate nightmare scenario for Ian Smith, the guerilla movements saw it as a major opportunity for them to restore to power without the need for any violent bloodshed on their parts. Hope remained for a British intervention after UDI for as long as 1966 until the Tiger talks (named after talks that were held on the ship H.M.S Tiger) happened. Nonetheless hope soon faded afterwards when both the ZANU and ZAPU began to realize that the proposals being presented by the British were not in the interest of either parties. (Maxey, 6) The guerillas thus began forming different plans and ideas of ways in which they could begin

their “revolutionary” struggle against the government, deciding firstly to conduct raids into in the hopes of stirring up the population.

Guerilla military developments

One of these first raids was conducted by the ZANU in 1966 whom began conducting raids into Rhodesia from Zambia with the first major battle taking place in Sinoia. Though a major defeat for the ZANLA (military wing of the ZANU), it is now commemorated as a national holiday as it was the beginning of the armed struggle for Rhodesia. While the battle had been a major defeat for ZANU, the ZAPU soon tried their luck in 1967 into conducting a raid into Rhodesia. With the help of the ANC (South African National Congress) 90 ZAPU/ANC soldiers moved in from Zambia and attempted to gain access via Botswana so that they could infiltrate and set up bases of operations inside Rhodesia itself. (Moorcraft, 31) However, the local population did not approve of their presence and soon Rhodesian forces swept in to remove both ANC and ZAPU force resulting in the death or capture of almost all guerillas. (Moorcraft, 32) Besides the loss of the force sent into Rhodesia, an even worse scenario developed for both the ANC and ZAPU. As South Africa worried about the joint alliance between the two groups and consequently began sending police and helicopter units across the border to support the Rhodesian armed forces - thus strengthening the governments position. (Moorcraft, 32)

The failure of the raids to have any impact on the situation in Rhodesia was not discouraging, both the ZANU and ZAPU had a major problem in recruiting members for their cause. While the ZANU began an early recruitment process in 1964, they achieved little success mainly due for a number of reasons. Firstly, was the fact that many black Rhodesians were unwilling to move to Zambia to begin training there. Secondly the ones who did and returned to Rhodesia were quickly killed in action or captured and put on trail, thus further discouraging the recruitment process. (Pandya, 77) Unlike the ZANU which began recruitment early, most support still lay with the ZAPU at the time of UDI. Therefore ZAPU had a much easier time at recruiting members of the public to fight for them, in addition, unlike the ZANU which encouraged members to come back for training in Zambia the main focus of ZAPU lay within building up large connections which would support the ZAPU and instead focus on sabotaging key areas of infrastructure. (Dumiso Dabengwa, 27) In doing so the ZAPU could create a much

stronger base of support for themselves, which therefore solidified their position as the main liberation movement of Rhodesia. Furthermore, unlike the ZANU which struggled to gain recognition, the ZAPU was already being recognized both inside and outside of the country and also had the backing of the OAU or Organization of African Unity, (whose aim was to support groups which were fighting independence struggles). With this extra recognition and previous establishment in Zambia the organization gained more recruits before ZANU was eventually recognized. (Josiah Tungamirai, 41) With recruitment numbers low, both groups began using a method called "Press-ganging" or forcing someone to join an army. (Tungamirai, 41) This resulted in an escalation of attacks between the two groups as they attacked each other's training facility in order to scatter the recruits and take them for themselves so increasing violence and tensions between them. (Tungamirai, 41)

Guerilla political developments

A final difficulty at the start of the conflict was the major ideological differences between both the ZANU and the ZAPU as well as the fact that both factions while not leaderless lacked strong leadership. When the ZAPU and ZANU split before UDI, (mainly due to the difference in approaches regarding disposing of the white minority government) - ideology did not necessarily play a role. However, when both groups decided to take up arms against the government they did so with different approaches. The ZAPU saw themselves as an armed struggle against a repressive regime, however wanted a professional and organized organization whom would overthrow the government via conventional military means. This type of ideology fell in line with Soviet ideology. (Richard Wood, 35) The ZANU on the other hand adopted a Maoist approach to warfare, focusing mostly on mobile warfare focusing on striking when possible and retreating when outmatched. (Wood, 35) This resulted in more tensions between the two groups as the ZANU began receiving support of the Chinese, while the ZAPU began receiving support from the Soviets.¹ (Marno de Boer, 36) Coupled with the

¹ While the Chinese and Soviets were involved in the conflict by supplying weapons and trainers to the ZANU and ZAPU their involvement was minimal. The main reason why each supported the other's groups and imposed their ideology on them had to do with the Sino-Soviet split which had occurred in the early 1960's. The Sino-Soviet Split was a disagreement over which communist ideology was the correct one

lack of leadership the leaders of the ZAPU and ZANU were still being imprisoned in Rhodesian jails, cooperation between the rebel movements was almost non-existent.

In short the armed struggle of the guerilla groups was slow to take off the ground. Hindered by constant problems of recruitment, raids which had no effect on the Rhodesian black population, increased military support by South Africa to the Rhodesian government, ideological differences and as mentioned in previous sections a border which was easily defensible, the guerillas struggled to gain much ground in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, as the war progressed the tide slowly turned in the guerillas favor during the period of 1970.

Brief Analysis of the background to the conflict and the Honeymoon period 1965-1970.

What is noticeable about the background of the conflict is that certain factors especially context factors played role in creating a latent conflict and an emerging one. Social cleavages between black and whites, and grievances among the black population were mostly the reason why the conflict went to latent conflict and then an emergent one. In the following phase from 1965 till 1970 however all other factors began to take an active role within the conflict.

For context national politics caused the declaration of UDI, and resulted in grievances no longer being able to be addressed in the political spectrum. This caused armed groups ZIRPA (ZAPU) and ZANLA (ZANU)) to begin forming with the help of international partners such Zambia, the USSR and China whom wanted to see an escalation of the conflict so that they may gain influence in the region. However, due to the lack of popular support guerilla groups struggled to gain recruitments and were unable to set a foothold inside Rhodesia. Additionally, international support given to the Rhodesian government by South Africa and Portugal managed to de-escalate the conflict.

Besides the help of international partners, factors of state actors such as the use of coercive force and the overall larger state capacity of the Rhodesian armed forces helped quickly de-escalate the conflict. Furthermore, with the strong government

leading to both communist nations supporting various guerilla movements around the world in order to gain influence and spread their ideology.

mandate of Ian Smith whom had the support of most of the white Rhodesians he could follow the path of using coercive force as a policy solution towards the conflict.


Finally, the factors of non-state actors, which played a role in this phase mostly, resulted in failed attempts to try and escalate the conflict. The lack of capacity which both groups possessed was just too small to make any real impact on Rhodesia, while the lack of a coherent strategy resulted in failed raids and an even further decrease in their capacity to run a guerilla campaign. Nonetheless as the conflict continued this slowly began to change.

4.4 The republic of Rhodesia and the struggle for independence 1970- mid 1974

After 5 years of almost no conflict, the white Rhodesia government was firmly in control of the country and had a distinct advantage over guerilla forces. Additionally, security forces were in a strong position militarily and it would seem that things were not about to change. However, after 5 years of failure the guerillas began to adapt a new strategy. and fatal errors by the Ian Smith government as well as geopolitical changes resulted in the war escalating.

Geopolitical situation regarding Rhodesia 1970 +Altena farm attack (1972)

(Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)



Key
Light blue-South Africa
Dark blue-Portugal
(Angola/Mozambique)
Red-Zambia (guerilla supporters)
Yellow- ZAPU
Orange- ZANU

Government role

After talks had once again broken down between the British and Rhodesia in regards to a settlement on the H.M.S *Fearless* (A British vessel where settlement talks were held) in 1968, Ian Smith realized he would not get recognition from within the British Commonwealth. He therefore began to create a new constitution that would make the country of Rhodesia a republic. He gambled that by doing so Rhodesia would receive more international recognition and therefore support. In addition to this the guerillas had mostly kept to themselves in the years between 1968 and 1972 (see guerilla section for more details) which made the threat of being domestically overthrown less. The British also realizing that their economic sanctions were not working, restarted relations with Rhodesia even going as so far to create a settlement offer which would have resulted in Great Britain providing development aid and money for education, in return for more black say within government policies and an eventual (unspecified) return to black majority rule. (BBC, 18th January 1972). If the settlement had gone through it would have resulted in a major victory for the Ian Smith government, not only would it have resulted with whites staying in power, but it would have resulted in the British government recognizing Rhodesia as an independent state and therefore not only receiving Western support but also the possible lifting of sanctions on the country. (Julius K. Nyere, 5)

However, before approval was given a commission was sent to investigate whether the population of Rhodesia agreed with the terms of the deal. Led by Lord Pearce the commission discovered that while both the Ian Smith government and the whites approved the deal most blacks firmly rejected the proposal. Consequently what was instead supposed to be a great victory for the Ian Smith government it instead resulted in support being withdrawn for the settlement. (Nyere, 8) While the rejection itself hurt the Ian Smith government it was also the fact that the opinion of the black population was heard for the first time since UDI and as it turned out spoke out against the government in mass, which was quite a shock towards the white population in Rhodesia. (Luise White, 322) Additionally not only the black population but the black Rhodesians which were fighting in the armed forces had also rejected the settlement proposal. Shocking the Rhodesian government and brought forth fears of black Rhodesian soldiers standing up towards their white Rhodesian counterparts (Maxey,

34) Finally, the rejection of the settlement also bought forth Bishop Muzorewa who would eventually come to play a major role in politics in Rhodesia. Muzorewa a relatively unknown figure up to that point had founded and created the ANC or African National Council (not to be confused with African National Congress) with the aim of stopping the settlement from going through. Unlike however, the guerilla leaders Muzorewa tried to take the moderate approach deciding not to take up an armed struggle and instead looking for a political solution towards the crisis. (White, 326) While this may have been the case he did receive the support of Sithole and Nkomo whom were still in prison at that time. (White, 327)

The failure of the settlement deal was not the only blow to the Ian Smith government. In late 1972, and throughout 1973 Rhodesia faced multiple crises, which would hurt the country both economically and strategically. The first major incident was the attack on Atlenta farm. A guerilla attack, which although not resulting in any casualties, was the first time guerillas were coordinated and organized. The attack had proved two major things, firstly that the guerillas were winning support on the ground in Rhodesia and secondly that FREMILO had given the ZANLA access to operate on Mozambique territory from the Tete province and via that route infiltrate Rhodesia. (see more in guerilla and armed forces section)

Although, slow to respond the Ian Smith government began the scheme, also they also used in Malaya of “protected villages”, the concept behind this was to remove the local population from rural areas, screen them and place them into villages protected by the security forces where they would be defended and interaction with insurgents would be difficult to do. (J.K. Cilliers, 79-82) While it was successful in Malaya and did have some success in Rhodesia at first, it also resulted in more discontent with the Rhodesian government. Many of the members being moved were families of ZANLA guerilla fighters, thus causing more anger at the government than at the guerilla fighters. (Wood, 38) In addition to this there was inadequate security at the camps resulting in guerilla fighters easily infiltrating the villages and intimidating or winning over the support of members of the black population at large. (Wood, 38) A final internal measure created by the Ian Smith was that the northern tribal lands would be split up into various administrative zones. Recognizing that the black population in the area was turning against the government Ian Smith had hoped that by creating more

administrative zones black Rhodesians would feel that the government was supporting them and thus reject guerilla politization. (Maxey, 129)

The attack not only caused the Ian Smith government to take internal measures but also external ones. Infuriated by the attack Ian Smith decided to close the border with Zambia on January 9th 1973 with the exception of copper shipments, this however was a major political miscalculation. Both Portugal and South Africa at the time had wanted to convince Zambia into becoming more moderate towards the guerilla wars by encouraging exports via the port of Beira in Mozambique and via ports in South Africa - however now that Rhodesia shut down the border (while eventually re-opening it again), this incentive was no longer there hence losing the opportunity to hurt the guerilla forces station in Zambia. (Moorcraft, 38)


In conclusion, the Rhodesian government had the firm upper hand during the first two years during the conflict escalation phase. However, after the settlement offer, failed, things escalated quickly. With a more coordinated guerilla force and a response which only provoked to isolate the white government, both internally and externally, the Rhodesian government slowly began losing its dominant stance which it had so long enjoyed 10 years before.

Military Role

Similar to the situation with the Rhodesian government the Rhodesian armed forces began to get a lot more involved during this escalating part of the conflict. While the entire possible settlement was going on in the background, the guerilla forces had slowly moved further East into Mozambique. The guerilla groups had made a deal with FRELIMO forces to be allowed access to the Tete province and thus inconspicuously enter Rhodesia and set up a base of operations there.

Map Northern Rhodesia

(Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)



Key

- Green-Rhodesia
- Red-Zambia
- Blue-Portugal (Mozambique)
- Yellow-ZAPU in Zambia
- Solid orange -ZANU in Zambia
- Dotted orange-Tete province controlled by ZANU and FRELIMO
- Stripped orange- Centenary province where the ZANU infiltrated Rhodesia


Nonetheless, it should not be understood that the Rhodesian armed forces turned a blind eye towards the guerilla forces. While it can be argued that they had become

complacent in their ways and possibly overconfident in their ability to handle the guerilla forces they were preparing for the worst. Aware that a possible large scale threat may be brewing, Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal came together and formed a semi-official organization named "Exercise ALCORA" - a military alliance of states which would coordinate military operations against guerilla forces in the so called frontline states (Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique). (Filipe Robeiro de Meneses, Robert McNamara, 1113-1114) While the organization was met with initial hesitation at first from both the Portuguese and the Rhodesians, it eventually gained speed in 1970 where it was officially inaugurated and a permanent body established in 1973. (Meneses, 1114) By 1974 there were even talks in the works of creating a rapid response force to help members deal with potential high-level guerilla insurgencies. (Meneses, 1128)

Moreover, besides exercise ALCORA being implemented Rhodesian forces were aware that trouble was beginning to stir in the Tete province as early as 1970. The Special Air Service or SAS as well as forces of the Rhodesian Light Rifles division had already been deployed alongside Portuguese forces in Mozambique in order to combat guerilla forces. (Cilliers, 14) However, when the eventual attack on Altena farm occurred the forces there were undermanned and underequipped to deal with the level of insurgency which had developed in the area. (Cilliers, 14)

Thus, Rhodesian armed forces began expanding its military manpower. As can be seen from the graph below throughout the 1965 till 1972 Rhodesian armed forces expanded slightly each year, after the Altena farm attack the army expanded exponentially to deal with the increase in guerilla activity. Nonetheless, this was mostly due to the Ian Smith government implementing the "Defense Act" which expanded compulsory service to territorial forces (reserve forces) and called up territorial forces for a period of one month every six months. (Maxey, 36) However, as these men were between the age of 38 till late 40's put a huge strain on the economic workforce, the defense bill was amended where almost all men between the age of 18 to 25 had to serve in either the armed forces or police service and were not permitted to leave the country. (Maxey, 37)

Number of people in security forces (Maxey, 30)



With the increase in the armed forces and the lasting shock of the attack on Altena farm, the armed forces quickly went about restoring order in the area. They set up operation Hurricane (see illustration), a joint command operations area where the air force, army and police would work together to tackle the insurgent threat by stemming the flow of insurgents crossing the border from Mozambique into Rhodesia and controlling the movements of the population under the village protection scheme. (Cilliers, 14) Tackling the insurgent threat eventually came down to the creation and deployment of Fireforce a new concept which would see regular army soldiers paradrop into areas where guerillas would have set up camp. The tactic involved preliminary bombing by aircrafts, then soldiers dropping into the area and moving in on guerilla forces to eliminate them. The tactic was first used in January 1974 and resulted in one of the most successful counter-insurgency operation since the creation of operation Hurricane. (Wood, 90-91)

Map showing military operations per area (Cilliers, 29)



While these policies may have seen drastic, Ian Smith wanted to quickly eliminate the threat of the ZAPU and ZANU inside Rhodesia. The policies he implemented were possibly meant to be short term and thus may not have been seen by the majority of the white population as necessarily harsh. After the Atlanta farm incident took place the security forces were taken by surprise, their response however was extremely fast. While the policies imposed by Ian Smith regarding the protected villages and extension of mandatory service did stir up discontent among the black and white population respectively from a military perspective they were highly effective. The protected villages removed the guerillas from their main base of support, which they had just set up within Rhodesia, and the extra manpower was used to increase patrols and soldiers in the Chiweshe tribal area. Predictions made by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) predicted that by the mid-1974 only between 70 till 100 hard-core

ZANLA guerilla fighters were still within Rhodesia. (Moorcraft, 39) Coupled with the creation of operation Hurricane as well as the now newly created counter-insurgency strategy of Fireforce, the Rhodesian armed forces had once again managed to quickly and effectively beat back the guerillas entering Rhodesia. Nevertheless, while this was met with initial success a series of disastrous external geopolitical shifts would see the Rhodesian security forces once again on the ropes.

Guerilla role

After the initial failures of the guerillas to gain any particular ground in Rhodesia and within the conflict itself, the period between 1970 and 1974 saw both guerilla forces regain their feet while still dealing with many internal struggles and the formation of many more guerilla movements. The ZAPU especially faced many difficulties in asserting itself as a dominant guerilla group, after early success and more international recognition than the ZANU the ZAPU failed to hold the moment due to a number of various reasons.

Guerilla Political developments

After licking their wounds from their earlier defeats in Rhodesia the ZAPU at first held onto their strategy of trying to conduct incursions into Rhodesia. While these raids still resulted in confrontations between the security forces they did little to sway the fight in favor of the ZAPU. However, in a major blow to the organization a leadership struggle occurred in the early 1970's till 1971. In 1970, with Nkomo still locked up in a Rhodesian cell, Chikerema acting president of the ZAPU began taking measures to cement his power as the new leader of ZAPU. He did so by taking a number of badly thought out decisions which would result in a leadership crisis within the ZAPU party. His first act was to invite foreign journalists to visit ZIRPA (military wing of ZAPU) military camps in Zambia and show them crossing the border into Rhodesia. (Eliakman M. Sibanda, 143) This resulted in anger among the ZAPU as it not only showed which routes were being used by the Guerillas to enter Rhodesia, but also that Zambia was actively supporting the terrorist movements and the faces of Rhodesian infiltrators. This angered the ZAPU mainly because Chikerema was providing both the Rhodesian and South African security forces with intelligence material which they would have

otherwise not received. This angered Jason Moyo, the second in command of the ZAPU forces who openly opposed the way in which Chikerema handled the situation and a minor split occurred between the two leaders. However, in order to calm down the situation Moyo proposed to change the structure of the war council to make military operations more successful. This would have also give him more power when it came to decision making. (Sibana, 144) This attempt however completely backfired and resulted in Chikerema accusing Moyo of trying to remove him from the ZAPU leadership chain and eventually Chikerema dissolved the war council thus removing Moyo and his supporters from any active role within the ZAPU. (Sibana, 145) Chikerema however worried about a possible mutiny within his forces, organized an army group led by one of the most experience officers Mthimkhulu to protect his interests - unfortunately for Chikerema Mthimkhulu seeing an opportunity to take power himself attempted to overthrow the entire ZAPU and resulted in the arrest of Moyo and his followers while Chikerema managed to evade the forces trying to capture him. (Dabengwa, 31) Zambia meanwhile became particularly worried about the prospect of an internal conflict happening among the well trained ZAPU forces. Therefore negotiated a conference where they were told to either settle their differences or be forcible removed from Zambia by the Zambian government. (Dabengwa, 31) While a settlement was reached it was in name alone. A year later in 1971 Chikerema left the group with disgruntled ZAPU officers and took with him a number of ZANU officers to create FROLIZI, a umbrella organization meant to united ZAPU and ZANU officers and leaders, while Moyo took control of ZAPU. (Sibanda 145) (Dabengwa, 31)

The split resulted in many strategic as well as political consequences of the ZAPU, it firstly resulted in an additional guerilla movement being formed led by Chikerema the FROLIZI which would through the rest of this period attempt to gain some legitimacy form either ZAPU or ZANU but ultimately failed to produce much and eventually joined the ANC (African National Congress) in 1974. The second consequence was that Mihimkhulu who had attempted to organize the coup within ZAPU was expelled, which removed one of the most experienced fighters within the ZAPU structure and hurt the ZAPU image. The third major consequences was, at the time of the split FRELIMO was negotiating with the ZAPU to allow them access via the Tete Province to attack Rhodesia, unfortunately with the internal fighting going on, the ZAPU liaison officer decided to switch sides to the ZANU whom eventually managed to convince (under the pretext that

he was still working ZAPU) the FRELIMO (the guerilla movement in Mozambique) to allow the ZANU passage through the Tete province - thus giving the ZANU a distinct advantage over the ZAPU. (Dabengwa, 31)

Guerilla military developments

Nonetheless while the split was a blow towards the ZAPU, they were quick to try and reconcile their power. A new strategy was implemented by Moyo who reformed the war council which therefore resulted in a much more coherent strategy in how they wished to win the war. The strategy involved a three-pronged approach: Firstly, the ZAPU would continue with raid attacks and increase the use of mine warfare (or placing mines across roads and driveways in order to blow up white citizens) on Rhodesia and its citizens; the second would be that while these raids were going on the ZIRPA would build up its conventional forces with the support of the Soviet Union to eventually begin conducting a more conventional war inside Rhodesia; and thirdly if the opportunity arose to negotiate with the Smith government for a favorable position in power. (Sibanda, 151) However, while the ZAPU were quick to bounce back from their organizational split, the ZANU seeing an opportunity used the turmoil created by the ZAPU to make deeper advantages.

While the ZAPU were busy due to their internal struggle, the ZANU began heavily revising their military strategy. Unable to make gains into Rhodesia they began adopting a different strategy, knowing that they would not be able to win through military conquest alone, ZANU under the guidance of Chinese instructors began adopting a Maoist approach to the war. (Boer, 36) By avoiding the security forces at all cost and slowly turning the local rural population against the Rhodesian government in favor of the ZANU they would be able to infiltrate the area and build up local resistance networks within the Rhodesia itself. (Boer, 36) Additionally, by building up local resistance it would allow for guerilla forces to spread thin the security forces and therefore hurt the country economically, as well as politically. The ZANU strategy in that sense had changed from a purely military struggle to a political struggle, where mobilizing the masses against the government became a larger priority than overthrowing it militarily. (Maxey, 116)

While this strategy was slow to start due to the fact that they were still restricted to one side of the border, the subsequent split in ZAPU allowed for the ZANU to mislead

FRELIMO on starting negotiations to allow access via the Tete province in Mozambique. With subsequent change in allegiances of the ZAPU liaison officer and the successful FRELIMO negotiation the ZANLA were able to move in and begin political operations in the province of centenary. (See map page 50) This was met with much initial success, while Rhodesian security forces were adamantly concentrating on the Zambian border they failed to notice the vulnerable North East of the country. The minister of internal affairs had assumed that Portuguese forces would protect the border area, as well as that the area had been largely ignored with no government representative visiting the areas since UDI. (Maxey 116) Thus, when the ZANLA force entered the area from the undefended border they slowly began politicizing the population and gaining support among the members there. When the Altena farm attack did eventually occur, it was a huge shock to the security forces, as described by J.K Cilliers "Previously members of the local population had willingly come forward to supply information on the presence and activities of insurgents, but within a matter of weeks all intelligence sources in the North-East dried up." (14) For the first time since UDI ZANU had effectively taken control over a tribal region due to their politicization tactics, dealing a heavy blow to security forces. However, following a strong response by both the government and armed forces, ZANLA forces were mostly expelled from the region. Nonetheless the political influence of ZANU remained therefore achieving their first objective of mobilizing the people against the Ian Smith government.

Conclusion guerilla phase

In conclusion, in this escalating period of the conflict the ZANU managed to strategically use the disorganization and problems left behind by the ZAPU to become a more prominent player in the Rhodesian Bush war. The ZAPU eventually managing to regain their composure, losing almost three years to bitter infighting as well as losing strategic areas like the Tete province in Mozambique to the ZANU. Even though both groups never managed to make a dent towards the white Rhodesian government, both groups had now cemented their position as being the two main opposition groups. Finally, in this escalating period of the war not much progress was made in removing the Rhodesian government, the next phase of the conflict would see guerilla forces moving increasingly inland.

Brief Analysis of the phase 1970-1974

In this phase of the conflict, various different factors began to play an ever increasing role within the conflict. However the various contexts of the conflict were mostly not present during this phase. While it could be argued that there were various political events such as the Pearce commission rejecting the lifting of sanctions or the rise of Muzorewa these changes in general did not have a major impact on the conflict as a whole or would not have resulted in an actual end towards the conflict (in regards to policy solutions). However, factors which did have a major impact on the conflict was mostly related to those regarding non-state actors.

The first major factor was the fractionalization of the ZAPU when the power struggle occurred between Moyo and Chikerema. While the fractionalization in the group did not escalate or de-escalate the conflict as a whole, the chaos that it caused allowed for the ZANU to gain the military advantage of using the corridor provided by the FRELIMO. This access also allowed for the ZANU to gain a foothold within Rhodesia and apply their change in strategy by politicizing the population towards their cause and escalating the conflict further once their incursion from the Tete province took place.


However, a factor which did take place in regards to the state, was of course the state-actors use of coercive force with operation Hurricane as well as the use of more state capacities by creating the joint command center.

4.5 The uneasy stalemate and resumptions of hostilities- mid 1974- 1976

When the government of Ian Smith and the Rhodesian armed forces were taken by surprise by the Altena farm attack, they would have hoped that it was the end to guerilla activities within their borders. Yet things were going to go from bad to worse for the Ian Smith government and for the security forces when in April of 1974 a military coup in Portugal resulted in the end of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique. This in turn led to the opening of Rhodesia's entire Eastern flank allowing ZANU whom now had good relations with FRELIMO to use the entire newly opened border to attack and hinder the Rhodesian government.

Geopolitical situation Rhodesia 1974

(Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)



Key-Geopolitical situation Rhodesia in 1974 (Not showing guerilla groups)

Green: Rhodesia

Blue: South Africa

Red: States supporting guerillas movements

Government role

When Portugal announced its withdrawal from its African colonies it was a turning point in the war. After elections were held in Mozambique and FRELIMO came to power in 1975 the Ian Smith government knew it was in a precarious situation. Not only was Rhodesia's eastern flank exposed to guerilla activity, its much-needed supply of oil and petrol which had been previously supplied through Mozambique's ports of Biera could be cut off if Mozambique decided install UN sanctions. (Martin, 146) Additionally, with the removal of Portugal, Rhodesia began to depend heavily on aid provided by South Africa both economically and militarily.

South Africa on the other hand was not pleased with the developing situation. Realizing it was impossible to stave off majority rule in Rhodesia and fearing that once Rhodesia fell it would have three extreme communist groups at its border which would threaten its security. (Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia) South Africa began looking for a diplomatic solution which would work out in its favor, but in that respect also abandon Rhodesia. After a series of negotiations with Zambia which was tired of the guerilla forces within the country, President Vorster (South Africa's president) proposed the so-called "Détente". It called for a ceasefire between Rhodesia and the guerilla groups in order for them to come together and negotiate a settlement in regards to Rhodesia's future. In order for it to work, Zambia had promised that it would hold back guerilla insurgencies or have guerillas groups face expulsion from the country. South Africa in return would need to withdraw its forces and support, while Rhodesia would return from its forwarding bases and release political prisoners. (Moorcraft, 40) While Ian Smith would not accept majority rule in Rhodesia, he did falter due to pressure from the Vorster government. He released a number of political prisoners under the pretext that after the meeting they would return to live out their sentence. (Martin, 145) These political prisoners included most of the leading figures within the ZAPU and ZANU leadership including Mugabe, Nkomo and Sithole. However, the conference was a disaster. With Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe released from prison they were all eager to consolidate their power in their respective guerilla groups. Instead they were forced to cooperate under the umbrella organization of Bishop Muzorewa ANC party and try to figure out a settlement. In August 1975 however neither party could eventually come to a compromise and talks collapsed.

The ceasefire and the eventual collapse of the talks had been a major setback for Ian Smith. By buckling under the pressure pushed onto him by Vorster the talks proved to be a useful propaganda tool for the guerilla forces whom proclaimed that the Ian Smith Government was giving up and surrendering. (Moorcraft, 40) In addition to this, by agreeing to the ceasefire the guerillas had time to recuperate from their loses in Operation Hurricane and once again re-establish their bases in Mozambique. As stated by Ian Smith "We were on the brink of dealing a knock-out blow. We had them on the run; of this there is no doubt...In a sense we dropped our guard and as a result we lost a bit of ground. This not only affected us military but, more important, psychologically." (Moorcraft, 40)

Nevertheless, more negotiation were yet to come, South Africa unwilling to accept that negotiations had broken down reaffirmed its commitment to come to a solution. After a major military operation called operation Eland (see military role) Voster furious at Ian Smith for trying to escalate the conflict accepted an initiation from Henry Kissinger to settle the conflict. Kissinger came over to Southern Africa to work out a settlement. After traveling throughout most of the frontline states a solution was finally presented to Ian Smith which stipulated that a national council would be set up composed of blacks and whites for an interim period of two years until eventually, following a two year transition period majority rule would be returned to the country - this was accepted by all frontline states. (Sue Onslow, 149) The main hurdle remained Rhodesia whom refused to accept majority rule, this was until South Africa eventually threatened to pull back all economic roads and military aid unless the prospect of majority rule was acknowledged. Threatening Smith to either accept majority rule or face a violent end, this event would later be called by Ian Smith as "The Great Betrayal" (Ian Smith, 199-210). Forced by Voster to accept the terms and seeing no other alternative it was on September 24th 1976 that Ian Smith eventually accepted the inevitable and conceded majority rule. (Onslow, 150) This was quickly followed by frontline states leaders backing away from the proposal on September 26th 1976 and calling for a conference outside of Rhodesia in Geneva where talks as per usual broke down without any significant progress in December 1976. (Onslow 151)

This phase in the conflict was significant turning point for the conflict as a whole, since it showed three major things. Firstly, that Rhodesia no longer had the support of its neighboring community with Portugal now gone and South Africa attempting to save

its own skin. Secondly, that without this support from the neighboring community Rhodesia would be forced to negotiate a compromise with the guerillas - something which would have been out of the question just a year previously. Finally, and possibly the most important event and turning point during this period was the acceptance by Ian Smith that there would be a transition to majority rule, which thus paved the way towards the end of the white ruled government.

Military role

The military did not fair any better with the removal of Portugal from the conflict. Having already lost an important military ally, South Africa began making things worse by pushing for a détente which stipulated the withdrawal of South African troops, equipment and military support from the conflict. While over 2000 South African troops were removed from the conflict some remained behind under the secret operation Polo, where 50 helicopter pilots and engineers would stay behind to support the Rhodesians. (Moorcraft 40) Additionally, in the same year “exercise ALORCA” came to a sudden and abrupt end, Portugal was in no state to help and was unwilling to commit itself to any future struggles, which may occur on Rhodesian or South African soil. Furthermore, Portugal ended the right for South Africa and Rhodesia to conduct operations on its territory or move into its territory to pursue any guerilla fighters thus in effect ending Rhodesias ability to operate in the Tete province. (Meneses, 104, December 2013) This was a massive loss both in manpower and the ability to combat the guerilla insurgency for the Rhodesians. Coupled with the decision to release the political leaders of the ZAPU and ZANU, the rebel groups would begin to put massive pressure on the military forces and the white population in general. However, there was a small advantage for the armed forces with the ‘détente’ in place and covert operations taking place (see guerilla section) throughout most of 1974 and until August 1975, the military forces could concentrate on adapting to the changing military climate, as well as holding and securing the territories they controlled and responding to any infiltration from guerillas who may ignore the détente and infiltrate Rhodesia anyway. Nonetheless, with the eventual failure of the ‘détente’ talks in August 1975 the war moved from a conflict

which sought a political solution to one which to resolve the conflict through coercive force.

In 1976, it was estimated that around 1000 guerilla fighters were already operating within the country with over 15,000 guerilla fighters stationed in Mozambique. (Cilliers, 28) Fearing a massive flow of guerillas into the country, the Rhodesian armed forces began multiple joint operations along the border with Mozambique. Similar to the structure and organization as Operation Hurricane, which had been set up in 1973, Operation Thrasher and Operation Repulse were set up respectively to combat any insurgent inflow into the country in February and March of 1976. (Cilliers, 28) Nevertheless, the Rhodesian forces realized that once they entered the country and politicized the population, little could be done to stop the influence of the guerillas in those areas. Thus, the Rhodesian armed forces began trying to eliminate the problem at its source.

With the new refined concept of Fireforce in place, which had proven to become one of the most valuable assets in the war against the guerillas, the Rhodesian armed forces decided to begin conducting external operations. In doing they hoped to destroy guerilla recruitment and training camps so to discourage possible future recruits and put a dent into the guerillas operations. While external operations were not new as mentioned earlier in this essay, this time they would be conducted without the coordination or permission of the host countries. The first major operation which caused uproar in South Africa and eventually resulted in Vorster forcing Ian Smith to accepting majority rule was Operation Eland conducted in August 1976. Selous scouts, the elite unit of the Rhodesian armed forces had discovered a major guerilla camp where guerilla fighters were training and moving guerillas into the area of operation thrasher. Disguising themselves as high ranking guerilla fighters they infiltrated the compound announced a rallying parade and thus drawing a large crowd of guerilla fighters towards their cars. Once a large enough crowd had gathered the scouts opened fire with heavy machine guns, mortar fire and grenades killing hundreds of guerilla fighters who had been completely taken by surprise. (Peter Baxter, 12 October 2012) It was a major blow towards the guerilla forces with the Rhodesian government predicting that over 300 ZANLA fighters died as well as 50 Mozambique soldiers, while the Mozambique military concluded that over 1000 ZANLA and Mozambique forces had died in the fighting.

(Cilliers, 178) What made the operation even more successful was that not a single of the 72 Rhodesians had died during the fighting.

This would not be the first external raid with many more occurring during that year alone, as well as throughout the rest of the conflict it did have the largest impact. The first impact was ZANLA stating that the camp had been a refugee camp further arguing that what Ian Smith's government had conducted was nothing more than a war crime (though as would later turn out through captured ZANLA documents most of those killed were guerilla fighters) (Moorcraft, 44). Vorster was equally furious that Ian Smith was escalating the conflict and eventually forced Smith to accept majority rule but also removed all forces under the secret "operation Polo" - thus cutting the strike capacity of the Rhodesian air force in half. (Moorcraft, 44) While this had severely hurt the Rhodesian armed forces even more it had proved to the world and to the guerillas, that while it may be that majority rule would eventually come to pass the Smith government would fight tooth and nail before it surrendered.

Guerilla role

With the removal of Portugal from Mozambique, it presented a major opportunity for both the ZAPU and ZANU however both guerilla forces had difficulty gaining momentum in order to continue their liberation struggle with the ZAPU, having difficulty in deciding whether to continue their liberation struggle or enter diplomatic talks with the Ian Smith government. While the ZANU faced a similar power struggle within its own ranks.

Guerilla political developments

With the 'détente' and the release of the leaders of the ZANU it was meant to be a major victory for the ZANU. Nonetheless, similarly to what happened with the ZAPU a major power struggle occurred within the ZANUS' ranks. The first major incident was the "Nahri rebellion" which began in December 1974, where a commander Nahri angered by the lack of sophisticated weapons (which were going to ZAPU as they had Soviet backing) and apparent disagreement over the fact that the ZANU leadership was no longer following the Maoist ways staged a rebellion and took control of one of the ZANU camps in Zambia near the border of Mozambique. (Martin, 161-164) ZANU eventually managed to control the rebellion and remove Nahri from the camp but not

before 50-60 ZANU soldiers had been killed. (Moorcraft 41) This would not be the first major shock to the insurgency.

Following the end of the rebellion in December 1974, in March of 1975 Herbert Chitepo the leader of the ZANU (while Mugabe and Sithole were still in jail) died after his car exploded killing him instantly. (Tor Sellstrom, 181) An outspoken critic of the 'détente' Chitepo angered Zambia and South Africa and was a constant worry for the Rhodesian government. While it could not be explained who assassinated Chitepo a Zambian lead investigation eventually found the ZANLA responsible for his assassination and blamed them for political infighting leading to the ZANU and ZANLA being expelled from the country where they were eventually forced to settle. (Moorcraft 41). Many years later, it would turn out that both incidents were neither caused by ZANU infighting or political rivalries but by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence agency who through careful planning had persuaded Nahri into staging his rebelling, and sent a Rhodesian to assassinate Chitepo. (Sellstrom, 181)

A final stumbling bloke for the ZANLA during this period was the actual political infighting which happened within the party structure. Sithole (the previous leader of the ZANU before he went to jail) was no longer welcome among the ranks of the ZANU after Sithole had denounced the struggle in open court. Furthermore Sithole had further pledged with his group members in jail to seek a settlement through political means and eventually ruled out majority rule angering Mugabe and other members alike. (Martin 149-152) Spurred on by this Mugabe was elected as the new leader of the ZANU days before the August 1975 'détente' conference surprising and angering many especially FRELIMO which had always viewed Sithole as the leader of the ZANU. Nevertheless, by 1976 Mugabe had the full support of the ZANU and FRELIMO and was ready to finish the war.

The covert operations by the Rhodesian central intelligence agency did put a dent in ZANU and their political leadership for a solid year. Nonetheless By removing Chitepo who was personally selected by Sithole to lead the ZANU, the Rhodesian armed forces removed a powerful ally of Sithole. Consequently when Mugabe came to power and Sithole (already unpopular among his compatriots) had no strong ally to back him up, eventually faded into obscurity. With a strong leader at the helm and now being in control of the entire Mozambique front, the ZANU and ZANLA were ready to begin their war against the Rhodesian government.

With the announcement of the 'détente' and the subsequent release of Nkomo the ZAPU was once again under strong leadership, which resulted in mass recruitment for the ZIRPA of around 3000 recruits per month. (Sibanda, 167) Additionally, the ZAPU moved to consolidate their power in the North and eventually moved into Francistown in Botswana to attempt to open up the South Western border of Rhodesia. (Sibanda, 175) In doing so, Rhodesia would not only have to deal with a new Eastern Front but also a third Western front opening up for them. Additionally, following the assassination of Chipolte and the subsequent removal of ZANU from Zambia, the ZAPU were ready to swoop in and take over any remaining bases in Zambia - thus opening up the entire Northern front for ZAPU forces to cross. For the rest of the period however, the ZAPU did not do much and mostly remained in their position.

Guerilla military developments

A final developed which affected both guerilla groups during this period was the creation of ZIPA or Zimbabwe People's Army. Following the assassination of Chiptole and the subsequent loss of Zambia as well as the following leadership struggle. The leaders of Mozambique and Zambia joined together and urged the ZAPU and ZANU to form a joint front together under the name ZIPA. While both groups eventually accepted the offer in early 1975 and created a joint command structure the alliance was short lived as Mugabe's forces were doing most of the heavy lifting in carrying out attack while ZAPU forces were displeased by the fact that they were using strategies and tactics employed by the ZANU thus at the end of 1976 the organization was effectively suspended. (Moorcraft, 88)

Brief analysis of the period mid-1974-1976

In this phase of the conflict almost all factors played a role. The factor for non-state actors, which played a major role in the de-escalation of the conflict, was the fractionalization that occurred within the ZANU. Due to this fractionalization and internal infighting the conflict began to de-escalate even before their respective international partners imposed the stalemate on them. (See analysis section for more details).

However, factors of context also played predominantly in this phase these were: international support, popular support as well as social cleavages. But while the latter two applied mostly to non-state actors, international support was the main reason why both the state and non-state actors came to a stalemate agreement or 'détente' as it was known. What this showed was the amount of influence international actors had on the warring parties in Rhodesia and how they could influence the conflict.

Nonetheless, while international actors may have called for stalemate and peace, guerilla forces were quick to prepare a renewal of the conflict by exposing the tribal social cleavage. In doing so guerilla groups not only managed to gain more recruits for their respective guerilla group but also increase popular support among the black Rhodesian population which would eventually escalate the conflict in the next stage.


Finally state factors also played a role during this phase of the conflict. Firstly was the change in coercive force tactics by state actors where instead of containing guerilla incursions into the country, Rhodesia would go on the offensive. (Thus resulting in an escalation of the conflict) Additionally, while it was forced upon Ian Smith by South Africa, Smith conceded to eventual majority rule thereby giving a policy solution to the conflict.

4.6 When the guerillas came marching in 1977-1979

In the final three years of the Rhodesian Bush war saw the most fighting and most death within Rhodesia. It was at this point during the conflict that the government of Rhodesia attempted its final desperate attempt to come to a political solution in Rhodesia while guerilla forces began the offensive they had long been planning for.

Map showing areas of guerilla activity in Rhodesia mid 1979 (not areas of control)

(Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)



Key

- Blue-Allies of Rhodesia
- Red-Allies of Guerilla forces
- Yellow-ZAPU territory (Zambia)
- Orange-ZANU territory (Mozambique)
- Dotted brown-ZANLA activity
- Dotted Green-ZIRPA activity

Government role

After the failed Gevena talks had ended in 1976, Ian Smith looked upon finding an internal settlement towards ending the war. Knowing that black majority rule would be inevitable he sought to make a deal with moderate black politicians in the hopes that by doing so the whites could retain some power, becoming internationally recognized and stop the advancing guerillas. Following massive military operations, which were aimed at discouraging the ZANU to continuing to fight, (See military role) Ian Smith entered negotiations with the ANC led by Bishop Muzorewa as well as the offshoot ZANU formed by Sithole in December 1977 with the hopes of forming a transitional government that would remove many of the previous racist provisions set out before UDI was declared. In that respect it was highly successful and by March 8th 1978 a deal had been set out and a four man executive council (EXCO) committee was formed, called the "March Agreement" which would lead to the new government of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe (Moorcraft 151) Nonetheless, it did not have the desired affect it wanted to have - Muzorewa and Sithole had convinced Smith they represented the majority of 20,000 guerilla fighters but as it would turn out, when an amnesty offer was extended to the guerilla fighters only a few hundred or so turned in their weapons. (Reagan Kerney, Washington Post)

Faced with the prospect that any future government with Sithole and Muzorewa would fail, Smith began secret negotiations with Nkomo in August/September 1978, under the idea that if he were to join the current government, other African countries would be sure to recognize it. Talks at first went well with Nkomo joyfully admitting that Ian Smith had declared "as far as he (Ian Smith) was concerned he was out," "He (Ian Smith) definitely would be prepared to see power transferred....to the Patriotic Front (ZANU/ZAPU official joint command but in reality a empty organization)." (Kerney, Washington Post) It would have possibly been successful too, with NKomo as the new leader of the government, a large guerilla force would stop fighting in Rhodesia, additionally with the security forces and ZIRPA forces integrated they could lead a strong front against the ZANU thus expelling them from the country. Unfortunately, as events would have it on the same day that the secret negotiations were revealed by Smith and Nkomo, ZIRPA forces shot down a Rhodesian Air airliner carrying 53 passengers 18 of which survived the crash. However, out of

these 18 survivors 10 were then subsequently executed by ZIRPA soldiers in the area. When news came out there was heavy condemnation by both the white and black Rhodesian public, talks between Ian Smith and Nkomo were instantly shut down and military operations against the ZAPU in Zambia were demanded. (Moorcraft 154) Thus, concluding a possible alternative solution for Ian Smith's government and thus entering the final year of the Republic of Rhodesia.

1979 was to be the final year that Rhodesia, as an independent state would exist. As the violence was escalating and the conflict also reaching into the usually white controlled areas (including Salisbury itself), the internal settlement was the last hope that the government of Ian Smith had in at least retaining some powers to decide the future of Rhodesia. Additionally, the Rhodesian government had hope that Margaret Thatcher would be elected as the new prime minister of Britain. As she had on multiple occasion denounced the guerilla movements and showed support in favor of the Ian Smith government. (Nicholas Waddy, 229) It was therefore wanted that with the newly elected black majority government, the renouncement of the discriminatory laws in 1965 and the end of white minority rule Thatcher would in some way recognize the newly established government. (Waddy, 229) Thus when the April elections came around and it was announced the Bishop Muzorewa has been elected as prime minister followed by news on May 4th that Margaret Thatcher had been named Prime Minister of Britain there was much hope in the air. On June 1st 1979 Bishop Muzorewa became the new prime minister of the newly established Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and white minority rule after 90 years came to an end. (BBC, June 1st 1979) Nonetheless, while Bishop may have been in "official" power the white Rhodesians still controlled the army, police, air force, as well as most civil servant jobs and were now also protected by law in the newly established constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. (BBC, June 1st 1979).

However, the plan failed with violence increasing across Rhodesia, as most grievances were not addressed by the white government and also the white military forces ignoring the Muzorewa government. Additionally, international recognition did not happen and Britain appeared unwilling to recognize the newly formed government. Thus, on 7th of August after a meeting with the Commonwealth a new conference was announced where all leaders of the Patriotic Front were invited, as well as leaders of the Zimbabwe- Rhodesian government to come to the Lancaster house conference to work out a compromise to the conflict. (Lancaster House Agreemen Proposals for constitution,


1979) While no one was expecting much success from the conference it was due to the bad negotiation skills of Muzorewa that British ambassadors managed to receive a lot of concessions from the prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. (Waddy, 247-248) This eventually resulted in the successful ceasefire agreement, a new timetable for majority rule elections, as well as British Rule returning to Rhodesia until the new elections were over. (Lancaster House Agreements Proposals for constitution, 1979)

Hence, after having only existed for six months, Zimbabwe Rhodesia ceased to exist on December 1979 and an interim period of British rule came about with a commonwealth peacekeeping force put in place to monitor the election process. This in general caused massive panic among the white population of Rhodesia whom feared that either Mugabe or Nkomo would come to power. Especially when it turned out that over 22,000 guerillas from either ZANU or ZAPU had gathered to partake in the ceasefire agreement, as well as future elections (See guerilla section for more information). While most whites did not believe that the ceasefire would hold and even believed that in the case of a victory by either Mugabe or Nkomo, an army takeover would occur. (See military section) Nonetheless, even this was not considered a possibility as numerous intelligence reports had previously stated that Muzorewa was likely to win with Mugabe and Nkomo only winning a small minority of the votes. (Peter Goodwin, Ian Handcock, 272-273) Despite the pressure by the Rhodesians on the British governor to call elections, the governor held firm and elections were held with a 93% turnout. As fate would have it of the 80 black seats in parliament (out of the 100, with 20 reserved for the whites for a period of 10 years) on March 4th it was announced that Mugabe won 57 seats, Nkomo 20 and Muzorewa winning a mere 3. (Moorcraft 176) The whites were panic stricken, some took the Beitbridge 500 which was the 500km drive to South Africa and a mass white exodus occurred, while others waited to begin Operation Quartz for a military takeover (See military section), but this never occurred. (Moorcraft, 178) It was on April 18th 1980 that Mugabe was sworn in as Prime Minister of the newly renamed Zimbabwe and brought a conclusion to the Rhodesian Bush War.

Military role

With the failure of the détente and the subsequent revival of the ZANU, the armed forces had their hands full. While Ian Smith was negotiating with Muzorewa on an internal government deal the conflict began to take a higher focus on military activity, conscription was extended, more frequent call ups were called as well as martial laws imposed in various areas. Moreover, the ZIRPA had finally decided to enter the fray and Rhodesia was now dealing with an insurgent border along the Zambian and Mozambique border but which also included the area across the Western border of Botswana (who although neutral in the conflict decided not to interfere with the incursions). (Cilliers, 37) Additionally, by the end of 1977 the amount of guerilla incursions had reached an all time high with over 5000 guerillas active in the country. (Cilliers, 43)

Estimated number of Guerilla forces in Rhodesia (Cilliers, 43-51)



To deal with this increase of guerilla fighters, another area of operation was set up. This was operation Tangent being created in August 1977 to deal with the increase in insurgency from ZIRPA insurgents. (Cilliers, 36)

However, the security forces were stretched to the limit - even though the army fielded highly experienced soldiers, it was difficult for just the whites to control the entire security situation on the ground. They began developing a new security strategy,

firstly in March 1977 they created the Combined Operations Center (ComOps) so that the air-force, army and police operations would all be coordinated from one central hub headed by the commander of the army General Peter Walls. (Moorcraft, 148) Secondly, in order to encourage guerilla leaders to come to a settlement (still falsely believing that Sithole as well as Muzorewa were in control of the majority of guerillas) while simultaneously dealing a blow to Mugabe the armed forces began conducting Operation Dingo.

Operation Dingo (which was the largest operation ever conducted by the Rhodesian armed forces) had the aim of destroying a major ZANLA camp 90km inside Mozambique and was also suspected to be the main headquarters of Mugabe during the Rhodesian Bush war. In all the operation involved 185 Rhodesian soldiers, 42 helicopters, eight hunters, six vampires, three Canberras, Six Dakotas and 12 Lynx aircraft. (Moorcraft, 150) In general, the entire air force of Rhodesia was deployed to conduct the operation. The operation would use Fireforce tactics by firstly bombing the camp until Rhodesian soldiers could paradrop around the perimeter to prevent guerillas from escaping until moving in and elimination any remain guerillas. (Wood, XII-XVI) The guerillas confident in their defendable position did not see the attack coming and while the operation was partially a failure as neither Mugabe nor ZANLA commanders were at the base that they it still had a detrimental affect on the ZANLA. (Woord, 145)

Additionally, two days later Operation Virile was initiated by the Rhodesian armed forces aimed at destroying logistical pathways such as bridges and communication equipment in order hamper efforts more. While not having the same impact as Dingo, Virile exposed to the Rhodesians the unpopularity of FRELIMO as the ruling party in Mozambique. It eventually made the Rhodesian government decide to begin supporting RENOMO a anti-communist movement aimed at overthrowing FRELIMO in Mozambique. (Wood, 199-200)

In all both operations resulted in only 2 killed and 2 wounded Rhodesian soldiers compared to 20% or 5000 soldiers of the entire ZANLA force, it set back recruitment by the ZANLA for months, and it instantly bought Sithole to the table and while Muzorewa was hesitant at first a few weeks later accepted the offer by Ian Smith to talk about a future unity government. (Wood, 200-202)

It seemed that for a while the security forces had dealt a severe blow towards the ZANU and with the internal settlement talks along the way as well, it seemed the white

Rhodesian government might just survive. Nonetheless, while the success of Dingo and Virile cannot be denied, guerilla forces continued their operations inside Rhodesia and the war would continue. In light of the internal settlement however, operations were temporarily scaled down in the hopes that an accord could be reached, a new strategy was created aimed at protecting vital Asset Ground, denying insurgents the ground of tactical importance, preventing incursions and raiding neighboring countries to disrupt the systems of command and control. (Woord 45) The second change in strategy was a massive transformation for the Rhodesian forces. It involved bringing in armed auxiliaries loyal to Muzorewa and Sithole in order to hold ground for the white Rhodesian forces. By doing so however the Rhodesian government showed that the white security forces could no longer hold and protect the territory themselves and instead needed the help of former guerillas to defend areas conquered by the Rhodesian forces. The scheme did eventually prove extremely successful and security forces for the first time began taking some ground while also helping to maintain security the April 1979 elections. (Cilliers, 48) Furthermore, in 1978 Rhodesia began supporting and financing the RENAMO, which by doing so began hampering both the Mozambique government (who then wanted a quick end to the conflict), as well as hinder ZANLA insurgencies who now also had to begin fighting RENAMO. (Wood, 45). Finally, a last developed which occurred resulting in a change in the military structure of the security forces was that the whites were slowly beginning to accept more and more blacks among their ranks. At the start of the war the only armed force unit, which contained blacks, was the African Rifle division. However due to the shortage of men and the exodus of many white Rhodesians, the army had no choice but the accept more black troops. Consequently by 1978 80% of the Rhodesian armed forces was black nonetheless whites would still remain officers and in command of the overall structure. (Moorcraft, 152)

Nevertheless, 1978 was not all to great for the Rhodesian armed forces either, while there was a revival in strategy as well as changes within the organization structure in 1978 by the end of 1978 the conflict had once again escalated massively once news came around that the Rhodesian Air commercial plane had been shot down. Rhodesian security forces increased the amount of border raids in Mozambique and began their first major external operations against ZIRPA across the Zambian border. (Cilliers 188) A last major blow to the security forces and the country itself was in

December 1978 when ZANLA guerillas managed to infiltrate the Salisbury oil refinery and blow up the fuel deposits stationed there - resulting in tens of millions of liters of precious fuel being destroyed, which severely hampering future operations that required a lot of fuel as well as hurting the economy in general. (Cilliers, 49)

In 1979 however, was a strange year for the Security forces as it became obvious they were losing the war. The previously established Security Axillary forces were now mostly dominated and used by either Sithole or Muzorewa to gain influence in certain regions. But instead of guaranteeing security frequent clashes between different security Axillary's also deteriorated the security situation. (Moorcraft, 156) Additionally, it began to look more and more like the security forces did not have a handle on the situation. Cross border raids were still common but they did not have any more major affects on either the ZANU or the ZIRPA and slowly the security forces had began losing ground while giving more ground to the auxiliaries. The final major successful operation was the smooth security situation which developed with the April 1979 elections and soon afterwards in December 1979, the British became the main members who were responsible for the security in Rhodesia.

When the British eventually took over from the Rhodesian government in December 1979 the security forces were mostly restricted to their barracks in accordance with the ceasefire which had been agreed earlier, only helping every now and then in regards to handling security situations. The real threat from the security forces eventually came with the upcoming elections. Fearing that Mugabe could possibly win the election, the armed forces began preparing for operation Quartz. Operation Quartz was aimed at using conventional weapons such as the recently acquired Eland tanks from South Africa to strike the ZANU guerillas whom had gathered in pre-selected location in adherence to the ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, at the same time of the operation soldiers would attempt to assassinate Mugabe while ignoring Nkmomos' ZAPU who the security forces would form an alliance with to drive out all the ZANU support. (Baxter, 18 April 2012) However, the order to begin the operation never came either because the intelligence services warned the British about the operation or Peter Walls director of ComOPs decided to call of the operation at the last minutes. (Possible due to the large win with which Mugabe won)

Guerilla role

The guerillas enjoyed the most success during this final phase of the conflict. The ZANU had recovered from their internal power struggle while the ZAPU had consolidated their power and were in negotiations with Ian Smith. Nonetheless, the ZANU were gaining ground quickly in Rhodesia and were seen as the most likely to win the war, however the ZAPU now with fully armed and fully trained army was ready to join the conflict with Cuban and Soviet backing.

Guerilla military developments

Between 1977 and 1978 the ZAPU had finally gained some ground into Rhodesia. With the inability of the security forces to deal with the ever increasing amount of guerillas, the ZAPU were able to infiltrate and begin making bases/areas of operations across the Zambian river. (Brickhill, 51) However, they were also faced with many problems, having finally gained access to the area a major offensive began with artillery pieces, advanced soviet anti-aircraft guns, as well modern combat equipment. The problem however began when the ZIRPA had to hold and consolidate territory. The ZIRPA whom had been trained in guerilla tactics and not infantry tactics did not know how to hold territory like a normal convention force. (Brickhill, 53) For example problems that the guerillas had was that knew how to hide from the Rhodesian armed forces but unable to take up defensive positions. Furthermore, unlike the ZANU which had experienced fire force to its fullest and had thus adapted its strategy accordingly the ZIRPA forces were unprepared for fire force tactics. Consequently after Rhodesian forces started actively targeting ZIRPA forces they were unprepared for the full force fireforce brought with it. (Brickhill, 53) The ZIRPA forces only began gaining ground after it became evident that Rhodesia was only focusing on protecting the strategically and economically important areas of the country, thus allowing ZIRPA forces to take and actively defend land they conquered without to much interference. (Brickhill, 54).

This strategy eventually lead to the turning point strategy in late 1978 where guerilla forces would consolidate their power in areas it controlled by beginning to set up administrative areas. (Sibanda, 190) However, the plan was not implemented till 1979 as a counterweight against the newly established Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and never began due to the ceasefire announcement and subsequent free elections.

Nonetheless, another plan, which was almost put in motion, was the Zero Hour Plan, that called for a large scale conventional assault from Zambia and Botswana targeting economic and strategic locations. In general it was a conventional invasion which the ZAPU and ZIRPA had been preparing that would be implemented in October/November of 1979. However, with the successful resolution of the Lancaster House Agreement the ZAPU decided not to implement their Zero Hour Plan and a conventional war never erupted. (Brickhill, 65) Nonetheless, while the ZAPU were on the point of a conventional war, the ZANU and ZANLA were already conquering vast amounts of territory.

The ZANU had begun making gains throughout the Rhodesian territories while still maintaining guerilla warfare and being loyal to the Maoist principle. Once the Mozambique leader had finally accepted Mugabe as the official leader of the ZANU, incursion rates within Rhodesia began to skyrocket, with Mozambique being open to the ZANU and Rhodesian security forces being spread thin. Nonetheless when the Rhodesian security forces began conducting operation Dingo it infuriated the ZANU and boosting white moral thus increasing their resolve against the guerilla forces. (Martin, 290) A year later in 1978 the ZANU announced the "year of the people" and similar to the ZAPU the ZANU would now begin their main offensive into Rhodesia in an attempt to take land and set up their own administrative areas where the security forces would no longer have a say in the day to day activities of the citizens. (Martin 292-293) While the ZANU were momentarily stunned by operation Dingo when the next rainy season came around (and thus the start of fighting), by December 1978 they had mostly recovered from their losses and were once again beginning to move inland.

By 1979 ZANLA were once again at full strength, even being unable to take in more and actively began discourage recruitment of guerillas in most areas. (Moorcraft, 156) The long waited rising up of the people had finally began for the ZANU. By April 1979 the elections came around which would see Muzorewa come to power as Prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, while there were some areas which actively encouraged voting most guerillas attempted to distort the elections in order to undermine its legitimacy. (Moorcraft, 156) Furthermore, as later turned out the purpose of the election (to reduce the strength of the guerilla movements) completely failed as by June 1979 over 20,000 guerillas were fighting within the country. (Moorcraft, 156) Nonetheless, what it had proved was that they were still a capable force and that for

most of the central areas of the population, the security forces were still heavily in control.

Guerilla political developments

By August 1979 two months later both the ZANU and ZAPU struggle came to a sudden end. With the Lancaster House Agreement both Nkomo and Mugabe had acknowledged that if the ceasefire was maintained and fair elections were held the struggle of majority rule would end. Additionally, guerilla forces were also beginning to struggle to maintain their domination. As it later turned out if Muzorewa had not conceded to the demands of the British diplomats, the Rhodesians may have had a good chance of having some success at the Lancaster House Agreement. Before the conference had begun Machel (leader of Mozambique) had told Mugabe that unless he accepted the terms at the Lancaster House he would get permission to stay in Mozambique as a refugee but no longer be allowed to conduct a guerilla war from Mozambique's territory. (Sibanda, 218-219) Besides Mugabe facing geopolitical difficulty, Nkomo was in a similar situation. When Nkomo attended the conference he was warned by Thatcher not to attack Rhodesia via Zambia or face British consequences; (Brickhill, 64) possibly alluding to the fact that the UK would begin supplying and aiding Rhodesia in the event of a ZAPU invasion. Nonetheless, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed and the ceasefire began to take effect. Both the ZAPU and the ZANU had slowly begun moving into Rhodesia however, not as victors but as soldiers adhering to a ceasefire. With elections around the corner, the massive ZANU and ZAPU machine began preparing for elections. While coup attempts were set in motion they never materialized never materialized. By March 1980 as election results came in, Mugabe leader of the ZANU became president and, resulting in one of the greatest ironies of all time - a communist who fought to take over the country was democratically elected as the leader of it. (BBC, March 1980)

Brief Analysis of the final phase of the conflict

In the final phase of the conflict different factors began to play a role in ending it. Firstly regarding context factors national politics and international support were a few of the main reasons why the conflict ended. National politics played a role firstly into putting

Muzorewa in power and when he got to power negotiated the Lancaster House Agreement (therefore calling elections and causing a de-escalation of the conflict). Additionally international support resulted in the UK once again taking over control of the country and monitoring elections.

In regards to factors involving state actors all factors played a role except for the use of coercive force in ending the conflict. This was mainly due to the lack of state capacities, which the Rhodesian government possessed. Therefore while it still applied coercive force the Rhodesian government knew that it needed to find a policy solution towards the conflict and attempted to do so with the internal settlement deal under Ian Smith and the Lancaster House Agreement under Muzorewa. Additionally, unlike Smith whom always had a strong government mandate it was Muzorewa, who had an extremely weak mandate, who eventually ended the conflict.

Finally, the non-state factors, which played a role during this final phase of the conflict was mostly using its increased capacity regarding manpower and technological power as well as the change in strategy by both the ZANU and ZAPU to completely invade Rhodesia. With both of these factors leading to an escalation in the conflict.

4.7 Analysis of the conflict

In this part of the thesis an analysis about the Rhodesian Bush war will be put forward, looking at certain context factors, state actor factors and non-state actor factors and how all this had an impact on influencing the conflict

Context

Social cleavages

When it came to social cleavages in the conflict there are two ever present cleavages. The first was the social cleavages between the whites and blacks, while the second, which developed later on in the war, and eventually lead to a civil war after the Rhodesian bush war ended, was the two different tribal groupings.

Nonetheless, the main social cleavage was certainly the whites versus the blacks. The whites being the overall rulers of Rhodesia for the last 90 years had enjoyed a life of luxury having a higher pay grade than the blacks, owning more farming land than the blacks and of course controlling all political, security and economic forces power within the country. (Panday 35, 41) The blacks on the other hand, were living in less luxurious houses, did not have the economic advantages the white had, were refused entry into politics on multiple occasions and while it could be argued that they were allowed into the army or other security forces they would never receive the rank of any commanding officer and so always being restricted in their role. (Moorcraft, 57-59) It was thus no surprise that there were blacks, which resented the whites and their government and wanted it to be removed in order to gain equal wealth and opportunity. Thus in turn this social cleavage lead to the overall emergence of the conflict. Coupled with the grievances which the blacks had towards the whites, which will be explored in the section 'grievances', black Rhodesians were understandably frustrated towards the white Rhodesians.

The second social cleavage was the two different tribal groupings within Rhodesia. The two main tribes within Rhodesia were at the time the Shona and Ndebele but were not a major part in the emergence of the conflict. Even when the conflict began

to escalate and the ZAPU and ZANU were formed, tribal politics did not play a major role. It would only begin to play a role in the conflict as a recruitment tool during the stalemate of the conflict when both the ZANU and the ZAPU were in desperate need of recruits, in order for them to do some damage to the white Rhodesian government. There were three main reasons why this social cleavage only emerged during the stalemate of the conflict.

The first was when both Nkomo and Mugabe were released from prison in 1975 they decided to actively begin recruiting using their popularity. (Sibanda, 167) As both leaders were respected among their various tribal communities, (with Nkomo having a large amount of respect in the Ndebele tribe while Mugabe having his base of support in the Shona tribe) it was possibly far easier convincing black Rhodesians into joining the struggle than convincing them to work with tribal members they did not trust. Secondly, the two different communist ideologies of the ZANU (following Maoist teachings) and ZAPU (following Soviet teachings) had no appeal to the black Rhodesians as they were seen as foreign and unfamiliar in the environment. (Moorcraft, 69) Thus by actively beginning to recruit based on tribal affiliation it began to seem more like a struggle of a community or tribe against the white government. A final reason why this social cleavage emerged was due to geography, as mentioned earlier at the start of the war both groups were limited to Zambia in order to conduct their activities. However, with the opening of Mozambique the ZAPU began conducting their activities fully from Zambia and Botswana, while ZANU began conducting it from Mozambique. Coincidentally this geography also perfectly lined up with the tribal regions dominated by both the Ndebele (Western Rhodesia) Shona (center and Eastern Rhodesia). The Ndebele being mainly located in Matabeleland North and South which stretches across Zambia and Botswana while the Shona support was mostly located in the rest of Rhodesia. Thus, making it easier or almost necessary to recruit from one's own tribe.

Nonetheless, while this social cleavage did emerge in the conflict and while it could be argued that it helped escalate the conflict. I argue that it was mainly responsible for a stalemate in the conflict. Firstly, because this social cleavage lead to an increase in popular support from both rebel movements which in turn escalated the conflict (see popular support) and this cleavage only appeared during the stalemate of the conflict when both groups needed to gain more support. So it did not escalate the conflict until talks broke down and the stalemate phase of the conflict ended.

Nonetheless, if we look past the Rhodesian bush war and further into the Zimbabwe civil war or Gukurahundi of 1983-1987, the creation of this social cleavage was a major emergent phase in regards to that conflict.

Popular support

Popular support played a major role in the escalation of the conflict for both the white government and rebel groups. While overall popular support was never achieved due to the social cleavages within Rhodesia, popular support was one of the main reasons why the conflict escalated. In general there were mainly two groups where popular support could be gained from either the black population or the white population. While the three groups where popular support could be given to was either one of the two rebel movements (ZANU, ZAPU or both) or the white Rhodesian government.

For the Rhodesian white government popular support was mainly gained from the white population in Rhodesia while the black population either passively supported the Rhodesian front or had no support towards either the guerilla movements or the white government. Nonetheless, this strong general support of the white population did grant the Rhodesian government two things. Firstly, it allowed for them to escalate the conflict by declaring UDI, which thus moved the conflict phase from an emergent conflict to an escalating one. Secondly, with this strong support they faced no major opposition within their own government ranks, leading to a strong government that resulted in escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. (See strength of government section under State Actors)

For the guerillas popular support was limited at the start of the conflict only for it to grow later on. If we look at the start of the conflict support for the various rebel movements was limited, resulting in failed border raids, lack of local support and failure to recruit until 1975 when support for these guerilla movements began to increase. As mentioned in the previous section, once recruitment for both the ZAPU and ZANU began focusing more on tribal affiliation and tribal struggle against the white government, popular support began to grow and with this support allowed for the ZANU and ZAPU to set up bases of operation inside Rhodesia. This allowed them to move freely throughout the area and attack the white government forces and citizens far deeper inside the country than they could have otherwise outside of it. Additionally, with the popular

support the often passive or lack of support towards the white government began to shift towards one of active opposition and hostility, while some blacks who still supported the government were either forced to join the white Rhodesian government or face being executed by the supporters of the guerilla forces or the guerilla forces themselves. (thus resulting in a further escalation of the conflict.

Grievances

Grievances played the role of bringing the conflict from a latent stage to an emerging conflict and then finally an escalating conflict. The main grievances as mentioned throughout the essay was firstly the laws' which gave less rights to the majority blacks in the country and divided up the black and white lands giving most of it to the whites. (pandya, 35) A second grievance was of course the lack of political entry for black political groups into mainstream politics and lack of majority rule for blacks. (Martin, xiv-xv) The reason why grievances brought the conflict from a latent stage to an emerging one has a lot to do with the decolonizing period of the time. While there were grievances during the latent period of the conflict with decolonization and black majority rule coming to many other African countries, black political parties such as the ZAPU saw a opportunity to address their grievances. By pressing for majority rule they could eventually change laws and policies and gain power over the country.

The escalation of the conflict happened after the UDI prevented any grievances to be addressed or changed, as the Ian Smith government would not adhere to their demands. Thus without any political platform for these grievances to be addressed the rebel groups took up the armed struggle. (See national politics for more details)

Local

Local politics in the Rhodesian Bush war played a minimal role within the conflict. There are a number of possible reasons for this the first being that Rhodesia is a small country by itself with an estimated population of around 3 million at the start of the war and around 7 million by the end of it. (Brownell, 51) Additionally, the white population was immensely smaller with only around a quarter of a million whites living in

Rhodesia. Seeing as all the power lay in the whites hands whom controlled politics on both a local and national level. The small community of whites would not see much different between local and national politics either.

National politics

National politics on the other hand played a role in almost all phases of the conflict, starting from emergence, escalation, de-escalation and partially conflict resolution. The emergence of the conflict began due to the nationalistic politics of the Rhodesian Front when they came to power in 1962. As mentioned in the thesis, when the Rhodesian front came to power they refused to allow black parties into power within the government structure, which resulted in a further emergence of the conflict. This emergence was created due to grievances (mentioned in the previous section) and with the constant banning of the various black political parties set up by Nkomo, which eventually lead to the ZANU creating their own military wing in order to prepare for an eventual guerilla war with the white government.

With the declaration of UDI by the Rhodesian front an escalation of the conflict occurred. As all other means of negotiation or gaining political power through non-violent means had been effectively blocked for the black political parties. Further escalation occurred from the period of 1975 till the late 1978 under Ian Smith, mainly because of an overreliance on the Rhodesian armed forces to control the situation without the need to shift policy or give blacks more power and rights. (therefore deescalating the conflict) By relying heavily on the security forces, Ian Smith was hesitant if not slow to implement any changes and once he did it only served to escalate the conflict. This was mainly due to the guerilla forces, seeing negotiation as a weakness. Thus with Ian Smith now attempting to negotiate his way out, it was seen as a weakness thus fueling their reserve and belief that they were winning the war.

However, while the Ian Smith government was responsible for the emergence and eventually escalation of the conflict, the Muzorewa government ruled over a phase of further escalation followed by a period of de-escalation phase of the conflict in the final years of the war mainly because of the resolution of hostilities following the Lancaster house agreement. With the new internal government in charge, the guerilla forces escalated the conflict as they may have felt threatened that the black population

would start to support the ruling government. Nonetheless, once the Lancaster house agreement was signed the conflict quickly de-escalated as a new solution was presented towards both guerilla groups. However, with the implementation of the Lancaster house agreement there was also a return of the British colonial rulers whom were responsible for the conflict resolution. (See international politics and foreign support)

International politics/foreign support

International politics played a major role along all phases of the war except for the emergence phase of the conflict. Nonetheless, foreign supporters of the guerilla forces were mostly aimed at escalating the conflict while supporters of the Rhodesian government at times either helped escalate, stalemate, de-escalate and even resolve the conflict.

In total there were three main phases where foreign support and international politics heavily influenced the conflict. Firstly, with the start of the conflict foreign supporters of the guerilla forces tried to escalate the conflict by providing territory, weapons and training - while foreign supporters of the Rhodesian government de-escalated the conflict by sending military equipment and troops.

Secondly, between 1974 and 1976/77 foreign support was aimed at resolving the conflict. This resulted in a stalemate of the conflict as both the Rhodesian government and guerilla forces were forced by their international supporter counter-parts to enter talks and negotiations with one another or face losing military aid, territory etc. While both the Rhodesian government and guerilla forces entered the so called "détente talks", as well as the following up talks in Geneva organized by Henry Kissinger, both failed and the conflict once again escalated. Additionally, foreign support came in the form of the opening up of Mozambique for the guerilla forces. With the opening of Mozambique the entire Western border of Rhodesia had opened up resulting in the guerilla being able to use the entire Western flank of Rhodesia and thus making it far easier to infiltrate and occupy areas of land.

The final phase of international support and politics was when British rule was temporarily returned to Rhodesia, following the Lancaster house agreement. This resulted in a de-escalation of the conflict as elections were monitored and coordinated

by commonwealth forces. Additionally, once election results were announced foreign support helped maintain that Mugabe stayed in power without being removed by military coup or other means - thus bring a resolution to the conflict.

State-actor

State action-Coercive force

When it came to using force, the Rhodesian government especially the Rhodesian armed forces knew how to use it however, this depended on their state capacity. Coercive force by the Rhodesian armed forces was almost always used with success to de-escalate phases of the conflict, nonetheless when their state capacities began to become limited coercive force only helped escalate the conflict.

At the start of the war when the Rhodesian armed forces had a large state-capacity and still outnumbered the guerillas in technological superiority, experience and manpower. The coercive force deployed by the armed forces had a de-escalating effect on the war. This was mostly due to the fact that they were quickly able to suppress any incursion that came within the country, as was seen in 1966 and 1967 when both the ZAPU and ZANU unsuccessfully tried to enter the country. Additionally, when guerilla movements did manage to gain a foothold within the country, as was the case with the ZANU in 1972 during the Altena farm attack. Due to the state's larger capacity (than the guerillas), the Rhodesian armed forces were quickly able to use the coercive power of the combined forces of the army, police and air forces into the region to once again bring it under its control, which thus resulted in a de-escalation of violence.

However, when state capacity started to reduce and guerilla forces began gaining experience, more manpower (as mentioned in popular support and social cleavages) and technology, which would narrow the technological superiority of the Rhodesian armed forces. There was an escalation in the conflict as the Rhodesian forces were still able to use coercive force with the use of new tactics such as fireforce and auxiliaries. However due to the lack of manpower (thus a reduction of state-capacity) were unable to control and hold areas in which coercive force had been used. This resulted in an escalation of the conflict as coercive force was still used on the guerillas but did not have a deterring affect on them anymore.

Station action-Policy solution

As mentioned in the previous section due to national politics and Ian Smith focusing mainly on ending the conflict via coercive force and not on policy solutions, there wasn't a policy solution till the end of the war, which by that time was already too late to have any effect.


While there were numerous attempts such as the settlement offer in 1972 and the détente in 1975 these events were not policy solutions to end the conflict but were either aimed at strengthening the position of the Rhodesian government or done under force. For example the settlement offer of 1972 with the British is debatable whether it would have in fact ended the conflict or merely dragged it out longer now that British support had been given. Additionally, the détente talks in 1975-1976 were doomed to fail from the start with the Rhodesian government unwilling to compromise and both guerilla forces eager to start fighting. Finally, Ian Smith acceptance of majority rule was mostly forced upon him by Voster (see international politics section) and thus cannot be seen as a state action policy solution.

However, the two policy solutions, which did come about only served to escalated the conflict. The first policy solution was the creation of the internal deal where Ian Smith would form a unity government with black leaders such as Sithole and Muzorewa, but where all military and economic power would remain in the whites hands. While this arrangement still annoyed Muzorewa and Sithole it was a threat towards both Mugabe and Nkomo - both of whom worried that their guerilla fighters would now join the opposing party (Moorcraft 151) Therefore a increase in violence occurred in order to hurt the legitimacy of Muzorewa and Sithole and show the world that the blacks did not accept the internal settlement deal.

The final policy solution was of course the Lancaster house agreement that was not decided by the government of Ian Smith but by Muzorewa government. Muzorewa decided that free democratic elections were to be held and all guerilla leaders were allowed to participate. Though mass intimidation did occur in the year leading up to the election from late 1979 till early 1980 there was a major de-escalation of the conflict as can be seen in the graph below with the number of ZANU guerilla fighters dying almost dropping to zero. Although unfavorable election results almost lead to a

renewed escalation of the conflict this did not occur and peace was temporarily restored and an end came to the Rhodesian bush war.

ZANLA combatants killed in action according to pro-ZANU newspaper. (Pandya, 263)



State capacity


While the state's capacity may not have been the main reason for an escalation, de-escalation or stalemate of the conflict, it did play an important role when it came to the use of coercive force by the state. What the state possessed from the start of the war was mostly technological superiority, having the ability to fly helicopters and airplanes almost unhindered against guerilla forces and experienced manpower. The biggest flaw however was the limited manpower they had. Although recruitment and forced conscription did boost the ranks (as seen in the graph below) it would not be enough for the state to combat the guerilla insurgencies. Even when they officially began recruiting more blacks into the armed forces they could not be trained as all experienced officers were fighting the guerilla insurgency in the bush.

Nonetheless, at the start of the war the state had a large capacity both in terms of military power and economic power; this served to quickly and effectively de-escalate the conflict when periods of violence would rise up, as could be seen in 1966, 1967 and 1972. Especially in 1972 the state could afford to send soldiers, police officers and air force into a single province and control it, which served as a de-escalating factor.

However, once the war began to spread after 1975/76 when ZANU guerillas were able to use the entire border of Mozambique to infiltrate escalation of the conflict took place. As the capacity of the guerilla forces grew, the capacity of the Rhodesian government began to decrease especially in regards to man power. Thus, operations like the one's conducted in 1972 in the Chiweshe province where the combined forces of all security forces were used could no longer be conducted, as manpower was just far too limited. Therefore it did not have a de-escalating effect as they did before but instead have an escalating effect as guerilla forces begin striking throughout the country. Meanwhile the Rhodesian armed forces in order to make up their lack of manpower began using firepower in order to exploit their main capacity of having aerial superiority (which results in cross border raids) and resulted in a rapid escalation. This escalation of the conflict would continue as government forces attempted to desperately stop guerilla forces from entering the country.

In the final years of the conflict the Rhodesian government attempted to increase its capacity by firstly recruiting more black soldiers into the ranks of the Rhodesian armed forces and after a deal had been struck with Sithole and Muzorewa have former guerillas act as auxiliaries in order to hold territory regained by the Rhodesian government. The reason why the security forces had to begin rely in these auxiliary forces was that during this period there was the lack of manpower. At the start of the conflict the Rhodesians were able to compensate for their lack of manpower mainly due to their experience and technological advantage as well as the guerillas inability to recruit members for its cause. Nonetheless now that popular support was turning in favor of the guerilla forces the Rhodesians had difficulty in recruiting the amount of manpower needed to sustain the guerilla groups and therefore also began recruitment in the black population. As can be seen from the graph below the white population remained mostly stagnant throughout the entire conflict while the black population boomed. (Brownell ,51)

Graph showing white vs black population in Rhodesia (Brownell, 51)



Thus, with the black population completely outgrowing the white population as well as whites starting to emigrate from the country faster and faster. (See graph page 39) The Rhodesian armed forces began relying more and more on auxiliaries loyal to Sithole and Muzorewa in order to compensate for their lack of capability.

Nonetheless this strategy in the short-term did little to de-escalate the conflict as the black soldiers being recruited into the army remained mostly untrained (as experienced soldiers were needed to fight and not be used as teachers) and therefore unused, while the auxiliaries while being able to hold land for the Rhodesian government often fought each other or the local population thus having an escalating effect on the conflict. (Moorcraft 156) In the long-term this strategy may have had a de-escalating affect as the guerillas were slowly being pushed back however this will likely never be known as soon after the implementation of auxiliaries the Muzorewa government signed the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the conflict.

Strong government-weak government

While there were free elections held for the whites, the overall government structure did not change massively until the final years of the war when the internal government was set up. When Ian Smith's party, the Rhodesian Front was first elected in 1962 it maintained a dominant hold throughout the 1970s even when Ian Smith announced his resignation towards majority rule. This led to him having a strong government with an especially strong mandate, but unfortunately also led to a massive escalation of the conflict. Having no major opposition in parliament Ian Smith had the power to use the armed forces and implement policy without anyone opposing him. What this also did was that there was no one in the government to actively propose policy solutions along different lines of thinking. Thus, with Ian Smith's overreliance on the armed forces and having a strong government mandate where no one could oppose him it may have been obvious for him to keep following the path of coercive force. While we can conclude that this did work in de-escalating the conflict in the period between 1965 and 1974, it instead escalated the conflict after 1975.

The only period of weak governance during the short lived history of Rhodesia was the weak government of the internal settlement. With Sithole and Muzorewa in charge but the white Rhodesians controlling all economic and security apparatuses, Muzorewa had in effect no power whatsoever to change the country. Additionally, the white government continued to conduct military operations without the support of the newly ruling government. This in turn kept escalating the conflict without the possibility for the new government to intervene and find some sort of solution. Thus, the government had a weak mandate, and with it was unable to de-escalate the conflict in the way they saw fit. Therefore when the Lancaster house agreements came around Muzorewa may have reasoned that if majority elections were to occur he may be able to maintain power and remove the whites from their position within the military and economic structure. By doing so he would then have the majority backing and de-escalate the conflict while also removing the support from the ZANU and ZAPU.

While his weak mandate may have led to Muzorewa accepting the Lancaster house agreement it was his accepting the agreement which led to a de-escalation of

the conflict. Although he eventually lost the election tremendously it did result in a resolution to the eventual conflict.

Non-state actors

Strategy of the armed groups

Strategy of both armed groups while similar at first eventually diverged when the war reached its highest level of escalation. Nonetheless all strategies used by the guerillas were aimed at escalating the conflict in one way or another in order to pressure the Rhodesian government into accepting majority rule

The first strategy as highlighted in the thesis was cross borders raids with the idea that once the guerilla forces entered Rhodesia, the blacks would rise up and join the guerillas into fighting the Rhodesian government. While the tactic was meant to escalate the conflict, the lack of coordination and over optimizing regarding the feelings of the black population towards the white government in-fact had a de-escalating effect. The raids by both groups failed – which in turn de-escalated the conflict, since South Africa and Rhodesia stepped up security along the Zambian border which didn't escalate the conflict.


However, after 1970 when both guerilla groups realized cross border raids would no longer work, they began adapting a different strategy, but this is where the split between the ZAPU and ZANU occurred. The first strategy as mentioned previously was the recruitment strategy (see popular support, and social cleavages) while the second was based on their respective communist foreign backing. As mentioned in the thesis the ZANU followed Maoist strategies which had a heavy focus on politicizing the population (or masses) before attack in order to gain support, and influence in the region. (De Boer,36) This escalated the conflict as guerillas now began to gain access across the various regions as well as gain more and more support among the black populace thus hurting the Rhodesian government.

The ZAPU began following Soviet conventional warfare, which focused on a large recruitment campaign while simultaneously building up their weaponry and arsenal. (De Boer,36) This was done in order for the conflict to eventually turn into a conventional war. Thus, unlike the ZANU which focused on the population and influencing the masses, the ZAPU focused on getting advanced weaponry, training a professional army and then going to war with the Rhodesian government. Nonetheless the ZAPU strategy only escalated the conflict slightly, mainly due to the fact that the

Soviet Union started supplying the ZAPU with advanced anti-air missiles, which resulted in them shooting down two civilian airliners in 1978 and 1979 that resulted in massive retaliation by the Rhodesian forces. (Moorcraft, 154) Nonetheless, for the rest the ZAPU were awaiting the moment in which they could strike, and most believe that this would have occurred if the Lancaster house agreement failed.


Nevertheless, the ZANU overall strategy was mainly responsible for the escalation of the conflict, even though having far less capacity than the ZAPU (See next section). Additionally, as can be observed from the graph below one can see how there were far more casualties and deaths in the areas the ZANU controlled/influenced than the areas in which the ZAPU operated (see picture). Thus, this lead to a conclusion that while both ZANU and ZAPU strategies in some ways escalated the conflict, the ZANU did this far more than the ZAPU.

Map showing areas of operation ZANLA (ZANU) and ZIRPA (ZAPU)
 (Diagram created by Willem Verdaasdonk)




Key	
Blue	Allies of Rhodesia
Red	Allies of Guerilla forces
Yellow	ZAPU territory (Zambia)
Orange	ZANU territory (Mozambique)
Dotted brown	ZANLA activity

Map showing military operations per area (Cilliers, 29)



Casualty rates per operational area (Cilliers, 36)



Capacity of guerilla forces

As previously mentioned the capacities of the guerilla forces changed throughout the conflict. At the start the capacities of the guerilla forces were rather small, having a few basic weapons, not much manpower and having neither support, or experience when it came to fighting the Rhodesian armed forces. This lack of capacity served to have a de-escalating effect towards the conflict, as the ZANU nor ZAPU could not effectively engage the Rhodesian armed forces with the capacities they had. Nonetheless, as the war progressed so did the capacities of the guerilla forces.


As mentioned under the section of social cleavages and popular support recruitment one of the most important tools when it came to building up a force, which would combat the Rhodesian forces. In order to withstand attacks conducted by the Rhodesian armed forces (such as fireforce) soldiers were needed in order to replace those which may have been lost. By doing so they could increase their support, increase their ability to inflict damage onto Rhodesia and withstand losing soldiers due to fireforce operations. Thus, by increasing their manpower capacity they escalated the conflict. This was especially true for the ZANU, which saw that with an increase in troops it could much easier conduct raids and attacks against government structures.

Nonetheless, while manpower was an important factor into contributing to the increasing capacity of the guerilla forces, the increase in technological also aided the guerillas. For example, with anti-air guns as well as anti-air shoulder carried missiles, the ZAPU escalated the conflict by shooting down civilian airliners. Additionally this technology helped both guerilla groups into halting the air supremacy, which the Rhodesian forces had enjoyed for so long.

Nevertheless, what is obvious was that with the increase in capacities of the guerilla forces and a decrease in the capacities by the Rhodesian government guerilla forces could escalate the conflict.

Fractionalization


In the Rhodesian bush war both the ZAPU and ZANU experienced some form of fractionalization. As can be seen from the diagram below that shows the various guerilla groups and factions developed throughout the conflict.



What we can see from this graph is that the ZAPU experienced multiple accounts of fractionalization, firstly with the ZANU official split occurring before the war began and finally between 1970 and 1972, where there was a leadership crisis and the FROLIZI group was established afterwards. However, the fractionalization of the group did not have any major effects on the conflict - this is possibly once again due to the strategy which the ZAPU adopted (of building up a conventional force before invading Rhodesia) Thus even when the FROLIZI was created they still maintained the original ZAPU strategy.

The ZANU only experienced one moment of official fractionalization when Sithole and Mugabe both claimed to be the leader of the ZANU (with Mugabe being officially elected), but also experienced multiple leadership and in-group uprising that same year. What we can also see from this form of fractionalization is that it mostly resulted in a de-escalation of the conflict. By observing the graph below we can see that at least in the case of the ZANU split there was a de-escalation which occurred, while it could be argued that this was also due to the détente, it cannot be ignored that the split did have some impact on the de-escalation of the conflict.

Graph showing casualty rates from 1972-1975. (Cilliers, 242) (Pandya, 262)



Nonetheless, what should be kept in mind is that the split de-escalated the conflict itself (The guerilla forces versus the Rhodesian government), but it may have escalated deaths and casualties among the groups due to heavy infighting and so may have escalated violence within the guerilla groups. However, due to the lack of data on this subject it is difficult to see what exactly the casualty rates and consequences for the group infighting was and whether it did have an escalating effect in the groups, as opposed to the conflict itself.

Besides explaining when and how these groups split, why these splits occurred must also be explored. If we look at the ZAPU, the most obvious indicators which lead to their split was almost always disagreements with the leadership. When the ZANU officially split from the ZAPU it was because members of the ZAPU were displeased with direction Nkomo was taking in order to undermine the Rhodesian government and instead wanted an armed struggle. Similarly, when Nkomo was in jail and Chikerema was in charge, the leadership's struggle originated after Moyo and other members had major objections towards the activities and policies of Chikerema, which eventually lead to internal infighting.

The ZANU experienced internal fighting not due to disagreement with the leadership but due to personal power struggles within the group. This can be seen by evidence of the Nahri rebellion, as well as both Sithole and Mugabe claiming to be the major representative of the ZANU.

Criminalization

No real criminalization occurred among the various rebel groups - while intimidation and vote rigging did occur, they were done in order to place their groups in a position of power but not for financial gain. One explanation for this could be the large amount of international support the groups received from the Soviet Union and China that thus did not require the groups to turn to criminal activities, in order for them to finance their war efforts.

Analysis Conclusion

In conclusion, the Rhodesian Bush war had many elements and factors which influenced the course of the conflict at various stages.

In the pre-phase of the conflict (1960-1965) we saw the creation of a latent conflict and the emergences of the conflict. The main reasons for the creation of a latent conflict was the underlying grievances and the social cleavages that existed in Rhodesian society. The fact that blacks did not have the same rights, income, or say within Rhodesian society as their white counter-parts (especially while surrounding countries were gaining independence and rights) resulted in the emergence of a latent conflict. Rhodesia would remain in the latent phase as long as black political leaders could vent this frustration through the use of politics. Nonetheless, Rhodesia's unwillingness to give blacks a political voice shifted the conflict from a latent one to an emerging conflict. The conflict shifted from a latent phase to an emerging conflict mostly due to national politics within Rhodesian society. Reluctant to allow black political parties in parliament and constantly banning black political parties frustrations began to arise with eventually the ZAPU political party splitting into two groups. The ZAPU and ZANU were formed where the ZANU also created its military wing the ZANLA. Eventually, with the rise of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front and the declaration of UDI, a political path to changing the country was shut off for the blacks - finally bringing the conflict from an emergent phase to an escalating one.

While the start of the conflict was a major escalation the phase of 1965 till 1970 was mostly peaceful. This was due to the strong state capacity and strategy of the Rhodesian government on the one hand and bad strategy of the guerillas on the other hand, which enabled the conflict to de-escalate. Additionally, the lack of popular support in regards to an armed struggle within Rhodesia also helped contribute to a de-escalation of the conflict. Nonetheless, international actors in favor of the guerilla movement began providing weapons, territory and training grounds for them to use in order to escalate the conflict. Nevertheless the international partners of Rhodesia countered this by sending in both economic and military aid therefore not escalating the conflict further.

Nonetheless, in the phase of 1970 till mid-1974 Rhodesia experienced an augmented escalation of conflict. This was in regards to the changing strategy of ZANU,

who were trying to gain both popular support for their cause and were far more organized than before. Nonetheless, with the state capabilities and strategy of the Rhodesian armed forces still being far more superior than those of the guerilla forces, they managed to quickly de-escalate the conflict once again.

However, before the Rhodesian armed forces could completely destroy the ZANU in Rhodesia, the stalemate of the conflict occurred in the phase of 1974 till 1976. In this phase mostly international partners tried to negotiate a peace settlement between the various guerilla groups but failed. As the guerilla forces began ramping up recruitment and increasing their capacity by exploiting social cleavages in regards to tribal affiliation, they also generated popular support for their resistance movements. The Rhodesian state meanwhile slowly became limited, as the necessity of the armed forces outgrew their capabilities and began using fireforce and cross border raids to compensate for this.

Nonetheless, even this would not prevent the eventual collapse of the Rhodesian state in the phase of 1977 till 1979. With the internal deal was meant as policy solution towards the conflict however failing and the guerillas once again changing strategy conquering large areas of the country and having far larger capacity than the Rhodesian armed forces. Eventually Muzorewa with his weak mandate eventually signed the Lancaster House Agreement which would bring an end to the conflict.

Although tensions remained high and fears that a coup or overthrow by the military would occur in the event of Nkomo or Mugabe gaining power, none of it occurred. The Rhodesian Bush war which had lasted over 15 years and had a significant impact on the Southern African hemisphere and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe itself ended on the 18th of April 1980.

5. Joint Analysis

Context

Social Cleavages

Social cleavages played a crucial role in all three conflicts. In the context of the conflicts as well as in the conflict emergence phases a comparable ethnic polarization can be witnessed. In Rhodesia it was the whites versus the blacks, in Northern Ireland it was nationalists versus unionists and in Peru it were the people with white features versus the Indian peasants, small merchants and industrial workers. In all three countries this ethnic polarization generated other cleavages such as rich versus poor and having political influence or not, which led to the overall emergence of the conflicts. It can furthermore be seen that these other cleavages overlap with the overriding cleavage of ethnic polarization. As was mentioned earlier, overlapping cleavages have the tendency to reinforce the division within society and it therefore has the power to intensify conflicts.

A difference on the other hand is observed in how the aforementioned cleavages drove the emergence and first phases of the conflicts. In Rhodesia the blacks resented the whites for their discriminatory policies and wanted to remove the white government in order to achieve equal prosperity and opportunity. This social-economic cleavage would drive the conflict until and after a tribal cleavage would emerge. In Peru, initially it was not the population itself that acted to change the social cleavages. Instead, the conflict emerged when Sendero actively used the increased division within society to gain support and convince the discriminated population to fight against the government. Nonetheless, the social-economic cleavage would drive the conflict. In Northern Ireland it was the Catholic population that started the civil rights movement to increase the social-economic cleavages. The social-economic cleavage disappeared as driving forces of the conflict, however, as they were subsumed by the national aspiration cleavage.

Concerning the escalatory and de-escalatory effects social cleavages had on all three conflicts, a number of similarities and differences can be highlighted. Just as Sendero had actively used the societal division to his advantage, the tribal cleavage between Shona and Ndebele in Rhodesia was also actively triggered as a means of recruitment. This recruitment had the effect of prolonging the stalemate and indirectly

escalating the conflict as recruitment helped create more support for the guerrilla groups and because of popular support the conflict escalated. The social cleavages did not have an influential de-escalation as they were not solved during the conflict.

In Peru the ethnic cleavage was reflected in the military's counterinsurgency operations which were hostile towards locals and thereby escalated the conflict as locals were alienated. Seeing as discrimination by the military and the social-economic cleavage were the most important drivers in the conflict, the conflict de-escalated once hostile troops were replaced and development programs were started. By doing so, the government addressed the social cleavages that were the driving force behind Sendero's recruitment methods. Once these cleavages were removed from the equation, Sendero could no longer exploit the cleavages as the government had changed the narrative of the conflict which had a de-escalation as a result.

While in Rhodesia and Peru the main cleavages around which the conflicts revolved were socio-economic differences and discrimination because of ethnicity, the Northern Ireland conflict was about the overriding cleavage of ethnic polarization/national aspiration. Unlike in Peru, the reforms that dealt with the socio-economic cleavage were unable to de-escalate the conflict as it no longer was the sustaining dynamic of the conflict. What is more, unlike in Peru or Rhodesia, the national identity cleavage was framed as a zero-sum game in which finding a middle ground solution would be almost impossible. This social cleavage therefore became the sustaining dynamic of the conflict as it was the reason for escalation after the peace initiatives and it continued to be a barrier to successful de-escalatory peace initiatives.

Popular Support

Popular support played an important role in each conflict as in each conflict increased popular support allowed the militants to escalate the conflict. Popular support can, however, also be linked to de-escalation. The period in which popular support caused an escalation in the conflict differs across the cases, but shows how important popular support was in escalating the conflicts.

In Peru, Sendero was able to escalate the conflict as in the previous 15 to 20 years leading up to the conflict, it had created the necessary popular support to start the conflict. Once the conflict had started, the discriminatory and violent repressive state-led counterinsurgencies alienated the population which saw them as an invading force

and this helped popular support for Sendero to rise even more. With this additional popular support, Sendero was able to escalate its violent campaign.

In Northern Ireland IRA support had been weak during the conflict emergence phase. As opposed to Sendero who had instigated the conflict themselves, it was only in the second year after the conflict had started before the IRA would really get involved and escalate the conflict. This was because popular support for the IRA would start growing massively after discriminatory and violent repressive state policies and coercive actions. Similar to the Peruvian case, these repressive state actions alienated the population to such an extent they were driven right into the IRA's arms. With this increased popular support the IRA was able to wage a vicious war against the British army and the loyalist forces. As a consequence loyalist paramilitary groups also gained momentum and the conflict escalated to a maximum in the third year of the conflict.

In the Rhodesia case, the Rhodesian white government had a large popular support base at the start of the conflict from the white population and was also passively supported by a portion of the black population. This strong popular support allowed the government to escalate the conflict. It took until 1975 before popular support of the various rebels groups rose as a consequence of active recruitment and another result was that passive support for the white government started to shift towards support for the guerrilla forces. This popular support allowed the militants to attack the white government forces which resulted in an escalation of the conflict.

Only in the Peruvian case did popular support for the militant group decisively decline during the conflict which had a de-escalating effect. The reasons for this declining popular support were that for a large part the popular support for Sendero rested on fear and when the government started a campaign of winning the hearts and minds of the population they regained popular support from the Indian peasants. As the conflict continued, the Peruvian government decisively won the battle for popular support and de-escalated the conflict. In Northern Ireland popular support for the IRA decreased a little when they ended their ceasefire in 1996 by bombing London's Docklands area. Although popular support did not decline heavily, it may have helped pressuring the IRA into a second ceasefire.

In Peru the popular support for the militants dwindled during the conflict and the conflict de-escalated because of it. The fact that it did can be linked to the fact that Sendero actively made use of the increased division within Peru and also exploited the

poor economic conditions of the marginalized population to make them fight the government. Willingness to fight the government did therefore not initially come from the population itself. In the 20 years leading up to the conflict, Sendero furthermore used a policy of indoctrination to gain popular support, but this also made the population fear Sendero. It can therefore be argued that the popular support Sendero gained was not fully based on loyalty. Lastly, the government was able to address the grievances on which the popular support of Sendero were built and the government therefore won the battle for popular support.

In both Northern Ireland and Rhodesia popular support for the militants did not decisively decrease during the conflict. This is because in Northern Ireland, IRA support came from the people itself, was not based on fear and because of the underlying national aspiration which popular support was stronger and more loyal. Moreover, even when nationalists would no longer fully support the IRA anymore, they would not cross over to the other side. This was because the cleavage that separated the opponents was too big and the IRA opponents could offer nothing of substantial value to win the battle for popular support.

In general it can be concluded that an increase in popular support causes an escalation of the conflict and a decrease in popular support has a de-escalating effect. In one instance this has proven to be different, however. In the early 1980s the IRA decided to begin a twin track of participating in politics alongside their military campaign. In order to play any part in politics, they needed to gain public support and refrain from alienating public opinion. As a consequence, the IRA began actively searching for public support and downsized their use of violence a little which had a de-escalating effect on the conflict.

Grievances

The most important similarity that can be distinguished in the factor of grievances is its role in moving the conflict from a latent phase to the emergent phase. In all the conflict there were significant grievances present that were exploited by actors that later would be the main combatants. Especially the inability to participate on the political level showed to be an important grievance in the three conflicts, since the grieved parties could not achieve their goal on the political level they were forced to the use of violence

to achieve their goals. The factor of grievances on the dynamics of the conflicts also showed some important differences. The first difference was that in the Irish conflict the British government, in contrast with the Peruvian and Rhodesian government, actively tried to address some of the important grievances although too little and too late, because it was too little to prevent the conflict from escalating and the bigger reforms were too late as the conflict had already escalated and changed into a national identity conflict. This is in complete contrast with the Peruvian and Rhodesian governments, which mostly ignored or did not understand the widespread grievances. This difference can partly be attributed due to racism and indifference to the “lower classes” of black people in Rhodesia and Indians in Peru. The dismissal of grievances by the Rhodesian and Peruvian government would play a very important escalatory role since it pushed the ignored population to supporting the insurgents.

Another difference between the conflicts is that addressing the grievances alone is not enough to de-escalate the conflict. In the case of the Irish conflict it can be argued that earlier de-escalation would have been possible if the British government had addressed the Loyalist grievances by inviting them to the peace process earlier, however the earlier addressing of grievances also proved to be unsuccessful. However, in Peru the attempts to address the grievances proved to be an effective way to de-escalate the conflict as it took away some of the grievances of the population against the security forces, which in combination with the increasing hate towards Sendero helped de-escalating the conflict.

Local Politics

In both Peru and Rhodesia local politics only played a minor role in the dynamics of the conflict although the reasons why this is the case differs. In Rhodesia the whites were a minority that firmly controlled politics on both the local and national level. Seeing as their control was so strong, they did not see much difference between the two levels of politics. In Peru on the other hand, weak local politics played some part in the escalation of the conflict. This was because the local governments were very much dependent on the central government, but the central government was too weak to protect local officials against Sendero. As a result of Sendero’s attacks, many mayors resigned which created a power vacuum in which Sendero seized power and was able to escalate the conflict.

The Northern Ireland case shows a complete divergent picture as the local government had a lot more autonomy from the central government than was the case in the other two conflicts. Even though the local politics are called local because Northern Ireland is part of Great-Britain, they are a separate area within Great-Britain and have their own Stormont parliament. In short, local was less local and more national than in the other two cases and therefore also had more influence on the conflict.

At the start of the conflict, Northern Ireland had its own Stormont government with its own unionist prime minister Terrence O'Neil. Because the unionist block was fragmented, O'Neil did not have the authority to deliver sufficient reforms to the civil rights campaign and therefore the conflict escalated. When in 1971 the hardliner Brian Faulkner became prime minister, he escalated the conflict by introducing a policy of aggression and introducing internment. After Britain imposed direct rule in 1972, the results of the local elections escalated the conflict because the elections preceding the Sunningdale Agreement showed an upsurge in loyalist parties and local elections also had a de-escalating effect on the conflict during the 1980s as Sinn Féin did well in local elections after which the IRA slightly decreased their use of violence.

National Politics

Unlike local politics, national politics played a major role in all three conflicts. Although the conflicts have in common that national politics was of importance in the conflict emergence phase, to what extent and how they influenced the conflict is different. In Northern Ireland it was not a British national government switch that instigated the emergence of the conflict. The British government did play a role in the emergence of the conflict as the government was unwilling to intervene and impose direct rule as to stop the processes that led to the emergence of the conflict because the British government did not want to get involved in the conflict.

The 1980 Peru elections were vital to the emergence of the conflict as the government that was chosen would make three specific decisions (not taking the Sendero threat seriously, relying on the police instead of the army and failure to recognize the causes of the insurgency) that created the favourable conditions for the conflict to emerge and escalate. Where the British government chose not to act with which they allowed the conflict to emerge, the Peruvian government did make certain choices which indirectly led to the creation of the conflict. Both governments also have

in common they underestimated the threat of a possible conflict, as the British government chose to not get involved in the issue early on and the Peruvian government underestimated the Sendero threat.

In Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front rose to power in 1962. The nationalistic policies and their refusal to allow black parties into power within the government structure alienated the black parties even more. With this, the government fuelled already existing grievances and directly helped the conflict emerge. A difference can be seen between the conflicts as the government in Northern Ireland failed to prevent the conflict from emerging, the Peruvian government indirectly stimulated the conflict by making wrong decisions and create favourable conditions for the conflict to emerge and the Rhodesian government directly influenced the emergence of the conflict by fuelling old grievances.

Following the emergence phase, national politics would also play a role in the escalation and de-escalation of each conflict. The Labour party won the 1970 British general elections and replaced the policy of reform with a hardline security stance. This shift of government policy created a context in which nationalist alienation ensured massive popular support for the IRA which escalated the conflict. Under the rule of Ian Smith, the Rhodesia conflict would witness a similar pattern as the overreliance on the armed forces instead of a shift to give more power and rights to the black population escalated the conflict. So in both conflicts popular support for the militants had been low, but increased rapidly after the security policy was introduced.

After the 1985 elections, the Peruvian government shifted from a hardline security approach to a 'soft' approach of fighting the socio-economic causes of the conflict. Although the Peruvian case shows an entirely different approach than the other two cases, this soft approach too led to an increase in violence.

Opposite to the escalatory hardline security stance of the British and Rhodesian government, the Peruvian coup Fujimori instigated in 1992 would de-escalate the conflict as he could roll out a strong counterinsurgency campaign that could defeat Sendero.

On the other hand, 'soft' approaches can also have a de-escalating effect on conflicts. The Labour government win in the 1997 election in Britain had a de-escalatory effect on the conflict as prime minister Blair was capable of convincing both unionists parties and Sinn Féin to cooperate in peace talks which eventually would lead to a

ceasefire. In Rhodesia the Muzorewa government signed the Lancaster house agreement which proposed majority elections and British rule. This massively de-escalated the conflict as the rebel groups achieved the thing they wanted all along, namely majority rule.

Lastly, a government switch itself can also have effects on the conflict, without the newly elected government having introduced new policies yet. This was the case in Rhodesia after Muzorewa rose to power. Muzorewa was a black president and was perceived by the fighting parties that guerrilla fighters might think the fight was over after a black man had become president. The fighting parties, however, saw Muzorewa as a puppet of the whites. To undermine the idea that the conflict had ended, the guerrilla parties increased their violence. Nonetheless Muzorewa also realizing that he would not be able to maintain power and having a weak mandate as the whites still controlled both the military and economic sectors he decided to enter negotiations with the non-state actors eventually resulting in a peace agreement which de-escalated and ultimately ended the conflict.

What the above analysis shows is that national government changes can have a huge effect on conflicts as government switches are often accompanied with policy switches which influence the conflict. It is furthermore apparent that a 'soft' approach can have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect and a hard approach can also have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect on the conflict. Choosing the correct timing for either negotiation or using violence is therefore of utmost importance.

The context of a conflict must be taken into account as the Peruvian case shows not fighting the militants escalated the conflict as Sendero regained power while they could have been defeated, and the Northern Ireland case and the Rhodesia case show that a badly timed and executed violent offensive instigated by a new government can also escalate the conflict by alienating the population. A well-timed and strong enough counterinsurgency programme can on the other hand cause a de-escalation of the conflict, as the Fujimori example shows. Finding a political compromise also has the power to de-escalate or escalate the conflict, depending on the context. In the early years of the Peruvian conflict it was counter-productive as the militants were able to regain strength and during the reign of Ian Smith the rebels believed the government acted out of a position of weakness. But in the last phases of Northern Ireland and Rhodesia, the

rebels respectively were pressured into the peace talks and were granted what they wanted all along, thereby de-escalating the conflict.

International Politics/foreign support

Although international politics/foreign support was of crucial importance in each conflict, because of the different dynamics, it played out vastly different in each conflict. Just as with the local politics factor, international politics in Northern Ireland shows a different dynamic than the other two conflicts. This is because the Republic of Ireland was directly involved in the conflict seeing as one part of the conflicting parties, the nationalists, wanted a united Ireland. The problem which the Troubles revolves around, national identity, directly includes the Republic of Ireland which is why the conflict never truly was only internal. The Peruvian and Rhodesian conflicts did not see any similar international connection with third countries.

For this reason, the Northern Ireland conflict was the only one in which international politics played a significant role in the conflict emergence phase. This was when Irish prime minister Jack Lynch, during the Battle of the Bogside, fuelled anti-partitionist feelings by publicly stating a united Ireland was the only possible solution to the conflict.

A number of international political involvements and foreign support policies played a role in the escalation and de-escalation of all three conflicts. Similarities and differences are present as a result of vastly different involved actors and diverging taken measures. The Rhodesian and Northern Ireland conflict have in common that both militant forces, throughout the conflict, were helped by foreign supporters. The difference is that Rhodesian militants were provided with territory, weapons and training and with this could really escalate the conflict. In Northern Ireland the militants were mainly provided with weapons, but seeing as they had more than enough weapons and did not need to use very sophisticated weapons, more weapons did not cause an escalation of the conflict. The inclusion of Semtex in their bombs did change the dynamics as the IRA came to focus on damage instead of deaths, but therefore did not so much escalate the conflict as such.

Another difference between the two conflicts is that foreign support in Rhodesia simultaneously de-escalated the conflict because the Rhodesian government received military equipment and troops while Northern Ireland did not need this foreign support

as it already had the national British military which had most necessary capabilities to deal with the conflict. During the fourth phase in the Peru conflict, a similar thing happened as the USA increased its aid to the government. Although the USA did not send in military troops, they did provide money and training by which the Peruvian intelligence apparatus became a more effective force that was able to de-escalate the conflict. A similar pattern can be seen on the national level in Northern Ireland as the British military helped the RUC professionalize after which they could more effectively deal with the IRA.

Another minor resemblance between Northern Ireland and Rhodesia is found. In Rhodesia between 1974 and 1977 foreign support was aimed at resolving the conflict. A stalemate occurred and therefore the fighting groups were pressured into peace talks. They failed, however, and the conflict escalated again. In Northern Ireland multiple peace talks ensued during the conflict as the Republic of Ireland and the British government wanted to solve the conflict. This often resulted in a stalemate between the parties and after the peace initiative would collapse, violence would resurface again. Although the different conflicts show a resemblance here, the dynamics were totally different as Ireland and Great-Britain had a vastly different relationship with the conflict than the international actors that forced the two conflicting parties in Rhodesia to negotiate. On the other hand, the pressure the US put on the British government to deal with the conflict effectively is comparable to the international pressure put on the Rhodesian parties, although the impact US pressure really had on the conflict is debated.

In Peru the international community had an indirect escalatory effect on the conflict as the withdrawing of funds would cause an economic crisis in Peru. This helped Sendero in escalating the conflict while it also stopped further escalation because it prevented the military from launching a coup.

State

State-action Coercive force

Throughout the three conflicts each state took both similar and different approaches when it came to the use of coercive force in order to de-escalate a conflict. In this part of the analysis we will first observe the similarities and difference in government action in regards to coercive force and then observe the effects it had on the conflict and whether

they were similar or different. This will be done by chronologically going through the conflict in order to see the difference per phase.

In all cases all three states used coercive force in order to suppress non-state groups. In Rhodesia this was done when guerilla groups infiltrated into Rhodesia from Zambia by quickly patrolling and monitoring the border. While with the troubles the UK force was sent in for order to be restored, while in Peru the police force was used in order to suppress the rebels gaining ground. Initially each of these uses had different results.

In Rhodesia due to good intelligence and superior state capabilities the Rhodesians were quickly able to suppress and drive out guerilla forces from the country therefore having a de-escalating effect on the country. In the case of the Troubles similar results were seen with the British forces viewed as conflict mediators thus de-escalating the conflict. Finally in the case of Peru, the lack of capacities such as the poorly trained and equipped police force to deal with Sendero also lead to an increase in violence as non-state actors began taking over territory in Peru.

As the conflicts shifted however, states began taking a different approach. The Rhodesians maintained their use of coercive force only increasing it more with operation hurricane when non-state actors managed to cross the border and enter Rhodesia starting the infamous Altena farm attack. The UK on the other hand began using more heavy-handed tactics in order to end the conflict. With their reform policies failing the army was called in to suppress and remove the IRA, however, bad intelligence and bad surveillance led to more anti-British sentiments as British forces were mainly focusing on catholic dominated areas and were seen as repressive towards them. This resulted in damaging their image of a neutral force resulting in an increase in recruitment for the IRA and therefore an increase in violence against British forces. Peru on the other hand began to improve on the mistakes they made early on in the conflict. Realizing the limited capability of the police force, they began using the army to route out Sendero. However, while this change was needed in order for Peru to combat Sendero the gross human rights violations against the population who lived in areas controlled by Sendero only served to increase the violence. Additionally, the army went in without a proper plan to tackle Sendero which lead to disastrous results.

The shift in the conflict resulted in various difference in all three states. What is evident however is that once it became clear that previous usages of coercive force were

not working it resulted in the use of more heavy handed tactics in order to resolve a conflict. Rhodesia began using the combined forces of the air force, army and police under operation hurricane to remove non-state forces and managed to de-escalate their conflict. Mainly due to their ability to deny non-state actors territory within Rhodesia and still have strong intelligence and capabilities. The UK and Peru only managed to escalate their conflict more. The UK lead by bad intelligence and bad surveillance began their campaign of trying to route out the IRA, but was seen as being repressive towards the catholic population. This resulted in large anti-British sentiment and an escalation of the conflict as the IRA gained more members and stepped up their attacks in the area. In the case of Peru while they did manage to harm the Sendero their lack of respect for human rights, towards the population living under the non-state actors rule and their lack of a coherent plan resulted in a further escalation of the conflict.

The next phase of each of the conflict saw each actor take several different directions when it came to the use of coercive force. In the middle stage of the conflict Rhodesia was unable to keep up with the growing capacity of the guerilla forces and began changing tactics. Instead of trying to prevent the guerillas from gaining entry into Rhodesia (which was almost impossible now that border with Mozambique had opened and guerilla forces outnumbered the Rhodesian forces) they instead decided to attack and raid bases controlled by non-state actors in order to remove the problem at its source. The UK also began taking a different approach, having learned from its previous mistakes it now began conducting major operations based on good intelligence and surveillance. They began implementing better tactics in Northern Ireland by removing the no-go zones and systematically targeting members of the IRA instead of the whole catholic population. Peru realizing that they needed to win over the population in order for them to remove Sendero began addressing the underlying problems of the conflict and attempting to reform the army so that it could operate without abusing human rights in the areas. Nonetheless while it was addressing this problem the army was angered by the changes and refused to leave their barracks consequentially resulting in the Sendero taking back areas that had been liberated by the army and facing no opposition.

In the middle stages of the conflict it was only the British which had learned from their past mistakes and had attempted to correct it. By implementing solid tactics and learning from the previous phase they managed to severely hurt the IRA by removing

prominent members within their ranks. Additionally, a solid and intelligence driven operation made the IRA realize that they could not make the British forces leave by force alone therefore de-escalating the conflict. The Rhodesian and Peruvian on the other hand only managed to escalate their conflict during this part of their conflict. The Rhodesians by not finding any alternative policy solutions and instead focusing on coercive force only escalated the conflict further while the Peruvians tried to find a policy solution without the use of coercive force served only to escalate their conflict as well.

Finally, in the last conflict phase all states took a somewhat similar approach but each had different effects. Rhodesia realizing that the attacks and raids on bases controlled by non-state forces was not having the desired affect began trying to build up their capacity to match those of guerilla forces. They did so by training auxiliaries or former non-state soldiers which could come in and control areas liberated by the security forces. This was meant to share the burden of military operations allowing the security forces to strike non-state bases while auxiliaries maintained security throughout the regions that had been liberated. Nonetheless it only further escalated the conflict as often these auxiliaries were untrained and undisciplined so did more harm than good. Additionally the conflict ended shortly thereafter not through coercive force but by policy oriented solutions thus the full effect of these auxiliaries cannot fully be observed. The UK similarly began using and building up a force comprised of protestant and catholic Irish policemen with the goal of removing the British army and instead leaving security operations to the PSNI or RUC. This had the effect of de-escalating the conflict as once again a more neutral force was put into place. In Peru having learned from all previous phases began conducting an extensive coercive operations, which was fully supported, well prepared and kept human rights in mind.

The effect that this final phase had on the conflict is vastly different from all three states. For Rhodesia the change in tactics only helped serve to escalate the conflict further. For the UK to implement a more neutral force and remove the British force altogether served to de-escalate the conflict but not to end it. While Peru implemented a similar tactic to what the British had done in the previous conflict phase by implementing a well coordinated and organized counter-insurgency operation which eventually de-escalated saw an end to conflict as a whole.

State action- Policy solution

When it comes to policy solutions within the states, all participants had vastly different approaches. In this part of the analysis we will look at the major differences between the various states and why they took such different policy solutions as opposed to how it affected the conflict in terms of how it escalated or de-escalated it. (This can be seen in the individual analysis)

The main difference between all three states is that they had vastly different approach when it comes to policy solutions. The UK in total attempted six different policy solutions in order to end the conflict. Meanwhile Rhodesia had only two major policy solution but only towards the end of the conflict when they were losing the war. While Peru never had a single policy solution and only proposed a policy solution but never implemented it towards the end of the conflict.

When analyzing as to why this was the case a reoccurring trend can be seen with all case studies. Firstly that the reason why there were so many different negotiated proposals with the UK possibly has to do with the fact that they didn't want the UK to become embroiled into the Northern Ireland conflict. At first the British attempted to quickly resolve the problem by instituting internment of suspected members of the IRA. Once this policy backfired and instead escalated the conflict the British government sought to resolve the conflict quickly so that they would no longer have to commit to The Troubles on a long term-basis. Thus a reason for continued policy oriented solution was all aimed at ending the conflict.

Similarly this can be seen in the case study of Rhodesia. When Rhodesia was winning the conflict in the first half of the conflict no policy solutions were discussed or presented (except for those forced upon them by international supporters). It was only when it became clear that the only way to win or de-escalate the conflict was through a policy solution and not coercive force that the Rhodesian government began actively proposing policy options such as the internal settlement offer.

Peru on the other hand saw no need to end the conflict through policy solutions. In most cases the conflict was isolated in the less developed regions of Peru thus serving more as a nuisance than an actual threat to toppling the country itself. Additionally, it was not losing the war in the general sense, military operations while harming the general population in the area did not affect the country as a whole but did affect the areas of operations regarding Sendero. Finally, when it did present a policy solution to

the conflict it was only when the leader of Sendero agreed to a policy solution which massively de-escalated the conflict

This is where a second trend becomes apparent in policy solutions, what is obvious from all case studies is that the only time a policy solution is successful in ending a conflict is when all parties of the conflict become involved. In Peru it was when the leader of Sendero and the government agreed to a policy solution compromise. In Rhodesia this was only the case when the Lancaster house agreement was signed where all non-state actors and the government agreed to equal democratic elections. While in the case of the UK it was only when the unionist were finally included in the Good Friday Agreement that the conflict massively de-escalated. Thus showing a re-occurring trend where when parties were excluded such as in the Rhodesian internal settlement or Sunningdale agreement and the Anglo-Irish agreement where parties were excluded that the conflict often tended to escalate or continue due to not all parties agreeing to the terms.

State capacity

State capacity appears to be one of the most important aspects when it came to tackling non-state actors activities within their borders. This part of the analysis will go through various phases of the conflict, look at how state-capacity increased or decreased and analyze the effects of it.

In the starting phases of each of the conflicts each of the countries experienced different levels of state-capacity. On the one hand Rhodesia which although having a small army and police still had a large state capacity which they could use against non-state forces in the region. Additionally by having this large state capacity the state was able to de-escalate the conflict quickly by bearing down on non-state forces. Peru and the Northern Ireland on the other hand had a definite lack in state capacity in the first phase of the conflict. With the UK's Northern Ireland Security apparatus unable to deal with growing unrest and conflict in Northern Ireland, while Peru used an under funded, under equipped and untrained police force to try and deal with Sendero. What is similar however in all three cases was that when the conflict began all three countries tried to keep it in the bounds of a police operation. Rhodesia conducted operations under police leadership with army backing, Peru sent in police counter-insurgency squads and

Northern Ireland used the RUC, the main difference being that the latter two countries lacked the capacity to deal with it.

As the conflict carried on and as the police capabilities of all states actors in the conflict began to decrease, the army became the primary state capacity to deal with insurgencies. What is similar about all conflicts is that at one point the use of the army becomes the primary means of dealing with insurgencies within a country. This usually occurs when it becomes evident that the conflict can no longer be managed by police forces alone. In Rhodesia the army, police and air force all became integrated under a structural command with operation Hurricane after the fatal Altena farm attack. In the UK the army was sent in after it became apparent that the RUC could no longer deal with the increasing amount of violence which was occurring in Northern Ireland. While in Peru after the massively under funded police force failed to put a stop to Sendero the government sent in the army to quell the non-state actor.

Nonetheless this change of state capacity from police to army had various different results. In Rhodesia the conflict de-escalated rapidly after 1972 at least temporarily with the more heavy-handed approach. The UK and Peru on the other hand experienced a massive escalation of the conflict. Mainly because the UK army was not prepared for a peacekeeping role and was prejudice against the largely catholic population of Ireland, while Peru escalated the conflict mainly because of the armies indiscriminate use of violence against anyone living in areas controlled by Sendero.

In the third phase of the conflict the state-capacity changed for all three countries as all three began taking different strategies. Rhodesia, which had once enjoyed a large state-capacity over the guerillas both in the numerical and technologic sense began losing its edge once non-state forces began gaining large number of recruitments and were able to expose the entire Rhodesian western flank with the opening of Mozambique. Similarly Peru although still having a far larger state-capacity than the non-state actors began losing a large chunk of its state-capacity capabilities once it began reforming the armed forces and removing officers who were suspected of human rights abuses. This resulted in the army refusing to fight the non-state actors. In both cases once state actors lost their state capacity supremacy it resulted in an escalation of the conflict. With Rhodesia unable to de-escalate the conflict through the use of force, while Peru unable to halt the non-state actors advance as the army refused to fight. The UK on the other hand had the ability to de-escalate the conflict with the use of force.

Throughout the conflict the British retained their large state capacity and thus after improvements were made both in regards to the police force and previous operation procedures (see section coercive force) the British army used its state capacity to de-escalate the conflict in 1972 with operation motorman which saw the use of over 12,000 troops take part in the operation. While the operation was the consequence of a large escalation in the conflict, afterwards when the operation had been successful the conflict de-escalated and the newly reformed RUC was placed in charge of the area again in 1974.

In the final phase of the conflicts, State-capacity for all three countries had a vastly different impact. For Rhodesia the lack of state-capacity to deal with the non-state actors prevented it from using the proper amount of coercive force in order to either bring the conflict to a stalemate or to de-escalate the conflict. This lack of state-capacity eventually led it to accept majority rule and with it an end to the conflict in a non-state actors victory. For Peru finally overcoming issues within the military used state-capacity to route Sendero. By having increased the manpower of the army and creating a coherent counter-insurgency strategy it eventually led to the capture of the lead of the Sendero and a de-escalation of the conflict. For the UK however, with the removal of most of the British forces from Northern Ireland and responsibility for security being handed back to the RUC resulted in a small escalation of the conflict. This was mainly due to the inability of the RUC to still deal with large scale riots and strikes due to lack of manpower. Nonetheless due to major reforms this escalation was only small as the reforms had provided the RUC with more public support and logistical intelligence. Thus while it did not reach the levels at it previously did, the removal of the army did slightly damage the ability of the state capacity.

Weak vs Strong government

When analyzing the effects a weak or a strong government had on a conflict there appears to be no real correlation between each of the conflicts. The main factor appears to be the context which the government is placed in.

For example; in Rhodesia during the first two phases of the conflict Ian Smith whom had strong government at the time managed to de-escalated as he faced no opposition inside parliament, therefore he could use coercive force any way he pleased. Peru similarly during the last phase of the conflict when Fujimori had a strong

government mandate could use coercive force without fear of opposition in order to defeat Sendero and therefore de-escalate the conflict. While the UK with the strong governments of 1979 and the strong government of Tony Blair in 1997 managed to de-escalate the conflict because they had the ability to break political deadlocks and maneuver around certain issues due to their strong governmental support.

Nonetheless having a strong government doesn't necessarily mean that it leads to a de-escalation of the conflict. In the third phase of the conflict Rhodesia's strong government mandate instead escalated the conflict as Ian Smith kept using coercive force in order to suppress the non-state actor, which ultimately failed. Similarly the UK had a strong government mandate during the second phase of the conflict, but due to its makeup of many unionists it instead escalated the conflict as it escalated the nationalists thus driving up recruitment for the IRA.

The division between strong government is the same when focus is placed on weak government. In Peru throughout the first three phases of the conflict it had a weak government, as it was unprepared to deal with the conflict, suffered from internal fighting between the army and the government, and when it attempted to deal with the non-state actor it often did more harm than good thus escalating the conflict. Similarly the weak governments of the UK resulted in the inability of the UK to bring reform to Northern Ireland therefore escalating the conflict.

Nevertheless a weak government can also de-escalate the conflict. In the UK the weak government mandate in the third phase of the conflict helped de-escalate the conflict in Northern Ireland as the UK government needed the help of Unionist MPs in order to pass legislation. Similarly, the weak government of Rhodesia in the final phase of the conflict allowed for a different course to be taken than the one solely based on coercive force and instead sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict, which worked and the conflict massively de-escalated and ended.

Non-State

Strategy of Armed Groups

The strategy of armed groups had both significant escalating and de-escalating effects on all three conflicts. However, there are some similarities and differences in how this factor was able to escalate or de-escalate the conflicts. Firstly, in all three conflicts the strategies of the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict by pressuring the governments to react to the violence carried out by the armed groups. In the conflict of Ireland, the IRA used violence to pressure the British government to withdraw, in Peru to provoke the brutal counterinsurgency campaigns and in Rhodesia to accept majority rule. However, the strategies and the impact of these strategies during the first phases of the conflict were quite similar. In the beginning of all three conflicts the armed groups conducted short, vicious and intense attacks against government forces. However, what differed were the results on the conflict, the armed groups in Peru and Ireland proved to be successful in their ability to escalate the conflict, while the armed groups in Rhodesia failed, leading to a de-escalation of the conflict. This can largely be attributed to the amount of popular support. The IRA and Sendero both operated in areas where it could rely on a significant base of support. This was not the case in the beginning of the Rhodesian conflict where support for the armed groups was not sufficient.

Secondly, it is interesting to see the escalatory or de-escalatory role of the changes of strategies from the armed groups during the conflicts. In Peru, Sendero decided to escalate the conflict to provoke another campaign by the government, thereby escalating the conflict in the short term, but de-escalating the conflict in the long term since it became more violent than the government and lost its essential bases of support. This is in contrast with Ireland, where the IRA noticed that it could not win in the short term by bombing the British away and changed its strategy to a more political and long term one. So instead of escalating the conflict, the IRA caused a slight de-escalation by a change in its strategy. Also the failure in Rhodesia by the armed groups to escalate the conflict in the beginning of the conflict led to a change of strategy that would result in a focus on creating more support and capacity which would prove to be successful and escalated the conflict significantly. Interesting similarity in that in all three conflicts the strategies of the armed groups rapidly changed after the governments had answered each on its own way to the violent campaigns. What differed however was

that only the armed groups in the Irish conflict shifted towards a more non-violent campaign, while in the Peruvian and Rhodesian cases the armed groups only increased their use of violence.

Thirdly it is important to bring up the role of strategy in the end of the three conflicts. In Peru, especially during the last phase of the conflict, Sendero was unable to create a new comprehensive insurgency strategy without their strategic leaders that were captured by the government, which helped de-escalating the conflict significantly. This was different with the IRA, the IRA leadership remained influential during the later phases of the war and although pressured, entered the peace processes as a strategy. It is the strategy of armed groups in Rhodesia that showed to be entirely different, instead of aiming to de-escalate the conflict, or being unable to escalate/de-escalate the conflict like Sendero, the ZAPU and ZANU were instead escalating the conflict by acquiring public support and capacity.

Capacity of Armed Groups

In the researched conflicts the capacity of armed groups played a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict. However, there are some significant differences in how it influenced the dynamics. The first interesting difference in the role of capacity of armed groups is that a low capacity showed different results in the conflicts in Rhodesia and Peru. It is mostly assumed groups with a low capacity are not able to escalate the conflict, however the armed groups in Peru were able to escalate war with the low capacity during the earlier phases of the war, the Rhodesian armed groups were unable to do similar which de-escalated the war. This can possibly be explained by the differences in expertise and capacity of the security apparatus in both countries. While the Peruvian security apparatus was very weak and inexperienced in the early phases of the war, the Rhodesian security apparatus was very experienced and effective and much better able to round up the insurgents. Secondly, another difference between the conflicts was that the high capacity of the IRA in Ireland, in contrast with the groups in Peru and Rhodesia, never escalated the war. The IRA had a high capacity throughout the whole conflict and had an abundance of weapons. It is often assumed that when there are more weapons available, the conflict will escalate. As was the case in Peru and Rhodesia where the increase in capacity resulted in an escalation of the conflict. The reason it did not escalate the conflict, like in Rhodesia and Peru, was the result of the

British army that was still far superior in firepower and capacity. While the Rhodesian and Peruvian armed forces were often challenged by the capacity of the armed groups in manpower and firepower, the British armed forces never had this problem. This was because the British armed forces were, and still are, one of the best trained and funded armies in the world.

Thirdly, all three conflicts show a slight escalation of the conflict when the armed groups gained access to more sophisticated weaponry. In Peru the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict with the heavy weapons they were able to buy from the revenues of the coca-trade, which gave them the possibility to fight the armed forces more effectively. In Ireland, the access to semtex helped escalate the conflict since it helped inflict much more material damage than previous bomb materials. And in Rhodesia the access to sophisticated anti-air weaponry escalated the conflict since it caused the downing of the two passenger airplanes and halted the air superiority of the Rhodesian armed forces, depriving them of the most important advantage in the conflict.

Finally, the capacity of the insurgent is heavily reliant on manpower. Both in Peru and Rhodesia the escalatory role of manpower is very visible. Both in Peru and Rhodesia the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict when they had access to a lot of manpower to replace the fallen fighters, and showed a de-escalation when the groups did not have the manpower. The IRA differed since it never had this problem of manpower because of its huge base of public support and followed a strategy that did not have a need for a lot of manpower. While the armed groups in Peru and Rhodesia were more engaged in a large scale guerilla war that required lots of manpower, the IRA was more focused on assassinations and small scale attacks.

Factionalization

Factionalization was an important escalatory and de-escalatory factor in the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts, but not in the Peruvian conflict. So why did factionalization play an important role in the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts and not in the Peruvian conflict? A possible reason factionalization did not occur in Peru could have been the result of the almost divine status of the leadership of Guzman. He was seen as a god and the ultimate strategic leader of Sendero among his followers, and his leadership was unquestionable. Although his capture did result in a slight different stance about the peace talks between the imprisoned leadership and the leadership that was not imprisoned, followers still

largely followed the commands and strategies provided by Guzman. It was also after the capture and the prison letters that Sendero would become a shallow form of its former organization. In the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts there was no ultimate and divine leader that unified all the parties, which led to multiple internal splits and uprisings that sometimes escalated and de-escalated the conflict. Although both conflicts show similarities in factionalization, the reasons and consequences of this factionalization differed significantly.

Firstly, in both cases factionalization of the armed groups caused an escalation in the conflicts, with the split of the of Provisional IRA in 1969 and the ZANU split in Rhodesia. However, both splits escalated the conflicts in different ways. While in the case of Rhodesia the conflict only slightly escalated the conflict due to infighting, the split of the Provisional IRA caused a major change of a defensive strategy to a more aggressive attacking strategy against the British government, severely escalating the conflict.

A second interesting similarity is that factionalization not only played an escalatory role, but also played an important de-escalating role during both conflicts. In both the Irish and Rhodesian conflict the factionalization caused by internal struggles led to a de-escalation of the conflict. However, the reasons why the split occurred differed significantly. In Ireland the threat of factionalization de-escalated the conflict because the parties involved in the peace talks were afraid that a new split would bring a resurgence in violence. All the parties engaged in the peace talks were aware of the consequences of the split in 1969, when the split between Provisional IRA and the Official IRA helped emerge the conflict. Therefore, the parties engaged in the peace talks deliberately softened their demands. This was absolutely not the case in the conflict of Rhodesia, where the conflict de-escalated because there was no clear leadership as a result of the ZANU split. So while the Irish case was a more calculated de-escalation by the leadership of the armed groups, the de-escalation of the Rhodesian conflict was a consequence of power struggles regarding leadership.

Criminalization

In two of the three cases criminalization did not occur in the conflict. Although in all cases criminal activities played a role in financing their activities, it only became an important part of the insurgency in the Peruvian conflict. This difference can be

attributed to different reasons, but the most logical one is that both Northern Ireland and Rhodesia did not have to rely on the financial resources gained by criminal activity. The Sendero insurgency did not receive the same level of foreign support that the armed groups in Rhodesia and Ireland experienced. Ireland received large amounts of weapons from the USA and Libya and did not have to rely on criminal activities for financial resources to buy weaponry, which was also the case for the armed groups in Rhodesia that received large amounts of weapons and financial resources from the Soviet Union and China. Only in the Peruvian case an argument could be made of criminalization because of the money received by the criminal activities in the coca-valley which did help escalate the war. It was known that Guzman and the Sendero leadership lived a lavish lifestyle as a result of the money received from the drug trade and although proved to escalate the conflict without the coca trade during the earlier phases of the war, it later became dependant on the large amounts of money from the valley to attract new fighters and to provide sophisticated weapons necessary to expand its operations against the Peruvian army. Sendero also escalated the conflict by increasing their criminal activities in the regions that were under their control, especially executions to settle community conflicts led to a vicious circle of violence between the communities. However, it should be stressed that although criminal activities played an important role in the Peruvian conflict, it never became the primary objective of Sendero.

6. Joint conclusion

In conclusion regarding the context of each conflict, there are a number of differences and similarities that had an escalatory or de-escalatory effect on the conflicts. Firstly, social cleavages played a big role in the emergent phase of all three conflicts and in all three countries the overlapping cleavages would have an escalatory effect of some sort on the conflicts. The conflict of Peru shows that using a counter-narrative when someone uses social cleavages to gain support for the conflict can have a de-escalatory effect. Regarding the possible de-escalatory effects of social cleavages, the analysis has shown the importance of knowing which cleavages drive the conflict and which do not as redressing the cleavages that do not drive the conflict will not de-escalate the conflict. Lastly, whether or not a social cleavage is framed as a zero-sum game, is very important for the conflict as non-zero-sum cleavages can be solved easier than zero-sum cleavages. This is because victory in a zero-sum framing can only be attained with the defeat of the other which means neither side want to give in to the other groups as their ideas directly oppose one another. Removing a zero-sum cleavage from the equation is therefore very hard and complicates ending a conflict.

Although the period in which the militants gained enough popular support to be able to escalate the conflict differs across the cases, in general it can be concluded that an increase in popular support causes an escalation of the conflict and a decrease in popular support has a de-escalating effect as increased popular support gives the militants the capacity to escalate the conflict. This did not, however, hold true for the IRA in the 1980s when the IRA began using a two-track of politics and a military campaign. Because the IRA actively sought public support for their political campaign, they downsized their use of violence and with that de-escalated the conflict.

Local politics had a vastly different influence on the dynamics of each conflict. In Rhodesia national control was so strong that local politics did not play any substantial role. In Peru national control was weak which is why Sendero was able to terrorise their way into controlling local politics which enabled them to escalate the conflict. Both cases show a lack of real local politics, but it can nonetheless be argued that strong national control over local politics has a de-escalatory role while a weak government control over local politics has an escalatory effect. In Northern Ireland local politics had more

autonomy and therefore influence on the conflict. Local electoral results showed an escalation because of loyalist upsurges while it saw a slight de-escalation after Sinn Féin did well in elections as this spurred the other parties into peace negotiations.

National politics influenced each conflict because national government switches can have a huge effect on conflicts as government switches are often accompanied with policy switches which influence the conflict. It is furthermore apparent that a 'soft' approach can have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect and a hard approach can also have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect on the conflict. Choosing the correct timing for either negotiation or using violence is therefore of utmost importance. Even without a changing government policy, a government switch can still effect a conflict, however.

There are many contrasting possible ways in which many different international actors can support or influence a conflict. What is clear, however, is that when rebels gain international aid this may help them in escalating the conflict. At the same time, when government forces get money, equipment, training or international troops this helps them in creating a more effective security intelligence apparatus that can de-escalate the conflict. Depending on the intentions and interplay between the international politics/international support, the conflict escalates, de-escalates or causes a stalemate.

There are also a number of similarities and difference, which may be highlighted in regards to state actors. Firstly is the use of coercive force: What is noticeable about all three states is that all used coercive force in some way or another to eliminate or de-escalate the conflict. While it shifts from phase to phase is can be seen that once a conflict begins to escalate more states tend to use more coercive force in order to attempt to de-escalate the conflict. What we can also see is if the use of coercive force is done without the proper planning, coordination or intelligence like in Peru and the UK, the use of coercive can have an escalating affect on the conflict. However, even if coercive force is properly used, if the state does not have the capability to keep up with the capability of non-state forces coercive force will not result in an end of the conflict as was the case in Rhodesia.

For Policy solutions the biggest trends appears to be that states begin negotiations either when they are losing the conflict (Rhodesia) or wish to exit a conflict as quickly as possible (UK). If the conflict is a mere nuisance and does not actually affect

the economic or general wellbeing of a state (as in the case of Peru and early phases in Rhodesia) negotiations or policy solutions are often ignored and coercive force is preferred in order to stop a uprising or an escalation of the conflict. When however policy solutions are presented they have only been successful in all case studies when all parties of a conflict are involved, this held both true in the UK, Rhodesia and in Peru where without the support of one party or another the conflict continued.

When it comes to state-capacity another number of trends can be observed. Firstly that when the conflict erupts the only capacity used by the states are the police forces. However, when it becomes clear that regular law and order cannot be upheld by the limited capacity of the police the states capacity is increased by having the army become involved either as a support mechanism for the police or take over control completely. Another noticeable trend within the conflict is that as long as the state has a larger capacity than the non-state actor with the use coercive force it can be an effective tool in de-escalating the conflict. Nonetheless, while it may de-escalate the conflict it is not the solution to ending it. (Even if properly planned) Instead while the non-state actor groups may be defeated a period of latent conflicts may instead occur, where old grievances and social cleavages remain. Furthermore if the state has a smaller capacity than the non-state actors it will likely result in an escalation of the conflict. This can be seen in the case study of Rhodesia (where not enough coercive force could be used to maintain order due to lack of manpower), Peru (due to the inability of the country to use the army made it have no capacity) and the UK only experiencing a slight escalation of the conflict, as the RUC was still incapable of dealing with large scale riots and strikes, however due to reforms it was only a slight escalation.

Finally, what we can also conclude is that there is no correlation between the strength of the government and a phase of the conflict, at least not when compared to these three case studies. In both cases of a strong and weak government there have been cases of escalation and de-escalation, it mainly depends on the factors playing a role during a certain period of the conflict. Nonetheless this is mostly based on chance as opposed to being a achievable factor.

There are a number of differences and similarities that had an escalatory or de-escalatory effect on the three conflicts. Firstly, the strategy of the armed groups all tried to escalate the conflict by achieving their goals through armed conflict and thereby provoking the government to react. A major difference however is that in the case of

Rhodesia this strategy failed and eventually helped de-escalate the conflict during the early phase of the conflict. Furthermore, the analysis also showed that a change in strategy of the armed groups can have drastic effects on the dynamics of the conflict, were we see in both the Irish and Peruvian conflict to deliberately change the strategy of the armed groups to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Lastly, especially at the end of the three conflicts we see clearly the importance of the strategy of the armed groups. In Peru Sendero was unable to adapt its strategy after its strategic leaders were captured, while in the Irish and Rhodesian conflict the groups were still able to lay out a comprehensive insurgency strategy.

The effect of the capacity of the armed groups was also very noticeable in all three conflicts, and in general it can be concluded that an increase in capacity has an escalating effect on the conflict and a decrease of capacity a de-escalating effect on the conflict. This was especially true for Sendero that gained a huge increase in capacity with the drug trade which made it possible to escalate the conflict, and showed also a de-escalation of the conflict when it lost its high capacity after the loss of the coca-valley.

The factionalization of the armed groups in Rhodesia and Ireland had both escalating and de-escalating effects. In general, it can be concluded that factionalization can escalate the conflict on a short term because of infighting or change of strategy, but that it can also de-escalate the conflict because of infighting and powerstruggles between the armed groups which weakens the armed groups capacities.

Finally, Criminalization only showed some escalatory effects in the case of Peru. While in the Rhodesian and Irish conflict criminal activities played only a minor role, in the Peruvian conflict the money received from criminal activities would hugely contribute to the fighting capacity of Sendero. However, it should be stress that it never became the primary objective of the insurgency, which still focused on ensuring the collapse of the government.

7. Methodology Reflection

After having conducted our research and coming to the final conclusions there are a number of improvements which could be implemented for future research.

Structural suggestions

Our first suggestion is to not only to look at a conflict as a whole but also the events, which happened before and after the conflict. While all three papers do go into some detail regarding the precursor events before the conflict breaks out deeper analytical and background research must be done in order to understand the conflict better and to observe the effects a conflict may have had on the country in later years to come. For example during the Rhodesian Bush the tribal divisions were exposed in order to ramp up recruitment for guerilla forces. While this social cleavage did not escalate or de-escalate the conflict in Rhodesia, afterwards when the conflict had ended this social cleavage remained, eventually resulting in the start of the Zimbabwean civil war where an estimate 380,000 people died. Therefore it is important to also highlight the effect certain indicators had before and after the conflict.

Research suggestions

When it comes to research regarding the various conflicts two major suggestions have come up. The first is to hold interviews with participants of the conflict (whether this be state-actors or non-state actors). This must mainly be done in order to understand the thinking behind some of the decisions made by the various groups at the time as opposed to what we have now where a decision was analyzed by other academics. Furthermore, by also interviewing the public or neutral members of the conflict in order to get a view on how they viewed the conflict or certain events which occurred within it.

The second change that would be handy but difficult due to financial and time limitations, would be to do local research in the country or area itself. This is important as gaining an understanding of the territory and people whom lived in the country during the conflict may explain why certain strategies were adopted and could enrich the research further.

Analytical suggestions

When it comes to analyzing the results of our research we also have two suggestions, which may be changed for future research. Firstly is to remove coercive force as an analytical indicator and replace it with strategy of state-actors. The reason for this is that the use of coercive force by the government would be better suited to fall under government policy solutions as the decision to use force in order to end a conflict could be a legitimate policy decision. Additionally by replacing coercive force with strategy of the armed forces gives it a better indication of what is being analyzed which is the strategies and tactics of the security forces.

The second suggestion regarding analyzing the conflict would be to remove weak versus strong government. While it is interesting to see what the impacts is on a conflict when a weak or strong government is in charge, after looking at the joint conclusion it becomes obvious that having a strong or weak government doesn't have a correlation on any of the phases of the conflict. Therefore it may be wiser to remove this section. Nonetheless this is only a conclusion drawn out of these three conflicts in this case study. Any past or future research may argue differently which must be taken into account when making this decision.

Areas of future research

Finally, two areas of future research, which would be interesting to explore, is both the perspectives of the conflict and the role of media and propaganda in a conflict. For perspectives we would like to explore if perspectives of the public and international actors changed anywhere in the conflict and whether it had an effect on the conflict. For example on a local level did the local population see the non-state actors as liberators or terrorists, did this perspective change once the government began adopting coercive force, were there different labels put onto non-state actors through different phases of the conflict? (E.g low level insurgents, communist terrorists, rebels etc). While for the international perspective questions which could be analyzed is if perceptions of the guerilla group or local government changed how it impacted international support.

What ties into looking at how perspective changed is also second item for future research, which is the role of the media and propaganda in a conflict. For example how did non-state actors newspapers or online materials help shape the conflict, did certain articles or propaganda pieces increase recruitment, or popular support which escalated or de-escalated the conflict?

However, even if both these options are not chosen to be analyzed in future research, it would still be helpful to include them in some way or another as they may explain why certain shifts occurred within the public, government or international actors.

8. Policy recommendations:

Following the analysis of all three conflicts separately and the overall conclusion that was drawn, a number of policy recommendations can be made.

- *Policy advise 1: Figure out which cleavages drive and sustain the conflict.* This is important because cleavages that do not drive the conflict also do not have the power to de-escalate the conflict. Knowing which cleavages do drive and sustain the conflict can provide the state actor with a guidance as to which policies will have the effect of de-escalating the conflict.
- *Policy advise 2: Use counter-narratives when existing cleavages are actively used and increased to start a conflict.* Social cleavages can aggravate the conflict and likewise using a counter-narrative can ease the tensions by trying to change the escalating factor the opponent uses to sustain the conflict.
- *Policy advise 3: Be aware of the popular support militant groups have and prevent popular support from rising.* Popular support can be of major influence on the escalation of conflicts. If a conflict emerges and the militant groups do not have a big popular support base yet, it is important to prevent popular support from rising later on in the conflict as this almost always has an escalatory effect on the conflict.
- *Policy advise 4: Emphasize the criminalization of the armed groups.* By emphasizing the criminalization of the armed groups, public support can decline since it becomes apparent that the armed group is losing the ideological goals it stood for and is becoming worse than the government. This emphasis can be achieved by publishing the violent activities of the armed groups and emphasizing that the government is not or less criminal than the armed group in question.
- *Policy advise 5: Only use coercive force on the basis of good intelligence and solid planning.* When coercive force is used without solid planning or good intelligence it is not likely to be targeted force and instead of de-escalating the conflict, this only escalated the conflict as the population as a whole is effected by the coercive force which aggravates the anger of the population. This can drive them into the militants arms which increases their popular support and escalates the conflict.
- *Policy advise 6: Keep firm control on the local governments.* This advice is linked to the importance of preventing popular support as a collapse of local governments can

lead militants to fill in the power vacuum after which their recruitment and popular support can rise. Preventing a local government collapse is therefore important.

- *Policy advise 7: Maintain a dominant state capacity over the non-state actors and keep the capacity of the armed groups at the lowest level possible.* It is important for the state to have a higher capacity than the non-state actors. Once the capacity of armed groups increases and the state capacity grows below that of the non-state actors, armed groups will be able to expand and intensify their violent campaign. Cutting of the flow of manpower, weapons and money to the rebels is therefore imperative.
- *Policy advise 8: Prevent international support from reaching the militants and ask for international help when needed.* Building on the previous recommendation, international support in favour of the militants can create more possibilities for the militants to escalate the conflict. International support in favour of the state on the other hand can increase the national security and intelligence apparatus which makes it easier to deal with the militants and de-escalate the conflict.
- *Policy advise 9: Involve all parties in peace negotiations.* When parties are left out of the negotiations their interests are unlikely to influence the talks and chances are high the uninvolved parties will try to bring down the peace initiative during and after the negotiations which will lead to another escalation of the conflict. For peace initiatives to work it is necessary for all parties to accept the compromise or an escalation after the peace talks will follow.

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