

# **The European Union Referendum in England, Scotland and Wales: An Individual Level Analysis of Hard Euroscepticism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments**

**Aidan Smith (S1946692)**

**Master Thesis**

**MSc Public Administration: Economics and Governance**

**Leiden University**

**Supervisor: Dr. Olaf van Vliet**

## **Abstract**

The United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union presents an interesting and new context to explore the drivers of Euroscepticism. The research presented in this thesis tests the identity, economic and cognitive theories of individual level Euroscepticism as well as the effects of the print media within this new context by comparing across the countries of England, Scotland and Wales using pre and post referendum data from the British Election Study. The research conducted here finds that Euroscepticism differs between countries within the UK with English individuals feeding into the nationalist anti-establishment perceptions of Euroscepticism. Welsh individuals present a different case with a suggestion of more egocentric economic values than nationalism. This finding suggests that Euroscepticism is not homogenous within the United Kingdom and recommends that further in-depth study on this is required.



## Contents

<b>1.Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Overview of the Research.....	1
1.2 Contribution of the Research .....	2
1.3 Outline of the Research .....	5
<b>2.Euroscepticism Theory .....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 The Drivers of British Euroscepticism .....	8
2.2 Eurosceptic Typologies.....	10
2.3 Pragmatic Eurosceptics and Europhiles .....	12
2.4 Populism.....	13
2.5 Driving Factors and Identifiers of Euroscepticism .....	14
Identity.....	15
Economic.....	17
Cognitive Political .....	19
<b>3.Research Design .....</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1 England, Scotland and Wales as Comparative Case Studies.....	21
3.2 Available Datasets and the British Election Study .....	23
3.3 Dependent Variables .....	25
Euroscepticism .....	25
Immigration Based Variables.....	26
3.4 Independent variables .....	27
Identity.....	27
Economic.....	28
Cognitive Political .....	29
Media based variables .....	30
3.5 Controls and Comparative Inclusions .....	33
3.6 Empirical Model .....	34
3.7 Don't know Answers and Missing Data in the BES .....	35
<b>4.Descriptive Statistics .....</b>	<b>37</b>
4.1 Groupings of the Dataset.....	37
4.2 Independent Variables .....	39
4.3 Construction of the Media Variables .....	40
4.4 Inter-variable Correlation .....	41

<b>5. Analysis and Results .....</b>	<b>45</b>
5.1 Identity .....	48
5.2 Economic .....	50
5.3 Cognitive .....	54
5.4 Media based variables .....	57
5.5 Anti-Immigrant Sentiments .....	61
<b>6. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>63</b>
6.1 Limitations and Recommendations .....	64
<b>Appendix 1 Working Age Models .....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Appendix 2 Variance Inflation Factor Tests .....</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Appendix 3 BES Survey Questions and Constructed Variables .....</b>	<b>74</b>
Dependent Variables .....	74
Independent Variables .....	74
Identity .....	74
Economic .....	75
Cognitive .....	75
Controls .....	75
<b>References .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>Data .....</b>	<b>85</b>

## List of Tables and Figures

### Figures

<b>Figure 1</b> UK Attitudes towards EU Membership 1990-2011 .....	10
<b>Figure 2</b> Dissimilarity of voting patterns in Scotland and Wales in general elections, compared to England .....	23
<b>Figure 3</b> The Economist's study of myths debunked by the European Commission by time, publication and topic ....	33
<b>Figure 4</b> Perceptions of the Economy in remain voters Waves 7 and 10 of the British Election Study .....	52
<b>Figure 5</b> Perceived effects of leaving the EU on the UK economy in Wave 10 of the British Election Study .....	53

## **Tables**

<b>Table 1</b>	Descriptive statistics of the Outcome and Explanatory Variables of the BES Internet Panel Study .....	38
<b>Table 2</b>	EU referendum vote intention (W7) and reported EU vote (W10) by country .....	38
<b>Table 3</b>	Educational makeup of Waves 7 and 10 .....	40
<b>Table 4</b>	Frequency of daily newspaper readership in Waves 7 and 10 with editorial positions on the referendum .....	41
<b>Table 5</b>	Media based variables and Indexes .....	41
<b>Table 6</b>	Correlation Table for the dependent variables in Wave 7 .....	43
<b>Table 7</b>	Correlation Table for the dependent variables in Wave 10, including generated media variables .....	44
<b>Table 8</b>	OLS regressions of European integration variable for the whole dataset and all country identifiers .....	46
<b>Table 9</b>	Logistic regressions of EU vote or vote intention for the whole dataset and all country identifiers .....	47
<b>Table 10</b>	Descriptive table showing the spread of economic perceptions and the EU integration scale .....	51
<b>Table 11</b>	All dependent variables with media variables included for the whole dataset Wave 10 only .....	56
<b>Table 12</b>	OLS regressions for immigration's effect on the economy for the whole dataset and all country identifiers .....	59
<b>Table 13</b>	OLS regressions for immigration's effect on culture for the whole dataset and all country identifiers .....	60
<b>Table 14</b>	OLS regressions of European integration variable 66 or older discounted .....	67
<b>Table 15</b>	Logistic regressions of EU vote or vote intention 66 or older discounted .....	68
<b>Table 16</b>	OLS regressions for immigration's effect on the economy 66 or older discounted .....	69
<b>Table 17</b>	OLS regressions for immigration's effect on culture 66 or older discounted .....	70
<b>Table 18</b>	Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS whole model .....	71
<b>Table 19</b>	Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS with model 1 media variables .....	72
<b>Table 20</b>	Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS with model 2 media variables .....	73
<b>Table 21</b>	Descriptive Table of Country Level Control Variables .....	76

## **1.Introduction**

In June 2016, the United Kingdom took the unprecedented decision to leave the European Union via countrywide referendum, with a vote tally of 51.9% for leaving the EU and 48.1% voting to remain. After a vociferous and often bitter referendum campaign two of the four countries that make up the UK, England and Wales with Leave votes making up 53.4% and 52.5% respectively of the country tallies. Conversely Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, by majorities of 62.0% and 55.8% respectively; with the overall majority being derived from the popular vote. With the result of this referendum, the United Kingdom's 42 years of membership in the European project began to come to an end. This result represents a two-decade long expansion of Euroscepticism throughout what had long been thought of as the odd partner in the EU. In these two decades anti-European Union sentiment moved from the fringe of politics and in 2016, it established itself very much in the mainstream of British political thought and events.

Importantly for the study of Euroscepticism the referendum presents a unique and new context; a previously Europhilic and member state deciding to leave the European Project. This new context provides new data and situations that can challenge how Euroscepticism can be viewed and studied. Previously data regarding referenda has been restricted to a question of further integration into the European project, with both the Maastricht and Lisbon referenda held in multiple EU countries were questions of ratification for future involvement in the EU. The UK example provides a different approach, of extreme Euroscepticism. This allows for greater analysis and input into the growth of this 'hard Euroscepticism' that has come to dominate the phenomenon in the United Kingdom.

### **1.1 Overview of the Research**

The research presented in this thesis will be exploratory within this new context, and will seek to empirically test pre-existing theories of Euroscepticism with the research question:

**'How do individual level theories of Euroscepticism explain the different outcomes of the European Union referendum in Wales, Scotland and England?'**

Three theories with wide and varying focuses on the roles of national identities, political economy and cognitive functions, as well as an analysis of the role that the British print media had in the campaigning processes will provide a unique multidisciplinary approach to explaining the EU referendum results and British Euroscepticism in general. The large amounts and varied data from the British Election Study (BES) internet panel from both before and

after the referendum will be used to generate inter-time period comparisons as well as those between countries within the United Kingdom.

The three theories applied here will help to analyse the drivers of Euroscepticism at the level of the individual within the three countries of study. The main two theories within the literature focus mainly on identity, which looks at the role national identities and cultures play in Euroscepticism and on economics, which looks at the ways economic positions and perceptions effect Eurosceptic behaviours. A third lesser-used approach, the cognitive political approach, which focuses on thought processes and cognitive functions, will also be applied here. The latter of these is highly linked to the role of the media and campaigning processes that is largely understudied when it comes to empirical studies of Euroscepticism. The role the print media plays in influencing voter choice and perceptions is much studied within British politics in general (Reeves et al, 2015; Newton and Malcolm, 2001) yet the media's effects on Euroscepticism have largely gone under the radar by comparison. Some research on the media's campaigning and focussing during the referendum is available, but this is largely not empirical (Levy et al, 2016; Moore and Ramsay, 2017), nor is it connected to the wider theories of Euroscepticism.

Furthermore in this research we make a distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism and Europhilia that allows for the use of both the binary variable of an individual's referendum vote or vote intention as well as a more widely encompassing variable supplied by the BES. As a secondary focus, initial polling has suggested that immigration was a key factor in explaining the EU referendum outcome (Scully, 2017; Ashcroft, 2016). The research will then also seek to test the approaches to Euroscepticism with attitudes towards immigration.

## **1.2 Contribution of the Research**

A key contribution of this research is the direct comparison of individuals from across three of the countries within the United Kingdom; Scotland, Wales and England. Given Northern Ireland's unique political and geographic status, as being the only country within the UK having a border with an EU state, the country will be omitted. Much of the study of Euroscepticism has tended to focus on cross EU country analysis (Toshkov and Kortenska 2015; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Hooghe and Marks, 2007; Gabel, 1998), which is somewhat problematic given the wide variance of political, economic and cultural differences between the 28, soon to be 27, member states. Euroscepticism is often argued to differ between countries (Taggart, 1998) so empirical measurement and comparison across countries with widely different political, economic and cultural contexts can generate largely differential results, as the drivers of Euroscepticism can vary between these contexts.

Here we find a gap in the research, as within the new context of the UK referendum we can carry out an interesting and new within country analysis, by, almost paradoxically, comparing between 'countries' within the United Kingdom. The UK differs from most states in the world with its unique historical makeup of four separate historical cultures and countries. Given the devolution that happened as both part of the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland, and the Blair government's push to decentralise power to Welsh and Scottish regional parliaments, the potential for economic and political differences between the countries within the UK has increased over the last 20 years. Thus it is entirely possible that the growth of Euroscepticism, particularly in England and Wales, has been facilitated by different factors. The countries studied in this research therefore are similar enough, yet at the same time different enough, in their levels of Euroscepticism, that a direct comparison provides new research into Euroscepticism.

When it comes to the study of British Euroscepticism in particular the vast majority of the focus has been on both on the right of the political spectrum (Cutts et al, 2011) and the most populous country of England (Jones et al, 2013). The assumption has been that Eurosceptics in the United Kingdom are a largely homogenous group and do not necessarily differ by country. Wales, a historically left wing country, voted with a majority to leave in the referendum and remains largely unstudied in comparison to her larger neighbour. This country will be a particular focus of interest in this thesis as it presents a curious case in the study of both the EU referendum and of Euroscepticism. The small country of 3 million inhabitants has moved drastically towards a Eurosceptic outlook. The country gave the right wing Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) their first seats outside of local council elections in 2014 and then joined England in the leave vote during the referendum. What is most interesting in the case Wales is a number of the traditional Eurosceptic arguments do not necessarily apply; research has suggested that through EU investment and agricultural assistance Wales has been a net receiver of EU funds, unlike the rest of the United Kingdom (Evans, 2012; Ifan et al, 2016). The country has also received similar levels of immigration to Scotland (Hawkins, 2017) yet the outcomes of the referendum are wildly differing and the two countries hold largely different views on its benefits (NatCen, 2013).

Where studies of Euroscepticism attempt to use the new context of the EU referendum they often discount such a cross country analysis. Hobolt's (2016) in depth and wide ranging study of individual level Euroscepticism neglects to focus on Wales and Scotland, only a variable measuring a vote for the Scottish National Party (SNP) or their Welsh equivalent, Plaid Cymru is applied. There is also no testing of whether Scottish or Welsh national identities influence Euroscepticism and only contains information on vote intention from before the referendum, here

we will include both a before and after for comparative purposes. Likewise Vasilopoulou (2016) focuses on predicting the referendum using individual level identifiers that focus on Eurosceptics as a homogenous group within the UK.

Given the potential for differences in Eurosceptics within the British context, it is therefore interesting to study the European Union referendum with this underused country based lens. If Euroscepticism is seen to be different between countries, the UK should not be viewed as a homogenous group in this sense. Therefore, this thesis seeks to break new ground by applying individual level theories of Euroscepticism to the three separate countries of the UK. The research here will seek to explain how the differing levels of Euroscepticism were facilitated by different elements of the particular theories at hand. Much of the knowledge presented in this research is highly specific to the three countries of study, but the referendum result was such an unprecedented and atypical event that new findings will help provide new insight to existing approaches or branch the study of Euroscepticism in new directions.

Both group and individual level analysis have been used to study voting patterns and Euroscepticism. Analysis at the individual level analysis provides the best way to calculate and predict individual level thought and value processes when deciding upon vote preferences that can better our understanding of Euroscepticism. When it comes to the group level of effects of immigration as a specific example of a theorised driver of Euroscepticism, Wales again presents a puzzling case; the mean for EU immigrants within local population areas is only 2.55% with a high of 5.44% in Newport (ONS, 2017a). Furthermore, Lemos (2009) found that immigration had little effect on labour markets in Wales between 2004 and 2006, that is after the 2004 expansion yet before the 2007 financial crisis suggesting that immigration had little 'real' economic and cultural impact in Wales. Relatively low levels and real effects of immigration coupled with high levels of Euroscepticism suggests that either most mainstream polling is incorrect when it comes to the reasons people voted to leave, or that Euroscepticism was driven by a magnifying effect caused in part by perceptions at the individual level. The same can be argued with the aforementioned disproportionate effects of EU investments into Wales. Thus it is at the individual level that the media and campaigning focus can best be analysed as it is at this level that we can measure perceptions as well as more empirical values, such as economic positions.

Lack of data is also a problem for group level analysis. In order to carry out a high standard of group level analysis detailed population data at the local level is required when looking particularly at the referendum vote. Euroscepticism, as will be discussed in further detail later in the theory and research design chapter, can be difficult to measure empirically. The referendum result provides an interesting measure of this but is only available at one single point in time. Thus for an analysis the EU referendum requires large amounts of local data to have a sufficient



amount of observations, this is an approach taken by Matti and Zhou (2017) and Goodwin and Heath (2016). The referendum vote however was organised in the middle of the census period, the closest census being 2011. Population estimates are available but only for Wales and England at the local level both of the aforementioned these use extrapolated population estimates, which leads to validity problems (Matti and Zhou, 2017). Individual level data is widely available as a significant amount of polling was carried out in the periods around the referendum with a large number of observations.

Thus while group level analysis may provide interesting findings it is currently not possible to further study with England, Scotland and Wales as the main objects to a high degree of accuracy. It is the aforementioned perceptions therefore that this research will look to study and individual level effects will be the main focus for the rest of this thesis. With the individual level identified as the key area of study, individual perceptions of areas linked to Euroscepticism and immigration are what is sought to be measured. These will then be measured against variables identified as key in the identity, economic utilitarian and cognitive political theory literature as well as the derived media variables.

### **1.3 Outline of the Research**

This thesis will then proceed to firstly explore the literature and theory of Euroscepticism to a greater degree and conceptualise the key areas of study, the section argues for a binary hard and soft definition of Euroscepticism that allows for analysis of a range of positions. It is in this section that the identity, political economic and cognitive approaches to Euroscepticism are identified and discussed. The thesis will then move on to operationalise these concepts and theories into measurable variables using the British Election Study data and then present the findings. This research finds that nationalist populism is key to explaining the referendum vote in England, yet this has often been equated to an explanation for the referendum vote in total. However, the findings presented here show that Welsh Euroscepticism is widely different from that of their eastern neighbours. This study presents that when measured at the individual level Welsh individuals bear more similarities, as far as trends go, to Scottish individuals in many aspects, yet the vote ended up being drastically different. The suggestion then is that Welsh Euroscepticism differs from both their English counterparts and the theories applied in general.

## **2.Euroscepticism Theory**

The vast majority of the literature describes Euroscepticism as a fringe concept, consigned to the margins and extremes of the political spectrum (Vasilopoulou, 2013). The British EU referendum vote flies in the face of this assumption however and the following chapter will seek to adapt existing theory on Euroscepticism to create a theoretical framework to explain why Euroscepticism can gain popular support at the level of the individual.

Euroscepticism began to enter the mainstream of European politics after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. This treaty saw the largest increase in the politicisation of the EU and the fast tracking of political integration in the member states (Brack and Startin, 2015). While the process beforehand had been largely elite driven via a form of tacit consent, it was the Maastricht treaty that saw the first notable pushback when it came to national referenda and public opinion. France for example saw only a slim majority win in favour of the treaty when taken to the public to ratify, while Denmark had to hold two before the preferred outcome was achieved. Thus the following further increases in politicisation coupled with increasing integration, both in terms of depth and breadth, as well as failings of this increasing process, most notably the EU constitution, has moved Euroscepticism from a fringe concept to a mainstay of European politics (Brack and Startin, 2015).

The problem however is that Euroscepticism may be a well-known and well used concept in the public sphere but is not necessarily easily determinable when it comes to potential drivers and varying types. When creating a theoretical framework to work around with regards to Euroscepticism it will be important to analyse the two elements of Euroscepticism theory; firstly analysing the nature of Euroscepticism and secondly looking at the driving factors involved in its growth of popularity. In sum the main questions of this section will be first to answer the 'what is Euroscepticism?' question, then move onto explain why and how it occurs.

To answer this 'what' question a simple definition of Euroscepticism is most apt as a place to begin. When it comes to definitions the literature generally agrees that the concept is a multifaceted form of opposition to the EU and European integration (Boomgaarden et al, 2011; Brack and Startin, 2015). There is some disagreement when it comes to specifics but an overall guideline in this section of the argumentation is all that is required at this point and specifics will be discussed later. This thesis will continue then with the use of Hooghe and Marks (2007) definition; that Euroscepticism can be classified as 'doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration' that encompasses a 'range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition'. This captures both the multifaceted nature of Euroscepticism as well as alluding to a degree of categorisation and typology that is important for a discussion on its individual level drivers. With this definition in mind and attitudes towards immigration as a specific

variable of interest, the element of European integration that is dissented against is the free movement of people, the second *acquis communautaire*. The difficulty and disagreement in the literature comes from analysing this definition in order to create a key conceptualisation on the drivers and effects of Euroscepticism and the typology and continuums of the varying types and levels of anti-EU sentiments.

The often referred to seminal article in the study of Euroscepticism is widely viewed to be Taggart (1998). Taggart initially categorises three types of reasoning for opposition to European integration; those that outright oppose integration and those that are not anti per se but are sceptical due to integration being either too inclusive or too exclusive. It is perhaps the latter of these that are most important to bear in mind for this study. On the side that feels that integration is too inclusive may fear it leads to a gateway to large scale immigration or other perceived threat. While on the side of the exclusive a number of politicians and academics saw growing integration as a danger to the international working class through exploitation of elites for example. This Euroscepticism is most likely to be found on the extreme left of politics and their opposition to the EU, and was the argument put forward by elements of the Labour party in the 1975 referendum on remaining part of the European Economic Community.

Importantly for the study of a political aspect to Euroscepticism is Taggart's conclusion that ideology alone does not predict Euroscepticism. Whilst this is shown in some of the EU referendum results ideology has generally been correlated with Euroscepticism in the UK when it comes to political parties. The Eurosceptic parties that have had the most success have tended to be right wing nationalists such as the United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP or the British National Party (BNP). Of the major parties it is the Conservatives that have had the most division when it comes to the subject of Europe. The then Prime Minister David Cameron's campaign pledge to hold a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union during the 2015 general election in the first place can largely be seen as a defensive move to counter the growing momentum of these Eurosceptic parties and to stop defections of Eurosceptic backbench MP's (McTague et al, 2016).

This leads onto a number of problems with key assumptions that in the wake of the growth of Euroscepticism in the past 15 years now seem relatively out-dated. Firstly Euroscepticism is no longer a 'touchstone of dissent', in the United Kingdoms, given the referendum result it is the majority view and is currently the default view of the May government whilst the leaving negotiations are ongoing. Following from this the statement that 'parties do not gain support on the basis of their position on European Integration' is also outdated. UKIP have campaigned as largely single issue anti-European Union party (Usherwood, 2008) that have based their election campaigns solely around Euroscepticism and immigration policy, albeit branching out in recent elections however (Hunt, 2014). Considering they have achieved close to 13% of the vote in both the Welsh Assembly and 2015 general election,

which is no mean feat in the United Kingdom's often static two party system, provides some countering to this statement.

## **2.1 The Drivers of British Euroscepticism**

Importantly noted by Taggart in this initial study, is that Euroscepticism differs from country to country. A focus on the drivers of British Euroscepticism in particular is thus likely to be important here. The United Kingdom has long been viewed as the 'awkward partner' when it comes to the European Community and the subsequent European Union (George, 1998). From Charles de Gaulle's vetoing of the UK's first application to join the EEC to Margaret Thatcher's often frosty relationship with Europe, the United Kingdom has often felt itself separate and different from her European neighbours. British history and the British people's association with the Empire is widely marked as a unique factor in this (Daddow, 2013). Europe is only one of the three traditional spheres of British foreign policy (Churchill, 1948), with the Commonwealth and the United States making up the other two. It is this on-going relationship with the Commonwealth and historical identity with the British Empire that often has British citizens looking beyond Europe for influence. This position is somewhat supported by evidence in polling that Eurosceptics tend to back freedom of movement within the Commonwealth more than within the European Union (Dahlgreen, 2015). It is this historical identity therefore that has often led to the links between Euroscepticism and the conservative right wing parties of the UK.

Interestingly, though, this is generally more so the case for those that identify particularly as English than British, Welsh, Scottish, Irish or a combination of the five (Jones et al, 2013). This is perhaps due to the long narrative of oppression from the English that dominates the ideologies of the, generally left wing, nationalist parties in the devolved countries of Scotland, Wales. In this sense nationalists of these regions tend to view themselves as victims of the British Empire rather than have a positive view of the historical identity and thus prize their regional and cultural identity over identity with the British Empire (Kidd and McClymont, 2014). This is especially the case in Scotland with their powerful nationalist movement and political party, that albeit lost the independence referendum, yet managed to win convincing majorities in both Scottish Parliament and General Elections. This brief discussion suggests therefore that nationalist sentiment may differ between the forms of nationalism present in the United Kingdom and therefore may have differential effects on Euroscepticism. This will be discussed in greater detail when looking at identity as a particular driver of Euroscepticism later in this chapter.

When it comes to external influences on British Euroscepticism Startin (2015) recognises three drivers in its growth that had important impacts on UK politics that were exacerbated by the aforementioned historical approach of Britain towards the European Project. Firstly the earlier mentioned politicisation of the European Project that was first introduced in the Maastricht treaty; the move from economic integration towards deeper political integration consequently led to the rise of political opposition to the varying degrees of integration in the European Union. Importantly here is the fact that this was not a specifically British phenomenon but led to Euroscepticism taking multiple forms across the EU.


Secondly and most important of these drivers is the 2004 enlargement and subsequent expansions into the ex-communist bloc in Eastern Europe. According to Startin this mainstreamed the debate on European Union membership as it allowed Eurosceptics to link concerns with the EU to unemployment and job security, via the idea of wage depreciation and potential for unemployment caused by low wage immigration from the newly joined countries. It is here that opposition to immigration becomes a mainstay in the political discourse around Euroscepticism in both the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union. Interestingly the government under Tony Blair largely underestimated the number of immigrants that would enter the country due to an assumption that other European countries would not put restrictions on migration in the transitional period of new membership (Watt and Wintour, 2015; Kvist, 2004). However a number of major EU countries, most notably Germany, Austria, France and Italy, enacted transitional restrictions with the aims of softening the potential impact of mass immigration. While the British government did eventually apply restrictions, only on welfare uptake, a Home Office report in 2003 predicted that net migration from the Accession 10 (AC 10) between 2004 and 2010 would average out to between 5,000 to 13,000 per year (Dustmann et al, 2003). In 2005 the net immigration flow from the EU 8 alone was around 71,000 (Migration Watch, 2017), over four times higher than the previous maximum estimate.

Therefore not only did the enlargement allow Eurosceptics to make a connection to unemployment and job security, the failure of the government to predict and control the widespread immigration from the new EU countries allowed for increasing dissent when it came to those concerned about the possible impacts of immigration. Importantly this is likely where Euroscepticism moves from principled opposition to the EU as a whole, to a form of conditional Euroscepticism based around opposition to the inclusivity of the EU noted by Taggart. Thus when looking at the effects of immigration on Euroscepticism the post 2004 timeframe is where it is most likely to move into the majoritarian mainstream and where anti-immigrant sentiment is most likely to come into play. Figure 1 helps to illustrate this overall downward trend in those viewing the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union as a positive coupled with a general increase in the negative and neutral perceptions. Those viewing membership as a

positive drops noticeably after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, while those viewing membership negatively sees an overall increase from 2004 onwards.

Finally Startin makes note of the Eurozone crisis and its effects on Euroscepticism throughout the EU. In Britain while the crisis did not affect the country directly it was portrayed by Eurosceptic groups, who had now grown vastly in size since the Maastricht treaty, as indicative of the failure of the European Union. In particular, the bailout deals imposed upon Greece were highly criticised by Eurosceptic media (Barnes, 2016). This period also saw increased migration due to addition of Romania and Bulgaria into the free movement areas, to much media hysteria. Thus unpredicted immigration combined with a history of Euroscepticism within the UK as well as history and nostalgia for empire propagated by political parties has generally been deemed to have had a greater effect in the United Kingdom, as a whole, than other European nations.

**Figure 1** UK Attitudes towards EU Membership 1990-2011



Source: Eurobarometer, 2017

## 2.2 Eurosceptic Typologies

With this brief study of the history of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom in mind the thesis will now move onto conceptualising and categorising Eurosceptics and Euroscepticism. Currently a binary, hard or soft typology has taken over the public narrative when it comes to Euroscepticism, mostly with regards to the outcome of Britain leaving the European Union; the level of relationship the country has with the EU post leaving. This narrative could largely be seen to stem from Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) with their refined definitions of hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard

Euroscepticism is, in this context, the 'outright objection to the current form of the European project through principle' whilst soft Euroscepticism can be seen to be 'contingent or qualified opposition to particular area of disagreement with the current form of European Union integration'. A number of similar binary typologies have also been determined such as a distinguishing between 'political' and 'instrumental' Euroscepticism (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005). The differing factor here is that political Euroscepticism is characterised by a preference for decision making at the national level rather than in the European Union's supranational institutions while instrumental Euroscepticism remains similar to Taggart and Szczepiński's notion of hard or principled Euroscepticism.

Further scholars have attempted a more thorough and specific categorisation on the types of Euroscepticism. Sørensen (2008) interestingly, identified four types of public Euroscepticism at the individual level. The economic category focuses on economic costs and benefits to the individual, sovereignty based Euroscepticism is positioned around the feeling that EU has too much jurisdiction and that decision making at the national level should be prioritised. While the democratic and political categories are based around the democratic deficit of EU supranational institutions and individual political affiliations with regards to the political affiliations of those in power within the European Union, on the other hand. This categorisation approach offers more specific and robust typology yet has a number of drawbacks when compared to the more common, diffuse binary typology. While these definitions can and do overlap to a significant degree Vasilopoulou (2013) recognises a trade-off between inclusivity and exclusivity when deciding on a conceptualisation of Euroscepticism. This thesis will move forward with the definition of Taggart's more inclusive hard - soft groupings. Greater categorisation does not seem to add anything of use when looking at levels of Euroscepticism in this fashion. An individual could fit within a number of categories and would still be considered Eurosceptic, so more specific categorisation at this stage of the analysis does not add anything of use to the use of a hard - soft typology.

With regards to Sørensen in particular the latter of her categories, political Euroscepticism, is unlikely to be widespread or important in this case as it assumes that individuals are informed or care about the political debates within the EU itself. The European Parliament elections generally are generally thought of as second order (Reif and Schmidt, 1980) and UK voter turnout has been consistently and significantly lower than the average for the rest of the EU during these elections. Furthermore the most recent EU parliamentary elections have been dominated by Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP, who are argued to be able to mobilise their vote easier due to low turnouts and their single issue political campaigning (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

Sørensen's contribution is useful however when it comes to the focus on the individual level of Euroscepticism as it is of high importance in this study. In fact the main commonality in the discussion of the literature

thus far has been a general focus on the explanations of Euroscepticism within particular political parties using comparative political methods as a model for research. The origins of Euroscepticism in public opinion are important when it comes to the case of the United Kingdom's referendum in 2016 however. While it is likely that Euroscepticism has been propagated by UKIP and other Eurosceptic political parties in some way, there are additional factors at play here. Even with their relatively large vote share in the major elections of the last five years UKIP have not had popular support and have been distant from forming governments. During the referendum campaigning all other major parties came out in favour of the Remain vote however, bar a few notable defections from individuals within the Conservative party. Thus Euroscepticism at a party level has not had popular support yet; it has been illustrated to have been achieved during the referendum. The leave vote was unprecedented in this case as an empirical measure of the most extreme form of Euroscepticism went vastly beyond traditional party support. Thus in the context of the British European Union referendum a party based approach is insufficient due to this disconnect between party Euroscepticism and the Euroscepticism which exists within the public. Sørensen's focus on the individual level is therefore highly relevant to this case and will need to be analysed further.

### **2.3 Pragmatic Eurosceptics and Europhiles**

Returning, for the moment to the hard - soft typology of Euroscepticism, an important explanation of how soft Eurosceptics could come to vote for what would be considered a hard Eurosceptic outcome is required. This is perhaps partly due to the structure of the referendum; by nature of the question the referendum was restrictive to only absolute outcomes, there was no middle ground available. Under such circumstances where the only outcomes are two extremes those defined as 'soft' in their opposition or support of the European Union, that is, the moderates, would be the most important grouping (Goodwin et al, 2018). If we take that for the hard - soft Eurosceptic typology there is a similar typology for the opposite reaction to the European Union; that of the Europhile. Firstly there is no logical reason why a hard Europhile would vote leave while a hard Eurosceptic would obviously vote to leave on principle. Due to EU membership being the status quo soft Eurosceptics or Europhiles would be expected to vote depending on their individual positions and rationalities in a pragmatic fashion (Clarke et al, 2017). For example soft Eurosceptics could vote remain to maintain the membership of the European Union due to the uncertainty of the outcome if a leave majority was achieved but conversely could have voted leave if they felt the United Kingdom and themselves would be better off outside of European Union membership. When it comes to the British referendum vote there may therefore be an element of pragmatism when it comes Euroscepticism in this fashion that is important to note.



By virtue of the hard and soft typology that has taken the public narrative on Britain's exiting of the European Union polling suggests that a large proportion of those who voted Leave in the referendum are supportive of a softer form of exiting (Walker, 2017; Watts, 2016; Wells, 2016). While there may be some differences between the hard and soft exits from the European Union and the binary scale used for Euroscepticism there is likely to be a correlation between the two. A principled, hard Eurosceptic is more likely to favour a more independent United Kingdom and thus a harder exit. On the other hand a conditional, soft Eurosceptic is likely to favour a softer exit from the EU based around their individual concerns and problems that they have with the European Union. This further suggests that the group of interest in this study is the soft Eurosceptics and europhiles as these are likely to be the difference makers within the given populations.

Furthermore the element of pragmatic rather than principle rejection of the European Union increasingly leads from the party level to that of the individual when it comes to analysis. Important to note is that when principle is taken out of the equation and only individual and group interests remain party politics is likely to play a lesser role in defining the EU referendum result of an individual. Rationality and self-interest could then be seen as key to Euroscepticism at this level. Political parties and key individuals within parties still have persuasive power during the referendum campaigning however so party affiliations cannot be entirely discarded when studying soft Eurosceptics and europhiles.

## **2.4 Populism**

Before moving on to discuss the driving factors of Euroscepticism, the perhaps 'elephant in the room' thus far not mentioned is populism; an again, elusive and often malleable term that will require some discussion before it can be adequately measured, studied and applied to the EU referendum case. There is no set or widely agreed upon definition as to what exactly populism is, Taggart (2004) for example finds, three distinct categories of definitions. A highly popular view is that populism is a loose term for a form of discourse or strategy used by both right and left ideological parties to further their own political goals (Weyland, 2001). This study will proceed with a definition that provides more substance to this however; that, at its base level populism is a 'thin ideology' (Stanley, 2008) that views politics and socioeconomic problems as a division between a pure majority and a corrupt minority, usually an elite (Mudde, 2004). It is described as a 'thin ideology' here as the division between the two groups is the defining commonality of the multiple threads of populism. Unlike traditional ideologies, such as liberalism and communism, the solutions to the political and socioeconomic problems viewed by populist parties are highly contextual to the majority and minority viewed by the populist actors and advocates (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012), hence why we see right

and left wing populist groups. Here we capture the essence of the two earlier focuses while providing a workable definition of the term, so it is easier to identify when it comes to looking at variables and categorisations.

Regardless of specific definition, populism was likely an important factor to the European Union referendum, due to the nature of the right wing Eurosceptic parties led by UKIP, which advocated the initial push for Euroscepticism from the early 2000's. In UKIP's political views the EU are an elite led minority, seeking to weaken national sovereignty and ultimately gain from the plight of the average British person (Farage, 2016). Given UKIP's influence when it comes to mainstream Euroscepticism many of UKIP's tactics and campaign points became mainstream during the campaigning phase of the referendum. If a key political driving force in the events leading up to the referendum can be accurately described as populist, it follows that populism is likely important in the referendum result and should be included in this study in some capacity.

There are a number of ways to categorise different types of populism; the object of blame or the minority seen as corrupt shifts and changes within any given context so a relevant and modern categorisation for British Euroscepticism is needed here. Of particular interest to the modern, 'anti-globalist' form of populism that swept through the democratic world in 2016, is the categorisation of both an economic and a cultural, or nationalist form (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). That is, populism with a particular focus on the economy and economic inequality and a form focussed on culture or opposition to progressive change. It is likely that elements of both of these were used in the referendum campaigns in some capacity. The latter of the two fits neatly within the bounds of the debate over the EU with the elite driven reforms mentioned throughout this section, especially when it comes to the nationalist elements involved in UKIP's discourse. Thus, the driving factors examined in this research will likely need to include aspects of these two strings of populism to fully explain the attitudes to Euroscepticism and immigration that were prevalent in the referendum debate and deciding voter preferences. With these key elements of populism identified, the theories used when looking at driving factors of Euroscepticism must involve both an economic element as well as a cultural element, which can include both national identities as well as opposition to elites and elite based progressive change.

## **2.5 Driving Factors and Identifiers of Euroscepticism**

With the important groupings and definitions identified the thesis will now move to a discussion of the driving factors of Euroscepticism at the individual level. This is where the main hypotheses of the research will be derived and the independent variables of the research will be identified. The literature points to three main drivers at the individual level, that largely link to the immigration debate with regards to Euroscepticism. The purpose here is to

identify how these theories may affect the way people perceive immigration when it comes to membership of the European Union.

## **Identity**

Firstly the effect identity has on Euroscepticism will be looked at. This theory postulates that Euroscepticism is derived from threats to national identities, with immigration being a driving force behind this threat (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002). This approach therefore looks to how nationalist ideologies seek to preserve national integrity and generally create a fear of foreign involvement in domestic politics. This branch of theory is heavily linked to social identity theory with the underlying assumption that identity is important to the human psyche and that people are often protective of this (McLaren, 2007). Key in the particular case of the United Kingdom is that there is often the paradox that it is possible to have more than one identity; an individual may report themselves as both Welsh and British for example, yet feel that a European identity is a danger to these. As has been noted earlier in this chapter this element of Euroscepticism has often been championed by the right wing nationalist parties such as UKIP, the BNP. These parties tend to portray themselves as being protective of British, or often English, culture from the threat of Europeanization.

Uniquely is the fact that the particular nationalist parties of Wales and Scotland, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party, are decidedly left wing and came out in favour of EU membership during the campaigning period. Nationalism, when it comes to political parties at least, and identity is therefore likely to be different in England than it is in Wales and Scotland. This is perhaps due to the importance of independence within the mind-set of Welsh and Scottish nationalism as well as the aforementioned historic perception of being a victim of England and London based governance. Nationalism in the English mentality is more concerned with Britain's independence from outside of the United Kingdom rather than within (Jones et al, 2013).

This is somewhat supported by Haesly's (2005) finding that national identities in Wales and Scotland are primarily determined by a need to distinguish themselves from the English. While the two Celtic cultures do bear a number of similarities Haesly finds a number of key differences. The Scottish identity is considerably stronger than Welsh identities with notions of a long standing independent and shared history as well as a greater interaction with a shared culture. Perhaps due to this Scottish culture has significantly more international acclaim than the national identity of their Welsh counterparts. Welsh identity on the other hand is significantly more diffuse and there is much less concurrence as to what constitutes Welshness. This is perhaps most likely due to the general link between Welsh culture and the Welsh language, an old Welsh proverb states; 'Cenedl heb iaith, cenedl heb galon' meaning 'a

Nation without language is a nation without heart'. The Welsh language however is only spoken by 19% of the population (StatsWales, 2017).

Despite these differences Haesly (2001) in an earlier study found similar points of disagreement with European Union policies in both Welsh and Scottish subsamples of Eurosceptics suggesting that Euroscepticism may be a 'British concern'. Again Haesly also found that Welsh Europhiles were so, largely due to a perceived need to differentiate themselves from the English Eurosceptics, while the Scots were more likely to be Europhiles based on economic concerns. Given the results in the referendum Euroscepticism being a British concern is unlikely however, yet the perceived need for the Welsh to separate themselves from their neighbours does suggest that identity does come into play here. Haesly's study was carried out before the 2004 expansion however and the aforementioned immigration and other events are thus not part of the research.

The English national identity is highly different to both of these however and is highly more diffuse, yet generally more strongly felt (Jones et al, 2013). While politically, nationalism in Wales and Scotland are placed on the left of the scale, English national identity tends to be placed on the right, with nationalist groups such as UKIP and the English Defence League championing and defending a sense of Englishness that they feel are under threat from outside forces (Pupcenoks and McCabe, 2013). Perhaps due to this, a sense of Englishness is often equated, sometimes unfairly, to that of being a 'little Englander', a term denoting those that wish for an isolationist foreign policy, hearkening back to the times of 'little England' or an England before imperialism. So the English national identity unlike the Welsh and Scottish counterparts is much more connected to Euroscepticism and populism in general, it is here we are likely to see the effects of cultural populism most clearly.

Immigration can be linked to identity if it is perceived to endanger the native cultures of the host country through a form of 'cultural dilution', (Hing, 1993) an often inflammatory term that sees mass level immigration and multiculturalism in general as a danger to national cultures through sheer numbers alone. This links a form of protectionism for national cultures with immigration based Euroscepticism in a way that one would expect greater levels of nationalism to lead to greater levels of Euroscepticism. With both these national identities being small within the context of the United Kingdom one would expect those identifying as nationalist to be highly protective of their identity and thus more likely to base their Euroscepticism around anti-immigration sentiments. However due to the strength of Scottish nationalism this thesis will hypothesise that the Scottish do not feel that their identity is under threat from mass immigration and therefore nationalism will have less of an effect on Euroscepticism. Conversely Welsh nationalism due to its diffuse nature is predicted to have a greater effect on Euroscepticism and therefore protectionist tendencies. Due to the earlier mentioned focus on the British Empire within the psyche those with

greater attachments to a British identity are predicted to also have a greater affinity with Euroscepticism and base this around concerns over immigration.

As a side note, the fear of foreign involvement in domestic politics could be construed as a desire for national sovereignty. Similar to immigration the notion of sovereignty is widely reported as important when it comes to polling on Euroscepticism. Sovereignty and the notion of sovereignty when it comes to the individual level can have a highly diffuse meaning however. If defined in a similar fashion to that of Sorensen, for example, it can be seen as the preference for decision making at the national over the European level. This could have number of causes and preferences for individuals and cannot be seen as mutually exclusive from Euroscepticism based around concerns for immigration. There could exist preferences for sovereignty when it comes to immigration policy for example, yet a simultaneous preference for the law making of the European Courts for example. For soft Eurosceptics a desire for sovereignty will be based around their individual opposition to a specific contested area of European integration from which their Euroscepticism is derived. Thus while measuring an individual's desire for sovereignty may be an indicator of Euroscepticism, it is not necessarily an indicator of Euroscepticism. Following from this discussion of the identity's potential role in driving Euroscepticism this study will hypothesise that:

**H1a:** Identification with Britishness and Englishness will have a positive effect on Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant perceptions

**H1b:** Those that identify with a Scottish national identity will be more likely to be anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic than those that identify with a Welsh identity due to the greater level of identification and homogeneity within the Scottish culture.

## **Economic**

The second approach that this thesis will seek to test is the utilitarian economic approach, which looks at the individual perceptions of costs and benefits of EU membership (Gabel, 1998). The EU, throughout the vast majority of its history has fundamentally functioned as an economic union, thus economic factors may have been the focus of many individuals when deciding their referendum vote. The underlying assumption here is that people prize their economic well-being in a rational manner over symbolic threats to a national grouping or identity, so that if people are fearful of their self-interest then they are more likely to be Eurosceptic (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). Of note however is that individuals are likely to have bounded rationality when it comes to their decision making here partly due to the

massive amounts of misinformation present during the campaigning, this will be controlled for using the cognitive theories discussed later on in this section.

There is also a distinct differentiation in this element of theory between objective economic realities, and the more malleable perceptions of economic positions that can be found within individuals (Gabel and Whitten, 1997). Both of these are relevant to individual level analysis and should be included in the discussion. The study of economics and economic perceptions and their effects on voter preferences has received much study and attention, the majority of previous studies into individual level effects have included them in some shape or form. These studies have found that the underpinnings of where individuals place their economic positions can be guided by a myriad of political, real and external influences, thus perceptions can often differ from real economic positions (De Vries et al, 2018). Within these there is also an important distinction between egocentric, individual level positional and sociotropic, country level perceptions (Evans and Andersen, 2006). That is, the perception of where an individual feels they register in the economic makeup of the country as a whole and where the individual feels the position of their country is on a macroeconomic scale. Both of these are important for measuring individual level economic perceptions here, as individuals may obviously perceive their economic positions differently, but may also perceive their country's future, or current status differently depending on a number of factors. With regards to Euroscepticism, therefore, if an individual deems that they or their country is losing out due to membership of the EU then this will likely provide a good indicator of whether they are more likely to be a Eurosceptic or not.

As an addition to these factors Deutch's (1957) transactionalist theory will be used to derive identifiers when measuring such an economic approach to Euroscepticism. Under this theory transnational economic and political cooperation between states generates a sense of community between the individuals and groups involved, which in turn generates legitimacy for further cooperation. Accordingly therefore those that are able to take the opportunities of work, travel and movement of capital offered by the European Union are more likely to support increasing levels of integration and are thus less likely to be Eurosceptics (Kuhn, 2011). This theory allows for the identification of individuals as potential 'winners' and 'losers' of European integration and EU membership. Thus those with higher levels of education and income are less likely to be affected by some of the negative effects of EU integration as they are more likely to have greater opportunities granted by greater EU integration. Conversely those with lower levels of education and low income backgrounds are more likely to be Eurosceptic. This is especially the case for those under threat of losing work due to EU integration. Workers in certain industries where capital and workforces are highly mobile, such as manufacturing, are viewed as much more likely to be Eurosceptic under this approach. Immigration can add to this further to this with the perception of low wage immigrants 'working for less' than native residents,

outcompeting them leading to job insecurity. We then must recognise the potential for populist influences on economic perceptions, especially when it comes to economic inequality and the identification as a 'have not' in populist discourse. Thus the 'have nots' identified by transnationalist theories are more likely to fall into the category of economic populism and have negative perceptions of the EU's effects on their economic positions.

With regards to this discussion this thesis will predict that;

**H2a:** Following from Gabel (1998) economic factors will be the most highly correlated variables with Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant values due to the economic nature of the European Union and overall self-interest of individuals.

**H2b:** Greater economic and transnational opportunities result in greater Europhilia and positive perceptions of immigrants

**H2c:** Egocentric rather than sociotropic economic perceptions will have greater explanatory power as these identify individuals as winners and losers of EU membership

### **Cognitive Political**

Finally a cognitive and political approach highlights the importance of the cognitive ability and political awareness of individuals and its effect on their support or opposition towards the European Union (Inglehart, 1970; McClaren, 2007). The assumption of this theory is that high cognitive ability and high political awareness leads to support for the EU as individuals are able to understand more information about the benefits of membership to themselves and to their country. Thus interaction with information on the European Union and European integration is seen to be always positive (Gabel, 1998). It is in this branch of Euroscepticism theory that key elements of the cultural form populism can be found. The 'us' and 'them' in this sense manifests in a deep distrust in experts and elite driven European integration, with a disconnect between European bureaucrats and the 'ordinary' British worker. Puzzling here however is that political awareness is often highly correlated with age (Bartle, 1997), yet the Leave vote was overwhelmingly voted for by the older generations. This is further confounded somewhat by the high profile of the referendum campaigns, coupled with a 70% turnout, a high for British politics, thus meaning that interaction with political discourse was likely to be quite high in general. Political awareness and Euroscepticism were therefore likely be at relatively high levels simultaneously throughout the voting population during the referendum.

This is assuming that the information individuals interacted with was correct however, yet this was far from the case during the referendum campaigning. A number of Eurosceptic newspapers, such as the Daily Express and the Daily Mail for example, have often been accused of sensationalist headlines and overly emotive campaigns when

it comes to their portrayals of the European Union. The now notorious figure that claimed the UK was sending £350 million per week to the EU written on the side of the Leave campaign group's bus is indicative of this. This figure is widely thought to be a misuse of official data (FullFact, 2017) and although measuring the UK's actual net weekly contribution is somewhat difficult it is thought to be much lower (FullFact, 2017). Cognitive ability and political awareness, particularly when it comes to consumption of news, could thus have played an effect in the referendum result when it comes to seeing through the misinformation that typified the referendum campaigning. This theory will be used to somewhat control and test for the effects of this and the overall relationship between an individual's media consumption and Euroscepticism. With regards to this theory then, the study will proceed with the following two hypotheses:

**H3a:** Interaction with greater information on the European Union will be significantly less correlated than the other theories covered due to the misinformation of the British press around the European Union.

**H3b:** Newspaper readership and misinformation will have a positive effect on Euroscepticism if the individuals are found to read Eurosceptic newspapers, the opposite effect will be the case for Europhilic media.

In summary this thesis will move forward with a binary typography of hard or soft Euroscepticism using the British EU referendum as context, in order to test the identity, economic utilitarian and cognitive political drivers of Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiment at the individual level. Particularly the context and growth of Euroscepticism within the UK, especially after the 2004 Expansion and the British history of Empire need to be kept in mind due to their unique nature within the study. The different cultural and national identities within Scotland and Wales also may be of importance. The transnational nature of individuals has also been argued to have an effect on Euroscepticism and will be tested in the empirical section of the study, as will the cognitive and political effects of individuals. The thesis will now move onto discuss the research methods, data used and measures for the variables identified here.



### **3. Research Design**

With the key theories and approaches in mind this chapter will seek to operationalise the theoretical framework into measurable variables and outcomes of interest in order to test the identity, economic and cognitive political theories of Euroscepticism. This will allow for the construction of ordinary least squares and logistic empirical models that will be divided into four separate tests depending on the respondents' country of residence. Additionally a separate model will be discussed here that looks specifically at the print media's effects on Euroscepticism, with variables derived from studies of the many British newspapers reporting of key issues during the referendum campaign. This chapter will also analyse key datasets that have been of use in the wider literature and will identify the British Election Study as the main dataset for this study. Initially this chapter will explore the comparable contexts of the three countries of study, it will then continue with a wider discussion of the variables used in similar studies and their potential limitations when it comes to the study of Euroscepticism.

#### **3.1 England, Scotland and Wales as Comparative Case Studies**

Politically the countries that will be studied are, while not entirely homogenous, distinctly similar. In general elections the major political parties campaign unilaterally, although devolution has led to some cleavages between the central and the regional parties. This is perhaps most notable in the disagreements between the First Minister of the Welsh Assembly and leader of Welsh Labour Carwyn Jones and the leader of the British Labour party Jeremy Corbyn in early 2016 (Morris, 2016). These disagreements are mostly found in the Labour party with its history of being made up of a multitude of groups however. While disagreements about particular policies do arise, overall the affiliations between the British parties and their devolved counterparts remain quite strong (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Hopkin, 2009). When it came to the EU referendum campaign arguments were made towards the contexts of the countries in general but the campaign groups were centralised with a British outreach.


While overall the countries of study remain politically similar they do seem to have differential effects of nationalism. As has been alluded to thus far the countries of Wales and Scotland bear significant similarities with their distinct national identities and political parties. England on the other hand does not have a specified nationalist political party, and those that promote English nationalism tend to register on the right of the political spectrum, so Scotland and Wales register differently to their mutual neighbour in this regard. Furthermore both have historical left wing tendencies, at the devolved governance level Wales has only ever had Labour governments in the Welsh Assembly while similarly Scotland initially had Labour led parliaments which have been replaced by the centre-left SNP in recent Scottish Parliamentary elections (Scully, 2013). Importantly these new devolved general assemblies

have allowed for greater plurality in voting and political discourse than is perhaps seen on the national level (Jones and Scully 2006). This has facilitated the rise of the nationalist parties within the two countries, and allowed UKIP to gain a foothold in Wales in the 2016 Assembly elections, with seven seats at the Senedd. These devolved government elections have also caused the major parties within the national context to slightly diversify their approaches to providing Scottish and Welsh answers to Scottish and Welsh questions (Jeffery and Hough, 2009).

The national levels follow similar left wing voting patterns with much of Wales and Scotland voting Labour since 1983 with an explosion of SNP support from the mid-2000s in Scotland. This trend is shown in Figure 2 that portrays a Dissimilarity Index to England between the Scotland, represented by the blue line and Wales represented by the green line, in national elections; 'where the nations would score 0 if they gave the same vote share to parties as did voters in England, and a maximum 100 if they gave all their votes to parties that won no votes in England' (Scully, 2015). The figure shows an overall similar trend in voting patterns from 1974 onwards with a large divergence from 2005 in Scotland that illustrates the growth of the SNP. England has much more tendency to swing in this regard with general elections largely being decided in the country given the larger population and number of seats available in the national parliament at Westminster. With no level of devolution to an English governing body there are very few nationalist parties that seek to specifically promote English interests and English identity.

Thus, to a certain extent, Wales and Scotland can be viewed as politically similar with England being slightly different as it does have the added level of devolved governance. Yet puzzlingly the outcomes of the former two in the European Union referendum differed vastly, suggesting that Euroscepticism and potentially immigration had differential effects when deciding an individual's vote. Thus the theoretical framework discussed will be used to highlight and contrast the potential difference makers, or with the case of England where the similarities lie, in the determinants of Euroscepticism that potentially led to referendum results in Wales in particular. This will be done in order to test the main hypotheses and illustrate the drivers of individual Euroscepticism and their links to anti-immigrant sentiments in the three countries.

**Figure 2** Dissimilarity of voting patterns in Scotland and Wales in general elections, compared to England



Source: Scully, 2015

Note: Blue line = Scottish vote patterns, Green line = Welsh vote patterns

### **3.2 Available Datasets and the British Election Study**

The vast majority of studies on the subject of Euroscepticism use data from Eurobarometer surveys, often for cross national comparisons (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Serricchio et al, 2013). While the Eurobarometer is a good resource for such country comparisons, with the focus being of this study being particularly on the United Kingdom they are not necessarily adequate in this case. The Europe wide focus of the Eurobarometer polling does not allow for large enough measurement of the smaller areas within the specific countries. The number of observations for Wales and Scotland in Eurobarometer 86.3 were 42 and 77 respectively for example (Eurobarometer, 2016). Such small numbers do not allow for an accurate study of the smaller nations within the UK to a satisfactory level and a larger dataset specifically based around the UK is needed. Thus this study will use the data available from the British Election Study as the number of observations is generally quite large and the focus is specifically on the United Kingdom and it's uniquely Eurosceptic outlook.

The British Election Study has conducted electoral research after every British general election since 1964 in conjunction with the Economic and Social Research Council as well as the Universities of Oxford, Manchester and

Nottingham. This is a robust and highly regarded study when it comes to research and includes a number of datasets with a large number of variables and a wide variety of study types available. This long running survey has recently undertaken an online panel study that is currently made up of 13 Waves from 2014 to 2017. This internet panel includes an extensive list of variables based around the social and political makeup and focuses in Great Britain, ranging from EU referendum vote or vote intention to questions around personality traits as well as a wide number of political party based variables. Waves 7 and 10 are the most relevant with regards to the EU referendum as these are the pre and post referendum Waves with the most wide ranging and useful variables pertaining to specifics of immigration and media usage of respondents. Both Waves were conducted by the YouGov polling company on behalf of the BES and were carried out from April to May 2016 and from November to December 2016 respectively. A comparison of the two may show the effects of the campaigning process undertaken by the Leave and Remain campaign groups as well as the campaigns from media outlets. Furthermore the closer to the referendum the better for data collection, as time and potentially social or political stigma can change people's views and even their remembering or willingness to report on certain variables.

Given the wide ranging data from the British Election Study a wide number of topics have been covered in the literature (Sanders et al, 2008; Larcinese, 2007, Alvarez et al, 2000), while a few have looked specifically at Euroscepticism and attitudes towards the EU. McClaren (2015) however uses the 2001 and 2005 post-election BES surveys to study the effects and growth of anti-immigrant attitudes in the United Kingdom. Her study using the BES data looked at the perceptions of immigration's effect on more domestic issues such as trust in politicians or the police however and is not so concerned with Euroscepticism and the causes of negative perceptions of immigration per se. The newness of the data and the explosive rise of Euroscepticism in this context means that few studies using the BES internet panel are currently available as a direct comparison. The British Election Study do publish regular analysis of their own data; of most interest here is their recent study focussing on the psychological and social aspects of the EU referendum voting patterns using only Wave 9 (BES, 2016). Their studies of national identity and the political economy of voting patterns using the internet panel data have largely been restricted to focus on class and party identity rather than national or cultural identity however (Mellon and Evans, 2016).

On the other hand; Goodwin and Millazzo (2015) use data from Waves 4 and 6 of the BES internet panel in a way similar to that planned in this study. Interestingly the authors notify the importance of immigration in the debate around European Union membership, as well as number of other socioeconomic variables. While the focus of this study is interesting and provides useful insights it ultimately does not include any focus on the UK as separate parts, the authors only include a variable on the respondents' English identities for example. Furthermore the dependent

variable for their study is the probability that an individual would report leave or remain vote intentions, at the time of the study a before and after comparison was not available.

### **3.3 Dependent Variables**

#### **Euroscepticism**

When it comes to the measuring of Euroscepticism many studies tend to suffer from the ever present 'dependent variable problem' and there is no one given universal measure for the concept available in the literature. How questions are worded and what questions are used are important to identifying Euroscepticism within individual respondents; subsequently for the majority of studies Euroscepticism tends to be measured by a combination of the approval for certain aspects of the EU, often, as mentioned, using Eurobarometer data and questionnaires (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005, Hooghe and Marks, 2004). As the BES is not specifically based on the European Union the data is somewhat limited. Furthermore given the changes in context after the referendum some variables in Wave 7, such as opinions on EU worker protections or the common agricultural policy, do not appear in Wave 10 as they are no longer be applicable.

Despite this, this study firstly will use two measures of Euroscepticism. The first will be a measure of how far individuals believe EU integration should go as far as Britain is concerned. The specific question here is as follows;

- Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

The mentioned scale runs from 'protect our independence' (0) to 'unite fully with the EU' (10). Note that in the raw BES data the scale runs in the opposite direction, this has been changed here to avoid the potential for confusing results as the later identified variables run from negative attitudes to positive attitudes, harmonisation thus reduces the chances of misinterpretation.

This measure of EU integration is best as it links to the level of preference for decision making at a national or supranational level as described in both Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) binary Euroscepticism typologies. This measure is also somewhat similar to the questions used in both Gabel's (1998) and McClaren (2004) studies, albeit with a larger scale and denotes a definite direction towards which individuals feel that European integration should go (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). Unlike Hooghe and Marks however the British Election

Study data does not include a variable that indicates a desired speed for integration. Speed of integration is not so important within the context of the UK and the EU referendum however. Those that felt the status quo was favourable were in the minority at the time of the referendum, meaning that the majority of those that vote felt that the speed of integration should essentially be zero or reversed in most cases. Hence speed of integration is only relevant for those where support for EU membership is the main body of study.

Furthermore this integration measure is in a scale where it is easier to determine levels of Euroscepticism than that of the referendum vote or vote intention. With this scale soft Eurosceptics and europhiles would be expected to register in the middle portions while those with hard opposition to the EU would likely register at the lower end of the scale, the opposite is the case for the hard Europhiles.

A binary variable of the vote intentions and registered votes of individuals will also be included. This will be measured in the same direction as the first Euroscepticism variable, running from negative to positive on a scale of 0 to 1 with 0 being a leave vote or vote intention and 1 being a remain vote or vote intention. This will provide a further measure of Euroscepticism within the British context. In this sense we can measure Euroscepticism on both a binary scale, with a Eurosceptic – non Eurosceptic choice structure as well as a multivariate scale which allows for the differentiation of hard and soft Eurosceptics.

### **Immigration Based Variables**

Similarly measuring an individual's attitudes towards immigration is also a subject of great discussion as immigration is itself a complex phenomenon and attitudes can be similarly multifaceted and difficult to measure (Davidov et al, 2015). Most of this difficulty comes from measuring across countries (Meuleman and Billiet, 2012), as locations of immigration, types of immigration and immigration levels can vary widely depending on the country of study. Measurement in this case is not so much of a factor as despite the United Kingdom being made up of four countries, immigration is controlled by the central government in Westminster, meaning that immigration is similar across the countries of study.

Nevertheless what and how questions are asked that pertain to perceptions of immigration are of importance. The British Election Study includes two important variables when it comes to the perceptions of immigration. These seem to be based off of those used in the European Social Survey and have been used in a number of studies on attitudes towards immigration in varying contexts (Masso, 2009; Card et al, 2005; Sides and Citrin, 2007). These are as follows:

- Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?
- And do you think that immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life?

Both are measured on a 1 to 7 scale, from negative to positive. While a number of key studies (Masso, 2009; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012) use composite variables to measure an overall attitude towards immigration, this study will use these questions as separate dependent variables as they are heavily linked to the economic and identity theories of Euroscepticism.

### **3.4 Independent variables**

The independent variables will be divided into the three main theory categories of identity, economic and cognitive political with a further category being added that looks specifically at the role of the media in deciding voter preferences and Euroscepticism.

#### **Identity**

Measurement of national identities is potentially complicated by the fact that they can often be diffuse and denote a highly personal attachment to a greater cultural whole. It is this personal attachment that is key here. If Tajfel's (1981, p.254-5) classic definition of social identity; that identity is 'part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' is taken, then an individual's self-report of their attachment to an identity is sufficient for measurement in this case. A further complicating factor in the case of the United Kingdom is that it is a country made up of countries; in that the UK as a whole is made up of four distinct areas, known generally as countries, with distinct individual histories and cultures.

Thus there can be assumed to be at least three levels to national and transnational identity in the United Kingdom;

1. the country level, or Englishness, Scottishness, Welshness and Irishness, although the latter is not available here.
2. the national level, or Britishness
3. the European level, or Europeanness

For the measurement of these national and international identities the British Election Study includes a highly useful self-reporting identity scales with regards to these Welsh, Scottish, English, British and European identities. The variable is measured on a 1 to 7 scale from 'not at all X' to 'very strongly X'. Identity here then is a self-report of an individual's perception of a connection to a shared culture. These may be relatively diffuse categories with little definition applied or given to the respondent about what the identity scale means but that is the point here however. According to Tajfel's definition, identity is an internally created and defined concept, one defines themselves by their perception of closeness to their nationality or shared culture (Carey, 2002). Emotional attachment is not something that can be defined and applied across a group, thus the self-rating scale used by the BES is a good measurement of identity in this case. Additionally a categorical Welsh speaking variable is also available for Welsh national identity measurement if it is assumed that the Welsh language is the key shared aspect of Welsh culture.

### **Economic**

Measuring the transnational nature of individuals and their openness to transnational factors can also potentially be difficult with large datasets. In his intensive testing of Deutch's transitionalist approach Kuhn (2011), for example, measures length of time individuals have lived abroad, whether their parents are international as well as an individual's preparedness to read a newspaper in another European language to name but a few variables. While such transnational factors are not available using the BES, other studies have measured indirect transnational factors to identify 'winners and losers' of globalisation and European Union membership (Kreisi et al, 2006; Tucker et al, 2002). These largely manifest as measurements of individual or household socioeconomic conditions or individual self-assessment of economic profiles (Kuhn, 2011), that is, both real economic conditions and perceptions of economic positions. In this sense it is those with greater socioeconomic conditions or perception of greater economic conditions that have greater access to transnational opportunities, such as work overseas, holidays or investments, and are defined as 'winners' of the transition to European Union membership (Tucker et al, 2002). Thus there is likely to be some overlap between transnational individuals and higher socioeconomic backgrounds as well as those with greater job security and a positive perception of their economic situation. This method of identifying winners and



losers of globalisation and transnational cooperation is not new but is highly useful with the BES dataset as a number of variables on both the actual economic conditions of individuals and their perceived economic conditions are available. Hence this thesis will use these variables to measure their transnationalism against Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments.

Therefore it is firstly key to measure how an individual's real economic positions with an empirical form of measurement. To do this, this study will use the reporting of gross annual income in brackets from under £5000 (1) to £100,000 and over (14) for individuals and under £5000 (1) to over £150,000 (15) for households available in the BES data. In both Waves a variable on an individual's attachment to working class backgrounds, with a binary attachment variable, will be used to indicate socioeconomic positions. This is measured with 1 being that the individual considers themselves working class and 0 being no working class attachment. When it comes to perceptions of economic positions two variables on the individual's perceptions will be used. The first of these measures the individual's perception of the national economic situation, which captures a degree of sociotropic perceptions. The second measures an individual's evaluation of their risk of unemployment, which will capture the egocentric level of perceptions. These run on scales of 1 to 5 both with negative perceptions at the lower end and positive perceptions at the higher end.

### **Cognitive Political**

Cognitive ability is not necessarily easily measured when it comes to large scale survey data. A simple yet potentially inaccurate measure would be to use the education levels of respondents in the BES. This is measured from no qualifications to postgraduate. The data also includes a distinction between GSCE's; compulsory exams taken throughout the UK at age 16, from A\* to C, a 'higher pass' and D to G, a 'lower pass'. There is likely to be some overlap with education and transnationalist variables here however, as education is often highly correlated with income, thus education cannot necessarily be differentiated from that of the economic utilitarian variables. While education will still be included a further measure of political awareness or attention will be included similar to both Gabel (1998) and Inglehart et al (1991) to measure how interactive individuals feel they are with politics in general. In the British Election Study this is represented by a self-reported measure of political attention from 0 to 10. While the question included in the British Election Survey data is not specifically aimed at knowledge of the EU, British politics in the periods before and after the referendum have revolved around the country's relationship with the EU however. Political attention can and should thus be assumed to mean political knowledge and attention shown towards the EU referendum and debate here then.

Finally an individual's trust in experts, while not necessarily a measure of cognitive ability will be included in this section as it will be used to measure an indicator degree of populism. Oliver and Rahn (2016) recognise a mistrust of expertise as one of the key dimensions of the populism that seemed to consume politics in 2016; Their further dimension of a national affiliation is captured somewhat by the identity based variables mentioned earlier, which if anything could show that populism in this sense does not fit within a single theory of individual level Euroscepticism.

While the BES does include specific populist variables, the anti-intellectualist variables will be used as these link best to the political cognitive theory of Euroscepticism found in the earlier literature. Use of anti-intellectualism here provides a measure of both thought processes and trust in mainstream thought as well as a measure of distrust in the intellectual, and often progressive elites. This could potentially play a part in explaining perceptions of immigration and Euroscepticism in the case of Britain; Michael Gove, a prominent figure in the Leave campaign infamously stated that the British people had 'had enough of experts' (Mance, 2016). Experts, in the populist view, represent an intellectual elite with a mandate to maintain the status quo of European integration (Khan, 2016; Groves, 2016).

This is measured in the BES, with a five point agree to disagree scale to the statement:

- 'I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts'

### **Media based variables**

Of high interest is the fact that the British Election Study has variables and reports on a given individual's main daily newspaper readership. Startin (2015) recognises Eurosceptic newspapers as a key driver in the growth of Euroscepticism, while Daddow (2012) goes further and places the 'Murdoch effect' as being of high importance. This effect alludes to the infamous Australian billionaire with his number of owned right wing newspapers in the UK, and their potential for having disproportionate effect on British politics. Furthermore, Swales (2016) interestingly found that people tended more to follow the view of their most read newspaper than their political party when voting in the referendum.

The effect of the British print media on voter preferences has been much studied, and they have long been argued to have the capability for both agenda setting and the framing of issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The term 'It was the Sun wot won it', referring to the famous headline in The Sun tabloid newspaper after the Conservatives' surprise victory in the 1992 election, is indicative of this. The paper notoriously campaigned vociferously for the party in the election campaign and there has been much debate and study devoted into the

effects of newspaper campaigns into elections and party support (Reeves et al, 2016; Linton, 1996). Limited empirical studies have been carried out on their effects on Euroscepticism within the British context however. The power of the British print media on elections should not be understated or ignored therefore. Thus daily newspaper readership could also be of importance to an individual's perception of the European Union and of immigration and will need to be accounted for in this study. This will be done by measuring the effects and uptake of the most Eurosceptic and europhilic newspapers and generating variables for referendum focus and trustworthiness when it comes to EU level reporting.

The British Election Study contains data on an individual's primary read daily newspaper, this data will be used to generate a number of variables based upon the paper read. The first variable generated will simply be the editorial position of the given newspaper, this will be measured with the same binary scale as the vote and vote intention dependent variable, with 1 being a remain position and 0 being a leave position. The main newspaper positions that will be used will be derived from editorials that explicitly state the position of the newspaper. While useful for gauging the effect the general output of the newspaper this variable is perhaps too simplistic as it does not measure how much of a campaigning focus or how active a newspaper was at promoting it's editorial position. Thus further variables will be derived and used.

Deriving variables of media focus and campaigning can be complicated by the tone and positions of reporting and information that is given in the articles read by individuals. When measuring the anti-immigrant sentiment of a particular newspaper the total number of articles by each paper containing negative depictions of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania, taken from Moore and Ramsay's (2017) study on the referendum campaign in the print media will be used. This measure takes only those that contain negative depictions of immigrants, or immigration (Moore and Ramsay, 2017, p.99) and provides a good measure of both tone, as only negative articles are included, and volume, as the numbers are divided by paper. Similarly a variable containing the volume of articles that mention both the economy and the explicit argument that EU migration creates pressures on public services take from Levy et al's (2016) comprehensive study of media focus and tone during the referendum period. This variable provides an interesting link between two of the main focuses of the referendum campaigning.


When it comes to the particular campaigning focus on the EU referendum in general, finding data on the specific tone of the papers is more difficult. To counteract this, this thesis will generate an a Referendum Leave Tone (RLTI) index that can be used to measure both volume and tone within these contexts. This will be a compound of the number of articles on the EU multiplied by the percentage of these articles that were pro leave in each newspaper. While the earlier position variable accounts for the official positions of the newspapers, the reality of differences in

tones and opinions within the newspapers as well as the focus on the referendum does not necessarily result in a uniformed message about a particular issue. This index then captures both volume and tone of referendum article. The data for this index will be taken from Levy et al (2016).

When it comes to the misinformation present throughout the referendum, trustworthiness may also be a factor to consider here and The Economist's (2016) study of debunked EU 'myths' will be used to measure this. Trustworthiness will be measured here as the number of incorrect articles by each newspaper according to the study, thus the higher the number of misleading reports by a newspaper the less trustworthy it can be considered when reporting on the EU referendum. Figure 3 shows a visual description of this as well as a sample of some headlines and a timeframe of when these myths appeared in the print media. The term 'myth' here is defined by the European Commission (2017) with their focus on debunking the misinformation propagated by the press, which more often than not has been British. Using the data displayed in the 'By Publication' graph shown in Figure 3 this study will divide each into categories with 10 myth report brackets for each paper, so 0 to 10 myths reported would be the lowest end of the scale and 90 to 100 would be the highest end of the scale. While it must be noted that from Figure 3 a number of these headlines and stories may be intended as humorous, humour itself is not apolitical and is often employed as a political tool. The reporting of humorous sounding myths by Eurosceptic media in this sense invites ridicule and incredulity towards the European Union thus allowing for criticisms of its importance and use to the United Kingdom and British society.

These variables allow for the measurement of both the EU referendum focus of the print media and of their trustworthiness and thus can be used to measure these effects on the perceptions of individuals when it comes to Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant values.

**Figure 3** The Economist's study of myths debunked by the European Commission by time, publication and topic



**Source:** The Economist, 2016

### **3.5 Controls and Comparative Inclusions**

While all countries available will be included in this study, a British average for the sample will be included first and foremost for comparative purposes and the analysis of general trends. Applying country identifiers for each country of interest will then allow for measurement of respondents from England, Scotland and Wales and will help to illustrate differentiation from national averages.

With the inclusion of such wide-ranging theories and independent variables there are a limited number of control variables identified in the literature that can be applicable here. Nevertheless age of respondents is likely to be

a factor, as previous studies have found that it was overwhelmingly the older generations that voted leave and that age is generally positively correlated with Euroscepticism (Moore, 2016; Ipsos, 2016a). This will be controlled for by using the age groupings, or age of respondents. Household size may indicate a paternalistic or family based demographic voting patterns so will be included here also, as will a measure of whether or not the individual is a homeowner. A binary gender variable will also be included as a demographic control. Finally a self-reported left right scale will also be used to measure individual's underlying political leanings to see if this has an effect on Euroscepticism. Given the importance of right wing parties in propagated Euroscepticism this is likely an important factor here as well. It may also bring up interesting results for the traditionally left leaning countries of Wales and Scotland here. Where the dataset is not being divided by country two group level statistics will be included. These are the unemployment levels and immigrant levels as a percentage of the population of each country. The specific construction of these variables, and the specific questions involved in all BES survey data used can be found in Appendix 3 at the end of this paper.

### **3.6 Empirical Model**

$$(1) E = \alpha + \beta_1 I + \beta_2 U + \beta_3 P + \beta_4 C + \theta + \varepsilon$$

$$(2) \text{Log}E = \alpha + \beta_1 I + \beta_2 U + \beta_3 P + \beta_4 C + \theta + \varepsilon$$

In summary the main body of the research will follow the equation denoted in (1) using an Ordinary Least Squares model. Where a binary independent variable is used, with the vote or vote intention measure of Euroscepticism, a logistic regression denoted in equation (2) will be used. The study will proceed then to use the country based models that have been identified in this chapter.

In these equations **E** in this case represents the dependent variable measures of Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiment measured in the integration scale and the two questions regarding the opinions of immigration. These will be measured against the independent variables separately. **I** represents the identity variables described earlier, all models will include a Britishness and Europeanness scale. The identity variables used will differ depending upon **C**, the country identifier as there is little point measuring Welsh identities for only Scottish respondents for example. The country identifier will be used to create groupings that divide the sample by their country of residence; Wales, England or Scotland, as well as an overall sample grouping. **U** represents the economic utilitarian values of income and perceptions of the economy and job security. These will be the same for all models, as will the cognitive political variables denoted by **P** that include measures of education, political awareness, anti-intellectualism and

whether the individual reads a newspaper. Finally  $\theta$  represents the demographic controls that will be used throughout all models.

The media based variables will be introduced to a separate version of each of these regressions without country identifiers. Given the fall in print media readership (Greenslade, 2016) dividing the sample up too many times could drastically decrease the number of observations and significantly reduce the representativeness of the study. This model will also only include individuals from Wave 10, as the majority of the variables are measured in the ten week campaigning period and will not have had an effect on the respondents before this in Wave 7 of the BES internet panel.

The BES also presents weightings of representativeness to the samples that will be applied to all regressions. These are provided by YouGov, the polling company that undertakes the research on behalf of the BES. Of note is that these weightings are designed in part to redress the issue of Scottish individuals being overrepresented in the sample, this problem is not so much of an issue here as we are dividing the samples by their country.

### **3.7 Don't know Answers and Missing Data in the BES**

A potential problem of discounting 'don't know' answers within the BES datasets must be acknowledged, before continuing. Don't know answers register outside of the scales in the BES rather than as a neutral or central position in the answers, thus including don't know answers skews the data. Discounting them from the data would greatly reduce the representativeness of the sample as we would only be measuring those who know what their views on these particular, and wide-ranging issues are. This is not the case within the EU referendum, people may not be informed enough to have formulated their own opinions on a variety of subjects but still have registered a vote. The representative nature of the sample would be therefore somewhat reduced as individuals cannot be expected to know everything about themselves or have formulated opinions on the entirety of the general questions within the BES. It is important to note that the numbers observations missed are minimal, between 200 to 500 per variable, yet the effect of skipping these is cumulative and can reduce the number of observations by up to two thirds.

In order to counteract this problem, where available, don't know answers will be registered as a middle or neutral position, for example if there is a scale of 1 to 5 then a 'don't know' answer is registered as a 3. This approach is taken Stephenson and Crête (2011), as a specific example, in order to maximise the use of their data, where a large number of independent variables are used. An individual whose opinion differs only slightly from the neutral position, that in this form of survey is unlikely to be picked up, is much more inclined to register as a don't know or to

give a non-answer as an 'easy out' (Gilljam and Granberg, 1993; Sturgis et al, 2014). Furthermore neutral answers in survey data are often equated to a lack of knowledge on a given subject (Raaijmakers et al, 2000). If we take the left right scale as an example for further analysis, if an individual registers a don't answer, it is then sufficient to assume that they are undecided on their political position and can be registered to a neutral position on the scale, in this case as a 5. The majority of reports used in this research similarly pertain to an individual's knowledge of either themselves or a perception that is largely derived at the individual level, thus registering a don't know answer as a neutral figure is likely to be sufficient for most variables used. This will only be done where such an opinion is stated however, it will not be done for binary variables and will also not be done for empirical reports. Moving missing data to a neutral midpoint may reduce accuracy to a small degree yet will allow for greater representativeness of the sample, this trade-off should be noted.



## **4.Descriptive Statistics**

### **4.1 Groupings of the Dataset**

As far as the makeup of Waves 7 and 10 go both have a sample of close to 30,000. Table 1, which describes all BES derived variables, shows an overall upward bias in the ages of respondents in Waves 7 and 10 of the BES panel study. Note that with regards the differences in reporting, age groupings will be applied to regressions in Wave 10 while a standard age variable will be applied to Wave 7. The median ages for both surveys are above the UK average. In Wave 7 it is 53 while in Wave 10 this falls in the upper bounds of the 46 to 55 bracket, while the median national age is closer to 46 when measured for those 18 or older (ONS, 2017). This is important given the overall trend between Euroscepticism and age discussed in the Research Design chapter, in the sense that one would expect to see a high proportion of leave voters in both samples.

Table 2 however shows a much more balanced picture when it comes to EU referendum vote intention and vote reporting. These are reported on a binary scale in line with the referendum question with 1 being remain and 0 being leave. Of most importance is that the data in the BES actually slightly overestimates the remain vote, and interestingly this is mostly the case with respondents from Wales. This is not too problematic however as the focus of the thesis is on the individual level thus meaning it is looking at how individual's perceptions affected their decision making and their opinions of immigration, so group level dynamics are not necessarily important at this stage of the research. Table 2 also shows a heavy bias towards respondents from England, this is understandable however given the overall population sizes; the populations of Wales and Scotland were estimated to be 3.113 and 5.404 million respectively in 2016 while England's population was 55.268 million (ONS, 2017b).

**Table 1** Descriptive statistics of the Outcome and Explanatory Variables of the BES Internet Panel Study

Variable	Observations		Mean		Standard Deviation		Scale
	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	
<b>Outcome Variables</b>							
EU Integration Scale	30,895	30,319	3.467	4.014	3.079	3.304	0-10
EU Referendum Vote	NA	27,406	NA	0.520215	NA	0.4996	0-1
EU Referendum Vote Intention	28,044	NA	0.512	NA	0.500	NA	0-1
Immigration And Economy	30,895	30,319	3.809	4.268	1.839	1.764	1-7
Immigration And Culture	30,895	30,319	3.603	3.943	1.961	1.975	1-7
<b>Identity</b>							
Britishness	30,895	30,319	5.619	5.556	1.589	1.624	1-7
Englishness	30,895	30,319	5.045	5.041	2.203	2.171	1-7
Scottishness	4,215	3,401	5.603	5.557	1.909	1.967	1-7
Welshness	2,580	2,003	4.740	4.728	2.304	2.346	1-7
Europeanness	30,895	30,319	3.579	3.725	1.895	1.997	1-7
<b>Economic</b>							
Gross Annual Personal Income	23,563	19,733	4.831	4.782	3.011	2.999	1-14
Gross Annual Household Income	22,074	22,597	6.732	6.845	3.548	3.568	1-15
Perception Of The Economy	30,895	30,319	2.617	2.476	0.956	0.905	1-5
Risk Of Unemployment	30,894	30,319	3.699	3.694	1.211	1.202	1-5
Working Class	30,895	30,319	0.414	0.394	0.493	0.489	0-1
Risk Of Poverty	30,895	30,319	2.531	2.506	1.230	1.209	1-5
<b>Cognitive</b>							
Education Level	26,287	25,536	2.964	3.050	1.358	1.320	1-5
Political Attention	30,895	30,319	6.983	6.561	2.265	2.446	0-10
Read Newspaper	30,895	30,319	0.692	0.583	0.461	0.493	0-1
Trust In Experts	30,895	30,319	3.172	3.004	1.045	1.119	1-5
<b>Controls</b>							
Age Group	22,700	30,319	5.096	4.792	1.561	1.622	1-7
Age	30,895	NA	50.750	NA	16.600	NA	18-97
Household size	30,440	30,317	2.580	2.573	1.456	1.523	1-8
Left Right Scale	30,895	30,319	4.953	4.992	2.174	2.119	0-10
Homeowner	30,895	30,319	0.638	0.647	0.481	0.478	0-1
Female	30,895	30,319	0.515	0.539	0.500	0.498	0-1

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

**Table 2** EU referendum vote intention (W7) and reported EU vote (W10) by country

Country	Remain		Leave		Don't Know	
	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
England	10561 (43.93)	9716 (49.55)	11229 (46.71)	9695 (49.44)	1821 (7.57)	197 (1.00)
Scotland	2523 (59.17)	1956 (64.90)	1368 (32.08)	1042 (34.57)	317 (7.43)	16 (0.53)
Wales	1268 (48.98)	947 (54.55)	1095 (42.29)	768 (44.24)	176 (6.80)	21 (1.21)
Total	14,352	12,619	13,692	11,505	2,314	234

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

Note numbers in brackets are percentage shares of the country for the particular wave

## **4.2 Independent Variables**

When it comes to the independent variables the spread is fairly even. Looking at the identity variables Scottishness, Britishness and Englishness are in general the strongest perceived identities in the sample and similar to Haesly's (2001) findings Welsh is seen as the weakest. Europeanness is split largely down the middle and the slight growth in Europeanness after the vote, could potentially be explained by remain voters perceiving a greater affinity with Europe but could also be due to the general overestimation of the remain vote in the dataset that is more apparent in Wave 10 than Wave 7.

Noticeably for the economic variables gross annual income seems generally quite low, the reporting mean for individuals falls between the £15000 and £25000 categories in both Waves, there is also a large amount of missing reports here, up to a third of the sample do not report a personal income for example. The former issue is perhaps due to the large number of students and retirees in the sample. The latter of these two categories are more likely to be asset rich, yet due to their retirement will have low incomes. When measuring only full time working adults from the sample the mean rises to 6.4 which falls in the £25,000 to £29,999 bracket, this in line with national averages as the UK average income for 2016 was £28,028 for full time workers (ONS, 2016). Thus despite the drop in reporting of income the sample seems to be relatively representative of the British population. Also of note is that these income brackets also include part time workers which could further reduce the accuracy of the data, these groups are not so much of a problem however as they are low income and working, which could have an effect on their voting patterns.

Another potential knock-on effect of the retired population in the sample is that they do not generally suffer any risk of unemployment, so could skew the results. For this reason a variable that measures an individual's risk of poverty, measured on a similar scale to that of the risk of unemployment, will be included. Despite the extensive pension systems within the United Kingdom pensioners are not above the risk of poverty, further pensioner poverty has been found to be increasing since 2013 (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2017), thus poverty can and does affect all those included in the dataset. To test for the potential of a disproportionate effect of retired individuals in the data separate regressions will be carried out that include only those of working age, so those younger than 66.

Table 3 shows the educational makeup of the two Waves and a general bias towards those with higher education, this is always likely however with the generally high educational standards within the UK. On the other hand however having a sample where between 41% and 46% of respondents having at least an undergraduate degree is a definite overestimation, although it is not too far off the national average. The number of people with

degrees in 2017 for example made up around 42% of the working age population between 21 and 64 (ONS, 2017a).

**Table 3** Educational makeup of Waves 7 and 10

Education Level	Frequency (percentage of Wave)	
	W7	W10
No qualifications	2061 (7.84)	1810 (7.09)
GCSE D-G	1300 (4.95)	1064 (4.17)
GCSE A*-C	5882 (22.38)	5232 (20.49)
A-level	5925 (22.54)	5689 (22.28)
Undergraduate	8527 (32.44)	9405 (36.83)
Postgraduate	2592 (9.86)	2336 (9.15)

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

### **4.3 Construction of the Media Variables**

Tables 4 and 5 display the statistics on the media based variables that will be used in the model that tests the effects of the media on voting patterns and anti-immigrant perceptions. Most notable from Table 5 is that papers that backed the Leave campaign provided a much greater focus on the subject matters at hand when it came to both front pages and the number of articles based around the EU. The newspapers that supported leave also had a much greater inclination to report misleading articles about the EU, perhaps as a tactic to play to their Eurosceptic base readership or perhaps just simply down to poor journalistic standards. Of further note is that the split between Remain and Leave in the newspaper editorials largely falls along the left right divide. The Express, Daily Mail and Telegraph are all well-known, largely right wing papers, the only notable exception here would be The Times, which usually plays to a centre right readership and decided to support the Remain campaign. There is perhaps some evidence of the 'Murdoch effect' with regards to The Times however. It is the only newspaper owned by Rupert Murdoch whose editorial decided to back the Remain campaign. According to Levy et al (2016) the actual reporting of the referendum however was highly skewed towards the Leave side of the vote with this particular newspaper. This is why the RLTI focus of The Times is so high when compared even to some Leave backing newspapers.

**Table 4** Frequency of daily newspaper readership in Waves 7 and 10 with editorial positions on the referendum

Daily Newspaper Readership	Frequency		EU Referendum Position
	W7	W10	
The Express	611	524	Leave
The Daily Mail / The Scottish Daily Mail	4,121	4,121	Leave
The Mirror / Daily Record	2,198	1,403	Remain
The Daily Star / The Daily Star of Scotland	328	212	Undeclared
The Sun	4,403	2,335	Leave
The Daily Telegraph	1,404	1,289	Leave
The Financial Times	141	154	Remain
The Guardian	2,236	2,474	Remain
The Independent	699	551	Undeclared
The Times	1,365	1,364	Remain
The Scotsman	186	106	Remain
The Glasgow Herald	289	144	Remain
The Western Mail	116	59	Remain
Other	3245	2935	NA
Total	21342	17671	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, EU Referendum positions derived from editorials of the specific papers in question.

**Table 5** Media based variables and Indexes

Publication	Articles On Referendum	Leave focus (%)	RLTI	Negative Articles Immigration	EU Myths	Economy and Immigration
<b>Remain</b>						
The Mirror / Daily Record	119	16	19.04	14	11-20	8
The Financial Times	318	20	63.6	10	NA	7
The Guardian	271	16	43.36	13	NA	22
The Times	336	36	120.96	15	31-40	7
<b>Leave</b>						
The Express	275	74	203.5	88	61-70	64
The Daily Mail / The Scottish Daily Mail	403	58	233.74	64	91-100	37
The Sun	249	44	109.56	33	21-30	20
The Daily Telegraph	360	47	169.2	3	11-20	9

Sources: Negative articles on immigration and economy and immigration from Moore and Ramsay (2017), article numbers and leave focus from Levy et al (2016) and EU myth categories from The Economist (2016)

#### **4.4 Inter-variable Correlation**

While we do see a large number of significant correlations we see very little strong correlation between the dependent variables in both Waves shown in the correlation Tables 6 and 7. Where correlation is at its strongest is between the economic variables which is largely understandable. The highest correlation seen is the measures of personal incomes and also between the risk of poverty and risk of unemployment. These two

correlations make sense as the higher an individual's income the higher their household's income will be, in fact if the individual lives in a household of 1 then the two variables will be the same. Similarly unemployment is generally linked with poverty so the correlations are understandable. The potential then for multi-collinearity is therefore quite high with the economic variables. Initial testing of the regressions however suggests that removing one or both of these variables has little effect on the overall outcomes and coefficients.

Furthermore, in Table 18 found in Appendix 2, a variance inflation factor test was run on the whole model regression for the European integration scale OLS. This is a test that generally measures how much multi-collinearity between independent variables inflates the variance of an estimator (Alauddin and Nghiemb, 2010). A general rule of thumb around these tests is that a VIF of 10 or above indicates a strong possibility of multi-collinearity (Belsley et al, 1980). The fact that all numbers in Table 18 are below 5 then indicates a relatively low potential for multi-collinearity as there is little inflation of the results. The correlation tables also show that education is fairly strongly correlated with a number of the economic variables. This suggests that education, while being a measure of cognitive potential, is also linked to transnational opportunities and perceptions of economic positions. It can therefore be viewed as both part of the cognitive political theory and the transnational economic approaches to gauging Euroscepticism.

Due to the high correlation between the media based variables seen in Table 7 two sub models will be used when introducing these variables. The first will apply the Referendum Leave Focus Index and the number of negative articles on immigrants while the second will apply the newspaper editorial position, the number of EU myths printed and the number of articles that connect the economy to negative pressures of immigration. These variables measure slightly different elements of media coverage of key issues in the referendum yet are all linked by Euroscepticism; a newspaper that has a greater focus on campaigning to leave the EU is more likely to print anti-immigrant articles and myths about the EU. Splitting up these variables helps to limit the potential for multi-collinearity as shown by the low VIFs in Tables 19 and 20, whilst also measuring their effects on their readers Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments.

In summary Waves 7 and 10 of the British Election Study are largely representative of the British electorate, although there are some challenges to using the data. The overall bias towards higher ages generally means that there is an over representation of retired respondents that could throw some of the data off when it comes to the measuring of income, both household and personal. This can be countered by controlling for retired respondents or measuring working statuses separately. The media based variables describe a picture that would be expected, with Eurosceptic news source more highly focussed on the referendum and more likely to print misinformation. The study will now seek to test these variables and produce the models discussed in the Research Design chapter to test the hypotheses.

**Table 6** Correlation Table for the dependent variables in Wave 7

	Britishness	Europeanness	Personal income	Household income	Economy	Unemployment Risk	Working Class	Risk of Poverty	Education level	Political attention	Reads new spaper	Anti-intellectualism	Age Group	Household size	Left Right scale	Homeow ner	Female	National unemployment rate (%)	Immigrant population %
Britishness	1																		
Europeanness	-0.0604*	1																	
Personal income	0.0221*	0.0084	1																
Household income	0.0044	0.0385*	0.7765*	1															
Economy	0.1150*	-0.0289*	0.0338*	0.0641*	1														
Risk of Unemployment	0.1091*	-0.0289*	0.0809*	0.0888*	0.1696*	1													
Working Class	0.0246*	-0.1252*	-0.1234*	-0.1597*	-0.1459*	-0.0603*	1												
Risk of Poverty	0.0656*	0.0409*	0.1395*	0.1807*	0.2561*	0.4877*	0.1586*	1											
Education level	-0.1320*	0.2630*	0.0998*	0.1593*	0.0653*	0.0025	0.2730*	-0.1358*	1										
Political attention	0.0129	0.1151*	0.0391*	0.0337*	-0.0161	0.0504*	0.0465*	-0.0943*	0.16*	1									
Reads any new spaper	0.0340*	-0.0076	0.0217*	0.0231*	0.0125	0.0352*	-0.0222*	-0.0414*	-0.0235*	0.1392*	1								
Anti-intellectualism	0.0464*	-0.2864*	-0.0293*	-0.0927*	-0.1829*	-0.0454*	-0.2044*	0.1798*	-0.3017*	-0.1164*	0.0293*	1							
Age Group	0.1936*	-0.1031*	0.1051*	-0.0155	-0.0724*	0.3069*	-0.0613*	-0.1816*	-0.2321*	0.134*	0.0899*	0.1817*	1						
Household size	-0.0576*	0.0055	0.0533*	0.1756*	0.0119	-0.1214*	0.0204*	0.0856*	0.0337*	-0.0530*	-0.0098	-0.0242*	-0.3478*	1					
Left Right scale	0.2378*	-0.3065*	0.0982*	0.0770*	0.3287*	0.1239*	0.0859*	-0.1260*	-0.1462*	-0.0208*	0.0660*	0.1041*	0.1467*	-0.0319*	1				
Homeow ner	0.1116*	-0.0096	0.1848*	0.1817*	0.0586*	0.2388*	0.0443*	-0.2905*	0.0542*	0.0821*	0.0174	-0.0018	0.4360*	-0.1276*	0.1293*	1			
Female	0.0283*	-0.0165	-0.0908*	-0.0434*	-0.0511*	-0.0321*	-0.0064	0.0899*	-0.0056	-0.2192*	-0.0430*	0.0285*	-0.0767*	-0.0025	-0.0564*	-0.0308*	1		
National unemployment rate	-0.1740*	0.0353*	0.0107	0.0098	-0.0312*	-0.002	-0.0031	-0.0112	0.0394*	0.0391*	0.0305*	-0.0082	-0.0109	-0.0233*	-0.0550*	-0.0065	-0.0159	1	
Immigrant population %	0.1615*	-0.0144	0.0046	0.0143	0.0688*	-0.018	0.0187*	0.0133	-0.0657*	-0.0379*	-0.0272*	0.0167	-0.0601*	0.0385*	0.0918*	-0.0499*	0.0440*	-0.0858*	1

Sources: BES Waves 7 and 10, ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05;

**Table 7** Correlation Table for the dependent variables in Wave 10, including generated media variables

	Britishness	Europeanness	Personal income	Household income	Economy	Unemployment Risk	Working Class	Risk of Poverty	Education level	Political attention	Reads new spaper	Anti-intellectualism	RLTI	Negative Immigration Articles	New spaper Position	EU Myths	Economy and immigration articles	Age Group	Household size	Left Right scale	Homeow ner	Female	National unemployment rate (%)	Immigrant population %
Britishness	1																							
Europeanness	-0.0941*	1																						
Personal income	0.0228*	0.0092	1																					
Household income	-0.0083	0.0412*	0.6351*	1																				
Economy	0.1782*	-0.3143*	0.0148*	-0.0007	1																			
Risk of Unemployment	0.1193*	-0.0597*	0.0696*	0.0491*	0.1257*	1																		
Working Class	0.0394*	-0.1115*	-0.1190*	-0.1509*	-0.0275*	-0.0595*	1																	
Risk of Poverty	-0.0837*	-0.0028	-0.1259*	-0.1445*	-0.1494*	-0.4718*	0.1342*	1																
Education level	-0.1273*	0.2665*	0.1126*	0.1424*	-0.1168*	-0.0051	-0.2441*	-0.1140*	1															
Political attention	0.0254*	0.1405*	0.0444*	0.0075	-0.0274*	0.0695*	-0.0346*	-0.1178*	0.1688*	1														
Reads any new spaper	0.0523*	0.0191*	0.0338*	0.009	0.0442*	0.0669*	-0.0088	-0.0898*	0.0229*	0.2018*	1													
Anti-intellectualism	0.1038*	-0.3676*	-0.0290*	-0.0877*	0.1939*	-0.0098	0.2039*	0.1303*	-0.3142*	-0.1533*	-0.0221*	1												
RLTI	0.1972*	-0.3015*	0.0552*	0.0168*	0.3253*	0.1227*	-0.0373*	-0.0850*	-0.1051*	-0.0695*	.	0.2357*	1											
Negative Immigration Articles	0.1411*	-0.2964*	-0.0121	-0.0443*	0.2225*	0.0526*	0.1009*	0.0159	-0.2189*	-0.1200*	.	0.2726*	0.7832*	1										
New spaper Position	-0.2189*	0.3873*	0.0014	0.0563*	-0.3473*	-0.0716*	-0.0868*	-0.0073	0.2596*	0.1688*	.	-0.3452*	-0.7961*	-0.6501*	1									
EU Myths	0.1843*	-0.3068*	0.0211*	-0.0152	0.2689*	0.0969*	0.0469*	-0.0353*	-0.1793*	-0.1012*	.	0.2782*	0.9047*	0.8921*	-0.6403*	1								
Economy and immigration articles	0.0617*	-0.1827*	-0.0156	-0.0265*	0.1310*	0.0251*	0.0432*	0.0107	-0.1126*	-0.0557*	.	0.1396*	0.6509*	0.9138*	-0.5392*	0.6949*	1							
Age Group	0.2212*	-0.1227*	0.0881*	-0.0776*	0.0715*	0.3114*	0.0385*	-0.1960*	-0.1954*	0.1601*	0.1476*	0.1765*	0.1943*	0.1325*	-0.1575*	0.1935*	0.0539*	1						
Household size	-0.0737*	0.0146*	0.0612*	0.2032*	0.0044	-0.1289*	-0.0076	0.1004*	0.0314*	-0.0789*	-0.0398*	-0.0150*	-0.0582*	-0.0242*	0.0203*	-0.0526*	-0.0111	-0.3490*	1					
Left Right scale	0.2476*	-0.3367*	0.0900*	0.0376*	0.4085*	0.1322*	-0.0651*	-0.1287*	-0.1367*	-0.0281*	0.0636*	0.2215*	0.4563*	0.2940*	-0.4526*	0.3826*	0.1539*	0.1709*	-0.0332*	1				
Homeow ner	0.1336*	-0.0087	0.1764*	0.1073*	0.0589*	0.2367*	-0.0513*	-0.2891*	0.0768*	0.1182*	0.0737*	-0.0028	0.1480*	0.0776*	-0.0697*	0.1317*	0.0407*	0.4286*	-0.1402*	0.1418*	1			
Female	0.0231*	-0.0015	-0.0929*	-0.0155*	-0.0645*	-0.0301*	-0.0088	0.0767*	-0.0109	-0.2107*	-0.0512*	0.0132*	0.0781*	0.1071*	-0.0548*	0.1040*	0.1058*	-0.0914*	0.0042	-0.0658*	-0.0458*	1		
National unemployment rate	0.0054	0.0144*	0.0123	0.0233*	0.0135*	-0.0081	-0.0151*	-0.0097	-0.0087	-0.0002	0.0193*	-0.0034	-0.0181*	-0.0113	-0.0118	-0.0187*	-0.0115	-0.0450*	0.0216*	0.0236*	-0.0317*	0.0125*	1	
Immigrant population %	0.1330*	-0.0154*	0.0068	0.0151*	0.0666*	-0.0170*	-0.0183*	0.0085	-0.0441*	-0.0482*	0.0042	0.0154*	0.0186*	0.0011	-0.0801*	0.0075	-0.006	-0.0528*	0.0512*	0.0698*	-0.0415*	0.0326*	0.7237*	1

Sources: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, Moore and Ramsay (2017), Levy et al (2016), The Economist (2016), ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p<.0



## **5. Analysis and Results**

When it comes to analysing the results of the regressions a number of points of comparison are available and interesting here. Firstly there is analysis across individuals from the respective countries identified using the country identifiers, which is the main focus of the research question. Analysis at this level generates a suggestion of the differential effects of the independent variables by country. Secondly, analysis across models, particularly with the comparison between the measure of Euroscepticism and the logistic model of vote or vote intention, differences between the two could represent differences between hard and soft Euroscepticism, given the binary nature of the vote and the more analogue measure available for overall Euroscepticism and Europhilia. Finally, relevant information can be obtained by comparisons across Waves, both before and after the referendum and these show the potential effects of campaigning and possibly media focus running up to and after the vote on the 23rd June 2016. This can be most explicitly seen in the change of the perceptions of the economy in the logistic model regressions, moving from strong positive correlation to even stronger negative correlation after the referendum, this will be explained in detail later in the chapter.

As a prior note, a large number of significant variables can be seen throughout individuals from all countries in the regression tables. The results here reinforce a number of known findings on the referendum from other pieces of research and scholarly works, which illustrates an element of external validity. Age for example is for the most part highly correlated with the dependent variables, although this trend is less significant in Welsh and Scottish individuals. Similarly the significant and highly correlated left right scale illustrates that Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments are generally a right wing phenomenon, which is largely seen in the British political parties' stances on these issues, although in Wales again this correlation is considerably less significant and strong.

The results for England bear all the markings of the nationalist populism found in other studies on the subject. Individuals who feel closeness to their English, and not necessarily British, nationality as well as those that feel the country's economy, rather than their own personal economic situation are more likely to be both Eurosceptic and vote leave. Euroscepticism in Wales seems to have widely different from both predictions and the theory. The individual level theories used cannot strongly explain why individuals for Wales register as Eurosceptic, the results are almost identical to the results for Scottish individuals. This chapter will proceed by looking at the major trends and differences in the theories and variables that can help explain why the countries voted in different ways and why their Euroscepticism manifested differently.

**Table 8** OLS regressions of European integration variable for the whole dataset and all country identifiers

European integration		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.1809***	-0.1673***	-0.1325***	-0.1224***	-0.1191***	-0.0876**	-0.1948***	-0.0935*
	Europeanness	0.5998***	0.5731***	0.5953***	0.5609***	0.6343***	0.6481***	0.5601***	0.5900***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1357***	-0.1307***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0073	-0.0027	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0412	0.0523
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0198*	-0.0020	0.0168*	-0.0113	0.0384	0.0499	0.0501	0.0105
	Household income	-0.0049	0.0165*	-0.0059	0.0210**	0.0071	-0.0417	-0.0091	0.0367
	Economy	-0.1321***	-0.5799***	-0.1346***	-0.5632***	-0.0616	-0.7206***	-0.0696	-0.4741***
	Risk of Unemployment	0.0253	0.0263	0.0335*	0.0320	-0.0252	-0.0471	0.0194	0.1555*
	Working Class	-0.0946**	-0.0325	-0.0867*	-0.0128	0.1100	-0.0493	-0.2204	-0.0435
	Risk of Poverty	0.0339*	-0.0254	0.0389*	-0.0198	-0.0232	-0.0530	0.1344	-0.0189
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.0236	0.0322*	0.0009	0.0120	-0.0040	0.0371	0.0545	-0.0476
	Political attention	-0.1412***	-0.1367***	-0.2099***	-0.1333***	-0.2363***	-0.1722***	-0.2418***	-0.1838***
	Reads any newspaper	-0.0718*	-0.0645*	-0.0372	-0.1214**	0.0052	0.1377	0.2692	0.1881
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.3472***	-0.3268***	-0.2352***	-0.3393***	-0.2148***	-0.2936***	-0.2001*	-0.3286***
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.1895***	-0.2006***	-0.0204***	-0.1862***	-0.0182***	-0.1859***	-0.0325***	-0.1841**
	Household size	0.0284*	0.0393***	0.0224	0.0278	0.0043	0.0525	-0.0902	-0.0105
	Left Right scale	-0.2023***	-0.2033***	-0.2276***	-0.1989***	-0.2670***	-0.1089**	-0.2285***	-0.2557***
	Homeowner	0.0428	0.0817*	-0.0115	0.0697	0.1119	-0.0253	0.3186	0.1218
	Female	0.1322***	0.1520***	0.2284***	0.1183**	-0.0037	0.1974	0.2071	0.0345
	National unemployment rate	0.6170	0.3939	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.05607***	-0.0527***	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigration and the Economy	0.1367***	0.1332***	0.1315***	0.1254***	0.0953	0.1532*	0.1445*	0.1219
	Immigration and Culture	0.3039***	0.3184***	0.2365***	0.2943***	0.2630***	0.2721***	0.2138***	0.3357***
<b>Observations</b>	18,989		16,359		1,615		948	728	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001

**Table 9** Logistic regressions of EU vote or vote intention for the whole dataset and all country identifiers

EU vote or vote intention		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0793***	-0.1272***	-0.0323	-0.0603*	-0.0732	-0.0632	-0.1415*	-0.2633**
	Europeanness	0.5795***	0.5126***	0.5699***	0.5032***	0.6678***	0.5826***	0.5911***	0.5905***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1079***	-0.1735***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0035	0.0060	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0448	-0.0249
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0166	0.0222	0.0140	0.0187	0.0498	0.0153	0.0247	0.0140
	Household income	0.0233**	0.0161	0.0229*	0.0134	0.0320	0.0333	0.0567	0.0529
	Economy	0.0638**	-0.6883***	0.0866**	-0.6652***	-0.0894	-0.6974***	0.0605	-0.9670***
	Risk of Unemployment	0.0578**	0.0324	0.0602**	0.0322	0.0520	-0.0086	0.0763	0.2453*
	Working Class	0.0066	-0.1243*	0.0257	-0.1002	0.3105	-0.2421	-0.4002*	0.0328
	Risk of Poverty	0.0066	-0.0437	0.0007	-0.0590*	0.0006	0.1184	0.1897*	-0.0597
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.0799***	0.1305***	0.0629**	0.1035***	0.0594	0.1509*	0.1314	0.1741
	Political attention	-0.1602***	-0.1159***	-0.1579***	-0.1112***	-0.1892***	-0.1257***	-0.1642***	-0.1607**
	Reads any newspaper	-0.0010	-0.0701	0.0202	-0.1268*	0.0095	0.2308	-0.1609	0.2704
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.2965***	-0.4728***	-0.2961***	-0.4681***	-0.3257***	-0.3639***	-0.3044**	-0.5419***
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.0119***	-0.1221***	-0.0111***	-0.1116***	-0.0133*	-0.0805	-0.0112	-0.2469*
	Household size	0.0176	-0.0198	0.0293	-0.0153	-0.0516	-0.0037	-0.0976	-0.1443
	Left Right scale	-0.2285***	-0.1718***	-0.2314***	-0.1599***	-0.1272**	-0.1617**	-0.2635***	-0.1358
	Homeowner	-0.0686	0.1515*	-0.0795	0.1413*	-0.0492	0.3545	0.0445	0.4066
	Female	0.1949***	-0.1089*	0.2361***	-0.1155	0.0971	-0.1478	-0.0296	0.0089
	National unemployment rate	0.4683**	1.1916*	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0635***	-0.0905***	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigration and the Economy	0.2911***	0.2741***	0.2902***	0.2702***	0.3180***	0.1945*	0.1408	0.3488**
	Immigration and Culture	0.2202***	0.2216***	0.2203***	0.2083***	0.1924**	0.2129**	0.1563*	0.2798**
<b>Observations</b>	17,180	13,880	13,341	11,193	2,364	1,667	1406	951	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001

## **5.1 Identity**

Looking at Tables 8 and 9, we can see that British and English identities are highly significant and, negatively correlated with the dependent variables, meaning that greater affinity with these identities increases the likelihood that an individual will be Eurosceptic. This is largely in line with hypothesis H1a, that predicted identification with Britishness and Englishness will have a positive effect on Euroscepticism. These national identities are important in this case given the nationalist populism of the vote Leave campaign, portraying the EU as an elitist and undemocratic outside influence on British and English politics (Jackson et al, 2016; Weissbecker, 2017). English nationalism and a perception of Englishness has long been thought to go hand in hand, with Euroscepticism (Henderson et al, 2016; Wellings, 2014). So with this connection in mind the fact that it is the only nationality within the subgroup of separate British identities that there is significance for in the Euroscepticism variables is highly understandable. Eurosceptics have often been stereotyped as 'little Englanders' (Ray, 2007), and the prevalence of the Englishness variable here suggests that there is distinct degree of nationalism in the English context of the referendum. Furthermore, in Table 9 for English individuals there is a lack of significant correlation in Britishness yet a significant negative correlation with the sense of Englishness. This suggests that when it came to the referendum English individuals link their Euroscepticism to their perception of Englishness and a sense that England is losing out from EU membership, rather than a sense the United Kingdom as a whole, a phenomenon noted by Jones et al (2013). Nationalism in England would then not seem to be British nationalism, but specifically English nationalism.

This makes the Welsh case more puzzling and atypical then, as a similar link with nationalism cannot be seen in the results, Welshness has little to no significant effect on Euroscepticism, similar to Scottishness. This finding is in direct contrast to H1b, where it was predicted that homogeneity and strength of national identity with regards to Scotland and Wales would increase Euroscepticism, but the two have similar results that lack statistical significance. This could be attributed to their nationalist political parties occupying the left side of politics, which has in recent times been more inclined to be Europhilic. This assumption is confounded somewhat by the lack of correlation in Wales for the left-right scale variable in Table 9 after the referendum however. This suggests that during the referendum, deciding between hard Euroscepticism and Europhilia a large number of Welsh nationalists could potentially have decided to vote leave, although not large enough to lead to a nationalist trend similar to England and Englishness. Yet interestingly this group did not necessarily change their views on the EU as a whole or their opinions on EU integration remained neutral and swung towards the leave side when it came to the vote, hence the continued trend in the EU integration variables. This change therefore could

represent the effect of campaigning on Welsh voters and show that the Leave campaign did significantly better at convincing left wing voters in Wales than it did in the other two nations shown here.

Welsh nationalism as shown by Haesly (2005) is more diffuse than its Scottish counterpart is. This is further compounded on by the fact that Wales has a relatively weak national civil society and national media when compared to Scotland, so the national identity is much more likely to be absorbed into the British mainstream (Evans, 2015) which is why we see slight significance in Britishness in Table 8. However we see no correlation in this variable for vote or vote intention, which suggests that for individuals from Wales, Britishness was not a factor in the leave vote, but is a factor when it comes to soft Euroscepticism. A tentative conclusion here then is that the Leave campaign was far more successful at swaying soft Eurosceptic left wing voters in Wales than it was in both England and Scotland but not by appealing to their sense of British or Welsh nationalism.

In Scotland identity is generally much stronger and the Scottish National Party has attempted to tie this identity to itself and promote a 'Scottish not British' attitude in its desire for independence (Mycock, 2012). Given the prevalence of the party and their relative closeness of the Scottish independence referendum, they have been somewhat effective in mobilising this Scottish identity (Glen, 2015). Thus there are much stronger linkages between the party and identity than with Welsh identities and Plaid Cymru. Concerning the European Union referendum, the vote may have cut across the divisions of the earlier independence referendum of 2014. On the other hand we see a limited following of the overall trend with regards to Britishness in Scotland when it comes to Euroscepticism. Those that voted No in the independence referendum of 2014 had a high tendency to hold a British identity and more right wing views (Pattie and Johnston, 2017). Those that feel less of an affinity Britishness are more likely to follow the party of choice, which tends to be the SNP, and therefore register as more Europhilic. Of course not all those that voted No in the Scottish independence referendum voted to leave the European Union, as there have been shown to be a multiplicity of reasons behind both votes. However there is a tendency for Britishness and right wing voting patterns in Scotland and a tendency for right wing and pro-union stances, as well as the opposite; a tendency for Scottishness and left wing ideologies, and pro-independence.

This is further supported by the suggestion that the Conservatives made great inroads in the 2017 general election by targeting the most Eurosceptic areas (Curtice, 2017), yet others, including the leader of the SNP have thought this to be at least partly due to a backlash against the party after their call for a second independence referendum (BBC, 2017). The two are highly linked however, Eurosceptics are more likely to vote against the SNP as they have a tendency to be both Eurosceptic and Pro-Union. Hence, we see correlation in the left-right scale for all Euroscepticism variables in Scotland. The right is a distinct minority in Scotland, as shown

by looking through their voting history earlier, and Scotland is also historically nowhere near as Eurosceptic as Wales given both the obvious referendum vote and recent voting behaviour. So those with strong British ties in Scotland are more likely to register as Eurosceptic, thus we see correlation in the Britishness variable. Therefore, the British nationalism was not necessarily as strong in Scotland given both their history and the strong status of the SNP.

Finally the European identity understandably has the highest correlations of this variable set, and importantly this correlation is slightly higher in individuals from Scotland than it is in Wales. This could suggest a greater European affinity for the former country as it shows a much stronger relationship between Europhilia and European identities in Scotland. This may have led to some differences in the outcomes of the EU referendum vote, but the differences are not large enough to place causality upon, although it could be a factor that needs to be recognised.

## **5.2 Economic**

Surprisingly overall we see very little significance in the economic variables which suggests that in general economic arguments did very little to sway voters. This very much goes against hypotheses H2a and H2b, economic factors are not the most strongly correlated variables, nor do those who would be more exposed to transnational opportunities seem to have greater Europhilia. Despite there being a large amount of campaigning being spent around economic arguments (Jackson et al, 2016; Levy et al 2016) these results are perhaps understandable as economic arguments, or arguments on economic sensibility were the centrepiece of the Remain groups campaigning strategy (Behr 2016; Curtice 2016). Given the outcome of the referendum it is apparent that these arguments were somewhat ignored by the majority of British voters.

Further contrary to the hypotheses we see further elements of nationalism, and likely nationalist influence on the referendum. Sociotropic factors, notably the perception of the economy as a whole, are highly more significant than egocentric and real economic factors across all models, contrary to H2c. Thus meaning that in general individual Euroscepticism or Europhilia is derived on country-based perceptions rather than individual perceptions of gains or losses. Again, however, these nationalist leanings mainly affect the English sample, when it comes to those that feel they are losing out economically, rather than the Welsh or Scottish.

The exception to this sociotropic trend interestingly is Wales, with a very strong correlation with those that feel they are under threat of unemployment, albeit not with the strongest level of significance. This correlation means that within the sample individuals who felt more of a threat of unemployment were more likely to register as Eurosceptic and to vote leave. While this correlation is visible for individuals in England it is much weaker than in Welsh individuals. We also see a stronger correlation between fears over the economic impact of immigration

in Wales. This suggests that to some extent voters in Wales were driven by egocentric economic perceptions rather than the nationalist sociotropic perceptions seen more strongly in English individuals. The variable is significantly only after the referendum, which suggests campaigning influences played a part in changing these perceptions. Thus it is perhaps likely that for Wales, economic arguments especially those that connected EU membership to the threat of job loss, likely through immigration, increased Euroscepticism, and that these arguments helped to convince individuals on both sides of the political spectrum. There seems then to have been a greater focus on egocentric economic perceptions when deciding vote choice in Wales than England and Scotland. Conversely however this trend does not have the strongest level of significance, yet is consistent with the two Euroscepticism dependent variables. This weakly significant variable is also the only major difference that can be seen between Wales and Scotland, so while there is an indication of an effect on Euroscepticism when it comes to egocentric economic perceptions this is not strong enough to draw any major conclusions from.

Returning to look at the economic change variable we see a change in signs between the logistic and OLS measure of Euroscepticism when looking at Wave 7 for both the whole dataset and the English country identifier. This is puzzling; as it suggests that those that perceived the economy to be performing badly desired more EU integration, yet the same group also tended to register a vote intention to leave the European Union. This latter finding is more in line with what is expected here, those that feel them or their country are losing out economically are more likely to connect this to hard Euroscepticism and a Leave vote or vote intention. This could indicate a level of pragmatism or soft Euroscepticism within this group, those that would feel their country would be better off economically, outside of the European Union could have voted pragmatically rather than in a principled anti-EU manner. The results from Table 8 with regards to this are all the more puzzling then. When a closer look at the data is had in Table 10 however an explanation can be found. The data is highly concentrated around the 'protect our independence' and the midpoint of the EU integration scale with the rest of the data spread around the rest of the scale. Thus the high concentration of low and medium scoring individuals on the EU integration scale skews the data and leads to a somewhat anomalous result. Interestingly this table does show that a large grouping of those that think the economy is getting worse and want to protect the UK's independence which does suggest pragmatic Euroscepticism with regards to the country or sociotropic level.


**Table 10** Descriptive table showing the spread of economic perceptions and the EU integration scale Wave 7

Economy doing better or worse	EU Integration scale										
	Independence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Unite fully
Getting a lot worse	1,509	107	151	190	146	481	551	306	220	117	360
Getting a little worse	2,946	449	617	751	640	1,090	1,297	778	455	234	371
Staying about the same	3,375	509	809	931	698	1,259	2,090	719	401	160	350
Getting a little better	1,960	319	526	608	416	511	540	330	153	75	144
Getting a lot better	107	19	26	18	19	12	12	10	7	5	11

Source: BES Waves 7 Internet Panel

For the economic change variable we also see a large shift to a significant negative correlation, between Waves, in the logistic model across all countries; this trend is also visible in Wave 10 in the EU integration variable. This can be explained by a change in perceptions of the economy in remain voters specifically. If we look into the data shown in Figure 4 for the specific sociotropic economic perception variable in question, we see that pre-referendum in Wave 7 the data is balanced between those that think the economy is staying the same and those that feel the economy is getting slightly worse. After the referendum however, we see a huge shift downwards towards the negative perceptions.

**Figure 4** Perceptions of the Economy in remain voters Waves 7 and 10 of the British Election Study



Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

There are two possible reasons that contributed to this massive change, firstly real economic conditions and secondly campaigning and focus of the two sides during the referendum. The first of these is partly down to the economic downturn and devaluation of the pound that happened as a result of the referendums outcome. Wave 10 was taken 4 to 5 months after the referendum, so economic decline, and the potential for further devaluation was well reported in this period. As the cause of the downturn can be placed on the outcome of the referendum, or at least the uncertainty that it brought to major world markets (Kierzenkowski et al, 2016), those that voted to remain could be expected to negatively perceive the economic downturn in a greater way. Those who see the referendum result as a bad decision, especially economically, will have their perceptions confirmed and entrenched by the real economic position of the country in this sense. A number of polling and findings backs up this finding from other researchers (Goodwin, 2018; Ipsos, 2016b; Roberts, 2016).


This difference in interpretation is perhaps then a knock on effect of the way the two sides campaigned during the referendum, where a number of key differences can be seen. The Leave campaigns focus was much



more positive about Britain's future outside of the EU including her economic future. The promise of new, 'fairer' trade deals around the world seems to have done much to convince leave voters of a more positive economic outlook for the United Kingdom. This effect is shown highly in Figure 5, where it can be clearly seen that the overall groupings towards negative outlooks of the effects of leaving the EU on the British economy are in those that voted to remain. The Remain campaign, or 'project fear' as it was dubbed by its opponents, largely focused on the potential for economic downturn and a much bleaker picture of Britain's economic future (Curtice 2016; Levy et al 2016). Due to the generally Eurosceptic press, the Leave campaign largely controlled the overall narrative here, and this has led to those that voted to leave generally have being much more bullish about Britain's economic prospects even with the post referendum economic slowdown. Interestingly this data also shows that only close to half of those that voted to leave the EU believe that doing so will benefit the UK economy. This may suggest why we see such mixed results when it comes to the selected theories, the referendum vote was not decided on one particular issue and a multiplicity of values and ideals were driving individuals risk perceptions when deciding their vote.

Remain voters were then more convinced by the Remain campaign that there would be drastic economic consequences of leaving the EU. When these consequences looked to be coming true those that voted remain perceived the economic downturn in a much greater way.

**Figure 5** Perceived effects of leaving the EU on the UK economy in Wave 10 of the British Election Study



Source: BES Wave 10 Internet Panel

The regression tables here then show little to no evidence that individuals with a lack of transnational opportunities are more likely to be Eurosceptic; there is only sporadic significance amongst these variables. Thus the 'winners' and 'losers' economically of EU membership were not necessarily defined by the individual at the

individual level but defined for the most part by individuals to be a country level issue, which feeds into the nationalist narratives in the Leave campaign groups. With the significance of the sociotropic variables only, it suggests that the argument of economic inequality, at an individual level, did not necessarily sway voters. This is not to say that economic populism was not a factor here however, as given the diffuse nature of the term it can easily link to nationalist ideas of not getting a fair deal from a 'corrupt' EU at the national level. The idea of disenfranchised individuals however with the exception of those in Wales, is largely unfounded according to these results and economic factors are not singularly explanatory when it comes to the vote, even in England

The large amount of pensioners that voted leave, both in the dataset and the UK as a whole do not seem to have a large effect on the real economic factors here. Tables 14 to 17 in Appendix 1 show the same regressions with those aged 66 or above discounted, meaning that only those of working ages are included. No major differences in terms of trends can be seen however, which suggests that it is a safe conclusion that the real economic factors used here; income, has very little effect on Euroscepticism and the decision to vote leave. What is most interesting is that in Table 14 the correlation with the risk of unemployment in Wales after the referendum increases dramatically, almost doubling in strength. This is understandable given that those who are not at risk of unemployment are not in these regressions and it shows where the Leave campaign was most successful at convincing younger individuals in Wales that membership of the EU was detrimental to their job prospects. This again is much stronger than in England and shows the main difference in Eurosceptics between the two countries.

So as far economic factors are concerned they were not necessarily perceived at the individual level, thus transnationalist ideas of winners and losers of EU integration are not necessarily important here. Sociotropic factors seem to have more weight in explaining Euroscepticism in this case but only for England in the period before the referendum. Welsh individuals seem to have been more convinced and concerned with job prospects when deciding their vote, which sets them apart from the other two countries. Finally the Remain campaign was highly successful in convincing those that voted to remain in the EU with its economic arguments, but again these had most salience at the sociotropic level.

### **5.3 Cognitive Political**

Interestingly the cognitive political variables have the most consistent and strong trends across all models. Elements of the aforementioned cultural populism, with a distinct trend of anti-intellectualism can be seen here with this trend generally being stronger in England than in Scotland and Wales. This fits into the narrative of the British public ignoring the advice of experts thus showing the hallmarks of anti-establishment politics that has been highlighted in other studies (Hobolt, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016).

What is most interesting here is that contrary to hypothesis H3a, that predicted greater attention to politics would have decrease Euroscepticism, we see the exact opposite when it comes to this variable, political attention has a highly significant and positive effect on Euroscepticism. Recall earlier when making the hypotheses that Gabel (1998) assumed that information and the more informed an individual is of the European Union the more likely they are to be in favour of greater integration. The opposite is seen in the British case however, the more an individual pays attention to politics, the more Eurosceptic they will register. Admittedly this is a self-report, so an individual's relative and real attention to politics is not measured. However it would be considered reasonable here to conclude that the more individuals feel they pay attention to politics, the more likely they are to be Eurosceptic and to vote leave.

These findings indicate a heavy suggestion of an effect of the media and political campaigning on Euroscepticism and opinions towards European integration. If we delve deeper into the meaning of paying attention to politics it should be seen as denoting a certain level of information gathering when viewing the political narrative. Sources of information, especially with a highly politicised subject matter, are important here as they can shape perceptions and have been oft shown to be valuable in swaying voter choice (Atwood and Sanders, 1976; Faber et al, 1993; Swire et al, 2017). These findings also indicate that the a Leave campaign controlled the media narrative when it came to the referendum, if the more individuals paid attention to politics increased their Euroscepticism, it stands to reason that the Eurosceptic arguments were the most persuasive here.

**Table 11** All dependent variables with media variables included for the whole dataset Wave 10 only

		EU Integration		EU referendum vote		Immigration and the economy		Immigration and culture	
		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.1860***	-0.1803***	-0.1530***	-0.1463***	-0.0949***	-0.0889***	-0.1095***	-0.1009***
	Europeanness	0.5476***	0.5415***	0.4989***	0.4907***	0.2960***	0.2896***	0.3511***	0.3430***
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0101	0.0106	0.0490**	0.0501**	0.0046	0.0059	0.0136	0.0147
	Household income	0.0084	0.0050	-0.0285	-0.0348*	0.0081	0.0074	0.0046	0.0028
	Economy	-0.6057***	-0.6000***	-0.6672***	-0.6537***	-0.0221	-0.0052	-0.0616*	-0.0482
	Risk of Unemployment	0.0326	0.0334	0.0705	0.0810*	-0.0099	-0.0094	-0.0034	-0.0024
	Working Class	-0.0974	-0.0584	-0.2118*	-0.1635	-0.1738***	-0.1827***	-0.2274***	-0.2163***
	Risk of Poverty	0.0008	0.0083	0.0175	0.0347	-0.0507**	-0.0518**	0.0114	0.0131
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.0106	-0.0099	0.1286***	0.0970**	0.1156***	0.1136***	0.0819***	0.0720***
	Political attention	-0.0992***	-0.1069***	-0.0836***	-0.0967***	0.0883***	0.0819***	0.0431***	0.0347***
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.3239***	-0.3075***	-0.4696***	-0.4467***	-0.2270***	-0.2171***	-0.2360***	-0.2182***
<b>Media</b>	RLTI	-0.0032***	-	-0.0040***	-	0.0007	-	-0.0012*	-
	Negative Immigrants Articles	0.0041*	-	0.0060*	-	-0.0063***	-	-0.0029*	-
	Newspaper Position	-	0.4660***	-	0.8173***	-	0.3496***	-	0.3836***
	EU Myths	-	-0.0198	-	-0.0255	-	-0.0127	-	-0.0446***
	Economy and Immigration articles	-	0.0076**	-	0.0155***	-	0.0036	-	0.0091***
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.1773***	-0.1801***	-0.1326***	-0.1389***	-0.0584***	-0.0526***	-0.1037***	-0.0985***
	Household size	0.0084	0.0187	-0.0422	-0.0249	0.0318*	0.03599448*	0.0032	0.0099
	Left Right scale	-0.2026***	-0.1961***	-0.1993***	-0.1840***	-0.0628***	-0.0430***	-0.1193***	-0.1005***
	Homeowner	0.0763	0.0756	0.2864**	0.2830**	-0.0466	-0.0508	-0.0371	-0.0350
	Female	0.1475*	0.1403*	-0.1220	-0.1333	-0.1149**	-0.1217**	0.1177**	0.1167**
	National unemployment rate	1.1220*	1.2480*	1.5859*	1.7954*	-0.1658	-0.1845	-0.0766	-0.0297
	Immigrant population %	-0.0969***	-0.1009***	-0.1283***	-0.1328***	-0.0029	-0.0023	-0.0003	-0.0023
	Immigration and the Economy	0.1376***	0.1288***	0.3051***	0.2962***	-	-	-	-
	Immigration and Culture	0.2460***	0.2429***	0.1655***	0.1622***	-	-	-	-
<b>Observations</b>	6,228	6,228	6,451	6,451	6,228	6,228	6,228	6,228	

Sources: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, Moore and Ramsay (2017), Levy et al (2016), The Economist (2016), ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.00

#### **5.4 Media based variables**

Table 11 then, shows the whole dataset with the media variables included for both anti-immigrant and Euroscepticism variables with two models introducing the variables separately. Model 1 looks at the effects of the Leave and anti-immigrant focus of the paper, Model 2 introduces the editorial positions, the EU myths and the number of articles that connect economic pressures to immigration. Here we see a limited support for hypothesis H3b, newspaper readership does have a positive effect on Euroscepticism, although this is complicated by differing levels of correlation. The fact that the quantity of negative articles and the composite variable for Leave focus, while significant, have very small correlations with the dependent variables while comparably the position of the paper during the referendum does, provides an interesting finding. The suggestion is that the traditional strengths of print media, in framing and agenda setting had little effect in the outcome of the referendum, at least when measured in the short term campaigning effects. A number of the Eurosceptic newspapers have been for a distinct period before the referendum and their reporting on EU issues has reflected this (Hawkins, 2012), so their effects in distilling Eurosceptic sentiment may not be fully captured. The suggestion here then is that those that read print media, had already formulated opinions, based on the position of their newspaper of choice, before the referendum campaigning period started. Thus, when it comes to Euroscepticism and the UK European Referendum the print media were likely to be effective at campaigning over long periods, yet in the short term there does not seem to be much of an effect.

Admittedly the study here provides information only on the quantity and tone of articles submitted by newspapers and not the persuasiveness of their arguments. The fact that there is only very weak correlation between even the number of negative articles on immigrants and the immigration variables suggest that these articles were not particularly persuasive however. There is thus the sense of predisposition around Euroscepticism and the print media here, those that regularly read daily newspapers had likely already made their mind up before the campaigning period. Individuals have been found to read things they agree with to reinforce their core beliefs through selective exposure (Stroud, 2008), thus a Eurosceptic would be attracted to a Eurosceptic newspaper long before the referendum, as they would be publishing articles they can agree with. Yet as was shown when investigating the massive shift in perception of the economy variable earlier, campaigning and media focus had a major impact on fears when framing the risks of leaving the European Union. Framing seems to have had more of an effect on Remain voters due to both the immediate real economic consequences after the referendum and the framing of how these would affect the country.

These findings also again point to the idea that the referendum result was an anti-political establishment vote, particularly on the right side of politics. Individuals on the right in particular, ignored party leanings and went with the major media voices here. The Conservative party, the main right wing party, with a few notable

exceptions backed the Remain campaign, yet for the most part the right-left scale indicates that there was a propensity for individuals that identify as right wing to be Eurosceptic and more likely to vote for leave in the referendum. Thus, a significant amount of Conservative voters must have voted leave, against their party and, as the majority of Conservative voters reside in England, this helps to explain the vote somewhat. Yet as was discussed earlier for Wales the referendum and Euroscepticism was seemingly more apolitical. Of course, it must be acknowledged that other forms of media are not mentioned here, the focus is strictly on traditional media. Television sources, such as news broadcasts are the most widely viewed news sources in the UK (Ofcom, 2017), yet are regulated by impartiality rules during times of elections and referenda, so for campaigning groups the main battle for the narrative and agenda setting came in the form of headlines in daily news shows in the UK. Furthermore, internet sources of information, and the wider potential for 'fake news' on these new platforms are not easily measurable in these circumstances. The BES is also more setup to measure the traditional media forms and newspaper readership and here it can be seen that the number of EU myths printed has little effect on Euroscepticism or anti-immigrant sentiments.

So the print media here may have had an effect on the long term growth of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom but their short term campaigning effects seem to have had little effect on both Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments. Individuals tend to follow their paper of choice but the level of focus found within a given newspaper does not seem to affect their Euroscepticism, which suggests a pre-disposition to agree with their choice of media. However from the main findings we see that individuals' political attention is negatively correlated with their opinions of European Union integration and their vote in the referendum. The suggestion here is that the Leave campaign and Eurosceptic advocates controlled the narrative both within the newspaper media sphere, as Eurosceptic newspapers are the most highly circulated (Levy et al, 2016), and without an overall political attention and information gathering influenced perceptions of the European Union in a negative way.

**Table 12** OLS regressions for immigration's effect on the economy for the whole dataset and all country identifiers

Immigration and the economy		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0903***	-0.0890***	-0.0114	-0.0329***	-0.1403***	-0.0670**	-0.0768*	-0.0309
	Europeanness	0.3396***	0.3072***	0.3242***	0.2986***	0.3069***	0.2779***	0.3562***	0.2734***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1708***	-0.1437***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0798***	-0.0053	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0675**	0.0211
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0002	0.0081	0.0004	0.0023	0.0069	0.0259	-0.0224	0.0045
	Household income	-0.0122**	0.0125*	-0.0132**	0.0121*	-0.0154	0.0095	0.0251	0.0229
	Economy	0.1341***	-0.0276	0.1293***	-0.0166	0.2419***	-0.0109	0.1023	0.0157
	Risk of Unemployment	-0.0338**	-0.0010	-0.0305**	0.0151	0.0077	-0.0304	-0.0535	-0.0554
	Working Class	-0.1444***	-0.1453***	-0.1073***	-0.1144***	-0.2158**	-0.2335**	-0.1243	-0.1333
	Risk of Poverty	-0.0710***	-0.0639***	-0.0618***	-0.0482***	-0.0837*	-0.1406***	-0.1025*	-0.0949
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.1703***	0.1186***	0.1518***	0.0940***	0.1463***	0.1157***	0.0650	0.1927***
	Political attention	0.1073***	0.0889***	0.1071***	0.0827***	0.1288***	0.1250***	0.0770***	0.1249***
	Reads any newspaper	-0.1410***	-0.0446	-0.1395***	-0.0506	-0.0578	-0.0881	-0.1294	-0.0196
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.2141***	-0.2300***	-0.1940***	-0.2063***	-0.2484***	-0.2229***	-0.3005***	-0.2545***
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.0097***	-0.0553***	-0.0089***	-0.0541***	-0.0074**	-0.0452	-0.0062	0.0518
	Household size	0.0089	-0.0071	0.0135	-0.0051	-0.0131	-0.0181	-0.0643	-0.0541
	Left Right scale	-0.1480***	-0.0977***	-0.1283***	-0.0855***	-0.1981***	-0.0778***	-0.1517***	-0.1163***
	Homeowner	-0.0116	-0.1113***	0.0243	-0.0641*	0.0213	-0.1343	-0.2883*	-0.3494*
	Female	-0.1486***	-0.0901***	-0.1398***	-0.1266***	-0.1245	-0.0060	-0.0463	0.2223
	National unemployment rate	0.2232*	0.3182	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0044	-0.0109	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Observations</b>	18,989	14,521	16,359	12,428	1,615	1,306	948	728	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001

**Table 13** OLS regressions for immigration's effect on culture for the whole dataset and all country identifiers

Immigration and culture		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0925***	-0.0972***	-0.0147	-0.0328**	-0.1438***	-0.0559*	-0.0494	-0.1133**
	Europeanness	0.3752***	0.3566***	0.3595***	0.3480***	0.3510***	0.3018***	0.3879***	0.3255***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1752***	-0.1573***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0770***	-0.0175	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0761**	0.0251
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	-0.0032	0.0163**	-0.0049	0.0092	0.0222	0.0553*	-0.0209	-0.0075
	Household income	-0.0107*	0.0086	-0.0108*	0.0114*	-0.0181	-0.0166	0.0151	-0.0021
	Economy	0.0989***	-0.0748***	0.0923***	-0.0698***	0.2119***	-0.0626	0.0877	0.0500
	Risk of Unemployment	-0.0172	-0.0036	-0.0070	0.0111	-0.0327	-0.0270	-0.0507	-0.0268
	Working Class	-0.1068***	-0.1859***	-0.0735**	-0.1598***	-0.1488	-0.2439**	-0.0676	-0.0516
	Risk of Poverty	-0.0479***	-0.0176	-0.0412***	-0.0074	-0.0615	-0.0273	-0.0272	-0.0551
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.1497***	0.1011***	0.1289***	0.0778***	0.1366***	0.0876*	0.0595	0.1705**
	Political attention	0.0535***	0.0446***	0.0554***	0.0400***	0.0611***	0.0639***	0.0203	0.0806**
	Reads any newspaper	-0.1123***	-0.0009	-0.1143***	-0.0038	0.0029	-0.0653	-0.0992	-0.0130
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.1811***	-0.2424***	-0.1541***	-0.2120***	-0.2420***	-0.3233***	-0.3058***	-0.2254***
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.0115***	-0.0891***	-0.0105***	-0.0854***	-0.0114***	-0.0659	-0.0060	0.0188
	Household size	0.0357***	0.0001	0.0488***	0.0043	-0.0607	-0.0569	-0.0668	-0.0092
	Left Right scale	-0.1904***	-0.1634***	-0.1704***	-0.1482***	-0.2212***	-0.1813***	-0.2157***	-0.14180***
	Homeowner	-0.0469	-0.1149***	-0.0271	-0.0741*	0.0711	0.0018	-0.1980	-0.4342**
	Female	0.0603*	0.1752***	0.0646*	0.1466***	0.1722*	0.3015**	0.0257	0.3270*
	National unemployment rate	0.2710**	0.0684	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0009	-0.0050	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Observations	18,989	14,521	16,359	12,428	1,615	1,306	948	728

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001



## **5.5 Anti-Immigrant Sentiments**

As shown by the tables that include dependent variables based around the European Union anti-immigrant sentiments are one of many significant factors when it comes to Euroscepticism and a decision to vote leave. While these are not the main focus of this research they still provide interesting results. Namely that they are largely driven by attachment to national identities, which again shows the prevalence of cultural populism and nationalism that has been seen throughout the results. However these results also show that a fear of losing out economically in a more egocentric economic view is also correlated which, interestingly, lends some weight to the transnationalist approach.

A key takeaway from these findings is that anti-immigrant sentiment in the United Kingdom, is mainly English and working class. The results here suggest that for England, those with anti-immigrant sentiment as an initial driver for Euroscepticism, were those that perceived themselves to be losing out. Interestingly these findings are more in line with the earlier hypotheses based around Euroscepticism, particularly those based around the individual level economic theories. The transnationalist theory then can help explain this somewhat as those with attachments to working class backgrounds and those that have a fear of poverty also have a tendency to be anti-immigrant. Both the cognitive and identity theories also play a part here which furthers the nationalist trends seen in the Euroscepticism based variables. Differing however is that anti-immigrant sentiments are significantly correlated with educational level across individuals from all countries while for the Euroscepticism variables this is relatively inconsistent and mainly significant in Wave 10. Thus, Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments are linked, but have slightly different driving factors.

By comparing the outcomes of the anti-immigrant variables with the Eurosceptic variables, we see a problem in many of the conclusions and the overall narrative about the EU referendum and Euroscepticism in general. There has been a tendency, at least in the mainstream to equate the referendum vote with anti-immigration (Runcimen, 2017, Wintour, 2017). The results here suggest that Euroscepticism goes beyond anti-immigrant sentiments. The majority of the media focus has been on the particular group that are both Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant, or anti-immigration. These findings argue that this focus has been overstated. Euroscepticism is mainly nationalist, at least in the English case and not particularly based upon individual perceptions of winning and losing economically. When we look at anti-immigrant sentiments however there is a distinct effect on the regressions by those that could perceive themselves as losers. This is a group that are likely to have contributed to the greater whole of the Leave vote, and have often been the main focus. Yet in this sample this group is not large enough to sway the overall Euroscepticism models in the economic factors at least, thus Euroscepticism in

England was derived from much more than anti-immigrant sentiments, and is more derived from patriotic feeling of unjustness and mistrust towards the EU and its elite driven integrational reforms.

Interestingly there is some significant and negative correlation for both Welshness and Scottishness in both the immigration variables used here. This is understandable given the earlier discussed theory, people with strong ties to national identities are more likely to be protective of their culture from immigration. What is most interesting here is that this nationalism did not feed into the reasoning for Euroscepticism in the two countries. As discussed earlier for Scotland these nationalist sentiment is closely tied to support for the pro-European SNP thus the connection between nationalist protectionism over culture and Euroscepticism does not seem to have been made. The Welsh case is ever so slightly different here as we also see some weak correlation in the economic variables. Given the earlier discussion it is likely that Welsh nationalists were more likely to register as Eurosceptic if they had anti-immigrant sentiments, it likely here then that the campaigning had most success in swaying Plaid Cymru voters. Besides this however the results are again highly similar to Scotland.

## 6. Conclusion

From the research conducted in this study the vote to leave the European Union shows all the hallmarks of a nationalist decision. Yet the findings here, using pre and post referendum British Election Study waves illustrate that the sources of this nationalism differs between countries within the United Kingdom. Returning to the original research question; 'How do individual level theories of Euroscepticism explain the different outcomes of the European Union referendum in Wales, Scotland and England?', this thesis finds very limited explanation for the individual level theories when viewed on their own. The fact that all of the theory guided hypotheses, apart from H1a and to a lesser extent H3b, were largely disproven by the findings suggests that these identity, economic and cognitive theories cannot individually explain the differing results in the three countries of study. However, by applying the wide ranging approach seen in this research and including all theories in the regressions, interesting differences between Eurosceptics with regards to the makeup and driving factors of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom can be seen.

These findings suggest that Eurosceptics in the United Kingdom are not necessarily a homogenous group and presents Wales as an interesting case for further study. For England, a sense of Englishness and a nation under threat from the EU was a vital driver for the leave vote, as well as an anti-intellectualist and anti-establishment context that is common in Eurosceptics throughout the UK. In Scotland a connection between Britishness and Euroscepticism is linked into the previous independence referendum. Scottish Eurosceptics are the smallest of groupings here however, given the overwhelming remain vote in the country. Of note is that by making the same arguments as the other countries, it seems that the Leave campaign in Wales had considerably more success convincing both left wing and young individuals, by evoking anti intellectualist and anti-immigrant arguments, as well as appealing slightly to their sense of unease about unemployment. Nationalist and cultural attempts to convince individuals in Wales seem here to have been largely unsuccessful compared to their English counterparts, which makes the Welsh case all the more puzzling. This is the only major difference we see in individuals from Wales however and the vast majority of results are the same or similar to those of individuals from Scotland, a Europhilic country.

In short the identity, economic and cognitive theories of individual level Euroscepticism cannot adequately explain why Wales, a traditionally left wing country, would choose to vote to leave the European Union. There is a suggestion that egocentric economic values played more of a part in Wales than in the other two countries, these are linked with perceptions however and not with 'real' economic positions. These theories tend to have a better time explaining England's choice to leave; a combination of nationalist, populist campaigning combined with individuals who felt their country was losing out economically, all culminated in the growth of mainstream Euroscepticism. These arguments had particular salience among the elderly and generally

the right wing of the English population. The latter of these is largely due to the general right-wing nature of Eurosceptic nationalist parties, namely the United Kingdom Independence Party, that have been at the forefront of the growth of anti-EU sentiment in the UK. Despite these political cognitive undertones no theory outright overrides another, not one theory can provide an adequate explanation for the British case on their own. The theories used cannot adequately explain the Welsh case. Given the generally small population and overall lack of impact the country has on the world, and even domestic UK politics, Euroscepticism is largely understudied here.

This thesis has also found that the print media has a large effect on peoples' Euroscepticism, yet the output and tone of their arguments do not seem to have much of an effect on their Euroscepticism, or their anti-immigrant sentiments. There is more of an effect from the overall editorial position of a paper than there is on any campaigning focus within the newspaper itself. This suggests that those that read newspapers, especially those that are principled or hard in their opposition or favour to the European Union are more likely to read newspapers that reinforce their pre-existing opinions. We do see the effects of the campaigning and media framing of the arguments in a different degree, Eurosceptics have been shown to be more bullish about economic prospects and distrusting of experts, while Europhiles are generally more fearful for the economy after the result. Both of these messages were put forward by the respective sides in the referendum debating processes and have fed into these perceptions in the post-referendum period.

Anti-immigrant sentiments played a fairly large role in the vote, but were one of many reasons why individuals in the United Kingdom would register as Eurosceptic and vote to leave in the referendum. The drivers of these anti-immigrant sentiments are linked to the nationalist drivers of Euroscepticism but with a greater focus on egocentric economic perceptions. In this sense it is those that largely perceive themselves to be losers that tend to be anti-immigrant, and those that tend to be anti-immigrant tend to be Eurosceptic. Egocentric and anti-immigrant sentiments are not the main or reasons why individuals would vote to leave however, the focus on anti-immigrant sentiments in the post-referendum aftermath seems to be largely misplaced. While those that individually perceived themselves to be losers of European Union membership in the United Kingdom to tend to be anti-immigrant this grouping does not necessarily make up a large part of the Eurosceptics.

### **6.1 Limitations and Recommendations**

A number of limitations with this research must be acknowledged however. Firstly when viewing the media based variables there is a distinct potential of reverse causality when it comes to the position of the newspaper's effect on an individual's Euroscepticism and Leave vote. Individuals have been found to read things they agree with to reinforce their core beliefs, thus a Eurosceptic would be attracted to a Eurosceptic newspaper as they are publishing articles they can agree with. This is a two way stream however; individuals who read the paper for other reasons, most of the right wing papers in the UK have well developed sports sections for

example, can also be convinced on new phenomena and discourse by the framing of specifics and facts around issues in topics that they did not particularly care for before reading. Studies have found that people are more likely to be convinced by their information sources where their direct involvement or experience with an issue is limited such as immigration (Duffy and Rowden, 2005). The same could be said about the EU, it is unlikely that the average individual in the UK has had much interaction with the EU outside of specific EU regulations. However the fact that there is very little strong correlation with the additional variables on the focus and tone of the reporting suggests there is indeed a degree of reverse causality here. Tone and focus are intended to persuade yet they do not necessarily have a strong effect on Euroscepticism whilst the editorial position has a very strong effect. This suggests that people may read the paper primarily for the position and not for the persuasiveness of their arguments.

Greater study into the cognitive biases of Euroscepticism and media intake could provide unique and interesting findings here, thus this thesis recommends greater study into the media's effect on the phenomenon. Investigating the effects of long term media biases towards Euroscepticism with the growth of mainstream Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom since the eastward expansion could provide further insight into the outside influences of individual level Euroscepticism. Opening up the study to include multiple EU countries could also provide for interesting comparisons of media biases and how they may differ between countries, although the United Kingdom is particularly unique in this factor given the prevalence and potentially high influence of Eurosceptic news sources.

An additional limitation of this study, as mentioned earlier, is the potential trade-off between accuracy and representativeness caused by movement of don't know answers to neutral positions. Even with this trade-off the number of observations in the regressions is greatly reduced from the overall N of 30,000 due to a large number of individuals not giving their individual or household income levels, due to this approximately half of observations are lost, depending on the wave. The representativeness of this sample then is greatly diminished due to this, only around 700 observations are available for Wales for example in Wave 10. A recommendation for further study would be to include further measures of 'real' economic factors, due to the potential for misreporting, are in this case, the unwillingness to report these variables, group level variables would perhaps be best utilised. This could test further the finding in this research that economic positions generally had little effect on Euroscepticism as well as provide more robust and accurate measurements of empirical economic positions.

Given the overall lack of study into the country and the interesting results noted in this research this thesis would also recommend further studies into the Welsh context as this seems to be an atypical and example of Euroscepticism, at least at the individual level. Expanding the focus to perhaps include the aforementioned group level variables or a more in depth single case study approach could provide a greater depth of knowledge

both into Welsh Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism in general. Welsh voters may provide an interesting and important subgroup of hard Eurosceptics that if studied in more detail could help to broaden knowledge of a kind of Euroscepticism that does not necessarily fit within the bounds of existing Eurosceptic theory.

Euroscepticism remains on the forefront of studies of public opinion throughout both the United Kingdom and the EU. Explaining this phenomenon, especially within the British, context can help to understand and predict a traditionally unpredictable concept and its effects on governance at both the domestic and supranational level. For Europhilic governments that wish to promote the European Union and avoid a British style referendum result or the growth of Euroscepticism should look to promote a view of their country as a part of a greater whole, that seeks to promote a view differing from the nationalist populism that helped to drive the UK away from the European Project. British Euroscepticism is unique however, as Chapter 2 argued, and the gains from this research may be limited to the specific British context here.

Despite this focussed approach on the British EU referendum the research presented in this thesis has sought to broaden this understanding by introducing cross country analysis within this new context, at the individual level. It has sought help create greater understanding of voter preferences with regards to Euroscepticism, especially within the context of a hard binary choice that was present in the referendum. With the United Kingdom currently in the process of leaving, a new period is about to begin for Europe, the understanding of this phenomenon will be tantamount to the challenges faced by the European Project, particularly when it comes to public opinion and individual perceptions of EU membership.

### Appendix 1 Working Age Models

**Table 14** OLS regressions of European integration variable 66 or older discounted

European integration		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.1779***	-0.1645***	-0.1303***	-0.115***	-0.1364***	-0.1431***	-0.1886***	-0.0834*
	Europeanness	0.5981***	0.5584***	0.5950***	0.5450***	0.5784***	0.6245***	0.5921***	0.6031***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1276***	-0.1269***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0404	-0.0294	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0200	0.0656
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0270***	0.0032	0.0247**	-0.0035	0.0271	0.0340	0.0603	-0.0066
	Household income	-0.0061	0.0146	-0.0076	0.0187*	0.0189	-0.0353	-0.0165	0.0447
	Economy	-0.1428***	-0.5686***	-0.1447***	-0.5516***	-0.0485	-0.6773***	-0.1253	-0.5012***
	Risk of Unemployment	0.0226	0.0277	0.0368*	0.0314	-0.0738	-0.0467	0.0229	0.1717*
	Working Class	-0.0816*	-0.0290	-0.0722	-0.0112	0.0578	-0.0429	-0.2497	-0.0750
	Risk of Poverty	0.0264	-0.0267	0.0333	-0.0221	-0.0073	-0.0394	0.0873	-0.0454
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.0383*	0.0265	0.0236	0.0147	-0.0033	0.0410	0.0539	-0.0514
	Political attention	-0.2208***	-0.1453***	-0.2172***	-0.1389***	-0.2219***	-0.1601***	-0.2401***	-0.1765***
	Reads any newspaper	-0.0303	-0.1155**	-0.0418	-0.1725***	-0.0075	0.1143	0.2427	0.2508
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.2253***	-0.3610***	-0.2236***	-0.3503***	-0.2361***	-0.3355***	-0.1371	-0.3111**
<b>Controls</b>	Age	-0.0245***	-0.2106***	-0.0234***	-0.2129***	-0.0187***	-0.1699**	-0.0356***	-0.1639*
	Household size	0.0120	0.0260	0.0223	0.0254	-0.0034	0.0472	-0.1087	-0.0042
	Left Right scale	-0.2504***	-0.2122***	-0.2408***	-0.2125***	-0.2884***	-0.0982*	-0.2388***	-0.2565***
	Homeowner	-0.0012	0.0138	-0.0244	0.0433	0.1597	-0.0499	0.2784	0.0664
	Female	0.2303***	0.1482***	0.2534***	0.1254**	0.0370	0.2658	0.3035	0.1045
	National unemployment rate	0.2537	0.6221	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0603***	-0.0546***	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigration and the Economy	0.1266***	0.1345***	0.1231***	0.1237***	0.0143	0.1245	0.1819*	0.1163
	Immigration and Culture	0.2544***	0.3111***	0.2404***	0.3039***	0.3299***	0.2754***	0.1707*	0.3301***
<b>Observations</b>	15,810	12,435	13,638	10,665	1,348	1,113	769	607	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel ONS (2017a) Note: \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

**Table 15** Logistic regressions of EU vote or vote intention 66 or older discounted

EU vote or vote intention		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0736***	-0.1243***	-0.0185	-0.0409	-0.0685	-0.0900	-0.1485*	-0.2930**
	Europeanness	0.5582***	0.5028***	0.5469***	0.4937***	0.6738***	0.5727***	0.5807***	0.6537***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1141***	-0.1831***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0107	0.0072	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0518	-0.0280
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0226*	0.0353**	0.0201	0.0318*	0.0344	0.0295	0.0590	0.0177
	Household income	0.0200*	0.0134	0.0191	0.0128	0.0456	0.0237	0.0373	0.0206
	Economy	0.0652*	-0.6655***	0.0952**	-0.6379***	-0.0823	-0.6389***	-0.0139	-1.1133***
	Risk of Unemployment	0.0542*	0.0248	0.0598*	0.0220	0.0371	-0.0490	0.0439	0.3970**
	Working Class	0.0119	-0.1067	0.0280	-0.0924	0.4174*	-0.1822	-0.5267*	0.1582
	Risk of Poverty	0.0019	-0.0508	-0.0003	-0.0628*	0.0160	0.0918	0.1308	-0.1418
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.1163***	0.1509***	0.1027***	0.1256***	0.0548	0.1959*	0.1228	0.1253
	Political attention	-0.1565***	-0.1129***	-0.1565***	-0.1072***	-0.1681***	-0.1251**	-0.1524**	-0.2071**
	Reads any newspaper	0.0008	-0.0628	0.0211	-0.1192	0.0432	0.2345	-0.1857	0.2633
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.2582***	-0.4510***	-0.2551***	-0.4477***	-0.3220***	-0.2940**	-0.2734*	-0.5955***
<b>Controls</b>	Age Group	-0.0139***	-0.1868***	-0.0141***	-0.1839***	-0.0072	-0.0821	-0.0101	-0.3945**
	Household size	0.0184	-0.0273	0.0318	-0.0220	-0.0524	-0.0371	-0.1185	-0.1471
	Left Right scale	-0.2322***	-0.1911***	-0.2360***	-0.1867***	-0.1357**	-0.1518**	-0.2648***	-0.1178
	Homeowner	-0.0620	0.1559*	-0.0572	0.1551*	-0.0514	0.3178	-0.1561	0.4103
	Female	0.2508***	-0.0740	0.2811***	-0.1048	0.2811	-0.0929	0.0603	0.4339
	National unemployment rate	0.4857*	1.2094*	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0673***	-0.0952***	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigration and the Economy	0.2946***	0.2669***	0.2953***	0.2601***	0.2547***	0.1699*	0.1799	0.3620**
	Immigration and Culture	0.2209***	0.2344***	0.2175***	0.2205***	0.2670***	0.2263**	0.0973	0.3369**
<b>Observations</b>	13,415	11,451	10,520	9,287	1,839	1,377	999	731	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001



**Table 16** OLS regressions for immigration's effect on the economy 66 or older discounted

Immigration and the economy		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0962***	-0.0941***	-0.0078	-0.0340**	-0.1319***	-0.0557*	-0.0787*	-0.0233
	Europeanness	0.3409***	0.3175***	0.3251***	0.3079***	0.3132***	0.2884***	0.3592***	0.2848***
	Englishness	-	-	-0.1831***	-0.1527***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0837***	-0.0151	-	-
	Welshness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0622*	0.0112
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	0.0000	0.0106	0.0001	0.0043	-0.0008	0.0263	-0.0038	0.0089
	Household income	-0.0099*	0.0135**	-0.0112*	0.0134*	-0.0045	0.0160	0.0258	0.0213
	Economy	0.1363***	-0.0436**	0.1314***	-0.0273	0.2451***	-0.0387	0.1094	-0.0621
	Risk of Unemployment	-0.0487***	-0.0031	-0.0395**	0.0141	-0.0363	-0.0381	-0.0716	-0.0550
	Working Class	-0.1150***	-0.1303***	-0.0728**	-0.0969***	-0.2055*	-0.2200*	-0.1356	-0.1843
	Risk of Poverty	-0.0709***	-0.0597***	-0.0603***	-0.0469***	-0.0680	-0.1268**	-0.1151*	-0.0470
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.1847***	0.1245***	0.1644***	0.0922***	0.1473***	0.1541***	0.0196	0.2210***
	Political attention	0.1085***	0.0920***	0.1071***	0.0866***	0.1269***	0.1251***	0.0908***	0.1189***
	Reads any newspaper	-0.1550***	-0.0712**	-0.1570***	-0.0801**	-0.0573	-0.1157	-0.1271	0.0153
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.2127***	-0.2214***	-0.1922***	-0.1958***	-0.2440***	-0.2068***	-0.2767***	-0.2390***
<b>Controls</b>	Age Group	-0.0141***	-0.0929***	-0.0129***	-0.0907***	-0.0101**	-0.0802*	-0.0114*	0.0390
	Household size	0.0118	-0.0031	0.0161	-0.0005	-0.0121	-0.0279	-0.0635	-0.0422
	Left Right scale	-0.1490***	-0.09848***	-0.1255***	-0.0873***	-0.2183***	-0.0823***	-0.1619***	-0.0937*
	Homeowner	-0.0047	-0.0970**	0.0215	-0.0441	0.0584	-0.1658	-0.2174	-0.3691*
	Female	-0.1806***	-0.0961***	-0.1788***	-0.1366***	-0.1524	0.0012	0.0251	0.2495
	National unemployment rate	0.2028*	0.3142	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	-0.0035	-0.0061	-	-	-	-	-	-
	<b>Observations</b>	15,810	12,435	13,638	10,665	1,348	1,113	769	607

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, ONS (2017a)

Note: \* p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001

**Table 17** OLS regressions for immigration's effect on culture 66 or older discounted

Immigration and culture		Whole		England		Scotland		Wales	
		W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10	W7	W10
<b>Identity</b>	Britishness	-0.0978***	-0.1059***	-0.0105	-0.0384***	-0.1363***	-0.0444	-0.0552	-0.0972*
	Europeanness	0.3780***	0.3655***	0.3622***	0.3559***	0.3514***	0.3056***	0.4008***	0.3378***
	Welshness	-	-	-0.1879***	-0.1657***	-	-	-	-
	Scottishness	-	-	-	-	-0.0845***	-0.0233	-	-
	Englishness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0655*	0.0089
<b>Economic</b>	Personal income	-0.0001	0.0221***	-0.0029	0.0139*	0.0356	0.0669**	-0.0054	-0.0012
	Household income	-0.0094	0.0079	-0.0088	0.0117*	-0.0197	-0.0196	0.0168	-0.0056
	Economy	0.1028***	-0.0836***	0.0965***	-0.0747***	0.2178***	-0.0523	0.0941	-0.0422
	Risk of Unemployment	-0.0295*	-0.0039	-0.0141	0.0129	-0.0472	-0.0384	-0.1019	-0.0173
	Working Class	-0.0740**	-0.167***	-0.0287	-0.1420***	-0.1564	-0.1952*	-0.1892	-0.0859
	Risk of Poverty	-0.0480***	-0.0132	-0.0403**	-0.0062	-0.0409	-0.0156	-0.0376	0.0009
<b>Cognitive</b>	Education level	0.1545***	0.0997***	0.1284***	0.0713***	0.1642***	0.0857*	0.0139	0.2042***
	Political attention	0.0538***	0.0493***	0.0549***	0.0449***	0.0533**	0.0678***	0.0327	0.0827**
	Reads any newspaper	-0.1314***	-0.0225	-0.1330***	-0.0202	-0.0151	-0.1508	-0.1396	0.0004
	Anti-intellectualism	-0.1768***	-0.2359***	-0.1495***	-0.2029***	-0.2348***	-0.3324***	-0.2662***	-0.1930**
<b>Controls</b>	Age Group	-0.0152***	-0.1181***	-0.0140***	-0.1118***	-0.0131***	-0.0853*	-0.0088	-0.0046
	Household size	0.0382***	0.0045	0.0511***	0.0092	-0.0543	-0.0656	-0.0718	0.0072
	Left Right scale	-0.1950***	-0.1663***	-0.1725***	-0.1508***	-0.2385***	-0.1973***	-0.2166***	-0.1144**
	Homeowner	-0.0469	-0.1042**	-0.0330	-0.0618	0.0383	-0.0043	-0.0821	-0.4324**
	Female	0.0362	0.1844***	0.0369	0.1577***	0.1191	0.2876**	0.0600	0.35305*
	National unemployment rate	0.2481*	0.0422	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant population %	0.0009	0.0012	-	-	-	-	-	-
Observations	15,810	12,435	13,638	10,665	1,348	1,113	769	607	

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, ONS (2017a)

Note p&lt;.05; \*\* p&lt;.01; \*\*\* p&lt;.001

## Appendix 2 Variance Inflation Factor Tests

Here we present the variance inflation factor tests that were referred to in the text. These tests were run to check for the potential effects of multi-collinearity within the regressions. Note that for VIF tests run on the regressions that included all media variables in the same model high scores were received, in this section we therefore present the 2 models used in the research to show that VIF is below the general rule of thumb; 10.

**Table 18** Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS whole model

Variable	W7		W10	
	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF
Immigration and the Economy	2.76	0.362423	2.6	0.384516
Immigration and Culture	2.72	0.367183	2.73	0.365696
Personal income	2.58	0.387117	1.76	0.56688
Household income	2.45	0.40809	1.83	0.545314
Age	1.67	0.598454	1.68	0.596328
Risk of Poverty	1.49	0.669365	1.42	0.704089
Risk of Unemployment	1.4	0.715802	1.39	0.718967
Europeanness	1.37	0.728924	1.51	0.662094
Left-right scale	1.35	0.738871	1.34	0.745121
Education	1.35	0.742273	1.28	0.782513
Homeowner	1.31	0.765283	1.33	0.753428
Economy	1.27	0.787399	1.22	0.816681
Anti-intellectual	1.27	0.78837	1.32	0.755609
Household size	1.17	0.851776	1.2	0.836353
Working Class	1.15	0.865894	1.12	0.896535
Political attention	1.14	0.875681	1.2	0.833437
Britishness	1.14	0.876496	1.15	0.867142
Female	1.08	0.923547	1.07	0.930473
Immigrant population %	1.05	0.955002	2.19	0.456915
National unemployment rate	1.05	0.95626	2.15	0.465873
Reads any newspaper	1.04	0.962748	1.07	0.93697

Source: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, ONS (2017a)

**Table 19** Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS with model 1 media variables

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
RLTI	3.21	0.31177
Negative Immigrants Articles	2.95	0.338542
Immigration and Culture	2.73	0.366587
Immigration and the Economy	2.52	0.396681
Immigrant population %	2.21	0.453414
National unemployment rate	2.18	0.457966
Household income	1.89	0.528214
Personal income	1.82	0.548512
Age	1.77	0.565047
Europeanness	1.59	0.62885
Left Right scale	1.52	0.657261
Risk of Poverty	1.44	0.696034
Risk of Unemployment	1.42	0.706111
Anti-intellectualism	1.38	0.726965
Homeowner	1.37	0.727965
Education level	1.33	0.753108
Economy	1.3	0.77006
Household size	1.22	0.818309
Political attention	1.17	0.851578
Working Class	1.16	0.860718
Britishness	1.14	0.873631
Female	1.1	0.907074

Sources: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, Moore and Ramsay (2017), Levy et al (2016), The Economist (2016), ONS (2017a)

**Table 20** Variance inflation factor tests for European Integration OLS with model 2 media variables

Variable

	VIF	1/VIF
Immigration and Culture	2.74	0.365497
EU Myths	2.64	0.37811
Immigration and the Economy	2.51	0.39765
Immigrant population %	2.2	0.454039
Economy and immigration articles	2.2	0.454159
National unemployment rate	2.18	0.458299
Newspaper Position	2.08	0.481757
Household income	1.9	0.527463
Personal income	1.82	0.54825
Age	1.77	0.565324
Europeanness	1.6	0.625964
Left Right scale	1.54	0.649146
Risk of Poverty	1.43	0.696978
Risk of Unemployment	1.42	0.705812
Anti-intellectualism	1.38	0.722668
Homeowner	1.37	0.727291
Education level	1.32	0.758841
Economy	1.3	0.767812
Household size	1.22	0.818081
Political attention	1.2	0.836153
Britishness	1.15	0.870392
Working Class	1.14	0.875825
Female	1.11	0.904571

Sources: BES Waves 7 and 10 Internet Panel, Moore and Ramsay (2017), Levy et al (2016), The Economist (2016), ONS (2017a)

### **Appendix 3 BES Survey Questions and Constructed Variables**

This appendix states the questions and scales used from the BES panel data (BES, 2018) as well as those variables that were constructed using BES data. Note that the numbers in ( ) represents the number denoted to the answer on the scale

#### **Dependent Variables**

EU Integration scale:

Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Protect our independence (0) - Unite fully with the European Union (10)

EU Referendum Vote Intention:

If you do vote in the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, how do you think you will vote?

Leave (0) – Remain (1)

EU Referendum Vote:

Which way did you vote [in the EU referendum]?

Leave (0) – Remain (1)

Immigration and the Economy:

Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?

Bad for the Economy (1) – Good for the Economy (7)

Immigration and Culture:

Do you think that immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life?

Undermines cultural life (1) – Enriches cultural life (7)

#### **Independent Variables**

##### **Identity**

All Identity Variables:

Where would you place yourself on these scales?

Britishness

Scottishness - if country= Scotland

Welshness - if country= Wales

Englishness – if county = England

Europeanness

Not at all [identity] (1) – Very strongly [identity] (7)

## Economic

### Personal Income:

What is your gross personal income?  
Under £5000 (1) - £100,000 or over (14)

### Household Income:

What is your gross household income?  
Under £5000 (1) - £150,000 or over (15)

### Economy:

Do you think that [the economy is] getting better, getting worse or staying about the same?  
Getting a lot worse (1) – Getting a lot better (5)

### Risky of Unemployment:

During the next 12 months, how likely or unlikely is it that you will be out of a job and looking for work?  
Very likely (1) – Very unlikely (5)

### Working class:

Variable constructed by taking answers from:  
Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to any particular class?  
If answer = Yes, working class then variable = 1  
If answer = No or nonworking class variant of yes then variable = 0

### Risk of Poverty:

During the next 12 months, how likely or unlikely is it that there will be times when you don't have enough money to cover your day to day living costs  
Very likely (1) – Very unlikely (5)

## Cognitive

### Education level:

What is your highest education level?  
No qualifications (1) – Postgraduate (6)

### Political attention:

How much attention do you generally pay to politics?  
Pay no attention (0) – Pay a great deal of attention (10)

### Reads any newspaper:

Constructed from answer to which daily newspaper do you read most often?  
If answer = any newspaper then variable = 1  
If answer = None then variable = 0

### Anti-Intellectualism

How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts?  
Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly agree (5)

## Controls

### Age or Age Group

Age of respondent, for Wave 10 age was divided into groupings and given numerical value by the BES

#### Household Size

How many people, including yourself, are there in your household? Please include both adults and children.

#### Female:

Gender variable constructed from answers to:

Are you male or female?

If answer = female then variable = 1

If answer = male then variable = 0

#### Left Right Scale:

In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Left (0) – Right (10)

#### Homeownership:

Variable generated from answers to:

Current housing situation

If answer = Own outright, with mortgage or through shared ownership then variable = 1

If answer = other valid variant then variable = 0

**Table 21** Descriptive Table of Country Level Control Variables

Country	Unemployment as % of total population		Immigrants as % of total population	
	W7	W10	W7	W10
England	4.9	4.75	13.03	13.45
Scotland	5.25	4.75	7.71	8.25
Wales	4.6	4.4	5.45	5.85

Source: ONS 2017b

Wave 7 data taken from July 2015 to June 2016 estimates

Wave 10 data take from July 2016 to June 2017 estimates



## References

- Raaijmakers, Q., Hoof, A., Hart, Harm 't, Verbogt, T., & Vollerbergh, W. 2000. Adolescents' midpoint responses on Likert-type scale items: Neutral or missing values? *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 12(2), 209-217.
- Alauddin, M. and Nghiemb, H.S. 2010. Do Instructional Attributes pose Multicollinearity Problems? An Empirical Exploration. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 40(3), pp.351–361.
- Alvarez, M., Nagler, J. and Bowler, S., 2000. Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election. *American Political Science Review*, 94(1), pp.131–149.
- Ashcroft, M. 2016. How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday... and why, *Lord Ashcroft Polls*, 24/06/2016 found at <http://lordashcrofthpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/> accessed 09/05/2018
- Atwood, L.E. and Sanders, K.R., 1976. Information sources and voting in a primary and general election. *Journal of Broadcasting*, 20(3), pp.291–301.
- Barnes, J. 2016. 'Greece CRUCIFIED on the cross of the euro' – UKIP MEP scolds EU on parliament floor, *The Sunday Express*, 16/02/16 found <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/768298/William-Dartmouth-scolds-European-Union-Greek-debt-eurozone-failings> accessed 12/11/2017
- Bartle, J., 1997. Political awareness and heterogeneity in models of voting: some evidence from the British election studies. *British elections and parties review*, 7, pp.1–22.
- BBC, 2017. General election 2017: Sturgeon says Indyref2 'a factor' in SNP losses, *BBC*, 9/06/2018, found <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40216748> accessed 10/05/2018
- Behr, R. 2016. 'How Remain failed: the inside story of a doomed campaign', *The Guardian*, 05/07/2016 found at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/how-remain-failed-inside-story-doomed-campaign> accessed 12/04/2018
- Belsley, D.A., Kuh, E. and Welsch, R.E., 1980. *Regression diagnostics : identifying influential data and sources of collinearity*, New York, NY [etc.]: Wiley.
- BES, 2016., Brexit Britain: British Election Study Insights from the post-EU Referendum Wave of the BES internet panel, *British Election Study*, 06/10/2016 found <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/brexit-britain-british-election-study-insights-from-the-post-eu-referendum-Wave-of-the-bes-internet-panel/> accessed 07/12/2017
- BES, 2018., British Election Study 2014-2018 Combined Waves 1-13 Internet Panel Codebook, found [http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Bes\\_wave13Documentation\\_V1.0.pdf](http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Bes_wave13Documentation_V1.0.pdf) accessed
- Boomgaarden, H.G., Schuck, A.R.T., Elenbaas, M. and Vreese, de, C.H. 2011. Mapping EU attitudes: conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support. *European Union Politics*, 12(2), pp.241–266.
- Brack, N. and Startin, N., 2015. Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the margins to the mainstream. *International Political Science Review*, 36(3), pp.239–249.
- Card, D., Dustmann, C. and Preston, I., 2005. Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey. *Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London* found <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14315/1/14315.pdf> accessed 07/12/2017.

- Carey, S., 2002. Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration? *European Union politics*, 3(4), pp.387–414.
- Churchill, W., 1948. Conservative Mass Meeting: a speech at Llandudno, 9 October 1948 found <https://web-archives.univ-pau.fr/english/special/SRdoc1.pdf> accessed 12/11/2017
- Clarke, H.D., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P., 2017. Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70(3), pp.439–464.
- Curtice, J. 2016. The Economics of Brexit In Voters' Eyes (Or, Why The Remain Campaign Failed), *NatCen Social Research*, found at <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/the-economics-of-brex-it-voters-eyes/> accessed 12/04/2018
- Curtice, J. 2017. The Three Characteristics of the Scottish Conservative Revival, *What Scotland Thinks: Comment and Analysis*, 01/10/2017 found at <http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2017/10/the-three-characteristics-of-the-scottish-conservative-revival/> accessed 12/04/2018
- Daddow, O., 2013. Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in Britain. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 15(2), pp.210–227.
- Daddow, Oliver, 2012. The UK media and 'Europe': from permissive consensus to destructive dissent. *International Affairs*, 88(6), pp.1219–1236.
- Dahlgreen, W. 2015. Freedom of movement within Commonwealth more popular than within EU, *YouGov*, 19/11/2015 found <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/11/19/majority-support-commonwealth-freedom-movement/> accessed 12/11/2017
- Davidov, E., and Meuleman, B. 2012. Explaining Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies in European Countries: The Role of Human Values. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(5), 757–775
- Davidov, E., Cieciuch, J., Meuleman, B., Schmidt, P., Algesheimer, R and Hausherr, M., 2015. The Comparability of Measurements of Attitudes toward Immigration in the European Social Survey: Exact versus Approximate Measurement Equivalence. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 79, p.244.
- De Vries, Hobolt and Tilley, 2018. Facing up to the facts: What causes economic perceptions? *Electoral Studies*, 51, pp.115–122.
- Deutsch K. W., 1957. *Political community and the North Atlantic area : international organization in the light of historical experience*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Duffy, B. and Rowden L. 2005. You are what you read? How newspaper readership is related to views, *Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute*, found at [https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/sri\\_you\\_are\\_what\\_you\\_read\\_042005.pdf](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/sri_you_are_what_you_read_042005.pdf) accessed 10/05/2018
- Dustmann, C., Casanova, M., Fertig, M., Preston, I. and Schmidt, C.M. .2003. The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows. *Home Office Online Report 25/03* Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office: London, UK found [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/reports/HomeOffice25\\_03.pdf](http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/reports/HomeOffice25_03.pdf) accessed 12/11/2017
- Eurobarometer 2017, Eurobarometer Interactive Data, *Eurobarometer*, found <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index> accessed 13/11/2017
- Eurobarometer, 2016, Standard Eurobarometer 86.3, *European Commission*, found [https://search.gesis.org/research\\_data/ZA6791](https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA6791) accessed 07/12/2017
- European Commission, 2017. Euromyths A-Z index, *European Commission in the UK Blogs* found <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/ECintheUK/euromyths-a-z-index/> accessed 28/11/2017

- Evans, D. 2015. No more 'Welsh effect'? Why the EU may be becoming a scapegoat in Wales, *LSE Brexit Blog*, 17/12/2015 found at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2015/12/17/no-more-welsh-effect/> accessed 12/04/2018
- Evans, G. and Andersen, R., 2006. The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(1), pp.194–207.
- Evans, J. 2012. EU funding for Wales 2012. *Jill Evans MEP Reports and Newsletters*, found [http://www.jillevans.net/english/EU\\_Funding\\_for\\_Wales\\_21-11-2012.pdf](http://www.jillevans.net/english/EU_Funding_for_Wales_21-11-2012.pdf) accessed 09/05/2018
- Faber, R., Tims, A. and Schmitt, K., 1993. Negative Political Advertising and Voting Intent: The Role of Involvement and Alternative Information Sources. *Journal of Advertising*, 22(4), pp.67–76.
- Farage, N. 2016 Why we must vote LEAVE in the EU referendum, *The Express Comment Pages*, 21/06/2016 found at <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip> accessed 12/04/2018
- Ford, R. and Goodwin, M., 2014. Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind. *Political Quarterly*, 85(3), pp.277–284.
- FullFact 2017 £350 million EU claim "a clear misuse of official statistics", *FullFact*, 19/09/2017 found <https://fullfact.org/europe/350-million-week-boris-johnson-statistics-authority-misuse/> accessed 13/11/2017
- Gabel, M. 1998 'Public support for European integration: an empirical test of five theories', *Journal of Politics* 60(2): 333–354. George, S., 1998. *An awkward partner : Britain in the European Community* 3rd [rev. and expanded]., Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press.
- Gabel, M. and Whitten, G., 1997. Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration. *Political Behavior*, 19(1), pp.81–96.
- Gilljam, M. and Granberg, D., 1993. Should we take don't know for an answer? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57(3), p.348.
- Glen, C. 2015. Nationalism, Identity and Scotland's Referendum, *Contemporary European Studies*, 1/2015, pp.5-19 found at [http://www.ces.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ces\\_1\\_2015\\_GLEN1.pdf](http://www.ces.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ces_1_2015_GLEN1.pdf) accessed 12/04/2018
- Goodwin, M and Milazzo C, (2015) Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: What Drives Euroscepticism?, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham Housing Briefing Papers*, December 2015, found <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151209EuroscepticismGoodwinMilazzo.pdf> accessed 07/12/2017
- Goodwin, M. 2018. The perceived costs and benefits of Brexit, *The UK in a Changing Europe Analysis blog*, 02/02/2018, found at <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-perceived-costs-and-benefits-of-brexit/> accessed 12/04/2018
- Goodwin, M.J. and Heath, O., 2016. The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result. *Political Quarterly*, 87(3), pp.323–332.
- Goodwin, M.J., Hix, S. and Pickup, M., 2018. For and Against Brexit: A Survey Experiment of the Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership. *British Journal of Political Science*, pp 1-15
- Greenslade, R. 2016. Suddenly, national newspapers are heading for that print cliff fall, *The Guardian*, 27/05/2016 found <https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/may/27/suddenly-national-newspapers-are-heading-for-that-print-cliff-fall> accessed 07/12/2017

- Groves, J. 2016. EU-funded 'experts' who warn of Brexit shock: Think tank accused of bias after warning of 'large negative' for the economy if Britain votes to Leave, *The Daily Mail*, 02/06/2016 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3620984/EU-funded-experts-warn-Brexit-shock-Think-tank-accused-bias-warning-large-negative-economy-Britain-votes-Leave.html> accessed 12/04/2018
- Haesly, R., 2001. Euroskeptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European Attachment in Scotland and Wales, *European Union Politics*, 2(1) pp.81-102
- Haesly, R., 2005. Identifying Scotland and Wales: types of Scottish and Welsh national identities. *Nations and Nationalism*, 11(2), pp.243–263.
- Hawkins, B., 2012. Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(4), pp.561–577.
- Hawkins, O. 2017 Migration Statistics. *House of Commons Briefing Papers*, SN06077, 07/03/2017 found at <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06077> accessed 09/05/2018
- Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Liñeira, R., Scully, R., Wincott, D., and Wyn Jones, R. 2016. England, Englishness and Brexit. *Political Quarterly*, 87(2), 187-199.
- Hing, B., 1993. BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION AND CULTURAL PLURALISM: ADDRESSING THE TENSION OF SEPARATISM AND CONFLICT IN AN IMMIGRATION-DRIVEN MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY. *California Law Review*, 81(4), pp.863–925.
- Hobolt, S., 2016. The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), pp.1259–1277.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2004. Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration? *Political Science and Politics*, 37(3), pp.415–420.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2007. Sources of Euroscepticism. *Acta politica*, 42(2-3), pp.119–127.
- Hopkin, J. and Bradbury, J., 2006. British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics. , 36(1), pp.135–152.
- Hopkin, J., 2009. Party Matters: Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain . *Party Politics*, 15(2), pp.179–198.
- Hudson, N. and Aiton, A. .2016. EU Nationals Living in Scotland, *SPiCe*, 03/11/2016 found [http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB\\_16-86\\_EU\\_nationals\\_living\\_in\\_Scotland.pdf](http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-86_EU_nationals_living_in_Scotland.pdf) accessed 13/11/2017
- Hunt, A. 2014. UKIP: The story of the UK Independence Party's rise, *BBC*, 12/09/2016 found <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073> accessed 12/11/2017
- Ifan, G., Poole, E. and Jones, R. 2016. Wales and the EU Referendum: Estimating Wales' Net Contribution to the European Union, *Wales Governance Centre*, found at <http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2016/05/Estimating-Wales%E2%80%99-Net-Contribution-to-the-European-Union.pdf> accessed 09/05/2018
- Inglehart, R. (1970) 'Cognitive mobilization and European identity', *Comparative Politics* 3(1): 45–70.
- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. 2016. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash, *HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026*, found at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2818659##](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659##) accessed 12/04/2018
- Ipsos 2016b. Half believe the economy will get worse in the short term if Britain leaves the EU but more likely to think it will improve in the long term, *Ipsos Mori*, 18/05/2016 found at <https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en->

[uk/half-believe-economy-will-get-worse-short-term-if-britain-leaves-eu-more-likely-think-it-will](#) accessed 12/04/2018

Ipsos, 2016a. How Britain Voted in the 2016 EU referendum, *Ipsos Mori*, 05/09/2016 found <https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2016-eu-referendum> accessed 28/11/2017

Jackson, D., Thorsen E. and Wring, D. 2016. EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign Early reflections from leading UK academics, *The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community*, found at <https://meandeuropa.com/wp-content/uploads/EU-Referendum-Analysis-2016-Jackson-Thorsen-and-Wring-v2.pdf> accessed 12/04/2018

Jeffery, C and Hough, D., 2009. Understanding Post-Devolution Elections in Scotland and Wales in Comparative Perspective. *Party Politics*, 15(2), pp.219–240.

Jones, R.W. and Scully, R., 2006. Devolution and Electoral Politics in Scotland and Wales. , 36(1), pp.115–134.

Jones, R.W., Lodge, G., Jeffrey, C., Gottfried, G., Scully, R., Henderson, A. and Wincott D. 2013. England and its two Unions: The Anatomy of a Nation and its Discontents, *Institute for Public Policy Research*, found at [http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/07/england-two-unions\\_Jul2013\\_11003.pdf?noredirect=1](http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/07/england-two-unions_Jul2013_11003.pdf?noredirect=1) accessed 12/11/2017

Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2017. Pensioner Poverty, *Joseph Rowntree Foundation*, found <https://www.jrf.org.uk/data/pensioner-poverty> accessed 28/11/2017

Khan, I. 2016 Scientists fighting Brexit risk looking like an out of touch elite too, *The Guardian*, 07/07/2016 found <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/jul/07/brexit-is-also-a-vote-against-the-elitism-in-science> accessed 12/04/2018

Kidd, C. and McClymont, G. 2014. Scottish independence essay: Say No to colony myth, *The Scotsman Opinion Pages*, 06/08/2014 found <http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/scottish-independence-essay-say-no-to-colony-myth-1-3500221> accessed 12/11/2017

Kierzenkowski, R., Pain, N., Rusticelli, E. and Zwart, S. 2016. The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision, *OECD Economic Policy Papers*, April 2016 No.16 found at <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jm0lsvdkf6k-en.pdf?expires=1523712784&id=id&accname=quest&checksum=F8A98090DDF97F41EFAB4F05F31A22E1> accessed 12/04/2018

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M, Bornschie, S. and Frey, T., 2006. Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), pp.921–956.

Kuhn, T., 2011. Individual transnationalism, globalisation and Euroscepticism: An empirical test of Deutsch's transactionalist theory. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(6), pp.811–837.

Kvist, J., 2004. Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among EU Member States in Social Policy. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 14(3), pp.301–318.

Larcinese, V., 2007. Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election. *Public Choice*, 131(3), pp.387–411.

Lemos, S. 2009 The Effects of Eastern European Migration in Wales, *Welsh Government Statistics and Research*, 14/09/2009 found <http://gov.wales/statistics-and-research/impact-migration-from-central-eastern-european-countries-wales-labour-market/?lang=en> accessed 13/11/2017

- Levy, D., Aslan, B. and Bironzo, D. 2016. UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum, *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*, found [https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-06/UK%20Press%20Coverage%20of%20the%20EU%20Referendum\\_0.pdf](https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-06/UK%20Press%20Coverage%20of%20the%20EU%20Referendum_0.pdf) accessed 28/11/2017
- Linton, M., 1996. Maybe The Sun won it after all. *British Journalism Review*, 7(2), pp.20–26.
- Lubbers M. and Scheepers, P. 2005 Political versus instrumental Euro-scepticism: Mapping scepticism in European countries and regions. *European Union Politics* 6(2): 223–242
- Lubbers, M. and Scheepers, P. 2010. Divergent trends of Euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(6), pp.787–817.
- Mance, H. 2016 Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove, *Financial Times*, 03/06/2017, found at <https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c> accessed 19/05/2017
- Masso, A., 2009. A Readiness to Accept Immigrants in Europe? Individual and Country-Level Characteristics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35(2), pp.251–270.
- Matti, J. and Zhou, Y., 2017. The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote. *Applied Economics Letters*, 24(16), pp.1131–1134.
- McCombs, M. and Shaw, D., 1972. The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36(2), pp.176–187.
- McLaren, L. (2007) Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and Institutional Distrust. *Acta Politica*, 42(2-3), pp.233–251.
- McLaren, L. 2002. 'Public support for the European Union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?' *Journal of Politics* 64(2):551–566
- McLaren, L. 2015. *Immigration and perceptions of national political systems in Europe*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- McTague, T., Spence, A. and Dove, E.I. .2016. How David Cameron Blew It. *Politico*, 12/09/2016 found <https://www.politico.eu/article/how-david-cameron-lost-brexiteu-referendum-prime-minister-campaign-remain-boris-craig-oliver-jim-messina-obama/> accessed 12/11/2017
- Mellon, J. and Evans, G., 2016 The New Face Of British Class Voting, , *British Election Study*, 22/05/2016 found <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/the-new-face-of-british-class-voting/> accessed 07/12/2017
- Meuleman, B. and Billiet, J., 2012. Measuring Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe: The Cross-cultural Validity of the ESS Immigration Scales. *Ask. Research and Methods*, pp.5–29.
- Migration Watch .2017. Net Migration Statistic, *Migration Watch UK*, found <https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-migration-statistics/> accessed 12/11/2017
- Moore, M. and Ramsay, G. 2017. UK media coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum campaign, *Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power*, May 2017 found <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/CMCP/UK-media-coverage-of-the-2016-EU-Referendum-campaign.pdf> accessed 28/11/2017
- Moore, P. 2016. How Britain Voted, *YouGov*, 27/06/2016 found <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/> accessed 28/11/2017
- Morris, S. 2016. Carwyn Jones says Welsh Labour will distance itself from Jeremy Corbyn, *The Guardian*, 21/02/2016 found <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/21/carwyn-jones-says-welsh-labour-will-distance-itself-from-jeremy-corbyn> accessed 12/04/2018

Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., 2012. *Populism in Europe and the Americas threat or corrective for democracy?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C., 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), pp.541–563.

Mycock, A., 2012. SNP, identity and citizenship: Re-imagining state and nation. *National Identities*, 14(1), pp.53–69.

Newton, K. and Brynjin, M., 2001. The National Press and Party Voting in the UK. *Political Studies*, 49(2), pp.265–285.

Ofcom, 2017. News consumption in the UK: 2016, 29/06/2017 found at [https://www.ofcom.org.uk/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0016/103570/news-consumption-uk-2016.pdf](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0016/103570/news-consumption-uk-2016.pdf) accessed 12/04/2018

Oliver, J., and Rahn, W. 2016. Rise of the Trumpenvolk. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 667(1), 189-206.

Pattie, C. and Johnston, R., 2017. Sticking to the Union? Nationalism, inequality and political disaffection and the geography of Scotland's 2014 independence referendum. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 27(1), pp.83–96.

Pupcenoks, J. and McCabe, R., 2013. The Rise of the Fringe: Right Wing Populists, Islamists and Politics in the UK. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33(2), pp.171–184.

Ray, L. 2007. Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron? *Acta Politica*, 42(2-3), 153-172.

Reeves, A., Mckee, M. and Stuckler, D., 2016. 'It's The Sun Wot Won It': Evidence of media influence on political attitudes and voting from a UK quasi-natural experiment. *Social Science Research*, 56, 44-57.

Reif, K. and Schmitt, H., 1980. NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS *European Journal of Political Research*, 8 pp.3-44

Roberts, M. 2016. Remain or Leave? What the numbers below the headlines tell us about the outcome, *YouGov*, 14/05/2016 found at <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/14/remain-or-leave-what-numbers-below-headlines-tell-/> accessed 12/04/2018

Runciman, D., 2016. A win for 'proper people'? Brexit as a rejection of the networked world. *Juncture*, 23(1), pp.4–7.

Sanders, D., Clarke, H.D., Stewart, M.C. Whitely, P., 2008. The Endogeneity of Preferences in Spatial Models: Evidence from the 2005 British Election Study. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 18(4), pp.413–431.

Scheufele, D., 1999. Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), pp.103–122.

Scully, R. 2016 More from the Barometer Poll – Brexit, *Cardiff University Blogs*, found at <http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/2017/01/16/more-from-the-barometer-poll-brexite/> accessed 09/05/2018

Scully, R., 2013. More Scottish than Welsh? Understanding the 2011 Devolved Elections in Scotland and Wales. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 23(5), pp.591–612.

Scully, R., 2015, The Electorally Disunited Kingdom, *Elections in Wales – Etholiadau yng Nghymru Cardiff University Blogs*, 09/11/2015 found <http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/2015/11/09/the-electorally-disunited-kingdom-2/> accessed 07/12/2017

- Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M. and Quaglia, L., 2013. Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), pp.51–64.
- Sides, J. and Citrin, J., 2007. European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(3), pp.477–504.
- Sørensen, C. .2008. Love me, love me not... A typology of public Euroscepticism, *European Parties, Elections and Referendums Network*, EPERN Working Paper No 19 found <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-working-paper-19.pdf&site=266> accessed 12/11/2017
- Stanley, B., 2008. The thin ideology of populism. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13(1), pp.95–110.
- Startin, N, 2015. Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK. *International Political Science Review*, 36(3), pp.311–323.
- StatsWales 2017. Welsh speakers by local authority, gender and detailed age groups, 2011 Census, *StatsWales*, found <https://statswales.gov.wales/Catalogue/Welsh-Language/WelshSpeakers-by-LocalAuthority-Gender-DetailedAgeGroups-2011Census> accessed 13/11/2017
- Stroud, N., 2008. Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of Selective Exposure. *Political Behavior*, 30(3), pp.341–366.
- Sturgis, P., Roberts, C., Smith, P., and Alwin, D. (2014) Middle Alternatives Revisited. *Sociological Methods and Research* 43.1: 15-38.
- Swales, K. (2016) Understanding the Leave vote, *NatCen Social Research Analysis Papers*, found [https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NatCen\\_Brexplanations-report-FINAL-WEB2.pdf](https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NatCen_Brexplanations-report-FINAL-WEB2.pdf) accessed 07/12/2017
- Swire, B., Berinsky, A., Lewandowsky, S., and Ecker, U., 2017. Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. *Royal Society Open Science*, 4(3), p.160802.
- Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A., 2002. Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and party systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3(1), pp.23–41.
- Taggart, P., 1998. A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), pp.363–388.
- Taggart, P., 2004. Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), pp.269–288.
- Tajfel, H., 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Economist 2016. Debunking years of tabloid claims about Europe, *The Economist*, 22/06/2016 found <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/06/daily-chart-15> accessed 28/11/2017
- Toshkov, D. and Kortenska, E. 2015 Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Integration in the European Union? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(4), pp.910–925.
- Tucker, J., Pacek, A. and Berinsky, A., 2002. Transitional winners and losers: attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries.(Abstract). *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3), pp.557–571.
- Usherwood, S., 2008. The dilemmas of a single-issue party - The UK Independence Party. *Representation*, 44(3), pp.255–264.



- Vasilopoulou, S., 2013. Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), pp.153–168.
- Vasilopoulou, S., 2016. UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum. *Political Quarterly*, 87(2), pp.219–227.
- Walker, P. (2017) 'Soft Brexit' policy won Labour votes in general election, says study, *The Guardian*, 01/08/2015 found <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/01/soft-brexite-policy-won-labour-votes-in-general-election-says-study> accessed 13/11/2017
- Watt, N. and Wintour, P. 2015. How immigration came to haunt Labour: the inside story, *The Guardian*, 24/03/2015 found <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/mar/24/how-immigration-came-to-haunt-labour-inside-story> accessed 12/11/2017
- Watts, J. 2016. Soft Brexit preferred choice of Britons as poll shows willingness to compromise on immigration, *The Independent*, 01/10/2016 found <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-bmg-poll-hard-soft-theresa-may-david-cameron-eu-referendum-a7340641.html> accessed 13/11/2017
- Weissbecker, E. (2017) A Discourse Analysis of the UK Referendum CAMPAIGN on EU Membership The Case of Michael Gove's "The facts of Life say Leave" Speech, *Institut für Europäische Politik*, found at [http://iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Wei%C3%9Fbecker\\_Discourse-Analysis-of-the-UK-Referendum-on-EU-Membership\\_2.pdf](http://iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Wei%C3%9Fbecker_Discourse-Analysis-of-the-UK-Referendum-on-EU-Membership_2.pdf) accessed 12/04/2018
- Wellings, B. (2014) English nationalism and Euroscepticism overlap and support each other in important ways, *LSE British Politics and Policy Blog*, 14/04/2014 found at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/english-nationalism-and-Euroscepticism/> accessed 12/04/2018
- Wells, A. 2016. 'Canada Option' is most popular type of Brexit deal, *YouGov*, 18/08/2016 found <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/18/majority-people-think-freedom-movement-fair-price-/> accessed 13/11/2017
- Weyland, K. 2001, Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, *Comparative Politics*, 34 (1), 1–22.
- Wintour, P., 2017 Brexit vote was 'tantrum' by British working class, says Alan Duncan, *The Guardian*, 03/10/2017 found at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/03/brexit-vote-was-tantrum-by-british-working-class-says-alan-duncan> accessed 28/11/2017
- Stephenson, L., and Crête, J. 2011. Studying Political Behavior: A Comparison of Internet and Telephone Surveys. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 23(1), 24-55.

## Data

- ONS, 2016. Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: 2016 provisional results, found <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2016provisionalresults#average-earnings> accessed 07/12/2017
- ONS, 2017a. Population Estimates for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid 2012 to mid-2016, found <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/latest> accessed 12/11/2017

ONS, 2017b. Graduates in the UK labour market: 2017, found <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/articles/graduatesintheuklabourmarket/2017> accessed 12/11/2017

British Election Study, 2017. 2014-2018 British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 7 and 10 found <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/> accessed 28/11/2017

Electoral Commission 2016. EU referendum results, found <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information> accessed 12/11/2017