Universiteit Leiden

A Policy Frozen in Ice?

An examination of United States Discursive Securitization of the Arctic

MSc Thesis

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore to what extent the United States discursively securitizes the Arctic region through its Arctic policies. Utilizing securitization theory devised by Buzan et al (1998), this thesis specifically examines the extent to which the United States securitizes the Arctic according to five security sectors: the military; political; economic; environmental and societal sectors. The thesis adopts discourse analysis as per Hansen (2006) as its analytical method. By conducting a discourse analysis of nineteen official United States policy documents and sixteen additional documents such as speeches and official governmental statements, this thesis examines to what extent the United States securitized its Arctic affairs across the five security sectors over time. The findings show that before the Cold War and leading up to the end of the Cold War, the United States primarily securitized the political/military sector through its policy discourse, and merely touched upon the economic and environmental sectors. Following the end of the Cold War until the present, the United States continued to securitize the military/political sector, and expanded its securitization to include the economic and environmental sectors too, but it did not securitize the societal sector. Despite an increase in discursive securitization moves over time, the thesis finds that United States' presence in the Arctic has wavered since the end of the Cold War. The research also finds that despite a long history of activity in the Arctic, current Arctic policy security goals are lacking and those that exist are vague in their formulation. It is desirable for the United States to further clarify its Arctic policy moving forward.

Key Words: Discourse Analysis, Security Sectors, Securitization Theory, United States Arctic Policy

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

ACIA – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment

AEPS - Environmental Protection Strategy

AMAP – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

AMEC – Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation

ANR - The Alaskan NORAD Region

ANWR – Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

ARPA – Arctic Research Policy Act (1984)

CITES – Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

CLRTAP – Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution

EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone

EPA – Environmental Protection Agency

FON – Freedom of Navigation

IMO – International Maritime Organization

IAPG – Interagency Arctic Policy Group

IR – International Relations

DOC – Department of Commence

DOD – Department of Defense

DOI – Department of the Interior

DOS – Department of State

DOT – Department of Transportation

EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone

IARPC – Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee

NEPA – Environmental Policy Act

NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NORAD - North American Air Defense Command

NPRA – National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska

NSC – National Security Council

NSDD-90 – National Security Decision Directive 90

NSDM-144 – National Security Decision Memorandum 144

NSF – National Science Foundation

NSR – Northern Sea Route

NWP – Northwest Passage

SS – Traditional Security Studies

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USCG – United States Coast Guard

USGS – United States Geological Survey

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This chapter provides a few introductory paragraphs. First the main research problem will be outlined. Then, the main research question and four sub-questions will be defined. Further, both the academic and societal relevance of this study will be elaborated upon. Finally, a reader's guide will be provided to clarify the structure of the research.

1.1 – State of the Arctic and the United States as an Arctic state

When we think of the Arctic region, themes that may come to mind are its location at the northern-most point on the globe; the extreme weather conditions and the unique ecosystems that accommodate a large variety of animal species. The region also boasts vast cultural diversity with over 40 different indigenous groups who call the Arctic region their home (Arctic Centre University of Lapland). The Arctic region has captivated the imaginations of many explorers, traders, missionaries, scientists and even politicians for centuries, and yet it remains sparsely populated with many areas left unexplored and untouched by mankind. Despite its seeming isolation from the rest of the world, the narratives surrounding the Arctic since the late 20th century has focused on the region's geographical transformation induced by climate change (Tamnes, 2011). Although the Arctic is the fastest-warming region on earth, it has proven to be one of the most difficult regions for scientists to model in terms of indicators of climate change (Hansen et al, 2016). Prognoses vary greatly, with the most alarmist climate models predicting that the Arctic will be ice-free in the summer months as early as this decade while others warn that the Arctic is on pace to be sea ice free in summertime within 30 years (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Houser et al, 2015; Stang, 2015).

In recent decades there has been a shift in the political situation in the Arctic with emerging questions of sovereignty, legality and security. Given that the Arctic was largely ice-covered year-round only several decades ago, states did not regard it as an area of much use from a geopolitical perspective. The vast geographical transformations in recent decades induced by climate change has changed the region to such an extent, that now potential trade routes and sizable amounts of undiscovered oil and gas reserves are being exposed in the region. While states view these changes as positive developments for commerce and mobility, the receding Arctic ice has also affected states perception of their insecurity to new threats. One security implication has been the Arctic

becoming more accessible to other state and commercial actors, potentially increasing the risk of boundary disputes, accidents during resource development, and changing regional governance (Greaves, 2016b; NOAA's Arctic Action Plan, 2014). Another security implication has been the emergence of a great variety of security issues that go beyond the traditional understandings of security to encompass unconventional threats like climate change (Greaves, 2016b). These realities have given the Arctic newfound geostrategic importance.

This thesis is concerned with analyzing United States Arctic policy and focusing on whether, and if so, to what extent, the United States securitized the Arctic through its policies. This thesis focuses exclusively on the United States' foreign policy towards the Arctic region. Specifically, a discourse analysis of various United States policy documents and speech acts centered on Arctic affairs will be conducted. Using the securitization theory devised by Buzan et al in 1998, the thesis will analyze whether and to what extent the United States securitized the Arctic through its Arctic policies.

Having purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire in 1867, the United States has since been an Arctic state, and has also been confronted with a rapidly changing Arctic. The United States is heavily reliant on foreign oil, and the prospect of decreasing this dependence makes energy exploration in the Arctic an attractive option for the United States Federal government. The Arctic is therefore seeing an incremental growth of industries and commerce which will likely continue to expand the more Arctic waters become ice-free in summer months (AMAP, 2007; National Research Council et al, 2014). These changes have spurred all the Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) to draft Arctic policies and strategies to adapt to both the challenges and opportunities presented by a changing Arctic.

The United States must deal with other Arctic states increasing their activities in the region. In an attempt to assert dominance and to preemptively lay claim to certain geographical areas, Arctic states like Russia, Canada and Denmark began engaging in more aggressive tactics to increase their regional presence both militarily an discursively. A high-profile example of this was in the summer of 2007 when Russian submarines planted a Russian flag encased in titanium on the Lomonsov Ridge to validate Russia's 2001 claim that the ridge is an extension of the continental shelf and therefore Russian sovereign territory (Stuhltrager, 2008). While this display held no legal standing, it was a demonstration of Russian presence in the region through soft power and is an example of the gradual securitization of the Arctic by Arctic states. Other developments

have been several Arctic countries investing in modernizing their military capabilities in the region; deploying warships in Arctic waters and having strategic bombers fly close to other states' airspace; and increasing the number of military exercises in the Arctic (Greaves, 2016b). Being an Arctic State, the United States is affected by these developments.

Purely discursive threat perceptions have increased in recent years as well. While these have not yet materialized, several Arctic States including the United States worry about increasingly accessible Arctic waters potential to increase the risks of irregular migration, smuggling, illegal shipping and even terrorism (Greaves, 2016b; NSPD-66). In addition to these rising threat perceptions, there will likely be a rise in civilian activity in the Arctic such as resource extraction, tourism, and commercial shipping. Finally, several non-Arctic states also have vested interests in the Arctic, with countries like China actively surveying possibilities to establish a regional presence (Wishnick, 2017). These factors all place additional pressure on Arctic countries' militaries to conduct search and rescue operations in case of emergency scenarios, including the United States (United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, 2013).

1.2 – Research question

The aim of this thesis is to answer the following research question: *Have the United States' Arctic Policies securitized the Arctic, and if so; to what extent?*

1.3 – Sub-questions

To assist in navigating this thesis, the following sub-questions will be answered to provide a focused and a structured account:

1) *What is the securitization framework?* To be answered in Chapter 2 – Theoretical framework.
2) *What is the Arctic?* To be answered in Chapter 4 – Analysis Part 1.
3) *How did United States Arctic policy change over time?* To be answered across Chapter 5 – Analysis Part 2, and Chapter 6 – Analysis Part 3.
4) *What is the current state of United States Arctic Policy?* To be answered in Chapter 6 – Analysis Part 3.

1.4 – Academic and societal relevance

The current study has both academic and societal relevance. The linkage of this study to the field of Crisis and Security Management (CSM) is that the Arctic is a region where various security threats may arise in the near to distant future. Being the fastest warming region on earth, climactic changes in the Arctic will influence the geographical make-up of the entire planet; could influence interstate behavior; and thus could even change the way we study IR. It is currently a region that has received relatively little attention from IR and CSM scholars, but this will likely change in the near future. Depending on whose (in)security we consider, changes in the Arctic pose geological and political threats and opportunities alike for local, regional and global actors.

The academic significance of this research lies in its effort to have a detail oriented look at the currently existing literature on IR in the Arctic region, specifically looking at literature on securitization theory. This study will offer insights that will allow future research to implement old ideas in new ways while contributing to existing securitization research. Importantly, the academic significance of this thesis lies in its purpose to explore if, and to what extent, the United States securitized the Arctic by analyzing official United States federal discourse. Furthermore, a discourse analysis of official United States Arctic policy examining the extent to which the United States securitizes the Arctic has not been done prior to this academic contribution.

Regarding the societal relevance of this research, the findings could show the United States' official stance towards the Arctic regarding military/political, economic, environmental and societal security sectors. Furthermore, the research could contribute to overall knowledge regarding how Arctic states like the United States frame the Arctic in terms of security.

1.5 – Reading guide

The thesis consists of seven chapters and is built up as follows. In chapter 1, an introduction was given and the research question and sub-questions were introduced. The main aim of the thesis is to explore the extent to which the United States securitizes the Arctic region through its discourse in its official Arctic policies. In order to do so, chapter 2 will first present the theoretical background of IR scholarship on the Arctic. Next comes an exploration of the Arctic region as a stage for IR, followed by an elaboration on securitization theory used in the thesis. Chapter 3 provides information on discourse analysis, the methodology used in this research. It clarifies the selected research methods while subsequently justifies the appropriateness of these methods. It too

discusses how the literature was operationalized. Chapters 4 to 6 are analytical chapters, divided as parts 1 through 3. Chapter 4 explores the various definitions of the Arctic, and defines what the Arctic is in the context of this thesis. Chapter 5 analyzes the security discourses of United States Arctic policy leading up to, and during, the Cold War. Chapter 6 analyzes United States Arctic policy security discourses from the post-Cold War era until the present. Finally, Chapter 7, building the conclusion respectively, contains the answer to the main research question and a critical discussion of some limitations to this study, and suggests possibilities for future academic research.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework that will be applied to United States Arctic policy. To discuss Arctic policy in terms of this thesis, section 2.1 will provide a literature review of existing IR scholarship about the Arctic. Section 2.2 explores the Arctic as a forum for IR. Subsequently, sections 2.3 to 2.5 will elaborate on the relevant theory regarding the Copenhagen School and the Securitization Framework, in turn answering the first sub-question: 'What is the securitization framework?'

2.1 – Literature review of IR scholarship on the Arctic

International Relations (IR) in the Arctic region can roughly be divided into two distinct periods: the period between the end of WWII and the end of the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period in which we find ourselves today. The former period has been characterized by bipolar Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States where the Arctic region was largely utilized by the two superpowers for military mobilization on their only common border, and where little other developments occurred beyond military securitization until the late 1980s (Steinberg, 2014; Åtland, 2008). The latter period proves much more complicated. With the fall of the Soviet Union came the shift in balance of power from a bipolar to a unipolar world order. This coincided with the radical transformation of the Arctic environment where large portions of sea-ice were melting at record speeds due to climate change. The proliferation of the Copenhagen School of security studies in IR in the 1980s facilitated the conditions for scholars to look at a broader range of security issues in the Arctic that extended beyond traditional military and political security to encompass other security dimensions like cultural, food, health, economic and environmental security (Jacobsen and Herrmann, 2017).

The earliest literature about IR in the Arctic was written in the 1990s with notable theoretical contributions from institutionalists like Young who wrote about Arctic environmental protection and interstate cooperation on Arctic affairs (1999). Later, several poststructuralist authors like Neumann (1994), Hønneland (1998) and Keskitalo (2004) all wrote about region-building and identity politics of the Nordic Arctic states. While in recent years there have been several academic works which have tried to illustrate the unique and interdisciplinary security dynamics and IR in the changing Arctic, these works are few and far between (Badell, 2016;

Jacobsen and Herrmann, 2017; Steinberg, 2014). More common are scholarly works which focus exclusively on single facets of IR in the Arctic, particularly the re-militarization of Arctic States like Russia and Canada (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Conley and Rohloff, 2015) and newfound energy exploration prospects (Ebinger and Zambetakis, 2009; Howard, 2009; Keil, 2015). More recently securitization theory had become a more popular analytical tool in IR when analyzing a single case-study. For example, Åtland wrote about how Mikhail Gorbachev famously discursively de-securitized Soviet Arctic policy during a speech in 1987 as part of the Murmansk Initiative (2008), and Greaves wrote about how countries like Canada and Norway use the Arctic to securitize their national identity (2016a).

IR scholars are also debating the extent to which the Arctic has conflict potential. Reasons for possible conflict revolve around disputes over previously inaccessible resources, shipping routes and geographical spaces which are becoming increasingly accessible due to the melting Arctic sea-ice. Some Arctic states are also actively building up their military presence in the region to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Conley and Rohloff, 2015). In addition, some non-Arctic countries are aggressively pursuing involvement in Arctic affairs, China being the most notable example. The involvement of non-Arctic states could also theoretically further complicate the dynamics of regional international relations (Wishnick, 2017; Wright, 2011). Despite these theoretical security threats, the profound changes in the Arctic's geographical make-up have facilitated conditions for cooperation among Arctic and non-Arctic states in the domains of environmental protection, combating the effects of climate change and the expansion of regional governance through international regimes, organizations and international agreements. While territorial disputes have occurred and exist today, so far conflicts of interest between states in the Arctic have not led to overt military confrontation. While some scholars acknowledge that conflict in the region cannot be ruled out completely given the factors discussed above, more are optimistic that the Arctic region will remain an area free from hostilities and will serve instead as an area for multilateral – both intergovernmental and interregional – cooperation, among Arctic and non-Arctic states alike (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Ebinger and Zambetakis, 2009; Le Mière and Mazo, 2013).

Regarding United States Arctic policy in particular, a reoccurring theme is the seeming contradiction of the United States policy where on one hand it states that the United States has national security interests in the Arctic, while on the other hand it has been relatively inactive

compared to most other Arctic states (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Steinberg, 2014). Furthermore, there is academic consensus that for the United States to be able to balance its environmental and economic goals, it must expand its fleet and clarify its environmental policy, because "[a]lthough at long last the United States has an interagency Arctic strategy in hand [under Obama], it continues to lack needed capabilities to ensure it plays a significant role in the Arctic global commons" (Conley and Kraut, 2010: 8). Other noteworthy commonalities in literature pertain to the United States' failure to ratify UNCLOS, and the detrimental effects this is having for United States regional policy credibility and national security (Bert, 2012; Conley and Kraut, 2010; Pedrozo, 2013). Despite these works, none have conducted a systematic discourse analysis of official United States policy documents examining to what extent the United States securitizes the Arctic through official federal discourse.

2.2 – The Arctic as a forum for international relations

With the Arctic's increased geo-political significance comes the need to regulate increased human activity through existing international regimes, and those specific to the Arctic, to protect the fragile environment and avoid inter-state conflict. Current regimes specific to the Arctic include the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which is an international regime adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2014 to regulate Polar navigation. In addition, the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, a high-level intergovernmental forum with eight-member states dealing with Arctic affairs, signified the increasing geopolitical significance of the Arctic. Members of the Arctic Council are the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. In addition, there are currently thirteen non-Arctic states with observer status in the AC. The Arctic Council has a policy of chairmanship when Arctic State members chair the organization for two years, granting them the opportunity to steer Arctic Affairs in certain directions. So far, the United States has chaired twice; the first time in 1988-90, and the second time in 2015-17. Through the Arctic Council came the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, an international treaty concluded among the member states of the Arctic Council in 2011. It coordinates international search and rescue coverage and response in the Arctic and delegates areas of search and rescue responsibility to each state party. Despite numerous territorial disputes, the binding treaty states that "the delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and shall

not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction" (Arctic Council, 2011). The establishment of the treaty reflects the Arctic region's growing economic importance because of its improved accessibility due to global warming. Several United States federal agencies responsible for emergency response and security have documented the need for capabilities that are informed by science in various Arctic policies (USCG Arctic Strategy, 2013; DOD Arctic Strategy, 2013; NOAA's Arctic Vision and Strategy, 2011; United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030, 2014).

In terms of international regimes, the 1984 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) holds significant clout in Arctic affairs. All Arctic states except for the United States have ratified UNCLOS, which has profoundly complicated inter-state cooperation in the region. While the United States has so far largely upheld the provisions set out by UNCLOS in the Arctic, Arctic Council members are frustrated by the United States' failure to ratify the convention (Ebinger and Zambetakis, 2009).

2.3 – Copenhagen School and the securitization framework

Traditional Security Studies (SS) saw security exclusively in terms of the state and its ability to exert military force. Following the end of the Cold War came the Constructivist push to broaden and widen the notion of security that challenged the traditional theoretical approaches of realism and liberalism in IR (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The Copenhagen School was one such constructivist discipline which challenged traditionalists' restriction on the meaning of security, and called for an expansion of security to encompass a wider range of sectors to include not only political and military security; but to expand security into distinct economic, environmental and societal sectors as well (Buzan, 1983). Ole Wæver conceptualized security to be the result of specific types of speech acts (securitizations), and sectors became the name for observations that resulted from particular "dialects of securitization" (1997: 356). The move to broaden the definition of SS saw resistance from realist authors like Walt, who argued that "[d]efining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any […] important problems" (1991: 213). Regardless, the constructivist push had truly manifested in the IR discipline when Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde published their seminal book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), which combined the ideas of broadening security sectors and the use of speech acts when attempting to securitize a referent object.

Departing from traditional security studies, the Copenhagen School saw security as a political action (securitization of something), rather than an abstract ontological concept of something that already exists in the world 'out there'. Copenhagen School scholars believed that it is impossible to identify a single meaning for 'security', and that instead their focus should lie on what gives the notion of security political power (Buzan et al, 1998; Greaves, 2016a). The Copenhagen School called for scholars to study the process by which status quo political issues are hyper-politicized to become pressing security matters. This is done according to a spectrum where issues can be either depoliticized; politicized or securitized (Buzan et al, 1998). Securitizing of certain issues grants securitizing actors the power to (re-)frame these issues as existential threats that require "emergency measures and justifying measures outside of the normal bounds of the political procedure" so long as an authoritative audience accepts a securitization move (Buzan et al, 1998: 25).

The securitization process does not occur in a vacuum, and whether securitization succeeds or fails depends on several variables. The securitization framework states that securitization occurs as a two-stage process. Firstly, *securitizing moves* directed towards a referent object can theoretically be done by any group, but it is common for securitizing actors to be linked to sovereign states and political leaders which typically wield significantly more power in geopolitical settings compared to other actors like NGOs and indigenous people's groups. This is due to so-called *facilitating conditions* which are contextual factors that help explain why some securitization moves are more likely to be accepted by an *authoritative audience* compared to others. Facilitating conditions can include the credibility of the *securitizing actor* according to the authoritative audience; the discourse used by the securitizing actor in their securitization moves; and the features of the object to be securitized (Buzan et al, 1998). Despite non-state actors being disadvantaged, the Copenhagen School seeks to expand the scope of securitization studies below and above the state by incorporating non-state actors as potential securitizing actors.



Figure 1: The Securitization Process as per the Copenhagen School, adopted from Buzan et al 1998

While many issues can be subjected to securitizing moves because security is a social construct, this does not mean that anything can be easily securitized. From a constructivist perspective, when a referent object is securitized this does not mean that the object is in 'actual' danger. It is sufficient for a referent object to be securitized so long as the authoritative audience accepts the securitization move. As Wæver states, "[t]he *word* 'security' is the *act*; the utterance is the primary reality" (1995: 55). The goal of a securitization move is typically to transform and/or implement status quo policy into policy of a security-centric nature (Buzan et al, 1998). This brings us to the second phase of the securitization process, where a securitizing move must be *accepted by an authoritative audience* for the issue to move away from the realm of regular politics into the issue becoming perceived as an existential security threat (Balzacq, 2005). The success or failure of a securitization move depends on whether the audience accepts the move or rejects it (Buzan et al, 1998). A securitizing actor needs a complying audience precisely because securitization goes beyond normal politics where rules can be broken in the name of security. Securitized issues are therefore often framed in terms of existential threats to win over the target audience: "if we [the group seeking to securitize an issue] do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)" (Buzan et al, 1998: 24).

2.4 – The five security sectors

This thesis will use the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to evaluate if, and to what extent, the United States securitizes the Arctic through its Arctic policies across five sectors. While the 1998 framework devised by Buzan et al, will be used:

1. *Military:* is about relationships of forceful coercion, and the ability of actors to fight wars with each other…
2. *Political:* is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition…
3. *Societal:* is about the sustainability of collective identities…
4. *Economic:* is about relationships of trade, production and finance….
5. *Environmental:* is about the relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.

The scheme above is directly cited from Buzan et al (1998: 7).

It is noteworthy to acknowledge that some in academia find dividing securitization issues into sectors problematic because it risks oversimplifying that these sectors are ontologically linked, and that one sector cannot truly be separated from another (Eriksson, 1999; Walt, 1991). For example, an environmental securitization move is inherently political in nature, and cannot be truly separate. Others contend that if one maintains the logic of sector-based securitization, more sectors can be added like food, law, religion, identity and human security (Floyd, 2010). Albert and Buzan address these issues as well, stating that while relevant, such debates are teleological (2011). The framework by Buzan et al, is an attempt to make analyzing securitization more accessible (1998). While I acknowledge the point of criticism directed at the sectoral approach, and I too foresee that there are overlaps between various sectors - I think that it is very well suited when analyzing the Arctic region because the Arctic is an excellent case-study where many emergent security dynamics are currently at play. United States Arctic policies explicitly touch upon several of these security sectors and separating them to dedicate analysis to each will only serve to yield a richer discourse analysis of United States Arctic securitization. I will therefore adopt the sector-based framework in my analysis of United States Arctic policies, using the specification of each sector's meaning as formulated by Buzan et al, (1998).

Given the close relationship between the military and political sectors in the context of United States Arctic policy, they will be combined in this thesis because the two are inherently

linked. As stated by Buzan et al, sectors can be treated as specific types of interactions: "the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion [and] the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition" (1998: 6). Both sectors stem from traditional security studies where the referent object of security was primarily the state actor exerting its power through military and political means, and both often function in tandem.

2.5 – The levels of analysis

As part of the Copenhagen School's expansion into multiple sectors, it also stated that securitization can be studied at different levels of analysis:

1. *International systems:* referring to global geo-politics, the most macro-level level of analysis
2. *International subsystems*: which are based within the international systems. They can operate regionally, economically and ideologically.
3. *Units:* which typically share a common identity, goal etcetera. Buzan et al refer to this level as "states, nations, [and] transnational firms."
4. *Subunits:* which refers to "organized groups of individuals within units that are able to affect the behavior of the unit."
5. *Individuals:* being the most micro-level of analysis.

The scheme above is directly cited from Buzan et al (1998: 6-7).

Applicable for this thesis are level 3 in particular, and level 2 to a limited extent. Level 3 because the United States is a single unit of analysis, and level 2 because the United States is involved in larger regional international organizations like the Arctic Council.

3. Methodology

This chapter provides information on the methodology used in this research – discourse analysis – and clarifies the properties of the selected method while subsequently justifying its appropriateness. Further will be demonstrated how the literature on discourse analysis was operationalized and which official Arctic policy documents were selected for analysis.

3.1 – Case study design and case selection

This research is designed to be an exploratory analysis of whether, and if so, to what extent, the United States securitizes the Arctic region through its Arctic policies. This thesis uses the securitization framework put forward by Buzan et al (1998) to explore whether the United States securitizes one or more of the five securitization sectors: military/political, economic, environmental and societal sectors. To measure whether, and to what extent, the sectors are present within policy documents, a technique must be employed that is designed to expose the processes that go into a securitization move, and the resulting effects following successful securitization. Having been used in other works that examine securitization, discourse analysis will be used to examine to what extent the United States securitizes the Arctic. While widely used in various academic disciplines, the term 'discourse analysis' lacks a universal definition. It is therefore unsurprising that opinions differ about what the term means, and what should be analyzed specifically (Balzacq, 2010). This thesis will not engage with the extensive debates surrounding the meaning of discourse analysis beyond discussing those that are commonly used within the security studies discipline.

3.2 – Discourse and securitization theory

When studying whether certain phenomena are securitized, a useful method to identify indicators of securitization is to analyze the discourse through which the issue of interest is framed. Within the securitization framework, security is seen as a social construct that is not simply an objective or subjective condition. Rather, security is the result of a specific discursive function with a rhetorical structure that is purposefully designed to be persuasive enough that the authoritative audience accepts it. This persuasion is done through a speech act, a discursive utterance that has a performative function in language and communications, meaning that specific language is uttered which functions as a form of social action designed to bring about change in the world (Peoples

and Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Within the Securitization framework this is no different, as securitizing speech acts are conceptualized to attain the goal of bringing about change from the status quo by transforming an initially non-security issue into one of security priority (Buzan et al, 1998; Wæver, 1995).

Language plays a central role in securitization because objects, subjects and material structures are all given meaning through discursive practices wherein every political action based in language serves a political purpose (Hansen, 2006). As Fairclough states, discourse is the "use of language seen as a form of social practice" where an issue is constructed to have a preconceived impact on a social issue (in Grindheim, 2009: 4). In terms of securitization, a wide array of issues can be framed as security threats through speech acts that are based in security language. As stated by Buzan et al (1998), language can be used to construct an issue as a security threat in a combination of ways:

1. By framing an object as existentially threatened and;
2. By framing an issue as though extraordinary action is needed to deal with the threat and;
3. By justifying the need to implement extra-ordinary action which breaks the conventions that make-up the status quo.

The scheme above is directly cited from Buzan et al, (1998: 36-39).

The Securitization framework's focus on the speech act has also brought with it criticism from authors who argue that this focus is too narrow, and that other forms of communication are also forms of discourse. Balzacq (2010) argues that means of communication like bureaucratic practices, writing, symbols, pictures and audio-visual stimuli are all forms of discourse. This is relevant to note in the context of this thesis because the understanding of discourse will not be limited to speech acts because official Arctic policies are predominantly written forms of discourse. While the thesis will explain the context surrounding when, where and why a speech or policy was drafted where applicable, a discourse analysis does not allow one to discern motives behind the text since the object of study is the text and nothing else. Motives (whether 'real' or just politically desirable) are relevant only insofar that they are explicitly part of the text. As argued by Hansen, "without knowledge of a key political vocabulary and its conceptual history one would be unable to identify the precise contextualized constitution of meaning" (2006: 75).

3.3 – Discourse analysis and securitization theory

Discourse analysis has a broad range of understandings and can be defined in a variety of ways. This thesis will not engage in discussions of what is meant by discourse analysis outside of its use in securitization literature. Within securitization literature, discourse analysis is a popular methodology used by scholars to analyze language used in political texts to transform public problems into questions of security. As a method, discourse analysis is used to demonstrate how different elements in the social world interact (Hansen, 2006). According to Balzacq, because the securitization framework's central focus is to analyze discursive construction of threats, the technique used to achieve this "needs to be tailored to the task of uncovering the structures and practices that produced the threat image whose source, mechanisms, and effects we want to explicate" (2011: 39). Discourse analysis is one such technique, and has proven useful when exploring a text's meaning, the context within which a text was created, and who created the text and for what purpose (Balzacq, 2011; Hansen, 2006).

The role of power is also an important element of discourse. Depending on the actor considered, the degree to which an actor can exercise and project their power on a discursive level can vary. In addition, the extent to which power projection will be accepted by other actors also depends on an actors' position of power. Politicians are typically privileged actors who possess a degree of power sufficient to establish a discourse and set a policy agenda (Buzan et al, 1998; Grindheim, 2009). Given that the texts analyzed in this thesis will be official United States policies and strategies from various United States Federal bodies, the discourse analysis will be an analysis of politics in text format. Analyzing policy papers is an important practice in the overall field of discourse analysis because "it becomes imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or of the status quo as something that is upheld by key actors through discourse" (Hajer, 1995: 55). Given that politicians are in a position of power to put forth their set of perceptions into the public domain through discursive means, analyzing the political texts they produce in addition to their speech acts provides valuable insight because discourse analysis is a perspective on reality which highlights meaning-making. Discourse analysis provides a different insight on reasoning and political behaviors compared to other methodologies (Grindheim, 2009).

Importantly, discursive utterances can contain overlapping security discourses that touch upon multiple security sectors at once (Buzan et al, 1998: 45). This is true in the case of all the United States official policies too, as they often call for dealing with economic or environmental

security questions while simultaneously stressing the importance of maintaining national security for example. Security discourses do not exist in isolation, and are often interlinked. Therefore, there will be overlap in themes where applicable when discussing the security sectors.

3.4 – Operationalization

This thesis aims to see the extent to which the United States securitizes the Arctic region through its discourse in its official Arctic policies. The method used is Hansen's intertextual model, which analyzes the official discourse presented in political (foreign policy) texts and speech acts (2006). This is a linguistic approach to texts where discourses are perceived as concrete texts or speeches. According to Hansen, discourse is "an interrelated set of texts" where each text produced has a discursive relationship with those produced in the past (2006: 50). This model also implies a more abstract approach to consider the context within which a text was produced and why its contents are as they are. This aspect focuses on the political situation at the time of a text's inception, those who were in power when they drafted the text, etcetera (Hansen, 2006). Discourse analysis is therefore not limited to explicit elements like direct quotes and references, but also includes the implicit elements surrounding an issue such as secondary sources, references and catchphrases (Hansen, 2006: 51). The thesis will apply securitization theory to examine to what extent the United States securitized the Arctic through its policies. The sectoral approach will serve to make the analysis more dynamic and variegate by categorizing different aspects of security into clearer indicators of whether the Arctic is securitized across the five security sectors on a discursive level. This approach will furthermore allow for more precise extrapolation upon which conclusions can be drawn.

To study how Arctic security has been discursively constructed within United States security policymaking, and to what extent this corresponds with the securitization framework set out by Buzan et al, a structured and systematic study of relevant texts must be conducted to determine the relationship between these questions. Towards this purpose, this thesis will conduct an extensive analysis of Arctic foreign policy discourse in the United States, which will map out what meaning Arctic security has had in the past, and what meaning it has acquired throughout several decades of policymaking. In the case of foreign policy specifically, poststructuralist discourse analysis "gives epistemological and methodological priority to the study of primary texts [like] presidential statements and speeches" (Hansen, 2006: 74).



Figure 2: Elaborated research design for discourse analysis (Adopted from Hansen, 2006: 72)

Given that the vast majority of texts taken into consideration for this discourse analysis are governmental and presidential addresses, they would be categorized as *official discourses* (Intertextual Model 1) according to Hansen. It must be acknowledged however that limited spill-over will occur into the wider political debate (Model 2) and marginal political discourses (Model 3B) surrounding the Arctic region because many policy issues are interlinked and tend to go beyond official discourses. Examples of this for the United States include cooperation between other Arctic states, or accounting for indigenous groups lobbying for their own preservation in a changing Arctic environment. Regardless, the aim of this thesis is to contain the analysis to Model 1 as much as possible, and the texts elected are evidence for this. Hansen recommends that texts meet certain criteria to ensure that only the most relevant are selected. Texts must (1) be characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; (2) be widely read and attended to which ensures that texts have a central role in defining dominant discourses; and (3) have the formal authority to define a political position which signify the text's important status and power (from Hansen, 2006: 77).

Furthermore, Hansen gives options for the *number of selves* to be analyzed. In the case of this thesis, there is but one self – the United States. In addition, several temporal perspectives can be taken; either a singular moment in time, comparative moments or historical development (Hansen 2006). This thesis will examine Arctic policy development since the first Arctic policy of 1971, and will take a

historical development perspective because the documents considered were drafted within a span of forty-six years. A historical perspective also allows one to see how texts evolved and changed over time (Hansen, 2006: 70). The number of events taken into consideration for the analysis are *multiple – related by issue*, namely issues relating to the security sectors in the context of United States Arctic policy. The research design will thus take the following shape:



Figure 3: Research design for discourse analysis of United States Arctic policy (Inspired by Hansen, 2006)

The first official United States Arctic policy was devised in 1971, and will serve as the starting point for the analysis. A total of nineteen official policy documents (see Appendix 1 for full detail) will be analyzed, comprising the following:

- 6 Presidential memoranda/directives (1971, 1973, 1983, 1994, 2009 and 2016)
    - 3 of which were initially classified as secret upon issuing (1971, 1973 and 1983)
- 3 Executive Orders (1985, 2013, and 2017)
- 6 Strategies from various governmental agencies:
    - 2 NOAA Strategy (DOC) (2011 and 2014)
    - White House National Security Strategy (2010)
    - White House National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013) (Called 'Obama's Arctic Strategy' in this thesis for convenience and to avoid confusion).
    - USCG National Arctic Strategy (2013)
    - DOD Arctic Strategy (2013)
- 3 Guidelines/plans from various governmental agencies (2009 and 2014)

    - 2 Guidelines for United States Navy (the maritime component of DOD) (2009 and 2014)
    - 1 Implementation plan for 2013 White House National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2014)
- 1 Public Law (ARPA, 1984)

All nineteen documents considered comprise the entirety of official policy documents implemented by the United States as of 2017, and thus represent the entire historical overview of official United States Arctic policy documentation. As Hansen states, "[the] construction of an intertextual link produces mutual legitimacy and creates an exchange at the level of meaning" (2006: 51).

To enrich the intertextual analysis, an additional sixteen official discursive utterances by presidents and representatives relating to the Arctic will also be included (see Appendix 2 for full detail). They comprise the following:

- 1 fact sheet issued by the White House (2016)
- 1 presidential weekly address (2015)
- 4speeches by presidents (1987, 1993, 2010 and 2015)
- 7 statements by presidents or representatives (1971, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1988, 2013 and 2016).
- 1 message to Congress from a president (1970)
- 1 news conference by a president (2015)
- 1 conference call by senior administration officials (2014)

These documents were collected from the American Presidency Project open-source database, which contains a vast collection of speeches and statements made by American presidents. The database contained 279 documents on 'Arctic' alone, but most were excluded for the following reasons:

- They are irrelevant to United States Arctic foreign policy and thus the focus of this thesis, such as those utterances dealing exclusively with Alaskan State affairs;
- Many utterances dealt with similar topics; were repetitive; and had little added value to the major policy documents already considered in the thesis;

- Many utterances were made by people outside of presidential administrations;
- Several utterances were made during discussions, debates and presidential campaigns, where the Arctic was framed more as a theme of discussion rather than an explicit policy question.

When combining the official Arctic policies and supplementary texts from the American Presidency Project database, a total of thirty-five documents containing discursive utterances will be directly cited in the analysis.

According to Hansen, "not all foreign policy events have a similarly striking political saliency – the selection of moments should therefore also be analytically driven by changes in important political structures or institutions" (2006: 70). Because United States Arctic policies were rarely updated since 1971, all official policies are taken into account in this thesis despite this remark. Selections of the supplementary official discursive texts (Appendix 2) were typically made based on the proximity of time within which they were delivered with relation to the issuing of official United States Arctic policies. They are taken into account because these statements often contained additional information about the main policy document. For example, following the issuing of the Presidential Memorandum on the Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing on December 20, 2016, the same day followed a supplementary statement from Barack Obama regarding the policy document with additional information. Other selections were made based on when presidents commented on balancing between two or more security sectors as Nixon did for example on September 26, 1971, following the issuing of the first official United States Arctic policy: "I do not believe that the apparent conflict between oil and the environment represents a permanent impasse. Instead it presents a challenge […] to our engineering skills and […] our environmental conscience" (Statement on Trans-Alaskan pipeline). Further selections were made when presidents directly mentioned other governmental entities and their role in Arctic affairs as President Clinton did when talking about the USCG: "your support for scientific work, such as with your icebreakers in the Arctic, adds to the entire Nation's research base at a time when we need desperately to invest more in research and development for our future economy as well as for our environmental security" (Remarks to the USCG in Seattle, 1993).

The starting point for the analysis begins with identifying discourses wrapped in securitization language. While some texts state 'security' explicitly, most documents describe

security less overtly. An example is Obama's 2013 Arctic Strategy which three main strategic goals are: (1) Advance United States Security Interests; (2) Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship and (3) Strengthen International Cooperation. While the first point contains explicit securitization language, the other two points are less clear. Referring to the notion of *conceptual intertextuality*, Hansen argues that where certain concepts are articulated such as overt 'security' and more implicit examples like 'responsible stewardship', these "utterances rely upon implicit references to a larger body of earlier texts on the same subject" (Hansen, 2006: 51). Notions like 'stewardship' in the separate policy Arctic strategy of the USCG for example implies security through this utterance in the form of "*safe* marine transportation"; "prevention [of] environmental *threats*" and "*fundamental* to United States maritime *interests*" – all examples of utterances wrapped in securitization language (2013: 21).

Three of the documents analyzed were classified as *secret* upon their issuing in 1971, 1973 and 1983 respectively, although all were eventually declassified and made publically available (See Appendix 1). Whether sources are publically available or not may influence their accessibility as well as discursive content. The possibility cannot be ruled out that there remains content about the Arctic which is not publically available, and is therefore not included in the analysis.

As is typically the case within discourse analysis, the purpose of this thesis is not to judge United States Arctic policy, but rather to analyze the discursive intricacies that went into forming these policies. Being arguably the remaining global superpower and an Arctic state, the historical role of the United States in the Arctic region is valuable to analyze considering the region's growing geo-strategic importance in international relations. To conduct a discourse analysis of United States Arctic policies and speech acts is an adequate means to answer the research question.

Documents not analyzed in the discourse analysis include those that deal with specific areas of Arctic affairs like research, rather than high-level policy documents which include themes of national security and international cooperation. An example of this includes plans created by bodies like the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) which was created by ARPA 1984. IARPC is considered to the extent that it was a product of ARPA 1984 to be an agency that sets research agendas and presents research findings about themes like glaciers and ecosystems, but its findings will not be considered because these fall outside the scope of the research.

4. Analysis Part 1: Defining the Arctic

The Arctic is the northernmost region in the world. Unlike the continent of Antarctica, the Arctic is a region without easily identifiable borders – particularly when determining how far south the Arctic region extends. Studying the Arctic can therefore prove challenging, because different delineations are used by experts for varying purposes. This section will provide four examples of common definitions of the Arctic region and the definition the United States uses to delineate its portion of the Arctic region. This section will answer the second sub-question: 'What is the Arctic?'

4.1 – The Arctic Circle definition

According to this definition, the Arctic is all territory within the Arctic Circle. The Arctic Circle is an imaginary line that circles the globe at approximately 66°33'N of the equator, and marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the summer solstice, and does not rise on the winter solstice (National Snow and Ice Data Center). The area spans approximately 21 million km^2, and covers 8% of the earth's surface. The Arctic Circle definition has gained popularity among scientists and politicians because it offers strict delineations for the Arctic as a geographical space, and can be studied year-round without having to account for geological and meteorological variables for example. Though useful, this definition has several drawbacks. Monica Dunbar criticized the definition for being "a purely astronomical concept", which lacks nuance in its definition of the Arctic (1966, 14). The Arctic Circle definition excludes geographical sub-regions like the Bering Strait, the White Sea, the southern part of Greenland and the Hudson Bay – all regions which are climatologically similar to areas within the Arctic Circle.

4.2 — AMAP definition

The Arctic Council put forward its own definition of the Arctic through its Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) working group in 1991. This definition delineates the Arctic as an area in more flexible terms compared to those discussed previously, and remains open to future amendments and additions. Currently, the boundaries of the Arctic vary between the Arctic Circle and 60°N latitude (see Figure 4). The eight countries whose territories fall within these delineations also have the freedom to determine how far south their Arctic borders lie up until 60°N latitude. In addition, AMAP's definition includes the following areas that the Arctic Circle definition omits: Hudson Bay; The White Sea; The blue warm waters of the Norwegian Sea and The Northern Maritime Corridor. Combined, these territories comprise an area approximately 33.4 million km^2, of which 60% is defined as Arctic water (AMAP, 1998: 7, 10). This definition permits the AMAP to implement "multiple scientific, political and pragmatic criteria that have been blended together to reach consensus across sectors and between the [Arctic] states. However, the ambiguity and flexibility of this definition causes overlaps with the Sub-arctic, which in principle should be the transition zone between the Arctic proper and the temperate zone" (Østreng, 2010).

Figure 4: Arctic Circle and AMAP Definitions of the Arctic, AMAP

4.3 — 10°C July Isotherm and Arctic Tree Line definition

The *10°C July Isotherm* definition of the Arctic embodies any region where the average temperature is below 10°C during the summer month of July. It includes some areas south of the Arctic Circle, while it excludes other areas north of the Arctic Circle (AMAP, 1998). For example, parts of Alaska and Scandinavia which are otherwise located within the Arctic Circle are excluded in this definition. The definition of the Arctic based on the *Arctic tree line* is where the Arctic is delineated based on where trees cease to grow due to the harsh climate, and the landscape is frozen and dotted with shrubs and lichens (AMAP, 1998). Polar tree lines are dependent on local variables such as permafrost, and therefore vary per region. Alaska's tree line is estimated to be at a latitude of approximately 68°N, while that of the Central Siberian Plains is estimated to be at 72°N for example (Smithson et al, 2013). Both definitions offer a relatively coherent means to delineate the Arctic based on the natural features of the region, but these definitions are not optimal. For example, the two definitions incorporate the blue oceans of the North Atlantic and North Pacific into the Arctic, while they exclude several coastal areas of the Northeast Passage and Northwest Passage of the Arctic which play an important role in Arctic geopolitics (Østreng, 2010).

4.4 — The United States definition of the Arctic

Currently the United States defines the Arctic region under the Arctic Research Policy Act (1984) as "all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the arctic ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian Chain" (Section 112 of ARPA, 1984). Figure 5 below shows these delineations.

Figure 5: Arctic Boundary as defined by ARPA (1984)

This definition can also be found in Statute 15, § 4111, of the United States Constitution. "This definition includes certain parts of Alaska below the Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska, such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta" (O'Rourke, 2011: 2).

The remainder of the thesis will incorporate the ARPA definition, because it delineates the territory the United States claims is within its sovereign domain, and includes the Arctic Circle definition to delineate the Arctic territory that falls outside of its sovereign domain.

5. Analysis Part 2: Cold War Arctic Policy

This chapter presents an overview of the general themes of United States Arctic Policy leading up to, and during, the Cold War. Section 4.1 discusses United States Arctic policy before the United States drafted an official Arctic policy. It focuses on the period between WWII and 1971. Section 4.2 focuses on policy memorandum NSDM-144: the first time that an executive government body began devoting time to the Arctic, where the Arctic became a topic of explicit policy-making. Lastly, section 4.3 focuses on ARPA 1984, where United States Arctic policy took on a more public character in the waning years of, and following, the end of the Cold War. This section will partially answer the third sub-question: 'How did United States Arctic policy change over time?'

5.1 – Unofficial Arctic policy

While the Arctic is not typically associated with key events of the Second World War (WWII), it served as a strategic route for delivering aircraft from the United States to the Soviet Union to sustain the war effort on the Eastern front against Axis forces (Barr, 2013). In addition, between 1944 and 1947, the United States had constructed eight wind class icebreakers – the first ice-breakers in the United States fleet. As part of the Lend-Lease policy, the United States supplied its allies with food, oil, and materiel between 1941 and August 1945. The Soviet Union was also given three of the United States' wind class icebreakers during this period. Although various countries utilized the Arctic region for military purposes during the later stages of the war, the United States – while providing supplies and facilities to its allies – barely had a military presence in the far-North at the time.

Following the end of WWII, the United States attempted to setup offensive capabilities using part of its Air Force in the Arctic. the Arctic's strategic and military value was recognized by General Harp Arnold of the United States Air Force who in 1946 said: "[i]f there is a third world war […] its strategic center will be the North Pole" (in Murphy, 1947: 61). Initially this proved unrealistic, because the Air Force had underestimated the costs associated with deploying in the Arctic, and faced problems brought by the harsh climate (Emmerson, 2010). Following the Soviet Union's first successful nuclear detonation in 1949, the United States introduced a systematic program involving flights along Soviet territory to monitor potential Soviet nuclear activities in the Arctic. Buzan et al, argue that "because most political and military threats travel

more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbors more than distant powers" (1998: 12). Fearing a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union across the Arctic, in 1954 the United States allied with its northern neighbor Canada to mobilize the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) – a system of radar stations in the far northern Arctic region of Canada, with additional stations along the North Coast and Aleutian Islands of Alaska, in addition to the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Iceland. Furthermore, in 1958 the United States and Canada created the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) for joint continental air defense. NORAD is based in several regions in the North American continent, including Alaska. The Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) maintains continuous capability to detect, validate and warn off any atmospheric threat in its area of operations – and is consequently responsible for the Arctic region. The establishment of the DEW Line and NORAD are examples of military and political securitization maneuvers set up to provide early warning of any sea-and-land invasion and to detect incoming Soviet bombers. As the United States had amassed great assets for defense and early-warning detection purposes in the Arctic, over time it managed to also deploy a sizable military presence (Emmerson, 2010). In 1968 a United States B-52 bomber carrying four nuclear bombs crashed near Thule Air Base in Greenland, the United States' northernmost military base built in 1943. The base was largely shrouded in secrecy prior to the event, but the resulting nuclear contamination of the surrounding area and discussions about compromised Danish (by way of Greenland) sovereignty further exposed United States military presence in the region (Emmerson, 2010).

Further technological developments reflected the military securitization of the region. Given the extent of Arctic sea-ice during the 1950s-1960s and lacking missile technologies at the time, the United States was investing in bomber and submarine capabilities to assert control over Arctic airspace and Arctic waters. The United States Navy had been operating in the Arctic since Admiral Richard E. Byrd's historic flight over the North Pole in 1926, but more notably the Navy maintained its presence in the Arctic during and immediately after WWII, a presence that peaked in 1954, when the United States launched the first-ever nuclear-powered submarine – the *USS Nautilus* (Titley and St. John, 2010: 41). The vessel was the first submarine to complete a submerged transit of the North Pole on August 3, 1958. In addition, in 1958 the third United States nuclear submarine – the *USS Skate* – became the first submarine to surface in the Arctic (Emmerson, 2010). These successful military projections of power by the United States had

spurred the Soviet Union to respond by increasing its own nuclear submarine capabilities in the region in the coming decades (Emmerson, 2010).

5.2 – National Security Decision Memorandum 144

Despite a range of military and political activities in the Arctic, the United States had only issued its first classified official Arctic policy in 1971 – the National Security Decision Memorandum 144 (NSDM-144). It was the first instance where an executive government body began devoting time to the Arctic where the region became a topic of explicit policy-making. President Nixon's policy stipulated three areas of focus:

(1) "The sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment";
(2) "[promoting] mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic"; and
(3) "at the same time [providing] for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic, including preservation of the principles of freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace" (NSDM-144: 1)

While the quotes above framed the United States policy goals, the rest of the document was dedicated to describe the challenges to ensuring successful coordination and implementation of the policy goals (Conley, 2013). More specifically, the policy aimed to address two primary challenges of United States Arctic policy: (1) successfully coordinating different stakeholders in the region who had never worked before together on Arctic affairs and; (2) implementing the policy to facilitate cooperation with other regional powers. In terms of securitization sectors, the military/political and environmental sectors are the only prevalent sectors in this policy.

Regarding the military sector, NSDM-144 explicitly called for the protection of its security interests in the Arctic by protecting its Arctic seas and airspace, albeit being vague about what is meant by 'essential security interests'. In addition, NSDM-144 was classified as *Secret* – the second-highest classification level in the United States. Information is typically classified as *Secret* when its unauthorized disclosure would cause "serious damage" to national security (United States Executive Order 11652), which points to the United States regarding the Arctic in terms of national security. No other record exists of the Nixon policy being mentioned, and this is likely due to the

policy explicitly prohibiting "public statements concerning the United States Arctic policy" (NSDM-144: 2). The policy was only distributed among a limited number of Federal agencies, namely: the departments of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Transportation, as well as the director of the National Science Foundation and the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (NSDM-144 and Conley, 2013). This contrasts greatly with point (2), which calls for 'mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic' (NSDM-144). This point signifies the presence of the Political sector too where there is a call for regional cooperation; a gesture of openness. It is therefore noteworthy that despite this, NSDM-144 was a secret document and remained classified for six years following its issuing in 1971.

NSDM-144 further stipulated that responsibility for coordinating and implementing the policy goals would fall to the National Security Council (NSC) directing an "Undersecretaries Committee" to review and forward action plans related to "[i]ncreasing mutually beneficial international cooperation with Arctic and other countries" (NSDM-144: 1). Despite this utterance, the confidential National Security Decision Memorandum 202 (NSDM-202) from 1973 overturned this decision by stating that "the president does not desire, however, that the United States undertake discussions at this time with the Soviet Union, Canada, and other countries with Arctic interests with the aim of promoting the establishment of a multinational Northlands and Arctic Cooperation Compact" (1973: 1), although no reasons were given for this decision. Being classified 'confidential', NSDM-202 was given the lowest classification level where disclosure of the information could result in "damage" to national security (United States Executive Order 11652). This move represents the overturning of the political sector which was established just two years earlier in NSDM-144. Also interesting to note is the difference in classification levels between NSDM-144 (secret) and NSDM-202 (classified), although there are no explanations given for the reasons behind this discrepancy.

Regarding the environmental sector, Richard Nixon had contributed much towards incorporating environmentalism into mainstream American security policies once he became president. Having been elected president in 1968, Nixon was sworn into office at a time when the environmental movement was transforming from a grass-roots movement into a major political force. President-elect Nixon took advantage of this policy window by incorporating environmental issues into his presidential campaign which helped propel him towards the presidency. Aside from drafting the first Arctic policy, Nixon contributed to pass significant United States environmental

law like the Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, which required that all executive federal agencies prepare environmental assessments and environmental impact statements. President Nixon's most significant contribution to environmentalism was the creation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, a year before NSDM-144 was issued. The EPA is an agency of the federal government of the United States which was created to protect human health and the environment by writing and enforcing regulations based on laws passed by Congress. The EPA passed seminal legislation like the Clean Air Act of 1972 for example.

Regarding NSDM-144 in particular, it remained consistent with Nixon's push to incorporate environmentalism into United States national security politics. As part of environmental securitization in the Arctic, NSDM-144 created the Interagency Arctic Policy Group (IAPG) "responsible for overseeing the implementation of United States Arctic policy and reviewing and coordinating United States activities and programs" and reporting to the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) about Arctic environmental research (NSDM-144, 1971: 2). A year prior to issuing this policy, the Nixon administration allocated $533.1 million for marine science and technological activities, of which a part was to be used for Arctic research. The policy does not indicate how much of the funds would go to Arctic exploration in particular, and remained vague about what environmental projects the United States would undertake (in a Message to Congress Transmitting Annual Report on Marine Resource and Engineering Development from April 13, 1970).

It is clear that while the United States included the Arctic region in its policymaking in 1971, the first Arctic policy was vague and general in its formulation of security discourse. At face-value most attention was dedicated to the military/political sector, of which a part called for cooperation with Arctic and other states on research endeavors – particularly on Arctic environmental research. Noteworthy is that the three policy goals are potentially conflicting – as on one hand NSDM-144 calls for cooperation between Arctic States while on the other hand it was classified as secret, and much discourse on cooperation was overturned by NDSM-202 a few years later. The environmental sector was reflected in President Nixon's push for environmental securitization, and the Arctic was just one of many policy areas in the United States where the environment was securitized.

5.3 – ARPA and beyond

Twelve years after NSDM 144, the Reagan administration issued the National Security Decision Directive 90 (NSDD-90), which maintained the previous policy's position that "[i]t is clear that the United States has unique and critical interests in the Arctic region related directly to national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry and environmental protection" (NSDD-90: 1). Like in NSDM-144, this two-page Arctic policy emphasized coordination responsibilities of the IAPG (Conley and NSDD-90). NSDD-90 also called for the evaluation of "priorities" that the IAPG should consider over the following ten years and to report these to the National Security Council (NSC). The policy also expressed the need to focus on enhancing international cooperation in the region with other Arctic states on the following areas: "search and rescue; protecting life, property, resources and wildlife; enforcing United States laws and international treaties; and promoting commerce" (NSDD-90: 1). Like President Nixon's Arctic memorandum before it, NSDD-90 too contains elements of political/military and environmental securitization, albeit remaining vague about the policy steps to be taken. NSDD-90 was also classified as 'secret', and was declassified only in 1998 by the NSC. While no explicit reasons were given for the decision to declassify the policy document, the timing points to the end of the Cold War as being a driving reason. Furthermore, in 1994 President Clinton issued an updated Arctic policy which superseded NSDD-90.

Despite the seemingly little progress of United States activity in the Arctic based on the discourse of NSDD-90, the United States Congress passed into law the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA) a year later, which lay the framework for all scientific and research activities conducted by the United States in the Arctic region (Conley, 2013). The National Science Foundation (NSF) would be the leading federal body responsible for upholding ARPA. As stated in ARPA, it sets out "to establish national policy, priorities, and goals and to provide a [f]ederal program plan for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural resources and materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and behavioral sciences" (ARPA, 1984: 2). ARPA also seeks to support DOD with national defense operations, provide DOC with logistical support and fund regional climatological research. Lastly, ARPA stipulated that the president would establish an Arctic Research Commission which Ronald Reagan formalized in 1985 with the issuing of Executive Order 12501 on January 28, 1985 (Reagan, Executive Order 12501). The issuing of ARPA marks a novel development where further

widening of securitization priorities occurred with the inclusion of the economic sector in addition to the military, political and environmental sectors in United States Arctic policy. Through ARPA, the United States policy mentioned national security in the context of energy independence for the first time. Specifically, "the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the Nation's dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments" (ARPA, 1984: 1).

ARPA was also the first unclassified United States Arctic policy upon its initial issuing and marked the first instance where the United States was public about its intentions in the Arctic on a discursive level. While the previous two policies proved vague in their framing of the Arctic, ARPA framed the region using *research* as justification for securitizing the military/political sector, and now the economic sector as well. Regarding the military/political sector for example, ARPA states that "as the Nation's only common border with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is critical to national defense" (1984: 1). It states the need to research the region in order to prepare for potential "future defense needs", while not explicitly stating what these may be beyond the Soviet Union being its Arctic neighbor (ARPA, 1984: 2). It too is noteworthy to mention that the environmental sector remains vague as it did in the previous policies, where ARPA only states the need to "research into the long-range health, environmental, and social effects of development in the Arctic […] to mitigate the adverse consequences of that development to the land and its residents" (ARPA, 1984: 2). This statement also includes elements of the societal sector, although ARPA does not politicize the sector beyond the quote above. Overall, despite being a policy advocating for research – ARPA's overall discourse focuses on the military/political discourse and does not include other security discourses.

6. Analysis Part 3: Post-Cold War Developments

This chapter turns its attention to United States Arctic policy discourse from the post-Cold War era until the present day. The end of the Cold War serves as a significant dividing line in this research because it marks a shift in the United States attitude towards the Arctic following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The post-Cold War era brought with it new security challenges which the United States began including in their evolving Arctic policy discourses, while at the same time acknowledging that the new era could facilitate new opportunities for regional cooperation. Rather than discussing the chronological evolution of policies like in the previous chapter, this chapter will be divided according to each security sector where the presence of each will be discussed. This chapter will further answer the third sub-question: 'How did United States Arctic policy change over time?' It will also answer the fourth sub-question: 'What is the current state of United States Arctic Policy?'

6.1 – Military/Political Sector

Ten years following NSDD-90, the Clinton administration issued the United States Presidential Decision Directive on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions (PDD/NSC-26). Being the first United States Arctic policy following the Cold War, it stated "[t]he end of the Cold War […] allows a significant shift of emphasis in United States Arctic policy. The new atmosphere of openness and cooperation with Russia has created unprecedented opportunities for collaboration among all eight Arctic nations […]" (PDD/NSC-26: 2). On the one hand, the policy calls for rapprochement with Russia specifically, stating that "[o]ur bilateral relations with Russia offer further opportunities to protect the Arctic environment" (PDD/NSC-26: 4). On the other hand, the policy does not concede on its stance on United States national security, stating that:

> "Although Cold War tensions have dramatically decreased, the United States continues to have basic national security and defense interests in the Arctic region. We have a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability throughout the region. We must maintain the ability to protect against attack across the Arctic, to move ships and aircraft freely […], to control our borders and areas under our jurisdiction and to carry out military operations in the region" (PDD/NSC-26: 2).

At first glance this section of the policy possibly highlights the presence of the military sector of the securitization framework, it too may allude to economic security "to move ships and aircraft freely" (PDD/NSC-26: 2). This policy leaves room for interpretation in this case, where the United States will not concede on its sovereignty and economic goals despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. This statement implies that the United States still considers Russia a potential threat in the region in terms of the political/military sectors, and the economic sector too.

As discussed previously in chapter 1, debates exist within IR about whether the Arctic is an area of peaceful cooperation or conflict. Throughout United States Arctic policy, each administration has reserved the right to frame the Arctic in terms of sovereignty and national security which the United States were to defend in case of infringement by a foreign actor. Despite this, the general consensus in academia is that the Arctic will remain a forum for cooperation, and this too is reflected throughout United States Arctic policy from Nixon's 1971 policy memorandum to Obama's latest 2013 Arctic Strategy. Given the opening of the Arctic region due to ice melting and actors eager to conduct resource exploration because of this, the Obama Administration called for the need to increase coordination and cooperation in the region to avoid accidental conflict. The Navy which only devised its own Arctic strategies under Obama in 2009 and 2014 stated: "[w]hile the Region is expected to remain a low threat security environment where nations resolve differences peacefully, the Navy will be prepared to prevent conflict and ensure national interests are protected" (The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030, 2014: 3).

6.1.1 – Territorial disputes

The Arctic region currently has four unresolved territorial disputes among several Arctic states, three of which involve the United States. This ties into the military/political sector because these disputes theoretically can lead to military conflict. Below each dispute will be described, followed by a discussion about the implications this may have in the context of the military/political sector.

Northwest Passage dispute

Scientists have predicted that global warming will sufficiently diminish the ice sheet in Canada's northern archipelago to allow ships to pass through the trans-Atlantic Northwest Passage (NWP)

in summer months (O'Rourke, 2018). The prospect of such traffic raises a major jurisdictional question. On one hand, Canada claims that such a passage would be an inland waterway according to UNCLOS, meaning that it falls within Canada's sovereign territory. On the other hand, the United States and other interested regional parties argue that the passage would constitute an international strait between two high seas, meaning that foreign vessels can freely access and pass through the passage (O'Rourke, 2018).

The biggest diplomatic event occurred in 1985 with the USCG icebreaker *Polar Star*, which used the NWP to navigate from Greenland to Alaska without requesting formal authorization from the Canadian government. It was the United States' position that the NWP was an international strait open to shipping and it sought only to notify Canada rather than ask for formal permission. Following the incident, representatives from both countries met in 1988 and signed an agreement on Arctic cooperation, which stated that: "the United States pledges that all navigation by United States icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada" (Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, 1988). The United States has since respected the agreement despite not being a signatory to UNCLOS, and the agreement being de facto rather than de jure (Pedrozo, 2013). It is therefore likely that the issue may arise anew if sufficient ice melts in the near-future to where the United States will seek to utilize the NWP on a more consistent basis. Section 6.1.2 discusses the NWP further in the context of the United States Freedom of Navigation doctrine (FON).

Binational boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea

The dispute involves a wedge-shaped slice on the International Boundary in the Beaufort Sea, between the Canadian territory of Yukon and the United States state of Alaska. Canada claims that the maritime boundary should follow the land boundary, while the United States claims that the maritime boundary should extend along an equidistant path between both countries' coastlines. The area largely became contested because it potentially holds significant hydrocarbon reserves, tying into the economic sector as well. Since 2005 the United States has invested in offshore leases in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, totaling over $3.7 billion since 2005 reflecting the economic value of the region (USCG Arctic Strategy, 2013: 13). Between 2012 and 2017 exploratory drilling operations were conducted by the United States, which leased eight plots of terrain below the water

to search for possible oil reserves. At the time Canada diplomatically protested these actions. Negotiations about a binational boundary in the Beaufort Sea are currently still ongoing. If the United States were to ratify UNCLOS, the dispute would likely be settled at a UN tribunal (O'Rourke, 2018).

Bering Sea dispute

The United States and then the Soviet Union signed an agreement in 1990 regarding a disputed area of the Bering Sea. While the United States Senate ratified the agreement in 1991, the Russian Duma has yet to approve the accord following the Soviet Union's collapse that same year. So long as Russia does not ratify the agreement, the Bering Sea is considered a territorial dispute. Regardless, no major international incidents have occurred as a result of this dispute.

Hans Island dispute

The Hans Island dispute involves Canada and Denmark. The thesis will therefore not elaborate upon this dispute because it does not directly involve the United States.

Despite these territorial disputes, it is clear that they have never reached a point of brinkmanship to where the possibility of conflict was likely. The NWP dispute would appear to display the greatest degrees of hostilities out of all the three disputes involving the United States, but none have resulted in military/political securitization of the region. On the contrary, several United States policies "encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region" (NSPD 66, 2009: 4). A 2011 report about the NWP conducted by the DOD states that currently international cooperation in the Arctic is effective to such an extent that this "provides a sound basis to anticipate that the security environment in the Arctic will be defined by cooperation rather than conflict in the future. Should military security issues arise, they will be addressed with the appropriate stakeholders through the network of relevant bilateral and multilateral relationships" (DOD Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, 2011: 10). In this regard military securitization of disputes have not occurred in the Arctic, despite formally there being several ongoing regional boundary disputes.

6.1.2 – United States Freedom of Navigation program

In 1983 President Reagan issued a statement about the United States' Oceans Policy, which stated that the United States "will exercise and assert its rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests [stipulated in UNCLOS]" (March 10, 1983). President Reagan referred to the Freedom of Navigation (FON), a program started in 1979 by the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) to support the free mobility of United States military and commercial interests by protesting and challenging attempts by coastal States to unlawfully restrict access to the seas. DOS diplomatically challenges foreign laws, regulations, or other claims of coastal States that are inconsistent with international law (called 'excessive maritime claims'), while DOD in turn supports DOS by conducting operational challenges against excessive maritime claims by foreign countries. The reasoning behind FON is that some coastal States assert excessive maritime claims that could infringe upon the sovereign rights and legal freedoms on the use of the seas and airspace guaranteed to all sovereign states under international law. The Oceans Policy states that the United States "will not […] acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedom of the international community" (Reagan's Statement on United States Oceans Policy on March 10, 1983).

FON is relevant for several United States Arctic securitization sectors. In terms of the political sector, FON operations have historically played a significant role in shaping United States foreign policy, and have become a common means for the United States to protect their national interests under the pretext of FON – the most high-profile example being the current situation in the South China Sea (Freund, 2017). In the Arctic, the United States is pressuring both Canada and Russia to allow free movement across the North West Passage (NWP) and Northern Sea Route (NSR) respectively. FON in the NWP and NSR both entered official United States security discourse in 2009 with the issuing of President G.W. Bush's Arctic policy memorandum: "Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. […] Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits" (NSPD-66, 2009: 4). Canada has historically lay claim and securitized the NWP despite it being a difficult area to navigate given year-round thick ice-cover (Conley and Kraut, 2010; Greaves, 2016a).

Unlike the NWP, the NSR has historically been much easier to traverse (O'Rourke, 2011; USCG Arctic Strategy, 2013), and February 2018 marked the first time that a ship sailed across the NSR without the aid of an ice-breaker during winter months (Brown, 2018). Similar to Canada and the NWP, the United States contends that Russia should concede the NSR for international use – while Russia claims the route falls within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (Conley and Rohloff, 2015). The difference between these two disputes is that Canada is a NATO ally while relations with Russia have been historically unstable. Regardless, the United States approach towards Russia in recent years has been tolerant. While the United States ceased providing Russia with military and Arctic oil exploration technologies following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 for example, the United States has yet to let Russian actions in non-Arctic related issues aggravate bilateral and multilateral cooperation on Arctic affairs (Obama Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine on July 29, 2014).

The FON program is also closely linked to economic securitization in the Arctic, because the ability to use the NWP or NSR as alternatives to the Panama Canal reduces both the distance and costs associated with transporting goods between Europe and Asia. The USCG Arctic Strategy states that the potential of using both routes would revolutionize international trade in the 21st century (2013). This is inherently linked to the economic sector, where the United States has increasingly equated economic interests with national interests. Obama's Arctic strategy sets out to "safeguard peace and stability [by] supporting and preserving international legal principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and other uses of the sea related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes" (Obama Arctic Strategy, 2013: 10).

Following the end of the Cold War, crimes like smuggling, criminal trafficking, and terrorism also became national security concerns. President G. W. Bush was the first and only president to explicitly mention the threat of terrorism in his Arctic memorandum NSPD-66: "the United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region" (2009: 3). This is understandable to the extent that terrorism became increasingly securitized under the presidency of G.W. Bush following 9/11. While Obama's 2013 Arctic Strategy did not mention terrorism in the Arctic context, Arctic policies of various governmental bodies continued to include it as a potential security threat (DOD Arctic Strategy,

2013; USCG Arctic Strategy, 2013). Noteworthy is that the DOD Arctic Strategy (2013) discusses preventing terrorism in the Arctic region specifically like Bush's NSPD-66 memorandum (2009), while the USCG Arctic Strategy (2013) discusses preventing terrorism without specifying the location explicitly. By framing terrorism vaguely, the USCG strategy leaves the possibility open for interpretation whether 'preventing terrorism' can occur regionally or nationwide. In closing, it is interesting that G.W. Bush's counter-terrorism security agenda reached Arctic policy to where other governmental bodies also included it in their discourse. The Arctic after all is an unlikely target and area from which the United States could expect a terror attack, which makes its reoccurring inclusion particularly interesting. In general, its inclusion represents the broadening of overall United States security interests in the region.

6.2 – Environmental Sector

Following the easing of Cold War tensions with the collapse of the Soviet Union, academic discussions about the definition of security also expanded to include environmental threats as security issues; particularly those threats associated with the political implications of resource extraction and pollution (Floyd, 2010). While discussions about the environmental implications for security had started to emerge in the 1970s (Falk 1971; Brown 1977), it was only in the 1980s when environmental security gained traction; and environmental issues like the depletion of the stratospheric ozone and global warming found their way into mainstream political discourse as 'environmental security' issues (Trombetta, 2008). While debates still exist about semantics over definitions, it is widely accepted in the environmental security discipline that "environmental factors play both direct and indirect roles in both political disputes and violent conflicts" (Trombetta, 2008: 587). Regarding geopolitics more generally, when regarding the environmental sector – it too is useful to see the Arctic in the context of the Anthropocene, the epoch where human activities have collectively impacted – and continue to impact – the global biosphere where transformative environmental changes threaten to undermine state (and others) security (Greaves, 2016a).

The way the United States constructed discourse towards the Arctic drastically changed from the late 2000s onwards to construct the Arctic as a region in need of 'preservation' and 'safeguarding'. Unlike prior Arctic policies which were relatively general about environmental security, G W. Bush's 2009 memorandum NSPD-66 expanded upon environmental security as a

key theme. For example, NSPD-66 called for the United States to "protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources" and to "[e]nhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues" (2009: 1). Prior Arctic policies were vaguer in their formulation of environmental security, a notable example being Bill Clinton's 1994 policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions (PDD/NSC-26), which combined both United States Arctic and Antarctic policies into one; reflecting the low priority of Arctic environmental security at the time. President Clinton's policy would remain in place until George W. Bush's NSPD-66 in 2009, which saw a long-needed update to United States Arctic policy. Barack Obama largely adopted the policy framework of NSPD-66 and expanded it into his own Arctic Strategy in 2013 which remains the latest United States Arctic policy. Currently, the Arctic is framed as a "unique and changing environment" in need of constant monitoring to ensure the preservation of unique environmental attributes like permafrost, diminishing land and sea ice, ocean acidification, etcetera (Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2014: 12).

6.2.1 – The environment as a forum for international cooperation

While the theme of environmental protection has remained consistent throughout United States policy, the frequency at which it became an area of security concern had become more notable over time. For example, the first Arctic policy memorandum from 1971 mentions the Arctic environment in the context of "sound and rational Arctic development" where resource exploration in the region would be "guided by the principle of minimizing any adverse effects to the environment" (NSDM-144: 1) In addition, the environment is mentioned in the context of multilateral cooperation with other actors in the Arctic, but little more detail is provided. This remained true for Reagan's NSDD-90 which had not altered the wording of Nixon's NSDM-144. The lack of focus in environmental protection is closely linked to the Political/Military Sector, as during the Cold War era the region's seas and land remained largely ice-covered and the two super powers were pre-occupied with utilizing the Arctic for military objectives rather than Arctic conservation (Stuhltrager, 2008).

While all United States Arctic policies called for cooperation with all Arctic countries on environmental issues, meaningful cooperation with the Soviet Union and later Russia came shortly before the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. As part of *glasnost and perestroika*, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met with United States President Ronald Reagan in Washington for a Summit

meeting in 1987, where the two leaders discussed a vast array of issues. Herein, both agreed to coordinate scientific research and protect the Arctic regional environment. Reagan spoke about the meeting's outcome on national television (Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting on December 10, 1987). The same year Gorbachev delivered a speech in Murmansk, which also came to be known as the Murmansk Initiative, where Gorbachev invited Arctic states to collaborate on technological exchange for research and cooperate on environmental protection and management (Åtland 2008). The next year Gorbachev and Reagan met again, where they "noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental cooperation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an International Arctic Science Committee of states with interests in the region" (Joint Statement Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow on 1 June, 1988).

A significant legacy left behind following soon after the end of the Cold War was the risk of long-term nuclear contamination from decades-long nuclear waste dumping by the Soviet Union in the Arctic. While most Arctic states were guilty of limited nuclear contamination in the region, in 1993 Russia had issued the *Yablokov report* which stated the extent of Soviet nuclear dumping between 1959 and 1992. The report stated "the total amount of waste dumped was between 11,000 and 17,000 containers of solid waste and 165,000 cubic meters of liquid waste" (in Floyd, 2010: 99). In addition, the report stated that the Soviet Union sank sixteen nuclear reactors in the Kara Sea; six of which were damaged to such an extent that they were dumped with nuclear fuel still inside the reactors (OTA Report, 1995). This worried countries like Norway, which in 1995 invited Russia and the United States to cooperate on the matter. A distinct feature of environmental issues is their borderless nature, where they can become a common problem for other actors besides those causing them. In the Arctic, the threat of regional nuclear disaster caused by Russian nuclear dumping became a national security issue for the United States (Floyd, 2010; OTA Report, 1995). Decontamination work had started that same year, but the agreement was formalized with the signing of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) in 1996. While nuclear contamination by Russia was not officially mentioned in Clinton's 1994 Arctic policy, it did explicitly highlight Russia's responsibility "for a disproportionate share of Arctic pollution" (PDD/NSC-26: 4). For the United States, the way to deal with this environmental threat was to offer the Soviet Union aid with its nuclear waste management and advice on environmental issues as a whole (Floyd, 2010).

Given that the context surrounding this period was that the United States became the lone super-power following the end of the Cold War, it had to behave carefully around Russia given the sensitive political situation of the time. AMEC proved a viable option because it exclusively involved Russia's, Norway's and the United States' militaries – and was not framed in terms of foreign aid for example which Russia might have perceived negatively (Floyd, 2010). Regardless of the severity of the possible nuclear contamination, Arctic environmental issues offered an opportunity for cooperation and mutual trust building between former Cold War rivals (Floyd, 2010; PDD/NSC-26, 1994). Also noteworthy is that in this case specifically, the military was utilized to achieve an environmental security objective by helping decontaminate the Arctic. This instance demonstrates that the military was used to achieve environmental securitization, and that there sometimes occurs an overlap between the various security sectors.

Themes of multilateral cooperation between all Arctic states also proliferated following the end of the Cold War. The first international agreement on Arctic environment was the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a non-binding agreement among the Arctic countries adopted in 1991 dealing with monitoring, assessment, protection, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the Arctic region. The end of the Cold War had facilitated further international agreements and fora such as the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996. While Arctic policy priorities differ per country, every Arctic nation is concerned with environmental protection in the Arctic region as a whole. The United States assumed chairmanship of the Arctic Council on two occasions, the first time from 1998 to 2000, and the second time from 2015 to 2017. The major environmental themes of the first chairmanship was the United States initiating the launch of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), the first-ever comprehensive scientific assessment of the effects of climate change in the Arctic, which was completed under Iceland's chairmanship in 2004. Similarly, the second chairmanship term had ended with the issuing of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation on May 11, 2017.

Following the end of the Cold War, there too came a drastic widening of international bodies dealing with cooperation on environmental issues in general and some dealing with the Arctic specifically. For example, G. W. Bush's NSPD-66 memorandum calls for continued cooperation "with other countries on Arctic issues through the UN and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),

the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer" (2009: 5-6). Both G. W. Bush's and Obama's Arctic policies called for increased international cooperation through these international fora because "what happens in one part of the Arctic region can have significant implications for the interests of other Arctic states and the international community as a whole" (Obama Arctic Strategy, 2013: 8). This was a turning point in United States Arctic policy discourse because environmental issues were no longer only framed as national security threats, but also as international security threats. In turn, United States Arctic policies called for the United States and other international actors to partake in international cooperation and diplomacy on environmental security issues.

6.2.2 – Security implications of climate change in the Arctic

According to Buzan et al, a unique feature of the environmental security sector is how it is divided into two separate yet overlapping agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda (1998). The scientific agenda is typically embedded in the natural 'hard' sciences and within nongovernmental activity. It is constructed outside of governmental and state politics by actors such as scientists and research institutions, which offer scientific findings on environmental matters which they deem potential security threats. In turn, the political agenda involves governmental and intergovernmental actors, processes and policies which address how to deal with various environmental issues on three levels. First, the political agenda determines to what extent an environmental issue underpinned by the scientific agenda becomes politicized, securitized or remains unaddressed. Secondly, the political agenda either accepts or rejects responsibility for a given environmental issue. Lastly, the distribution of responsibility and political management of given issues: Buzan et al, give the examples of "problems of international cooperation and institutionalization in particular regime formation, the effectiveness of unilateral national initiatives, distribution of costs and benefits, free-rider dilemmas, problems of enforcement", etcetera (1998: 72).

Historically, both the scientific and political agendas converge in the context of United States policies pertaining to Arctic research and multilateral cooperation in particular. The most notable example are the debates surrounding what effects climate change in the Arctic region may

have on the United States and the rest of the world. Through decades of scientific research, the broad consensus amongst the scientific community is that anthropogenic climate change is real, and that the Arctic is warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet (examples include: Tamnes, 2011; Hansen et al, 2016). Other (climatological) research shows that "the period 1995 to 2005 was […] the warmest in the Arctic since the 17th century [with] temperatures 2°C above the 1951–1990 average" (Przybylak, 2007: 318). While still a highly contested topic within politics in the United States in particular, many politicians too are coming around to acknowledge the existence of climate change and its effects in the Arctic as argued in the scientific agenda. Climate change in the region led to rapid melting of Arctic land and sea ice, which led the United States and the other Arctic states to pay closer attention to the effects of climate change on regional security. The United States launched several initiatives, one of which included the first-ever comprehensive scientific assessment of the effects of climate change in the Arctic as part of its Arctic Council Chairmanship from 1998 to 2000.

President G. W. Bush's memorandum was the first official Arctic policy to acknowledge the effects of climate change in the region and on Arctic residents, albeit focusing less on the effects that climate change was having on the regional environment in favor of its potential economic opportunities (NSPD-66, 2009). Under President Obama climate change became framed as a national security threat, and also an international security threat. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Administration stated that "successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help [to] combat climate change" (2010: 11). In the Arctic specifically, the Obama Administration stated that "climate change is already affecting the entire global population, and Alaska residents are experiencing the impacts in the Arctic" (National Arctic Strategy, 2013: 4). A few months prior to the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, Obama said:

> "[Climate change] is all real. […] Rising sea levels are beginning to swallow one island community. Think about that. If another country threatened to wipe out an American town, we'd do everything in our power to protect ourselves. Climate change poses the same threat right now. That's why one of the things I'll do […] is to convene other nations to meet this

threat. Several Arctic nations have already committed to action" (The President's Weekly Address, August 29, 2015).

This statement shows that under Obama, environmental issues came into their own as security issues independent from other sectors – most notably the military sector, which has dominated United States Arctic security discourse since WWII.

6.3 – Economic Sector

According to Buzan et al, the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance (1998: 7). Economic security is possibly the most difficult sector to define given the nature of free market economies in liberal societies like the United States that oppose any form of controlling the free-market by the state or any other entity. As stated by Buzan, "the normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, aggressive competition and uncertainty", and politicizing and securitizing economic affairs runs counter to free-market principles (2007: 120). It therefore becomes difficult to determine the extent to which the economy is secure and insecure, and what degree of insecurity is acceptable for a securitizing actor.

Economic questions have emerged consistently throughout United States Arctic policy as one of the main areas of interest, with themes of exploitation of energy resources, energy independence, enhanced infrastructure and enforced protection/safety of maritime commerce dominating policy discourse over the years (Obama's Arctic Strategy, 2013; DOD Arctic Strategy, 2013). While the Nixon administration did not mention economic interests in the first United States Arctic policy, Nixon stated that marketing of Arctic oil is a high national priority: "[it] would save this Nation $15 to $17 billion which we would otherwise have to spend if we imported a like quantity of foreign oil" (Statement about the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline on 26 September 1971). Furthermore, as mentioned by the Obama administration the economic sector "will be guided by our central interests in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security of the United States; protecting the free flow of resources and commerce" (National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 27). By using language like 'security' and 'protection' in this context, United States discourse is claiming an economic sphere of influence of its Arctic region. Prior to Barack Obama's presidency, United States Arctic policy only framed economic security in terms of energy development and did not explicitly state economic security interests. This changed with the issuing

of Obama's Arctic Strategy, which was the first policy to explicitly call United States economic priorities in the Arctic "economic security" issues (2013: 5).

6.3.1 – Spheres of influence through economic power

Given that the Arctic territory is steadily opening, states are increasingly interested in asserting and expanding their spheres of influence in the region to control the vast resource wealth. The Arctic has approximately thirty percent of the world's natural gas deposits and thirteen percent of the world's undiscovered oil reserves (Gautier et al, 2009). According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the United States Arctic territory contains approximately twenty percent of all hydrocarbons in the Arctic region (in Kiel, 2014). In addition to hydrocarbons, the Arctic region has deposits of precious stones and metals such as platinum, gold and diamonds. Lastly, the Arctic region is also "rich in organic (timber and fish) and inorganic (mineral) natural resources" (Conley and Kraut 2010: 11). Ice-free summers could theoretically give Arctic states and international companies access to these untapped natural resources, albeit on a seasonal basis. If states and companies were to extract these resources, it would mean an increase in regional maritime traffic. The potential for resource extraction in the region has gained attention of many state and non-state actors who would have vested interests to capitalize from the potential economic opportunities (Keil, 2015; National Research Council et al, 2014). Currently these resources are remote and costly to access, but they are becoming increasingly accessible due to rapid Arctic ice-melt. The desolate Arctic region is therefore becoming more interesting for the world as a potential new frontier for energy exploration, commerce and travel. New shipping routes are opening too, which potentially reduces the time and cost for maritime transportation.

The melting of ice-caps will profoundly change the Arctic's geographical features, which in turn might change the way states interact in the region. The DOD states that climate change in the Arctic "will permit seasonal commerce and transit" (2010: 86), which presents a unique opportunity for inter-state cooperation, but also leaves the possibility for conflict between states with overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. In 2009 the Navy devised an Arctic strategy which it later updated in 2014. The 2014 strategy states: "while the region is expected to remain a low threat security environment where nations resolve differences peacefully, the Navy will be prepared to prevent conflict and ensure national interests are protected. In the coming decades, the Arctic Ocean will be increasingly accessible and more broadly used by Arctic and non-Arctic

nations seeking the Region's abundant resources and trade routes" (The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030: 2). As discussed in previous chapters, while conflict is considered unlikely, natural resources are framed as central to national economic security for countries like Canada, Norway and Russia. This reality has spurred on renewed proliferation of military activities in the region where countries are making various territorial claims to consolidate their spheres of influence over vast areas with resource extraction potential (Greaves 2016b). As discussed previously in section 6.1.1, currently all regional disputes continue to be ignored in favor of cooperation, and the likelihood of military conflict over resource extraction is low. Regardless, through issuing the 2009 and 2014 policy documents, the Navy is claiming a role in the Arctic by bringing it into its sphere of influence and therefore has a stake in determining to what extent the region remains cooperative or becomes more conflictive in the future (The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap, 2009; The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030, 2014). This development also indicates the proliferation of securitizing actors in the region, rendering the regional security dynamics more complex and intertwined.

Given that Russia is swiftly expanding its military and economic presence in the Arctic, the United States is impeding Russian progress by using soft power in the form of sanctions following the 2014 Ukraine crisis. As briefly discussed in section 6.1.2, the United States imposed sanctions on military and Arctic oil drilling technologies:

> "We are going to impose export license requirements on a universe of technologies if they're to be exported or re-exported to Russian […] Arctic offshore […] oil production activities. […] the Russians are generally just at the beginning stages of trying to develop that kind of exploration and production [technology]. These [sanctions] are designed […] to impact their ability to produce in more technologically challenging future projects" (Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine July 29, 2014).

Sanctions are a method of economic securitization which hinder economic progress of the state targeted. The United States legitimizes its economic securitization move directed at Russia under the pretext of Russian aggression, although this is never stated explicitly in United States Arctic

policy discourses beyond the quote above (Conley and Rohloff, 2015). Despite the sanctions, the United States has continued to cooperate with Russia on Arctic affairs.

Given the opening of the Arctic region due to ice melting and actors eager to conduct resource exploration, the Navy called for the need to increase coordination and cooperation in the region with the help of the USCG to avoid accidental conflict: "as ice coverage in the Arctic continues to recede and shorter shipping routes become more accessible and more profitable, increased ship traffic and human activity in the region will require that the United States be more prepared to respond to emergencies in this remote region" (The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030, 2014: 7).

It is clear from the various Arctic policies that the United States wants to remain active in the Arctic region and is not willing to concede its spheres of influence. While the United States has participated in the Arctic Council, there are still many policy aspects that the United States could implement in the Arctic to reaffirm their regional presence. The two main aspects that reappear consistently in United States Arctic policy are the need to develop United States Arctic technologies and the need to ratify of UNCLOS.

Regarding Arctic technologies, while ARPA 1984 called for the United States to continue developing its icebreaker technologies, and President Clinton acknowledged the importance of icebreakers for the "development for our future economy" during his remarks to the USCG in Seattle in 1993 – only President Obama made icebreaker technology development official policy in his 2013 Arctic strategy. Obama publicly voiced his concerns about the extent of the discrepancies of United States icebreaker technologies in a statement in 2015:

> "[t]oday, in part because we haven't been reinvesting, […] we really only have two [icebreakers], and only one heavy icebreaker. Just to give you a sense of contrast, Russia has about 40, and 11 icebreakers either planned or under construction. […] It's important that we are prepared so that whether it's for search-and-rescue missions, whether it's for national security reasons, whether it's for commercial reasons, that we have much greater capabilities than we currently have" (Remarks Prior to a Boat Tour of Kenai Fjords National Park in Seward, Alaska on September 1, 2015).

The need for icebreakers therefore also extends beyond the economic security sector into the military/political sector as well, where having reliable search-and-rescue capabilities enables the United States to achieve its 2013 policy goals of "Enhanc[ing] Arctic Domain Awareness" and "[Preserving] Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas" (Obama Arctic Strategy, 2013: 6). This presents several noteworthy complex dynamics where several security sectors interlink discursively. Taking the quote above, the military is mobilized for 'commercial reasons', meaning that the military is utilized to achieve economic security goals. This shows that here too there is a degree of overlap between various security sectors in the Arctic context where discursively one sector is mentioned while in actuality another sector is securitized.

6.3.2 – Failure to ratify UNCLOS

In December 1982, the United Nations issued the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, where coastal states enjoy sole exploitation rights over all natural resources within 200 nautical miles (370km) within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). UNCLOS also grants states the right to make claims to additional territories if they can prove that the territory claimed is part of the country's extended continental shelf. Unlike Antarctica for example which is a continent, the Arctic region is an Ocean where UNCLOS applies. All Arctic states have ratified UNCLOS, except for the United States – which has complicated commercial delineations in the region as a result. Many (predominantly Republican) American politicians argue that signing UNCLOS would infringe on United States sovereignty and FON, a leading theme in overall United States Arctic policy. Others argued that the ocean's resources cannot be claimed by any one nation (Wright, 2011). For example, on January 29, 1982, Ronald Reagan made the following statement: "[w]hile most provisions of the draft convention are acceptable and consistent with United States interests, some major elements of the deep seabed mining regime are not acceptable" (at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea).

In the context of the Arctic, the United States has followed, and continues to follow, the rules stipulated by UNCLOS despite failing to ratify the convention while only being a signatory. George W. Bush's Arctic memorandum stated that the United States is an "Arctic Nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region" (NSPD-66, 2009: 2). One of the policy's six specific national security objectives for the Arctic was economic interests, and it specifically called

for the Senate to "act favorably on the United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea […] to protect United States interests" (NSPD-66, 2009: 5). Similarly, Obama's 2013 Arctic Strategy also stated the need for the Senate to ratify UNCLOS.

There appears to be a discrepancy where the executive branch of the United States government is willing to accede to UNCLOS, but there is domestic opposition on the pretext that this could infringe upon United States sovereignty. Given that by the time UNCLOS was tabled in 1982, the Soviet Union was already declining and the United States was gradually becoming the world's single superpower. In this context, the United States favored the less strict legal delineations of FON over the stricter legal restrictions presented by UNCLOS at the time (Freund, 2017). Accession into UNCLOS became an integral part of United States policy discourse since 2009 which coincides with the changing world order where countries like China are on the rise and Russia is actively remilitarizing in the region (Pedrozo, 2013). Such scenarios pose an increased threat to United States regional spheres of influence, thereby making ratifying UNCLOS more appealing for United States policymakers.

While Russia has been discussed extensively in prior sections, China's growing regional role is noteworthy. Having been an observer on the Arctic Council since 2013, China recently released its first public Arctic policy in January 2018. China describes itself as a major Arctic stakeholder and a 'near-Arctic State', with distinct economic interests in the region. China's growing involvement presents two challenges for the United States. Firstly, Chinese involvement further complicates the regional security dynamics in the fragile Arctic. Secondly, China on numerous occasions criticized the United States of being hypocritical for not ratifying UNCLOS while simultaneously infringing upon other countries' sovereignty under the pretext of FON (Freund, 2017). While this is mostly applicable to the current South-China Sea dispute, China's growing presence in the Arctic could lead to similar confrontations in the future on Arctic affairs if the United States does not ratify UNCLOS. Chinese scholars have also pointed to the United States' failure to ratify UNCLOS as a potential compromise of its' regional sphere of influence:

> "The position of the United States as a non-signatory state in reality impedes its protection of its maritime interests. To protect their rights and interests in the Arctic region, every state has started paying serious attention to UNCLOS and hopes to find in it the legal basis for supporting its positions, this in order to win advantageous positions in international

court decisions and obtain the recognition of international society" (Liu Huirong and Yang Fan quoted in Wright, 2011: 9-10).

Recent calls to ratify UNCLOS in official United States Arctic policies could be perceived as a discursive instrument that the United States is using to its advantage in upholding its sphere of influence in the region. While not explicitly part of the five security sectors, the question of whether to ratify UNCLOS brings Arctic policy within legal discourse – which in turn could reflect upon developments in political/military or economic sectors. The United States is primarily concerned with preserving its spheres of influence, and recent calls in United States Arctic policy to ratify UNCLOS are an indicator of this. Whether the United States ratifies UNCLOS depends on future geopolitical developments first and foremost. After all, if the United States ratifies UNCLOS, this will affect United States foreign policy across the whole world – not just in the Arctic region.

6.3.3 – Environmentally responsible resource exploration

While much of the developed world is making strides to replace hydrocarbons with low carbon and renewable energy solutions in an effort to keep global warming below 2°C, several studies suggest that the demand for energy will continue to grow worldwide and the demand for hydrocarbons will continue to grow as well (International Energy Agency, 2017; United States Energy Information Administration, 2018). A key theme dominating discourse surrounding the economic sector throughout United States Arctic policy has been the need for the United States to become energy independent by pursuing oil exploration within Alaska's Arctic territory and offshore oil exploration. Two regions reappear throughout United States Arctic policy discourse in particular: the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPRA) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). While oil exploration within these geographical entities are mostly domestic issues, they are relevant in the context of international relations because United States Arctic policy has repeatedly called for becoming energy independent from foreign countries by utilizing domestic fossil-fuel reserves (NSPD-144, 2009). With sea-ice rapidly melting and ice-free summers becoming a reality, Arctic states like the United States are becoming increasingly incentivized to consider the Arctic as an area for energy exploration. There are several plausible explanations for this, including advances in drilling and maritime technologies suitable for the

Arctic environment, as well as the region being politically stable compared to other oil-rich regions of the world (Koivurova and Hossain, 2008).

Theoretically if the United States were to be able to extract oil from its Arctic region, its reliance on foreign oil could decrease. The desire to become more energy independent by pursuing energy exploration in the Arctic had existed long before the end of the Cold War era. For example, Jimmy Carter suggested legislation to Congress proposing a private oil and gas leasing program for NARP to "lessen our dependence on foreign oil and increase this Nation's energy security [to] succeed in our struggle to win the energy fight" (National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska Statement on Proposed Legislation on January 28, 1980). President Carter went on to say that "[i]t is in the interests of our Nation's security", which is a securitizing move based in the economic sector (1980). The first mention of decreasing dependence on foreign oil in official Arctic policy discourse came in ARPA, which exclusively framed the issue in terms of economic security: "the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the Nation's dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments" (1984: 1).

More recent Arctic discourse by the United States indicate that the economic and environmental sectors are becoming more interlinked in Arctic policies, and that there is a convergence between the two sectors where both are securitized simultaneously. As environmental and climactic issues became increasingly prevalent in United States political discourse over time, this also changed the way in which the United States framed energy exploration. As mentioned in section 6.2.2, G. W. Bush's Arctic memorandum was the first policy to acknowledge the effects of climate change. This reflected on the way Bush, and later Obama, framed regional energy exploration. The issue of energy independence increasingly became tied to sustainable development where policies used oxymoronic language like environmentally "responsible" and "sound" methods of energy development (NSPD-144, 2009: 9; United States Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013: 7). Discursively the utterances by Bush and Obama signify the merging of the economic and environmental sectors where both are securitized. This is further reflected in the following statement by Barack Obama pushing to pursue oil exploration in the Arctic region in a sustainable manner when he proposed a plan to lease limited areas off the North Slope of Alaska:

> "Now, there will be those who strongly disagree with this decision, including those who say we should not open any new areas to drilling. But what I want to emphasize is that this

> announcement is part of a broader strategy that will move us from an economy that runs on fossil fuels and foreign oil to one that relies more on homegrown fuels and clean energy. And the only way this transition will succeed is if it strengthens our economy in the short term and the long run. To fail to recognize this reality would be a mistake" (Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland on March 31, 2010)

Currently the United States is faced with a dilemma of whether or not to prioritize the economic sector over the environmental sector, or vice versa. Regarding economic securitization, the United States is still heavily dependent on fossil fuels and will continue to be for the coming decades (United States Energy Information Administration, 2018). Exploring avenues for energy exploration in the Arctic represent short-term security solutions of United States Arctic policy. In turn, the United States also desires to maintain relevance in global politics by adapting to trends like advancing its clean energy technologies as part of its environmental security practices. The desire to invest in cleaner energy sources represent more long-term security goals of United States Arctic policy. It cannot be understated, however, that current formulations of United States Arctic policy discourse is contradictory because energy exploration is an inherently environmentally harmful practice – particularly in a fragile environment like the Arctic. The attempt to combine both security sectors results in confusing and vague policy formulation where it is unclear what United States policy is, and where its policy priorities lie. These unclear formulations are further adopted in discourses of federal agencies tasked with aiding the federal government with policy implementation – proliferating the problem further (DOD, 2013; NOAA's Arctic Action Plan, 2013).

The United States had contemplated the possibility of allowing Shell to conduct energy exploration in the Arctic as late as 2015. During a news conference, Obama linked domestic oil exploration to national security, and framed this option as a better alternative to relying on foreign oil: "I would rather us – with all the safeguards and standards that we have – be producing our oil and gas, rather than importing it, which is bad for our people, but is also potentially purchased from places that have much lower environmental standards than we do" (The President's News Conference at Camp David, Maryland on May 14, 2015). This too demonstrates that Obama did not want to favor one security sector over another, in turn discursively securitizing both. This is a noteworthy revelation given that under Obama the United States had experienced the worst oil

spill in its history in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. The prospect of economic independence through drilling in the Arctic was framed as a more favorable option than relying on foreign oil despite this, and also used environmental securitization language by stating that foreign oil might come from less clean sources. On the other hand, this position favors the economic sector over the environmental sector by disregarding the potential risk that drilling in the Arctic could cause an oil spill too, which would prove extremely difficult to clean up given the Arctic's inhospitable environment (NOAA's Arctic Vision and Strategy, 2011).

A drastic change in policy discourse came at the end of Obama's presidency in late 2016 when he issued a law permanently banning offshore oil drilling in the Arctic and the Atlantic shortly before President-elect Donald Trump took office in January 2017. Using the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which states: "the President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf", Obama banned all future offshore oil and gas drilling in most of the United States Arctic, including the entire Chukchi Sea and 98 percent of the United States Beaufort Sea (Fact Sheet: White House Announces Actions to Protect Natural and Cultural Resources in Alaskan Arctic Ocean on December 9, 2016). This was done under the pretext that drilling in the Arctic could have adverse effects on the environment. Obama stated:

> "These actions […] protect a sensitive and unique ecosystem that is unlike any other region on earth. They reflect the scientific assessment that, even with the high safety standards […], the risks of an oil spill in this region are significant and our ability to clean up from a spill in the region's harsh conditions is limited. By contrast, it would take decades to fully develop the production infrastructure necessary for any large-scale oil and gas leasing production in the region – at a time when we need to continue to move decisively away from fossil fuels" (Statement on the Withdrawal of Certain Areas in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans on the Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing on December 20, 2016).

This stark change in policy discourse compared to previous discourses can be explained in several ways. Firstly, given that it had been known since November 2016 that Obama's successor would be Donald Trump, considered and unlikely and an unpredictable Republican candidate – this could be perceived as a securitization move that protects the environmental sector over the economic

sector. Secondly, having done much for the environmental sector throughout his presidency – this maneuver helped Obama solidify his substantial environmental legacy as president despite his original intentions to pursue energy exploration in the Arctic.

Other, more economic-centric arguments state that large-scale drilling in the Arctic would be unlikely for at least another 50 years due to environmental variables like poor lighting, 'growlers' (small icebergs almost entirely submerged underwater) and an overall lack of interest in the Arctic by the oil industry given low oil prices at the time (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2015). Obama himself acknowledged that "in 2015, just 0.1% of United States federal offshore crude production came from the Arctic" (Statement on the Withdrawal of Certain Areas in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans on the Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing on December 20, 2016). This utterance, and the fact that Obama drastically changed his policy position on Arctic drilling following Trump's election; both point to political utterances being unstable as they can change easily due to exogenous and endogenous factors. While it is impossible to fully explain why Obama's policy transformed from an economic security-centric agenda to one favoring environmental security, this points to political agendas being reactive to circumstance where politics is symbolic to a certain extent. This again points to the greater overarching phenomena of United States Arctic policy having a lack of direction and being vague in its formulation about what its primary security priorities are.

If we consider that drilling in the Arctic would not be an economically profitable endeavor in terms of the economic sector, Obama's ban indeed makes sense. Regardless, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795 in April 2017, which modified President Obama's withdrawals calling to re-open all of these areas for leasing consideration except for the North Aleutian Basin (O'Rourke, 2018). Rescinding the ban will prove more difficult however, as President Trump would have to have his case repealed in the United States Congress.

6.4 – Societal Sector

As stated by Wæver et al, the societal security sector refers to "[t]he ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats" (1993: 23). Societal security refers to the survival of a unified community where the referent objects are "large scale collective identities that can function independent of the state" (Buzan et al, 1998: 22). Societal insecurities can stem from a variety of factors: migration, vertical competition and

horizontal competition (Buzan et al, 1998). Migration refers to the movement by people from one place to another with the intentions of settling, both permanently and temporarily, in a new location. Vertical competition refers to the integration of a group within a broader organization (Buzan et al, 1998). Finally, horizontal competition refers to the situation when a group is forced to integrate more influential identities within their own identity (Buzan et al, 1998). Societal security is therefore viewing security as something that is achieved when a community can be resilient and persist through changes in society that theoretically threatens the community's original way of life.

In the United States Arctic, societal issues include cooperation with the various indigenous groups living in Alaska such as the Aleut, Yupik and Iñupiat Inuit (BOEM, 2012). Given environmental climactic changes of recent years, previously uninterrupted indigenous settlements have increasingly seen their traditional ways of life hampered by receding ice cover and increased activity by Arctic states. The first time that indigenous peoples were mentioned in modern Arctic policy discourse was in ARPA, which granted "one member appointed from among indigenous residents of the Arctic who are representative of the needs and interests of Arctic residents and who live in areas directly affected by Arctic resource development" to join the Arctic Research Commission (1984: 2). Subsequent Arctic policies have called for including the "Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them", but only to a limited extent (NSC-26, 1994: 2; NSPD-66, 2009: 3). A pattern can be seen that indigenous groups are never given a choice to make decisions independently, and that they are only included in those initiatives proposed by the Federal government. For example, President Clinton called for indigenous participation in AEPS (NSC-26, 1994) and President Bush called for an increased role for indigenous groups in the Arctic Council (NSPD-66, 2009). This overall lack of agency granted to indigenous groups signifies that the United States does not securitize, nor politicize, indigenous societal issues in the Arctic context. The plight of indigenous groups are instead occasionally linked to the environmental sector, albeit rarely. For example, The IARPC will "assess local resident priorities for addressing change and engage indigenous observers and communities in monitoring environmental variables" (Implementation plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2014: 20). Regardless, these discourses are vague in their formulation of what exactly must be done to ensure the protection of indigenous communities and ensure societal security. Societal issues have also appeared the least throughout Arctic policy since 1971.

7. Conclusion

7.1 – Discussion of findings

The study grew out of an academic interest to examine if, and if so, to what extent, the United States securitizes its Arctic affairs through official policy discourse. The analysis presented in this thesis demonstrates that the United States securitized, and continues to securitize, certain aspects of its Arctic policy, albeit to varying degrees across the five security sectors. This thesis demonstrates that shifting policy coalitions and priorities changed the area of focus by United States policymakers over time.

During WWII and the early years of the Cold War, the United States almost exclusively viewed the Arctic through the military sector. The Arctic first served as a military-strategic front for Allied cooperation during WWII and later became one of many regions in the world of geopolitical Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. While the United States also introduced the environmental sector under Nixon and the economic sector under Reagan into official policy discourse, these sectors only manifested to a much greater degree following the end of the Cold War. Overall the United States devoted little time to the Arctic at the time, as evidenced by few Arctic policy documents, and their overall vague discursive formulations about what United States Arctic policy entails.

From the waning years of the Cold War until the present, changes occurred in United States Arctic policy which reflected the new unipolar world order. In addition, rapid climactic changes in the Arctic also facilitated the conditions for Arctic states, including the United States, to become more active in the region. While the military sector remained present in policy discourse, the United States had a virtually non-existent military presence in the region following the end of the Cold War. This resulted in most other Arctic states surpassing the United States in the region militarily, especially its former Cold War rival – Russia. United States policy discourse instead focused on the potential economic security which became closely linked to national security. Both Republican and Democratic administrations were open to utilizing the Arctic's vast resource wealth to become more energy independent. In addition, with global warming and climate change becoming a larger global security concern, the United States increasingly began to frame environmental security as national security.

Conversely, United States policy described the need to conduct resource extraction in an environmentally responsible manner, which is contradictory given the discrepancy between

seeking to protect the environment while simultaneously seeking to further conduct fossil fuel extraction in an environmentally fragile region. In a drastic turn of events, the Obama administration banned oil and gas drilling in most of the Arctic days before Trump became President of the United States in January 2017. Given these developments, the Arctic remains a low security priority in United States national policy despite the recent spike in interest. In addition, current policy discourse remains vague about what United States Arctic policy priorities are, and what they ought to be.

Throughout the post-Cold War era of United States Arctic policy, there were several instances where policy goals of one sector seemed to be realized under the guise of another. Examples include the utilization of military means to combat environmental nuclear contamination in the mid-1990s; and the discursive call by Obama to proliferate ice-breaker technologies to secure sea-routes for economic purposes in 2013. In addition, overlap between the economic and environmental security sectors in both G. W. Bush's 2009 memorandum and Obama's 2013 strategy for the Arctic occurred for example. While Buzan et al acknowledge that the five security sectors are not mutually exclusive and that overlap can occur between them, this is only a partial explanation (1998). An additional explanation is the overarching lack of policy goals and focus in United States Arctic policy.

The Arctic has consistently been an area of international multilateral cooperation throughout United States Arctic policy history, and it has increasingly transcended to become an area of international security concern regardless of vague policy formulation. This is demonstrated by the various international agreements that have resulted from cooperation on Arctic affairs, and most notably the establishment – and growing role – of the AC. The inauguration of Donald Trump as president has many worried about the implications for Arctic affairs, especially after the recent withdrawal from the 2015 Paris climate agreement by the United States. Despite this, for now the United States position on the Arctic remains status quo and is discursively open to continue cooperation and research in the Arctic with other Arctic States. On May 2017, Secretary of state Rex Tillerson signed a commitment to continue to curb greenhouse gas emissions and to extend scientific cooperation in the Arctic region (Wintour, 2017).

Ways in which the United States could continue to formulate a concise Arctic policy is to further involve the various national governmental bodies to cooperate and formulate their own policy documents. In 2013 the DOD and USCG formulated their own Arctic policies

supplementing Obama's 2013 strategy, but other departments would be encouraged to do so as well to facilitate further cooperation between the various federal bodies. Furthermore, both G. W. Bush's and Obama's Arctic policies called on Congress to ratify UNCLOS, as this would formalize more concrete guidelines on maritime conduct in the Arctic; it would also make resolving the four territorial disputes easier; it would render the United States a more reliable diplomatic partner to other Arctic states; and it would give the United States more legal standing as a regional securitizing actor.

7.2 – Limitations and possibility for expansion

To ensure scientific thoroughness, several limitations of this thesis will be discussed and ideas for possible improvements will be presented. Firstly, this thesis is based on a single case study analysis which raises concerns about its external validity, methodological precision and subjectivity of the researcher. Secondly, securitization theory has several limitations as discussed in section 2.5. There exists contestation within academia about how the securitization sectors ought to be categorized, and that there is often overlap between various sectors. Having used the Copenhagen School of securitization in the analysis, it too faces several empirical contestations pertaining to inherent tensions in its main theoretical assumptions and the validity of its claims of a universal logic of security. Doubts exist about the generalizability of the securitization framework across other cases and contexts. The third limitation pertains to the methodology of discourse analysis used in this thesis. Like securitization theory, divides exist in academia about how one chooses to conduct discourse analysis, and which methodological approach is best suited for a given case-study. Lastly, supplementary discursive utterances were exclusively collected from the American Presidency Project open-source database. The analysis is therefore limited to those utterances contained in the database. While a total of 279 documents contained the word 'Arctic' upon searching, only sixteen were directly cited in the analysis. The process of selecting which documents to include and exclude undoubtedly points to a degree of unavoidable subjectivity on the part of the researcher, which is a limitation.

Regardless of these limitations, the analysis can none the less be generalized across other case-studies in the Arctic to a certain degree. While this thesis only explored official United States Arctic policy, similar analyses of the seven other Arctic states' official policy discourses could be conducted to compliment it. Conveniently, the Arctic is limited to eight states, with a few states seeking increased involvement in regional affairs. Because all Arctic states have issued official policies (Model 1 according to Hansen, 2006), this too provides a strict delimitation of documents to be analyzed. Having

a similar discourse analysis analyzing the extent to which all Arctic States securitize the Arctic, this would provide new macro-level insights into regional dynamics of securitization discourse by state actors. It would also provide insight into what each state actor finds most important in the Arctic; could pin-point existing policy gaps or points of contestation; and could perhaps prove useful for regional policy cooperation.

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Appendix 1 – All official policy documents issued by the United States government used in analysis

	Title	Date	Administration	Type of Document	Classification Status upon issuing
1	National Security Decision Memorandum 144	22 December 1971	Richard Nixon	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Classified as 'Secret' (Declassified 18 May 1977)
2	National Security Decision Memorandum 202	22 January 1973	Richard Nixon	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Classified as 'Confidential' (Declassified 9 June 2002)
3	National Security Decision Directives 90	28 January 1983	Ronald Reagan	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Classified as 'Secret' (Declassified 23 October 1998)
4	Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984	January 1984	Ronald Reagan	Public Law	Unclassified
5	Executive Order 12501 Arctic Research	28 January 1985	Ronald Reagan	Executive Order	Unclassified

6	Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 Memorandum	9 June 1994	Bill Clinton	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Unclassified
7	National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25: Arctic Region Policy	9 January 2009	George W. Bush	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Unclassified
8	The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap	October 2009	Barack Obama	Guidelines for U.S. Navy (Maritime component of DOD)	Unclassified
9	National Security Strategy	May 2010	Barack Obama	National Strategy (Executive Office of the President White House)	Unclassified
10	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Arctic Vision & Strategy	February 2011	Barack Obama	Strategy (NOAA, part of DOC)	Unclassified
11	National Strategy for the Arctic 2013	May 2013	Barack Obama	National Strategy (Executive Office of the President White House)	Unclassified

12	United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy	May 2013	Barack Obama	National Strategy (USCG)	Unclassified
13	Executive Order 13653 - Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change	1 November 2013	Barack Obama	Executive Order	Unclassified
14	Arctic Strategy Department of Defense	November 2013	Barack Obama	Strategy (DOD)	Unclassified
15	Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region	January 2014	Barack Obama	National Strategy (Executive Office of the President White House)	Unclassified
16	The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 - 2030	February 2014	Barack Obama	Guidelines for U.S. Navy (Maritime component of DOD)	Unclassified
17	NOAA's Arctic Action Plan Supporting the National Strategy for the Arctic Region	April 2014	Barack Obama	Strategy (NOAA, part of DOC)	Unclassified

18	Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing	20 December 2016	Barack Obama	Presidential Memorandum/Directive	Unclassified
19	Executive Order 13795 - Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy	28 April 2017	Donald Trump	Executive Order	Unclassified

Appendix 2 – Other governmental discourses outside of official policy documents used in analysis

	Title	Date	Administration	Type of Document	Classification Status upon issuing
1	111- A message to Congress Transmitting Annual Report on Marine Resource and Engineering Development	13 April 1970	Nixon	Message to congress	Public
2	308 - Statement about the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline	26 September 1971	Nixon	Statement	Public
3	National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska Statement on Proposed Legislation	28 January 1980	Carter	Statement	Public
4	President Ronald Reagan's Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea	29 January 1982	Reagan	Statement	Public

5	Statement on United States Oceans Policy	10 March 1983	Reagan	Statement	Public
6	Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting	10 December 1987	Reagan	Speech (Televised)	Public
7	Joint Statement Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow	1 June 1988	Reagan	Statement	Public
8	Remarks to the United States Coast Guard in Seattle	20 November 1993	Clinton	Speech	Public
9	Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland	31 March 2010	Obama	Speech	Public
10	Statement by the Press Secretary on the National Strategy for the Arctic Region	10 May 2013	Obama	Statement	Public

11	Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine	29 July 2014	Obama	Conference Call	Public
12	363 - The President's News Conference at Camp David, Maryland	14 May 2015	Obama	News Conference	Public
13	578 - The President's Weekly Address	29 August 2015	Obama	Weekly Presidential Address	Public
14	589 - Remarks Prior to a Boat Tour of Kenai Fjords National Park in Seward, Alaska	1 September 2015	Obama	Speech	Public
15	Fact Sheet: White House Announces Actions to Protect Natural and Cultural Resources in Alaskan Arctic Ocean	9 December 2016	Obama	Fact Sheet	Public
16	858 - Statement on the Withdrawal of Certain Areas in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans on the Outer Continental Shelf From Mineral Leasing	20 December 2016	Obama	Statement	Public