



**The terrorist attacks in France of 2015: a comparison between  
the potential similarities, changes and developments.**

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Thesis supervisor: Alex P. Schmid

Second reader: Edwin Bakker

Genevieve Frydman  
s1470221

## Table of content

<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b> .....	4
1.1 Subject of Master thesis and link to Crisis and Security Management (CSM).....	4
1.2 Motivation and interest.....	8
1.3 Research question and structure.....	9
1.4 Methodology.....	10
<b>Chapter 2: Brief History of the relationship between France and its Muslim community</b> .....	12
2.1 Brief background of Muslim migration to France.....	12
2.2 Marginalization into the <i>banlieues</i> of Paris.....	14
2.3 Legislation concerning the Muslim community.....	17
2.3.1 Burqa ban.....	17
2.3.2 Anti-terrorism laws.....	19
2.3.3 Is there an unfair bias?.....	21
2.4 Prior to the events of January 7 <sup>th</sup> 2015.....	23
2.4.1 Previous acts of terrorism in France.....	23
2.4.2 Clash of civilizations?.....	24
2.4.3 Political discourse.....	28
<b>Chapter 3: Timeline of events, January 7<sup>th</sup> – 11<sup>th</sup> 2015</b> .....	31
3.1 Charlie Hebdo (January 7 <sup>th</sup> to January 11 <sup>th</sup> ).....	31
3.2 November 2015.....	42
<b>Chapter 4: Theoretical framework: Securitization theory</b> .....	49
<b>Chapter 5: How the world has reacted: France and the international community</b> .....	60
5.1 Politicians.....	60
5.1.1 Domestic.....	60
5.1.2 International.....	66

5.2 Journalists and the media.....	72
5.2.1 Domestic.....	72
5.2.2 International.....	76
5.3 Muslim community.....	80
5.3.1 Domestic.....	80
5.3.2 International.....	85
5.4 Jewish community.....	89
5.4.1 Domestic.....	89
5.4.2 International.....	94
5.5 Concluding remarks.....	96
<b>Chapter 6: Analysis.....</b>	<b>101</b>
6.1 <i>Chef d'état</i> : Francois Hollande.....	102
6.1.1 January 2015.....	102
6.1.2 November 2015.....	104
6.2 Former President Nicolas Sarkozy.....	107
6.2.1 January 2015.....	107
6.2.2 November 2015.....	109
6.3 Prime Minister Manuel Valls.....	112
6.3.1 January 2015.....	112
6.3.2 November 2015.....	113
6.4 Leader opposition party: Marine Le Pen.....	114
6.4.1 January 2015.....	114
6.4.2 November 2015.....	116
6.5 Conclusion drawn from discourse.....	119
6.6 Audience.....	125
6.7 Conclusion drawn from audience.....	131
6.8 Final comments .....	134
<b>Chapter 7: Conclusion.....</b>	<b>137</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>142</b>

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Subject of Master thesis and link to Crisis and Security Management (CSM)**

On January 7<sup>th</sup> 2015, the headquarters in Paris of the well-known satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* were entered by two masked men who conducted a massacre against the cartoonists of the magazine for their numerous depictions of the Prophet Mohammed. It must be understood that *Charlie Hebdo's* sole interest did not lie in the numerous cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed or related to the Muslim culture. Rather the magazine was recognized for leaving no topic or individual exempt from or untouched by its criticisms. This thesis has been written out of concern for the potential victimization of the Muslim community. As all the perpetrators were Muslims and acted in defence of the honour of the Muslim Prophet Mohammed, the Muslim community feels itself branded with the terrorists simply for being Muslims. This sense of detachment will be used as a baseline of assumption moving forward in the analysis.

A three-day long attack in the city of Paris followed in the name of avenging the alleged shame imposed on the Prophet, including the hostage scene at a kosher supermarket by an affiliate of the initial attackers where more people were murdered as retaliation for France ensuing a war against the Caliphate and the Islamic State<sup>1</sup>.

During the final stages of completing this thesis, another terrorist attack was launched in France. On November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, eight different attacks were carried out across Paris. The attacks differed from those in January being more random acts with the purpose of attacking French culture at its heart; restaurants, bars and even a soccer stadium, all examples of 'ordinary' locations for Parisians to frequent. Due to

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<sup>1</sup> Kuruvilla, C., Kaleem, J., (2015), Amedy Coulibaly Paris Kosher Market Terrorist Had History of Ties to Violence, *Huffington Post*, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/09/amedy-coulibaly-paris-kosher-market\\_n\\_6444418.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/09/amedy-coulibaly-paris-kosher-market_n_6444418.html) (accessed 02/09/2015)

the small time frame between these two incidents, it was decided that a comparison be established between the two.

‘The French 9/11’ is how the January 2015 attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* and the hostage scene at the kosher supermarket have been labelled by some observers. Senior advisor at the French Institute for International Affairs, Dominique Moisi, suggests that although the events of 9/11 were of much greater magnitude – nearly 3000 deaths and two iconic buildings demolished versus less than two-dozen deaths – “the attacks in Paris and in New York share the same essence. Both cities impersonate a similar universal dream. Both are metaphors for light and freedom. Both belong to the world, not only to their respective countries<sup>2</sup>”. Whilst the events of 9/11 brought to the media’s attention the growing presence and concern of terrorism in the West particularly with the ideology of jihadism, the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre has exacerbated the growing trend of tension between the Muslim community and the host country it resides in<sup>3</sup>, in this case France. Similarly, the events of November 13<sup>th</sup> added to the tension and may be interesting to analyse.

There has been a shift in discourse in the period between the terrorist attacks in Europe of January 2015 and those of November 2015. The events, which occurred in the aftermath of the attacks, are the main concern of this thesis. Prior to these attacks the Western world was already battling with social tensions between a government and its Muslim communities, terrorism on the West and the delicate issue of limits on freedom of expression.

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<sup>2</sup> Moisi, D., (2015), *The French 9/11*, *Project Syndicate*, available from <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-massacre-islamic-extremism-by-dominique-moisi-2015-01> (accessed 09/05/2015)

<sup>3</sup> Bier, J., (2015), Kerry: “Lack of Integration’ of Muslims in Europe Like U.S. Civil Rights Struggle in ‘60s, *Weekly Standard*, available from [http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kerry-lack-integration-muslims-europe-us-civil-rights-struggle-60s\\_824240.html](http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kerry-lack-integration-muslims-europe-us-civil-rights-struggle-60s_824240.html) (accessed 02/09/2015)

The magnitude of the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* does not lie in the terrorist attack itself but instead in the long standing difficulty in establishing a middle ground accepted by all of society between freedom of expression and hate speech, or defamation. Since 1905 the division of state and church is referred to as *la laïcité* upon the official recognition of freedom to exercise one's religion in private without the state or public's interference<sup>4</sup>. Freedom of expression allows for the simultaneous criticism by the media for instance and praise whilst freedom of religion often proclaims tolerance and respect for other beliefs. Therefore the co-existence of both freedoms depends on the middle ground established between them, there must be equal respect coming from both sides: "if freedom of speech is diluted, so is freedom of religion, and all citizens suffer"<sup>5</sup>. The difficulty however remains in the portrayal of both freedoms now showing their own set of difficulties not only before the events but specifically following the events in a need to establish a sense of normality. The importance of mentioning the law of *laïcité* is linked to the fact that the Muslim community's identity is linked to its religion, which is partially responsible for the argument mentioned in this thesis. Obviously a branch identified by its radical affiliation with terrorism causes this view: Muslims commit 70% of terrorism<sup>6</sup>. The author of this thesis notes a certain bias has been established by political leaders initiating the securitization of the Muslim community in France as seen with Marine Le Pen's anti-immigration stance. Framing is then seen as a mechanism of fear management of the "other" here being the Muslim community.

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<sup>4</sup> Saubaber, D., (2015), *La Laïcité une interprétation fallacieuse de la neutralité de l'Etat*, *L'Express*, available from [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/la-laicite-une-interpretation-fallacieuse-de-la-neutralite-de-l-etat\\_1648115.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/la-laicite-une-interpretation-fallacieuse-de-la-neutralite-de-l-etat_1648115.html) (accessed 09/05/2015)

<sup>5</sup> Heawood, J., (2012), Chapter 16: Taking Offence: Free Speech, Blasphemy and the Media, *Religion and the News*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, United Kingdom :183-192

<sup>6</sup> Mora, E., (2012), Sunni Muslim 'Extremists' Committed 70% of Terrorist Murders in 2011, *CNS News*, available from <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/sunni-muslim-extremists-committed-70-terrorist-murders-2011> (accessed 31/12/2015)

In the context of this thesis, the following quote highlights a link between a core pillar in the ideology of terrorism being the sharing of a philosophy through social media for instance and the foundation of the securitization theory where discourse allows for an equal role for both the orator and the audience in the context of security changes: “Communication is not a process of transmission of messages but of dialogue with an audience”<sup>7</sup>. The author of this thesis points out that there is potential for a certain perception to be created that would suggest that terrorism is for the most part rooted in Islam. This is due to events such as 9/11, the Madrid bombings and Boko Haram. There is a rejection of multiculturalism present in France expressed by nationalists. This is linked to a history search to honour the secular political lifestyle seen through the extensive investment in the francophone community where assimilation and integration are paramount<sup>8</sup>. The author of this thesis would suggest that the rejection of multiculturalism as seen in the 2004 and then 2010 laws banning religious clothing like the burqa to be worn in public or in school, could be interpreted as foundations to potential securitization of the Muslim community<sup>9</sup>.

The importance of this thesis in the research of Crisis and Security Management is linked to France’s responsibility in managing the domino effects following the *Charlie Hebdo* incidents. France hosts the largest Muslim community of Western

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<sup>7</sup> Archetti, C., (2013), Chapter 5: The Role of Narratives, *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media*, Palgrave Macmillan, London :139

<sup>8</sup> Shohat, E., Stam, R., (2014), Thinking about *Unthinking*, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media, Routledge, United Kingdom :390

<sup>9</sup> Shani, G., (2015), La Haine: Laïcité, Charlie Hebdo and the Republican War on Religion, *E-International Relations*, available from <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/29/la-haine-laicite-charlie-hebdo-and-the-republican-war-on-religion/> (accessed 16/06/2015)

Europe, more than 5 million Muslims. This is closely followed by Germany<sup>10</sup>. Therefore similarly to issues experienced by neighbouring countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, a growing parallel Muslim identity unable to conform to an already present identity within these Western countries has caused social rifts especially in second-generation Muslims. This led to large-scale increases in radicalization and foreign fighters<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, as these Western countries face this social identity crisis linked to a difficulty of cohesion between its different communities, the political discussion has turned to a long-standing debate around integration, assimilation and immigration into Europe in turn potentially initializing a certain securitization of one community in particular.

In relation to the attacks of November 2015, it is interesting to note the growth and progression of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, as well as their more frequent attacks internationally. In addition, the West has become more involved in the fight against ISIS with the aim to completely eradicate its threat<sup>12</sup>. This too plays a role in France's attitude to its immigrant community.

## **1.2 Motivation and interest**

The author's choice to focus on such a recent topic stems from her original thesis topic being the analysis of France's legislative incorporation of the United

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<sup>10</sup> Power, C., (2015), Why There's Tension Between France and its Muslim Population, *TIME*, available from <http://time.com/3659241/paris-terror-attack-muslim-islam/> (accessed 16/06/2015)

<sup>11</sup> Bertholee, R., (2014), Jihadism on the Rise in Europe: the Dutch Perspective, *Washington Institute*, available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadism-on-the-rise-in-europe-the-dutch-perspective> (accessed 02/09/2015)

<sup>12</sup> Ignatius, D., (2015), How ISIS Spread in the Middle East, *The Atlantic*, available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/> (accessed 10/12/2015)



Nations Security Council Resolution 1624; condemnation of the glorification of terrorism through the media<sup>13</sup>.

The case study of this thesis does not present itself as a unique case, but rather a piece of a much larger puzzle the international community is facing, and in particular the West. The problem lies in eradicating terrorism whilst solidifying one's social identity threatened by militant sectors of Muslim diaspora communities. In terms of the Masters' program under which this thesis is written, there is a particular interest in observing the crisis management that occurred following the incidents in Paris. At the same time this thesis is looking into the sociological effects that are involved as France faces a certain identity crisis. Furthermore the author was raised in a francophone community in South Africa, establishing a certain sense of nationalism to France following the incidents that occurred in January 2015 whilst remaining inquisitive about the politics surrounding it. Furthermore, the author's interest since completing her undergraduate studies has been around the particular details of Muslim community and terrorism<sup>14</sup>, and the influence both have on the development of national and international legislation in the context of social identity.

### **1.3 Research question and structure**

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<sup>13</sup> UNSC, (2005), Resolution 1624 (2005), *Security Council 5261<sup>st</sup> meeting*, available from [http://www.mofa.go.kr/mofat/htm/issue/policyplanning/UNSCR\\_1624.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.kr/mofat/htm/issue/policyplanning/UNSCR_1624.pdf) (accessed 21/04/2015)

<sup>14</sup> The author finds great interest in understanding the religious aspect involved in terrorism from a cultural identity standpoint. Furthermore the Muslim community's decisions and choices in dealing with terrorist branches identifying to Muslim culture and Islam can create another level of understanding within the identity of the culture and its people. Lastly the author remains inquisitive about how the identity clash in the former impacts a potential identity crisis within a country victimized by terrorism.

The research question for this thesis will be the following: **has there been a comparison in the discourse of the four leading French politicians between the terrorist attacks of January 2015 and those of November 2015 to suggest the securitization of the Muslim immigrant community in France?**

Even though it has been stated that the events that occurred at the *Charlie Hebdo* offices are not the main case study of this thesis, there is a necessity to detail the events (chapter 3) and establish a theoretical framework as a foundation for the core analysis of this thesis (chapter 4). Before this can be done however, a chapter has been provided to aid the reader in establishing a brief history of the relationship between France and its Muslim immigrant community. The theory chosen here is the securitization theory linked to the Copenhagen School of thought. According to the Copenhagen School of thought speeches are analysed to determine whether discourse suggests or promotes the introduction of new security measures by isolating a specific grouping of individuals (referred to as “them”) from the rest of the community of citizens<sup>15</sup>. The core analysis of this thesis can be broken down into two different chapters. The first will highlight the different reactions to the events of and following the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters’ shootings and the events of November 13<sup>th</sup>, from within France and from the international community (chapter 5). The second will look more specifically at key speeches in the month following the events after *Charlie Hebdo* and after the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks in an attempt to compare and establish whether there was indeed a securitization of the Muslim community (chapter 6).

#### **1.4 Methodology**

As the topic is extremely relevant at present, the research methodology of this thesis has been influenced to a large extent. The main source of research is desktop research and primarily from media outlets as there is very limited academic literature on this particular topic available at present, and on some aspects of the

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<sup>15</sup> McDonald, M., (2008), Securitization and the Construction of Security, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.14, No.4 : 568

case none at all. News clippings from news websites and their respective YouTube pages were primarily used as well as opinion articles from social media outlets, in particular Twitter which played a major role in the *Charlie Hebdo* crisis. There is therefore a descriptive approach utilized throughout the analysis provided within the thesis illustrating the different narratives engaged by the French government, members of society, the international community as well as politicians and others. Therefore the methodological approach of this thesis remains qualitative.

Certain limits were put on the research of this thesis. The author thought it beneficial to look only into a one-month timeframe following the events, as the four weeks that followed the initial event proved to have the largest quantity of reaction and attention. In addition, there is a particular focus on the key actors in the public eye, being the main political leaders of the government of France. The politicians chosen here are the current President of France Francois Hollande, his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy, the current Prime Minister Manuel Valls and the leader of an anti-immigration opposition party Marine Le Pen.

The decision in choosing these specific politicians rather than any of the other numerous politicians in France who have openly spoken, following the incidents is based in their different political backgrounds allowing for a varied and contrasting range of the political spectrum. It is important to note that the assumption here is that the reader is aware of a general background of all four chosen politicians as their political views are elaborated upon in this thesis. Furthermore another limit is applied in choosing only publicly recognized politicians for two reasons: their repeated presence and consequently numerous speeches given as well as providing the reader with recognizable politicians.

This thesis would like to bring the reader's attention to a required restriction in the research and analysis of this thesis. The author focused on a very Western interpretation to the terrorist attacks of January 2015. In addition, the time frame chosen in this analysis begins with a concentration on the events from January 7<sup>th</sup> to January 11<sup>th</sup> 2015 being the epicentre of the attacks.

## **CHAPTER 2: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITS MUSLIM COMMUNITY**

The aim of this thesis is to draw a comparison between the consequences following the terrorist attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* and the kosher supermarket that occurred in early January 2015 and those of November 13<sup>th</sup>. And also to determine whether these consequences emphasised a potential securitization of the Muslim community of France. It is therefore necessary to look into the history of this community and its relationship with France in order to establish whether or not there is a founding argument that could have led to the existence of securitization.

This chapter will look into the continued development of the Muslim community's presence in France from a historical perspective while remaining critical of the political relationship between these two cultures. Within the framework of this chapter, when referring to the Muslim community of France the author includes primarily the *Maghrebins* of France as they represented 43% of France's immigrant population in December 2014, with more than 660 000 from Morocco and 720 000 from Algeria<sup>16</sup>.

### **2.1 Brief background of Muslim migration to France**

Unlike its strongest and oldest ally, the United States, France does not identify itself as a country of immigrants although it is second only to the United States in the numbers of its immigrants<sup>17</sup>. This can be traced back to Napoleon who saw it to be in the interest of France to expand its language and culture across the world. In 1799 he briefly occupied Syria and Egypt and then expanded to Northern

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<sup>16</sup> Centre d'observation de la société, (2014), D'ou viennent les immigrés?, *Observation Société*, available from <http://www.observationsociete.fr/dou-viennent-les-immigrés> (accessed 08/12/2015)

<sup>17</sup> Engler, M., (2007), France, *Focus Migration*, available from <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/France.1231.0.html?&L=1> (accessed 02/12/2015)

Africa in 1830<sup>18</sup>. Due to a need to support the growing industrialization of France as well as a slow birth rate and therefore a shortage of labour at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and well into the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, French borders were opened to the populations of its colonies.

Then during the First World War, thousands of *Maghrebins* joined the French armed forces but remained separated from fellow French combatants due to the continued perception of differing values<sup>19</sup>. For instance, Article 7 of the Evian Accords initiated in 1962 granted the same rights to Algerians as to French nationals with the exception of political rights<sup>20</sup>. Before the war of independence started in 1954, Algeria had a very close relationship with France allowing Algerians easy access to French citizenship. Those who had fought alongside France in previous wars sought refuge within France during and after the end of the war of independence but the assimilation proved difficult due to a certain hostility within the host nation<sup>21</sup>. The beginnings of discrimination and political bias can be linked to the government's concern about a new potential clash between the colonizer and the ex-colony due to the presence of members of the FLN (*Front de Liberation Nationale*)<sup>22</sup>.

However, in the 1970's after the economic downturn caused by the steep rise in the oil price, France, like many other European nations, closed its borders to

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<sup>18</sup> Seljuq, A., 1997, Cultural Conflicts: North African Immigrants in France, *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol.2, No.2

<sup>19</sup> Chenut, H.H., (2004), Introduction, *Breaking the Silence*, Berkeley UP, United States : 6

<sup>20</sup> Hawkins, A., (2011), Chapter 2: Immigration and Integration, *Sending Religion to the Corner: Franco-Maghrebis and Islam in France*, Lulu.com, United States :28

<sup>21</sup> Walton, C.A., (2007), Migration sans Assimilation: Muslim Immigration in France, *New Horizons Online* : 4-5

<sup>22</sup> Fetzer, J.S., Soper, C., (2005), Chapter 4, *Muslims and the State in Britain France and Germany*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom : 64

migrant workers until an appropriate welfare system could be established to lower unemployment rates and attend to social services to aid the successful integration of the already present immigrants<sup>23</sup>.

It can then be said that an uncomfortable relationship between France and its immigrants dates back many years and is potentially rooted in the history of colonization, the war of independence and the post-war immigration of many workers from the Maghreb as well as of the *harkis* – those Algerians who fought on the “wrong” side of the war of 1954-1962<sup>24</sup>.

## **2.2 Marginalization into the *banlieues* of Paris**

Since the 1950s, the French government invested in massive housing projects called *l’Habitation a Loyer Modere* (HLM) otherwise known as low-income households. A division became evident between the outer periphery of the cities and the inner circle whereby social tension and economic instability were evident from the 1980s onwards when most of the *banlieues* populations consisted of immigrants seeking better living conditions and governmental aid while native-born French communities were moving out of the HLM as they climbed up the social ladder. It is from here that the *banlieues* began to receive their labelling of ghettos; a certain stigma based upon racial tensions and cultural discrimination<sup>25</sup>.

The 1980’s saw the first wave of riots within the *banlieues* as an expression of anger from immigrant communities sensing a complete detachment from not only the main cities they belonged to; Paris and Lyon being the most prominent, but from France as a whole. This was in part linked to President Francois Mitterrand’s inability

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<sup>23</sup> Engler, M., (2007), France, *Focus Migration*, available from <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/France.1231.0.html?&L=1> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>24</sup> Faivre, M., (2002), L’Histoire des Harkis, *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains*, No.202 :55-63

<sup>25</sup> Cesari, J., (2005), Ethnicity Islam and les banlieues: Confusing the Issues, *SSRC*, available from <http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Cesari/> (accessed 02/12/2015)

to manage the major economic crisis of the 1970s<sup>26</sup>. The burning of cars, large demonstrations often ending in clashes with the police and the targeting of municipal buildings such as police offices and symbolic institutions, were all examples of the rioting that started the creation of a new identity for the residents of the *banlieues*<sup>27</sup>.

On October 27<sup>th</sup> 2005, after two men were accidentally electrocuted while attempting to escape from the police, violence erupted first in Clichy-sous-Bois north of Paris and then in many other *banlieues* of Paris. Riots followed and continued for two weeks exposing the distrust between immigrant populations living at the outskirts of Paris of which the majority were of Muslim communities and French police forces. Although it was the biggest demonstration in forty years, what was most alarming was perhaps the statement of Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Interior at the time, about “zero tolerance”<sup>28</sup> towards the *racailles*. “Zero tolerance” was a term often used throughout French history but first coined in 1994 by the mayor of New York City in the hope of improving the city’s crime situation. The term *racailles* roughly signifying ‘mob’ is a derogatory term often attributed to populations of lower socio-economic class, insinuating a certain ghetto-ism. This thesis questions whether the term is misplaced and insulting here considering the circumstances and the communities involved in the crisis.

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<sup>26</sup> Kimmelman, M., (2015), France Aims to Embrace Its Estranged Suburbs, *NY Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/europe/paris-tries-to-embrace-suburbs-isolated-by-poverty-and-race.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/europe/paris-tries-to-embrace-suburbs-isolated-by-poverty-and-race.html?_r=0) (accessed 03/12/2015)

<sup>27</sup> Silverstein, P., Tetreault, C., (2005), Urban Violence in France, *Middle East Research and Information Project*, available from <http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/urban-violence-france> (accessed 03/12/2015)

<sup>28</sup> Hussey, A., (2014), The French Intifada: how the Arab banlieues are fighting the French state, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/french-intifada-arab-banlieues-fighting-french-state-extract> (accessed 02/12/2015)

It must be noted that until today no court date has been set to charge or investigate the events that occurred between the police officers and those killed in 2005 causing unresolved tension and a growing anger to develop. In addition French intelligence services concluded that the riots were a response to Muslims in France sensing social exclusion rather than an attempt to overthrow or undermine the government of France<sup>29</sup>.

Although the 2005 riots remain the largest and most violent in the *banlieues*, they are not unique. In November 2007, two teenage boys of North African heritage died during a police chase leading to more riots and unrest linked to immigrant communities feeling unsafe in their *banlieues*. This feeling could be partially linked to their distrust of law enforcement officials<sup>30</sup>.

According to *le Parisien*<sup>31</sup> in July 2010 in Grenoble, after a police chase led to the death of a young man, the city fell victim to a clash between the youth and armed police forces as well as random fire bombs spread across the city in buildings and trams. Two years later in 2012, a large and violent group of protesters occupied the entrance of the police station of Trappes following the arrest of a woman wearing a burqa. The sit-in turned into a violent confrontation for eight hours.

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<sup>29</sup> Hargreaves, A.G., (2007), *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration Politics Culture and Society*, Routledge, United States : 108-109

<sup>30</sup> Bass, L.E., (2014), Chapter 2: Ehy Study Sub-Saharan African Immigrants in France, *African Immigrant Families in Another France*, Palgrave Macmillian, United Kingdom: 13

<sup>31</sup> Le Parisien, (2015), Chronologie: Du Jamais Vu Dans le Pays, *Le Parisien*, available from <http://atelier.leparisien.fr/sites/longsformats/emeutes-2005-dix-ans-apres/chrono.html> (accessed 08/12/2015)



According to the information presented thus far, the *banlieues* emphasise the tension that exists between France and its immigrant population. The physical division that is visible only seems to aggravate the situation at hand.

### **2.3 Legislation concerning Muslim community**

The reader must bear in mind that France is a secular state that prides itself on its historic separation of state and Church referred to as *laïcité*. This separation was introduced in order to create equilibrium between communities that need not feel pressurised by the beliefs of another. In addition the separation aimed at preventing discrimination. France is not a signatory of the EU's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages<sup>32</sup>. This in itself would suggest that France does not identify minority groups but rather that there is a system of universalism. This means potentially ignoring the underlying issues at hand due to conflicting differences that are not necessarily given the attention required for social cohesion, or which cannot be addressed with France adhering to such an agreement.

#### **2.3.1 Burqa ban**

The wearing of religious insignia has become subject to a socio-political debate since the 1980s. On October 22<sup>nd</sup> 1989 a demonstration took place in Paris to support the Muslim girls expelled from their school in Criel.

In December of the same year Madam Mitterrand challenged the Department of Education and its choice to ban "ostentatious religious insignia"<sup>33</sup>:  
"If today, after two hundred years of the revolution the secular schools cannot welcome all religions in France that means there has been regression"<sup>34</sup> .

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<sup>32</sup> Oprea, M.G., (2015), How France Grew Its Own Terrorists, *The Federalist*, available from <http://thefederalist.com/2015/01/16/how-france-grew-its-own-terrorists/> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>33</sup> Seljuq, A., (1997), Cultural Conflicts: North African Immigrants in France, *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol.2, No.2

However it was the Minister of the Interior at the time, Charles Pasqua, whose statement would be said to be one of the founding arguments used by the French government to begin its process in legally banning the symbols altogether:

“We must also be very vigilant and ensure that the wearing of the Islamic head scarf is not used in a deliberate and organized way to challenge the principles of secularism that govern our schools”<sup>35</sup>.

These two different quotes illustrate the difficulty within France to decide where the limits to secularism lie within a country attached to its republican values. At the same time it is faced with a growing immigrant community demanding its own rights alongside their rights as French citizens.

In 2004, it became illegal for young girls to wear headscarves, veils or a burqa at school, which then developed into the 2010 law banning the covering of women in public places. The decision was supported by the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of progressive coexistence between communities in France<sup>36</sup>. The French government defended its choice by stating that it was because such displays were not compatible with the laws of *laïcité*.

The decision was met with much criticism and arguments of religious scrutiny with many Muslim women choosing to wear certain garments rather than it being imposed with the argument based on the passage of the Koran that invites a woman to exercise modesty rather than impose it<sup>37</sup> and an extreme acting out of secular

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Willsher, K., (2014), France’s burqa ban upheld by human rights court, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/france-burqa-ban-upheld-human-rights-court> (accessed 03/12/2015)

<sup>37</sup> Tasini, D., (2013), Le voile des femmes arabes point de division entre espace public et religio-site, *Philosonsorbonne*, No.8 : 193

values. Thus it follows that a certain stigma was created on a nationwide level restricting a woman within a Western country attempting to promote liberal values.

### **2.3.2 Anti-terrorism laws**

Although the French Constitution holds twenty-one articles relating to the fight against terrorism, only a few relating specifically to the current case will be analysed.

The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution in 2005, introduced by the United Kingdom to complement the UN's expanding anti-terrorism measures. Resolution 1624 condemns the incitement to, and justification or glorification of terrorism. The resolution addresses in particular the important "role of the media, civil and religious society, the business community and educational institutions" advocating that these must find common ground for dialogue and coexistence within the context of combatting the growth of terrorism. In addition the UNSC recognizes "the importance that, in an increasingly globalized world, states act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting sophisticated technology, communications and resources to incite support for criminal acts"<sup>38</sup>. This implies that traditional media, television, radio and print, are now being confronted with the appearance of fast-paced sharing platforms known as social media that are being used to propagate terrorist or extremist ideologies.

The resolution also refers to the importance of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This made it imperative for members who adopted the Resolution to differentiate between hate speech and freedom of expression and/or freedom of press as laid down in their own national legislatures.

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<sup>38</sup> UNSC, (2005), Resolution 1624 (2005), *Security Council 5261<sup>st</sup> meeting*, available from [http://www.mofa.go.kr/mofat/htm/issue/policyplanning/UNSCR\\_1624.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.kr/mofat/htm/issue/policyplanning/UNSCR_1624.pdf) (accessed 21/04/2015)

France's Penal Code and 1881 Act on the freedom of expression and press co-operate on the prevention and punishment of the incitement to terrorism. Articles 23 and 24 of the 1881 Act form the foundation of France's stance on the topic. Article 23 refers to the different means that can be used to express incitement being: "speeches, shouts or threats proffered in public places or meetings, or by written words, printed matter, drawings, engravings, paintings, emblems, pictures or any other written, spoken or pictorial aid, sold or distributed, offered for sale or displayed in public places or meetings, either by posters or notices displayed for public view, or by any means of electronic communication". The article was amended in 2004 to include all electronic means as an addition to the law. Article 24 "criminalizes incitement to and advocacy of terrorism" and entails the punishment of a fine and/or imprisonment depending on individual cases that will be meted out if found guilty of such a crime<sup>39</sup>.

*L'apologie du terrorisme* can be directly translated as the 'apology of terrorism': it is the modernization of the above-mentioned laws under the Penal Code of France. Article 421-2-5 of the French Penal Code from November 13<sup>th</sup> 2014 recognizes *l'apologie* as a federal crime. This law has been criticized for limiting freedom of expression in public forums. However according to the Minister of Justice, Christiane Taubira, it has as its aim "to sanction the acts directly linked to acts of terrorism", adding that the Internet must be seen as "a powerful vector of indoctrination leading individuals to radicalize while inciting them to commit acts of

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<sup>39</sup> de La Sabliere, (2006), Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1624: report of France in response to the questions of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, *United Nations Security Council*, available from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/440/46/PDF/N0644046.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 21/04/2015)

terrorism”<sup>40</sup>. Consequently, public hate speeches, whether in person or online, are a major issue of concern for the government in its anti-terrorism strategies.

### 2.3.3 Is there an unfair bias?

The French Code of Criminal Procedure gives far-reaching authority to law enforcement officers to conduct identity checks as they see fit according to Article 78-2. Abuse of power is therefore very possible as there is no need for documenting the basis for an identity check. This doesn't suggest that all security checks or identity checks show signs of abuse of power or discriminatory treatment of the individual, but research has shown that there is often a racial bias that plays a role<sup>41</sup>. Ethnic profiling will lead to tensions between civilians and law enforcement.

In a study conducted by the Montaigne Institute, at a think tank overseen by Professor Marie-Anne Valfort of the Sorbonne University, a conclusion was presented that a bias exists when it comes to hiring workers in France, often to the detriment of applicants of Muslim origin. According to more than six thousand responses to job adverts between 2013 and 2014, only “4.7% of practicing Muslims were asked for a job interview, compared to 17.9% of practicing Catholics.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Soullier, L., (2015), Apologie du terrorisme: la justice face à l'urgence, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/22/apologie-du-terrorisme-la-justice-face-a-l-urgence\\_4560603\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/22/apologie-du-terrorisme-la-justice-face-a-l-urgence_4560603_3224.html) (accessed 29/04/2015)

<sup>41</sup> Sunderland, J., Ward, B., (2011), “The Root of Humiliation”, *Human Rights Watch*, available from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01/26/root-humiliation/abusive-identity-checks-france> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>42</sup> Sides, J., (2015), New research shows that French Muslims experience extraordinary discrimination in the job market, *The Washington Post*, available from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/23/new-research-shows-that-french-muslims-experience-extraordinary-discrimination-in-the-job-market/> (accessed 05/12/2015)

This is not a new issue at hand in France. In 2010 Stanford Professor David Laitin found that “a Christian citizen with African heritage is two-and-a-half times more likely to get called for a job interview than an equally qualified Muslim citizen with the same ethnic background.”<sup>43</sup>

With an already troubling high unemployment rate within the *banlieues*, the reference to ethnicity and religion in a CV causes an issue of discrimination. This cannot aid the government in solving its disagreements with its immigrant communities.

Food it seems has become intertwined with politics in France; in December 2014 *The New York Times* released an article suggesting the development of a “French Kebabaphobia”<sup>44</sup> since 2013 linked to the fear of an Islamization of France.

Although sometimes perceived as attacking the Muslim community of France, Marine Le Pen in April 2014 showed her dedication to France’s philosophy of secularism in a more general account: “We will accept no religious requirement in the school lunch menus [...] There is no reason for religion to enter into the public sphere”<sup>45</sup>. This would then cause an issue for both Jewish and Muslim children if pork were to be presented at lunchtime, as well as the issue of halaal and kosher

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<sup>43</sup> Gorlick, A., (2010), Stanford study shows Muslim job discrimination in France, *Stanford News*, available from <http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/november/muslim-france-study-112210.html> (accessed 05/12/2015)

<sup>44</sup> Sciolino, E., (2014), French Politics Served in a Pita, *The New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/dining/kebabs-as-a-political-statement-in-france.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/dining/kebabs-as-a-political-statement-in-france.html?_r=0) (accessed 04/12/2015)

<sup>45</sup> Zahra Janmohamed, S., (2014), Eat pork or starve say French politicians, *The National*, available from <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/eat-pork-or-starve-say-french-politicians> (accessed 04/12/2015)

food preparation techniques. It must be added that Sarkozy supported this concept of carrying secularism through to the canteens of French schools, suggesting that it was a major concern for French voters<sup>46</sup>.

The argument of bias would then seem too difficult to prove here. As mentioned earlier there is an argument made to prove that anti-Semitism is still alive in France and consequently there cannot be a bias against the Muslim community alone. Rather it may be suggested that there is a different approach taken by politicians in the framing of the Muslim community to their detriment. This next section of this chapter will look into this.

## **2.4 Prior to the events of January 7<sup>th</sup> 2015**

### **2.4.1 Previous acts of terrorism in France**

France is not unfamiliar with acts of terrorism in its own territory. Timothy Holman challenges the way the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attacks were presented as a singular attack. Holman states in his article for *Terrorism Monitor*, that nine different terrorism-related attacks occurred between September 2012 and December 2014<sup>47</sup>. What is important to note is that the last large scale act of terrorism in France was a mere twenty years ago when during the summer of 1995 the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) placed six different bombs killing eight people and wounding 150<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Stille, A., (2013), The Justice Minister and The Banana: How Racist is France?, *The New Yorker*, available from <http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-justice-minister-and-the-banana-how-racist-is-france> (accessed 04/12/2015)

<sup>47</sup> Holman, T., (2015), The Swarm: Terrorist Incidents in France, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol.13, No.21

<sup>48</sup> Riding, A., (2002), French Court Sentences 2 for Role in 1995 Bombings That Killed 8, *The New York Times*, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/01/world/french-court-sentences-2-for-role-in-1995-bombings-that-killed-8.html> (accessed 05/12/2015)

The *Charlie Hebdo* attacks consequently accentuate a continuous issue for the French government. During the past twenty years although of different scales, France has been a victim of homegrown terrorism. Questions can then arise around what the government's forces are missing or what is encouraging the perpetual threat.

#### 2.4.2 Clash of civilizations?

In an interview in December 2013 with the Hamburg-based German weekly *Der Spiegel*, recognized essayist Alain Finkielkraut, while discussing France's new challenge of transformation in the wake of its often-difficult relationship with minorities, explained, "multiculturalism does not mean that cultures blend"<sup>49</sup>.

Later on Finkielkraut pointed out a key understanding to this Muslim-French relationship in that "Former French President Jacques Chirac made a similar statement. Islam may one day belong to Europe, but only after it has Europeanised itself. It is not an insult to the others to point out their otherness"<sup>50</sup>. It must be noted that here the essayist when referring to 'the others' is referring to the Muslim community of Europe in a general sense. This could identify an Islam that belongs to France versus an Islam that exists within France with no strings attached to it, deepening the division and security concern at hand.

*Communautarisme* according to *Larousse* is defined as the organization of a society in communities, based on the understanding that there is an assimilation of

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<sup>49</sup> Von Rohr, M., Leick, R., (2013), French Philosopher Finkielkraut: 'There Is A Clash of Civilizations', *Spiegel International*, available from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-french-philosopher-finkielkraut-on-muslims-and-integration-a-937404.html> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.



the individuals rooted in an institutionalized set of norms and values<sup>51</sup>, in other words the establishment of a community.

What has become apparent is the creation of a community within a community rather than assimilation into a hybrid community. The Muslim community of France has felt the necessity to create in its generality a community of its own separate from that of France where it feels disengaged, whether that be with limits of personal expression like the burqa or physical separation in the *banlieues*. This cannot be equated to a clash of cultures but rather a separation between the two. There is a lack of cohesion and understanding between the two communities. However a true example of *communautarisme musulmane française* has yet to produce itself. The ban of public display of culture and religion has stopped Muslim women from wearing the burqa. This thesis questions whether the laws of *laïcité* are conducive to a healthy environment between the immigrant Muslim community and the receiving host nation, with the end goal of creating one cohesive community.

Although France abides by a philosophy of universalism, Emmanuel Todd suggests that the people of France have begun adhering to a philosophy of difference whereby if “the immigrant, the Jew, the Muslim, the Black are different by nature, the brothers are unequal, men are unequal, people are unequal and there is no existence of a universal man”<sup>52</sup>. Todd continues by explaining the evident right of being different from your neighbour, but the division has become so entrenched that there is little space left for tolerance or respect of another culture, before even considering the possibility of multiculturalism. In an extreme case, he goes as far as

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<sup>51</sup> Larousse, Definition Communautarisme, *Larousse France*, available from <http://www.larousse.fr/encycopedie/divers/communautarisme/35542> (accessed 03/12/2015)

<sup>52</sup> Todd, E., (2015), Chapitre 2: Charlie, *Qui est Charlie? Sociologie d'une crise religieuse*, Editions du Seuil, France: 279

to compare the extreme rejection of the 'other' to the xenophobia, which resulted in the Nazi regime.<sup>53</sup>

In a report conducted by *L'Institut Montaigne* in conjunction with Gilles Kepel, it was shown that France cannot alone hold the responsibility for successful integration and assimilation of immigrants into France and furthermore into French society. Public schooling is available and free to all children born in France. In the *banlieues* many immigrant children leave school before the suggested age of 16 and go unattended while their parents are at work. Islam can play the role of a safety net and protector allowing for the instilling of values and traditions for children and young adults without guidance or monitoring. In addition it was found that in Seine-Saint-Denis out of 600 000 Muslim residents, a third of them were not even French nationals<sup>54</sup>. The study concludes with a difficult ultimatum presented by young Muslims in the *banlieues* of France: "They do not want the French state to interfere in matters relating to Islam, but they also expect the state to improve their lot in life"<sup>55</sup>. Obviously the ability of France to integrate is not solely its responsibility without the co-operation of the minority it seeks to assimilate.

Emmanuel Todd suggests in his book *Qui est Charlie?* that failed integration is rooted in the breakdown of the family structure within immigrant communities. Immigrant children find themselves confronted in school and in society through interaction, television, music with French values and norms that potentially oppose or do not synchronize with those imposed at home leading to confusion and the development of a new culture, which has yet to find its place in French society<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid : 281

<sup>54</sup> Kern, S., (2011), French Suburbs Becoming 'Separate Islamic Societies', *Gatestone Institute*, available from <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2487/french-suburbs-islamic-societies> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Todd, E., (2015), Chapitre 5: Les Français Musulmans, *Qui est Charlie? Sociologie d'une crise religieuse*, Editions du Seuil, France :500-502

This is particularly applicable to second generation Muslims in France. Evidently such a sociological effect will be linked to contexts such as unemployment, lack of education, socio-economic hierarchies but according to Todd those remain consequences of this new psychology.

In Todd's earlier book *Après l'empire*, he critically analyses Samuel Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations" after the events of 9/11 in the USA. He begins by establishing that the world is not tolerant, is often too quick, too hasty in its labelling of a culture or an actor. The reaction of American politicians in the days following the terrorist attacks repeated the philosophy of Huntington suggesting that the Christian and Muslim cultures are ideologically confrontational. This evidently remains incorrect; terrorism stems from a radical branch of Islam that is confrontational to any and all populations they deem 'un-Muslim'. Refusing to consider Huntington's philosophy as a justifiable theory, Todd suggests that his perspective is "the daughter of modern jihad, it is the conceptual return to the vision of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, who believed, keeping in mind the end of the American strategy, in the conflict of civilizations"<sup>57</sup>. Todd explains that the Muslim world has not developed as fast and as far as the West, Europe or even China and Japan, therefore pushing large groups of Muslim migrants to relocate to these parts of the world which in turn must cause a certain "mental uprooting"<sup>58</sup> effect. The latter will inevitably be an issue when facing re-integration in a new and foreign environment.

At the same time, the question of successful integration brings up another question and that is the definition of integration. This thesis suggests that integration will stress the successful co-habitation of a new community within its host society resulting in its own unique community and then will follow the transition to perceiving both communities as equals and natives to the new hybrid society. Erik Bleich and Rahsaan Maxell in an article in the *Washington Post* stated

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<sup>57</sup> Todd, E., (2002), Chapitre 1: Le mythe du terrorisme universel, *Après L'Empire: essai sur la décomposition du système américain*, Gallimard, France :49

<sup>58</sup> Ibid :50

that Muslim integration in France is a success due to the Muslims identifying to and participating within France<sup>59</sup>. On the other side, Kim Yi Dionne in the same publication believes the opposite while French Muslims are marginalized from the social and political spheres of France with continuous discrimination linked to their heritage<sup>60</sup>.

The question arises whether France as a changing culture, including Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, is facing an identity crisis of its own.

### 2.4.3 Political discourse

During a rally in 2010, Marine Le Pen made a comparison between the Muslims of France and the Nazi occupation of the Second World War:

“For those who want to talk a lot about World War Two, if it’s about occupation, then we could also talk about it. This referred to Muslims worshipping in the streets, because that is occupation of territory”<sup>61</sup>.

The statement was not well received and in 2012 a request was made to the European Parliament for Le Pen’s immunity as a member to be wavered in order to prosecute her. On July 2<sup>nd</sup> 2013 the European Parliament granted the request for the

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<sup>59</sup> Fredette, J., (2014), Are French Muslims integrated? Depends on what you mean by integration, *Washington Post*, available from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/29/are-french-muslims-integrated-depends-on-what-you-mean-by-integration/> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Henderson, B., (2013), Marine Le Pen ‘loses immunity’ over comparing Islamic prayers to Nazi occupation, *The Telegraph*, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10092939/Marine-Le-Pen-loses-immunity-over-comparing-Islamic-prayers-to-Nazi-occupation.html> (accessed 04/12/2015)

removal of her immunity, and her court date was scheduled for October 2015<sup>62</sup>. Le Pen was cleared of all charges on December 15<sup>th</sup> 2015<sup>63</sup>.

Nicolas Sarkozy and his advisors in his presidential campaign of 2012 made some controversial statements. Claude Gueant, Interior Minister during Sarkozy's cabinet, suggested that not all civilizations are "equal in worth"<sup>64</sup> linked to their differing contributions to humanity and the French civilization, which Sarkozy supported with the argument of "common sense". The President at the time also said he gave "preference to the community, but I don't see why we couldn't give preference to nationals". Although it was shown earlier on in the chapter that it is difficult to prove the existence of a political bias, there is a definite division here placing citizens on a hierarchal scale of 'preference'.

In early February 2013, Manuel Valls, French Interior Minister at the time, announced the government's plan to expel a number of imams deemed radical and negatively influential on the Muslim community of France. He explained his own distinction between radical Islam and Islam of France but that it remained necessary

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<sup>62</sup> AFP, (2015), Prieres de rue: relaxe requise pour Marine Le Pen, *L'Express*, available from [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/prieres-de-rue-marine-le-pen-jugee-pour-provocation-a-la-haine-raciale\\_1727413.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/prieres-de-rue-marine-le-pen-jugee-pour-provocation-a-la-haine-raciale_1727413.html) (accessed 08/12/2015)

<sup>63</sup> Sims, A., (2015), Marine Le Pen cleared of inciting hatred after comparing Muslim prayers in the street to Nazi occupation, *The Independent*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-cleared-of-inciting-hatred-after-comparing-muslim-prayer-in-the-street-to-nazi-a6774126.html> (accessed 12/01/2016)

<sup>64</sup> Mondon, A. (2013), The far right in France is now mainstream and the French only have themselves (and Sarkozy) to blame, *The Independent*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-far-right-in-france-is-now-mainstream-and-the-french-only-have-themselves-and-sarkozy-to-blame-8490570.html> (accessed 04/12/2015)

to remove the threat of radical Salafi imams who present a threat to France as a whole from a security and social perspective<sup>65</sup>.

A panel led by former Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault in 2013 recommended new policies to be acknowledged by the government in assisting the integration of Muslim immigrants. One of the recommendations was to remove the reference to nationality, religion or ethnicity in public by authorities and the media. Jean-Francois Cope, leader of the main opposition party being the conservative UMP, disagreed vehemently with the findings:

“This report is an attempt to make multiculturalism the new model for France. It would no longer be up to immigrants to adopt French culture, but for France to abandon its own culture, language, history and identity to adapt to other people’s cultures”<sup>66</sup>.

Marine Le Pen added that the incorporation of such policies into the French government would be “a declaration of war on the French people” while President Francois Hollande simply distanced himself from the research entirely, claiming it was not in alignment with the views of the government<sup>67</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Bamat, J., (2013), France set to deport hard-line imams, *France24*, available from <http://www.france24.com/en/20130130-france-deport-radical-imams-islam-valls> (accessed 04/12/2015)

<sup>66</sup> Kern, S., (2013), France: The Looming Battle over Muslim Integration, *Gatestone Institute*, available from <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4113/france-muslim-integration> (accessed 02/12/2015)

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

## **CHAPTER 3: TIMELINE OF EVENTS**

This chapter will serve as a factual outline of the events that occurred at the beginning of January 2015 in France, and particularly in Paris and the area surrounding it. It will also establish a brief outline of the chronology of events that occurred on the 13<sup>th</sup> of November of the same year in different parts of Paris.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis and this chapter will focus on the events following the terrorist attacks and in particular the three days following the attacks. Only the main events are detailed therefore excluding the smaller, more irregular ones that followed. The importance of this chapter is linked to a required context of understanding leading to the different reactions of various public figures that will later be analysed specifically in Chapter 5.

### **3.1 *Charlie Hebdo* (January 7<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup>)**

#### **Wednesday 7<sup>th</sup> January 2015<sup>68</sup>.**

It was reported around midday that after first entering the wrong building, two men entirely dressed in black, wearing balaclavas, asked for directions to the *Charlie Hebdo* offices. After calling out their victims by name, eleven people were killed including journalists and staff members. Among them were four well-known French journalists and the editor of the magazine. During the attackers' escape from the scene, there was a confrontation with the police blocking their exit route that developed into an exchange of gunshots. A bystander filmed the execution of a police officer on a sidewalk a few blocks away from the main scene of the crime. The

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<sup>68</sup> Rayner, G., (2015), Paris hooting at Charlie Hebdo offices: how terrorist attack unfolded, *The Telegraph*, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11330484/Paris-shooting-at-Charlie-Hebdo-office-how-terrorist-attack-unfolded.html> (accessed 15/03/2015)

police officer was later identified as an officer of the 11eme arrondissement police force. This video became the initial visualization of the attacks<sup>69</sup>.

The massacre caused the death of twelve people, including the police officer mentioned who ironically happened to be a Muslim. Among the victims, six had significant links with the magazine and the controversial cartoons<sup>70</sup>, and/or articles that triggered the need for retaliation from the perpetrators. Here it is necessary to mention the murder committed by the Kouachi brothers as well as recognize the radical strand instilled in the founding pillars of *Charlie Hebdo*. This magazine frequently published cartoons targeting the Muslim community and Islam despite heavy criticism from the community.

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<sup>69</sup> Robson, S., (2015), Charlie Hebdo terror attack: Sickening moment policeman executed by militants as he held up hands in surrender, *The Mirror UK*, available from <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/charlie-hebdo-terror-attack-sickening-4935314> (accessed 31/07/2015)

<sup>70</sup> A cover from 2005 sees a crying Prophet with the title “Mohammed overwhelmed by fundamentalists” whilst he utters “It’s difficult to be loved by idiots”. Following a failed court case against the magazine the cover of the following issue of *Charlie Hebdo* in 2007 depicted representatives of the Jewish, Catholic and Muslim faith all shouting out simultaneously “We must veil Charlie Hebdo” making reference to the French law banning the public wearing of any religious attire (i.e.: burqa). In 2011, one issue of the magazine was – tongue and cheek- edited by the Prophet and renamed ‘Sharia Hebdo’ while the Prophet says “One hundred lashes if you don’t die of laughter”. This led to the hacking of the website after the insinuation of Mohammed being homosexual. In retaliation to the constant criticism received, the magazine ridiculed the movie *Les Intouchables* by drawing a Jew wheeling a Muslim stating “You must not make fun of”. The quote is a parody on the movie’s plot (about a young man who becomes a nurse for a wheelchair bound millionaire) clearly distinguishing a social crippling of the Muslim community in France and underlining the criticism *Charlie Hebdo* receives for making fun of, in this case, Islam and Judaism.



Stephane Charbonnier, also known as Charb joined the magazine in 1992 and took over as editor-in-chief in 2009. After the initial terrorist threat involving the firebombing of the magazine's previous offices, Charb at the time of his death was still under police protection. One of the officers in his guard was among those who lost their lives. Charb would be remembered by the following quote summarizing his controversial stance as a journalist: "It may sound pompous but I'd rather die standing than live on my knees"<sup>71</sup>.

Jean Cabut, referred to as Cabu, was one of the founders of *Charlie Hebdo*, which was originally a satirical magazine named Hara-Kiri. It was banned following the death of Charles de Gaulle in 1970 due to a disagreement about the magazine's announcement of the former President's death<sup>72</sup>. As the mastermind behind the Mohammed cartoons, Cabu was recognized as a merciless journalist attacking everyone from Jacques Chirac to Jean-Marie Le Pen. He would be labelled as "the best journalist in France" by Jean-Luc Godard, a well-known French filmmaker<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>71</sup> Sanchez, R., Payne, E., Fantz, A., (2015), French cartoonists killed in Paris took profane aim at the world, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/07/world/france-magazine-attack-victims/> (accessed 20/03/2015)

<sup>72</sup> Sherwin, A., (2015), What is Charlie Hebdo? A magazine banned and resurrected but always in the grand tradition of Gallic satire, *Independent UK*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/what-is-charlie-hebdo-banned-and-resurrected-but-always-in-the-grand-tradition-of-gallic-satire-9963721.html> (accessed 02/09/2015)

<sup>73</sup> The Telegraph Obituaries, (2015), Cabu – obituary, *The Telegraph*, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11330890/Cabu-obituary.html> (accessed 18/04/2015)

Georges Wolinski, the grandfather of the magazine was 80 years old at the time of his death. He was particularly well known for his influence with the satirical magazine *L'Enrage* where he secured his place as a respected journalist in France<sup>74</sup>.

Bernard Verlhac, also known as Tignous was a consultant to the magazine as he wrote for many other newspapers too after deciding to be a part of the redesign of *Charlie Hebdo*. His transfer to the magazine was based on his wish for cartoons to become recognized as an official form of journalism<sup>75</sup>.

Philippe Honore remained one of the famous cartoonists on the team but preferred to showcase his work rather than pose himself as an illustrator<sup>76</sup>.

Bernard Maris was an economist for *Charlie Hebdo* but he too was executed for his role in the Mohammed caricatures created by the magazine. He had

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<sup>74</sup> Sim, S., (2015), Stephane Charbonnier, Jean Cabut Among Charlie Hebdo Shooting Victims, *International Business Times*, available from <http://www.ibtimes.com/stephane-charbonnier-jean-cabut-among-charlie-hebdo-shooting-victims-1776356> (accessed 20/03/2015)

<sup>75</sup> Plougastel, Y., (2015), Tignous, dessinateur a l'imagination fertile et corrosive, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/07/tignous-dessinateur-a-l-imagination-fertile-et-corrosive\\_4550983\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/07/tignous-dessinateur-a-l-imagination-fertile-et-corrosive_4550983_3224.html) (accessed 20/03/2015)

<sup>76</sup> Independent UK, (2015), Philippe Honore: Cartoonist who had been with Charlie Hebdo since its revival and was shot dead in the attack on its offices, *The Independent Obituaries*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/philippe-honor-cartoonist-who-had-been-with-charlie-hebdo-since-its-revival-and-was-shot-dead-in-the-attack-on-its-offices-9981458.html> (accessed 20/03/2015)

contributed editorials and articles and was also known for his radio appearances under the pseudonym of Uncle Bernard<sup>77</sup>.

The remaining five victims include Frederic Boisseau, the first victim of the shooting, the caretaker of the building, Frank Brinsolaro a police officer employed for Charb's protection following numerous death threats, Elsa Cayat a psychoanalyst and columnist for the magazine, Ahmed Merabet the murdered police officer, Mustapha Ourrad a copy editor and Michel Renaud, a former journalist turned travel expert, visiting the magazine for the weekly editorial meeting<sup>78</sup>.

President Francois Hollande declared France to be in a state of war with the terrorists immediately following the announcement of the attack at the *Charlie Hebdo* offices. This was the first official mention of a terrorist attack<sup>79</sup>. The president raised the nation's threat level to its maximum and put into force the *Plan Vigipirate*. As a result 10,500 soldiers were immediately deployed. Higher police presence was noted on the streets either on foot or in police vehicles. Main transport stations for bus, train and tram, schools, official government buildings, cultural buildings,

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<sup>77</sup> Crary, D., (2015), Charlie Hebdo shooting: Stephane Charbonnier, Bernard Maris among those killed, *CBC News*, available from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/charlie-hebdo-shooting-stéphane-charbonnier-bernard-maris-among-those-killed-1.2892946> (accessed 20/03/2015)

<sup>78</sup> Pearce, M., NG, D., (2015), Charlie Hebdo shooting: The victims, *The LA Times*, available from <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-paris-victims-20150107-htmllstory.html> (accessed 18/04/2015)

<sup>79</sup> L'Obs, (2015), Attentat contre "Charlie Hebdo": ce que prévoit le plan vigipirate "alerte attentat", *L'Obs*, available from <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/charlie-hebdo/20150107.OBS9462/ce-que-prevoit-le-plan-vigipirate-alerte-attentat.html> (accessed 15/03/2015)

including large-scale shopping centres and media houses, became prime locations with limited access<sup>80</sup>. The Charles de Gaulle airport would later be partially closed.

On the evening of Wednesday 7<sup>th</sup> January 2015, a spontaneous mass mobilization of French citizens occurred, following intense media coverage of France's worst domestic attack since the Second World War. A very large crowd of mourning citizens gathered in La Place de la Republique in Paris while similar mass vigils took place across the country. The mourners held up signs of what was to become the popular slogan 'Je Suis Charlie'. Some of them also carried posters with caricatures of broken pencils in solidarity with the victims and as an expression of their belief in a free press<sup>81</sup>.

The media released information about three possible suspects, one of which surrendered to the officials shortly after the announcement<sup>82</sup>. The Kouachi brothers

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<sup>80</sup> *Plan Vigipirate* refers to the anti-terrorism response strategy based on three components being vigilance, prevention and protection. Intervention measures are used to ensure the protection of the French state nationally and abroad. It is broken down into two parts: the first constitutes information relating to the protection before and after an attack, and the later includes the threat level which introduces its own consequent strategies depending on the situation at hand.

Direction de l'information legale et administrative, (2015), *Plan vigipirate*, *Service-Public*, available from <http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F32522.xhtml> (accessed 31/07/2015)

<sup>81</sup> Dearden, L., (2015), Charlie Hebdo attack: Thousands join vigils in Paris, London, Berlin and around the world, *The Independent UK*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-attack-thousands-join-vigils-in-paris-london-and-around-the-world-9963618.html> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>82</sup> AP, (2015), "Several arrests" but 2 suspected gunmen at large after Paris massacre, *CBS News*, available from <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/3-suspects-identified-in-deadly-attack-on-paris-newspaper/> (accessed 31/07/2015)

were named as the prime suspects and a manhunt was initiated for their arrest. The brothers were not unknown to the French intelligence services. Due to their status as returning foreign fighters they had been on a terrorist-watch list for some time prior to the incident.

The older Kouachi brother did not have the same status as his younger brother Cherif regarding a long criminal record. He was tracked after visiting Yemen and for having been linked to terrorist cells there<sup>83</sup>. The brothers, although born in France, were of Algerian descent and had been abandoned by their parents when still very young and were assigned to the nation's foster system.

Cherif on the other hand was repeatedly arrested and eventually imprisoned from 2005 to 2008 where it is believed he was radicalized due to his strong ties to Djamel Beghal known for his attack on the US embassy in Paris in 2001. Upon his release Cherif was recruited to train for jihad in Iraq; however he was arrested before he could leave France<sup>84</sup>.

#### **Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> January 2015**

Two key events took place on the second day following the attack: the Kouachi brothers were on the run, which led to an intense police presence in the Ile-de-France municipality. At the same time a similar execution-style attack as the one on the *Charlie Hebdo* staff took place in Mont Rouge a suburb of Paris. In this

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<sup>83</sup> Randall, C., Conroy, E., (2015), From orphans to terrorists: journey of the Kouachi brothers, *The National*, available from <http://www.thenational.ae/world/france/from-orphans-to-terrorists-journey-of-the-kouachi-brothers>, (accessed 08/04/2015)

<sup>84</sup> Bronstein, S., (2015), Cherif and Said Kouachi: Their path to terror, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/13/world/kouachi-brothers-radicalization/> (accessed 08/04/2015)

incident one police officer was killed. At the time, no official link was made between these two attacks and the attackers<sup>85</sup>.

The manhunt for the Kouachi brothers led up north. Reims a neighbouring city northeast of Paris became a focal point for the police. A building was raided which was believed to be the location where one of the suspects resided. Later on, reports surfaced of a possible sighting of the suspects at a petrol station in Villers-Cotterets 80 km east of Reims. The deployed officers were put on foot patrol while helicopters were also used to search through the surrounding fields and forests<sup>86</sup>.

President Hollande condemned the terrorist attacks in an official statement. The message he conveyed boiled down to 'the Republic is at war'. Hollande repeated the 'us vs. them' perspective used initially in his first speech from Wednesday 7<sup>th</sup>, labelling the attackers barbarians who would be brought to justice. He informed the country of the strategy employed, reassuring the people of his commitment to ensuring a return to domestic tranquillity<sup>87</sup>.

### **Friday 9<sup>th</sup> January 2015**

Early on Friday morning the pursuit of the Kouachi brothers continued near Charles de Gaulle international airport where a car chase took place. The suspects entered a printing business in Dammartin-en-Goele and took one-person hostage. As

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<sup>85</sup> Sky News, (2015), Police Officer Killed in Second Terror Attack, *Sky News*, available from <http://news.sky.com/story/1404109/police-officer-killed-in-second-terror-attack> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>86</sup> BBC, (2015), Paris attacks: Suspects' profiles, *BBC Europe*, available from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30722038> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>87</sup> RTBF, (2015), Discours de Francois Hollande, *RTBF.Be*, available from [http://www.rtbf.be/video/detail\\_discours-de-francois-hollande?id=1983517](http://www.rtbf.be/video/detail_discours-de-francois-hollande?id=1983517) (accessed 15/03/2015)

a siege situation developed, the surrounding residents were urged to remain indoors<sup>88</sup>.

At the same time another hostage situation developed in a kosher supermarket in the neighbourhood of Vincennes in Paris. Surrounding schools were immediately put on lockdown<sup>89</sup>. A four-hour hostage situation led to the execution of four shoppers after an initial negotiation attempt had failed. This led to a forced armed entry into the shop by security forces resulting in freeing most of the remaining hostages. Amedy Coulibaly, the identified attacker responsible for the siege was killed during the intervention. Prior to the raid, an unidentified hostage had attempted to calm the situation by conversing with Coulibaly. This conversation was recorded after negotiators had phoned the supermarket's landline and the terrorist had failed to hang up the phone. In the intercept he was quoted as saying: "they must stop attacking the Islamic State, stop unveiling our women, stop putting our brothers in prison for nothing at all"... "If people manage to unite as they did for Charlie Hebdo... do the same by uniting and saying: 'Leave the Muslims in peace.' Why do you not do that?" At one point he stressed: "We are not killers, we are the defenders of the Prophet, and we kill those who insult him"<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>88</sup> Editorial, (2015), Charlie Hebdo attack: Shots fired as suspects take hostage near Paris, *The Telegraph UK*, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11334661/Charlie-Hebdo-attack-Shots-fired-in-Paris-car-chase.html> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>89</sup> Silva, C., (2015), Paris Manhunt Lockdown: Streets Empty as French Police Search for Charlie Hebdo Gunmen [PHOTOS], *International Business Times*, available from <http://www.ibtimes.com/paris-manhunt-lockdown-streets-empty-french-police-search-charlie-hebdo-gunmen-photos-1776206> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>90</sup> De Peyer, R., (2015), 'When I pay taxes, it is for roads, for schools': How brave hostage challenged Paris terrorist during Jewish supermarket siege, *London Evening Standard*, available from <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/when-i-pay-taxes-it-is-for-roads-for-schools-how-brave-hostage-challenged-paris-terror-suspect-during-siege-at-jewish-supermarket-9969850.html> (accessed 18/04/2015)

In the seven-minute clip of the conversation released two days after his death, Coulibaly professed his allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and detailed his preparation for the retaliation that was conducted by his “brothers in arms” during the *Charlie Hebdo* shooting<sup>91</sup>. The link between the three gunmen dated back from the time Amedy and Cherif had been imprisoned together from 2005-2006. It should be noted that all three perpetrators were born in France, although they had an immigrant background.

Around 5pm, French police surrounded the location where the Kouachi brothers were found and further negotiations took place. In the course of this exchange of messages, the brothers confessed that it was their plan to die as martyrs redeeming the Prophet’s honour<sup>92</sup>. They were later killed in a shootout, ending the three-day attacks in and around Paris<sup>93</sup>.

### **Sunday 11<sup>th</sup> January 2015**

At the end of the series of incidents, as a way of coping with the attacks, a nation-wide march was organized by the municipality of Paris following the initiative of the President, and supported by many of France’s political party leaders<sup>94</sup>. The

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<sup>91</sup> Borger, J., (2015), Paris gunman Amedy Coulibaly declared alliance to ISIS, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-gunman-amedy-coulibaly-allegiance-isis> (accessed 08/04/2015)

<sup>92</sup> Steinbuch, Y., (2015), Massacre suspects ‘want to die as martyrs’, *NY Post*, available from <http://nypost.com/2015/01/09/operation-underway-to-detain-french-shooting-suspects/> (accessed 18/04/2015)

<sup>93</sup> CBS News, (2015), 3 days of terror: Key events in Paris shootings and hostage-takings, *CBS News*, available from <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-key-events-in-paris-newspaper-attack-and-hostage-takings/> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>94</sup> Thomson, A., (2015), More than a million rally for Charlie Hebdo in Paris, *FT*, available from <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea4aa8fc-99b4-11e4-93c1-00144feabdc0.html#slide0> (accessed 02/09/2015)



march initially took place in Paris, and was repeated across France. An international domino effect ensured that the idea of a solidarity march was carried to many cities abroad as well; London, Istanbul, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro and Stockholm were some of the places that saw major marches<sup>95</sup>.

The very foundations of *La Republique* - liberty equality and fraternity - were, as it were, taken hostage during the three-day takeover. Many saw France as a whole threatened in its core values. This is probably the explanation why these marches were such a success, with millions of people participating – many more than had been expected. It had been estimated that the march in Paris would at best gather around one million citizens due to the lingering fear of another attack following the initial violent attacks. However, there were three times as many people<sup>96</sup> showing not only to the French people but to much of the rest of the world that France would not bow to terrorism, whether coming from abroad or from inside its borders.

The show of unity by forty-three national leaders from the Western, Arab and African worlds who participated in the march in Paris took the message of solidarity and determination not to bow to violence to a new level. The international community took a stand against terrorism to show that their determination had only been strengthened after such an attack<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>95</sup> AFP, (2015), Charlie Hebdo shootings: Worldwide marches from London to Washington in solidarity with France, *ABC News Australia*, available from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-12/worldwide-marches-solidarity-with-france-charlie-hebdo-victims/6012164> (accessed 31/07/2015)

<sup>96</sup> Webb, A., Fouquet, H., (2015), Millions Rally in France to Mark Terrorist Attacks, *Bloomberg*, available from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-09/paris-terror-suspects-killed-in-twin-french-police-raids> (accessed 15/03/2015)

<sup>97</sup> Willsher, K., Penketh, A., Topping, A., (2015), Paris welcomes world leaders to solidarity rally against terror attacks, *The Guardian UK*, available from

The joint effort of the French President, high-level international guests, common citizens and, of course journalists, played a crucial role in providing some closure to the event from an emotional perspective for the French people. The sense of 'togetherness' subsequent to the march strengthened the country in a time of expected division.

As briefly mentioned throughout the chapter, the *Plan Vigipirate* was enacted following the events of January 7<sup>th</sup>, which required a public declaration of its launch by the President. Furthermore there is an undeniable presence of the media, used as a great tool of communication to reach the masses. This was seen in the announcement of the suspects via national television and social media, which in turn propagated the 'Je Suis Charlie' slogan as well as tracking the information relating to the developments surrounding the Kouachi brothers and the hostage situation. The former allowed citizens to remain vigilant with up to date information. It can be said that it was used as a crisis management scheme, therefore supporting the importance of discourse during the three-day attack on Paris. The following chapters will focus on the different discourses in response to the events mentioned here and the effects they subsequently precipitated.

### **3.2 November 2015**

#### **Friday 13<sup>th</sup> November 2015**

Unlike the events in January of the same year that lasted three days, the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris in November 2015 took place in one day in

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<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-world-leaders-solidarity-rally-terror-attacks> (accessed 15/03/2015)

just over thirty minutes. According to *La Liberation* between 9.20pm and 9.53pm eight synchronised attacks took place<sup>98</sup>, which included:

- Three detonated bombs around the Stade de France during a friendly match between France and Germany. Two suicide bombers were responsible. The first explosion occurred outside the stadium after one of the bombers had been refused entry after a security check discovered the explosives. This detonation killed the bomber and a bystander.

The second explosion at 9.30pm was caught on television during the live airing of the soccer game. The President was rushed out moments later.

The last bomb was detonated at 9.53pm at a corner fast-food café near the stadium.

After the game, all fans were asked to take to the pitch whilst awaiting evacuation<sup>99</sup>.

- three shootings in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> arrondissement of Paris at two different restaurants Le Petit Cambodge and La Belle Equipe, and two bars La Bonne Biere and Le Comptoir Voltaire.
- and a situation in the Bataclan theatre where hostages were held during a music concert which ended in the three assailants activating their suicide vests.

The Eagles of Death, a recognized metal music group, were halfway into their concert when two men entered the hall and began firing machine guns at the 1500 audience members. The gunfire, which was initially believed to be part of the show's theatrics, is said to have lasted around twenty minutes as the terrorists reloaded their weapons up to four times. Around 10pm, the perpetrators began changing the scenario into a hostage scene. The standoff

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<sup>98</sup> Liberation, (2015), Chronologie de l'enquete depuis les attentas a Paris, *La Liberation*, available from [http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/18/attentats-a-paris-la-chronologie-de-l-enquete\\_1414435](http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/18/attentats-a-paris-la-chronologie-de-l-enquete_1414435) (accessed 09/12/2015)

<sup>99</sup> BBC, (2015), Paris attacks: What happened on the night, *BBC*, available from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994> (accessed 31/12/2015)

lasted just over two hours. The scene was described as carnage<sup>100</sup>. None of the band members was hurt.

A total of 129 deaths were confirmed and over 350 wounded. Most of the victims in these attacks were in the Bataclan<sup>101</sup>. The victims were from a total of fifteen countries, differing from the first attack, which only included French citizens<sup>102</sup>.

At midnight on Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> President Francois Hollande declared a state of emergency<sup>103</sup>.

The following day, President Hollande would launch France's largest air raid on Syria where it would target the capital of ISIS, Raqqa. Twenty bombs were dropped from ten fighter jets during the early hours of Sunday morning. A

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<sup>100</sup> Nossiter, A., Higgins, A., (2015), 'Scene of Carnage' Inside Sold-Out Paris Concert Hall, *The New York Times*, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/world/europe/paris-attacks.html> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>101</sup> Liberation (2015), Le deroule exact des attentats du 13 novembre, *La Liberation*, available from [http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/14/le-deroule-exact-des-attentats-du-13-novembre\\_1413492](http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/14/le-deroule-exact-des-attentats-du-13-novembre_1413492) (accessed 09/12/2015)

<sup>102</sup> Davidson, H., (2015), Identities of Paris terror attack victims from more than a dozen countries emerge, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/15/paris-attacks-identities-of-victims-from-more-than-a-dozen-countries-emerge> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>103</sup> de Mellevoue, D., (2015), Six attaques en 33 minutes: chronologie d'une nuit d'horreur, *Le Figaro*, available from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/14/01016-20151114ARTFIG00253-attentats-de-paris-chronologie-d-une-nuit-d-horreur.php> (accessed 09/12/2015)

recruitment centre loaded with arms and a terrorist training camp were the main targets<sup>104</sup>.

Similarly to the events following the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attacks, a hash tag was used to show solidarity and help those directly affected by the attacks of November 13<sup>th</sup>. #PorteOuvertes, directly translated as 'open door', was used across social media where local residents close to the scenes of terror opened their doors for the night to people who feared returning home before the government regained control and neutralized the threats<sup>105</sup>. La Place de la Republique regained its symbolism of unity and strength as it had done in January of the same year with many gathering to light candles and grieve together<sup>106</sup>.

The orchestrators of the events that took place on November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015 can be divided into three groups based on the locations where they executed their attacks. *Le Monde* published an article on its website with background details of the terrorists involved<sup>107</sup>.

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<sup>104</sup> Doherty, B., Henley, J., Traynor, I., (2015), Paris attacks: French police launch raids as military strikes ISIS in Syria, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/15/paris-attacks-car-found-with-kalashnikovs-as-gunmans-relatives-questioned> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>105</sup> Itkowitz, C., (2015), Parisians offering #PorteOuverte (open door) to people stranded in wake of attacks, *The Washington Post*, available from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-life/wp/2015/11/13/parisians-offering-porteouverte-open-door-to-people-stranded-in-wake-of-attacks> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>106</sup> Chauvet, C., Rojas, R., (2015), Paris Attacks: The Violence Its Victims and How the Investigation Unfolded, *The New York Times*, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/in-place-de-la-republique-a-defiant-gathering-to-mourn/> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>107</sup> Vaudano, M., (2015), Attentats du 13 novembre: que sait-on des terroristes impliqués?, *Le Monde*, available from <http://www.lemonde.fr/les->

At the Bataclan, three bodies were recovered belonging to Ismael Omar Mostfai identified by fingerprint, Samy Amimour and Foued Mohamed-Aggad identified on December 9<sup>th</sup> 2015.

Mostfai was born in Courcouronnes, a suburb of Paris, and was under surveillance – called “fiche S” by intelligence services. This was linked to a concern of potential radicalization after traveling to Syria between 2013 and 2014.

Amimour was also a native of Paris but was more active in his terrorist affiliations prior to November 2015. He was interrogated in October 2012 after links were made by the authorities between him and a terrorist organization in France that was being prosecuted at the time. The following year he violated his judicial control leading to an international arrest warrant being released.

Mohamed-Aggad a resident of a southern suburb of l’Ile de France was known to be associated with one of France’s most successful recruiters for foreign fighters, Mourad Fares. He too left for Syria in 2013 to join ISIS’ armed forces<sup>108</sup>.

Outside the Stade de France, Bilal Hadfi’s body was identified while the two others were not identified. Another is known to have travelled through Greece on October 3<sup>rd</sup> of the same year. Their identities remain undisclosed to the public.

Hadfi was a French national but resided in Belgium. He too had travelled to Syria but Belgian authorities had lost track of his movements.

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[decodeurs/article/2015/11/15/que-sait-on-des-auteurs-des-attaques-du-13-novembre\\_4810502\\_4355770.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/decodeurs/article/2015/11/15/que-sait-on-des-auteurs-des-attaques-du-13-novembre_4810502_4355770.html) (accessed 09/12/2015)

<sup>108</sup> Borredon, L., Vincent, E., (2015), Qui etait Foued Mohamed-Aggad le dernier kamikaze du Bataclan, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/12/09/qui-etait-foued-mohamed-aggad-le-dernier-kamikaze-du-bataclan-identifie\\_4827693\\_4809495.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/12/09/qui-etait-foued-mohamed-aggad-le-dernier-kamikaze-du-bataclan-identifie_4827693_4809495.html) (accessed 09/12/2015)

Finally in the numerous attacks at the bars and restaurants, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, suspected leader of the events, and Brahim Abdeslam were identified whilst a third body remains unidentified.

Abaaoud was of Belgian nationality and died during a police raid on the morning of November 18<sup>th</sup> 2015. During the same raid, there was another explosion of a suicide vest. Abaaoud is suspected of radicalizing the Abdeslam brothers while incarcerated with Salah. Abaaoud is also said to be associated with the failed terrorist attack on-board a Thalys train between Amsterdam and Paris in August 2015.

Brahim was Salah's older brother and owned a bar in Brussels.

It must be noted that Salah Abdeslam is believed to have been a part of the attacks at the friendly soccer game. A warrant for his arrest has been processed but he currently remains at large. He is French. His parents lived in French Algeria and inherited the nationality but he was born in Belgium. It remains unknown what his exact role was in the attacks. His radicalization is presumed to have begun during his stay in jail in 2010 after being charged with theft and drug trafficking.

On November 14<sup>th</sup>, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks calling them the first of many to come whilst labelling France as the "capital of prostitution and obscenity". In a video distributed on Twitter, the terrorist organization proclaimed in English, French and Arabic its determination to eradicate its enemies who threaten the progression and power of the Islamic State<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>109</sup> Callimachi, R., (2015), ISIS Claims Responsibility Calling Paris Attacks 'First of the Storm', *The New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html?_r=0) (accessed 31/12/2015)

In addition a total of ten arrests had been made by the Belgian government<sup>110</sup>, in connection with the November attacks in Paris from December 31<sup>st</sup> 2015 onwards. This once again demonstrates the trans-national cooperation of the second terrorist attacks.

Major security changes were put into operation both in France and in Belgium. In France the declaration of a state of emergency called for the temporary shutdown of borders, an extra 1500 soldiers were deployed and two different contingency plans were implemented one for l'Île de France and the other on a global level for French citizens abroad and returning to the mainland. Services at the metro stations surrounding the main places of attacks were temporarily suspended. All state schools and universities were closed on Saturday 14<sup>th</sup><sup>111</sup>

Brussels was put under lockdown linked to a fear of a similar attack-taking place in the Belgian capital as well as information leading investigators into Belgium. The lockdown extended over numerous days where schools, universities and large parts of the subway system were closed, and the military was deployed in the streets in a similar manner as in Paris. Furthermore the fact that many of the terrorists involved in the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks, were Belgian nationals, led the Belgian government to extend security measures. Raids were carried out in Molenbeek and Jette, known immigrant neighbourhoods, where numerous arrests were made<sup>112</sup>.

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<sup>110</sup> Melvin, D., (2015), 10<sup>th</sup> person arrested in connection with Paris attacks, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/31/europe/belgian-terror-arrest-paris-attack/> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>111</sup> Shannon, V., (2015), Paris Attacks: What we Know and Don't Know, *The New York Times*, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/world/europe/paris-attacks-what-we-know-and-dont-know.html> (accessed 31/12/2015)

<sup>112</sup> Al Jazeera, (2015), Belgium to decide on extending Brussels lockdown, *Al Jazeera*, available from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/belgium-state-alert-continues-day-151122032505683.html> (accessed 31/12/2015)



## **CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITIZATION THEORY**

This chapter will take the form of a literature review of the securitization theory through the perception of various authors. This is an attempt to outline the foundation most suitable for the analysis of this thesis. After establishing such an outline, the thesis will show the gaps in the research done on the theoretical literature in order to set the tone for the rest of the thesis.

This thesis is founded on the securitization theory and the questioning of its potential utility for the interpretation of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* and November 13<sup>th</sup>. However, during the research of this case study, a certain parallel to constructivism was observed, namely the expression of a need to adapt current security measures due to a change in society. There is a need to observe the particular breaking down of one status quo and the construction of a new one when breaking down the elements of the securitization theory to its simplest form. The simplest form will be the expression of a need to adapt existing security measures due to a change in society.

The previous chapters accentuated certain key terms and concepts such as the presence of a security risk, the place and role of political figures and key participants, the variety of speeches and the role of the audience.

Securitization as a theory was introduced by the Copenhagen School and refers to a model for the sociology of the analysis of security: "Securitization is a successful speech act 'through which an inter subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat'"<sup>113</sup>. This definition would then produce the understanding that securitization is created by an initially subjective interpretation and adaptation

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<sup>113</sup> Guzzini, S., (2011), Securitization as a causal mechanism, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.42, No.4: 329-341

of a definition of security which is then reinserted into society through discourse so as to influence a new model of understanding. The discourse is often pronounced by a prominent public figure, assuming a presence of influence in the delivery of the discourse.

The original definition of securitization claims a role for the audience as proven by the following quote: “This leads the Copenhagen school to define securitization as a speech act that has to fulfil three rhetorical criteria. It is a discursive process by means of which an actor (1) claims that a referent object is existentially threatened, (2) demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that ... threat, and (3) convinces an audience that rule-breaking behaviour to counter the threat is justified.” The assumption is then understood that there is a necessity for the public to be present in order for the speech act to be acknowledged<sup>114</sup>. The audience is therefore a key participant in securitization if there is an aim of instilling a long-term and successful strategy. However, the role of this key participant assumes further that the audience is qualified to justify its reasoning in supporting the speech acts in question. Thus it follows that this is an over-estimation of the analytical capacity of the electorate on key national issues, as the political leaders are the ones supposed to be experts in their field.

The role of the audience is challenged by Matt McDonald who believes that a securitization theory does not create an environment of negotiation but rather one of imposition and/or persuasion in concentrating so intensively on speech acts by individuals at the top of a social hierarchy<sup>115</sup>.

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<sup>114</sup> Buzan, B. Waever, O., De Wilde, J., (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, United States : 27-31

<sup>115</sup> McDonald, M., (2008), *Securitization and the Construction of Security*, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.14, No.4 : 563-587

Consequently it must be determined whether French society does indeed follow a trend of an audience abiding by the discourse of only top-level politicians. According to the *Institut Français d'Opinion Publique* (IFOP) in 2012 43% of the surveyed population perceived Islam as a threat while 17% agreed that Islam as a culture belonged to French culture. Surprisingly, early in 2015, the fear of Islam as a threat was only raised by 1% whilst 2% more of the population acknowledged Islam as an integral part of French culture<sup>116</sup>. This example illustrates in part that indeed the audience belongs to the negotiation field of potential securitization but the numbers cannot support the theory that French society in general has supported an initiative to securitize the Muslim community.

Stuart Croft looks into the consequences of the effects of securitizing as an element of society, and how that is translated into a shifting of securities. This occurs in a three-step process. Initially there is a speech act that must be conceptualized in an established relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience exposed to it. This establishes trust and a measure of receptiveness to the speech. Furthermore, the securitizing actor must hold a high position in the political hierarchy as political figures and policy-makers are more likely to provide a speech act capable of initiating a process of securitization. Finally, more weight must be accorded to the public for being able to accept and internalize the speech act, and accept it as a new reality. The discourse inserted in the relationship between speaker and audience has the power to shift the existing security perception into a new direction<sup>117</sup>.

In essence, this perspective of the securitization theory promotes the audience's position as much as the discourse made to it. The language used, and thus the framework instilled by it through the delivered message must not simply be

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<sup>116</sup> IFOP, (2015), *Les Français et leur perception de l'Islam*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 23/09/2015)

<sup>117</sup> Croft, S., (2010), Does 'Shifting Securities' Shift Securitization Theory, *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol.9, No.2: 259-262

accepted by the audience at the receiving end, but must turn the speech into practice. It is only then and there that securitization is implemented.

Rita Floyd continues to develop this concept by stating that a further three determining factors must be considered in order for a securitization effect to be established. There must be a “threat that endangers the survival of an actor or an order regardless of whether anyone has realized this”<sup>118</sup> from a long-term point of view. This necessitates the confirmation that the threat at hand initially has the potential to have a long-term effect instead of being a momentary eruption. Floyd’s interpretation allows for a large responsibility of influence to be placed on the orator in distinguishing on behalf of the audience between what poses a threat and what does not. This could emphasize a certain level of subjectivity.

Then “the referent object of security must be morally legitimate”<sup>119</sup> as determined by the governing body initializing the securitization process. The implementing of such a process can only be deemed successful if it will have a positive consequence on the majority of society. Thus it will be conducive to the well being of society at large in terms of societal coherence, co-existence and positive outcomes.

Finally “the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question”<sup>120</sup> thus allowing the response to be measured in proportion to a realistic threat and realistic defence of such a threat. The correct response must address the threat in a genuine manner. This means that there is no further agenda, political or otherwise, but to isolate and control what the people considered a threat.

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<sup>118</sup> Floyd, R., (2011), Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis?

Towards a just securitization theory, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.42, No.4: 428

<sup>119</sup> Ibid : 428

<sup>120</sup> Ibid :428

Together these three elements emphasise the use and importance of the discourse analysis. Evidently there is an overwhelming volume of discourse produced following an event disturbing the status quo. There is therefore a need to funnel the discourse provided in order to establish a core centre of focus. This requires that two key dimensions appear; the action that is sought to be achieved and subsequently the reactions generated from this by the audience. It could be said that discourse analysis is then examining how a narrative is born. According to Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy discourse analysis “is about the power of incomplete, ambiguous and contradictory discourses to produce a social reality that we experience as solid and real”<sup>121</sup> which is in accordance with the definition of securitization seen above. Thierry Balzacq describes this by stating that “the aim of discourse analysis is to establish the meaning of texts shaped by distinct contexts”<sup>122</sup>. This puts into perspective the importance of what is not said or assumed, from that which is said, and the importance of how it is interpreted or aligned to the securitization mechanism.

According to the securitization theory the case study of this thesis has presented three different entities. They are the Muslim community in France as the referent object, French society at large as the audience and French politicians advocating potential securitization as the securitizing actor.

Until now there has been no mention of political baggage. The attention of the reader must be drawn to events preceding the overwhelming reaction to the January 2015 and November 2015 events, which resulted in, amongst others, the law banning the wearing of the burqa in public and the extension of the period of the state of emergency. In the scenario where there has been a long-standing

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<sup>121</sup> Phillips, N., Hardy, C., (2002), *What is Discourse Analysis, Discourse Analysis*, Imperial College Business School, United Kingdom :2

<sup>122</sup> Balzacq, T., (2011), Chapter 2: Enquiries into methods: a new framework for securitization analysis, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, London: 31-53

political dispute between two confronting communities within the same society, the effects of securitization have to be seen in perspective.

Political baggage is interesting to look at considering the timeline of securitization. There is a deliberate choice by politicians to introduce a new construction of security. Evidently there is a lead up to the decision to implement a certain securitization but it remains separate in time accentuating a need to consider early intervention by government to control a situation before it becomes an issue. In other words suggesting that securitization may not be required or tempting if issues or threats are dealt with before they require large-scale intervention. In accordance to the issue of time, Ronnie Lipschutz believes that securitization is the result of extended “products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them”<sup>123</sup>. This in itself shows a certain limit to the theory specifically in this thesis. The case study focuses on a one-month period following the events at the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters and a one-month period following the events of November 13<sup>th</sup>, but the elements that triggered them occurred long-before, as seen in Chapter 2. For example, the various depictions of the Prophet Mohammed date back to 2005<sup>124</sup> as does the 2004 law banning the public wearing of the hijab<sup>125</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup> Lipschutz, R.D., (1995), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, United States : 8

<sup>124</sup> Thompson, N., (2015), Charlie Hebdo: Satirical magazine is no stranger to controversy, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/07/europe/charlie-hebdo-controversy/> (accessed 07/10/2015)

<sup>125</sup> Chrisafis, A., (2011), France’s burqa ban: women are ‘effectively under house arrest’, *The Guardian*, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/19/battle-for-the-burqa> (accessed 07/10/2015)

Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Peterson look into the three-part foundation that politics plays in securitization<sup>126</sup>. The first assumes that politics is a history development that is constantly modified and rewritten by different discourses attached to a political timeframe and aligned philosophy. There is therefore a will and a motivation to enforce a new strategic doctrine with the expectation of a new practice to be engaged as a consequence from it. Then, there is a need to create a formulation for what society is and the values it is based on. In essence there is a structural identity attached to the society in question that allows for the functioning of society. Finally, the construction of such an identity becomes apparent, which may entail emancipating some aspects of society for the greater majority's interest linked to correct security measures.

The 'they' terminology explained by David Holmes following the implementation of an 'us versus them' paradigm, can be employed by either side of the dispute whether it be to indicate a generalization due to a laziness to provide details, carelessness, understood here as the lack of care of the other or to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the other<sup>127</sup>. This train of thought poses the question whether the initiation of such an identity is seen to be a long-term model. Then the securitization would not be implemented for a limited time only, but would lead to ending multiculturalism completely in its radical extreme. Therefore a distinct division is made with the 'other' being foreign. In this case study this refers to the Muslim immigrant community of France as opposed to that which is deemed 'normal' or that which belongs to society without constraints.

There is an equal need to consider what the latter implies. A society is constructed on an agreement of one identity of citizenship with certain norms and values attached to it. Proponents of a single identity, according to Bill Mc Sweeney

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<sup>126</sup> Pram Gad, U., Lund Peterson, K., (2011), Concepts of politics in securitization studies, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.42, No.4 : 318-320

<sup>127</sup> Holmes, D., (2005), Chapter 2: Theories of Broadcast Media, *Communication Theory: Media Technology and Society*, SAGE Publications, London: 353

ought to consider the potential risk of “fostering and legitimizing intolerance, and encouraging and exacerbating, possibly unconsciously, securitizing dynamics between identity groups”<sup>128</sup>. Mc Sweeny continues by noting that in securitizing an identity a certain pressure is exercised, thereby challenging negotiability and flexibility. A politics of exclusion is thus born from an identity clash. Matt McDonald noted in 2008 an element that remains an issue in France when it comes to the host society’s attitude towards the immigrant Muslim community:

“There is clearly a choice to characterize immigrants as threatening, one that is often communicated by political leaders and the suspension of the normal rules of the game, whether defined in terms of domestic political debate or adherence to international rules and norms. Securitization illuminates these dynamics well.”<sup>129</sup>

One must understand what makes individuality so problematic to society, and more particularly minority identity issues. This can be understood by examining the people encompassing the general public<sup>130</sup>. Herbert Blumer’s definition coincides with the ‘us vs. them’ concept mentioned regarding the clash of cultures. The mass is “constituted by detached and alienated individuals who face objects or areas of life which are interesting but which are also puzzling and not easy to understand and order”<sup>131</sup>. This definition is judgmental which can be translated into an elitist perspective of what is seen as appropriate interests in keeping a system of societal hierarchy. This in itself demonstrates the continued strains between individuals

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<sup>128</sup> McSweeny, B., (1999), *Security Identity and Interests*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom : 72

<sup>129</sup> McDonald, M., (2008), Securitization and the Construction of Security, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.14, No.4 : 567

<sup>130</sup> Munn, M., (1993), The Effects of Free Speech: Mass Media Communication Theory and the Criminal Punishment of Speech, *American Journal of Criminal Law*, Vol.21 : 439

<sup>131</sup> Blumer, H., (1946) *Collective Behavior*, *Principles of Sociology*, Barnes and Noble, New York: 186



whose individuality cannot be discarded. Furthermore choosing to label individuals as being 'the other' or foreign, implies an assumption that such individuals are unable to actively participate within society with correct practice or adequate knowledge. This would entail that certain implemented discourses do not promote strands of individuality but rather a generalization across the board made up of a normalized identity<sup>132</sup>: There can be no assurance that one identity is accepted without restraint by all members of mass society who will then not go on to challenge the information projected at them.

Ole Waever in discussing the securitization method states:

“Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as *security* issues. We have also to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in non-security terms that is to take the problems but leave them un-securitized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to schematize *themselves* as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it.<sup>133</sup>”

This quote shows that there is still a need to look at the normative framework presented by the securitization theory as a parallel argument. This would make the issue of securitization more sociological than political. There is an ethical element that must be considered. It should be obvious that there is a need to consider that dialogue involves elements of vulnerability linked to the timeframe in which the discourse occurs, influencing the securitization which has taken place and the sensitivity surrounding it all linked to a certain history. The effects that occur, as

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<sup>132</sup> Aggarwal, V.B., Gupta, V.S., (2001), *Mass Communication – Origin and Development, Handbook of Journalism and Mass Communication*, Concept Publishing Company: 30-31

<sup>133</sup> Waever, O., (1995), *Securitization and Desecuritization, On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York: 66

consequences to the discourse of securitization, must be taken into account. The effects in question raise issues of equality of the individuals belonging to the same society and the debate of the clash of civilizations<sup>134</sup> by Huntington returns to the forefront. An identity crisis has caused disturbances in an already weak framework of multiculturalism leading to the establishment of the “other” who is deemed foreign or alien.

Bearing in mind that although the role of this chapter is to list the elements that make up and those that clash within the securitization theory, the case study at hand remains a practical example of how the theory is applied. The reader should bear in mind the visuals of the terrorist attacks of January and November 2015 in Paris. Both online and on paper images were used as news websites or social media forums to give expression to the severity of these attacks. The general public became involved and concerned. This in itself indicates a limit of the securitization theory in the variant presented by Michael C. Williams whereby he challenges the argument that an effect of securitization cannot solely be the result of speech acts but that other mediums are required to support the former<sup>135</sup>.

The reader will recall that the events that occurred in January 2015 are linked to visual images printed by *Charlie Hebdo* and formerly by Danish counterpart *Jyllands-Posten* – these were different but similar images. These caused much upset in the Muslim community across France and the world. The sources used for the research of Chapters 3 and 5 were primarily from live reporting of the three-day attacks and then the live commentary given by the French politicians referred to in this thesis. This thesis would also observe a development of the securitization theory when considering the fast-paced globalized 21<sup>st</sup>-century where communication is

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<sup>134</sup> Huntington, S.P., (1993), *The Clash of Civilizations?*, *Foreign Affairs*, available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations> (accessed 01/08/2015)

<sup>135</sup> Williams, M.C., (2003), *Words Images Enemies: Securitization and International Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.47 : 525-526

closely linked to speech and image. The visual imagery after the November attacks did not have the same impact possibly linked to a sense of déjà vu. Similarly, the images of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 remain very much a part of the overall understanding of the events that occurred when the World Trade Centre was attacked.

Conclusions can be drawn from this literature review that not only emphasize certain imperfections within the theory itself but also set the precedent for analysis within this thesis.

The main concept brought forward throughout this chapter is the vulnerability of identity of religious minorities and the necessity for its protection. This aspect is also reflected in Michael S. Drake's definition of political social identity: "In order to be effective, social identity has to operate as a social code, so a claim or an imposition of social identity has to achieve social recognition, and when it does, it becomes enormously powerful, because it informs our expectations of others and of ourselves<sup>136</sup>."

However, the literature presented here focuses on a present timeframe based on recent events limiting the area of analysis. Securitization may not be imminent in terms of the discourse presented in this thesis, whether it is materialized in a lack of security changes or labelling the group that needs to be excluded. The political statements of a number of French politicians quoted in subsequent chapters may potentially present factors that could develop in a future stage into actual securitization. Of course this gap must be contextualized with further speeches, actions and an observation on the progression of the status quo following the upsetting incident at the root of the speeches or acts of January and November 2015.

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<sup>136</sup> Drake, M.S., (2010), Chapter 3: From Identity Politics to the Politics of Representation, *Political Sociology for a Globalizing World*, Polity Press, United Kingdom : 57

Chapters 5 and 6 will then be analysed utilizing the theory presented thus far as well as keeping in mind the gap mentioned here, presenting an interesting beginning for continuous analysis as will be shown in this thesis.

## **CHAPTER 5: HOW THE WORLD HAS REACTED; FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

Many speeches (official or unofficial) were given during the three-day period in Paris following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and then again after the November 13<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks. This thesis will reflect on these responses in the categories of domestic and international including Western democracies as well as some Muslim majority countries.

### **5.1 Politicians**

#### **5.1.1 Domestic**

President Francois Hollande made a statement in an unofficial setting shortly after the attacks on the morning of the 7<sup>th</sup> of January confirming that the magazine's offices had been entered and a terrorist act had taken place: "an act of exceptional barbarism has just been committed" ... "this is a terrorist attack, there is no doubt"<sup>137</sup>. He was on his way to meet with his cabinet to discuss what needed to be done regarding securing the city of Paris and apprehending as well as prosecuting the terrorists at large. It would be the first time he mentioned the deployment of the *Plan Vigipirate* (previously explained in Chapter 3).

Following his impromptu first statement, the French President made an official statement on January 8<sup>th</sup> in which he paid tribute to the fallen "national heroes, whose dedication to the Republic's values would not easily be forgotten"<sup>138</sup>. In addition he spoke of the "influence, audacity and independence"<sup>139</sup> behind the

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<sup>137</sup> LiveNews 24x7, (2015), Francois Hollande Speech After French Magazine Charlie Hebdo Kills 11, *YouTube Channel*, available from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9dW6UCVH6Y> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>138</sup> FRANCE 24, (2015), Attentat a Paris: Francois Hollande annonce une journee de deuil national jeudi 8 janvier, *Youtube channel*, available from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JY85lJaisbQ> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*

philosophy of *Charlie Hebdo* that would be supported and continued by the French government and its people. The President showed his confidence in the *Plan Vigipirate* and emphasized his dedication to restore public order in France. The President also took the opportunity to mark the 9<sup>th</sup> of January as a day of mourning and decreed that France would be in mourning for the three consecutive days.

In the early hours of November 14<sup>th</sup> 2015, once all the locations attacked by extremists had been contained, President Francois Hollande addressed the nation. He took the opportunity to acknowledge the doctors, fire fighters and civil servants who had aided in the containment of the various attacks. The president also spoke of the “ruthless combat mission”<sup>140</sup> he was to engage himself in avenging the honour of the evening’s victims. The sense of unity and determination was emphasized as a requirement in a time of “infinite emotion in the face of dramatics and an abominable tragedy that is in fact an act of barbarism”.

A drastic change was apparent when President Hollande addressed the National Congress on November 16<sup>th</sup> 2015, the first time since May 2012. It is here that the President emphasized France’s victimisation through a barbaric “act of war”<sup>141</sup>. At midnight on November 14<sup>th</sup> 2015, the President declared France to be in a state of emergency. During his meeting in Congress, Hollande argued for a prolonged state of emergency in order to allow for greater security strategies to be implemented and avoid further attacks. The President’s discourse is very different from that of January 2015 in terms of his clarity around a need to engage in an attack rather than remain in a mode of defence to keep the unity of France whole.

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<sup>140</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), Declaration a la suite des attaques a Paris, *Elysee*, available from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-a-la-suite-des-attaques-a-paris-2/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>141</sup> d’Allones, D.R., (2015) Attaques a Paris: Francois Hollande s’adressera au Congres le 16 novembre, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/attaques-a-paris-francois-hollande-s-adressera-au-congres-le-16-novembre\\_4809916\\_4809495.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/attaques-a-paris-francois-hollande-s-adressera-au-congres-le-16-novembre_4809916_4809495.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)

Former President Nicolas Sarkozy gave a speech the same day as the attacks took place to reassure the country of its united front despite “a national tragedy” caused by “savage and barbaric” acts <sup>142</sup>.

Sarkozy was invited by President Hollande after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks to join the united political front initiated by the President to bring together different perspectives in defeating the growing threat of terrorism in France through a scheme of vigilance and direct defence. Addressing his role in this project, former President Sarkozy explained his dedication to the initiative specifically because according to him he had mentioned the necessity even before the attacks took place in January 2015. He argued for the President to elevate the already existing alert levels and reinforce security measures particularly border control quotas <sup>143</sup>, indirectly referring to the quotas of Muslim immigrants, reiterating the narrative mentioned earlier.

This thesis emphasizes the importance of Sarkozy’s role in the *Charlie Hebdo* saga not only with Hollande’s satisfaction rate diminishing <sup>144</sup>, inviting more Frenchmen to call Sarkozy back to run the country’s government, but also because of

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<sup>142</sup> Chaîne UMP, (2015), Attentat Charlie Hebdo: “une tragedie nationale” pour Nicolas Sarkozy, *Youtube Channel*, available from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqDQt7Bw8P4> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>143</sup> Redaction de France Info, (2015), Sarkozy a demande a Hollande d’augmenter “le niveau de fermete et de vigilance”, *France info*, available from

<http://www.franceinfo.fr/actu/politique/article/sarkozy-demande-hollande-d-augmenter-le-niveau-de-fermete-et-de-vigilance-628421> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>144</sup> Chazan, D., (2015), French president Francois Hollande’s approval ratings drop after post-Charlie Hebdo boost, *The Telegraph*, available from

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11427963/French-president-Francois-Hollandes-approval-ratings-drop-after-post-Charlie-Hebdo-boost.html> (accessed 28/09/2015)

his longstanding support of the magazine even as Prime Minister under Jacques Chirac. One blog would go as far as to renaming both Sarkozy and the magazine as 'Charlie Sarkozy' and 'Nico Hebdo' to emphasise the former President's dedication to the publication<sup>145</sup>. It seems as though Sarkozy used the political situation to promote himself as a valid candidate for re-election in France. Sarkozy was publicly embarrassed when not receiving a formal invitation from the French President to stand front row at the nationwide organized march on January 11<sup>th</sup> 2015<sup>146</sup> although he tried repeatedly to make his way to the front for any and all photo opportunities. His legitimate interests in progressing France's anti-terrorist strategies should be questioned congruent to his personal interest in promoting his political career.

Sarkozy's interests were continuously questioned following the November 2015 attacks. Following his second invitation from the President to *l'Elysee* on November 15<sup>th</sup>, Sarkozy said: "The word war is not a word to use by accident, or to be used lightly. I have said to President Holland that it seems to me that we need to construct appropriate responses, which means an inflection of our foreign politics, decisions on a European level and drastic modifications of our political security"<sup>147</sup>. The former President's comments following November 13<sup>th</sup> have proven to be far more drastic than those in January 2015 in terms of his dedication to regaining France's belief in Republicanism. He supported the President's choice to temporarily

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<sup>145</sup> Le Collectif: les mots sont importants, (2015), Charlie Sarkozy et Nico Hebdo, *Oumma*, available from <http://oumma.com/Charlie-Sarkozy-et-Nico-Hebdo> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>146</sup> Specia, M., (2015), Charlie Hebdo would approve: Sarkozy mocked after pushing his way to front of Paris march, *Mashable*, available from <http://mashable.com/2015/01/14/sarkozy-charlie-hebdo-march/> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>147</sup> France2, (2015), Attentats a PArise Nicolas Sarkozy recu par Francois Hollande a l'Elysee, *France TV Info*, available from [http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/attaques-du-13-novembre-a-paris/attentats-a-paris-nicolas-sarkozy-recu-par-francois-hollande-a-l-elysee\\_1176829.html](http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/attaques-du-13-novembre-a-paris/attentats-a-paris-nicolas-sarkozy-recu-par-francois-hollande-a-l-elysee_1176829.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)



shut down the borders but remained very critical of the President's efficiency in preventing terrorist attacks. Sarkozy stressed "too much time had been lost"<sup>148</sup> and questioned whether "all the consequences were considered after the attacks in January"<sup>149</sup>. The rift in government was apparent during a looming regional election but remained questionable in a time of required unity.

On the opposite side of the French political spectrum, Marine Le Pen leader of the *Front National* similarly used the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks to her party's advantage. Recognized for her anti-immigration stance and borderline Islamophobic tendencies, Le Pen blamed the government for allowing French democratic rights to be tarnished by Islamism; this being the philosophic and ideological attachment to the radical Islamic politics<sup>150</sup>. The irony remains that Le Pen and her party were often at the centre of *Charlie Hebdo's* caricatures but nothing comparable to the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, which evidently the *Front National* did not denounce. Her comments would cost her the invitation by the President to the unity rally on January 11<sup>th</sup>, but she would attend anyway although not in the formal front row of international leaders. The attacks could not have come at a more strategic time for the *Front National*: the rising fear of terrorism within French society has led

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<sup>148</sup> Boudet, A., (2015), Apres les attentats de Paris Sarkozy accuse Hollande d'avoir "perdu trop de temps", *Huffington Post France*, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2015/11/18/apres-attentats-sarkozy-accuse-hollande-perdu-trop-temps\\_n\\_8588864.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2015/11/18/apres-attentats-sarkozy-accuse-hollande-perdu-trop-temps_n_8588864.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Wright, R., (2015), A Short History of Islamism, *Newsweek*, available from <http://www.newsweek.com/short-history-islamism-298235> (accessed 09/09/2015)

to a rise in public opinion polls of her party<sup>151</sup>, reigniting the debate about the issue of more immigration into France<sup>152</sup>.

Similarly to her remarks in January 2015, Marine Le Pen used the events of November 13<sup>th</sup> of the same year to promote her party's ideas. Le Pen explained that she had previously on a long-term basis reminded the President of an urgent need to pay more attention to the country's immigration and failed integration<sup>153</sup>. Her discourse proved to be well received with her success in the regional elections at the end of 2015, showing great promise for her party in the upcoming national elections<sup>154</sup>.

It must be noted that there was no organized march following the November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015 terror attacks. There was a memorial service held similar to the one in January of the same year but the political response was very subdued and quiet compared to the loud outburst in response to the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings. This quietness was typical of most of the reactions to the November attacks.

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<sup>151</sup> Horowitz Satlin, A., (2015), Marine Le Pen Leads French Presidential Poll, *The Huffington Post*, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/29/marine-le-pen-president-poll-\\_n\\_6573356.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/29/marine-le-pen-president-poll-_n_6573356.html) (accessed 28/09/2015)

<sup>152</sup> Gourevitch, P., (2015), Le Pen's Moment, *The New Yorker*, available from <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/le-pens-moment> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>153</sup> Le Monde, (2015), Marine Le Pen: "Nous devons retrouver des frontières nationales", *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/video/2015/11/17/marine-le-pen-nous-devons-retrouver-des-frontieres-nationales\\_4812206\\_4809495.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/video/2015/11/17/marine-le-pen-nous-devons-retrouver-des-frontieres-nationales_4812206_4809495.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>154</sup> Bremmer, I., (2015), Marine Le Pen Lost a Battle but May Win the War in France, *Time*, available from <http://time.com/4147837/marine-le-pen-france-regional-elections/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

### 5.1.2 International

President Obama labelled the events of *Charlie Hebdo* “cowardly evil attacks”<sup>155</sup> and promised to stand in solidarity with America’s “oldest and strongest ally”<sup>156</sup> during the difficult time ahead. The US President also insisted that the shared values between the countries meant that any assistance that was necessary would be provided to the French government in bringing to justice those found guilty. However the American President’s perspective is not always necessarily shared by the American public: “Nine years ago, six in 10 Americans said it was irresponsible for newspapers to run cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad over Muslims’ objections. Today, six in 10 say they are okay with the newspapers doing just that”<sup>157</sup>.

The American President’s remarks on the November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015 terrorist attacks did not differ in their message compared to his first comments. Obama spoke of the “outrageous attempt to terrorize innocent civilians”<sup>158</sup>. He reiterated his sense of unity between the two old friends in stating that the attack was “not just on the people of France but an attack on all of humanity and the universal values that we share”<sup>159</sup>. This philosophy is supported by Obama’s statements on November 16<sup>th</sup> at

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<sup>155</sup> Associated Press, (2015), Paris Shooting Terror Attack at Charlie Hebdo: Obama Reacts – The New York Times, *Youtube Channel*, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=089VFDai2L4> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>156</sup> Ibid

<sup>157</sup> Blake, A., (2015), The impact of Charlie Hebdo: Americans back Muhammad cartoons, *Washington Post*, available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/01/29/americans-support-publishing-muhammad-cartoons-nine-years-after-saying-they-were-irresponsible/> (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>158</sup> Garunay, M., (2015), President Obama Offers a Statement on the Attacks in Paris, *White House*, available from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/11/13/watch-president-obamas-statement-attacks-paris> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

the G20 summit in Ankara where he insisted that the US-led coalition in Syria, to which France solidified its membership to after its raids early on November 14<sup>th</sup> following the attacks, was the only solid strategy moving forward to end ISIS<sup>160</sup>.

What did cause strong controversy was Presidential candidate Donald Trump's comments following the November terror attacks: "When you look at Paris, you know the toughest gun laws in the world, Paris, nobody had guns but the bad guys [...] you can say what you want but if they had guns, if our people had guns, if they were allowed to carry it would have been a much, much different situation<sup>161</sup>". The comment follows his tweet early in the year where after the *Charlie Hebdo* incidents he said: "Isn't it interesting that the tragedy in Paris took place in one of the toughest gun control countries in the world?<sup>162</sup>". Trump's comments seem in bad taste considering the gravity of both terror attacks but it does not stop him from calling for a nationwide ban on Muslim refugees, in the event of him being elected as President. His speech would then be used in numerous extremist videos, only feeding into the hatred of extremism<sup>163</sup>.

The UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, and his former coalition partner Nick Clegg, expressed their sadness and simultaneous anger about the situation as a

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<sup>160</sup> Liptak, K., Holmes, K., Kopan, T., (2015), Obama says ground troops to fight ISIS would be a mistake, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/16/politics/obama-responds-to-paris-terror-attack/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>161</sup> Diamond, J., (2015), Trump: Paris massacre would be 'much different' if people had guns, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/politics/paris-terror-attacks-donald-trump-guns/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Brennan, C., (2015), Donald Trump's call for ban on Muslims has just been used in a militant Islamist recruitment video, *The Journal*, available from <http://www.thejournal.ie/trump-islam-video-2527289-Jan2016/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

whole<sup>164</sup>. The prime minister would subsequently attend the unity rally on January 11<sup>th</sup> in Paris.

The Prime Minister echoed President Obama's message during his address following the November 13<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in Paris. Cameron declared that the events were the worst in France since the Second World and that Britain was at threat of a possible imminent attack. Nonetheless he remained firm in his alliance and support towards France during its time of mourning: "They were killed and injured by brutal, callous murderers who want to destroy everything our two countries stand for. Peace, tolerance, liberty"<sup>165</sup>.

A poll conducted in the United Kingdom by ComRes found that out of 1000 people, 27% said they understood to a certain degree the reasons offered by the Kouachi brothers in the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine attack. However, almost two-thirds of the population (62%) said that they completely disagreed with these acts of violence. In addition 11% of the total surveyed professed the opinion that any organization that publishes discriminatory images of the Prophet Mohammed deserves to be attacked<sup>166</sup>.

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<sup>164</sup> Good Morning America, (2015), World Leaders Head Paris March Honoring Terror Victims, *ABC News*, available from <http://abcnews.go.com/International/marchers-world-leaders-gather-paris-cry-freedom-rally/story?id=28144762> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>165</sup> Cameron, D., (2015), Prime Minister comment on Paris terrorist attack, *UK Government*, available from <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-statement-on-paris-terror-attack> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>166</sup> AFP, (2015), Charlie Hebdo: 27% des musulmans britanniques comprennent les motifs de l'attentat, *L'Express*, available from [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/charlie-hebdo-27-des-musulmans-britanniques-comprennent-les-motifs-de-l-attentat\\_1655386.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/charlie-hebdo-27-des-musulmans-britanniques-comprennent-les-motifs-de-l-attentat_1655386.html) (accessed 30/03/2015)

The attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* brought the spotlight back onto the discussion of the rise of Islamophobia in Europe: “This is a dangerous moment for European societies [...] With increasing radicalization among supporters of jihadist organizations and the white working class increasingly feeling disenfranchised and uncoupled from elites, things are coming to a head<sup>167</sup>”. This was the perspective given by Peter Neuman Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College in London. Based on this, the response given by neighbouring European states must be seriously taken into account. If France is facing a crisis of its own, then neighbouring states can only prepare for the eventuality of a similar crisis within their own borders. Additionally, as previously indicated when citing examples of individual responses by voices from the UK and the USA, states previously affected by domestic terrorism are determined to avoid another attack by affiliating themselves to France and providing any necessary assistance.

The author would like to emphasise that until the present there has been no official mention or acknowledgment of moderate Muslims in general on the one hand and their victimization on the other following the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* or the grief they as a community are experiencing. It must be reiterated that the Muslim community of France and that of other countries as a whole was affected by the attacks too as they do not align themselves to the branch of extremism seen here as threatening. The author then questions whether Western leaders imagine Muslim leaders to clarify this distinction thus defending their anti-terrorism stance instead of the responsibility falling primarily on the West.

Geert Wilders, a prominent figure in the Dutch political landscape with his Freedom Party is very open about his anti-Islam approach to politics, specifically

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<sup>167</sup> Erlanger, S., Bennhold, K., (2015), ‘Dangerous Moment’ for Europe as Fear and Resentment Grow, *The New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/paris-attack-reflects-a-dangerous-moment-for-europe.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/paris-attack-reflects-a-dangerous-moment-for-europe.html?_r=1) (accessed 19/04/2015)

when it comes to the issue of immigration. His concept of what the Netherlands, and in a greater context Europe, should look like has instilled and reflected a growing Islamophobia within the Netherlands<sup>168</sup>. In an interview on January 8<sup>th</sup> 2015, he expressed his longstanding view on radical immigrants: “let them leave or detain them but never let them return”<sup>169</sup>. In Wilders’ opinion, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks are only the beginning of a war Europe is facing. This will only continue to worsen as “the elephant in the room that is Islam, that is immigration”, threatens European values<sup>170</sup>.

More recently in May 2015, Wilders released a short film online (although having previously shown the movie) entitled *Fitna* (Arabic for ‘strife’) simultaneously showing images of violence orchestrated by Muslim extremists and passages from the Koran<sup>171</sup>. Although not harmful in plain sight, the purpose of the video was to show that Muslims would initiate war in anger.

This is direct incitement to violence. It is necessary to limit criticism in the context of a sensitive community if such criticism will be perceived as discrimination, and potentially hate speech. There is an element of double standards if a member of Parliament of a Western state can openly discriminate against a branch of Islam, here being extremists, but not allow for rightful retaliation. The right to defend one’s neighbour’s honour must be legitimate within the framework of the security of law

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<sup>168</sup> The Economist, (2015), Solidarity for now, *The Economist*, available from <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21639537-backlash-against-european-muslims-would-play-hands-killers-solidarity> (accessed 19/04/2015)

<sup>169</sup> Sun News TV, (2015), Geert Wilders on the Islamic terror attacks on Charlie Hebdo cartoonists, *Youtube Channel*, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzDCeWNOBBo> (accessed 08/05/2015)

<sup>170</sup> Ibid

<sup>171</sup> Harris, S., (2015), Losing Our Spines to Save Our Necks, *The Huffington Post*, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/losing-our-spines-to-save\\_b\\_100132.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/losing-our-spines-to-save_b_100132.html) (accessed 21/05/2015)

without promoting or condoning acts of violence or terrorism. In essence, Geert Wilders is generating Islamophobia through a narrative that does not consider Islam as a religion divided into branches (moderate Muslims, non-practicing Muslims, orthodox Muslims and extremist Muslims) but rather generalized the culture and religion as a violence-rooted militant organization.

Although Geert Wilders made an example of a potential anti-Muslim narrative, he is not the only European politician to do so nor does he do so without political reason. He may link it with cultural issues such multiculturalism or to economic issues as a result of high levels of Muslim migration into the Netherlands<sup>172</sup>.

In Prague, on November 17<sup>th</sup>, the leading political party hosted a rally advocating the closing of national borders to Muslim migrants<sup>173</sup>. Evidently this took place in the context of the 2015 migrant crisis emerging from the Middle East and flooding Europe as well as the November 13<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in Paris. The philosophy behind the campaign has been named 'Block Against Islam'.

In a similar situation, PEDIGA supporters in Germany held their own rally in Dresden on November 18<sup>th</sup> calling refugees "animals" and stating that "one refugee is one too many". The anger echoes that of the Czech people, as Germany is the

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<sup>172</sup> Schneider, C.P., (2015), Geert Wilders: Rise of an anti-Islam opportunist, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/08/opinions/schneider-geert-wilders/> (accessed 09/09/2015)

<sup>173</sup> Lane, O., (2015), Eastern Europe Rising: Czech President Speaks at Anti-Islam Rally with Pediga Leaders Tommy Robinson, *Breitbart*, available from <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/11/17/eastern-europe-rising-czech-president-speaks-anti-islam-rally-pegida-leaders-tommy-robinson/> (accessed 02/01/2016)



largest host of Muslim migrants of 2015 with almost one million entering the country in just a few short months<sup>174</sup>.

The anti-Muslim narrative seemingly exploding across Europe does present an issue to the rapid pace of Europe's new face of multiculturalism. Furthermore the need for unity in a time where extremism feeds off division is more crucial than ever.

## **5.2 Journalists and the media**

### **5.2.1 Domestic**

The terrorist attacks of Wednesday 7<sup>th</sup> January 2015 had as an end goal to simultaneously avenge the alleged insults inflicted by the *Charlie Hebdo* caricatures on the Prophet Mohammed and silence those at fault for this. However the journalists of France were anything but silenced. The first noticeable reaction was that of *Charlie Hebdo* whose website was temporarily suspended to present only a black backdrop and in full screen what would become the international phenomenon of 'Je Suis Charlie' in honour of the murdered journalists. The magazine would later receive backing from Radio France, *Le Monde* and France Television to assist with any necessary funding or technical support to ensure the continuation of the magazine's publication.

While the international community used Twitter to promote 'Je Suis Charlie', the French press shared images of different media offices coming to a standstill for a moment of silence. The French Journalists' Union expressed its dismay: "The massacre perpetrated against the editorial staff of *Charlie Hebdo* is a horror that strikes at us all. When journalists are killed, it is done to make an entire profession

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<sup>174</sup> Ernst, A., (2015), Update: Refugee fears spur rise of Germany's far right, *Al Jazeera*, available from <http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2015/11/18/germany-anti-islam-rally-paris-hate.html> (accessed 02/01/2016)

feel fear; it is done to silence. Attacking a newspaper is an attempt to muzzle the freedom of expression that exists in a democracy”<sup>175</sup>.

Giles van Kote, director of *Le Monde* showed his determination to refuse such acts to threaten France’s standing on freedom of expression: “The tragedy only reinforces our belief that it is necessary to fight against ignorance, intolerance, obscurantism and fanaticism. It is more vital than ever to remember that freedom of the press is not negotiable.”<sup>176</sup>

Martin Vidberg, cartoonist for the same newspaper chose not to draw in his daily column but instead have the following sentence printed: “How can I draw today? How can I not draw today?”<sup>177</sup>. Vidberg’s sentence makes a statement for French journalists that face the problem of pushing the limits of freedom of expression or limiting their freedom of press with censorship.

The day following the attacks, journalists gathered outside the *Charlie Hebdo* offices holding up their press identification cards and ‘Je Suis Charlie’ posters to

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<sup>175</sup> Hare, K., (2015), ‘Nous Somme Tous Charlie’: Journalists reacts to the shootings at Charlie Hebdo, *Poynter*, available from <http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/310943/nous-somme-tous-charlie-journalists-react-to-the-shootings-at-charlie-hebdo/> (accessed 09/04/2015)

<sup>176</sup> Santi, J-G., van Kote, G., (2015), Gilles van Kote directeur du “Monde”: “Il faut qu’il y ai un prochain numero de Charlie”, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/eclairages/video/2015/01/08/gilles-van-kote-directeur-du-monde-il-faut-qu-il-y-ait-un-prochain-numero-de-charlie\\_4551610\\_3164243.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/eclairages/video/2015/01/08/gilles-van-kote-directeur-du-monde-il-faut-qu-il-y-ait-un-prochain-numero-de-charlie_4551610_3164243.html) (accessed 01/08/2015)

<sup>177</sup> Hyland, V., (2015), The French Media Reacts to the *Charlie Hebdo* Massacre, *New York Magazine*, available from <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/french-media-reacts-to-charlie-hebdo-massacre.html> (accessed 09/04/2015)

observe a minute of silence at noon<sup>178</sup>. This unanimity among French journalists was not a reaction following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks but had been in existence long before. In 2006 Philippe Val who had resurrected *Charlie Hebdo* in 1991 stated “after having overcome Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, the world now faces a new global threat of totalitarian nature: Islamism. We – writers, journalists and intellectuals – call for resistance against religious totalitarianism to promote freedom, equal opportunities and secular values for all<sup>179</sup>”. It must also be noted that this statement of 2006 is the only mention of Islam or the Muslim community from the journalistic environment prior to the January attacks, thus far.

Following the terrorist attacks on November 13<sup>th</sup> in Paris, recognized newspapers such as *La Liberation*, *L’Equipe*, *Le Figaro*, *La Voix du Nord* and *Le Parisien* dedicated their front pages to pictures of the carnage. The newspapers used words such as “horror, massacre, war”<sup>180</sup> to express the lack of words to define their shock and fear. This was demonstrated with a lower key retaliation as seen in January 2015 after the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre. The outcry remained the same but the way in which the media responded was more diluted.

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<sup>178</sup> Piasecki, M., (2015), Global Reaction to the Terrorist Attack on French Newspaper Charlie Hebdo, *Getty Images Netherlands*, available from <http://www.gettyimages.nl/detail/nieuwsfoto's/french-journalists-observe-a-minutes-silence-at-noon-nieuwsfotos/461170678> (accessed 09/04/2015)

<sup>179</sup> Bolton, K.R., (2015), Charlie Hebdo: Where Neocons, Zionists, Masons and Communists Converge, *Foreign Policy Journal*, available from <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/01/27/charlie-hebdo-where-neocons-zionists-masons-and-communists-converge/> (accessed 11/05/2015)

<sup>180</sup> AFP, (2015), Paris attacks: French press reacts with ‘L’Horreur’ ‘This time it’s war’, *ABC News*, available from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-14/paris-attacks-this-time-its-war-french-press-reacts/6941544> (Accessed 02/01/2016)

## #JeSuisCharlie

The creator of the slogan “Je Suis Charlie” that would go on to become not only one of Twitter’s most recognized, famous and tweeted hash tags but also one of France’s biggest movements of solidarity and resistance, is the creation of the art director of *Stylist* magazine Joachim Roncin. According to the editor it expressed his sadness and shock: “There’s nothing political in these three words [...] It’s only something that’s very democratic, something that says I’m not afraid”.<sup>181</sup>

The hash tag became an internationally recognized slogan not only on social media but also across locations of vigils where individuals began holding up signs of the hash tag and homes placing them on their windowsills. In the first twenty-four hours following the shootings in the Charlie Hebdo offices, the hash tag was used over three million times, that is 6,500 tweets a minute<sup>182</sup>. The latter proves that the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* affected the international community as much as French citizens.

Perhaps the slogan has become more than an act of solidarity among the French population; there is a great deal of political uncertainty in France currently with Francois Hollande being one of the most unpopular President’s to date and the *Front National* growing in support. This reflects a lack of social cohesion. The reaction to the attacks enhanced the sense of a common social identity for many Frenchmen. Socio-political debates have resurged following the incident. Inequalities within society specifically towards the immigrant populations received criticism following the attacks. The limit between hate speech and freedom of expression,

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<sup>181</sup> Groll, E., (2015), Meet The Man who Put the ‘Je Suis’ in “Je Suis Charlie’, *Foreign Policy*, available from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/19/meet-the-man-who-put-the-je-suis-in-the-je-suis-charlie/> (accessed 18/03/2015)

<sup>182</sup> Whitehead, T., (2015), Paris Charlie Hebdo attack: Je Suis Charlie hashtag one of most popular in Twitter history, *The Telegraph*, available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/je-suis-charlie-france-patriotism/384990/> (accessed 18/03/2015)

and more importantly the political leadership concerning France's stance on freedom of press, developed so far that it threatens to ignite political instability<sup>183</sup>.

The trend branched into creating other prominent hash tags such as #JeSuisAhmed in reference to the murdered police officer, #JeSuisJuif and more controversially #JeNeSuisPasCharlie.

### **#PorteOuvrte**

Twitter played a crucial role following the November 2015 terrorist attacks. This time it showed its support for those directly affected by allowing users to offer shelter to those in the surrounding areas who were too afraid to return home for the night. 'Porte Ouverte' is directly translated as open door. Paris residents solidified the philosophy of community by offering up their homes as refuge during a time of fear and chaos. An independent researcher found that the hash tag was used over 880 000 times during the early hours of November 14<sup>th</sup> 2015<sup>184</sup>.

### **5.2.2 International**

It has been mentioned before that this thesis is primarily focused on a Western centred position and perspective but in this section, the international response in the media was very similar to that of the domestic responses. It was interesting to delve into the contrasting response of Muslim oriented countries in telling the story in their own media.

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<sup>183</sup> Sayare, S., (2015), *What Je Suis Charlie Has Become*, *The Atlantic*, available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/je-suis-charlie-france-patriotism/384990/> (accessed 18/03/2015)

<sup>184</sup> Ruest, N., (2015), A Look at 14939154 #Paris #Bataclan #Paris Attacks #PorteOuvrte, *Ruebot*, available from <http://ruebot.net/post/look-14939154-paris-bataclan-parisattacks-porteouvre-tweets> (accessed 02/01/2016)

The Arab League's quick response to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks set the example for much of the Muslim world to react. The member states of the Arab League have all denounced the use of terrorism and have shown solidarity with the people of France and in particular the Muslim communities, urging them not to retaliate but to allow justice to prevail<sup>185</sup>. Nations of the Muslim world then individually expressed their thoughts through press statements. The reactions of Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Turkey will be analysed in this section as individual examples representing the Muslim opinion.

The Iranian government expressed its disgust of the terrorist attacks by extremist elements on the freedom of expression, maintaining, "All acts of terrorism against innocent people are alien to the doctrine and teachings of Islam"<sup>186</sup>. Gatherings of journalists holding vigil, placing flowers and candles outside the gates of the French embassy in Teheran and the active online support of human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh are all examples of the country's show of support for France.

The national Iranian newspapers differed in their coverage of the attacks. The official newspaper dedicated its front page to the story whilst others like *Sharq* and *Etemad* preferred to use only a portion of the front page to show solidarity<sup>187</sup> - but not more than they deemed necessary. The Iranian media openly criticized *Charlie Hebdo's* choice to continuously insult the Prophet Mohammed but did not agree with the implemented means of violence and terrorist initiatives to momentarily suspend its existence. Furthermore many articles indirectly blame the French

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<sup>185</sup> Vivarelli, N., (2015), Arab World Reacts to Charlie Hebdo Magazine Attack, *Variety*, available from <http://variety.com/2015/film/global/arab-world-reacts-to-charlie-hebdo-magazine-attack-1201394661/> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>186</sup> Esfandiari, G., (2015), 'Je Suis Charlie' in Tehran, *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, available from <http://www.rferl.org/content/je-suis-charlie-in-tehran/26783603.html> (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>187</sup> Ibid

government and Francois Hollande's implementation of their laws on freedom of expression and freedom of press as they have unintentionally led to the attacks<sup>188</sup>.

The Egyptian Prime Minister ordered a ban of any sharing of publications that were deemed religiously insulting or discriminatory. Similarly, the Egyptian Family House, bringing together the main Muslim and Coptic Christian authorities released a statement condemning the division between people and religion caused by the cartoons. Media houses were asked to refuse support as they could potentially be labelled as condoning and encouraging blasphemous articles, which could then incite more violence<sup>189</sup>.

A CNN reporter interviewed citizens in Cairo asking for their reaction to the new *Charlie Hebdo* cover. Some of the responses were: "Inappropriate at the current time and should not have been published<sup>190</sup>", "If they wanted to say our religion is about forgiveness, they could have put it in a headline. No need for cartoons that offend religions<sup>191</sup>" and "An individual's freedom doesn't mean encroaching on others' beliefs. But freedom ends at assaulting the freedom of others<sup>192</sup>".

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<sup>188</sup> Paraszczuk, J., (2015), Muslim Press Reacts to Charlie Hebdo Attacks, *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, available from <http://www.rferl.org/content/muslim-press-reacts-charlie-hebdo-attack/26783014.html> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>189</sup> Barnard, A., (2015), New Charlie Hebdo Muhammad Cartoon Stirs Muslim Anger in Mideast, *New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/middleeast/new-charlie-hebdo-muhammad-cartoon-stirs-muslim-anger-in-mideast.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/middleeast/new-charlie-hebdo-muhammad-cartoon-stirs-muslim-anger-in-mideast.html?_r=0) (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>190</sup> CNN, (2015), How do Egyptians feel about new Charlie Hebdo cover?, *CNN international*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/01/14/natpkg-open-mic-egypt-cairo-charlie-hebdo.cnn> (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*

The Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* printed some of the content from the new *Charlie Hebdo* edition; it is the only publishing house in the Muslim world to do so despite national and neighbouring voices urging it not to do so. However *Cumhuriyet* is a contradiction in itself as the paper has been scrutinized for its own controversy defending the freedom of expression whilst not allowing any judgment or criticism of Ataturk the first President of Turkey<sup>193</sup>. The newspaper received threats and protestors were outside their offices disapproving of the choice to publish the cartoons in question, leading to numerous arrests being made. It seemed as though the newspaper was seeking to provoke an internal, i.e. Turkish, response around the question of freedom of expression.

Likewise numerous websites were blocked after attempting to post some of the controversial editorials. Deputy Prime Minister Akdogan took to Twitter to express his anger towards the issue at hand: “Those who disregard the sacred values of Muslims by publishing forms allegedly referring to our Prophet, are clearly committing a provocation [...] The fact that those who irresponsibly target the values of society, publicly express it via media or through art doesn’t change its aggressive nature”<sup>194</sup>.

Furthermore the Muslim media houses refused to publish the new set of *Charlie Hebdo* covers, thereby once again reiterated the division within the community between that which is deemed to be Islamic and that which must be banished from the culture as a whole. Therefore one can only come to the

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<sup>193</sup> Oruc, M.S., (2015), Turkey’s red line, *Aljazeera*, available from

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/turkey-red-line-free-speech-cen-201511953215836507.html> (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>194</sup> Sim, S., (2015), Charlie Hebdo Reaction: Turkey, Russia, Egypt React To Magazine With Mosque Shootings, Free Speech, *International Business Times*, available from

<http://www.ibtimes.com/charlie-hebdo-reaction-turkey-russia-egypt-react-magazine-mosque-shootings-free-1783656> (accessed 22/03/2015)



conclusion that if Muslims themselves reject terrorism, and seek to be provided with security and just politics that there is after all an imbalance with the portrayal of Islam.

### **5.3 Muslim community**

#### **5.3.1 Domestic**

Following the attacks on the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters a survey was conducted among 1000 French citizens: 57% sided with the decision to ignore the reaction of angered Muslim minorities responding in a violent manner and were in favour of continued publication of such cartoons. Among the surveyed, women and adults under 35 years of age were more concerned with sensitivity towards the Muslim religion and community as a whole<sup>195</sup>.

The results of the above-mentioned survey are on par with the reaction of the French government following the events of January 2015. There is clearly a necessity to address the societal issues at hand in French society, primarily those concerning the growing division between the Muslim community and the greater population. It is only natural that the majority of society should react with indifference if the government simply shows interest in the long-standing *Plan Vigipirate* rather than grass-root level intervention schemes.

The Grand Mosque of Paris issued the following statement after the attacks: “We strongly condemn these kinds of acts and we expect the authorities to take the most appropriate measures. Our community is stunned by what just happened. It’s a whole section of our democracy that is seriously affected. This is a deafening declaration of war. Times have changed, and we are now entering a new era of

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<sup>195</sup> Linshi, J., (2015), 42% of French Opposed to *Charlie Hebdo*’s Cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, Poll Finds, *TIME*, available from <http://time.com/3672921/charlie-hebdo-prophet-muhammad-muslim-cartoon-poll/> (accessed 30/03/2015)

confrontation”<sup>196</sup>. The Union of Islamic Organization supported the latter and expressed its condolences to the families of the victims.

The announcement of a new *Charlie Hebdo* edition following the attack raised concerns for the coalition made up of the French Council of Muslim Religion and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France. The duo expressed their regret at the magazine’s choice to go ahead as it would only provoke further instabilities within the country as well as being insulting towards the period of mourning, as well as to the victims<sup>197</sup>. The French Council of the Muslim Religion had previously criticized *Charlie Hebdo* for republishing the Mohammed cartoons printed by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2006<sup>198</sup>.

Muslims also used political parties to voice their concerns. Like the left-wing organizations primarily the *Parti des Indigenes de la Republique* whose majority of members are Muslim. “This is a veritable nightmare for the Muslim community, but a veritable windfall for the extreme-right parties that will exploit this appalling crime... The people who committed this crime have committed a crime not only against *Charlie Hebdo* but also against the Muslim community” ... “We denounce the attack and the implementation of the attack by the jackals that want to use this

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<sup>196</sup> Kuruvilla, C., Blumberg, A., (2015), Muslims Around The World Condemn Charlie Hebdo Attack, *Huffington Post*, available from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/muslims-respond-charlie-hebdo\\_n\\_6429710.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/muslims-respond-charlie-hebdo_n_6429710.html) (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>197</sup> RFI, (2015), French Muslim Leaders appeal for calm as Charlie Hebdo prints new Mohammed front page, *RFI*, available from <http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20150113-french-muslim-leaders-appeal-calm-charlie-hebdo-prints-new-mohammed-front-page> (accessed 22/03/2015)

<sup>198</sup> VICE, (2015), How the Muslim Communities of Europe Reacted to the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ Massacre, available from <http://www.vice.com/read/how-the-muslim-communities-of-europe-reacted-to-the-charlie-hebdo-massacre-184> (accessed 18/04/2015)

incident to start a witch hunt against Muslims<sup>199</sup>. These quotes show the concern of the Muslim communities about the potential subsequent actions of retaliation following the attacks.

On an opposing side, four recognized French Imams urged the Muslim communities in France to react to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and not remain subdued by the fear involved: "Let the silent majority of Muslims take to the streets"<sup>200</sup>.

At the same time, certain schools in Muslim neighbourhoods in France did not observe the minute's silence on January 8<sup>th</sup>, the day following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, as they did not identify the Kouachi brothers as murderers but rather heroes of Islam<sup>201</sup>.

As the Muslim communities were already divided in their interpretations of Islam and extremism in the European context, the attacks probably accentuated and instigated action.

The reaction of the Muslim community in the aftermath of the attacks is not to be minimized in importance but instead be compared to the message being spread by the governing body that is the French government. It is a pity that hardly

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<sup>199</sup> TeleSur, (2015), French Progressives Respond to the Charlie Hebdo Massacre, *TeleSur TV*, available from <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/French-Progressives-Respond-to-the-Charlie-Hebdo-Massacre---20150108-0016.html> (accessed 18/04/2015)

<sup>200</sup> ANSA, (2015), French imams urge Muslims to 'react' to Charlie Hebdo attack, *ANSA Italia*, available from [http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2015/01/08/french-imams-urge-muslims-to-react-to-charlie-hebdo-attack\\_87ae9eab-12d2-442b-b4e2-a49c24da6282.html](http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2015/01/08/french-imams-urge-muslims-to-react-to-charlie-hebdo-attack_87ae9eab-12d2-442b-b4e2-a49c24da6282.html) (accessed 18/04/2015)

<sup>201</sup> Bordelon, B., (2015), French Muslim Students Refused to Honor Moment of Silence for *Charlie Hebdo* Attack, available from <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/411452/french-muslim-students-refused-honor-moment-silence-charlie-hebdo-attack-brendan> (accessed 18/04/2015)

any attention was given by leading politicians and journalists to the effects of the terrorist attack on *Charlie Hedbo* on Muslim community. This in itself is a concern and demonstrates the sentiment towards Muslim communities as a whole, instead of the identification of radicals and Islam as separate entities. In a sense, Islamophobia following the attacks is being entrenched from the lack of compassion towards one section of society. This is exemplified by the violent reactions following the incident involving grenades thrown at mosques or a boar's head placed in front of a Muslim prayer room<sup>202</sup>.

The reactions by the Muslim community of France following the November terror attacks may be even more important than those of January 2015. The reason was that the community feared further amalgamation with extremists and potentially more violent retaliation. This was expressed by the President of *le Conseil Français du culte musulman*:

“We reject categorically and without ambiguity all forms of violence or of terrorism that are in complete opposition to the values of peace and fraternity that Islam is founded upon [...] We address ourselves to the entirety of France to clarify what Islam says about terrorism and the attacks [...] We, Muslims of France, citizens in our right are an integral part of the nation, and stand in solidarity with the national community. We, Muslims of France, proclaim our unwavering attachment to the Republican pact that unites us all<sup>203</sup>.”

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<sup>202</sup> Chalabi, M., (2015), France Has A History of Anti-Semitism And Islamophobia, *Five Thirty Eight*, available from <http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/france-has-a-history-of-anti-semitism-and-islamophobia/> (accessed 11/05/2015)

<sup>203</sup> Sauvaget, B., (2015), Les musulmans de France veulent lever toutes les ambiguïtés, *La Liberation*, available from [http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/20/les-musulmans-de-france-veulent-lever-toutes-les-ambiguites\\_1414816](http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/20/les-musulmans-de-france-veulent-lever-toutes-les-ambiguites_1414816) (accessed 02/01/2016)

The same message of horror and disgust towards the acts of terror as well as the declaration of unity and aid where needed/wanted was mirrored by *l'Union des organisations islamiques de France, l'Union des mosques de France* and *la Federation des organisations islamiques en Europe*<sup>204</sup>.

The *Grande Mosque* of Paris held its weekly Friday night service on Friday 20<sup>th</sup> November but heightened its security drastically with every congregant being allowed entry after being body-searched by authorities. A gathering had been organized to take place after the service with the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, as the guest of honour, but was later cancelled due to security fears<sup>205</sup>.

The fear of amalgamation was not without reason. Following the incidents of November 13<sup>th</sup> it was reported that graffiti was written on a kebab shop with the words "dirty Arabs" and "terrorists". In Blaye, pork was left on the steps of a mosque with the inscription "France belongs to the French". In Pontarlier, red crosses were drawn across the walls of another mosque in Creteil and on a municipal building in Evreux the sentence "death to Muslims" was painted. Incidents of police officers being more aggressive with women and men of Muslim descent in the streets were also reported when their faces were covered with hats, scarves, and even motorbike helmets.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Ben Rhouma, H., (2015), *Attaques terroristes a Paris: les reactions fermes des organisations musulmanes*, *Saphir News*, available from [http://www.saphirnews.com/Attaques-terroristes-a-Paris-les-reactions-fermes-des-organisations-musulmanes\\_a21534.html](http://www.saphirnews.com/Attaques-terroristes-a-Paris-les-reactions-fermes-des-organisations-musulmanes_a21534.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>205</sup> Le Monde, (2015), *A la Grande Mosquee de Paris la priere du vendredi sous haute securite*, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/video/2015/11/20/a-la-grande-mosquee-de-paris-la-priere-du-vendredi-sous-haute-securite\\_4814480\\_4809495.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/video/2015/11/20/a-la-grande-mosquee-de-paris-la-priere-du-vendredi-sous-haute-securite_4814480_4809495.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>206</sup> Bounoua, M., (2015), *Apres les attentats des musulmans agresses partout en France*, *Slate France*, available from <http://www.slate.fr/story/110347/attentats-islamophobie-france> (accessed 02/01/2016)

### 5.3.2 International

The Muslim Council of Britain showed its disapproval of terrorism in the name of Islam: “Nothing justifies the taking of life. Those who have killed in the name of our religion today claim to be avenging the insults made against Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace. But nothing is more immoral, offensive and insulting against our beloved Prophet than such a callous act of murder”<sup>207</sup>.

The organization’s remarks following the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks reiterated the division between Islam and the Islamic State, which uses violence to kill and injure: “There is no justification for such carnage whatsoever.”<sup>208</sup>

On the other hand in March 2015, the Islamic Human Rights Commission based in London labelled *Charlie Hebdo* the “islamophobe of the year”<sup>209</sup>, highlighting a certain irony at hand.

The attacks of January 2015 in Paris particularly affected the Belgian Muslim community, still experiencing a backlash following the Jewish Museum shooting in May 2014. Some examples of this backlash are Muslim children being taunted in

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<sup>207</sup> Muslim Council of Britain, (2015), Paris Murders are a Greater Insult to Islam: Council of Britain Statement on Charlie Hebdo Massacre, *Muslim Council of Britain News*, available from <http://www.mcb.org.uk/paris-murders-jan-08-15/> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>208</sup> MCB, (2015), Horrific Attacks in Paris: Muslim Council of Britain Responds, *Muslim Council of Britain*, available from <http://www.mcb.org.uk/horrific-attacks-in-paris-muslim-council-of-britain-responds/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>209</sup> Le Figaro, (2015), Charlie Hebdo sacre “islamophobe de l’annee”, *Le Figaro*, available from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/03/11/97001-20150311FILWWW00280-gb-charlie-hebdo-sacre-islamophobe-de-l-annee.php> (accessed 30/03/2015)

schools and congregations in areas surrounding mosques are being publicly victimised. Immigrants in the Vilvoorde region, the Flemish municipality of Belgium with a high rate of Turkish immigration are becoming victims of hate. Vilvoorde's soccer stadium was branded with a graffiti reading, "All Muslims have to leave Europe" and signed by "Charlie Hebdo"<sup>210</sup>. It can be expected that the Muslim community of Belgium could become reclusive out of fear.

Belgium as a whole remains greatly affected and involved in the terrorist attacks of November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015 in Paris. *La Ligue des Musulmans* in Belgium released a statement condemning the terror attacks labelling terrorism "blind to religion and nationality"<sup>211</sup> as well as urging the authorities to impose the most stringent strategies in order to "avoid falling into the trap of amalgamations and conclusions of hate that play into the game of extremists".

Two important facts must be noted: the first is the role of Brussels in Europe as the hub of many European headquarters. The second is that 6% of the Belgian population and a quarter of its capital are of Muslim descent. These two concepts must then be linked to Belgium's open-door policy on migration and a turbulent relationship between the French and Flemish counterparts<sup>212</sup>. The socio-political situation of Belgium is as complicated and sensitive as in France.

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<sup>210</sup> Birnbaum, M., (2015), Belgian Muslims face renewed anger alienation after attacks in Paris, *Washington Post*, available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-paris-attacks-belgian-muslims-face-renewed-fight/2015/01/14/823d8f40-9b62-11e4-96cc-e858eba91ced\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-paris-attacks-belgian-muslims-face-renewed-fight/2015/01/14/823d8f40-9b62-11e4-96cc-e858eba91ced_story.html) (accessed 19/04/2015)

<sup>211</sup> Durre, J-J., (2015), La Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique condamne les attaques de Paris, *Cathobel*, available from <http://www.cathobel.be/2015/11/15/la-ligue-des-musulmans-de-belgique-condamne-les-attentats-de-paris/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>212</sup> Kohn, A., (2015), As a 'terror dragnet' locks down Brussels real divisions are over language not religion, *Timeline*, available from

After it was uncovered that many of the terrorists involved in the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks could be traced back to Belgium, Belgian police conducted hundreds of raids in the largely Muslim dominated area of Molenbeek. With an unemployment rate of up to 40% in the area and a neighbourhood known for its issues with crime, there is a noticeable parallel with the outburst seen in France in the *banlieues*. In addition, Belgium holds the largest number of foreign fighters to Syria in Europe<sup>213</sup>. The reader is reminded that extremist Muslims remain a minority figure but the Muslims of Molenbeek and to a larger extent in Belgium will begin to feel a sense of honing-in in part due to the government's fear of the Muslim suburb producing more threats.

The imam of al-Khalil, the main mosque in Molenbeek, notes that although the Muslim immigrants of today are fourth or fifth generation Belgian citizens the division remains as fresh as that resented by the first wave of immigrants: "Even children realize one way or another that they are marginalized and that they are encountering racism [...] That is what makes recruiting them easy, because they have accumulated hatred<sup>214</sup>".

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<https://www.timeline.com/stories/terror-drag-net-brussels-language-religion>

(accessed 02/01/2015)

<sup>213</sup> Mufson, S., (2015), The Belgian neighbourhood indelibly linked to jihad, *The Washington Post*, available from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-belgian-neighborhood-indelibly-linked-to-jihad/2015/11/15/02bba49c-8b39-11e5-bd91-d385b244482f\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-belgian-neighborhood-indelibly-linked-to-jihad/2015/11/15/02bba49c-8b39-11e5-bd91-d385b244482f_story.html) (accessed 02/01/2015)

<sup>214</sup> Hendawi, H., (2015), In Belgian district many feel a dead end fuels militancy, *The Washington Post*, available from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-belgian-district-many-feel-a-dead-end-fuels-militancy/2015/12/20/e7e3513c-a718-11e5-b596-113f59ee069a\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-belgian-district-many-feel-a-dead-end-fuels-militancy/2015/12/20/e7e3513c-a718-11e5-b596-113f59ee069a_story.html) (accessed 02/01/2016)



The Muslim community in Germany is in a very similar situation. Nurhan Soykan, secretary-general of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany expressed her concern that the bloodbath would seep into Germany. However she said she also remained optimistic due to the fact that the inclusion experienced by Germany's Muslims within society was greater than the exclusion, which was exemplified by non-Muslim communities expressing their regret at the events and voicing the need for an inclusive German identity<sup>215</sup>.

The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, one of Germany's largest immigrant organizations took an inclusive approach in the framing of their statement following the release of the new *Charlie Hebdo* cover: "We condemn the act in the strongest possible terms, but at the same time urge people not to be intimidated or become divided ... Despite the sorrow, grief and rage over this attack, let us take pains to ensure that people of every religion, be it Islam, Christianity, Judaism or any other belief, are not stigmatized after such kinds of beastly terror attacks"<sup>216</sup>.

Although some Muslims in Sweden have called *Charlie Hebdo* "disrespectful, provocative and cheap"<sup>217</sup>, the Stockholm Mosque dedicated the sermon on Friday 9<sup>th</sup> January, the first Friday following the attacks, to criticizing the attacks as being contrary to the values on which Islam is founded. Made up of immigrants from a

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<sup>215</sup> von Hein, M., (2015), German Muslims denounce Paris attack as 'abuse of the religion of peace', *DW*, available from <http://www.dw.de/german-muslims-denounce-paris-attack-as-abuse-of-the-religion-of-peace/a-18183086> (accessed 19/04/2015)

<sup>216</sup> RT, (2015), German Muslims unite in commemoration of Charlie Hebdo massacre, *RT*, available from <http://rt.com/news/221679-germany-muslim-attack-commemoration/> (accessed 19/04/2015)

<sup>217</sup> The Local, (2015), Swedish Muslims react to new Charlie Hebdo, *The Local Sweden*, available from <http://www.thelocal.se/20150114/swedish-muslims-react-to-latest-charlie-hebdo-issue> (accessed 19/04/2015)

dozen Muslim countries, the congregation of the Stockholm Mosque still continues to promote peace and social cohesion.

European Muslims show confidence, for the most part, in their integration and belonging to the continent whilst Europeans are inclined to exclude them. This is seen in a survey conducted by *Institut Français d'Opinion Publique* in July 2015 where 44% of the respondents admitted to perceiving a Muslim community in France as a threat to the identity of the country<sup>218</sup>. In a study conducted in 2011, Gilles Kepel discovered that Muslim communities living in the *banlieues* of Paris felt their culture developing and existing alongside the French culture due to their sentiment of exclusion<sup>219</sup>. This thesis notes the time difference between these two studies but Gilles Kepel acknowledges that his study of 2011 was a repetition of his earlier study some twenty-five years earlier and the conclusions drawn were very similar, although not as extreme. There is a certain development in a conflict of narratives that emerges.

## **5.4 Jewish community**

### **5.4.1 Domestic**

It is also important to illustrate the Jewish community's response to the events that took place in January 2015 in France. A historical approach is necessary to ascertain this response. According to Manfred Gerstenfeld anti-Semitism has been a trend in Europe and in France since the end of the Second World War<sup>220</sup> but more recently has become sidelined with the rise of Islamophobia since 9/11. However with the recent *Charlie Hebdo* incident, Jews in France once again fear for their security.

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<sup>218</sup> IFOP, (2015), *Les Français et leur perception de l'islam*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 30/09/2015)

<sup>219</sup> AFP, (2011), French suburbs turn away from state and towards Islam, *The Local FR*, available from <http://www.thelocal.fr/20111006/1407> (accessed 30/09/2015)

<sup>220</sup> Gerstenfeld, M., (2005), The Deep Roots of Anti-Semitism in European Society, *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol.17, No.1

A journalist for *The Guardian* interviewed a French Jewish family from the southern city of Montpellier who have been raised to be ashamed of their religion and not disclose that they are Jewish for fear of retaliation. The 10 year-old girl stated “I don’t want to get beaten up. I’ll never say I’m Jewish. [...] I don’t want to lose my friends for that. As it is they think I’m spoilt because I have pocket money and I’ve never been spanked, not like them! If on top of all that they found out I was Jewish. I’d be done for<sup>221</sup>”. In addition her mother commented, “It’s awful. I feel guilty about hiding like this. I’m not ashamed to be Jewish... well a bit. But the fear turns into shame”<sup>222</sup>. These two comments show the identity crisis felt by some Jews in France. The country was the first in Europe to emancipate the Jewish community and then strip them of their civil rights a century later during the German occupation. The reintroduction of successful reintegration has been difficult and fairly unsuccessful as the remains of anti-Semitism continue to isolate the community<sup>223</sup>.

France’s Prime Minister Manuel Valls “declared in his February 16 [2015] interview “France loves Jews” ... “France without Jews would not be France” ... “whenever a Jew leaves, it is part of France that leaves””<sup>224</sup>. This statement coincides with that of Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, who addressed all the Jews of France on the first Sunday following the attacks of January 2015: “You

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<sup>221</sup> Van Renterghem, M., (2015), From Auschwitz to Charlie Hebdo: the perils of being Jewish in France, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/jews-france-antisemitism-charlie-hebdo> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>222</sup> Ibid

<sup>223</sup> Boteach, S., (2015), The Last Jews of France, *Observer*, available from <http://observer.com/2015/01/the-last-jews-of-france/> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>224</sup> Gabon, A., (2015), France’s Reactions to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks (3/3), *Turkey Agenda*, available from <http://www.turkeyagenda.com/frances-reactions-to-the-charlie-hebdo-attacks-3-3-2012.html> (accessed 11/05/2015)

have a full right to live secure and peaceful lives with equal rights wherever you desire, including here in France”<sup>225</sup>. This statement would contradict his following comment inviting all Jews of France to return to Israel where they would be promised the security they deserve.

There is a certain outcome that therefore emerges creating a certain double standard from government level; Jews and their established community within France, and Europe, are praised for their indispensable role in society whilst the Muslim community is ignored, marginalized or otherwise portrayed as volatile.

Some members of the Jewish community feel the rise of anti-Semitism once again following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and are seriously considering the possibility of repatriation to Israel following a feeling of isolation within France. This is the sentiment expressed by Yonathan Arfi, Deputy President of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions: “now that France’s core values have been attacked, people see that Jews are only the first target on a longer list. I hope they will see that they [the French government] have a responsibility for the problem we face”<sup>226</sup>. Similarly, Jewish Human Rights lawyer and Vice President of the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, Philippe Schmidt, expressed his reservations about the nationwide organized march on January 11<sup>th</sup> 2015 stating that the march was for *Charlie Hebdo* and not for the Jewish lives lost or the attack on the

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<sup>225</sup> Greenhouse, E., (2015), After *Charlie Hebdo* Jews in France Confront An Old Question, *Bloomberg*, available from <http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/features/2015-01-13/after-charlie-hebdo-jews-in-france-confront-an-old-question> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>226</sup> Ford, P., Llana, S.M., (2015), For French Jews Hebdo attacks are just latest sign of anti-Semitism’s rise (+video), *CS Monitor*, available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0116/For-French-Jews-Hebdo-attacks-are-just-latest-sign-of-anti-Semitism-s-rise-video> (accessed 20/05/2015)

community itself<sup>227</sup>. The author perceives this to be an extreme reaction to the march that should rather be recognized as a joint effort of French citizens after a terrorist attack that rattled the country as a whole. It is fair to attribute such anger to the Jewish community seeing that it was attacked during the hostage scene at the kosher supermarket.

This too is the argument presented by the Muslim community following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, who felt that that the Jews were the 'favourites'. This is concerning the established law of *laicite* that would state equal recognition of communities on the exclusion of their religion from public consideration. An imbalance of favouritism or bias therefore becomes apparent.

The Bataclan theatre, being the worst hit location during the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks, is speculated to have been a target due to its connections to the Jewish community through its owners and investors. In 2011 the terrorist group Jaish al-Islam threatened to attack the site. There have also been numerous protests due to the club's usage by pro-Israel groups<sup>228</sup>.

It must be noted, however, that there is a difference between the two terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. The first could be said to directly attack the Jewish community of France with many of the *Charlie Hebdo* journalists being Jewish and the hostage scene at the kosher supermarket, whereas the second targeted Frenchmen as a whole. Seemingly the Jewish community of France responded in this manner. The *Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France* (CRIF) pleaded to France as well as her allies to lead a top-priority fight against jihadism and presently

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<sup>227</sup> Liphshiz, C., (2015), Rallied for Charlie Hebdo – Not Jewish Victims, *Forward*, available from <http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/212830/many-french-jews-believe-marchers-rallied-for-char/> (accessed 20/05/2015)

<sup>228</sup> Sokol, S., Strich, J., (2015), French Jews call for war on Jihadism as terror engulfs Paris, *Jerusalem Post*, available from <http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/French-Jews-call-for-war-on-Jihadism-as-terror-engulfs-Paris-433071> (accessed 02/01/2016)

its greatest fighter, ISIS<sup>229</sup>. In a way it could be said that the second attack forged together the Jewish community and France, which had been isolated after the first terror attacks.

However, what has not changed between January and November 2015 is the Jewish community's lack of trust in its security in France. Avi Mayer, official spokesman for the Jewish Agency, stated that following the January terror attacks in Paris more than six thousand Jews have made aliyah (Hebrew for immigration to Israel) and many more are expected after the November attacks<sup>230</sup>.

Ezra Levant a Canadian journalist took to the streets of Paris following the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks to understand what the grass-root level emotion was among French Muslims. The answers are surprising: a Turkish restaurant owner admitted that the problem "is international, it is not a fixed enemy<sup>231</sup>" making the war on terror complicated and difficult to win. Then more than one individual placed the blame on "political actions or Jewish actions", clearly stating that ISIS had nothing to do with Muslims because "terrorists are not Muslims" linked to the prohibition in the Koran to kill one's neighbour. Evidently these are unique views but the fact remains that in a time of much needed unity between two communities of France, there are large divisions continuously threatening the stability of the country.

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<sup>229</sup> i24news, (2015), 'We are all France': French Jews react to Paris attacks, *i24News*, available from <http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/92513-151115-we-all-are-france-french-jews-react-to-paris-attacks> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>230</sup> Times of Israel, (2015), Dozens of French Jews immigrate to Israel after Paris attacks, *Times of Israel*, available from <http://www.timesofisrael.com/first-french-jews-immigrate-to-israel-after-paris-attacks/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

<sup>231</sup> Chastain, M., (2015), Islamic State 'is Jewish': Paris Muslims React to Attacks, *Breitbart*, available from <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/11/23/islamic-state-jewish-paris-muslims-react-attacks/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

#### 5.4.2 International

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made headlines with the following tweet on January 10<sup>th</sup> 2015: “to all the Jews of France, all the Jews of Europe, Israel is not just the place in whose direction you pray, the state of Israel is your home”<sup>232</sup>. Although the PM waited for the end of the siege to occur, his statement was widely considered as untimely. The open invitation to immigrate to Israel could weaken the already fractured Jewish community within France. Furthermore his statement would see much tension during the unity march; President Hollande did not extend Netanyahu an invitation but rather invited a Palestinian representative. However Prime Minister Netanyahu believed it was necessary for the Jewish world to feel represented. He therefore went to Paris as the head of a recognized state, thus causing a controversy.

Following the November terrorist attacks, Netanyahu called a press conference. Once again he addressed the strong relationship between France and Israel, as well as the Jewish community shared between them. It becomes noticeable that the Prime Minister uses this opportunity, much like his address in January 2015, to underline Israel’s security issues as equal to those of France: “I have been arguing for years that Islamic terror is attacking Israel and other countries because it simply wants to destroy us [...] An attack on any of us needs to be seen as an attack on all of us.”<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Independent UK, (2015), ‘Israel is your home’ Benjamin Netanyahu tells French Jews after Charlie Hebdo rally, *Independent*, available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/israel-is-your-home-benjamin-netanyahu-tells-french-jews-after-charlie-hebdo-rally-9971954.html> (accessed 30/03/2015)

<sup>233</sup> Peter Brown, F., (2015), Netanyahu Just Responded to Paris Terror Attacks in a Way That Only Bibi Can and Obama Won’t, *Western Journalism*, available from <http://www.westernjournalism.com/netanyahu-just-responded-to-paris-terror-attacks-in-a-way-that-only-bibi-can-and-obama-wont/> (accessed 02/01/2016)

Benjamin Netanyahu's importance in the context of *Charlie Hebdo* is directly linked to the Jewish community in France and their fear of a resurgence of anti-Semitism following the terrorist attacks of 2015. Netanyahu's reaction to the massacre is in line with theories around the development of a clash of civilizations where historically anti-Semitism has reigned but is now being taken over by Islamophobia. This is in part due to the successful integration and insertion of Jews into the European culture and lifestyle in particular, such is the hypothesis presented by historian Jonathan Judaken<sup>234</sup>. It is obvious here that there is a clash of perception of Jewish integration in Western Europe between Judaken and Gerstenfeld mentioned earlier. Equally other theories such as the one by Max Blumenthal suggest that such a clash of civilizations, between the two main communities and then between the communities and the French culture, has been manufactured by the French and Israeli governments<sup>235</sup>. Therefore this thesis turns to a survey conducted in 2014 that reported, "74 % of the 3,833 French Jews polled by Paris' Siona organization of Sephardic French Jews said they had considered emigrating... Of the 74.2 % of respondents who said they are considering leaving, 29.9 % cited anti-Semitism. Another 24.4% cited their desire to "preserve their Judaism""<sup>236</sup>.

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<sup>234</sup> Caschetta, A.J., (2015), Are Muslims the New Jews?, *Jihad Watch*, available from <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/05/are-muslims-the-new-jews> (accessed 11/05/2015)

<sup>235</sup> Blumenthal, M., (2015), In wake of January attacks French Muslims have been demonized in manufactured 'clash of civilizations', *Mondoweiss*, available from <http://mondoweiss.net/2015/07/demonized-manufactured-civilizations> (accessed 09/09/2015)

<sup>236</sup> Medina, M., (2014), Nearly 75 Percent of French Jews Considering Emigration, *Tablet*, available from <http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/173382/nearly-75-percent-of-french-jews-considering-emigration> (accessed 30/09/2015)



## 5.5 Concluding remarks

In an attempt to taper down the subject matter to be analysed in this thesis there is a need to make a general summary of the research made in this section and then follow it up with a listing of the assumptions and hypotheses that can be drawn from the former in order to either prove their validity or contradict them entirely.

It was shown that the French political forefront, based on the politicians chosen in this thesis, manifested fracturing and division in a time of required unity. This fracturing can become a concern if too frequently projected in mass media and projected into mass society. In the discourses given by French politicians there is only mention of the severity and savage nature of the attacks thus contributing to a development of an “us vs. them” paradigm. Furthermore the only visible security change and new implementation made public, is the *Plan Vigipirate* and the extension of the state of emergency effected in December 2015. It is important to note that the *Plan Vigipirate* included the deployment of ten thousand military officers as well as a simultaneous deployment of almost twenty thousand officers to protect 717 Jewish schools, synagogues, some mosques and finally certain cultural locations like museums and heritage sites<sup>237</sup>. The fact that some mosques of France were also afforded additional protection is an indication that the Muslims of France were treated with the same consideration.

At the same time the United States and the United Kingdom’s statements supported and re-iterated the philosophy put forward in France, being the national support of freedom of expression over the sensitivity of religion and personal belief.

Certain hypotheses become apparent in the analysis of the political reactions. There was no mention until now of the effect on the moderate Muslim community

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<sup>237</sup> Marchand, L., (2015), Plan Vigipirate: comment un dispositif exceptionnel est devenu permanent, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/04/24/plan-vigipirate-comment-un-dispositif-exceptionnel-est-devenu-permanent\\_4621647\\_4355770.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/04/24/plan-vigipirate-comment-un-dispositif-exceptionnel-est-devenu-permanent_4621647_4355770.html) (accessed 02/10/2015)

and the sensitivity required around them, questioning whether there is support for the community at all. This can be linked to the open and very public discourse of some politicians in the Netherlands, similar to Marine Le Pen's political philosophy of anti-immigration and anti-Muslim, entrenched into a section of national politics.

French and Western Europe media outlets presented the news as supportive of the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine and the values of the Republic it stood for: secularism, freedom of expression and freedom of press. Assumptions made here stress the lack of attention brought to the different communities left out of the centre of attention. The victims are mentioned but there is no attention paid to the fractured society and the sense of victimization resounding throughout it as a potential consequence. Looking at journalism from a general perspective there was a noticeable lack of mention of the root of the problems within France and more of a focus on the issue of growing terrorism without seeing the link between the two. The issue with realizing and addressing this shortcoming is the potential for Islamophobia with a generalization of Islam, grouping extremist terrorists and the moderate Muslim community together.

There is a clear division between the Muslim community and the Western community. The Muslim community has historically struggled to feel integrated upon immigration, and the Western community sees difficulty in agreeing with its integration due to the conflicting values and norms of the two groupings.

Many voices in the Muslim world rejected the possibility of printing the new covers of *Charlie Hebdo* following the terrorist attacks. They also made a public distinction between radical and extremist terrorists claiming affiliation to Islam versus the moderate Muslim community unaffiliated to violence. However this distinction is not always accepted or even integrated into the Western discourse as seen in this Chapter.

This is carried through with the reactions seen in the Muslim community in France as well as in Western Europe. The question of this thesis is whether or not

there is a distorted perception of the Muslim community in France that sees the generalization of terrorists and moderate Muslims bracketed under the same label. Though it is not the subject of this thesis, it can be questioned whether or not the standing laws in France of secularism and the lack of blasphemy laws contribute to the continuation of a societal hierarchy in favour of non-immigrant communities entrenched in foreign cultures, thus creating a sort of securitization before the law is even exercised.

The last section of this chapter looked into the Jewish community's reaction to the incidents. In the example provided there seems to be a deep concern about the rise of anti-Semitism within France and the need for more security changes to challenge it. Furthermore certain hypotheses such as the overload of support for the Jewish community disadvantaged the Muslim community who until recently had no public announcement of support. In addition, the alignment of France and Israel as strong political allies makes this statement even more of a concern. The Jewish community is in a position to make a national decision whether or not to leave France and return to Israel or to fight for their right to be French.

Until now there has been a certain leniency towards a pro-Muslim narrative in this thesis creating an illusion of injustice towards them following the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attacks. However it is important for a balance of argument to be presented. The prejudice placed on the Muslim community aligned to the stereotype of regrouping terrorists with the general Muslim community as a whole has a certain reasoning to it. In order to understand this reasoning, there is a need to outline the religious laws within the Koran in order to provide the opposing side of the argument. The first law claims the issue of infidels, labelled as such by fanatics of the religion due to their lack or inability to live by the law of Islam and are deemed to be unfit to practice the honourable teachings of Islam. This is important in creating variances within the culture from reformed to orthodox interpretations of the Koran. If a member of the congregation shows signs of doubt or disagreement that can be translated into hate towards the religion, the religious law states that the appropriate punishment is denied access to Paradise after death. Finally the life of a

devout Muslim involves the commitment to defending Islam whilst simultaneously sharing the beliefs and teachings to a maximum number of people surrounding him/her<sup>238</sup>. In reviewing the possible reasons for retaliation it is imperative to remember the basics of Islam, and not fundamentalism.

Corresponding with these directives in the Koran there is also the issue of drawing or illustrating the physicality of the Prophet Mohammed explicitly mentioned in the Hadith, the collection of teachings from the Prophet Mohammed as well as reports of the Prophet's life similar to an exemplary narrative. This is linked to the issue of idols and the Prophet's insistence of his being but a man and not a God. This means that there is not only one version of him but rather different interpretations. This is a common thread in the hadith whereby depictions of religious entities are frowned upon. Therefore as a reaction to this, some Muslims feel it is their "license and right"<sup>239</sup> to defend the Prophet and if necessary use violence to restore his honour. In essence there is therefore a thread of potential violence linked to a strongly founded doctrine of defence and honour, which may lead a small group of congregants of the Muslim community to deviate to an extremist ideology.

Chapter 5 has allowed for a more general analysis of the reactions following the terrorist attacks of January 2015 and November 2015 in France in order to create a detailed overview for the reader of the situation at hand. Chapter 6 will then answer the following questions: Is there truth in stating that there is an overall anti-Muslim perception following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks on January 7<sup>th</sup> 2015? Is there a trend of Islamophobia? Is the Jewish community more favoured politically over the Muslim

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<sup>238</sup> Bains, D., Ahmed, A., (2007), Inspiring Intolerance: The Truth about Robert Spencer – A Review of the Truth about Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion, *Asian American Law Journal*, Vol.14, No.1 :235-242

<sup>239</sup> Burke, D., (2015), Why Islam forbids pictures of Mohammed, *CNN*, available from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/07/living/islam-prophet-images/> (accessed 21/04/2015)

community in France? Has France shifted its security measures drastically following the terrorist attacks?

## **CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS**

This chapter of the thesis will investigate whether four of France's prominent politicians, most visible in public and most vocal about the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and the contexts surrounding them, have in their statements directly or indirectly securitized the Muslim community of France. It will be shown that there was no real proof of securitization but rather a beginning of a potential lead for future securitization.

The four politicians chosen were chosen due to their already existing positions with regard to the Muslim community and/or their involvement in prior links to it.

Every rhetorical position of the selected stance of the four politicians will be established in accordance with up to three of their speeches following the January 7<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks and then again following the November 2015 attacks. Here certain key topics and statements begin to appear that are repetitive throughout the speeches that will be analysed. These can be classified into three core concepts: the already broken social contract of France between distinct communities, the importance and irreplaceability of the Jewish community and finally the very strong belief in French identity.

When collecting quotes of the four chosen politicians, it became apparent in this thesis that there was not a securitization of the Muslim community of France but rather a securitization of jihadi terrorism.

The politicians continuously referred to it both in January and November 2015. Based on the Securitization Theory, the direct labelling of the 'enemy' or, in other words of the subject matter threatening the stability of France's security status, is known as the referent object.

Then the theory suggests the need for discourse to promote the need for security changes in order to neutralize the threat at hand created by the referent object. Between January and November 2015 the security changes while remaining

very similar, do take a harsher tone in November with the common use of the word 'war'.

Finally, the theory insists on the large role of the audience spoken to by the politicians in question. Opinion polls have allowed this thesis to question whether in fact the discourse provided was heard and accepted as an agreed necessity.

This chapter will therefore outline a handful of key quotes given by the four politicians in January and in November 2015 and propose what terms refer to the referent object, the security changes suggested and the unity spoken of. It must be remembered that although France faced a terrorist attack and the politicians addressed its need to be controlled, they too discussed the need to avoid division and dispute in a time of crisis. The key terms found in sections one to four will then be summarised in section 5 to provide a visual conclusion.

## **6.1 Francois Hollande**

### **6.1.1 January 2015**

After the three day attack in Paris, the takeover of the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters, the hunting down of the two attackers of the former and those of the kosher supermarket hostage scene, the President made an address on January 9th to the nation to confirm the elimination of the three terrorists and return to normality.

"I call on you to remain united, because – as I previously told the French people – it's our best weapon. We must show our determination to fight against anything that could divide us, and to be merciless when it comes to racism and anti-Semitism ... not being divided means we must not paint people with a broad brush; we must reject facile thinking and eschew exaggeration. Those who committed these terrorist acts, those terrorists, those fanatics, have nothing to do with Muslim religion."<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), *Charlie Hebdo – Statements by Francois Hollande, Embassy of France in Washington*, available from <http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article6408> (accessed 26/06/2015)

Here the President uses the terminology “united” and “our” referring to the need for unity in a time of expected division. Furthermore he names “racism and anti-Semitism” as well as “those fanatics” as the threats at hand.

January 13<sup>th</sup> 2015 can be labelled as one of the most important in the month following the first attack in Paris, including the three-day siege itself, as the day was deemed a day of homage to the victims as well as the country itself in a state of mourning. The morning’s event took place at *l’Elysee*. This speech in particular took place in front of the building as an introduction to the day’s theme of finding new political schemes to re-secure France and its people.

“We need to react in affirming three principles, firmness is a condition of security, to be ruthless in the face of acts of anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim, to be intractable in the face of *l’apologie du terrorisme*”<sup>241</sup>.

Once again “anti-Semitism” and “anti-Muslim” are mentioned as issues threatening the peace of France. Note that the President’s acknowledgment of an anti-Muslim narrative dismisses the hypothesis of securitization of the Muslim community of France. In addition, the President in following the securitization theory speaks of “firmness”, “ruthless” and “*l’apologie du terrorisme*” as security projections moving forward to eliminate the threats at hand.

### 6.1.2 November 2015

Shortly after the events of November 13<sup>th</sup>, President Hollande addressed the French people in the same vein as his address following the events of *Charlie Hebdo*. He stressed the importance of unity and solidarity during a time of potential division and panic.

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<sup>241</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), Hommage national aux trois policiers morts en service, *L’Elysee*, available from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-national-aux-trois-policiers-morts-en-service-3/> (accessed 26/06/2015)



“We must show proof of compassion and solidarity; we must also show proof of unity and keep composure. In the face of terror, France must be strong, must be grand and the authorities of the country firm, which we will be.”<sup>242</sup>

This quote confirms the emotion of unity. The repetition of the symbolism through different synonyms cannot be mistaken: “compassion and solidarity”, “unity” and “composure”.

It must be noted that what does change in the President’s discourse, is his mention of who the enemy is and therefore who must be isolated as a target. During his address in the emergency meeting in Congress on November 16<sup>th</sup> 2015, the President emphasizes that the enemy is not just one of France, but rather a shared enemy of the international community:

“We are not participating in a war of civilizations, because these assassins do not represent one. We are at war against jihadi terrorism that threatens the entire world and not just France.”<sup>243</sup>

In this excerpt, the President’s discourse identifies two components of the securitization theory. The first is in naming the threat “assassins” and “jihadi terrorism”. Then, he repeats the word “war” twice referring to both the declaration of war by terrorists on France as well as France’s security response to it.

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<sup>242</sup> Les News, (2015), Hollande Annonce L’etat D’urgence Apres Les Attentas de Paris, *Youtube channel*, available from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmYAygtCMVw&list=RDcmulOOZShpE&index=2> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>243</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), Discours du president de la Republique devant le Parlement reuni en Congres, *L’Elysee*, available from

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-reuni-en-congres-3/> (accessed 10/12/2015)

In the same speech the President reinforces the idea of “perseverance, unity, lucidity, dignity”<sup>244</sup> that France, as a whole needs to exemplify, once again recalling the idea of community and closeness. This excerpt of Hollande’s speech echoes a statement made by Nicolas Sarkozy following the attacks in January 2015 when commenting on the issue France faces with radical Islam within its borders.

Finally the President announced, “It is Frenchmen who on Friday killed other Frenchmen”<sup>245</sup>. It is the first time the President acknowledges that the perpetrators are French citizens, as it was not done after the events of *Charlie Hebdo* although all three involved perpetrators were French citizens by birth. Although there is no trace of securitization here by singling out the attackers, the decision to mention their origin probably accentuates the President’s need to address homegrown terrorism.

Just as there was a memorial service in honour of the victims of the January 2015 terrorist attacks, a service commemorating the victims of November’s attacks was organized in Paris on November 27<sup>th</sup>. The President for the first time made his distinction between Islam and extremism which had been at the root of November 13<sup>th</sup>’s attacks:

“The enemy is the fanaticism that wants to subject man to an inhumane order, it’s the philosophy of obscurantism, in other words it is a misguided Islam that renounces the message of its holy book.”<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), Hommage national aux victimes des attentats du 13 novembre (hotel national des Invalides), *L’Elysee*, available from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-national-aux-victimes-des-attentats-du-13-novembre-hotel-national-des-invalides/> (accessed 10/12/2015)

“What do terrorists want? To divide us, to oppose us, to estrangle us from one another. I can assure you, they will fail. They have a culture of death, but us, we have love, the love of life.<sup>247</sup>”

This thesis draws a comparison between this quote and the one from the President’s speech at L’Elysee where he explains that the authors of the terrorist attacks are not identifiable by the Muslim culture or Islam as a religion but rather that they belong to an ideology unattached to any civilization due to its perspective of torment and pain. This is important for the President to mention, as there is indeed a securitization of jihadi terrorists, named enemies of the state. What is also interesting is Hollande’s choice to give the referent object many faces: “fanaticism”, “obscurantism”, “terrorists” and “culture of death”.

On November 16<sup>th</sup> during his meeting with Congress, the President declared, “France is at war”<sup>248</sup>. He refers back to his decision on November 13<sup>th</sup> to temporarily close the borders of France and echoes Marine Le Pen’s philosophy of concern surrounding the weak border system in France, and in the European Union, which is partially to blame for the infiltration of terrorism:

“If Europe does not control its exterior borders well as we can see today with our own eyes, it is the return to national borders, if not walls, or barbed wire that is announcing itself. It would then be the deconstruction of the European Union.<sup>249</sup>”

“The necessity to destroy Daesh is a subject that concerns the international community [...] France will intensify its operations in Syria.<sup>250</sup>”

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Hollande, F., (2015), Discours du president de la Republique devant le Parlement reuni en Congres, *L’Elysee*, available from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-reuni-en-congres-3/> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

Here, Hollande mentions 'Daesh' as well as the continued armed operations in Syria alongside the Western allies. Similarly to President Obama referring to ISIS as ISIL in order to refuse an acknowledgment of their right to territory, France refers to them as Daesh. The explanation accentuates a certain securitization. France in ignoring the terrorist organization's choice of name is publicly declaring the dismissal of such an organization. This in itself would suggest that ISIS does not present values or norms worthy of being considered a legitimate political entity. Note also the use of "destroy" which voices a firm resolution.

## **6.2 Nicolas Sarkozy**

### **6.2.1 January 2015**

Former President Sarkozy was invited to participate in an interview by established radio station RTL on January 12<sup>th</sup> 2015 as a part of a special broadcast in providing more direct information to the station's audience, curious about what the new security protocols in reality imply.

"There is a necessity to unite without the mention of honouring the victims, the 17 victims, in the face of the graveness of the aggression at hand, against our democracy, against our Republic, and I would even go as far as to say our civilization."

In a unique method, Sarkozy incorporates the referent object here by denying its legitimacy as a "civilization" in comparison to the "unity" required honouring the fallen heroes.

In the same interview for RTL on January 12<sup>th</sup> 2015 Sarkozy while emphasising the necessity of unification, also made a point of the underlying social issues at hand potentially threatening the possibility of effective unity.

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

“Immigration is not linked to terrorism but does complicate matters ... when integration is not working, that creates a problem on our territory.<sup>251”</sup>

Although not blatantly spoken as an issue and in need of change, immigration is noted as being problematic in its current form in France according to Sarkozy. In noting the failures of the integration process, Sarkozy subtly implies that immigration can present a threat to France if not correctly controlled.

During his live interview on the 8pm national news broadcast on January 21<sup>st</sup> 2015, the former President explained where in his opinion, the limits lay around radical Islam in France. The importance not only of the interview’s platform, but also of the interview itself must not be denied.

“Very concretely I wish for us to work together on the integration of Imams ... so that when Imams do not defend values that are our own, we can deport them... Deport them out of the country.<sup>252”</sup>

“I think today, the only question that presents itself is: what is Islam prepared to do to integrate into the Republic. We want an Islam of France and not an Islam in France.”

Imams are presented as potential threats if associated to the context of an “Islam in France” rather than “of France”. The difference refers back to Sarkozy’s view of failed integration and the consequences it creates.

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<sup>251</sup> Sarkozy, N., (2015), Nicolas Sarkozy: “L’unite ne doit pas empecher la lucidite”, *RTL*, available from <http://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/nicolas-sarkozy-l-unite-ne-doit-pas-empecher-la-lucidite-7776179492> (accessed 26/06/2015)

<sup>252</sup> Sarkozy, N., (2015), Nicolas Sarkozy – JT 20H France 2- 21 janvier 2015, *Chaine UMP Youtube*, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfPDNWBm9MY> (accessed 26/06/2015)

### 6.2.2 November 2015

Two days before President Francois Hollande announced that France was at war his predecessor did so in his first speech following the events of November 13<sup>th</sup>. During the same announcement, Sarkozy emphasized the role of the people of France in the so-called “war”.

“The terrorists have declared war on France. Our country must not surrender; our country must not walk away.<sup>253</sup>”

“Our people are determined to defeat barbaric jihadism.<sup>254</sup>”

Once again the referent object is “barbaric jihadism” and “terrorists” as well as the “declared war” which simultaneously is also a security protocol to be engaged in retaliation. Although not explicit in detail, his security suggestions do entail engaging in combat with his refusal to “surrender” or “walk away”.

On November 26<sup>th</sup> 2015 former President Sarkozy gave a speech in Schiltigheim during his promotional tour of France prior to the regional elections. Sarkozy’s discourse shows major variation to his initial statements of much needed unification in January 2015 and in particular the place Islam holds within France through its Muslim community:

“There is no longer a French identity; there is no longer a happy identity in a society that has become multicultural. There is no longer a French identity, there is no longer a happy identity if we do not share moral values, a lifestyle, a politeness, a sense of belonging to one nation, share a history, a language, a common collective

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<sup>253</sup> Attentats a Paris, (2015), Attentats a Paris: le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy Nous sommes en guerre, *Youtube channel*, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4f7TJkhs2XI> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*

and when we show solidarity in our largest success as much as in our largest defeats.<sup>255</sup>”

This quote presents an issue in the analysis: whilst the mention of unity through the term “solidarity” is used, Sarkozy addresses “multiculturalism” as a security threat. Sarkozy’s comment of “an Islam in France” versus “of France” is recalled here. Moreover, multiculturalism is based on the coming-together of different communities in unison to create one larger community, but in Sarkozy’s opinion is weakening France.

During an interview on the 8pm news on TF1, Nicolas Sarkozy on November 15<sup>th</sup> explained a strategy of how he believes France can regain control of its security measures in view of more looming terrorist attacks.

“There are 520 young Frenchmen who are present in either Syria or Iraq, all those that return to France must immediately be put in prison. Those who hold dual nationality should not be kept a second longer in the territory.<sup>256</sup>”

“I would add that on the Internet, any person perceived to consult a jihadi website must be considered as a jihadi, and must be recognized as a criminal. The same action must be taken when consulting paedophilia sites.<sup>257</sup>”

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<sup>255</sup> Sarkozy, F., (2015), Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy a Schiltigheim, *Les Republicains*, available from [http://www.republicains.fr/actualites\\_discours\\_nicolas\\_sarkozy\\_schiltigheim\\_20151126](http://www.republicains.fr/actualites_discours_nicolas_sarkozy_schiltigheim_20151126) (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>256</sup> Berdah, A., (2015), Sarkozy veut “assigner tous les fiches S a residence avec bracelet electronique”, *Le Figaro*, available from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2015/11/15/25002-20151115ARTFIG00197-sarkozy-veut-assigner-tous-les-fiches-s-a-residence-avec-bracelet-electronique.php> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

Sarkozy further explained that there are over eleven thousand individuals marked on the *fiches S* in addition to the hundreds of jihadists in the Middle East who are to “be put in prison”. Furthermore “jihadists” are added to the list of names given to the referent object. Sarkozy declares that the French authorities should specifically shadow them all because the attacks from January and November of 2015 were all individuals under supervision that ‘fell through the cracks’. These same “criminals” should be equipped with ankle monitors to track their movements depending on their scale of concern for authorities, and then be potentially placed under house arrest. The aim evidently is to understand more of the jihadi mentality when contracting a plan for attack. In conclusion, Sarkozy suggested the need for a de radicalisation project. At present prisons are training centres for radicalization in France, which require dire attention<sup>258</sup>.

Note that former President Sarkozy was very critical of President Hollande’s lack of inability to keep France safe after the January terrorist attacks<sup>259</sup>. This discourse changes greatly following the collaboration of the two parties in January and in November 2015 in the hope of merging the two parties for a stronger front. As mentioned before, at the time of the November terrorist attacks, all political parties in France were promoting their campaign tours so the criticism could be linked to this. However the change from unity to confrontation could show a type of securitization, for by demonstrating to his audience that Hollande has failed in keeping France safe, Sarkozy is creating another segmentation within France.

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<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Goar, A., Lemarie, A., (2015), Nicolas Sarkozy: “Trop de temps a ete perdu” depuis “Charlie Hebdo”, *Le Monde*, available from [http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/11/18/nicolas-sarkozy-trop-de-temps-a-ete-perdu-depuis-charlie-hebdo\\_4812279\\_823448.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/11/18/nicolas-sarkozy-trop-de-temps-a-ete-perdu-depuis-charlie-hebdo_4812279_823448.html) (accessed 10/12/2015)



## 6.3 Manuel Valls

### 6.3.1 January 2015

On January 10<sup>th</sup> 2015 Valls gave his first statement following the incidents at the *Porte de Vincennes* in front of the kosher supermarket where the hostage scene occurred the day before. The importance of his location represents the first signs of solidarity with the Jewish community.

“Our compatriots and our fellow citizens of Muslim religion and culture suffer too from terrorism. That is perhaps the most important message: the refusal to amalgamate. Jihadism seeks to create this amalgamation.”

“We are not a community made up of additions; we are one nation, a Republic with values: generosity, solidarity, fraternity, secularism.<sup>260</sup>”

These quotes directly oppose the referent object named “terrorism” and “jihadism” as well as “amalgamation” and then the Prime Minister’s call for unity through “generosity, fraternity, secularism”. The last term refers to the need to dismiss Islam as the threat but rather include the extremist philosophy of terrorism.

### 6.3.2 November 2015

Although his speech in front of *l’Assemblée nationale* in November 2015 was more strategic and a detailed report of how the President wishes to move forward in amendments to the Constitution, Prime Minister Manuel Valls kept the same outlook on Islam as he did in January 2015:

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<sup>260</sup> Valls, M., (2015), Manuel Valls: “Venez Nombreux” A La Marche De Dimanche, *France Ce Soir*, available from <http://www.francesoir.fr/politique-france/manuel-valls-venez-nombreux-la-marche-de-dimanche> (accessed 26/06/2015)

“Radical Islam and jihadism are true gangrenes for Islam. They seduce and divert individuals in their hundreds. There is therefore a need to attack with the greatest firmness.”<sup>261</sup>

Valls makes a point throughout his speech, to show his distinction between radical Islam and the Muslim community of France and as will be observed throughout his speeches in the month after November 13<sup>th</sup>. In doing so, there is a securitization of “radical Islam” acted out by “jihadism” which is noted to be a threat even to Islam as “gangrenes”.

As mentioned earlier, Manuel Valls gave a speech in front of the *Assemblée Nationale* on November 19<sup>th</sup> 2015. While he emphasized the need to unite particularly in an attempt to refute the amalgamation of the Muslims of France with radicals and jihadis, the Prime Minister also took a severe tone of persuasion to arrive at the conclusion that France must engage in an attack on extremism as opposed to one of defence previously used:

“Finding a long-term answer for Islamic terrorism is to finally attack once and for all the roots, here in France, of this issue.”<sup>262</sup>

“To fight radicalization is not to find excuses or justifications. And it is not to fall into the trap of self-punishment. It is, on the contrary, to be at the height of a considerable requirement of lucidity.”<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Valls, M., (2015), *Projet de loi sur la prorogation de l'état d'urgence – Discours du Premier ministre à l'Assemblée nationale, Gouvernement*, available from <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5907-projet-de-loi-sur-la-prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence-discours-du-premier-ministre-a-l-assemblee> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>262</sup> Valls, M., (2015), *Projet de loi sur la prorogation de l'état d'urgence – Discours du Premier ministre à l'Assemblée nationale, Gouvernement*, available from <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5907-projet-de-loi-sur-la-prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence-discours-du-premier-ministre-a-l-assemblee> (accessed 10/12/2015)

Although Valls chooses to incorporate Islam into the label of the referent object here as “Islamic terrorism”, his previous statements have clarified his views on the division between terrorism and the Muslim community of France. Furthermore “radicalization” is noted as also being an important threat that deserves more attention if there is a chance at reducing its growth, and inevitably its existence.

## 6.4 Marine Le Pen

### 6.4.1 January 2015

On her official website, Le Pen released a brief video with her official statement shortly after the news of the attacks at the magazine’s headquarters. This allowed for a more intimate dialogue with her audience.

“But the Nation is also united to say that we, the French people, regardless of our origins, will not accept this attack against our freedom and against our lives.”<sup>264</sup>

Analysing Marine Le Pen’s statements surrounding the *Charlie Hebdo* events must be contextualized with her perceived controversial stance on immigration. Sometimes she targets the Muslim community from the perspective of her political party’s founding argument and motives. The statement presented here contradicts completely the above-mentioned controversial stance she presents. She clearly states that no matter what community a citizen belongs to, there is a necessity to unite and become one solid front in the fight against terrorism, particularly from home-born foreign fighters. Although subtly expressed, the assumption would then be that according to Le Pen, the Muslim community was a part of “France’s people”

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> Le Pen, M., (2015), Marine Le Pen – Front National – Charlie Hebdo Statement: English Translation, *Traditional Britain*, available from <http://traditionalbritain.org/blog/marine-le-pen-front-national-charlie-hebdo-statement-english-translation/> (accessed 26/06/2015)

as mentioned and not a separate distinct group within a society seen as fragmented according to different identities. This is essential in proving that here is no connecting link to the securitization theory as there is no reference in the speech, which reflects a certain image of society.

All other speeches given by French and international politicians used here in this chapter and for the most part throughout this thesis were spoken live. In this case this speech is unique and takes a new direction of discourse as the sections used for analysis originate from an invited editorial by Marine Le Pen herself for the *New York Times* (dated January 18<sup>th</sup> 2015), which is, to say the least, controversial in its original format.

“Muslims themselves need to hear this message. They need the distinction between Islamist terrorism and their faith to be made clear. Yet this distinction can only be made if one is willing to identify the threat. It does our Muslim compatriots no favours to fuel suspensions and leave things unspoken.”

“First ... the very idea of border checks is deemed to be heretical. ... Second, the massive waves of immigration, both legal and clandestine, our country has experienced for decades have prevented the implementation of a proper assimilation policy. ... Without a policy restricting immigration, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to fight against communalism<sup>265</sup> and the rise of ways of life at odds with *laicite*.<sup>266</sup>”

Le Pen is known for her direct stance on “Islamist terrorism” being a threat to France and includes the responsibility of the Muslim community in France of clarifying the difference between the two. The security changes proposed are

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<sup>265</sup> The concept of *communautarisme* was expanded on in Chapter 4.

<sup>266</sup> Le Pen, M., (2015), To Call This Threat By Its Name, *New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic-fundamentalism.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic-fundamentalism.html?_r=0) (accessed 26/06/2015)

delivered in a potential consequential situation should France not win the war with the referent object. “Massive waves of immigration” would drown France if “border checks” were not imposed immediately.

#### 6.4.2 November 2015

On December 3<sup>rd</sup> 2015, Marine Le Pen used a strategy of fear implementation to both advance her political philosophy as well as her party with impending regional elections:

“Totalitarian Islamism will take over the power of our country if we lose the war against them ... If we lose, the veil [referred to as the burqa in France] will be imposed on all women, Sharia law will replace our Constitution, barbarism will be instilled.”<sup>267</sup>

In this excerpt of Le Pen’s quote, the *Front National* leader shows the extreme consequences should the referent object being “totalitarian Islamism” and “barbarism” reign France. The burqa and “Sharia law” will be negative security changes imposed on the country.

From her first statement following the attacks, on November 14<sup>th</sup>, Marine Le Pen exemplifies the securitization theory by stating “France and the French are no longer safe, it is my duty to tell you<sup>268</sup>”. Le Pen’s strategies then follow those she presented in January 2015:

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<sup>267</sup> Atlasinfo, (2015), France: Marine Le Pen nie ses propos sur l’islam et les musulmans, *Atlas Info*, available from [http://www.atlasinfo.fr/France-Marine-le-Pen-nie-ses-propos-sur-l-islam-et-les-musulmans\\_a67239.html](http://www.atlasinfo.fr/France-Marine-le-Pen-nie-ses-propos-sur-l-islam-et-les-musulmans_a67239.html) (accessed 15/12/2015)

<sup>268</sup> Le Pen, M., (2015), Attentats de Paris: Marine Le Pen s’adresse aux Francais, *Le Front National*, available from <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/attentats-de-paris-marine-le-pen-sadresse-aux-francais/> (accessed 15/12/2015)

“Fundamentalist Islam must be annihilated. France must prohibit Islamist organizations, close radical mosques and deport foreigners who preach hate on our soil, as well as illegal migrants who don’t have anything to do. When it comes to dual-nationals participating in Islamist movements, they must be stripped of their nationality and banned from the territory.”<sup>269</sup>

Le Pen here uses strong threatening words such as “stripped” and “banned” to support her proposed security changes.

Previously shown in her January 2015 statements, Marine Le Pen is not attempting to securitize the Muslim community as a whole but rather identify radical extremists presenting a threat to France and its people as she identifies “fundamentalist Islam” and “Islamist movements” as the root of the issue. In addition, on November 16<sup>th</sup> 2015 in her reaction to President Hollande’s speech to Congress, Le Pen noted that in her opinion the President did not broach the topic of “an indispensable combat against Islamism as an ideology<sup>270</sup>”. This, however, echoes the President’s statement that France is at war.

As seen with former President Nicolas Sarkozy’s criticism of President Hollande’s choices in 2015 following the terrorist attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*, Marine Le Pen was very vocal during a *Front National* rally on November 28<sup>th</sup> 2015 in Ajaccio. Le Pen accused Hollande and Sarkozy in part due to their united front of being “petrified by reality<sup>271</sup>” and of “waiting for a massacre to happen, to react<sup>272</sup>”.

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<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Le Pen, (2015), Reaction de Marine Le Pen au discours du President de la Republique au Congres a Versailles, *Le Front National*, available from <http://www.frontnational.com/2015/11/reaction-de-marine-le-pen-au-discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-congres-a-versailles/> (accessed 15/12/2015)

<sup>271</sup> AFP, (2015), Attentats: Marine Le Pen accuse le gouvernement de sombrer dans “l’apathie et la communication sterile”, *La Liberation*, available from <http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/28/attentats-marine-le-pen-accuse-le->

“They have voted on a law on gathering information aimed at putting sixty-five million Frenchmen under surveillance when they aren’t capable of watching ten thousand people all holding *fiches S*.<sup>273</sup>”

It could be said that Marine Le Pen in publicly denouncing the security measures employed or in her opinion not employed, being the “*fiches S*”, proves the drastic need for a reshuffling of new increased security strategies by the governing body particularly in a time leading up to elections. According to the securitization theory, a discourse suggesting that the security status quo is threatened is a basic necessity in completing the theory on a community altogether. Here in this speech however she does not offer alternatives to an audience as to whom or what requires securitization, which doesn’t assist the situation but rather implements a blame game strategy. The game only includes political figures in an election race.

Le Pen used this same strategy during an interview with Hala Gorani on *CNN* where she stated “I have not waited for the terrorist attacks to ask for a stop on immigration<sup>274</sup>”. While discussing Europe’s current refugee crisis, the *Front National* leader used the opportunity to prove once more that her philosophy on regaining a sense of nationalism and republicanism in France cannot be possible with millions of refugees entering Europe’s borders, with the potential threat of terrorists infiltrating the system.

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[gouvernement-de-sombrer-dans-l-apathe-et-la-communication-sterile\\_1416912](#)

(accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid.


<sup>274</sup> Le Pen, M., (2015), Marine Le Pen sur CNN (VO), *Le Front National*, available from

<http://www.frontnational.com/videos/marine-le-pen-sur-cnn-vo/> (accessed

15/12/2015)


### 6.5 Conclusions drawn from discourse

The author of this thesis has compiled two graphs in accordance with the speeches provided above. The number of times the politicians referred to the referent object, the need for unity and the propositions for security changes were counted and placed into two graphs in order to visualize the potential changes in discourse.



	Referent Object	Security Changes	Unity
Francois Hollande	5	3	2
Nicolas Sarkozy	2	2	1
Manuel Valls	4		1
Marine Le Pen	1	4	1





	Referent Object	Security Changes	Unity
Francois Hollande	7	9	6
Nicolas Sarkozy	8	2	1
Manuel Valls	4	1	
Marine Le Pen	8	5	

The referent object, being Jihadi terrorism, was mentioned five times by President Hollande following the January terror attacks and seven times in November 2015. Valls’s references in the same period do not show great increase and remain at four repetitions each time.

Nicolas Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen on the other hand see a noticeable increase in the number of times they address the referent object. Sarkozy increases from two to eight times between January and November 2015 whereas Le Pen multiplies her unique mentioning in early 2015 eight times in November of the same year. This does show an increase in concern. Evidently two terror attacks in the same year present an issue for France with questions arising around why the attacks were not prevented and who went wrong and where. The increase in calling out the

terrorists is equally important as a message to them as well as to the French public in addressing the threat at hand. It is a direct invitation to pay attention.

As mentioned before, the securitization theory calls for the need to elaborate on required changes to accommodate the singling out of a threat in society. President Hollande mentions different strategies nine times in November 2015, a clear increase from a mere three times in January 2015. This does include his address to Congress where he called for numerous legal changes in the French constitution following a terrorist attack and a state of emergency.

Sarkozy following both attacks only spoke of security changes twice, which remained the same in both instances. Similarly Le Pen echoed much of Sarkozy's concerns and security propositions as seen in the previous sections of this chapter. She only spoke five times of security changes in November 2015, once more than following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks.

What is surprising is Prime Minister Manuel Valls's single mention of needed security changes in November 2015. It will be shown later on that Valls participated in a greater campaign of including the Muslim community in a time where amalgamation of moderate Muslims and terrorists may have been a worrying consequence.

The dire need for unity in a time of division and fear was not established as much as expected following both attacks in 2015.

Nicolas Sarkozy spoke of it only once in January and November of 2015, in the quotes provided. Similarly Valls and Le Pen did not mention the need for unity following the November 2015 attacks, but did once after the first attacks. Hollande however used the second terror attack to solidify his belief in the need for community and togetherness. The President tripled his two expressions of January, after the attacks on November 13<sup>th</sup> 2015.

This thesis has repeatedly confronted the issue of amalgamation. Due to terrorist philosophical ideology aligning itself to Islam, stereotype and the public may be tempted to regroup jihadists with moderate Muslims.

January 10<sup>th</sup> 2015 during his speech in front of the *Porte de Vincennes*, Manuel Valls expressed his inclusion of the Muslim community in France's fear of terrorism. In doing so, the Prime Minister echoes the President's call for unity but in explicitly calling out the Muslim community, there is a public display for all of France to follow the same philosophy.

“Our compatriots and our fellow citizens of Muslim religion and culture suffer too from terrorism. That is perhaps the most important message: the refusal to amalgamate. Jihadism seeks to create this amalgamation.<sup>275</sup>”

During his meeting in Evry on November 28<sup>th</sup> 2015, the Prime Minister once again voiced his urgency to France to break down the stereotypes causing much underlying tensions and racism. As seen in Chapter 2, the Muslim immigrant population of France faces much insecurity in society based on their origins. In mentioning these troubled communities, Valls expressed his concern in amalgamation. The stereotypes may consequently turn against France: it was shown that many youngsters of France turn to jihad as a result of feeling detached from the culture or as though they do not belong.

“It is not because a youngster is in trouble that he is of immigrant descent ... It is not because you are unemployed or of maghrebinne descent or a member of the Muslim culture that you become a terrorist or a delinquent ... if we accept this excuse that

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<sup>275</sup> Valls, M., (2015), Manuel Valls: “Venez Nombreux” A La Marche De Dimanche, *France Ce Soir*, available from <http://www.francesoir.fr/politique-france/manuel-valls-venez-nombreux-la-marche-de-dimanche> (accessed 26/06/2015)

would mean we are throwing all of the youngsters in these categories into the arms of an organization, and that would be unacceptable.<sup>276</sup>”

The previous quote’s message is carried through a passage of Valls’s speech in front of *l’Assemblée Nationale* on January 13<sup>th</sup> 2015. Although the terrorist attacks were committed in the name of Islam, moderate Muslims of France felt the repercussions of fear and retaliation as much as any other Frenchmen, if not more in some cases. This was seen with the backlash received across Europe from different Muslim communities. What is interesting is that the Prime Minister’s comment did not precipitate in actual security changes. Where the Jewish community of France received a massive increase in protection in front of schools, synagogues and cultural locations, very little was provided to the Muslim community.

“Another urgent matter is to protect our fellow Muslims ... Islam is the second religion of France. She has her place in France.<sup>277</sup>”

This sense of inclusion created by Manuel Valls is somewhat questioned by Marine Le Pen in her editorial for the *New York Times* on January 18<sup>th</sup> 2015. In her open letter the opposition party leader outlines the heavy responsibility the Muslim community must accept and act upon. This responsibility is the necessary requirement of publicly announcing the community’s distance to jihadi terrorism.

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<sup>276</sup> Rovan, A., (2015), Evry Manuel Valls dessine la France de l’après 13 Novembre, *Le Figaro*, available from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2015/11/28/01002-20151128ARTFIG00030--evry-manuel-valls-dessine-la-france-de-l-apres-13-novembre.php> (accessed 10/12/2015)

<sup>277</sup> Valls, M., (2015), Discours de Manuel Valls a l’Assemblée Nationale en hommage aux victimes des attentats, *Gouvernement de France*, available from <http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/3118-seance-speciale-d-hommage-aux-victimes-des-attentats-allocation-de-manuel-valls-premier-ministre> (accessed 26/06/2015)

Without it, Le Pen believes that the community can never truly integrate and belong to France and its culture. In essence, it refers back to the comment made about an “Islam of France” versus an “Islam in France”.

“Muslims themselves need to hear this message. They need the distinction between Islamist terrorism and their faith to be made clear. Yet this distinction can only be made if one is willing to identify the threat. It does our Muslim compatriots no favours to fuel suspicions and leave things unspoken.<sup>278</sup>”

### 6.6 Audience

The third pillar of the securitization theory lies within the reception of the security speeches made to the audience addressed.

Following the events of January 2015, IFOP conducted a study in France to use as a means of comparison. The organization looked into the French perception of Islam, a study it had previously done in 2010. In December 2010, 42% of the surveyed population identified Islam, being the general grouping of the Muslim community of France as a threat to national identity. In July 2015 that number only rose by 2%, which remains at first glance a rather low increase considering the terrorist attacks six months prior. However when compared to the 3% drop in the perception that Islam could be an enrichment factor to France, there is a clearer image of a depreciation towards the Muslim community of France<sup>279</sup>.

This social separation can be linked to that mentioned by Prime Minister Manuel Valls at *les voeux de la presse* on January 20<sup>th</sup> 2015:

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<sup>278</sup> Le Pen, M., (2015), To Call This Threat By Its Name, *New York Times*, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic-fundamentalism.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic-fundamentalism.html?_r=0) (accessed 26/06/2015)

<sup>279</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les Français et leur perception de l’islam, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3096-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 14/10/2015)

“An apartheid in terms of territory, society and ethnicity, has imposed itself on our country, a social misery has been topped with regular discrimination because one doesn’t have the right surname or the right colour skin [...]”<sup>280</sup>

Apartheid (Afrikaans word for separation<sup>281</sup>) was a political regime based on racial segregation in South Africa. The regime promoted the undermining/growth restriction of the African populations of the country while the white population remained in the position of control. This forced the country into the position of an outcast from the international community for most of the second part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and remains a heavy burden on the country’s current development process, most importantly in the context of politics and economic growth.

Based on the explanation provided above, it seems dangerous for Valls to use such a strong word to describe the state of affairs in France both following the incidents at the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters as well as the social consequences. In alignment with the theory provided the implementation of such a word would suggest the creation of an “us vs. them” paradigm. Therefore as this thesis analyses this section of Valls’s speech in the context of the terrorist attacks of January 2015 two elements arise. There is clearly a dominant population within French society, which is directly causing the undermining/growth restriction of another. As a consequence an imbalance of worth in society linked to discrimination and perception is born. Although in his speech Valls does not clearly mention which party belongs to which category, he does mention ethnicity, which then without a doubt points a finger towards the immigrant populations of France. In continuing this line of argument, most ethnic communities of France are of Muslim origin, primarily

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<sup>280</sup> Valls, M., (2015), Manuel Valls: “un apartheid social, ethnique, territorial” en France, *RFI*, available from <http://www.rfi.fr/france/20150120-manuel-valls-apartheid-social-ethnique-territorial-france-voeux-presse/> (accessed 26/06/2015)

<sup>281</sup> Hass, A., (2000), Settlements or Peace, *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics Economics and Culture*, Vol.7, No.3

from the *Maghreb* region of Africa. Therefore it is an insinuation that there is indeed an awareness around the existence of discrimination towards the Muslim community. While this all remains hypothetical based on one train of thought, there is no clear instigation towards securitizing the community from Valls but rather an agreement of its already recognized presence.

Although the previous figures show a general scope, it may be interesting to look into more particular survey results such as the political party the specific audience members are linked to. Out of the 44% illustrating Islam as a menace to the state of France 90% of the *Front National*<sup>282</sup> agreed showing much support for the discourse provided by Marine Le Pen.

Throughout this thesis the reader's attention has been brought to the necessity to distinguish between the Muslim community of France and that of extremist groups participating in acts of violence as was propagated by the four politicians as seen in this chapter and chapter 5. However, for the French population this division has become more difficult to adhere to following the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*. In January 2015 66% of the surveyed population agreed that the country should not amalgamate the two previously mentioned groupings of Muslims, in July of the same year the result dropped by 3%. It is important to note that it is not a radical drop in satisfaction that is concerning but rather that in the survey the interviewed had to choose what statement resonated more with them between the first statement and that of Islam not representing a threat (32% in July 2015)<sup>283</sup>. In essence, those surveyed admitted more that Islam is a threat to France rather than grouping all Muslims, radical or not, together. Following the terrorist attacks in November 2015, *IFOP* conducted another survey and found that 67% of the French did not believe there should be an amalgamation of all Muslims<sup>284</sup>. This is then

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<sup>282</sup> Ibid

<sup>283</sup> Ibid

<sup>284</sup> IFOP, (2015), Le rapport des Français à l'Islam en France, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3218-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3218-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 16/12/2015)

supported by the poll results that saw 76% of all surveyed in favour of France's military intervention in Syria in a poll conducted in October 2015<sup>285</sup>.

Consequently, there cannot be effective securitization seeing that the audience does not perceive the Muslim community of France as a liable threat that needs security attention.

It must however be noted in this chapter that more than one politician has raised the concern about immigration into France. This has been noted by the audience and accepted as a security issue. According to IFOP in April 2006 40% of the surveyed French population agreed that more was to be done for the immigrant community in France. In January 2015, that same number rose to 68%<sup>286</sup>. The former statistics could show the development of the birth of a certain prejudice against the immigrant community for the unfair attention given to them over the reigning concerns of French nationals. This is proven with a recent poll questioning the potential wish of the French to suspend the Schengen treaty and redistribute border controls. In April 2015 71% of the surveyed population were in favour<sup>287</sup>.

It may be interesting to briefly consider why the audience did not show adherence to a potential discourse of securitization. During the period of 8 and 9 January 2015, IFOP conducted a survey and found that 66% of the surveyed population agreed that there shouldn't be an amalgamation of Muslims compared to

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<sup>285</sup> IFOP, (2015), L'adhésion des Français à l'intervention militaire en Syrie contre l'Etat islamique, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3153-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3153-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 16/12/2015)

<sup>286</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les priorités des Français et la question de l'immigration, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2924-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2924-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 15/10/2015)

<sup>287</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les Français et les flux migratoires, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3017-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3017-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 15/10/2015)



29% that identified Islam as a potential threat<sup>288</sup>. In the peak of the crisis following the attacks on the *Charlie Hebdo* headquarters there was a disinterest in adhering to an anti-Muslim narrative linked to potential securitization. Consequently, in a survey conducted by IFOP in February 2015, only 24% of the total number surveyed, admitted to feeling complete confidence in the police force and special forces for keeping them safe against acts of terrorism whilst a small 11% said the same about President Hollande's government<sup>289</sup>. It could be said that the lack of confidence around security could be linked to a lack of reference to a security threat by the four politicians. Lastly, IFOP found that 57% of its surveyed population agreed that there wasn't a need to respond negatively to the terrorist attacks based on the Mohammed cartoons by limiting the publications of more cartoons versus 42% who believe the opposite<sup>290</sup>. Although this isn't a huge difference, there is groundwork demonstrating that the audience does not have a founding argument that could potentially align itself to the discourse given by the four politicians presented here.

As seen in the previous section of this chapter, the discourse of the chosen politicians has changed somewhat to a more radical stance. The first noticeable change from January to November 2015 is from the tactic of defence against terrorist attacks to a declaration of war. The audience too has shown a change of heart.

In the first round of the regional elections of 2010, Marine Le Pen's party *le Front National* gathered a total of 11.42% of the votes. More recently in early December 2015, the same party came first in the first election round with an

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<sup>288</sup> IFOP, (2015), Le rapport des Français à l'Islam en France, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2906-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2906-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 03/11/2015)

<sup>289</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les Français la lutte contre le terrorisme et la menace islamiste, IFOP, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2948-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2948-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 14/10/2015)

<sup>290</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les mesures attendues par les Français à la suite des attentats, [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2910-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2910-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 03/11/2015)

astounding 27.73% of the total votes cast. This put Marine Le Pen ahead of both Nicolas Sarkozy's party and that of the current President<sup>291</sup>. The results coincided with a survey conducted by IFOP in early October 2015 where 31% of the total number surveyed, declared that they would vote for Marine Le Pen in the national elections of 2017 but it must be noted that only 16% of the total 31% said they would definitely vote for her<sup>292</sup>. Nonetheless the numbers prove that France is changing its views on returning to a government dedicated to nationalism and republicanism.

However, in the second round of the elections held one week later, although Marine Le Pen held a constant 27% of the votes, she regained her position in third place to be beaten by the Right with 40% and the Left with almost 29%<sup>293</sup>. The actual numbers should not be the main focus though; Marine Le Pen has used the terrorist attacks of this year to prove her longstanding arguments and the philosophy of her party. This is significant when considering the change of attitude of the audience to the discourses from January 2015 to November of the same year.

Between January and November 2015, the French population remained 87% confident in the police forces, and *gendarmeries* as well as 50% remaining confident

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<sup>291</sup> AFP, (2015), Regionales: revivez la journee du second tour en direct, *Le Parisien*, available from <http://www.leparisien.fr/elections-regionales/en-direct-regionales-second-tour-les-bureaux-de-vote-ouvrent-en-metropole-13-12-2015-5366595.php> (accessed 15/12/2015)

<sup>292</sup> Internaute, (2015), Election présidentielle 2017: Marine Le Pen sondage choc [date, candidats, sondages, resultat, *L'Internaute*, available from <http://election-presidentielle.linternaute.com/> (accessed 16/12/2015)

<sup>293</sup> Internaute, (2015), Resultats regionales 2015: Score du FN resultats complets en region et par ville, *L'Internaute*, available from <http://election-regionale.linternaute.com/> (accessed 16/12/2015)

in the Hollande administration<sup>294</sup>. The fact that these statistics have not changed between two terrorist attacks in the same year does seem significant considering the December election results. It would then seem unfair to say that the audience adhered to a theory of securitization, seeing that there is indeed a rise in concern in France relative to the elevated threat level (from 93% in January 2015 to 98% in November 2015<sup>295</sup>), but nonetheless there is still a unity between French and Muslims alike unrelated to a wish to exclude and cast out the Muslims completely.

### **6.7 Conclusions drawn from audience**

Considering the election campaign in France in 2015, the author of this thesis thought it interesting to look at how the opinion polls reflected the audience's adherence to the discourse provided following the two terrorist attacks of 2015.

The first graph presents the findings of an *IFOP* survey conducted in November 2015 just one week after the terrorist attacks. The question posed to the public was: "You are aware that following the terror attacks, different political personalities have expressed different propositions to combat jihadi terrorism. Would you deem their propositions credible in fulfilling their promises?"<sup>296</sup>.


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<sup>294</sup> IFOP, (2015) Les reactions des Francais aux attentas du 13 novembre, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3202-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3202-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 15/12/2015)

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>296</sup> IFOP, (2015), La credibilite de differentes personalites politiques en matiere de lutte contre le terrorisme, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3203-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3203-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 04/01/2015)

## Credibility ranking in combatting terrorism - November 2015



	Credibility ranking
Francois Hollande	70
Nicolas Sarkozy	69
Manuel Valls	56
Marine Le Pen	49


These figures present interesting findings, specifically for Marine Le Pen and President Hollande. As seen in the previous section, Marine Le Pen made record progress in the most recent regional elections. The President on the other hand has been seen as one of the most unsuccessful Presidents in opinion polls. However here, it seems the roles have been reversed: Le Pen's at time controversial stance on potentially exiting the European Union and becoming stricter on immigrants and at times solely concentrating on Muslim immigration, was not well received. President Hollande's discourse has shown to play in his favour, alongside his crisis management of the two terror attacks thus leading the credibility ranking.

It goes without saying that this conclusion is drawn from one poll, and each survey comes with the warning that every percentage can be up to 2-3% incorrect.

Nonetheless, this section aims to show the different perspectives provided by the French public on the same topic.

The second graph is also based on an *IFOP* survey; this time conducted in the first half of December 2015. Here participants were asked the following: “If next Sunday the first round of the national presidential elections were to take place, which candidate would you most likely vote for?<sup>297</sup>”

The author of this thesis chose to only consider in this graph the three leading politicians in the presidential race.



	Jan-15	Nov-15
Francois Hollande	21	22
Nicolas Sarkozy	23	21
Marine Le Pen	29	27

<sup>297</sup> IFOP, (2015), Les intentions de vote pour l’élection présidentielle de 2017, *IFOP*, available from [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3244-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3244-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed 04/01/2016)

Once again, should the discourse given by the three politicians presented here have swayed the audience dramatically in according the crisis the grave tone it deserved, the opinion polls would have changed immensely between January and November 2015. The graph shows that although there are minor variations, there is not much to prove the audience changing adherence to one discourse over another.

### **6.8 Final comments**

Obviously the analysis of this thesis remains difficult to establish without subjectivity or bias based on the fact that what is being analysed is social identity and the threat to its existence. What has become evident throughout this chapter is the change in discourse of the four chosen politicians. The second terrorist attack in less than a year evidently caused an increase in fear and can explain such a change that would be necessary to manage the situation at hand. However, based on the evidence provided, this thesis does not confirm that there has been proof of securitization of the Muslim community of France. The evidence indeed shows a tension that remains unresolved and requires immediate attention. Buzan explains this in his differentiation between societal security and social security: the former includes all identities within the same society or nation and creates the 'we' identity whilst the latter is a more individualistic approach<sup>298</sup>. These concepts are entrenched in identity-based communities and in the context of the case study of this thesis are at the root of the problem. There is an inability to agree on communal and minority group identities.

In establishing a general analysis based on the speeches presented in this chapter in correlation with the theoretical framework presented in a previous chapter, certain conclusions can be drawn.

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<sup>298</sup> Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Vilde, J., (1998), Chapter 6: The Societal Sector, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, United States :119-140

There was indeed a clear enacting of dialogue between orators at the top of the political hierarchy, within different political parties, and an audience made up of all citizens of France. Based on statistics this primarily promoted trust and unity. With the inclusive audience mentioned here it follows that there cannot be securitization if the discourse is being addressed to the Muslim community too, contrary to the initial assumption of their specific potential securitization.

As presented in a previous chapter, there is a necessity to grant the audience the benefit of interpreting and adhering to the orator's discourse more than simply listening. Here the analysis showed no real evidence to any change in the audience's perceptions of either the politicians in question or the Muslim community.

Our analysis found signs of securitization since some speeches placed real emphasis on the threat in France attempting to dismantle its security and stability, and then more importantly the strong values on which its society is founded. The securitization was not of the Muslim community of France but of the threat at hand being extremist terrorism in the form of jihadi fighters.

In terms of security measures presented to be equal to the threat in question, the analysis of the speeches used as basis for discourse did not go into the details surrounding the security changes. Rather they focused on the divisions within French society, its fragmented state and how that is impacting the country as a whole with a major threat to its identity. Earlier on in the thesis, the *Plan Vigipirate* was briefly outlined but apart from this security protocol launched following the January 7<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack, the key speeches chosen in this chapter do not present any new mention of security. This changed following the November 2015 attacks where all four politicians proved to change course in their speeches and speak of an active war. At the same time, they provided details of the strategies required to win, like an intervention in Syria, the extension of the state of emergency and more stringent immigration reforms.

There is indeed a 'they' and 'we' opposition repeatedly made where the Jews are often mentioned more favourably than the Muslims. This must be interpreted as a generality, although it was shown on many occasions that the Muslims are seen to be a part of French identity. What does show proof of a social division is the perception of their requirement to integrate more from their own part rather than France insisting on them to integrate. This is translated into the tension between the two identities based on sensitive socio-political factors.



## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

The thesis presented here can be divided into three sections.

The first elaborated on the chronology of both the case studies examined. Initially, the thesis outlines the timeline that followed suit after the January 7<sup>th</sup> 2015 terrorist attacks on the satirical magazine's headquarters where four of France's most recognized journalists were killed. The events of *Charlie Hebdo* and later on the hostage scene at the Jewish supermarket were used as the stepping-stone to question France's current relationship to its Muslim community.

Then, the events of November 13<sup>th</sup> being the second terror attack in France in the same year were presented where eight simultaneous attacks were executed across Paris.

It was decided at the beginning of the thesis to set a timeframe limit on the analysis. The timeline would only focus on the major events between January 7<sup>th</sup> and January 11<sup>th</sup> 2015 and then only on November 13<sup>th</sup> of the same year. The reason behind such a decision was to limit the analysis of the events following the attacks in order to concentrate only on the core elements of the attacks.

Part two of the thesis covered both the theoretical framework as well as a brief history of the relationship between France and its Muslim immigrant community.

The Securitization Theory used as the skeleton to the analysis has shown that the vulnerabilities in society have been exposed by mass media in the name of regaining social cohesion, otherwise known as the French social identity. A parallel was drawn between the chosen theory and that of the constructivism theory. Both suggest the failure of one system, here being security, and the need to build a more solid system.

The theory presented the necessity to break down speeches and discourse into three elements in order to prove or deny the existence of securitization. The securitizing actor is represented by individuals of hierarchy and recognized in society, here being the four chosen French politicians. The referent object is the presented threat to the status quo that demands to be addressed. In this thesis, the hypothesis placed the Muslim community of France as the referent object. Finally the theory shows that the audience presented with such information plays a massive role in determining whether securitization will take place.

The history chapter of this thesis allowed the reader to understand the roots of the Muslim community of France. From the years of labour immigration of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the expanding philosophy of *francophonie*, the Muslim community has for many decades felt a part of France and its culture. What remained crucial to understanding many socio-political undertones in the case studies of this thesis, are the numerous violent eruptions in the *banlieues* of France between members of the Muslim community and France based on issues of negligence, discrimination and misunderstandings. It was shown that the Muslim community has had to live alongside the French community due to limits on its belief system crucial to its identity. The cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed is an example, although in the name of satire, of a limitation set on the Muslim community pushing them to feel like the 'other'. The Muslim community's entrenched social identity differs completely from that of the French identity. France's continuous search for social stability has made a point of eliminating such individuality strands in an effort to recreate the original identity of Republicanism. This eventually caused violent retaliation as a response.

Limits were shown throughout this chapter suggesting that there has been a failed or potentially incomplete process of integration of immigrant communities, not solely to blame on the government of France that has led to a dysfunctional society instead of cohesive communities.

The last part of the thesis had as aim to question whether there was a presence of securitization of the Muslim immigrant community of France. This included two chapters. The first explored both the French and international community reactions to both the case studies presented. The core chapter of this thesis then looked into discourse provided by four of France's prominent politicians.

A chapter was dedicated to the varying perspectives of politicians, journalists and citizens alike from France, and then from the international community including Western countries and Muslim majority countries in the same categories. Here it was shown that there is a certain generalization of the Muslim community in France that does not always allow for the recognition of moderate Muslims. Consequently this stimulates in the Muslim community a fear of retaliation following any act of extremism. In addition the majority of Muslim communities internationally continued to express their dissociation from and disapproval of the extremist wing of Islam. Muslim communities within Western Europe expressed their concerns following the incidents explaining that although they feel a sense of belonging, or as much as is allowed, they fear their presence is gradually being regarded as undesirable.

This last argument was put into comparison with the Jewish community of France fearing its loss of importance with a concern of a growing sense of anti-Semitism following the impact on the community of the hostage scene at the kosher supermarket and then again at the Bataclan theatre. However, this is ironic, as the Muslim community feared a long-standing emotion of resentment linked to the current issue with immigration in France. According to the Muslim community, this is linked to an undercurrent of Islamophobia.

The four politicians chosen included President Francois Hollande, former President Nicolas Sarkozy, Prime Minister Manuel Valls and the opposition party leader Marine Le Pen. Each politician presented in some way in one of his or her numerous speeches an element of the securitization theory but in quite a diluted manner. However, there was no proof of a complete trilogy of the elements of the

securitization theory, thus failing to confirm the hypothesis. It was shown throughout the thesis that stereotypically it may be assumed that in a crisis there may be more unity than division and this was not necessarily always the case in France. For the most part the speeches of politicians analysed continuously mentioned their devotion to finding unity again.

The analysis began with looking into President Francois Hollande's speeches following the attacks on January 7<sup>th</sup> 2015: he remained rather general in his speeches focusing on the requirement for unity and reiterating the values and pillars the country was built upon. His speeches created the link between politics and audience which was needed to move forward either in a situation of securitization or simply as needed in a crisis.

After the events in November of the same year, the President's tone changes drastically. He securitizes jihadi Muslims and states that war has been declared on France. There is also an effort to change security measures such as the duration of the state of emergency and expanding surveillance possibilities.

The author of this thesis specifically chose to analyse former President Nicolas Sarkozy before the current Prime Minister due to his important role during the *Charlie Hebdo* crisis even if under scrutiny, for political gain reasons. This concern was raised again following the November 13<sup>th</sup> attacks. Furthermore President Hollande's choice to invite Sarkozy to the discussion table in January 2015 and again in November 2015 showed the initiative for unity during the challenging time. The former President showed a more aggressive tone than the other speakers and dramatically stated the Republic's "zero tolerance" for extremists and its preparedness to deport any person unwilling to integrate with French identity and/or question its values. Of all the speakers he presents the most rational response in terms of the necessity to shift focus to the pressing underlying matters potentially responsible for the attacks, namely the fractured society and its roots. Sarkozy's discourse does follow that of Marine Le Pen in November 2015 in terms of France's issue with immigration and the questioning of its value to the Republic.

During his campaign trail, Sarkozy also uses the opportunity to discredit Hollande's cabinet due to its inability to prevent another terror attack.

Prime Minister Manuel Valls's discourse between January and November 2015 did not greatly differ. He remained determined in pushing away all stereotypes of the Muslim community and regularly denounced the usage of amalgamations. He too securitized jihadi Muslims. However two key choices made in two different speeches of his, prove his bias towards one community in France, the Jews, to the detriment of another, the Muslims, as well as his use of the word 'Apartheid' causing much disturbance within the political community. This was a disconcerting label to place on a country still recovering from a major crisis. Despite the Prime Minister's very candid explanation of the importance and necessity of affording the Muslim community the same security measures as the rest of France and in particular compared to the Jews who proved to be the most trusted and attached community of France, Valls deemed it fit to stress that without the Jews, France would never be the same.

Marine Le Pen may initially have seemed to present the most obvious case for securitization of the Muslim community considering her stern stance on immigration and the closing of French borders. However, her speeches examined in this thesis do not present any new material from her usual stance on immigration and the Muslim community, which concludes that she did not drastically prove any steps towards securitizing her usual group.

It was George Orwell who said, "The further a society drifts from truth, the more it will hate those who speak it". The conclusion which is reached in the analysis of this thesis through the different elements presented in this paper is that there is no securitization of the Muslim community of France. Certain elements suggested that a future securitization could eventually take place due to the often mentioned fractured society which can be linked back to the Muslim community living beside the French identity rather than for the two merging and integrating. In addition further analysis could be made on concepts such as a law regarding blasphemy or

the laws on public display of culture/religion attached to the founding pillar of secularism. This approach would take a wider and more historical route to the analysis without concentrating as much on discourse but more on the perceptions in mass society from both sides. The Muslim community and then the rest of society comprised of the Jewish community, Christians and others.

Due to the current political situation in France including the much-anticipated upcoming national elections, as well as in Western Europe concerning the growing number of foreign fighters emerging from the continent and fleeing to Syria to then return and retaliate on their national countries, it is felt that change is required and highly encouraged. With its recent attack in November 2015, France has seen that it has for too long permitted immigration without concerning herself with the difficulty of integration and assimilation. There is an identity crisis in France and to a large extent in Western Europe too. This is of long standing and without urgent attention and drastic action could cause a modification of the identity structure of France. Probably an amalgamation of the three majority individual strands in France might be the result.

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