

## **FIGHTING DISPLACEMENT**

The impact of post-conflict security on displacement in Kosovo and Libya

Master thesis: International and European Governance

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis attempted to find if post-conflict security has an impact on the level of displacement. The research has established the important conditions for post-conflict security to be an integrated DDR-SSR approach, an effective government and a strong international assistance. As the world witnesses an increase in civil war outbreaks, traditional peacekeeping missions will not achieve the desired results. The theoretical framework has set out three key principles the international community should commit when aiming to establish post-conflict security. These principles fall under the DDR-SSR Nexus, because both programs share the same objectives of contributing to nationwide and regional peace. As disarmament and demobilisation set the foundation for the wider nature of the security sector and ex-combatants can be reintegrated into the national security forces, DDR provides an entry point for SSR and the other way around. The theory stresses both programs should be conducted in a flexible and parallel sequence, so they can anticipate on each other's consequences and not follow a laissez faire approach. Foremost, DDR and SSR should be nationally owned and involve an equal participation of members from vulnerable groups. As the theory on the DDR-SSR Nexus is too complicated to measure on itself, this research has selected two measurement indicators; 'Political Transformation' and 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence'. These measurements are applied on the two selected cases, Kosovo and Libya, in order to measure whether or not the implementation of the DDR-SSR Nexus established post-conflict security and influenced the level of displacement. These cases are studied separately as within-case analysis, because the highly differentiated country characteristics do not allow direct comparisons. It can be inferred from the evidence that the integrated implementation of DDR-SSR and the strong international assistance in Kosovo resulted in long-term sustainable peace. While it was expected Kosovo to have low displacement, because of sustainable post-conflict security, the evidence showed high economic migration and a large Diaspora. Libya on the contrary, received international assistance only on a supportive basis. The implementation of DDR and SSR was found to be incoherent and not able to establish political reform and/or political stability. As expected, the evidence showed high levels of displacement in relation to a low post-conflict security.

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## 1 Introduction

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) warns the world it is in an era of worldwide displacement (UNHCR, 2015). Displacement is a term interchangeably used for ‘forced migration’ and covers all flows of refugees, asylum seekers, internal displacement and development-induced displacement (Castles, 2003). High Commissioner António Guterres believes recent changes in the dynamics of migration cause most migrants not to have economic reasons for migration, but to flee from war, conflict and persecution (The Guardian, 2015). In 2014 the number of newly displaced individuals put under the care of the UNHCR came down to 13.9 million people, a quarter increase of the previous year. In 2015 the number of displaced individuals was calculated to be 60 million, the highest recorded level thus far (UNHCR, 2015). The trend of an increasing global displacement goes hand in hand with the unfortunate development of more conflict each year since 2011. The International Crisis Group writes the year 2016 “is unlikely to bring improvement from the woes of 2015” and they further state “it is war - not peace - that has momentum” (2016).

Since the Cold War there has been a shift from ‘inter-state’ conflicts to ‘intra-state’ conflicts. Armed force is no longer solely used from one country to another, but also from one government to an internal opposition group (Rufer, 2005). Alongside the changing concept of war, the concept of security has also changed. Security is no longer the “study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Del Rosso, 1995). It has changed in the all-encompassing condition of people living in freedom, having the ability to participate fully in their government and enjoying protection for their fundamental human rights (OECD, 2001: 38). Security should thus be more than the protection of territory and sovereignty, it should be addressed more individually. In closer consideration and under the recent circumstances of worldwide displacement, security should specifically address the vulnerable groups of displaced individuals.

This thesis is written on the research problem of the refugee crisis around the Mediterranean Sea. The UNHCR has marked Libya as one of the ‘hotspots’, indicating the many migrants who organise themselves every day on the shores of Libya (UNHCR, 2015: 3). With Libya’s strategic position to Italy the country is a perfect gateway to Europe (BBC, 2014). At the time of writing - mid-2015 - the number of refugees trying to enter Europe nearly doubled in comparison to earlier years, and the number of deaths has since tripled. In April 2015 alone 1,308 refugees died from drowning, making the Mediterranean situation a refugee crisis of historic proportions (The Guardian, 2015). Acknowledging the urgency of the situation does raise the question of *what can we do?* Vincent Cochetel, the head of UNHCR's Europe Bureau is quoted in an article in ‘Spiegel’ “there is no lack of ideas and concepts for a fair refugee policy in Europe”, he says, “but there is a lack of will and courage to implement them” (2015). In fact, there is an ongoing debate on the “allocation of refugees, based on the principle of shared responsibility and solidarity among the EU Member States” (Bendel, 2015: 1). When the EU is not able to come to an agreement because the “European immigration policy

is a mess, a patchwork of 28 hugely varying national systems” it might be time for a different approach (Traynor, 2015).

This study aims to find the necessary conditions for safety and security to return to a post-conflict country. Out of the motivation to shed light on the current situation in Libya, the study will attempt to make an argument on security in relation to displacement. The crisis in Libya has aggregated effects on the security situation of the entire region. With the absence of a functioning state Libya has become a safe haven for illegal networks of armed groups. As these armed groups prey on vulnerable migrants for the recruitment of new fighters and word-to-mouth about the human trafficking rings leads hundreds of migrants towards Libya per day, the country is a breeding place for violence and terrorism (Edelen, 2015). To enhance the representativeness of the sample and to strengthen the useful variation on the dimensions of the theoretical interests it is decided to select Kosovo as the second case. Libya and Kosovo share a NATO intervention in the form of an air campaign. Both countries had very few to no state institutions after the war and both struggled with massive numbers of displacement. The research aims to indicate to what extent the assumptions of this thesis apply for each country individually.

Inspired by the work of England this thesis will study the linkages between post-conflict security, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and displacement (2012). According to England “displaced populations and weak security institutions profoundly affect each other” (2012: 4). In other words, among all the other causes of displacement a common one is the lack of physical security, either because formal security institutions fail to ensure it, or because those institutions themselves undermine it (England, 2012). Consistent with the work of England (2012) Knight stresses “for peacebuilding interventions to be sustainable, there needs to be a growing awareness among policy makers, interveners, academics and practitioners on the links between DDR and SSR” (Knight, 2010: 30). If there is a growing awareness on an integrated DDR and SSR approach and the combination of these peacebuilding activities has a direct influence on sustainable peace, the research question is as follows: *What is the impact of post-conflict security on the level of displacement in Kosovo and Libya?*

### **1.1 Theoretical and empirical relevance**

To start with a general note why this research is of relevance, is that the volume of international migration will continue to be high as stated in the ‘World population prospects’ of the UN. High-income countries are projected to have a net migration, between 2015 and 2050, accounting for 82% of their population growth. This means, the deaths in high-income countries are estimated to be 21 million, while 91 million migrants will enter in the period between 2015 and 2050 (UN<sub>A</sub>, 2015). The problem of displacement will remain important for many years to come and new studies on the matter will be most valuable.

New studies should draw their inferences from the most valuable examples available regarding displacement and security. As Webber writes in ‘The Kosovo war: a recapitulation’ (2009: 449) “the past has been relayed into the present, how an event obtains significance (or ‘historicity’) at the point of its occurrence and how the narrative of meaning which develops around it comes to inform present-day concerns”. While the war in Kosovo happened fifteen years ago, some characteristics are of significance in a present-day approach. For Libya the significance was in the choice of intervention, a NATO air campaign to stop human rights abuses committed by Gadhafi against his own population. Both UN missions in Kosovo and Libya were determined to provide a safe and free return of all displaced individuals to their homes (General Assembly Resolution, 1999; 2011). If we want to get a grip on the worldwide displacement such determinations will be of utmost importance in future UN resolutions.

Over the last two decades the implementation of security and development-oriented interventions is gaining attention (Muggah, 2005; Knight, 2010). DDR and SSR have become buzzwords in international peacebuilding, but there are very few attempts of established linkages between them (Knight, 2010: 29-30 ). Academics and policy makers continue to view DDR and SSR as separate processes, with different priorities, different actors involved and unparalleled timelines. The scholarship on the topic of DDR and SSR “rarely treats both in an integrated manner”, which results in a mismatch of conceptual frameworks (McFate, 2010). Nevertheless, there is a growing momentum for peacebuilding processes in support of ‘intra-state’ post-conflict security. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimated the number of civil wars to increase drastically in the upcoming years. Most of the civil wars will be concentrated on the African continent. In the past five years fifteen new conflicts broke out, of which eight of them are in Africa (UNHCR, 2015). This research will attempt to complement the existing literature by connecting DDR and SSR. Considering whether or not the international community has adhered (in the peacebuilding process) to the suggestions made in the literature, it will enable this study to investigate if an integrated DDR-SSR approach increases post-conflict security. The actual measurement of post-conflict security is operationalised through two measurement variables. The operationalisation of DDR and SSR can be challenging due to the lack of successful measurement indicators (IDDRTG, 2010). Besides, the discourse of SSR is relatively young and there a very few known examples from the ground which can guide policymakers and practitioners (Bryden, 2011). Regarding these claims the study will attempt to make a valuable contribution to the existing literature. If the tensions between DDR, SSR and the needs of displaced individuals would be studied in a combined manner, it will likely generate a better understanding for the creation of durable solutions (England, 2012).

## **1.2 Structure**

The research is outlined in eight chapters. To introduce the reader to the concepts of security, displacement, DDR and SSR chapter two will provide a critical overview of the existing academic

literature. The explanation of the concepts forms the solid foundation of the research and brings forth a theoretical framework of an Integrated DDR and SSR approach. The third chapter outlines the research method, the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables and explains the strategy behind the selected cases. Chapter four and five consist of an in depth case-analysis on Kosovo and Libya. The civil wars in both countries are introduced through a short historical overview of events after which the concepts of chapter two are applied and case specifically explained. Based on the analyses of these chapters, chapter six will summarize some of the important results and outline subsequently the effects of the theoretical framework on the dependent variable displacement. These results will be discussed in chapter seven and answer the proposed hypotheses. The thesis concludes with chapter eight, which provides a short summary of the findings and sets out recommendations for policymakers and suggestions for future study.

## **2 Theoretical framework**

The proposed research will be derived from a clear and comprehensive analytical assessment of the current literature. The first section will evaluate the changing concept of security and explain the role of DDR and SSR in its modern definition. This overview might be extensive but “providing clarity on the scope of activities and linking these to a desired end state provide an important starting point to better understanding the relationship between DDR and SSR” (IDDRTG, 2010: 3). After determining the modern tools for establishing post-conflict security, the concept is brought into relation with displacement. The theoretical framework in section 2.3 introduces the DDR-SSR Nexus, three principles the international community should commit in order to be assured a transition from war to peace is possible. As, however, the DDR-SSR Nexus cannot be manipulated it leads the theory towards two measurement indicators which can estimate post-conflict security.

### **2.1 Literature overview**

#### *2.1.1 The changing concept of security*

In the post-Cold War period the concept of national security had to be redefined, because security no longer revolved around the ‘State’ (UNDP, 1990; Del Rosso, 1995; King and Murray, 2001). The traditional view on security always had a strong focus on the “study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Del Rosso, 1995). Territorial integrity of sovereign states was ensured by military defence. The total funds spent on military security have been as large as 49 percent of the combined global income of the world population (King & Murray, 2001). However, the military is not the only source of national security and military threats are not the only danger a state will face. In the 1970’s the concept of national security was first expanded to include international economics, because of the growing interdependence of national economies due to globalisation (Mathews, 1989). Currently, there are many more non-military phenomena like pollution, migration, all forms of trafficking, diseases and the growing global population which challenge the concept of security (UNDP, 1990; Del Rosso, 1995). The concept of ‘human security’ is the latest in a long line of neologisms and encourages scholars to think about more than the military to defend State’s interests (Paris, 2001). Del Rosso (1995) adds territorial boundaries are largely meaningless in a world dominated by overriding laws, rules and information that constitute a global market. Despite the consensus on the importance of human security, an uncontroversial definition of the concept does not yet exist. While the international community has worked to identify the key components, they remain largely scattered from individual to collective threats and from physical to political threats (Hussein, Donata & Wanjiru, 2004). As an attempt to operationalise such definitions of human security two schools of thought are combined, ‘freedom from fear’, as to protect individuals from violent conflicts and ‘freedom from want’, as to achieve human security through fighting hunger, diseases and natural disasters (UN, 2005). In other words, Hendrickson (1999: 17) describes the changes in the concept of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a greater emphasis on human security” and “from security through

armaments to security through sustainable human development”. In the World Summit outcome of 2005 the UN reaffirms “that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system” and these pillars are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Hussein et al. explain these two schools of thought on human security are to “underpin reconstruction processes in countries emerging from violent conflict” (2004: 8).

### 2.1.2 Security in this thesis

The Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) give a clear modern definition of security:

*“Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing. The security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing”* (OECD, 2001: 38).

The change in the concept of security as described in the previous section is mainly affected by globalisation, but also by the changing nature of violent conflict. In the post-Cold War period there was a shift from ‘inter-state’ conflicts to ‘intra-state’ conflicts (Rufer, 2005). The UN charter presupposes the most serious threat to be external aggression, one state against another, but the last two decades reveal far more people are killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Annan, 2000). Armed force is no longer solely used from one government to another, but also from one government to an internal opposition group (Rufer, 2005). The understanding that safety and security are *not* likely to ‘return’ immediately after a ceasefire changed traditional peacekeeping into a more “complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars” (Brahimi, 2000: 3, Muggah, 2005). This complex model can be placed under the term peacebuilding, which has first been used by John Galtung in his pioneering work ‘Three approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’ (1976). His call for the creation of the term peacebuilding was to promote sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict and violence. He explains that structures must be found that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war in situations where war might occur (Galtung, 1976).

Since the 1990’s DDR has become an important practice under the mantle of peacebuilding (Bryden, 2011). It is difficult to pin down the exact number of DDR programs over the past years, but Oxfam International states that several thousand ex-combatants from more than 30 countries have been participating in DDR programs (Oxfam International, 2007). The most important ideology behind DDR is that insecurity, exacerbated by unregulated small arms used by ex-combatants, can

affect the total (re)development of post-conflict environments (Humphreys, 2002; Muggah & Batchelor, 2002; UN Foundation, 2004). Without a successful DDR program sustainable recovery cannot be achieved and simultaneously without a successful peacebuilding process the strength of a DDR program would be questionable (Özerdem, 2002). Different scholars agree that DDR “directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects” and “has perhaps the single most important precondition for post-war stability” (Knight & Özerdem, 2004; Bredal & Ucko, 2009). The Brahimi Report (2000) recommends disarmament programs to be the first phase of any operation with the aim to rapidly disarm fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of relapse into conflict. In regard to all this, DDR is seen as a pillar of the so-called ‘military–civilian transition operations’ and is implemented by many actors of the international community in many post-conflict situations (Muggah, 2005).

In comparison, although becoming increasingly important within the human security agenda, SSR is a relatively young program. The wider issues of human livelihood required broader security measures that exceeded beyond traditional military defence and include police, intelligence services, judicial institutions and elected civil authorities responsible for security oversight (OECD, 2005: 11). The concept of SSR was first introduced in 1997, by former British Minister of International Development, Clare Short (Winkler, 2002; Brzoska, 2003). Ball describes in her 1998 report how the British Government saw a reform in the security sector as fundamentally involved with governance. If good governance and the respect for human rights is not extended to the security sector, societies where security forces are autonomous and non-transparent will return to resolve conflicts with the threat of violence or force (Ball, 1998). Winkler adds to this “without security there can simply be no sustained development, nor any progress towards democracy, stability and peace” (2002: 5).

Within post-conflict peacebuilding DDR and SSR have the most apparent linkages. Both programs seek the same achievement of long term security and development, by addressing the needs of former combatants there appear direct opportunities to reform (or transform) the security sector (Bryden, 2007). Muggah subsumes DDR and SSR to be under the mantle of ‘reconstruction and development’ (2005). Both processes are valuable in (re)establishing the physical security that England found to be a common cause for displacement (2012). This is acknowledged in the Brahimi Report (2000: par. 42) which makes a clear case “for the impact of DDR and SSR as an area in which peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order”. To be more specific about the apparent linkages between both programs the OECD affirms that “the two issues are often best considered together as part of a comprehensive security and justice development program” (2007: 105).

### *2.1.3 A definition of DDR*

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are three terms that stand for one joint process. DDR is the most common abbreviation but there is some confusion in the literature about various other

combinations that are possible like DR, D&R and DDRR or DDRRR. For the latter two terms the R's stand for 'Reintegration', 'Resettlement', 'Repatriation' and, or 'Reinsertion' (Rufer, 2005). The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) write in their 'lessons learned unit' of principles and guidelines that DDR is part of a natural continuum in peace processes: "where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences" (1999: 16). Rufer contradicts this and describes how "we are dealing here with the complex interplay of very different processes", that DDR has an important relation to other components in the peacebuilding process and that there is also a relationship between the phases of DDR (2005: 19). The DDR sequence can be roughly divided in two components where the DD's are generally led by the military and the R lies mostly within the responsibility of civilian actors. In general the DD programs are planned for a short period of time, weeks or months, and are accompanied with measures to secure a ceasefire and if necessary prepare the appointment of a transitional government (Rufer, 2005). The DD programs often fall within the budget of Peace Support Operations (PSO). The UN has established PSO under a broad peace support mandate and the tasks include arranging peace negotiations and agreements, monitoring ceasefires, providing humanitarian assistance and the peacebuilding activities of DDR (Knight, 2009). The R measures are conducted over a much longer time and involve many - mostly civilian - national and international actors. While there is a fundamental difference in the actors involved, a sustainable demobilisation and disarmament relies on the successful implementation of reintegration measures, just as much as reintegration depends on the success of the previous phases (Rufer, 2005). Recently, it is believed that reintegration is the critical link between both D's and the broader peace process (Hazen, 2011). Reintegrating ex-combatants in other parts of the security sector is seen as a direct contribution to SSR (Bryden, 2007). The growing importance of the reintegration process and the changing definitions of the concept will be explained in section 2.2. First, the following description of the original definitions of the components of DDR are based on the definitions that are given by the the UNDPKO (1999).

### **Disarmament**

The UNDPKO defines disarmament as "the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone". Disarmament should encourage a well-functioning arms management and facilitate a safe storage place for seized arms before their final disposition. Disarmament is necessary to restore the balance of means of violence in a state (UNDPKO, 1999). Within disarmament there is a distinction between coercive and consensual disarmament; in the former, external forces are authorized to use force when warring parties do not respond voluntarily to weapons control commitments, and in the latter warring parties should voluntarily give up their weapons (Tanner, 1996). For the voluntary disarmament approach the UN can use a variety of inducements; two of them are a *weapons-for-cash* or a *weapons-for-development* program (Tanner 1996; Knight & Özerdem, 2004). In the weapons-for-cash approach a certain amount of cash (or other valuables) is used as an

incentive for ex-combatants to hand over their arms. One of the main criteria of this approach is that the valuables received for the often old and unserviceable weapons are used to buy newer and more dangerous weapons. Hence, this approach indirectly creates a greater illegal weapons market as the newer weapons are smuggled across the borders from neighbouring countries (Knight & Özerdem, 2004: 505). Eck does compare this problem to the flooding of a basement: “if water is being pumped out of a flooded basement surrounded by a hidden pool, the pumping will have to continue until both the cellar and the pool are empty. If, however, there is a spring under the cellar, no amount of pumping will help” (1996: 133). He argues that weapon collection programs will not address the reasons that lead people to buy guns in the first place, nor will it prevent the gun flow into the society. One important factor to the illegal arms market is whether or not neighbouring countries are in a conflict of their own and if this violence will spill-over to the country that is being disarmed (Eck, 1996). Bernal explains further that (1) not only porous borders with countries with active weapon markets will hinder effective disarmament, but also (2) the often lack of capacity to enforce regulations on carrying and using a weapon, (3) and the unstable political, economic or security climate that enhances the security and economic value of using a weapon (1996: 34).

The overall experience with the weapons-for-cash approach was a negative one and thus the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) describe in their publication ‘Securing Development’ why the weapons-for-development is an improved approach to reducing arms. Faltas & Di Chiaro (2001) note that the weapons-for-development approach is probably the most effective inducement and persuasion for ex-combatants to change their norms against, and their culture of, the use of weapons for violence. In general, the methods of a weapons-for-development approach are based on the component of ‘raising awareness’ among the government and society (UNDP, 2005). These methods are designed to address two main issues: the first is to recognize that security is an important condition for economic recovery and sustainable development. It is important to learn the government and society that reducing the amount, and demand of small arms is key in creating an ‘enabling environment’. The second is to simultaneously address the need for security and development, because poverty and a perceived feeling of inequality can be as a catalyst for insecurity (UNDP, 2005). The weapons-for-development approach is described by Knight & Özerdem as a ‘social contract’ (2004: 505). In other words, “combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community, which act as impartial mediator. The combatants surrender the security and economic surety that their weapons provide, in exchange for opportunities and assistance in finding new peaceful livelihoods” (Knight & Özerdem, 2004: 506).

### **Demobilisation**

Demobilisation is defined as “the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life” (UNDPKO, 1999: 15). This entails that ex-combatants who are registered, are provided with the basic needs and are discharged

and transported to their home communities. Before ex-combatants are discharged they should receive information about living a civilian life, they should know about their rights, duties, opportunities and constraints of being a citizen (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996). The process of discharge is at the core of the demobilisation process and can be conducted individually in temporary centres or collectively under the concept of ‘encampment’, which entails the collection of ex-combatants in so-called cantonment sites (Rufer, 2005; UN, 2006). While, the use of cantonment sites is presented by the UNDPKO as a necessary requirement for the DDR process, scholars disagree on the pros and cons of encampment.

There are three important phases in the process of demobilisation: (1) registration and documentation, (2) health screening and (3) the discharge of ex-combatants in civilian life (Knight & Özerdem, 2004; World Bank, 2009). For all these phases encampment provides many operational advantages, it allows for example a comprehensive information gathering that will greatly enhance the success and effectiveness of the later reintegration process. Moreover, while the families of combatants often come along it is easier to prepare them together on the changed circumstances of civilian life and to furnish them with information on the DDR program (Knight & Özerdem, 2004). However, some commentators do highlight the disadvantages of grouping thousands of ex-combatants on the security and the peace process as a whole. Kingma (1997) especially mentions that when the facilities in cantonment sites are not adequately provided rebellion or violence can break out, which would seriously undermine the further process of demobilisation and reintegration. The World Bank (2009) also recognises this risk and warns that while cantonment is necessary it should be as short as possible to prevent combatants to become a serious threat to society. Additionally, Coletta et al. (1996) point out the irony of how cantonment sites are most likely to reinforce a structure of command that the DDR program is intended to dissolve. Following from the preceding discussion Knight & Özerdem (2004) propose an alternative to cantonment sites in the establishment of local demobilisation centres in combatants’ own communities. The World Bank proposes mobile demobilisation services, which are faster and cheaper and can be brought to the combatants (2009). One of such an individual and decentralised approach was used in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, where mobile units on wheels disarmed combatants, prepared them to be demobilised and allocated them to reintegration programs (Rufer, 2005). Often, the demobilisation process is an opportunity to merge ex-combatants in a new integrated national army, as long as this is stated in the peace agreement (Knight, 2010).

### **Reintegration**

Lastly, reintegration is a process of assistance measures, provided to former combatants that would increase the economic and social reintegration potential for them and their families into civil society (UNDPKO, 1999: 15). Being a part of a society or community again is for many ex-combatants difficult, as they often have no memory of their past lives or nothing to return to. Reintegration is part

of the general development of a country and this third component of DDR is mostly formulated with an open time frame (World Bank, 2009).

Disarmament and demobilisation are quite technical components and therefore easy to execute. There are many examples of them in existing case-studies, but reintegration still remains in a kind of ‘theoryless field’ (Nilsson, 2005). Reintegration is the soft counterpart of the other two components in DDR and was originally referred to as a primarily economic assimilation of ex-combatants. The economic reintegration was short-term process of providing ex-combatants with the basic needs to survive and to continue to take part in the society instead of returning to violence (Knight & Özerdem, 2004). Over time, the emphasis on economic reintegration has shifted to social reintegration and the program started to include other groups besides ex-combatants. The main reason for this shift has been to avoid tensions among groups and to build up a better civil society (Nilsson, 2005). The widening of the term reintegration, started to blur the meaning. Kingma therefore decided to introduce three different types of reintegration: economic, political and societal reintegration (2000). The first type is, as said before, about ensuring the economic security of ex-combatants. In general ex-combatants are only trained for war and economic integration will need to include all sorts of training and education to shape them for jobs that support the civil society (Nilsson, 2005). The second type, political integration is “the process through which the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of decision-making processes” (Kingma, 2000: 28). The reason why combatants choose to fight is often born from a dissatisfaction of not being able to decide their own faith and ignoring them in a post-conflict situation will create tension once again. Additionally, it is good to encourage political participation among all different groups in society (Özerdem, 2012). The third type, societal reintegration, is “the process through which the ex-combatant and his or her family feel part of, and are accepted by, the community” (Kingma, 2002: 32). The complexness of this type depends on the circumstances of the war, some ex-combatants will be welcomed as war heroes, while others will find it hard to reconnect themselves to a society that has been torn by the war. This type of integration can last for years and is about building bridges and restoring confidence among the war-affected groups (Colletta et al., 1996: 24).

Recently reintegration is placed more in relation to the broader security sector. According to Bryden “reintegrating former soldiers into different parts of the security sector may meet the needs of both DDR and SSR” (2007: 14). This statement will be further explained in section 2.2 of the theoretical framework.

#### *2.1.4 A definition of SSR*

Security Sector Reform in a developing or post-conflict country generally means a “transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (Wulf, 2004; 3;

OECD, 2005: 20; Brzoska, 2006). This well-functioning security framework can be realised by the development donor community through the following overarching objectives. There should be (1) an establishment of effective governance, accountability and oversight structures in the security system, (2) improved delivery of security and justice services, (3) development of local leadership and (4) ownership of the reform process and sustainability of justice and security service delivery (DFID, 2003; OECD, 2001; OECD, 2007). Concerning these four objectives it is important that development agencies address the issue of how international assistance can be best coordinated and aligned with the local needs and priorities of the developing country. Woodward argues that the security of states and the security of persons should not be separated (1999). In her analysis she finds that in the long run only governments are able to effectively protect the population. Therefore it is not enough to simply hold governments accountable for how they treat their persons, their capacity to protect human rights should be strengthened (Woodward, 1999).

The role of the UN in SSR has been gradual over the last few years, unlike its consolidated role in DDR. An important challenge for the UN in creating a SSR framework is the condition that reform in the security sector demands a national consensus and a policy setting dominated by local ownership (Knight, 2009). With something as important as security institutions, the donor community needs to be aware that the primary agents of the security sector in developing countries often do not operate along Western lines (Hendrickson, 1999). The establishment of a well-functioning security system is key in any democracy, but in post-conflict environments the members of the security system are often involved in serious human rights violations. A reform within those institutions is often of the utmost urgency in order to change its agents in protectors of the population (Davis, 2009). The primary objective of a security reform is “to create functionally differentiated, professional armed forces that are under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use, and are able to provide security for the population” (Brzoska, 2000).

While the development of the concept is still recent, the list of countries in need of security reform is long. The reasons why a reform in security institutions is necessary varies and makes a coherent approach towards SSR difficult. There are many ideas outlined in the literature on the implementation of SSR, which can be found in the work of Brzoska (2000; 2003; 2005; 2006) and Wulf (2004). As the theoretical framework of this thesis entails an integrated approach between DDR and SSR, it is decided not to specify further on any individual SSR approaches.

## **2.2 Displacement**

This year, more than 60 million people will be displaced, the highest recorded level since the Second World War (UNHCR, 2015). Armed conflict and internal strife are the major causes of population movement and all concepts are indisputably correlated with one another (Jaques, 2012). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has determined that internal conflicts are by far the most important factor in generating displacement (2015). Contrary to international wars, internal conflicts

have a personal and intimate component, because one knows so well the people they are fighting against. Civil wars include disputes about race, ethnicity, religion or politics, but whatever the reason civilians are the principal victims. They might flee a climate of insecurity when the government and rebel groups terrorise the streets, or they might deliberately be targeted (Jaques, 2012). It appears “forced displacement of civilians is no longer an unfortunate consequence of the conflict; it has become a deliberate strategy of war” (Jaques, 2012: 7). Organizations and individuals who work on behalf of refugees see each war to be more violent than the previous and the streams of forced migration to be unprecedented in its degree of human tragedy (Crisp, 2000). Especially the humanitarian displacement in Africa is very large in scale and has become highly complex. Crisp, researcher with the UNHCR, finds multiple sources of evidence on the precarious situation of displaced people in Africa. Even if they succeed to escape their own country it is becoming incredibly difficult to find refuge in other states (Crisp, 2000).

A general notion of people being displaced is that the conflict has not ended. Holtzman points this out in the following statement: “there can be no hope of normalcy until the majority of those displaced are able to reintegrate themselves into their societies” (1995: 15). In order to foster the reintegration of the displaced population, the creation of security should not stop after the establishment of a ceasefire. England (2012) writes in her paper on the linkages between SSR and displacement how weak security institutions continue to affect displacement in post-conflict environments. She explains how the security sector either had a role in fuelling the conflict, or did not possess the authority to prevent it. Either way the human rights abuses committed by security actors permanently damage the trust and confidence people have in the security system. She therefore stresses that transforming a weak security sector depends on rebuilding the trust and “instilling a sustainable sense of public service, effectiveness, and accountability in those institutions” (England, 2012: 4). In order to achieve durable solutions in case of security the focus should be on the reform of the police and justice sector. These security institutions are the most visible for the local population and demonstrating their integrity and legitimacy are the most necessary preconditions for the return of displaced individuals (England, 2012).

### **2.3 Theoretical framework**

As the literature shows DDR and SSR are more often than not seen as each other’s extension in achieving sustainable peace. Both programmes share the same objectives of contributing to nationwide and regional peace. DDR aims to restore physical security in order to put governance structures back in place and to enable the country to return to normalcy. SSR encompasses activities that foster long term security and enables peace and development processes to consolidate (Knight, 2009). DDR directly influences the prospects for SSR, because disarmament and demobilisation - often conducted before SSR - set the foundations for further reform by shaping the numbers and nature of the security sector (Bryden, 2007). The Integrated DDR Standards of the UN DDR Resource Centre is a report

designed in response to the fragmented approach of the UN concerning DDR (2010). The UN DDR Resource Centre has been working on these integrated standards since the 1980's, as the peacekeeping environment has changed both in nature and complexity. One of the last modules of the report covers the linkages between DDR and SSR and offers a set of common principles that will support the design, implementation and sequencing of DDR and SSR programs. According to the Integrated DDR Standards (2010) both “DDR and SSR should be nationally owned and designed to fit the circumstances of each particular country” but “the engagement by the international community in these areas is routinely criticised for failing to apply these key principles in practice.” (IDDRTG, 2010).

The research of Bryden (2007; 2010) complements to a large extent the research done by the UN DDR Resource Centre. Bryden selected five of the key principles and explained them in order of importance (2007). To narrow down the scope of this thesis, it is decided to only focus on the first three key principles of Bryden's work (see Table XXX). By using the Integrated DDR Standards in combination with the theories of Bryden, who has formulated the principles in a more coherent theory, it should be possible to pin down the most important activities the international community should address when establishing sustainable peace in a post-conflict country. As Bryden formulates the key principles as “the most promising avenues for influencing policy and practice” (Bryden, 2007; 13).

Table 1	
<i>Three key principles of an integrated DDR-SSR approach</i>	
<b>Peace agreements</b>	It is highly recommended to have a framework of DDR that reflects upon SSR or vice-versa.
<b>Sequencing</b>	DDR and SSR are not a straightforward linear process. Reintegration melts both DDR and SSR together
<b>Local ownership and participation</b>	External actors should adjust their assistance to the priorities of local communities

**Peace agreements**

In post-conflict peacebuilding the immediate pressure is to stabilise the situation and this makes SSR often a later priority than DDR. However, as Bryden (2007) argues, both peacebuilding processes are lengthy and unpredictable, they therefore require some flexibility to ensure that the actors involved are not bound to unrealistic figures and deadlines. The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (SIDDR) supports a framework in which DDR reflects upon SSR (2006). It would be encouraged if a DDR framework can be “constructed in connection with a view to the future security sector, particularly for the creation of new national and integrated defence and police forces” (SIDDR, 2006: 18). In a more practical manner Bryden (2007) clarifies how the remaining number of soldiers or rebels in a post-conflict environment will define the shape of the

security sector. When this number is too large there is an increased risk of insecurity and a possible relapse into violence. In addition a peace agreement or UN resolution that is narrowly focused on addressing the needs of one particular group and thus neglecting the needs of other vulnerable groups, can foster resentment and endanger long-term peace perspectives (Bryden, 2007). Reflecting upon the DDR-SSR link creates an entry point for either of the two processes. This, in combination with the right sequence is a way to anticipate the consequences instead of enduring a laissez faire approach (SIDDR, 2006).

### **Sequencing**

The sequence of DDR and SSR is not a straightforward linear process, there is a growing believe that the different elements of either concepts should be decoupled and executed in a parallel framework (Muggah, 2005; Nilsson, 2005; Rufer, 2005; Bryden, 2007). The UNDP writes that the specific sequencing of DDR and SSR should depend upon the specific circumstances of the country and the conflict (2005). Bryden suggests the same in his DDR-SSR nexus, but he adds that in an ideal situation DDR follows a broad-based SSR assessment (2007). This assessment should map the wide range of national stakeholders and define their security needs before one can determine the size and nature of the security sector (Bryden, 2007). In his theory SSR can be an entry point of DDR, instead of the traditional view that SSR activities should follow the reintegration process. In fact, the reintegration process is starting to function as the component where DDR and SSR melt together.

### *Reintegration into security forces*

The demobilisation of warring parties “is not a magic bullet, which automatically takes care of a larger set of development and security problems” (Kingma, 2000). If national armies, guerrillas and rebels demobilise they place a significant strain on the security of the society. First, it is important to link DDR with justice mechanisms in order to ensure accountability for war crimes, before former soldiers re-enter in their community. Second, an adequate reintegration program prevents demobilised fighters from a return to violence and offers them alternative livelihoods (UN, 2000). One way to provide ex-combatants with a new life is by reintegrating them into different parts of the security sector. Demobilised combatants often did not attend any higher education and are basically trained for the sole purpose of fighting. By using their skillset to reform security institutions one can merge the needs of both SSR and DDR (Bryden, 2007). When the reintegration of former combatants is done cautiously it can enhance the trust of the population in reformed security forces (Bryden, 2011). Ethnic diversity and gender balance should underpin the reform of security institutions. Even more important is to clearly distinguish the roles of different security actors. War and conflict can obscure the role of security institutions and one important part task of DDR and SSR is to codify the different roles in legislation. Furthermore, every security role needs clear entering criteria to enhance the transparency

of the system and the trust of the population (OECD, 2007; Bryden, 2011).

### **Local ownership and participation**

One challenge that is shared by DDR and SSR is inherent to wider peace building agenda, the difficulty to align external assistance with needs of local communities on the ground (Bryden, 2007). In other words Bryden states that external actors should accept they are only facilitators for a peacebuilding process, which is designed, implemented, and managed at the national level (2011: 243). The OECD (2007) suggest in this context that peace support operations are most effective when not focused too narrowly on their own role in service provision. It is better to enhance or built the capacity of local institutions to take over that role of service provision (OECD, 2007). Local ownership is a concept which is much broader than just the state, it demands state and non-state actors at the national, regional and local level to be included in the DDR and SSR decision-making. The ultimate goal is to provide national and regional actors with the capacity to implement and oversee DDR and SSR activities. If this can be realised it will be the turning point between short-term stabilisation and long term recovery (IDDRTG, 2010). Nonetheless, the difficulties of reaching a consensus when allowing local authorities to involve in the planning, implementation and monitoring of external assistance should not be underestimated. It is however the only way to ensure that DDR and SSR programs respond to the local needs (Bryden, 2007).

This section also requires special attention for the participation of vulnerable groups, like woman and ethnic minorities, in the DDR and SSR activities. The Integrated DDR Standards claims the absence of women in the security sector is a lost opportunity to benefit from different perspectives offered by women as security providers (2010). In addition, offering ethnic minorities a place in the security sector will enhance the confidence people have in the system and strengthen the image of transparency and accountability (Bryden, 2007).

### **Two measurements of DDR-SSR on post-conflict security**

The three selected principles of the DDR-SSR Nexus seek to address security challenges which are often a result of a state's loss of control over the legitimate use of force. The Integrated DDR Standards specify "DDR and SSR should therefore be understood as closely linked to processes that enhance the ability of the state to deliver security and reinforce the rule of law" (IDDRTG, 2010: 4). The operationalisation of the DDR-SSR Nexus, as a measure of post-conflict security, is complicated by the absence of clear indicators for success. Traditionally DDR is measured by the number of former combatants participating in the program and the number of ceased weapons. Though DDR is not an isolated program, as set out in this thesis, and therefore a more complicated measure is required (IDDRTG, 2010). The following measurement indicators are strongly connected with political transformation and political stability. It is expected of DDR and SSR to ultimately add to the establishment of a strong and stable political leadership, in post-conflict situations.

### **Measuring ‘Political Transformation’**

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) “analyses and evaluates whether and how developing countries and countries in transition are steering social change toward democracy and a market economy” (BTI, 2014). The analytical framework of the BTI is divided into two sections, the Status Index and the Management Index. The Status index consists of two transformation statuses, the political transformation and the economic transformation of a country. In order to estimate post-conflict security the score on political transformation will be the most important.

Political transformation consists of five criteria; stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration. Stateness is seen as a precondition for political transformation, it measures the outcomes on questions specifically dealing with the monopoly of force and the structure of basic administrative powers. Furthermore, the rule of law is concerned with the separation of powers, the political participation with the acceptance of democratic institutions by the population, the stability of institutions is measured by its capacity to represent a broad spectrum of interests and the political and social integration by the political culture upon which it is based (BTI, 2014). The information on these criteria is gathered by country experts, who are guided by a standardized codebook developed by the BTI. Country experts of 129 countries evaluate if the country has met the criteria as set out in the codebook and value each of them accordingly. The measurement for the criteria’s is from (1) the worst to (10) the best. In the second round of evaluations a different expert will review the assessment and outcomes made by the first expert before it can be processed through a calibration process. This calibration process standardises the analytical process to regional and interregional values. Ultimately all scores add up to one political transformation score and makes comparisons between countries in political transition possible.

### **Measuring ‘Political Stability & Absence of Violence’**

The ‘Political Stability & Absence of Violence’ measures the “perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence including terrorism” (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2015). The governance indicator is built upon variables out of different data sources, measuring perceptions ranging from the threat of armed conflict, government stability and ethnic tensions. The perception of ‘Political Stability & Absence of Violence’ is presented in percentages and the higher the percentage score, the more countries in the world are found below the studied case and thus the better the performance of the studied case can be appreciated.

### **3 Research design**

The purpose of a research design is to “make valid explanatory and causal inferences about the social worlds on the basis of empirical information” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 8). The chapter will start by explaining the research variables and their operationalisation. Based on the variables a set of hypotheses is formulated and the expected causal mechanisms will be explained. Then the chapter will continue with the methodology, case-selection and limitations of the study.

#### **3.1 Research variables and hypotheses**

##### *3.1.1 Dependent variable*

In this research the dependent variable (Y) is displacement. Displacement covers all forms of forced migration and refers “to those who have left their usual place of residence in order to escape from persecution, armed conflict or violence” (Crisp, 2000: 1). When people decide to cross international borders they are referred to in this research as ‘refugees’, those who remain within their country are referred to as ‘internally displaced persons’ or IDP’s. The term ‘returnees’ is used when refugees are able to return to their country and internally displaced are able to go back to their community (Crisp, 2000). Displacement in this thesis will refer to refugees and IDP’s, unless it is stated otherwise.

The aim of the research is to find patterns in displacement parallel to the patterns of increased or decreased security. Collecting information on the number of displaced individuals is operationalised through data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With agencies in more than 123 countries and 9.300 staff members the UNHCR is the main source of official numbers on displacement throughout the world (UNHCR, 2016). The mapping of displacement patterns starts with the number of displaced individuals just after the establishment of a ceasefire. This number is the so called bottom line and from there the data is analysed for irregular spikes. The overall pattern should explain whether or not displacement is declining, and which events trigger that change.

##### *3.1.2 Independent variable*

The independent variable (X) is the overarching concept of post-conflict security. Based on the theoretical framework security is referred to in this thesis as human and state security. Military force is often seen as the definition of security, but especially in post-conflict peacebuilding human security is of primary importance (Hendrickson, 1999). As post-conflict security alone is difficult to measure the variable is divided in two secondary independent variables ( $X_1$ ) and ( $X_2$ ).

The DDR-SSR Nexus is a set of principles that has a strong impact on the post-conflict security. Only, the absence of a clear set of indicators to measure its success does complicate the operationalization of the DDR-SSR Nexus. The significance of the concept will remain important for the country analyses and the discussion, but it will not be operationalised as one of the variables measuring post-conflict security. The variables that capable of manipulating post-conflict security are ‘Political Transformation’ ( $X_1$ ) and ‘Political Stability & Absence of Violence’ ( $X_2$ ). As the case-

analyses will explicate, both Kosovo and Libya are examples of countries in political transition. More specifically with both countries the emphasis is on regime change, this is why the variable ( $X_1$ ) political transformation is of particular importance. The scores on political transformation are derived from the country reports published by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. There are two sets of reports for each country, one from 2012 and one from 2014. The political transformation score will be between (1) the worst or (10) the best.

The second variable 'Political Stability & Absence of Violence' ( $X_2$ ) is an indicator by the World Bank. For both Kosovo and Libya this variable calculates how they score on political stability and absence of violence in percentages. The higher the percentage score, the more countries in the world are found below the studied case and thus the better the performance of the studied case can be appreciated. To operationalise this variable it is necessary to know from which percentage level one can speak from a good or bad performing country? In other words, how many countries that are member of the UN will fall above or below the percentage of a bad performing country. In order to calculate this, the Fragile State Index is used. The Fragile State Index uses a powerful data collection tool based on a Conflict Assessment System Tool or CAST. This system analyses thousands of reports and articles and collects all valuable indications of risk. All these indicators combined produce a list of countries ranked on their stability, from the first country with the highest warning of instability to the last country with the lowest risk of instability (Fragile State Index, 2015). The list is divided in several different zones describing the situation of the country ranging from a 'very high alert' warning to a 'very sustainable' label. By using the list of countries according to CAST, it is possible to calculate how many members of the UN - on average - are in the 'alert-zone'.

The alert-zone consists of countries that have been given a *very high alert*, a *high alert*, or an *alert* warning. From 2008 to 2015 the list included either 177 or 178 countries of which on average 35 countries fell in the alert-zone. If it can be assumed the list of countries in the Fragile State Index would hold the same results if all 193 UN member states would have been included, it is possible to calculate the percentage of the number of UN member states that fall in the alert-zone. From the calculation it appears that on average and rounded up, 19,8% of the countries from the Fragile State Index fall in the alert-zone between 2008 and 2015. Again, if assumed the list of the Fragile State Index is an example for all UN member states, it can be inferred that 19,8% of the UN member states fall in the alert-zone. Now combining variable ( $X_2$ ) 'Political Stability & Absence of Violence' with the calculation derived from the Fragile State Index, it can be indicated that countries scoring 19,8% or lower belong to the highest alerted countries of the UN.

### 3.1.3 Hypotheses and causal mechanism

This research will be guided by a set of hypotheses. As Creswell explains an "hypothesis is a formal statement that presents the expected relationship between an independent and dependent variable."(2003: 20). The concepts embedded in the hypotheses will need to be translated into

researchable entities (Bryman, 2012). The following hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework and formulated through a translation of DDR and SSR into measurable constructs.

Since the shift from international war to civil war, peacebuilding has gone beyond the process of restoring physical peace. It includes activities of socioeconomic progress, the dismantle of conflict-nurturing institutions and the reform of political institutions (Knight, 2010). Interventions based on DDR and SSR encourage fighting factions to disarm and demobilise, followed by a long reintegration process and the simultaneous reform of the security sector. The DDR-SSR principles set out in the theoretical framework encourage an coherent and tightly coordinated peacebuilding process. DDR and SSR are best performed when nationally owned, which gives the international donor community the job of educating post-conflict countries in managing their institutions themselves (Knight, 2010; Bryden, 2011). In other words, DDR and SSR are the kick-start of political reform and state-building. Political reform and state-building are of special importance concerning the security sector of a post-conflict country. England finds a there exists a strong relationship between displacement and weak security institutions (2012: 4).

The following hypothesis expects Kosovo's high score on the variable ( $X_1$ ) political transformation to lower the dependent variable (Y) displacement. To avoid misinterpretation on what accounts as a 'high score', it will simply be said when scores on political transformation are above the average score 5, they will account as a high score. Kosovo became an independent state in 2008 and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index is one of the few databanks to consider Kosovo in isolation of Serbia. This means the first findings on Kosovo as political independent are from the year 2012. This is almost twelve years after the ceasefire and four years after the independence. Since some time has passed, the country is expected to have politically transformed. The first hypothesis is stated as follows:

H<sub>1</sub>: If Kosovo has a score on political transformation above 5, it is expected to have a low level of displacement

A second hypothesis on political transformation is formulated for Libya. As the period between the war in 2011 and the selected country reports of 2012 and 2014 is much tighter, the expectation for Libya is different. It is not expected for Libya to have a high score on political transformation. To avoid misinterpretation on what accounts for a low score, it will be said that all scores below the average score 5 will account for a low score on political transformation. The second hypothesis is stated as follows:

H<sub>2</sub>: If Libya has a score on political transformation below 5, it is expected to have a high level of displacement.

The second variable ( $X_2$ ) 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' enables both countries to be combined in one hypothesis. The common characteristic for both countries in this variable is the calculated alert-zone. Countries scoring on 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' at the 19,8% level or below belong to the most highly alerted countries of the UN. It is expected when countries are in the alert-zone the conditions for political stability are bad and the country possibly struggles with an eruption of violence. Both these conditions are expected to have a negative influence on the dependent variable (Y) displacement, stating the third hypothesis as follows:

H<sub>3</sub>: If a country has a percentage score of 19,8% or lower on political stability and absence of violence it is expected to fall in the alert-zone and have a high level of displacement.

### **3.2 Methodology**

The research method of this thesis is a 'case study', an in depth method to understand a real-life phenomenon (Yin, 2009: 18). A more specific definition of the case study is given by Gerring "as an in-depth study of a single unit, a relatively bounded phenomenon, where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena" (2004: 341). The decision to use a case study method is especially justified when the variables are too complex for the application of other research strategies (Yin, 2009: 19). Due to the complex variables there is a tendency of associating case studies with qualitative research. While it is true that scholars favour qualitative research when conducting case studies, it is certainly possible to have a 'mixed methods' approach of quantitative and qualitative research (Bryman, 2012). Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner (2008) even mention how quantitative analysis, based on large global data sets, has its own constraints and limitations. They propose quantitative data to be seen as complementing qualitative in-depth research, rather than supplanting it. This research will use a mixed methods approach, as the independent variable DDR-SSR Nexus is too composite to be quantified properly and the dependent variable displacement offers clear statistical references.

As the  $N$  in this research is larger than one, it can be referred to as a multiple case study. The advantages of a multiple case design are to provide a much tougher test of the theory and give a better indication under which circumstances the theory may hold (De Vaus, 2001). A multiple case study is about observing and comparing carefully selected information, through time or space, with the intention to derive a meaningful relationship between variables. Preferably this relationship is a causal one, which means the variation in the dependent variable is evidently and systematically related to the variation in the independent variable (Keman, 2011). To further specify the character of the multiple case design, this study is a 'two-case' case study of Kosovo and Libya.

Each case is unique and as King et al. add "every aspect of social reality is infinitely complex" (1994: 42). Both cases in this 'two-case' case study share some important characteristics, but are not convincing enough for a direct comparison of individual outcomes. This is largely due to

the difference in time frame. Whereas the war in Kosovo happened 15 years ago, the conflict in Libya has been recent and not settled yet. It is therefore decided to conduct a 'within-case analysis', which focuses on the causal path within a case rather than on an analysis across cases (George & Bennett, 2004). This does not mean, however, that when causal paths are seemingly alike they cannot be used in combination to strengthen the causal relationship. Eisenhardt (1989) explains how coupled within-case analysis can provide a cross case pattern comparison. One tactic, according to him, is to make categories or dimensions that are the same for each within-case analysis. These categories can emerge from the research question or can be selected by the researcher. For this thesis one category is the DDR-SSR Nexus, which has emerged from the research question, the other categories are the measurement indicators as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The measurement indicators are selected, because out of the few these are the only ones that measure the data for Libya and Kosovo in the same values and quantities. Thus, making an adequate category for cross case comparison.

A fundamental tool for carrying out a 'within-case analysis' is process-tracing. According to Collier process-tracing can be defined "as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses" (2011: 823). George and Bennett have a leading role in developing this research method as an essential part of 'within-case analysis', they refer to process-tracing as "attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes" (2004: 6). It is an alternative way of finding causal mechanism outside the method of controlled comparison, like experiments. One challenge of a within-case analysis can be the daunting volume of data associated with open-ended research problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). This research is definitely based on an open-ended research problem of world-wide displacement. The current refugee crisis in and around the Mediterranean Sea is just a sample of the wider effects displacement will have on our world. To get a grasp of the concepts of security and displacement, the relation they have to each other and the examples from real-life cases, a staggering volume of data is handled.

### **3.3 Case selection**

At the time of writing, mid 2015, the focus of the refugee crisis was on the people who crossed the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Europe. Based on the incidents happening at that time, it was decided to select Libya as one of the cases of the 'two-case' case study.

By choosing two cases an interdependency can exist in a way the first case affects the choice of the second case and so on (Kuzel, 1999). De Vaus emphasises the external validity is enhanced when cases are selected in a strategic manner rather than a statistic manner (2009: 238). In addition Yin suggests to use a 'case-selection strategy' to limit the selection bias (2009). However, even with a case-selection strategy it is a challenging endeavour to choose good cases for exceptionally small samples (Gerring, 2004). One limitation is often that cases for small samples cannot be chosen randomly, which violates the external validity of the research. Instead there is a strong support for purposive sampling, a non-probability method which enables the researcher to use the most

appropriate cases given the research strategy. Seawright & Gerring (2008) explain how to choose the sample for a case-study analysis by setting out two important objectives. The first objective is it should be a representative sample, and the second is it should be a useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interests (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). With this theory in mind a second case is only deemed qualified if it matches the following criteria. The country should have experienced at least one civil war and some sort of regime change or political transformation. Furthermore, due to the civil war the majority of the population is displaced. In addition, a more specific criterion is that NATO had an active role in establishing the cease-fire. With these criteria there are only two countries besides Libya to be of interest and of them is Kosovo.

The cases should provide “the kind of control and variation required by the research problem” (George & Bennett, 2004: 84). When having a closer look at the cases it shows how appropriate they are for the research problem. The mission in Kosovo is one of United Nations’ most advanced democracies after a military intervention (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). The NATO intervention in Libya is triumphed by the international community as a textbook example of the responsibility to protect (Kupperman, 2015; Nuruzzaman, 2014). Nonetheless, both countries have, or are still struggling with massive displacement. The analysis of these cases will therefore be extremely valuable in testing the theory if security and displacement affect each other.

### **3.4 Limitations**

The quality of a qualitative research can be evaluated on the basis of the following four criteria: ‘construct validity’, ‘internal validity’, ‘external validity’ and ‘reliability’ (Yin, 2009). These criteria can especially be challenging for a case study research. This section will therefore address special attention to the four criteria and explain how several case study tactics are used to deal with these limitations.

#### **Construct validity**

A construct is a quality we assume exists, but we cannot directly observe. Constructs need to be defined in such a way that one is able to identify the characteristics of a constructs if one came across them. In other words, construct validity is about “measuring what we think we are measuring” (King et al., 1994: 25). The biggest threat to construct validity is to use inadequate terms and definitions for setting up the constructs of the research. Creswell would apply on this research the criterion “tells a persuasive story in a literary way” (2003: 215). For this research to be persuasive the evidence is derived from an extensive document analysis in combination with claims on pragmatic grounds. The mixed methods approach enhances the quality of the constructs as facts cannot be interpreted in any other way than how they are intended (Creswell, 2003). This study includes two measurement indicators, which add to the operationalisation of the variable security. Yin (2009) adds construct validity can be improved when the empirical findings are collected through multiple sources of

evidence. This is why the study is based on two within-case analysis. As Eisenhardt writes one challenge of a within-case analysis can be the daunting volume of data, but for construct validity this is an advantage (1989).

### **Internal validity**

The research objective is to establish a causal relationship between the research variables and to find which conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 2009). In order to make sure “the research design can sustain the causal conclusions that we claim”, the internal validity needs to be improved (de Vaus, 2001: 27). As Bryman more specifically explains, if we suspect (X) to cause (Y) nothing else can be responsible for the variation of (Y) (2012). The threat to internal validity of this case is that it cannot directly be controlled or observed. The inferences made in this research are an attempt at explaining the causal relationships. Nonetheless the method process-tracing can “contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena and to evaluating causal claims” (Collier, 2011). Process-tracing can only be conducted when the sequence of the independent, dependent and intervening variables is carefully described. Within this research the independent and dependent variables are described very precise and through the explanatory way of writing all possible intervening variables will be delineated.

### **External validity**

To what population or groups can the findings of the research be generalised is the main question within the issue of external validity (Bryman, 2012). It is important that the findings are “generalizable beyond the immediate case study” (Yin, 2009, p. 43). The threat of external validity in a case-study design is that small-N studies are often considered too small for credible generalisation (De Vaus, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Yin explains how external validity has been a major problem for case-study design as critics argue single case-studies generally provide a poor basis for generalisation (2009). Quantitative researchers are keen on generating representative samples, preferably of a large quantity, to be sure it provides is an adequate inference of the larger population (Bryman, 2012). This study is conducted over two cases, but the reasonable risk is that the evidence is highly country specific. The systematic case selection strategy and a the mixed methods approach of analytical and statistical inferences should however enable a fairly solid generalisation.

### **Reliability**

This concepts is concerned with whether or not the measures of the study are consistent in their conceptualisation and if the results of a study are repeatable. A later investigator should be able to follow the same procedures and arrive at the same conclusions (Yin, 2009). When all the procedures of the research are carefully documented it can be ensured future research would come to the same conclusions.

## 4 Kosovo

In this chapter the extensive document analysis on Kosovo will be the first case of the ‘two-case’ case-study. The first section covers some essential country characteristics before the following sections proceed to a more in depth overview of the civil war and the peacebuilding process. The analysis attempts to explain the role of NATO in the humanitarian intervention, the structure of UNMIK and whether or not the international community adhered to the DDR-SSR Nexus as outlined in the theoretical framework.

### 4.1 Country description

Kosovo is a small country in the central Balkans, between Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (see the appendix). In the first Balkan war of 1912, Serbia conquered Kosovo and made it an autonomous province under Serbian rule in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). After the civil war in 1999 Kosovo was placed under the rule of a UN interim administration (IICK, 2000). The vast majority of the population in Kosovo has always been Kosovar Albanian, counting for 92% of the population in 2012. In 1948 the Kosovar Serbs made up for 25% of the total population, but this number has been declining ever since. Just before the NATO intervention the Kosovar Serbs made up for a small 10% of the total population and currently this number approximately 2% of the population in Kosovo (IICK, 2000; CIA, 2015).

The Human Development Report (2014) on Kosovo provides an overview of some important economic and social characteristics. In the years leading to the war there is a sharp decline in the GDP per capita. Where in the 1980’s the GDP per capita was \$1125, in 1994 this figure declined to a GDP of \$320 per capita. In the aftermath of the war the economic activity remains low due to the high unemployment rate and the lack of capital for investments. The UNDP has designed an index, which measures the key development of human life. The Human Development Index consists of three basic dimension: life expectancy, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2014). The last few years the Human Development Index of Kosovo is in the category of ‘high development’.

Years	2000	2006	2010	2014
<b>Population (in thousands)</b>	17000	1719	1775	1823
<b>GDP per capita</b>	920	2050	2334	2585
<b>Unemployment rate</b>	55%	45%	45%	-
<b>Human Development Index</b>	0.671	0.678	0.789	-

Sources: (World Bank, 2015; UNDP, 2014)

## 4.2 Conflict background

The claim on Kosovo “cannot be understood without taking into account the strong historical and emotional ties of both Albanians and Serbs” (Friedrich, 2005: 229). Therefore this section will give a brief examination of their historical perspectives on the region, these perspectives are written down in the work of Bieber & Daskalovski (2003: 14-20) and in Troebst (1998).

According to the Serbs their history began with the arrival of the Slavs in the fourth century AD. Among the Slavs were three distinct groups: the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Between the seventh and the tenth century the Serbs settled themselves in the area of Kosovo and referred to it as the heart of the Serbian Empire. Their Empire lasted until the Turkish invasion in the 14th century. Under the Ottoman rule the Serbs were forced to migrate to the North, which caused the Serbian ethnic element in Kosovo to be weakened and provided opportunity for the Albanians (protected by Ottoman authorities) to settle in. The Albanians, however, saw the expansion of the Serbs in ‘Kosova’ as an annexation and occupation of Albanian territory. They claim that even after the Turkish invasion, the Serbs received the blessings of the Orthodox Church and Russia to further invade Albanian land. The Serbian-Ottoman wars from 1877-1878 caused more than 120.000 Albanians to flee ‘Kosova’ and refuge to neighbouring *vilayets*. In the 1878 Berlin Congress it was decided that several Albanian territories were to belong to Serbia or Greece. Due to the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 the Ottoman Empire lost all its territory in Europe and Kosovo was officially allocated to Serbia (Zwol, 1999). However, being under Serbian rule did not change the ethnic balance between Kosovar Serbs as Kosovar Albanians, as the latter were still the majority. Troebst summarizes the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo as “a territorial one with strong ethno-political, cultural and linguistic connotations” (1998: 1). Both sides favoured solutions to the conflict that were incompatible. Serbia wanted to preserve the status quo and wanted to continue the ‘cleansing’ of the population from Albanian majority, while in turn the Kosovar Albanians could no longer imagine a future inside Serbia and opted for self-determination (Troebst, 1998).

### 4.1.1 Intensification of the conflict

After the Second World War, Yugoslavia was ruled under the communist leadership of Tito. In 1974 he declared Kosovo to be an autonomous part of Serbia and, among other things, he returned a third of the land that was colonized by the Serbs back to the Albanians (IICK, 2000; Friedrich, 2005). Rather than experiencing an increased feeling of freedom in the post-war period and being under a Yugoslavian Constitution, the Kosovar Albanians particularly felt repressed. Especially when after Tito’s death in 1980 a growing nationalism became increasingly influential in Serbia. The Independent International Commission Kosovo (IICK) writes how “the period of political uncertainty just after Tito’s death” was the consequence of a growing polarization between the Albanian and Serbian communities, “which may account for the vehemence of the reaction at a Serbian and federal level to the demonstrations” (2000: 37). By this they mean the 1981 demonstrations of Kosovar Albanians for

a 'Kosova Republika' that were brutally crushed by the Serbian security forces (Troebst, 1998). The accession of president Milošević in Serbia in 1987 worsened the situation of Kosovar Albanians, as Milošević helped his allies in Kosovo to power. By 1989 the Serbian parliament passed amendments on the constitution that reasserted Kosovo under Serbian control (Bideleux, 1998; Zwol, 1999; Troebst, 1998). The term Serbianization got a new meaning when the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy spawned an increase in human rights abuses. The Serbs took control over Albanian radio and television stations, major industrial enterprises, newspapers, theaters, museums, cinemas and changed many Albanian street names in Serbian names. Troebst describes how during this time the Serbian regime and the institutions built up by Kosovar Albanians "developed into two completely separate states" (1998: 5). The far-reaching separation between the two societies was partly initiated by the 'Democratic League of Kosovo' (LDK), which was formed by a group of Kosovo Albanian elite that was searching for new forms of nonviolent resistance (Troebst, 1998). By 1991 the LDK had organised itself as a dominant political organization that aimed for the establishment of a parallel Kosovo Albanian State or "shadow-state" (Troebst, 1998: 5; Friedrich, 2005: 230). The LDK held unofficial parallel elections in 1992 that declared Rugova to be president of the Republic of Kosovo (Friedrich, 2005). However, the nonviolent forms of resistance would soon come to an end when the international community did not solve the Kosovo Problem in the Dayton Accords in 1995. In fact, after Dayton the EU formally recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo, as a state. Bideleux describes how the Kosovar Albanians were "bitterly disillusioned with Rugova's passivity after the Dayton Accords" (1998: 32). The IICK writes how Dayton was indirect message to Milošević that his role in Yugoslavia and Kosovo was legitimised and a signal to the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo was definitely of the international agenda (2000). This message "led directly to a decisive surge of support among Kosovars for the path of violent resistance as the only politically realistic path to independence" (IICK, 2000: 59). In this armed resistance for independence the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) played a major role and guerrilla-like movements gained the upper hand (Friedrich, 2005).

#### *4.1.2 NATO in Kosovo*

By March 1999, the Serbs had produced the internal displacement of more than 500,000 Kosovar Albanians. It was their strong-armed effort to root out as many guerilla-like movements, organised by the KLA, since 1998. Despite the aggravated violence against Kosovar Albanians, the KLA did not back down and stepped up their guerilla attacks. The situation was a cycle of violence, spiraling out of control, which only worsened when the West finally tried to put an end to it (Buckely, 2000). The Dayton agreement might have been the closing chapter for the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, it was probably the prelude to Milošević's war in Kosovo. In 1989 the US openly condemned the situation in Kosovo and the activities of the Serbian authorities. The UN Security Council soon adopted resolution

1160, marking the conflict as a threat to the international security and demanding an end to violence (Wheeler, 2000: 257-259).

The Rambouillet Accord was a 'peace plan' for Kosovo, presented by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an ultimatum. To Becker it was "a declaration of war disguised as a peace agreement", a take it or leave it proposition for Yugoslavia (1999). There were no negotiations on the Rambouillet Accord and Milošević had no intentions to sign an agreement that opened the doors for a very broad autonomy of Kosovo. Becker writes in his short piece for the Tribunal of U.S./NATO war crimes in Yugoslavia, that under the Rambouillet Accord NATO would have been the basic state apparatus of a 28,000-strong occupation army allowed to use force to ensure compliance with the conditions of the agreement (1999). After the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations the Serbian leadership felt they had nothing to lose, their offensive against the Kosovar Albanian population aggravated. On March 21st, the last warning for Milošević was to desist from military action or to expect NATO countermeasures (Webber, 2009). The international pressures on Belgrade had no impact and the UK took the lead in preparing a tougher approach, arguing NATO should be prepared to use force. Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign in Kosovo, started on March 24 and lasted for seventy-eight days (Buckely, 2000; Friedrich, 2005). The four contributors to the air campaign were the UK, France, Germany and the US. The latter committed over 650 planes, which made them by far the largest contributor (Wheeler, 2000: 266). Despite the overwhelming superiority of NATO the Serbs escalated their attacks against Kosovar Albanians. The IICK refers to this vicious campaign launched by the FRY government as 'ethnic cleansing' of Kosovar Albanians (2000: 88).

### **Discussing legitimacy**

Since the establishment of NATO there were three military action interventions in the form of an air campaign, this was in 1995 in Bosnia, 1999 in Kosovo and 2011 in Libya (Hunter, 2011). The way these interventions were conducted challenged the concept of legitimacy in international law for military action (Wheeler, 2000). In the case of Kosovo Russia and China were the main opponents of the humanitarian intervention, accusing it to be out of UN authority, contravening UN charter article 2.4 (Özdem, 2003). In a meeting of the Security Council in October 1998 Costa Rica argued the goals of the intervention to be "ethically and morally unquestionable", but they had to be achieved by means of law (UN Security Council, 1998). The ambassador of Brazil stressed that "non-universal organisms may resort to force only on the basis either of the right to legitimate self-defence, or through the procedures of chapter VIII" (UN Security Council, 1998). One day after Operation Allied Force commenced, Russia, China and Namibia drafted a resolution for an immediate cessation of the use of force against the FRY, this resolution was rejected with twelve votes to three (UN Press Release, 1999). The United Nations representatives who voted in favour of the NATO operation agreed that the world could not turn 'a blind eye' to the brutal attacks executed by the government of

Belgrade (UN Press Release, 1999). On the one hand the air campaign can be seen as illegal, because UN Security Council did not approve any military action. On the other hand it can be considered legitimate, because all diplomatic avenues were exhausted before NATO decided to lend its support and to stop the Serbian authorities who were engaged in severe crimes to humanity (IICK, 2000).

The legitimacy of Operation Allied Force was not only questioned by UN member states, many scholars have investigated the humanitarian intervention and the extent to which it was *humanitarian* (Fisk, 1999; Wheeler, 2000, Massa, 2009). Massa (2009) concludes in her work that because of the many interests involved in Kosovo the attacks were focused, not only on stopping the sufferings of Kosovar Albanians, but rather on the surrender of Milošević. The lessons learned from the Bosnian intervention were that the use of force had worked to induce the compliance of Serbian authorities and therefore seemed a logical resort in the case of Kosovo (Wheeler, 2000: 242). Equally important, the EU wanted to be a key player in the security arena of the Cold War era. They stood at a crossroad with on one end the option of not interfering and being diminished as a security institution or to take military action without a legal basis for an air campaign (Hunter, 2011). Regarding the role of the US, Johnstone believes they misused the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo to assert their influence over Europe and to strengthen the dominance of NATO in the region (2002).

The widespread oppression of Kosovar Albanians is the most cited justification for the NATO intervention (Wheeler, 2000). However, it can be argued if the methods employed by NATO were in the right proportion to the problem. During the course of the intervention the alliances targeted the Serbian military with limited success. When the pressure for result started to grow, NATO switched from precision-guided attacks towards larger targets like infrastructure, government buildings, bridges and fuel depots. This change in strategy increased the collateral damage and civilian casualties significantly. The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, raised concern “whether NATO was being sufficiently careful in its targeting” and questioned if the attacks were in the right proportionality to the problem (Wheeler, 2000: 272). While the bombing campaign was in full force at least 4.400 documented killings of Kosovar Albanians occurred. Additionally, human rights organizations estimated that during the war 863.000 individuals fled Kosovo, 590.000 were internally displaced (Webber, 2009). When the end of the bombing campaign did not bring Milošević back to the table for further peace negotiations, NATO was planning for a ground invasion. The deployment of ground troops was seen as a last resort and was aimed at increasing the pressure on the FRY government to comply with NATO (IICK, 2000). Fisk (1999) strongly disagrees with that strategy, if NATO had been prepared to intervene on land early in the war countless Albanian lives could have been saved. Additionally, NATO explicitly wanted to avoid an image of being the ‘air force’ of the KLA. In the end this image was hard to suppress, because many rebels returned home thinking they won the war (on the ground) with the help of NATO (from the air). In other words, members of the KLA thought their actions were justified by NATO as it was fighting by their side. General Wesley Clarke who commanded NATO forces during the intervention in Kosovo let it slip in an unguarded

moment how “air power alone cannot stop paramilitary action”, asserting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo should have been stopped more proportional with the commitment of ground troops, not solely with air power (Wheeler, 2000: 272).

### **Rounding up**

In June the war came to an end when Milošević and the Serb parliament accepted a peace agreement drawn by the G8 (Webber, 2009). The most important guidelines of the peace agreement were the withdrawal of FRY military, the presence of UN troops to command and control; an interim administration in a process towards self-governing and most importantly the return of all refugees (Webber, 2009). The approved peace plan stated that “the people of Kosovo will enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, but there were no specific goals for the long-term status of Kosovo (IICK, 2000: 96).

## **4.2 UNMIK**

The same day NATO’s bombing campaign came to an end, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (IICK, 2000). By authorising Member States to establish an international security and civil presence, the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides sufficient legal ground for the emplacement of an Interim Administration. Their justification according to the UN Charter, article 39, was that peace includes “the establishment of long-term and sustainable peace” (Friedrich, 2005: 234). The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) included a complete takeover of governmental functions to facilitate a political process in order to determine Kosovo’s future. As all government functions, including judicial and legislative functions are necessarily connected to sustainable peace, the UN is able to mandate an interim administration in regard of article 39 of the UN Charter (IICK, 2000; Friedrich, 2005).

### *4.2.1 UN Mandate*

The guidelines of the UNMIK are set out in Resolution 1244 and are “to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes” (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). The UN is responsible for the civil presence by appointing a Secretary General Special Representative to supervise and coordinate its actions, while the members of NATO are responsible for the international military presence. The latter is set out in the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) and the FRY government (IICK, 2000: 101). The North Atlantic Council authorised the deployment of KFOR, following the adoption of Resolution 1244 and designated the action ‘Operation Joint Guardian’ (IICK, 2000). The deployment of the KFOR should support the UNMIK, but simultaneously retain an independent position as it is

authorised separately (Friedrich, 2005). The exact words in the resolution are that KFOR should be “coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence” in “a mutually supportive manner” (General Assembly Resolution, 1999).

While the responsibilities of the KFOR resemble those of traditional authorised UN troops with a strong mandate, the responsibilities of the UNMIK are of a wide scope. In order to deal with the multitude of objectives, which are coordinated by different organisations, UNMIK comprises four different pillars (General Assembly Resolution, 1999; Friedrich, 2005). The coordination and provision of humanitarian assistance, the former Pillar I, is provided by the UNHCR. The civil administration, Pillar II and the police and justice administration that is of 2001 the new Pillar I, are provided directly by the UN. Democratisation and institution building, Pillar III, are provided by Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Finally, the reconstruction of the economy and infrastructure, Pillar IV, are provided by the EU (General Assembly Resolution, 1999; IICK, 2000: 101; Friedrich, 2005: 237).

#### *4.2.2 DDR-SSR Nexus*

According to the theoretical framework of section 2.2, the international community does not always apply the key principles that are necessary to establish long-term security. This chapter will evaluate how the international community reflected upon DDR and SSR and which principles have been applied. For this evaluation several UN documents have been used. Among them are resolution 1244 which outlines the responsibilities of both the international military presence and the international civil presence and the report of the Secretary General of June 12, 1999, which presents a preliminary operational concept for UNMIK.

#### **Peace agreements**

Though DDR and SSR should be reflected upon in the framework of a UN mission, the theory recommends this should be done in a flexible manner as both processes are lengthy and unpredictable (Bryden, 2007).

In the case of Kosovo, resolution 1244 decides that the activities of the international security force, or the KFOR, are to enforce and maintain a ceasefire, demilitarize the KLA and establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety. The resolution does not specify any deadlines by which the KFOR should have completed their responsibilities. In fact, UNMIK is established for an initial twelve months and will continue thereafter unless the security council decides otherwise. Furthermore, it is stated that the KFOR should coordinate their activities closely with the international civil presence and ensure public safety until they are able to take that responsibility for their task. Then, section 14 of the resolution demands that all parties concerned should act in full cooperation “including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). The initial authorized

number of police personnel was agreed up to 4,718 persons, including formed units and border police. This number was proposed by the Secretary General Bernard Kouchner, and accepted by Danilo Trük President of the Security Council (Security Council, 1999).

As for the SSR activities the resolution decides that, among others, the international civil presence should promote substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, organise and oversee institutions that support such a democratic and autonomous self-government and protect and promote human rights. For the maintenance of civil law and order the resolution recommends the international civil presence to work together with KFOR in establishing a local police force (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). Again the resolution does not specify any dates by which the international civil presence should have completed their responsibilities.

### **Sequencing**

The specific sequencing of DDR and SSR does not have to be a straightforward linear process, it should depend upon the specific circumstances of the country and the conflict (UNDP, 2005). The activities might best be executed in a parallel framework.

In the Secretary General's report of June 12, 1999 it is indicated that the UNMIK and the KFOR "coordinate their activities closely to ensure that both the military presence and the civilian presence operate in a mutually supportive manner towards the same goals" (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>A</sub>: par. 7). In order to facilitate this close coordination there were ought to be regular consultations between the commander of the KFOR and the Special Representative of the Secretary General. One month after the implementation of UNMIK, the Secretary General writes in his report how the international civil presence works closely with the KFOR and assists the latter in conducting their responsibilities of ensuring public safety (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>B</sub>). Bernabéu summarises the tasks of UNMIK and KFOR as to build all institutions from scratch while "simultaneously governing and maintaining the rule of law and order" (2007: 73). The absence of institutions that execute law and order was the primary problem of Kosovo's insecurity. Especially the absence of a legitimate police force limited the abilities of the KFOR in executing all the necessary security activities (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>B</sub>).

One example of the close cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR is the establishment of a Joint Crisis Task Force, involving Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs, members of UNMIK and members of KFOR. This task force was put together in response to the attacks against minority groups and leaders of the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs agreed on concrete measures to enhance security (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>B</sub>).

### *Reintegration into security forces*

One of the principles of the theoretical framework illustrates how reintegration is increasingly viewed in relation to SSR. One way to provide demobilised fighters with an alternative livelihood is to

reintegrate them in different parts of the security sector (Bryden, 2007). The Secretary General's report of September 16, 1999 states the opportunities for former KLA combatants are to be reintegrated in new police, fire and civil forces, or to be registered for civilian employment. Ex-combatants of the KLA would be given preferential access to available places in the Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Police Service (Özerdem, 2003). On September 20, 1999 the KFOR successfully finalised the demilitarization of the KLA and UNMIK authorised the establishment of Kosovo Protection Corps. The activities of the Protection Corps are limited to civil emergencies, search and rescue missions, demining projects or rebuilding infrastructure (UN Security Council, 1999 C). Contrary to the limited activities of the Kosovo Protection Corps the Kosovo Police Service was established with "the aim to create a modern democratic police force that will restore confidence in law enforcement and effectively apply community-based policing principles" (OSCE, 2005). This police force employed only the 'hard core' ex-members of the KLA, because the international community found it crucial from a security perspective to keep this 'hard core' occupied with challenging tasks (OSCE, 2005). The demilitarization of the KLA in a protection corps and a civil defence force was a totally new challenge for the international community, unique in the sense because it was carried out under the authorisation of an interim administration (Özerdem, 2003).

### **Local ownership and participation**

The principle of local ownership and participation explains why it is important for external actors to recognise they are just facilitators of the peacebuilding process and the local communities are the implementers and managers of the program (Bryden, 2011). To include local communities and vulnerable groups into the DDR and SSR activities is the essential bridge between short-term security and long-term peace (IDDRTG, 2010).

UNMIK acknowledges the essential requirement for the mission to succeed is to include all people of Kosovo in its work, in particular that of the interim administration. Therefore, they established a system of advisory mechanisms and implementation committees that should fully engage the local population. Local leaders should especially feel encouraged to make contributions in judicial affairs, the implementation of public services and governance at large (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>A</sub>). In the report of the Secretary General of September 16, 1999 the structure of the Kosovo Transitional Council is introduced. This council has brought together all major political parties and ethnic groups of the region, to enable the people of Kosovo to have a direct input into the UNMIK decision-making process. The establishment of this council gives an opportunity to the people to "achieve consensus on a broad range of issues related to civil administration, institution-building and essential services, thereby creating a climate where participation in democratic processes is the norm" (UN Security Council, 1999 c: par. 2). To give the council greater responsibility it is divided in four different areas of expertise, these are housing, health, education and public utilities. Each area of expertise will be chaired by one representative of the UNMIK and one drawn from the local community (UN Security

Council, 1999<sub>C</sub>). Furthermore, on December 15, 1999 the three political parties of Kosovo decided to participate in the establishment by UNMIK of a Kosovo-UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure (UN Security Council, 1999<sub>D</sub>).

### **4.3 Independence of Kosovo**

For almost a century the Kosovar Albanians felt restless under foreign occupation. The whole process of an UN interim administration was expected by the Kosovar Albanians to lead to independence, but even under UNMIK there was still a change Kosovo could return to Serbia (Perritt, 2010).

In May 2001 the UNMIK laid the solid foundations of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PSIG) as envisaged in resolution 1244. This establishment paved the way to region-wide elections and initiated the transfer of public administration responsibilities to local control (UN Security Council, 2001). Between May 2001 and 2003 these power transfers to local institutions were delayed and UNMIK undertook little to promote local ownership reconstruction processes (Visoka, 2011). It seemed to the Kosovar Albanians UNMIK was reluctant to search out the political status of Kosovo and this led to tensions between the elected Kosovar Albanians of local governments and the UN representatives. The authority of the international community weakened in this period, because the local political leadership matured (Perritt, 2010).

In March 2004 there was a three day riot, largely directed at the ethnic Serb population, which reported 19 deaths, more than 900 people injured, another 4100 displaced and several houses and churches destroyed (Weller, 2008). These incidents together with the growing tensions between the local government and the UN political oversight putted the discussion on the political status of Kosovo firmly on the agenda (Visoka, 2011). The Contact Group, composed of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US steered most of the negotiations on the status of Kosovo. They issued ten guiding principles that needed to be imposed by the mediators of the negotiations in order for a settlement of the status of Kosovo to take place (Weller, 2008). After two years of UN-led negotiations in Vienna, Kosovo and Serbia failed to achieve a consensual solution. Ahtisaari, who was appointed by the Secretary-General to lead the settlement efforts, claimed the negotiations to be exhausted and new meetings would not bring either side closer to a compromise. In 2007 Ahtisaari completed and submitted a proposal to the UN, which can be read as a blueprint for state formation. As the UN had no alternatives concerning the future of Kosovo it was decided to implement the Ahtisaari plan. After the plan came into force on February 17, 2008 the UNMIK mandate remained unchanged for the indicated transition period of 120 days. Within this time the Kosovo Assembly approved a new constitution and when the UNMIK mandate expired, all legislative and executive authority were transferred to the governing authorities of Kosovo. In practice, even after the 120-day transition period, Kosovo continued to be strictly supervised by the international authorities (International Crisis Group, 2007). As Willigen reports, international administrations are meant to be temporary and transitional.

**5 Libya**

Libya is the second case of the ‘two-case’ case-study and is analysed through an extensive document analysis. The first section covers some essential country characteristics before the following sections proceed to a more in depth overview of the civil war and the peacebuilding process. The analysis attempts to explain the role of NATO under the responsibility to protect, the structure of UNSMIL and whether or not the international community adhered to the DDR-SSR Nexus as outlined in the theoretical framework.

**5.1 Country description**

Libya is a large country in the northern part of Africa between Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea (see the appendix). Vanderwalle refers to the history of Libya as an ‘extraordinary odyssey’ (2006). Within hundred years the country changed from an Italian colony, to the United Kingdom of Libya with a short lived monarchy, to an absolute regime under Qadhafi and lastly to a stateless country after the revolution in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2011).

Furthermore, it is important to note how strong nomadic alliances ruled the country before the colonial conquest by Italy. Those nomadic influences never disappeared and developed into a true tribal ideology. When Qadhafi came to power and realised he could not eliminate the power of the tribes he decided to use them in his favour. It is estimated that there are currently 140 tribes in Libya, many of which have influences from outside the country (Cherstich, 2014). The vast majority of Libya’s population, an approximate 97%, is Berber and Arab (CIA, 2015). The country characteristics in Table 3 are an estimate by the World Bank and the UNDP, because the latest official population census was in 2006 and the recent unrest complicated the collection of trustworthy information on economic and social demographics.

Table 3				
<i>Country characteristics of Libya</i>				
<b>Years</b>	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Population (in thousands)</b>	6288	6283	6265	6258
<b>GDP per capita</b>	2870	5875	5093	-
<b>Unemployment rate</b>	18%	20%	20%	-
<b>Human Development Index</b>	0.711	0.745	0.738	0.724

Sources: (World Bank, 2015; UNDP, 2015)

## 5.2 Conflict background

In order to understand the conflict in Libya, it is important to understand the context of the causes leading to the revolution in 2011. A critical point in Libya's history was the military coup in 1969 carried out under the rule of colonel Moammar al-Qadhafi, who soon consolidated his position as leader of the new regime (International Crisis Group, 2011). Mieczyslaw, Boduszyński & Pickard write how Qadhafi "did not merely run the old system - *he* was the system" (2013: 87). They explain how Qadhafi instituted the Jamahiriya, the 'state of the masses', an expression of an unique political model that was set out in his 'Green Book'. His political ideology was based on the rejection of any form of political representation as "the members of the parliament represent their party and not the people", thus "under such systems the people are victims, fooled and exploited by political bodies" (Qadhafi, undated: 7-8). In theory the will of the masses was implemented from the grassroots level all the way up through committees and congresses. Political parties were in this ideology obsolete, because the people would represent themselves (International Crisis Group, 2011).

One effect of the Jamahiriya was that any other group or institution with opposite ideas to the principles of the revolution was liable to execution. The very few institutions that did exist barely functioned, with no common ordering principle or chain of authority beyond Qadhafi himself. Almost entirely based on his own political vision, Qadhafi built a new state that allowed no space for dissent (International Crisis Group, 2011). The continuation of his regime was difficult, especially because the country's many tribes and clans. Tribal peoples is explained by Stephen Corry as "those which have followed ways of life for many generations" and "whose social cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other societies ... whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs laws or regulations" (2011: 62). In the Arab world tribes normally fulfil a social role of related families living together, but in Libya the tribal identity became a central player in the economic and political arenas over the past forty years (Hweio, 2012). When Qadhafi came to power he first tried to reduce the power of the tribes, as he associated them with "the monarchy's reactionary practices" (International Crisis Group, 2011: 11). Despite his efforts, tribes remained an important social identifier, especially in the eastern regions of Libya. Qadhafi decided better to use the tribes to consolidate his power, by playing one tribe off against the other there emerged a certain 'tribal system' in which only the most loyal tribes gained a place in the political arena. His strategy of using the tribes to control the society resulted in a very advanced strategy of tribalism which was incorporated in nearly every political structure (Hweio, 2012). Among other causes the discrimination of tribes led to tribal tensions and a growing hostility against Qadhafi's regime (International Crisis Group, 2011).

In December 2010 the so-called Arab Spring unexpectedly erupted in Tunisia and spread across a number of Arab countries as a revolutionary wave of protests and demonstrations. Libya was the third country to experience the Arab Spring, but contrary to its neighbouring countries, the Libyan revolution took a singular course (Deeb, 2013). From the countries participating in the Arab uprisings it was the only state that experienced such a complete breakdown of an authoritarian regime. It is

especially unique how the apparatus of the state got split and local rebel groups claimed to fully represent the state instead (Lacher, 2012). In order to determine how this power vacuum could happen, it is important to evaluate the course of Libya's revolution and the response of the international community.

### 5.2.1 NATO in Libya

The violence started in February 2011 and can be seen as the product of 42 years of autocratic power, of having no mediator between the state and society (Jebnoun, 2015). Lacher explains why two decisive developments altered the course of the Libyan revolution into a civil war (2012). First, Qadhafi's security forces responded violently to the demonstrations by firing in the crowd and killing hundreds of people within days. Second, with the start of the revolution Libya's leading Qadhafi opponents established the National Transitional Council (NTC). To the outside world they claimed to be the *de facto* government of Libya, willing to change the country when the conflict was settled.

The NTC successfully gained international recognition for the human rights abuses and the targeting of civilians by Qadhafi (Lacher, 2012). The UN Security Council expressed grave concerns at the situation in Libya and requested the Libyan authorities to protect their people. The Security Council adopted resolution 1970 on February 26th, which established an open-ended arms embargo on Libya and imposed severe sanctions on Gadhafi and his family (Blanchard, 2011). Several UN officials including Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tried to negotiate with Qadhafi and persuade him to comply with the resolution (Bellamy, 2011). When this request was neglected the UN had no other choice than to implement resolution 1973, which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya. This resolution was merely adopted out of precaution to avoid Qadhafi would use his own planes to bomb the population (Deeb, 2013). With the approval of resolution 1973 the UN demanded "the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians" and authorized member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas (General Assembly Resolution, 2011 A). The code name of the NATO intervention was 'Operation Unified Protector' and got approved by ten votes in favour, none against and five in abstention. The main reason for Russia, China, Germany, India and Brazil to abstain from voting was because they favoured a more peaceful approach to the conflict and were hesitant to the unintended consequences of a NATO intervention (UN Press Release, 2011). For seven months NATO supported the rebel forces with airstrikes. The key players in this air campaign were the UK and France, with the support of the US (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013).

In a joint article published in several newspapers, President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and former President Sarkozy pledged how they would respond, together with their NATO allies, to the Libyan crisis. They stated "our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that" (Cameron, Obama & Sarkozy, 2011). The article also underlines, while it is NATO and its partners acting in the name of the United Nations, it will

ultimately be the Libyan population and not the UN who choose their new constitution. The article concludes with a promise that the UK, France and the US will not rest until the Libyan population can choose its own future (Cameron, Obama & Sarkozy, 2011).

### *5.2.2 Discussing legitimacy*

Resolution 1973 called upon 'all necessary measures' to protect the Libyan population from Qadhafi (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). Due to this statement NATO enjoyed a very wide discretion of forcible means. Every type of intervention except 'a foreign occupation force' - as explicitly mentioned in paragraph four of the resolution - was allowed (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). Nonetheless, China and Russia questioned the methods used by NATO. Both countries saw the intervention as a disguise to overthrow Qadhafi and facilitate a regime change. China and Russia were strong supporters of a political solution to the Libyan crisis. A spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry urged NATO "not take any actions that exceed the authority granted by that resolution" (Dorsey, 2011). The worrisome argument made by the Chinese is based upon international law, which states: "pro-democratic military intervention with the aim of changing a regime collides with the prohibition of the threat of force or use of force under article 2(4) of the UN charter" (Payandeh, 2011). Commenting on the arguments by China and Russia, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stressed in a UN conference that regime change was not the intention of the mission. The intervention had as sole purpose the protection of civilians "because Colonel Qadhafi has been killing his own people" (UN News Centre, 2011). When analysing the statement of Ban Ki-moon it seems removing Qadhafi is a necessary condition in the protection of the Libyan population. Obama, Cameron & Sarkozy underline in their joint article the impossibility for Libya to have a future under Qadhafi's rule and that the constitutional process only can begin when Qadhafi resigns (2011). In this perspective a regime change would remove the greatest threat on the people of Libya. Their article is ambiguous, because on the one hand NATO is not authorised to remove Qadhafi, but on the other hand the three authors are urged to keep pressure on Qadhafi's regime in order to protect the Libyan population.

In the past, UN authorisation for individual states to use force in a conflict without any international element, would have been remarkable (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013). Recently such interventions, with the purpose to prevent national humanitarian catastrophes, are made easier under the responsibility to protect (RtoP). The World Summit doctrine states collective action is allowed when "peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UN, 2005: 139). Libya was a test case for states to act upon their responsibility to protect.

### **Responsibility to protect: RtoP**

In 2000 Kofi Annan called on the Member States to critically look into the dilemma of intervention. Problems like mass-murder, genocide and ethnic cleansing challenged the principles of sovereignty

and the legitimacy of interference. Annan concluded the debate that a concept like sovereignty cannot be a justification for great abuses of human rights and war crimes committed by the sovereign government on its own population (2000: 48). A few years later, in the World Summit of 2005, the biggest achievement was the agreement of UN member states on the principle that states have a responsibility to protect their population from war crimes and crimes against humanity. As stated in the World Summit doctrine the international community is prepared to take collective action, when peaceful means prove to be inadequate and national authorities continue to withdraw themselves from their duty to protect their people (UN, 2005).

An intervention based on RtoP is a form of humanitarian intervention, but permits military action only when all other non-coercive methods have been exhausted (Haider, 2013). The RtoP extends a solely military intervention with the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. The framework of RtoP is, unlike a humanitarian intervention, firmly rooted in international law. Under RtoP the UN Security Council or the state in question can authorise an intervention, therefore avoiding violation of paragraph 2.4 of the UN charter. With the RtoP doctrine, interventions shift away from state-centred interests towards interests in the greater public good and the protection of a population. With the support of NATO the local militias in Libya could successfully defeat Qadhafi's security forces. Kupperman writes in his article how the US was very pleased to announce that while having no service members on the ground, the objectives were being met (2015).

### *5.2.3 Civil war*

The NATO intervention in Libya was seen by many as a success (Daalder & Stavridis). It was praised because it prevented a bloodbath in Benghazi and it helped the local militias and the NTC to replace Qadhafi's dictatorial regime. Due to the precision of its air campaign collateral damage was minimized (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Kupperman, 2015). The NATO bombing campaign lasted six months and according to Human Rights Watch most of the victims were caused by clashes between the rebels and the government (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013). Despite the triumph, NATO could not prevent Libya to fail at the establishment of a modern state.

After the capture and murder of Qadhafi the country was left with a highly fragmented society and found itself in the presence of powerful and violent warlord militias (Jebnoun, 2015). Among the theories trying to explain the tribal dynamics in a post-Qadhafi Libya, Chestrich's perspective on tribalism is the most clear (2014). To him many Libyans resort to their tribal connections, not so much out of ideology, or because their culture demands them to do so, but because tribes were the only way to make normal life possible (2014). Where Lacher (2012) believes tribes are the reason why Libya is failing as a nation, Chestrich believes that the influence of tribes is growing because the state is so 'traumatically absent' (2014: 408). The International Crisis Group argues while the NTC has been successful in obtaining the international support it needed, it never truly led the Arab Spring in Libya

and was never able to unite the country under its control (2011). An important explanation for the difficulties NTC encountered in uniting the nation was the disarray in the police and national armed forces. Due to great personnel deficits in these institutions, the country slipped into a security vacuum, which made tribes feel obliged to protect their own communities (International Crisis Group, 2012). The two major militias in Libya are the Islamists and the Nationalists. In the end of 2011 the two rival parliaments battled over the power in Tripoli, the country's capital (Stephen, 2015). Rather than accepting the results of the first parliamentary elections in 2011, the Islamists accused the Nationalist government from being ex-Qadhafi supporters. Since the battle of Tripoli the country has been torn between two competing governments. The Islamist government 'Libyan Dawn' led by prime minister Omar al-Hassi based in Tripoli and the Tobruk-based internationally recognized government 'Operation Dignity' led by prime minister Abdullah al-Thinni (Murray, 2015).

Four years after the Qadhafi regime the international community comes to realize that having elections is not equal to establishing democracy (The economist, 2015; Kuperman, 2015). Bernardino Leon, former Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya and former head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is afraid that if "a real political dialogue does not start in Libya soon, there is only one thing that will be certain: the country will be an open field for ISIS" (Jebnoun, 2015: 832). He warns that today Libya is more fragmented than ever (Jebnoun, 2015).

### **5.3 UNSMIL**

On September 16th 2011 the UN unanimously decided to adopt a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to reconstruct the state, restore the order and public security and reduce the arms and weapons inflow (General Assembly Resolution, 2011<sub>B</sub>).

#### *5.3.1 UN Mandate*

Resolution 2009 states how UNSMIL, under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary General will assist the National Transitional Council in reconstructing the state and creating sustainable peace in Libya (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). In short, those efforts should contain: to restore public security and rule of law, promote national reconciliation and future elections, restore institutions and public services and promote and protect human rights. The UNSMIL is mainly designed out of a strong commitment to give Libya its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. The Security Council therefore stresses national ownership and responsibility to be key in Libya's process towards sustainable peace (General Assembly Resolution, 2011<sub>B</sub>).

The initial period for the mission in Libya was set at three months, but due to the challenging task of persistent fighting and the huge quantity of weapons scattered all over the country this period was extended with another twelve months (Corter & Koutroulis, 2013). With the extension of the mission two new points emerged on the international agenda (General Assembly Resolution, 2012). First, the voluntary and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons received critical

attention and is since seen as a key factor in the consolidation of peace. Second, the presence of the large quantity of weapons remained a risk for the international security (General Assembly Resolution, 2012). After the first extension in 2012 the mission has been prolonged three times, every year in march, with the end-date now being March 15, 2016 (General Assembly Resolution, 2015).

### *5.3.2 The DDR-SSR Nexus*

It is to be noted that UNSMIL is very different from UNMIK. In the absence of a strong international presence Libya struggled with the implementation of peacebuilding activities. The evidence on integrated DDR and SSR activities is slim and appears to be uncoordinated and incoherent.

#### **Peace agreements**

The Integrated DDR Standards encourages a DDR framework to be “constructed in connection with a view on the future security sector, particularly for the creation of new national and integrated defence and police forces” (SIDDR, 2006: 18). UNSMIL is, however, a supportive mission and the role of the UN is to facilitate the means for Libya to rebuild itself. Besides strong general suggestions on the importance of the rule of law, preparing and establishing a new constitution, restoring the public security and develop capable institutions to uphold that security, the Security Council does not specify in the resolution 2040 the exact activities to achieve those goals (General Assembly Resolution, 2011).

#### **Sequencing**

The UNDP writes the specific sequencing of DDR and SSR should depend upon the specific circumstances of the country and the conflict (2005). Bryden suggests the same in his theory on the DDR-SSR nexus, but he adds an ideal situation of DDR should follow a broad-based SSR assessment (2007). One problem of the security sector reform in Libya is the ‘militia problem’. McDonough, researcher with the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, has set out some of the major implications which hindered the demobilisation and reintegration attempts of former combatants (2014). After the revolution in 2011, when the NTC tried to consolidate its power, it got undermined by the self-inflicted problem of the militias. Torn between ineffective national security forces and the growing security vacuum, the NTC decided to place some militias as auxiliary forces on the government’s payroll. At the time, militias were better trained, equipped and staffed than the police and armed forces which supposedly should enforce the national security of Libya (International Crisis Group, 2012; McDonough, 2014). Another reason for the NTC to authorise such a hybrid arrangement was to satisfy local militias and to avoid an insurgency against the government (McDonough, 2014). The decision of the government to co-opt with local militias affected to a very large extent the effectiveness of DDR programs.

### *Reintegration of ex-combatants in security forces*

It is specified in the mandate of UNSMIL how the international community should assist Libya with a national approach “to the integration of ex-combatants into Libyan national security forces” (General Assembly Resolution, 2012). Above all, “police and security institutions that are capable, accountable, respectful of human rights and accessible and responsive to women and vulnerable groups” were the main purpose of reforming the security sector (General Assembly Resolution, 2012). In the Secretary General report of March 1, 2012 it is stated how the government announced to integrate or reintegrate some 75,000 revolutionary fighters in either defence, police or civilian security sectors (UN Security Council, 2012). In February 2013 the Secretary General reported how “a number of national security priorities”, including the reintegration of former combatants is challenged due to the lack of a proper national security coordination. In 2011, the NTC established the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development and tasked them with overseeing the DDR process of ex-combatants. This organisation has since registered approximately 250.000 militiamen in their database, but in comparison to the true extent of Libya’s militias this is only a minor achievement. Their abilities to convince local rebel groups to disarm and demobilise are hampered by the government’s willingness to rely on the rebels in case of national security (McDonough, 2014). Due to the hybrid arrangements the chains of command of the Libyan Armed Forces and the Libyan Police Service got complicated and weakened. The International Crisis Group states without “strong state institutions or police force, follow-through is implausible” (2012). This is why Libyan authorities along with militaries from Italy, Turkey, the UK and AFRICOM decided to train, advise and equip a 20.000 men strong General Purpose Force to help the country rebuild its weak security sector. This army, trained overseas, would fulfil the purpose to protect the newly elected government from the fighting militias and compel them to disarm and demobilize (Wehrey, 2013). McDonough argues the General Purpose Force to be no cure for the militia problem and recognises the risk this force could over-time serve as just another rebel group (2014). When the violence spiraled out of control once again in 2014, the plans for such a new force got postponed (Wehrey, 2013).

Konstanyan & Blockmans (2014) critique the role of Europe, one of the main peacebuilding facilitators in Libya, by stating it lost its grip on the situation. In total the EU has committed 80.5 million euros in humanitarian assistance and 130 million euros in technical assistance. Most EU programs are geared towards long-term democratic transition, but are lacking short-term crisis instruments, like ‘boots on the ground’, to accompany the steps taken towards reconstruction. Furthermore they point out how the UK, France and Italy have been competing with each other in order to secure military defence contracts, or military training programs for their own benefit. They suggest the EU to rethink their strategy in Libya until there is a unanimous decision by the UN or NATO on how to proceed in general (Konstanyan & Blockmans, 2014). This October, however, the EU foreign affairs officials drafted a paper in preparation for when a new ceasefire in Libya would hold. The paper mentions how EU states consider to provide a civilian or military mission to work on

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, including the redeployment of EUBAM, the European Border Assistance Mission. EUBAM was established to help Libyan authorities in educating their border police in handling the large streams of migrants from neighbouring countries (EEAS, 2015). The drafted paper entails a mission of modest scale, mainly concerned with peace monitoring support (Rettman, 2015).

### *Security Sector*

The Libyan authorities and their international partners met in Paris in 2013 and in Rome in 2014 , where they reaffirmed strong international support for the creation of an effective state and a sovereign Libya (UNSMIL, 2015). The website of UNSMIL describes the inter-related areas, which are supported by the UN, to be; “national security architecture, arms and ammunition management (including non-proliferation), police development, defence and military reform, border security” and DDR of rebel groups (2015). The promotion of the rule of law and the protecting of human rights is the main activity of the Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Division of the UNSMIL, this division cooperates closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In 2012 it offered the Libyan authorities a report called “Transitional Justice - Foundation for a New Libya” with the strategy of a comprehensive transitional justice process aimed at reconciliation. The division is highly engaged with the Libyan Ministry of Justice to support the resumption of the court system (OHCHR, 2015).

### **Local ownership and participation**

The theory on local ownership is particularly of force with UNSMIL. External actors know they are just facilitators of the peacebuilding process in Libya, while the local authorities are the implementers and managers of the process. It is stated numerous times in the adopted UN resolutions that all tasks need to be in “full accordance with the principles of national ownership” and “shall be to assist the Libyan authorities to define national needs and priorities throughout Libya” matching them with strategic and technical advice where appropriate (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). The report of the Secretary General on March 1, 2012 encourages the Commission to allow eligible women to register for the demobilization and reintegration program. One of the key points of the mission is the empowerment of women and to facilitate that their needs, aspirations and challenges are taken into account. During the first elections the mission is urged to make sure the Libyan population is able to participate actively and safely, with the emphasis on women, minorities and other vulnerable groups (UN Security Council, 2012).

#### **5.4 Recent developments**

Four years ago the NATO intervention in Libya was conducted out of ‘responsibility to protect’. Today the situation is more complicated, because the same militias pushed to victory with the help of NATO are now fighting against each other (Stephen, 2015). The two political alliances Operation Dignity and Libyan Dawn are backed by rival brigades that fight over power, territory and oil. Despite some groups denouncing the alliances as illegitimate, the rival parliaments signed a political agreement in July 2015 with guiding principles for completing the transition initiated in 2011. The actual agreement or unifying both parliaments has been signed after a long run of negotiations on the 17th of December 2015. Martin Kobler calls the 17th a historic day for Libya. The UN agreement proposes both parliaments to unite in one government led by a presidential council of a prime minister, Fayeze el-Sarraj, five deputy prime ministers and three senior ministers (Reuters, 2015; De Standaard, 2015). The members of Libya’s rival parliaments who signed the agreement support the hope there will finally be an end to the 18-month long civil war. UK prime minister David Cameron said: “importantly, this agreement means the international community can now engage with one unified, representative government in Libya in the fight against ISIS and the migrant traffickers” (Stephen, MacAskill & Kingsley, 2015). The UK expects the new government will request military support in the fight against ISIS. This expectation leads members from Libyan militias to think their new government is a puppet of the West. Other specialists argue the West should not illusion a foreign intervention on ISIS, as it is not clear how the new government wants to act (Stephen et al., 2015).

On December 22nd a UN resolution 2214 was drafted, which authorises all countries to fight terrorism in Libya. The only condition is those countries need to inform the Libyan government in advance and coordinate with them. At the time of writing, the countries that seem to prepare for airstrikes are the US, the UK, France and Italy (MacAskill & Mason, 2015).

## **6 Case analyses and the patterns of displacement**

In this chapter each case will be examined according to a 'within-case analysis', using process-tracing as the chosen research method. Building on the evidence from chapter four and five each case analysis will question the role of NATO in the intervention and the role of the DDR-SSR Nexus in the peacebuilding process. Then both within-case analysis are followed by the data on the measurement variables 'Political Transformation' and 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence'. Finally, the analysis will conclude with the data on displacement so chapter seven can set out the results on the hypotheses.

### **6.1 Kosovo**

For over a century the region Kosovo has been a subject of dispute (Troebst, 1998; Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003). The nature of the dispute and the claims on the entire region of Kosovo by either the Serbs or the Albanians is largely based on historical arguments. Both sides favoured solutions to the conflict which were incompatible (Troebst, 1998). While Kosovo was most of its history under Serbian rule, this did not change the ethnic balance between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. The latter has always been the vast majority of the population, the consensus in 2012 measured 92% of the Kosovars to be Albanian (CIA, 2015). This ethnic imbalance has caused many problems and tensions, especially when Milošević became president of Serbia in 1987. Under his authoritarian rule Kosovo endured a time of Serbianisation accompanied by severe human rights abuses directed at Albanians, which ultimately build up to the eruption of a full-scale civil war in 1998 (Buckely, 2000). It is interesting to see how after the war Kosovar Albanians, with their impressive majority, were no longer the vulnerable group and violent crimes were now directed at Kosovar Serbs. While there was a large-scale return of displaced Kosovar Albanians immediately after the war, an additional stream of Serbian refugees left the region out of security concerns (UN Security Council, 1999 B). Today there is still a Kosovo Diaspora, meaning Kosovars living outside of Kosovo, of roughly 800.000 people (UNDP, 2014).

#### *6.1.1 The role of the international community in Kosovo*

The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was one of three air-supported missions of NATO (Hunter, 2011). A mission which challenged the legitimacy of military action according to the international law on sovereignty and was accused to be out of UN authority, contravening article 2.4 of the UN charter (Wheeler, 2000). China and Russia were the main opponents of the intervention in Kosovo, demanding a more peaceful approach to the conflict in Serbia. Both countries feared the intervention would have unwanted consequences for the entire region (Özdem, 2003). Regardless the critique, UN representatives agreed the world could not turn a blind eye to the human rights abuses caused by the Serbian authorities. NATO proved to be successful in Bosnia (1995) when the use of force induced the compliance of Serbia. At the time there were no clear assumptions or experiences on how to deal

with states unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. Therefore a NATO intervention seemed a natural approach in the case of Kosovo (Wheeler, 2000). Operation Allied Force lasted seventy-eight days, with the UK, France, Germany and the US as its main contributors (Wheeler, 2000; Friedrich, 2005).

After the war scholars started to investigate how *humanitarian* the intervention really was (Fisk, 1999; Wheeler, 2000, Massa, 2009). There is disagreement if the methods used by NATO were in the right proportion to the problem (Wheeler, 2000). Especially when despite the overwhelming superiority of NATO the Serbs aggravated their attacks on the Kosovar Albanians. In their turn NATO needed to change its strategy to larger targets like important bridges, government building and fuel-depots (Massa, 2009). It appeared NATO did not only focus its attacks on protecting the Kosovar Albanians, but also largely on the surrender of Milošević. In any war the civilians are the biggest victim, but in the case of Kosovo most casualties were at the side Kosovar Albanians with an approximate of 4.400 documented killings. (IICK, 2000).

When the war came to an end the UN passed resolution 1244, which authorised the establishment of an international security presence (KFOR) and an international civil presence (UNMIK). In order for Kosovo to have long-term and sustainable peace, resolution 1244 included a complete takeover of governmental functions. Chapter VII of the UN charter provides sufficient legal ground for the establishment of such an UN-led interim administration (IICK, 2000; Friedrich, 2005). However in case of the Kosovo Protection Corps Özerdem questions if it was the right decision to have everything decided without consulting the local governments or the ex-combatants for that matter (2003). In section 6.1.2 Özerdem's position on the Kosovo Protection Corps will be clarified. Lastly, Kosovo was placed under an UN-led interim administration so the international community could sort out the future political status of the country. To the Kosovar Albanians it seemed that decision was either neglected or continuously postponed (Perritt, 2010). This attitude of UNMIK towards Kosovo's political status complicate the establishment peace, it led to tensions and violent incidents committed by Kosovar Albanians against Kosovar Serbs. After the riots in 2004 the security was in such danger that the issue of independence was finally put on the international agenda.

### *6.1.2 DDR-SSR Nexus in Kosovo*

The theoretical framework of this research is based on a selection of principles outlined in the work of Bryden (2007) and the Integrated DDR Standards (2010). The literature covers the linkages between DDR and SSR and offers a common set of principles that should be addressed when establishing sustainable peace. The research into these integrated DDR and SSR principles is of course from after the first time SSR was introduced as a peacebuilding concept in 1997 (Winkler, 2002). This means, when Kosovo's peacebuilding process commenced in 1999 the guiding principles provided by the UN DDR Resource Centre had not yet been published. However, there did exist a strong notion of the direct contribution DDR and SSR make to public security and law and order (Brahimi Report, 2000). After analysing the first year of the UN documentation on the mission in Kosovo it appears how much

attention was paid to the integration of DDR and SSR programs. In fact, the three selected principles in the theoretical framework have been applied in Kosovo's peacebuilding process almost as a textbook example.

In general, resolution 1244 divides DDR as an activity of the KFOR and SSR as an activity of the UNMIK. The KFOR is tasked with the enforcement and maintenance of the ceasefire, the demilitarisation of the KLA, the establishment of a secure environment and ensuring the public safety until UNMIK can take that responsibility from their hands. The purpose of the UNMIK is to establish a final settlement of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, but also to maintain law and order and establish a police force capable of fulfilling that task (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). Upon closer consideration the individual tasks of the KFOR and UNMIK are demanded to be conducted in a coordinated manner. Section 14 of resolution 1244 adds specifically the "full cooperation by all concerned" (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). A close coordination of activities is important to ensure that KFOR and UNMIK operate in a mutually supportive manner towards the same goals (UN Security Council, 1999 A: par. 7). The core of the security problem in Kosovo was the absence of an effective security sector. Crimes went unpunished and criminal gangs battled freely over scarce resources. All this because the KFOR was very limited in its ability to maintain law and order, as there was no well-functioning police force to support its tasks (UN Security Council, 1999 B). Nonetheless, both UNMIK and KFOR succeeded to build most institutions from scratch while "simultaneously governing and maintaining the rule of law and order" (Bernabéu, 2007: 73). Theoretically the demilitarization and reintegration of the KLA in the Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Police Service was successful. The creation of either these two security institutions was an unique experience for the international community as it was undertaken by the UN within the sovereignty of the FRY without the input of Serbian authorities or local Kosovar governments. In a practical sense Özerdem argues that members of the Kosovo Protection Corps "would have felt a sense of ownership and pride in the rebuilding of their motherland, instead of feeling totally independent on the international community" when they had been actively involved and treated as partners (2003: 98). Despite his argument, of which part might be true, the members of the Kosovo Protection Corps never turned against the KFOR or the interim administration. Considering the importance of local ownership and participation, UNMIK acknowledged the essential requirement for the mission to succeed was to include all people of Kosovo in its work, in particular that of the interim administration. Therefore, they established a system of advisory mechanisms and implementation committees that should fully engage the local population. With the creation of the Kosovo Transitional Council, local leaders were encouraged to take part in negotiations and represent all different ethnicities of the Kosovar population (UN Security Council, 1999 C: par. 2). Establishing a platform of political leaders from local communities is one feature of the confidence-building mechanism that should improve the grave humanitarian situation and return displaced individuals.

### *6.1.3 Measuring security in Kosovo*

Security is a difficult concept to measure, this is why this thesis uses a combination of theoretical and pragmatic claims. This section will compare the scores on political transformation and Political Stability & Absence of Violence. The civil war in 1999 was the result of a deeply rooted dispute on the region Kosovo and whether or not it belonged to Serbian or Albanian territory. The measurement indicators will signify if the independence of Kosovo in 2008 brought any change to the political stability of the region.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index calculated the score on political transformation for Kosovo in 2012 to be 6,70 out of 10. With this score the country ranked on place 43 out of the 128 participating countries. In 2014 the Bertelsmann Transformation Index calculated the score on political transformation for Kosovo to be 6,60 out of 10. With this score the country ranked on place 46 out of the 129 participating countries. The two biggest problems for the political development in Kosovo to transform are the parallel security and intelligence structures of the Serbians in Northern Kosovo and the large scale corruption in all levels of the administration. The corruption caused the score of 2014 to drop with one tenth of a point, because the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (Eulex) is still not able to fight corruption. The Bertelsmann report of 2014 argues if Eulex had more information on high-level corruption cases, their task would be easier. On the problem of the Serbian parallel security and intelligence structures the Bertelsmann report of 2014 indicates there are new positive developments. Both sides start to believe in the importance of normalizing their relations. Belgrade has declared they will work on the transparency of Serbian structures in Northern Kosovo and Prishtina has integrated five Serbian mayors in the government of Kosovo in 2014. This development might indicate why the score on Political Stability & Absence of Violence is increasing for the year 2014 (see Figure 1).

The measurement indicator Political Stability & Absence of Violence indicates Kosovo to be in the alert zone from 2010 until 2013. The alert zone is calculated with the Fragile State Index and is true for all countries that score at 19,8% or lower. For three years it meant Kosovo belonged to the 20% most highly alerted countries. To understand the scores for these years, several reports from the Secretary General are examined and it can be concluded, while the overall security situation is relatively calm, it remains fragile. The main reason for heightened security concerns is indicated to be the political split between Northern Kosovo and the rest of the country (UN Security Council, 2010). This is consistent with the information provided by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Furthermore, the elections in 2010 caused a political polarisation and intense discussions on the formation of a coalition (UN Security Council, 2011). In October 2013 a new phase was launched when both governments in Belgrade and Prishtina commenced with new rounds of European Union-mediated dialogue. Both sides have indicated to want to resolve their differences and again this is consistent with the information provided by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. These positive

developments show the percentage for the year 2014 to rise above the alert-zone (see Figure 1) (UN Security Council, 2013).




Figure 1. Kosovo’s World Bank Governance Indicator: ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’

6.1.4 Effects on displacement in Kosovo

The conflict between the Serbian authorities and the Kosovar Albanians illustrates how forced displacement can be a deliberate strategy of war and not just an unintended consequence. Serbian authorities deliberately ‘cleansed’ the population from Kosovar Albanians with the aim to create ethnically-homogenous regions, it was their military objective to do so and not a consequence of the war. When the international community labelled the self-defence and self-protection activities of the KLA as terrorism, they unwittingly played into the corner of the Serbian authorities. The terrorism loophole proved to be the perfect legitimization for the Serbs to protect the internal security of their territory (Hayden, 1998). The humanitarian consequences of the intensification of the war and the NATO intervention resulted in a forced migration of almost 800.000 Kosovar Albanians and the internal displacement of another 500.000 (UN Security Council, 1999 B). For Kosovo the number of displaced individuals remained high in the years after the war and even today there is a large part of the Kosovar population living outside Kosovo. Some of the main reasons for this displacement will be explained below.

**Security situation**

The most important parameter for the mission in Kosovo was “to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes” (General Assembly Resolution, 1999). The Secretary General report of July 12, 1999 states how more than 650.000 refugees had returned home, either spontaneous or with the assistance of the UNHCR. However, the report also mentions how the first

weeks of the ceasefire witnessed an exodus of members of minority groups, primarily Serbs leaving Kosovo for neighbouring countries in the FRY. The first wave of Serbian refugees left out of security concern, but as the incidents against Kosovar Serbs, committed by Kosovar Albanians, increased and worsened the Serbs fled the region to escape persecution (UN Security Council, 1999 B). The insecure and unsafe conditions for minority groups made the UNHCR decide to discourage large scale refugee return for the course of several months (UN Security Council, 1999 D).

In 2000 it was reported how some host countries started with the process of forced return (UN Security Council, 2000). The UN and the civil presence in Kosovo urged host countries not to proceed with this process, as uncontrolled large-scale returns of Kosovar Albanians could have a severe impact on the development achievements made to date. It would further endanger the relationship between Kosovar Albanians and the remaining minority groups and will drive them to compete for the scarce housing and limited employment opportunities (UN Security Council, 2000). Housing surveys conducted right after the ceasefire in heavily damaged villages conclude how many houses are beyond repair and at least 50.000 are damaged up to 50% but repairable. This means the UNHCR has the daunting task of building emergency shelter for the returning and internally displaced individuals who lost their home. Additionally, due to the widespread damage of the war UNHCR could not guarantee every individual, returnee, refugee or internally displaced to have access to basic services like clean water, electricity and health assistance (UN Security Council, 1999 C). Overall it must be noted the number of forced returns has always exceeded the number of voluntary returns. From the total numbers of returnees 70% were deported or forced to return (DCAM, 2013).

The eruption of violence in March 2004 had a great impact on the trust and security concerns between ethnic communities. The process of organized returns of refugees was delayed by three months. According to the UNHCR Population Statistics Database the total number of refugees in 1999 was 501.262 and the number of IDP's was 234.900, those numbers in 2004 were 271.683 refugees and 248,154 IDP's. The increase in the number of IDP's explains the impact of the 2004 riots and the sharp decline in the number of refugees can possibly be allocated to the large numbers of forced return. Furthermore the Population Statistics Database shows how after 2007 the numbers remain relatively stable and only decrease marginally. One explanation for this marginal decrease after 2007 is the economic situation of Kosovo and will further explained below.

### **Economic situation**

The Human Development Report on Kosovo calculated the size of the Diaspora, to be approximately 874.000 (2014). This calculation is based on the 2011 census and on the hypothetical population that all individuals born in Kosovo still live there. In total the population of Kosovo would be 2.65 million, but the actual residents make up for 1.78 million. From the 874.000 people living outside Kosovo 66% is Kosovar Albanian, 20% is Kosovar Serb and 13,7% have other ethnicities (UNDP, 2014). That the Kosovo Diaspora continues to be that large is inherited by the refugee crisis of 1999. The main drive

for Kosovar Albanians to live outside Kosovo is either to reunite with family or to seek better living conditions (DACM, 2013). As the unemployment rate lies around 21,8% for men and at 40% for women, the labour market conditions are difficult. The country relies heavily on the financial flows from the Kosovo Diaspora, which account for one fifth of the Gross Domestic Product (UNDP, 2014). In an evaluation report of the IOM it is concluded from a survey that the main reasons for migration are: lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo, better economic perspectives outside Kosovo and lack of access to health services and social services. Despite the major improvement of governmental and municipal structures on the living standards of the Kosovars, the health care system is still poorly functioning. Some medical treatments are still not available in Kosovo and drive Kosovars to immigrate to countries where the access to health is easier (IOM, 2015).

In an article for 'Balkan Insight' it appears Albanians were the largest single national group next to the Syrians to request asylum in Germany in 2015 (Ristic, 2016). Some 54.762 Albanians, and an approximate of 37.095 Kosovars sought asylum in Germany last year. As Germany is struggling with the influx of migrants fleeing from persecution and armed conflict, migrants from the Balkans are classified as 'economic migrants' in an attempt to divide both groups. It is unlikely these numbers will decrease in the upcoming years, which will mean some of the economic migrants will be deported back home (Ristic, 2016).

## **6.2 Libya**

The eruption of violence in 2011 is not inherent to Libyan political culture. It was the aftermath of a four decade long process of an absolute rule under Qadhafi, who build the state entirely on his own political vision without state institutions, consensus-building and space for dissent (International Crisis Group, 2011). The Jamahiriya forbid any other group or institution with opposite ideas to the principles of Qadhafi's regime. The tribes came closest to a mediator between state and society, than any other institution. As Qadhafi was unable to eliminate the power of tribes, he decided to play them off in a power scheme. This scheme reinforced the position of the tribes. After the revolution Libya emerged without a robust society, but with the presence of strong and powerful militias. Jebnoun finds the political fragmentation and security vacuum were "aggravated by the refusal of armed groups to disarm and demobilise without guarantees for their future role in the transitional process" (2015: 836). The tribes and local militias were given always a place in the political arena and as Lacher argues "localism and regionalism became the salient features of the new Libya's political landscape" (Lacher, 2012). While the National Transitional Council (NTC) managed to get the attention of the international community for the war crimes committed by Qadhafi against his own people, it never succeeded to lead the country after the revolution. Libya split in two separate states with an Islamist government 'Libyan Dawn' led by prime minister Omar al-Hassi based in Tripoli and the Tobruk-based internationally recognized government 'Operation Dignity' led by prime minister Abdullah al-Thinni (Murray, 2015). After four years of rivalry between both parliaments the UN brokered deal for

an unity government was finalised in the beginning of December 2015. The new prime minister of Libya will be Fayaz el-Sarraj (De Standaard, 2015).

### *6.2.1 The role of the international community in Libya*

The humanitarian intervention in Libya was the third NATO air campaign since the alliance's establishment (Hunter, 2011). The NATO intervention in Kosovo challenged legitimacy under international law. At the time Costa Rica argued while the goals for Kosovo were "ethically and morally unquestionable", they had to be achieved by means of law (UN Security Council, 1998). The beginning of the 21st century enlarged the concept of security from (national) state security to individual security and giving every person the right to live in freedom. Kofi Annan called up states to critically look into the dilemma of intervention (Annan, 2000; OECD, 2001). To Annan it was incomprehensible how state sovereignty was a justification for countries to go unpunished for committing war crimes, human rights abuses and genocide against their own population. In the past the UN did not authorise states to take action against another state for reasons of human rights violations, if that state did not pose a threat to international security (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013). In fact, the UN charter presupposes the most serious threat to be external aggression, but since the Cold War there has been a shift from 'inter-state' conflicts to 'intra-state' conflicts (Rufer, 2005). Therefore all member states of the UN agreed at the World Summit of 2005 that collective action is allowed when "peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UN, 2005: 139). An intervention based on the responsibility to protect is a form of humanitarian intervention, but the UN will only resort to military action when all other non-coercive methods have been exhausted (Haider, 2013)

Resolution 1973 called on member states of the UN to use 'all necessary measures', except a foreign occupation force, to protect the Libyan population against Qadhafi (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). Operation Unified Protector lasted seven months and provided the Libyan rebel forces with the necessary air support to defeat Qadhafi. The largest contributors of the air campaign were the UK, the US and France (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013). While the NATO intervention in Libya was military speaking a success, it could not prevent the country from slipping into complete chaos. Critics argue NATO should have finished its work when their planes removed Qadhafi's regime. Even though Libya did not requested external support, the UN should have pushed for tight supervision of government practices (Strickland, 2014). Tight supervision might prevented the NTC to encounter such difficulties in uniting the nation. The international community could have supported the police and armed forces with training, equipment and staff, to prevent a security vacuum. However, in the current situation Chestrich believes the influence of tribes is growing because the state is so 'traumatically absent' (2014: 408).

September 16th 2011 the UN unanimously decided to adopt a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to reconstruct the state, restore the order and public security and reduce the arms and weapons inflow (General Assembly Resolution, 2011 B). However, the role of the international community in this mission, is as the title reveals, only a supportive one.

### *6.2.2 DDR-SSR Nexus in Libya*

In comparison to Kosovo, Libya's peacebuilding process happened well after the publishing of the Integrated DDR Standards. In fact, much of the literature used in this thesis is from before 2011 thus it would seem the international community is familiar with the importance of connecting DDR and SSR. Analysing the Libyan case reveals the contrary.

UNSMIL is a supportive mission and the role of the UN is to facilitate the means for Libya to rebuild itself. Besides strong general security suggestions the Security Council does not specify exact activities to achieve this (General Assembly Resolution, 2011). UNSMIL stresses the importance of national security architecture, police development and defence or military reform. The OHCHR offered Libyan authorities a report in which the strategy for a comprehensive transitional justice process is set out, but if it has been put in motion is highly doubtful (OHCHR, 2015). The lack of national security coordination makes any reform in any area almost impossible. According to McDonough the NTC relied too soon in the process on the support of militias (2014). The hybrid arrangements which emerged between the NTC and local militias complicated the activities of disarmament and demobilisation. The militias were not willing to give up their newly acquired power and the country split itself once again in a system of tribes (International Crisis Group, 2012).

### *6.2.3 Measuring security in Libya*

Security is a difficult concept to measure, this is why this thesis uses a combination of theoretical and pragmatic claims. This section will examine the scores on political transformation and Political Stability & Absence of Violence in Libya. The conflict in Libya emerged from a deep dissatisfaction incubated by the Libyan population against the autocratic regime of Qadhafi. The civil war ultimately resulted in a regime change and these measurement indicators signify parts of this transformation.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index calculated the score on political transformation for Libya in 2012 to be 3,10 out of 10. With this score the country ranked on place 117 out of the 128 participating countries. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index calculated the score on political transformation for Libya in 2014 to be 4,13 out of 10. With this score the country ranked on place 91 out of the 129 participating countries. The score for 2012 is based upon a review period from before the revolution and the ousting of Qadhafi. It is not remarkable the score on the indicator 'monopoly of force' is a 9 out of 10 and the scores on 'free and fair elections', or 'freedom of expression' are a 1 out of 10. After the capture and murder of Qadhafi, the score on political transformation almost automatically improves. From an outside perspective the plans by the NTC to draft a new constitution,

the first free elections in October 2011 and the establishment of democratic institutions seem to improve the country. An inside perspective reveals how Libyans deem themselves unfit for democracy as corruption is spreading rapidly and the economy does not experience any government control. The latter information corresponds with the measurement indicator ‘Political Stability & Absence of Violence’, which shows a sharp decline since the year 2011. The alert zone is calculated with the Fragile State Index and is true for all countries that score at 19,8% or below. Since 2011 Libya belongs to the top 10% and even the top 5% most highly alerted countries (see Figure 2). The Bertelsmann report of 2014 explains how Libyans are confused with the recent acquired freedom. To them democracy means nothing is forbidden and everything is allowed. It is therefore that the score on monopoly of force as shifted to a 4 out of 10, free and fair elections to an 8 out of 10 and freedom of expression to a 7 out of 10. The overall score on political transformation might be better than under the absolute regime, but the stability and absence of violence show the disarray the country is struggling with.




Figure 2. Libya’s World Bank Governance Indicator: ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’

6.2.4 Effects on displacement in Libya

The incidents leading from the Arab Spring in Libya caused the largest migrant crisis since the Gulf Wars. The people fleeing Libya are mostly migrant workers and their families. Given that Libya houses 1.8 million migrants and 70.000 of them left the country within days after the eruption of violence, the implications of their movements are major. By December 2011 the neighbouring countries Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania all declared national crises. Now that financial remittances in these countries are reduced, local communities are unable to supply enough food for the returnees. Consequently, the arrival of returnees drives citizens in local communities to further compete for

resources and employment (Dominguez & Pitt-Rashid, 2012). The total number of migrants who have left Libya in 2011 is estimated at 790.000 people. The UNHCR comments the numbers can in fact be much higher, as not all areas of Libya can be reached due to the volatile situation (UNHCR News Stories, 2015).

### **Security situation**

Among the Libyan population the revolution and the violence in 2011 resulted in a first wave of 600.000 IDP's and some 150.000 people, including 15.000 country officials to flee Libya. Different sources report in 2012 that more than 450.000 civilians returned to Libya and an approximate of 90.000 remained internally displaced (Charron, 2015; UNHCR News Stories, 2015). The principal areas where displaced families need to seek shelter are the areas around Benghazi and Tripoli, fighting factions have turned these areas in battlegrounds. At least 57.000 people were still displaced from the violence in 2011 and stayed in asylum centres around Tripoli and Benghazi, but the eruption of violence in 2014 caused them to flee the shelters and be displaced again (Charron, 2015). Besides the number of already displaced individuals, there has been an additional internal displacement of 270.000 people in the west, 90.000 in the east and about 18.500 in the south of Libya. Tunisia is struggling with a strained economy and scarce resources as they host almost two million Libyan refugees. If the recent unified government will ever succeed in establishing an effective state and effective security forces, the prospects for Libyan refugees to return are optimistic.

The external sources of forced migration originating from Syria, Afghanistan and the countries of Central Africa would, however, continue to pose great threats on the security of Libya. Warnes reports in 'The Guardian' how up to 600.000 people are estimated to wait in Libya's coastal cities for an opportunity to cross the Mediterranean (2014). The spring and summer season provide excellent conditions for boats migrants to cross the Sea and by June 2014 already 50.000 people arrived on the shores of Italy (Warnes, 2014). In the same month one year later Hughes reported for 'The Guardian' very similar figures. After interviewing Captain Cooke-Priest from the British Royal Marines it became clear there were still around 400.000 people waiting and an average of 3.000 migrants trying to leave the shores of Libya per day (Hughes, 2015).

At the heart of the problem is the security vacuum caused by the inability of national and local governments to control the fighting militias. The national unrest has attracted radical groups, practicing smuggling and human trafficking, from outside Libya (Charron, 2015). In an interview with a 'successful' smuggler Porsia reports how since 2006 the market of human trafficking has been booming (2014). Smuggling rings in the coastal cities of Libya exist 2006, but Qadhafi turned a blind eye to the illegal operations as it provided him with extra income. After the collapse of the government in 2011 the trafficking industry turned into a gigantic profitable business (Porsia, 2014).

It might be concluded that the important external causes strain Libya's security in addition to the internal divisions of Libya. These external causes are the countries in Central Africa and the Sahel

zone. To be more specific the circumstances in the “ Sahel—the semi-arid band just south of the Sahara desert, are particularly prone to producing waves of migrants” (Edelen, 2015). Edelen further writes that she find the EU to be part of the problem as it focusses its response to heavily on the crisis symptoms (2015). The EU strategy of conducting military operations against human traffickers is without a doubt politically correct, but will not halt the flow of migrants as the ‘push’ factors in the Sahel region are not addressed (Edelen, 2015).

## **7 Results and discussion**

The previous chapter has carried out two ‘within-case analysis’ and defined the patterns of displacement for both Kosovo and Libya. The first section of this chapter will explicate the results on the expected relationships as set out in the three hypotheses and provide a brief discussion on the outcomes. The second part of the chapter will provide a preliminary conclusion, in the form of a table which sets out some of the most important findings of the case-analyses. The conclusion in chapter 8 will largely draw on the narrative of the table and set out two recommendations for future policymakers and one recommendation for future research.

### **7.1 Results**

Throughout this thesis it has been established what the valuable contribution is of DDR and SSR in the creation of sustainable peace. The set of DDR-SSR principles as set out in the theoretical framework is recommend for the international community to adhere in post-conflict peacebuilding. The Integrated DDR Standards has mentioned “the engagement by the international community in these areas is routinely criticised for failing to apply these key principles in practice” (IDDRTG, 2010: 4). The question that naturally arises is; what are the consequences of an integrated DDR-SSR approach on post-conflict security and what is the impact of post-conflict security on displacement? The activities of DDR and SSR go beyond the establishment of physical security. As they include socioeconomic progress, the dismantle of conflict-nurturing institutions and the reform of political institutions, they can be measured by two indicators of political transformation and political stability.

#### *7.1.1 Hypothesis I*

In line with  $H_1$  the first causal mechanism attempts to find a relationship between ( $X_1$ ) political transformation and (Y) displacement in Kosovo. Based on the timing of the research by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, twelve years after the establishment of the ceasefire and four years after the independence, it is expected the country has had enough time to build an effective autonomous government. In the literature it can be found that displaced individuals are more likely to return to their communities if they have the confidence that past committed war crimes and human rights abuses are not likely to happen again (England, 2012). The hypothesis is therefore stated as follows:

$H_1$ : If Kosovo has a score on political transformation above 5, it is expected to have a low level of displacement

The evidence from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index gives Kosovo on the political transformation a score of 6,70 out of 10 for the year 2012, and for the year 2014 a score of 6,60 out of 10. In both years Kosovo scores above the average score of five, thus affirming these scores on

political transformation can be accounted for as a high score. Now, the hypothesis expects a low level of displacement and this is partly true.

During the war more than 800.000 Kosovar Albanians fled the country and 500.000 people got internally displaced (UN Security Council, 1999B). After the establishment of a ceasefire more than 650.000 refugees and IDP's returned home, either spontaneous or with the help of the UNHCR (UN Security Council, 1999 D). This large-scale return complicated the availability of housing and other primary resources like medication, food and water. When the host countries announced to start initiating processes of forced return, the UNHCR advised them not to until they could guarantee basic safety and living standards for the returnees (UN Security Council, 2000). Overall, it must be noted that the number of forced returns has always exceeded the number of voluntary returns. From the total numbers of returnees 70% were deported or forced to return (DCAM, 2013). While the UNHCR reports a decrease in the number of refugees, it does not necessarily mean the country was completely safe. Looking at the number of IDP's, the statistics show a slight increase after the establishment of the ceasefire until 2004 after which the number decreases marginally.

Based on the 2011 population census the Kosovo Diaspora is calculated to be 874.000. The main reasons for Kosovars to migrate outside of Kosovo are the high unemployment rates, to reunite with family and the poor improvements in health and social services. In 2015 the Albanians and Kosovars were the largest group of asylum seekers besides Syrians, if this trend continues it is expected that Germany will start with forced returns (Ristic, 2016). To answer the hypothesis, despite the high score on political reform there is no low level of displacement. Whether this can be attributed to post-conflict insecurity, or to the poor economic circumstances is not entirely clear. There is probably a combination of both small terrorist incident and the better economic perspectives outside Kosovo.

### *7.1.2 Hypothesis II*

In line with H<sub>2</sub> the causal mechanism attempts to find a relationship between (X<sub>1</sub>) political transformation and (Y) displacement in Libya. As Libya only in 2011 changed from an absolute regime into a democracy and only since December 2015 shows development towards a unified government it is not expected to have a high score on political transformation. Subsequently, due to the ongoing unrest it is also not expected for the country to have a low level of displacement. The hypothesis is stated as follows:

H<sub>2</sub>: If Libya has a score on political transformation below 5, it is expected to have a high level of displacement.

The evidence from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index gives Libya, on the political transformation, a score of 3,10 out of 10 for the year 2012, and for the year 2014 a score of 4,13 out of 10. In both

years Libya scores below the average score of five, thus affirming these scores on political transformation can be accounted for as a low score. The hypothesis expects a high level of displacement regarding the low scores on political transformation and this is true.

From the 1.8 million migrant workers residing in Libya, 790.000 fled the country in 2011. Most of them returned to their countries of origin, which caused Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania to call of national crises, because of the strain the returnees put on the economy (Dominguez & Pitt-Rashid, 2012). Among the Libyan population 600.000 got internally displaced and 150.000 fled the country in 2011. These numbers increased dramatically when the violence started to spiral out of control in 2014. At the time the UNHCR estimated the total internal displacement to be at 435.000 people, but the number could be higher as not all areas of Libya could be reached (UNHCR News Stories, 2015). Moreover, Libya still one of the most popular gateways to Europe. In 2014 and 2015 there have been reports of 400.000 to 600.000 people waiting at the shores of Libya for an opportunity to cross the Mediterranean. The data-analysis shows these migration streams are originating from the Sahel region and Central Africa. It can even be inferred, because of the low political transformation and the ongoing violence human trafficking rings could grow and attract even more migrants. Taking this into consideration it means there are probably more refugees within Libya than there are Libyan refugees in neighbouring countries.

### *7.1.3 Hypothesis III*

In line with H<sub>3</sub> the causal mechanism attempts to establish a relation between (X<sub>2</sub>) 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' and (Y) displacement. The common characteristic for both countries in this variable is the calculated alert-zone. Countries scoring on 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' at the 19,8% level or below belong to the most highly alerted countries of the UN. These countries are expected to experience either political instability or ongoing violence and terrorism, or both. This is assumed to have a negative influence on displacement and therefore the hypothesis is stated as follows:

H<sub>3</sub>: If a country has a percentage score of 19,8% or lower on political stability and absence of violence it is expected to fall in the alert-zone and have a high level of displacement.

To start with Kosovo, Figure 1 in chapter 6 shows the scores on 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' for the years 2008 until 2014 . When in February 2008, the country received its political status of independence UNMIK remained mandated for a transition period of 120 days. Even after the transition of all legislative and executive authority, UNMIK kept a tight supervision on Kosovo (International Crisis Group, 2006). Looking at the graph the scores on political stability and absence of violence are significantly higher for 2008 and 2009 than for the years that follow. The country experienced a sharp decline in 2010, which corresponds to the political polarisation happening that

year concerning the elections (UN Security Council, 2010). From 2010 until 2013 the scores on 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' were subsequently; 13,7% - 15,1% - 16,1%. During this period the country falls in the alert-zone and is expected to endure political instability and/or ongoing violence. The most important threat on this variable is posed by the Serbian parallel security and intelligence structures in Northern Kosovo. In the end of the year 2013 the Serbian and Albanian governments agreed to work on the reconciliation of their century long dispute. The effects of that agreement can be witnessed when the score in 2014 nearly doubles to 32,5%. It is difficult to derive from the case- and data-analysis whether the high level of displacement during the years Kosovo was in the alert-zone can be contributed to post-conflict insecurity. The reports of the Secretary General during that period, indicate some small incidents related to the elections, but in general call the overall security situation generally calm (UN Security Council, 2011; UN Security Council, 2012).

For Libya, Figure 2 in chapter 6 shows the scores on 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' for the years 1996 until 2014. It immediately appears the scores for 2011 until 2014 are very low counting for; 11,8% - 6,6% - 4,7% - 4,4%. This means since the outbreak of the civil war in February 2011, Libya has been in the alert-zone. During this period the country is expected to endure political instability and/or ongoing violence. The relationship between 'Political Stability and Absence of Violence' and displacement is strong. The country struggles with a very high internal displacement counting for more than 435.000 Libyans, but the most significant strain on Libya's security are the external causes of forced migration originating from the Sahel region and Central Africa. Security and displacement in Libya are in a vicious circle where the one causes more instability in the other and so on.

## **7.2 Conclusion**

This conclusion will briefly summarise the detected relationships for each individual case. The mission in Kosovo established one of United Nations' most advanced democracies after a military intervention (Buono de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). This was only possible because the international community had a strong civil and military presence in the region, which consequently resulted in a well-integrated DDR-SSR Nexus. The scores on political transformation are high and stable, while the score on political stability and absence of violence indicate a period of three years where Kosovo falls in the alert-zone. After considering all the evidence, also from the literature analysis, it can be concluded the third hypothesis probably explains the relationship between post-conflict security and displacement in Kosovo the best. Over the studied years there existed some post-conflict violence which was largely connected to the stability of the political situation in Kosovo.

Despite the fact the NATO intervention in Libya was seen by most as a very successful one, NATO could not prevent the country to fail at the establishment of a modern state. The evidence on both hypotheses show low scores on political transformation and even lower scores on political

stability and absence of violence. The lack of an effective government and the small role of the international community in coordinating the peacebuilding process, resulted in an incoherent DDR-SSR approach. Evidence from the case-analysis suggest the principles of the DDR-SSR Nexus are hardly applied by the Libyan authorities. All this caused post-conflict violence to continue and to increase the level of displacement both originating from within Libya as originating from without Libya.

### **7.3 Discussion**

For this section it is decided to summarise some of the most important findings in a table overview (see for Table 4 page sixty-seven). The studied cases have very different country characteristics, it is therefore not possible to directly compare the results. However, the table reflects upon the choices made within each post-conflict situation and provides the narrative for the final conclusion.

Table 4			
<i>Results of the case analyses and personal commentary</i>			
	<b>Kosovo</b>	<b>Libya</b>	<b>Commentary</b>
NATO	Air campaign  Humanitarian intervention - illegitimate	Air campaign  Responsibility to protect - legitimate	Both NATO interventions were an air campaign. The illegitimate intervention (according to international law) has interestingly be more successful than the legitimate intervention.
International presence	Full take-over of governmental functions (UNMIK) and international security presence (KFOR)	United Nations supportive mission. Little international presence, but no international security presence on the ground.	In Libya the expectation was: NTC would form an effective government and rebuild Libya from the ground up. The international community was too eager to believe Libya could do this alone and reality has shown the opposite. Kosovo had no state or government when it seceded from Serbia, but the international community decided in this case to take over all governmental functions and have blue helmets present on the ground.
Demographic differences	Two ethnic groups Serbians and Albanians	± 140 different tribes	Unifying al people under one government, as one population, is much more a challenge for the authorities in Libya than for the authorities in Kosovo.
Institution building	Building institutions from scratch	Building institutions from scratch	The international community took over the task of institution building in Kosovo. In Libya this has been led by the NTC before a new elected government could take it over. Until today this has not happened yet, and it would only be fair to await (regarding the recent unification of the government) their proceed to this matter.
Monopoly of force	Decisions made by the international civil presence and continued supervision after declaration of independence.	For an interim period decisions were made by NTC. In 2012 the country split between two rival parliaments, but recent negotiations led to the unification of both parties in one government.	In Kosovo the monopoly of force was strongly centred under UNMIK. This proved to be successful in the integration of the different ethnic groups. Especially over the last year, due to continuous UN sponsored dialogue, both Serbian and Albanians recognise the need for reconciliation. Libya was until recently not able to create one unified government. It resulted in a very fragmented society. In 2015 both rival governments reached agreement with UN sponsored negotiations
DDR and SSR	Integrated process of demobilisation and reintegration in security forces. Strong attention for equal representation of the different ethnic and vulnerable groups. Strong attention for local representation in governmental factions.	Strong ideas for the disarmament of fighting militias, but the hybrid arrangements between them and the NTC complicated the total DDR program. Strong attention for the reform of the security sector, but actual progress in this area has been marginal.	Kosovo had no authorities after the secession of Serbia, this is why the UN controlled all state-building and peacebuilding activities. Libya did have an interim administration (NTC), but the international community should have presumed - <b>on the basis of the severity of the situation</b> – it was a country without any administration. It should have been just as a clear as with Kosovo, the state needed to be rebuild from scratch. It should have been clear when the NTC was not able to hold successful elections all other peace- and state-building activities would be complicated.
Hypotheses	H <sub>1</sub> Partly true H <sub>3</sub> True	H <sub>2</sub> True H <sub>3</sub> True	The difficulty for the outcomes of Kosovo's hypotheses are the economic aspects that probably drive displacement, but there are some indications of internal insecurity as well. Libya's hypothesis can be clearly tested for being true.

## 8 Conclusion

Security no longer exists only as the “study of threat, use and control of military force” (Del Rosso, 1995). Security includes, besides the protection of territory, also the protection of people. Security is a right for people to live in freedom, participate fully in their government, enjoy the protection of fundamental human rights, have access to the primary necessities of life and live in a healthy environment (OECD, 2001: 38). During times of war people often lose these basic security rights and it drives people to flee their usual place of residence. Accordingly this thesis aimed to answer the question: *what is the impact of post-conflict security on the level of displacement in Kosovo and Libya?*

Since the establishment of NATO there were three air-supported missions, one in Bosnia, one in Kosovo and one in Libya (Hunter, 2011). The NATO interventions in both Kosovo and Libya were deployed in a somewhat similar manner, but the outcomes were completely different. In Kosovo the international community decided to intervene without the authorisation of the UN and thus contravening article 2.4 of the UN Charter, while in Libya they acted in full accordance with international law under the responsibility to protect. It cannot be said, the legitimate NATO intervention in Libya has been more successful than the illegitimate intervention in Kosovo. Military speaking the international community was very pleased with Operation Unified Protector, but the aftermath of the war has posed great risks for the security of the entire region. After the UN called upon ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the Libyan population, it was explicitly stated by the UN a foreign occupation force was not allowed to enter Libyan territory. After the intervention in Kosovo, NATO could easily transform some of its troops into ‘blue helmet’ peacekeepers. Whereas in Libya the entire role of NATO was supportive to the NTC and local militias. The prohibition of having a foreign occupation force on Libyan territory probably influenced the UN’s decision to refrain from having a ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping mission. When comparing the outcomes of the NATO’s interventions, this might have been the critical difference which caused Libya to be where it is today.

The NATO mission in Kosovo has been more successful in creating long-term sustainable peace. However, it is remarkable that most of the post-conflict violent incidents were war-related revenge, committed by Kosovar Albanians and directed towards the the Kosovar Serbs. Due to the tight supervision of the UNMIK and the strong law enforcement of the KFOR these incidents posed only a small threat to the internal security of the country. The international presence was able to quickly initiate a coherent process of DDR and SSR and partly unify the population under one leadership. The biggest challenge for the security in Kosovo were the Serbian parallel security and intelligence structures in the northern part of the country. Over the last two years the UN as consistently organised dialogues between the Kosovar and Serbian government, which in 2013 resulted in an agreement to reconcile their differences at last. For this reconciliation to take place the international community had to strictly supervise all government functions, even after the

independence of Kosovo for fourteen years. From this perspective it is difficult to understand, why there were no lessons learned for the situation in Libya.

Libya's biggest security challenge has been the absence of an effective government. As the NTC could not establish successful post-conflict elections all other peacebuilding activities were complicated as well. The country slipped into a security vacuum and became politically fragmented when the country split alongside rivaling parliaments. As UNSMIL was a supportive mission and the country was divided by two governments, it became difficult for the donor community to support Libya in structuring an effective unified government. Additionally, just after the establishment of a ceasefire the NTC encountered great personnel and arms deficits in the national security forces. As the country was struggling with inadequate national security coordination the local militias felt obliged to protect their own communities (Chestrich, 2014). Subsequently the NTC putted some of these militias on the government payroll as they were better trained, equipped and staffed than the Libyan Armed Forces and the Libyan Police Service. These hybrid arrangements negatively affected the willingness of other rebel groups to disarm and give up their newly acquired power. In the aftermath of the civil war Libya was unable to reduce the continuous violence due to the weakness of the armed forces, the weakness of institutions and the proliferation of weapons across the country.

The lack of an effective government in Libya has contributed to the inadequate international assistance and has increased the number of refugees and IDP's. Besides, the ongoing violence attracted many new radical armed groups and allowed the human trafficking business to expand. This has increased migration from the Sahel region and other countries in Central Africa, making it even more difficult to resolve the internal security threats that Libya is struggling with. The high displacement in Kosovo does seem to contradict the expectation that high scores on political transformation results in a low level of displacement. In general, the collected evidence from the literature attributes the high displacement to the poor economic situation of the country. On the other hand the scores on political stability and absence of violence do correspond more adequately with the high levels of displacement.

In line with this conclusion it is recommended to policymakers and practitioners that future peacebuilding missions do not implement isolated activities of DDR and SSR. Especially when the world is witnessing an increasing number of civil war outbreaks, traditional peacekeeping activities will not achieve the desired results. An integrated DDR and SSR approach is found to be most suitable for dealing with institution reform, state-building, reconciliation between fighting factions and reintegration of ex-combatants into national security forces. Moreover, as the increasing civil war outbreaks produce massive streams of displacement, DDR and SSR can together (re)build the confidence of displaced individuals in their state. The first most likely opportunity for the international community to initiate a peacebuilding process using the DDR-SSR Nexus will be in Syria. A second policy advice for the international community would be to learn from their mistakes in Libya and to

evaluate best practices from other cases. As Syria lies in an already fragile region, the donor community cannot afford to make mistakes.

In line with the recommendation above, it would be valuable to conduct a more in depth study on the position of tribes in countries in North Africa and the Middle East. It was demonstrated in the case of Libya tribes hold a strong position in society and their existence can alter the outcome of an established ceasefire. Unfortunately, due to time constraints it was not possible to conduct further research to the development of tribes and their specific influences on, for example, politics. The development of such a research could be conducted in the form of a multiple case-study in order to infer which tribal aspects are unique for what specific country characteristics. A larger N-study will also enhance the quality of the findings and enable for generalisation. The outcomes of the study can aid the international community when preparing their assistance in, for example, Syria and tailor the peacebuilding process to the needs of the country.

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# 10 Appendix



Map No. 4133 Rev. 03 UNITED NATIONS  
July 2015 (Colour)

Department of Field Support  
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

