

Meaning-making: discourse and the European Union's external action instruments in Somalia

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Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DG ECHO	Directorate-General Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection
EU	European Union
EEAS	European External Action Service
HR	High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
ICRC	International Commission of the Red Cross
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SHARE	Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience
SWD	Staff Working Documents
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The 2015 Action Plan	EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020
The Commission	European Commission
The Comprehensive Approach	EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises
The Council	Council of the European Union
The Strategic Framework	A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

1. European Union's external action in Somalia and the Comprehensive Approach

The European Union (EU) has a range of policies at its disposal to engage with third countries, countries outside the EU. This external action encompasses Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Commercial Policy, Cooperation with Third Countries, which refers to development aid and technical assistance and humanitarian aid¹. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, EU's humanitarian aid policy is defined independently from the other external action policies, and contains a strong commitment to safeguard the independent nature of humanitarian aid based on need, irrespective of political, economic or security objectives. Moreover, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies in article 214(2) that “[h]umanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with international law”² which is generally interpreted as a reference to the four principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence³. At the same time however, the Lisbon Treaty stresses the importance of coherence between the EU's external action policies, “denoting the absence of contradictions between different areas on external policy and the establishment of synergies between them”⁴.

In 2013, the joint communication of the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) stated that “[t]he EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision”⁵. The key principle or assumption in the EU's Comprehensive Approach is that such an approach should be facilitated by increasing coherence. Moreover, the connection between security and development is articulated: both facilitate and enhance each other. Without sufficient security, no development takes off, while limited development in for example societal stability impedes security objectives⁶.

1.1. Research problem and research question

This call for coherence can create tension between the objectives of EU humanitarian aid policies and other external actions, because it can affect the neutrality of humanitarian actions, especially in the case of man-made disasters, because the origins of a such a crisis are often the result of political tensions, for example civil war⁷. Moreover, if a man-made disaster is combined with a natural disaster, there is even more opportunity for tension, as natural and

¹ Schütze 2014b. External Union powers. Competences and Procedures.

² Broberg 2014. EU Humanitarian Aid after the Lisbon Treaty, 168.

³ Broberg 2014. EU Humanitarian Aid after the Lisbon Treaty, 170; Orbie, Van Elsuwege, and Bossuyt. 2014. Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the European Union's External Action : The Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence.

⁴ Orbie, Van Elsuwege, and Bossuyt. 2014. Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the European Union's External Action : The Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence, 159.

⁵ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 3.

⁶ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 4.

⁷ Orbie, Van Elsuwege, and Bossuyt. 2014. Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the European Union's External Action : The Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence, 161; Dany 2015. “Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union.

man-made disasters enhance each other⁸. In this thesis, such a combined disaster is researched: the case of Somalia, where conflict, combined with famine, have created an insecure country, oftentimes reinforcing the conflict. The EU is “engaged with Somalia through a comprehensive approach based on active diplomacy, support for political change, improving security, development assistance and humanitarian aid”⁹. Currently, three EU CFDP missions are located in the country: EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. On the humanitarian front, the EU has been active in the country since 1994, via the Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (hereinafter DG ECHO). Food aid is a substantial part of DG ECHO’s humanitarian assistance to Somalia: in 2010, 14 percent¹⁰ of its budget was dedicated to emergency food aid and food security, in 2011, 33 percent¹¹, 65 percent¹² in 2012 and 62.5 percent¹³ in 2013. Unfortunately, later funding allocations no longer distinguish between humanitarian assistance and food aid, but overall funds remain considerable: in 2014, 37 million euro¹⁴ was reserved for Somalia, and the EU assigned a budget of 46.5 million Euros to the country in 2016¹⁵.

The combination of multiple CFSP missions within the CFDP framework and the long-term engagement of the EU with Somalia regarding humanitarian aid makes Somalia suitable to investigate the tension between these two foreign policy instruments, formulated in the following research question *‘How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian and foreign policy engagement (via CFDP) with Somalia since 2009, and has this contributed to the politicization of humanitarian aid?’*

The central research question is built up out of three sub-questions:

1. How has the EU discursively produced its CFSP policies with regard to Somalia?
2. How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian policies with regard to Somalia?
3. Does the discourse on EU policies regarding Somalia since 2009 display tensions that could indicate a politicization of aid?

The research focused on the period from 2009 to the present. The choice for 2009 as a starting point is based on the importance of the Lisbon Treaty as the legal foundation of the two forms of foreign engagement. Moreover, with this treaty the EU formally stressed the wish for coherence between its policy instruments. Lastly, the treaty created two relevant actors for this

⁸ Orbie, Van Elsuwege, and Bossuyt. 2014. Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the European Union's External Action : The Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence.

⁹ European External Action Service 2017. Somalia and the EU, 1.

¹⁰ European Commission 2010. Commission Decision on the approval and financing of a Global Plan for humanitarian actions in Somalia from the general budget of the European Union, 3.

¹¹ European Commission 2011. Commission Implementing Decision amending Commission Decision C(2011)431 of 31 January 2011 on the financing of humanitarian aid operational priorities from the 2011 general budget of the European Union, 5.

¹² European Commission 2012. Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of humanitarian aid operational priorities from the 2012 general budget of the European Union, 24.

¹³ European Commission 2013. Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of humanitarian aid operational priorities from the 2013 general budget of the European Union, 12.

¹⁴ European Commission 2014. Commission Implementing Decision financing humanitarian aid operational priorities from the 2014 general budget of the European Union, 13.

¹⁵ DG ECHO 2017. Factsheet Somalia, 1.

research: The External Action Service and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security¹⁶.

1.2. European Union's engagement with Somalia

The engagement of the European Union with Somalia dates back to the 1990s. Already in 1994, the European Union provided humanitarian aid to the country and its inhabitants¹⁷. In response to the collapse of state structures¹⁸.

The increase of terrorism and the attacks on 9/11 drew renewed attention to the risk of so called fragile states as hospitable to terrorists¹⁹ to the European continent. A failed state can be defined as a state in which no longer a government can “project authority over its territory and peoples and...protect its national boundaries...[S]tate failure manifests itself when a state can no longer deliver physical security, a productive economic environment, and a stable political environment for its people”²⁰. Within the EU, the attention for the political development of the state of Somalia, as a prime example of a failed state, grew²¹. The EU acknowledged the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as the representatives of the Somali state and pursued a comprehensive approach towards the country, which was reflected in policy and strategy documents²². Moreover, the EU's engagement with Somalia changed considerably in 2007 in response to the growth of the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab and the increase in piracy of the coast of Somalia. Two policies with strong security objectives were introduced: “rebuilding the Somali security sector on shore to become capable of fighting terroristic behaviour as well as countering pirates' activities off-shore”²³.

To rebuild the Somali security sector, the EU took several steps: first, the EU provided financial support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), charged with providing security for humanitarian transport; protect all those involved in the peace process; and protect the Somali government. Secondly, in 2008, the EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVOR) was implemented, charged with four objectives: protection of World Food Program's vessels delivering food to the country; deterrence, prevention and suppression of piracy activities; protection of vulnerable vessels; and monitoring fishing activities²⁴. Thirdly, the EU stepped up its operational presence with the establishment of the (military) European Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in 2010, tasked with reforming the Somali security sector and strengthening the Somali national security forces²⁵. Fourthly, in 2012, a capacity building mission for the entire Horn of Africa was established, which since 2015 specifically focuses on Somalia²⁶. The mission aims to strengthen the Somali authorities in normalizing coast guard duties and policing the coastal region²⁷. Thus, the EU has thus concerned itself with Somalia

¹⁶ Schütze 2014a. External Union Policies. A Substantive Overview.

¹⁷ DG ECHO 2017. Factsheet Somalia; Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?

¹⁸ Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?, 180.

¹⁹ Barma 2007. Failed State.

²⁰ Barma 2007. Failed State, 307.

²¹ Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?

²² Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?

²³ Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?, 182.

²⁴ European Union 2001a in Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?, 182.

²⁵ Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?

²⁶ Ehrhart and Petretto. 2014. Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach Work?; European External Action Service 2017. Somalia and the EU.

²⁷ European External Action Service 2017. Somalia and the EU.

for over 25 years, via humanitarian aid policies and more recently, via the CSDP. Especially the security side of the engagement has received considerable attention and has gained prominence in EU foreign policies.

1.3. Academic and social relevance

The research investigates two forms of foreign engagement – CFSP missions and humanitarian aid – which are traditionally studied in relation to sovereign states. By researching these policy fields in the context of the European Union, the research aims to enlarge the knowledge on these two policy fields and their form within a supranational structure. Secondly, this thesis contributes to the academic knowledge on the politicization of humanitarian aid within the EU framework. By applying the theory on politicization of humanitarian aid to a specific case, the knowledge on mechanisms of and reasons for this politicization in practice will be advanced.

The social relevance of this thesis lies in the attempt to disentangle the complex web of institutional policies and politics regarding CFSP policy and humanitarian aid, which can help to increase the transparency of the EU and its decisions. Secondly, the research can provide insight in the relation between humanitarian aid and other external action policies and how this comes to the fore in policy texts, communications and decisions. This can aid society to better understand the relationship between the two policy fields in EU discourse, their commonalities and differences and how the quest for coherence can facilitate politicization of humanitarian aid.

1.4. Conclusion and reading guide

To answer the central research question, the report is divided in seven chapters. This first chapter has discussed the research objective to investigate the possible tension in the EU's engagement with Somalia between two foreign policies: humanitarian aid and the CFDP. This tension is related to the quest for coherence found in the Lisbon Treaty and the TFEU, which came into force in 2009, and is a central component in the EU Comprehensive Approach guiding EU's engagement with third countries. Secondly, the chapter has introduced the research question following from the problem statement as: *How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian and foreign policy engagement (via CFDP) with Somalia since 2009, and has this contributed to the politicization of humanitarian aid?* The second section has discussed EU engagement with Somalia and the current CFDP missions in the country, while the third section set out the academic and social relevance of the research.

The remainder of the report is structured as follows: chapter two introduces the conceptual framework built upon three concepts: discourse, coherence and politicization of humanitarian aid. The understanding and use of the concepts are discussed, and the chapter concludes by providing a synthesis of the concepts and how they constitute the conceptual framework. Chapter three discusses methodology and sources. Chapter four to six form the main body of the thesis: the discourse analysis. Chapter four analyses the articulation on coherence and comprehensiveness leading up to the Strategic Framework in CFSP related documents, before analyzing their articulation in the Strategic Framework. This is followed by analyzing humanitarian policy, taking the Strategic Framework as a starting point to trace the discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness regarding Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. Chapter five first discusses two implementations of the Strategic Framework before analyzing the continuation of discourse in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises and the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020. Then, the intertextuality between the latter two policies and the two implementations is analyzed, again to investigate the development of the discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness. Chapter six utilizes the analysis on the discursive production of coherence and comprehensiveness to

investigate if the discourse indicates politicization of humanitarian aid. Finally, chapter seven concludes the report by answering the sub-questions, the central research question and discussing the research limitations and avenues for further research.

2. Conceptual framework

The research is based on three central concepts: discourse, coherence, and politicization of humanitarian aid. These three concepts are discussed in the next sections. The last section discusses how the concepts taken together form the conceptual framework for the research.

2.1. Discourse

As a general definition, discourse is “a particular way of talking about and understand the world”²⁸. Discourse is simultaneously a theory and a method, which support and complement each other. Here, the theoretical side of discourse is discussed, while discourse as method is discussed in chapter three. This section develops the general definition of discourse above by identifying the social constructivist underpinnings of discourse, the role of language in discourse and the different strands in academia, followed by Mouffe and Laclau’s discourse theory and some elements of critical discourse analysis, which inform the research. Next, some main elements of discourse and their function are discussed, followed by a conclusion.

2.1.1. Social constructivism, language and discourse

Discourse is closely connected to social constructivism. Social constructivist approaches share, according to Burr, four premises: knowledge on ‘the world’ is not a reflection of truth, but a representation of the understanding of the world; representation and understanding of ‘the world’ is historically and culturally informed; understanding ‘the world’ is a social process; and “different social understanding of the world lead to different social actions”²⁹. Taken together, these premises stress the importance to understand the co-constitutive processes that take place in the formation of knowledge and consequently ‘the world’. In other words, the construction of knowledge guides what is understandable, comprehensible and ‘real’. Social constructivism thus rejects the existence of an objective truth or reality: instead, reality is the result of the social construction of knowledge through co-constitutive, or discursive, processes. The outcome of such social construction of knowledge through language can be described as discourse.

Language plays a pivotal role in discourse. It is through language that reality is accessed, formed and understood³⁰. Language, or words, acquire meaning through the assignment of meaning to it. In other words, the signifier (word) has no inherent meaning until it becomes signified through discursive practices, which ascribe meaning to the signifier. This signified meaning, in turn, needs to be actively reproduced in discursive practices. With this in mind, discourse can be defined as “related sets of ideas, expressed in various kinds of written and spoken text, and employing a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, assumptions and forms of social action”³¹. While there are many different academic strands of discourse and discourse-analytic approaches, there are some commonalities with underpin discourse. Firstly, discourse is constitutive of meaning and social reality: it actively produces meaning and social reality. Secondly, discourse functions to produce “legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices”³² within a social or political setting. Thirdly, discourse inherently involves practices of silencing and exclusion, and fourthly, discourse requires constant articulation and re-articulation and is an open-ended process: it is therefore open to

²⁸ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 1.

²⁹ Burr 1995: 3-5; Gergen 1985: 266–269 in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 5–6.

³⁰ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*.

³¹ Jackson, Richard. 2007. An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post- September 11, 234.

³² Jackson, Richard. 2007. An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post- September 11, 234.

challenges³³. The active production of social reality and legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices means that discourse produces a ‘self’ in relation to an ‘other’. Establishing legitimate knowledge inherently involves exclusion and silencing of the ‘other’, by articulation and re-articulation of the ‘self’. This is necessary because articulation is never complete, and can thus be challenged by other meanings, opinions and views.

2.1.2. Discourse theory and critical discourse analysis

In this thesis, understanding of discourse is informed by Laclau and Mouffe’s work on discourse theory, combined with critical discourse analysis. Informed by Marxist and structuralist ideas, discourse theory “aims at the understanding of the social as a discursive construction whereby, in principle, all social phenomena can be analysed using discourse analytical tools...The creation of meaning as a social process is about the fixation of meaning [which] is impossible because every concrete fixation of the signs’ meaning is contingent”³⁴. It is precisely this impossibility to fixate a signs’ meaning (or signifiers’ meaning) which is central in discourse theory. Mouffe and Laclau state that “a discourse is formed by the partial fixation of of meaning around certain *nodal points*”³⁵ which is “a privileged sign around which other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point”³⁶. However, this fixation of meaning can never be completed, but can be sustained by articulation of the meaning to exclude other meanings. The notion of articulation corresponds to a central element in critical discourse analysis: intertextuality³⁷. Intertextuality refers to “the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events”³⁸. Such intertextuality can be manifest, meaning that explicit references to other texts are made in the studied document³⁹. Intertextuality thus contributes to the development and change of the meaning of a sign, a text or a discourse, which relates to articulation: both intertextuality and articulation refer to the assignment of meaning to specific words or texts, thus stabilizing the meaning assigned to them. Articulation and intertextuality are thus the specific practices that reproduce – or change – meaning, and thus discourse⁴⁰.

Articulation and intertextuality are both concepts which are used to establish meaning of signs and more broadly, the social reality. Such social realities can be found in political processes and politics. Mouffe and Laclau define politics as “the understanding of society in a particular way that excludes all other ways”⁴¹ though articulation and re-articulation. This dominance of one particular social reality can be understood as hegemony⁴². In discourse theory, hegemony means that “through the production of meaning, power relations can become naturalized and so-much part of the common sense that they cannot be questioned”⁴³. In critical discourse analysis, the concept of hegemony is used to “analyse how discursive practice is part of a larger social practice involving power relations”⁴⁴. Taken together, knowledge and social

³³ Jackson, Richard. 2007. An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post- September 11.; Milliken 1999. The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods.

³⁴ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 24.

³⁵ Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112 in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 26.

³⁶ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 26.

³⁷ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 140.

³⁸ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 73.

³⁹ Fairclough 1992b, 117 in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 73.

⁴⁰ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method.

⁴¹ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 36.

⁴² Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 7.

⁴³ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 32.

⁴⁴ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 76

realities are produced through a hegemony of a specific meaning through politics, which simultaneously naturalizes such politics and power relations.

2.1.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, this section has introduced the concept discourse in relation to discourse theory and critical discourse analysis. Discourse constitutes social reality and legitimate forms of knowledge, by articulation of meaning and thus exclusion of other meanings. The exclusion of other meanings – and more general, other discourses – draws attention to the notion of ‘self’ and ‘other’. The articulation of meaning takes place by assigning specific meaning to language or words through articulation and intertextuality. However, meaning is never fixated, but remains contingent and needs to be constantly articulated and re-articulated in order to stabilize the meaning. The self is thus articulated in relation to the other. Discourse theory uses the term nodal point to identify a central sign to which other signs are related, which receive their meaning from these other signs. A dominant social reality – and thus discourse – can be seen as a hegemony, which excludes the possibility to question the dominant discourse, because it becomes naturalized.

2.2. Coherence

In the field of peace and security, the notion of coherence has gained prominence in the policy of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU⁴⁵. There is however no clear-cut definition of coherence or its composing elements. Instead, the overall objectives and goals of coherence are used to define the concept. For example, it is defined as the aim “to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among the activities of international and local actors”⁴⁶, or “a quest for synergy and added value in the different components”⁴⁷. Policy makers assume a causal relationship between coherence and effectiveness and, in the long-term, sustainability of a policy⁴⁸. No or limited coherence would in time result in inefficient policies, lower quality outcomes and risk of duplication of policies⁴⁹. Increasing coherence is thus perceived as a prerequisite for creating sustainable, long-term peace and security, and this perceived necessity of coherence for peace and security legitimizes the quest for more coherence.

2.2.1. European Union and coherence

In EU context, coherence is pursued through a comprehensive approach, which is “a process aimed at facilitating system-wide coherence across security, governance, development and political dimensions of international peace and stability operations”⁵⁰. Council Conclusions describes this comprehensive approach as “both a general working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, collectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, working practices and results”⁵¹ to “make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic”⁵². Thus, EU’s

⁴⁵ De Coning and Friis 2011. Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach.

⁴⁶ De Coning and Friis 2011. Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach, 246.

⁴⁷ Hillon 2008 in Reynaert 2012. The European Union's Foreign Policy since the Treaty of Lisbon: The Difficult Quest for More Consistency and Coherence, 207.

⁴⁸ De Coning and Friis 2011. Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach.

⁴⁹ De Coning and Friis 2011. Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach.

⁵⁰ De Coning and Friis 2011. Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach, 245.

⁵¹ Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach in Faria 2014. What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU Action Plan and beyond, 3.

⁵² European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 2.

comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (hereinafter the Comprehensive Approach) aims to strengthen the EU's position as a foreign actor, by increasing the synergy and complementarity of different policies dealing with the world outside the European Union.

2.2.2. Dimensions and limitations of coherence

In the context of the external action of the European Union, Gerhard discusses four contexts or dimensions in which coherence is commonly brought up. Vertical coherence deals with “the concertation of member-state positions and policies with and in respect of the overall consensus or common position at the union level”⁵³. It thus deals with coherence between member states and the Union. The second dimension is horizontal coherence, which deals with coherence between the different external policies on the EU level, “mainly between the supranational and the intergovernmental spheres”⁵⁴. Thirdly, internal coherence focuses on coherence within each sphere of external actions, while the fourth dimension, external coherence, strives for coherence between the Union and third countries⁵⁵.

For this research, the horizontal dimension of coherence is especially relevant. The two researched policy areas are governed through different institutional set-ups. Humanitarian aid is firmly located in the supranational field, while CFSP policy is made through intergovernmental arrangements. As such, there is need for horizontal coherence between different policy areas, since both fields deal with policies for third countries and are, in the case of Somalia, implemented simultaneously in the same country.

It is however acknowledged that a commitment to ‘coherence’ and a ‘comprehensive approach’ is difficult to realize in practice. De Coning and Friis discuss two limitations regarding coherence which are relevant in the EU context. Firstly, impact-output limitations refer to the difference between success at the practical and the strategic level⁵⁶. On the practical level, success is usually measured as the ability of an actor to pursue its own priorities. On the strategic level however, success is determined by the actions of an actor which contribute to the greater goal, for example durable peace. This disconnect and sometimes conflicting priorities between the practical and strategic level limits coherence between organizations or departments. Secondly, conflicting values, norms, principles and mandates may limit coherence⁵⁷. Different organizations have different values and norms based on their area of expertise and theoretical underpinnings. A prime example of this at the EU level concerns humanitarian aid policies and policies within the CFSP. As discussed above, humanitarian policies are based on need, irrespective of politics, while CFSP is informed by political objectives. These fundamental differences can impede coherence if both policy instruments are implemented in the same region.

2.2.3. Conclusion

Coherence is a central objective in relation to the pursuit of peace and security on the international level. The UN, NATO as well as the EU have incorporated the notion of coherence in policies such as an integrated approach or comprehensive approach. The EU pursues coherence via its Comprehensive Approach, which aims to increase the effectiveness of different policy instruments in to increase peace and security. Moreover, coherence has a central place in the Treaty of Lisbon and its accompanying Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding relations, policies and actions with third countries. This privileged

⁵³ Gebhard 2017. *The Problem of Coherence in the EU's International Relations*, 128.

⁵⁴ Gebhard 2017. *The Problem of Coherence in the EU's International Relations*, 130.

⁵⁵ Gebhard 2017. *The Problem of Coherence in the EU's International Relations*.

⁵⁶ De Coning and Friis 2011. *Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach*, 260.

⁵⁷ De Coning and Friis 2011. *Coherence and Coordination. The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach*, 263.

position of coherence in all external action of the EU draws attention to horizontal coherence: coherence between the different external action policies. In this research, two of these policy fields have been researched: humanitarian aid – a supranational policy – and CFSP – an intergovernmental policy. The development of the discourse on horizontal coherence is thus relevant for the research, especially in light of the limitations of coherence. De Coning and Friis note that there is often a disconnect between the strategic and practical understanding of coherence as well as differences between the norms, values and objectives of different policies, which can hinder horizontal coherence.

2.3. Politicization of humanitarian aid

Humanitarian aid is one instrument which states and supranational organizations such as the EU use to engage with third countries. Increasingly, the risks of politicization of humanitarian aid are recognized as “one of the most critical issues facing humanitarianism today”⁵⁸. Before discussing the components of politicization, the next section discusses the notion of humanitarianism, the fundamental humanitarian principles and the difference between humanitarian aid and development aid as an introduction into the practical application of humanitarianism: humanitarian aid. An understanding of humanitarianism and its principles is necessary to understand the politicization of humanitarian aid, since politicization can infringe the principles guiding humanitarian aid. politicization is discussed in the second section using three categories of politicization developed by Charlotte Dany: instrumentalization, militarization and developmentalization.

2.3.1. Humanitarianism and its principles

In a broad sense, humanitarianism “consists of actions to improve wellbeing or welfare”⁵⁹. More specifically, humanitarianism refers to “the impartial, neutral, and independent provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters”⁶⁰. This definition draws attention to humanitarian principles, which were first formulated by the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC)⁶¹. The ICRC “identified seven core principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality”⁶². The first four principles are generally perceived as the core principles⁶³. The principle of humanity refers to the goal “to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being”⁶⁴. Secondly, impartiality commands that assistance is given based on need, regardless of race, nationality, gender, religion or political affiliation⁶⁵. Thirdly, the principle of neutrality determines that humanitarian organizations do not take side in a conflict and refrain from any action that (dis)advantages one of the conflicting parties⁶⁶. Fourthly, independence states that humanitarian organizations

⁵⁸ Kuwali 2013. From Durable Solutions to Holistic Solutions: Prevention of Displacement in Africa, 269.

⁵⁹ Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails, 136.

⁶⁰ Barnett 2013. Humanitarian Governance, 382.

⁶¹ Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics.

⁶² Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, 3.

⁶³ Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics; Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union; Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails.

⁶⁴ International Commission of the Red Cross 2017. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, 1.

⁶⁵ Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics; International Commission of the Red Cross 2017. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary.

⁶⁶ Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics; International Commission of the Red Cross 2017. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary.

should be autonomous and independent from any actor which has a stake in the outcome of the conflict, for example by limiting financial dependence on such actors⁶⁷.

These four fundamental principles set humanitarian aid apart from other assistance, such as development aid. This is reflected in the two policies guiding EU action in both fields: the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the European Consensus on Development. With the humanitarian consensus, the EU “is firmly committed to upholding and promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence”⁶⁸, while the development consensus states that the “objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development [which] includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects”⁶⁹. EU development assistance thus incorporates political considerations: it aims to increase good governance, human rights and rule of law. Moreover, the stressed complementarity between security and development is deemed central to increase peace and stability⁷⁰.

2.3.2. Politicization

Politicization of humanitarian aid refers to the “trend towards a more political approach to humanitarian aid at the cost of fundamental humanitarian principles”⁷¹. However, this definition does not imply that humanitarian aid has moved from a-political to political, since humanitarian aid “is a political process in a political world”⁷², but that its principles are becoming compromised at the costs of political considerations⁷³. One overarching reason for politicization of humanitarian aid is the fact that contemporary conflicts are no longer inter-state conflicts, but intra-state conflicts and civil wars⁷⁴. Traditional sovereign governments are often scant in such conflict situations, which leaves those providing humanitarian aid to deal with insurgents, rebels and sometimes criminals to gain access to those in need. This “de-institutionalization of sovereign central authority meant a diminishing impact of international humanitarian law”⁷⁵ and recognition of, and adherence to, the humanitarian principles. In her article on politicization of humanitarian aid in the EU⁷⁶, Dany distinguishes three forms of politicization: instrumentalization, militarization and developmentalization, which are discussed below.

2.3.2.1. Instrumentalization

Instrumentalization of aid occurs when humanitarian aid becomes part of a broader policy objective, for example security or regional stability. Humanitarian principles are no longer the main reference point for determining the allocation of aid⁷⁷. Instead, the broader objectives

⁶⁷ Barnett and Weis 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics; International Commission of the Red Cross 2017. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary.

⁶⁸ Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 30 January 2008. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 2.

⁶⁹ Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 24 February 2006, 3.

⁷⁰ Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 24 February 2006, 7.

⁷¹ Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union, 421.

⁷² Slim 2003 in Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union, 425.

⁷³ Kuwali 2013. From Durable Solutions to Holistic Solutions: Prevention of Displacement in Africa.

⁷⁴ Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails.

⁷⁵ Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails, 137.

⁷⁶ Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union.

⁷⁷ Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union.

guide aid provision and consequently allows conditionality to enter the discussion: political and moral issues, such as the “legitimacy and policies of the authority in charge”⁷⁸ influence the decision to provide assistance. For example, in 1997, the United Nations withdrew its staff and stopped assistance in reaction to the toppling of the international supported government by rebels. Consequently, people in need were cut off much-needed humanitarian assistance as politics determined the allocation of aid over need⁷⁹. Similarly, instrumentalization takes place by selectively providing humanitarian assistance, for example by geographic limitations (only in the territory held by ‘legitimate actors’) or to those people in need which support such legitimate actors (limiting assistance to people supporting the opposing party(ies))⁸⁰. Moreover, instrumentalization can come to the fore when looking at the way funds for humanitarian aid are provided by donors. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from untied grants to UN organizations to tied – earmarked – funds⁸¹. With most humanitarian funds now earmarked for specific crises, countries and objectives, humanitarian organizations’ ability to provide aid based on need is restricted. Especially instrumentalization via earmarked funds is relevant in the context of the EU. The Commission, via DG ECHO, is responsible for allocation of EU humanitarian funds to implementing partners, for example UN organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This allocation is guided by policies and requirements formulated by DG ECHO, which can not only be informed by the four humanitarian principles, but also by other objectives of the EU in general, such as development and security. Thus, via earmarking, the risk of instrumentalization arises in EU context.

2.3.2.2. Militarization

Militarization – the second form of politicization – takes place when the lines between humanitarian aid and military actions and policies become blurred⁸², for example when humanitarian aid becomes part of the military strategy to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. Governments perceive humanitarian aid as a complementary factor in the global war on terror, supporting military and security objectives⁸³. One notable example of militarization is the statement by then US secretary of state Colin Powell naming (humanitarian) NGOs ‘force multipliers’: “humanitarian organizations expanded the reach of the US government and helped achieve the political goals of the intervention”⁸⁴. A different form of militarization is the co-optation of humanitarian principles, values and the ‘language’ by intervening actors (for example the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan), which blurs the lines between military and humanitarian action⁸⁵. Intervention parties increase the legitimacy of military action by framing the intervention as a reaction to humanitarian crises and “referenc[ing] universal morality, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights”⁸⁶.

2.3.2.3. Developmentalization

The third form of politicization is developmentalization, meaning that humanitarian aid broadens its scope, adopting longer term and more political tasks and consequently blurring the lines between humanitarian aid and development aid⁸⁷. This is in part a reaction to the

⁷⁸ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise, 4.

⁷⁹ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise.

⁸⁰ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise.

⁸¹ Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails.

⁸² Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union.

⁸³ Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails.

⁸⁴ Lischer 2007. Military Intervention and the Humanitarian ‘Force Multiplier’, 99.

⁸⁵ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise.

⁸⁶ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise, 5.

⁸⁷ de Torrenté 2004. Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration’s False Promise; Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union, 426.

increasing number of ‘multi-mandate’ organizations which not only work in the field of humanitarian aid but also in development aid⁸⁸. Contrary to humanitarian aid, “[d]evelopment aid...refers...to...economic assistance in the form of loans or grants by a developed country to a developing country...to stimulate political change and to promote economic and social development”⁸⁹, in line with the interests of the donor country⁹⁰. Development aid thus includes political considerations and priorities set by the donor, for example economic progress, increasing political stability or security. These political considerations are central in distinguishing between humanitarian aid and development aid, but become blurred in contemporary humanitarian aid practices. Both humanitarian organizations and donors are no longer satisfied with alleviating the suffering of people in need, but increasingly venture into developmental aspects in attacking the ‘root causes’ which create the need for humanitarian aid⁹¹.

2.3.3. Conclusion

The provision of humanitarian aid is generally understood as providing life-saving assistance to those in need, irrespective of race, religion or political affiliation with respect for the human being. Moreover, aid should not favour one side of the conflict and organizations providing aid need to be independent from actors which have a stake in the conflict. Humanitarian aid should thus adhere to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, which imply that politics and political considerations should not influence the choice to provide aid, or how such aid is provided. Politicization can take place in three forms: instrumentalization occurs when humanitarian aid becomes part of the broader policy objective, impeding on impartiality. Secondly, militarization means that the lines between military action and humanitarian action become blurred, which impedes neutrality and independence. Thirdly, developmentalization refers to the trend in which humanitarian aid and development aid become more intertwined, which can impede neutrality, impartiality and independence.

2.4. Synthesis

The conceptual framework used in this research is built up out of three concepts: discourse, coherence and politicization of humanitarian aid. This chapter has discussed the literature on the concepts and how they inform the research above. This synthesis discusses how the concepts relate to each other and form the conceptual framework. Discourses constitute social realities and produce legitimate forms of knowledge. Discourse theory employs the notion of nodal points to identify central signs in discourses, which are supported by other signs. These other signs thus give meaning to a nodal point: without it, a nodal point is void of meaning. In this research, the concept of coherence is understood as a nodal point in the external policies of the European Union. Coherence occupies an important place in the treaties and policies which govern external action. Moreover, in the Lisbon Treaty, all policies dealing with third countries contain references to coherence between external policies. Thus, the EU strives to increase horizontal coherence in its external action policies. Coherence however, is an empty term if it is not supported by other terms, requirements and objectives which make it concrete. In this sense, coherence is a nodal point in the EU discourse on external action, which receives its meaning from notions of comprehensiveness as found in the Comprehensive Approach. The goal of increasing coherence across external policies creates the risk of politicization of humanitarian aid. As De Coning and Friis pointed out, coherence can be limited by conflicting

⁸⁸ Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union.

⁸⁹ Renzaho 2007. Measuring Effectiveness in Development and Humanitarian Assistance: An Overview, 3.

⁹⁰ Renzaho 2007. Measuring Effectiveness in Development and Humanitarian Assistance: An Overview.

⁹¹ Dany 2015. Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union; Weiss 2016. Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails.

norms, values and objectives. The EU, by assigning strategic importance to coherence between different policies to improve its external action, opens the possibility for politicization of humanitarian aid to reach coherence. So, the focus on coherence within the EU external action discourse can lead to politicization of humanitarian aid, a policy area which, in a sense, derives its legitimacy from a strong commitment to stay clear of politics.

3. Methodology

Evident from the research question, the proposed research method is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis investigates social phenomena and specifically how ideas and objects come into being⁹². In short, it analyses how reality is socially constructed in documents. Chapter two has developed the theoretical side of discourse built on the work of Mouffe and Laclau's discourse theory, combined with some elements of critical discourse analysis. Since discourse theory is limited on discourse as method⁹³, the framework for this research is largely built on critical discourse analysis. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, both approaches share four commonalities and are part of the social constructivist and post-structuralist tradition, which perceives reality as the result of the social construction of knowledge through discursive processes. It is thus possible to combine different discourse-analytic approaches. The next section discusses discourse analysis as method and develops the framework used in this research. This is followed by a discussion on sources, while the final section provides a conclusion.

3.1. Discourse as method

In her book "Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war", Lene Hansen develops a poststructuralist framework for organizing a discourse analysis based on four categories: the number of selves, intertextual model, time period, and the number of events⁹⁴. Firstly, the number of selves refers to the number of actors studied in a research. For example, to investigate the political discourse on refugees, a researcher will not only study the official documents, but also documents produced by groups opposing refugees, which will constitute two different selves. Another option is to study the self in comparison to 'the other' through 'discursive encounters' by comparing the discourse of the self with the counter-construction of the self (and the other) by the other⁹⁵. A third option is to only study the discourse of the self and how the other is (explicitly or implicitly) constructed in the discourse of the self: "the self is constituted through the delineation of Others, and the Other can be articulated as superior, inferior, or equal"⁹⁶.

The second category, intertextuality, refers to the fact that a text stands never entirely on its own, instead, it refers implicitly or explicitly to other texts, establishing its reading as well as the understanding of the referenced texts⁹⁷. This process takes place via using citations and references, but also via conceptual intertextuality: "articulation of concepts such as 'the Balkans, 'security' and 'democracy' rely upon implicit reference to a larger body of earlier texts on the same subject"⁹⁸. As discussed in chapter two, the notion of intertextuality is related to the notion of articulation in discourse theory. Articulation assigns meaning to a word or text, which draws on other articulations of that word or text. Articulation (or intertextuality) of a discourse is, following discourse theory, centred around nodal points: privileged signs to which other signs are related⁹⁹ and (partially) fixate the meaning of a nodal point. Hansen develops three intertextual models for discourse analysis, ranging from the analysing the official discourse using official texts, analysing these official texts in relation to the wider political landscape including oppositional interpretations and the media, and thirdly, incorporating texts

⁹² Hardy, Harley, and Phillips 2004. Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?

⁹³ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method.

⁹⁴ Hansen 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 65.

⁹⁵ Hansen 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 68.

⁹⁶ Hansen 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 68.

⁹⁷ Kristeva 1980 in Hansen 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 49.

⁹⁸ Hansen 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 51.

⁹⁹ Jorgensen and Phillips 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 26.

and documents which have no direct connection with the official discourse such as literature and film¹⁰⁰.

Thirdly, the time period is an important category to delineate the scope of the research. Hansen differentiates between studying “events either at one particular moment or through a longer historical analysis”¹⁰¹. Studying one particular event can reveal how the dominant discourse responds to for example a conflict. Contrary, the choice for a longer time period can shed light on how a discourse becomes dominant, in other words, a hegemonic discourse. By analysing the development of a discourse for a longer time period, the articulation and re-articulation of meaning in relation to politics and power can be researched, identifying the hegemony of certain meanings. Fourthly, the number of events is closely related to the temporal aspect: in the study of one particular event, the number of events is usually one, which can be divided in smaller sub-events. On the other hand, studying a longer period of time involves a selection of events: this selection can be based on a connection in issue, for example a comparative study of two conflicts which involve the same actors. Another option is a connection in time: events have taken place in the same period of time¹⁰².

3.2. Discourse analysis of the EU’s engagement with Somalia

In this research, the discourse of one self is analysed: that of the European Union concerning Somalia. This self is divided in two sub-selves: CFSP policy and humanitarian aid. These two sub-selves are related by the articulation and re-articulation of coherence as a nodal point in the discourse. The sub-selves produce both a social reality of the EU’s engagement. By analysing the sub-selves in relation to each other, the research can identify if there is a tension between the two sub-discourses, which could indicate politicization of humanitarian aid. It is expected that some form of othering takes place within these documents and the discourse, namely by othering those activities and/or groups which threaten the stability of Somalia, such as piracy and criminality, as well as rebel groups and the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. The intertextual model used in this thesis is one centred around the official policy discourse of the self, which can be found in official EU documents, produced by the institutions of the EU such as the Commission, the Council of the European Union (hereinafter Council), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The choice to analyse the official discourse is informed by the goal of the research: it is best suited to investigate the discourse of the EU the fields of security and humanitarian aid. The analysis will encompass texts from 2009 to the present, thus focusing on the development of the discourse over time. The number of events will be connected via the period of time: the selected documents for the two sub-selves will cover the same time period, but the events studied are not necessarily intimately connected: all documents will be related to Somalia and coherence, but not necessarily to the same issue, for example piracy. To structure the period covered in this research, the selection of documents is based on what Hansen named ‘critical events’¹⁰³. The research has identified three critical events which are more or less connected to the two sub-selves: the 2011 Strategic Approach for the Horn of Africa, its sub-strategy Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) and the 2013 EU Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises.

3.3. Sources

The sources for the discourse analysis consist of documents produced by EU institutions such as the EEAS, the HR, DG ECHO and the Council of the European Union. The analysis is based

¹⁰⁰ Hansen 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*.

¹⁰¹ Hansen 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, 69.

¹⁰² Hansen 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*.

¹⁰³ Hansen 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, 54.

on policy documents regarding decisions, implementations, annual reports and strategic policy documents. To analyse the development of discourse, special attention has been given to the articulation and intertextuality between the studied documents to investigate how the discourse continued and changed over time.

3.4. Synthesis

This chapter introduced the methodology employed in the research to analyse how horizontal coherence between EU foreign policy instruments discursively produce the official discourse of two categories of external action: CFSP and humanitarian aid. using Hansen's four categories to structure the discourse analysis, the EU discourse on humanitarian aid and CFSP policy is investigated by analysing EU documents, ranging from Council Decisions, Council Conclusions, reports produced by DG ECHO, EEAS and the European Commission. The documents are selected based on their relevance regarding coherence and EU action in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, covering the period from 2008 until 2017. Moreover, the document selection is informed by the three identified critical events: the 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, SHARE in 2012 and the 2013 Comprehensive Approach.

4. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa

Since 2009, the engagement of the EU with Somalia has been intensive: three CFSP missions are currently implemented in the country, next to long term commitments to development and humanitarian aid. The notion of coherence and a comprehensive approach is evident within the documents on these missions, such as Council Decisions, Council Conclusions, joint communications and Staff Working Documents. Moreover, an overarching framework to guide the EU's engagement with the country has been formulated in 2011: the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (hereinafter the Strategic Framework). This chapter traces the development of this notion of coherence and comprehensiveness in the discourse of the European Union, for both its CFSP policy and humanitarian policy. The first section discusses the legal basis for EUNAVOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia, and how the notion of coherence and a comprehensive approach have been articulated. The second section discusses the relevance of the Strategic Framework for the discursive production of the discourse on coherence in CFSP missions. The third section investigates the humanitarian policy discourse on coherence using the Strategic Framework as a starting point to discuss an element which contributes to coherence: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. The fourth section provides a conclusion.

4.1. EUNAVOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia

Previous to the launch of the Strategic Framework, the EU decided to implement two missions in Somalia within the CFSP framework: Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. This section discusses the legal basis for these missions and how coherence is discursively produced within these legal bases. Secondly, it analyses what elements are mentioned as part of a comprehensive approach to Somalia as a sign supporting coherence as a nodal point.

4.1.1. Coherence

In 2008, the EU naval mission Atalanta was launched with the objective to contribute to “the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia...[and]...the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast”¹⁰⁴. The mandate specifies the actions under Atalanta as “[to] provide protection to vessels chartered by the WFP, including by means of the presence on board those vessels of armed units of Atalanta...[to] provide protection...to merchant vessels [and to] take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent, and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery”¹⁰⁵. The decision on Atalanta took place before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the TFEU in December 2009, but already contains some references to coherence. For example, article 8 states that “[t]he Presidency, the SG/HR, the EU Operation Commander and the EU Force Commander shall closely coordinate their respective activities...”¹⁰⁶. Council decision 2010/437/CFSP amended the joint action in this respect, removing the Presidency and the SG/HR from article 8 and implementing the HR as a coordinating actor¹⁰⁷. During the first years of Atalanta, the discourse on coherence furthered

¹⁰⁴ Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, article 1.

¹⁰⁵ Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, article 2.

¹⁰⁶ Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, article 8.

¹⁰⁷ Council Decision 2010/437/CFSP amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, article 1.3.

its understanding as the aim to increase the coordination and coherence between the different tasks of the mandate. Thus, the discourse on coherence was one of internal coherence: increasing the coordination and complementarity within one policy.

In 2010, the EU decided to launch a second CFSP mission: EUTM Somalia. Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP formulates the mission as “[t]he Union shall conduct a military training mission...in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG)”¹⁰⁸, with the objective “to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector”¹⁰⁹. The decision contains a more developed understanding of coherence, by assigning the HR to “ensure the implementation of this decision and its consistency with the Union’s external action as a whole...”¹¹⁰. The decision on EUTM Somalia thus stressed the importance of horizontal coherence between the different EU policies and instruments. Secondly, the articulation of coherence extended with external coherence as “support should be part of a larger and coherent framework involving close EU cooperation and coordination with the African Union, the United Nations and other relevant partners...”¹¹¹ and “[t]he mission would also facilitate the coordination of EU action with AMISOM”¹¹². Taken together, the decisions on Atalanta and EUTM Somalia do not seem to correspond regarding the understanding of coherence: the decisions on Atalanta articulate a discourse on internal coherence, while EUTM Somalia develops coherence in relation to horizontal and external coherence.

One explanation for this difference is the entry of the Lisbon Treaty and the TFEU in December 2009 and the importance of coherence for the EU’s external action in these treaties. Article 21 of the Lisbon treaty defines the general provisions for EU external action as “the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations”¹¹³ and “shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and other policies”¹¹⁴. Thus, with the entry of the Lisbon treaty, the EU announced its intention to ‘speak with one voice’ regarding international policies and actions. To reach this, the EU set the goal to increase the coordination and consistency between its external actions, underlining the need for increased horizontal coherence between policies and missions. Next to horizontal coherence, article 21 states that “[t]he Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regions or global organizations...It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems”¹¹⁵. Thus, external coherence between the EU’s external actions and actions by international organizations is deemed important to solve ‘common problems’. Since the decision on Atalanta took place before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the articulation of coherence as horizontal and external aspects was not part of the EU’s external action

¹⁰⁸ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, article 1.

¹⁰⁹ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, article 1.

¹¹⁰ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, article 7.

¹¹¹ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, whereas (3).

¹¹² Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, whereas (10).

¹¹³ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 26 October 2012, article 21.2.

¹¹⁴ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 26 October 2012, article 21.3.

¹¹⁵ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 26 October 2012, article 21.1.

policies. In contrast, the decision of EUTM Somalia took place after the Lisbon Treaty and is thus informed by the importance of horizontal and external coherence articulated in the treaties.

4.1.2. A comprehensive approach

The notion of a comprehensive approach is explicitly articulated regarding Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. In its recitals, Council Decision 2008/851/CFSP refers to the Council Conclusions of 26 May 2008, in which the Council “reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive approach to a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and humanitarian aspects”¹¹⁶. EUTM refers in its recitals to the Council Conclusions of 27 July 2009, in which the Council “underlines the importance of a comprehensive approach to the situation in Somalia, linking security with development, rule of law and respect for human rights, gender related aspects and international humanitarian law”¹¹⁷. The Council Conclusions of 27 July 2009 can be interpreted as an elaboration of the political, security and humanitarian aspects mentioned in the Council Conclusions of 26 May 2008: development, rule of law and human rights are political and security aspects, while international humanitarian law can be interpreted as referencing humanitarian aspects, since it provides the legal basis for humanitarian aid intervention.

Thus, the early decisions on Atalanta and EUTM Somalia show that the notion of coherence differed between the two missions: Atalanta defined coherence as internal coherence, while in EUTM Somalia, the notion of coherence was articulated as horizontal and external coherence. However, the Council Conclusions recited in the Council Decisions on both missions underline the importance of a comprehensive EU approach towards Somalia, guided by political, security and humanitarian aspects.

4.2. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa

On 14 November 2011, the Council of the European Union adopted a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa “to guide the EU’s engagement in the region”¹¹⁸. The plan encompasses the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South-Sudan, Uganda and Somalia¹¹⁹. The objective of the EU is defined as “to support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government”¹²⁰. The relevance of the Strategic Framework for analysing the discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness is twofold. Firstly, both the objectives of Atalanta and EUTM Somalia contribute to the objective of the EU set out in the Strategic Framework: Atalanta “contributes to containing piracy”¹²¹, which increases security, while EUTM Somalia “supports the training of Somali National Security forces”¹²² contributing to stability and security in the region. Thus, the Strategic Framework defines the framework or strategy within these two missions operate. Secondly, the third CFSP mission, EUCAP Somalia, is not mentioned in the Strategic Framework, since it was only decided upon in 2012. However, the Strategic Framework is recited¹²³ in Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP which serves as the legal basis for EUCAP. The objective of EUCAP Somalia is “to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their

¹¹⁶ Council of the European Union 28 May 2008. Draft Council Conclusions on Somalia, 3.

¹¹⁷ Council of the European Union 27 July 2009. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

¹¹⁸ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn. of Africa, 2.

¹¹⁹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 4.

¹²⁰ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 6.

¹²¹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 11.

¹²² Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 11.

¹²³ Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), whereas (1).

maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance”¹²⁴. The tasks are defined as to “assist authorities in the region in achieving the efficient organization of maritime security agencies carrying out, coast guard function; deliver training courses and training expertise...[and] to assist Somalia in developing its own land-based coastal police capacity”¹²⁵, which contributes to “accountable security institutions”¹²⁶ and “assisting the establishment of the security in Somalia”¹²⁷. Thus, EUCAP Somalia supports the objectives of the Strategic Framework. In light of the importance of this Strategic Framework for all three CFSP missions, it is relevant to discuss the discourse regarding coherence and a comprehensive approach is formulated and produced.

As discussed above, the legal bases for Atalanta and EUTM Somalia contained different notions of coherence. With the Strategic Framework, important steps to harmonize the notion of coherence were taken. First, the framework explicitly defines coherence as horizontal as “the EU will ensure continuity and coherence of the different strands of its policies...”¹²⁸. The Strategic Framework focuses on “five main areas [of engagement]: the development partnership, the political dialogue, the response to crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship”¹²⁹. These five policy areas are linked to each other in the Strategic Framework, implicitly referencing a comprehensive approach. For this research, the response to crises is relevant: the Strategic Framework elaborates on the response to crises as “[i]n humanitarian response the EU is providing needs based humanitarian assistance to the people suffering from drought and conflict...”¹³⁰, but also as response within the CFSP framework: “crisis response and management...is conducted through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP)...for e.g. negotiations, mediation efforts, strengthening of rule of law...”¹³¹. Thus, both humanitarian aid and CFSP missions are understood as policies which can be used to respond to crises.

Atalanta and EUTM Somalia articulate a comprehensive approach encompassing political, security and humanitarian aspects. In the Strategic Framework “the EU recognises that to render its future engagement more effective it must pursue a comprehensive approach that will address the regions interlocked challenges”¹³². By describing the challenges as interlocked, the EU justifies taking a comprehensive approach to deal with these challenges, linking the five EU policy areas. In turn, to ensure that such a comprehensive approach addresses these interlocked challenges, the need for horizontal coherence arises and becomes a central part of the comprehensive approach. These interlocked challenges are, according to the document, unaccountable governance, corruption and the absence of the rule of law, inter-state rivalry, persistent poverty, climate change, migration, small arms proliferation and a lack of an effective regional organization¹³³ which resulted in “a chronic instability in the region – especially Somalia”¹³⁴. These challenges contain political, security and humanitarian aspects.

¹²⁴Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), article 2.

¹²⁵ Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), article 3.

¹²⁶ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 14.

¹²⁷ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 15.

¹²⁸ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 8.

¹²⁹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 8.

¹³⁰ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 10.

¹³¹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 10.

¹³² Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 6.

¹³³ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 6-7.

¹³⁴ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 8.

For example, unaccountable governance and absence of rule of law has “permitted e.g. piracy and violence to flourish in Somalia...which have now reached a scale where they threaten international security”¹³⁵, while small arms proliferation “makes previous disputes...more violent and more difficult to mediate by peaceful means”¹³⁶. These challenges thus contain political and security aspects. Moreover, persistent poverty “destroys the stability [which] have denies many of the people of the region the hope of a better future”¹³⁷ and “[t]he livelihoods of large numbers of people affected by extreme poverty and food insecurity...is made worse by...a mix of the effects of climate change and inadequate policy interventions”¹³⁸ which contains political aspects as well as humanitarian aspects, if extreme poverty and food insecurity result in for example famine. Thus, the interlocked challenges in the region can be understood as elaborating the political, security and humanitarian aspects which supported the understanding of a comprehensive approach in the Council Decisions on Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. Moreover, by elaborating on these three aspects as interlocked challenges, the Strategic Framework provides the rationale for using a comprehensive approach and a focus on horizontal coherence to address these challenges, linking different external action policies of the EU.

4.3. Humanitarian policy

Humanitarian policy is a separate policy field of the EU, illustrated by the separate chapter on humanitarian aid in the TFEU. The EU has a long-term engagement with Somalia regarding humanitarian aid which is reflected in the Strategic Framework. As discussed above, the Strategic Framework identifies humanitarian response as one of its actions in response to crisis. The importance of humanitarian assistance is mentioned in the Council Conclusions on the Strategic Framework, as it states that “[t]he EU remains deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis affecting...the Horn of Africa”¹³⁹ and “will continue to provide neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian assistance”¹⁴⁰. These principles seem to set humanitarian aid apart from other external action policies, but do not prevent that it should be “conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union”¹⁴¹, stating that cooperation and consistency between different policy fields should be pursued. Thus, humanitarian aid policy should also be part of a coherent and comprehensive approach between external action policies. This section traces the notion of coherence in humanitarian policy, using the Strategic Framework as a starting point.

In the Strategic Framework, humanitarian policy is part of the comprehensive approach, since it is one of the policies which can respond to crises as discussed above. More importantly, the Council “highlights the need to address the underlying causes of the current humanitarian crisis in particular to structural food insecurity [and] recurrent drought”¹⁴². Considering this need, the Strategic Framework calls for “strengthening [the region’s] resilience to disasters, linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) for a long-term perspective”¹⁴³. There is obvious tension with the foundation of humanitarian aid. LRRD policy aims to increase

¹³⁵ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 6.

¹³⁶ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 7.

¹³⁷ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 7.

¹³⁸ Council of the European Union. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 7.

¹³⁹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2.

¹⁴⁰ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2.

¹⁴¹ Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 26 October 2012, Part five, Title 1, article 205.

¹⁴² Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3.

¹⁴³ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 16.

resilience: it is future oriented, aimed at prevention of for example famine, instead of response to famine. Moreover, the long-term perspective seems ad odds with the short-term objective of humanitarian aid, as well as the notion to link development aid and humanitarian aid: since development aid is guided by political or security objectives, linking these two can compromise the impartiality and independence of humanitarian aid.

Despite these tensions between humanitarian aid and development aid, LRRD has been a long-standing policy, first developed in 1996¹⁴⁴ to address the gap when moving from humanitarian aid to development assistance. More recently, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (hereinafter ‘The Consensus’)¹⁴⁵ discusses LRRD policy. The Action Plan to implement The Consensus comprised six areas of action. Area 5: Enhancing coherence and coordination¹⁴⁶ refers to LRRD as “LRRD challenges are tackled by applying a policy mix of humanitarian, stabilization and development interventions which ensure the coherence of European interventions”¹⁴⁷. One of these challenges is “[r]ecovery and reconstruction in the aftermath of a disaster...which requires structural and development action beyond immediate emergency aid. Thus it is important to ensure that humanitarian, development and other relevant aid instruments work better together”¹⁴⁸. LRRD “requires humanitarian and development actors to coordinate...and to act in parallel”¹⁴⁹ and to address “improved cooperation between humanitarian aid development agencies and other aid actors, including the international community, in particular at field level and in situations of fragility”¹⁵⁰.

As formulated in The Consensus and its Action Plan, LRRD thus informs humanitarian aid policy in fragile contexts and humanitarian crisis and links humanitarian aid, development aid and *other aid instruments*. While these other aid instruments are not further specified, it is possible that this refers to the stabilization interventions which are mentioned in the Action Plan. Secondly, LRRD draws attention to the importance of coordination between the different policy as well as increased cooperation: external action policies are thus not only expected to coordinate with each other, but are expected to cooperate to increase the continuity between the policies and thus consistency and coherence. In The Consensus, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development thus already contained a strong notion of coherence and comprehensiveness between different policy fields, which was reinforced by including LRRD in the Strategic Framework to address the interlocked challenges.

¹⁴⁴ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 5.

¹⁴⁵ European Commission 9 April 2010. Commission Staff Working Paper. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Annual Report on the Humanitarian Aid Policy and its Implementation in 2009 COM(2010)138, 5.

¹⁴⁶ European Commission 9 April 2010. Commission Staff Working Paper. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Annual Report on the Humanitarian Aid Policy and its Implementation in 2009 COM(2010)138, 4.

¹⁴⁷ European Commission 9 April 2010. Commission Staff Working Paper. Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Annual Report on the Humanitarian Aid Policy and its Implementation in 2009 COM(2010)138, 5.

¹⁴⁸ Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 30 January 2008. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, article 77.

¹⁴⁹ Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 30 January 2008. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, article 77.

¹⁵⁰ Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 30 January 2008. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, article 78.

4.4. Synthesis

This chapter has analysed the articulation of coherence and comprehensiveness using the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa as a critical event in stabilizing the discourse on these two notions. Both CFSP missions and humanitarian policy actions are discussed in the Strategic Framework as contributing to the EU objective to address the interlocked challenges of the region to ensure lasting peace, stabilization and prosperity. By linking the challenges in the region to each other, the Strategic Framework justifies taking a comprehensive approach – with horizontal coherence as a central element – to the region, linking its different external action policies to each other. However, the understanding of coherence and comprehensiveness in the framework built up on earlier notions, which can be found in the Council Decisions on CFSP missions and The Consensus.

In the analysis of the two policy areas – CFSP and humanitarian policy – it becomes clear that their respective actions relate to the articulation of a comprehensive approach in the Strategic Framework. In relation to CFSP missions, the articulation of a comprehensive approach built upon earlier articulations: there is thus a continuation of the understanding of what entails such an approach, starting from political, security and humanitarian aspects towards an elaborate framework of interlocked challenges set out in the Strategic Framework. Moreover, this common discourse is reflected in what the CFSP missions aim to achieve: the objective of Atalanta supports the development of an accountable government and rule of law by prevent and deter acts of piracy, while EUTM Somalia contributes to these objectives by training Somali security forces. The third mission, EUCAP Somalia, contributes to accountable government and rule of law, by supporting the development of security institutions. Regarding humanitarian policy, LRRD contributes to the objective to reduce poverty and food insecurity, which is an integral element of the articulated comprehensive approach in the Strategic framework. Thus, the articulation of the objectives of the missions and LRRD support a comprehensive approach towards Somalia as formulated in the Strategic Framework.

The articulation of coherence has been more diverse: regarding Atalanta, coherence referenced to internal coherence. With the launch of a second mission (EUTM Somalia), the discourse shifted towards on the one hand to horizontal coherence between EU external action, while on the other hand external coherence became more articulated. Moreover, LRRD stresses the importance of horizontal coherence between different policy fields. The launch of the Strategic Framework in 2011 produced a hegemonic understanding of coherence as continuity and coherence between all EU policies which operated in the region as well as external coherence, thus underlining the importance of horizontal and external aspects of coherence for EU's engagement with Somalia.

Thus, the Strategic Framework solidified a common understanding of coherence and a comprehensive approach in relation to humanitarian policy and CFSP policy in the Horn of Africa. In both policy fields, a similar discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach developed, underlining the importance of horizontal coherence between different external action policies to facilitate a comprehensive approach. In the Horn of Africa – and thus Somalia – this comprehensive approach built upon humanitarian, security and political aspects which were earlier identified in the CFSP missions as well as in The Consensus: the articulation of the comprehensive approach shows strong intertextual links to earlier policies. The discourse found in the Strategic Framework continued the understanding of a comprehensive approach. For coherence, the more diverse articulations found in earlier texts made place for a discourse focused on horizontal coherence.

5. Coherence: Operations Centre, SHARE, and the Comprehensive Approach

The previous chapter has shown that the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa has had considerable influence on the discursive production of coherence and comprehensiveness in EU's external action. The discourse on coherence became primarily understood as horizontal coherence between the different external action policies of the EU, while the understanding of a comprehensive approach to the region – and thus Somalia – continued to elaborate and specify on the political, security and humanitarian aspects identified in the recitals on Atalanta, which became institutionalized in the Strategic Framework as the interlocked challenges. In this chapter, the implementation of the Strategic Framework is analysed in the first section to investigate how this hegemonic discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness has informed CFSP policy by analysing the EU Operations Centre. The second section analyses SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience as an implementation of the Strategic Framework in humanitarian policy. The third section turns back to the Strategic Framework to investigate the continuation of the discourse in the 2013 EU wide Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises and the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 for implementation of the Strategic Framework. The fourth section investigates the discourse found in the two implementations of the Strategic Framework in connection to the continuation of the discourse discussed the section three. The fifth section concludes.

5.1. CFSP policy: the EU Operations Centre

The launch of the EU Operations Centre in for the Horn of Africa (hereinafter the Operations Centre) in 2012 is one concrete example of the implementation of the Strategic Framework as “[t]he EU Operations Centre should facilitate coordination and improve synergies amongst the Horn of Africa CFSP missions and operation in the context of the Strategic Framework”¹⁵¹. More specifically, the Operations Centre aims to enhance coherence between CFSP missions as to “provide, using its military expertise and specialised planning expertise, direct support to the Civilian Operations Commander for the operational planning and conduct of the RMCB [EUCAP Somalia] mission; to provide support to the EUTM Mission Commander and enhance strategic coordination between EUTM Somalia and the other CSDP mission and operation in the Horn of Africa; [and] to liaise with Operation Atalanta”¹⁵². The Operations Centre aims to increase the coordination and cooperation between the three CFSP missions by providing “support in the field of operational planning and conduct...with a view to increasing efficiency, coordination and strengthen civil-military synergies”¹⁵³, as well as to increase the missions’ strategic capacity “to provide support to the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), at its request, in its strategic planning for the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa”¹⁵⁴. Moreover, the relevance of the Operations Centre for ensuring coherence is recognized in amendments of CFSP missions. In an amendment of EUTM Somalia for example, “[t]he EU military mission shall maintain and enhance coordination with EUNAVOR ATALANTA and EUCAP Nestor. The EU Operations Centre shall...facilitate such

¹⁵¹ Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, whereas (10).

¹⁵² Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, article 2.2.

¹⁵³ Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, article 2.1.

¹⁵⁴ Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, article 2.2

coordination and information exchange”¹⁵⁵. For EUCAP Somalia, The Operations Centre is recited in the decision to establish the capacity building mission¹⁵⁶.

On comprehensiveness, the relevance of the Operations Centre is confirmed in several Council Conclusions. In its Conclusions of 1 December 2011, the Council confirms that “[t]he Lisbon Treaty offers a strong framework...for the EU to act as an effective and coherent actor. The creation of the [EEAS], and the integration of CFSP structures within it...is a key step in ensuring a more coherent, strategic and synergetic use of all EU policy instruments”¹⁵⁷ and “[t]he Council stressed that improving CSDP will also require significant improvement in the EU’s performance in planning and conducting CSDP civilian missions and military operations”¹⁵⁸. On 18 January 2012, the Council reinforced the need for an Operations Centre as “[t]he simultaneous conduct of three CSDP actions in the region will require an enhanced level of coordination and interaction, including between military and civilian actors. In this regard, the activation of the Operations Center will contribute to reinforcing the EU’s comprehensive approach that mobilizes the different tools at the EU’s disposal and to improving the performance of the existing EU CSDP structures and of its missions and operations”¹⁵⁹. In these Council Conclusions, the Strategic Framework is not explicitly mentioned, nor the interlocked challenges that constitute the comprehensive approach. However, the comprehensive approach is discussed on more general terms, as more coherent, strategic and synergetic use of all EU policy instruments and mobilizing the different tools at the EU’s disposal. Moreover, the Council Conclusions underline that the Operations Centre will contribute to the comprehensive approach. The implementation of the Operations Centre and the Strategic Framework is reflected in the Annual report of 2012 by the HR on CFSP policy: “the EU has actively sought to implement its Strategic Framework...in further pursuit of the comprehensive approach of its actions in the region”¹⁶⁰. The CFSP missions “contributed significantly to achieving the objectives of the Strategic Framework”¹⁶¹, while the Operations Centre complemented these efforts by supporting “the planning and facilitate[ing] coordination EU CSDP missions and operations”¹⁶². Thus, the Operations Centre complemented and enhanced the effectiveness of the CFSP missions and contributed to the comprehensive approach in the region as formulated in the Strategic Framework.

5.2. Humanitarian policy: SHARE

11 April 2012, the European Commission publicised the Staff Working Document (SWD) SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, stating that “there is a need to follow on from humanitarian intervention and to strategically build resilience to food security and malnutrition

¹⁵⁵ Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, article 7.3.

¹⁵⁶ Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), whereas (4).

¹⁵⁷ Council of the European Union 1 December 2011. Council Conclusions on CSDP, article 29.

¹⁵⁸ Council of the European Union 1 December 2011. Council Conclusions on CSDP, article 30.

¹⁵⁹ Council of the European Union 18 January 2012 Council Conclusions on the Activation of the Ops Centre, article 1.

¹⁶⁰ Council of the European Union 16 October 2013. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 78.

¹⁶¹ Council of the European Union 16 October 2013. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 79.

¹⁶² Council of the European Union 16 October 2013. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 79.

in the Horn of Africa”¹⁶³ and that “building resilience is an issue both for humanitarian and development actors”¹⁶⁴. The SWD “may serve as a background to future work on [SHARE], involving EU short-term contributions...as well as consideration of priority themes and sectors for longer term interventions in the region, involving improved cooperation”¹⁶⁵. SHARE is one of the policies developed in reaction to the Strategic Framework, to implement LRRD policies¹⁶⁶. This section first discusses how notions of coherence and comprehensiveness can be identified within SHARE and how these notions are related to the Strategic Framework, followed by the proposed actions for implementation of SHARE.

5.2.1. Coherence and comprehensiveness

The notion of coherence is clearly present in SHARE: to increase the effectiveness of EU assistance for resilience in the region, SHARE “must include three general aspects: ...improving the link between humanitarian and development assistance...a clear articulation between regional and national level and...coordination”¹⁶⁷. The first aspect – improving the link between humanitarian aid and development aid – indicates that horizontal coherence needs to be improved between humanitarian and development aid. This need is intertextually supported as in “an agenda for Change, the Commission stresses the aim for the EU to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian aid and crisis response to long-term development assistance. Moreover, both the EU food security policy and humanitarian food assistance policy indicated the importance of close linkage between humanitarian actors and instruments in enhancing food security”¹⁶⁸. Thus, the need to link humanitarian and development assistance is identified by the Commission and by the Council. The second and third refer to external coherence, as “a regional approach should be taken on common issues and cross-border themes. This would involve partnership agreements with and support to regional bodies...Such a regional approach should be combined with specific national level interventions...aligned to regionally and nationally owned plans”¹⁶⁹. Regarding coordination “[a] broad partnership approach is required, involving international agencies, other development partners, organizations of producers, regional, national and local authorities, private sector and NGOs”¹⁷⁰. With the development of SHARE, the articulated discourse on coherence continued, rearticulating the importance of horizontal coherence as well as external coherence.

On a comprehensive approach, SHARE reflects the interlocked challenges found in the Strategic Framework. “A number of factors contribute to growing vulnerability of livelihoods – including rural poverty, low productivity, insecure access to land, weak governance, insecurity and pro-longed geo-political instability”¹⁷¹. These factors clearly resemble some of

¹⁶³ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 2.

¹⁶⁴ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 2.

¹⁶⁵ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 2-3.

¹⁶⁶ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 4.

¹⁶⁷ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 4.

¹⁶⁸ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 5.

¹⁶⁹ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 6.

¹⁷⁰ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 6.

¹⁷¹ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 3.

the interlocked challenges of the Strategic Framework, such as persistent poverty, weak governance and absence of the rule of law. Moreover, “the causes of the crisis are complex and interrelated”¹⁷² which, similarly to the Strategic Framework, links the challenges together, reinforcing the need for a comprehensive approach. One of these causes, climate change, is used to exemplify this complexity and interrelatedness. A steady decrease in average rainfall and increasing variability (as a consequence of climate change) has “in combination with population growth...increased overall pressure on natural resources in the region, with visible signs of unsustainable resource exploitation, environmental degradation and escalating insecurity”¹⁷³. Comprehensiveness in SHARE thus builds upon the discourse in the Strategic Framework, reinforcing the need for a comprehensive approach in general and specifically to increase resilience.

5.2.2. Actions for implementation

In contrast to the Strategic Framework, SHARE proposes measures to increase horizontal coherence for Horn of Africa resilience policies. To link humanitarian and development policies, progress can be achieved by “focusing the use of humanitarian and development assistance on respective comparative advantages...encouraging 'cross-learning' of humanitarian and development experiences in projects supporting resilience; and organising early exchanges of information and opinions between humanitarian and development services on all proposed 'resilience' programmes and projects”¹⁷⁴. In Somalia, both humanitarian and development policies are implemented: “in order to address the severe food insecurity...emergency food assistance initiatives...comprise a combination of large-scale interventions (food aid) associated with livelihood support, cash transfer activities and voucher systems (for water, seeds and tools etc)”¹⁷⁵. Moreover, “[s]ome recovery assistance is directed towards farmers and herders”¹⁷⁶, an area where development assistance is also taking place as “funding in [development policy] is geared towards natural resource management [and] animal health and veterinary services delivery”¹⁷⁷. Thus, both humanitarian and development policies are working on increasing livelihoods in Somalia, warranting the need for “[c]lose coordination between the various humanitarian and development assistance tools...to avoid inconsistencies or overlaps concerning for instance livelihood support and cash- as well as voucher-based safety nets”¹⁷⁸.

5.3. The Strategic Framework: implementation and the Comprehensive Approach

As shown above, both SHARE and the Operations Centre built upon the discourse on horizontal and external coherence as set out in the Strategic Framework. It is relevant to research how the discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach of the Strategic

¹⁷² European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 3.

¹⁷³ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 4.

¹⁷⁴ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 5.

¹⁷⁵ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 10.

¹⁷⁶ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 10.

¹⁷⁷ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 10.

¹⁷⁸ European Commission 11 April 2012. Staff working document. SHARE: Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience, 10.

Framework has developed after its launch in 2011, as it is a critical event in the discourse. The development of the discourse is analysed by investigating the intertextual links between the Strategic Framework, its EU Horn of Africa Region Action Plan 2015-2020 (hereinafter 2015 Action Plan) and the 2013 ‘EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’.

The discursive production of the notion of comprehensiveness in the Strategic Framework has had considerable influence, found in the Comprehensive Approach as “the concept of a comprehensive approach is not new as such. It has already been successfully applied as the organizing principle for EU action in many cases in recent years, for example, in the Horn of Africa”¹⁷⁹. In this communication, the challenges which make the case for the comprehensive approach are defined as the “effects of climate change and degradation of natural resources, population pressures and migratory flows, illicit trafficking, energy security, natural disasters, cyber security, maritime security, regional conflicts, radicalisation and terrorism”¹⁸⁰. These challenges reflect most of the interlocked challenges articulated in the Strategic Framework, while the influence of the Strategic Framework is also visible in the preferred reaction: “the EU has a wide array of policies, tools and instruments at its disposal – spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields”¹⁸¹, reflecting the policies present in the Strategic Framework.

On coherence, the Comprehensive Approach recalls the Lisbon Treaty as “the Treaty calls for consistency between the different areas of EU external action [and] the EU has both the increased potential and ambition – by drawing on the full range of its instruments and resources – to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic”¹⁸². To reach this, the Comprehensive Approach “covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises; through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building”¹⁸³ to “further the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action and policy”¹⁸⁴. The Comprehensive Approach underlines that “[a] coherent political strategy...starts with all relevant players sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge”¹⁸⁵. This shared analysis should be advanced by “strengthen[ing] early, pro-active, transparent and regular information-sharing, co-ordination and team-work among all those responsible in the EU’s Brussels headquarters

¹⁷⁹ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 11 December 2013. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 2.

¹⁸⁰ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 11 December 2013. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 3.

¹⁸¹ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 3.

¹⁸² European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 2.

¹⁸³ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 2.

¹⁸⁴ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 5.

¹⁸⁵ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 5.

and in the field (including...CFSP missions and operations [and] EU agencies as appropriate) [and] develop and systematically implement a common methodology to conflict and crisis analysis, including development, humanitarian, political, security and defence perspectives”¹⁸⁶. Thus, the notion of coherence in the Comprehensive Approach explicitly refers horizontal coherence between CFSP policies and humanitarian policies (among others) to increase the effectiveness of EU external action when applying a comprehensive approach. Horizontal coherence thus facilitates a comprehensive approach, which the EU deems necessary to address the (interlocked) challenges of conflict and crises.

However, the intertextuality between these two documents is not one-way: the Strategic Framework has not only informed the Comprehensive Approach, but the Comprehensive Approach has informed the 2015 Action Plan, which “seeks to implement the EU strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, taking into account new challenges”¹⁸⁷. The interlocked challenges “identified in the Strategic Framework...remain entirely relevant today...[t]hese factors combine to produce chronic instability in the region. Yet since 2011, three further issues affecting EU interests in the region have gained particular salience: the influence of the wider region on the Horn of Africa; radicalisation; and migration and forced displacement”¹⁸⁸. These three additional challenges reflect the challenges identified in the Comprehensive Approach: The influence on the wider region relates to the challenge of regional conflicts as “the Horn of Africa also retains a significant risk of inter-state conflict [while] [t]he internal dynamics of the region are themselves affected by broader supra-regional dynamics”¹⁸⁹. The second challenge of radicalization is present in both documents and linked to terrorism as “[v]arious forms of violent extremism have increased across the Horn of Africa in recent years...The most sophisticated exponent of violent extremism, Al-Shabaab, continues to attract recruits from Somali communities throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond”¹⁹⁰. The third challenge, migration and forced displacement has already been acknowledged in the Strategic Framework, but its importance has been heightened by referencing the Comprehensive Approach by focusing on migration *flows*: “[t]he countries of the Horn of Africa are both a source of, and a transit route for, unprecedented migration flows...Significant numbers of refugees leave their country to escape from violent conflict, political persecution or environmental catastrophes...In some cases, refugees fall victim to grave abuses at the hands of traffickers *en route*”¹⁹¹. The Action Plan echoes the identified challenge of migratory flows, but also illicit trafficking of the Comprehensive approach. Thus, the understanding of a comprehensive approach in the 2015 Action Plan – and in extension the Strategic Framework – has been informed by the Comprehensive Approach with three additional challenges. The discourse on comprehensiveness has continued with the Comprehensive Approach and the 2015 Action Plan, reinforcing the interlocked challenges which warrant a comprehensive approach. On coherence, both policy documents continued the identified need for horizontal coherence to increase the effectiveness of EU external action in implementing a comprehensive approach.

¹⁸⁶ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 11 December 2013. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 5.

¹⁸⁷ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 4.

¹⁸⁸ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 7.

¹⁸⁹ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 7.

¹⁹⁰ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 8-9.

¹⁹¹ Council of the European Union 26 October 2015. EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, 9 (emphasis in original).

5.4. Continuation of coherence: SHARE and the Operations Centre

The implementation of humanitarian policy via SHARE has also influenced the development of an overall approach to resilience in 2012: the EU approach to Resilience – learning from Food Security Crises. In this communication, the interlocked challenges are articulated as “[t]he effects of economic shocks, rising and fluctuating food prices, demographic pressure, climate change, desertification, environmental degradation, pressure on natural resources, inappropriate land tenure systems, insufficient investment in agriculture, have, in many parts of the world, resulted in greater exposure to risk”¹⁹², echoing the factors contributing to growing vulnerability as articulated in SHARE: poverty, low productivity, insecure land access, climate change and environmental degradation. The communication displays similar intertextually as SHARE with the EU Agenda for Change and food security communications¹⁹³ and strongly builds upon SHARE as “the Commission has recently taken two initiatives: Supporting Horn of African Resilience (SHARE) and "Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience Sahel" (AGIR). These set out a new approach to building up the resilience of vulnerable people. The purpose of this Communication is to use the lessons from these experiences to improve the effectiveness of the EU's support to reducing vulnerability”¹⁹⁴ and “the EU is developing and implementing innovative responses to the crises in the Horn of Africa...which should provide valuable lessons for a more systematic and long-term approach to building the resilience of affected populations”¹⁹⁵.

Regarding coherence, the communication continues the identified need for coherence between humanitarian and development policies as “[s]trengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance”¹⁹⁶. Second, the communication states that “enhancing resilience calls for a long-term approach, based on alleviating the underlying causes conducive to crises”¹⁹⁷: next to linking humanitarian and development policies, the communication furthers the need to take a long-term perspective. Third, the communication reinforces the prominence of LRRD in SHARE as it “represent[s] an improvement in the way humanitarian and development assistance interact, boosting the levels of assistance in the short-term, facilitating the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)”¹⁹⁸. The identified action in SHARE to increase horizontal coherence – improving the link between humanitarian and development policies – is rearticulated in the communication as “[t]he Commission will moreover strive for joint programming of the resilience-related actions in its humanitarian and development assistance so as to ensure maximum complementarity, and to ensure that short-term actions lay the groundwork for medium and long-term interventions”¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹² European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 2.

¹⁹³ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 2.

¹⁹⁴ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises. Crises, 3.

¹⁹⁵ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 5.

¹⁹⁶ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 5.

¹⁹⁷ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 5.

¹⁹⁸ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 7.

¹⁹⁹ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 12.

In 2017, a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action launched an overarching policy towards resilience, resembling the Comprehensive Approach of 2013. Building upon the 2012 communication, and in extension SHARE and the Strategic Framework, the communication states that the EU "will place a greater emphasis on addressing protracted crises, the risks of violent conflict and other structural pressures including environmental degradations, climate change, migration and forced displacement"²⁰⁰. Thus, this communication shows intertextual links with the challenges warranting a comprehensive approach in the Strategic Framework, its 2015 Action Plan and the Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, the "EU's current model of addressing crises needs to become better attuned to a situation where poverty, population growth, climate change, rapid urbanization, competition for limited resources conflict and violent extremism are creating whole regions of instability"²⁰¹, resembling the challenges identified in the texts above as well as the result of these challenges: instability. On coherence, "the division of labour between humanitarian aid and development cooperation has been changing...The EU should prioritise and enhance close cooperation of EU political, humanitarian and development actors on protracted crises"²⁰².

For CFSP policy, the launch of the Operations Centre aimed to increase horizontal coherence between CFSP missions in Somalia, as well as between these missions and other Commission operations. In the 2013 report of the HR, the Operations Centre is commended as "[t]he EU Operations Centre coordinated and strengthened civil-military synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa and facilitated the EU's comprehensive approach in the region"²⁰³. Moreover, it "plays a useful role...in providing their respective commanders [of the three missions in Somalia] with information on other EU activities"²⁰⁴, while in 2014, The Council highlights "the added value provided by the activated EU Operations Centre"²⁰⁵.

Regarding comprehensiveness, the interlocked challenges are not explicitly recalled in the Council Decision, but the Operations Centre should contribute to the comprehensive approach as formulated in the Strategic Framework. The Operations Centre articulated understanding of the comprehensiveness is thus related to the interlocked challenges. Moreover, the launch of the Comprehensive Approach in 2013 is referred in these documents, as "the EU, collectively, is taking towards an increasingly comprehensive approach in its external action...Having various tools at the EU's disposal and the ability to approach each crisis in a tailor-made fashion is one of EU's greatest strengths. The comprehensive approach is being implemented including by several missions and operations"²⁰⁶. The importance of CFSP policy is stressed as "[s]tability of the Horn of Africa is another major priority...Within the framework of the Comprehensive Approach, CSDP missions will remain at the heart of our activity in this

²⁰⁰ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action, 4.

²⁰¹ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action, 7.

²⁰² European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action, 7.

²⁰³ Council of the European Union 23 July 2014. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 106.

²⁰⁴ Council of the European Union 23 July 2014. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 203.

²⁰⁵ Council Conclusions on CFSP 18 November 2014, 7.

²⁰⁶ Council of the European Union 23 July 2014. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 202.

region”²⁰⁷ and “The EU and its Member States, through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other policies and instruments, have a strong role to play through its unique comprehensive approach to preventing and managing conflicts and their causes”²⁰⁸. Thus, CFSP missions and operations – and thus the Operations Centre – firmly support the comprehensive approach, and the Council Conclusions and CFSP reports place CFSP at the heart of such a comprehensive approach. Moreover, the CFSP report implicitly acknowledges the need for horizontal coherence between CFSP mission and other EU action as the missions are implemented within the framework of a comprehensive approach such as the Strategic Framework and its 2015 Action Plan.

5.5. Synthesis

The analysis of the Strategic Framework regarding the discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach in the previous chapter has shown that with the Strategic Framework, the discourse on horizontal coherence became hegemonic. Both for humanitarian policy as CSFP policy, the discourse on coherence developed from internal coherence as articulated for Atalanta towards external coherence and horizontal coherence as main objectives. This chapter has discussed two implementations of the Strategic Framework, the Operations Centre and SHARE, and how the notion of coherence and comprehensiveness are articulated in these implementations. Secondly, the continuation of these discourses in the 2015 Action Plan and the Comprehensive Approach have been analysed. Thirdly, the development of the Operations Centre and SHARE has been analysed to investigate how the continuation of the discourses has intertextually informed these two implementations.

As discussed above, the decision to launch the EU operations Centre has been informed by the Strategic Framework. The tasks of the Operations Centre aim to contribute to increasing coherence between the three CFSP missions. This can be interpreted as a reference to internal coherence, since all missions fall within the CFSP framework. However, since all three missions are established with separate decisions and support different objectives of the Strategic Framework, the Operations Centre can also be interpreted as aiming to increase horizontal coherence within the CFSP framework. Moreover, in its CFSP report in July 2012, the HR reflects on the Operations Centre as “[t]he activation of the Operation Centre for the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa... will contribute to making a more optimal use of existing resources in the (military) support of the EUCAP [Somalia] mission and thus greater efficiency through better information exchange and improved coordination with ATALANTA and EUTM and between our operations and Commission projects”²⁰⁹. The Operations Centre should thus not only increase efficiency, information exchange and coordination between the CFSP missions, but also *between* these missions and Commission projects, thus stressing the need to increase horizontal coherence between CFSP policies and among others, humanitarian policy. In humanitarian policy, the launch of SHARE in 2012 built strongly on the Strategic Framework. It recognized the need for horizontal coherence between humanitarian and development assistance to increase the effectiveness of EU action, by using the comparative advantages of each policy, to increase cross-learning and increase early coordination when planning both humanitarian and development actions. However, a need for external coherence was identified between EU policy – via SHARE – and policies of regional and international actors, as well as NGOs. Thus, the need for coherence has been articulated

²⁰⁷ Council of the European Union 23 July 2014 Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 213.

²⁰⁸ Council Conclusions on CFSP 18 November 2014, 2.

²⁰⁹ Council of the European Union 16 October 2013. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 5.

referencing horizontal and external coherence to increase the resilience populations in the Horn of Africa.

The notion of comprehensiveness is less articulated regarding the Operations Centre. The Strategic Framework is recited as one of the reasons for establishing the Operations Centre, but the understanding of a comprehensive approach as the interlocked challenges is not explicit. Instead, comprehensiveness is utilized to refer to comprehensiveness between all EU policy instruments to increase the coherent, strategic and synergetic use of EU policies, which resembles the 2013 Comprehensive Approach. However, the 2012 annual report recalls the importance of the Strategic Approach for the Operations Centre for CFSP missions in the region and the complementary role of the Operations Centre, which indicates that the interlocked challenges articulated in the Strategic Framework inform the understanding of a comprehensive approach for the Operations Centre. For humanitarian policy, SHARE resonates the interlocked challenges of the Strategic Framework as building blocks of a comprehensive approach, stressing the influence of these challenges on vulnerability and food insecurity of peoples in the region.

With the launch of the Comprehensive Approach in 2013, the notion of comprehensiveness was – similar to the Strategic Framework – formulated as a necessary response to challenges hindering the development of a region. Recalling the interlocked challenges articulated in the Strategic Framework, the Comprehensive Approach added new challenges of which three are relevant in relation to the Strategic Framework: regional conflict, radicalization and migration flows. In the 2015 Action Plan, these three challenges were added to the interlocked challenges hindering peace, security and development in the region leading to chronic instability. Thus, the interlocked challenges articulated in the Strategic Framework continued to inform the understanding of a comprehensive approach. However, the Comprehensive Approach broadened this understanding by specifying the need to address the entire response-cycle from preparedness to reconstruction. The combination of the interlocked challenges – warranting involvement of a wide range of actors and policies – with a focus to address the entire response-cycle is used to call for horizontal coherence.

As shown above, SHARE has had considerable influence on the development of a general approach to increasing resilience, first with the 2012 communication and in 2017 with the Strategic Approach to Resilience. SHARE is explicitly mentioned in both documents as a pilot project from which lessons need to be learned to inform a general approach to resilience. In both texts, the interlocked challenges constitute a comprehensive approach and warrant the need for horizontal coherence between humanitarian and development policy. With the strategic approach to resilience, the interlocked challenges relate to the challenges articulated in the Comprehensive Approach and the 2015 Action Plan. Thus, there is a continuation of the discourse on comprehensiveness found in SHARE, building upon An agenda for Change, Food Security Communications, the Strategic Framework and its 2015 Action Plan, and the Comprehensive Approach. The discourse on horizontal coherence is similarly continued: all documents call for increasing the cooperation, coordination and complementarity between humanitarian and development policies. Moreover, in the strategic approach to resilience, the need to increase horizontal coherence between humanitarian, development *and* political actors is identified.

Regarding the Operations Centre, the understanding of comprehensiveness is less explicit. However, it is intertextually linked to the Strategic Approach and the Comprehensive Approach and thus implicitly shares the understanding of a comprehensive approach as the interlocked challenges. The Operations Centre contributes to horizontal coherence by collecting and sharing information about all EU activities in the region, and thereby improving the civil-

military synergies. Moreover, it contributes to the implementation of the comprehensive approach, thus supporting addressing the interlocked challenges.

6. Politicization

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, politicization takes place when political considerations compromise the principles of humanitarian aid: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian aid and policies should provide life-saving assistance based on need, regardless of gender, religion or political affiliation, without any preference of the outcome of a conflict and independence from (external) actors with a stake in the outcome of a conflict. This chapter analyses the discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness discussed in the previous two chapters to investigate how the discourse can indicate politicization of humanitarian aid. The first section discusses how the discourse on coherence influences the humanitarian principles guiding EU humanitarian aid. Section two discusses indications of developmentalization in EU engagement with Somalia, followed by a discussion on militarization and instrumentalization in section three. The fourth section concludes the chapter.

6.1. humanitarian principles and coherence

In the context of EU's humanitarian policies towards the Horn of Africa, the adherence to the principles of neutrality and independence is fragile, despite their presence in the Lisbon Treaty and the TFEU. In the Lisbon Treaty, the general provisions for external action state that “[t]he Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by...respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”²¹⁰. Moreover, the TFEU states that “[h]umanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and non-discrimination”²¹¹. While not directly providing assistance to those in need, humanitarian funds are divided amongst implementing organizations based on humanitarian policies developed by the EU. SHARE, as an off-shoot of the Strategic Framework, thus guides the division of funds. Specifically, this connection between the Strategic Framework and SHARE can impede the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, because SHARE aims to contribute the overall objective of the EU in the region: “to support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government”²¹². This objective has clear political considerations and by extension, funding for humanitarian assistance could – through SHARE – include political considerations and advantage one of the conflicting parties. For the principle of independence, the same problem occurs: the objective of the EU as formulated in the Strategic Framework combined with the reasons for EU engagement in the region as “[t]he EU’s interests in the Horn of Africa are defined by the region’s geo-strategic importance, the EU’s historic engagement with the countries of the region, its desire to support the welfare of the people and help lift them from poverty into self-sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region”²¹³ can impede independence. The EU has an interest to increase peace, stability and prosperity, which impedes on the independence of humanitarian policies by the assignment of humanitarian funds.

Thus, both the neutrality and independence of EU humanitarian assistance are fragile. This fragile position of humanitarian assistance is implicitly recognized in the Council Conclusions by referencing the principles underpinning humanitarian assistance: “[t]he Council calls on all

²¹⁰ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 26 October 2012, title V, Chapter 1, article 21.1.

²¹¹ Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 26 October 2012, Chapter 5, Title III, article 214.2.

²¹² Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 6.

²¹³ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3.

parties to comply fully with international humanitarian law and the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence”²¹⁴ and “[t]he EU underlines the importance of allowing the full, safe, independent, timely and unimpeded access of all humanitarian actors to all those in need of assistance, in line with international humanitarian principles”²¹⁵. Moreover, the Strategic Framework contains similar references as “the EU is providing needs based humanitarian assistance...fully in line with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence”²¹⁶. By referencing humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law in the treaties and the Strategic Framework, the EU aims to safeguard the special position of humanitarian aid in its approach towards the Horn of Africa.

6.2. Developmentalization

However, the strive for horizontal coherence could increase this fragile position of the principles, since it warrants increased cooperation and coordination between the EU external actions policy fields as well as synergies between these policies. Despite recalling its principles, humanitarian aid has the potential to, through horizontal coherence, become more aligned with political objectives with the launch of the Strategic Framework and its implementation in SHARE. As discussed in the previous chapter, SHARE has been developed in reaction on the Strategic Framework, to increase resilience in the region by furthering coordination and complementarity between humanitarian and development policies. The notion of LRRD further supporting the increased need for horizontal coherence between these two policy fields. Increased complementarity combined with cross-learning and early coordination has the potential to politicize humanitarian aid, by compromising the principled approach of humanitarian assistance to facilitate LRRD policies, leading to a developmentalization of humanitarian aid. Thus, horizontal coherence between humanitarian and development policies within the SHARE framework increase the risk of developmentalization as the Council “stresses the importance of mutually reinforcing linkages between humanitarian and development assistance in building resilience”²¹⁷, while the 2013 annual report of DG ECHO states that it is crucial to “appropriately address longer-term rehabilitation and development needs at the very earliest stages of a humanitarian response. Only if humanitarian and development actors work hand in hand will they have a chance to...genuinely improve the prospects for sustainable development”²¹⁸.

This link between humanitarian and development policy can be described as the humanitarian-development nexus to which SHARE contributes by “improving the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)...and enhancing coordination”²¹⁹ and to which “[t]he Commission is actively working towards improving LRRD and developing stronger cooperation with other Commission services”²²⁰. Moreover, “strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance”²²¹ and “the need for humanitarian

²¹⁴ Council of the European Union 26 May 2008. Draft Council Conclusions on Somalia, 3.

²¹⁵ Council of the European Union 22 July 2013. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 6.

²¹⁶ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 10.

²¹⁷ Council of the European Union 14 May 2012. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 3.

²¹⁸ European Commission 25 September 2013. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2012, 5.

²¹⁹ Council of the European Union 14 May 2012. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 3.

²²⁰ European Commission 25 September 2013. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2012, 5.

²²¹ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 5.

aid...is the highest ever recorded. Whole regions are stuck in a state of protracted crises and fragility...Structural fragility, which has both short-term and long-term socioeconomic and political impacts, needs to be addressed more effectively in order to break recurring cycles of emergencies”²²². These texts take the humanitarian-development nexus even a step further by first reiterating that the Strategic Framework “highlights the need to address the underlying causes of food insecurity, displacement and conflict”²²³, indicating that the causes of food insecurity, displacement and conflict are related. Implicitly, the Council calls not only for linkage between humanitarian and development policies, but also linkage with CFSP policies, since these address the causes of displacement and conflict. Secondly, “the recent severe food crisis in the region serves to underline the importance of a comprehensive approach addressing the security, fragility and development nexus”²²⁴, stressing that the food crisis – a humanitarian crisis – needs to be addressed using CFSP policies to address the causes of such a crisis. Thirdly, in the 2012 EU approach to resilience, the humanitarian-development nexus is related to security as “[w]here violent conflicts exist the resilience strategy and the wider EU political and security approach should be mutually supportive and consistent, and synergies should be developed at the levels of instruments notably the Common Security and Defence Policy instruments”²²⁵, while in the 2017 Strategic Approach to Resilience, the EU should “prioritise and enhance close cooperation of EU political, humanitarian and development actors on protracted crises and protracted displacement”²²⁶. Thus, to increase resilience, humanitarian policy should not only increase its coordination with development policy, but also political and military policy, via CFSP policy.

This humanitarian-development nexus is also supported by the notion of causes or root causes articulated in CFSP documents, the Strategic Framework and DG ECHO’s annual report: the Council “stresses the need to fight the root causes of piracy”²²⁷ and “highlights the need to address the underlying causes of the current humanitarian crises in particular structural food insecurity, recurrent drought and conflict”²²⁸, “the EU will pay special attention to root causes and drivers of conflict, and lagging development”²²⁹ and “EU’s commitment to stronger links between humanitarian and development aspects [is needed], in order to address the both the symptoms and the underlying causes of crises”²³⁰. Root causes are also recalled in relation to resilience as “[b]uilding resilience is a long term effort...is a part of the development process...and need[s] to tackle to root causes of recurrent crises rather than their consequences”²³¹ and resilience is a “broad concept that encompassing all individuals and the

²²² European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action, 6-7.

²²³ Council of the European Union 14 May 2012. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

²²⁴ Council of the European Union 14 May 2012. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

²²⁵ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 11.

²²⁶ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action, 7.

²²⁷ Council of the European Union 27 July 2009. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 3.

²²⁸ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2.

²²⁹ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 4.

²³⁰ European Commission 25 September 2013. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. Annual Report on the European Union’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2012, 14.

²³¹ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 2.

whole of society, that features democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the capacity to reform"²³².

These root causes are the sources of the interlocked challenges comprising the comprehensive approach in the Strategic Framework, the Comprehensive Approach and the 2015 Action Plan and are used stress the humanitarian-development nexus, but also the security-development nexus. In its conclusions of 27 July 2009, the Council “stresses that long term assistance from international partners cannot be effective without a stabilization of the security situation”²³³, while the Council Conclusions of 14 November 2011 explicitly mention the security-development nexus as “the challenges of development are closely linked to those of security”²³⁴. Moreover, “[i]n unstable and fragile countries, where resilience is often weakest, it is also important to ensure that policy initiatives take into account the security- development nexus, thereby encouraging an approach that can promote policy coherence and complementarity”²³⁵ and “[s]ustainable development and poverty eradication require peace and security, and the reverse is equally true...Long term engagement in peace and state building and long-term sustainable development are essential to address the underlying causes of conflict and to build peaceful, resilient societies”²³⁶. The interlocked challenges or root causes are closely linked to both security and development in the texts: progress in one area cannot be reached without taking the other into account. Thus, the discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach identify the humanitarian-development nexus and the security-development nexus as solutions to the interlocked challenges which hamper progress in the Horn of Africa, since the interlocked challenges or root causes have resulted in “a chronic instability in some parts of the region – especially Somalia”²³⁷

6.3. Militarization and instrumentalization

Through the articulation of the two nexuses, the comprehensive approach can – by extension – link humanitarian policy to security objectives: humanitarian and development policy should coordinate and complement each other, while development policy should complement security concerns. This paves the way for the two other forms of politicization: instrumentalization and militarization. Militarization takes place when humanitarian aid is delivered by military actors or when military actors employ humanitarian concerns to support their presence. The mandate of Atalanta plainly exemplifies militarization, since it aims to protect World Food Programme vessels against piracy: the delivery of humanitarian aid is thus facilitated by a military operation. This is also reflected in Council Conclusions on Somalia, as it “commends the sequenced initiatives of some EU members to provide protection to World Food Programme vessels [and] stresses the need for wider participation by the international community in these escorts in order to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somali populations”²³⁸. Moreover, the Operations Centre can increase the risk of militarization, since it contributes to increasing coordination between CFSP missions and Commission programs.

²³² European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action, 3.

²³³ Council of the European Union 27 July 2009. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

²³⁴ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 8.

²³⁵ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 5.

²³⁶ Council of the European Union 23 July 2014. Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 181.

²³⁷ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 8.

²³⁸ Council of the European Union 28 May 2008. Draft Council Conclusions on Somalia, 4.

The indicated risk of developmentalization in SHARE can, when combined with the identified security-development nexus, can lead to instrumentalization of humanitarian aid. Development aid is informed by political considerations, which in the Strategic Framework are identified as to achieve peace, stability, security and prosperity. With the Comprehensive Approach, objective was formulated as “to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development”²³⁹, while the 2017 strategic approach to resilience aims “to identify how a strategic approach to resilience can increase the impact of EU external action and sustain progress towards EU development, humanitarian, foreign and security policy objectives”²⁴⁰. Moreover, the EU engagement with Somalia is firmly informed by these considerations with its support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as “the Transitional Federal Charter provides the only credible framework...in shaping the future of Somalia [and] [t]he Council also welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and local leaders in Mogadishu”²⁴¹ and “[t]he Council reaffirms its support to the Transitional Federal Government [and] calls upon all armed groups to urgently lay down their weapons and join a genuine broad-based dialogue with the TFG”²⁴². In the Strategic Framework, EU’s support for the TFG is mentioned as “the EU provides funding for the Transitional Federal Institutions [and EUTM Somalia] supports the training of Somali National Security Forces”²⁴³. This clear support for the TFG increases the risk of instrumentalization when, as with the Strategic Framework, a comprehensive approach for engagement is implemented. The hegemonic understanding of the comprehensive approach as the interlocked challenges and root causes warrants coordination and complementary action between the different policy fields. With the explicit support of the EU for one of the conflicting parties in Somalia, this coordinated and complementary approach can steer humanitarian aid away from its neutral and impartial principles. This is exaggerated by the risk of developmentalization indicated above, since increasing synergies between humanitarian and development aid in the quest for increasing resilience can be perceived as a political objective, supporting the TFG.

Via SHARE, the EU aims to increase the resilience of vulnerable populations, especially to food insecurity. Food insecurity is related to extreme poverty, and exaggerated by climate change²⁴⁴, which are two of the interlocked challenges or root causes which are part of the comprehensive approach. Addressing these challenges supports the overall objective of the EU, as “persistent poverty...destroys the stability on which economic growth and investment depend [and] the livelihoods...of people affected by extreme poverty and food insecurity...is made worse by...a mix of the effects of climate change and inadequate policy interventions”²⁴⁵. By increasing resilience through utilizing the humanitarian-development nexus, instability and vulnerability as result of the interlocked challenges are addressed, increasing stability and prosperity. Moreover, increasing resilience via SHARE can undo the inadequate policy interventions which have negatively influenced people’s livelihoods, thus supporting the establishment of an accountable government. Thus, the humanitarian-development nexus links humanitarian aid to development aid, which is linked to the political objectives of the EU to

²³⁹ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 11 December 2013. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 2.

²⁴⁰ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action, 2.

²⁴¹ Council of the European Union 26 May 2008. Draft Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

²⁴² Council of the European Union 27 July 2009. Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2.

²⁴³ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 11.

²⁴⁴ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 7.

²⁴⁵ Council of the European Union 14 November 2011. A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 7.

increase peace, stability, prosperity and accountable government. With the explicit support to the TFG, the comprehensive approach as interlocked challenges or root causes increases the risk for instrumentalization of humanitarian aid in Somalia as an instrument to support the TFG.

Next to instrumentalization of humanitarian aid by supporting the TFG, policy documents on resilience indicate a second risk of instrumentalization: effectiveness. In the 2012 approach to resilience, the EU reiterates that joint analytical frameworks “can help improve the impact of the responses to crises [which] identifies the areas, both in terms of sectors and geographic regions, where an enhanced resilience approach could have the most impact”²⁴⁶. Moreover, by “[f]inding short-term interventions that have a long-term impact”²⁴⁷, the need for effective humanitarian action is underlined, which can compromise the principle of neutrality. With the 2017 strategic approach to resilience, the risk of instrumentalization is further enhanced, because the understanding of resilience encompasses political considerations: democracy, accountable government and sustainable development: “[a] resilience approach to the prevention of violent conflict aims at improving interventions, through better understanding of the factors that lead to violent conflict and identifying the endogenous capacities within a society that can allow some communities to resist a drift towards violence. It can give traction to initiatives for peace, and support to local conflict- resolution mechanisms”²⁴⁸. Thus, resilience can contribute to increasing peace, and in extension stability and prosperity, impeding the principle of neutrality.

6.4. Synthesis

The articulation of the humanitarian principles in the Lisbon Treaty, the TFEU, policy documents such as DG ECHO annual reports, SHARE and the Strategic Framework, as well as Council Decisions on CFSP missions provide clear guidance for humanitarian action: humanitarian aid should provide life-saving assistance based on need, regardless of gender, religion or political affiliation, without any preference of the outcome of a conflict and independence from (external) actors with a stake in the outcome of a conflict. In practice however, adherence to these principles is fraught: while the EU does not directly provide humanitarian aid itself, it is collectively the largest donor of humanitarian assistance²⁴⁹. Its funds are divided amongst implementing organizations, based on compatibility with EU policy. The articulated discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness in EU policy in general and humanitarian aid policy in specific, has increased the risk of politicization by stressing the importance of coordination and complementarity between humanitarian policy and other forms of external action, such as development aid and military action via CFSP. Starting with the Strategic Approach, the understanding of a comprehensive approach as interlocked challenges provided the rationale for horizontal coherence, since different policies were deemed applicable to address the same challenges. These challenges are also formulated as root causes, which impede peace, security and development. The understanding of a comprehensive

²⁴⁶ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 10.

²⁴⁷ European Commission 3 October 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, 11.

²⁴⁸ European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 7 June 2017. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action, 8.

²⁴⁹ European Commission 28 Augustus 2014. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. Annual Report on the European’s Union’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2013, 3.

approach as the interlocked challenges in the Strategic Framework became further institutionalized in the Comprehensive Approach which continued and elaborated the hegemonic discourse on a comprehensive approach, since it informed the 2015 Action Plan and the 2017 strategic approach to resilience.

Politicization can be divided in three forms: developmentalization, militarization and instrumentalization. The risk of developmentalization can be identified in SHARE. As a sub-strategy of the Strategic Framework, SHARE aims to increase the complementarity between humanitarian intervention and development assistance to increase the resilience of populations by increasing coordination and cross-learning between the two policy fields. Moreover, to increase resilience, SHARE calls for long-term assistance, extending the presence of humanitarian aid and thus moving beyond short-term live-saving aid, while at the same time integrating development assistance into its programming. Secondly, militarization takes place when military actors are involved in the protection or transport of humanitarian aid. The Atalanta anti-piracy mission clearly displays this form of politicization, since one of its tasks is to protect humanitarian food assistance provided by the World Food Program. Furthermore, the Operations Centre can increase the risk of militarization, since it aims to increase the coordination and complementarity between CFSP missions and other EU actions and thus humanitarian aid.

The third form of politicization, instrumentalization, can also be identified. With the articulation of the humanitarian-development nexus and the development-security nexus, humanitarian assistance can become aligned with political objectives. Moreover, the explicit support for the TFG of Somalia increases the risk of instrumentalization, since the neutrality of EU humanitarian aid can become contested. The Strategic Framework and its 2015 Action Plan, as well as SHARE and the 2017 strategic approach to resilience state the objectives of the EU as supporting peace and accountable government. With the explicit support for the TFG, humanitarian assistance under SHARE can seem to favour those regions where the TFG is present, and consequently decrease its presence in opposition-held territory. Secondly, this risk of instrumentalization can be increased with the focus on the impact of humanitarian aid on the objectives of the EU as supporting accountable government of the TFG. The focus on effectiveness of humanitarian aid can increase the risk of instrumentalization, since it guides the implementation of resilience programs to those areas where they can have the highest impact. Consequently, a focus on effectiveness can impede the impartial and neutral principles. Thirdly, the Operations Centre aims to increase horizontal coherence between CFSP missions and other Commission activities in the region. The three CFSP missions function in support of the TFG as Atalanta contributes to increasing the maritime security, EUTM Somalia contributes to the strengthening of TFG forces by training soldiers²⁵⁰, while EUCAP Somalia assists the authorities in achieving effective organization of maritime security²⁵¹. Thus, by increasing the horizontal coherence between the CFSP missions with an explicit support for the TFG and humanitarian aid, the Operations Centre can increase the risk of instrumentalization of humanitarian aid as favouring the TFG.

²⁵⁰ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces.

²⁵¹ Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR).

7. Conclusion: meaning making in EU's engagement with Somalia

The three previous chapters have discussed the results of the discourse analysis of EU documents on two of its external action policies: humanitarian aid and CFSP missions. This final chapter is dedicated to answering the research question that formed the starting point for the research. Before doing this, it is worthwhile to recall the context, problem statement and research questions, the conceptual framework, methodology and sources. Section four then answers the sub-questions that have guided the research, before answering the central research question in section five. The final section shortly discusses the limitations of the research and provides some avenues for future research.

7.1. Introduction

The European Union's external action is comprised of an array of policies: commercial policy, technical assistance, military action via CFSP, development assistance and humanitarian aid. With the Lisbon Treaty and its accompanying TFEU, the EU committed itself to increase the effectiveness of its external action by increasing the coherence between different policies "denoting the absence of contradictions between different areas on external policy and the establishment of synergies between them" (Orbie, Elsuwege, and Bossuyt 2014, 159). However, the treaties explicitly recognized the difference between humanitarian aid and other external action by dedicating a separate chapter to humanitarian aid. In this chapter, the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are recalled as guiding EU humanitarian aid and policy. Thus, while aiming to increase coherence between external action policies, the EU recognized the special status of humanitarian aid. In 2013, the Commission and the HR published a joint communication guiding external action: the Comprehensive Approach to external action and crises, aiming to increase the effectiveness of EU external action by increasing coherence between all policy fields, including humanitarian aid, which can lead to politicization of humanitarian aid by infringing the humanitarian principles to facilitate coherence with other policies. This possible politicization by the commitment to coherence served as the starting point for the problem statement: how does the EU discursively produce a notion of coherence between its external action, while safeguarding the special position of humanitarian aid set out in the Lisbon Treaty?

To analyse this, the research has conducted a discourse analysis based on EU documents related to its engagement with Somalia. The EU has been engaged with the country since 1994 via the provision of humanitarian aid and has since 2008 deployed three CFSP missions: Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. Both external action policies – humanitarian aid and CFSP policy – are governed differently: humanitarian aid is governed at the supranational level where the European Commission formulates policy, while CFSP engagement is governed on the intergovernmental level, by the Council of the European Union. This long-term engagement and the presence of two differently governed policies provided a suitable case to research the EU discourse on coherence and politicization, which resulted in the following research question: *How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian and foreign policy engagement (via CFDP) with Somalia since 2009, and has this contributed to the politicization of humanitarian aid?*

The central research question is built up out of three sub-questions:

1. How has the EU discursively produced its CFSP policies with regard to Somalia?
2. How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian policies with regard to Somalia?

3. Does the discourse on EU policies regarding Somalia since 2009 display tensions that could indicate a politicization of aid?

7.2. Theory and concepts

To answer the research question, the research developed a conceptual framework built on three concepts: discourse, coherence and politicization of humanitarian aid. Discourses constitute social realities and produce legitimate forms of knowledge. Using Mouffe and Laclau's notion of nodal points, the research identified coherence as a nodal point informing the discourse. Coherence is a central element in EU external action, as formulated in the Lisbon Treaty: with coherence, the EU aims to increase the effectiveness of its external action policies. However, the term coherence is void of meaning when it is not supported by other signs, requirements and objectives. In the EU discourse, the notion of comprehensiveness and a comprehensive approach supported coherence as a nodal point, as well as the formulated objectives in the Strategic Framework, Comprehensive Approach and SHARE. As noted in Chapter two, coherence can be limited by conflicting norms, values and objectives. These differences are most clear between humanitarian policy and CFSP policy and development policy, illustrated by the four humanitarian principles. However, these different norms, values and objectives have not limited the development of a hegemonic discourse on coherence: instead, different norms and values are commended as 'comparative advantages' which allow different policy fields to address the same challenges and increase complementarity, because the policy fields share an objective: to address the interlocked challenges comprising a comprehensive approach. Thus, the discourse on coherence has facilitated coordination and complementarity between different policy fields. However, it has consequently creates the possibility for politicization of humanitarian aid. Charlotte Dany identified three forms of politicization: developmentalization, militarization and instrumentalization, which all have been identified in the discourse on EU engagement with Somalia as a result of the hegemonic understanding of coherence in the discourse.

7.3. Methodology and sources

The research has been informed by discourse theory developed by Mouffe and Laclau, as well as critical discourse analysis. Since discourse theory provided little guidance on discourse analysis as method, analysis has been informed by critical discourse analysis. In her book "Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war" Hansen developed a framework for discourse analysis based on four categories: the number of selves, intertextual model, time period and number of events. For this research, one self has been analysed, the European Union's engagement with Somalia. Within this self, two sub-selves have been identified: humanitarian aid and CFSP policy. Both sub-selves are connected through coherence as a nodal point in the discourse and produce a social reality regarding the EU's engagement with Somalia. As both sub-selves share coherence as a nodal point, this allowed to analyse the discourses in relation to each other to investigate indications of politicization. For the intertextual model, the official discourse of the EU has been analysed, since it is best suited to analyse the development of a discourse on coherence and indications of politicizations. The analysed time period has been informed by the importance of the Lisbon Treaty for coherence in EU external action, resulting in a time period from 2009 until the present day. However, it became clear that the discourse had been articulated before 2009, resulting in the inclusion of some earlier texts in the analysis. The number of events selected to structure the research were informed by inductive analysis of documents, from which three critical events emerged: the Strategic Framework of 2011, SHARE in 2012 and the Comprehensive Approach in 2013.

The research has analysed the EU discourse regarding Somalia using inductive discourse analysis. Starting with the 2013 Comprehensive Approach and the Council Decisions and recited Council Conclusions on CFSP missions, the analysis identified the 2011 Strategic Approach for the Horn of Africa as a critical event in the discourse. In the Strategic Framework, the discourse on coherence became harmonized as referring to horizontal coherence, while the comprehensive approach became firmly understood as interlocked challenges building upon earlier articulations. To analyse if this hegemonic discourse continued, two implementations were analysed: the EU Operations Centre and SHARE, and later documents referring to these implementations, such as the EU approach to resilience, the 2017 strategic approach to resilience and reports by the HR on CFSP. Moreover, the continuation of the discourse in the 2015 Action Plan has been analysed to investigate the discursive influence of the second and third critical event – SHARE and the Comprehensive Approach – on EU engagement with Somalia.

7.4. Sub-research questions

This research has aimed to analyse the discursive production of the European Union's engagement with Somalia via its humanitarian and CFSP policy to investigate if this discourse can indicate politicization of EU humanitarian aid policy. To structure the research, three sub-questions have been formulated, which are answered separately before answering the central research question. One note on structure is required before answering the research questions. The first two sub-questions deal with CFSP and humanitarian policy separate, while the analysis is structured around the three critical events. The sections on the first two sub-questions thus inevitably overlap, since the critical events have been important for both policy fields. The third sub-question does not contain this overlap, since both policy discourses have been analysed in unison to investigate indications of politicization.

7.4.1. Coherence and comprehensiveness in CFSP policies

The first sub-question dealt with how the EU has discursively produced its external action policy via CFSP policy. CFSP policy is an intergovernmental strand of EU policy, which is formulated, executed and mainly financed by the EU member states, via the political and security committee and the Council of the European Union. The engagement with Somalia dates back to 2008, when the EU NAVFOR mission Atalanta was launched to fight piracy of the coast of Somalia and protect vessels – commercial and WFP vessels delivering humanitarian aid – against piracy. This first mission provided the starting point for analysing the discursive production of CFSP engagement with Somalia in relation to the notion of coherence and comprehensiveness. Even though the mission was established before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, some references towards coherence can be discerned in the texts. With the launch of operation Atalanta, the notion of coherence produced was one of internal coherence between the different elements of the operation. The launch of EUTM Somalia in 2010 aimed to contribute to the training of Somali security forces and the development of the Somali security sector. In the analysed texts, horizontal and external coherence were articulated, which can be interpreted as a response to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in which horizontal coherence is formulated as a central element to increase the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. In 2011, the launch of the Strategic Approach harmonized the understanding of coherence as horizontal coherence in relation to CFSP policy, since the Strategic Framework and its Council Conclusions were recited in Atalanta and EUTM Somalia amendments. Moreover, the third CFSP mission, EUCAP Somalia, recited the Strategic Framework as well, reinforcing the produced horizontal and external coherence discourse.

Thus, the discourse on coherence informed CFSP engagement in Somalia and, with the Strategic Framework, the region. The discourse developed from internal coherence towards horizontal and external coherence. The articulation of coherence as horizontal and external can be identified as the rationale for the discursive production of a comprehensive approach. Already in 2008, The Council called for a comprehensive approach towards Somalia, encompassing political, security and humanitarian aspects. In its recitals, EUTM Somalia specified these aspects as rule of law, respect for human rights, gender and international humanitarian law and the link between security and development. The Strategic Approach continued the discourse, by producing a notion of interlocked challenges that have resulted in chronic instability in the region and especially Somalia. These interlocked challenges serve as the rationale to implement a comprehensive approach towards the region spanning all external action policies to increase the effectiveness of EU engagement. The discursive production of a comprehensive approach thus built upon the political, security and humanitarian aspects formulated with the launch of Atalanta. In 2012, the EU Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa was established, tasked to increase the coordination and complementarity between the three CFSP missions and other Commission activities. Recalling the Strategic Framework, the Operations Centre was situated within the Strategic Framework and the articulated discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness. Moreover, it aimed to contribute to increasing horizontal coherence between the different CFSP missions as well as Commission activities, for example development aid or humanitarian aid.

7.4.2. Coherence and comprehensiveness in humanitarian policy

The second sub-question dealt with the discursive production of humanitarian policy. Humanitarian aid – as the practical application of humanitarian policy – is formulated in relation to the four humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian aid should provide life-saving aid, regardless of race, ethnicity or political affiliation, without providing aid (dis)advantaging one of the conflicting parties and independently from external actors having a stake in the outcome of a conflict. The EU does not directly provide humanitarian assistance, but develops policy and assigns funds to partners to provide aid, guided by its policy. While less explicit, notions of coherence and comprehensiveness come to the fore in humanitarian policy documents. Even though humanitarian aid occupies a separate chapter in the TFEU, it contains the same reference to the Lisbon Treaty as other external action policies: to pursue cooperation and consistency with other external action policies. In 2011, the Strategic Framework reflected this objective by recalling the provision of humanitarian assistance in response to drought and conflict, areas where EU development policy and CFSP policy are also implemented. In the Strategic Framework, humanitarian policy has been formulated as an element of EU engagement with the region. The discursive production of coherence as horizontal and external coherence discussed above informs not only CFSP policy, but also humanitarian policy. Moreover, the interlocked challenges as warranting a comprehensive approach include humanitarian policy as well, since the challenges result in a need for humanitarian assistance. For example, interstate rivalry results in forced displacement, small arms proliferation increases violent disputes and poverty is the result of conflict due to displacement as well as climate change and pressure on scarce resources.

This hegemonic discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness is more explicit in SHARE, a sub-strategy of the Strategic Framework. To increase resilience of populations in the Horn of Africa, SHARE aims to increase coordination and complementarity between humanitarian and development policy to increase resilience, by utilizing the comparative advantages of each policy, to increase cross-learning and increase early coordination when planning both humanitarian and development actions. Thus, SHARE continued the discourse on horizontal

coherence articulated in the Strategic Framework as a tool to reach its objective of resilience, focusing on coherence between humanitarian policy and development policy. Similarly, the discourse on a comprehensive approach produced in the Strategic Framework is rearticulated by identifying the interlocked challenges as the sources of vulnerability which need to be addressed to increase the resilience of peoples. This understanding of a comprehensive approach as interlocked challenges continued in the 2012 communication on resilience and the 2017 strategic approach to resilience. Thus, in all three texts the interlocked challenges comprise a comprehensive approach to increasing resilience.

7.4.3. Coherence and politicization

Turning to the third sub-question, the research investigated how the produced discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness in humanitarian and CFSP policy can indicate a politicization of humanitarian aid. Politicization takes place when political considerations increasingly compromise the four principles of humanitarian aid: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Having discussed the production of these discourses for both policy fields separate above, it becomes evident that both policy fields have been informed by the produced discourse in the Strategic Approach. Both humanitarian and CFSP policy reproduced the discourse in its missions, Operations Centre and SHARE policy. The discourse produced in the Strategic Framework has informed a more general policy document as well: The Comprehensive Approach. With this policy, the EU first recalled the rationale for horizontal coherence and increased this need by stating the need to address the entire conflict-cycle from preparedness to reconstruction. Secondly, by reciting much of the same challenges formulated in the Strategic Framework, it continued the discourse on a comprehensive approach. The Comprehensive Approach informed the Strategic Framework as well, since the three additional interlocked challenges identified in the 2015 Action Plan were first formulated in the Comprehensive Approach.

The notion of interlocked challenges has an important function in the discourse: by linking different challenges to each other, the need for a comprehensive approach to address these challenges is formed. For example, as the challenge of persistent poverty is linked to climate change, any intervention should address both these aspects to create lasting results. Moreover, if poverty is also understood as a result of conflict, population pressures and weak land governance (as it is done in the Strategic Framework), even more elements need to be addressed. Thus, by explicitly linking different challenges to each other, the EU not only creates a need for a comprehensive approach, it also creates a need for horizontal coherence, since an array of policy fields can be involved in addressing these challenges. Coming back to the challenge of poverty, CFSP policy aims to contribute to increasing governance and conflict resolution via EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia, while development policy works on increasing sustainable land use and veterinary health. However, if poverty resulted in a famine (as a result of all elements influencing poverty), humanitarian aid would be provided to the region which should not only save lives, but also contribute to increasing resilience of people in line with the EU objective to increase resilience. Thus, with the hegemonic notion of a comprehensive approach, a wide array of policy actors can become involved in the same region, addressing the same challenges. This in turn provides the rationale and justification to focus on horizontal coherence between these policy actors, since they all work on the same issues. Thus, the discourse on coherence is supported and reinforces by the notion of a comprehensive approach: by taking a comprehensive approach to address interlocked challenges, a need for horizontal coherence arises to guide the different policies, to prevent overlaps and inconsistencies. Moreover, with the articulated aim to increase the effectiveness of EU external action, the need for complementary policy arises, which provides further rationale for horizontal coherence.

By formulating a discourse of interlocked challenges which warrant horizontal coherence, the EU creates the possibility for a politicization of humanitarian aid. Horizontal coherence can increase the already fragile position of the humanitarian principles by pursuing coordination and consistencies between all external action policies in the Lisbon Treaty. While the EU does not provide aid directly, it divides funds to humanitarian actors informed by its policies. With the Strategic Framework, the EU produced a hegemonic discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach, informing humanitarian policy. The previous chapter has discussed politicization divided in three categories: developmentalization, militarization and instrumentalization. Developmentalization takes place when humanitarian aid increasingly moves away from short-term intervention aimed at saving lives towards more preventative, long-term programs. The EU approach to resilience clearly displays such developmentalization. With the launch of SHARE, the aim to increase resilience of people to reduce their vulnerability to future shocks shows the long-term perspective of this policy. Moreover, the articulated horizontal coherence discourse could further impede humanitarian aid, since LRRD – as the term says – aims to link relief and development. Since development aid does not share the neutral and independent underpinnings of humanitarian aid the discursive link between these policy fields create the risk of infringing these principles. The identified need for horizontal coherence between humanitarian and development aid can be described as the humanitarian-development nexus: both policy fields contribute to similar problems and need to increase their complementarity to increase the effectiveness of both policies, for example to address recurrent cycles of insecurity and vulnerability.

Thus, the launch of the Strategic Framework in 2011 and its sub-strategy SHARE in 2012 have increased the risk of developmentalization of humanitarian aid, since the resilience approach calls for long-term engagement focusing not only on the consequences of food insecurity, but also on addressing the causes of such insecurity to prevent future crises. Horizontal coherence aims to strengthen the cooperation and coordination between the two policy fields as part of the humanitarian-development nexus. Moreover, the discourse increasingly links SHARE and resilience programs to the security-development nexus. The identified need to address root causes and to operate within a comprehensive approach to increase resilience calls for coordination and complementarity with political and security policies, which address the same root causes. In general, the analysed texts stress the security-development nexus: no development can take off without security, while security cannot be sustained without development. Since SHARE links humanitarian and development policies, humanitarian aid can contribute to development. With the articulated security-development nexus, humanitarian aid can – in extension – contribute to security related policies which are informed by political considerations. Thus, the neutrality and independence of humanitarian assistance can become compromised through developmentalization.

The articulation of the two nexuses link humanitarian policy – via development policy – to security and political aspects and creates the possibility for two other forms of politicization: militarization and instrumentalization. Militarization occurs when military actors are involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid or when humanitarian concerns are used to legitimize military action. In Somalia, the delivery of aid via the WFP vessels is facilitated through Atalanta. Moreover, the legitimization of the military mission is the humanitarian need in Somalia. Thus, via Atalanta, militarization of humanitarian aid takes place, since military actors are involved in the delivery of aid and use a humanitarian imperative to justify the mission. A second risk of militarization can be identified in the Operations Centre, because it aims to increase information exchange, cooperation and coordination between the CFSP missions and other Commission policies and programs. It is not unthinkable that the Operations

Centre – with its function to increase coordination and coherence – can facilitate humanitarian aid delivery and thus militarize such aid.

The risk of developmentalization discussed above can, in combination with the security-development nexus, indicate a risk of instrumentalization. Development aid is informed by political considerations, which are formulated in the Strategic Approach as to achieve peace, stability, security and prosperity. This objective developed in the Comprehensive Approach to helping countries to reach sustainable development, while the strategic approach to resilience formulated the objective to increase the impact of external action and progress humanitarian, foreign and security objectives. Via SHARE, the EU aimed to increase the coordination and complementarity between humanitarian and development policy to increase resilience. With the Comprehensive Approach and the strategic approach to resilience, resilience became increasingly understood as an instrument to contribute to development and security objectives. Thus, the discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach increasingly linked humanitarian policy with political and security objectives through resilience, increasing the risk of instrumentalization.

In the discourse on Somalia, instrumentalization can be discerned in two forms. First, the EU explicitly chooses the side of one of the parties: the TFG. In the Strategic Framework, its 2015 Action Plan, SHARE and other resilience policies the EU explicitly support the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia and the CFSP missions contribute to the TFG by training its security forces, securing its maritime territory and developing its security related governance. This explicit support can increase the risk of instrumentalization via the hegemonic understanding of the interlocked challenges or root causes as the building blocks of a comprehensive approach, which can only be implemented by increasing the horizontal coherence between all EU polices. Thus, by increasing horizontal coherence and the coordination and complementarity of these policies, it becomes possible that humanitarian aid becomes an instrument to reach the political objectives of the EU: to support the TFG. A second risk of instrumentalization can be identified in relation to resilience: effectiveness. The EU commends joint humanitarian-development programming can improve the impact of crises response by identifying those areas where resilience programs have the most impact, incorporating long-term impact and even preventing violent conflict and supporting peace initiatives. The focus on impact and effectiveness in resilience programs can lead to instrumentalization of humanitarian aid when effectiveness takes centre stage in the decisions on where to provide aid.

7.6. EU humanitarian and CFSP policy: coherence and politicization

Having answered all three sub-questions, the central research question can now be answered: *How has the EU discursively produced its humanitarian and foreign policy engagement (via CFDP) with Somalia since 2009, and has this contributed to the politicization of humanitarian aid?*

The EU has discursively produced its humanitarian and CFSP engagement with Somalia with the articulation of a hegemonic discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach in the 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. Coherence became increasingly understood as horizontal coherence between the different EU policy fields, such as humanitarian aid, development assistance, political engagement and CFSP missions. This understanding moved from internal coherence articulated in Atalanta towards horizontal and external coherence articulated in EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. The 2011 Strategic Framework harmonized these different understanding towards horizontal coherence and reproduced this discourse to humanitarian policy with SHARE. As a sub-strategy of the Strategic Framework,

the discursive production of horizontal coherence continued, aiming to increase the coordination and complementarity between humanitarian and development policy.

This hegemonic understanding of coherence has been supported by the notion of a comprehensive approach, which developed from humanitarian, security and political aspects to the articulation of interlocked challenges in the Strategic Framework. Moreover, this articulation informed the Comprehensive Approach, which subsequently informed the 2015 Action Plan for the Strategic Framework. These interlocked challenges have informed the EU resilience policy SHARE and later communications on resilience as well. The notion of a comprehensive approach displays strong intertextuality between policies, communications and Council Conclusions. Thus, both the understanding of coherence and a comprehensive approach show intertextual links and they reinforce each other. The hegemonic understanding of comprehensiveness as the interlocked challenges warrant the need for involvement of different external action policies to address these challenges or root causes. However, to increase the effectiveness of all these different policies, there is a need to increase the coordination and complementarity between these policies. Hence, the notion of horizontal coherence becomes more important, to facilitate such coordination and complementarity.

The discourse on coherence and a comprehensive approach are thus shared in the two policy fields. There is a common understanding of the challenges which impede progress and these challenges are linked to each other as well: to solve for example persistent poverty, security needs to be increased, as well as the governance structures: there is a need for horizontal coherence. However, such horizontal coherence can facilitate politicization of humanitarian aid. For example, resilience policies stress the complementarity of humanitarian aid and development assistance in increasing resilience. To achieve this, humanitarian policy should not only focus on saving lives, but incorporate resilience at the earliest moment in its response. Thus, resilience policies can increase the risk of developmentalization, where humanitarian aid increasingly moves towards longer-term developmental objectives. Secondly, the increased coherence between CFSP and Commission programs – and thus humanitarian aid – facilitated by the Operations Centre, can increase the risk of militarization: humanitarian aid is facilitated by military actors or humanitarian imperatives are used to legitimize military action. One example of militarization is the protection of WFP vessels by Atalanta, effectively militarizing the delivery of humanitarian aid. The third form of politicization is instrumentalization. The engagement of the EU is guided by the shared understanding of the interlocked challenges formulated in the Strategic Framework, but the texts also contain explicit support for one of the parties in Somalia, the TFG. Humanitarian aid is linked to development aid via the humanitarian-development nexus and resilience programs and, via the identified security-development nexus, to security policy. Thus, humanitarian aid can be used as an instrument to support the TFG, for example via SHARE. Secondly, instrumentalization can be indicated by the focus on effectiveness in resilience programs, which can impede the impartial distribution of humanitarian aid to favor regions or groups where such programs are expected to have the most impact.

In conclusions, the research has shown that EU engagement with Somalia has discursively produced a discourse shared by CFSP and humanitarian policy, centred around horizontal coherence as a nodal point which is supported by, and thus receives its meaning from, the notion of comprehensiveness and a comprehensive approach. The Strategic Framework formulated such a comprehensive approach as the interlocked challenges, a notion which continued in later documents and as root causes. The discourse analysis has shown that coherence and comprehensiveness not only support each other and assign meaning to each other, but they also reinforce each other. By linking the challenges, the EU discursively creates

the rationale for increasing horizontal coherence. However, when horizontal coherence is increased between different policy fields, the interlocked aspects of the challenges are further reinforced, since more policies can, and probably will, address them. It can thus be argued that a notion of comprehensiveness supports horizontal coherence, which in turn increases the need for comprehensiveness. As discussed in the report, horizontal coherence increases the risk of politicization of humanitarian aid. As horizontal coherence and comprehensiveness reinforce each other, it consequently increases the risk of politicization even further, since a comprehensive approach warrants the need for horizontal coherence, which in turn increases the need for a comprehensive approach. To ensure the neutral, impartial and independent provision of humanitarian aid, it is therefore pivotal for the EU to recognize this politicization when providing humanitarian aid (funds) to the people of Somalia.

7.6. Limitations and further research

As with any research, inevitable limitations arise. The first limitation is related to the chosen intertextual model: by limiting the analysis to the official discourse of the EU, counter-discourses and their possible influence on the official discourse could not be identified. Secondly, the restriction in sources for the analysis can have limited the analysis in terms of conflicts and struggles leading up to the articulation of the hegemonic discourse. The available documents were limited to (draft) Council Conclusions, Council Decisions and annual reports. A related third limitation is that the analysis has not been able to research the practical implementation of the discourse on coherence in Somalia or if this has led to concrete tension or politicization. Instead, the official discourse has allowed to analyse indications of politicization present in policy. It is however not unlikely that, as policy creates the possibility for politicization, this also takes place in Somalia in practice. Finally, the research has – guided by an inductive reading of documents – focused on resilience and food security related humanitarian policies, where clear indications of politicization have been identified. However, the EU provides funds for numerous forms of humanitarian assistance, which were consequently not considered. It is therefore not possible to generalize the results to all EU humanitarian aid assistance in Somalia.

As this research has shown that the discursive production of coherence and comprehensiveness creates the possibility for politicization, future research could use this research as a starting point to research if politicization takes place ‘on the ground’, the relation between the official EU discourse and discourses of NGOs which implement EU humanitarian discourse and counter-discursive practices. Moreover, as this research has shown how the experiences in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have discursively informed the Comprehensive Approach and the strategic Approach to resilience – both overarching policies for all EU external action – this research could serve as a starting point to investigate the discourse on coherence and comprehensiveness in other regions or countries where the EU implements its external action. Finally, the research could provide as a basis for further research on the continuation of the official EU discourse to external action formulated in the 2016 Global Strategy and the 2016-2020 Strategic Plan of DG ECHO.

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