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Masters Thesis conflict Analysis

Thesis capstone project-conflict dynamics



Abstract

This thesis is a combined project which sets out to uncover patterns in conflict dynamics that explain why conflicts escalate and de-escalate during their existence. In order to be able to make such an analysis, three conflicts are described in detail, analysed and subsequently compared. The three conflicts that are compared in this project are the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Rhodesian Bush War and the Internal Conflict in Peru. This specific part of the project focuses on the conflict dynamics of the Troubles in Northern Ireland from 1966-1998 which was an intense conflict between nationalist wanting a united Ireland and unionist wanting to stay within the British union. This paper researches the dynamics by tracing the historical context of the conflict after which the conflict itself is divided in seven different phases and subsequently analysed.

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1: Joint Introduction

"So why do we study war? I think most obviously, simply to survive. In the 20th century, a hundred and fifty million people, a hundred and fifty million people died as a result of war. Hundreds, millions, were disfigured, wounded or had their homes destroyed. War, has this horrific capacity. War is something that when it comes to us, we might not survive it, and as our capacity to impose violence on each other we had better understand exactly what it is" – Miguel Centeno (Coursera, 2016).

As Miguel Centeno argues in the above quote, it is extremely important to study war, not only to understand it, but also to prevent it from happening. This paper will contribute to this effort by not only focusing on why a war starts or ends, but also by focusing on what happens *during* the war. What actions and decision by which specific actor escalated or de-escalated the war? Or why does one group suddenly decide to kill another group it lived with peacefully for years? This paper will especially focus on these questions in the following conflicts: 1) the Rhodesian Bush War, 2) the Internal Conflict in Peru and 3) The Troubles in Ireland.

The Rhodesian Bush War was a civil war that lasted from July 4 1964 to December 12 1979 which led to universal suffrage, the end of the white minority-rule in Rhodesia and the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The main actors during this war were the white-government under the leadership of Ian Smith who fought against Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and against Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The war which would last more than fifteen years, would cost more than 30.000 lives (New World Encoclopedia, 2016).

The Internal Conflict in Peru began in 1980, on the eve of the first election Peru after more than seventeen years of military rule. After the Maoist organization, Sendero Luminoso, was led by a charismatic leader called Abimael Guzmán, burned the ballot papers in a small town in Peru's countryside. What followed was a twenty-year internal conflict which would cost between the 30.000 to 70.000 lives (Peru Support Group, 2016)

The Troubles was a violent thirty-year conflict that was framed by a civil rights march in Londonderry on 5 October 1968 and later the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998. At the heart of this conflict lay the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It was a war characterized by many actors who all engaged in killings. Eventually the death toll exceeded 3.600 people, and 50.000 more were wounded (BBC History, 2016).

This thesis will have a slightly different structure than a "normal" thesis. The first part is a joint literature review and methodology which is the foundation of this paper. The second part contains the three internal conflicts, each researched and analyzed individually. The third

part of this paper will contain the joint analysis where the main differences and similarities between these three conflicts will be highlighted. Finally, the last section of this paper contains the main findings and conclusions on the basis of which policy advise is suggested.

2: Literature Review

2.1: Underlying theories of conflict

In this literary review we will explore the various theories and concepts surrounding conflict studies following the various stages as outlined by the graph below. We begin with latent conflict where the conflict has not yet begun but underlying tension are beginning to be shown. This is then followed by conflict emergence where these tensions are now openly shown in the wider public space and some small acts of violence begin to occur, this in turn results in conflict escalation where violence and war occurs. However, as the conflict drags on a stalemate or a hurting stalemate occurs where none of the parties involved benefit anymore from the conflict and seek for a way out. This eventually leads to a de-escalation of the conflict and a start of negotiations in the hope of creating a settlement, which would result in a dispute settlement which should end the conflict. The final phase of the conflict then transpires where peace building is conducted so that underlying tensions are resolved and stability can return to a country. It must however be noted that while we use this model to outline the various theories and concepts throughout a conflict, the conflict itself can vary where after a hurting stalemate instead of de-escalation occurring, conflict escalation re-occurs again. With that noted we begin with the latent conflict. By splitting up the concepts and theories in the literature review by each phase it allows us to adequately use the concepts in the relevant phase during our own conflict analysis and thus give deeper insights. Additionally, by doing so in the literary review there will not be any future confusion where each theory and concept belongs as opposed to debating it in our conflict analysis.

Conflict phases model (Eric Brahm, http://www.beyondintractability.org)



2.2: General definitions and terms

Irregular warfare

Irregular warfare also known by various other degree of names (such assymetic, guerilla, unconventional warfare etc) is often referred to when mentioning a conflict where conventional military force is not used or irregular forces are used against a conventional military force. While the term is hard to define as it encompasses many various things the US Department of Defense has used two main forms of defining irregular warfare the first is "A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may apply the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approach, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will." (Eric Larson, 10)

However, because the definition still did not encompass the full scope of irregular warfare a second definition was needed stated as "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence of the relevant populations. IW (Irregular Warfare) favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may emply the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will…" (Larson, 10) While debate still ranges on if both these definitions full encompass the concept many argue that combined they form the basic definition of what irregular warfare is. Additionally, by knowing what the definition is it can be linked back to the various groups and non-state actors which will be presented throughout the thesis.

Geopolitical Conflicts: Proxy wars and foreign intervention

Geopolitical conflicts are often described as political conflicts where geography place an important role. However, while this is the generally excepted definition authors up to this day have questioned the accuracy of such a description especially in regards to the term geopolitics. Author Klaus Dodds in his book "Geopolitics" argues that there are two main understandings of the term geopolitics. Firstly, he argues that geopolitics is just a reference to the world as seen today and often described by metaphors such as "iron curtain" "Third World" etc, to be able to create a simple model of the world. (Klaus Dodds, 4) However, the author argues that this form of simplistic explanation is too Western orientated and more often used by new sources to describe major events. (Dodds, 4)

The second understanding of the term Geopolitical which the author provides is that geopolitics aims to "…focus our attention on how geopolitics actually works as an academic

and popular practice…(and) proceed to question how they generate particular understandings of places, communities, and accompanying identities". (Dodds, 5) In that sense while geopolitical conflicts are hard to define it is in the general definition conflict where geography and politics become embroiled.

Proxy warfare is a perfect example of this, where the concept refers to a war conducted by small groups against each other are supported by larger states whom provide foreign intervention to a group they support. Foreign intervention is described as a third party not involved in a conflict aiding or helping another party militarily, financially, or via material goods. As Adam Lockyet describes foreign intervention as "…the transfer of resources from an external state to a contesting party in a civil war. Resources are broadly defined as any funds, weapons, equipment, material or personnel that have immediate or potential coercive value." (2339).

Proxy wars were often used to further geopolitical (see previous concept) influence within a region and therefore hurt the opposing force. Andrew Mumford author of the book "proxy wars: war and conflict in the modern world" described proxy wars as "…the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence the strategic outcome…proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct costly and bloody warfare. " (11) Additionally, the author cites Karl Deutsch the original author who coined the term whom defined it as "an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country and using some of that countries manpower, resources and territory as means to achieving foreign goals and …strategies." (Mumford, 13).

Insurgency

Insurgent violence can take different forms which include revolutions, coup d'états, Leninist Revolution, guerrilla wars and terrorism. Each form will shortly be described. It is important to make a distinction between these kinds of insurgency since they shape the conflict each in its own way. Some forms of insurgency are more sudden waves of intense violence with lots of casualties, while others may show a more prolonged conflict that takes multiple years.

Coup D'état

A coup d'état is a sudden and powerful stroke in politics and often results in the forcible overthrow of a government. Thus it can be described as the seizure of power by an individual or a small group of persons who control an important position in the state's machinery. A coup

is often planned in such a way that the overthrow will be swift. Regardless of its success it is a brief event, but it can sometimes lead to long wars with lots of casualties. In sum a coup d'état can be characterized as a planned insurgency at a high level of the state's ranks by a few people and involve little violence during a very brief period of time (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, p. 19).

Leninist Revolution

A revolution is, unlike a coup d'état, a change of the system rather than just a strategy to gain power. Revolutions sometimes are non-violent, but in most other instances they have resulted in huge casualties and bloodshed. Some were quick and some took years. Here we focus on the Leninist revolution where the violence was meant to be brief but where the actual seizure of power resulted in immense violence. The Leninist revolution model is characterized by a huge preparation before the final confrontation where lots of people were recruiting, educating and organizing the revolutionaries. It can thus be argued that this model is an insurgency from below that involves numerous people where the preparation stage was very long, but the violent confrontation is expected to be brief (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, pp. 20-21)

Guerrilla War

Guerrilla war is a diffuse type of war that is fought in relatively small formations against a stronger enemy. In many insurrections in history this kind of warfare has been the main form of resistance to the more powerful enemy. Its strategy is to avoid direct and decisive battles against a more powerful enemy and opt instead for a longer and more small scale type of engagement. Guerrilla war can be used a method to wear the enemy out, or to gain time to build a regular army that could win in a conventional conflict. An important characteristic for guerrilla warfare is that they adopt a flexible style of warfare with many hit and run operations. They utilize the terrain, blend into the population and sometimes launch their attacks from neighbouring countries. This makes this kind of warfare very difficult for the enemy's forces to win against a much smaller enemy (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, p. 21).

Terrorism as a form of Insurgency

Terrorism as a form of insurgency is different from guerrilla, conventional war and riots. They are carried out systematically and constitute a distinct strategy of insurgency. When we think of terrorism we think of actions like the 9/11 attacks in 2001 or the London bombings in 2005 not of guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Merari, 1993, p. 12). What defines terrorism as a strategy the most is that it is based, more than other

forms of insurgency, on psychological impact. Describing the strategy of terrorism as a form of psychological warfare does not specifically explain how terrorists hope to win by it. Although terrorists have been rarely clear enough as to lay down a complete, coherent strategic plan, it is possible to discern several strategic ideas that terrorists have held as the cardinal practical concept of their struggle.

Causes of Terrorism

In the article "The Causes of Terrorism", Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorism is not per se a reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society. It is more than often a dissatisfaction of a small fragment of a population that acts on the behalf of a majority that is unwilling or unaware of their grievances. Given some source of dissatisfaction in the modem state with its bland bureaucracies, lack of responsiveness to demands is omnipresent-terrorism has become an attractive strategy for small organizations of diverse ideological persuasions who want to attract attention for their cause, provoke the government, intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy, impress an audience, or promote the adherence of the faithful. They have the idea that there is an absence of choice and reason that there is no other alternative than committing terrorist attacks. Terrorism is thus the result of a steady growth of engagement and opposition and described as a group development that depends on government action (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 396)

2.3: Latent conflict

Patterns of conflict

First proposed by Richard E. Barringer, Barringer proposed that certain "patterns of factors exist that variously condition the origin, development, and termination of conflict…" (7) Additionally, he argues that these patterns are not purely militarily but also "social, political, economic, technological, military and psychological." (Barringer, 7) He further continues by debating that by observing past conflicts, these patterns can be observed in conflicts and their impact towards the conflict analysed.

Researchers of the air staff and command college whom created a viewable model of Barringers conflict patterns later expanded upon his model and added a few extra details such as the post-conflict stage, additionally transition stages as well as. However, what the model lacks is the escalation and de-escalation sub-phases thus while the model is a good referencing

point to patterns of conflict it should not be regarded as what Barringer himself proposed. (Sam Allotey, 100).



Figure 1. Conflict Resolution Framework

Weak Governance

One of the main causes of violent conflict is weak governance institutions which are often distinguished by low levels of institutionalization (UN DEA, 2010: 25). A breakdown in state constrain in the latent conflict stage can bring about the emergence of actual conflict. An effective government with working institutions is able to prevent or reduce the intensity of conflicts even while robust motivations to start a conflict exist. A weak governance may be unable to restrain underlying violent conflict which allows conflicts to erupt and increase (Hampson & Malone, 2002: 115). Weak governance is not only a problem in the latent phase of a conflict, it may also be a reason for conflicts to escalate again within the conflict or to recur after a peace agreement is signed. It is therefore of utmost importance to transform governance and governance institutions is post-conflict situations (UN DEA, 2010: 25). Here it is therefore useful to assess the strength of the government involved to see how a conflict was able to erupt after the latent stage and if or how the strength of the government was increased during or after the conflict to prevent another episode of escalation.

Polarization

Identity and cleavages are known causes for conflicts and polarization helps to understand them. Research has shown that economic, religious as well as ideological polarization between groups is a sizable cause of violent conflicts. Moreover, the magnitude of polarization has an expanding influence on the level of conflict (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 132). Polarization itself can be divined as "*the extent to which the population is clustered around a small number of distant poles"* (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 133). It can therefore be seen as divisions within society. When multiple cleavages overlap it causes division in society to be mutually reinforced while cross-cutting cleavages may counterbalance each other. The manner in which society is polarized around certain cleavages is therefore important to know. Polarization therefore revolves around the idea that friction in society is caused by two simultaneously processes. The first being identification with people within one's own group and the second being the process of distancing oneself from people belonging to other groups (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 133). The concepts of cleavages and polarization are important for this thesis as they are important factors in letting the conflict escalate as well as de-escalate a conflict when polarization is decreased.

2.4: Conflict Emergence

Conflict Emerge

After a conflict has remained latent for some time, if the underlying grievances or frustrations are strong enough, a "triggering event" marks the emergence or the "eruption" phase of the conflict. This event or episode may be the first appearance of the conflict, or it may be a confrontation that erupts in the context of a protracted, but dormant, or low-level conflict (Kriesberg, 2003).

Political violence

In this stage it is important to understand the universe of political violence. In theory there are uncountable ways to classify political violence. But here we identify the following as seen in table 1:

1: *States against States*, here we see violence of states directed towards other states by using sizable regular armies and military strategies. All acts are reflecting the capability of a large bureaucracy and are carefully organized and planned.

2: *States against Citizens*, violence from states against it citizens by legal and illegal laws that enforce oppression.

3: *Citizens against Citizens*, examples of politically motivated violence here are racial or ethnic attacks.

4: *Citizens against the State*, this kind of violence can be spontaneous or organized and is mostly aimed to overthrow the ruling party (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, pp. 17-18)

Political violence graph (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, 17-18)

		Target	
		State	*Citizens*
Initiator	*State*	Full-scale war; belligerent activity in peacetime.	Legal and illegal law enforcement oppression
	Citizens	Guerilla war; insurgent terrorism; coup d'état; Leninist revolution	Vigilante terrorism; ethnic terrorism

Table 1 A Basic Classification of Political Violence

The Commitment Problem

The commitment problem is commonly used to explain why state are unable to come to a pre-war arrangement which could have prevented conflict (Rider & Owsiak, 2015: 509). Wars or conflict in general are always costly to all groups involved even when one of the parties gains more advantage than the others. Additionally, all sides to a conflict are aware of the costs the conflict will bring about. (Fearon, 1995: 6). The commitment problem encapsulates the inability of groups to commit themselves to a mutually favourable outcome that can prevent the cost of conflict. The parties to a conflict will defect from commitments because of a lack of trust the others will hold their end of the deal (Moran, 2012: 55). The commitment problem is important for this thesis as it can help explain why conflicts emerge or escalate even when they could have been prevented.

According to Fearon, the commitment problem arises when three conditions are met: *" (1) the groups interact in anarchy, without a third party able to guarantee and enforce agreements between them; (2) one of the groups anticipates that its ability to secede or otherwise withdraw from joint arrangements will decline in the near future; and (3) for this group, fighting in the present is preferable to the worst political outcome it could face if it chose continued interaction "* (Fearon, 1995: 10). The absence of a third party that can insure agreements is therefore an important part of a commitment problem as well as major shifts in the expected distribution of power (Blattman & Miguel, 2010: 13). The dilemma here is that

when these circumstances are present a conflict will develop, regardless of the fact that all groups would be better off if one could abstain from exploiting the other after the other's decline of power (Fearon, 1995: 10).

Karl Marx

Karl Marx one of the first proponents of conflict theory proposes that conflict often orientate from class struggle and when a conflict does erupt it has a large and ever resounding impact. According to Lewis A. Coser Marx argues that "…conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict." (200) Additionally, author R.J Rummel argues that Marx uses six elements which outline class conflict:

- Classes are authority relationships based on property ownership,
- A class defines groupings of individuals with shared life situations thus interests,
- Classes are naturally antagonistic by virtue of their interests,
- Imminent within modern society is the growth of two antagonistic classes and their struggle, which eventually absorbs all social relations,
- Political organization and power is an instrumentality of class struggle and reigning ideas are its reflection,
- Structural change is a consequence of the class struggle (1977)

In all while Karl Marx main focus lies within the societies social changes though class struggle by conflict he does not look at how conflicts change or how social struggles come into play during a conflict. As he argues his main focus is in bringing about social change through violence and often through the lower classes. However, it is important to cite the author as he does explain why a latent conflict may escalate into a full-blown conflict.

Game theory

Game theory plays a central role when it comes to peace and conflict studies. First proposed by Anatol Rapoport who argues that game theory should be defined as "…a theory of rational decisions during conflict situations." (1) The theory aims to separate a conflict into four categories (players, strategies, outcomes and payoffs) and by doing so calculate the rational choices leaders make in determining whether or not to go to war. Throughout the years this theory has been further expanded to include other factors which may have an impact on rational thinking, author Katarzyna Zbiec states that author Thomas Shelling determined that credible

deterrence such as trade agreements, and early mobilization of a single party may have a profound impact on the rational choices. (42-44) Further points he brings up is the segregation of the population as well as, mutual distrust between various countries also wither down the rational thinking of countries and thus increase the escalation of war. (Zbiec, 44-46) This idea is again seen in Van Fearon's proposal on rational explanations of war as well as Karl Von Clausewitz ideas.

Karl von Clausewitz was a general in the Prussian army and he was also a military theorist. As such, he developed one of the most influentual theories of war, more specifically on the political philosophy of war in his work *On War* (Heywood, 2011: 243). Clausewitz is famous for describing war as *the continuation of politics by other means* as well as defining war as *"an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfull our will"* (Williams, 2008: 188). Clausewitz argued that going to war was is rational decision, similary related to game theory where rational decisions are taken into account when deciding whether or not to go to war. Additionally he argued that a simple cost-benefit analysis should be made by the political authorities concerned whether or not going to war is in their best interest or not (Heywood, 2011: 243). In this sense, war was thus viewed as a legitimate state policy instrument.

The importance of including game theory in research regarding conflict studies is not necessarily that it will be used but that many social theories have used to theory to formulate their own ideas such as the case with Clauswitz and Fearon to the decisions which are made by individuals during conflict situations.

Besides game theory and predicting that war was a rational choice for political entities to make as shown under game theory he also presented a number of other theories which help explain conflict studies. The first of which is the Clausewitz trinity or the idea that war is occurs due to the three elements the first being; blind instinct set about by hatred, animosity and primal instinct to turn towards violence. (75) The second being the probability and chance of which a person or entity decides to go to war, while finally the third being the "subordinate nature of a political instrument" (Clausewitz, 75-76) These three elements can be split up into three other categories.: People with their primal instrinct to turn to violence, the army which looks at chances for war and the probability of success, while the final entity is politics/government whom decided to go to war and where the army and people must obey.

The second theory which Clausewitz highlights is the fog of war, here he argues that at times it will be impossible to see the conflict for what it is either during or after a conflict has occurred. This may be due to a variety of reasons such as planning while it is going on,

confusion on the battle field etc. He highlights that the only way for the fog of war to be lifted and data to be revealed is by expressed talent or by chance. (Clausewitz, 180).

Rise of the Conflict

Conflict emerges when individuals and groups that depend on one another for valuable outcomes and deprive one another of such valued outcomes through their independent actions. Conflicts between groups can emerge when the attributes of one group will have the feeling that they are falling below a reasonable standard in comparison by another group their actions or inactions. Reasons for conflict could be tangible goods such as money, territory but can also be intangible goods like status, religion and respect. When one of the groups in a society gets the feeling they are not getting the respect or money they are entitled to, then social conflict is likely to emerge (De Dreu, 2010).

Security Dilemma

The security dilemma is a concept that argues that: what one does to enhance one's own security causes reaction that, in the end can make one less secure (Posen, 1993, p. 28). This problem is often overlooked by statesmen that not recognize that this problem exists. They do not empathize with their neighbours and do not understand that some of their actions are threatening for the other party. This dilemma is especially intense when offensive and defensive military forces are more or less identical, states cannot signal their defensive intent. States can use for example armoured forces to defend their borders against an attack by other armoured forces but the neighbour can also see it as a threat because of the offensive potential of armoured forces. In a security dilemma states always assume the worst. But also during a time where it is known that an offensive is more effective than defence, states will often choose the offensive if they wish to survive. This can cause the pre-emptive war to prevent the other force to strike first (Posen, 1993). Important to understand in this dilemma is the fear of being exploited, states don't want to be in a vulnerable position and that it is likely when two states which support the status quo but do not understand this security dilemma will end up in war or in a hostile relationship (Jervis, 1978).

Security Dilemmas in Ethnic Wars

This problem that barriers cooperation at the international level of politics also applies to problems that arise as central authority collapses in multi-ethnic empires. Regardless of the

origins of ethnic strife, once violence reaches the points that ethnic communities cannot rely on the state to protect them, each community must mobilize to take responsibility for its own security (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 147). This causes a real threat because the mobilization is often accompanied by nationalist rhetoric that often seems threatening to other groups and also because going on the offensive is more effective in an inter-community conflict because settlements and towns that are multi-ethnic are harder to hold than to take (Kaufmann, 1996, pp. 147-148) Additionally, itis important to note that the severity of security dilemmas is most intense when the demography is very intermixed and is more limited when they are very separated. When communities are very intermixed, both sides are vulnerable to attack, and since it is almost impossible to defend it is only "logical" to kill or drive out the enemy population before they do the same (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 148). Finally, the security dilemma argues that once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, this war will not end until the populations are separated into defensible and homogeneous regions because neither group will trust the other. An attack will also become less likely because it requires much more effort (Kaufmann, 1996).

2.5: Conflict escalation

Escalation

While outlining his theory regarding patterns of conflict Barringer also explored in detail the concept of escalation regarding conflicts. According to him, escalation is defined as "any intensification or moderation, respectively, of the scale or scope of ongoing hostilities that constitutes a fundamental change in the "rules of the game" governing their conduct". In other words, an escalation doesn't necessarily need to be an escalation in violence but can also occur if another factor/pattern is applied or changed. E.g sanctions are placed upon a certain group which makes them more desperate and therefore result in a change of strategy (a change in the rules of the game)

Social Interdependence Theory

The social interdependence theory fits into the conflict escalation phase because it points to certain factors that have the power to escalate a conflict into a one that is violent and destructive. The social interdependence theory builds on the work done by Kurt Lewin who argued that the essence of group dynamics is the interdependence among groups members. Common goals generate motivation towards the accomplishment of these same goals which makes the group an interdependent whole (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). Deutsch extended Lewin's work by specifying two categories of social interdependence, namely positive and negative

interdependence. Positive interdependence occurs when it is perceived by individuals that *"they can attain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are cooperatively linked attain their goals"* (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). Negative interdependence on the other hand occurs when it is perceived that individuals "*can obtain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are competitively linked fail to obtain their goals"* (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). When these two categories are applied to conflict, it can say something about the processes and conditions of constructive conflicts in which a mutual problem is tackled collectively and it can say something about destructive conflicts in which conflicts are framed as a zero-sum game (Vallacher et al., 2013: 35).

Deutsch furthermore identified a couple of factors that influence a conflict in becoming either constructive or destructive, the difference being that a constructive conflict is solved before it can escalate into a real violent conflict, while a destructive conflict escalates in violence. The first factor is the nature of the conflict. A zero-sum view of the conflict will quickly escalate towards a destructive conflict. Large conflicts about basic principles, identity and substantive issues are furthermore more likely to become destructive than small ones. The specific context may also affect the conflict seeing as cultural differences can lead to misunderstandings and can increase in-group, out-group thinking which can cause even more polarization (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998). Therefore, the social interdependence theory is important for the thesis seeing as the existence of certain factors can point to a conflict becoming a constructive one without much escalation or a destructive conflict which does escalate. It is important to recognize what factors make the conflict a destructive one so work can be done to de-escalate and turn the conflict into one with positive interdependence.

2.6: Stalemate

Stalemate

Once conflicts escalates for a while, they often reach a stalemate. The occurrence of stalemates is a common feature of international interactions. A large part of militarized disputes (40%) over the period 1816-2001 resulted in a stalemate. A stalemate occurs where there is neither a clear victory of one party nor an effective conflict resolution mechanism (Caruso, 2007, p. 2). Stalemates emerge for a number of reasons: 1: failed tactics, 2: depletion of available resources to fuel the conflict, 3. A reduction in support of the conflict by group members or allies and 4. costs are becoming too high to continue the fighting (Brahm, 2003). It is often argued that the phase of stalemate is an important moment to mediate between the warring parties, like Kissinger argued when he said: "Stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement"

(Zartman, 2001, p. 8). In this stage they seek an alternative policy or a way out. The concept is based in cost-benefit analysis which assumes that a group or state will pick the alternative which it prefers and that states and groups at some point in the conflict realize that the current status quo or no negotiation is a negative-sum situation. To avoid the outcomes of this negative sum-situation they will explore the positive-sum outcomes. (Zartman, 2001, pp. 9-10). It is thus important that the fighting parties need to have some sense and willingness to search for a solution and the realization that the other party shares that sense and willingness to search.

Duel concern theory

Duel concern theory is considered a predictability theory of choice and strategy depending on certain conditions within a conflict (Robin Vallecher, 37). The theory centers on a particular group and their outcome as well as their rivals. Depending on the outcome of a certain action and the strength and weakness of themselves and their opponent's groups may decide to take certain actions such as yielding, avoiding, contenting, compromising etc. (Vallecher, 37) This theory fits in with the Ripeness theory where parties at one point enter a hurting stalemate and it is decided to enter negations however before that the duel-concern theory may be applied to assess the strengths and weakness of the group and their rival.

Ripeness theory

The Ripeness theory as proposed by William Zartman is formulate to explain why negations for an end to a conflict occur, and in doing so the author additionally explains when parties are ready to negotiate a settlement towards the conflict. (228) According to the author there are two elements which determine when conflicting parties are ready to enter a negotiated conflict. Firstly, a "mutually hurting stalemate" must occur. This concept defined as "…when the paries find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them." (Zartman, 228) indicates that neither side will likely win the conflict. The second element according to the author is the perception that there is a way out. (Zartman, 288) although in reality of the situation doesn't necessarily have to be true as long as the perception is there a move towards a resolution will be established.

This theory combined with the duel concern theory is essential when applying it to conflict analysis. While duel concern theory helps analysts measure the impact of actions by a group or nation, ripeness theory is applied once an action results in a hurting stalemate therefore resulting in the application of the theory.

Political Will

To end a stalemate in a peaceful resolution it is important that the fighting parties themselves can exercise the political will necessary to reach a solution (Theofilopoulou, 2007). However, in conflicts there are groups or individuals at both sides that have built up an interest in keeping the conflict going. This happens when the conflict has brought them political power or economic opportunities that they did not have before the conflict (Brahm, 2003). But political will to continue the conflict is also based on the fact that when the war ends the can be hold accountable. A relevant observation was made by Norpoth when he said: "war and economics have few rivals when it comes to making or breaking governments" (de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995, p. 841). It is assumed that political leaders of both warring parties are intent on maintaining themselves in power and use the available tools of power and rules to accomplish this end. This results in cases where political leaders, especially authoritarian, are inclined to fight wars longer to keep themselves in power (de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).

2.7: Conflict de-escalation-negotiation

De-escalation

Conflict de-escalation is referring to a significant decrease in the severity of violence or coercive means that are being used between the adversaries. The conflict is thus becoming less intense and is becoming less violent. De-escalation is often not the consequence of a single event but a process that goes step-by-step by negotiating and earlier made agreements (Maiese M. , 2004). Important to understand here is that the methods used by the adversarsaries eventually may become too costly or ineffective, supporters may cease to support and external pressure can become too burdensome (Kriesberg, 2003) When a conflict has reached this point, one side typically makes an important conciliatory gesture. Hostility decreases, the tendency to retaliate lessens, and the level of coerciveness declines. Eventually adversaries may begin to confer benefits on each other and reward each other for cooperating. All of these factors initiate the process of de-escalation. Once initiated, de-escalation tends to proceed slowly and requires much effort (Maiese M. , 2004)

Conciliatory Gestures

Very important in the stage of de-escalation are conciliatory gestures. These kind of gestures are often necessary to stop and interrupt a conflict that has been ongoing for a long time and can help transform the conflict. These gestures are, however, not easy to carry out and their success depends heavily on many factors such as the relations between the adversaries. In

addition, these actions need to be precise, appropriate and seem fresh and fitting in the situation of the conflict (Kriesberg, De-escalation Stage, 2003). When these conciliatory gestures appear to be effective they often are a prelude to formal negotiations. There are several features of gestures that increase the likelihood of successful conciliation according to Mitchell (2000, pp. 285-286):

1: the gesture represents a major change from the past;
2: it is novel;
3: it fits into the target's orientation;
4: it is made in an undeniable manner;
5: it involves costs and risks for the initiator;
6: it is made unconditionally and voluntarily;
7: it is made so that it would be difficult or impossible to reverse; and
8: it is structured so that the other side can easily respond positively.

It should be stressed about these gestures that a single one does not suffice to end or interrupt a conflict. Effectiveness is more likely if the gesture is convincing and appears to be widely supported and binding for the future (Kriesberg, 2003).

Negotiation

Negotiation in its simplest form is a discussion between two or more parties who are trying to work out a solution to their problem. These negotiations can happen on all kinds of levels, from two individuals at the local level or between two states at the international level. The goal is often to achieve a goal that they were not able to achieve on their own and prefer to search for an agreement than to fight or give in (Maiese, Negotiation, 2003).

Power Dependence Theory

Another important theory for this thesis in understanding conflict dynamics is the power dependence theory. As can be seen from the graph which shows the different phases of conflicts, after a hurting stalemate the de-escalation or negotiation phase begins. The parties entering this phase are, however, not always equal partners in these negotiations due to power differences. According to Emerson, "*the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B on A"* (Emerson, 1962: 33). Dependence in negotiation situations is based on two variables. The first variable states that the manner of dependence of A on B is directly related to the value

A attributes to outcomes in which B mediates. The second variable argues that the dependence of A upon B is inversely proportional to the possibility of attaining A's goals without the help of B (Emerson, 1962: 32; Vallacher et al., 2013: 38).

Understanding the power differences between conflicting parties is important for understanding if and how a conflict de-escalates or how the negotiations will unfold. Unequal dependencies can lead to power imbalances or power abuse which can in turn lead to the conflict re-escalating again (Molm, 2007). The power dependence theory can therefore be of help in understanding how negotiations begin, how the content of the negotiations can be influenced by differences in power and why not all de-escalations and negotiations within conflict last and are able to prevent another escalation phase.

External Pressure

De-escalation can also happen because of the roles played by outside parties and the ways in which they relate to the fighting parties to foster the de-escalation and/or pressure them into negotiations (Maiese, 2004). External pressure can translate to international intervention which has three broad forms: noncoercive *intervention, coercive intervention,* and *third-party mediation* during both the negotiation and implementation stages. *Non-coercive interventions* show a sense of alarm over the violation of minority rights taking place in other countries and has at times outside states and multilateral organizations exerted pressure on the transgressors (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 65). *Coercive interventions* can help bring warring parties to the bargaining table and enforce the resulting terms. A key requirement for these interventions is that there is true international commitment. Without the commitment the peace created by the intervention will not last for a longer period of time. (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 42). *External mediation* is helpful in bringing about de-escalation, but it is unlikely to be successful in the absence of expectancy revision by either one or both adversaries or policy entrepreneurs. Shocks (transitional situations that can instigate a major period of change in adversarial relations by altering key expectancies) play an important role here since external mediators are well aware that certain periods are riper for bringing about de-escalation or negotiation than other times (Rasler, 2000, pp. 702-703).

Termination of the conflict

The termination of a conflict is always difficult to determine, more often than not once a conflict "official" ends there is a tendency for the conflict to either re-emerge or continue on. As William Flavin states "Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict." (96).

Flavin therefore makes a distinction between conflict termination and conflict resolution arguing that conflict resolutions is "…a long process. It is primarily a civil problem that may require military support. Through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the condition for successful conflict resolution" (96). Additionally, as the author highlights often the termination of the conflict is seen through the lens of some type of military intervention or military action, while conflict resolution is considered in the spectrum of civilian operations. (See concept of conflict resolution)

Greed and Grievances

This concept argues that rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions in society. In political science rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest (Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2004, p. 563). In contrast there is an economic approach argues that rebellion occurs in the pursuit of self-interested material gain. Oil, diamonds, timber and other primary commodities form the basis of the contestable resources over which rebels fight their governments. A strong resource base can thus serve as a mechanism for mobilization. (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 319). Important here is the feasibility hypothesis created by Collier &Hoeffler which is a variant of Hirshleifer Machiavelli Theorem that proposes that no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused (Hirschleifer, 2001). The feasibility hypothesis proposed that where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur. It leaves the motivation of the rebels unspecified and its initial agenda being determined by the preferences of the social entrepreneur who is first to occupy the niche. This will sometimes be a not-for –profit organization with a political or religious agenda and sometimes a for-profit organization. (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2008, p. 2) There are thus two prevalent rebel motivation explanations, greed and grievances. They provide a common explanation-'opportunity' and 'viability' describe the common conditions sufficient for profit-seeking, or not-for-profit, rebel organizations to exist (Collier & Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 2004, p. 565).

2.8: Dispute settlement

Peace Process

Peace process is defined by Harold Saunders as "*a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means"* (Saunders, 1996: 483). The peace process of conflicts does not only exist of official negotiations and signing a peace agreement, however. The peace process

plays out in different phases of the conflict and in different arenas. According to Saunders firstly the pre-negotiation phase starts in which it is the purpose to begin or nourish the peace process by paving the way through changing relationships. Conflicts are often caused by incompatible interests over which people do not want to negotiate. The goal of pre-negotiations is therefore to "*start a political process that can change relationships and lead to the end of violence, to peace and to reconciliation"* (Saunders 1996: 421).

Seeing as the aim of a peace process is to end the violent conflict through improving relationships among groups, public participation in this process next to the official arena is very important. Sounders has therefore identified four arenas in which the peace process simultaneously unfolds: the official arena, the quasi-official arena, the public peace processes and civil society (Burgess, 2004). Saunders also came up with five cyclical phases in peace processes. In the first phase officials and the people agree they want to work towards peace by defining the main problem within the conflict. In the second phase relationships and issues are mapped clearly. The next phase uses public dialogue to solidify the desire to implement collective solutions. Phase four is the phase in which actual negotiations take place and in the last phase citizens and officials together implement their agreed decisions (Saunders, 1996).

Another typology of peace processes is given by Nicole Ball which breaks the peace process down in two stages which each also comprise of two phases. The figure below shows the objectives in each phase of the conflict (Burgess, 2004).

Stages of peace process (Burgess, 2004)

The Peace Process in Countries with Negotiated Peace Settlements

STAGES	Cessation of Conflict		Peacebuilding	
PHASES	*Negotiations*	*Cessation of Hostilities*	*Transition*	*Consolidation*
MAIN OBJECTIVES	Agreeing on key issues to enable fighting to stop	Signing peace accords Establishing cease-fire Separating forces	Establishing a government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively Implementing reforms to build political institutions and establish security Inaugurating economic and social revitalization Promoting societal reconciliation	Continuing and deepening reform process Continuing economic and social recovery efforts Continuing promotion of societal reconciliation

As can be derived from the above, implementing a peace agreement takes a long time. That being said, the peace process does not end with the peace agreement. Other work such as disarmament and building new relations and institutions are also part of the peace process as a whole (Burgess, 2004). For this thesis it is important to recognize who does what in which phase of the peace process to know why some peace initiatives fail and others succeed in de-escalating the conflict.

Spoilers

As has been stated before, conflicts are often caused by incompatible interest which is why the peace process is such a complicated business. Peace processes are fragile journeys to peace and the longer a peace process takes the more likely it will relapse into conflict again because of spoilers (Wallensteen, 2012: 136). Stephen Stedman defines spoilers as *"leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it"* (Stedman, 1996: 369). This means spoilers are actors who intentionally try to undermine the peace process and conflict settlement. Identifying spoilers within peace processes is therefore important for this thesis.

Spoilers occur for the reason that it is unusual for all parties to simultaneous see peace as advantageous (Stedman, 2000: 7). The existence of spoilers does not, however, automatically suggest a peace process is doomed to fail (Newman & Richmond, 2006: 101). It is, however, important to recognize the existence of spoilers and how they influence the peace process which when failed can lead to escalation of the conflict again.

Stedman identifies four different dimensions in which spoilers form a problem to the peace process. The first regards the position of the spoiler; whether it is inside or outside the peace process. Inside spoilers are likely to use strategies of stealth while outside spoilers generally adopt violent strategies (Stedman, 2000: 8). The reason for these different methods is that inside spoilers spoil because their expectations of the peace process are not met while the outsiders spoil because their very existence is challenged by the peace process (Zahar, 2003). A second dimension regards the number of spoilers. More often than not multiple spoilers will try to challenge the peace process which complicates the strategies to deal with them as marginalizing one spoiler may reinforce others (Stedman, 2000: 9). Stedman also recognized that spoilers vary in their goals and commitment to undermining a peace process which is why he identified three types of spoilers: limited, greedy, and total (Stedman, 2000: 10). Whether or not the type of spoilers can change during the peace process depends on the locus of the spoiler. When the locus of the spoiler is a leader, change in type is much more likely than when it comes from followers (Stedman, 2000: 11).

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution can be seen as the process in which a peaceful ending to a conflict is facilitated. Wallensteen defines conflict resolution as "*a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other"* (Wallensteen, 2012: 8). Three common approaches to conflict resolution are negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Negotiation means the conflicting parties will try to come to a resolution themselves. With mediation, the conflicting parties communicate through a neutral third party which can recommendations of a non-binding nature. With arbitration, the conflicting parties declare to carry out the recommendations of a third party (Goltsman et al., 2009: 1397).

Conflicts differ from disputes in that they often last longer and are caused by more than incompatible interests. Fundamental differences and non-negotiable issues generally lie at the heart of conflicts which is why conflict resolution should go beyond only fulfilling group's interests. To truly resolve a long-term conflict, the underlying causes of the conflict must be

found and dealt with while at the same time underlying identities and values must be respected (Spanger, 2003). Dispute settlement, however, is only aimed at resolving a dispute as swiftly as possible. It therefore can happen that disputes within the context of a conflict are resolved while the conflict itself and its underlying causes are not (Spanger, 2003). For this thesis it is therefore crucial to determine what the underlying causes of conflicts are and when they are successfully resolved so as to stop the conflict from escalating again.

2.9: Post-conflict peacebuilding

Normalisation Process

The normalisation process is part of the post-conflict peacebuilding phase and can be seen as a stage within a conflict in which it coincides with peace agreement making and the reconciliation process. It can be seen as response of structural peacebuilding in which the relations between different groups are normalised through confidence building measure (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 16).

Resilience Theory

The theory of community resilience is of special importance in the aftermath of conflicts since it can help understand why some conflict won't start again, even when both sides committed atrocities. It argues that communities have the potential to function effectively and adapt successfully in the aftermath of disasters and wars. It is a process that links a certain network of adaptive capacities (these are resources with dynamic characteristics) to adaption after a certain disasters or crisis. To build collective resilience communities there is a need to reduce risk, engage local people in mitigation, create organizational linkages, boost and protect social supports and reduce resource inequities. This requires flexibility, decision-makings skills and reliable sources of information in difficult and unpredictable circumstances (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008, p. 1). The theory of resilience provides an excellent framework for enhancing community resilience after cases like chronic civil wars or other disasters to buffer the adverse effects of disasters and promote community wellbeing. It is suggested to ensure commitment to engage the entire system of the community in an inclusive process by identifying scripts, themes and patterns across generations and community history; foster creativity as the central process of healing maintaining sensitivity to issues of culture, gender and spirituality; and to encourage access to all natural and ancillary resources (Somasundaram & Sambasivamoorthy, 2013).Other factors mentioned include building on existing resources; collaborating and networking across all systems; relating program needs to

goals, future and best interests of the community; encouraging natural change agents and leadership within the community; empowering families and communities; and developing ownership by the community. Norris et al. (2008) identify four primary sets of adaptive capacities for community resilience — economic development, social capital, information and communication, and community competence. Community competence here refers to the capacity, resources and skills within the community to act together, cooperatively and effectively, to meet challenges. Unfortunately, in disaster situations, particularly chronic war contexts, some or many of these resources and support systems would be affected, dysfunctional or not available especially after a war (Masten & Narayan, 2012).

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a term often used in the field of conflict resolution and it refers to a process that tries to assist in turning the conflict settlements into a lasting end of the conflict (Hauss, 2003). In short, reconciliation means *"finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately"* (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 12). It can therefore be defined as a process which conflicting parties must follow to "*move from a divided past to a shared future"* (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 12). It is also commonly acknowledged that reconciliation encompasses at a minimum the components truth, justice, mercy, and peace as identified by John Lederach (Hauss, 2003). Ideally reconciliation has a backward-looking and a forward-looking dimension as it should bring about personal healing to past struggles as well as enable groups to get on with their life in a shared society (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 19).

Reconciliation after peace agreements is of vital importance seeing as without reconciliation fighting between the parties can break out again. This is because, as Fen Osler Hampson terms it, a lot of peace agreements are "orphaned". This means that the peace agreement that was reached did stop the fighting, but a stable peace was not reached which means an agreement was made without addressing the problems that lay at the heart of the rise of the conflict (Hamson, 1996). For the purpose of this thesis, finding out whether or not reconciliation has taken place is therefore important in understanding whether the conflict has truly de-escalated. The UN IDEA has identified three non-linear stages of reconciliation after conflicts. Stage 1. Replacing Fear by Non-Violent Coexistence. Stage 2. When Fear No Longer Rules: Building Confidence and Trust. Stage 3. Towards Empathy (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 19-21). Concluding, all conflicts should go through a reconciliation process for them to put an end

to violence once and for all for if this does not happen violent conflict is a reasonable prospect, even if a conflict settlement was reached (Brahm,

3: Research Methodology

3.1: Central Research Question

To understand conflict dynamics and what factors are involved in influencing the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict a central research question for these thesis was asked. What causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflicts? This question would guide us when looking into each of the three case studies and creating the methodology for our research.

3.2: Quantitative vs Qualitative Research

When debating what type of research to use for these theses it was decided to use qualitative research. There are a number of reasons for this, as can be seen through the literature review almost all authors have used qualitative research to explain phases or stages of a conflict. For example, Ricard E. Barringer, author of the book "Patterns of Conflict" used empirical qualitative research to argue when a conflict occurs and when it enters a different phase. He further uses qualitative research to explore what factors influence how a conflict ends. Other authors who have not looked at the conflict as a whole but rather at different stages of a conflict have also used qualitative research to come to their conclusions - such as Joan Esteban and Gerald Schneider who looked at polarization within a conflict (131-138), or Lewis A. Coser who tried to use theories of Karl Marx and class struggle to look at the role of class conflict. (197-205).

Other authors who have attempted to use quantitative data such as Paul R Pillar (not present in the literature review) use quantitative methods to attempt to determine why a conflict ends but only from the perspective that it ends due to negotiations between warring parties as opposed to any other means. (3) Pillar argues that while quantitative data does provide a lot of insight into a certain phase it is also extremely limited to a single focus depending on the research question. (Paul Pillar, 3-4) Furthermore, author Geoff Coyle argues that uncertain principles that often appear in system dynamics make it difficult to show clear and understandable results because not everything is known (226-227); Coyle therefore argues that inaccurate data can result in incorrect conclusions. Accordingly, since these theses cover a large number of topics and various stages of a conflict which may contain uncertainties, focus on a qualitative research paper was better suited.

A final argument why the authors of these theses have used qualitative as opposed to quantitative research is due to all these theses having to be compared to one another and

discovering if there are factors or incidents in each case study which resulted in similar or different outcomes. As author John Gerring argues, the only way to do so properly is via the method of "qualitative comparative analysis" which stipulates that if comparing multiple non-linear case studies, qualitative research methods are best suited. (4)

3.3: Historical Case Study Analyses

Having established why these theses use qualitative research to study each conflict it will now be explained what type of qualitative research we used. In all three theses, historical case study analysis was used in order to compare historical conflicts to one another. As cited by Jack S. Levy, "(Alexander) George argued that case study researchers should adapt the method of the historian but convert descriptive explanations of particular outcomes to analytical explanations based on variables" (2). Levy further cited George by arguing that a case "is an instance of a class of events" and a case study as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events." (Levy, 2) Falling in line with the definition provided by Alexander George, the three theses all follow a similar pattern, choosing a historical episode and then observing and analysing to see if there are various different or similar comparisons between each of the events. Furthermore, as these theses focused on various historical phases, the changes and comparisons need to be made over time.

Additionally, to further expand on comparing various historical case studies, all three theses fall in line with the definition given by Ingo Rohlfing, who states "…the key elements of Comparative Historical Methodology are: it aims to provide comprehensive explanations of outcomes in specific cases; it has a particular emphasis on well-crafted concepts and valid measurements…" (16-17) This is done during the joint analysis section of the theses where all three cases studies are observed and explanations of the various outcomes are provided.

Therefore, historical case studies provide the necessary tools towards these theses to provide thorough analysis and come to comprehensive and comparative conclusions in regards to all three conflicts.

3.4: Analytical Framework

Understanding conflict dynamics

To fully understand conflict dynamics, broad research was conducted to learn about previous studies and academic ideas. The literature review presents a brief overview of what the authors of the theses believe to be the most important literature into the study of conflict dynamics.

Using the model presented by Eric Brahm where he outlines the various stages of conflict, the literature is split up to highlight the different phases of the conflict, which the author of a certain text attempts to explain. (2003) By doing so a clearer picture is presented which highlights the research already done within the study of conflict dynamics and what issues arise during each conflict phase, which makes it move onto the next phase in the model. For example, Esteban & Schneider focused heavily on polarization and how larger and larger splits within society resulted in hostility towards each other therefore escalating a conflict. (2008). Meanwhile, other authors such as William Zartman focused on the ripeness theory and when hostilities eventually turn towards a stalemate in a conflict. (228)

By exploring the different phases and the literature attached to them, a clearer understanding of conflict dynamics can be given. By doing so, a structured analytical framework can be created. In the case of the three theses, the analytical focus was placed on three actors within the conflict: The context, the state, and the non-state actors.

Structure Analytical framework

The analytical framework was split up into three categories: The context of a conflict, State actors and Non-state actors. Depending on the conflict and the theory, different factors were placed within each of the three categories. For example, in regards to the context of the conflict following the theory of polarization by Esteban & Schneider, social cleavages and fractionalization were to be explored within each of the three conflicts and eventually compared to each other (this will be further explained in the next section). Below you can see the full separation of factors within each of the three actors.

Factors of each actor (Diagram created by authors)



The Context

Why do conflicts begin, why do they erupt, and why do they end? Understanding this is imperative to understanding the drivers of a conflict and therefore answering the research question. The contextual factors highlight the underlying causes of a conflict and why a conflict may continue or end. The factors that are associated with the context of a conflict are in most cases underlying disagreements or dissatisfaction within society, and while Rappaport may argue that leaders make rational choices to go to war, there has to be a cause which encourages them to make that choice. (1) This brings to use the factors highlighted in regards to the context of the conflict.

Social cleavages

As mentioned previously, the idea of social cleavages and conflict came from the theories developed by Esteban & Schneider, who argued that with an increase in polarization within society the higher the chance that violence may occur within society. (133) They further expand on the idea arguing that religion, economics or ethnic factors may result in parts of society beginning to recognize themselves as independent or separate from mainstream society, which results in a higher chance of conflict occurring. (133) The authors of the three theses wanted to

observe whether this was in fact also the case in regards to the three case studies. Therefore, we began observing social cleavages within each of the three conflicts and whether these changed throughout the conflict, or if social cleavages were a driver of the conflict.

Popular Support

Another underlying context is popular support (or lack thereof). While social cleavages may provide the dissatisfaction with society it is leaders (according to Rappaport game theory) who decide to go to war and who make the choices during a conflict. (1) Furthermore, Mesquita & Siverson argue that leaders are the ones who may continue or maintain a conflict, in order to stay within political power and use all the tools necessary in order to accomplish this goal. (1995) Nevertheless, how does someone gain the power and tools to conduct a war or maintain one for that matter? One of the most important factors is manpower, and in order to keep oneself in power popular support from parts of the population. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how popular support or lack of popular support regarding the leaders of the state and non-state actors influenced and drove the conflict further.

Grievances

Collier & Hoeffler established that grievances play a significant role within a conflict. They argued that severe grievances, such as high inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions in society are sufficiently acute enough that people are willing to engage in violent protests. (563) Similar to polarization and social cleavages, established by Esteban & Schneider, grievances play a role in the polarization of a society and therefore the creation of social cleavages. Nonetheless, unlike social cleavages which splits up society based on ethnicity religion etc, grievances focus especially on criticisms towards the state or non-state actors. Therefore, it is important to see how grievances played a role and whether or not conflicts end once these grievances are addressed within a conflict.

Local politics-National politics

As within any conflict, local or national politics may play a role in regards to the context of a conflict. Not addressing grievances by other parts of society, social cleavages and popular support all influence how politicians react to moments within a conflict. One theory, which rings especially true, is the power dependence theory that argues if there is an imbalance of power between the warring parties a stalemate with a conflict may or may not be broken. (Emmerson, 32) (Vallacher, 38). Another theory that relates to local and national politics is the

concept of spoilers, where leaders who believe a peace process may threaten their power undermine it through violent means. (Stedman, 369) Consequently, it is necessary to compare and observe the impact which local and national politics has on the case study conflicts.

International politics/support

Besides local and national politics, conflicts may not only have an impact on the country itself but also on those around it – this results in international actors becoming involved. This can come in the form of external pressure, as described by Lake & Rothchild either through non-coercive intervention, coersive intervention, or third party mediation. (65) Depending on what form of internvetion, the conflict can move to various different phases and therefore influence the conflict as a whole. Thus, it has a need to be included into the study of conflict dynamics.

State

Separate from the context of a conflict, one of the main actors of a conflict is of course the state itself fighting against a non-state actor.

Coercive force

If we are to believe the writings of Thomas Hobbes in his book "Leviathan", then the state should have the monopoly on violence. Nonetheless, when citizens rise up against the state they may have to use this force to quell a conflict. This falls in line with Clausewitz's theory who argues that "an act of violence (is) intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will" (Williams, 188). In this case, to force the non-state actor to cease hostilities so that the state can maintain the status quo. It is necessary to observe whether or not coercive force by the state has an impact on conflict dynamics and the phases of the conflict. In doing so it can be established whether or not it is easier for states to look for policy solutions or to instead maintain pressure onto the non-state actors.

Policy solutions

As mentioned in the previous factor, besides from using coercive force in order to end the conflict, policy solutions, which address some of the factors regarding contexts, may be an alternative solution. Although, most theories such as ripeness theory (Zartmann, 288) deal with resolving a conflict through policy solutions, they mostly occur during a stalemate phase of a conflict. Nonetheless, policy solutions are an integral part when it comes to escalating or de-

escalation a conflict, and must therefore be taken into account when comparing the three case studies.

Capacity of State forces

In order for a state to conduct war it needs the capacity and manpower to actually conduct it. Although this factor does not relate back to any particular theory in the literature review, it is necessary to explore what the resources of the state were in comparison to the resources and capacities of the non-state actor. By doing so, a comparison can be done on the scope of the conflict, as well as how it influences the various different phases of the conflict.

Weak vs Strong government

Related to local and national politics, it is important to establish what sort of government was in charge during the various phases of the conflict, and if the government changed during these phases. In the literature review, weak governance has been argued to be the cause for a conflict to move from a latent period towards an emergent conflict if state institutions are weak and therefore unable to address underlying problems within society. (Hampson & Malone, 115). Nonetheless, it may also appear that if a strong government is unwilling to compromise it may result in a prolonging or extension of a conflict. Thus, once again it is necessary to explore this factor within the three case studies.

Non-State

Non-stat actors are the polar opposite of the state actors when it comes to internal conflict dynamics and have been split up into factors as labelled below.

Strategy of armed groups

The strategy of the armed groups involves how or via what measures a non-state actor hopes to accomplish its goals. Strategy according to the Duel Concern theory is where armed groups take certain actions depending on those conducted by the opposing actor (Robin Vallecher, 37). Armed groups may attempt to enter negotiated settlements, violent struggles etc. Nonetheless the strategy of armed groups does not always have to be reactionary, they may also at times follow their own strategy if there is the belief they may win a conflict. It is necessary to observe different ways in which different non-state actors attempt to obtain their goals in order to establish if there is a set pattern in how a conflict may be resolved.

Capacity of armed groups

Identical to state actors, non-state actors need capacity and manpower to conduct violent conflict. Again this factor does not relate back to any particular theory in the literature review, but needs to be explored nonetheless to make a comparison to the capacities of the state actor. In doing so, a comparison can be done on the scope of the conflict, as well as how it influences the various different phases of conflict.

Factionalization

Is the process of a group splitting apart due to social cleavages or grievances that may occur within a non-state actor's faction or group? In this process, similar to social cleavages that occur within a society, the group may split due to ethical, culture, religious, political etc. differences. Almost all theories related to social cleavages, as well as popular support play a role within factionalization of a group. However, unlike social cleavages and popular support which may increase the chances of a conflict occurring, factionalization may result in a decrease or increase in violent conflict between state and non-state actors, as infighting may remove them of the will to fight. It is therefore important to understand the group dynamics and the issues which play a role within non-state actors groups to create a better understanding of each of them and how they influenced conflict dynamics and phases.

Criminalisation

Criminalisation refers to the fact where different groups stray from their original goal in order to make profit from criminal enterprises. Although this is not explored among theories presented in the literature review, it is nonetheless an important aspect to observe and see if non-state actors move away from their original goal.

3.5: Method of Data-gathering

This research has two separate components, each component has uses a different method of data-gathering. The first component is the literature review, which is a collection of different methods, theories and viewpoints on studying conflict dynamics. By performing such a literature review one can find the most useful theory or method for studying conflict dynamics but also shows the huge amount of theories and escalatory factors available in the study of conflict dynamics. This huge amount of theories and factors gives many opportunities but also makes this research more difficult because one can overlook certain essential theories and

factors. The goal of this research is to combine all the used theories and factors in one general theoretical framework. This framework will consist of three dimensions which are: the state, the non-state and the context dimension. The ultimate aim of this research is to gain new relevant data and to add new insights in the overall resources of conflict dynamics. Finally, the second part will consist of gathering of data will be done by focusing on desktop research, gathering information from secondary literature like academic texts and research. But also primary sources will be used, like newspaper articles or biographies of persons who played an important role during the conflict.

Case Study Selection

Three cases are selected to show insight into the conflict dynamics. To make a visible comparison we need to discover similarities between the cases. All three conflicts are irregular armed conflicts and share the fact that it were conflicts between a state and a non-state actor. The non-state actors in the chosen conflicts are insurgent groups who aim to gain control over certain territory. The means to achieve this goal are often accompanied with guerilla and terrorist tactics. Furthermore, it was important that the conflict had a duration for longer than five years and that they were recent (after 1945).

The Peruvian Conflict

The Peruvian Conflict started in 1980 after the Maoist group Sendero Luminoso burned the ballot boxes during the elections. This action, largely ignored by the central government of Peru, was the start of many other small-scale attacks in the rural highlands of Peru. The newly elected Peruvian government was still weak and inexperienced because of the previous military dictatorships and feared to use the army to crush Sendero. When the government did finally act with a brutal repressive campaign the conflict escalated significantly. The insurgents found many support by using the grievances of the local Indians in Peru who were ignored and badly treated by the racist central government. As a result of both this big base of support, a clear strategy, a strong leader and a weak government apparatus the Peruvian state collapsed into conflict with the insurgents even appearing to win during the end of the 1980s. The war would last almost 20 years, although there the fighting largely stopped after 1993, there were still some large attacks. By 2000 most of the leaders and supporters were captured or killed, but the group still remains at large in Peru, even in present day.

The Peruvian state has a long colonial history. The area of present Peru was discovered by the Spanish in the 16th century and would result in the occupation by the Spaniards for almost three centuries. Although Peru already became independent (1826) quite long before the internal conflict started, the root of this war can still be traced back to the effects of the time under Spanish Colonial Rule.

The Rhodesian Conflict

The Rhodesian conflict started in 1965 after Ian Smith declared Rhodesia an independent nation to the British public and the citizens of Rhodesia. This move was met with a lot of resentment both internationally and nationally and it was expected that this new state would soon fall. However, this did not happen at all and what followed were fifteen years of brutal conflict between the largely white Rhodesian army apparatus and the two black rebel military groups : the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIRPA). During the first years the black rebel groups were no match for the much more experienced and funded army of the Rhodesian government and were crushed during the fighting. However, the Rhodesian armed forces were not able to deliver a final blow to the rebel forces which were becoming more and more organized and internationally funded which led to a significant increase in fighting and led to a stalemate. After this short-lived stalemate the fighting reached a new level of intensity not seen before in this conflict, leading to the final defeat of the Rhodesian government which was followed by Mugabe coming to power in 1980.

The conflict of Rhodesia can be seen as an indirect result of the British decolonization of its African colonies during the 1950s and 1960s and the coming into power of black majority rule governments. Another interesting aspect of this conflict is the constant escalation of the conflict and the sudden and unexpected end during the most intense part of the conflict in 1980.

The Troubles

The Troubles, or internationally known as the Northern Ireland Conflict was a thirty-year conflict that started after a civil rights march in 1968 and ended after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The main reason for the conflict to emerge was the status of Northern Ireland as part of Britain instead of being part of the Republic of Ireland. Although often regarded as religious conflict, it was territorial conflict. During the conflict all parties, the republican and loyalist paramilitaries, the British security forces, were all guilty of killings

which eventually would reach the number of 3600 killed and 50.000 wounded when the conflict ended in 1998.

The conflict went on for almost three decades and would spread to Great-Britian, the Republic of Ireland and even Gibraltar. Especially the bomb-attacks from the IRA would leave a significant impact on this conflict. Finally, this conflict is interesting because, in comparison with the other two conflicts, there were multiple attempts to find a political solution to the conflict. Although this often failed, it would eventually succeed with the Good Friday Agreement which brought an end to the Troubles and resulted in Northern-Ireland remaining part of Britain. (BBC History, 2016).

4: Individual Masters Thesis

Escalation and de-escalation during the Troubles in Northern Ireland

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S1217240
Masters Thesis: Capstone Conflict Dynamics
Dr. Alastair Reed
Word count: 32193
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5: Introduction Case Study the Troubles 1966 - 1998

This case study is about the Northern Ireland conflict from the mid-1960's until 1998, which is better known as 'the Troubles'. With the death toll exceeding 3.600 and with an approximate 50.000 injuries, the violent thirty-year-long Troubles would have a major impact on everyone living in Northern Ireland. In order for one to truly grasp the magnitude and intensity of the Troubles it is important to think in terms of proportionality instead of absolutes. Seeing as Northern Ireland had a population of around 1.6 million during the conflict, 0.22 per cent of the population has been killed and almost 2 per cent injured during the Troubles (Dixon, 2008: 28). When these figures are extrapolated to for example the population of the United States, over 600.000 would have died and almost 9 million would have been injured which amounts to more than the United States endured during World War II (Hayes & McAllister, 2005: 601).

The Troubles did not erupt at any specific date, but emerged after a series of incidents between Catholics and Protestants during the 1960s. The conflict, however, has much older roots as the conflict can be traced back to the conflict over Irish territory that began with the Anglo-Norman invasion of 1169 (Hennessey, 1997: 1). The Plantation of Ulster in 1603 created a division between British Protestants and Irish Catholics that would lay at the basis of the Troubles (Darby, 1995; Dixon, 2008: 3). This is because the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the two competing national identities that go with it, were the main drivers of the Troubles. In essence the Troubles are a conflict between two conflicting parties, the unionist and the nationalists. The unionists are mainly Protestants of British descendant that want Northern Ireland to stay within the British union. The nationalists are mainly Catholic with an Irish identity that wish to see Northern Ireland become part of a United Ireland (Tonge, 2002: 1). Seeing as it was almost impossible to find a middle ground between these positions, the conflict dragged on for 30 years and ended with the Good Friday Accords in 1998.

This does not mean, however, violence was on a constant level during the whole conflict. It instead varied across the years and witnessed many escalations and de-escalations as can be seen below in Figure 1. On the basis of the figure a number of questions can be raised: Why for example did it take a few years before the violence really escalated instead of escalating directly after the conflict had begun. Why was the year 1972 by far the most violent year of the Troubles, but was 1972 at the same time the year which witnessed the first major de-escalation of the conflict? This is where the importance of this case study comes in as the aim and importance of this case study about the Troubles is that it will try to explain why and how conflicts escalate and de-escalate.



Fig. 1: Death Count per year during the Troubles[1]

From the crude statistics of death count during the conflict, escalations and de-escalations can be pinpointed. Knowing *why* a conflict escalates or de-escalates is, however, equally important to knowing *when* a conflict escalates and de-escalates. To get a greater understanding of the dynamics that played a part in the conflict this case study will delve into the Troubles and try to find out what happened during the conflict that caused it to escalate or de-escalate.

This research will do so by firstly describing the historical context of the Troubles after which the conflict will be divided into seven different phases which will all describe in detail the most important changes and events that took place and effected the conflict in an escalatory or de-escalatory way. Thereafter the dynamics of the conflict itself will be analysed by means of an analytical framework consisting of fourteen different key factors that can explain the escalation or de-escalation of the Troubles.

[1] Statistics found on: http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html

6: Background to the Conflict

The Norther Ireland conflict, called the Troubles, from late 1960 until 1998 is what this thesis is about. The conflict over Irish territory is, however, one that has been going on for centuries. In order to understand how the troubles originated it is therefore important to trace the historical path that led to the situation to when the troubles began. This will be done by chronologically explaining some of the most important events in British-Irish history.

Explaining nationalism and unionism

Before going into the background of the conflict, it is important to explain the conflicting parties in more detail. As was stated before, the Troubles was mostly a conflict between the unionists and the nationalists in which the unionists are mainly Protestants of British descendant that want Northern Ireland to stay within the British union and he nationalists are mainly Catholic with an Irish identity that wish to see Northern Ireland become part of a United Ireland (Tonge, 2002: 1). Another important distinction needs to be made, however, because just as unionist and nationalist are divided, these two groups are divided on the analysis of the conflict themselves as well. A somewhat contested distinction is made here between nationalists and republicans where nationalist refers to someone that aspires a united Ireland, but opposes the use of violence to achieve it and republican refers to someone who aspires the same, but is willing to use violence. Republicans can therefore be regarded as hardline nationalists (Dixon, 2008: 6). Another distinction is made between unionists and loyalists. The term unionist is described here as someone who wishes Northern Ireland to stay within the British union, but is opposed to the use of violence to preserve the union and loyalist refers to unionists who are willing to employ or advocate violence to defend the union (Dixon, 2008: 13).

Ireland's Woes

Seeing as the troubles in Norther Ireland became a conflict over territory, it is not surprising a historical debate exists between nationalists and unionists over which group has the first claim to Northern Ireland as this can be used to legitimate their political claim (Dixon, 2008: 2). The Anglo-Norman invasion of 1169 and the subsequent domination of England over Ireland until 1920, is often pinpointed as the beginning of Ireland's woes. It was not until 1603, however, before the conquest of Ireland was complete. What followed was the plantation of Ulster in 1609 which would have a significant effect on Irish-British relations (Dixon, 2008: 3). The Norther Ireland province of Ulster, which used to be a stronghold of Gaelic culture, was colonized by British, often Protestant, people who were offered land, while the native Catholic

Irish were dispossessed and banned to the mountains and bogs. A hundred years later Protestant settlers owned 80 percent of the land at the expense of the Catholic Irish. This plantation therefore saw the introduction of two opposing groups who differed on religious, cultural and territorial grounds (Darby, 1995; Dixon, 2008: 3).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth century the Irish rose up against the English Protestants multiple times, but they were defeated every single time which is why Protestant dominance endured. At the end of the eighteenth century the privileges of Anglican Protestants over Catholics grew as penal laws were passed to further establish British dominance in Ireland. These laws reinforced existing feelings of hatred between both communities and both groups used violence to defend themselves from the other (Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988: 24). This was followed by another attempt to get Irelands independence from England, but instead in 1801 the Act of the Union was passed which abolished the Irish parliament and integrated it into the British parliament (Dixon, 2008: 3).

During the eighteenth century both peaceful and violent attempts were made by nationalists to overthrow the union and fight English domination in Ireland. One of the most important movements in this regard has been the constitutional movement for Irish Home Rule. Meanwhile the unionists, who were mainly descendants of Protestant settlers during the plantation of Ulster, were afraid of a Catholic dominated all-Ireland assembly and resisted the Home Rule, seeing as they were a majority in Northern Ireland but a minority in all of Ireland (Darby, 1995; Dixon, 2008: 3).

Because of the first world war, the question of Irish Home Rule was postponed. In 1916, however, a group of republicans declared an independent Ireland. At first this Easter Rising failed, but when its leaders were executed, public opinion shifted which created sympathy for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin, its political wing, who demanded Irish independence (Darby, 1995). In 1918, the last all-Ireland elections took place which were clearly won by Sinn Féin. What followed was a War of Independence fought by the IRA against the British state to drive them out of Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 4). Caused by the escalating violence, the British government began considering permitting Ireland certain forms of limited Home Rule (Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988: 24). Meanwhile the unionists who were mainly Ulster Protestants, maintained their resistance towards a united independent Ireland as they feared becoming a minority. From 1918 onwards they were afraid they would not be able to stop Home Rule for Ireland and even threatened with secession of Northern Ireland from the British empire into a sovereign state if the British government would go on with its plans to provide Ireland with Home Rule. They furthermore wanted to ensure that when a Home Rule arrangement was

made, at least the Northern counties of Ireland would be excluded (Darby, 1995; Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988: 24).

When in 1920 the Government of Ireland Act was signed and came into effect the next year, Ireland had been partitioned. In the south of Ireland the Parliament in Dublin would have some power over twenty-six counties of Ireland. Northern Ireland was given its Stormont parliament in Belfast and would consist of six out of nine counties of Ulster where unionists would hold a clear majority although they only had majority in four out of six counties (Dixon, 2008: 4). Norther Ireland was created on the basis of demography, seeing as the boundaries of the Ulster region were redrawn. The six counties which now belonged to Norther Ireland were the biggest area in which a clear majority of the population wanted to preserve Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom (Darby, 1995); Tonge, 2002: 13). Roughly two third of the population was Protestant unionist while a third consisted of a Catholic, nationalist minority (Darby, 1995).

Fig. 2 Ulster coloured. Norther Ireland in orange and Republic of Ireland part in green. [2]

The partition of Ireland was meant to be an interim measure which would again be followed by reunification. The British were in favour of achieving Irish unity within the British empire while the Irish nationalists wanted a united Ireland outside the empire. Instead of creating unity, however, partition lead to more division between the majority Protestant Northern Ireland state and the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Free State (Dixon, 2008: 4).

[2] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ulster_counties.svg

For neither the nationalists nor the unionist partition was the preferred outcome. The unionists overcame their objections. Partition was viewed as being the least unfavourable option as they were afraid of being absorbed in a united Irish state in which they would be a clear minority (Tonge, 2002: 13). The nationalists on the other hand could not accept only being granted a weak governance as they wanted independence. The war of independence which was fought by the IRA until 1921 can be seen to be motivated by the lack of granted independence. In 1921 the Anglo-Irish treaty was signed in which the Irish Free State was created and granted the Belfast government greater autonomy. It was this treaty that confirmed the true partitioning of Ireland (Tonge, 2002: 14).

Politics of discrimination after Partitioning

As was mentioned earlier, with partition a Protestant, unionist majority had been created in Norther Ireland. Conversely, a discontented Catholic, nationalist minority was also present which viewed themselves as being trapped in an illegitimate state (Tonge, 2002: 19). Northern Ireland can therefore be regarded as an insecure state from within. Northern Ireland was, however, also threatened from outside as the Irish Free State laid claim on the whole island of Ireland as its national territory and the IRA extended their violent campaigns in order to acquire an independent united Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 4; Darby, 195).

The unionist majority was very afraid of these insecurities and therefore established control by discriminating against the Catholic, nationalist minority which would cause social cleavages and grievances. At the same time the British government wanted to diminish its involvement in the 'Irish Question' which is why it handed over responsibilities to the Stormont parliament and ignored the discrimination of Catholics in Norther Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 5).The notion of an 'Orange state' in which unionists fought for the self-preservation of their own population is a popular one (Tonge, 2002: 20).

Seeing as conflict within Northern Ireland after partition had resulted in over 400 killings and more than 2000 injured within the first two years, emergency legislation was almost immediately introduced. In 1922 the Special Powers Act was introduced which suspended regular legal processes. Internment, which is detention without trial, was also introduced in 1922 (Darby, 1995; Tonge, 2002: 20). Both procedures were mainly executed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the reserve police and 'B specials' (a part-time Protestant police force with a sectarian reputation) which all consisted of almost exclusively Protestant unionists. Nationalists excluded themselves from those forces, but were also unwanted. It comes as no surprise that most of the violence was therefore directed at the Catholic minority (Darby, 1995;

Tonge, 2002: 20). Further discrimination was mainly to be found in the areas of electoral practices, employment and housing.

Regarding electoral practises, many nationalists contend that discrimination was in-built seeing as the boundaries of Northern Ireland were specifically shaped as to give the Protestant unionist a majority that could not be challenged. Because of the proportional representation which the elections would have, the nationalist minority would be represented nonetheless. In 1922, however, the unionist government abolished the proportional representation system and replaced it with a first-past-the-post system for local elections and it did the same for parliamentary elections in 1929. This system clearly favoured unionist votes (Tonge, 2002: 21). What's more, unionist electoral dominance was reinforced by gerrymandering, which means manipulation of electoral boundaries, in areas where Catholics formed majorities (Dixon, 2008: 66; Tonge, 2002: 21). The result of this gerrymandered majoritarian system rendered the Nationalist party irrelevant which is why they employed long periods of abstention from Stormont. This abstentionism ended in 1965 when it became the official nationalist opposition (Tong,e 2002: 26).

As was mentioned earlier, employment discrimination was also a problem in Northern Ireland. Both systematic and non-systematic discrimination occurred and resulted in the fact that Catholic males were about "2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than Protestant males" (O'Duffy, 1993: 131). A couple of strands can be mentioned for this discrimination in employment. The first is that private employment was a problem as most of the employers were Protestant at the time and rather hired Protestants instead of Catholics (Dixon, 2008: 67). Public employment was also a problem seeing as nationalists did not seem to reach the higher levels of public employment (Dixon, 2008: 67). This was caused by the fact that local councils tended to exclude Catholics and the police services were seen as sectarian which is why Catholics did not want to work for them (Tonge, 2002: 23).

Housing was another way in which Catholics were discriminated against. Especially after the second world war competition over quality housing grew. Catholics, however, were disadvantaged because allocation of housing was arranged on the basis of ad hoc decisions which often favoured Protestants. Furthermore, there was a tendency of councils to preserve the already existing segregation between nationalists and unionists while nationalist were also sometimes allocated in highly unionist populated areas. Catholics were, however, also often

placed in the slum dwellings (Tonge, 2002: 23). As can be seen from the picture below, clear residential segregation existed between Catholic and Protestant areas.



Fig 3. Rough segregation in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry[3]

Besides residential segregation, social segregation was also present in Northern Ireland, although not always because of discrimination. Research has shown that at a very young age children started to develop sectarian attitudes and this can be ascribed to the fact that children followed their education in majority Catholic or Protestant schools which limited contact across the community (Dixon, 2008: 22; Tonge, 2002: 26). Both communities were also divided on social and cultural grounds as they attended different churches and played different sports (Dixon, 2008: 26). Integrationist theory suggests that contact between groups can mitigate inter-group violence by breaking down prejudices, clearly this did not happen in Norther Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 21).

As was mentioned earlier, the discrimination that occurred under the unionist regime all revolved around the threat of Northern Ireland being incorporated into a united Ireland in the future which they wanted to prevent at all cost (Tonge, 2002: 29). The 1937 constitution of the Free Irish State increased the unionist fear of a united Ireland as it declared that "the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas" (Tonge, 2002: 32). From this it can be deduced that the most important relationship from 1921 onwards

[3] (Dixon,2002: 25) Map 1.2.

was the one within the island of Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the rest instead of the relationship between groups within Northern Ireland (Darby, 1995).

This claim is also based on the fact that although nationalists were perceived by the unionist as being disloyal and rebellious, they actually were not so rebellious and determined to overthrow the Norther Ireland state between 1921 and 1968 despite the fact they were discriminated against (Tonge, 2002: 27). The period from 1922 until 1955 saw little challenge to the Northern Ireland state and the IRA border campaign from 1956 and 1962 was stopped because the nationalists in Northern Ireland showed too little support for their cause (Tonge, 2002: 30).

During the 1950s a Catholic middle class emerged as a result of free secondary education (Darby, 1995). At the end of the 1950s some wealthy Catholics were ready to accept the continuity of the Northern Ireland state. Despite this acceptance and the earlier mentioned passivity of the nationalist side to resist unionists, however, no real attempt was made by unionists to integrate them into society. Unionists did not dare to make concessions as they were afraid nationalists would only demand more (Tonge, 2002: 31).

O'Neil's Modernisation attempts

The relative peaceful 1950s were followed by a period in which both the nationalists as well as unionists debated what the best way forward would be. From the 1960s onwards instead of emphasising the relationship of both groups within the island of Ireland, the focus of the problems came to lay on the relationship between unionists and nationalists within Northern Ireland (Darby, 1995). In 1963 the moderate unionist Terrence O'Neil became prime minister of Northern Ireland (Darby, 1967: xii). O'Neil wanted to modernise Northern Ireland because traditional industries declined and unemployment rose. In his biography, O'Neil states the need for modernisation as he said: "We had all the benefits of belonging to a large economy…but we threw it all away in trying to maintain an impossible position of Protestant ascendancy at any price" (O'Neil, 1972: 67). Northern Ireland also felt pressure from London to reform both economic and political structures (O'Duffy, 1993: 134). O'Neil saw the possibility of introducing a more liberal way of governing in which the government would be more tolerant and co-operative towards the nationalists. This did not mean, however, nationalists were granted power-sharing in decision-making. It instead meant nationalists would be given some concessions which would ensure greater societal consensus (Tonge, 2002: 35).

The concessions O'Neil wanted to make towards the nationalists came in the form of a modest reform package that amounted in no way to assimilation politics. Moderate unionists

held the view that modest reforms would be enough to satisfy the nationalist Catholic minority. As a result, the reforms targeted local government discrimination but did nothing to try to reform housing, employment or policing (Tonge, 2002: 36). O'Neil was also not able to deliver more than modest reforms as this was already met with opposition from both inside and outside his political party. Other unionist had to be convinced his reformists politics would not mark an end to Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2002: 64).

At the same time as the unionist were leaning towards modest reform, the nationalist also began to take a different stance on the future. The growing, yet still small, Catholic middle-class that had emerged from the 1950s began to question the nationalist politics of abstentionism and non-cooperation with the unionist government. Meanwhile, the violent nationalism of the IRA had also failed to bring about a united Ireland (O'Duffy, 1993: 134). This non-cooperative way of politics had achieved nothing which is why other political strategies were proposed. Instead of abstentionism and rebellion, some critical nationalist recognized that reform could also help them. Some therefore came to see the strive for anti-partitionism as subordinate to gaining more immediate gains (Tonge, 2002: 36). This group therefore started to challenge the unionists dominance on British instead of Irish citizenship. This meant that instead of pursuing anti-partitionism which would certainly be put down as nationalist rebellion, they pressed on issues such as housing, employment discrimination and political representation (O'Duffy, 1993: 134).

The formation of the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) in 1964, marked the beginning of a civil rights campaign fighting for nationalists rights and raising consciousness for their cause. The CSJ was a non-violent group that raised the civil rights issue mainly by lobbying. Another feature of the CSJ was that it was purely aimed at civil rights issues and was not concerned with anti-partitionism politics (Tonge, 2002: 37). The forming of the CSJ together with the changes in the 1960 as mentioned earlier and changes such as the failed IRA's border campaign and the IRA pursuing a more political path, led some optimists to believe signs of reconciliation between the two communities was taking place (Dixon, 2008 69).

On the surface it seemed as though reconciliation took place, but simultaneously growing conflict and polarization were also brewing (Dixon, 2008: 69). Far from being dead, traditional nationalism had not disappeared and sectarian and nationalist sentiment were on the rise. Internal change was, however, still the main goal of nationalists (Tonge, 2002: 37). An example of the tensions that were still present between the nationalists and the unionists were the Tricolour Riots of 1964. The riots were caused by a nationalist election candidate who had put up an Irish Tricolour flag in his office even though at that time the flag was illegal. Pressured

by hard-line unionists, the unionist minster of home affairs gave the RUC the command to remove the flag. An intense confrontation was the result and at some point the deployment of British troops was even threatened (Boyd, 1969).

7: Phases of the Conflict

The conflict is broken down into seven specific phases. Each phase describes certain important developments that influence the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. The changing levels of violence during the Troubles can be seen in fig.1.

The first phase (1966-1969) describes how the civil rights movement takes politics to the streets after which the struggle is reframed into a nationalist anti-partitionist struggle and the British government is forced to send in the military. The second phase (1969-1972) covers the change from a policy of reform to a hardline security stance which alienates the nationalist population and drives them into the arms of the revived IRA. Loyalist paramilitary groups emerge as a counter force and this phase witnesses the biggest escalation of the conflict after which the British government imposes direct rule. Phase three (1972-1974) sees the first major de-escalation of the conflict as a consequence of operation Motorman and this is followed up by the first power-sharing initiative which culminates in the Sunningdale Agreement that collapses almost immediately. In phase four (1974-1979) the British government wants to normalise the conflict by way of Ulsterization and criminalisation and as the IRA settles down for a long war the conflict witnesses its second major de-escalation. During phase five (1979-1988) the propaganda war becomes important as IRA members start a hunger strike in prison. When Bobby Sands, a convicted IRA member, is elected as an MP, the IRA begins its twin track of participating in politics through Sinn Féin while it also continues its military campaign. This period also sees the British and Irish government approach each other which culminates in the governmental Anglo-Irish Agreement. In phase six (1988-1994) the second peace process begins. Although this phase sees an increase in loyalist violence, the period ends with a major de-escalation as the IRA invokes a ceasefire after the British and Irish government published the Downing Street Declaration. During the last phase (1994-1998) the IRA revokes its ceasefire because of a decommissioning deadlock. When in 1997 Tony Blair is elected prime minister, he pulls the IRA back into the peace process and in 1998 the Good Friday Agreements is signed which causes another major de-escalation of the Troubles.

7.1: Phase 1: From civil rights to politics in the streets (1966 – 1969)

This phase of the conflict sees the establishment of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign which moves the conflict from a latent stage into the conflict emergence stage by challenging the longstanding discrimination, inequality and uneven access to political power. Once the movement begins taking politics to the streets, protesters clash with the police, riots erupt and descend into violence and the struggle for civil rights is reframed and reshaped into a nationalist anti-partitionist struggle as nationalistic feelings resurface among nationalists. During the Battle of the Bogside the conflict escalates and when it became clear the RUC was unable to handle conflict, the British army comes in and temporarily ends the violence.

In and outside pressure on O'Neil: the failure of delivering civil rights reform

As was mentioned at the end of the context part, nationalism was very much alive in the mid-1960s. The commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Risings in 1966 for example were celebrated with an intensity that could barely be allowed by the state (Dixon, 2008: 69; Tonge, 2002: 37). Even though the IRA had shifted its emphasis towards a political struggle, recruitment was growing again and it prepared for a military campaign (Purdie, 1990: 10, 31).

A reaction from hard-line unionists was therefore not very surprising. The moderate O'Neil was challenged by Protestant fundamentalists. Especially by Ian Paisley who formed the new Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC) which also established a paramilitary wing called the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966 (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 4; Dixon, 2008: 78). O'Neil was seen as being too soft for the nationalists by implementing his reforms (Hugh, 2011, chapter 3). In their view someone had to fight for Northern Irelands preservation as part of Britain as they feared it was being undermined (Faulkner, 1978: 43). They furthermore saw the IRA as a real danger of this view and they therefore pledged that "from this day on we declare war against the IRA and its splinter groups" (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 4). Almost immediately the UVF became involved in discriminate attacks against Catholics. After two Catholics had died as a consequence of multiple attacks, the moderate Stormont government banned the UVF and the minister of Home Affairs concluded that "this organisation now takes its proper place alongside the IRA in the schedule of illegal bodies" (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 5).

At this stage, the conflict was still in its latent conflict stage in which longstanding discrimination, inequality and uneven access to political power exist, but are not yet really challenged by the nationalists. The conflict was, however, clearly heading towards the conflict

emergence stage (Brahm, 2003). The hopes of reconciliation between nationalists and unionist in the 1960s as mentioned before, would have needed conflict regulation by political elites that on both sides would be willing and able to accommodate each other (Nordlinger, 1972: 43). The willingness and ability of political elites to accommodate each other are influences by a history of elite compromise, which was clearly absent, and communal elite stability which absence will be described below (O'Duffy, 1993: 132).

The 1960s saw a breakdown of pure unionist hegemonic control and this led to fragmentation inside the unionist block (Buckland, 1981: 106-110). The unionists were internally fragmented and real differences existed between moderates and extremists. The leadership, in this case the O'Neil government, therefore had not enough authority to offer significant modernisation compromises to the nationalists as they feared unionist hardliners would take advantage of them (O'Duffy, 1993: 133). The loyalists were thereby allowed to derail conflict regulation initiatives and this is something that will also play a significant role in later phases of the conflict (O'Duffy, 1993: 135).

Outside pressure from Britain on the O'Neil government was also influenced by intra-group fragmentation. The British government saw nationalist feelings growing again and were especially afraid of a renewed violent IRA offensive that would make them reopen the Irish Question again and maybe even force them to deploy troops into Northern Ireland. This was something they wanted to prevent and they therefore put some pressure on O'Neil to put in place some reform measures in Northern Ireland. They could not pressure O'Neil too much, however, as he felt pressure from hard-line unionist from in and outside his party. The English Labour government feared that O'Neil would be replaced by hard-line unionists if they would publicly pressure him to announce reform (Dixon, 2008: 76,77). At the end of 1966 O'Neil did come up with a moderate reform package, but it was not enough to satisfy the nationalists as he had failed to gain adequate support for introducing the reforms the Catholics had demanded (Dixon, 2008: 77).

The creation of the civil rights movement

On 29 January 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was established. This civil rights movement demanded 'British rights for British citizens' and therefore appealed to a patriotic sentiment (Dixon, 2008: 95). A steering committee of 13 was elected from different nationalist parties which shows NICRA was essentially an umbrella association (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 5). In its constitution it emphasized "the association's character as a body which would make representation on the broad issues of civil liberties and would also

take up individual cases of discrimination and ill-treatment" (Purdie, 1990: 133). The association had five main objectives (Purdie, 1990: 13):

1. To defend the basic freedom of all citizens.
2. To protect the rights of the individual.
3. To highlight all possible abuses of power.
4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association.
5. To inform the public of their lawful rights.

These objectives confirm the fact that NICRA was a very moderate association at this stage and that it was only concerned with individual grievances and defending legal, social and constitutional rights. Militant protest or civil disobedience were therefore not things NICRA was concerned with in this stage (Purdie, 1990: 133). Another significant thing that was not included in its constitution was the demand for ending partition. The NICRA was not insisting on power-sharing capabilities within the Stormont government. Its aim was merely to be tolerated and treated in a fair manner after which political participation would follow. The aims of the NICRA can therefore be regarded as an extension of the modernisation programme O'Neil was in favour of (Probert, 1978). Another evidence of its lack of anti-partitionism was the fact that it used the term 'Northern Ireland' instead of referring to it as the 'six counties' by which they implicitly recognised the state. A hard-line civil rights movement nationalist summed up the core of NICRA in its first phase very well when he said that "NICRA was a reformist organisation, out for a limited change within the North, not an end to the northern state" (McCann, 1992: 179).

This first phase of the existence of NICRA is widely regarded as an ineffective period (Purdie, 1990: 133). After one and a half year NICRA changed course when some officers and members of the executive committee changed and the association was prepared to extend its actions into civil disobedience (Purdie, 1990: 134; Tonge, 2002: 37). It was in this phase that the association also began demanding that concrete grievances such as discrimination in housing, employment and electoral practises would be addressed. They did so through the following demands (Connoly, 1990: 50):

1. One man, one vote to be extended to local elections;
2. Cessation of gerrymandering;
3. Equitable housing allocations, via a point system;
4. Abolition of the Special Powers Act;
5. Disbandment of the 'B' Specials;

6. Introduction of complaints mechanism in local government.

From civil rights to protest marches

As was mentioned earlier, until now this phase of the conflict can still be regarded as the latent conflict stage. When the underlying grievances are strong enough, a trigger event can turn the conflict into the conflict emergence stage (Kriesberg, 2003). As will be shown below, 1968 saw such a trigger event which created protest action that eventually led to violence and what's more, it also saw the struggle for civil rights being reshaped and reframed into a nationalist anti-partitionist struggle (Kriesberg, 2003).

Austin Currie, a member of parliament (MP) for the Nationalist Party, already started in 1967 with campaigning for fair housing allocation. He did so by squatting, which is illegally occupying houses, and with this he set the first step towards civil disobedience. Currie believed direct action to be the only way nationalist could ever advance their position within Northern Ireland and he at the same time also believed Irish unity was inevitable (Dixon, 2008: 79; Tonge, 2002: 38).

In June 1968 Currie was involved in what became a trigger event that fuelled Catholic resentment and let to the first protest marches. On June 19, Currie raised a question to the Stormont government on a specific case about the allocation of a house in Dungannon. The house was allocated to a nineteen-year-old unmarried Protestant woman, who happened to be the secretary of a solicitor that also was a Unionist parliamentary candidate, instead of to a homeless Catholic family that had been squatting there. More cases like this one existed, but Currie made this case widely publicized as he himself also squatted the house in order to draw attention (Dixon, 2008: 79; Purdie, 1990: 135; Tonge, 2002: 38).

In this stage the civil rights movement began to believe that constitutional measures to redress their grievances would not get the job done and they therefore started to take politics to the streets (Purdie, 1990: 3). In July, the executive committee of NICRA held a protest meeting in which Currie proposed to stage a protest march from Coalisland to Dungannon that would end with a rally on the Market Square of Dungannon. The committee was hesitant at first, but in a later meeting agreed to the first civil rights march which would take place on 24 August 1968 (Dixon, 2008: 79; Purdie, 1990: 135). The RUC at first agreed to the route of the march, but when Ian Paisley announced the Ulster Protestant Volunteers would counter-demonstrate at the same time and place, the police wanted to re-route the NICRA march to only those parts of the city that were Catholic. NICRA, however, refused this re-routing as this would have implied the march to be a sectarian one, which it was not (Dixon, 2008: 80; Purdie, 1990: 135).

Both demonstrators and counter-demonstrators were kept apart by the RUC, but a group of young demonstrators tried to attack the UPV demonstrators that were challenging them. The RUC, however, managed to contain the trouble and the NICRA platform dissuaded the civil rights supporters from trying to attack the UPV again by reminding them they were demonstrating for civil rights. Some NICRA marchers, including the MP Gerry Fitt, however, testified they were demonstrating for both civil rights and a united Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 80; Purdie, 1990: 136).

The Derry march: slide into violence

A week after the first civil right march in Dungannon, NICRA was approached by the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) who wanted to organise a protest march in Derry. The DHAC was comprised of a coalition between nationalist radicals and the left wing of the Northern Ireland Labour Party or NILP (Purdie, 1990: 138). The NILP was a labour party that attracted both Protestants and Catholics and wanted to move towards a cross-communal direction (Dixon, 2008: 71). NICRA agreed to the march which would take place on 5 October 1968, but they did so without sufficiently taking into account the special circumstances in Derry (Melaugh, 2016). These special circumstances were mostly comprised of fierce resentment felt by the Catholics in the city because of the worst cases of gerrymandering in whole of Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 80; McCann, 1993: 83-118; Melaugh, 2016). According to McCann, an important member of DHAC, in 1968 (McCann, 1993:83-118):

> "(the DHAC's) conscious, if unspoken, strategy was to provoke the police into over-reaction and thus spark off mass reaction against the authorities. We assumed that we would be in control of the reaction, that we were strong enough to channel it. The one certain way to ensure a head-on clash with the authorities was to organize a non-Unionist march through the city centre".

The DHAC therefore pressed for a route of the march that would run straight through unionist Protestant territory which they believed to be unheard of and would create opposition (McCann, 1993; 83-118). NICRA nonetheless agreed to the route as it did not want its marches to be seen as sectarian. This did not, however, mean NICRA would defy the police as they would probably want to prevent actual confrontation as they had done in their first civil rights march (Purdie, 1990: 139).

On 3 October 1968 the Minister of Home Affairs re-routed the civil rights march in Derry as they banned them from the city centre because the Protestant Apprentice Boys wanted to march on the same route that same day which could cause trouble (McCann, 1993: 83-118;

Purdie, 1990: 140). As a result, NICRA actually did not want to proceed with the march, but as DHAC stated they would go on with the march either way, NICRA members were swayed (Purdie, 1990: 140).

The march of 5 October was attended by 400-600 marchers who dared to defy the ban. Before the march had really begun, however, the police already intervened and stopped them from going into the city centre. At first the crowd was attempted to stay peaceful and to walk away, but at one point some protesters started throwing things at the police after which the police advanced on the crowd using physical force (Dixon, 2008: 80; Purdie, 1990: 143). In the Bogside, which is a Catholic dominated neighbourhood just outside the city centre of Derry (See Figure 3), a general violent confrontation between the RUC and young Catholics who had not been part of the march was what the march escalated into. Both the leaders of the march and the leaders of the police could not control their people which is why the march escalated into violence (Dixon, 2008: 80; Purdie, 1990; 143).

From civil rights to sectarian violence

The escalation of the march of 5 October had a strong effect on the Catholics living in Northern Ireland. Before the Derry march it was hard to speak of an actual civil rights movement as it only consisted of a small collection of groups of activists in certain areas of Northern Ireland. The 5 October march, however, transformed the movement to all parts of Northern Ireland where a Catholic population lived (Purdie, 1990: 155). Many more Catholics therefore became involved with the civil rights movement. Maybe surprisingly, the radical DHAC was marginalised while the moderate Catholic population established the Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC) whose interest were modest and restricted to civil rights. They furthermore did not want the movement to escalate into violence and tried to fight for their civil rights in a disciplined manner (Dixon, 2008: 81). Until the end of 1968 the DCAC did a good job of organizing demonstrations in a controlled setting, but thereafter it failed to manage its followers that responded violently to unionist provocation. The RUC was also not powerful enough to control the huge marches, containing 15.000 protesters (Purdie, 1990: 194).

The reforms that were announced by O'Neil following the 5 October Derry march were not able to halt the deteriorating circumstances. (Tonge, 2002: 38). This was because he was "neither able to persuade unionism of the necessity for reform nor to deliver sufficient concession to the civil rights campaign" (Dixon, 2008: 90). This corresponds to what is said about the conflict emergence stage, which is that modest reformist goals are now seen as inadequate and modest reform programmes are therefore not enough to stop the disintegrating

circumstances (Kriesberg, 2003). O'Neil was unable to quickly address all the demands of the civil rights campaign because of the split in unionists camps, which is why some nationalists claimed that equality would not be achieved within the current political system and violence was therefore regarded as necessary (Fitzduff & O'Hagan, 2009). In fact, since the beginning of 1969 the conflict became more sectarian in nature. When in January 1969 the B specials violently attacked the People's Democracy march from Belfast to Derry and the RUC did little to stop them, the debate on civil rights shifted towards state's security reform. As another consequence, nationalists created "Free Derry", which was an initiative to organise vigilante committees that were ordered to defend the nationalist Bogside area around Derry by preventing the RUC from entering (Dixon, 2008: 82).

What followed was a 'marching season' in Ulster in which hundreds of protest parades were undertaken (Tonge, 2002: 39). Seeing as the DCAC was no longer able to control every march, many of them ended in riots and violent confrontation with the RUC. Especially young rioters could not be contained and the political agenda was drifting away from civil rights towards the commitment of defending nationalists territory and attacking the RUC. It therefore became clear that old nationalistic feelings were resurfacing again among nationalist (Dixon, 2008: 82; Ó Dochartaigh, 1997: 45). The struggle for civil rights was thus reshaped and reframed into a nationalist anti-partitionist struggle (Kriesberg, 2003). This nationalist, sectarian tone of some civil rights supporters in 1969 is clearly shown by a comment of McCann (Dixon, 208: 82):

> "the cry 'get the Protestant' is still very much on the lips of the Catholic working-class. Everyone applauds loudly when one says in a speech that we are not sectarian, we are fighting for the rights of all Irish workers, but really that's because they see this as the new way of getting at the Protestants".

Battle of the Bogside: escalation complete

From the beginning of the 'marching season' in January it became clear this could lead to further escalation of the emerged conflict. The first consequence of the marching season was that it increased turmoil within the unionist party. Prime minister O'Neil was forced to recognize the ineffectiveness of his reform programs and because of internal party differences he saw no chance of an increased reform package. Therefore, O'Neil resigned on April 28, 1969 and he was succeeded by the moderate prime minister Chichester-Clark who had beaten the more hardline Brain Faulkner in the UUP leadership election (Gillespie, 2009: xxiii).

This actual escalation of the conflict would eventually take place in Derry in what is called the Battle of the Bogside (Tonge, 2002: 39). On 12 August 1969, an annual parade consisting of 15.000 Apprentice boys closely passed the nationalist Bogside which had been barricaded by Catholics since January 1969. The march went on quite peacefully until in the afternoon the conflict escalated (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 38).

It is not precisely clear who started the violence, but it is clear that both the Catholics living in the Bogside and the RUC believed they needed to be on the defensive against the other group. Once the violence had started, a vicious cycle emerged in which increasing force was used up until the point certain violence was provoked which neither side intentionally wanted to use (Stetler, 1970). Nonetheless, it is known that the conflict started with people throwing stones at each other and the Catholics escalated the violence by throwing petrol bombs to the other side. The police reacted by charging into the Catholic area using armoured vehicles to breach the barricades of the Bogside. The nationalist, however, fiercely continued their resistance and around midnight the RUC used CS gas to restore order in the Bogside (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 38; Stetler, 1970).

Even though it became clear the conflict was escalating, the British Labour government did everything they could to prevent using the military as they feared this would lead to direct rule which they wanted to prevent. The Stormont government would have to exhaust all its resources before British troops would be send in to restore order (Dixon, 2008: 101).

Meanwhile, the NICRA executive had decided to increase pressure on the RUC by organizing demonstrations across all of Northern Ireland which led to the spread of disturbances across Northern Ireland. By doing so they had hoped to relieve some pressure on the Catholics fighting in Derry (Dixon, 2008: 83). The following day fighting continued in and around the Bogside, but sectarian fights also started in Belfast and in the rest of Northern Ireland which meant the conflict had escalated quickly. It is therefore argued that some republicans used the 12 August conflict as a way to bring down the very existence of Northern Ireland (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997: 116). In the evening of 13 August, prime minister of the Irish Republic, Jack Lynch, fuelled anti-partitionist feelings by saying in a radio and television broadcast (Deutsch & Magowan, 1937: 38; Stetler, 1970):

> "Recognising . . . that the reunification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it is our intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the six counties of Northern Ireland".

There is no doubt this statement increased unionist fears of a hidden civil rights agenda which fuelled the conflict. Unionists were furthermore afraid of an Irish invasion as Lynch had also argued in favour of a UN-peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland and he had moved Irish troops to the Northern Irish border. Nationalists on the other hand were encouraged by these statements and they "believed themselves within a whisker of a United Ireland" (Dixon, 2002: 83). This clearly shows that the civil rights movement for some had become an anti-partitionist struggle again. The fighting had continued through the night and in the morning of 14 August, RUC casualties had depleted the strength of the force to such an extent that recovery was not possible. Because of this, 8.500 B specials were called to report for duty. At the same time British prime minister James Chichester-Clark had asked British troops to assist. Around 5 am the British troops, consisting of the first Battalion of the Prince of Wale's Regiment of Yorkshire, had arrived in Derry after which the RUC and the B specials were separated from the Bogside and could return home. The British forces did not attempt, however, to enter the Bogside. While the British troops had temporarily ended the violence in Derry, in Belfast vicious sectarian riots erupted in which six people were killed and many more had to move out of their houses. British troops where therefore also ordered to patrol the streets of Belfast (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 39: Stetler, 1970).

7.2: Phase 2: From reform to security policy (1969 – 1972)

After the British troops are send in to restore order in Northern Ireland, they act as a neutral force that facilitates in bringing both conflicting parties together by way of reforms. Meanwhile the IRA resurfaces and becomes involved in the conflict. Once it becomes clear the reform strategy is failing, the British government securitizes the conflict. The hardline approach from the military and especially the failure of the Falls Road Curfew, the internment policy and Bloody Sunday further alienates the nationalist. IRA support and recruitment soars and violence escalates. As a consequence, violent loyalist paramilitary groups emerge and as the conflict escalates to a maximum at the end of the phase, the British government imposes direct rule.

Trying to contain the conflict

Initially, the nationalists were relieved to see British troops replace the RUC and the B specials as trust in both forces had collapsed and British forces were seen as neutral. As a result of British troops deployment, the conflict in Derry had temporarily ended (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 39; Stetler, 1970). The British army was not, however, specifically deployed to protect Catholics from angry unionists demonstrators or the RUC or the B specials as the government

was clearly instructed to not get sucked into the Irish Question again (Dixon, 2008: 101). The main reason why the Stormont government had asked British forces to intervene was the fact that the local police forces had broken down. Restoring order was therefore a main priority for the British. Another, interlinked, priority was changing and strengthening the local police forces in order for the British forces to withdraw again. One way of organising such a change was the policy of Ulsterization, which means "the replacement of British army personnel by locally-recruited forces" (Dixon, 2008: 105). This, however, only began to take shape in the mid-1970s.

On 10 October 1969 the Hunt Report was published and endorsed by British Home Secretary James Callaghan. The report recommended the RUC to continue as an unarmed civil police force while the B specials should be disbanded and replaced by a locally recruited part-time RUC reserve squad which would be under British control. The report furthermore recommended the RUC to increase its recruitment and especially recruit Catholics (Dixon, 2008: 106; Hunt, 1969). These measures were taken to relieve Catholic grievances, but it failed to recognize the importance of the police force for the unionist population in Northern Ireland. The conflict that had already existed between the army and unionist that resented British interference in Northern Ireland was exacerbated by the report and riots followed (Dixon, 2008: 106). What is more, in the early 1970s some Catholics indeed did joint the RUC, but by mid 1970s, 98% of the RUC was Protestant because the IRA intimidated Catholics so they would not join the RUC. As a consequence, the RUC was not trusted in Catholic areas which is why the British military in effect became the official police force in Northern Ireland (Enloe, 1980: 115; Tonge, 2002: 89). Seeing as almost no Catholics served in the RUC during the Troubles, the process of internalisation did not mature as the Protestant RUC was still policing Catholic areas.

In effect, it was perceived that the Northern Ireland police forces should be brought closer to the British police model. This view is endorsed by Callaghan who said that: "The underlying theme of the Report was that policing in Northern Ireland should become more akin to policing in the UK" (Callaghan, 1973: 113). The report was part of a wider British policy which believed that the key to resolving the Northern Ireland conflict was modernization. It was though the sectarian division would fade once Northern Ireland would become more 'British' (Dixon, 2008: 95). Already since the beginning of the 1960s, through indirect rule, the British government had encouraged the Stormont government to a programme of reform. With this, the government had hoped to avoid re-opening the Irish Question again (Dixon, 2008: 95). Seeing as they now were directly involved in Northern Ireland, they wanted the Stormont government to introduce such reforms that ensured Northern Ireland would be up to British

standards. The military was only to be 'borrowed' by the Stormont government after which a swift withdrawal was envisioned (Dixon, 2008: 102).

As was mentioned earlier, the British wanted to be a neutral force that could facilitate in bringing both conflicting parties together by way of reforms. In this, they had a delicate position as they needed to be sympathetic to the Catholic condition while at the same time not enraging the Protestants and risk a war on two fronts. Within a couple of days after the British military had intervened, the British government made clear to the unionist that Northern Ireland would remain part of Britain as long as its people and the government would want it to be. Together with the Stormont government they furthermore promised the nationalist Catholics they would try to ensure equal housing allocation and public employment. This was because it was hoped that when reforms were made towards British standards it could pacify Catholic grievances by endorsing some of the civil rights movements claims (Dixon, 2008: 103).

By the end of 1969 the civil rights movement had seen many wished reforms come true in a relative short period of time (O'Neil, 1972: 111). The English Labour government therefore started to believe their reform programme may be enough to mitigate Catholic grievances and stop the conflict from escalating (Dixon, 208: 107). The violence had, however, not stopped following the implemented reforms. As mentioned before, this was because the struggle for civil rights had been reframed into a nationalist anti-paritionist struggle in which conflicting national aspirations would be the dynamic the conflict revolved around (Kriesberg, 2003).

IRA revival

The revival of the IRA which had been diminished since its border campaign miserably ended in 1962, made sure unionist had to respond to the civil rights campaign. Until the end of 1969 the IRA had been weak, recruitment was almost vacant and military strategy and action were downgraded by its leadership. When in December 1969 the IRA leadership determined that Sinn Fein was allowed to end abstentionism and take part in the assembly of Ireland if they were elected, some critics formed the Provisional IRA and broke away from what was now called the Official IRA. The Provisional IRA members opposed ending abstentionism and as they overtook the Official IRA the politics of abstentionism was reinstated (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973:55; Tonge, 2002: 42). The Official IRA had been a left-wing organisation which emphasized the unity of the working-class and had a defensive military outlook on the conflict. The Provisional IRA on the other hand was a right-wing organisation which had a more militaristic stance. Both groups, however, continued to use violent tactics until the Official IRA announced a ceasefire in 1972 after which the Provisional IRA would become the

dominant group (Dixon, 2008: 10). Seeing as the Provisional IRA would become the most important republican organisation during the Troubles, this thesis will from here on refer to the Provisional IRA as the IRA.

As will be discussed in greater depth below, heavy-handedness from the British army towards the Catholic minority undermined their original welcome. As a consequence, nationalists became hostile towards the British troops while violent IRA activity led to even greater repression by which hostility grew even more (Tonge, 2002: 43).

Beginning of nationalist alienation

When the British army had arrived in Northern Ireland, they initially took a non-confrontational stance to both conflicting parties as they wanted to be a neutral force that could quickly withdraw once the reforms had eased the conflict. In time, however, it became clear the reform strategy was failing and violence persisted. More and more the reforms and the 'Briticization' of Northern Ireland seemed to be failing and Northern Ireland began to be seen as 'un-British' by some within the English Labour government (Dixon, 2008: 96).

As a consequence of the failing reforms, the conflict in Northern Ireland became more securitized. The reform programme that had been introduced by the Labour government had clearly not met Catholic grievances and set Northern Ireland to the road of normality. Consequently, the British army began using counter-insurgency policies like patrolling the Catholic populated areas as a way of enforcing order. It became clear, however, the army lacked the specific training to act as peacekeepers and they lacked the local knowledge and intelligence to perform targeted operations (Tonge, 2002: 40). Unsurprisingly the relationship between the army and the nationalists deteriorated rapidly because of the heavy-handedness of the first (Dixon, 2008: 109; Ó Dochartaigh, 1997: 167). Seeing as the reforms had not been successful yet, the patrolling army fuelled the fears of the Catholic population that instead of protecting them, the army was protecting the Unionist government. In April 1970, the first real conflict between British troops and the Catholic population took place in Ballymurphy, Belfast (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997). From a British viewpoint this was described as: "The troops were now being attacked by the people it was thought they were there to defend" (Dixon, 2008: 109). This resulted in a shifting outlook on the conflict by the British, who started to justify the creation of a more hardline security stance.

From reform to repression by the newly elected Conservative government

This hardline-security stance came about when in June 1970 the English Labour government was replaced by a Conservative government, which traditionally is seen as pro-unionist. The politics of newly elected prime minister Edward Heath would show a clear shift from reform to security policies (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973:66; Dixon, 2008: 111). According to some, multiple security policy mistakes as executed by the British army have contributed to the escalation of the conflict (Boyle & Hadden, 1994: 83).

The first major security policy failure was the Falls Road Curfew which would see a major backlash from the alienated Catholic population. On 3 July 1970, the army was searching for arms in a house on Falls Road, Belfast. After the search they were attacked by a nationalist group which resulted in heavy rioting. The army reacted with bringing in armoured vehicles and hundreds of troops entered the area which was being sealed off as a curfew was imposed at 10.15 am (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 68; Warner, 2006: 325). During the curfew, which was maintained for 36 hours, no one was allowed out of their house while the army was conducting a house to house search to find IRA members and arms. At the end of the operation five civilians had been killed and 60 had been wounded. This shows that the army was no longer willing to negotiate with the Catholic population about their dissatisfaction and hearts and minds were clearly not won. It had become clear that the army was no longer operating as a transitory police force and the violent way in which they had behaved themselves had broken Catholic goodwill towards the army (Warner, 2006: 327). Ó Dochartaigh puts it nicely when he says that "waging a counter-insurgency campaign was busily burning the bridges to the Catholic community in Derry and Belfast which had been built through negotiations in the first weeks after their arrival" (1997).

As a result, nationalists therefore more and more became estranged from the army and IRA recruitment increased. Many people who never supported the IRA cause were now willing to give their approval to the IRA (Warner, 2006: 336). At the beginning of 1971 both the official and the provisional IRA were increasing their offensive attacks against the British army. This was because both groups believed a short, intense war could quickly result in a United Ireland. British prime minister Heath was therefore asked by Northern Ireland prime minister Chichester-Clark to reassure unionist by imposing a more repressive security regime (Dixon, 2008: 112; Tonge, 2002: 43). When Heath declined, Chichester-Clark resigned on 21 March. On 23 March he was succeeded by Brian Faulkner who was a hardline unionist that favoured a policy of aggression (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973:98; Dixon, 2008: 112; McGuffin, 1973).

The failure of internment: major escalation

From the beginning of Faulkner's appointment, it became clear the prime minister wanted to introduce internment, which is detention without trial. The army was against the introduction of internment as they feared they did not have enough intelligence to get the right people. Faulkner, however, was determined to introduce internment (McGuffin, 1973). The British government initially did not want internment to be introduced as they feared it would result in an escalation of the conflict that could have direct rule as a consequence (Dixon, 2008: 112). Nonetheless, Falkner persuaded those that resisted and started operation internment on nine August 1971. This internment operation came to be known as one of the most disastrous operations of the entire Troubles as it reinforced hostilities between the Protestant and Catholic communities and enabled the conflict to escalate to a maximum (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973:118; McGuffin, 1973).

Militarily wise, initial internment was a total failure as IRA members were aware it was coming and went away from home. Further along the line it became clear the military lacked sufficient intelligence. Six months of internment had let to 2.357 arrested people of which 1.600 were completely innocent (McGuffin, 1973). Not only was internment itself a failure, it also had far-reaching escalatory effects on the conflict as it ended any remaining hope of nationalist co-operating with the Stormont regime (Dixon, 2008: 112). Catholics were enraged because internment was mostly directed at Catholics, many innocent men were interned and those that were detained were also being treated badly. All in all internment was clearly a measure that constituted communal punishment (Dixon, 2008: 112; Tonge, 2002: 44).

After internment was initiated, the army was primarily concerned with collecting intelligence and evidence on IRA activities so that IRA members could be interned. Seeing as the army lacked proper intelligence collection, however, they had to apply regular house searches, personal stop-searches and arrests on the whole population of a suspected IRA area. This could only be done by a 'constant and systematic harassment of thousands of people within a clearly defined area' (Dixon, 2008: 113). Hillyard has estimated that these military tactics resulted in the arrest of one out of four Catholic men between the ages of sixteen and forty-four between 1972 and 1977 as well as the fact that between those same years on average every single Catholic household had been searched twice (Hillyard, 1988: 169). As one can imagine, this strongly alienated the Catholic population and drove them into the arms of the IRA which saw an enormous increase in recruitment. From 1971 onwards, IRA support therefore grew and

because they achieved a united front in favour of the armed struggle they could intensify their attacks (Dixon, 2008: 112).[4]

After the introduction of internment, the IRA furthermore was determined to acquire a united Ireland as quickly as possible and they tried to realise this by instigating and intensifying a vicious violent campaign to pressure the British government to withdraw from the conflict (Tonge, 2002: 43). Part of IRA tactics was therefore to specifically increase their violent offensive against the British army. As a consequence, from 1971 until 1975, apart from ordinary civilians, the British army was the group who sustained most losses as in this period the IRA was responsible for most killings (CAIN 3, 2016). As can be seen from the graph below, from all IRA killings during the conflict, most victims were from the British army.



Fig. 4: Approximate of who killed whom during the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 29).

Because of the increased IRA violence, Faulkner was pressured by hardliners to "crack down even harder on terrorism" (Dixon, 2008: 112). Although it is very difficult to precisely determine what exactly caused the conflict to escalate in 1971, from the sheer numbers of those killed in the conflict it can be argued that internment had a massive escalatory effect. Within the two years leading up to the internment procedures, 66 people were killed of which 11 were soldiers. In the seven months following internment, 610 were killed of which 134 were soldiers (Dixon, 2008: 112).

[4] See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/cgi-bin/tab2.pl for a cross-tabulation between the organisation responsible for the deaths versus the total deaths per year, to see the intensity of IRA violence.

Growth of loyalist paramilitary groups

The escalation that took place after internment was not only caused by conflict between the IRA and the army. Following the increased IRA recruitment, a growth of loyalist military groups within the working-class also emerged as they feared their position within Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 116). The first paramilitary Protestant group was the Ulster Protestant Volunteers which had already been established by Ian Paisley in 1966. In 1971 their example was followed as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was formed. The UDA was a force that attempted self-policing as the association had emerged from a mixture of local defence forces. The UDA had come to life in order to defend Ulster which is why its true loyalty lay with Ulster instead of Britain. In 1972 their membership had risen to 35.000 which is why it was a force that had to be taken into account and could not easily be banned (Tonge, 2002: 46).

Following the IRA offensive of early 1971, more loyalist groups emerged, such as the West Ulster Unionist Council, the Loyalist Association of Workers and most important the Ulster Vanguard. This last group was capable of mobilizing around 60.000 people at the same time for their rallies and they furthermore used both constitutional and extra-constitutional approaches. With this high popular support base, the loyalist paramilitary groups were able to follow the IRA's example of violent attacks (Tonge, 2002: 46). As can be seen from the table below, the loyalist militants account for 29.2 percent of the deaths of the conflict and were therefore one of the major players in the conflict.

	Percentages
Police/Police Reserve	1.4
Army	8.2
UDR/RIR	0.2
Republicans	58.6
Loyalists	29.2
Other	2.4
(N)	(3,670)

Fig.5: Agencies responsible for those killed, 1969 - 2001[5]

British direct rule imposed

From the early-1970s onwards, the British political elite was not as determined in their resolve to defeat the insurgents as they were before and after the introduction of internment and the following backlash, both the Labour and Conservative parties seemed to be more sympathetic towards Irish Unity (Patterson, 1986). British withdrawal and Irish unity therefore became a

[5] (Hayes, McAllister, 2005: 601).

scenario that was more discussed. This shift was also instigated by the fact that British public opinion had shifted towards withdrawal from Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 115). Some politicians in the Conservative government, however, feared withdrawal would result in bloodshed. They were partly right, as the IRA saw the signs of withdrawal which encouraged them to believe that when enough British soldiers were killed withdrawal would come. They therefore escalated their violent campaign throughout Northern Ireland and believed that 1972 would be 'The year of victory' (Smith, 1995). At the same time, loyalist forces also mobilized as they feared being driven out of Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 122).

Another major reason for the upsurge of anti-British sentiments, feelings of alienation and the consequently major escalating violence was the incident called Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972. On this day a peaceful nationalist demonstration against internment took place in Derry which escalated when the British army opened fire on the protest march and killed thirteen innocent Catholics (Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 2010 Volume 1; Dixon, 2008: 112). John Peck has said the following on the events: "Bloody Sunday had unleashed a wave of fury and exasperation the like of which I had never encountered in my life, in Egypt or Cyprus or anywhere else. Hatred of the British was intense. Someone had summed it up: We are all IRA now" (McKittrick & McVea, 2000; 76-97). Bloody Sunday caused a massive increase in IRA and other paramilitary group activity and the violence escalated massively. That day would mark a prelude to a year full of revenge attacks, shootouts and bombings that let to almost five hundred deaths which makes 1972 by far the deathliest year of the conflict (McKittrick & McVea, 2000; 76-97).

All of the aforementioned increased the feelings of the British government that the crisis was getting out of hand and Stormont was unable to address the high levels of violence in Northern Ireland. By March 1972, British prime minister Heath still considered firm security policies to be the way forward, but he at the same time believed Dublin should be involved in political initiatives to power sharing. Heath furthermore concluded that a cross-community government had to be built in Northern Ireland and as 'only direct rule could offer us the breathing-space necessary for building it' the Stormont government had to be replaced (McKittrick & McVea, 2000; 76-97). On 30 March 1972 the British government was forced to take responsibility in Northern Ireland and prime minister Heath announced that direct rule from Westminster was imposed on Northern Ireland by means of the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provision) Act (Dixon, 2008: 113; Tonge, 2002: 48).

7.3: Phase 3: The first peace talks: in search for a moderate silent majority (1972 – 1974)

This phase begins in the most violent year of the conflict. After the events of Bloody Friday, the British government decides to launch operation Motorman which dismantles the nationalist no-go areas from which the IRA planned their attacks and the conflict experiences its first steep de-escalation. Hereafter the British government proposes a power-sharing experiment in which a compromise was to be found by the moderate silent majority while the extremists were to be marginalised. In 1974 the Sunningdale Agreement is signed, but it is undermined and brought down by the IRA and the loyalist parties which were not included in the peace initiative.

Appeasing the nationalist parties

The British were forced, reluctantly, into direct rule which is why this was intended as a temporary measure while a new cross community system was devised. When the Stormont government was disbanded, William Whitelaw became the first Northern Ireland Secretary in the newly created department the Northern Ireland Office. Whitelaw's most important task was to create cross community talks by opening negotiations with the parties. In order to create space for political initiatives, he ordered the military to take a 'low-profile' stance in nationalist areas (McKittrick & McVea, 2000; 76-97).

The winning of hearts and minds was regarded as very important to create a safe environment for the Catholic population in which they would want to negotiate. Besides taking a low profile in nationalist areas the army was also not allowed to re-occupy nationalist no-go areas and the internment of Catholics decreased substantially after direct rule was introduced. Republican prisoners were also granted political status in order to defuse a hunger strike (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). With reaching out to the nationalists, the government and the army really had to balance a thin line as they wanted to prevent provoking another Protestant backlash which could result in a war on two fronts (Dixon, 2008: 116).

The appeasement of Whitelaw worked to some extent as some Catholics began to voice their dissatisfaction with the current levels of violence because they were fed up with the conflict and wanted a ceasefire (Dixon, 2008: 125). Throughout the first two months after direct rule had been introduced, the Official IRA continued with their intense violent campaign. This was, however, coming to an end. On 21 May 1972, the Official IRA murdered an off-duty Catholic British soldier after which widespread local protest followed (Smith, 1995**).** On 29 May they therefore announced a ceasefire as they believed "the overwhelming desire of the great majority of all the people… is for an end to military actions by all sides" (Dixon, 2008: 125). The ceasefire marked an end to the military wing of the Official Sinn Féin, although they

reserved the right to initiate operations in self-defence. In effect the Official IRA therefore only faded out by the end of 1973 (Smith, 1995). In 1975, the Irish National Liberation Army was formed by members of the former Official IRA who opposed the Official IRA cease fire. Although the organisation mounted an offensive against the Northern Irish security forces in was never able to become a substantial party in the conflict as the Provisional IRA remained the leader of the republican front (Dixon, 2008: 10).

Approaching the IRA

On 13 June 1972 Whitelaw was invited by the IRA to meet them in Derry to talk and negotiate. While Whitelaw rejected their approach, he did offer the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SLDP) the space to organise an IRA –British government talk as the government was anxious to learn what was possible. On 15 June the SLDP had arranged an agreement with both parties in which a secret meeting was scheduled and in which the Provisional IRA proposed a ceasefire from 22 June onwards. The Truce of 26 March as instigated by the IRA was a prelude to the secret talks between the British government and the IRA that would be held on 7 July (CAIN, 2016). When the unionist heard of the truce between the IRA and the British government they, however, feared this was the beginning of a sell-out by the British. The UDA therefore reacted by starting to organise barricades to establish its own no-go areas (Dixon, 2008: 117; McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

On 7 July 1972 the secret talks between the IRA and the British government finally started. The talks, however, failed and Whitelaw described them as follows: “The meeting was a non-event. The IRA leaders simply made impossible demands which I told them the British government would never concede” (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). As a consequence, the IRA ended the ceasefire and stepped up the escalation of their violence with vengeance. Meanwhile, the unionist were also alienated by the governments talks with the IRA and they therefore started to flock towards unionist paramilitary groups that also began killing on a large scale (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). What followed was a nightmare scenario in which the British army would face war on two fronts (Dixon, 2008: 117).

The violent year 1972

With the alienation of both the IRA as well as the unionist paramilitary groups, violence was escalating to a maximum in Northern Ireland. The year 1972 would be the deathliest year of the troubles with almost 500 fatalities, up to 5.000 injured people, 10.000 shootings, 2.000 armed robberies and almost 2.000 explosions (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). July 1972 was to

be the most lethal month during the conflict as almost a hundred people died. One of the bloodiest days in July was 21 July which came to be known as 'Bloody Friday'. On this day the IRA detonated twenty-two bombs in Belfast within 75 minutes. They thereby killed nine people and seriously injured 130 (Dixon, 2008: 118; McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97; Tonge, 2002: 44).

The British government, however, faced a dilemma as a less violent stance towards nationalists may have reduced alienation and therefore IRA popular support, but this could have the consequence of encouraging loyalist paramilitary groups to fill in the vacuum and increase their violent offensive (Dixon, 2008: 117). In the end it was felt necessary for the army to show the IRA violence did not pay. Bloody Friday therefore encouraged the British government to decide to launch Operation Motorman on 31 July 1972. The operation was aimed at dismantling and retaking the no-go areas in Belfast and Derry that had been drawn up by nationalist in 1969. The no-go areas kept the rest of the population out of the area and the IRA was able to plan and attack their opponents from within the no-go areas in which the army was unable to enter and stop the attacks (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997). Seeing as the IRA at the time was the main escalating factor in the conflict, removing the no-go areas from which they planned the attacks was important for limiting IRA capacity and de-escalation of the conflict. The operation was massive in scale as some 12.000 troop together with tanks and bulldozers were deployed. The fact that the operation was targeted, directly aimed and massive in scale made it differ from earlier operations. The mission was executed successfully and was a significant blow to the IRA as the no-go areas were indeed dismantled. Although it did not mark and end to the IRA campaign of violence, it did bring about the greatest de-escalating of the conflict (Bew & Gillepsie, 1993: 54; CAIN, 2016; Dixon, 2008: 118; McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97; Mulholland, 2002: 106).

Power sharing experiment: Finding middle ground while marginalizing the extreme forces

It was against the background of the aforementioned atrocities in which the British government wanted to try and find a political settlement. The power-sharing experiment was aimed at finding a compromise between the moderate nationalists and moderate unionists. The British government assumed a compromise could be found on the moderate centre ground on which it was thought a 'moderate silent majority' existed that was in favour of peace (Dixon, 2008: 123). The British government had a two-way approach in finding this moderate compromise. On the one hand it had to coerce the political elites (top-down) into an agreement while preventing the

alienation of either group and at the same time a bottom-up approach was initiated to promote reconciliation (Dixon, 2008: 124).

On 31 October 1972 the British government published a discussion paper in which it displayed its minimum requirements for a power-sharing settlement. It laid the basis of the governments approach the following years. Cross-community support was demanded as well as some executive power for minority groups. To calm unionists fears it was also stressed that the Northern Ireland border was not an issue. It also affirmed that Britain would not impede Irish unity and that its main concerns were peace and stability (Dixon, 2008: 129; McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). Another major point in the discussion paper was the acknowledgment that any settlement that could captivate cross-community support must have an 'Irish dimension'. The document declared that: "A settlement must recognise Northern Ireland's position within Ireland as a whole. It is therefore clearly desirable that any new arrangement should, whilst meeting the wishes of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, be so far as possible acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of Ireland" (Northern Ireland Office, 1972: Paragraph 76). With this the legitimate Republic of Ireland's interest in Northern Ireland was recognized as well as its importance in solving the conflict.

The next question was how inclusive or how exclusive the power-sharing settlement would be. The British government actually wanted the IRA to be part of the negotiations into a peace process, but the IRA was not interested in power-sharing settlement as they believed they could bomb Britain into withdrawal. In the following period the IRA therefore tried to kill as many British soldiers as possible, stepped up its bombing campaign and tried to bring down the power-sharing settlement in any way they could (Dixon, 2008: 126; McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97; Smith, 1995). It is therefore no surprise the IRA was ruled out of the peace process. The choice of not inviting hardline-unionists or paramilitary groups was a deliberate one as it was feared this could alienate moderate unionists as well as nationalists. The government therefore had "little alternative but to build peace on the moderate centre ground of Northern Irish politics, attempting to boost moderates while marginalizing the Provisional IRA and loyalist extremists" (Dixon, 2008: 1267,127).

Local elections 1973

The hopes of a silent moderate majority were encouraged by moderates themselves. Opinion polls also concluded that the moderate non-sectarian parties were gaining ground. The British government was therefore made to believe the moderates stood a chance of winning the elections. On 20 March 1973 the British government issued their White Paper entitled 'Northern

Ireland Constitutional Proposals' which discussed a devolved power-sharing assembly called the Northern Ireland Assembly which was to be chosen in the new elections (Dixon, 2008: 130). Because the moderates were thought to win at the elections, the British government started the power-sharing talks with only the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) and moderates from the UUP. The Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) was excluded from the negotiations at first because it could undermine the stability of the talks as the SDLP was in favour of Irish Unity (Dixon, 2008: 127).

In March 1973 local district council elections were held and at the end of June the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections took place. The British government hoped a strong centre, middle ground would emerge from these elections. Although the opinion polls suggested a clear win for the moderates, it was nonetheless very difficult to estimate seeing as the violence since the last election could have turned the support for each party around. The elections, however, proved to shatter any illusion of a moderate silent majority as an upsurge in hardline nationalist parties as well as the nationalist SDLP was overwhelming (Dixon, 2008: 128).

By insisting on and pushing for an Irish dimension the British government had alienated many unionist which feared British intentions. Unionist parties themselves were also divided however. Brian Faulkner and his moderate UUP had won 22 seats with which they were the biggest unionist party, but the other unionist parties that rejected the power-sharing initiative won a combined 27 seats which shows how divided the unionist parties were (McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97; Smith, 1995).

"The illusion of a moderate silent majority was shattered by the result of the elections" (Dixon, 2008: 132) as the SDLP had won almost the total nationalist votes while the NILP and the APNI won much less votes than was expected. As a result, the power-sharing executive had to consist of the APNI and the NILP as well as the SDLP and the UUP headed by Brian Faulkner if it were to achieve sufficient Catholic and unionist representation (Dixon, 2008: 133).

The power-sharing talks begin

The republicans as well as the loyalists were not involved in the power-sharing talks but they made their presence felt anyway as they continued their campaign of violence throughout the period of talks. In 1973 the death toll fell substantially when compared to the previous year. With 255 deaths, the death toll had almost been halved. The violence, however, continued and with 255 killings in one year it was a clear strain on the power-sharing talks (McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

When the Northern Ireland Assembly met for the first time on 31 July 1973 it was against this background negotiation had to take place (CAIN 2, 2016). Moreover, the talks were complicated by the fact that Faulkner and his UUP held the support of a minority of unionist which is why he was constrained by pressure from more hardline parties. Getting a deal with the nationalists without losing support from those hardline parties and alienating a large part of unionist population was therefore a difficult task (Dixon, 2008: 134).

Real negotiations were going on from 31 July onwards and were achieving a lot of agreement, but by November the composition of the executive and the Irish dimension were forming major stumbling blocks and it was feared the talks would fail. On 21 November, however, a breakthrough in the composition of the executive was reached. This paved the way for talks between the power-sharing Northern Irish parties, the British and the Irish government at Sunningdale between six and nine December 1973 (McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

Sunningdale Agreement

The Sunningdale conference was to a large extent an intergovernmental conference as the Anglo-Irish relationship was very important. The Sunningdale talks were mainly aimed at negotiating how the Irish dimension in the form of 'the Council of Ireland' would work and to settle the constitutional status of Northern Ireland (McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). On the latter, the Irish government met the unionists halfway as they declared: "that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status" (Dixon, 2008: 137). On the working of the Council of Ireland, Faulkner was totally outmanoeuvred, however, as the Council was given so much power that with a little imagination it could be seen as an all-Ireland Parliament. Faulkner did try to water down the agreement, but as the British government tried to be a neutral player and the Irish government went on full SDLP support, he was forced to accept a settlement which he could not sell to the other unionists (Dixon, 2008: 138; McKitrrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). Both the SDLP and the Irish government were aware of the fact that Faulkner was pushed too hard as an SDLP delegate had said: "Look we've got to catch ourselves on here. Brian Faulkner is being nailed to a cross. There is no way Faulkner can sell this" (White, 1984: 152).

The failure of Sunningdale

Despite the electoral win of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Vanguard Party, the loyalist parties had been excluded from participating in the Sunningdale talks as it was feared they would disrupt negotiations (Dixon, 2008: 136; Gillespie, 1998: 104). It became

clear, however, that the hardline unionists would disrupt the agreement either way as unionist overwhelmingly opposed the deal and rallied against it as they feared it would precipitate a united Ireland. These fears were also exaggerated by the fact that the Irish government failed to recognize the status of Northern Ireland and statements from the Irish government as well as from the SDLP that Sunningdale would be a prelude to a united Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 140,141).

As December was turning into January it was clear that anti-Sunningdale unionists were gaining support. Nonetheless, the Northern Ireland Executive was installed on 1 January 1974. On 4 January, however, the council of the UUP voted in favour of rejecting the Council of Ireland as proposed in the Sunningdale Settlement after which Brian Faulkner resigned as leader of the party. This in effect "ended the moral legitimacy of the Sunningdale deal and killed Sunningdale as an effective package" (Gillespie, 1998: 108). Faulkner had already represented a minority of the unionist population and now the population he represented was not even in favour of the Sunningdale agreement.

The creation of an anti-Sunningdale unionist party called the Ulster United Unionist Council (UUUC) was another sign of the failure of Sunningdale to find cross-community support (Gillespie, 1998: 110). In February 1974 a British General Election, in which the Labour government regained power, was called for domestic reasons, but is was also an indicator for measuring the support for a power-sharing commitment. The UUUC with its slogan 'Dublin is only a Sunningdale away', gained 51.1 per cent of the votes while moderate power-sharing unionist were obliterated in the ballot. Once again the moderate silent majority was outnumbered (Dixon, 2008: 142; Gillespie, 1998: 111).

Violence escalating again: the collapse of Sunningdale

The first couple of months of 1974 saw again a deterioration of the security situation as the IRA and loyalist unionist paramilitary groups put pressure on the executive. February and March for example had the highest number of explosions that entire year (Gillespie, 1998: 111). This was because the IRA escalated its bombing campaign in order to undermine the executive as it hoped the British would withdraw from Northern Ireland. The loyalists on the other hand were so alienated by the power-sharing initiative they brought down the Sunningdale Agreement with their 14-day long strike in May (Dixon, 2008; 144).

The Ulster Workers Council initiated their 14-day strike on 15 May 1974 after a unionist motion that condemned the power-sharing Council of Ireland was defeated on a vote (Anderson, 1994). The alienation of the Protestant community in the previous years was so strong that a large part of them supported the strike. The *Newsletter editorial* summarized the unionists

feelings adequately when it said that "unionists had, in recent years, been herded by the British government towards the edge of a cliff and had gone along with this until the point at which they were being asked to jump. During the UWC strike they were saying 'No"' (Dixon, 2008: 145).

At the beginning of the strike the British government had called on the moderate silent majority to stand up against the 'Protestant fascists' that were intimidating them. On the fourteenth day of the strike, on 28 May 1974, Faulkner and his unionist colleagues resigned and the executive collapsed after which direct rule resumed (CAIN 2, 2016). After the executive had collapsed, the British government turned its back on the moderates by distancing themselves from the responsibility of the collapse as they argued that its failure had always been inevitable (Dixon, 2008: 147).

7.4: Phase 4: settling down for a long war 1974 – 1979

After the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement the British government cultivates the idea they will withdraw from Northern Ireland and both the IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups turn to sectarian violence as they want to assert their predominance. The British government furthermore starts talks with the IRA. This gives them the opportunity to normalise the conflict by way of Ulsterization and criminalisation. The British military transfers powers to the RUC which professionalises and is now able to take on the militants. As a consequence, the IRA settles down for a long war which is less intense and therefore the conflicts sees a second steep de-escalation.

The Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention

After the executive had collapsed in May 1974 the British believe in the existence of a silent moderate majority collapsed. What's more, those who professed to be loyal to Britain were the ones who made their power-sharing attempt fail. The earlier threats that Britain would withdraw from Northern Ireland if the power-sharing experiment was brought down fuelled the widespread believe of a pull out. The British government did indeed discuss the withdrawal option, but came to the conclusion it was likely to destabilize the conflict even more by an expected upsurge of sectarian violence (Dixon, 2008: 153). A gradual withdrawal with a power-sharing mechanism in place became the favoured option. The strength of the unionists had become apparent in the UWC strike and from this it was concluded that Irish unity was not the best way for Britain to disengage themselves from the conflict. Instead, a more effective way

of creating room for a British withdrawal seemed to be to transfer power to an independent, Ulster that could develop its own identity (Donoughue, 1987: 128).

Only two months after the power-sharing executive had collapsed because of the UWC strike, the British government proposed a Constitutional Convention for the parties in Northern Ireland to discuss a settlement and consider "what provision for the government of Northern Ireland would be likely to command the most widespread acceptance throughout the community" (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974). The British government believed a new awareness in the Protestant and Catholic working class had emerged since the executive collapsed and they should therefore be granted the chance to discover a common identity and overcome sectarian division. In calling this convention, the British government wanted to place responsibility for a solution with the people and the political parties in Northern Ireland, while Britain could act as a facilitator (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974).

An attempt to integration was thus made, with a minimal Irish dimension. The election of the Constitutional Convention was held on 1 May 1975 in which the UUUC won 55 percent of the votes. An anti-power-sharing majority who opposed an Irish dimension was therefore established and would dominate the meetings. The following year meetings were held, but no significant developments were made. In March 1976 the convention was therefore ended without any substantial progress made (Elliot & Flackes, 1999; Tonge, 2002: 121).

Ulsterization and criminalisation

Simultaneously with pursuing the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention, the newly elected British Labour government was beginning to use Ulsterization and criminalisation as a way of normalising the conflict. Ulsterization which is known as the replacement of British army personnel by locally-recruited forces, was used to strengthen the RUC while also making the police the primary force of dealing with the fight against terrorism. The British military could therefore slowly transfer their tasks to the increasingly strong police (Tonge, 2002: 95). The process can therefore also be called de-militarization. Another significant development which happened simultaneously was the professionalization of the local RUC by which they could take over the British military role (Neumann, 2003: 375). Criminalisation which is known as treating members of paramilitary groups as common criminals, was also used as a way of normalizing the conflict. On 1 March 1976 it was therefore announced that members of paramilitary groups which would be sentenced after this date, could no longer make use of the special category status and would be treated as ordinary criminals (Dixon, 2008: 162; Tonge, 2002: 95).

At the beginning of 1976 the British Labour government announced an extensive security package which among others included increased surveillance operations and the establishment of the Special Air Service in Northern Ireland. The Labour government had to yield to some unionist requests because the general elections of 1974 had produced a close result. The Labour government therefore needed the Ulster Unionist support and as a result took a more unionist stance on Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 165).

Approaching the IRA

Even though the British government had decided it would not withdraw from Northern Ireland, they nonetheless cultivated the idea of withdrawal. By publicly leaving the withdrawal option open, the Irish government, the SDLP and the unionist still feared the consequences this would have. The IRA, however, welcomed the withdrawal option as they believed they were on the brink of victory (Dixon, 2008: 160). The British Labour government cultivated this idea and entered into secret talks with the IRA. The end of internment on 9 July 1974 as well as lifting the ban on Sinn Féin, the political party of the IRA, was supposed to persuade the IRA down a political path (Dixon, 2008: 160). On 22 December 1974 a short ceasefire was announced. As a sign of good faith, on 27 January the IRA called an unannounced truce. With this, the British government had accomplished a temporary end to the fighting which was a win in their overarching goal of normalization (Kelley, 1988: 233-237).

Britain misleads: from escalation to de-escalation

As a consequence of the fear from British withdrawal, both paramilitary loyalist as well as the IRA tried to assert their predominance over the other and turned to sectarian violence. The paramilitary loyalists declared themselves in favour of an independent Ulster and between 1974 and 1976 they scaled up their violence and killed 452 people, which accounts to 40 percent of their total victims throughout the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 161). Additionally, 1976 accounted for 297 deaths, which made it the second deathliest year with only 1972 having a higher death toll (Tonge, 2002: 96).

Because of the increased violence, the truce with the IRA broke down in September 1975. The truce and the sectarian violence had, however, released some pressure on the British army which is why they were able to further implement police primacy through Ulsterization. During the truce with the IRA the British were also able to infiltrate the IRA and increase their surveillance. This led to over 400 people being charged with violent offences in the first five months of 1976 (Smith, 1995: 133). In 1976 the British government furthermore made very

clear that a united Ireland was not a solution which it wanted to impose and they were not going to withdraw from Northern Ireland any time soon (Dixon, 2008: 162).

As a consequence, in 1977 the IRA had to accept that their violent offensive to make Britain withdraw had failed. They therefore settled down for the 'long war' which was less intense, but very sustained. Simultaneously an attempt was made to get involved in the political struggle alongside the armed struggle (Dixon, 2008: 163). This, coupled with fact that the effects of Ulsterization started to kick in, made sure 1977 saw the second largest de-escalation of violence in the conflict. As was mentioned before, the IRA had its own reasons of decreasing the intensity of its violence and was also limited by the strength of the RUC. The loyalist paramilitary groups were less inclined to use as much violence as they did in the previous year as it became clear the British government was not about to withdraw and the decreased IRA violence reduced their need for counterattacks (Dixon, 2008: 164). The year 1978 would see a further decrease in violence.

7.5: Phase 5: The Anglo-Irish process (1979 – 1988).

As the process of criminalisation continues, the IRA becomes aware of the importance of the propaganda war and starts a hunger strike which gains a lot of attention. As Bobby Sands, an IRA convict, is nominated and elected for an MP position, the IRA begins its twin track of participating in politics through the political wing Sinn Féin and continuing their military campaign. This phase also sees the beginning of the Anglo – Irish cooperation as the British government recognizes the Irish interest in Northern Ireland. In 1985 the intergovernmental Anglo – Irish Agreement is signed, but seeing as nationalists and republicans are once again bypassed, violence escalates after the agreement is signed as both groups try to bring down the agreement.

Government switch

In May 1979 the British general elections were decisively won by the Conservative party. The Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher thereby replaced the Labour government. Because of their big win, the British government no longer needed the support of Ulster Unionist MPs at Westminster and had more space to manoeuvre. Instead of the promised politics of integration in Northern Ireland, the Conservative government switched towards devolution and power-sharing again (Dixon, 2008: 172).

Thatcher recognized the lack of policy initiatives in the previous years had not resulted in the end of violence and therefore something had to be done. Power-sharing and devolution

were first promoted by means of the Atkins talks of 1979. The Atkin talks were designed to bring the main Northern Ireland political parties together and discuss power-sharing, devolution and also the Irish dimension. The parties could not, however, agree on which form of devolution would be most appropriate and in 1980 the talks ended (Tonge, 2002: 123).

In May 1980 another important development was kick-started as Thatcher and the Irish prime minister Haughey met and discussed the important relationship the two countries have with each other and with Northern Ireland. The need to increase the relationship between the two countries in order to achieve peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland was also highlighted (Dixon, 2008: 173). In December 1980 another meeting was scheduled in which a joined Anglo-Irish study was set up to explore the possibility of Anglo-Irish institutional arrangements. A year later the study was presented and an intergovernmental council of ministers would be established to look into Northern Ireland policy. Because of this arrangement, the following years would be characterised by more intergovernmental political initiatives (Conolly, 1990: 145; Elliot & Flackes, 1999).

Hunger strikes: a battle in the propaganda war

While the British government was pursuing an intergovernmental approach with the Irish government, they simultaneously continued the hardline security stance and were not willing to grant concessions (Tonge, 2002; 122). The process of Ulsterization and criminalisation that had begun a few years earlier was carried on as a means of normalising the conflict and winning the propaganda war (Dixon, 2008: 174). As part of this process of criminalisation and normalisation, on 26 March 1980 a total end to Special Category Status for members of paramilitary organisations was announced (Tonge, 2002: 122). After the IRA had become aware that they had to settle down for a long war, they too became preoccupied with the propaganda war. A shift was noticed in which the IRA wanted to move away from alienating public opinion because propaganda was increasingly important to gain support. Indiscriminate and sectarian violence were politically damaging and therefore had to be thought through carefully (Dixon, 2008: 175).

The British government wanted to portray the paramilitary prisoners as terrorists and were therefore not willing to grant them political prisoner of war status as this could be seen as legitimizing their violent struggle (Dixon, 2008: 175). In light of the propaganda war, the IRA on the other hand tried to achieve the exact opposite and defied criminalization. As a result, on 27 October 1980, seven IRA volunteers who were in prison refused to eat food and the hunger strike began. Conveniently enough the volunteers originated from five out of the six Ulster

counties which greatly helped in expanding activist mobilization throughout Northern Ireland (Ross, 2011: 96).

The number of people that supported the hunger strike campaign for political status was growing. Throughout Northern Ireland massive protests were organized and more and more people started to go on hunger strike (Ross, 2011: 97). After fifty-three days, on 18 December 1980, the hunger strike ended as it was believed the British government was offering concessions towards their demands (Ross, 2011: 103). When the British government was not upholding their end of the deal a second hunger strike started on 1 March 1981. Bobby Sands was the leader of the IRA in the H-Block Maze Prison and started fasting once again. He demanded for the paramilitary prisoners: "the right to wear their own clothes, no prison work, freedom of association, extra recreational facilities and more letters and visits, and the return of remission lost on protest" (Hennessey, 1997: 260).

A great opportunity to gain publicity presented itself when Sands was nominated to become an MP for Fermanagh-South. The SLDP withdrew themselves from the election and Sands defeated the Unionist candidate and was elected on 9 April 1981 (Dixon, 2008: 178; Hennessey, 1997: 261). Margaret Thatcher was not convinced, however, and declared: "We are not prepared to consider special category status for certain groups of people serving sentences for crime. Crime is crime is crime; it is not political" (Hennessey, 1997: 261). On the fifth of May 1981, after sixty-six days on hunger strike, Sands was the first of ten hunger-strikers to die. On 3 October that same year the hunger strike was ended and although no political status was granted by the British government, on a large part of the demanded issues, concessions were made (Dixon, 2008: 178; Hennessey, 1997: 261).

Hunger strike effects: short and long term

From a propaganda point of view, the hunger strikes had been a major success for the IRA. The British government had failed in portraying IRA members as terrorists which was a setback in their attempts to criminalize the IRA and normalize the conflict. During the hunger strikes the IRA had downsized its use of violence in order to maximize support for the hunger strikes. This clearly worked, as the IRA gained a lot of popular support and the outside world was shown the political nature of the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 180). Violence, however, increased again after the hunger strikes as more people were killed and more shootings and bombings took place compared to the previous year. A part of this increased violence can be attributed to the radicalising effect the hunger strikes had on the nationalist population (Hennessey, 1997: 262).

Another huge effect the hunger strikes had, was that it unexpectedly led Sinn Féin into politics as the election of Sands had shown this was possible. Although Sinn Féin had a policy of abstentionism which would only later be dealt with, the shift towards actively competing in politics was an important one. For propaganda purposes a link between the IRA and Sinn Féin was publicly denied although it was clear a link existed (Dixon, 2008: 12). At a Sinn Féin conference in 1981 a senior republican has asked: 'Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?' (Dixon, 2008: 181; Hennessey, 1997: 263). Because Sinn Féin wanted to play a more prominent role in politics, the republican movement could start using a twofold strategy of Sinn Féin participating in politics while simultaneously the IRA continued their armed struggle. This also put a little strain on the IRA's use of violence as Sinn Féin needed a supportive nationalist population in order to be electorally successful. This is why from 1981 until 1986 a slight decrease in violence can be observed (Hennessey, 1997: 263).

The British government tried to curtail the consequences of hunger strikes by facing them down as they feared a unionist backlash. Alienation of unionist did indeed happen as is shown in the increased electoral support of the hardline DUP. At the same time, it was clear that a substantial part of the Catholic population supported the IRA. After the Northern Ireland elections of 1982 and the Westminster General Elections of 1983 the fear of Sinn Féin overtaking the SDLP became a real possibility which would strongly reduce the probability of a compromise between unionists and nationalists. This threat would later on press the British government to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985 (Dixon, 2008: 181).

Anglo – Irish cooperation

The intergovernmentalism between the British and the Irish government that was kick-started in 1980 witnessed a setback during and shortly after the hunger strikes as the Irish government had demanded concessions from the Brits (Tonge, 2002: 123). After the British General Elections of 1983 talks about the British-Irish initiative on Northern Ireland were opening up again. Both governments feared the political support for Sinn Féin and were interested in improving their security situation (Dixon, 2008: 185). By going into British-Irish talks, the British government showed it admitted that Northern Ireland was not entirely a domestic matter and the Irish interest in Northern Ireland was acknowledged (Dixon, 2008: 186; Tonge, 2002: 127).

In 1983 the Republic of Ireland established the New Ireland Forum by which it wanted to asserts its approach towards Northern Ireland. The forum also wanted to bolster the SLDP against Sinn Féin. In 1984 the report was issued and it recognized the Britishness of unionists and the importance of two differing traditions within the island of Ireland. The report went on and offered three ways forward: a united Irish state, a federal or confederal state or joint authority (Conolly, 1990: 146; Dixon, 2008: 187; Tonge, 2002: 126). In a press conference Thatcher, however, made clear none of these options could be considered as she said:

> "I have made it clear…that a united Ireland was one solution that was out. A second solution was confederation of two states. That is out. A third solution was joint authority. That is out" (Thatcher, 1984).

Notwithstanding Thatcher's reaction, the Irish-British talks were going pretty well, but their outburst had also produced US pressure on making progress in the Northern Ireland case. Eventually it would turn out the report would have substantial influence on the following Anglo-Irish Agreement (Smith, 1985).

Anglo-Irish Agreement

As was mentioned earlier, the British government used the Anglo-Irish talks to get a grip on the security situation in Northern Ireland by cooperating with the Republic of Ireland which by many was seen as a safe haven for republicans. The government also wanted to use the talks to offset nationalist alienation and the threat Sinn Féin posed to the SDLP. The SLDP was therefore kept informed by the Irish government (Conolly, 1990: 148; Dixon, 2008: 188). The risk of being focused on preventing nationalist alienation was risking unionist alienation. This was exactly what happened as the unionists were once again excluded from negotiations. It was felt the unionists would disrupt the Anglo Irish Agreement negotiations and consequently they were deliberately kept in the dark (Smith, 1985).

When the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on 15 November 1985, a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was set up. National parties were bypassed and instead an intergovernmental agreement had been made. The most important points of the agreement were the affirmation that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only be changed when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland would want its status to be changed and the fact that the Republic of Ireland would get a limited, consultative role in certain Northern Ireland affairs (Dixon, 2008: 191; Tonge, 2002: 129).

Reactions to the AIA

Moderate nationalist were happy with the agreement as they had been a driving force behind the whole idea and the SLDP had been kept up to date by the Irish government from the start. A clear aim of both the Irish as well as the British government was to bolster the SLDP against Sinn Féin. Unsurprisingly, Sinn Féin opposed the agreement because they believed it was consolidating Northern Ireland and it was specifically aimed at defeating the IRA (Dixon, 2008: 199; Tonge, 2002: 135,136).

Unionists on the other hand were outraged by the agreement. They saw the agreement as a prelude to Irish unity and they felt betrayed by the British government which allowed the Irish government a defined role in Northern Ireland politics and thereby granting them joint authority. Opinion polls showed that Protestant support for the agreement amounted to no more than 10 percent (Tonge, 2002: 131). The fact that unionists could disagree so much with 'their' British government was because English unionism differed from Northern Irish unionism. Where unionists wanted to stay in the union and prevent a united Ireland at all cost, it seemed the British government was mainly preoccupied with trying to remove the Irish question from their agenda as it was a monetary drain as well as a drain on British soldiers lives (Dixon, 2008: 197).

Both the British and the Irish governments had expected a unionist backlash, but they underestimated unionist reactions nonetheless. The strength and hostility of the unionist resistance was surprising for both governments. Unionists wanted to make sure Northern Ireland was to stay in the union and therefore took politics into the streets again. On 23 November 1985 a unionist demonstration against the AIA amounted to around 250.000 people which is about a quarter of the entire unionist population. Exactly a year after the signing of the AIA another major demonstration was held in which 200.000 protesters took part. To underline the united revolt against the agreement all fifteen unionist MPs at Westminster resigned by using the slogan 'Ulster says no' (Hennessey, 1997).

After the AIA violence increased again. The three years following the agreement witnessed 27 percent more deaths than the three years preceding the agreement (Tonge, 2002: 138). Both the leader of the DUP and the UUP wanted to discuss devolution if the AIA would be suspended, but both leaders could not, however, convince their supporters who wanted the AIA to be scrapped altogether (Dixon, 2008: 203). Both leaders also struggled to restrain and control unionists protesters and they feared protest could escalate out of control. The revival of loyalist paramilitary groups shows how hard it was to control the outraged unionists (Dixon, 2008: 204; Tonge, 2002: 138).

By 1988 both unionists and nationalists regarded the AIA to have failed to benefit any group. The unionist protest against the AIA watered down as it was unable to destroy the agreement (Cochrane, 2001). The AIA would, however, prove itself useful as the intergovernmental co-operation of the agreement would be used in the later peace process. The AIA had shown that governments, instead of local parties, were now the key players (Tonge, 2002: 138).

7.6: Phase 6: The process of talks about talks to end the deadlock (1988 – 1994)

This phase witnesses the beginning of the second peace process as many different parties start talking to each other. Both the SLDP and the British government started (secret) talks with Sinn Féin and the Brooke and Mayhew talks were the first talks in which all the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland were invited to negotiate. This period, however, sees an increase in loyalist violence as they fear being outmanoeuvred by the British government who held secret talks with Sinn Féin. Nonetheless, when the Irish and British government publish the Downing Street Declaration, unionist reactions are mild. Also important is the fact that an internal struggle within the IRA arises and it is decided a ceasefire will be imposed which creates a major de-escalation.

Hume – Adams talks

The main prerequisite of starting another peace process was bridging the ideological gap between unionists and republicans. An agreement had to be sustainable in a cross-community way (Dixon, 2008: 210). In order for this to happen all groups had to shift their position on the conflict. After so many years of conflict, violence and propaganda the population in Northern Ireland was, however, extremely polarized which made it difficult for all parties to give in to each other (Dixon, 2008: 214).

The shift of Sinn Féin was a very important one in developing the peace process. As was mentioned earlier, since the 1980s the leadership of the organisation had shown its willingness of participating in elections and thereby saw its first appearance in politics. The IRA became aware of the fact that the armed struggle alone would be inadequate. The politics of abstentionism was therefore cast aside in 1986 at a Sinn Féin conference as it was perceived that politics could help them advance their goals (Dixon, 2008: 218; Tonge, 2002: 143). The IRA was, however, not willing to end its violent campaign before they were convinced of the fact that Britain did not want to stay in Northern Ireland and would withdraw in the near future (Tonge, 2002: 140).

By the late 1980s Sinn Féin was looking for allies and the SLDP wanted to enter into dialogue with Sinn Féin as they hoped it could lead them away from the path of violence. In 1988 therefore the leaders of both groups started to exchange policy documents and the Hume – Adams talks began. These talks are known to be the first step towards the peace process. The leader of the SLDP, John Hume, wanted to convince the Sinn Féin leadership of the futility of their violent campaign, of the British neutrality on Northern Ireland and the need for considering the unionist position. Although the talks ended without a real agreement, the talks can be regarded as a significant shift in attitude (Hennessey, 1997: 276; Tonge, 2002: 144).

Brooke and Mayhew initiative

The polarization that followed after the AIA had prevented any successful chance of an all-party talk. When in 1988 everyone implicitly accepted the failure of the AIA, the unionist leaders requested the Secretary of State to begin "a process of talks about talks to end the deadlock" (Dixon, 2008:225). Unionists and nationalists, however, disagreed over whether the talks should take place inside or outside the AIA agreement (Flackes & Elliot, 1999: 241). At the beginning of 1990 Brooke argued that three relationships had to be dealt with in the following talks: relationships within Northern Ireland, the relationship between North and South Ireland and lastly the Anglo-Irish relationship. The unionists accepted the importance of all three relationships and thereby acknowledged a fully internal settlement was impossible (Cochrane, 2001; Dixon, 2008: 226).

The unionist paramilitary groups showed their willingness to support the talks as they declared a ceasefire at the beginning of the talk. In March 1991 the Brooke/Mayhew talks began in which the British government, the Irish government and the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland (UUP, DUP, SLDP and Alliance Party) were all present. The aim was to talk about talks and find a new agreement that would overrule the AIA (Hennessey, 1997: 280). In July 1991 the talks ended as the parties could not agree on the last two relationships. In 1992 the talks were, however, resumed by Patrick Mayhew. Although these talks collapsed as well, the unionist UUP had showed some progress as they recognized the need to give nationalists an active role in Northern Ireland and they agreed to a North-South Inter-Irish relations committee to be set up (Dixon, 2008; 227; Tonge, 2002; 146).

Secret talks with Sinn Féin

Peter Brooke, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had since July 1989 been allowed to enter into secret talks with Sinn Féin to find out what happened inside the organisation. The

secret talks attempted to bring Sinn Féin into the political process, tried to persuade them into a ceasefire and thereby end the ongoing stalemate (Dixon, 2008: 220). On November 1990 Brooks gave an important speech in accommodating nationalists when it was asserted that Britain was neutral on the Northern Ireland question and Britain had no "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland' (Tonge, 2002: 146).

Simultaneously with the Brooke/Mayhew initiative the British government used a Back Channel to communicate with Sinn Féin. This communication was used to find out under what circumstances the IRA would establish a ceasefire and both sides showed their intent to end the political stalemate (Tonge, 2002: 146). In an interview Brooke admitted to the fact that a military defeat of the IRA was difficult to envisage and the IRA at the same time knew they were also not going to win (Cochrane, 2001). The IRA had difficulty with giving up their armed struggle without creating a divide within the organisation. An honourable way out of the conflict was therefore necessary (Dixon, 2008: 215). In 1992 Sinn Féin released the document *Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland* in which it for the first time recognized the importance of Britain in persuading the unionists to accept a united Ireland. Less emphasis was laid on British withdrawal and the armed struggle was downgraded (Hennessey, 1997: 285).

After the 1992 general elections, however, the IRA bombed the Baltic Exchange in London with which it killed three people and injured 91. It moreover caused material damage worth £800 million which exceeded the total amount of material damage of all the previously detonated IRA bombs together since 1969 (Dixon, 2008: 226). The IRA was able to inflict so much damage with one bomb as it had received a massive amount of Semtex from Libya between 1985 and 1987. The use of Semtex in bombs causes a far more powerful blast than previous used material and IRA bombs after 1990 therefore had more impact (Boyne, 1996: Harnden, 2011).

Unionist violence

In the process leading up to a renewed peace process, the British government had great difficulty in finding a balanced settlement in which both unionists and nationalists ideas demands were met. The British had to act as a neutral party to attract Sinn Féin into the process, but at the same time they had to make sure unionists were not alienated (Dixon, 2008: 214). The British policy of pursuing all-party talks while at the same time encouraging Sinn Féin into the political process by secretly meeting them, increased unionist feelings of insecurity. As a consequence, loyalist violence increased (Hennessey, 1997: 285). In the early 1990s for the first

time in the conflict, loyalist paramilitary groups were escalating their violence to an extent they killed more people than the IRA did (Dixon, 2008: 227; Tonge, 2002: 152).

The Downing Street Declaration

In 1993 it became public that Sinn Féin was not only using a backchannel with the British, but that the Hume – Adams talks were also revived. In April 1993 the two leaders issued a statement in which they agreed on the fact that conflict had to be settled through national self-determination in which the consent of the people of Northern Ireland was regarded important. The significance of this declaration is that Sinn Féin had never before officially recognized Northern Ireland as such. The draft document that was presented would later on be used as a basis for the Downing Street Declarations. The Hume – Adams negotiations angered unionists and after the document was released violence surged again (Hennessey, 1997: 285; Tonge, 2002: 147).

Because of the increased violence, emphasis shifted towards the British and the Irish government who were also negotiating about how to shape the peace process and they were coming to the conclusion that a policy of joint authority would be the best way forward. The two governments intended to issue a joint declaration which would hopefully lead to an IRA ceasefire (Dixon, 2008: 235). On September Hume and Adams made the mistake of publicly linking their own initiative to the Anglo-Irish initiative which alienated unionists. As a result, hardline unionists increased their offensive in nationalist areas (Dixon, 2008: 230). A British government official described the mistake as follows: "*As we've agreed all along, association with Hume – Adams is a kiss of death for any text intended to secure acceptance on both sides of the community"* (Dixon, 2008: 235).

On 15 December 1993 the Joint Declaration between the Irish and the British government, which is better known as the Downing Street Declaration, was published as the two governments had found enough common ground to work with. The drafting of the document was very subtle as it aimed at drawing in the republicans while also reassuring unioninsts. The declaration was meant as an extensive political framework that could help in solving the Northern Ireland conflict (Tonge, 2002: 158). It can be seen as a formalization of the peace process in which the two governments initiated a series of initiatives that were to lead to the removal of conflict (Tonge, 2002: 154).

Seeing as the declaration had to both appeal to the nationalists and not alienate unionists, the document used a number of necessary ambiguities which enabled both groups to interpret the declaration their own way (Dixon, 2008; 235). Overall the unionists reaction to the

declaration was mild. The UUP leadership did not approve nor disapproved it and argued that it certainly was not a sell-out from the British. The DUP leadership on the other hand rejected the declaration. Unionist public opinion tended to agree with the DUP, but the moderate reaction from the UUP can be seen as a tactical decision which was aimed at pacifying rising dissent among unionists (Cochrane, 1997). This tactical decision is seen as pivotal in restricting violent reaction in Northern Ireland. The British government realized this and tried to mitigate the declaration by demanding that the IRA should decommission all its weapons before it could operate within the all-party talks (Dixon, 2008: 237).

The IRA did not favour the declaration, but nonetheless a dispute arose within the organisation as to whether or not the armed struggle was still effective in creating a united Ireland. The declaration put pressure on the IRA to examine the possibility of entering the peace dialogue by declaring a ceasefire (Hennessey, 1997: 288). On 31 August 1994 the IRA leadership had convinced its members that the pan-nationalist front would be an efficient alternative to violence and the leadership therefore announced a ceasefire[6] by declaring (Coogan, 2002: 659; Hennessey, 1997: 288; Tonge, 2002: 157):

"*Recognizing the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success the leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann (IRA) have decided that as of midnight, Wednesday, 31 August, there will be complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly"*

7.7: Phase 7: The peace process (1994 – 1998)

When loyalist paramilitary groups also announce a ceasefire the conflict de-escalates rapidly. The problem of decommissioning, however, derails the peace talks and a stalemate begins. The decommission deadlock was supposed to end with the Mitchell Principles, but as the IRA does not agree with the commitment they end their ceasefire and detonate a bomb after which violence increases again. The election of the Labour government in 1997 revives the all-party talks as Blair reassures unionists and pressures Sinn Féin in cooperating. Mid 1997 the IRA announces a second ceasefire and ultimately in 1998 the Good Friday Agreement is signed and passed in a referendum.

[6] The continuation Irish Republican Army was formed in 1986, but became operational in 1994 after the Provisional IRA began its ceasefire (Dixon, 2008: 10).

Permanent ceasefire?

The IRA ceasefire was welcomed differently by various groups. The Irish government accepted the IRA ceasefire straight away as it was their task to bring the IRA into the pan-nationalist group and keep them there. Within a few days Gerry Adams publicly shook hands with the IRA leadership as a way of showing the world the IRA was on board (Dixon, 2008: 241). The unionists and the British government were more sceptical about the IRA ceasefire, however. The unionists were afraid the ceasefire was just a tactical way of winning concessions from Britain. This fear was exacerbated because the ceasefire declaration had not mentioned it would be permanent. The British government recognized the unionists hesitancy and took steps to reassure the unionists of their commitment to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 241). As a result, in December 1994, the unionist paramilitary groups 'announced its own indefinite suspension of violence, emphasising that it was conditional upon Republicans desisting from the use of force' (Tonge, 2002:158). Because of the ceasefires on both sides, the conflict saw a major de-escalation of violence.

The problem of decommissioning

As was mentioned earlier, after the Downing Street Declaration was signed the British government insisted on decommissioning because the government wanted to appease the unionists. Unionist public opinion polls showed a 92 percent majority in favour of decommissioning as a requirement of letting Sinn Féin enter the talks. Decommissioning was therefore ranked high on the British priority list and they refused to start all-party talks including Sinn Féin before the IRA had handed over their weapons (Dixon, 2008: 241). As a sign of good faith the loyalist paramilitaries agreed to decommission when the IRA would do the same and they also agreed to not strike first. They were, however, not willing to decommission while the IRA would not. The relevance of decommissioning and the permanency of the IRA ceasefire were that this would mean Sinn Féin could not threaten a return to violence while negotiating to increase its bargaining position and it would be a clear statement of true commitment to the democratic process. The stance of the British government on decommissioning was furthermore an opportunity for the British government to show unionists the sincerity of their resolve in defending the union (Dixon, 2008: 242, 245).

The IRA was, however, not going to declare a permanent ceasefire. They were sceptical about the intentions of the British government which is understandable after what happened during the 1975 ceasefire. Invoking a permanent ceasefire would mean the organisation would lose its bargaining power and a permanent ceasefire would furthermore be seen by its members

as a surrender as the nationalists would no longer be able to defend themselves. Regarding the decommissioning, nationalist political leaders opposed it right away, but a large part of the Catholic population was in favour of decommissioning all paramilitary groups. When decommissioning became a highly contested subject, Catholic public opinion shifted (Dixon, 2008: 242).

Pushing for decommissioning was a tricky task. The Sinn Féin leadership needed to be able to maintain unity within the IRA and could only do so when they would not be pushed too far for concessions. The IRA had seen splits in the organisation before and this needed to be prevented at this point, because a permanent settlement to end all violence would be almost impossible if other hardline paramilitary groups were again formed [7](Dixon, 2008: 10, 243). Both the unionists and the British government therefore understood the importance of a united IRA movement. On top of that, the RUC and British army officials had already argued that the IRA decommissioning its arms was futile military wise as they had the capacity to re-arm very quickly. The British government's insistence on decommissioning can therefore be seen as a symbolic gesture to the unionists instead of a policy of real value. Policemen and senior soldiers furthermore argued decommissioning could be counterproductive and lead to a breakdown of IRA discipline and even splits within the organisation. Both would derail the possibility of a peace talk and could escalate the conflict. Both the RUC and the army were therefore more interested in the intentions of the IRA (Dixon, 2008: 243).

The Irish government shifted its position on decommission after it became clear the IRA was severely against. The Irish government had to oppose decommissioning seeing as if they aligned themselves with the British government and against the pan-nationalist front, the non-violent pan-nationalists strategy would be undermined and the IRA ceasefire would be put at risk. The British government had the same problem in mirror sight as they had to deliver to the unionists if there was to be any prospect of an all-party talk (Dixon, 2008: 246). When the two opposing blocks reached a stalemate over the decommissioning issue, British prime minister Major came up with the idea of initially only decommissioning offensive weapons such as explosives (Dixon, 2008: 247). The dual role of the British government in which they both had to please nationalists while avoiding the alienation of unionists is clearly shown here.

[7] Even though it is tried to prevent a split within the IRA, the Real IRA was established in 1997 (Dixon, 2008: 10).

The Framework Documents

On 22 February 1995 the Framework Documents were published which were a follow up on the Downing Street Declaration. The Framework Documents were a bilateral agreed framework between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in which a framework for the future governance of Northern Ireland was offered. The documents were not meant as a rigid blueprint of how any future settlement should look like. It was an assessment of both governments that set out to achieve a realistic, balanced agreement that all parties could live with (Cash, 1996). The guiding principles of the envisioned co-operation within Northern Ireland was to be as follows (Framework Documents, 1995):

(i) The principle of self-determination
(ii) The consent of the governed
(iii) Non-violence
(iv) Equality in esteem

The framework furthermore touched upon the issues of structures within Northern Ireland, the North-South institutions and the East-West structures. The most important suggestions were the establishment of a power-sharing Northern Ireland executive and a North-South body that should protect minorities by means of checks and balances (Framework Documents, 1995: Dixon, 2008: 247; Tonge, 2002: 161).

The unionists did not, however, accept the framework as they felt it to be another attempt towards Irish unity. The Irish and British government had tried to appease the nationalists by delivering concessions to them in order to entrench the IRA ceasefire. Both governments had agreed the all-party negotiations would then be the place to dilute the framework and appease the unionists. It became clear, however, the governments needed to intensify their efforts to keep unionists aboard the peace process. A month after the framework had been released, the leader of the UUP, Molyneaux, resigned and was succeeded by David Trimple who strengthened resistance to the framework (Dixon, 2008: 249; Tonge, 2002: 162).

Ending the decommission deadlock

British prime minister Major wanted to advance the peace process regardless of a declining support by both the unionists and his backbenchers. Major also felt pressure from the USA, most notably from president Clinton, to resume the peace talks and let Sinn Féin into the talks without decommissioning (Dixon, 2008: 250). In June 1995 prime minister Majors made sure the British and Irish government agreed on a joint attempt to end the deadlock about decommissioning. On 28 October 1995 both governments agreed the need to investigate the

decommissioning issue simultaneously with the all-party talks. Therefore, an international team was installed and headed by US Senator George Mitchell. The body was established to 'provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue' (Agreement on Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 1997). The international body reported that (Mullen, 1996);

> *"the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations…It is not that they (the body) are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal"*.

The report therefore argued that decommissioning should take place during the all-party talks and it furthermore recommended that (Mullen, 1996):

> *"To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles"*

This commitment came to be known as the Mitchell Principles.

The British government endorsed the findings of the report and struck a compromise in which republicans would be granted entry to the all-party talks without having to decommission and the unionist were offered an elected assembly to negotiate a settlement (Bew & Gillespie, 1996: 162). The Irish government and moderate nationalists feared this compromise would be met with republican outrage. They were right, as the IRA, on 9 February 1996, detonated a large bomb in London's Docklands area in which two people were killed and over a hundred injured. With this attack the ceasefire of 1994 ended and it therefore became clear the ceasefire had certainly not been permanent (Mulholland, 2002: 170).

The IRA attacks sparked outrage both nationally and internationally. As public support for the IRA declined a little, all the parties in the Northern Ireland peace process declared their willingness to accelerate the process and start the peace talks without Sinn Féin. Political violence was a red line for participation and the IRA had to reinstate its ceasefire in order for Sinn Féin to be allowed in the negotiations (Mulholland, 2002: 171). On 30 May 1996 the Forum Elections for Peace and Reconciliation were held. The elections were a test-case for the following peace talks and it would show the moderate silent majority was still not a majority. Despite the IRA ending its ceasefire, Sinn Féin realized its best-ever election in Northern Ireland and the hardline DUP was catching up with the moderate UUP. When on 10 June 1996

the IRA had failed to restore its ceasefire, Sinn Féin was excluded from the beginning of the all-party talks (Dixon, 2008: 257; Mulholland, 2002: 171).

Drumcree rioting and the failure of the all-party talks

The Orange march through Drumcree were a reflection of the polarization within Northern Ireland that was still present despite the beginning of the all-party talks. A long-standing orange march in Drumcree through Catholic area was re-routed by the police. The unionists disagreed heavily with this decision and started rioting for five days after which the RUC decided to reverse their decision (Mulholland, 2008: 172). The restricted capacity of the RUC to deal with massive unionist uprisings was exposed in ways similar to earlier phases of the conflict. The RUC Chief Constable agreed with the march going ahead in Catholic areas as he pointed out that 3.000 police officers and British soldiers would not be able to contain 60-70.000 demonstrating loyalists (Dixon, 2008: 260).

The march itself triggered a nationalist response and resulted in violence and conflict all over Northern Ireland. The polarization that ensued would also have negative effects on the all-party talks as it constrained the ability of both nationalists and unionists to move to a centre ground. A political deadlock was reached once again as it became clear the hopes for a middle ground consensus were dashed again. Mayhew analysed this as follows: "*For my own part, and I think for a great many people, the wish had been father to the thought that on each side ancient fires of hostility and fear had greatly diminished. They had not"* (Dixon, 2008: 261).

Labour government: reviving the all-party talks

The political deadlock was broken when on 1 May 1997 the Labour government was elected with a clear majority and was therefore not dependent on unionist PMs. Mo Mowlam, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland argued that "*We were able to make statements and progress in a way that had just not been possible for them"* (the Conservative government) (Mowlam, 2002: 116). Newly elected prime minister Tony Blair announced that the Northern Ireland peace process was his highest priority. He therefore turned to the unionists by giving them constitutional reassurance after which he addressed Sinn Féin by saying: "*The settlement train is leaving. I want you on that train. But it is leaving anyway, and I will not allow it to wait for you. You cannot hold the process to ransom any longer. So end the violence now"* (Collins, 2005: 65).

On 20 July 1997 the IRA invoked its second ceasefire. Sinn Féin was allowed at the negotiation table when the all-party talks began on 9 September 1997. The UUP initially did

not attend the all-party talks because they did not agree with the fact that Sinn Féin was allowed to join in without having decommissioned their weapons, but on 23 September they returned to the negotiation table and sat together with Sinn Féin. During the process both Sinn Féin and the UDP were temporarily kicked out (the UDP walked out before they were officially suspended) because of violent activity from their paramilitary wing. As the negotiations were near the end, both groups re-entered the negotiations once they had shown they would uphold the principle of non-violence (Ingraham, 1998). Even though it was tried to prevent a split within the IRA, the Real IRA was established in 1997. The organisation lacked a significant support base, however, and was therefore unable to alter the dynamics of the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 10, 243).[8]The peace process therefore continued and lasted until on 10 April 1998 the Good Friday Agreement was signed (Dixon, 2008: 264; Mulholland, 2008: 173).

The Good Friday Agreement

The main points of the Good Friday Agreements are the following: the first strand was that a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly would be elected on the basis of cross-community voting. Another important strand was that a North-South Ministerial Council would be established in which executive responsibilities of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would be brought together. The third strand was creating a British-Irish Council. Agreement was also reached on equality-oriented measures, decommissioning and reform of policing and criminal justice (Gov.uk, 1998).

The agreement was able to win support from all parties by being constructively ambiguous. This way the agreement could be signed, but it would store up problems for the future (Dixon, 2008: 265). Seamus Mallon, a deputy leader of the SLDP, had called the Good Friday Agreement 'Sunningdale for slow learners' (Tonge, 2002: 185). To a large extent this was true, as in constitutional terms little change was made. The Sunningdale failure had made the negotiating parties aware of the fact that neither the unionist nor the nationalists should be pushed too far as this would have resulted in a breakdown of the peace talks as it had done in 1974 (Dixon, 2008: 267). The most important change with regard to the Sunningdale Agreement was therefore the inclusivity of the Good Friday Agreement as virtually all parties were brought into the multi-party negotiations (Tonge, 2002: 189).

[8] It was only after the Good Friday Accords had already been signed, the Real IRA became of influence when it killed 29 people and injured 310 with its Omagh Bombing, making it the worst atrocity the conflict had seen (Dixon, 2008: 293).

In order for the agreement to be fully endorsed by both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement was the subject of referenda. In the Republic of Ireland, the agreement was passed with 94.4 percent on a low turnout of 55.6 percent. In Northern Ireland the agreement was passed with 71.1 percent on a high turnout of 81.0 percent.



Table 14.1 The Good Friday Agreement referenda 1998

Country	Yes	%	No	%	Turnout (%)
Northern Ireland	676,966	71.1	274,879	28.9	81.0
Republic of Ireland	1,442,583	94.4	85,748	5.6	55.6

Fig. 6: The Good Friday Agreement Referenda 1998[9]

Although a 71.1 percent 'yes' vote is quite substantially, the 'yes' vote was not evenly distributed among the population. Nationalists had endorsed the agreement with 99 percent while unionists had only agreed on it with 57 percent (Hayes & McAllister, 1999). Nonetheless, the Good Friday Agreement witnessed a substantial de-escalation of the conflict.

[9] Tonge, 2002: 190.

8: Analysis of the Troubles

After the previous section has addressed the different phases of the Troubles from 1966 until 1998, this section will analyse the most important factors within the conflict that have had an influence on the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation throughout the conflict. The analytical framework, as explained in the methodology chapter, will be applied to the Troubles.

The analytical framework is divided into a trinity of context, state actors and non-state actors, with each containing a series of key factors:

Context: *Social cleavages; popular support; grievances; local politics; national politics; international politics/foreign support*

State actors: *State action – coercive force; state action – policy solution; state capacity; strong government/weak government*

Non-state actors: *Strategy of armed groups; capacity of armed groups; factionalisation; criminalisation*

8.1: Context

Social cleavages

In order to understand the conflict, it is important to recognize that conflicting national aspirations is the most important cleavage in the Troubles as the difference between unionists wanting to stay within Britain and nationalists wanting to create a unite Ireland lies at the heart of the conflict. Many other overlapping cleavages, however, exist of which religion, ethnicity, political influence and socio-economic status are the most important. The unionists are mainly ethnic British, Protestant who had more political influence and have a higher socio-economic status while the nationalists are ethnic Irish, Catholic with a lower socio-economic status and almost no political influence (O'Duffy, 1993: 128). Intercutting cleavages such as language and class are subsumed by the overlapping cleavage of national identity. The Northern Irish society thus was highly polarized and the existence of multiple overlapping cleavages reinforced the division within society which limited compromising possibilities for the leaders of both groups (Esteban & Schneider, 2008: 133; O'Duffy, 1993: 128).

At the start of the conflict, with the creation of the Campaign for Social Justice, nationalists recognized the difficulty of attaining their anti-partitionist goals. Instead they focused on straightening the political and social-economic social cleavages first. The underlying cleavage that has caused the other grievances, however, was that of national aspiration as the discriminatory policies that caused the cleavages were implemented after partition because of the fear the unionist felt towards the nationalists. The conflict emerged and escalated when the civil rights struggle was reframed into a nationalist anti-partitions struggle and as a consequence the national aspiration cleavage resurfaced again and became the only cleavage of real importance (Tonge, 2002: 36).

During the whole conflict the different aims of nationalist wanting a united Ireland and unionist wanting to be part of Great-Britain continued to be the single most important issue. This view is supported by the fact that moderate reforms to address the other cleavages in the early stages of the conflict could no longer de-escalate the conflict. This was because the other cleavages were not the sustaining dynamic of the conflict as the overriding cleavage of national aspiration had become too important (Kriesberg, 2003). It can be argued that the nationalist aspiration cleavage played an escalatory role throughout the conflict and continued to be a barrier to successful de-escalatory peace initiatives.

The main reason why the national identity cleavage had an escalatory role in the conflict was because it was seen as a zero-sum game which means "the victory of one side can only be achieved by the defeat of the other" (Davis, 1997: 34). This is consistent with what the social

interdependence theory says about negative interdependence which occurs when it perceived that someone "*can obtain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are competitively linked fail to obtain their goals*" (Johnson & Johnson, 1989). Northern Ireland cannot be part of Britain while also being part of a united Ireland and finding a middle ground in this situation is very difficult. This zero-sum outlook on the conflict had an escalatory role because neither side wanted to give in to the other as both groups ideas directly opposed the other. The cleavage could therefore never totally be removed from the equation.

After every peace initiative the leaders of all groups had to sell the initiative to their constituencies and presented the initiative as a win. This then alienated the other groups, who also wanted a win. Consequently, the initiative broke down and violence escalated again. After every peace initiative except the Good Friday Accords, violence thus escalated again because of the overriding cleavage of national identity. Either one of both sides felt they had not achieved a win in the initiative and as a consequence returned to violence again. This was exacerbated by the fact that British unionism was different from Northern Irish unionism while Irish nationalism wanted the same as Northern Irish nationalism (Dixon, 2008: 196). Ireland wanted Northern Ireland to be part of a united Ireland. Britain on the other hand supported the union, but most of all wanted an end to the 'Irish question' and therefore acted as a neutral broker in the peace initiatives. The cleavage of national identity was therefore not equally distributed among the third parties to the conflict and as a consequence unionists were a minority in most negotiations. Unionist objectives were often suppressed which alienated unionists who feared a sell-out by the British. As a result, unionist clung on to their national identity even stronger and violence escalated again (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

Popular support

The IRA military campaign that ended miserably in 1962 had shown a sharp weakening in popular support for the IRA. Until 1969 the militant organisation was weak and recruitment was almost non-existent. Rising nationalist feelings coupled with nationalist alienation because of the heavy handedness of the British military and the creation of the Provisional IRA led to increased popular support for the IRA (Tonge, 2002).

It was not until three major events occurred during the first two years of the 1970s, however, that popular support for the IRA soared. The Falls Road Curfew of 3 July 1970 had the consequence of estranging the Catholic population from the British army and as a result more and more Catholics gave their approval to the IRA (Warner, 2006: 336). The introduction of internment in August 1971 saw another major Catholic backlash which resulted in a massive

increase in IRA recruitment (Hillyard, 1988: 169). The events of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 was another state action that fuelled nationalist alienation and drove them right into the arms of the IRA (McKittrick & McVea, 2000: 76-97). Far from de-escalating the conflict, the introduction of internment and forceful military action served to alienate a large part of the nationalist population to such an extent the IRA could massively escalate its violence. This is also clearly shown by the number of deaths per year in the conflict (see fig. 1). At the same time, however, unionists feared their position within Northern Ireland and loyalist paramilitary groups with a high popular support base were created and they followed the violent example of the IRA (Tonge, 2002: 46).

In another instance popular support for the republicans, however, had the effect of de-escalating the IRA violence. After the IRA had realised they could not acquire a quick British withdrawal they settled down for a long war and they simultaneously became preoccupied with the propaganda war. Gaining public support and refraining from alienating public opinion became important. When the Hunger Strikes of 1980 and 1981 gained much public support and Bobby Sands even gained the opportunity of becoming an MP, the IRA downsized its use of violence. Actively searching for public support because they wanted to compete in politics therefore had the influence of de-escalating the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 180).

When the IRA detonated a large bomb in London's Docklands area on 9 February 1996, they ended their ceasefire. This attacked sparked outrage both nationally and internationally and as a consequence public support decline a little. All the other parties decided to go on with the peace talks without Sinn Féin which put pressure on the IRA to invoke a second ceasefire in 1997 (Dixon, 2008: 243; Mulholland, 2002: 171). The minor decrease in IRA popular support therefore may have influenced the IRA's decision to invoke the second ceasefire.

Grievances

In the conflict emergence phase, the sense of grievances over discrimination in housing, gerrymandering/political influence and employment started the conflict with the introduction of the civil rights campaign. Once the civil rights movement began to believe that constitutional measures to redress these grievances would not be achieved, they took politics to the streets. Both O'Neil as well as the British government recognized Catholic grievances and tried to appease them with modest reforms. At the end of 1969 discrimination in housing and employment had already been dealt with, but this mitigating of grievances could not de-escalate the conflict (O'Neil, 1972: 111). This was because the reforms were too modest and some of the NICRA marches had ended in sectarian violence between nationalists and unionists which

in effect reshaped and reframed the conflict into a nationalist anti-partitionist struggle. It can therefore be concluded that these grievances acted as a trigger, or in other words that nationalism was partly the result of nationalism, but the grievances themselves did not sustain the conflict or escalated the conflict in later phases as the real issue that drove the conflict had become nationalism versus unionism.

An often heard unionist and loyalist view of the aforementioned grievances is described by Christopher Hewitt, who argues that the rise of the civil rights movement and the following violence was not a result of Catholic grievances. He instead believes the Catholic grievances to be exaggerated and thinks the civil rights movement emerged as a result of nationalist feelings (Dixon, 2008: 84; Hewit, 1981: 377; Hewitt, 1985: 102). Even though the emergence of the conflict as one resting on grievances is disputed by some, discrimination certainly did take place and later on in the conflict the political influence grievance came back in the peace talks as nationalists wanted at a say in local politics.

During the conflict a loyalist grievance came into being as the loyalists were not invited to the peace processes of the Sunningdale Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Agreement and lastly the British government did not notify the unionist of their backchannel with Sinn Féin during the second peace process. The choice of not inviting the loyalist groups had been a deliberate one from the British government, but it nonetheless alienated the group heavily (Dixon, 2008: 126). The loyalists could not participate in the peace processes and were only to voice their dissatisfaction by bringing the initiative down afterwards making any accord futile after which violence escalated again. Earlier de-escalation of the conflict might have been possible if the earlier peace processes had been more inclusive.

Local politics

Throughout the conflict it is apparent that local Northern Irish elections and the elected individuals have had a great impact on the escalation and de-escalation of violence. In the conflict emergence phase it became clear O'Neil was not able to deliver sufficient reforms to the civil rights campaign as the unionist block had been fragmented. He therefore did not have enough authority and could not prevent the conflict from escalating (Dixon, 2008: 90).

In the second phase of the conflict, Brian Faulkner succeeded Chichester-Clark as prime minister of Northern Ireland. The newly elected hardline unionist prime minister introduced the policy of internment which escalated the conflict to a maximum (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 118). Seeing as Faulkner was a hardliner himself, he was easily pressured by other hardliners within his party to crack down on the IRA very strongly as the IRA had stepped up its violent

campaign following internment and the incident of Bloody Sunday. In the period of Faulkner as prime minister, the policy of aggression pressured both groups into a downwards spiral of violence as the IRA scaled up its violence as it was alienated by the aggressive policies and in reaction to this Faulkner increased its attacks on the IRA. The ferocity with which both groups attacked each other was unprecedented in Northern Ireland and let to the single most escalated year of violence of the conflict (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

After direct rule had been imposed, the British government wanted to find a political settlement by initiating a power-sharing experiment in which a silent moderate majority would be helped to find a compromise (Dixon, 2008: 123). A new Northern Ireland Assembly was to be set up which had to be elected. These local elections, however, shattered the hope of a silent moderate majority as an upsurge in loyalist parties ensued (Smith, 1995). The power-sharing talks went on anyway, but the local elections had shown the thin base on which the talks were built and it therefore strengthened the loyalist groups in their resolve and legitimacy to undermine the moderate Sunningdale Agreement and bring it down (Dixon, 2008: 144).

On the other hand, the Northern Ireland elections of 1982, together with the Westminster General Elections of 1983, had a de-escalating effect on the conflict. Sinn Féin did well in both elections and as a consequence the IRA slightly decreased its use of violence (Hennessey, 1997: 263). Sinn Féin doing well in elections also had the effect of speeding up the process of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which led to a de-escalation of the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 181).

National politics

Just as local Northern Irish politics effected the emergence, escalation and de-escalation of the conflict, so did national British politics. When the conflict emerged and escalated in Derry in August 1969, the Labour government did everything within their power to prevent direct rule or using the military. This was because the government was afraid this could lead to direct rule after which the Irish question would be back on the agenda once more. The threat of direct rule was therefore issued as a way of persuading the Stormont government to using all their resources before they would ask for the deployment of British troops. As a consequence, the B specials were deployed and CS gas was used, which escalated the conflict even more. It can therefore be argued that the British refusal of taking swift action inflamed communal tensions and allowed the rioting to escalate the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 101).

The general elections of 1970 would mark a profound shift in the way the British government handled the Northern Ireland conflict as the Labour government who was in favour of reform was replaced by a conservative government with a hardline security stance. This

policy change as instigated by the government shift, helped create a context in which IRA support would grow massively as a consequence of nationalist alienation by the heavy handedness of the British army (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 66).

In the 1974 British general elections, the Labour party replaced the conservative party as they won the elections with a small majority. The new security strategy of normalization which was enacted by the government would at first lead to an escalation of the conflict as unionists feared a British withdrawal and republicans thought their time had finally come (Dixon, 2008: 143). On the other hand, the consequence of the security strategy of the Labour government which existed of increased surveillance and Ulsterization, led to the second major de-escalation of the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 164).

The general elections of 1979 saw a big victory for the Conservative party which started a phase of power-sharing and devolution initiatives. The Conservative government sought contact with the Irish Republic and in a later stage also entered into secret talks with Sinn Féin. In general, this led to a phase of relative stability in which a decline in violence until the Anglo-Irish Agreement can be observed (Dixon, 2008).

The election of the Labour government in 1997 had the effect of ending the existing political deadlock by which it paved the way to the Good Friday accords that would mark the final de-escalation of the conflict. The elected Labour government headed by prime minister Blair was elected with a clear majority and was therefore not reliant on unionist UUP support in the Westminster parliament. They therefore could do more towards the peace process and marked Northern Ireland as top priority and was able to assure unionists while at the same time it could also pull Sinn Féin into the peace talks (Collins, 2005: 65).

International politics/foreign support

In none of the phases of the Troubles the conflict was truly internal. From the moment the civil rights struggle was reshaped into a national identity conflict it became international. Because the nationalists wanted Northern Ireland to be part of a united Ireland and the Republic of Ireland wanted to incorporate Northern Ireland into their territory, the Republic of Ireland became involved in the conflict. Consequently, the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland as well as the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and Great-Britain would play a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict.

In the conflict emergence phase, the Republic of Ireland had an escalatory effect on the conflict as during the Battle of the Bogside, prime minister Jack Lynch fuelled anti-partitionist

feelings and increased unionists fears of a united Ireland by publicly saying a united Ireland was the only possible solution to the conflict (Tonge, 2002: 83).

It was not until, 1972, however, before the British government acknowledged the importance of an Irish dimension and consequently accepted the interest and influence of the Republic of Ireland in the conflict (Northern Ireland Office, 1972). As a consequence, the Republic of Ireland was included in the Sunningdale Agreement, but as it later turned out their role in the agreement would have an escalatory effect on the conflict. First of all, their presence made sure the nationalists were overrepresented in the peace talks which had the effect of outmanoeuvring the unionists which were pushed too far and this would have a unionist backlash as a result (MxKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97). The Irish government furthermore failed to recognize the legal status of Northern Ireland, which it had promised to do so. This too exaggerated unionists fears of a hidden agenda in which the Sunningdale Agreement would be a prelude to a united Ireland. As a reaction to this fear, the unionists escalated their violence once more (Gillepsie, 1998: 111). The same thing happened with the Anglo-Irish Agreement in which the British and the Irish government were the main partners. Because of the intergovernmental character of the agreement, national parties were bypassed and unionists demands were once more underrepresented as the British government tried to act as a neutral actor and the Irish government mostly acted in favour of the nationalists (Dixon, 2008; Tonge, 2002).

After the 1994 IRA ceasefire, the Republic of Ireland played a role in de-escalating the conflict by bringing the IRA into a pan-nationalist group. This was meant to encouraged the IRA into the political process without returning to violence again (Hulholland, 2002: 170).

External pressure from the USA on Britain to effectively deal with the conflict, was present during the Sunningdale talks, the hunger strikes and the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The significance of this pressure is debated among scholars, but in these instances it did not play a decisive role in the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict (Dixon, 2008). Some have argued that the end of the cold war enabled the US to put more pressure on Britain to effectively deal with the Northern Ireland problem. Although this is debatable, some influence can be seen by the involvement of America in the Mitchell Principles and during the whole second peace process. The weapons for the IRA that were shipped in from the USA and Libya also did not decisively escalate the conflict as the IRA had more than enough weapons (Cusak, 2005). When Semtex was delivered to the IRA this did have an effect on the conflict, but this will be explained in more detail in the capacity of armed groups part.

8.2: State actors

State action – coercive force

In the first four phases of the conflict, the British army used coercive force as a means of de-escalating the conflict although they very soon recognized the conflict could not be resolved by coercive force alone. After Ulsterization started to kick in during the mid-1970s, the RUC was given primacy in coercive operations and Britain emphasised more on the political solution (Kearney, 2013).

As stated before, in the conflict emergence stage the British government was weary of introducing direct rule as they feared a sectarian civil war would be the consequence. The government furthermore wanted to prevent their military from being deployed in Northern Ireland as this would put the Irish Question high on the agenda again. The fear of being dragged into the conflict made sure the British government did not act swiftly enough (Ryder, 1997: 116). The moment when the conflict had spiralled out of control and communal tensions had already been inflamed heavily, the British government had no option but to act by bringing in the army.

At first the British army had a pacifying effect on the conflict as the forces took a non-confrontational stance to both conflicting parties and they therefore were seen by both sides as a neutral force. When the military stepped up its repressive approach because the initiated reforms were failing, the relationship between the army and the nationalists deteriorated. The heavy-handedness of the army, coupled with counter-insurgency policies such as enforcing order by patrolling Catholic areas, alienated the nationalists population and re-opened the conflict as IRA support grew (Ó Dochertaigh, 1997: 167).

The hardened military approach and its escalating effect became apparent in the Falls Road Curfew incident and the failure of implementing internment effectively. Both operations show a weakness in proper surveillance and intelligence collection which is why the operations were not targeted intelligence campaigns aimed at IRA members, but instead were aimed at the whole Catholic populated area to discover prohibited IRA activities. Repressive military measures such as house searches and personal stop-searches were indiscriminately aimed at the whole Catholic population which alienated them and drove them into the arms of the IRA (Dixon, 2008: 113; Hillyard, 1988: 169). The coercive force used in the Bloody Sunday incident is another example of repressive action without proper intelligence and without taking into account the negative effects this repressive action could cause. It can therefore be regarded as state repression that had the effect of fuelling anti-British sentiments even further and alienate the Catholic population to such an extent IRA recruitment once again soared (McKittrick &

McVela, 2000: 76-97). All in all, the repressive military operations in the second phase of the conflict revived the militant threat of the IRA which until then had only been a marginalized organisation with a narrow support base (Tonge, 2002: 43).

The third and fourth phases of the conflict would witness two major coercive security operations which, as opposed to the previous military operations, would account for the two largest de-escalations of the conflict. The main reason for the de-escalatory effects of the following operations is the fact that the operations were targeted campaigns aimed at countering the sustaining dynamics of the conflict. In July 1972 Operation Motorman was launched in order to dismantle the nationalist no-go areas. The operation was different from previous military operations as it was well-organized, had a clear aim and target and, with deploying 12.000 troops, was massive in scale (CAIN, 2016: Dixon, 2008: 118). The year 1972 was the most violent year the conflict would see. The IRA would launch attacks on their adversaries from within the no-go areas in which the army could not operate to stop the attacks (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997). The IRA had become the sustaining dynamic of the conflict which could only be dealt with by going into the no-go areas. When the British army used serious force to eliminate the no-go areas, the conflict de-escalated. Another important factor why this military operation de-escalated the conflict was that it was directly aimed at the IRA and not to the broader Catholic population. As a consequence, the Catholic population was not further alienated by the operation.

As was stated before, during the earlier periods it became apparent the military was hardly able to coordinate targeted counterterrorism operations as they were too blunt an instrument to gather enough intelligence. Therefore, during the fourth phase, the British government decisively pushed through their policy of Ulsterization. The policy of police primacy in the fight against terrorism led to the strengthening of the RUC by replacing the British army by locally recruited forces (Tonge, 2002: 95). This, coupled with the fact that the British had gained some room to manoeuvre because of the truce with the IRA led to increased surveillance and infiltrations within the IRA. As a consequence of this intelligence approach, in 1976, police and military forces were able to lead targeted operations and charge 400 IRA members with violent offences (Smith, 1995: 133). These intelligence led operations at the beginning of 1976 would mark the second major de-escalation of the conflict. The operations and the increased RUC strength were a blow to the IRA as this showed them they could not make Britain withdraw by means of their violent offensive. From that point on the IRA therefore used a less intense violent campaign. As a consequence of the decreased IRA violence the loyalist paramilitary groups were also less inclined to use as much violence. It can therefore be

argued that the IRA was the sustaining and escalating force of the violence and once they were dealt with efficiently, the conflict de-escalated to a large extend, although not completely (Dixon, 2008: 164).

State action – policy solution

In the conflict emergence phase, the British government, through indirect rule, tried to pressure O'Neil into putting in place some reforms to appease the Catholics and prevent the conflict from turning into a national aspiration conflict. The Stormont government could, however, not come to an agreement that was acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants. This was because both unionist and nationalist blocks were internally fragmented in moderates and hardliners (Dixon, 2008: 90). After the military had intervened, the British government tried to contain the conflict by modernizing Northern Ireland and granting the Catholics many of the desired reforms. This approach did not work, however, because the British government failed to see the conflict had turned from a civil rights conflict into a national identity one (Dixon, 2008).

The policy of internment which the British government initially opposed, but after being persuaded by Faulkner in the end reluctantly agreed to, would have a massive escalatory effect on the conflict. As a consequence of the violence, British public opinion shifted towards withdrawal after which the British government was also more inclined to accept Irish Unity, as they wanted to solve the Northern Ireland conflict as soon as possible (Patterson, 1986). This policy stance, however, alienated unionists and at the same time encouraged the IRA to scale up their military campaign. The conflict escalated to such an extent the British government felt the need to impose direct rule again as they saw no other way of containing the violence (Dixon, 2008: 113; Tonge, 2002: 48). It took a policy of low profile military stance in nationalist areas coupled with Operation Motorman to de-escalate the conflict to such an extend before talking about a political solution was possible again.

Between 1972 and 1974 the first peace talks to find a political solution to the conflict began with the power-sharing talks that would lead to the Sunningdale Agreement. The British government believed a moderate silent majority existed that was in favour of peace and it was with this group the power-sharing talks would be held (Dixon, 2008: 123). The question of how inclusive or exclusive the power-sharing talks would be, would have a major effect on this peace initiative as well as on peace talks later on in the conflict. From 1972 onwards the British acknowledged the legitimate interest of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland and they were therefore included in the peace talks. The IRA was asked to join, but declined. The loyalist

groups on the other hand were deliberately left out of the negotiations as it was thought they might disrupt the negotiations (Dixon, 2008: 127).

Although the Sunningdale Agreement was signed and came into effect at the start of 1974, it collapsed very quickly as the political solution was brought down by a unionist strike. The following factors played an important role in the collapse of the agreement. The first was that Britain wanted to solve the conflict as quickly as possible. They acted as a neutral party in the negotiations to appease the nationalists while reassuring the unionists. By being a neutral player, the British government in effect concluded Irish unity was the best way forward to disengage as quickly as possible from the conflict as unionists were clearly outmanoeuvred by the moderate nationalists and their Irish support. The British government had not recognized unionists needs which is why unionists felt sold out. This unionist alienation resulted in bringing moderate unionist into the extremist camp and violence increased again because of the unionist backlash.

After the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed, the British government started cultivating the idea of withdrawing from Northern Ireland. Because of this, they were able to enter into secret talks with the IRA in which a cease fire came about (Kelly, 1988: 233-237). With this, the British government created its own space for implementing normalisation through Criminalisation and Ulsterization. Because of this policy, the army and the police were able to infiltrate the IRA and de-escalate the conflict.

The Anglo-Irish agreement shows a similar pattern as the Sunningdale Agreement. After the Anglo-Irish agreement was signed in 1985 the unionist immediately tried to bring it down. This was because they again were excluded from negotiations. The Anglo-Irish Agreement had been an intergovernmental agreement in which the moderate nationalists had been informed along the way, but unionists had been kept in the dark. The British government once more did not recognize unionists needs and the soothing of nationalists came at the expense of unionists. Unionists felt sold out again as they saw the agreement as being a prelude to a united Ireland and violence increased again after the agreement was signed (Hennessey, 1997).

As was stated earlier, during the sixth phase many different parties were talking to each other. The moderate SLDP was talking to Sinn Féin, the British government initiated talks with the Republic of Ireland and even started a secret backchannel with Sinn Féin. Unionists were, however, not included in any of the talks which alienated them to such an extent they increased their violence to an amount they overtook the IRA violence (Hennessey, 1997 285; Tonge, 2002: 152). It was during this same phase, however, that the British government learned how

important it was for the peace negotiations to not alienate the unionists. During the Brooke and Mayhew talks the loyalist party DUP was therefore for the first time included in the all-party talks (Hennessey, 1997: 280). In return the loyalist paramilitaries invoked a ceasefire throughout the talks and the unionists parties made some progress towards the nationalists.

In the Downing Street Declaration, both the British as well as the Irish government finally recognized the need to avoid unionist alienation which is why they put some ambiguities in the declaration. Instead of acting as a neutral player, the British government stepped up and wanted to show unionists the sincerity of their resolve by insisting on decommissioning. As a result, unionist reaction to the initiative was mild (Dixon, 2008: 242). As a consequence of Britain's inclination on decommissioning, a deadlock ensued which would only end after the Labour government was elected in 1997. Prime minister Blair succeeded in convincing both loyalists and republicans of joining the peace talks. The all-party negotiations were therefore more inclusive than any previous one and because the Good Friday Agreement was sufficiently ambiguous, peace was finally signed.

One point to take from this analysis is that giving preference to appeasing nationalists at the expense of unionist alienation is something that is seen throughout the conflict. This can be declared by the fact that Britain wanted to solve the Irish question as soon as possible and therefore tried to act as a neutral player in the peace initiatives. The consequence of this was that unionists were outmanoeuvred which had a unionist backlash and increased violence as a result. The exception of this was the Good Friday Accord. With the Good Friday Accords the British government finally recognized the importance of the unionists and the inclusion of the hardliners. Inclusivity therefore played a crucial role in the final de-escalation of the conflict.

State capacity

As the Battle of the Bogside endured, it became clear the Northern Irish security apparatus was lacking manpower to contain the conflict. On the morning of 14 August 1969, the RUC could simply no longer handle the conflict as they did not have the manpower. As a result, the British government was asked to assist in Northern Ireland. The British government send in the army which had more than enough manpower and firepower to reassert control and temporarily end the conflict. As would become painfully clear in the following phase, however, the army lacked the training to act as peacekeepers and did not have the local knowledge or intelligence to perform targeted operations against the resurged IRA (Tonge, 2002: 40).

Some mistakes in the security policy had the effect of escalating the conflict. First of all, the military had not been trained for a peacekeeping mission or a long-term policing job

and their heavy-handedness alienated the nationalist population. Secondly, after the conflict became more securitized the military began using counter-insurgency policies. Although the military had the capacity in manpower to patrol areas and do house and personal-stop searches, it was not effective as they lacked targeted intelligence and they therefore inflicted their policies on the whole Catholic population. Instead of targeted operations, blunt force was used which drove the nationalist even more towards the IRA (Ó Dochertaigh, 1997: 167).

The fact that the British state clearly had the military capacity and means in manpower and machines to take on the IRA if it prepared well for it, was made clear in Operation Motorman in 1972. With tanks, bulldozer and 12.000 troops the operation was massive in scale and destroyed the nationalist no-go areas after which the conflict saw a major de-escalated (CAIN, 2016; Dixon, 2008: 118; McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97).

It would take until the mid-1970s, however, before security operations could rely on local knowledge and targeted intelligence. This form of state capacity grew after the policy of normalization and Ulsterization was finally implemented and the RUC was given primacy in dealing with the IRA. The local police primacy provided future operations with local knowledge which, coupled with the professionalization of the police forces, created the possibility of targeted intelligence. As a consequence, from 1976 onwards the capacity to deal with the IRA effectively was created and this caused the second major de-escalation of the conflict (Dixon, 2008: 162; Neumann, 2003). A related measure, namely internalisation, which is police primacy drawn from the local population, which was firstly proposed in the Hunt Report, was not implemented, however. Although the RUC was strengthened by increased recruitment and professionalization, Catholic representation never materialised although this was what the Hunt Report had proposed (McGarry & O'Leary, 1999). It can be argued that Ulsterization was an attempt to keep Britain out of the Irish question and keep it a regional problem as the British handed over police tasks to the local Northern Irish people. Seeing as the RUC was almost entirely Protestant, it is not completely internalized as Protestants were policing Catholics instead of the proposed idea of Protestants policing Protestants and Catholics policing Catholics. Seeing as Catholics were policed by Protestants, this still created grievances and lack of trust in the police among the Catholic population.

The Protestant backlash after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Drumcree rioting, however, showed the deficiencies of the RUC. Comparable to the conflict emergence phase, the RUC had too little power and capacity to deal with and control the massive demonstrating crowd (Dixon, 2008: 260). As was explained earlier, after both instances violence escalated again. The point to take from this analysis therefore is that a balance must

be found between proper training, locally recruited forces that can increase surveillance and targeted operations and enough manpower as all are important factors in combating militant forces and therefore have the ability to create a de-escalation of the conflict.

Weak vs. strong government

The British government was never happy with reopening the Irish Question and they therefore tried to find the quickest way out in every phase. Depending on the electoral strength or weakness of the government or their political will to deal with the conflict, a change of course was instigated.

In the first stage of the conflict, the Northern Irish government still played an important role. Prime minister O'Neil tried to curtail the conflict by initiating moderate reforms. The fragmentation of the unionist block, however, showed the weakness of the O'Neil government as the prime minister had too little authority and was unable to sufficiently address civil rights demands because of extremist unionist pressure. As a consequence, the weak O'Neil government was unable to curb the conflict from escalating (Dixon, 2008: 90; Tonge, 2002: 38). At the same time the British government showed a lack of political will to get involved in the conflict. The government therefore waited until the last moment when all other resources had been depleted and the conflict had escalated already, before they intervened and bring in the army.

The 1970 British General Elections created a strong Conservative government which generally is seen as pro-unionist. This strong government had the means and the will to take on the militants by imposing stricter security policies. This, however, escalated the conflict as nationalists became alienated and IRA support rose (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 66). The strong government of 1979 on the other hand had a de-escalating effect on the conflict as their big electoral win gave them room to manoeuvre into the Anglo-Irish Agreement during which negotiations the conflict steadily decreased (Dixon, 2008: 172).

During the British General Elections of 1974 a small Labour majority was elected. The elections had produced such a close result, the government was dependent on Unionist MPs. This weak government therefore took a more unionist stance on Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008: 165). This weakness of government actually had a de-escalating effect on the conflict as it was the only phase in which no unionist alienation came about and it moreover was a phase in which Ulsterization took place.

During the last phase, the political deadlock or stalemate caused by the decommission issue and the Drumcree rioting could not be solved by the weak Conservative government.

Things turned around when in 1997 the Labour government was elected with a clear majority which meant they were not dependent on unionist MPs and had more room to manoeuvre. The Blair government had the electoral strength, the political capital and the very important political will to break the deadlock wide-open (Gov.uk, 1998). He thereby encouraged the IRA to invoke its second ceasefire and managed to let all parties agree on the Good Friday Agreement which caused the last de-escalation of the conflict.

As can be seen from the analysis above, depending on the circumstances both strong and weak governments had an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect on the conflict. A strong government does not necessarily mean a de-escalation of the conflict as a strong government can push through the wrong policy which can have an escalating effect on the conflict. On the other hand, a weak government which lacks power can be forced into cooperation which can have the effect of de-escalating the conflict. The intentions, political will of a government and the chosen policy is therefore of greater importance than the strength of a government alone. What matters is what a government does with the power it is given and the room is has to manoeuvre.

8.3: Non-state Actors

Strategy of armed groups

At the beginning of 1969 the IRA had been diminished and had become an organisation with little recruitment and downgraded military strategy. Some members disapproved, broke away from the official IRA and formed the Provisional IRA whose primary concern would be the use of violent tactics (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973: 55). As popular support was growing, the IRA, from 1971 onwards, could mount more intense attacks as they achieved a united front in favour of the armed struggle. They used the tactic of waging a short, vicious and intense violent campaign to put pressure on the British government to withdraw from the conflict. This increased IRA violence had a massive escalatory effect on the conflict as it was met with the military cracking down on terrorism even harder and it had a growth of loyalist paramilitary groups as a consequence (Dixon, 2008: 112).

The IRA would not cooperate in the power-sharing initiative that would lead to the Sunningdale agreement as they believed they could bomb Britain into withdrawal and stepped up its bombing-campaign and tried to kill as many British soldiers as possible during and after the negotiations to bring down the power-sharing settlement (Dixon, 2008: 126, 144; McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 76-97; Smith, 1995).

After the IRA was misled by the British government in 1976, they realised they could not make Britain withdraw by means of a violent offensive and the IRA therefore settled down for a long war which was less intense. This change of strategy causes a sharp de-escalation of the conflict as other groups also became less inclined to use excessive violence. Simultaneously with the long war, the IRA shifted its strategy towards the propaganda war for which sectarian violence was politically damaging. The IRA during the early 1980s was not only using its violent force, but also used Hunger Strikes to increase support and fight their opponents (Ross, 2011: 96). The unexpected electoral win of Bobby Sands cleared the way for a twofold strategy of political participation while continuing the armed struggle which saw a slight decrease in violence (Hennessey, 1997: 263).

By the late 1980s the IRA became aware of the fact they could not win the conflict by means of the armed struggle alone. Their political wing Sinn Féin therefore started talks with both the SDLP and the British government. Both of which can be seen as a first step towards the peace process while the violence stagnated (Hennessey, 1997; Tonge, 2002). This process led to an internal IRA dispute after the Downing Street Declarations which were won by those in favour of entering the peace process and declaring a cease fire in 1994.

The IRA would, however, not negotiate from a position of weakness and was therefore not willing to declare a permanent ceasefire which would weaken their bargaining power. When the decommissioning problem could not be solved, the IRA ended the ceasefire by detonating a bomb. However, when it became clear the all-party talks would continue with or without the IRA they invoked a second ceasefire which would be permanent.

Capacity of armed groups

Throughout the conflict the military capabilities of the IRA can be considered high as they continuously had a high amount of quality weaponry to carry out their attacks. The majority of IRA weaponry was shipped in from the USA and Libya (Boyne, 1996). Because of the abundancy of weapons, more weapons did not equal escalation in this conflict. The IRA did not really need nor use the huge amount of weaponry or the very sophisticated weapons such as rocket launchers it received from Libya as they did not have a chance of winning a full-frontal attack on the British military which was far superior. The IRA therefore focused not on open offensives, but instead mainly used handguns for assassinations (Cusack, 2005). As was mentioned earlier, the decommissioning issue which became a stumbling block in the second peace process, was actually mainly a symbolic issue as the IRA had the capacity to quickly re-arm themselves if necessary (Dixon, 2008: 243).

The only weapon that had a real influence on the ability of IRA attacks was the use of Semtex in their bombs. A massive amount of Semtex were delivered to Northern Ireland from Libya between 1985 and 1987 (Boyne, 1996; Harnden, 2011). The capacity of the IRA grew with the use of Semtex as the force of the bombs the IRA detonated after 1990 had way more impact. The growing capacity because of the use of Semtex can most clearly be seen when one compares the twenty-two detonated bombs during Bloody Friday in 1972 with the Baltic Exchange Bombings in London 1992. The twenty-two bombs killed nine people and seriously injured 130 while causing little other damage (McKittrick & McVela, 2000: 73-97; Tonge, 2002: 44). The one Semtex bombing of 1992 killed three people, injured 91 and caused 800 million pounds' worth of damage. With this, the one Semtex bomb had caused more material damage than the total damage caused by all the previously detonated IRA bombs together since 1969 (Dixon, 2008: 226). Although the Semtex bombings did not necessarily cause more casualties, it did cause major financial damage by which it pressured Britain to find a solution to the conflict.

Factionalisation

The internal dynamics of the IRA would both have an escalatory and a de-escalatory effect on the conflict. When in 1969 the Provisional IRA broke away from the Official IRA this changed the dynamics of the militant movement. Especially after the 1972 ceasefire of the Official IRA the Provisional IRA would become the dominant group, which escalated the violence by taking the offensive against the British government (Dixon, 2008: 10).

As was mentioned earlier, neither the Irish National Liberation Army nor the Continuation Irish Republican Army was ever able to overtake the Provisional IRA as the most important republican militant organisation. Both groups mounted small attacks, but were not able to (de-)escalate the conflict. The same holds true for the Real IRA which lacked a sufficient support base to change the dynamics of the conflict so close to the Good Friday Accords. It was only after the Good Friday Accords had already been signed the Real IRA felt its presence heard through the Omagh Bombing in 1998 which by killing 29 people and injuring 310 was the worst single atrocity the conflict had seen (Dixon, 2008: 293). On the other hand, after decommissioning had become an important issue, the threat of a split within the IRA prevented an escalation of the conflict. This was because it was realised the IRA could not be pushed too far, as all parties believed a split within the IRA would derail the peace talks after which violence would surge again.

Although the split between the military part of the IRA and the political wing, Sinn Féin, had existed before the troubles began, it once again became important in the first half of the 1980s as a twin track of participating in politics and continuing the military campaign began. Although one cannot speak of direct fractionalisation as Sinn Féin already existed, the suddenly emerged importance of Sinn Féin put a strain on IRA use of violence and de conflicted slowly de-escalated for a period (Hennessey, 1997: 263).

Criminalisation

Although the IRA was involved in some criminal activity, criminal behaviour itself never became the objective or affected the strategy of the organisation. One reason for this is that the IRA did not need criminal behaviour to sustain its activities as they had an abundancy of weaponry and no need for very advanced, costly weapons as was mentioned earlier.

9: Conclusion case study the Troubles 1966 – 1998

The Troubles in Northern Ireland show how difficult it can be to solve a conflict that has roots that go way back in History. From the analysis above a couple conclusions can be drawn regarding the escalation and de-escalation of the Troubles. First of all, it is clear the overriding cleavage of national identity played a crucial escalatory role as it was the driving force during the whole conflict and acted as a barrier to successful de-escalatory peace initiatives. The reason for this is that the conflict was framed as a zero-sum game in which one side can only achieve victory at the expense of the other. Removing the cleavage from the equation was therefore almost impossible.

The Troubles furthermore show the importance of popular support as an escalating factor in the first few phases of the conflict. At the beginning of the Troubles, popular support for the IRA was low and only after popular support grew because of failing security measures was the IRA able to escalate the conflict to a maximum.

Local politics, national politics and international politics also played a major role in the dynamics of conflict because of the special circumstances of the conflict which mean Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland all have an interest in the conflict and a special relationship with each other. All three factors influenced the conflict in an escalatory as well as in a de-escalatory way.

The analysis furthermore shows an emphasis on policy solutions and peace talks to solve the problem as many peace initiatives were started to end the conflict. All but the Good Friday Accords collapsed because not all parties were included and the agreement alienated a certain group that returned to violence in order to bring the initiative down. Inclusiveness therefore played a crucial role in the escalation of earlier peace initiatives and the final de-escalation in the last phase of the Troubles.

What is noticeable, however, is that the use of indiscriminate coercive force was the main reason for the total escalation of the conflict, but that targeted coercive force was responsible for the two steepest de-escalations of the conflict. From this it follows that state capacity alone in the form of a strong military with advanced weapons is not enough to de-escalate a conflict as surveillance and targeted intelligence is necessary. Once the British military handed over some powers to the professionalised RUC the conflict de-escalated.

The strategy the IRA used during the conflict also had a major effect on the dynamics of the conflict. Until the fourth phase of the conflict, the strategy of the IRA was to wage a short, vicious and intense violent campaign to put pressure on the British government and make them withdraw. This strategy escalated the conflict massively. The strategy of settling down for

a long war de-escalated the conflict just as the strategy to follow a twofold strategy of politics and violence de-escalated the conflict a little.

With the Good Friday Agreement an end to the Troubles was created as all influential factors came together and formed a positive combination which was able to bring about the final de-escalation of the conflict.

10: Joint Analysis

10.1: Context

Social Cleavages

Social cleavages played a crucial role in all three conflicts. In the context of the conflicts as well as in the conflict emergence phases a comparable ethnic polarization can be witnessed. In Rhodesia it was the whites versus the blacks, in Northern Ireland it was nationalists versus unionists and in Peru it were the people with white features versus the Indian peasants, small merchants and industrial workers. In all three countries this ethnic polarization generated other cleavages such as rich versus poor and having political influence or not, which led to the overall emergence of the conflicts. It can furthermore be seen that these other cleavages overlap with the overriding cleavage of ethnic polarization. As was mentioned earlier, overlapping cleavages have the tendency to reinforce the division within society and it therefore has the power to intensify conflicts.

A difference on the other hand is observed in how the aforementioned cleavages drove the emergence and first phases of the conflicts. In Rhodesia the blacks resented the whites for their discriminatory policies and wanted to remove the white government in order to achieve equal prosperity and opportunity. This social-economic cleavage would drive the conflict until and after a tribal cleavage would emerge. In Peru, initially it was not the population itself that acted to change the social cleavages. Instead, the conflict emerged when Sendero actively used the increased division within society to gain support and convince the discriminated population to fight against the government. Nonetheless, the social-economic cleavage would drive the conflict. In Northern Ireland it was the Catholic population that started the civil rights movement to increase the social-economic cleavages. The social-economic cleavage disappeared as driving forces of the conflict, however, as they were subsumed by the national aspiration cleavage.

Concerning the escalatory and de-escalatory effects social cleavages had on all three conflicts, a number of similarities and differences can be highlighted. Just as Sendero had actively used the societal division to his advantage, the tribal cleavage between Shona and Ndebele in Rhodesia was also actively triggered as a means of recruitment. This recruitment had the effect of prolonging the stalemate and indirectly escalating the conflict as recruitment helped create more support for the guerrilla groups and because of popular support the conflict escalated. The social cleavages did not have an influential de-escalation as they were not solved during the conflict.

In Peru the ethnic cleavage was reflected in the military's counterinsurgency operations which were hostile towards locals and thereby escalated the conflict as locals were alienated. Seeing as discrimination by the military and the social-economic cleavage were the most important drivers in the conflict, the conflict de-escalated once hostile troops were replaced and development programs were started. By doing so, the government addressed the social cleavages that were the driving force behind Sendero's recruitment methods. Once these cleavages were removed from the equation, Sendero could no longer exploit the cleavages as the government had changed the narrative of the conflict which had a de-escalation as a result.

While in Rhodesia and Peru the main cleavages around which the conflicts revolved were socio-economic differences and discrimination because of ethnicity, the Northern Ireland conflict was about the overriding cleavage of ethnic polarization/national aspiration. Unlike in Peru, the reforms that dealt with the socio-economic cleavage were unable to de-escalate the conflict as it no longer was the sustaining dynamic of the conflict. What is more, unlike in Peru or Rhodesia, the national identity cleavage was framed as a zero-sum game in which finding a middle ground solution would be almost impossible. This social cleavage therefore became the sustaining dynamic of the conflict as it was the reason for escalation after the peace initiatives and it continued to be a barrier to successful de-escalatory peace initiatives.

Popular Support

Popular support played an important role in each conflict as in each conflict increased popular support allowed the militants to escalate the conflict. Popular support can, however, also be linked to de-escalation. The period in which popular support caused an escalation in the conflict differs across the cases, but shows how important popular support was in escalating the conflicts.

In Peru, Sendero was able to escalate the conflict as in the previous 15 to 20 years leading up to the conflict, it had created the necessary popular support to start the conflict. Once the conflict had started, the discriminatory and violent repressive state-led counterinsurgencies alienated the population which saw them as an invading force and this helped popular support for Sendero to rise even more. With this additional popular support, Sendero was able to escalate its violent campaign.

In Northern Ireland IRA support had been weak during the conflict emergence phase. As opposed to Sendero who had instigated the conflict themselves, it was only in the second year after the conflict had started before the IRA would really get involved and escalate the conflict. This was because popular support for the IRA would start growing massively after

discriminatory and violent repressive state policies and coercive actions. Similar to the Peruvian case, these repressive state actions alienated the population to such an extent they were driven right into the IRA's arms. With this increased popular support, the IRA was able to wage a vicious war against the British army and the loyalist forces. As a consequence, loyalist paramilitary groups also gained momentum and the conflict escalated to a maximum in the third year of the conflict.

In the Rhodesia case, the Rhodesian white government had a large popular support base at the start of the conflict from the white population and was also passively supported by a portion of the black population. This strong popular support allowed the government to escalate the conflict. It took until 1975 before popular support of the various rebels groups rose as a consequence of active recruitment and another result was that passive support for the white government started to shift towards support for the guerrilla forces. This popular support allowed the militants to attack the white government forces which resulted in an escalation of the conflict.

Only in the Peruvian case did popular support for the militant group decisively decline during the conflict which had a de-escalating effect. The reasons for this declining popular support were that for a large part the popular support for Sendero rested on fear and when the government started a campaign of winning the hearts and minds of the population they regained popular support from the Indian peasants. As the conflict continued, the Peruvian government decisively won the battle for popular support and de-escalated the conflict. In Northern Ireland popular support for the IRA decreased a little when they ended their ceasefire in 1996 by bombing London's Docklands area. Although popular support did not decline heavily, it may have helped pressuring the IRA into a second ceasefire.

In Peru the popular support for the militants dwindled during the conflict and the conflict de-escalated because of it. The fact that it did can be linked to the fact that Sendero actively made use of the increased division within Peru and also exploited the poor economic conditions of the marginalized population to make them fight the government. Willingness to fight the government did therefore not initially come from the population itself. In the 20 years leading up to the conflict, Sendero furthermore used a policy of indoctrination to gain popular support, but this also made the population fear Sendero. It can therefore be argued that the popular support Sendero gained was not fully based on loyalty. Lastly, the government was able to address the grievances on which the popular support of Sendero were built and the government therefore won the battle for popular support.

In both Northern Ireland and Rhodesia popular support for the militants did not decisively decrease during the conflict. This is because in Northern Ireland, IRA support came from the people itself, was not based on fear and because of the underlying national aspiration whish popular support was stronger and more loyal. Moreover, even when nationalists would no longer fully support the IRA anymore, they would not cross over to the other side. This was because the cleavage that separated the opponents was too big and the IRA opponents could offer nothing of substantial value to win the battle for popular support.

In general, it can be concluded that an increase in popular support causes an escalation of the conflict and a decrease in popular support has a de-escalating effect. In one instance this has proven to be different, however. In the early 1980s the IRA decided to begin a twin track of participating in politics alongside their military campaign. In order to play any part in politics, they needed to gain public support and refrain from alienating public opinion. As a consequence, the IRA began actively searching for public support and downsized their use of violence a little which had a de-escalating effect on the conflict.

Grievances

The most important similarity that can be distinguished in the factor of grievances is its role in moving the conflict from a latent phase to the emergent phase. In all the conflict there were significant grievances present that were exploited by actors that later would be the main combatants. Especially the inability to participate on the political level showed to be an important grievance in the three conflicts, since the grieved parties could not achieve their goal on the political level they were forced to the use of violence to achieve their goals. The factor of grievances on the dynamics of the conflicts also showed some important differences. The first difference was that in the Irish conflict the British government, in contrast with the Peruvian and Rhodesian government, actively tried to address some of the important grievances although too little and too late, because it was too little to prevent the conflict from escalating and the bigger reforms were too late as the conflict had already escalated and changed into a national identity conflict. This is in complete contrast with the Peruvian and Rhodesian governments, which mostly ignored or did not understand the widespread grievances. This difference can partly be attributed due to racism and indifference to the “lower classes” of black people in Rhodesia and Indians in Peru. The dismissal of grievances by the Rhodesian and Peruvian government would play a very important escalatory role since it pushed the ignored population to supporting the insurgents.

Another difference between the conflicts is that addressing the grievances alone is not enough to de-escalate the conflict. In the case of the Irish conflict it can be argued that earlier de-escalation would have been possible if the British government had addressed the Loyalist grievances by inviting them to the peace process earlier, however the earlier addressing of grievances also proved to be unsuccessful. However, in Peru the attempts to address the grievances proved to be an effective way to de-escalate the conflict as it took away some of the grievances of the population against the security forces, which in combination with the increasing hate towards Sendero helped de-escalating the conflict.

Local Politics

In both Peru and Rhodesia local politics only played a minor role in the dynamics of the conflict although the reasons why this is the case differs. In Rhodesia the whites were a minority that firmly controlled politics on both the local and national level. Seeing as their control was so strong, they did not see much difference between the two levels of politics. In Peru on the other hand, weak local politics played some part in the escalation of the conflict. This was because the local governments were very much dependent on the central government, but the central government was too weak to protect local officials against Sendero. As a result of Sendero's attacks, many mayors resigned which created a power vacuum in which Sendero seized power and was able to escalate the conflict.

The Northern Ireland case shows a complete divergent picture as the local government had a lot more autonomy from the central government than was the case in the other two conflicts. Even though the local politics are called local because Northern Ireland is part of Great-Britain, they are a separate area within Great-Britain and have their own Stormont parliament. In short, local was less local and more national than in the other two cases and therefore also had more influence on the conflict.

At the start of the conflict, Northern Ireland had its own Stormont government with its own unionist prime minister Terrence O'Neil. Because the unionist block was fragmented, O'Neil did not have the authority to deliver sufficient reforms to the civil rights campaign and therefore the conflict escalated. When in 1971 the hardliner Brian Faulkner became prime minister, he escalated the conflict by introducing a policy of aggression and introducing internment. After Britain imposed direct rule in 1972, the results of the local elections escalated the conflict because the elections preceding the Sunningdale Agreement showed an upsurge in loyalist parties and local elections also had a de-escalating effect on the conflict during the

1980s as Sinn Féin did well in local elections after which the IRA slightly decreased their use of violence.

National Politics

Unlike local politics, national politics played a major role in all three conflicts. Although the conflicts have in common that national politics was of importance in the conflict emergence phase, to what extend and how they influenced the conflict is different. In Northern Ireland it was not a British national government switch that instigated the emergence of the conflict. The British government did play a role in the emergence of the conflict as the government was unwilling to intervene and impose direct rule as to stop the processes that led to the emergence of the conflict because the British government did not want to get involved in the conflict.

The 1980 Peru elections were vital to the emergence of the conflict as the government that was chosen would make three specific decisions (not taking the Sendero threat seriously, relying on the police instead of the army and failure to recognize the causes of the insurgency) that created the favourable conditions for the conflict to emerge and escalate. Where the British government chose not to act with which they allowed the conflict to emerge, the Peruvian government did make certain choices which indirectly led to the creation of the conflict. Both governments also have in common they underestimated the threat of a possible conflict, as the British government chose to not get involved in the issue early on and the Peruvian government underestimated the Sendero threat.

In Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front rose to power in 1962. The nationalistic policies and their refusal to allow black parties into power within the government structure alienated the black parties even more. With this, the government fuelled already existing grievances and directly helped the conflict emerge. A difference can be seen between the conflicts as the government in Northern Ireland failed to prevent the conflict from emerging, the Peruvian government indirectly stimulated the conflict by making wrong decisions and create favourable conditions for the conflict to emerge and the Rhodesian government directly influenced the emergence of the conflict by fuelling old grievances.

Following the emergence phase, national politics would also play a role in the escalation and de-escalation of each conflict. The Labour party won the 1970 British general elections and replaced the policy of reform with a hardline security stance. This shift of government policy created a context in which nationalist alienation ensured massive popular support for the IRA which escalated the conflict. Under the rule of Ian Smith, the Rhodesia conflict would witness a similar pattern as the overreliance on the armed forces instead of a shift to give more power

and rights to the black population escalated the conflict. So in both conflicts popular support for the militants had been low, but increased rapidly after the security policy was introduced.

After the 1985 elections, the Peruvian government shifted from a hardline security approach to a 'soft' approach of fighting the socio-economic causes of the conflict. Although the Peruvian case shows an entirely different approach than the other two cases, this soft approach too led to an increase in violence.

Opposite to the escalatory hardline security stance of the British and Rhodesian government, the Peruvian coup Fujimori instigated in 1992 would de-escalate the conflict as he could roll out a strong counterinsurgency campaign that could defeat Sendero.

On the other hand, 'soft' approaches can also have a de-escalating effect on conflicts. The Labour government win in the 1997 election in Britain had a de-escalatory effect on the conflict as prime minster Blair was capable of convincing both unionists parties and Sinn Féin to cooperate in peace talks which eventually would lead to a ceasefire. In Rhodesia the Muzorewa government signed the Lancaster house agreement which proposed majority elections and British rule. This massively de-escalated the conflict as the rebel groups achieved the thing they wanted all along, namely majority rule.

Lastly, a government switch itself can also have effects on the conflict, without the newly elected government having introduced new policies yet. This was the case in Rhodesia after Muzorewa rose to power. Muzorewa was a black president and was perceived by the fighting parties that guerrilla fighters might think the fight was over after a black man had become president. The fighting parties, however, saw Muzorewa as a puppet of the whites. To undermine the idea that the conflict had ended, the guerrilla parties increased their violence. Nonetheless Muzorewa also realizing that he would not be able to maintain power and having a weak mandate as the whites still controlled both the military and economic sectors he decided to enter negotiations with the non-state actors eventually resulting in a peace agreement which de-escalated and ultimately ended the conflict.

What the above analysis shows is that national government changes can have a huge effect on conflicts as government switches are often accompanied with policy switches which influence the conflict. It is furthermore apparent that a 'soft' approach can have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect and a hard approach can also have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect on the conflict. Choosing the correct timing for either negotiation or using violence is therefore of utmost importance.

The context of a conflict must be taken into account as the Peruvian case shows not fighting the militants escalated the conflict as Sendero regained power while they could have

been defeated, and the Northern Ireland case and the Rhodesia case show that a badly timed and executed violent offensive instigated by a new government can also escalate the conflict by alienating the population. A well-timed and strong enough counterinsurgency programme can on the other hand cause a de-escalation of the conflict, as the Fujimori example shows. Finding a political compromise also has the power to de-escalate or escalate the conflict, depending on the context. In the early years of the Peruvian conflict it was counter-productive as the militants were able to regain strength and during the reign of Ian Smith the rebels believed the government acted out of a position of weakness. But in the last phases of Northern Ireland and Rhodesia, the rebels respectively were pressured into the peace talks and were granted what they wanted all along, thereby de-escalating the conflict.

International Politics/foreign support

Although international politics/foreign support was of crucial importance in each conflict, because of the different dynamics, it played out vastly different in each conflict. Just as with the local politics factor, international politics in Northern Ireland shows a different dynamic than the other two conflicts. This is because the Republic of Ireland was directly involved in the conflict seeing as one part of the conflicting parties, the nationalists, wanted a united Ireland. The problem which the Troubles revolves around, national identity, directly includes the Republic of Ireland which is why the conflict never truly was only internal. The Peruvian and Rhodesian conflicts did not see any similar international connection with third countries.

For this reason, the Northern Ireland conflict was the only one in which international politics played a significant role in the conflict emergence phase. This was when Irish prime minister Jack Lynch, during the Battle of the Bogside, fuelled anti-partitionist feelings by publicly stating a united Ireland was the only possible solution to the conflict.

A number of international political involvements and foreign support policies played a role in the escalation and de-escalation of all three conflicts. Similarities and differences are present as a result of vastly different involved actors and diverging taken measures. The Rhodesian and Northern Ireland conflict have in common that both militant forces, throughout the conflict, were helped by foreign supporters. The difference is that Rhodesian militants were provided with territory, weapons and training and with this could really escalate the conflict. In Northern Ireland the militants were mainly provided with weapons, but seeing as they had more than enough weapons and did not need to use very sophisticated weapons, more weapons did not cause an escalation of the conflict. The inclusion of Semtex in their bombs did change the

dynamics as the IRA came to focus on damage instead of deaths, but therefore did not so much escalate the conflict as such.

Another difference between the two conflicts is that foreign support in Rhodesia simultaneously de-escalated the conflict because the Rhodesian government received military equipment and troops while Northern Ireland did not need this foreign support as it already had the national British military which had most necessary capabilities to deal with the conflict. During the fourth phase in the Peru conflict, a similar thing happened as the USA increased its aid to the government. Although the USA did not send in military troops, they did provide money and training by which the Peruvian intelligence apparatus became a more effective force that was able to de-escalate the conflict. A similar pattern can be seen on the national level in Northern Ireland as the British military helped the RUC professionalize after which they could more effectively deal with the IRA.

Another minor resemblance between Northern Ireland and Rhodesia is found. In Rhodesia between 1974 and 1977 foreign support was aimed at resolving the conflict. A stalemate occurred and therefore the fighting groups were pressured into peace talks. They failed, however, and the conflict escalated again. In Northern Ireland multiple peace talks ensued during the conflict as the Republic of Ireland and the British government wanted to solve the conflict. This often resulted in a stalemate between the parties and after the peace initiative would collapse, violence would resurface again. Although the different conflicts show a resemblance here, the dynamics were totally different as Ireland and Great-Britain had a vastly different relationship with the conflict than the international actors that forced the two conflicting parties in Rhodesia to negotiate. On the other hand, the pressure the US put on the British government to deal with the conflict effectively is comparable to the international pressure put on the Rhodesian parties, although the impact US pressure really had on the conflict is debated.

In Peru the international community had an indirect escalatory effect on the conflict as the withdrawing of funds would cause an economic crisis in Peru. This helped Sendero in escalating the conflict while it also stopped further escalation because it prevented the military from launching a coup.

10.2: State Actors

State-action Coercive force

Throughout the three conflicts each state took both similar and different approaches when it came to the use of coercive force in order to de-escalate a conflict. In this part of the analysis

we will first observe the similarities and difference in government action in regards to coercive force and then observe the effects it had on the conflict and whether they were similar or different. This will be done by chronologically going through the conflict in order to see the difference per phase.

In all cases all three states used coercive force in order to suppress non-state groups. In Rhodesia this was done when guerrilla groups infiltrated into Rhodesia from Zambia by quickly patrolling and monitoring the border. While during the troubles the British military was sent in for order to be restored, while in Peru the police force was used in order to suppress the rebels gaining ground. Initially each of these uses had different results.

In Rhodesia due to good intelligence and superior state capabilities the Rhodesians were quickly able to suppress and drive out guerrilla forces from the country therefore having a de-escalating effect on the country. In the case of the Troubles similar results were seen with the British forces viewed as conflict mediators thus de-escalating the conflict. Finally, in the case of Peru, the lack of capacities such as the poorly trained and equipped police force to deal with Sendero also lead to an increase in violence as non-state actors began taking over territory in Peru.

As the conflicts shifted however, states began taking a different approach. The Rhodesians maintained their use of coercive force only increasing it more with operation hurricane when non-state actors managed to cross the border and enter Rhodesia starting the infamous Altena farm attack. The UK on the other hand began using more heavy-handed tactics in order to end the conflict. With their reform policies failing the army was called in to suppress and remove the IRA, however, bad intelligence and bad surveillance led to more anti-British sentiments as British forces were mainly focusing on catholic dominated areas and were seen as repressive towards them. This resulted in damaging their image of a neutral force resulting in an increase in recruitment for the IRA and therefore an increase in violence against British forces. Peru on the other hand began to improve on the mistakes they made early on in the conflict. Realizing the limited capability of the police force, they began using the army to root out Sendero. However, while this change was needed in order for Peru to combat Sendero the gross human rights violations against the population who lived in areas controlled by Sendero only served to increase the violence. Additionally, the army went in without a proper plan to tackle Sendero which lead to disastrous results.

The shift in the conflict resulted in various difference in all three states. What is evident however is that once it became clear that previous usages of coercive force were not working it resulted in the use of more heavy handed tactics in order to resolve a conflict. Rhodesia began

using the combined forces of the air force, army and police under operation hurricane to remove non-state forces and managed to de-escalate their conflict. Mainly due to their ability to deny non-state actors territory within Rhodesia and still have strong intelligence and capabilities. The UK and Peru only managed to escalate their conflict more. The UK lead by bad intelligence and bad surveillance began their campaign of trying to root out the IRA, but was seen as being repressive towards the catholic population. This resulted in large anti-British sentiment and an escalation of the conflict as the IRA gained more members and stepped up their attacks in the area. In the case of Peru while they did manage to harm the Sendero their lack of respect for human rights, towards the population living under the non-state actors rule and their lack of a coherent plan resulted in a further escalation of the conflict.

The next phase of each of the conflict saw each actor take several different directions when it came to the use of coercive force. In the middle stage of the conflict Rhodesia was unable to keep up with the growing capacity of the guerrilla forces and began changing tactics. Instead of trying to prevent the guerrillas from gaining entry into Rhodesia (which was almost impossible now that border with Mozambique had opened and guerrilla forces outnumbered the Rhodesian forces) they instead decided to attack and raid bases controlled by non-state actors in order to remove the problem at its source. The UK also began taking a different approach, having learned from its previous mistakes it now began conducting major operations based on good intelligence and surveillance. They began implementing better tactics in Northern Ireland by removing the no-go zones and systematically targeting members of the IRA instead of the whole catholic population. Peru realizing that they needed to win over the population in order for them to remove Sendero began addressing the underlying problems of the conflict and attempting to reform the army so that it could operate without abusing human rights in the areas. Nonetheless while it was addressing this problem the army was angered by the changes and refused to leave their barracks consequentially resulting in the Sendero taking back areas that had been liberated by the army and facing no opposition.

In the middle stages of the conflict it was only the British which had learned from their past mistakes and had attempted to correct it. By implementing solid tactics and learning from the previous phase they managed to severely hurt the IRA by removing prominent members within their ranks. Additionally, a solid and intelligence driven operation made the IRA realize that they could not make the British forces leave by force alone therefore de-escalating the conflict. The Rhodesian and Peruvian on the other hand only managed to escalate their conflict during this part of their conflict. The Rhodesians by not finding any alternative policy solutions and instead focusing on coercive force only escalated the conflict further while the Peruvians

tried to find a policy solution without the use of coercive force served only to escalate their conflict as well.

Finally, in the last conflict phase all states took a somewhat similar approach but each had different effects. Rhodesia realizing that the attacks and raids on bases controlled by non-state forces was not having the desired affect began trying to build up their capacity to match those of guerrilla forces. They did so by training auxiliaries or former non-state soldiers which could come in and control areas liberated by the security forces. This was meant to share the burden of military operations allowing the security forces to strike non-state bases while axillaries maintained security throughout the regions that had been liberated. Nonetheless it only further escalated the conflict as often these auxiliaries were untrained and undisciplined so did more harm than good. Additionally, the conflict ended shortly thereafter not through coercive force but by policy oriented solutions thus the full effect of these auxiliaries cannot fully be observed. The UK similarly began using and building up a force comprised of protestant and catholic Irish policemen with the goal of removing the British army and instead leaving security operations to the PSNI or RUC. This had the effect of de-escalating the conflict as once again a more neutral force was put into place. In Peru having learned from all previous phases began conducting an extensive coercive operation, which was fully supported, well prepared and kept human rights in mind.

The effect that this final phase had on the conflict is vastly different from all three states. For Rhodesia the change in tactics only helped serve to escalate the conflict further. For the UK to implement a more neutral force and remove the British force altogether served to de-escalate the conflict but not to end it. While Peru implemented a similar tactic to what the British had done in the previous conflict phase by implementing a well-coordinated and organized counter-insurgency operation which eventually de-escalated saw an end to conflict as a whole.

State action- Policy solution

When it comes to policy solutions within the states, all participants had vastly different approaches. In this part of the analysis we will look at the major differences between the various states and why they took such different policy solutions as opposed to how it affected the conflict in terms of how it escalated or de-escalated it. (This can be seen in the individual analysis)

The main difference between all three states is that they had vastly different approach when it comes to policy solutions. The UK in total attempted six different policy solutions in order to end the conflict. Meanwhile Rhodesia had only two major policy solution but only

towards the end of the conflict when they were losing the war. While Peru never had a single policy solution and only proposed a policy solution but never implemented it towards the end of the conflict.

When analysing as to why this was the case a reoccurring trend can be seen with all case studies. Firstly, that the reason why there were so many different negotiated proposals with the UK possibly has to do with the fact that they didn't want the UK to become embroiled into the Northern Ireland conflict. At first the British attempted to quickly resolve the problem by instituting internment of suspected members of the IRA. Once this policy backfired and instead escalated the conflict the British government sought to resolve the conflict quickly so that they would no longer have to commit to The Troubles on a long term-basis. Thus a reason for continued policy oriented solution was all aimed at ending the conflict.

Similarly, this can be seen in the case study of Rhodesia. When Rhodesia was winning the conflict in the first half of the conflict no policy solutions were discussed or presented (except for those forced upon them by international supporters). It was only when it became clear that the only way to win or de-escalate the conflict was through a policy solution and not coercive force that the Rhodesian government began actively proposing policy options such as the internal settlement offer.

Peru on the other hand saw no need to end the conflict through policy solutions. In most cases the conflict was isolated in the less developed regions of Peru thus serving more as a nuisance than an actual threat to toppling the country itself. Additionally, it was not losing the war in the general sense, military operations while harming the general population in the area did not affect the country as a whole but did affect the areas of operations regarding Sendero. Finally, when it did present a policy solution to the conflict it was only when the leader of Sendero agreed to a policy solution which massively de-escalated the conflict

This is where a second trend becomes apparent in policy solutions, what is obvious from all case studies is that the only time a policy solution is successful in ending a conflict is when all parties of the conflict become involved. In Peru it was when the leader of Sendero and the government agreed to a policy solution compromise. In Rhodesia this was only the case when the Lancaster house agreement was signed where all non-state actors and the government agreed to equal democratic elections. While in the case of the UK it was only when the unionist were finally included in the Good Friday Agreement that the conflict massively de-escalated. Thus showing a re-occurring trend where when parties were excluded such as in the Rhodesian internal settlement or Sunningdale agreement and the Anglo-Irish agreement where parties were

excluded that the conflict often tended to escalate or continue due to not all parties agreeing to the terms.

State capacity

State capacity appears to be one of the most important aspects when it came to tackling non-state actors activities within their borders. This part of the analysis will go through various phases of the conflict, look at how state-capacity increased or decreased and analyse the effects of it.

In the starting phases of each of the conflicts each of the countries experienced different levels of state-capacity. On the one hand Rhodesia which although having a small army and police still had a large state capacity which they could use against non-state forces in the region. Additionally, by having this large state capacity the state was able to de-escalate the conflict quickly by bearing down on non-state forces. Peru and the Northern Ireland on the other hand had a definite lack in state capacity in the first phase of the conflict. With the UK's Northern Ireland Security apparatus unable to deal with growing unrest and conflict in Northern Ireland, while Peru used an underfunded, under equipped and untrained police force to try and deal with Sendero. What is similar however in all three cases was that when the conflict began all three countries tried to keep it in the bounds of a police operation. Rhodesia conducted operations under police leadership with army backing, Peru sent in police counter-insurgency squads and Northern Ireland used the RUC, the main difference being that the latter two countries lacked the capacity to deal with it.

As the conflict carried on and as the police capabilities of all states actors in the conflict began to decrease, the army became the primary state capacity to deal with insurgencies. What is similar about all conflicts is that at one point the use of the army becomes the primary means of dealing with insurgencies within a country. This usually occurs when it becomes evident that the conflict can no longer be managed by police forces alone. In Rhodesia the army, police and air force all became integrated under a structural command with operation Hurricane after the fatal Altena farm attack. In the UK the army was sent in after it became apparent that the RUC could no longer deal with the increasing amount of violence which was occurring in Northern Ireland. While in Peru after the massively underfunded police force failed to put a stop to Sendero the government sent in the army to quell the non-state actor.

Nonetheless this change of state capacity from police to army had various different results. In Rhodesia the conflict de-escalated rapidly after 1972 at least temporarily with the more heavy-handed approach. The UK and Peru on the other hand experienced a massive

escalation of the conflict. Mainly because the UK army was not prepared for a peacekeeping role and was prejudice against the largely catholic population of Ireland, while Peru escalated the conflict mainly because of the army's indiscriminate use of violence against anyone living in areas controlled by Sendero.

In the third phase of the conflict the state-capacity changed for all three countries as all three began taking different strategies. Rhodesia, which had once enjoyed a large state-capacity over the guerrillas both in the numerical and technologic sense began losing its edge once non-state forces began gaining large number of recruitments and were able to expose the entire Rhodesian western flank with the opening of Mozambique. Similarly, Peru although still having a far larger state-capacity than the non-state actors began losing a large chunk of its state-capacity capabilities once it began reforming the armed forces and removing officers who were suspected of human rights abuses. This resulted in the army refusing to fight the non-state actors. In both cases once state actors lost their state capacity supremacy it resulted in an escalation of the conflict. With Rhodesia unable to de-escalate the conflict through the use of force, while Peru unable to halt the non-state actors advance as the army refused to fight. The UK on the other hand had the ability to de-escalate the conflict with the use of force. Throughout the conflict the British retained their large state capacity and thus after improvements were made both in regards to the police force and previous operation procedures (see section coercive force) the British army used its state capacity to de-escalate the conflict in 1972 with operation motorman which saw the use of over 12,000 troops take part in the operation. While the operation was the consequence of a large escalation in the conflict, afterwards when the operation had been successful the conflict de-escalated and the newly reformed RUC was placed in charge of the area again in 1974.

In the final phase of the conflicts, State-capacity for all three countries had a vastly different impact. For Rhodesia the lack of state-capacity to deal with the non-state actors prevented it from using the proper amount of coercive force in order to either bring the conflict to a stalemate or to de-escalate the conflict. This lack of state-capacity eventually led it to accept majority rule and with it an end to the conflict in a non-state actors victory. For Peru finally overcoming issues within the military used state-capacity to route Sendero. By having increased the manpower of the army and creating a coherent counter-insurgency strategy it eventually led to the capture of the lead of the Sendero and a de-escalation of the conflict. For the UK however, with the removal of most of the British forces from Northern Ireland and responsibility for security being handed back to the RUC resulted in a small escalation of the conflict. This was mainly due to the inability of the RUC to still deal with large scale riots and strikes due to lack

of manpower. Nonetheless due to major reforms this escalation was only small as the reforms had provided the RUC with more public support and logistical intelligence. Thus while it did not reach the levels at it previously did, the removal of the army did slightly damage the ability of the state capacity.

Weak vs Strong government

When analyzing the effects a weak or a strong government had on a conflict there appears to be no real correlation between each of the conflicts. The main factor appears to be the context which the government is placed in.

For example; in Rhodesia during the first two phases of the conflict Ian Smith whom had strong government at the time managed to de-escalated as he faced no opposition inside parliament, therefore he could use coercive force any way he pleased. Peru similarly during the last phase of the conflict when Fujimori had a strong government mandate could use coercive force without fear of opposition in order to defeat Sendero and therefore de-escalate the conflict. While the UK with the strong governments of 1979 and the strong government of Tony Blair in 1997 managed to de-escalate the conflict because they had the ability to break political deadlocks and manoeuvre around certain issues due to their strong governmental support.

Nonetheless having a strong government doesn't necessarily mean that it leads to a de-escalation of the conflict. In the third phase of the conflict Rhodesia's strong government mandate instead escalated the conflict as Ian Smith kept using coercive force in order to suppress the non-state actor, which ultimately failed. Similarly, the UK had a strong government mandate during the second phase of the conflict, but due to its makeup of many unionists it instead escalated the conflict as it escalated the nationalists thus driving up recruitment for the IRA.

The division between strong government is the same when focus is placed on weak government. In Peru throughout the first three phases of the conflict it had a weak government, as it was unprepared to deal with the conflict, suffered from internal fighting between the army and the government, and when it attempted to deal with the non-state actor it often did more harm than good thus escalating the conflict. Similarly, the weak governments of the UK resulted in the inability of the UK to bring reform to Northern Ireland therefore escalating the conflict.

Nevertheless, a weak government can also de-escalate the conflict. In the UK the weak government mandate in the third phase of the conflict helped de-escalate the conflict in Northern Ireland as the UK government needed the help of Unionist MPs in order to pass legislation. Similarly, the weak government of Rhodesia in the final phase of the conflict

allowed for a different course to be taken than the one solely based on coercive force and instead sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict, which worked and the conflict massively de-escalated and ended.

10.3: Non-State Actors

Strategy of Armed Groups

The strategy of armed groups had both significant escalating and de-escalating effects on all three conflicts. However, there are some similarities and differences in how this factor was able to escalate or de-escalate the conflicts. Firstly, in all three conflicts the strategies of the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict by pressuring the governments to react to the violence carried out by the armed groups. In the conflict of Ireland, the IRA used violence to pressure the British government to withdraw, in Peru to provoke the brutal counterinsurgency campaigns and in Rhodesia to accept majority rule. However, the strategies and the impact of these strategies during the first phases of the conflict were quite similar. In the beginning of all three conflicts the armed groups conducted short, vicious and intense attacks against government forces. However, what differed were the results on the conflict, the armed groups in Peru and Ireland proved to be successful in their ability to escalate the conflict, while the armed groups in Rhodesia failed, leading to a de-escalation of the conflict. This can largely be attributed to the amount of popular support. The IRA and Sendero both operated in areas where it could rely on a significant base of support. This was not the case in the beginning of the Rhodesian conflict where support for the armed groups was not sufficient.

Secondly, it is interesting to see the escalatory or de-escalatory role of the changes of strategies from the armed groups during the conflicts. In Peru, Sendero decided to escalate the conflict to provoke another campaign by the government, thereby escalating the conflict in the short term, but de-escalating the conflict in the long term since it became more violent than the government and lost its essential bases of support. This is in contrast with Ireland, where the IRA noticed that it could not win in the short term by bombing the British away and changed its strategy to a more political and long term one. So instead of escalating the conflict, the IRA caused a slight de-escalation by a change in its strategy. Also the failure in Rhodesia by the armed groups to escalate the conflict in the beginning of the conflict led to a change of strategy that would result in a focus on creating more support and capacity which would prove to be successful and escalated the conflict significantly. Interesting similarity is that in all three conflicts the strategies of the armed groups rapidly changed after the governments had answered each on its own way to the violent campaigns. What differed however was that only the armed

groups in the Irish conflict shifted towards a more non-violent campaign, while in the Peruvian and Rhodesian cases the armed groups only increased their use of violence.

Thirdly it is important to bring up the role of strategy in the end of the three conflicts. In Peru, especially during the last phase of the conflict, Sendero was unable to create a new comprehensive insurgency strategy without their strategic leaders that were captured by the government, which helped de-escalating the conflict significantly. This was different with the IRA, the IRA leadership remained influential during the later phases of the war and although pressured, entered the peace processes as a strategy. It is the strategy of armed groups in Rhodesia that showed to be entirely different, instead of aiming to de-escalate the conflict, or being unable to escalate/de-escalate the conflict like Sendero, the ZAPU and ZANU were instead escalating the conflict by acquiring public support and capacity.

Capacity of Armed Groups

In the researched conflicts the capacity of armed groups played a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict. However, there are some significant differences in how it influenced the dynamics. The first interesting difference in the role of capacity of armed groups is that a low capacity showed different results in the conflicts in Rhodesia and Peru. It is mostly assumed groups with a low capacity are not able to escalate the conflict, however the armed groups in Peru were able to escalate war with the low capacity during the earlier phases of the war, the Rhodesian armed groups were unable to do similar which de-escalated the war. This can possibly be explained by the differences in expertise and capacity of the security apparatus in both countries. While the Peruvian security apparatus was very weak and inexperienced in the early phases of the war, the Rhodesian security apparatus was very experienced and effective and much better able to round up the insurgents.

Secondly, another difference between the conflicts was that the high capacity of the IRA in Ireland, in contrast with the groups in Peru and Rhodesia, never escalated the war. The IRA had a high capacity throughout the whole conflict and had an abundancy of weapons. It is often assumed that when there are more weapons available, the conflict will escalate. As was the case in Peru and Rhodesia where the increase in capacity resulted in an escalation of the conflict. The reason it did not escalate the conflict, like in Rhodesia and Peru, was the result of the British army that was still far superior in firepower and capacity. While the Rhodesian and Peruvian armed forces were often challenged by the capacity of the armed groups in manpower and firepower, the British armed forces never had this problem. This was because the British armed forces were, and still are, one of the best trained and funded armies in the world.

Thirdly, all three conflicts show a slight escalation of the conflict when the armed groups gained access to more sophisticated weaponry. In Peru the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict with the heavy weapons they were able to buy from the revenues of the coca-trade, which gave them the possibility to fight the armed forces more effectively. In Ireland, the access to Semtex helped escalate the conflict since its helped inflict much more material damage than previous bomb materials. And in Rhodesia the access to sophisticated anti-air weaponry escalated the conflict since it caused the downing of the two passenger airplanes and halted the air superiority of the Rhodesian armed forces, depriving them of the most important advantage in the conflict.

Finally, the capacity of the insurgent is heavily reliant on manpower. Both in Peru and Rhodesia the escalatory role of manpower is very visible. Both in Peru and Rhodesia the armed groups were able to escalate the conflict when they had access to a lot of manpower to replace the fallen fighters, and showed a de-escalation when the groups did not have the manpower. The IRA differed since it never had this problem of manpower because of its huge base of public support and followed a strategy that did not have a need for a lot of manpower. While the armed groups in Peru and Rhodesia were more engaged in a large scale guerrilla war that required lots of manpower, the IRA was more focused on assassinations and small scale attacks.

Factionalization

Factionalization was an important escalatory and de-escalatory factor in the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts, but not in the Peruvian conflict. So why did factionalization play an important role in the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts and not in the Peruvian conflict? A possible reason factionalization did not occur in Peru could have been the result of the almost divine status of the leadership of Guzman. He was seen as a god and the ultimate strategic leader of Sendero among his followers, and his leadership was unquestionable. Although his capture did result in a slight different stance about the peace talks between the imprisoned leadership and the leadership that was not imprisoned, followers still largely followed the commands and strategies provided by Guzman. It was also after the capture and the prison letters that Sendero would become a shallow form of its former organization. In the Irish and Rhodesian conflicts there was no ultimate and divine leader that unified all the parties, which led to multiple internal splits and uprisings that sometimes escalated and de-escalated the conflict. Although both conflicts show similarities in factionalization, the reasons and consequences of this factionalization differed significantly.

Firstly. in both cases factionalization of the armed groups caused an escalation in the conflicts, with the split of the of Provisional IRA in 1969 and the ZANU split in Rhodesia. However, both splits escalated the conflicts in different ways. While in the case of Rhodesia the conflict only slightly escalated the conflict due to infighting, the split of the Provisional IRA caused a major change of a defensive strategy to a more aggressive attacking strategy against the British government, severely escalating the conflict.

A second interesting similarity is that factionalization not only played an escalatory role, but also played an important de-escalating role during both conflicts. In both the Irish and Rhodesian conflict the factionalization caused by internal struggles led to a de-escalation of the conflict. However, the reasons why the split occurred differed significantly. In Ireland the threat of factionalization de-escalated the conflict because the parties involved in the peace talks were afraid that a new split would bring a resurgence in violence. All the parties engaged in the peace talks were aware of the consequences of the split in 1969, when the split between Provisional IRA and the Official IRA helped emerge the conflict. Therefore, the parties engaged in the peace talks deliberately softened their demands. This was absolutely not the case in the conflict of Rhodesia, where the conflict de-escalated because there was no clear leadership as a result of the ZANU split. So while the Irish case was a more calculated de-escalation by the leadership of the armed groups, the de-escalation of the Rhodesian conflict was a consequence of power struggles regarding leadership.

Criminalization

In two of the three cases criminalization did not occur in the conflict. Although in all cases criminal activities played a role in financing their activities, it only became an important part of the insurgency in the Peruvian conflict. This difference can be attributed to different reasons, but the most logical one is that both Northern Ireland and Rhodesia did not have to rely on the financial resources gained by criminal activity. The Sendero insurgency did not receive the same level of foreign support that the armed groups in Rhodesia and Ireland experienced. Ireland received large amounts of weapons from the USA and Libya and did not have to rely on criminal activities for financial resources to buy weaponry, which was also the case for the armed groups in Rhodesia that received large amounts of weapons and financial resources from the Soviet Union and China. Only in the Peruvian case an argument could be made of criminalization because of the money received by the criminal activities in the coca-valley which did help escalate the war. It was known that Guzman and the Sendero leadership lived a lavish lifestyle as a result of the money received from the drug trade and although proved to

escalate the conflict without the coca trade during the earlier phases of the war, it later became dependant on the large amounts of money from the valley to attract new fighters and to provide sophisticated weapons necessary to expand its operations against the Peruvian army. Sendero also escalated the conflict by increasing their criminal activities in the regions that were under their control, especially executions to settle community conflicts led to a vicious circle of violence between the communities. However, it should be stressed that although criminal activities played an important role in the Peruvian conflict, it never became the primary objective of Sendero.

11: Joint Conclusion

In conclusion regarding the context of each conflict, there are a number of differences and similarities that had an escalatory or de-escalatory effect on the conflicts. Firstly, social cleavages played a big role in the emergent phase of all three conflicts and in all three countries the overlapping cleavages would have an escalatory effect of some sort on the conflicts. The conflict of Peru shows that using a counter-narrative when someone uses social cleavages to gain support for the conflict can have a de-escalatory effect. Regarding the possible de-escalatory effects of social cleavages, the analysis has shown the importance of knowing which cleavages drive the conflict and which do not as redressing the cleavages that do not drive the conflict will not de-escalate the conflict. Lastly, whether or not a social cleavage is framed as a zero-sum game, is very important for the conflict as non-zero-sum cleavages can be solved easier than zero-sum cleavages. This is because victory in a zero-sum framing can only be attained with the defeat of the other which means neither side want to give in to the other groups as their ideas directly oppose one another. Removing a zero-sum cleavage from the equation is therefore very hard and complicates ending a conflict.

Although the period in which the militants gained enough popular support to be able to escalate the conflict differs across the cases, in general it can be concluded that an increase in popular support causes an escalation of the conflict and a decrease in popular support has a de-escalating effect as increased popular support gives the militants the capacity to escalated the conflict. This did not, however, hold true for the IRA in the 1980s when the IRA began using a two-twin track of politics and a military campaign. Because the IRA actively sought public support for their political campaign, they downsized their use of violence and with that de-escalated the conflict.

Local politics had a vastly different influence on the dynamics of each conflict. In Rhodesia national control was so strong that local politics did not play any substantial role. In Peru national control was weak which is why Sendero was able to terrorise their way into controlling local politics which enabled them to escalate the conflict. Both cases show a lack of real local politics, but it can nonetheless be argued that strong national control over local politics has a de-escalatory role while a weak government control over local politics has an escalatory effect. In Northern Ireland local politics had more autonomy and therefore influence on the conflict. Local electoral results showed an escalation because of loyalist upsurges while it saw a slight de-escalation after Sinn Féin did well in elections as this spurred the other parties into peace negotiations.

National politics influenced each conflict because national government switches can have a huge effect on conflicts as government switches are often accompanied with policy switches which influence the conflict. It is furthermore apparent that a 'soft' approach can have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect and a hard approach can also have an escalating as well as a de-escalating effect on the conflict. Choosing the correct timing for either negotiation or using violence is therefore of utmost importance. Even without a changing government policy, a government switch can still effect a conflict, however.

There are many contrasting possible ways in which many different international actors can support or influence a conflict. What is clear, however, is that when rebels gain international aid this may help them in escalating the conflict. At the same time, when government forces get money, equipment, training or international troops this helps them in creating a more effective security intelligence apparatus that can de-escalate the conflict. Depending on the intentions and interplay between the international politics/international support, the conflict escalates, de-escalates or causes a stalemate.

There are also a number of similarities and difference which may be highlighted in regards to state actors. Firstly, is the use of coercive force: What is noticeable about all three states is that all used coercive force in some way or another to eliminate or de-escalate the conflict. While it shifts from phase to phase is can be seen that once a conflict begins to escalate more states tend to use more coercive force in order to attempt to de-escalate the conflict. What we can also see is if the use of coercive force is done without the proper planning, coordination or intelligence like in Peru and the UK, the use of coercive can have an escalating effect on the conflict. However, even if coercive force is properly used, if the state does not have the capability to keep up with the capability of non-state forces coercive force will not result in an end of the conflict as was the case in Rhodesia.

For Policy solutions the biggest trends appears to be that states begin negotiations either when they are losing the conflict (Rhodesia) or wish to exit a conflict as quickly as possible (UK). If the conflict is a mere nuisance and does not actually affect the economic or general wellbeing of a state (as in the case of Peru and early phases in Rhodesia) negotiations or policy solutions are often ignored and coercive force is preferred in order to stop an uprising or an escalation of the conflict. When however, policy solutions are presented they have only been successful in all case studies when all parties of a conflict are involved, this held both true in the UK, Rhodesia and in Peru where without the support of one party or another the conflict continued.

When it comes to state-capacity another number of trends can be observed. Firstly, that when the conflict erupts the only capacity used by the states are the police forces. However, when it becomes clear that regular law and order cannot be upheld by the limited capacity of the police the states capacity is increased by having the army become involved either as a support mechanism for the police or take over control completely. Another noticeable trend within the conflict is that as long as the state has a larger capacity than the non-state actor with the use coercive force it can be an effective tool in de-escalating the conflict. Nonetheless, while it may de-escalate the conflict it is not the solution to ending it. (Even if properly planned) Instead while the non-state actor groups may be defeated a period of latent conflicts may instead occur, where old grievances and social cleavages remain. Furthermore, if the state has a smaller capacity than the non-state actors it will likely result in an escalation of the conflict. This can be seen in the case study of Rhodesia (where not enough coercive force could be used to maintain order due to lack of manpower), Peru (due to the inability of the country to use the army made it have no capacity) and the UK only experiencing a slight escalation of the conflict, as the RUC was still incapable of dealing with large scale riots and strikes, however due to reforms it was only a slight escalation.

Finally, what we can also conclude is that there is no correlation between the strength of the government and a phase of the conflict, at least not when compared to these three case studies. In both cases of a strong and weak government there have been cases of escalation and de-escalation, it mainly depends on the factors playing a role during a certain period of the conflict. Nonetheless this is mostly based on chance as opposed to being an achievable factor.

There are a number of differences and similarities that had an escalatory or de-escalatory effect on the three conflicts. Firstly, the strategy of the armed groups all tried to escalate the conflict by achieving their goals through armed conflict and thereby provoking the government to react. A major difference however is that in the case of Rhodesia this strategy failed and eventually helped de-escalate the conflict during the early phase of the conflict. Furthermore, the analysis also showed that a change in strategy of the armed groups can have drastic effects on the dynamics of the conflict, were we see in both the Irish and Peruvian conflict to deliberately change the strategy of the armed groups to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Lastly, especially at the end of the three conflicts we see clearly the importance of the strategy of the armed groups. In Peru Sendero was unable to adapt its strategy after its strategic leaders were captured, while in the Irish and Rhodesian conflict the groups were still able to lay out a comprehensive insurgency strategy.

The effect of the capacity of the armed groups was also very noticeable in all three conflicts, and in general it can be concluded that an increase in capacity has an escalating effect on the conflict and a decrease of capacity a de-escalating effect on the conflict. This was especially true for Sendero that gained a huge increase in capacity with the drug trade which made it possible to escalate the conflict, and showed also a de-escalation of the conflict when it lost its high capacity after the loss of the coca-valley.

The factionalization of the armed groups in Rhodesia and Ireland had both escalating and de-escalating effects. In general, it can be concluded that factionalization can escalate the conflict on a short term because of infighting or change of strategy, but that it can also de-escalate the conflict because of infighting and powerstruggles between the armed groups which weakens the armed groups capacities.

Finally, Criminalization only showed some escalatory effects in the case of Peru. While in the Rhodesian and Irish conflict criminal activities played only a minor role, in the Peruvian conflict the money received from criminal activities would hugely contribute to the fighting capacity of Sendero. However, it should be stress that it never became the primary objective of the insurgency, which still focused on ensuring the collapse of the government.

12: Methodology Reflection

After having conducted our research and coming to the final conclusions there are a number of improvements which could be implemented for future research.

Structural suggestions

Our first suggestion is to not only to look at a conflict as a whole but also the events, which happened before and after the conflict. While all three papers do go into some detail regarding the precursor events before the conflict breaks out deeper analytical and background research must be done in order to understand the conflict better and to observe the effects a conflict may have had on the country in later years to come. For example, during the Rhodesian Bush the tribal divisions were exposed in order to ramp up recruitment for guerrilla forces. While this social cleavage did not escalate or de-escalate the conflict in Rhodesia, afterwards when the conflict had ended this social cleavage remained, eventually resulting in the start of the Zimbabwean civil war where an estimate 380,000 people died. Therefore, it is important to also highlight the effect certain indicators had before and after the conflict.

Research suggestions

When it comes to research regarding the various conflicts two major suggestions have come up. The first is to hold interviews with participants of the conflict (whether this be state-actors or non-state actors). This must mainly be done in order to understand the thinking behind some of the decisions made by the various groups at the time as opposed to what we have now where a decision was analysed by other academics. Furthermore, by also interviewing the public or neutral members of the conflict in order to get a view on how they viewed the conflict or certain events which occurred within it.

The second change that would be handy but difficult due to financial and time limitations, would be to do local research in the country or area itself. This is important as gaining an understanding of the territory and people whom lived in the country during the conflict may explain why certain strategies were adopted and could enrich the research further.

Analytical suggestions

When it comes to analysing the results of our research we also have two suggestions, which may be changed for future research. Firstly, is to remove coercive force as an analytical indicator and replace it with strategy of state-actors. The reason for this is that the use of coercive force by the government would be better suited to fall under government policy

solutions as the decision to use force in order to end a conflict could be a legitimate policy decision. Additionally, by replacing coercive force with strategy of the armed forces gives it a better indication of what is being analysed which is the strategies and tactics of the security forces.

The second suggestion regarding analysing the conflict would be to remove weak versus strong government. While it is interesting to see what the impacts is on a conflict when a weak or strong government is in charge, after looking at the joint conclusion it becomes obvious that having a strong or weak government doesn't have a correlation on any of the phases of the conflict. Therefore, it may be wiser to remove this section. Nonetheless this is only a conclusion drawn out of these three conflicts in this case study. Any past or future research may argue differently which must be taken into account when making this decision.

Areas of future research

Finally, two areas of future research, which would be interesting to explore, is both the perspectives of the conflict and the role of media and propaganda in a conflict. For perspectives we would like to explore if perspectives of the public and international actors changed anywhere in the conflict and whether it had an effect on the conflict. For example, on a local level did the local population see the non-state actors as liberators or terrorists, did this perspective change once the government began adopting coercive force, were there different labels put onto non-state actors through different phases of the conflict? (E.g. low level insurgents, communist terrorists, rebels etc). While for the international perspective questions which could be analysed is if perceptions of the guerrilla group or local government changed how it impacted international support.

What ties into looking at how perspective changed is also second item for future research, which is the role of the media and propaganda in a conflict. For example, how did non-state actor's newspapers or online materials help shape the conflict, did certain articles or propaganda pieces' increase recruitment, or popular support which escalated or de-escalated the conflict?

However, even if both these options are not chosen to be analysed in future research, it would still be helpful to include them in some way or another as they may explain why certain shifts occurred within the public, government or international actors.

13: Policy Recommendations

Following the analysis of all three conflicts separately and the overall conclusion that was drawn, a number of policy recommendations can be made.

- *Policy advise 1: Figure out which cleavages drive and sustain the conflict.* This is important because cleavages that do not drive the conflict also do not have the power to de-escalate the conflict. Knowing which cleavages do drive and sustain the conflict can provide the state actor with a guidance as to which policies will have the effect of de-escalating the conflict.
- *Policy advise 2: Use counter-narratives when existing cleavages are actively used and increased to start a conflict.* Social cleavages can aggravate the conflict and likewise using a counter-narrative can ease the tensions by trying to change the escalating factor the opponent uses to sustain the conflict.
- *Policy advise 3: Be aware of the popular support militant groups have and prevent popular support from rising.* Popular support can be of major influence on the escalation of conflicts. If a conflict emerges and the militant groups do not have a big popular support base yet, it is important to prevent popular support from rising later on in the conflict as this almost always has an escalatory effect on the conflict.
- *Policy advise 4: Emphasize the criminalization of the armed groups.* By emphasizing the criminalization of the armed groups, public support can decline since it becomes apparent that the armed group is losing the ideological goals it stood for and is becoming worse than the government. This emphasis can be achieved by publishing the violent activities of the armed groups and emphasizing that the government is not or less criminal than the armed group in question.
- *Policy advise 5: Only use coercive force on the basis of good intelligence and solid planning.* When coercive force is used without solid planning or good intelligence it is not likely to be targeted force and instead of de-escalating the conflict, this only escalated the conflict as the population as a whole is effected by the coercive force which aggravates the anger of the population. This can drive them into the militants arms which increases their popular support and escalates the conflict.
- *Policy advise 6: Keep firm control on the local governments.* This advice is linked to the importance of preventing popular support as a collapse of local governments can lead militants to fill in the power vacuum after which their recruitment and popular support can rise. Preventing a local government collapse is therefore important.

- *Policy advise 7: Maintain a dominant state capacity over the non-state actors and keep the capacity of the armed groups at the lowest level possible.* It is important for the state to have a higher capacity than the non-state actors. Once the capacity of armed groups increases and the state capacity grows below that of the non-state actors, armed groups will be able to expand and intensify their violent campaign. Cutting of the flow of manpower, weapons and money to the rebels is therefore imperative.
- *Policy advise 8: Prevent international support from reaching the militants and ask for international help when needed.* Building on the previous recommendation, international support in favour of the militants can create more possibilities for the militants to escalate the conflict. International support in favour of the state on the other hand can increase the national security and intelligence apparatus which makes it easier to deal with the militants and de-escalate the conflict.
- *Policy advise 9: Involve all parties in peace negotiations.* When parties are left out of the negotiations their interests are unlikely to influence the talks and chances are high the uninvolved parties will try to bring down the peace initiative during and after the negotiations which will lead to another escalation of the conflict. For peace initiatives to work it is necessary for all parties to accept the compromise or an escalation after the peace talks will follow.

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