

THE ROTTERDAM CLIMATE INITIATIVE

A public-private interest group coalition

Created to fight climate change



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PREFACE

The world of public affairs started to fascinate me during a series Master Class I attended. This Master Class series of Montesquieu Institute and Leiden University was among others given by Arco Timmermans. Sustainability and the fight against climate change have been a personal topic of interest for some time. The RCI made it possible for me to combine my topic of interest within public affairs, resulting in the choice on further narrowing my topic in order to reach interest group coalition formation theories.

Firstly, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Arco Timmermans who despite of the long writing process was continuously willing to supervise my writing process. I really appreciated the meetings and his good insights and suggestions regarding my topic. Secondly, I would like to thank my co-reader for his effort in the last minute of reading.

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List of Abbreviations

CCI	Clinton Climate Initiative
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
DCMR	Dienst Centraal Milieubeheer Rijnmond / Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond
DEF	Deltalinqs Energy Forum
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
IAB	International Advisory Board of Rotterdam
PCC	Paris Climate Conference
PoR	Port of Rotterdam
RCI	Rotterdam Climate Initiative
REP	Rotterdam Energy Programme
RECP	Rotterdam Energy & Climate Programme

I: Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

The former president of the United States, Bill Clinton, paid a brief visit to the Netherlands in 2006 where he spoke about climate change at Paleis Soesdijk. De Nationale Postcode Loterij, the Dutch postcode lottery, invited Clinton regarding their 1 million euro donation for his Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI). The CCI is a global alliance in order to fight against climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. This alliance includes forty world cities, whereby the city of Rotterdam had been asked to join (ANP, 2006). Shortly after, Rotterdam announced that it would launch its own Climate Initiative. In 2007 three different actors united with Rotterdam for a unique partnership within the Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI). The four stakeholders were the municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, the corporate sector united in Deltalinqs and DCMR, and the Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond. The RCI presented their plans in the climate program that pursued the most rigid climate objectives in the EU. Their ambitious goal was to combine climate action within economic opportunities and therefore reducing the CO₂ emissions (Rotterdam Climate Initiative, 2008). Rotterdam is a large world port city and lined with an important economic position in the EU. In order to remain and improve its position and to adapt to climate change, Rotterdam entered a coalition.

Working together and forming a coalition such as the one in Rotterdam is something we see on a daily basis. At first sight, the four actors did not appear to be the most obvious partners to form a coalition. The RCI appeared to be rather ad hoc. However, Rotterdam is one of the most polluted cities in the world, and has already initiated different activities concerning sustainability and measures against climate change. Since the sixties Rotterdam's port area has been structurally paying attention to the environment. This was partially due to the growth of the port, with substantial opposition against the growth from among others the

Central Action Committee Rijnmond (Energietransitie Interviews, 2008). We continuously see different stakeholders working together and coalitions can differ in many ways. As such, it is important to analyse what kind of interest group coalition the four actors created in order to find out their reasons of cooperation and purpose.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Climate change is a global issue and this means that stakeholders on international, national and local level are involved in the challenges of fighting against the changes. An initiative that started on local level could eventually have greater impact, based on their coalition. This rather unique cooperation in Rotterdam offers the possibility to look into coalition formation between public and private actors.

1.2.1 Research question

The main research question:

“What kind of interest group coalition did the city of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs and DCMR create, how did this coalition change over time and how can their collaboration be explained?”

Answering this question will provide a greater insight into coalitions and coalition forming within the field of public affairs in the Netherlands. In order to answer my research question, several partial research questions are formulated. First of all, it is important to set out the research subject. Theories of different types of coalitions and coalition formation will be outlined. In addition, there are many reasons why interest groups cooperate and join a coalition. Therefore it is important to find out why specifically these four stakeholders joined forces. In order to answer the main research question, I will answer the following partial research questions:

1. *Why do interest groups join a coalition?*
2. *Which types of coalitions can be distinguished?*

After answering these questions the focus shifts to the four stakeholders that allied in the RCI. In order to understand the RCI and the type of coalition, it is valuable to expand on what this initiative is and what the motives are of the actors involved. The actors are public and private; concern a collective of companies and one large company; the political office in charge of the city at large and a government department with a specific focus. With all these different actors, specific and different interests are to be expected. However, they all decided to work together in the RCI. Hence, it is significant to answer the following partial question:

3. *Who are the four stakeholders and what are their individual interests in the RCI?*

On the basis of the exposed interests it is important to determine why these four stakeholders have joined forces and what their common interests and goals are. According to the RCI an environmentally sustainable Rotterdam can only be reached by cooperation with different stakeholders. From a theoretical perspective, analyses can be drawn in order to understand the emergence of this particular coalition. The question will contribute to a better understanding of the cooperation:

4. *What are the characteristics of the RCI coalition?*

With the following partial research question I reached my last question and final point in order to answer the main research question. As the initiative started in 2007, the organization and goals might have changed over time. In order to find out whether this is the case, the coalition will be analysed from the beginning until the current situation. This allows reaching conclusions regarding coalitions in the Netherlands.

5. *Has the RCI changed since it was established in 2007?*

1.3 Relevance

Academic Relevance

There is a large body of literature on coalition formation and especially on why different interest groups decide to join a coalition. However, the different types of coalitions are not straightforward and easy to distinguish. Most studies concern cases from the US and the EU, which are relatively more about coalitions of likeminded interest groups. The case used here is different as it concerns a Dutch case and the coalition examined has four members with diverse interests. This Dutch case will contribute to the existing literature on coalition formation from a different perspective. The research will furthermore add deeper understanding to the theories of coalition formation within the field public administration. By defining different types of coalitions and especially analysing why coalitions form, it provides further insight into the context and motives of cooperation between organisations.

Social relevance

Research outcomes could lead to recommendations for other similar coalitions and cities. This way Rotterdam can be a guide for other cities that want to tackle environmental problems. At the same time the RCI itself can function as an example for other partnerships and coalitions that would include heterogeneous actors, including private and public actors. To conclude, the research on the emergence of the RCI could be of great value to tackle similar complex environmental problems in the future.

1.4 Methods

In the previous subchapters, the background for the research has been outlined, as well as the statement of the problem in order to formulate my research questions. According to

Eisenhardt (1989) the procedure of answering the research question within academia is based on empirical and theoretical evidence in order to develop a strategy that will lead to answering the questions. In this chapter I will elaborate on the methods that I use for my research regarding coalitions. Hence, the reasons will be justified for choosing a single case study as primary research strategy. In addition, an overview will be provided of how my research is structured.

1.4.1 Case study

The selection of a single case study was preceded by two interviews. The intention of the pre-research was to determine whether the statement of the problem is feasible for research. The data and information gathered from the interviews confirmed my assumptions. Firstly, the pre-research included an orientation of documents, newspapers and research papers. Interviews are the first-mentioned significant data source. An important first round of interviews efficiently provided data and it could be used to strategically access key-informants (Swanborn, 2008: 78 -79). The exploration of the causal mechanisms, that I want to find in this case study, could lead to different conclusions. This way the data from the case can be determined in order to validate the designated causal mechanisms (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 299).

The type of research I use in this case study is descriptive and exploratory. A characteristic of a case study is that variables blend. Case studies have the advantage of adapting better to this particular case considering that within case studies a larger number of variables can be identified and measured (Yin, 2009). The research is additionally non-experimental, which has the advantage that the limited cases provide the ability to receive deeper understanding of the subject being researched (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 6). Advantages of using this case are a deeper understanding of coalitions and coalition forming. Case studies are not seen as a research unit as such, hence more as an experiment to test a

theory and to expand the theoretical framework regarding analysing similar cases (Yin, 2009: 66-67). The nature of the research question, whether it is exploratory, explanatory or descriptive depends on the amount of knowledge regarding the examination of the case (Swanborn, 2008).

Because of the limited amount of significant actors and an obligation for more detail in questions a survey or other quantitative research was not chosen. The main sources that are used are academic literature, along news articles, documents, reports and position papers from all the four stakeholders involved. The sources reflect on the RCI and its reasons that this initiative is founded. The use of different sources increases the reliability of research (Van Thiel, 2007: 113).

Interviews

In this case study interviews have been added. These are preliminary interviews used for pre-research as well as interviews for further analysis of the case. The first interview was held with a relevant actor from the RCI within the DCMR, who referenced the CSS project of the RCI. The second interview with a key actor from Deltalinqs provided an insight concerning the cooperation of the four stakeholders within the RCI. After these interviews my statement of the problem was clear in order to start my research. Other key actors have subsequently been approached for interviews.

Interviews provide a possibility to gain information about the political procedures within the RCI that can go beyond information on other sources of the stakeholders. All the interviews are semi-structured and open-ended. The flexible format of such an open-ended interview provides the opportunity to discuss other relevant questions that come up during the interview (Yin, 2012: 12). Prior to the interview a protocol list with significant topics and questions is established. The interview protocol is based on the underlying theory, which is expressed in the theoretical framework. Interviews do not provide the most reliable data,

however they have the possibility to add greater value to the background information and reveal new information. Interviews are intended to look like a normal conversation about the subject in matter instead of a regular questionnaire in an interview. Finally, as previously mentioned, interviews include key participants such as public affairs professionals as well as other managers that conduct their work in the public affairs of the RCI. The respondents who had been questioned for the interview have been informed and asked for permission to cite them. Relying on their affirmation there will be no quotes in my thesis that could lead to traceability to the individual respondents. The interview reports will be transcribed regarding the analysis.

1.5 Readers guide

In the first chapter an introduction is provided with the reasoning of the topic of my research. Within the research design, methods that have been used are being explained. Additionally the relevance and research questions are described. My last point in this chapter concerns an outline of the thesis. The second chapter examines the reasons the underlying theories in the theoretical framework of this study. I will go further into the reasons why interest groups join a coalition. Then define and outline significant concepts, concerning coalition formation and different types of coalitions. In addition the characteristics of these coalitions are put forward. The third chapter introduces the case study. It identifies the four stakeholders with their respective interests. Subsequently, I will point out the emergence of the RCI and what role the initiators and stakeholders have. The final point concerns the characteristics of this coalition and the reasons why they cooperate. In the fourth chapter the studied case will be linked to the theory. An analysis is provided from the findings and the partial questions on the type and the reason of cooperation will be exposed. In the final chapter I conclude my findings and will answer my main research question.

II: Interest group coalitions

2.1 Introduction

Previous research on interest group coalitions addressed many questions regarding the behaviour of interest groups within coalitions. Nevertheless, what an interest group coalition exactly entails has proven to be rather difficult. Hitherto, everyone can recognize some sort of organization created when individual interests groups bind together to overcome the collective action problem they are facing. Olson (1965) referred to the collective action problem where a group or individuals needed coercion or some other device in order to aim their common interest. However, this does not mean that every group that overcomes a collective action problem is a coalition and that every group functions the same. While there have been numerous studies regarding the aspects of coalition activity few studies focused on the effect of institutional design on coalition formation. Mahoney (2007) therefore argued in her research that we also must take the institutional structure of the political system, the nature of the issue at hand and the characteristics of the interest groups itself into account.

In the following sub-chapter I will present an overview of logics of why interest groups join coalition. The literature on why interest groups form or join a coalition is very broad, is borrowed from many disciplines, and is not clearly structured. Subsequently, the different types of interest group coalitions, outlined in the literature, will be presented. This will include the characteristics, conditions and interpretation of coalitions in order to appoint an understanding that is necessary for my research.

2.2 Why do organizations join a lobbying coalition?

The second part of the main research question is “why did the interest groups decide to join the RCI”. Underlying this question is the assumption that interest groups are rational actors.

They act rational as they prefer success in achieving their objectives and act accordingly. Given this logic interest groups will choose to lobby alone or align themselves with other interest groups based on their assessment of which strategy will most likely lead to success (Hojnacki, 1997: 66). Because no interest group has all the information they act as bounded rational actors, so based on their incomplete information, the group makes a decision. The decision making process can be understood as a rather straightforward process in which the costs, benefits and expectations of the different strategies are identified (Hojnacki, 1997: 66). Based on this cost/benefit analysis the perceived optimal strategy is chosen and executed.

The assumption that organizations operate rationally and that organizations base on their own perspectives and interests, creates the foundation to analyse why and when organizations join interest group coalitions in order to work with others or decide to work alone (Hojnacki, 1997: 84). However, analysing the decision organizations make to either work with other interest groups or to work alone is complicated by the many different ways success can be interpreted and defined. Often success is not only related to the realization of a policy objective through influence. Success can for example also be claimed by maintaining membership rolls, securing access to political elites, nurturing the relationship with another interest group, blocking the activities of another interest or improving the salience and popularity of an issue over the long haul (Lowery, 2007: 53). Anything that can improve the probability of survival for an organization can be claimed a success. The reasons for joining an interest group coalition are thus very divers and many different arguments have to be considered. The literature on why interest groups join an interest group coalition reflects this diversity: there is a plethora of reasons to be found and the debate is very multidisciplinary in nature. The drawback of this lively debate is the absence of an accepted theoretical model to structure the motivations of interest groups to join forces.

2.2.1 Reasons why interest groups join an interest group coalition

In the broad and multidisciplinary literature on why an interest group would join an interest group coalition some arguments are more prevailing than others. One of the most common used arguments why an interest group would be enticed to join an interest group coalition are the gains in efficiency that joining an interest group coalition could bring. As Hojnacki (1998: 439) states “almost all discussions of interest group coalitions refer to resource sharing as a benefit of coalition advocacy” (Berry 1977, 1989; DeGregorio and Rossotti 1995; Hula 1995; Ornstein and Elder 1978; Scholozman and Tierney 1986). Coalition activities should be more economical. Sharing the burden of the lobbying process is one of the simplest ways to gain efficiency. In a world where interest groups need to be visible and active on a wide array of issues and where the resources are limited joining an interest group coalition can be a low-costs way of being involved (Hula, 1995). Interest group coalitions can also be more efficient because of scale advantages (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 5). Similarly, efficiency can also be gained by dividing the workload up in such a way that each member of the coalition does those tasks for which it has a comparative advantage. This allows the members of an interest group coalition to avoid doing the entire lobbying process and specialize in those parts of it that they excel at (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 6).

Another often used argument for interest groups to join an interest group coalition besides efficiency is effectiveness. When multiple interest groups form an interest group coalition this sends a strong signal to politicians and enhances the impact of their message. The argument put forward by many scholars of lobbying coalitions was that politicians are looking for signs that a policy proposal has a broad support among affected constituencies. Especially in a political system where the policymaker is accountable to an electorate they will want to know if their support for a policy or proposition will be beneficial for them in the next election. A lobbying coalition with a lot of members could give politicians the

reassurance of such a broad support (Hall, 1969; Hojnacki, 1998; Hula, 1995; Kingdon, 1981; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004; Mahoney, 2007; Mayhew, 1974). Having a broad coalition is also an indication for politicians that the interest groups have reached a consensus on the issue at hand. The position advocated by the interest group coalition is thus one that will be supported by a majority of the interest groups (Hecklo 1978; Hula 1995, 1999, Mahoney, 2007). This also means that politicians do not have to use resources to bring the different interest groups together, the interest groups have already done so. If a lot of interest groups are in agreement on an issue this also reduces the risk for a politician of being ambushed by an interest group that has a slightly different opinion on the issue.

Besides the efficiency and effectiveness gains that can be realized when joining an interest group coalition there are a multitude of other reasons why an interest group might want to join an interest group coalition. Mahoney and Baumgartner (2004: 5) state that joining an interest group coalition can be an effective way to change the venue. Especially if a company has been unable to realize its own more narrowly defined objectives it can join a coalition and subsequently attempt to realize the broader objective.

Hula (1999) also founded that interest groups join coalitions in order “to learn important information, to attract symbolic benefits of being associated with a general effort, to effect public perception by inserting import group goals into the coalition’s overall stance, or simply to save precious resource by sharing in a joint effort”. According to Hojnacki (1997: 67) interest groups can also join an interest group coalition to avoid or counter competition from defining the issue at hand without their input. In both cases joining a coalition might not have been the first choice of an interest group but circumstances force the interest group to join the coalition.

The goals of the interest group coalition, realization of a policy through influence, can also be a secondary gain for a specific member of the interest group. An interest group can

join a coalition because the relationship with the politicians being influenced is important to them and they can show support by joining an interest group coalition (Lowery, 2007: 42).

It is even possible that the relationship with other members of the coalition is the real reason for joining. In order to avoid being perceived as a free rider or not concerned about the interests of the other members of a coalition, an interest group can decide to join. Working together with the other members also gives an interest group the opportunity to show its willingness to work together and commitment to their collective objectives (Hojnacki 1998, Heaney 2004). Being part of an interest group coalition can also be good for the relationship between an interest group and the public. It signals their willingness to engage on the issue and can create goodwill (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 6). Avoiding a conflict with other interest groups can also be a reason for an interest group to join an interest group coalition (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 9). Besides the relationship with politicians it can also be the relationship with the wider public that convinces an interest group to join a coalition. Being part of a coalition that does something that the public approves of can be good for the image of the interest group. All in all, an interest group can join a coalition for very different reasons than the policy objective of the coalition.

Several authors also mention how changing circumstances regarding the issue at hand can induce an interest group to join an interest group coalition. Mahoney and Baumgartner (2004: 9) state that if an issue becomes more salient it can lead to interest groups joining forces. Because the issue has become more important, more people, interest groups and other organizations will be paying attention and lobbying under such circumstances requires more resources and a broader base of support. In general, a rise in salience will result in increased costs involved, making the pooling of resources even more attractive (Mahoney, 2007: 12). The same logic applies if the opposition to an issue increases. Overcoming a better-organized and more energized opposition will again require more resources. A strong and visible

opposition also drives organizations together to fight their common foe (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001: 1206-1207; Gray and Lowery, 1996; Hojnacki, 1997). If the issue becomes more threatening, interest groups are also enticed to join forces in order to face the common threat (Gais and Walker 1991; Hojnacki 1997; Whitford 2003). In general the tendency seems to be that how higher the stakes are, the quicker an interest group will decide to join an interest group coalition to collectively fight for their interest.

The characteristics of the interest group coalition itself are not used that often, but are nevertheless still important. An interest group coalition can be very appealing because an important interest group is part of the advocacy. An interest group can be especially interested in joining a coalition when it deems this necessary, or even impossible, to accomplish its objective without this pivotal organization (Hojnacki 1997, 68). The broader membership of an advocacy organization can also be a reason to join when the members in the past have shown to be committed to the cause, reducing the risk of free riders, and have been successful in realizing their lobbying objectives (Hojnacki 1997, 68). Organizational qualities such as being flexible enough to accommodate new objectives and having a good communication structure, can also convince interest groups to join a coalition (Pijnenburg 1998, 307). A well-structured organization and important and committed members will increase the likelihood of a new interest organization joining. An interest organization can also choose to join an interest group coalition because of its own organizational characteristics. It may realize that it is not strong enough to achieve its objectives without the assistance from other interest groups (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 9).

It is also possible that joining a coalition is the logical next step for an interest group. They might already be lobbying alone and to increase the probability of success they will want to join a coalition. This tactic, known as “all directional” lobbying, is based on the idea that more paths to success you are on the better. Given the uncertain nature of the process of

lobbying it makes sense to try to use as many as possible (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Coen 1997; Pijnenburg, 1998; Beyers, 2002). In an organization there can also be the belief that lobbying should be done collectively. An interest group might join an interest group coalition because it simply believes that this is how it always got things done. Again, the ambiguous nature of lobbying makes it hard to assess the effectiveness of lobbying and makes it easy for erroneous myths to survive (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 6). One of the simplest reasons why an interest group joined an advocacy coalition is that they were asked to join it and for whatever reason did not decline the invitation (Hojnacki, 1997: 69). An organization invited to join an interest group coalition often has resources, grass roots strength or expertise, which the interest group coalition would like to benefit from.

So far there has only been attention for the benefits of joining an interest group coalition and the reasons why an interest group should indeed join a coalition. However, there are also costs involved in joining such a coalition. The institutional structure of an interest group coalition requires resources. These resources cannot only be used for lobbying (Mahoney, 2007: 7). There also is the risk of members of the interest group coalition free riding on the efforts of other members (Hojnacki, 1998). One of the most often used arguments against joining an interest group coalition is the problematic nature of reaching a consensus on the issue that is being lobbied on. The bigger the interest group coalition, the harder it will be to reach a consensus. If the members cannot agree on the position of the interest group coalition there is the risk that the coalition will not accomplish at all. But even if a consensus is reached this often means that there will be a discrepancy between what each individual member wants and the position of the coalition. It is thus unlikely that any of the members will get exactly what they wanted, even if the coalition is successful in their lobbying effort (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 6). To include all the different interests of the members the consensus position taken by the coalition is also often rather broad. Research

has shown that interest groups with a broad objective are less successful than groups with a specific interest (McLaughlin, Jordan and Maloney 1993; Greenwood 1997; Coen 1997).

For the case analysed, concerning the RCI, the cost and benefit analysis was positive for each of the four stakeholders involved. They all joined the interest group coalition. The costs involved with joining an interest group coalition are still relevant as they shed light on how rational the considerations are that each of the members made before joining the coalition.

2.2.2 Structure of the reasons

Why people, or organizations in this case, work together is a complicated puzzle. The great reasons discussed in the literature speak volumes to this, as does the multidisciplinary character of the reasons listed. It is however possible to group several of the reasons listed together. This leads to six dimensions: economic reasons, norms, alternative motives, signalling, external factors and organizational features.

Economic reasons

One of the most important reasons to join an interest group coalition is to gain economic efficiency. Lobbying as a collective, leads to several economic advantages that can make a collective effort worth it. Being part of an interest group coalition means that some of the costs involved can be shared. For example, there is no longer the need to sustain multiple separate relations with a politician, one for the coalition will do. This literally saves money. In a coalition, the members can also specialize in what they are good at. The coalition will also remove some of the competition for the attention of politicians. This increases the efficiency of the lobbying process. It is also possible that an interest group simply is too weak to go at it alone, because they lack the resources or because the issue at hand is too big. Given the

prominence of economic reasons in the literature it is to be expected that these reasons were also important for the members of the RCI.

Norms

An organization can also join an interest group coalition because they believe that this is the right thing to do. An organizational norm has developed over time that compels the organization to lobby as a collective. This can be the result of their belief of lobbying, as a collective, is good for the organization. Another explanation is that the organization has simply always been part of interest group coalitions and continues to do so. It is also possible that they believe that lobbying, as a collective, is in general the right thing to do. This belief is broader than just their own organization. This same logic, for their own organization and in general, can also apply to the fear of being seen as a free rider. The belief that being labelled a free rider is bad for the organization can also lead to the choice to join an interest group coalition. The underlying reason for joining might also be relational.

Signalling to politicians

The most obvious relation being influences here is between the interest group and a politician. By demonstrating to the politician that there are a lot of interest groups in favour of a particular issue the probability increases that beneficial action is taken on the issue. Joining an interest group coalition also demonstrates that the interest groups are in agreement on the issue. Both size and consensus are positive signals for the politician and can help to achieve the policy objective. It is important to note that the relation here is not the goal; it is a tool to achieve a certain objective.

The relationship between an interest group and other parties can also be the objective of joining an interest group coalition. It can be considered as more important than the

objective, or at least as a nice bonus. An interest group can join an interest group coalition to improve the relationship with a specific member of the coalition. The coalition can also be a vehicle to gain access to other members in the coalition. Joining a coalition can also be good for public relations, aimed at the public in general or at some politicians. Especially when other parties regard the purpose of the interest group coalition as positive, it can be beneficial to be part of such a coalition.

Alternative motives

Sometimes the reasons for joining an interest group coalition are not connected to the objectives of the coalition. It can be beneficial to be part of the coalition, be associated with the other members or be seen by the public to advocate on behalf on an issue. The membership of the coalition can also be used deflect criticism. It is even possible that an interest group joins a coalition just to be part of the decision making process in the coalition and ensure that the coalition does not harm the interests of the interest group in question. In other words, the objective of an interest group coalition does not have to be the reason to join.

Organizational

For an interest group the structure of the interest group coalition can also be a reason for why it joined the coalition. The interest group coalition can be the most famous coalition or some of its members are considered as pivotal players in the field. The coalition can also have a good track record, both when it comes to being successful and having members that contribute to its success. The coalition can also be regarded as flexible when it comes to its objectives, giving new members a chance to influence the collective objectives. A coalition that communicates adequately will also be more appealing to new members. How a coalition is structured and who is part of it can be important considerations for an interest group.

Joining a functioning coalition with active and important members can be just as important as any other reasons.

External

Sometimes an interest group is forced to join an interest group coalition because of changes in the lobby environment. If the issue an interest group is interested in changes as to how it is being defined, an interest group might find it compelled to join a coalition. Or if all other interest groups create or join a coalition, an interest group might find it outgunned in the lobbying arena. To compete with other groups an interest group might have to join a coalition itself, even if it did not want to do so at first. The environment can sometimes decide for an interest group.

2.3 Interest group coalitions

Interest group coalitions are important players in the field of interest advocacy. Many interest groups have chosen to collaborate with other interest groups to advocate collectively for their interests. What exactly defines an interest group coalition is however not easily specified. According to Baumgartner et. al (2009: 6) the defining feature of a lobbying coalition is the shared policy goal by the collaborating set of actors. The different actors share an objective and as likeminded actors they naturally gather to achieve the common policy goal (Lowery, 2007: 30). Having a shared policy objective does not mean the collaborating actors also agree with each other on other subjects. The members of an interest group coalition can agree, and work together, on a particular objective while having a conflict on several other issues. Heany and Lorenz (2013) conceptualized an interest group coalition as the entity that arises when two or more interest groups choose to collaborate in advocating their public policy agendas. Here the collaborating actors do not have to agree on the policy objectives. An interest group

coalition is born as long as two interest groups collaborate. Next to the actual collaboration there are no requirements for what defines an interest group coalition. The concept is very flexible and can take many different forms (Heany and Lorenz, 2013: 254).

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Sabatier (1988) provided a more substantial conceptualization of the interest group coalition in his seminal work “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”. Sabatier developed a theoretical framework that embeds interest group coalitions in a broad and complex political system. In his advocacy coalition framework, advocacy coalitions work together in the same manner as other interest group coalitions. However, Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions share more than a policy goal or collective efforts. The actors in advocacy coalitions also share a set of normative and causal beliefs about how they can achieve their goal (Sabatier, 1988: 129-139). While the intentions of a coalition are based on its beliefs, its ability to realize its goals depend heavily on the resources the coalition can utilize. The members of an Advocacy Coalition can also have various positions within an organization. Its members can be elected officials, bureaucrats, researchers and interest group leaders.

Ad Hoc Coalition

The literature on interest group coalitions also described some interest group coalitions with specific organization features. One of the types of interest group coalitions featured more often in the literature on interest groups coalitions is the Ad Hoc Coalition. Berry (1989: 166) defined the Ad Hoc Coalition as an interest group coalition that “exists for the specific purpose of working on a single issue and dissolve when that issue reaches some resolution or when the coalition partners no longer feel the effort is worthwhile.” Such a coalition is

characterised by little or no formalization, a limited duration and considerable autonomy of the coalition partners (Pijnenburg, 1998). The Ad Hoc Coalition can be regarded as the opposite of interest group coalitions, which are formal, with an extensive organizational structure and built to last.

Event Coalition

Closely related to the Ad Hoc Coalition is the Event Coalition. An Event Coalition by nature is, according to Levi and Murphy (2006), just as the Ad Hoc Coalition; a coalition built to function for a limited timeframe and without organizational features. The difference is that Event Coalitions are built for one particular event. The purpose of the organization is mostly to provide tactical and practical coordination. Event Coalitions often do not have long-term objectives or strategies. Such coalitions often are highly flexible and can be created quickly to respond to a particular event more effectively.

Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition

Pollack (1997, 578) defined the 'Baptist and Bootlegger' coalition not by its organizational features or the number of objectives it has. A Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition is a coalition of very different interest groups, hence the name Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition, which have chosen to work together because they have one common objective. The common objective is often territorial in nature. For example, a coalition of interest groups from one country that cooperate because they all want the standards used in their country to become the supranational or international norm.

2.3.1 Characteristics of an interest group coalition

Depending on the context, issues at hand and interest groups involved, there can be many different types of interest group coalitions. Different types that are not all classified.

However, several authors have demonstrated that coalitions can be distinguished by using diverse concepts, which expose specific characteristics of coalitions. In this chapter, the characteristics found in the literature will be outlined.

Formalization, duration and autonomy

A good starting point for the characteristics of interest group coalitions is the typology created by Mulford and Rogers (1982: 9-31). They divided interest group coalitions based on their formalization, duration, autonomy of the coalition partners and the number of issues advocated on. Almost all interest groups engage in some degree in networking with other interest groups. How this relationship with other interest groups is formalized does however differ. Mulford and Rogers (1982: 12) labelled this the “formalization” of an interest group coalition. Formalization ranges from interest group coalitions that are based on a verbal, informal understanding amongst the members of the coalition. At the other end of the spectrum there are institutionalized coalitions with formal agreements that bind its members and an organizational structure with logos, letterheads and secretariats. Interest group coalitions can also be distinguished based on for how long the coalition is intended (Mulford and Rogers, 1982: 13). Some coalitions, such as the Event Coalition, are created to advocate for one particular event and then disband. Such coalitions are used to influence the outcome for one particular proposed law or one summit. Other coalitions are made to last for a longer time. These coalitions often try to influence a policy process that will continue for many years, or even decades.

Mulford and Rogers (1982: 12) argued that the degree of autonomy is also an important characteristic in classifying interest group coalitions. The degree of autonomy of the coalition members depends on whether the coalition is a cooperation between equals or a unified coalition. In a cooperation different interest groups work together in a coalition, often

a peak or umbrella organization. The members are still doing the advocacy but coordinate their actions actively. In a unified coalition, the coalition advocates on behalf of its members and is in control of its message. The national trade associations in Western Europe are a good example of such a coalition (Pijnenburg, 1998: 305).

Number of issues advocates, homogeneity and size

The final characteristic used by Mulford and Rogers (1982: 13) is the number of issues advocated on by an interest group coalition. This can be one single issue, such as the Ad Hoc Coalition, or multiple issues, as with trade organizations. The higher the number of issues an advocacy organization represents the harder it is to reach a consensus amongst its members. At the same time by representing multiple interest groups on multiple issues, the interest group coalition becomes an important player in the political arena. A trade organization, which represents many different actors on diverse issues, is therefore a complex player for politicians. They cannot ignore the trade organizations, as there is usually much at stake and high costs if they choose to do so.

In addition to the characteristics of interest groups used by Mulford and Rogers to classify interest group coalitions there are multiple characteristics used by other scholars. The most important characteristics of interest group coalitions not used by Mulford and Rogers are the homogeneity of its participants, the size of the coalition and the targeted audience of the coalition. The homogeneity of the participating interest groups in a coalition is based on the diversity of the coalition members (Pijnenburg, 1998: 305). Trade associations are a good example of rather homogenous interest group coalitions. The trade organization represents a multitude of organizations that are all a member of a particular trade. This ensures a certain degree of similarity not found in for example a labour peak association. Examples of interest group coalitions that often are heterogeneous are Event Coalitions and Baptist and Bootlegger

Coalitions. While the members share one particular objective that brings them together they are different types of organizations with different objectives in many other respects. Homogeneity is important as it influences the functioning of the interest group coalition in multiples ways. It is arguably easier to reach a consensus if the interest groups in a coalition are similar. This also makes it easier to work together on other issues.

Interest group coalitions can also differ from each other based on the strategies they use to achieve their objective. To realize a policy objective interest group coalitions can utilize many different strategies. Lobbying entails more than lobbying politicians. It can also be done at different levels of the government, focus on grassroots mobilization, amicus curiae briefs, get-out-the-vote drives or media advertisement (Heaney and Geoffrey, 2013: 254). Different objectives can require different strategies and different strategies can lead to other organizational features. One of the most straightforward differences between interest group coalitions is size. Interest group coalitions can have a different number of members and this influences the functioning and dynamics in a coalition (Heaney and Geoffrey, 2013: 252). Larger coalitions can have more resources and are better at signalling to politicians. In other words communicating information about to politicians. The downside of a larger coalition is that a consensus amongst the members becomes harder to reach. Larger coalitions can also be less stable than smaller coalitions.

In order to find out why interest groups join a coalition and which interest group coalitions can be distinguished I structured the main findings from different theories of several authors. Firstly, I provided an overview with different reasons of why interest groups join an interest group coalition. Subsequent I have structured and divided the reasons under a few main reasons. Lastly I mostly based on the characteristics argued by Mulford and Rogers. That led to the following characteristics which will be used to assess an interest group coalition: formalization, duration, autonomy of the coalition partners, number of issues

advocated on, homogeneity of its participants, size of the coalition and the targeted audience of the coalition. These were the most evident from the literature I have been using on interest group coalitions and coalition formation. This framework will make it easier to analyse the RCI case. In the subsequent chapter the case of the RCI will firstly be described, before both the initial organizational features and how the RCI developed over time will be analysed.

III: Background and Case

3.1 Introduction

In May 2007, Ivo Opstelten, at that time mayor of Rotterdam, presented the Rotterdam Climate Initiative at the Clinton Climate Congress. As it turned out, Rotterdam was the only Dutch city among fifty major world cities in the fight against climate change. The climate initiative in Rotterdam was also unique because the municipality, the industry and the port were cooperating with each other in the RCI. Being home of one of the biggest ports in the world was also one of the reasons why Rotterdam, together with Houston, Singapore and Shanghai, was invited to join an environmental convention in New York (Milieusensor, Van Tongeren, 2007).

In this chapter the four initiators of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative will be elaborated upon and the eventual emergence of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative will be put in an historical perspective. Therefore, a short insight will be given on the background of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative. At first, the Rotterdam Climate Initiative might seem to have been rather ad hoc. However, it will become clear that the stakeholders were no strangers to each other and have worked together on numerous occasions before the Rotterdam Climate Initiative. At the same time, Rotterdam cooperated with many partners in its fight against climate change. In 2007 these ambitions resulted in an initiative: the RCI. This chapter will therefore answer the partial question: ‘Who are the four stakeholders and what are their individual interests?’.

3.2 RCI – Stakeholders

The RCI counted four different founders in 2007. Before addressing the RCI coalition, the following subchapters will discuss the four stakeholders individually. These stakeholders

have their own views and agenda concerning sustainability in the region of Rotterdam, for the Netherlands and worldwide. Views and agendas are being further adjusted and sometimes shaped by the RCI. Additionally, their individual characteristics and interests will be outlined in the next chapter, in order to determine why they decided to work together.

3.2.1 Municipality of Rotterdam

The city of Rotterdam is not a regular municipality in the Netherlands. As a low-lying delta, Rotterdam has the largest international port of Europe. The Rotterdam area also has the highest CO₂ emission in the Netherlands (Rotterdam Climate Initiative, n.d.). A staggering twenty-five per cent of the CO₂ pollution in the Netherlands originated from the Rotterdam area (RCI, 2011). The city was therefore obliged to reduce its environmental impact. The governing coalition agreed in 2006 to focus on sustainability. This resulted in the environment being part of the economic and social development agenda of the city. The objectives for 2006 were aimed at air quality, reductions in energy usage and a green living environment (Coalition agreement Rotterdam, 2006). In order to become a leading world port city, regarding knowledge and innovation, Rotterdam needed to become the cleanest world port city first. The large chemical and energy industries in the Rotterdam area led to a substantive CO₂ pollution. It was not unexpected that a reduction of the CO₂ emissions became one of the main objectives of the governing coalition (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007: 49). In 2006, the International Advisory Board (IAB), led by former Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, advised Rotterdam to position itself as the World Capital of CO₂ free energy (IAB Report, 2006). The International Advisory Board accentuated the economic opportunities of clean energy and reduction of CO₂ emissions for the Rotterdam area, if by 2025 it had achieved to position itself as the World Capital of CO₂ free energy. In that same advice, the International Advisory Board emphasised that Rotterdam should manifest itself on international level. The International Advisory Board is an advisory council, which comes

together once every two years, comprised of international leaders in academia, the public and the private sector. The International Advisory Board advises the municipal executives of Rotterdam on economic development as well as different aspects of urban development.

The city council invested 31 million euro between 2007 and 2010 in the RCI to lower its emissions. On that account, it is obvious that politicians pay attention to this area. At the same time, Rotterdam also strived to be an attractive city to live in, for sustainable economic growth and activity for the city. These ambitions have been codified in the spatial development strategy 2030 ‘Stadsvisie Rotterdam’ and in the RCI goals. Within the ‘Stadsvisie Rotterdam’ there were six subjects outlined in order to be effective in reducing CO₂ emissions. New policies are tailored on the practices of Rotterdam and for the development of laws and regulation Rotterdam should exploit more own experience (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007: 90-91).

Rotterdam works together with companies, organizations and the community in order to implement the most recent ‘Sustainable Program 2015 – 2018’. The Paris Climate Agreement offered an opportunity to accelerate their efforts to fight climate change. Rotterdam will introduce an additional sustainability measures during their current term of office (Press release, 8 July 2016). The fight against climate change and sustainability can be seen as significant objectives for the municipality. The city is constant developing and it requires measurements.

3.2.2 Port of Rotterdam

The Port of Rotterdam is of great importance for the economic growth and prosperity for both Rotterdam and the Netherlands. However, this economic activity comes at a cost. In the Rotterdam area, over 85% of its CO₂ emission is derivable from the industry, and especially from the energy industry (RCI, 2009). Because of its state as one of the largest seaport in the world and close proximity to densely populated areas, it is important that the public opinion is

positive. If the goals of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative are met, it could help to create a greener image of the Port of Rotterdam and its industries.

From the start, the Port of Rotterdam had to cope with two agenda's. Its economic interests concerned the importance of transport and transshipment. The other interest was that of the RCI. The new coal power stations are a good example of how these interests can clash. Taking the new coal power stations into commission was good for the port, but dramatic in terms of CO₂ emissions (Energietransitie interviews, 2008). The port needed to act within an active role regarding activities, as being of one of the carriers of the RCI. Additionally, the Port of Rotterdam committed to ambitious goals. One of them concerned the aim of becoming the most sustainable world port. The Port of Rotterdam worked ground breaking and with the development of the second Maasvlakte it wanted to become leading in sustainability and accessibility. Corporate governance has definitely played a role in this. However, the commitments made were not set to be formal as final goals. This way the shareholders could have a say in developing the policies. The main contributions of the Port of Rotterdam to the RCI were in facilitating, stimulating and developing projects that contribute to the fulfilment of the RCI ambitions (Port of Rotterdam, 2010). It deserves to be mentioned that the municipality of Rotterdam is the main shareholder of the port of Rotterdam.

3.2.3 Deltalinqs


The third initiator concerns Deltalinqs, as the entrepreneur association of the port and industrial enterprises in Mainport Rotterdam. Since 2001 over 700 companies have joined the association and it accounts for 3,5 % of the Gross National Product in the Netherlands. Indirectly they provided work to over 180,00 people. Deltalinqs aims to further Rotterdam's sustainable growth and strengthen its social and political acceptability of the port activities in the whole area. Their principles are, in general, based on entrepreneurship and innovation. Deltalinqs represents its member's interest on six main themes, namely the economy,

innovation, environment, labour market, infrastructure and safety (Deltalinqs, n.d.). The association underlines that it exists for and by its members and therefore works together in order to promote common concerns. Each year members can provide valuable input through many meetings that Deltalinqs organizes. Deltalinqs joined the RCI as well regarding its private representation in the coalition. At the start, there was a lot of discussion within Deltalinqs about the targets that have been set. 50% reduction of the CO₂ emissions sounded absurd and not everyone at the General Assembly supported the goals of the RCI. In such an assembly, it matters who supports which cause. The refineries were mostly against the RCI target; however, everyone was in favour of energy efficiency (Interviews, 2015). In 2014 Deltalinqs set up Deltalinqs Energy Forum (DEF), a knowledge network, which works with the municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam and the DCMR. DEF is organised in four business platforms that pursue the ambitions of the RCI (Deltalinqs Energy Forum: Programma, 2015). The ambassadors of this program signed on behalf of the members of Deltalinqs a Letter of Cooperation with the municipality of Rotterdam. This letter of intent did not establish financial or legal obligations. It simply united companies in the business platforms from the industry, the port, energy sector and the public sector.

Source:

Deltalinqs Energy

Forum, 2015



Climate change has reached Deltalinqs as it also has an impact on business and the industry on a longer term. The companies needed to adapt and work together for solutions. They can do a lot on their own; however, the element of partnership is significant. Competition is high and the economic importance plays a role. Nevertheless, there is a great importance for society where working energy efficient is key. In other words, working together to work cleaner and more sustainable.

3.2.4 DCMR

DCMR is the environmental protection agency of local and regional authorities in the Rijnmond area. It includes the province of South Holland, sixteen municipalities and Rotterdam. DCMR licenses, accredits and controls business regarding the environment regulation. The main objective is to use its legal instruments, knowledge and expertise in order to diminish the detrimental environmental impact of companies. Consequently, DCMR

aims to provide a safe living environment for the residents in the Rijnmond region. Besides, they work together with other government agencies, such as the labour inspectorate, the public health service, the fire department and the police. DCMR depends on the local and regional authorities for guidance when it comes to objectives for a liveable and safe place for everyone who lives and works in the Rotterdam region. The concrete tasks are the monitoring of environmental quality, advising on environment and safety, imposing environmental and safety rules, and monitoring compliance. Furthermore, the DCMR is responsible for issuing permits and taking action against nuisance and incidents (DCMR rapport, 2009). In addition to these tasks, the DCMR also gives advice and is working together with the municipality of Rotterdam and the port of Rotterdam.

The DCMR is a partner of the RCI. There are interests that collide between de Port of Rotterdam and Deltalinqs. DCMR is within the RCI positioned as the “green conscience” in order to be the balance between the partners (Interviews, 2015). For instance, it has the responsibility to advise the RCI about the capture and storage of carbon. DCMR took a leading position on the CSS project and focused on knowledge structure, policy development and enforcement (Energietransitie Interviews, 2008).

DCMR is furthermore involved in essential international networks. One of the more important networks the DCMR takes part in is the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). This network provides information about policy development and represents their interests at the European level. By providing position papers for the EC they can influence policies for instance. Eurocities is another important network of big cities in Europe. Their main responsibility is to influence the policy agenda in the EU and provide knowledge for the cooperative projects of the EU. The DCMR is part of Eurocities by being a member of the Committee of the Environment Forum and participates in the workgroup for Air quality, climate change and energy efficiency.

The wish to improve the climate, the regional environment and stimulate the economy is a collective goal of all four-coalition members. The ambitions of the DCMR included reducing the environmental impact of companies and create knowledge of how to run an environmental friendly port. This has been an ambition of the DCMR since its founding in 1971 and makes DCMR a logical partner for the RCI.

3.2.5 Other

From a formal point of view, the municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs and DCMR Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond are the founders and members of the RCI coalition. However, the stakeholders group involved around the RCI is much broader. The RCI has, besides its four formal partners, many other partners throughout the city of Rotterdam. Only taken the council into account where experts ranging from Unilever to the WWF, and from the ministries to different Universities, corporate sector and several knowledge institutes to NGOs, have a seat. RCI and its members work together, depending on the current initiatives, with many project developers, contractors and investors (RCI, 2008). Internationally the RCI is part of the C40, the Cities Climate Leadership Group. The C40 is a network of the world's megacities committed to addressing climate change. RCI is also member of the Clinton Climate Initiative as Bill Clinton asked Rotterdam to join him (AD, 2006). The CCI is a program initiated in 2006 by Bill Clinton to fight the climate change. Over the years many more stakeholders have joined the RCI.

3.3 Emergence of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative

The Rotterdam Climate Initiative was not born out of thin air. The four members knew each other for many years and worked together on numerous projects. The objective of the RCI, to reduce the environmental impact of the port and its industries, had also been on the agenda for

many years. Since approximately the sixties, the Rotterdam Port area has been concerned with the environment. In these years, the Port had continued to grow. The socialists preferred the development of the Port and its contribution to the economic development of the region. However, there has been a lot of discussion about and resistance to the growth oriented vision of the port. During the sixties, it became clear that the growth of the port could only continue and count on support if there was also attention for the improvement of air quality and the broader interest of the nearby residents. Therefore, the environmental measures were in natural compensation and focused mainly on improving the air quality (Benner et al, 2009: 22).

1980 – 1990

The focus on air quality in the sixties shifts in the eighties and nineties as new initiatives arise regarding a more efficient energy supply from different interest groups, as the municipality of Rotterdam, the former Eneco, environmental groups, the province of South-Holland and the Europoort-Botlek-Belangen (the former Deltalinqs). In 1993 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment¹ designated the Rijnmond area as one of the ten ROM-areas. Those were the Spatial Ordering Environment areas, the so-called Ruimtelijke Ordening Milieu. ROM-areas operated on a regional scale and the Rijnmond area was expected to work on how spatial ordering can be combined with environmental aspects. It primarily focused on environmental effects such as air quality and traffic flows. The project “Energy 2010” arose at that time. Initiators were the former project bureau of Warmth-Power (PW/K) and Eneco.² The environment was not the only concern of the ROM-Rijnmond. It also focused on

¹ VROM, Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu. In 2010 is this ministry divided into three

² In the 1980's the new energy companies were no longer part of the government. By means of the Dutch law it is not possible for municipality companies to merge. The municipality remained involved as being shareholder. In 1995 Den Haag, Dordrecht en Rotterdam merged and formed a new organisation, Eneco.

expanding the Port of Rotterdam. Keeping a balance between economic growth and the environment was not an easy task, especially because environmental movements were not represented in the ROM-Rijnmond group. Environmental groups had to maintain their dialogue through consultations with the non-governmental stakeholders inside the ROM-Rijnmond group (Benner et al, 2009: 22). These consultative structures did ensure that different stakeholders, business related and environmental oriented, would continuously be able to find each other.

Late nineties – 2000

In 1997 the Dutch government introduced a national CO₂ reduction plan and altered the playing field. It shifted the focus to CO₂ reduction and the warming of the earth. At the same time, it altered the working of environmental projects by creating grants for related projects. One of the methods to reduce CO₂ was to exchange waste heat. This encouraged companies to work together in order to exchange warmth. The government did not have a major role in the CO₂ reduction, apart from providing grants to facilitate projects. Consequently, the strategy of electricity company Eneco changed. In 2000 Jan Laan, the new director of the ROM-Rijnmond area, was willing to put ‘energy’ back on the map in cooperation with the province of South-Holland. George Brouwer led this Energy Rijnmond project. Before 2003 the government in the Netherlands worked with the Energy2010 programme. In 2003, three initiatives, namely the Energy Rijnmond, Environment Rijnmond and INES Mainport Project coincided into R3. The R3 was an industrial program and focussed on energy efficiency, green raw materials and CO₂ storage. The ROM-Rijnmond was formally responsible for this project.

After 2003

Hugo Brouwer, responsible for the Energy Transition at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, noticed environmental developments in the Rijnmond. The area had however no organisation or a clear vision where they were heading. Jan Paul van Soest, Brouwer's advisor, was given the assignment to map the long-term perspective of the Rijnmond area. Van Soest gathered relevant partners and wrote the vision paper 'To C or not to C' (Energietransitie interviews, 2008). This paper eventually led to a more focused framework and a more evident problem analysis regarding the long-term perspective of the Rotterdam area. In addition, it became clear that the industry in Rotterdam was strongly dependent on fossil fuels. This could only result in inevitable risks for the future and accordingly climate targets were set. On national level, the government withdrew because other regions in the Netherlands also presented themselves and were willing to participate (Energietransitie interviews, 2008).

In that year, the Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR)³ had a meeting. The EDBR was an advisory board of the Municipal Executive of the city of Rotterdam. According to Van Soest (2008) the Board worked on its image and needed an issue to stand for. That meeting covered enough items regarding environment and climate, such as the vision paper of the R3. Top executives, Lubbers and Opstelten, then reinvented the R3 and renamed it into Rotterdam Climate Initiative. Ruud Lubbers was the former Prime Minister and was also chair of the International Advisory Board. In the same period the IAB also advised Rotterdam of becoming world capital of free CO₂ energy. The executives based the RCI goals on the previous analyses and advise from the R3 vision paper.

³ In 2014 the Economic Board merged with Rotterdam Investment Agency and Rotterdam Marketing into Rotterdam Partners

2006 - 2007

It was a matter of time the municipality of Rotterdam took over the objectives of the EDBR and the IAB. The initiative had also political support. When Ivo Opstelten was the mayor of Rotterdam, the Liberals, Labour, Christian Democrats and the Greens held power in the city council. Councilor Arno Bonte, from the Greens insisted that Rotterdam should become a member of the Clinton Foundation (GroenLinks, 2006). He proposed this in the commission for Economy, Port and Environment meeting (RCI, n.d.). The RCI became a fact, however the initiators pretended for a short period of time that there was nothing else before the RCI (Benner et al, 2008). Many people were involved around this project and thereupon threatened to withdraw. RCI became a new climate program of the municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, DCMR Environmental service Rijnmond and the logistical and industrial companies represented in Deltalinqs. The RCI included, besides the industrial initiatives, also the built environment. That concerned the human-made surrounding, which provided setting for human activity, including buildings, parks, infrastructure for water supply and energy networks.

At this point a slightly other view can be taken into account about how the RCI emerged in its last steps. From the interview sources, it became clear that this climate initiative had been formed very fast. Climate change hit the political agenda in 2006. A British development economist, Nicholas Stern, released a report, better known as the Stern Review, about the greenhouse effect and global warming. (NRC Next, 2006). He outlined a terrible future we are heading for if we do not react, and not doing anything will be more expensive than actual investing in climate improvement. Tony Blair, prime minister of the United Kingdom at that time, endorsed the conclusions of this report about climate change.


The next highlights are seen as crucial moments in the history of the RCI. In the Netherlands, Balkenende aligned with his British colleague, as there was a need for acting.

The Dutch coalition agreement included a goal of 30% reduction of the CO₂ emissions compared to 1990. On national level, sustainability turned into one of five cornerstones of this coalition agreement.

On local level, in 2006 Bill Clinton, former President of the United States chose for Rotterdam as the only Dutch city to join his project. Bill Clinton was enthusiastic and devoted against climate change and demanded a robust approach of Rotterdam in the fight against climate change (NRC Handelsblad, 2007). Clinton launched his own Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) where forty world cities cooperate in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (NRC Handelsblad, 2007). In December 2006 Rotterdam joined the CCI whereby the mayor of Rotterdam Opstelten announced his ambition. Rotterdam must become the world capital of CO₂-free energy (Trouw, 2006). Climate change required a revision in many policy areas, such as traffic, spatial planning, energy, housing and economic policy. In addition, Rotterdam needed to set up its municipal lobby differently in the political capital city The Hague. One of the lobby interests would be including sea shipping in the Kyoto greenhouse gas reduction agreements (Trouw, 2006).

In that same month Ivo Opstelten paid a visit to the mayor of London, Ken Livingstone. The reason for that was mainly the Tour de France. However, Livingstone asked Opstelten to become a member of the Cities Climate Leadership Group. Livingstone chaired this extensive network of world cities that exchange and share their knowledge and experience regarding reducing carbon dioxide. Ivo Opstelten joined his group and was determined to work on his ambition. He approached an expert within the municipality for an assignment in order to set up an outline for a plan with actions regarding reducing CO₂ emissions in the Rotterdam area (Interviews, 2017). That was basically the start of the RCI. Important to mention is the fact that in September 2006 the municipality executives of Rotterdam presented their strategic policy on energy in a program the Rotterdam Energy

Program (REP). This REP was an initiative of the Port of Rotterdam, municipality in cooperation with Deltalinqs and DCMR (College B&W, 2006). Everyone, including knowledge institutions, were fulfilling their tasks. Only one challenge was ahead. The municipality wanted to maintain the crucial tasks of actively and effectively bringing together and combining all economic and sustainable opportunities and therefore perceive missing links. In other words, it concerned facilitating and guiding the cooperation regarding sustainable energy, innovations, and transitions in the area. The IAB followed short after with their advice and with the accession to the CCI, the development of the case has accelerated. In March 2007, Opstelten informed the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) about Rotterdam's ambitions of the RECP through an official letter. In which he explained the organisation of the RECP as seen below.



Rotterdam Energy and Climate Board:

voorzitter: burgemeester

kwartiermaker: drs. R.F.M. Lubbers

Leden:

wethouders Financiën en Milieu/Haven/Economie,
OBR, HbR, DCMR, Deltalinqs, Programmadirecteur

Rotterdam Energy and Climate Council:

voorzitter: kwartiermaker drs. R.F.M. Lubbers

vice-voorzitter: ir. R. Willems

Leden: definitieve samenstelling volgt.

Taak: adviseren en ondersteunen van het RECP

Management Team:

- programmadirecteur: drs. A. Dikmans
- Gemeente Rotterdam: drs. F.H.M. Akerboom
- HbR: R. Melieste
- DCMR: drs. M.M. de Hoog
- Deltalinqs: C.J.M. Asselbergs

Expert team RECP:

voorzitter: prof. dr. W. Hafkamp

Leden: nader vast te stellen

Taak: advisering aan Board, MT en Council

Title: Organisation RECP

Source: Letter to the Ministry of VROM (2007)

Also, Opstelten emphasised the fact that cooperation with the government was considered very important and necessary. Subsequently, the RECP is discussed in the city council where the Municipal Executive of Rotterdam announced to come up with a proposal about the needs of the RECP estimated to be around 50 million from the municipality's side (Commissie

ESMV, 2007). The quantitative goals of the RCI were formulated in CO₂-terms regarding a more straightforward communication. The ambition was a 50% reduction of CO₂ emission in 2025. That was even before the European Union (EU) or Dutch government formulated this target. This certain goal must be seen as that ambition which ensures a more sustainable energy supply in and around Rotterdam (Energietransitie interviews, 2008).

3.4 Organisation structure and changes

The RCI is a public-private partnership, including the municipality of Rotterdam, DCMR environmental protection agency Rijnmond, the Port of Rotterdam and the industry Deltalinqs. These four actors work together in order to achieve the desired results of the RCI. To achieve the results each member was required to contribute and where necessary to support the city in its efforts.

3.4.1 Organisation

In order to function, at least on paper, the RCI created an elaborate formal organisation structure. At the beginning the organizational structure of the RCI included a management team, a board and a council.

Management team


The management team was responsible for the daily affairs of the RCI. The four partners together managed the organization and implement the strategy of the RCI. Each partner was represented with a member in the management team. This management team was daily operational and responsible for most of the work done by the RCI. It cared for the preparation and the implementation of the decisions of the Board. Therefore, the management team reported to the RCI Board.

Board

The Board consisted the highest level of representatives of the four partners. The mayor of the municipality of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, chaired the Board. This Board collectively determined the strategy for the RCI and keeps an eye on the implementation of its strategy.

Council

The RCI Council was the primary advisory body within the RCI. The members of the Council were top specialists in their field of expertise. Different experts, working for organisations as ministries, universities or NGO's, or in the corporate sector, had a seat on the Council. The Council advised the board on many different matters and subjects and provided recommendations. The former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Ruud Lubbers, was the first chairman of the Council. In 2012 Jeroen van der Veer replaced him. He is the current advisor and ambassador of the RCI.



Title: Management model- organisation of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative

Source: RCI, 2007

The management model of the RCI in 2008 is above illustrated, along with the list of members of the board and the management team. The financial responsibility of the RCI was in the hands of the board of Mayor and Alderman of Rotterdam. Both the RCI management team and the RCI board reported to the Rotterdam board of Mayor and Alderman, members of the board of Mayor and Alderman participate in both.

3.4.2 Changes

Since 2007 the RCI has undergone several changes concerning both its main objectives and organisation structure. In 2009, the city of Rotterdam appointed its first climate director for Climate Affairs: Paula Verhoeven. She was responsible for the structure of and implementation of the contribution of Rotterdam to the Rotterdam Climate Initiative. Verhoeven had her own way of leading. She believed the entire municipality was likely to play a role. The entire climate related projects of the city would be managed by and controlled by one project office. As climate director Verhoeven was to manage the 80 million euros for climate-related projects the City of Rotterdam had reserved. At the same time the focus shifted to performance. Climate related projects were required to achieve quantifiable goals. Because of the large budget the program of the RCI was deeply embedded within the municipality and the Port of Rotterdam. Nevertheless, the RCI remained essential as a catalyst in the climate projects of Rotterdam (Report RCI, 2009).

The two main objectives of the RCI were also still in place after a year. The RCI was responsible for achieving a sizable reduction of the CO₂ emission and make the region 100% climate-proof. The derivative goal of strengthening the Rotterdam economy was also still in place. Continuous efforts were made to realize broad support and involvement of companies and the public. Therefore a new program ‘Investing in sustainable growth’ was established with the cooperation of companies and citizens of Rotterdam (Annual Report RCI, 2010). Starting 2011 the tasks and staff of the Department of Coordination Environmental Policy

Rotterdam of Municipal Workers were now part of the Program Bureau Sustainability. The RCI is since then also part of the program bureau.

Program Office Sustainability

In 2012 the Board of Mayor and Aldermen decided to continue along the path of sustainability and to broaden the tasks of the former program bureau (Duurzaamheidsmonitor, 2013). The bureau was renamed as the Program Office Sustainability. This substantial adjustment meant that the classic environment tasks of the municipality had become the responsibilities of the Program Office Sustainability. Hence, the RCI is since then part of the Program Office Sustainability. This reorganization led to a reorganization of the roles and responsibilities of the RCI. After several years this partnership institutionalized. The former RCI director, Wiert-Jan de Raaf, remained the program manager of the Port and Industries, which is associated with the program office and is the primary contact for all the RCI partners. Paula Verhoeven has been appointed as the director Sustainability. The execution of task was invested in the municipal services and third parties. The concrete tasks of the office bureau were as follows: communication and participation around the program facilitating the cooperation the RCI was responsible for; maintaining a network with the most significant executors/performers; and securing sustainability in every aspect within and out the municipal organisation. The municipality of Rotterdam made the Program Office Sustainability responsible for its legal environment issues. They are assisted by the DCMR as the municipality also worked together with the DCMR on advising and execution of legal tasks.

The Program Office Sustainability looks at which parties in the city are contributing to environmental improvements and accordingly sets the agenda and holds those accountable. Additional goals have been set together with the city of Rotterdam and the RCI in the 'Program Sustainability 2010 – 2014'. This program should have strengthen the economy of Rotterdam and result in 350 millions of sustainable investments. These investments were in

order to contribute to an improved employment, a better living quality for the people of Rotterdam and a more attractive business environment for companies. The objectives were alongside the initial goals, such as improving the air quality in Rotterdam.

The practical implementation of the program and reporting its progress were tasks of the Program Office Sustainability. Coordination of the legal environmental tasks of the municipality was also part of the task package (Duurzaamheidsmonitor, 2013). The implementation of the individual activities remained a responsibility of the 'ordinary' municipal organization and the RCI partners, Port of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs and DCMR Environmental Services Rijnmond. The Program Office Sustainability is now part of the cluster City Development of the municipality of Rotterdam. It is a temporary organization as the goal is to eventually integrate the program as an integral and fundamental part of the policies in Rotterdam. The activities and results are being yearly monitored and presented in the Sustainability monitor.

The financial responsibility about the expenditures of the program, including the RCI, is channelled through the Urban Development cluster to the Board of Mayor and Alderman and the city council. There were also other funding sources for carrying out the program. In 2010 a budget of 31 million was reserved (Programmabureau Duurzaam, nd). The Sustainable Program was responsible for the general resources for environment of DCMR and the government fees that are reserved for air quality and soil measurements. These fees may only be used if justified by specific provisions. The external partners received a RCI work budget from the municipality. However, an appeal can be made to their own organizations if they are in need of co-financing. This has led to reducing the dependence of the funding from the municipality (Programmabureau Duurzaam, nd).

(bedragen x € 1.000)

FINANCIERING RCI-PARTNERS	2013
1) DCMR	735
2) Deltalinqs	761
3) Havenbedrijf / Port of Rotterdam	348
TOTAAL	1.844

Title: Financial Funding RCI-partnes

Source: Programmabureau Duurzaam, Duurzaamheidsmonitor

The total budget of the RCI and its members in relation to climate change programs was considerable. In total, an amount of € 1.844.00 was paid to the external RCI partners in 2013. Companies and the Global CSS Institute funded the activities of Deltalinqs for nearly € 530.000. The members of Deltalinqs contributed to launch RCI-activities. The Port of Rotterdam financed around € 1.2 million, comprised mostly of own staff working for RCI-activities and around € 100.000 on external costs.

In 2012 the European Commission was developing a climate adaptation strategy. This strategy needed to be developed on local level and therefore it was facilitating cities with a training program. The city of Rotterdam has been appointed as ‘peer city’ (Duurzaamheidsmonitor, 2013).

2014

In the 2014 coalition agreement the primary goal of the RCI was overhauled. The four partners determined they needed to revise their program as equals in order to ensure an innovative, clean and future-proof port (RCI, 2009). The program also needed to meet both national and the European environmental targets. Accordingly the focus shifted to clean tech businesses and sustainable energy production. This meant a substantial change of direction for the RCI. The primary goal was no longer intact, as the focus lies on green energy, innovation energy-efficiency and clean energy. With these new objectives the RCI was convinced it

could contribute to the achievement of the climate goals and, in a broader sense, have a positive effect on the climate projects in Rotterdam.

2016 and further

Pex Langeberg, alderman in Rotterdam, stated after the Paris Climate Conference (PCC) in December 2016 that the city of Rotterdam would continue to invest in climate change and the economy. Concretely this meant Rotterdam will be investing in healthier air, cleaner energy at lower costs and a strong and innovative economy (Press RCI, march 2017). Based on the ambitions of the ‘Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change 2015-2018’ measures have been taken on air quality, green in the city, climate resistance and area development. While adapting the RCI, Rotterdam’s approach on national and international level is believed to be on the radar of all levels of government, but also on NGOs and knowledge institutions concerning sustainable innovation, mobility and energy transition (Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change, 2015). For Rotterdam, this meant that it is helpful for the discussion with both central government and the EU regarding legislation and subsidies for promoting sustainable transition. The RCI partnership was therefore also helpful for attracting funds and projects to Rotterdam that indirectly results in employment opportunities. In 2030 Rotterdam aims to be a green, healthy and future proof city and therefore commitment is required on many levels. The board of Mayor and Alderman of Rotterdam provides a good example linked to the sustainable goals by stating the explicit intention of clearing the way for future public transportation methods. The municipality is a driving force of the sustainable transition, starting with their own local government (Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change, 2015).

The composition of the RCI also shifted. Its original members remained part of the RCI while the VNO-NCW, the Dutch business organisation, and the province South Holland

have joined. The original members each still have their own vision and implementation agenda that is been coordinated under the umbrella of the RCI (Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change, 2015). These were also set out in documents such as the Port Vision 2030, the Deltalinqs Energy Forum Programme 2014-2018 and the Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change. Furthermore, each member remains providing a member for the management team. In the council many experts from the government, business, knowledge institutes and NGO's come together under the chairmanship of Jeroen van der Veer (RCI, 2017). To conclude, the new focus is line with the RCI, which is the focus on green growth, energy efficiency, innovation and reducing pollution for cleaner air. Reduction of the CO₂ emissions is for the RCI no longer the fundamental goal. It is rather the positive effect from the different sustainable projects and measures that are being implemented.

IV: Analysis

4.1 Introduction

Interest group coalitions vary and an exact definition or even exact specifications, is not easily formulated. In the literature on lobbying coalitions, multiple authors have discussed different types of interest group coalitions. Size, number of issues, institutionalization, time horizon and other characteristics are used in order to categorize lobbying coalitions.

This chapter will start with answering the partial question ‘*Why do interest groups join a coalition?*’ The reasons why the four interest groups decided to join a coalition will be further discussed in order to determine what kind of coalition the RCI is. Taking the case of the RCI into account, there is not one already defined type of coalition, which fits the RCI. The RCI is a public-private coalition with different characteristics. It is clear that the RCI has similarities with the characteristics of an Advocacy Coalition as described by Sabatier. Sabatier’s (1988) Advocacy Coalitions share more than a policy goal or collective efforts, such as normative and causal beliefs. However, besides these characteristics of the RCI coalition is rather different from an Advocacy Coalition. Based on the characteristics several authors have exposed, within different types of interest group coalition earlier. The argument how the RCI differs from an Advocacy Coalition and what kind of coalition it is will be made towards the end of this chapter. Lastly a conclusion will be drawn on the type and characteristic of the RCI answering the partial research question: ‘*What are the characteristics of the RCI coalition?*’. And the comparison will be made between the RCI at the start in 2007 and the current situation of the RCI.

4.2 Reasons of cooperation

The four partners cooperating in the RCI, the municipality of Rotterdam, DCMR environmental protection agency Rijnmond, the Port of Rotterdam and the industry Deltalinqs, are strange bedfellows. Two government organisations and two private, for profit, organizations combining their lobbying organization and working together is not something witnessed every day. The RCI in Rotterdam is a rather unique cooperation and because of that it is not exceptional that the reasons for joining the RCI were different among the four participants.

Economic and signalling to politicians

In the literature we see economic reasons being the most prominent. Organizations work together, among other things in order to be more efficient (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2004: 6). This would enable interest groups to achieve the same objective with fewer resources or achieve objectives unobtainable if there was no cooperation. However, efficiency played a rather marginal role in the reasons provided by the RCI stakeholders for this research. There was no mention of cooperation being more efficient or dividing the costs of lobbying for climate initiatives. The availability of resources leads to different answers from the four partners. The distinction here is between the government organization and the private organizations. The private organizations had resources at their disposal, mostly knowledge, manpower and financial resources, which the government organizations did not have. In order to challenge climate change, and especially to reduce the CO₂ emissions and to strengthen the economy, there was the need of cooperation with the private sector. For the government organizations it was more efficient to work together with the private organizations, regarding enriching these resources rather than creating them themselves.

For the private organizations there was little to be gained in efficiency from the cooperation. Economic efficiency apparently was not an important factor for the RCI participants. The effectiveness of the lobbying efforts did however take a more prominent position in the reasons for joining the RCI. The two government organizations, and especially the municipality of Rotterdam highly valued the cooperation with the Port of Rotterdam and Deltalinqs. The R3, an industrial platform that focussed on energy efficiency, green raw materials and CO₂ storage, was before the RCI emerged a cooperation including the private and the public sector (Energietransitie interviews, 2008). In that extension the municipality built upon the added value of the private sector. Both the municipality and DCMR expressed their preference, as they knew their lobbying efforts, individual or combined, would be rather ineffective without the endorsement of the Port and Deltalinqs. The Port and the industries in that area take such a prominent position in Rotterdam and without their cooperation climate initiatives would have to fight an uphill battle (Interviews, 2017). So in order to lobby effectively for climate initiatives it was imperative that the Port was part of the interest group coalition.

The Port, as lobbying partner, signalled to those being lobbied that the Port was on board with the climate initiatives. Joining the coalition demonstrates that the Port was in agreement on the fight against climate change. This makes it easier for a politician or an organization that is being lobbied to comply or at least be in favour of the initiative. It is, among others, for this reason the municipality was willing to get the Port on board as partner in the RCI.

The Port and Deltalinqs did not mention the effectiveness of lobbying in cooperation with the government organizations as a reason for joining. They did however mention they thought it was important to be a partner of the municipality and DCMR. By offering the Port a seat at the table they wanted to be part of the RCI. The reason for this willingness of the

Port, to be part of the RCI, seems to be that they knew that they were not environmental friendly. The Port and its business is mainly the cause of high CO₂ emissions in the Rotterdam area. Thereby, the environmental regulation could be imposed to reduce their environmental impact. Deltalinqs stated unequivocal there already was too much regulation and bureaucracy (Interviews, 2016). This hindered the competitiveness of the larger port area. The increased attention for environmental issues was considered as a potential risk for even more regulation. Deltalinqs was rather part of the efforts to curb the climate impact of the port area than to be on the outside and be confronted with new regulations and its accompanying bureaucracy. Additionally it is leads to interpret the fact, that being part of the RCI 'looked good'. It showed the willingness of the port area and the industry to reduce its environmental impact and challenge climate change. The actual reduction in greenhouse gasses or the environmental impact of the larger port area was not mentioned as a reason to join, nor the efforts of the RCI to lobby for initiatives to reduce the environmental impact of the port area. In other words, the Port of Rotterdam and Deltalinqs joined the RCI as a defensive measure. They did not want to be accused of not caring about the environment or be confronted with regulation that would serious undermine their competitive international position.

Norms

The creation of the RCI and the subsequent joining of the four participants also has a normative aspect. On several occasions interviewees mentioned it was the "logical" next step in the already existing cooperation between the partners (Energietransitie interviews, 2008). The four partners had been working together for many years and on multiple climate-related initiatives. Formalizing this cooperation in an organization made sense. This also fits in the general trend in Rotterdam. There are many different platforms and organizations where public and private partners work together. In Rotterdam this method of organizing apparently

is rather popular. So when the municipality of Rotterdam proposed the RCI and asked the Port and Deltalinqs to join them they were both used to such forms of cooperation and considered it a logical next step. Not joining the RCI would be against earlier behaviour and would also put other cooperative projects in question.

Alternative and organizational

The collective organization – an interest group coalition in this case – can itself also be a reason for an organization to join. The collective organization can have a successful track record, making the step to join somewhat less of a risk, or it can be the pivotal collective organization in its field; a gatekeeper so to say. If an interest group wants to achieve anything in this field, it will simply have to join this initiative. These reasons are all of little importance for the decision to join the RCI.

The RCI was a new organization, however it did not have to be created from scratch. The participants already knew each other from the R3 strategic platform. The R3, including the four members, focussed on energy efficiency, green raw materials and CO₂ storage (Energietransities interviews, 2008). Building on earlier connection in the field of environmental action groups, the RCI narrowed their focus within the fight against climate change. Better organizing and structuring the organization has been a reason why the private sector responded positively to the request to be part of the RCI. Joining a functioning coalition with active and important members is therefore an important reason.

The circumstances under which a lobby group operates can influence its strategy. If an issue becomes more salient it can become a higher priority for a lobby organization attractive (Mahoney, 2007: 12). Salience can also attract more resources from other lobby organization. Higher salience can thus lead to a decision to join a lobby coalition. Without a doubt the environment has become a more salient issue in the recent decades. The Environmental

Convention in New York, an important event in the creation of the RCI, is just one of many examples of the environmental initiatives that were launched in that period of time. Various interviewees mentioned the importance and increased attention, of protecting the environment. However, none linked the significance of environmental protection to joining the RCI directly. Changes in the circumstances seemed to play a less important role in the decision to join the RCI. In the coalition agreement, the municipality of Rotterdam decided to focus on the environment, as it was part of the economic and social development agenda of the city. Rotterdam wanted to become leading as a sustainable world port city (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007). For that matter the reasons of the RCI were in the spectrum of being part of an initiative that will brand Rotterdam in a positive way.

Concluding, it can be said there is a sharp distinction between why the government organizations, the municipality of Rotterdam and DCMR, and the private organizations, the Port of Rotterdam and Deltalinqs, joined the RCI. The private partners were there because they felt the pressure. This pressure was both of the government and the public. The private partners were asked to join the RCI and a refusal to join could have put them and the government at opposite sides of the environmental issue (Interviews, 2017). This could have resulted in regulation that would have harm their international competitive position. They also felt the pressure of the public, as more people became aware of the importance of the environment. That means if they were not joining the RCI, and in worst case even opposing the initiatives, it could have harm their image. The private stakeholders thus had to be part of it and therefore joined the RCI.

There is no indication that they actually cared about the actual lobbying. Regulations and bureaucracy concerning the environment were rather the objectives they cared about. In addition they were concerned about economic affairs, which would get an impulse if the branding of this initiative proceeds as expected. The private organizations were seen as

significant for the public organization. In other words, they needed the resources these organizations could bring to the table. That was mostly manpower and expertise of how the environmental impact of the port activities could be reduced. Furthermore the municipality wanted the industry and the Port of Rotterdam on board in order to indicate and expose the Port was not against the RCI. If the RCI had to lobby on behalf of environmental protection while the Port of Rotterdam was opposing it, the chances of realizing anything would be slim to none. The RCI needed the stamp of approval of the Port and the industrial companies.

4.3 Characteristics RCI coalition

The concept of an interest group coalition is very flexible and can take many different forms (Heany and Lorenz, 2013: 254). From that perspective, the RCI coalition has characteristics of different types of coalitions. Lowery (2007) stated when different actors share an objective and being likeminded, they sometimes gather in order to achieve a common policy. The RCI has different actors that share an objective, but they did not naturally gather. The reason why they gathered will be expanded in the next subchapter.

Initially the RCI existed for a specific purpose and was working on its main goal, namely reducing the CO₂ emission by half in 2025. Taking that into account we can therefore say that the RCI is also partly an Ad Hoc Coalition, as Berry (1989) defined to be an interest group coalition that “exists for the specific purpose of working on a single issue and dissolve when that issue reaches some resolution or when the coalition partners no longer feel the effort is worthwhile”. In addition, it is also partly an Event Coalition as defined by Levi and Murphi (2006). The coalition is built to function for a limited timeframe and achieve specific objectives. The characteristics of the above coalitions are distinguished by among others the typology of Mulford and Rogers (1982) based on formalization, duration, autonomy and

number of issues advocated on.

Formalization

Mulford and Rogers (1982) describe formalization as how interest groups engage with the other interest groups within a coalition. It differs in how the relationship is formalized and it can be based on verbal, informal understanding, but it can also be an institutionalized coalition that binds its members with formal codified agreements and a clear organizational structure. At the start of the RCI, all the four members signed an extensive agreement, which laid out the organizational structure of the RCI. This agreement consisted of a management team, a board and a council (RCI, 2007). These are all formalized and binding for all the member organizations. Part of the original agreement is that all four members are being represented in the management. So each member has the formal right of consultation and deciding on decisions made. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the RCI is more than its formal organizational structure. It also applies to its image as made clear by the logo the RCI has been using. In addition to the RCI logo, we also see the logos of the members as the coalition emphasises its participating members.



ROTTERDAM.CLIMATE.INITIATIVE

Title: RCI Logo

Source: <http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/>

Duration

Rotterdam set the ambitious objective of becoming a sustainable world port city. In order to

achieve that, RCI set their target on reducing the CO₂ emissions by half, using 1990 as comparison point. This main goal must be achieved by 2025. From this perspective, the organisation existed in order to achieve an objective with a limited time horizon. The RCI did not have a clear long-term future plan beyond 2025. Mulford and Rogers' (1982) Event Coalition is in particular created to advocate for one particular event. This is for the RCI not entirely the case, as it has a secondary objective, namely strengthening the economy. This meant stimulating innovation and knowledge development in terms of sustainability; stimulating sustainable energy generation and involving civil society and the private sector (Jaarverslag RCI, 2008). Their main goal was the fight against climate change and achieving clear results by 2025. However, it is nowhere mentioned RCI would dissolve afterwards or at least what would happen if they did not meet their goals on time. The short-term effects were expected to be less CO₂ and efficient use of energy, as sustainable energy generation and CO₂ capture, have a longer lead time (Jaarverslag RCI, 2008). In other words, the RCI might have had a limited time horizon on paper, but it is unrealistic to expect its main objective to be achieved in the near future. There is also no formal agreement of how the RCI will be dissolved, which therefore we can say that the RCI is not build for a limited timeframe.

Autonomy

The degree of autonomy is important as it determines if the coalition is between equals or a unified organization, which acts upon itself. Within the RCI, the members are doing the advocacy. Their actions are being coordinated, but there is a certain level of autonomy, which ensures members to lobby. For instance, if there is a certain project, where the network and expertise lies within the port of Rotterdam, then the port will do the advocacy (Interviews, 2015). There is as expected intercourse between the members and everything is coordinated, but the individual members have a high level of autonomy within the organisation.

Conclusively it can be stated, the RCI is a coalition between equals with a high level of autonomy for its members.

Number of issues advocated

The number of issues that are advocated by an interest group coalition says among other things something about reaching consensus within a coalition and amongst its members. The higher the numbers of issues, the harder it is to reach that consensus (Mulford and Rogers, 1982: 13). The RCI advocates mainly on behalf of the two main goals that have been set. Not all the members do however see reducing the CO₂ emissions by 2025 as a doable goal. It is known Deltalinqs questioned this objective from the beginning (Interviews, 2015). The RCI uses the fight against climate change and sustainability as an umbrella issue. One of the issues included under this umbrella is the strengthening of the economy of Rotterdam. Mulford and Rogers (1982) emphasise the fact that when a coalition represents multiple interest groups on multiple issues the interest group coalition will become an important player in the political arena. The RCI is an example of such an important player, which includes the significant players in the city of Rotterdam and advocates on behalf of multiple issues.

Homogeneity

Pijnenburg (1998) stressed that homogeneity in a coalition is based on diversity of the coalition members. Homogenous coalitions represent members with a certain degree of similarity. The RCI is an example of a heterogeneous coalition. Its members share enough to bring them together, although they are different types of organizations. This includes different objectives and a different strategy regarding how to accomplish their objectives. The municipality for instance is concerned about the general welfare of the city, including safety and economic affairs, while the Port of Rotterdam is mostly concerned about its competitive

position, image and the possibility to grow. The RCI is a coalition of strange bedfellows. Additionally the RCI also has similarities with a Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition, as described by Pollack (1997, 578), as it is a coalition of very different interest groups, which have chosen to work together because they have one common objective.

Size

Interest groups coalitions differ also in size, as they can have a different number of members. Heaney and Lorenz (2013) stressed size influences the functioning and dynamic in a coalition. Larger coalitions are more likely to have more resources and are better at signalling to politicians. The RCI coalition has four members, which includes important players from the public and the private sector in the Rotterdam area. Because the RCI is relatively small it coordinates quickly and reaches a consensus without too much trouble. While the coalition might be small it does have a large reach and weight. This is the result of each member being an important player and having its own expertise. The combination of these factors provides a comprehensive lobbying coalition in Rotterdam.

Conclusively, it can be stated that coalitions have many different characteristics by which we can distinguish them, however there are certain types that are standing out. The RCI coalition is based, on its characteristics, a fusion of different types of coalitions. It is partially an Ad Hoc Coalition, a Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition and an Event Coalition. However, given the underdeveloped state of the literature on advocacy coalitions there is no already defined type of coalition that fits the RCI. So it is best to not categorize the RCI using the coalition types provided in the literature, but use the characteristics provided. At the start the RCI was a long-term, formalized advocacy coalition where the limited number of heterogeneous members had considerable freedom to advocate on behalf of two umbrella

issues. The RCI structure ensured coordination amongst the members and a place at the table for every member.

4.4 Comparison characteristics

The current situation will be compared with the initial organizational structure of the RCI in 2007, in order to answer the partial research question: *'Has the RCI changed since it was established 2007?'*

In the ten years the RCI has been in existence, its organizational structure has changed. The most important development for the RCI has been the shifting from its initial main goal to several "new" goals and the position of the original members in the RCI.

Duration, Number of issues advocated

The specific purpose of existing was the fight against climate change, with the main task of reducing the CO₂ emissions by half in 2025. However, the focus changed within a few years as the target was not doable with the timeframe. The RCI commissioned a research, which is conducted by the ECN Policy studies, on the "Exploration for Rotterdam Climate Initiative - CO₂ emissions by 2030". In this study, Rotterdam's CO₂ emissions have been estimated for the future years 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030. In April 2013 the results demonstrated the fact that the sectors used in this research already exceed the emission targets. This was due to the lower CO₂ emissions from power plants. Different developments, such as high gas prices, low electricity prices and low CO₂ prices influenced the lower CO₂ emissions (ECN, 2013). Conclusively they expected nonetheless, a substantial increase of CO₂ emissions, which means the RCI was in need of additional policy efforts concerning their target. The main goal became a broader and larger goal, in the light of the challenges of fighting climate change.

This new objective did not come with a clear target, but involved more tasks and various ways to contribute to a sustainable city and world port. In other words, the purpose of the RCI shifted to a broad, longer-term objective which is also hard to quantify. This basically made the RCI not accountable as they did not have a specific goal anymore. It is easier to account for a strategy and policy concerning a broader aim with no timeline. As well as the member had more freedom to work on objectives they preferred within the broad umbrella issue of a sustainable city.

Formalization, Size, Homogeneity, Autonomy

Furthermore, we also see changes concerning the organisation of the coalition. Already in 2008 the RCI reviewed its own functioning and gave the statement it had become a broad movement. Which led to the launch of other projects and execute climate related activities. These were activities both in the city and the port of Rotterdam. The RCI expanded as a network, including citizens, companies, industry and several institutions (RCI Annual Report, 2008). Then in 2009 the program of the RCI was more embed within the municipality of Rotterdam and the Port of Rotterdam. Recent years the municipality of Rotterdam had become more of a driving force. Rotterdam used the RCI to expand the cooperation within the city. Cooperation was achieved by working together with public and private actors on more projects. Also projects with different stakeholders have been initiated. Hence, the collaboration has evolved.

And in line with the evolution of the RCI the number of issues advocated on has also increased. Other targets, in order to achieve their new objective, concerning becoming a sustainable world port city, replaced the initial objective of reducing the CO₂ emissions by 2025. In addition the city of Rotterdam set up a programme, called Rotterdam Climate Proof, which has been taken over by the RCI (Climate Proof, 2010). In this programme activities and

a strategy has been outlined to confront the challenges of climate change. What the formalization concerns we see that the RCI has more or less become part of the municipality Program Office Sustainability. Earlier it has been mentioned that the municipality was increasingly becoming the driving force in the RCI. This was a development, which among others ensured the funding of RCI. The Urban Development cluster of the Board of Mayor and Alderman and the city council of Rotterdam have insisted this (Duurzaamheidsmonitor, 2013). In the initial coalition four interest groups were participating. That fact did not change, so the size stayed the same. The homogeneity based on the diversity is also not different. The players in the coalition remained the same. However, the relationship between the members has changed. There is also more collaboration between the coalition and individual members with different stakeholder outside the RCI.

At last, the change on autonomy, we can conclude that the loose structure of the RCI did not change. The members are still doing the advocacy and their actions remain coordinated. The RCI members also have their own agenda, beside the one of RCI, in order to achieve their own important goals. In addition we see the RCI members cooperating with each other outside the RCI. An example from the Port of Rotterdam concerns their program 'Havenvisie 2030'. It is based on cooperation, among others, with the municipality of Rotterdam and Deltalinqs. Another example is the Deltalinqs Energy Forum (DEF), initiated by Deltalinqs, which is also in line with the RCI. Conclusively there are many on-going projects which show the autonomy rests largely at RCI's members when it comes to advocacy.

Since its inception the RCI has changed considerable. As laid out above, most importantly the RCI lost its clear and quantified objective of reducing the CO₂ emission by half in 2025. Besides, the municipality of Rotterdam has taken a strong leadership role in the coalition. The new and ambiguous objective of the RCI, in other words contributing in

becoming a sustainable world port city, implies that each member could choose how Rotterdam was to become a sustainable world port. This gave them the freedom to frame almost any climate or environment related objective as a RCI project. At the same time the municipality of Rotterdam became the unofficial leader of the RCI. The city of Rotterdam defined what it means to be a sustainable city and port. To this extent the members gained considerable autonomy, and on the other hand they lost some of it to the municipality of Rotterdam. After several years the RCI is still a formalized organization with a limited number of heterogeneous members. However, the RCI now advocates on behalf of such a broad and not defined objective. Conclusively this means that it became harder to distinguish whether the RCI members advocate on behalf of RCI's interests or their own interests. At the moment the coalition can be seen as a platform. This platform brings many different stakeholders together and gives new initiatives, which will be connected to the RCI, a boost in order to contribute in the aim of becoming a sustainable world port city.

V: Conclusion

In 2007 a unique partnership emerged in the Rotterdam area, the Rotterdam Climate Initiative. Its members are the city of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, the entrepreneur association of the Port and industrial enterprises in Deltalinqs and DCMR Environmental Services of Rijnmond. Climate change is a global concern and it exceeds local levels. However, in Rotterdam, exclusively local stakeholders, joint forces to do their part in fighting against climate change. While there are many climate initiatives the RCI was different. It is a public-private collaboration to advocate on behalf of a public good. The many questions regarding the functioning and creation of the RCI led to the main research question:

“What kind of interest group coalition did the city of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam, Deltalinqs and DCMR create, how did this coalition change over time and how can their collaboration be explained?”

In order to answer my research question several partial research questions have been answered first. To answer the last part of the research question, I have provided a classification of the reasons why organizations join an interest group coalition. In the literature several authors described several reasons why interest groups would join a coalition. These reasons I have structured and classify them as follows: Economic Reasons, Norms Signalling to politicians, Organizational and External reasons, and Alternative motives. Interviews with key figures in each of the RCI member organizations made it apparent the reasons the four stakeholders had for joining the RCI are not identical. We see a striking distinction between the public and the private members. The public organizations tend more toward the economic reasons. For them it is more about efficiency than for the private members. However, the economic efficiency is stressed as not an important reason. The municipality was most in favour of having the private sector on board for signalling purposes, due to their prominent position in the city and port. Alternative motives, such as pressure

from the city of Rotterdam and the public and realisation that having a spot at the negotiation table makes you more influential, where reasons for the private members to join the RCI.

Based on coalition formation theories, concerning interest groups, an overview was given of which types of coalition there can be distinguished. After analysing the characteristics of the RCI, I can conclude the RCI did not fit into any of the already defined interest group coalitions. The RCI does share some of the characteristics of the Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition, the Ad Hoc Coalition and the Event Coalition. Firstly we see an evident similarity with the Baptist and Bootlegger Coalition, as the RCI is a coalition of different kind of interest groups. Furthermore the RCI existed for a specific purpose and was working towards its main goal. This goal was reducing the CO₂ emissions by 2025, which made the RCI similar to an Ad Hoc Coalition as it had a clear timeline. However, their new broader goal, contributing to a sustainable city, causes it to distance the RCI from an Ad Hoc Coalition. The change in objective also made the RCI less of an Event Coalition. When it emerged, the RCI focused on the year 2025, but that focus is subsequently lost.

Furthermore, I have structured the characteristics of interest group coalitions in order to have a better overview. Additional research is however needed to expand the theory and have a broader classification. I have used the most important categorizations that were identified in the existing literature on interest group coalition formation. The characteristics are divided into the following categories: formalization, homogeneity, size, number of issues advocated, autonomy and duration. Based on these characteristics I have explained what kind of interest group coalition the stakeholders have created. The RCI was, at the beginning, a formalized interest group coalition with a limited number of heterogeneous members. Its members had considerable freedom to advocate on behalf of the two umbrella issues. What changed in subsequent years is the fact that the members gained more autonomy as the specific target the RCI morphed into an unspecified broader goal with no timeline. The

dynamic within the RCI also changed as the municipality of Rotterdam has turned out to be the driving force.

After analysing the dynamic within and the functioning of the RCI I have concluded that the RCI shifted from being a clear interest group coalition that advocates on behalf of a collectively decided objective. Over time it became a platform where stakeholders find each other. The initial focus on CO₂ reduction and its great ambitions have been let go. For that matter we can imply that the initial purpose of the coalition has failed. This failure cannot be seen separate from the unique structure of the RCI and the very different reasons for the original members to join the RCI. Given their different reasons for joining and objectives it is not a surprise that the main objective of the RCI was altered radically. However, while the initial objective might have been let go the RCI found a second lease on life as the coalition expanded and turned into an extensive platform. This platform has the benefits of the coalition on which it was build. The platform is well known, highly formalized and institutionalized, and an important player as having the most important stakeholders on board. Mainly because the RCI no longer has a clear target, the members and affiliated organizations can operate more autonomously working on the umbrella issue of turning Rotterdam into a sustainable world port city. The platform works as a catalyst and allows many different stakeholders to connect and participate. Therefore the RCI has increased its reach, which makes it easier for the participants to signal to politicians the importance of their initiatives or to find other stakeholders. Only from this perspective the RCI can be seen as an example for other cities. Cities that are in need of more collaboration throughout their city and where the public and the private sector are working together challenging the fight against climate change.

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APENDIX

In this appendix the list is provided of people who were interviewed, what their role with regard to the RCI is and the interview questions are displayed.

Mr. Remon Dantuma, Coordinator Climate and Energy DCMR / RCI

Mr. Cees Jan Asselbergs, former director Deltalinqs and board member RCI

Mr. Ivo Weekenburg, Director Economy Development Cooperation / Municipality of Rotterdam

Mr. Fred Akerboom, Municipality of Rotterdam, program manager RCI

1. How did the RCI emerge?
2. Why did the municipality of Rotterdam/DCMR/Deltalinqs/Port of Rotterdam decide to participate in 2007? What were its motives and interests?
3. To what extent are the interests realised within the RCI?
4. To what extent has the RCI organization changed compared to 2007? If so, can you elaborate?
5. What do you think of the development of the RCI?