

Leiden University – Campus The Hague
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs



Master thesis

SECURE STATE OR SECURITY STATE?

The possible development of the Netherlands into a security state, since the implementation of preventive counterterrorism measures in 2011

January 9th, 2018

Jessica Hulsman (s1875477)

Master Crisis & Security Management

Supervisor: S. Wittendorp MA

Second reader: Dr. R.S. Prins

Acknowledgements

Before you lies the thesis ‘Secure state or security state?’. This research focuses on the effect of counterterrorism measures, with regard to the possible development of the Netherlands into a security state, since the implementation of preventive counterterrorism measures in 2011. This thesis is the conclusion of the Master’s program Crisis & Security Management, which is part of the faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University.

From this place, I would like to thank the people who contributed to the realization of this thesis. I would like to thank my friend in Israel, who inspired me to write about this subject, during a walk through Jerusalem. I also would like to thank my supervisor, Stef Wittendorp, for his excellent guidance, his detailed feedback, and the knowledge he shared. I also want to thank Ruth Prins for her feedback in her role as second reader.

Finally, I want to thank my husband, with whom I could debate about issues, and who kept me motivated if I ever lost interest. His support has helped me to fully focus on my thesis, and therefore can proudly present the result to you.

Jessica Hulsman

Lunteren, January 2018

Content

- Introduction 6**
- Academic and societal relevance 7
- Reading guide 9
- Body of knowledge 10**
- Security in general 10
- National security 11
- Security state 12
 - Framework 16
- Methodology and design 19**
- Framework 21
 - A welfare state or a risk-driven state? 22
 - The criminalization of social policy within a state 23
 - The blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-
bordering of the state 25
- Design 27
- Sampling 28
- Unit of analysis and unit of observation 28
- Pitfalls 29
- Methods and data gathering 29
 - Desktop research 29
 - Document analysis 30
- Background information 32**
- National security threats 32
- Terrorist threat 32
- Counterterrorism measures 33
- Document description 34
 - National Counterterrorism Strategies (2011-2015 and 2016-2020) 35
 - Terrorism Threat Assessment (No. 26 – 46) 36
 - Policy implications ‘Terrorism Threat Assessment’ (No. 37 – 41) 37
 - Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism 37
- 1. A welfare state or a risk-driven state? 38**

1.1 Intelligence collection and analysis as the cornerstones	38
1.1.1 The centrality of intelligence	38
1.1.2 State and non-state actors	40
1.1.3 Online monitoring.....	42
1.2 Defensive modes of action	44
1.2.1 Travel movements and border protection	44
1.2.2 Protection of Dutch interests at home and abroad	47
1.3 Conclusion.....	49
2. The criminalization of social policy within a state	51
2.1 Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats	51
2.1.1 The citizen as a professional.....	51
2.1.2 The citizen in other 'roles'	53
2.2 Construction of legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible.....	55
2.2.1 Importance of a legal basis	55
2.2.2 Changed or new legislation	56
2.2.3 Preventive criminalization.....	60
2.3 Offensive modes of action.....	61
2.4 Conclusion.....	66
3. The blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control.....	67
3.1 Offensive modes of action.....	67
3.1.1 Military and paramilitary operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure.....	67
3.1.2 Infiltrations and targeted killings.....	69
3.2 Legitimized 'wartime' state activities	71
3.2.1 restrictions based on suspicious activity or speech	72
3.2.2 Intrusive surveillance.....	73
3.2.3 Propaganda	78
3.2.4 'Wartime' state activities.....	80
3.3 Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats	80
3.3.1 Strengthening the psychological endurance of the civilian population.....	81
3.3.2 Hybrid measures	85
3.4 Militarization of the police	85

3.5 Conclusion.....	87
4. Operating as a security state?	89
4.1 Portraying certain issues as an existential threat	89
4.2 Extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedure.....	92
4.2.1 The need for counterterrorism measures	93
4.2.2 Extraordinary measures	94
4.3 State searches for new technologies of power and risk management to counter this threat	95
4.4 conclusion.....	97
Conclusion.....	99
Appendix 1 - Visual.....	106
Appendix 2 - Framework for empirical analysis of security states	107
Appendix 3 - References	109

INTRODUCTION

The risk of terrorism emanating from the belt of instability along Europe's external borders¹, has caused a wave of preventive measures to counter the threat of a terrorist attack in western-European countries, including the Netherlands. These counterterrorism measures have consequences for a society and the way a country is governed. One of the possible effects is the development into a 'security state'. A security state can be described as a state where extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedure, in order to protect its society from an issue, which is presented by the state as an existential threat.²

The Netherlands is a state that, apart from some small-scale incidents, has not experienced a large-scale terrorist attack since 1977. Still, after terrorist attacks in surrounding countries, the Netherlands has implemented a wide variety of counterterrorism measures (such as the monitoring of social networks, military protection at high risk places, movement restrictions or preventive arrests of suspected terrorists). This makes the Netherlands an interesting case, because it can show the effects of the terrorism threat and counterterrorism measures, without an actual attack having taken place. This leads to the question, what the effects are of counterterrorism measures on the way the Dutch state is governed, and to what extent the Netherlands has developed into a security state since the implementation of its counterterrorism measures?

After a period of relative peace, with only small-scale incidents, 2011 marks the start of a period in which terrorism has taken its place again on the national security agenda.³ Although it might be contested if terrorism has indeed become a larger threat to national security⁴, it has

¹ RIVM (2016). *Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: Een all hazard overzicht van potentiële rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten* (pp. 137). Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/Nationaal%20Veiligheidsprofiel%202016_tcm31-232083.pdf

General Intelligence and Security Service (2017). *Annual report 2016* (pp. 3). Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2017/04/04/annual-report-2016>

² Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis* (pp. 23-24). Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub.

³ NOS (2015). *Terreur in Europa; een bloedige lijst*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2069008-terreur-in-europa-een-bloedige-lijst.html>

Datagraver (2015). *Toenemend terrorisme wereldwijd*. Retrieved from: <http://www.datagraver.com/case/toenemend-terrorisme-wereldwijd>

⁴ Alcantara, C. (2017). 46 Years of terrorist attacks in Europe, visualized. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/>

been a dominant subject in Dutch threat reports.⁵ Jihadist terrorism is currently identified as the largest threat to national security by the Dutch government⁶, and the expectation is that this threat further increases in the coming years.⁷ To counter this terrorist threat, different measures have been implemented by the Dutch government, ranging from gathering information, prevention of attacks, protection of persons and objects, to training of security networks and enforcement of the democratic rule of law against extremism and terrorism.⁸ This research will specifically focus on preventive measures since 2011, to analyze to what extent, and in what way, the Netherlands has developed itself into a security state. All the above leads to the following research question: “*To what extent, and in what way, has the Netherlands developed itself into a ‘security state’, since the implementation of preventive counter-terrorism measures in 2011?*”

ACADEMIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

This research will focus on a security challenge that Western countries currently have to deal with, and in all probability also in the future. However, there is limited knowledge about the effect of these measures for Dutch society, and how this changes the way the Netherlands is governed.⁹ Therefore, additional information and insights are needed to increase understanding of these effects. Only when there is sufficient understanding, it is possible for western-European governments to counter the terrorist threat in a more comprehensive way, which also considers how these measures affect society before additional ones are taken.

⁵ RIVM (2016). *Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: Een all hazard overzicht van potentiële rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten* (pp. 137). Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/Nationaal%20Veiligheidsprofiel%202016_tcm31-232083.pdf

General Intelligence and Security Service (2017). *Annual report 2016* (pp. 3). Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2017/04/04/annual-report-2016>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020* (pp.3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020* (pp.9). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

⁹ Amnesty International (n.d.). *Contraterrorisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-wedoen/themas/veiligheid-en-mensenrechten/contraterrorisme>

Post, H. (2016). *De angst regeert: Een onderzoek naar de beleidsreactie van de Nederlandse overheid na terroristische aanslagen*. Retrieved from: <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=141733>

Bos, A., Douglas, S., Klem, W. & Noordegraaf, M. (2016). *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?: Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015. USBO advies*.

In the previous years, an extensive body of research has been published on the terrorism threat in western-European countries. The focus ranges from trying to identify the causes of terrorism, the perpetrators, different terrorism threats, and the effectiveness of implemented counterterrorism measures. This research aims to add an extra angle of incidence to the ongoing debate, which is the focus on the possible effects of counterterrorism measures for a society, and more specifically the link with the concept of the 'security state'. In this way, this research may serve as a starting point for additional academic studies to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the possible effects of counterterrorism measures for the Netherlands, or western-European countries in general. There have been a small number of evaluations about the implications of counterterrorism measures for society (both in the Netherlands¹⁰, and outside) but these are focused on the period before 2010. This means there is a gap in literature when focusing on the link between securitization of society and counterterrorism measures, and especially in the period from 2011 until now.

The concept of the 'security state', although a relative new concept, has been researched by a variety of disciplines and scholars as well. This research ranges from trying to identify what the security state entails¹¹ and where it came from¹², to its implications for racism¹³ or criminology¹⁴. However, there is limited literature on the emergence of a security state with a

¹⁰ Rijksoverheid (2011). *Antiterrorisme-maatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw*. Retrieved from:

<https://www.burojansen.nl/pdf/AntiterrorismemaatregeleninNederlandinheteerstedecenniumvande21eeeuw.pdf>

Postma, W.S. (2012). *Performative power van contraterrorisme-beleid*. Retrieved from: http://www.governancequarterly.org/uploads/1/5/6/9/15692298/postma_w_-_master_thesis.pdf

Commissie evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid (2009). *Naar een integrale evaluatie van antiterrorisme-maatregelen*. Retrieved from:

https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kkg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vi6v1ktsk9y2/f=/blg20673.pdf

¹¹ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 141-157

¹² Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 1-25

¹³ Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Institute of Race Relations*, 46(1), 3-29

¹⁴ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 141-157

Andreas, P. & Price, R. (2001). From war fighting to crime fighting: Transforming the American national security state. *International Studies Review*, 3(3), 31-52

link to counterterrorism measures¹⁵, and especially not focused on the Netherlands. This paper aims to address this gap in knowledge by analyzing the possible development of the Netherlands into a security state, after the implementation of counterterrorism measures in 2011. Additionally, because there is no clear understanding of the characteristics of the security state, this research aims contribute to the creation of a framework for empirical research on the security state. This is done by combining existing literature on security states with the specific characteristics that can be found in the case of an 'extreme' security state: Israel.

READING GUIDE

This thesis will start with a body of knowledge, that provides an overview of academic literature on the concepts security, national security and the security state. Hereafter comes a methodology and design chapter which includes an operationalization of the main concepts and an overview and explanation of the framework on the characteristics of a security state, which can be used for empirical research. After this, a chapter called 'background information' will give some background information about terrorism as a national security threat to the Netherlands, followed by a description of each of the documents that will be analyzed.

Then the possible development of a security state in the Netherlands will be analyzed in four chapters. The first three chapters will consist of an analysis based on what the security state is, classified by three drivers. The fourth chapter analyzes to what extent the Netherlands operates as a security state. This analysis will close with a final conclusive chapter.

¹⁵ Kruk, M. (2016). *Waarom de Fransen liever in een veiligheidsstaat dan in een democratie lijken te willen leven*. Retrieved from: <https://decorrespondent.nl/4207/waarom-de-fransen-liever-in-een-veiligheidsstaat-dan-in-een-democratie-lijken-te-willen-leven/429274522292-e91c2732>

BODY OF KNOWLEDGE

As explained in the introduction, this paper will focus on the possible development of a Dutch 'security state' after the implementation of preventive counterterrorism measures in 2011. To analyze the context of a Dutch security state, and what it entails, this review will start with a short overview of academic literature on security in general. After this, the subject and literature will be narrowed down to the concept of national security, followed by an argument why this concept is too limited when it comes to analyzing the possible effects of counterterrorism measures. Lastly, another (more suitable) concept will be introduced, which is the concept of the security state. This concept is translated into a framework, which can be used for empirical research.

SECURITY IN GENERAL

Security is described by Wolfers as “*the absence of threats to acquired values*”.¹⁶ Because of the ambiguity of the ‘absence of threats’, Wolfers' definition has been adapted by Baldwin to “*a low probability of damage to acquired values*”.¹⁷ However, this definition still remains fairly broad, with much room for interpretation. This relates to Zedner’s argument that the term security is used in many different senses, and often without clearly defining the meaning ascribed.¹⁸ Therefore, Baldwin created a series of questions, which can help determine what security means in specific situations:¹⁹

Security for whom?

A wide range of answers to the question is acceptable: the individual, the state, the international system etc. The answer depends on the research question to be addressed.

¹⁶ Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an ambiguous symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 485. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145138>

¹⁷ Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 1997(23), 13

¹⁸ Zedner, L. (2003). Too much security? *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 2003(31), 158

¹⁹ Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 1997(23), 13-17

Security for which values?

All the 'who's' defined above have different values, such as economic welfare, autonomy, physical safety. If the values are not defined, this could lead to confusion about what is meant by security.

These two questions suffice to define the concept of security in a given situation, but additional questions can be added to make the concept more specific and clear: 'How much security?', 'From what threats?', 'By what means?', 'At what cost?' and 'In what time period?'. With these questions, Baldwin shows that security is not a clear-cut concept. How security is perceived and framed depends on who defines it and in what context. This will be further addressed in the explanation of the concept of 'securitization'.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Baldwin's definition of security can be related to Walter Lippmann's description of national security: *"a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war"*.²⁰ In other words, security measures the absence of threats to acquired values, or the absence of fear that these values will be attacked.²¹

This is further specified by Chandra & Bhonsle, who state that the concept of national security is often narrowly defined as the *"preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state, as well as its core political and cultural values, against military threats from without and disruptive elements from within."*²² Furthermore, the authors state that these threats arise from (the threat of) the use of force, which results in a dependency of national security on a state's ability to deter or defeat an attack.²³ This means that the national security-approach is predominantly limited to a focus on the use of force, while it does not take into account the additional 'new' security challenges that states are faced with in the 21st century,

²⁰ Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an ambiguous symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 484

²¹ Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an ambiguous symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 485

²² Chandra, S. & Bhonsle, R. (2015). National security: Concept, measurement and management. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(4), 337

²³ Chandra, S. & Bhonsle, R. (2015). National security: Concept, measurement and management. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(4), 338

such as globalization, terrorism, climate change, pandemics etc.²⁴ This is endorsed by Ullman, who argues that defining national security primarily in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality, and causes states to concentrate on military threats and ignore other, harmful dangers. Which in turn, reduces their total security.²⁵ In other words, the national security concept presumes issues to be security-issues, and approaches these issues from a security point of view, while not considering the complex problems that a state faces.²⁶ Furthermore, it does not consider the changing character of the state, or possible implications of security measures for its society. These limitations form the argument why the national security approach is unsuited for analyzing counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands, and their possible effects on Dutch society. Therefore, another concept is introduced, to help map the effects of government policy regarding counterterrorism: the concept of the 'security state'.

SECURITY STATE

There is no consensus on a definition of a security state, but the idea behind the security state concept is not new, and has already been introduced by Michel Foucault in 1978.²⁷ Foucault introduces a new form of power, which he refers to as “sécurité”, which is focused on the 'governing of life' and people's living conditions, specifically in terms of prevention, population, regulation, and risk.²⁸

Iris Marion Young describes that the concept of the security state is based upon the idea of masculine protection²⁹, and that it started with "*a man who keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and readily risks himself in the face of threats from the outside in order to protect the subordinate members of his household.*"³⁰, but then slowly moved to families

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ullman, R.H. (1983). Redefining security. *International Security*, 8(1), 129

²⁶ Freeman, C.W. Jr. (n.d.). National security in the age of terrorism: Remarks to the congressional research service seminar for new members. *Middle East Policy Council*. Retrieved from: <http://www.mepc.org/speeches/national-security-age-terrorism>

²⁷ Schuilenburg, M. (2011). The securitization of society: On the rise of quasi-criminal law and selective exclusion. *Social Justice: A journal of crime, conflict, and world order*, 38(1), 71

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 1-3

³⁰ Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 4

joining protection associations because of the constant fear they lived under³¹, to the moment the state took over this role:

*All the petty protectors in the state of nature give up their powers of aggression and defense, which they turn over to the sovereign. They make a covenant with one another to live in peace and constitute civil society under the common rule of an absolute authority who makes, interprets, and enforces the laws of the commonwealth for the sake of peace and security of subjects.*³²

Young defines the security state as: "one whose rulers subordinate citizens to ad hoc surveillance, search, or detention and repress criticism of such arbitrary power, justifying such measures as within the prerogative of those authorities whose primary duty is to maintain security and protect the people."³³ However, this definition is rather broad, and portrays the state as a (dictator-like) actor that takes unannounced measures and represses any criticism on its dominant position. It leaves out the part where a country stays a democracy, but still can develop into a security state because its citizens accept the justification, and support the measures that are taken to ensure security.

At the same time, Young does help to gain insight in the different aspects of a security state. She states that a security state has an external and internal aspect:

*It constitutes itself in relation to an enemy outside, an unpredictable aggressor against which the state needs vigilant defense. (...) Internally, the security state must root out the enemy within. There is always the danger that among us are agents who have an interest in disturbing our peace, violating our persons and property, and allowing outsiders to invade our communities and institutions. To protect the state and its citizens, officials must therefore keep a careful watch on the people within its borders and observe and search them to make sure they do not intend evil actions and do not have the means to perform them.*³⁴

The current terrorist threat in the Netherlands can be linked to the internal aspect of the security state, with counterterrorism measures aimed at rooting out the enemy within.

³¹ Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 4

³² Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 7

³³ Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 8

³⁴ Ibid.

Liz Fekete does not give a clear definition of the security state, but describes how 9/11 has launched a wide range of counterterrorism measures among Western-European countries, and caused the emergence of the security state.³⁵ Fekete's main focus is on the security state in relation to muslim-extremism and what this means for integration, which limits the scope of analysis regarding the security state. But the article can be useful in gaining insight in what the security state is capable of and what the link is between the security state and securitization.³⁶ Furthermore, Fekete gives possible characteristics of a security state, such as the role of security services, policing a suspect community, crimes of association, trial by media, national identity and the move to monoculturalism, and the end of multiculturalism.³⁷ However, these characteristics are too limited for analyzing the development of a Dutch security state, because of the aforementioned scope of the article.

This brings to the work of Simon Hallsworth & John Lea. In their article 'Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state', they give a more comprehensive definition of the security state. The security state is described as a state that "*searches for new technologies of power and risk management aimed at 'external' threats that, in a globalized world, may originate in the next street or in another continent.*" and "*in turn, these technologies and practices come to infect the government of the population as a whole.*"³⁸ This definition will be used for this research, because in this way the security state is described as a concept that aims to describe a certain reality (in relation to security and threats) that exists in a specific society or state.

As mentioned before, Fekete linked the concept of the security state to the concept of securitization. This research will also use the concept of 'securitization' to study the possible development of a Dutch security state. Because the security state describes a certain reality, which has developed because it has to deal with a certain 'external' threat, it is useful to understand the process how such a threat comes about. Securitization theory helps to gain insight in the process of how a certain issue becomes a security-issue, or in other words, how an issue becomes a threat.

³⁵ Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Race & Class*, 46(1), 5

³⁶ Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Race & Class*, 46(1), 5-7

³⁷ Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Race & Class*, 46(1), 7-21

³⁸ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 142

Securitization theory has been developed by the Copenhagen School (specifically by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde) in the early 1990's. The original formulation explains securitization as a 'speech-act': a discourse that generates social reality.³⁹ More specifically, the process of securitization can be described as "an issue that is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."⁴⁰ This means there are three elements present in securitization: an actor (in most cases the state) who securitizes an issue, the speech act and the audience who accepts or denies this legitimization of security measures.⁴¹

The concept of the 'security state', although a relative new concept, has already been researched by a variety of disciplines and scholars. Including the scholars discussed above, this research ranges from trying to identify what the security state entails⁴² and where it came from⁴³, to its implications for racism⁴⁴ or criminology⁴⁵. However, there is limited literature on the emergence of a security state with a link to counterterrorism measures⁴⁶, and especially not focused on the Netherlands. There have been a small number of evaluations about the implications of counterterrorism measures for society (both in the Netherlands⁴⁷, and outside)

³⁹ Abulof, U. (2014). Deep securitization and Israel's "demographic demon". *International Political Sociology*, 8(4), 396- 415

⁴⁰ Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis* (pp. 24). Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub.

Bruyn, D. de (2006). *De magistraat aan het woord: Een verkennend onderzoek naar de opvattingen van magistraten over hun functioneren in justitie en samenleving* (pp. 49). Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9(1), 55

⁴¹ Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3), 362

⁴² Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 141-157

⁴³ Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), 1-25

⁴⁴ Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Institute of Race Relations*, 46(1), 3-29

⁴⁵ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 141-157

Andreas, P. & Price, R. (2001). From war fighting to crime fighting: Transforming the American national security state. *International Studies Review*, 3(3), 31-52

⁴⁶ Kruk, M. (2016). *Waarom de Fransen liever in een veiligheidsstaat dan in een democratie lijken te willen leven*. Retrieved from: <https://decorrespondent.nl/4207/waarom-de-fransen-liever-in-een-veiligheidsstaat-dan-in-een-democratie-lijken-te-willen-leven/429274522292-e91c2732>

⁴⁷ Rijksoverheid (2011). *Antiterrorisme-maatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw*. Retrieved from:

<https://www.burojansen.nl/pdf/AntiterrorismemaatregeleninNederlandinheteerstedecenniumvande21eeuw.pdf>

but these are focused on the period before 2010. This means there is a gap in literature when focusing on the link between securitization of society and counterterrorism measures, and especially in the period from 2011 until now. This thesis aims to address this gap in knowledge by analyzing the possible development of the Netherlands into a security state, after the implementation of counterterrorism measures in 2011.

FRAMEWORK

In order to analyze to what extent the Netherlands has developed into a security state, a framework will be created. The literature on security states does not provide a clear and comprehensive framework on the characteristics of a security state, which can be used for empirical research. Therefore, the information from the literature on security states will be combined with specific characteristics that can be derived from empirical reality, to create a more comprehensive picture of what a security state entails. By combining academic research with reality, it is possible to create a framework that is up-to-date and more reliable to analyze and draw conclusions on, about the possible development of a security state. The specific characteristics from empirical reality will be derived from the case of an extreme security state: Israel. An extreme case is used because this can help outline the contours of what a security state can entail. When using less extreme cases, it can be difficult to differentiate between what is a characteristic of a security state and what is not. Israel provides these contours of an extreme security state, as the prominence of security practices and discourse in Israel is acknowledged by a wide range of scholars. Its constant existential threats depict Israel's citizens and state as invariably endangered⁴⁸, influencing thought, decision making and national polity in Israel.⁴⁹ This has resulted in the state of emergency becoming a part of normal politics in Israel, which in turn influences the issues that can be securitized.⁵⁰

Postma, W.S. (2012). *Performative power van contraterrorisme-beleid*. Retrieved from: http://www.governancequarterly.org/uploads/1/5/6/9/15692298/postma_w_-_master_thesis.pdf

Commissie evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid (2009). *Naar een integrale evaluatie van antiterrorisme-maatregelen*. Retrieved from:

https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vi6v1ktsk9y2/f=/blg20673.pdf

⁴⁸ Abulof, U. (2014). Deep securitization and Israel's "demographic demon". *International Political Sociology*, 8(4), 396- 415

⁴⁹ Abulof, U. (2009). "Small peoples": The existential uncertainty of ethnonational communities. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 228-229

⁵⁰ Lupovici, A. (2014). The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel. *International Studies Review*, 16(3), 391

However, it is important to note that there are differences between the cases of Israel and the Netherlands, which can influence the compatibility of the framework for western-European countries like the Netherlands. First of all, the geographical difference. The Netherlands is part of western-Europe, while Israel is part of the Middle-East. This, in its turn, also results in differences in culture and religion. Furthermore, Israel is a country that ‘stands on its own’, and is not part of a larger ‘institution’, as the Netherlands is part of Europe. The Netherlands also does not have a ‘West Bank’ within its borders, which means that the Netherlands is not faced with conflicts motivated by a territorial dispute.⁵¹

Although Israel and the Netherlands differ in many respects, there are also reasons why the two should be compared, and why a framework based on specific characteristics from Israel could be very useful to analyze the situation in the Netherlands.

First, Israel is not only confronted with threats that are based on territorial motivations, but also with threats that are part of a larger ideologically-driven Islamist motivation.⁵² This is the same threat that western-European countries are currently faced with.⁵³ Second, Israel and the Netherlands are both based on a system of democracy. This can be linked to the critique on Young’s description of a security state, because both cases can show how a democratic country can still develop into a security state. Third, although Israel and the Netherlands are not always confronted with the same threat in terms of origin (religious, political, or territorial), both countries are faced with the same forms of attacks: the perpetrators are mostly individuals⁵⁴ (whether or not backed up by a larger organization or group⁵⁵), carrying

⁵¹ Frantzman, S.J. (2017). *Is Israel a model for Europe confronting terror? Yes and no*. Retrieved from: <https://sethfrantzman.com/2017/08/22/is-israel-a-model-for-europe-confronting-terror-yes-and-no/>

⁵² Ibid.

Gold, D. (n.d.). Is the Terror against Europe Different from the Terror against Israel? In F. Nirenstein (ed.), *Lessons from Israel’s response to terrorism*. Retrieved from: <http://jcpa.org/lessons-israels-response-terrorism/terror-europe-different-terror-israel/>

⁵³ Algemene Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst (n.d.). *Dreiging voor Nederland*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/dreiging>

⁵⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). *Wave of terror 2015-2017*. Retrieved from: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx>

Foster, A. (2017). Terror attacks timeline: From Paris and Brussels terror to most recent attacks in Europe. Retrieved from: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism>

NOS (2015). *Terreur in Europa; een bloedige lijst*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2069008-terreur-in-europa-een-bloedige-lijst.html>

Frantzman, S.J. (2017). *Is Israel a model for Europe confronting terror? Yes and no*. Retrieved from: <https://sethfrantzman.com/2017/08/22/is-israel-a-model-for-europe-confronting-terror-yes-and-no/>

out terrorist-type of attacks (such as bomb-attacks, shootings, kidnappings, or vehicular ramming attacks⁵⁶), mostly aimed at ‘soft’ (civilian) or high profile targets, and in most cases with the goal to spread fear. Although these kinds of attacks have not (yet) been carried out in the Netherlands, the attacks in surrounding western-European countries show the same form of attacks. Lastly, in both countries the (terrorist) threat emanates from outside the nation’s borders, as well as from within the nation’s borders (for example returned foreign fighters).⁵⁷

Therefore, by using characteristics from Israel as an extreme security state, and combining this with the existing academic literature on this subject, a more comprehensive framework can be created to analyze the possible development of a Dutch security state.⁵⁸ This framework can be found in the next chapter.

⁵⁵ Magen, A. (2015). *Israel, Europe and the converging terror threat*. Retrieved from: <http://fathomjournal.org/israel-europe-and-the-converging-terror-threat/>

⁵⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). *Wave of terror 2015-2017*. Retrieved from: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx>

Foster, A. (2017). Terror attacks timeline: From Paris and Brussels terror to most recent attacks in Europe. Retrieved from: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism>

NOS (2015). *Terreur in Europa; een bloedige lijst*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2069008-terreur-in-europa-een-bloedige-lijst.html>

Frantzman, S.J. (2017). *Is Israel a model for Europe confronting terror? Yes and no*. Retrieved from: <https://sethfrantzman.com/2017/08/22/is-israel-a-model-for-europe-confronting-terror-yes-and-no/>

⁵⁷ Magen, A. (2015). *Israel, Europe and the converging terror threat*. Retrieved from: <http://fathomjournal.org/israel-europe-and-the-converging-terror-threat/>

⁵⁸Abulof, U. (2014). Deep securitization and Israel's "demographic demon". *International Political Sociology*, 8(4), 396- 415

METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

This research will have an analytical approach, because it aims at using an analytical framework to study the phenomenon of the security state. Indicators from the literature and empirical reality are used to analyze the current situation in the Netherlands after the implementation of counterterrorism measures. To address this issue, an explanatory research question will be used, which will be answered through two concepts: 'preventive counterterrorism measures' and 'the security state'.

Preventive counterterrorism measures	Indicators
Set of actions or measures designed to stop a terrorist attack, before it actually occurs. ⁵⁹ More specifically, these measures are designed for the prevention and disruption of extremism and terrorism, and distortion of terrorist attacks ⁶⁰	<p data-bbox="750 775 1337 801"><i>Prevention and disruption of extremism and terrorism</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="750 819 1394 898">- Defensive modes of action (e.g. safety barriers, military checkpoints, monitoring of social networks)⁶¹ <li data-bbox="750 913 1394 1037">- Offensive modes of action (military and paramilitary operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure, e.g. infiltrations, preventive arrests, targeted killings)⁶² <li data-bbox="750 1052 1394 1308">- Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats (e.g. obligatory military service, permission for use of private protection companies, making it easier to carry weapons, and efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population)⁶³

To increase the internal validity of this concept, the definitions of Bolt and Lucas & Pomeranzev are combined, to create a definition that is more specific and comprehensive.

⁵⁹ Napcan (n.d.) *What is prevention?* Retrieved from: <http://napcan.org.au/prevention/what-is-prevention/>

⁶⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020* (pp.13). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismedebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

⁶¹ Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy* (pp. 29). Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Tucker, J.B. (2008). *Strategies for countering terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli experience*. Retrieved from: <https://coincentral.wordpress.com/2008/06/04/strategies-for-countering-terrorism-lessons-from-the-israeli-experience/>

Horowitz, D. (1993). The Israeli concept of national security. In Yaniv, A. (Ed.), *National security and democracy in Israel* (pp. 11-16). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Security state			
<i>What it is:</i> A security state searches for new technologies of power and risk-management aimed at 'external' threats that, in a globalized world, may originate in the next street or in another continent. ⁶⁴		<i>How it operates:</i> A state where extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedures, in order to protect its society from an issue, which is presented by the state as an existential threat. ⁶⁵	
Indicators			Indicators
<i>A welfare state or a risk-driven state?</i> - Intelligence collection and analysis are the cornerstone - Defensive modes of action	<i>The criminalization of social policy within a state</i> - Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats - Construction of legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible - Offensive modes of action	<i>The de-bordering of the state</i> - Offensive modes of action - Legitimized 'wartime' state activities - Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats - Militarization of the police	- A (representative of the) state - Portrays a certain issue as an existential threat - Threat is seen as an 'external' threat - Extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedure - State searches for new technologies of power and risk management to counter this threat

Because there is no consensus on a definition of a security state, the definition of Buzan, and the definition of Hallsworth & Lea are combined to provide a more complete definition, which will increase the internal validity. The indicators that are given, will be further elaborated and operationalized in the following framework.

⁶⁴ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 142

⁶⁵ Summary of Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis* (pp. 24). Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub.

Bruyn, D. de (2006). *De magistraat aan het woord: Een verkennend onderzoek naar de opvattingen van magistraten over hun functioneren in justitie en samenleving* (pp. 49). Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

FRAMEWORK

As said before, Fekete provided certain characteristics of the security state, but these characteristics are too limited for analyzing the development of a Dutch security state, because of its focus on integration. Hallsworth & Lea have a broader focus when they provide characteristics of the security state. In their article 'Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state', three key drivers of a security state are identified: (1) the change from a welfare state to a risk-driven state, (2) the criminalization of social policy within a state, and (3) the blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-bordering of the state.⁶⁶ These key drivers can also be seen in figure 1.




FIGURE 1 - DYNAMICS OF THE SECURITY STATE

These drivers will be used to analyze the possible development of the Dutch state into a security state on a more 'broad level': to what extent has the Netherlands developed these broad changes in governance? To further refine this framework, characteristics of a security

⁶⁶ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 144

state are derived from the current situation in Israel⁶⁷. These characteristics will be incorporated in the three drivers, and will be used to analyze the more specific, practical, (and in most cases) more visible measures that indicate the development into a security state.

The combination of these three drivers and characteristics are translated in the following framework (for an overview, see appendix 2). This framework can provide a more comprehensive picture of the possible development into a security state, because it addresses both the visible, practical measures, as well as the underlying 'flow' of change of the way the Netherlands is governed.

A WELFARE STATE OR A RISK-DRIVEN STATE?

This driver explains the presence of welfare-thinking or risk-thinking within a state. The welfare state was characterized by its inclusive character, where risks could be reduced through changes in society (such as extension of social rights, extending welfare and promoting social control).⁶⁸ But this welfare-thinking changed in the current world of slowing economic growth, growing social inequality and insecurity.⁶⁹ This has led to the emergence of a security state, which reconstructs problems as risks and dangers that require coercive forms of management.⁷⁰ In short, problems are seen as risks and these risks should be prevented. In this thesis, this driver will focus on whether the Netherlands can be defined as a welfare-state or a risk-driven state.

Intelligence collection and analysis are the cornerstone⁷¹

- Indicator 1: Intelligence gathering is justified and used as the basis for prevention of terrorism.

⁶⁷ Hamou, N. (2016). *How Israel became a role model in fighting terrorism*. Retrieved from: http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/08/22/how_israel_became_a_role_model_in_fighting_terrorism_112005.html

Tucker, J.B. (2008). *Strategies for countering terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli experience*. Retrieved from: <https://coincentral.wordpress.com/2008/06/04/strategies-for-countering-terrorism-lessons-from-the-israeli-experience/>

⁶⁸ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 143-144

⁶⁹ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 144

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy* (pp.35). Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

- Indicator 2: Intelligence can be gathered by state actors (such as AIVD, MIVD), but also by non-state actors (private companies) which will be passed on the government.
- Indicator 3: monitoring of social networks and the internet in general

Defensive modes of action⁷²

- Indicator 1: actual prevention of attacks by making it difficult for the terrorist to reach his intended target, through early identification and neutralization⁷³
 - preventing the infiltration of terrorists into the country (border control and defending nation's borders)
 - identifying and neutralizing terrorists as they travel about the nation's roadways (surveillance and monitoring main road network and public transportation)
- Indicator 2: Deterring terrorists from carrying out their attacks at well-protected facilities by generating the feeling that any action they may undertake is doomed to failure and making them fearful of injury, capture, and punishment.⁷⁴
 - preventing penetrations into secure installations or areas (physical guarding, providing security for sensitive installations, symbolic targets, population centers, safety barriers, military checkpoints)

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN A STATE

Within the security state, suspected citizens and non-citizens are approached from a risk-perspective. There tends to be a focus on short-term coercive solutions, that reduce the intimidation capacity of offenders, while doing little to address the underlying causes.⁷⁵ The aim to counter the terrorist threat, has resulted in a change in how suspects are perceived and treated. The focus now lies on preventive criminalization, which means that even a suspicion can be reason for increased surveillance. Due process and rights of the accused have become less important than increased efficiency.⁷⁶ One of the results of this preventive criminalization

⁷² Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy* (pp. 35). Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

⁷³ Ganor, B. (2017). *The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide for decision makers* (pp. 93). New York, USA: Routledge

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 147-148

⁷⁶ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 148

is the profiling of 'suspect communities' or potential enemy aliens⁷⁷: "*Predictably such classifications have been accorded to those communities of similar ethnic or religious background to the supposed terrorists and in particular on elements of the global surplus population who reside among them.*"⁷⁸ These 'suspect communities' can not only be signaled by the government, but by any actor or individual within society.

Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats⁷⁹

- Indicator 1: efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population
 - o engaging citizens in signaling radicalization

Construction of legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible⁸⁰

- Indicator 1: redefinition of 'terrorism'
- Indicator 2: expanding rights of law enforcement in case of suspicion of participating in terrorism
- Indicator 3: extension of police pre-trials detention for terrorist suspects

Offensive modes of action⁸¹

- Indicator 1: preventive searches
- Indicator 2: preventive arrests
- Indicator 3: (movement) restrictions imposed on individuals

⁷⁷ Kennisplein.be (2011). *Signalen van radicalisering*. Retrieved from:

<https://www.kennisplein.be/Pages/Signalen-van-radicalisering.aspx>

⁷⁸ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 150

⁷⁹ Tucker, J.B. (2008). *Strategies for countering terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli experience*. Retrieved from: <https://coincident.wordpress.com/2008/06/04/strategies-for-countering-terrorism-lessons-from-the-israeli-experience/>

Horowitz, D. (1993). The Israeli concept of national security. In Yaniv, A. (Ed.), *National security and democracy in Israel* (pp. 16). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

⁸⁰ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 147-149

⁸¹ Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy* (pp. 35). Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

THE BLURRING OF THE DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL TERRITORY AS SITES OF CONTROL,
RESULTING IN THE DE-BORDERING OF THE STATE

The emergence and rise of globalization has resulted in a slow dissolution of the sovereign nation-state. The enemy no longer solely is the foreigner that lives abroad, but can also be the 'enemy within'.⁸² It is very difficult to distinguish the 'good' from the 'bad'⁸³, and therefore, state and non-state actors select responses which compete, merge and form new hybrid legal and political categories.⁸⁴ This results in the border being everywhere, and everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance.⁸⁵

Terrorism is a threat that can be perceived both as war or crime, because it is simultaneously external and internal, warfare against the state and criminal murder of innocent civilians.⁸⁶ This makes a traditional war or crime approach not sufficient, and therefore governments have to seek an encompassing approach in dealing with terrorism: *"seeking to arrest and prosecute those who conspire to commit acts of terror, while at the same time introducing 'wartime' restrictions involving pre-emptive criminalization based on suspicious activity or even speech."*⁸⁷

This blurring of warfare and criminality also infects policing. The original aim of policing is to arrest, gather evidence and apprehend suspects for prosecution in the courts. Warfare's original aim is to 'take out', 'inflict unacceptable casualties' or otherwise neutralize the enemy's threat. Current policing seeks to anticipate enemy actions and has adopted preventive responses that previously would have been unthinkable other than at times of major civil disturbance and the suspension of normal legality.⁸⁸

⁸² Amoore, L. (2006). 'Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror'. *Political Geography*, 25, 338

⁸³ Franko Aas, K. (2007). 'Analysing a World in Motion: Global flows meet 'criminology of the other'. *Theoretical Criminology*, 11(2), 292

⁸⁴ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 149

⁸⁵ Amoore, L. (2006). 'Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror'. *Political Geography*, 25, 347

⁸⁶ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 150

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 151

Offensive modes of action⁸⁹

- Indicator 1: seeking to arrest and prosecute those who conspire to commit acts of terror
- Indicator 2: military and paramilitary operation to disrupt terrorist infrastructure
- Indicator 3: infiltrations
- Indicator 4: preventive arrests
- Indicator 5: targeted killings

Legitimized 'wartime' state activities⁹⁰

- Indicator 1: 'wartime' restrictions based on suspicious activity or speech
- Indicator 2: intrusive surveillance in different areas, such as
 - o financial transactions
 - o interpersonal communications
 - o presence in significant locations
 - o personal identity details

Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats⁹¹

- Indicator 1: Obligatory military service
- Indicator 2: permission for use of private protection companies in fighting terrorism
- Indicator 3: making it easier to carry weapons
- Indicator 4: efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population
 - o let population get used to (heavily armed) police and military in public spaces
 - o let population get used to everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance.
 - o let population actively participate in identifying threats

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy* (pp. 29). Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

⁹⁰ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 150

⁹¹ Tucker, J.B. (2008). *Strategies for countering terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli experience*. Retrieved from: <https://coincentral.wordpress.com/2008/06/04/strategies-for-countering-terrorism-lessons-from-the-israeli-experience/>

Horowitz, D. (1993). The Israeli concept of national security. In Yaniv, A. (Ed.), *National security and democracy in Israel* (pp. 16). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Militarization of the police⁹²

- Indicator 1: Blurring of tasks military and police
- Indicator 2: police officers are trained by the military
- Indicator 3: stand-by and deployment of heavily-armed teams to intervene in case of an attack

The Dutch counterterrorism approach (also called the 'broad approach') can be divided into preventive and repressive measures.⁹³ Given the limited time and resources for this master thesis, this research will only focus on one part of this 'broad approach': the preventive counterterrorism measures taken by the Dutch government, since 2011. Prevention is an action, or a set of actions designed to stop something before it actually occurs.⁹⁴ To specify the definition to the prevention of security threats, the following definition will be used for the analysis: "*activities and practices aimed at anticipating, avoiding, and removing possible causes to preclude a hazardous event from happening.*"⁹⁵

DESIGN

To answer the research question, explanatory, qualitative, deductive research will be conducted. More specifically, this research will take the form of a single case study design, because it aims to do an in-depth analysis of a particular nation-state (the Netherlands).⁹⁶ The Netherlands is chosen because it is a country that has not experienced a large-scale terrorist attack since 1977, but still has taken a wide variety of (preventive) counterterrorism measures after terrorist attack occurred in its surrounding countries. This makes the Netherlands an interesting case, because it can show the effects of the terrorism threat and counterterrorism measures, without an actual attack having taken place. Furthermore, the researcher is a Dutch citizen, which contributes to the accessibility of information (such as language, accessibility from a specific country etc.), and a sensitivity for the cultural environment of the case. This

⁹² Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 151

⁹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 17). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

⁹⁴ Napcan (n.d.) *What is prevention?* Retrieved from: <http://napcan.org.au/prevention/what-is-prevention/>

⁹⁵ BusinessDictionary (n.d.). *Prevention*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/prevention.html>

⁹⁶ Willis, B. (2014). *The advantages and limitations of single case study analysis*. Retrieved from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-single-case-study-analysis/>

can lead to a more in-depth analysis of the case, and to gain a more substantiated understanding of the way counterterrorism measures affect the development of a security state. In this way the internal validity will be high, because conclusions about the unit of analysis can be drawn with a high degree of certainty.

SAMPLING

The sampling method that will be used is 'purposeful sampling', using the judgment of the researcher. This is chosen because this research focuses on relative new developments regarding counterterrorism measures, and therefore a limited number of English or Dutch primary data sources are available. Samples will be selected in advance of the analysis, in the form of selective theoretical sampling, where initial samples are chosen according to the criteria and theory of the concept of 'counterterrorism measures', and others will be selected according to categories emerging from the data.⁹⁷ The data will consist of contextual information, academic literature on the concept of the security state and official documents disseminated by the Dutch government on counterterrorism measures. This will be further elaborated in the 'methods and data gathering' chapter. Lastly, this sampling method is also cost-effective and time-effective.

UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND UNIT OF OBSERVATION

Within the case of the Netherlands, preventive counterterrorism strategies are chosen as the unit of analysis, because of the aforementioned knowledge gap regarding counterterrorism measures and the development of a security state. Within the unit of analysis, the focus will be on preventive counterterrorism measures (that are taken by the Netherlands since 2011) and the role of the Dutch state.

The indicators of a security state will provide the actual insight about the question if the Netherlands has developed into a security state. The external validity is low, because this research only focuses on the case of the Netherlands, and cannot be completely generalized to other countries. However, the Netherlands has the same governance system (democracy) as

⁹⁷ Fletcher, M. & Plakoyiannaki, E. (n.d.). *Case study selection: An overview of key issues for international business researchers*. Retrieved from:

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.9094&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

most western-European countries, and faces the same threat (jihadist terrorism). If a country also employs the same counterterrorism measures, this can increase the external validity in terms of generalizability to other western-European countries.

PITFALLS

Possible limits of the design and ways to counter these pitfalls are the following:

- Because the literature doesn't provide a comprehensive framework for empirical research, the framework is created by the author herself. This can result in 'missed characteristics' that should also be part of this framework. Hopefully, this research will serve as a starting point for other studies to develop a comprehensive framework.
- The specific characteristics for the framework are derived from (an extreme security state) Israel. But Israel and the Netherlands differ in many respects, which can influence the compatibility of the framework for western-European countries like the Netherlands. However, the two cases also have similarities, which contribute to the applicability of the framework to the Netherlands.
- Because of the relative recent time-period that will be researched, limited literature may be available. This can be countered by triangulation of research data, cross-checking the information with official reports in the document analysis and acknowledging a possible bias.
- Using purposive sampling can lead to a high level of bias, and the inability to generalize the research findings. This can be countered by keeping the indicators at the core of the research, which will help with choosing useful samples.

METHODS AND DATA GATHERING

By using a triangulation of data sources, which consists of desktop research, and document analysis (in the form of discourse analysis), the gathered information will be validated through cross verification. In this way a more in-depth and balanced image will be provided, which will increase the internal validity.

DESKTOP RESEARCH

Internal desktop research will be focused on the extensive sources on security states and counterterrorism measures of the online Leiden University Library.

External desktop research will be divided in 'online desk research', and 'government published data'. These methods will be used to obtain and analyze news reports (for contextual information), academic literature on the different concepts, and governmental policy documents and strategic documents (which will be used to analyze the counterterrorism measures, because in most cases the government has the obligation to inform citizens on measures that are taken).

DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

Written documents will be systematically analyzed through a critical examination, in the form of deductive critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) will not be limited to analyzing the specific structure of texts, but will also systematically relate these structures to the sociopolitical context.

Official information disseminated by the Dutch government about counterterrorism measures since 2011, will be analyzed. This analysis will be done, on the basis of the diagram in appendix 2. This diagram contains the whole framework for empirical analysis on security states, including all drivers, indicators, and sub-indicators. Each of the indicators will be assigned a number, as will all the sub-indicators. Then, each of the selected documents will be analyzed completely (both titles and text), in search of literal terms that can be linked to the (sub-)indicators, descriptions that express the general intention of the (sub-)indicators, or justifications regarding the (sub-)indicators. Each word, sentence or paragraph that can be linked to one of the above, will be coded with the according number of the (sub-)indicator. After that, all fragments with a specific code are collected, structured, and analyzed on what they say about the different (sub-)indicators, what kind of dynamics are present in these texts, and how this can be linked to the different drivers (what is the function of these texts regarding the possible emergence of the security state).

CDA will also be used to analyze the more general discourse of the governmental documents, regarding the securitization of terrorism. In this case, the documents will be analyzed on the basis of the indicators of 'how a security state operates', that can be found in the diagram on page 20. The gathered texts will be analyzed for word-use, and the underlying meaning of these words and texts (for example, how the threat is defined; to what extent, and how, this

threat is portrayed as an existential threat; and if there is a justification for implementation of extraordinary measures).

By analyzing the documents in this way, the validity of the research will increase. Furthermore, all of the above can lead to a conclusion about to what extent, and how, the Netherlands has developed into a security state, after the implementation of counterterrorism measure since 2011.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Before the Dutch counterterrorism policy is going to be analyzed, this chapter will give some background information about terrorism as a national security threat to the Netherlands, followed by a description of each of the documents that will be analyzed.

NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

In order to provide insight in the different disasters, crises, and threats that can possibly disrupt Dutch society, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCSC) publishes an overview of these threats every four years, called the 'National Security Profile'.⁹⁸ In addition, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service publishes annual reports on current international developments and threat levels.⁹⁹ When these two profiles are combined, a comprehensive image of the current issues that could pose a threat to Dutch national security could be created.

TERRORIST THREAT

The Dutch government has determined that undermining, extremism, and terrorism is the dominant threat to national security. In particular, the risk of terrorism emanating from the belt of instability along Europe's external borders.¹⁰⁰ This terrorism can be even further specified to 'jihadist terrorism', which is the main focus of Dutch threat reports since 2005¹⁰¹, while non-jihadist or violent incidents are much less prominent.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ RIVM (2016). *Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: Een all hazard overzicht van potentiële rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten*. pp. 137. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/Nationaal%20Veiligheidsprofiel%202016_tcm31-232083.pdf

⁹⁹ General Intelligence and Security Service (2017). *Annual report 2016*. Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2017/04/04/annual-report-2016>

¹⁰⁰ RIVM (2016). *Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: Een all hazard overzicht van potentiële rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten*. pp. 137. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/Nationaal%20Veiligheidsprofiel%202016_tcm31-232083.pdf

General Intelligence and Security Service (2017). *Annual report 2016* (pp.3) Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2017/04/04/annual-report-2016>

¹⁰¹ General Intelligence and Security Service (n.d.) *Terrorisme in the kort*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme>

¹⁰² Bakker, E. & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. (2016). Jihadisme centraal in tien jaar Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland. *Nationale veiligheid en crisisbeheersing*, 14(1), 3-8

Jihadist terrorism can be defined as *"from ideological motives threatening, preparing or committing human-directed serious violence, or actions aimed at inflicting societal disruptive harm, with the aim of bringing about social change, causing serious fear to people or influencing political decision making."*¹⁰³ The perpetrators are identified as extremist Muslims who propagate violence against 'enemies of Islam', whether or not driven or motivated by, for example Al Qaeda, Daesh, Tahrir Al-Sham (previously: Jabhat Al Nusra), Boko Haram and Al Shabaab.¹⁰⁴ In addition to the current threat perception, jihadist terrorism is also expected to be a future threat, as claimed by the Ministry of Security and Justice: *"it is the expectation that the threat of global jihadism further increases in the coming years, in the form of transnational networks, returning 'foreign terrorist fighters', potentially violent individuals, and rapid domestic radicalization processes."*¹⁰⁵

COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES

Apart from some small-scale incidents such as the murder on Theo van Gogh in 2004, there hasn't been a large-scale terrorist attack in the Netherlands since the hijacking of a train at De Punt in 1977. Still, different measures have been taken by the Dutch government to counter the terrorist threat. These measures will be addressed in the analysis, but it may serve helpful to know that the government has defined five areas of interest (also called intervention areas) that are used as a strategic framework for counterterrorism measures¹⁰⁶:

1. Acquirement - timely indication of (potential) threats
For example, through information gathering about extremist and terrorist movements, networks and organizations, their methodology and the means they use.
2. Prevention - prevention and disruption of extremism and terrorism
For example, prevention of fear, disturbing threats and suspension of attacks
3. Defense - protection of persons, objects and vital processes against extremist and terrorist threats

¹⁰³ Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (n.d.). *Onderwerpen: Terrorisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁰⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 9-10). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Through physical protection of national security interests, civil aviation and the cyber domain

4. Preparation - optimal preparation for extremist and terrorist violence and its consequences

Through monitoring, training and strengthening of security networks

5. Prosecution - enforcement of the democratic rule of law against extremism and terrorism

Tracing and prosecution of perpetrators or persons affiliated with extremism and terrorism

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Due to time-limitations, not every document disseminated by the Dutch government on its counterterrorism measures can be analyzed. Therefore, a selection has been made, which resulted in the documents listed below. These documents are chosen, because they are presented by the government as the leading and most comprehensive documents with regard to the Dutch counterterrorism strategy. This is confirmed by the fact that other documents, such as letters to parliament or progress reports, constantly refer back to these 'main documents'. Most of these documents are 'dynamic working-documents', that are based on developments in society, and continually examine if additions or changes are needed in the measures. However, it should be noted that although these documents are dynamic, they do not give a complete account of empirical reality. These documents describe the range of measures at disposal of the government, of which some are implemented, while others could be implemented, but are not yet so. In other words, not all the described counterterrorism measures are (yet) part of empirical reality. This does not mean that these documents do not give an impression of the development of the Netherlands into a security state, because all these measures show what is possible and accepted in the Netherlands regarding counterterrorism measures. However, this side note should be kept in mind when conclusions are drawn in this research. Additional empirical research could be done to deepen this research.

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES (2011-2015 AND 2016-2020)

As a result of attacks in the Netherlands and abroad, the Netherlands has intensified its counterterrorism policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the request of the House of Representatives and after preparation of the Suyver Commission, the policy has been evaluated in 2010. This evaluation recommended, among other things, the drawing up of a national strategy.¹⁰⁷

The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 is the first national counterterrorism strategy. The objective of this strategy is to reduce the risk of, and fear for, terrorist attacks, and to limit the possible damage after a possible attack.¹⁰⁸ The strategy links all government actors (both locally, nationally and internationally) in a joint approach, and provides a framework for effectively countering extremist and terrorist groups or persons, who turn directly or indirectly against the Dutch democratic legal order or national security by means of non-statutory (violent) means.¹⁰⁹

The basis for the strategy is the so-called ‘broad approach’. This means that the risks of terrorism are identified and tackled as early as possible, through a combination of preventive and repressive measures.¹¹⁰ The strategic choices flow from the expected terrorist threat over the subsequent five years. Each choice can be accommodated within the aforementioned five pillars¹¹¹: acquirement, prevention, defense, preparation, and prosecution.

The National counterterrorism strategy stems from the government-wide ‘National Security Strategy’ and the ‘International Security Strategy’ of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The strategy also ties in with international strategies aimed at combating extremism and terrorism, such as the ‘EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy’, the ‘UN’s Counterterrorism Strategy’ and the resulting action plans.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Minister van Veiligheid & Justitie (2011). Terrorismebestrijding. *Kamerstuk 29754, nr. 203*. Retrieved from: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/29279/kst-29754-203.html>

¹⁰⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 7). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁰⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹¹⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 37). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹¹¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 38). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹¹² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

In 2016, the national counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015 was evaluated, with the purpose to gain insight in what contribution the strategy has made to reducing the risk of attacks, reducing the fear of attacks, and limiting the possible damage after attacks. Based on the points of interest of this evaluation, the national counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020 was created.¹¹³

TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT (No. 26 – 46)

The Terrorism Threat Assessment is published four times a year and provides an integral overview of the domestic and international threats against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad.¹¹⁴ The Threat Assessments are based on information from the Intelligence and Security Services, the National Police, open source information, information from foreign partners, and analyses from embassy personnel.¹¹⁵ The Threat Assessment acts as a guiding foundation for Dutch counterterrorism policy, which means that the end result forms the basis for future policy decisions and strategic choices. The Netherlands has a system of threat levels, that indicate the chances of a terrorist attack. These threat levels are determined periodically by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCSC), based on the Terrorism Threat Assessment.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?: Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015. *Universiteit Utrecht - Departement Bestuurs- en Organisationswetenschap (USBO)*

¹¹⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 54). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism.*

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 24). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.*

¹¹⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 34 (pp.1). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.*

¹¹⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 54). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism.*

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 24). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.*

POLICY IMPLICATIONS ‘TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT’ (No. 37 – 41)

The Minister for Security and Justice presents a letter to the House of Representatives after each terrorism threat level is published. In this letter, the most important notions of the terrorism threat levels, and the policy findings associated with it, are discussed.¹¹⁷

COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PROGRAM TO COMBAT JIHADISM

The Dutch government’s commitment to counter the terrorist threats posed by violent jihadism is described in the ‘Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism’.¹¹⁸ The Action Program consists of new measures and legislation, intensification of existing measures, as well as all existing actions. The initial document was published in 2014, and was designed as a dynamic working document. The aim of the action plan is threefold¹¹⁹:

1. Protection of the democratic constitutional state
2. Combat and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands
3. Remove the breeding ground for radicalization

The action plan is continually examined considering current developments, and focused on whether additions or intensification are needed in the approach.¹²⁰ This is particularly done on the basis of the ‘terrorism threat levels’, which give an estimate of the terrorist threat in the Netherlands, and provide new insights and lessons learned from implementation of counterterrorism measures.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 39* (pp. 1). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Minister van Veiligheid & Justitie (2014). *Kamerbrief over de integrale aanpak jihadisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/08/30/integrale-aanpak-jihadisme>

¹²⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). *Voortgangsrapportage Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2014/11/13/tk-bijlage-1-voortgangsrapportage-actieprogramma-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme>

¹²¹ Ibid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 39* (pp. 1). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

1. A WELFARE STATE OR A RISK-DRIVEN STATE?

As explained before, the first driver focuses on the presence of welfare-thinking or risk-thinking within a state. A security state reconstructs problems as risks and dangers, that should be prevented.

1.1 INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS AS THE CORNERSTONES

The first indicator of the security state addresses the cornerstone-role of intelligence collection and analysis. Intelligence is different from information. The principle difference is that information is merely data. Data by itself does not include any context. Information in combination with its associated context can be considered intelligence.¹²² In the case of terrorism prevention, information is gathered in combination with the context, to be able to translate this intelligence to practical counterterrorism measures.

This indicator can be divided in three sub-indicators: (1) Intelligence gathering is justified and used as the basis for prevention of terrorism, (2) intelligence can be gathered by state actors, but information available with non-state actors can also be passed on to the government, and (3) social networks and the internet in general are monitored.

1.1.1 THE CENTRALITY OF INTELLIGENCE

First, intelligence gathering is justified and used as the basis for prevention of terrorism. This starting point is presented in various Dutch counterterrorism documents. The National Counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015 clearly positions the collection and analysis of intelligence as the fundament of terrorism prevention.¹²³ In the strategy, intelligence collection is justified as essential for assessing the nature, direction and seriousness of the terrorist threat, so this intelligence can then be used to take risk mitigation measures.¹²⁴

¹²² Goldfarb, J. (2016). *What is the difference between information and intelligence?* Retrieved from: <http://www.securityweek.com/what-difference-between-information-and-intelligence>

¹²³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 9). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹²⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 53). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

It is argued, that as more concrete intelligence becomes available about the threat, predictability and thus the possibility of targeted intervention increases.¹²⁵ In other words: Dutch counterterrorism-policy is strongly dependant on intelligence gathered by intelligence and security services.¹²⁶ All of the above can be summarized in the following quote:

*Intelligence and information acquisition form the basis for CT policy. There is a growing awareness that a rapid availability of objective and reliable intelligence is essential for an effective counterterrorism policy. They serve as the foundation for all possible CT measures or efforts at home and abroad. The Dutch government emphasizes the prevention of radicalization and ultimately terrorism in its domestic and foreign CT policy.*¹²⁷

According to the government, this intelligence-gathering does not limit itself to Dutch territory, but also focuses on intelligence about threats that develop abroad, which can manifest themselves as a threat to the Netherlands or to Dutch interests abroad. This strategy is called 'forward defense'.¹²⁸ The government states that the overall goal (both outside and within the Netherlands) of intelligence gathering and analysis is 'to recognize and overcome deviant behavior that could indicate security risks in an early state, and take action against terrorism in a general sense and against specific groups in particular'.¹²⁹

The 'National counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020' agrees with this, as can be seen in the quote that "*information is crucial for targeted interventions, effective monitoring and security, adequate response and enforcement of the rule of law.*"¹³⁰ This strategy also provides a list of the specific subjects about which intelligence is gathered (such as preparatory actions and attack planning, personal information about potential terrorists, travel movements, terrorism

¹²⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 53, 58). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹²⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹²⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 53). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 60, 64). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹³⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

financing, recruitment etcetera)¹³¹ and portrays intelligence also as part of an interaction with the fields of 'detection' and 'prosecution', which emphasizes the cornerstone-role of intelligence.¹³²

Where both national counterterrorism strategies broadly cover the position and justification of intelligence regarding countering terrorism, the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism describes the specific systems used for intelligence-gathering and dissemination (such as the Schengen Information System and the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents), and the specifics about information exchange with other European member states.¹³³

The 'Terrorism Threat Assessment' also includes a broader range of actors that are involved in intelligence-gathering, such as partnerships between different EU-security services for the exchange of (operational) intelligence.¹³⁴

1.1.2 STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The second sub-indicator focuses on the different bodies that are responsible for the intelligence-gathering. Intelligence can be gathered by state actors, but information available with non-state actors can also be passed on to the government. In the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015, only state actors are positioned as responsible for intelligence-gathering. The Dutch intelligence and security services are mentioned most often, but also the National Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are discussed.¹³⁵ These actors, including the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCSC), municipalities

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 15, 20). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹³³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 29). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹³⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹³⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 53-55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*

and the prosecution, are also described in the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism.¹³⁶

Not only the actors that are responsible for intelligence-gathering, but also the different ways in which intelligence is gathered are justified in the strategy:

*These services have special powers, which in the extreme case can have a profound effect on the privacy of citizens. To prevent terrorist attacks, the intelligence and security services may use means such as eavesdropping, monitoring, observing and infiltrating, provided that the necessary information cannot be obtained in other, less drastic ways. In the recent past this authority has repeatedly stifled terrorist actions in the bud.*¹³⁷

Especially the last sentence shows a justification for the means that are used by the intelligence and security services, especially with regard to preventing terrorism.

The National counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020 expands the list of (mostly state-related) intelligence-gathering actors, and shows that the Dutch government also positions non-state actors as important for counterterrorism purposes. These actors do not directly gather intelligence to counter the terrorist threat, but the government argues that the information they possess can be relevant for combating extremism and terrorism, and can increase the intervention capacity of the government.¹³⁸ The following quote shows this argumentation: "everyone has to realize that their information can be of significance (...) Only with this awareness, we keep the integral local approach effective and make early interventions in radicalization processes possible."¹³⁹ The 2016-2020 strategy also provides examples of the non-state actors that can be called upon for their information, such as social services, education, Dutch deployment abroad (development cooperation, the diplomatic missions network), science, or journalism.¹⁴⁰ The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism adds another important group of non-state actors, which is the Muslim community. In this

¹³⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 25). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹³⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹³⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 12). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹³⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

case, the government states that it periodically consults with imams, in which themes such as radicalization, education and discrimination are discussed.¹⁴¹

With regard to the possible emergence of a security state, the cooperation with non-state actors shows that the Dutch government seeks to involve 'welfare-actors' (such as social services and other non-state actors) in the identification of terrorism, which means that these welfare-actors must now act as security actors.

1.1.3 ONLINE MONITORING

The third sub-indicator addresses the monitoring of social networks, and the internet in general, by a security state. In the National counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015, measures with regard to online monitoring are scarcely present. The only remark that can be linked to this sub-indicator is the following: *"The requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity, however, force the services into a carefully considered and limited use of special intelligence resources. This implies that they must also make optimum use of relevant information that is available from open sources ('open source intelligence', OSINT)".*¹⁴² OSINT can be linked to online monitoring, because it uses information that is openly available, which includes social networks and the internet in general.

In the National counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020, online monitoring gets a more prominent place. This can be seen in the description of measures that are designed for disrupting online disseminators of extremist and terrorist ideologies (such as identifying disseminators of digital propaganda and disrupting their distribution channels, working with Internet Service Providers and social media companies to get websites taken down and disrupt extremist and terrorist statements and actions, or international efforts to prevent the spread of 'violent extremist narratives').¹⁴³ The involvement of Internet Service Providers and social media companies shows that the government also seeks cooperation with non-state actors (and thus asks them to play a role as a security-actor) in the online domain.

¹⁴¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁴² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁴³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

This more specific description of online monitoring can also be found in the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism, where it is described that online facilitators and disseminators of jihadist propaganda will be identified and disrupted in their activities.¹⁴⁴ To identify these facilitators and disseminators, the government claims it is necessary to monitor social networks and the internet in general. And again, it is argued that not only governmental actors are responsible for online monitoring, but that also citizens and internet providers are encouraged to report jihadist content on the internet and social media.¹⁴⁵

All the above shows that the Dutch government aims to prevent terrorism by relying on intelligence collection and analysis as the basis of counterterrorism measures. The intelligence that is gathered does not limit itself to Dutch territory, but also focuses on threats that develop abroad and in the 'online world', which contributes to the preventive approach of Dutch counterterrorism measures. Furthermore, intelligence is portrayed as part of an interaction with the fields of 'detection' and 'prosecution', which emphasizes the cornerstone-role of intelligence, and shows the broad and (mostly) preventive approach that the Netherlands has committed to. Lastly, not only state actors, but also non-state actors are positioned as important for the provision of information. According to the government, the latter are not responsible for the gathering of intelligence, but the government can use existing information of non-state actors to add to its own information database.

Going back to the presence of welfare-thinking or risk-thinking within a state, it can be seen that the government aims to involve 'welfare-actors' (such as social services and other non-state actors) in the identification of terrorism, which therefore must act as security actors. Or in other words, non-state actors are called on their responsibility to contribute to the common effort to keep the Netherlands safe from an issue that is presented by the state as an existential threat.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 13). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁴⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 23). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁴⁶ Summary of Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis* (pp. 24). Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub.

1.2 DEFENSIVE MODES OF ACTION

The second indicator of the security state focuses on 'defensive modes of action'. This indicator is two-fold: the first part is about the prevention of attacks by making it difficult for the terrorist to reach his/her intended target through early identification and neutralization in the form of arrest. This can be done by monitoring and restricting the travel movements of (suspected) terrorists, both outside and within the nation's borders. The second part focuses on protecting vital infrastructure, persons, or buildings and preventing penetration of the vital infrastructure.

1.2.1 TRAVEL MOVEMENTS AND BORDER PROTECTION

The analyzed documents describe a number of measures that the Dutch government can take to prevent a terrorist from reaching his/her intended target, and also describe a range of actors that the government aims to cooperate with.

According to the documents, the detection and prevention of travel movements consists of several 'layers'. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 argues that the first and most important layer is the gathering of intelligence about travel movements of (suspected) terrorists in and out of the country, also known as 'travel intelligence'.¹⁴⁷ Because this subject has already been covered with the first indicator 'Intelligence as the cornerstone', it will not be discussed in detail again. However, it is important to note that most analyzed documents refer to travel intelligence when they address the prevention of attacks.¹⁴⁸

The next layer is said to consist of trying to stop people who are suspected of traveling to terrorist areas.¹⁴⁹ If intelligence shows that there is a potential exit, with the goal to join a terrorist group, the suspect is signaled for arrest and stopped by the Royal Marechaussee (the

Bruyn, D. de (2006). *De magistraat aan het woord: Een verkennend onderzoek naar de opvattingen van magistraten over hun functioneren in justitie en samenleving* (pp. 49). Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

¹⁴⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 53, 58). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁴⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 58). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020* (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Dutch military police) at the border.¹⁵⁰ The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism describes that, with well-founded suspicions of departure, it is also possible to repeal or refuse travel documents. Furthermore, traveling with a Dutch passport outside the European Union can be made impossible by a travel ban for the suspected person.¹⁵¹ The Terrorism Threat Assessment presents an explanation about why Western countries try to prevent people from traveling to terrorist areas: it is said, that in this way it is possible to prevent further radicalization, prevent the gaining of experience of violence, and prevent joining a terrorist organization. And in this way, Western authorities also have more options for operation control in their own country.¹⁵²

If it has been impossible to stop a person from traveling out of the country, or if a suspect doesn't originate from the Netherlands, another possibility to keep these persons from traveling (back) into the Netherlands is presented by the government, which is border protection.¹⁵³ The National counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015 is the first document that addresses the protection of external borders and civil aviation. It is argued that, to combat terrorism, the nation's borders should be well guarded so that terrorists will not have the chance to cross the borders unnoticed. The powers in these areas are laid down in the Police law, The Law on the judicial organization, the Municipalities Act, the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, and various underlying laws and regulations.¹⁵⁴ The 2016-2020 strategy adds to this, by presenting the government's aim to deploy new technological means, and keep knowledge and expertise up to date to stop travel movements of potential extremists and terrorists.¹⁵⁵

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism and the Terrorism Threat Assessment describe the different possibilities at disposal of the government, to prevent

¹⁵⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁵³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁵⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 83). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁵⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

infiltration into the Netherlands. One example is to gain access to reservation and check-in data from civil aviation. According to the documents, the Dutch government considers it necessary for all airlines operating in the Netherlands to structurally provide all reservation and check-in data to the government, to control the travel movements of suspected persons.¹⁵⁶ Another option that is described is the checking of travelers in combination with their identity documents, to help prevent any misuse of travel documents. These checks happen at the borders by the Royal Marechaussee, and within the nation's borders at passport checks by the National Police and at municipalities when passports are issued.¹⁵⁷ Lastly, the Dutch government considers it important to seek cooperation at the international level, especially in the field of surveillance and external border protection. It is stated in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 that the prevention of terrorist infiltration into the country through border control is perceived as a growing challenge, because of increased travel movement and various forms of migration.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, the Dutch government proposes the close cooperation with European and international partners. This cooperation includes, among other things, an adjustment of the Schengen border code¹⁵⁹ and participation in a system for the exchange of fingerprints of asylum seekers in the European Union.¹⁶⁰

All the above shows that the Dutch government sees the protection of the nation's external borders and the monitoring of travel movements as an important factor for countering the terrorist threat, and the prevention of a possible terrorist attack. This can be linked to the fact that a security state reconstructs problems as risks and dangers that require coercive forms of management. Or in short, that problems are seen as risks and these risks should be prevented. In the Netherlands, this prevention takes the form of monitoring, protection, but also cooperation with other (non-state) actors (such as other European countries, and airline companies). This cooperation is also described by Hallsworth & Lea, who state that in the

¹⁵⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26-27). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁵⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 38 (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁵⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 88). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁵⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp.3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁶⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

security state, *"the functions of the state are increasingly distributed through an assemblage of state and non-state actors."*¹⁶¹

As explained in the framework, another characteristic of the security state is the search for new technologies of power and risk management aimed at 'external threats'.¹⁶² This search for new technologies will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, section 4, but can also be linked to this chapter, especially to the government's aim to deploy new technological means, the use of the Schengen system, fingerprints systems, and a reservation and check-in database.

1.2.2 PROTECTION OF DUTCH INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD

The second part of the indicator 'defensive modes of action' focuses on preventing penetrations into secure installations or areas. In the already several times mentioned National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 it is argued that the state, legal order and (vital elements of) Dutch society must be optimally protected against concrete and virtual terrorist threats or attacks.¹⁶³ What this exactly means, is also described:

*This concerns the protection of persons, objects, events and services that form the core of our state and our legal order. These include the Royal House, politicians, members of the judiciary, government buildings, embassies and international organizations. In addition, it must be prevented that vital sectors such as the energy sector, the financial sector, the telecommunications sector and civil aviation are affected. Finally, attention is paid to the protection of national seaports and airports.*¹⁶⁴

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism and the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 affirm this description.¹⁶⁵ The latter also states that 'soft targets' (potential, difficult to protect targets where many people come together and where there can

¹⁶¹ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 144

¹⁶² Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 142

¹⁶³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 10). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 16). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

be many victims) get special attention, because according to the Dutch government, these soft targets are increasingly in the spotlight of terrorist groups and individuals.¹⁶⁶

The 2011-2015 strategy positions two systems as important in the prevention of threats against these vital elements in Dutch society: 'the Surveillance and Protection system' (which aims to take security measures when there are threats directed against individuals, objects and services), and 'the Counterterrorism Alert System' (which ensures the protection of vital business sectors in their totality).¹⁶⁷ The Surveillance and Protection system can consist of cameras or guard posts, but also of more 'high-risk' measures such as protection of individuals.¹⁶⁸

Civil aviation receives special attention in both National counterterrorism strategies, because it is argued that this sector is relatively often confronted with terrorist threats.¹⁶⁹ Specific preventive counterterrorism measures for this sector can be control of passengers, carry-on baggage and checked baggage and airport security. This happens, among other things, through access control, monitoring of the periphery and protection of aircraft.¹⁷⁰

Another area that receives special attention by the Dutch government is the area of 'national events'. National events, such as King's Day, the National Commemoration, Veterans Day and Prinsjesdag, are presented by the government as special events that have security risks attached to it, and therefore require (additional) measures to counter these risks. In this case, a working method is proposed by the government, that includes integrated threat assessments to map the possible security risks, and the implementation of a system of security rings.¹⁷¹ This method shows the increase in regulations that focus on the prevention of risks through the exclusion of individuals or groups.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 83). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁶⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 85). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁶⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 43 (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁷⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 89). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 16). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁷¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 10). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

However, this protection does not only limit itself to within, but also outside the nation's borders. Both National counterterrorism strategies explain the principle of 'forward defense', whereby attention is also paid to threats against Dutch citizens and Dutch interests abroad, using Dutch means of power in military and civilian missions abroad.¹⁷²

With regard to the defensive modes of action, it can be concluded that both the detection and prevention of travel movements of potential terrorists, and the prevention of attacks at vital infrastructure or persons can be found within the Dutch preventive counterterrorism measures. Here too, the focus is on prevention of risks, through the exclusion of individuals or groups, which can be linked to the emergence of a security state.

Another characteristic of the security state that can be found in the abovementioned methods, is the fact that the government needs to gain access to all kinds of information systems to combat terrorism, and justifies this in its counterterrorism policies.

1.3 CONCLUSION

Taking into account all of the above, it can be concluded that risk-thinking is present within the Netherlands: problems are seen as risks, which should be prevented. This can be seen in the fact that the government searches for ways to gain access to as much intelligence as possible to indicate risks (more specifically, terrorism). This can be linked to the first indicator, which describes the reliance of the Dutch government on intelligence collection and analysis (both through the involvement of state and non-state actors), and the cornerstone-role it has within counterterrorism measures. Also, the second indicator can be related to this search for information, because of the description of how the government aims to gain access to all kinds of information systems to combat terrorism.

The second indicator also shows that (suspected) individuals can be prevented from traveling in and outside the Netherlands, or individuals or groups can be restricted in access vital infrastructure or buildings, instead of a free movement for all citizens. In this case the focus

¹⁷² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 21). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 16). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

lies again on the prevention of risks, but this time through the exclusion of individuals or groups, in contrast to the inclusive character of the welfare-state.

Lastly, the emergence of a security state also becomes clear in the fact that the government seeks partnerships with non-state actors (some of which can be characterized as welfare-actors) in countering terrorism, and thus mobilizes them as security actors.

2. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN A STATE

This driver focuses on the change in how suspects are perceived and treated, which results in the emergence of preventive criminalization.

2.1 CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO MAKE IT MORE PROACTIVE AND RESILIENT IN COUNTERING SECURITY THREATS

The third indicator of the security state is the construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats. The focus here lies on the efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population, for example by engaging them in signaling radicalization. The aim of the Dutch government to make its citizens more resilient, can be divided into two parts¹⁷³: resilience of the 'demand-side' (make risk groups more resilient for terrorist-propaganda) and resilience of the population (citizens who do not belong to these risk-groups). The first will be addressed in chapter 3, the latter in this chapter.

2.1.1 THE CITIZEN AS A PROFESSIONAL

With regard to engaging citizens in signaling radicalization, the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 states that *"whatever protective measures are taken, they will only work in addition to the resilience of individuals and organizations"*.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, specific measures are proposed by the Dutch government to increase the resilience of the population.¹⁷⁵ One of these measures is to raise awareness among citizens about their own responsibility for making risks manageable. The 2011-2015 strategy describes the efforts of the Dutch government to address citizens in their roles as professional in an organization.¹⁷⁶ The underlying idea is that this has a direct effect on the security of these organizations, and thus to society in a broader

¹⁷³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 10, 71). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁷⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 87). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁷⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 64). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁷⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 87). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

sense.¹⁷⁷ Hereby, the focus is not solely on signaling radicalization, but goes broader: the aim is to raise 'security awareness and performance' in all layers of the organization.¹⁷⁸ To reach this goal, the government has developed a program to increase security awareness among professionals that work in vital sectors, and offer them possibilities for action if incidents occur.¹⁷⁹ The strategy also describes the intention of the government to further expand this program.¹⁸⁰

In addition, it is described that the government considers it important that the local government and professionals who work with young people, are alert to signals that may indicate radicalization. The strategy argues that it is important that these actors are competent and know that they are supported to intervene on a small scale.¹⁸¹ In this case, the focus is less on signaling radicalization within an organization, and more on society as a whole. With these measures, the Dutch government strives for giving security issues a structural place in social thinking and acting.¹⁸²

The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 also describes the aim of creating resilience among citizens through increasing awareness among professionals, but does not mention specific groups. Furthermore, this document focuses more on the government's aim to increase awareness and training of professionals and develop high-quality expertise in the field of terrorist threats, modus operandi and radicalization processes.¹⁸³

The documents of the Terrorism Threat Assessment also describe the importance of terrorism-prevention in the form of early signaling of radicalization, delegitimizing the jihadist propaganda, and strengthening the resistance of groups against radicalization.¹⁸⁴ These

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 85). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 109). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁸¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 73). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁸² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 85). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁸³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁸⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

documents also underline the importance of the 'Security awareness & performance' program¹⁸⁵, with a focus on promoting security awareness among employees of the immigration services. This can for example be seen in the implementation of a reporting structure within the executive organizations of the foreigners chain, that is designed for reporting radicalization signals within the registration and screening procedures, from employees in the workplace and from the refugee population itself.¹⁸⁶

The Terrorism Threat Assessment also describes a change in the counterterrorism strategy, from a more broad prevention strategy with regard to creating resilience, to a specific approach concentrating on supporting knowledge and skills in sectors where the risks of violent radicalization are deemed greatest.¹⁸⁷ However, through the chosen discourse, it becomes clear that the government has introduced these changes out of necessity ("*because of the political and financial reality*"¹⁸⁸), which can be seen in the warning that is included, stating that this change in strategy may not be without risk, because "*it is conceivable that the alertness to extremism at the local level, as well as the expertise to recognize radicalization is reduced, because less training is given.*"¹⁸⁹

2.1.2 THE CITIZEN IN OTHER 'ROLES'

What is striking in the abovementioned documents, is that the individual citizen is not addressed, but that the measures appeal to the citizen in its role as a professional or employee in an organization. In contrast, the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism presents measures that address the citizen in different 'roles'. First of all, a broader range of professionals are engaged (such as municipalities, educational institutions, youth workers, police officers, social organizations, and employers).¹⁹⁰ The measures describe the support from the Dutch government to help these professionals in signaling radicalization, sharing this information with the right authorities, and how to act with respect to these radicalized

¹⁸⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁸⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40 (pp. 3-4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁸⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 32 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18-20, 25). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

individuals. According to the government, this support takes the form of strengthening its own information position and networks¹⁹¹, informing and advising the before mentioned professionals¹⁹², and providing practical support.¹⁹³ Second, the individual citizen is encouraged to get involved in signaling radicalization. This can be seen in the establishment of a national hotline for radicalization, where citizens can report concerns about radicalization, recruitment and jihadism (both online and offline) anonymously.¹⁹⁴ Third, the community and individuals around 'risk-groups' or 'risk-individuals' (such as family, friends and imams) are engaged in signaling radicalization.¹⁹⁵

All the above shows that the Dutch government has taken measures to make civil society more proactive and resilient in countering terrorist threats, especially in terms of engaging citizens in signaling radicalization. First, citizens are addressed in their role of professional, through the implementation of programs, information and advice from the government and practical support. But the individual citizen is also engaged in signaling radicalization, both the people who are close to risk-groups, and those who do not have to deal with radicalization in their immediate environment.

The engagement of citizens in signaling radicalization fits the idea that suspected citizens and foreigners are approached from a risk-perspective. The government's aim to involve every layer of society to signal risks, because it claims to be unable to monitor and check everyone themselves, exposes the underlying belief that every individual could be a risk. The involvement of all layers of society also means that all these actors will have their 'antenna

¹⁹¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18-19). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁹² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18-20). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18-19). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁹⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17-18, 23). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

¹⁹⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

out'. In the case when a person is suspected of radicalization, this means that the suspicion alone would lead to increased surveillance (officially or unofficially), because not only the government, but all actors are involved in this surveillance.

Although it may not be discussed in the abovementioned measures, it is important to note that the engagement of citizens in signaling radicalization may increase the profiling of suspects communities, because not every individual has the perception or training to 'not generalize'. This link between counterterrorism measures and the emergence of 'suspect communities' is also described by Francesco Ragazzi.¹⁹⁶

2.2 CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO MAKE PREVENTIVE CRIMINALIZATION POSSIBLE

The fourth indicator of the security state is the construction of the legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible. This can be done through the redefinition of 'terrorism', expanding the rights of law enforcement in case of suspicion of participation in terrorist activities, or through an extension of police pre-trial detention for terrorist suspects.

2.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF A LEGAL BASIS

The basic principles of Dutch counterterrorism measures with regard to laws and regulations are outlined in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015. In the document, the government states that a legal basis for counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands is considered very important, so legal protection for all citizens can be provided. Article 90 of the Constitution obliges the Dutch government to promote the international legal order, and this article is also given as the reason why the government makes every effort to help prevent terrorism, both nationally and internationally.¹⁹⁷ According to the government, counterterrorism measures should also be proportional and as much as possible in line with the free exercise of fundamental rights.¹⁹⁸ These basic principles are translated in the goal of

¹⁹⁶ Ragazzo, F. (2016). Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism as 'policed multiculturalism'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(5), pp. 724-741

¹⁹⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 21). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

¹⁹⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 8). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

the Dutch government with regard to counterterrorism legislation: the possibility to take criminal action at an early stage against the preparation of terrorist acts.¹⁹⁹

2.2.2 CHANGED OR NEW LEGISLATION

In addition to the basic principles, the 2011-2015 strategy also defines the attacks on September 11th, 2001 as the cause for changes in classic criminal law, to make it possible to take (preventive) action against terrorist threats, both nationally and internationally.²⁰⁰ The government claims that when adjusting the criminal legislation to combat terrorists, the Netherlands opted for a systematic embedding of terrorism legislation in the common criminal procedure,²⁰¹ which means that the Netherlands does not know separate terrorism legislation (such as emergency legislation).²⁰² Although no separate emergency legislation is present, the strategy does present other possibilities and conditions for changes or expansions in the existing legislation.²⁰³ In addition, a number of specific changes in the legal framework are described, most of which affect the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. These changes are focused on expansion of the possibilities for detection and prosecution of terrorist offenses.²⁰⁴ One change can be directly linked to the sub-indicator that discusses the extension of police pre-trial detention for terrorist suspects. This changed measure describes the possibility that suspects of terrorist crimes can be held on lighter grounds (without serious objections against the suspect), during the first phase of pre-trial detention.²⁰⁵

The National counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020 also stresses the importance of a legal basis for counterterrorism measures²⁰⁶, and additionally, gives a more general overview of the changes that have been made to the legal framework regarding terrorism, and why:

¹⁹⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 99). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁰⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 100). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 99-100). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁰⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 100-102). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁰⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 102). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁰⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 20). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

In recent years, much has been invested in tightening of the criminal law instruments against terrorism. Between 2004 and 2009, legislative proposals that penalize preparatory acts of terrorism, make interrogation of protected witnesses possible, penalize participation and cooperation in terrorist training, and expand the possibilities to detect and prosecute terrorist suspects, have been adopted. In 2013, an amendment to the Criminal Code was adopted regarding the criminalization of financing terrorism. To what extent additional legislation is needed to tackle extremism and terrorism is a consideration that is made over and over again.²⁰⁷

The documents of the Terrorism Threat Assessment are the first to discuss the possible redefinition of 'terrorism'. It is described that the focus of the preventive fight against violent extremism has been adapted from measures for entire population groups, to sharply focused interventions for radicalized individuals.²⁰⁸ This shows a change in how terrorism is perceived: from the more general approach of entire population groups as potential terrorists to a more specific approach in which different factors influence an individual to radicalize.

In addition to different examples of new or expanded counterterrorism measures, the documents of the Terrorism Threat Assessment also give a comprehensive justification for these changes. It is argued that the war in Syria, the revival of global jihadism and the formation of ISIS have made that Europe and the Netherlands are facing security problems that have not yet manifested itself on this scale and with this magnitude.²⁰⁹ According to the documents, these developments have led to an intensification and broadening of existing counterterrorism measures and proposals for new measures.²¹⁰ This means that in contrast to the National Counterterrorism strategies, the Terrorism Threat Assessments state that not only existing measures have been expanded, but also new measures have been proposed. Examples of these changed and new measures are: the imposition of clearer legal limits for recruiting and supporting terrorist organizations because of judicial convictions²¹¹, the 'temporary law

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 32 (pp. 6). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

²⁰⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 6). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

²¹⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 4, 6). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

²¹¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 8). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

on administrative measures to combat terrorism' which creates the possibility to take administrative action to prevent suspects from traveling out of the country²¹², or to freeze assets of individuals or organizations that are involved with terrorist activities.²¹³ In addition, specific examples are given in which these changed (or new) measures have been executed against (suspected) terrorists²¹⁴, although it is argued that despite these measures, the criminal law approach is often not possible in reality, due to lack of sufficient evidence.²¹⁵

The abovementioned measures show that the Dutch government acts on the basis of risk-thinking. For example, the temporary law on administrative measures, which shows that the government sees early intervention as necessary to counter the terrorist threat. The freezing of assets clearly shows the emergence of preventive criminalization, because suspects are punished through the freezing of their funds, without a prior conviction.

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism provides the most comprehensive list of existing, expanded and new measures that can be used to prevent terrorism:

Existing measures

- Suspects and convicts for a terrorist crime, and detainees that radicalize and recruit others, are directly placed in the 'terrorist prison wing';²¹⁶
- Various options for keeping returned foreign terrorist fighters under supervision for a longer period of time, such as imposing an (un)conditional prison sentence;²¹⁷
- In the case of a suspected exit involving a minor, child protection measures can be taken.²¹⁸

²¹² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 40 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²¹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 41 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²¹⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 28 (pp. 5-6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 32 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 34 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²¹⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). *Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties* (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Expanded measures

- Recognized foreign terrorist fighters with a non-EU nationality become illegal aliens (for the Schengen area), which gives the possibility to declare this person illegal when he/she returns, and expel him/her;²¹⁹
- It is made more difficult for malicious actors to get resources for a terrorist attack and there is continuous research on existing and new means for a terrorist attack, and required countermeasures;²²⁰
- Criminal law intervention in extremist hate speech and calls for violence is prioritized.²²¹

New measures

- Bill for the introduction of long-term behavior-influencing and freedom-restricting measures for returning foreign terrorist fighters;²²²
- Recognized foreign terrorist fighters lose Dutch citizenship, and in addition, the law will be further tightened to make it possible to do this without prior criminal conviction;²²³
- Recognized foreign terrorist fighters are placed on the national terrorism list, all funds are frozen, all financial services are refused, and everyone who (in)directly makes money available to them is punishable themselves;²²⁴

²¹⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²¹⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 7-8). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 13). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

- (Temporary) administrative measures to reduce risks and prevent serious offenses by returned foreign terrorist fighters, such as periodic reporting obligation, contact bans, and cooperation in relocation;²²⁵
- Strengthening of detection of jihadist travel movements, through access to reservation and check-in data.²²⁶

The abovementioned measures show that, apart from the long-term solutions to counter the terrorist threat, there also can be seen a tendency to focus on short-term coercive solutions to reduce the intimidation capacity of the offenders.

2.2.3 PREVENTIVE CRIMINALIZATION

With regard to the construction of the legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible, it can be concluded that Dutch counterterrorism measures go beyond the three sub-indicators that are given in the framework. The three sub-indicators can only be found in the documents on a limited scale, but this does not mean that Dutch counterterrorism measures do not conform to this indicator. Given the extensive justification and examples of changes in counterterrorism measures, it can be concluded that Dutch counterterrorism measures do meet the general meaning of this indicator, which is the construction of the legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible. This becomes clear in the fact that it has been made possible to impose (movement) restrictions or detention on suspects, who have not (yet) been convicted, and in quotes that can clearly be linked to preventive criminalization, such as *"...penalize preparatory acts of terrorism..."* and *"...expand the possibilities to detect and prosecute terrorist suspects..."*.²²⁷

²²⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 7). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 8). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26-27). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²²⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 20). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Concerning the possible emergence of suspect communities, which is part of the criminalization of social policy within a state, this indicator gives an argument against the emergence of these suspect communities when it describes the change in focus of the preventive fight against violent extremism from measures for entire population groups, to sharply focused interventions for radicalized individuals.

Furthermore, there is not only the case of increased surveillance, but also a tendency to focus on short-term coercive solutions to reduce the intimidation capacity of the offenders, which means that due process and rights of the accused have become less important than increased efficiency and risk-prevention. This reduced importance of due process and rights of the accused is shown in the fact that these measures are contrary to Article 6 (2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that *"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."*²²⁸

The measures aimed at reducing the intimidation capacity of the offenders, and the reduced importance of due process and rights of the accused are also not in line with the claims of the Dutch government about the importance of a legal basis for counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands, including the legal protection and protection of fundamental rights for all citizens. In other words, fundamental rights and a legal basis are positioned as important, but at the same time the government introduces measures and changes in the legal basis to restrict these rights, when a person is suspected to pose a terrorist threat to the Netherlands.

2.3 OFFENSIVE MODES OF ACTION

The fifth indicator of the security state is called 'offensive modes of action'. This indicator focuses on counterterrorism measures such as preventive searches and preventive arrests to counter a possible terrorist threat, as well as (movement) restrictions imposed on individuals.

From

Some parts of the National counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015 remain generally vague about hindering the possibilities to commit a terrorist attack, by broadly formulating that the measures taken are focused on 'acting against specific individuals or groups' and 'where

²²⁸ EVRM (1950, November 11th). Accessed at January 4th, 2018, from: <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001000/2010-06-10>

necessary isolating or containing the radicalized person or organization'.²²⁹ These sentences remain vague about what this 'acting', 'isolating' or 'containing' entails (which, in all probability, is done intentionally, to ensure the protection of the intelligence and security services²³⁰). However, a few specific examples of these measures are given later in the document, as can be seen in the following quote:

*Action against individuals or groups takes place after indications have been found during observations, that they constitute a potential terrorist risk. This action can take different forms: the early disruption of activities of these groups or individuals, freezing of financial assets, targeted action by police or welfare units, or 'immigration law' intervention.*²³¹

The measure of 'immigration law' intervention can include refusal, withdrawal or not extending a residence permit, declare someone an illegal alien, or refuse or withdraw Dutch citizenship.²³² This measure has already been discussed in the part about the legal framework, but in this context, it can also be classified under the 'imposing (movement) restrictions on individuals'. In the end of the document, another form of offensive modes of action is presented, which is the 'online-level'. It is stated that the Dutch government will monitor and prevent abuse of the internet by terrorists as much as possible, through strategic alliances with public and private partners.²³³ One specific measure is the taking down of websites with jihadist content. A wide range of other possibilities for online measures are discussed in detail in the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism.²³⁴

The National counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020 also makes a distinction between online and offline offensive modes of action, and gives additional examples of online and offline measures. The document states that the online-measures are aimed at disrupting online

²²⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 63, 73). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²³⁰ Wiv (2002). Paragraph 2.4. Accessed at January 6th, 2018, from <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0013409/2018-01-01>

²³¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 64). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²³² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 68). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²³³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 108). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²³⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 13-14, 23). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

disseminators of terrorist ideologies, through identifying these disseminators and disrupting their distribution channels, or addressing the disseminators and take criminal action.²³⁵ The offline-measures are aimed at weakening and disrupting the terrorist networks and their activities, through continuous monitoring and intervention at situations of gathering, recruitment, hate speech, fraud, or abuse of public venues. But apart from disrupting the actual networks and activities, offline-measures are also argued to help with disrupting the threat emanating from individuals. The latter can be done through administrative measures, de-radicalization programs, reintegration trajectories for former convicts and preventive use of criminal law.²³⁶ Both the online and offline part are examples of preventive arrests or restrictions imposed on individuals or groups, but on a different level.

The Terrorism Threat level documents discuss the same measures as the National counterterrorism strategies²³⁷, but add one new example of (movement) restrictions regarding detainees: an individual regime applies to a detainee that is placed in the terrorist section. In this case the director determines (based on a risk assessment) to what extent the detainee is enabled to participate in activities individually or jointly.²³⁸ According to the government, this movement restriction is part of counterterrorism measures that prevent a terrorist to recruit or radicalize other persons.

However, the Terrorism Threat level documents do not only give examples of the measures that can be taken, but also give examples of situations in which these measures have been executed (with the aim to justify these measures). These examples mostly take the form of preventive searches and arrests, or declaring individuals as an illegal alien and expelling them from the Netherlands.²³⁹ Furthermore, the effect of the executed measures is discussed, which

²³⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40 (pp. 2, 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 4-6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²³⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 38 (pp. 2-3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²³⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 28 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

makes it part of the more general justification of preventive counterterrorism measures. Two quotes can pose as an example: "Action by the police and the judiciary have led to a number of arrests and foiled attempts at exit. A preliminary effect of this action seems to be the disruption of the propaganda of the Dutch jihadist movement."²⁴⁰ and "The arrests in various European countries show that security organizations are intensively involved in the detection and prosecution of possible terrorists. This prevents attacks."²⁴¹ Here too, it becomes clear that preventive counterterrorism measures, and more specifically (movement) restrictions, are taken that appear to be in contrast with the government's claim about the importance of a legal basis for counterterrorism measures and the protection of fundamental rights.

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism also gives a list of different measures focused on preventive arrests and (movement) restrictions for individuals, but it is interesting to see that all these measures are focused on persons who want to travel to terrorist territory, those who have already exited, and those who want to return from these areas. In this case it can be assumed that persons who travel to terrorist territory are by definition seen as a security risk by the Dutch government. This is interesting to note, regarding the statements in the Terrorist Threat Assessment that "*it has been established that most returned foreign fighters [at that time] do not pose a threat*", because individuals returned disappointed from those terrorist territories.²⁴² Measures with regard to persons preparing an attack on Dutch territory are not present in any of the government documents.

Examples of measures for potential terrorist travelers are the already aforementioned revocation or refusal of travel documents, an exit ban, and in the case of a suspected exit

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 29 (pp. 5). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 31 (pp. 4). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 32 (pp. 6). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 3). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

²⁴⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37 (pp. 4). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40 (pp. 2). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

involving a minor, child protection measures are taken.²⁴³ Recognized terrorist travelers can lose Dutch citizenship, can be declared illegal alien within the Schengen area, can be placed on the national terrorism list, and can be reported to the authorities of those countries of which they also have nationality.²⁴⁴ Consequences of these measures are the termination of benefits, financial allowances and student loans, and the expulsion from the Netherlands. Returning terrorist fighters can also be placed under long-time supervision (both in terms of imprisonment or through behavior-influencing and freedom-restricting measures)²⁴⁵, or face risk reduction measures to prevent further radicalization of the suspect, or the carrying out of a terrorist attack (such as a periodic notification duty, contact bans, or cooperation in relocation).²⁴⁶

Taking into account all of the above, it can be concluded that all three sub-indicators of the fifth indicator are more or less present within Dutch counterterrorism policy. In the case of preventive searches, only a limited amount of measures is mentioned. Although the documents do not literally mention preventive searches it cannot be stated that these measures are not present in Dutch counterterrorism policy. There may not be a mentioning of physical searches, but in a more general sense the continuous monitoring and observations can also be seen as preventive searches for information and clues. In the case of preventive arrests and (movement) restrictions for individuals, it can be concluded that these measures are largely present, both on the online and offline level.

This also adds to the link with the driver about (movement) restrictions, and the more extreme measure of preventive arrests of suspects who have not yet been convicted, show again that the 'presumption of innocence' has made way for preventive criminalization. Furthermore,

²⁴³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁴⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 6-7). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁴⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁴⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 8). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

measures go beyond increased surveillance, and also focus on short-term coercive solutions to reduce the intimidation capacity of the offenders, and risk-prevention in general.

2.4 CONCLUSION

The criminalization of social policy within a state, visible in the emergence of preventive criminalization, is clearly present in Dutch counterterrorism measures. The idea that a 'risk perspective' is used to identify persons posing a potential danger, can be found in the third indicator. The government is unable to monitor and check every individual, and therefore the government considers it important to involve every layer of society in signaling risks, which exposes the underlying belief that every individual could pose a risk. Note the difference, that not only suspects, but every individual could pose a risk. Therefore, it can be concluded that Dutch counterterrorism measures regarding this point, go beyond the characteristics of preventive criminalization.

Concerning the possible emergence of suspect communities, which is part of the criminalization of social policy within a state, it can be concluded that the government is not likely to contribute to this emergence, because of the change in focus from preventive measures for entire population groups, to sharply focused interventions for radicalized individuals. However, the engagement of citizens in signaling radicalization may increase the profiling of suspect communities because not every individual has the perception or training to 'not generalize'.

The implementation of preventive measures to reduce the risk and intimidation capacity of the suspects, can be linked to the analyses of the fourth and fifth indicator. The possibilities created by the counterterrorism measures to impose (movement) restrictions or detention of suspects who have not (yet) been convicted, show a tendency to focus on short-term coercive solutions to reduce the intimidation capacity of the offenders. Due process and rights of the accused have become less important than increased efficiency and risk-prevention, as can be seen in the fact that the measures are contrary to the 'presumption of innocence'. In some cases, sub-indicators cannot literally be found in the analyzed documents, but in these cases it can be concluded that the measures meet the general meaning of the indicators.

3. THE BLURRING OF THE DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL TERRITORY AS SITES OF CONTROL

The third driver addresses the blurring of the territory inside and outside a nation's borders, as a result of the emergence and rise of globalization. This blurring has resulted in the de-bordering of the state, because problems can now originate from within and outside the nation's borders. Therefore, these problems should be dealt with in an early stage, before any (further) risks emerge for the nation's internal security. This process of de-bordering shows the existence of preventive thinking within a security state, because measures are taken outside the nation's borders (e.g. through active intervention abroad), to prevent a problem from emerging within the nation's borders.

The de-bordering of the state also makes it difficult to distinguish the 'good' from the 'bad' with regard to the terrorist threat. Therefore, measures are focused on providing an encompassing approach to deal with this problem.

3.1 OFFENSIVE MODES OF ACTION

The sixth indicator of the security state is also called 'offensive modes of action', and can be considered part two of the fifth indicator. In part one, preventive arrests have already been discussed, so this chapter will not discuss this again. However, it should be noted that preventive arrests cannot only be linked to preventive criminalization, but also have a focus on neutralizing the 'enemy within', preventing suspects from traveling abroad, and making sure returned foreign terrorist do not pose a threat to the Netherlands. This makes these preventive arrests also a part of the third driver of the security state: blurring of domestic and global territory as sites of control.

Beside preventive arrests, the sixth indicator also includes other sub-indicators, which will be the focus of this chapter. These sub-indicators are 'military and paramilitary operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure', 'infiltrations', and 'targeted killings'.

3.1.1 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS TO DISRUPT TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE

Both National Counterterrorism Strategies clearly describe how and why military operations are conducted, and argue that the most far-reaching and large-scale way of prevention, is

military intervention. In addition, the documents describe the governments' aspiration to play an active role in the fight against international terrorism, for example through 'Security Sector Reform', development cooperation, promotion of human rights, and military (peace building) missions (also called 'forward defense').²⁴⁷ These military missions (e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan) are focused on military action against terrorist elements, and strengthening the resilience of the foreign government and population.²⁴⁸ According to the government, deployment in 'source-countries' of terrorism reduces the breeding ground for extremism and terrorist and in turn reduces the risk of terrorist attacks against individuals or groups in the Netherlands, or against Dutch interests abroad.²⁴⁹ These claims clearly show the presence of de-bordering and preventive thinking in the Netherlands, because the government presents terrorism as a cross-border problem, which should be dealt with at an early stage, before it starts to pose a risk for the internal security in the Netherlands. Or in other words, active intervention abroad is necessary to prevent possible suffering at home.

Lastly, military operations are claimed to be useful for the gathering of intelligence. According to the government, this intelligence is essential for the formulation of geopolitical and trend analyses, which can form the basis of preventive counterterrorism measures within the Netherlands.²⁵⁰

Paramilitary operations are more vaguely described in the analyzed documents. A paramilitary organization can be defined as "*an organization operating as, in place of, or as a supplement to a regular military force*".²⁵¹ The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 is the only document that describes activities that can be linked to the presence of paramilitary operations. For example, through statements that threat-oriented interventions are conducted against persons, groups and modus operandi that pose the biggest threat, or that attacks and violence are thwarted, through cooperation between intelligence and security services and the

²⁴⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 6, 16). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁴⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 57, 68). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁴⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁵⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 57). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁵¹ Dictionary.com (n.d.) *Paramilitary*. Retrieved from: <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/paramilitary>

deployment of the Dutch Counterterrorism Unit (also called the Special Interventions Unit).²⁵² This unit is not part of the Dutch armed forces, but part of an overarching service of special units of the National Police, with special authorities.²⁵³ In this case, it can be argued that the Dutch Counterterrorism Unit poses as a semi-military organization.

Beside the abovementioned descriptions, the analyzed documents do not give any further descriptions of military or paramilitary operations as part of preventive counterterrorism measures.

3.1.2 INFILTRATIONS AND TARGETED KILLINGS

Infiltration can be defined as “to enter or gain access to (an organization, place, etc.) surreptitiously and gradually, especially in order to acquire secret information or cause damage.”²⁵⁴ The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 leaves no ambiguity about the use of infiltrations, as can be seen in the following quote:

*To be able to compose thorough threat analyses and be able to carry out interventions (or have them carried out), the Dutch counterterrorism policy is strongly dependent on intelligence provided by the intelligence and security services. These services have special powers, which in the extreme case can intervene deeply in the privacy of citizens. To prevent terrorist attacks, the intelligence and security services may use means such as eavesdropping, tracking, observation and infiltration, under the condition that the necessary information cannot be obtained in other, less drastic ways. These special powers have repeatedly stifled terrorist actions in the bud, in the recent past.*²⁵⁵

In addition, the document presents adjustments to the legal framework (more specifically, to the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws), that have expanded the possibilities for investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes. These adjustments have

²⁵² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 15). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁵³ Ducheine, P.A.L. (2008). *Krijgsmacht, Geweldgebruik & Tereurbestrijding* (pp. 101, 356, 363). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers

²⁵⁴ Oxford Dictionaries (n.d.). *Infiltrate*. Retrieved from: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/infiltrate>

Merriam-Webster (n.d.). *Infiltrate*. Retrieved from: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infiltrate>

²⁵⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 54-55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

made it possible to use special investigative powers, such as infiltration and observation in case of 'indications of a terrorist crime'.²⁵⁶

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism is the only other document where the use of infiltration techniques as part of counterterrorism measures can be found. This document mainly focuses on the use of online infiltrations. It is described that a specialist team of the National Police fights online jihadist content, through monitoring the internet, and informing the Public Prosecutor about possible criminal offenses.²⁵⁷ Although the use of online infiltrations by this specialist team is not specifically mentioned, other sources argue that these methods have been used before by the Dutch government, which strengthens the argument that the same techniques are also used for terrorism prevention.²⁵⁸

Targeted killing is a term that is not defined under international law. According to a UN report the term came into usage after Israel implemented a policy of 'targeted killings' of terrorists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and therefore defines targeted killings as 'premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody'.²⁵⁹ With regard to targeted killings in the Netherlands, none of the analyzed documents refers to this sub-indicator. Therefore, it can be concluded that this measure is not part of the Dutch preventive counterterrorism measures.

²⁵⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 102). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal (n.d.) *Verruiming mogelijkheden tot opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven*. Retrieved from: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/30164_verruiming_mogelijkheden_tot

²⁵⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 23). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁵⁸ NOS (2017). *Infiltratie door politie op dark web lijkt succesvol*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2190178-infiltratie-door-politie-op-dark-web-likt-succesvol.html>

Verhagen, L. (2017). *Politie beheerst wekenlang drugsmarktplaats op dark web, zonder dat het opvalt*. Retrieved from: <https://www.volkskrant.nl/tech/politie-beheert-wekenlang-drugsmarktplaats-op-dark-web-zonder-dat-het-opvalt~a4507394/>

²⁵⁹ Masters, J. (2013). Targeted Killings. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/targeted-killings>

United Nations General Assembly (2010). Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston: Study on targeted killings [United Nations Report]. Retrieved from <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf>

It can be concluded that the rise of globalization has resulted in Dutch offensive modes of action that are aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attacks against Dutch citizens and interests, both at home and abroad. This becomes clear through the government's statements about Dutch participation in the fight against international terrorism, with the aim to reduce the breeding ground of terrorism.

Because of the blurring of the domestic and global sites of control, and the difficulty this brings to distinguishing the 'good' from the 'bad', new and hybrid measures have been taken to counter the terrorist threat, both on the legal and the political level. This can be linked to the use of infiltration techniques and paramilitary actions. The use of infiltration techniques leaves no ambiguity, but the use of paramilitary actions is more vaguely described. However, the Dutch Counterterrorism Unit (also called the Special Interventions Unit) meets the description of a semi-military organization, and therefore it can be concluded that (to a certain extent) paramilitary operations are present within the Dutch counterterrorism strategy. No statements can be made about what these operations specifically entail, because this is not described in any of the documents, but it can be concluded that paramilitary actions are part of the merging and formation of new hybrid categories to counter the terrorist threat.

The most 'extreme' form of offensive modes of action -targeted killings- is not present in any of the analyzed documents, and is therefore not a part of Dutch counterterrorism measures.

3.2 LEGITIMIZED 'WARTIME' STATE ACTIVITIES

The seventh indicator of the security state focuses on the use of legitimized 'wartime' state activities. 'Wartime' state activities can be defined as measures that are normally taken during wartime, but are now taken by a security state to counter a certain threat. Wartime measures that can be linked to the context of counterterrorism are restrictions of speech and activities (such as movement restrictions²⁶⁰, restrictions to carry certain weapons²⁶¹, or financial restrictions²⁶²), or intrusive surveillance in different areas (such as financial transactions,

²⁶⁰ CQPress (1948). *Freedom of movement*. Retrieved from:

<https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresre1948082000>

B'Tselem (2017). *Restrictions on movement*. Retrieved from: https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement

²⁶¹ ICRC (2011). *Weapons*. Retrieved from: <https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/weapons>

Squires, P. (2014). *Gun crime in global contexts* (pp. 140). New York: Routledge

Library of Congress (n.d.) *Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Germany*. Retrieved from:

<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/germany.php>

²⁶² Fairman, M.D. (2009). The restriction of civil liberties during times of crisis: The evolution of America's response to national military threats. *Governmental and International Relations Honors Papers*, 7. Pp. 178, 212

interpersonal communications, presence in significant locations, or personal identity details).²⁶³

3.2.1 RESTRICTIONS BASED ON SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY OR SPEECH

In chapter 2, section 3, several measures have already been discussed about movement restrictions. Therefore, these measures will not be discussed again in this chapter. It is however important to note that restrictions on movement are not only part of preventive criminalization, but also are part of the blurring of domestic and global territory as sites of control. Because of the globalization and blurring of borders, it can be difficult for governments to keep track of individuals or groups that pose a terrorist threat to the Netherlands. Because of this, it can be helpful for governments to impose (movement) restrictions on suspects, to make it easier to monitor them.

Apart from restrictions on movement, other ‘wartime’ restrictions can also be found in the analyzed documents. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 describes restrictions on weapons, explosives and other resources that can be used for terrorist purposes. The government claims that by disrupting access to terrorist resources, terrorist threats may be prevented. Measures that can be linked to this disruption of terrorist resources are: checking goods at the border (with a focus on weapons, chemicals and other resources), and monitoring new attack-methods (such as drones, lasers and biotechnology).²⁶⁴

Descriptions of financial restrictions also are also present in the analyzed documents. Both the freezing of financial assets of potential terrorists, and the prevention of terrorist financing are positioned as part of these financial restrictions, and are claimed to be done through measures

Taylor, B. (n.d.). *August 1914: When global stock markets closed*. Retrieved from: <https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gfdblog/?p=2750>

Alhamwi, M.K. (2017). *Eyes on Damascus: Exchange rates, financial restrictions and subsidized fuel*. Retrieved from: <https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/12/11/eyes-on-damascus-exchange-rates-financial-restrictions-and-subsidized-fuel>

²⁶³ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 150-152

²⁶⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

such as border checks for cash and other sources of terrorist financing (such as drugs, wild animals and art)²⁶⁵, or through the investigation of cash flows.²⁶⁶

The Policy implications of Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment 41, adds to the above by stating that countering terrorist financing is a government priority, both in national and international context.²⁶⁷

All the above shows that restrictions of speech and activities are present in the Netherlands. These restrictions are part of measures that are normally taken during wartime, but are now taken in ‘peacetime’, to counter the terrorist threat. However, it can be argued that movement restrictions and financial restrictions in the Netherlands are focused on individual suspects, and not on society as a whole (as is often the case during wartime), which then shows a difference with real wartime measures. Therefore, it can be concluded that in a strict sense, wartime restrictions are present in the Netherlands to counter the terrorist threat, but that the focus of these restrictions is different from real wartime restrictions.

3.2.2 INTRUSIVE SURVEILLANCE

Another sub-indicator of ‘wartime’ state activities is the use of intrusive surveillance in different areas. This could be surveillance of financial transactions, interpersonal communications, presence in significant locations, or personal identity details. Surveillance of different areas is made possible in the Netherlands, through the Law of 20 November 2006 amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws to expand the possibilities to detect and prosecute terrorist offenses. This law has made it possible to use special investigative powers (such as infiltration and observation) at an early stage to prevent terrorist attacks.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁶⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁶⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 102). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

The area of financial transaction surveillance has the most prominent place in the analyzed documents. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 describes that (suspected) terrorists can be traced on the basis of financial data at home and abroad.²⁶⁹ In this case, it is argued by the government that gaining insight in the financial flows, provides information for the intelligence services about life patterns, contacts, or modus operandi of terrorists.²⁷⁰ In the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020, the scope of financial surveillance is expanded. This can be seen in the statements that information is gathered about terrorist financing, financial networks and financial transactions, and is used to detect and prosecute suspects of terrorist financing.²⁷¹ The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism adds to the strategies, by describing that financial networks are visualized on behalf of the Public Prosecution Service and investigation services.²⁷² How this information is gathered, is already discussed under the topic of financial restrictions.²⁷³

In the Policy implications of the 41st Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment, the government provides an overview of specific measures different government bodies can take when suspicions exist about terrorist financing. For example, it is said that in the case of serious suspicions of financing from abroad, which create a risk for the democratic legal order or national security, intelligence and security services have the possibility to investigate. When suspicions are less serious, but there is some doubt about funding or its origin, the local government has various options for conducting research.²⁷⁴ Another example that is given, is the Tax and Customs Administration, which supervises institutions or foundations with a so-called General Benefit-Enhancing Institutions-status (ANBI in Dutch), and can withdraw this status if the objective and the activities of the institution are not in accordance with each

²⁶⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 65). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁷⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 58). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁷¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁷² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁷³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 14). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁷⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

other.²⁷⁵ Lastly, it is described that the Financial Expertise Center has started a project which aims to map out financial networks of persons or groups that can be linked to terrorism. The Dutch government claims that, based on these insights, specific preventive and repressive measures can be taken to counter the terrorist threat.²⁷⁶

Another area of surveillance is the presence of individuals or groups in significant locations. In the analyzed documents, measures that can be linked to this area are mainly focused on surveillance of travel movements. In the 2011-2015 strategy, the government claims that research into terrorist travel movements has proved to be of great importance, and has led to the discovery, disruption or dismantling of many jihadist networks.²⁷⁷ This surveillance does not only take place on international scale, but also the local detection capacity is claimed to be essential, because deviations in behavior or absence of certain individuals are first noticed by these actors.²⁷⁸ The 2016-2020 strategy makes a distinction between the more specific surveillance of travel movements from potential terrorists, and the more general surveillance of global terrorist movements and the threat thereof for the Netherlands.²⁷⁹

However, the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism argues that jihadist travel movements from, within and to Europe currently cannot be recognized adequately and in time, because reservation and check-in data from civil aviation is not structurally available. Therefore, a new measure is proposed by the government, in which airlines flying into the Netherlands should structurally provide all reservation and check-in data to the Dutch government, to improve the detection of jihadists.²⁸⁰

The area of personal identity details surveillance is only present to a limited extent in the analyzed documents. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 describes the acquisition, analysis and interpretation of personal information from potential terrorists, both

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* 41 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁷⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 58). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020* (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁸⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). *Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties* (pp. 26-27). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

at home and abroad, with a focus on who they are, where they are, what their intentions are and which action they undertake.²⁸¹

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism describes the use of a targeted approach focused on radicalizing young people in local risk areas. It is presented that in cooperation with municipalities, educational institutions, youth workers and employers, the Dutch government seeks to map personal details of young people who are at risk of radicalization, with the aim to develop a specific, individual approach.²⁸² Here it can be seen that the government is gathering personal identity details of suspected (future) extremists and uses this information to specify and tailor preventive measures for these individuals or groups.²⁸³ The claim that the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism manages a central overview of the measures taken at the individual level shows the ongoing surveillance and mapping of personal information.²⁸⁴

Measures with regard to the fourth area of interpersonal communications surveillance are not present in any of the analyzed documents.

A number of measures that are presented/addressed in the government documents, do not fit directly into one of these four areas, or apply to more than one area. Therefore, these measures will be shortly discussed here.

The information gathered during the different types of surveillance not only has the purpose to map the behavior and network of an individual or group, but goes broader. This can be seen in the government's statement that surveillance also aims at gathering information about terrorist movements, terrorist networks and organizations, their methods and the means they use (firearms, explosives, CBRN, cyber-attacks), and information about recruitment techniques.²⁸⁵ Where the abovementioned surveillance is for a large part done in secret, the

²⁸¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁸² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 19). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁸⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 11). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

government also argues the use of conducting surveillance openly. In this case, the Dutch government makes sure that the person under surveillance, and his environment, become aware that he/she is subject of government surveillance. According to the government, this results in the person no longer being able to play a role in terrorism-related activities.²⁸⁶

With regard to the sub-indicator about intrusive surveillance, it can be concluded that three out of four areas are present in Dutch counterterrorism measures, and some measures even go beyond these four areas. Financial transaction surveillance has the most prominent place in government documents, and is used to gather information about a wide range of areas. Regarding presence in significant locations surveillance, the government's main focus lies on travel movements. This surveillance has a broad scope, because it takes place both on a local, national, and international level. In addition, the government aims to broaden this area of surveillance even more, as can be seen in the proposed new measure about governmental access to reservation and check-in data.

Personal identity details surveillance is also present in government documents, albeit to a limited extent. However, documents do show the presence and aim of the government to gather personal identity information of suspected (future) extremists, with the justification to use this information to specify and tailor preventive measures for these individuals or groups. The additional description of the creation of a central 'database' about the different individual measures, shows the ongoing surveillance and mapping of personal information.²⁸⁷

Only measures with regard to the fourth area of interpersonal communications surveillance are not present in any of the analyzed documents, and it can therefore be concluded that this area of surveillance is not present in the Netherlands.

Where Hallsworth & Lea describe the security state's use of massive intrusive surveillance²⁸⁸, in the case of the Netherlands, it can be seen that surveillance mostly takes place on an individual scale (e.g. in financial surveillance, and personal identity details surveillance). However, the area of travel movements surveillance shows both surveillance on an individual

²⁸⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 65). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁸⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁸⁸ Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2), 150

level, and on a broad level of surveillance of all citizens. This can be seen in the fact that local actors are claimed to be essential for early detection of deviations in behavior, which means that on a 'local level', all citizens are subject of surveillance. Another example is the proposed measure in which all reservation and check-in data will become accessible to the Dutch government, which also includes information about individuals who are not suspects.

In addition, it is important to note that the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 creates an important condition for the use of surveillance, which is the protection of fundamental rights:

*At the same time there are limitations to the possibilities to act, both in practical and legal sense. In line with an important starting point of this strategy, namely the protection of human rights as a central condition in all counterterrorism measures at home and abroad, it must be ensured that counterterrorism always remains proportional and in accordance with the human rights standards.*²⁸⁹

However, at the same time it can again be seen, that the legal basis is changed (to make it possible to use special investigative powers, such as infiltration and observation, at an early stage), because it is claimed to help prevent terrorist attacks. In other words, fundamental rights and a legal basis are positioned as important, but at the same time the government introduces measures and changes in the legal basis that can violate these rights, with the justification of early detection and terrorism prevention.

3.2.3 PROPAGANDA

Although propaganda is not established as one of the sub-indicators, it is described in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 and in one of the Policy implications of the Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment. Propaganda can be described as 'how do you tell your story to the enemy, or foreign countries, in order to persuade them towards changing their behavior to conform with your objectives?'²⁹⁰ This can be done through a variety of techniques, such as sending disinformation, adapting messages to different audiences by matching them to the preconceptions and biases of its audience, or making sure that

²⁸⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 59). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁹⁰ Bolt, N. (Speaker), (2017). *The informational dimension of hybrid warfare* [podcast]. Retrieved from: <https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/hybridwarfare>

information is emotionally engaging.²⁹¹ It can be argued that propaganda is part of a state's 'wartime activities'. The book 'Propaganda and Persuasion' describes that the citizen seems most familiar with the use of propaganda as a wartime activity, because in times of political conflict, propaganda becomes most manifest to the public as groups use it to achieve their goals.²⁹² Therefore, the measures regarding propaganda will be discussed in this chapter.

One of the measures discussed in the 2011-2015 strategy is focused on understanding processes of radicalization, and making sure this radicalization does not result into terrorist activities. Therefore, it is argued that the government makes an effort to understand the terrorist 'narrative', and where possible provide a counter-narrative.²⁹³ This can also be defined as counterpropaganda. One of the documents of the Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment Policy Implications also touches upon this counterpropaganda, by arguing that prevention also can take the form of de-legitimation of the jihadist message on the internet and elsewhere.²⁹⁴

Another measure that can be linked to the use of (counter)propaganda, is the effort by the Dutch government to improve the image of the Netherlands abroad, through public diplomacy: "*in cooperation with strategic partners, the government is aiming to create a diverse and realistic image of the Netherlands, where there is room for many lifestyles and religions. Where possible, it is explained what freedom of expression, the democratic rule of law, and separation of powers mean in practice.*"²⁹⁵ This quote meets the characteristics of propaganda, because it aims at telling a story to the enemy, or foreign countries, to persuade them towards changing their behavior (in this situation: no longer see the Netherlands as a 'bad guy' and legitimate target).

²⁹¹ Lucas, E. & Pomeranzev, P. (2016). *Winning the information war: Techniques and counter-strategies to Russian propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe*. Center for European Policy Analysis (pp. 20). Retrieved from: https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706

²⁹² Jowett, G. & O'Donnell, V. (2006). *Propaganda and persuasion* (pp. 204). London: Sage Publications Ltd.

²⁹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 71). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁹⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37* (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

²⁹⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 74). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

3.2.4 'WARTIME' STATE ACTIVITIES

With regard to the seventh indicator, it can be concluded that Dutch counterterrorism measures again go beyond the sub-indicators that are given in the framework. Restrictions on speech and activities have proven to be part of the wide range of counterterrorism measures. This can be linked to the driver, in the way that the globalization and blurring of borders, has made it difficult to keep track of individuals or groups that pose a terrorist threat to the Netherlands. (Movement) restrictions can make it easier to monitor suspects, or disturb the plans for an attack, both at home and abroad. However, it should be noted that wartime restrictions to counter the terrorist threat may be present in a strict sense, the focus of these restrictions is different from real wartime restrictions (more on an individual level, than on society as a whole).

With regard to the sub-indicator about intrusive surveillance, it can be concluded that three out of four areas are present in Dutch counterterrorism measures, and some measures even go beyond these four areas. Nonetheless, in most areas, this surveillance takes place on an individual scale, instead of the massive intrusive surveillance described by Hallsworth & Lea. Only the area of travel movements surveillance shows both the surveillance of (suspected) individuals, and the 'massive' surveillance of all citizens. Furthermore, it can be seen again, that fundamental rights and a legal basis are positioned as important, but at the same time the government introduces measures and changes in the legal basis that can violate these rights, with the justification of early detection and terrorism prevention.

Although not mentioned in the framework, another sub-indicator can be considered part of a state's 'wartime' activities, which is the use of '(counter)propaganda'. The presence of measures that focus on (counter) propaganda, shows that Dutch counterterrorism measures go beyond the seventh indicator. However, it should also be concluded that 'wartime' state activities are limited to their presence in a 'strict sense', and in most cases do not meet the general meaning and scope of wartime activities (as explained before).

3.3 CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO MAKE IT MORE PROACTIVE AND RESILIENT IN COUNTERING SECURITY THREATS

The eighth indicator of the security state is also focused on the construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats. Where the emphasis in chapter 2, section 1, lay on increasing the resilience of the population by engaging the citizen

in signaling radicalization, this chapter will address all other measures that can be linked to the construction of civil society. However, the in chapter 2, section 1, discussed engagement of citizens in signaling radicalization can also have the underlying effect that the population gets used to everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance (as described in the security state theory). This in turn may strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population. Therefore, the efforts to engage citizens is also applicable to this chapter.

Sub-indicators for the other measures to construct civil society in making it more proactive and resilient are: the existence (or introduction) of obligatory military service, engaging private protection companies in fighting terrorism, making it easier to carry weapons and strengthening the psychological endurance of the civilian population. The first three sub-indicators (obligatory military service, engaging private protection companies, and making it easier to carry weapons) are not mentioned in any of the documents on counterterrorism measures. Therefore, it is concluded in this context, that these sub-indicators of a security state are not present in the Netherlands.

3.3.1 STRENGTHENING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENDURANCE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

The fourth sub-indicator, however, is present in large numbers in the analyzed documents. 'Efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population' can be divided into two parts. First, the more general measures that strive for giving security issues a structural place in social thinking and acting.²⁹⁶ The Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment argues that an increase in attention for to radicalization and terrorism-related issues in Dutch society, will increase the vigilance for risks in the area of terrorism and extremism.²⁹⁷ It is argued that (as agreed by the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015) whatever protective measures are taken, they will only work in addition to the individual resilience of individuals and organizations: *"implementation practice shows that trust in the measures and the expertise of the operators ensures movement of with more certainty of the threatened. This*

²⁹⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 85). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁹⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 33 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

reinforces the effectiveness of the measures, because it promotes undisturbed functioning, the central starting point of security."²⁹⁸ Therefore, it can be concluded that this measure is seen by the Dutch government as the basis of all Dutch counterterrorism measures.

However, the National Counterterrorism strategies present the other side of giving security issues a structural place in society. The documents argue that too much attention for radicalization and terrorism can have the opposite effect of increasing the fear among the population, and thus playing into the hands of terrorists.²⁹⁹ This results in the statement by the government that it takes into account the influence that (communication about) the counterterrorism policy has on the experience from citizens.³⁰⁰ One example that is given, is the pursuit of minimizing (visible) security measures. According to the government, the use of (technical) innovations makes it possible to create the same or higher security with less visible measures.³⁰¹ Furthermore, these measures do not address the fact that the aforementioned efforts to engage individuals in signaling radicalization, can also have the side effect of increasing fear among citizens. In this way the efforts can have an opposite effect (instead of diminishing the terrorist threat, terrorists achieve their goal of spreading fear).

The second part focuses on the increasing the resilience of the 'demand-side'. These measures aim at making risk groups more resilient for terrorist propaganda.³⁰² In contrast to the first three sub-indicators, this part is (in most cases extensively) addressed in all analyzed documents.

The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 gives a fairly general description of these measures by stating that the Dutch government will work to strengthen the resilience of the demand side, undermine the offer, reduce the breeding ground and invest in deradicalization.³⁰³ Active citizenship is argued to be essential for a vital democratic rule of

²⁹⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 87). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

²⁹⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 13). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 87). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁰² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 10, 71). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁰³ Ibid.

law as a binding factor between all citizens.³⁰⁴ However, the specific content of these measures is not explained. The same can be said for the Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment, which sticks to the same general descriptions, with the only difference that it mentions Muslim communities as the target audience.³⁰⁵

The 2016-2020 strategy has the same purport, but gives a bit more detailed information about specific measures that are taken. The first step that is described is conducting research on new ideological corners where social unease exists, from which possible violence can arise in the future.³⁰⁶ The subsequent steps focus on increasing the resilience of vulnerable groups and their environment, through initiation and stimulation of initiatives to make these groups more resistant to terrorist ideologies and recruitment.³⁰⁷

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism takes up the largest part of measures to increase the resilience of the demand-side, and gives explanations of the specific content of these measures. The first set of measures that can be derived from the document is the Dutch government's aim to fight the distribution of the jihadist message, and generating the possibility for social opposition is presented. This is done through measures such as online monitoring, removal of jihadist content, and criminal prosecution of the disseminator(s).³⁰⁸ Generating the possibility for social opposition is said to take the form of small-scale initiatives to distribute alternative messages, through local networks, meetings, and social media. But also, active communication about misleading information or rumors, and

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 10, 64). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁰⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 73). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁰⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 33 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁰⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 12). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁰⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 13). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁰⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 23). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

supporting Islamic counter-messages are said to be part of measures regarding social opposition.³⁰⁹

The latter can be linked to the second set of measures that can be derived from the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism: supporting actions or people that fight jihadism.³¹⁰ According to the government, this includes supporting key figures from the Muslim community who produce a counterargument, by providing them with training and, where necessary, providing them with protection³¹¹, strengthening networks around young people and their educators³¹², supporting the local approach (e.g. by professionals and municipalities) in priority areas³¹³, and supporting educational institution through educational programs against radicalization, giving expert advice and the creation of information portals.³¹⁴

If the previous measures are not sufficient, the government claims it will proceed to targeted actions against radicalizing individuals or groups, while trying to involve the direct environment as much as possible. Various examples are given, such as that young people who run the risk of radicalizing, will receive an individual approach, which is focused on creating 'positive alternatives' (such as a job, sport or education), in exchange for reciprocal requirements.³¹⁵ Another example that is given, is the government's aim to involve the immediate environment as much as possible when a person has started to radicalize. According to the government, this can be done through supporting the Islamic community

³⁰⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 19-20). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18-19). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 17-18). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 25). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 18). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³¹⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 19). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

(such as imams and mosque leaders) in tackling radicalization, or by warning the immediate environment of a person in the event of a suspected exit, to prevent departure.³¹⁶

3.3.2 HYBRID MEASURES

It can be concluded that the second part of the 'construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats' is only partly present in Dutch counterterrorism measures. The sub-indicators obligatory military service, engaging private protection companies, and making it easier to carry weapons are not present in any of the documents on counterterrorism measures. Therefore, it can be concluded in this context, that these sub-indicators are also not present in the Netherlands.

In contrast, the sub-indicator of strengthening the psychological endurance of the civil population, is largely present in Dutch counterterrorism measures. Both the more general measures that strive for a structural place of security issues in social thinking and acting, and the measures that aim at making risk groups more resilient for terrorist propaganda can be linked to the idea of new hybrid measures that focus on signaling or preventing the enemy within. These measures are also clear examples of the aim to construct civil society in a way that it becomes more proactive and resilient in countering security threats. As an overall conclusion, it should be noted that the eighth indicator is merely present on a small scale, and does not contribute largely to the overall description of the blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-bordering of the state.

3.4 MILITARIZATION OF THE POLICE

The ninth, and last indicator of the security state is the militarization of the police. This indicator focuses on the blurring of the tasks of military and police, which can simply mean that the National Police performs military tasks (or vice versa) or they work together in combined teams, or it can mean that police officers are trained by the military, and heavily-armed teams are stand-by or deployed to intervene in case of an attack.

The National counterterrorism strategy 2011-2015 provides a clear description of how this indicator takes shape within the Dutch counterterrorism measures: *"the main suppliers of*

³¹⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 11, 17). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

information are the police (especially DNR and IPOL) and the intelligence services AIVD and MIVD. Actual action against groups or individuals happens by the special units of the police and the armed forces."³¹⁷ This quote literally describes the overlapping tasks of the police and military, both in the process of gathering information and actual action against (suspected) terrorists. A list of which special units are involved in counterterrorism actions, gives an even clearer insight into the blurring of tasks: "*the special units system consists of special assistance units of the police and Defense (respectively UI, UE&OO and UIM), detention and support units of the police regions and the Royal Marechaussee, and from an overarching service for special (assistance) units (DSI).*"³¹⁸ The DSI (Special Interventions Service in English) is an example of a unit that consist of both police and Defense personnel, and was founded (on July 1st, 2006) to ensure coherence and an optimal approach to terrorism.³¹⁹ It is also an example of a heavily-armed team that is stand-by to intervene in case of terrorism-related situations.

Examples of counterterrorism measures where the National Police performs military tasks (and vice versa) can be found in the Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment Policy Implications. One document describes the measure where the Royal Marechaussee has provisionally taken over the surveillance and security of a number of high-risk objects from the police. The reason given, is that the Marechaussee is adequately equipped for surveillance and security tasks.³²⁰ Other documents describe the other way around, where the National Police takes over tasks that are originally assigned to the Royal Marechaussee, such as checking travelers and their identity documents, measures to counter terrorist travel movements, or the creation of a multidisciplinary team aimed at tackling migration crime where both the police and Defense cooperate intensively.³²¹

³¹⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 67). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

Arrestatieteam.nl (n.d.) *Dienst Speciale Interventies (DSI)*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.arrestatieteam.nl/eenheden/binnenlandse-eeenheden/dienst-speciale-interventies>

Ministerie van Defensie (n.d.) *Terreurbestrijding*. Retrieved from: <https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/taken-in-nederland/terreurbestrijding>

³²⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 38* (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³²¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 38* (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

The latter fits well with the measures described in the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism. This documents mainly describes programs in which police and military cooperate to combat terrorism in the Netherlands: continuous cooperation with Defense and the National Police in investigating existing and new terrorist resources³²², setting up specialized teams with expertise on behavior and travel patterns of terrorists within the Royal Marechaussee and the National Police³²³, and the possibility to gain access to reservation and check-in data by both the National Police and the Royal Marechaussee, to be able to detect jihadist travelers.³²⁴

With regard to the militarization of the police, it can be concluded that all sub-indicators are present within Dutch counterterrorism measures, be it to a greater or lesser extent. Going back to the blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control as a result of globalization, this indicator can be linked to the development of an encompassing approach, and the blurring of warfare and criminality. This can be seen in the fact that the National Police has adopted preventive measures that overlap with military methods, and in some situations, tasks are even interchangeable.

3.5 CONCLUSION

The blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-bordering of the state, is clearly present in Dutch counterterrorism measures. The resulting difficulty of distinguishing the 'good' from the 'bad' has resulted in the emergence of new hybrid measures. This can be seen in the sixth indicator, where military operations are

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 39 (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³²² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 7-8). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³²³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 27). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³²⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 26-27). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

conducted to tackle the root causes of terrorism, and infiltrations and paramilitary operations are used to prevent suspects from carrying out attacks.

The blurring of criminality and warfare, can be found in the seventh indicator, which describes the inclusion of 'wartime' activities in counterterrorism measures. Although these activities in most cases do not meet the general meaning and scope of real wartime activities, the presence of these activities still shows the blurring of criminality and warfare in the Netherlands. The use of (movement) restrictions and intrusive surveillance also can be linked to the de-bordering of the state, because these activities result in the border being everywhere, and everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance.

The blurring of warfare and criminality also affects policing, which can be linked to the ninth indicator. Here, it becomes clear that methods and tasks of the National Police and the military overlap in the case of countering terrorism, and in some situations, are even interchangeable.

The eighth indicator ('construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats') is only present on a limited scale. However, the more general measures that strive for giving security thinking a structural place in social thinking and acting, and the measures that aim at making risk groups more resilient for terrorist propaganda can be linked to the idea of new hybrid measures that focus on signaling or preventing the enemy within.

4. OPERATING AS A SECURITY STATE?

In the 'methodology and design' chapter, the concept of the security state has been operationalized and divided into two parts. First, what the security state is, and second, how the security state operates. Now that it has been analyzed in the first three chapters what the security state is, and it has been determined to what extent the Netherlands fits the indicators of the security state, it is also important to look at how a security state operates. Therefore, this chapter will focus on an analysis of to what extent the Netherlands operates as a security state. This has also been addressed to a limited extent during the discussion of the various indicators in chapter 1 to 3, but this chapter aims to create a more complete overview.

How a security state operates, can be described as follows: A state where extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedures, in order to protect its society from an issue, which is presented by the state as an existential threat.

4.1 PORTRAYING CERTAIN ISSUES AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT

First, in all cases the documents are the product and communication of a representative of the state, which could be an individual or a governmental body, because all the analyzed documents are part of the official information regarding counterterrorism measures, disseminated by the government. Second, regarding the portrayal of a certain issue as an existential threat, it can be seen that the dominant pattern in all analyzed documents is that this 'issue' is described as jihadist terrorism. This can be seen in quotes such as:

National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015

*"Since the beginning of this millennium, the number of terrorist attacks has increased, both nationally and globally. These attacks have mainly come from a jihadist angle."*³²⁵

*"The current terrorist threat comes mainly from a jihadist angle."*³²⁶

*"In jihadist circles, at this moment the main source of the terrorist threat..."*³²⁷

³²⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 17). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³²⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 8). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020

"The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 already perceived global jihadism as the most important threat to our national security. (...) What we expect is that the jihadist threat continues to increase..."³²⁸

Dutch Terrorism Threat Assessment

"The jihadist threat against Western countries is still present."³²⁹

"The most important component of the threat to (the interests of) the Netherlands is still the international jihadist threat."³³⁰

Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism

"The threat emanating from jihadism..."³³¹

Third, jihadist terrorism is framed as an existential threat: a threat to the 'western way of living' and Dutch national security. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015 sometimes literally describes what the terrorist threat means for the Netherlands, by stating that counterterrorism measures are meant for protection of national security, Dutch democracy and the rule of law.³³² This can also be seen in the following quote:

Not only because of the often-serious consequences of an attack in terms of loss human lives and material damage, but also because of the damage that an attack or a threat inflict on the democratic process and legal order. If a politician, a company or

³²⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 8). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³²⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 6). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³²⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid & Justitie (2011). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 26 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 19-20). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

*a citizen feels forced to (not) do something, and therefore no longer feels free in its legitimate choices, democracy and the rule of law are affected at their core.*³³³

In other parts of the 2011-2015 strategy, the idea of an existential threat emerges as the underlying point of view, for example by mentioning that *"together we protect the stability and quality of our democratic legal order and our open society"*³³⁴, without a specific reference to jihadist terrorism.

What is interesting to see, is that the Dutch government claims that it does not have the intention to securitize jihadism or terrorism, but at the same time recognizes that securitization is part of counterterrorism. This becomes clear in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015, which describes the relation between official counterterrorism policy and the related discourse (in laws, statements, measures and comments) on the one hand, and the social and political perception of terrorism and counterterrorism on the other. In the document, the Dutch government claims that it does not deliberately attempt to influence social and political perceptions about terrorism, but admits that despite this, perception plays an important role in counterterrorism.³³⁵

The National Counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020 follows a similar discourse as the 2011-2015 strategy. This can be seen in the following quote: *"[extremist groups] behave outside the law, from an ideological motive. This can undermine the democratic rule of law, especially if these actions occur more frequently and increase in scale and severity."*³³⁶, or the statement that the Netherlands is a possible target for society-disrupting attacks.³³⁷

The securitization of jihadism is also present in the largest part of the Terrorism Threats Assessments and Policy Implications documents. Most of these documents start the assessment with this securitization of jihadism, using quotes such as:

³³³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 7). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³³⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 74). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³³⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 5). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 14). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

*"The jihadist threat against Western countries is still present."*³³⁸

*"The international profile of the Netherlands is unchanged. The Netherlands is still seen as a legitimate target..."*³³⁹

*"The presence of Dutch jihadists in conflict areas not only creates security risks in these areas, but can also (in time) potentially lead to a higher threat in the Netherlands itself."*³⁴⁰

*"The situation on the most important jihadist battle scenes is worrying: there are more jihad areas than ever and there is more interest in the jihad areas from the Netherlands than ever."*³⁴¹

*"The most eye-catching potential threat to the Netherlands is based on the potential return of jihadists from Syria"*³⁴²

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism does not address the existential threat of jihadism for the Netherlands.

4.2 EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES ARE TAKEN, OUTSIDE THE NORMAL BOUNDS OF POLITICAL PROCEDURE

In the security state, the portrayal of (jihadist) terrorism as an existential threat normally results in the justification (and implementation) of extraordinary measures to counter this threat. Chapter 4.1 already discussed the portrayal of terrorism as an existential threat. This chapter will focus on whether the justification of extraordinary measures and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure is present or not.

³³⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³³⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding (pp. 4). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 28 (pp. 1). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 29 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁴⁰ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 30 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁴¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 31 (pp. 1). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁴² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 33 (pp. 2). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

4.2.1 THE NEED FOR COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES

With regard to the justification and implementation of counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands, the dominant pattern that can be dissected, is the justification that counterterrorism measures are needed to counter the terrorist threat.

Both National Counterterrorism Strategies and the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism justify the general need for counterterrorism measures to counter the terrorist threat. The National Counterterrorism Strategies describe that *"preventing terrorism is essential. (...) Effective counterterrorism focuses both on the removal of the causes of terrorism and on their prevention. In addition, counterterrorism makes it possible to take protective measures against a possible attack and be prepared for the consequences."*³⁴³ and *"recent incidents and developments, at home and abroad, justify extra attention to the approach to radicalized individuals."*³⁴⁴ It is also claimed that the developed counterterrorism strategy is based on the mission to protect national security with the means that the Law and the Democratic Legal Order provide, which shows a justification of the already developed counterterrorism measures.

The Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism describes in even clearer terms why, and how, measures can contribute to countering the jihadist threat:

*The threat emanating from jihadism and the prevention of attacks requires a powerful, offensive, broad approach, involving both the fight against the hard core of jihadists, and the spread of violent thought, through a criminal and a administrative approach. In the fight against jihadism, it is important to prevent new accretion of the jihadist movement, by combating radicalization and removing the breeding ground. (...) The purpose of this program is threefold: protecting democracy and the rule of law, fighting and weakening of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands, and the removal of the breeding ground for radicalization.*³⁴⁵

³⁴³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 7). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁴⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 14). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁴⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 3). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

4.2.2 EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES

Within the dominant pattern, the justification can also be found for the implementation of extreme measures to counter the terrorist threat. For example, in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015: "*terrorism is a very serious phenomenon, because it seeks to attack the foundations of society and the rule of law. That is why the state is allowed to fight terrorism with the most serious means possible (if there is a legal basis for this).*"³⁴⁶

However, this quote also shows the government's claim that "*the fight against terrorism must always take place within the framework of the rule of law and with respect for the fundamental freedoms of citizens.*"³⁴⁷ Where, as discussed before, terrorism is portrayed as an existential threat, that could only be countered by (existing, new, changed or extreme) counterterrorism measures, it is argued that respect for human rights is a key precondition for counterterrorism measures. This means that the Dutch government aims to take into account the impact of each measure on the fundamental rights³⁴⁸, and (counterterrorism) measures should not be taken outside the bounds of normal political procedure.

But at the same time of this claim to operate within the framework of the law, it can be seen that this framework is not fixed. Chapter 2, section 2 has shown the government's actions to expand and add measures that can be used to prevent terrorism. This means that at the same time of the statements about the importance of a legal basis for counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands, the legal basis is changed or expanded, based on the justification that it helps prevent terrorism. This can also be seen in the (already in chapter 2.2 and 2.3 discussed) fact that fundamental rights and a legal basis are positioned as important, but at the same time the government introduces measures and changes in the legal basis to restrict these rights, when a person is suspected to pose a terrorist threat to the Netherlands.³⁴⁹ One example is the 'Temporary law on administrative measures to combat terrorism', which creates the possibility

³⁴⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 21). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁴⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 22). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁴⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 40). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁴⁹ as discussed in chapter 2, section 2 and 3

to impose freedom restrictions on persons who pose a threat to national security, or who intend to join terrorist groups.³⁵⁰ Although it can be argued that the law is temporary, it still shows the fact that measures and changes in the legal framework are introduced, when they are believed to contribute to terrorism prevention. Therefore, it could be concluded that, although in strict terms counterterrorism measures are not taken outside the normal bounds of political procedure, the expansion of the legal framework pushes the boundary of when something is extraordinary. Which makes it possible for the Dutch government to implement measures that might previously have been considered as extraordinary, but have now become ‘ordinary’ through a new conception of the legal framework.

4.3 STATE SEARCHES FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER AND RISK MANAGEMENT TO COUNTER THIS THREAT

The third indicator focuses on the search of a security state for new and improved ways to counter the terrorist threat. This can include the more specific search for new technologies, or the more general search for new forms of risk management. In the case of the Netherlands, the latter has already been addressed in the previous analysis chapters, and includes all new counterterrorism measures that have been proposed or implemented. That is why this chapter will focus on whether the specific search for new technologies to counter the terrorist threat is present or not in the Netherlands.

Both National Counterterrorism Strategies position the search for new and improved technologies as important, as can be seen in the following quotes:

National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015

*"The enormous amounts of data, the wide availability of information and the rapid succession of technical innovations (for example in the field of data carriers, interactive internet applications and information accessibility), force ... to develop new search strategies, organizing possibilities, and establishing relational connection between information."*³⁵¹

³⁵⁰ Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal (n.d.) *Tijdelijke wet bestuurlijke maatregelen terrorismebestrijding*. Retrieved from: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34359_tijdelijke_wet_bestuurlijke

³⁵¹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015* (pp. 55). *National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

*"The Cabinet periodically conducts technology explorations to map new developments that are relevant for counterterrorism. On the basis of these explorations, it will be decided which developments will be supported, applied or should lead to policy changes. (...) Special attention will be paid to technological trends in civil aviation."*³⁵²

National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020

*"Use of high end technical applications and innovations (big data, web crawlers, data analytics) to guarantee the quality of interpretation and analysis, support information exchange, accelerate the response time in case of incidents, and improve possible prosecution."*³⁵³

*"We use technological developments to fill up security concepts in a better and more flexible way."*³⁵⁴

Furthermore, the analyzed documents discuss several new technologies that are already implemented or will be implemented in the future. These technologies are claimed to help make prevention of the terrorist threat more efficient. For example:

- the (proposed) changes within the Schengen Information System (SIS-II), such as increasing the frequency of signaling jihadists, linking SIS-II to the National Investigation Register to help the signaling of jihadists during contact with the police, and the proposition to the European Commission for a new category for jihadists in SIS-II;³⁵⁵
- the linking of SIS-II to the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), and the implementation of SLTD into standard checks at the Dutch borders;³⁵⁶

³⁵² Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015 (pp. 108). *Nationaal Coördinator for Security and Counterterrorism*.

³⁵³ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 12). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁵⁴ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020 (pp. 16). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁵⁵ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 28). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

³⁵⁶ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 29). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid*.

- Dutch participation in Eurodac, a system for the exchange of fingerprints of asylum seekers within the European Union;³⁵⁷
- and the development of a technological portal to create one facility to receive and access reservation and check-in data from all airline companies flying into the Netherlands³⁵⁸

In a more general sense, the analyzed documents also present the existence of partnerships and cooperation on European and international level, especially with a focus on the exchange of information and intelligence.³⁵⁹

All the above shows the presence of the state's search for new technologies of power and risk management to counter the terrorist threat, in the Netherlands. The analyzed documents not only give different examples of new technologies that are already implemented (or will be implemented in the near future), but also the importance of a (constant) search for new and improved technologies is emphasized.

4.4 CONCLUSION

With regard to the analysis about how the security state operates, it can be concluded that the Netherlands operates as a security state to a certain extent. When going back to the definition (a state where extraordinary measures are taken, outside the normal bounds of political procedures, in order to protect its society from an issue, which is presented by the state as an existential threat.) it can be seen that a representative of the state indeed portrays the issue of (jihadist) terrorism as an existential threat. In other words, terrorism is securitized by a representative of the state.

³⁵⁷ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 6). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

³⁵⁸ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 27). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

³⁵⁹ Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 29). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41 (pp. 2). Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid.

Regarding the implementation of extraordinary measures, it can be concluded that, the more 'general' justification that measures are needed to counter the terrorist threat is present to a large extent. However, only one document contains the justification of extreme or extraordinary counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands. But it is important to note that, although in strict terms counterterrorism measures are not taken outside the normal bounds of political procedure, the expansion of the legal framework makes it still possible for the Dutch government to implement extraordinary measures.

The last part of the definition, which is the search for new technologies of power and risk management, is also present in the Netherlands. Next to the different examples of new technologies that are given, the documents also emphasize the importance of a (constant) search for new and improved technologies.

In the end, this means that the Netherlands fully meets two of the three indicators of how a security state operates. However, the Dutch government has also created opportunities that make the implementation of more extreme measures possible, without violating the limits of the law. This means that the third indicator is met in a more general sense, because (although not outside the bounds of normal political procedure), the Dutch government has the possibility to use extraordinary measures.

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

Jihadist terrorism is identified as the largest threat to national security by the Dutch government, and it is expected to further increase in the coming years. At the same time, the Netherlands is a state that, apart from some small-scale incidents such as the murder on Theo van Gogh in 2004, has not experienced a large-scale terrorist attack since 1977. Still, after terrorist attacks in surrounding countries³⁶⁰, the Netherlands has implemented a wide variety of counterterrorism measures (such as the monitoring of social networks, military protection at high risk places, movement restrictions, or preventive arrests of suspected terrorists). This raised the question what the effects of these counterterrorism measures are on society and the way the Dutch state is governed, and more specifically, to what extent the Netherlands has developed into a security state through the implementation of these counterterrorism measures.

All of the above led to the following research question: *“To what extent, and in what way, has the Netherlands developed itself into a ‘security state’, since the implementation of preventive counter-terrorism measures in 2011?”* With this question, this research aimed to address the gap in academic literature on the effect of counterterrorism measures with regard to the emergence of a security state, especially with a focus on the Netherlands.

Because the literature on security states does not provide a clear and comprehensive framework on the characteristics of a security state, that could be used for empirical research, a framework was created. From academic literature about security states, three 'drivers' have been derived, to analyze the more 'broad' changes in governance in the Netherlands. These drivers have been combined with specific characteristics of a security state, that are derived from the current situation in Israel. Israel is used because it is an example of an extreme security state, which can help outline the contours of what a security state can entail. These characteristics have been incorporated into the three drivers, and are used to analyze the more specific, practical, (and in most cases) more visible measures that could indicate the

³⁶⁰ For example, the attacks in Paris (2011), London (2013), Brussels (2014), Paris (2015), Nice (2016), Berlin (2016), and Manchester (2017)

development of the Netherlands into a security state. This has resulted in the framework that can be found in appendix 2.

This framework has been used to analyze a selection of documents, that are presented by the government as the leading and most comprehensive documents with regard to the Dutch counterterrorism strategy: The National Counterterrorism Strategies (2011-2015 and 2016-2020), the Terrorism Threat Assessments (no. 26 – 46), the Terrorism Threat Assessment's Policy Implications (no. 37 – 41), and the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism. These documents were analyzed through desktop research and critical discourse analysis (CDA), which means that not only the structure of the texts was analyzed, but also the 'underlying meaning' of these texts and their relation to the sociopolitical context. This analysis focused on the complete documents (both titles and text), and searched for both literal terms that could be linked to the indicators, descriptions that expressed the general intention of the indicators, or justifications regarding the indicators. This analysis has led to the following results.

THE NETHERLANDS AS A SECURITY STATE

A WELFARE STATE OR A RISK-DRIVEN STATE?

The first chapter shows the presence of risk-thinking within the Netherlands, which means that the Netherlands can be defined as a risk-driven state. Problems are seen as risks, which should be prevented. This becomes clear in the fact that the Dutch government searches for ways to gain access to as much intelligence as possible to make it possible to indicate risks (more specifically, terrorism). This can be linked to the first indicator ('intelligence collection and analysis as the cornerstone'), which describes the reliance of the Dutch government on intelligence collection and analysis (both through the involvement of state and non-state actors), and the cornerstone-role it has within counterterrorism measures. But also, the second indicator ('defensive modes of action') can be related to this search for information, because of the description of how the government aims to gain access to all kinds of information systems to combat terrorism.

The analysis of the second indicator also shows the possibility to prevent suspects from traveling in and outside the Netherlands, or restrict access to vital infrastructure or buildings, in contrast to a free movement for all citizens. Again, it can be concluded that the

government's focus lies on the prevention of risks. In this case through the exclusion of individuals or groups, in contrast to the inclusive character of the welfare-state.

Lastly, the emergence of a security state also becomes clear in the fact that the government seeks partnerships with non-state actors (some of which can be characterized as welfare-actors) to help counter terrorism, and thus mobilizes them as security actors.

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY WITHIN A STATE

The criminalization of social policy within a state, visible in the emergence of preventive criminalization, is also present in Dutch counterterrorism measures. The analysis of the third indicator ('construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats') shows how a 'risk perspective' is used to identify persons posing a potential danger. The engagement of citizens in signaling radicalization fits the idea that suspected citizens and foreigners should be approached from a risk-perspective. The government's aim to involve every layer of society to signal risks, because it claims to be unable to monitor and check everyone themselves, exposes the underlying belief that every individual could be a risk.

The implementation of preventive measures to reduce the risk and intimidation capacity of the suspects, can be found in the analyses of the fourth and fifth indicator ('construction of the legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible' and 'offensive modes of action'). The possibilities created by the counterterrorism measures to impose (movement) restrictions or detention on suspects who have not (yet) been convicted, show a tendency to focus on short-term coercive solutions to reduce the intimidation capacity of the offenders. Due process and rights of the accused have become less important than increased efficiency and risk-prevention, as can be seen in the fact that the measures are contrary to the 'presumption of innocence'. In some cases, sub-indicators cannot literally be found in the analyzed documents, but in these cases, it can be concluded that the measures meet the general meaning of the indicators.

THE BLURRING OF THE DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL TERRITORY AS SITES OF CONTROL

The third chapter shows the presence of the blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-bordering of the state. Because this blurring of territory

makes it difficult to distinguish the 'good' from the 'bad', new forms of hybrid measures emerged in the Netherlands. This can be linked to the sixth indicator ('offensive modes of action'), where it becomes clear that military operations are conducted to tackle the root causes of terrorism, and infiltrations and paramilitary operations are used (to greater or lesser extent) to prevent suspects from carrying out terrorist attacks. The most 'extreme' form of offensive modes of action -targeted killings- is not present in any of the analyzed documents, and is therefore not a part of Dutch counterterrorism measures.

The blurring of criminality and warfare, can be found in the seventh indicator ('legitimized 'wartime' state activities'). Although these activities in most cases do not meet the general meaning and scope of real wartime activities, the presence of the activities still shows the blurring of criminality and warfare in the Netherlands. The use of (movement) restrictions and intrusive surveillance also can be linked to the de-bordering of the state, because they result in the border being everywhere, and everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance.

The blurring of warfare and criminality also affects policing, which can be linked to the ninth indicator ('militarization of the police'). It has become clear that methods and tasks of the National Police and the military overlap in the case of countering terrorism, and in some situations, are even interchangeable.

The eighth indicator ('construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats') is only present on a limited scale. However, the more general measures that strive for giving security thinking a structural place in social thinking and acting, and the measures that aim at making risk groups more resilient for terrorist propaganda can be linked to the idea of new hybrid measures that focus on signaling or preventing the enemy within.

OPERATING AS A SECURITY STATE?

Where the analysis of the first three chapters focused on what the security state is, the fourth chapter focused on an analysis of to what extent the Netherlands operates as a security state. The following indicators have been used: are certain issues portrayed as an existential threat, are extraordinary measures taken, and does the state search for new technologies to counter this threat?

Regarding the analysis about how the security state operates, it can be concluded that the Netherlands operates as a security state to a certain extent. First, terrorism is securitized by the state, as it has become clear that a representative of the state portrays the issue of (jihadist) terrorism as an existential threat.

Second, the implementation of extraordinary measures, outside the bounds of normal political procedure. It can be concluded that the more 'general' justification that measures are needed to counter the terrorist threat is present to a large extent, but the justification for extreme or extraordinary counterterrorism measures is only present on a limited scale. However, it is important to note that although in strict terms counterterrorism measures are not taken outside the normal bounds of political procedure, the expansion of the legal framework pushes the boundary of when something is extraordinary. What might previously have been considered as extraordinary, has now become 'ordinary' through a new conception of the legal framework. The question of whether the case of the Netherlands indeed meets this condition, is therefore not so easy to answer.

The last part of the definition, which is the search for new technologies of power and risk management, is also present in the Netherlands. Next to the different examples of new technologies that are given, the documents also emphasize the importance of a (constant) search for new and improved technologies.

All of the above leads to the conclusion that the Netherlands has developed itself into a security state since the implementation of preventive counterterrorism measures in 2011, both in terms of what the security state is, and how it operates. The analysis has shown that all nine indicators of 'what the security state is', are present in the Netherlands (be it to a greater or lesser extent), and that the Netherlands also meets the three indicators of 'how the security state operates'. Apart from the indicators, the analysis of the three drivers shows that the Netherlands also meets the 'underlying flow' of change in the way the Netherlands is governed. Lastly, the emergence of a security state becomes clear in the fact that a certain reality (in this case the reality of jihadist terrorism) exists in the Netherlands, and measures to counter this reality come to infect the governance of the population as a whole.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that not all indicators are present to the same extent. Sometimes counterterrorism measures go beyond the indicators of the framework (such as the

construction of the legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible), but in other cases the indicator is only present to a limited extent (in the case of the construction of civil society). Furthermore, the Dutch government has the overall aim to keep counterterrorism measures proportional, which diminishes the chance of becoming an 'extreme' security state, like Israel. However, it should be taken into account that the aforementioned expansion of the legal framework does contest the concept of proportionality in the case of the Netherlands.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Although this research aimed to address the gap in literature of the possible effects of counterterrorism measures for a society, and more specifically the link with the concept of the 'security state', there are still some limitations.

First of all, because the literature did not provide a comprehensive framework for empirical research of the security state, the framework was created by the author herself. This could have resulted in 'missed characteristics' that should also be part of this framework. To counter this, academic literature has been combined with specific characteristics from empirical reality in Israel. However, there are also differences between the cases of Israel and the Netherlands, which can influence the compatibility of the framework for western-European countries like the Netherlands, and could have resulted in 'missed characteristics'.

Second, given the conclusions about the expansion of the legal framework, and its effects on the use of 'extraordinary measures', the question is raised to what extent the terminology of 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' is helpful for conducting research about the security state. Especially in terms of possible follow-up research that focuses for example on 'proportionality', it might be useful to formulate these terms more specifically, or to reformulate them.

Third, given the limited time and resources for this master thesis, this research only focused on the preventive side of the 'broad approach' of the Dutch counterterrorism strategy. For a broader and more complete picture, it would be advisable that additional research is done, that includes the repressive side of Dutch counterterrorism measures. Additional research could also be done on the empirical reality of counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands. The drafting of policy documents often serves to show that the government takes the described

problem seriously, regardless of the actual implementation of these measures. The analyzed documents describe the range of measures proposed by the government, of which some are implemented, while others are not (yet). In other words, not all the described counterterrorism measures are (yet) part of empirical reality. For example, because it is possible that certain proposed measures are practically not feasible. Therefore, research into what measures are actually implemented can help increase the certainty and reliability of the conclusions.

Furthermore, this research only focused on an analysis of official information disseminated by the Dutch government. Academic literature could be expanded by also analyzing non-official information disseminated by the government (such as social media, speeches, or interviews).

Lastly, it is important that research is also carried out into the possible emergence of a security state in other western European countries. Because only when there is sufficient understanding of the possible effects of counterterrorism measures with regard to the possible development of a security state, it is possible to counter this development, and take into account the effects of the security state on western-European societies.

APPENDIX 1 - VISUAL

Research design: qualitative single case study design

RQ

“To what extent, and in what way, has the Netherlands developed itself into a ‘security state’, since the implementation of preventive counter-terrorism measures in 2011?”



Context: the security state

Unit of analysis: The Netherlands

Preventive counterterrorism strategies



Internal validity

Concepts

- Security state
- Counterterrorism measures

Operationalization

- Indicators

External validity

Selection through purposive **sampling**

Limited possibility to **generalize findings** to other western-European countries (same governance system and posed with same threat)



Triangulation of methods

- Document analysis
- Desktop research



Data collection

- Critical discourse analysis on official information disseminated by the Dutch government regarding (preventive) counterterrorism measures since 2011
- Using the Leiden University catalogue, online desk research and government published data



APPENDIX 2 - FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SECURITY STATES

<p style="text-align: center;">A welfare state or a risk-driven state?</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The criminalization of social policy within a state</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The blurring of the domestic and global territory as sites of control, resulting in the de-bordering of the state</p>
<p><i>Intelligence collection and analysis are the cornerstone</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intelligence gathering is justified and used as the basis for prevention of terrorism. 2. Intelligence can be gathered by state actors (such as AIVD, MIVD), but also by non-state actors (private companies) which will be passed on the government. 3. Monitoring of social networks and the internet in general 	<p><i>Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. engaging citizens in signaling radicalization 	<p><i>Offensive modes of action</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Seeking to arrest and prosecute those who conspire to commit acts of terror 2. Military and paramilitary operation to disrupt terrorist infrastructure 3. Infiltrations 4. Preventive arrests 5. Targeted killings
<p><i>Defensive modes of action</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actual prevention of attacks by making it difficult for the terrorist to reach his intended target, through early identification and neutralization <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. preventing the infiltration of terrorists into the country (border control and defending nation's borders) b. identifying and neutralizing terrorists as they travel about the nation's roadways (surveillance and monitoring main road network and public transportation) 2. Deterring terrorists from carrying out their attacks at well-protected facilities by generating the feeling that any action they may undertake is doomed to failure and making them fearful of injury, capture, and 	<p><i>Construction of legal framework to make preventive criminalization possible</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Redefinition of 'terrorism' 2. Expanding rights of law enforcement in case of suspicion of participating in terrorism 3. Extension of police pre-trials detention for terrorist suspects 	<p><i>Legitimized 'wartime' state activities</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 'Wartime' restrictions based on suspicious activity or speech 2. Intrusive surveillance in different areas, such as <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. financial transactions b. interpersonal communications c. presence in significant locations d. personal identity details

<p>punishment.</p> <p>a. preventing penetrations into secure installations or areas (physical guarding, providing security for sensitive installations, symbolic targets, population centers, safety barriers, military checkpoints)</p>		
	<p><i>Offensive modes of action</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Preventive searches 2. Preventive arrests 3. (Movement) restrictions imposed on individuals 	<p><i>Construction of civil society to make it more proactive and resilient in countering security threats</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Obligatory military service 2. Permission for use of private protection companies in fighting terrorism 3. Making it easier to carry weapons 4. Efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian population <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. let population get used to (heavily armed) police and military in public spaces b. let population get used to everyday spheres becoming domains of homeland security surveillance. c. let population actively participate in identifying threats
		<p><i>Militarization of the police</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Blurring of tasks military and police 2. Police officers are trained by the military 3. Stand-by and deployment of heavily-armed teams to intervene in case of an attack

APPENDIX 3 - REFERENCES

Abulof, U. (2009). "Small peoples": The existential uncertainty of ethnonational communities. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1)

Abulof, U. (2014). Deep securitization and Israel's "demographic demon". *International Political Sociology*, 8(4)

Alcantara, C. (2017). 46 Years of terrorist attacks in Europe, visualized. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/>

Algemene Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst (n.d.). *Dreiging voor Nederland*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/dreiging>

Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (n.d.). *Onderwerpen: Terrorisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme>

Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (n.d.) *Terrorisme in the kort*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme>

Alhamwi, M.K. (2017). *Eyes on Damascus: Exchange rates, financial restrictions and subsidized fuel*. Retrieved from: <https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/12/11/eyes-on-damascus-exchange-rates-financial-restrictions-and-subsidized-fuel>

Amnesty International (n.d.). *Contraterrorisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-we-doen/themas/veiligheid-en-mensenrechten/contraterrorisme>

Amoore, L. (2006). 'Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror'. *Political Geography*, 25

Andreas, P. & Price, R. (2001). From war fighting to crime fighting: Transforming the American national security state. *International Studies Review*, 3(3)

Arrestatieteam.nl (n.d.) *Dienst Speciale Interventies (DSI)*. Retrieved from: <http://www.arrestatieteam.nl/eenheden/binnenlandse-eeenheden/dienst-speciale-interventies>

Bakker, E. & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. (2016). Jihadisme centraal in tien jaar Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland. *Nationale veiligheid en crisisbeheersing*, 14(1)

Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 1997(23)

Bolt, N. (Speaker), (2017). *The informational dimension of hybrid warfare* [podcast]. Retrieved from: <https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/hybridwarfare>

Bos, A., Douglas, S., Klem, W. & Noordegraaf, M. (2016). Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?: Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015. *USBO advies*.

Bruyn, D. de (2006). *De magistraat aan het woord: Een verkennend onderzoek naar de opvattingen van magistraten over hun functioneren in justitie en samenleving*. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

B'Tselem (2017). *Restrictions on movement*. Retrieved from: https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement

BusinessDictionary (n.d.). *Prevention*. Retrieved from: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/prevention.html>

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub.

Chandra, S. & Bhonsle, R. (2015). National security: Concept, measurement and management. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(4)

Commissie evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid (2009). *Naar een integrale evaluatie van antiterrorisme-maatregelen*. Retrieved from:

https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vi6v1ktsk9y2/f=/blg20673.pdf

CQPress (1948). *Freedom of movement*. Retrieved from:

<https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresre1948082000>

Datagraver (2015). *Toenemend terrorisme wereldwijd*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.datagraver.com/case/toenemend-terrorisme-wereldwijd>

Dictionary.com (n.d.) *Paramilitary*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/paramilitary>

Ducheine, P.A.L. (2008). *Krijgsmacht, Geweldgebruik & Tereurbestrijding*. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers

Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal (n.d.) *Tijdelijke wet bestuurlijke maatregelen terrorismebestrijding*. Retrieved from:

https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34359_tijdelijke_wet_bestuurlijke

Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal (n.d.) *Verruiming mogelijkheden tot opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven*. Retrieved from:

https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/30164_verruiming_mogelijkheden_tot

EVRM (1950, November 11th). Accessed at January 4th, 2018, from

<http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001000/2010-06-10>

Fairman, M.D. (2009). The restriction of civil liberties during times of crisis: The evolution of America's response to national military threats. *Governmental and International Relations Honors Papers*, 7.

Fekete, L. (2004). Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state. *Institute of Race Relations*, 46(1)

Fletcher, M. & Plakoyiannaki, E. (n.d.). *Case study selection: An overview of key issues for international business researchers*. Retrieved from: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.9094&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Foster, A. (2017). Terror attacks timeline: From Paris and Brussels terror to most recent attacks in Europe. Retrieved from: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism>

Franko Aas, K. (2007). 'Analysing a World in Motion: Global flows meet 'criminology of the other'. *Theoretical Criminology*, 11(2)

Frantzman, S.J. (2017). *Is Israel a model for Europe confronting terror? Yes and no*. Retrieved from: <https://sethfrantzman.com/2017/08/22/is-israel-a-model-for-europe-confronting-terror-yes-and-no/>

Freeman, C.W. Jr. (n.d.). National security in the age of terrorism: Remarks to the congressional research service seminar for new members. *Middle East Policy Council*. Retrieved from: <http://www.mepc.org/speeches/national-security-age-terrorism>

Ganor, B. (2017). *The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide for decision makers*. New York, USA: Routledge

General Intelligence and Security Service (2017). *Annual report 2016*. Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2017/04/04/annual-report-2016>

Gold, D. (n.d.). Is the Terror against Europe Different from the Terror against Israel? In F. Nirenstein (ed.), *Lessons from Israel's response to terrorism*. Retrieved from: <http://jcpa.org/lessons-israels-response-terrorism/terror-europe-different-terror-israel/>

Goldfarb, J. (2016). *What is the difference between information and intelligence?* Retrieved from: <http://www.securityweek.com/what-difference-between-information-and-intelligence>

Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). Reconstruction Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state. *Theoretical criminology*, 15(2)

Hamou, N. (2016). *How Israel became a role model in fighting terrorism*. Retrieved from: http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/08/22/how_israel_became_a_role_model_in_fighting_terrorism_112005.html

Horowitz, D. (1993). The Israeli concept of national security. In Yaniv, A. (Ed.), *National security and democracy in Israel*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

ICRC (2011). *Weapons*. Retrieved from: <https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/weapons>

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). *Wave of terror 2015-2017*. Retrieved from: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx>

Jowett, G. & O'Donnell, V. (2006). *Propaganda and persuasion*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Kennisplein.be (2011). *Signalen van radicalisering*. Retrieved from: <https://www.kennisplein.be/Pages/Signalen-van-radicalisering.aspx>

Kruk, M. (2016). *Waarom de Fransen liever in een veiligheidsstaat dan in een democratie lijken te willen leven*. Retrieved from: <https://decorrespondent.nl/4207/waarom-de-fransen-liever-in-een-veiligheidsstaat-dan-in-een-democratie-lijken-te-willen-leven/429274522292-e91c2732>

Library of Congress (n.d.) *Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Germany*. Retrieved from: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/germany.php>

Lucas, E. & Pomeranzev, P. (2016). Winning the information war: Techniques and counter-strategies to Russian propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe. *Center for European Policy Analysis*. Retrieved from: https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706

Lupovici, A. (2014). The limits of securitization theory: Observational criticism and the curious absence of Israel. *International Studies Review*, 16(3)

Magen, A. (2015). *Israel, Europe and the converging terror threat*. Retrieved from: <http://fathomjournal.org/israel-europe-and-the-converging-terror-threat/>

Masters, J. (2013). Targeted Killings. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/background/targeted-killings>

Merriam-Webster (n.d.). *Infiltrate*. Retrieved from: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infiltrate>

Minister van Veiligheid & Justitie (2011). Terrorismebestrijding. *Kamerstuk 29754, nr. 203*. Retrieved from: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/29279/kst-29754-203.html>

Minister van Veiligheid & Justitie (2014). *Kamerbrief over de integrale aanpak jihadisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/08/30/integrale-aanpak-jihadisme>

Ministerie van Defensie (n.d.) *Terreurbestrijding*. Retrieved from: <https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/taken-in-nederland/terreurbestrijding>

Ministerie van Veiligheid & Justitie (2011). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 26. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/samenvatting-dtn26_tcm31-30131.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2011-2015. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-2011-2015_tcm31-30099.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). Veertiende voortgangsrapportage terrorismebestrijding. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen_a_z/dtn/index.aspx?select=3&q=&df=01-01-0001&dt=31-12-9999&dctermsType=&kw=&SortBy=Datum&

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 28. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/samenvatting-dtn28_tcm31-30133.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 29. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn-29-def_tcm31-30134.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 30. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn-30-kamerbrief_tcm31-30135.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2012). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 31. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/samenvatting-dtn31-def_tcm31-30136.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 32. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn32-kamerbrief-dtn32-nl-def_tcm31-30137.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 33. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn-33-v2_tcm31-30138.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2013). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 34. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn34-tk-brief-nl_tcm31-32587.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/brief-tk-beleidsbevindingen-dtn-37-12nov_tcm31-31619.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2014). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 37. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/bijlage-1-samenvatting-dtn-37_tcm31-32592.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 38. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/tk-beleidsimplicaties-dreigingsbeeld-terrorisme-nederland-38_tcm31-31630.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 39. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/tk-beleidsimplicaties-dreigingsbeeld-terrorisme-nederland-39-def_tcm31-31636.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/beleidsimplicaties-dtn40_tcm31-31639.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 40. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/openbare-samenvatting-dtn40-9-november-2015_tcm31-32603.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Beleidsimplicaties Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/beleidsimplicaties-dreigingsbeeld-terrorisme-nederland-41_tcm31-31643.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 41. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/samenvatting-dtn-41_tcm31-32602.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 43. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/DTN43_samenvatting_opgemaakt%20def_tcm31-214349.pdf

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?: Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015. *Universiteit Utrecht - Departement Bestuurs- en Organisationswetenschap (USBO)* Retrieved from: <https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/2608-evaluatie-nationale-contraterrorisme-strategie-2011-2015.aspx>

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2016). Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie: 2016-2020. *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme: Overzicht maatregelen en acties (pp. 29). *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2014). *Voortgangsrapportage Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2014/11/13/tk-bijlage-1-voortgangsrapportage-actieprogramma-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme>

Napcan (n.d.) *What is prevention?* Retrieved from: <http://napcan.org.au/prevention/what-is-prevention/>

NOS (2017). *Infiltratie door politie op dark web lijkt succesvol*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2190178-infiltratie-door-politie-op-dark-web-lijkt-succesvol.html>

NOS (2015). *Terreur in Europa; een bloedige lijst*. Retrieved from: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2069008-terreur-in-europa-een-bloedige-lijst.html>

Oxford Dictionaries (n.d.). *Infiltrate*. Retrieved from: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/infiltrate>

Post, H. (2016). *De angst regeert: Een onderzoek naar de beleidsreactie van de Nederlandse overheid na terroristische aanslagen*. Retrieved from: <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=141733>

Postma, W.S. (2012). *Performative power van contraterrore-beleid*. Retrieved from: http://www.governancequarterly.org/uploads/1/5/6/9/15692298/postma_w_-_master_thesis.pdf

Ragazzo, F. (2016). Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism as 'policed multiculturalism'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(5)

Rijksoverheid (2011). *Antiterrorisme-maatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw*. Retrieved from: <https://www.burojansen.nl/pdf/AntiterrorismemaatregeleninNederlandinheteerstedecenniumvande21eeeuw.pdf>

RIVM (2016). *Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: Een all hazard overzicht van potentiële rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten*. Retrieved from: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/Nationaal%20Veiligheidsprofiel%202016_tcm31-232083.pdf

Schuilenburg, M. (2011). The securitization of society: On the rise of quasi-criminal law and selective exclusion. *Social Justice: A journal of crime, conflict, and world order*, 38(1)

Smith, J.D. (2005). *The effectiveness of Israel's counter-terrorism strategy*. Retrieved from: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432673.pdf

Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3)

Squires, P. (2014). *Gun crime in global contexts*. New York: Routledge

Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9(1)

Taylor, B. (n.d.). *August 1914: When global stock markets closed*. Retrieved from: <https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gfdblog/?p=2750>

Tucker, J.B. (2008). *Strategies for countering terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli experience*. Retrieved from: <https://coincentral.wordpress.com/2008/06/04/strategies-for-countering-terrorism-lessons-from-the-israeli-experience/>

Ullman, R.H. (1983). Redefining security. *International Security*, 8(1)

United Nations General Assembly (2010). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston: Study on targeted killings* [United Nations Report]. Retrieved from: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf>

Verhagen, L. (2017). *Politie beheerst wekenlang drugsmarktplaats op dark web, zonder dat het opvalt*. Retrieved from: <https://www.volkskrant.nl/tech/politie-beheert-wekenlang-drugsmarktplaats-op-dark-web-zonder-dat-het-opvalt~a4507394/>

Willis, B. (2014). *The advantages and limitations of single case study analysis*. Retrieved from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-single-case-study-analysis/>

Wiv (2002). Accessed at January 6th, 2018, from <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0013409/2018-01-01>

Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an ambiguous symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4). Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145138>

Young, I.M. (2003). The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state. *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1)

Zedner, L. (2003). Too much security? *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 2003(31)