‘Gorgianizing’ at Elaious

Redefining sophistic and cultural identity in Philostratus’ *Heroicus*

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To my mother, the fighter

& to my best friend

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INTRODUCTION

Embarkation

Philostratus' *Heroicus*[1] is a dialogue on heroes and their cults, which by time of the text's production[2] have been abandoned as a result of change. This change is partly due to neglect or break with cultic traditions of the past, which are here idealized in all their aspects. The story is as follows: a merchant sailing from Phoenicia into the Aegean Sea is detained by lack of winds at Elaious, a town on the Thracian Chersonese. There he meets a vinedresser, who supposedly shares in the intimate friendship and knowledge of the ghost of the hero Protesilaus. After exchanging pleasantries, the Phoenician shares a dream he had about stopping over in Elaious, where he reads the Catalogue of Ships (*Iliad* 2) and lets the Achaean soldiers embark on his ship. As soon as the merchant gets an early taste of the divine wisdom of Protesilaus, captured by the divine site of his heroic cult and the eroticized landscape, he self-interprets his dream as an imperative to hear about the heroes of the Trojan War, in order to obtain favorable winds.

These new stories are told by the vinedresser on the authority of Protesilaus, who, after dying in Troy, acquired divine wisdom and periodically engaged in 'correcting' Homer's poems. Initially, the Phoenician merchant exhibits serious resistance and disbelief towards these 'new stories'. In order for the storyteller to circumvent his interlocutor's skepticism, the vinedresser engages various means to make his account plausible. In this light, the most prevailing accounts of the Trojan War are seen as poetic lies or repressions of truth. The most notorious instance of such repressions is the *Odyssey*, the bargaining outcome between Homer and Odysseus seeking to restore his repute in exchange for exclusive material about the Trojan War[3]. The major stake in this settlement was the suppression of Palamedes, an intelligent hero who suffered no less than Ajax from Odysseus' wickedness. This said, a large part of the text seeks to restore Palamedes to his heroic ethos and intellectual status. Defending Palamedes' case takes the form of an *apologia*

[1] Scholarly consensus attributes this text to Flavius Philostratus, author of *Vita Apollonii*, *Vitae sophistarum*, *Imagines* I–II, *Nero*, a collection of *Letters*, a couple of *Dialexeis*, and *Gymnasticus*; Miles (2017)b 273–275.
[2] For the proposed dates of the text see Maclean–Aitken (2001) xlii–xlv. This issue does not affect our argument here. However, I agree with those readings of *Heroicus* as a product of the immediate cultural, social, and political conditions of its production; according to Aitken (2004) 280–284 and Shayegan (2004) 285–286, in this text, Philostratus arguably advocates Severan policies against the rising empire of the Sasanians, a hypothesis that locates the text in the reign of Alexander Severus (reign 222–235 CE).
[3] *Her.* 43.12–16. For the motif of hero in league with author see Anderson (1986) 245–246.

with strong encomiastic features emphasizing the hero's sophistic wisdom. One of the models Philostratus had in mind in re-enacting the hero's apology must have been Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* (*Palamedes*)[4] composed in the fifth century BCE. But to what extent did Philostratus rely on this source?

'Gorgianizing' and Corpus

Explicit claims about Gorgias are made in *Lives of the sophists* (*Lives*) and the seventy-third *letter* to Julia Domna, both testifying to Philostratus' detailed and systematic study of the sophist's style. In these texts, we learn of a series of authors, amongst whom also Plato, who emulated Gorgias. Philostratus coins the term 'Gorgianizing' to refer to their emulations. Drawing upon existing confidence in explicit inferences Philostratus makes about the vast amount of authors admiring the sophist and his eloquence, we may set out to explore instances where he, too, alludes to Gorgias or reproduces his style and thought. This can happen i) by way of imitating Gorgias' elaborate stylistic figuration (the so–called *gorgieia schemata*[5]), ii) through implementation of argumentative patterns exemplified in Gorgias' model speeches, or iii) by incorporating ideas and themes, which were associated with Gorgias.

Of these forms, I will mainly focus on argumentation and thematic development, discussed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively, because of the degree of complexity involved. For a *literatus* like Philostratus it would not be that hard to furnish symmetrical sentences flooded with rhyming endings and antitheses. But how easy would it be to grasp and incorporate the substance of Gorgias' thought? The question is not easy to answer, primarily because there is no definite answer to what exactly Gorgias' substantive thought consisted in, if at anything. For while for sophists like Prodicus of Ceos or Protagoras of Abdera it is puzzling to understand the subtleties of their doctrine, yet scholars more or less agree on what framed their chief ideas, in Gorgias' case, there is a vast disagreement on whether or not such a framework even existed[6]. Was he a rhetorician? A philosopher? Or a philosophical sophist?

[4] The edition I am using for Gorgias' fragments is Diels–Kranz' (1952).
[5] Diod. Sic. 12.53.4.
[6] Consigny (2001) 3.

Philostratus seems to opt for the latter option. The idea of philosophical sophist did not only qualify intellectuals of the ancient times as we learn in *Lives*; rather, it seems to parade through the entire *Corpus Philostrateum* and permeate its stories and characters. Here we will see that the merging of philosophy and sophistry may in some cases be synonymous to the act of 'Gorgianizing'. To this end, *Heroicus* provides for an interesting case study in the following respects: 1) the first part of the text seeks to account for the *aletheia* in Protesilaus' stories about the Trojan War. How is this 'new truth' made plausible? Apart from the authority of Protesilaus, the vinedresser engages in refuting older accounts, on the basis of their logical improbabilities. Persuasion is pivotal to winning over the Phoenician who shows his disbelief upfront[7]. One of the means the vinedresser deploys to overcome the Phoenician's skepticism is the argument from probability in combination with strategies of deductive reasoning. The argumentation process, I argue, is evocative of Gorgias' *Palamedes*. 2) After the Phoenician has successfully yielded to the vinedresser/Protesilaus, everything is set for the main discussion, that is, the Catalogue of the heroes. A prominent passage here is about the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes. In this thesis, I will examine Philostratus' Palamedes not only as culture hero, but also as a sophist-hero, not very distant from the prominent intellectuals of *Lives* or from the divine thaumaturge in *Vita Apollonii*.

Status quaestionis and Research question

In his lucidly argued treatment, Consigny (2001) devotes considerable space to establishing how Plato and Aristotle's views have biased all later authors' conception of Gorgias, thus creating a 'hermeneutic aporia'. Consigny locates Philostratus amongst a series of authors, like Pausanias, Diodorus, and Cicero, who deemed Gorgias as a 'stylist without much substance' (pp. 151–2). This does no justice at all, first and foremost, to Consigny's own approach: in order to rehabilitate Gorgias as a serious thinker, he uses Philostratus as evidence. A striking example lies in the second paragraph on page 37, where Consigny says 'we are justified in repudiating the notion that Gorgias is a frivolous orator rather than a philosopher worth taking seriously' and a few lines later he cites Philostratus' *Lives* as proof. Additionally, the passage he adduces also from *Lives* on page 151 serves by no means as *prima facie* evidence that 'Philostratus draws no connection between

[7] *Her.* 3.1.

Gorgias' substantive thought and the manner of his speaking and writing' (151–2). In this thesis, we will see that Philostratus not only perceived the substance of Gorgianic thought but also incorporated and reproduced it. As said, our focus will be on *Heroicus*, to which I now turn.

In his exhaustive commentary, Grossardt (2004) dismisses previous interpretations of *Heroicus* as reflecting Philostratus' adherence to Caracalla's religious beliefs or his wish to revitalize ancient heroic cults (Eitrem (1929) 1ff., Mantero (1966) 225). Based on the hymn Achilles composes for Echo[8], a clear notion of intertextuality, he chooses to read the text as a tribute to poetry. *Heroicus* indeed exposes the author's self-conscious attempt to 'compete' with the prevailing accounts (especially Homer) of the Trojan War, a practice known in Imperial literature as Sophistic *Homerkritik* (Dué – Nagy (2004) 51–54, Mestre (2004) 127–141, Maclean – Aitken (2001) lx–lxxvi, Zeitlin (2001) 255–66, and Anderson (1986) 242–4).

These interpretations sit well with my approach in this thesis, in that they capture the central role of intertextuality, metatextualism, and self-reflexivity (Whitmarsh (2004), (2009)). Philostratus knows his classics and handles his sources with a great deal of allusion and ambiguity (Rusten (2004) 144–5); One of these elusive authorities is Gorgias of Leontini, the model sophist for Philostratus (Mestre (2004) 138). Intertextuality with Gorgias informs both the formal aspect of the text and the thematic development of its intellectual characters. It is here examined in relation to Homeric revisionism, the establishment of authority, and the phenomenology of *paideia*, that is, the aspects of the text which reflect the preoccupations and conflicts of intellectuals in Philostratus' day. The impressive scholarly work focusing in the last two decades on the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes (Mariscal (2008), Favreau Linder (2015), Miles (2017)a), and the ongoing debate on Philostratus' definition of the Second Sophistic in relation to its cultural legacy (Anderson (1986), (1993), Whitmarsh (2017) have led me to the main research question I raise in this thesis:

How does Philostratus articulate and promote his intellectual agenda by ways of 'Gorgianizing', that is, emulation of and rivalry with Gorgias, in *Heroicus*?

[8] *Ibid.* 55.3.

Method

The primary method I will use to substantiate my argument is close reading. In addition, intertextuality will prove a useful methodical tool to address Gorgias' influence on Philostratus as well as the thematic and conceptual evocations of texts from the Classical period in Second Sophistic literature. If Philostratus could not influence what Gorgias wrote, he could nonetheless influence how his readers, including ourselves, perceived of Gorgias' writings. Furthermore, as many scholars have noticed, several aspects of *Heroicus*, such as its landscape (i.e. the Chersonesus, that is, the juncture between the Western and Eastern Empire), the cult sight of Protesilaus, the dynamic interaction of the two interlocutors (i.e. a Greek educated vinedresser constructed as the 'insider' of Hellenic culture vs a Phoenician stranger and 'outsider'), and the values they represent (i.e. rural labor, rustic philosophy, simplistic lifestyle *vis-à-vis* urban lifestyle and mercantile attitude [9]) are apt examples of how *Heroicus* is implicated with questions of cultural identity and self-construction. Similarly, the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes is one of the main markers of the text's sophisticated literary texture.

[9] Phoenicians in ancient literature represent the vices of city life as well as trickster and fraud; Aitken (2004) 267–285 explores the shifts in the symbolism of the word in the advent of the Severans.

CHAPTER I

Re-introducing Gorgias to his fan-club

This chapter, occupies surest ground in order to prepare the way for the main analysis of the following three chapters. My aim is to establish that Philostratus studied Gorgias in depth as the archetypal sophist. The texts I will draw my inferences from are: *Lives*[10], written before 238 CE, and the seventy-third *letter* to the empress Julia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus (reign 193–211 CE)[11]. *Lives* is a quasi–biographical[12] account of different types of sophists dating from Gorgias to Philostratus' contemporaries. It has been considered a fundamental source of sophistic activity in the Imperial Era. Yet, the arrangement of the material often takes the reader unawares, while many of the biographies include serious falsities[13]. Consequently, despite the genuine scholarly interest, it does not aim at the extremes of antiquarian exactitude[14]. Starting with the more counter-intuitive *letter* 73 and then moving to the more schematic *Lives*, I will briefly discuss the specific passages, which construe Gorgias as the origin of sophistry and its functions, a cultural legacy, as it were, historically transmitted to and interpreted by Philostratus.

I. An appeal to the empress

An intensifying οὐδὲ ὁ θεσπέσιος Πλάτων (not even the divine Plato[15]) kicks off Philostratus' confessional *letter* to his patroness, Julia Domna, serving to establish that not even the greatest among the philosophers envied the sophists. Rather, he was emulous of their style and mannerisms, and even rivaled Gorgias in 'Gorgianizing'[16]. This beginning takes the reader aback, in that it withholds Plato's severe criticisms of sophists and proposes a reconciliation between two

[10] Transl. Wright (1921) adapted. The text is Stefec's (2016).
[11] Date is uncertain; Demoen – Praet (2012) n.13 437–438.
[12] Swain (1991) 151: 'a sort of cross between biography and the blend of biography and doxography'.
[13] Schmitz (2009) 49–51 accepts Philostratus' knowledge about his subject and attributes part of the text's inconsistencies to the discrepancies between the historical Philostratus and the implied narrative persona. Swain (1991) 152–163 thoroughly checks the veracity of Philostratus' data on the basis of his access to Athenian and Roman sources, and his acquaintances, while holding offices in Athens or as member of Julia's circle in Rome. See also Anderson (1986) 24–25.
[14] Anserson (1986) 14.
[15] Transl. Benner (1949) adapted. The text is Kayser's (1871) (repr. Hildesheim (1964)).
[16] Cf. *VS* 493.

antagonistic discourses, that is, sophistry and philosophy. The literary interest of the text is betrayed by the use of metalanguage; γοργιάζειν (emulating Gorgias' style) is probably a Philostratean invention.

Later on, the author ventures on arguing that in the long history of Greek literature, many authors[17] have by convention emulated (ζηλωταὶ ἐγένοντο) one sophist or another. While Hippias, Protagoras, and Prodicus are also mentioned, it is Gorgias who typifies the notion of 'sophistic'. For the Thessalians, practice of oratory translated to 'Gorgianizing'[18]. Aspasia trained Pericles to speak like Gorgias. Critias and Thucydides are also great examples of literary emulation; Philostratus here captures the notion of *remodeling* one's own style according to one's genius (μεταποιοῦντες ἐς τὸ οἰκεῖον)[19]. Then, we have an excerpt from Aeschines the Socratic, composed of four cola of eight, eight, nine, and ten syllables, serving to illustrate a structural 'Gorgianism'[20]. Finally, the elements ἀποστάσεις and προσβολαί (break-offs and sudden transitioning) are said to often be adopted by epic poets. A very interesting piece of information is given in the beginning of this list of imitators:

> The admirers of Gorgias were excellent men and very numerous; […] in the next place his admirers embraced the entire Greek people (εἶτα τὸ ξύμπαν Ἑλληνικόν), among whom, at Olympia, from the threshold of the temple, he delivered an oration against the barbarians[21]. *Ep.* 73.18–23

After Gorgias' oration at Olympia, (see also next section), every Greek became his admirer. This exaggerated statement about Gorgias' large amount of devotees is the second indication, after 'Plato the Gorgianizer', of Philostratus' inflated subjectivism. Now, not only does Gorgias' biggest adversary accommodate himself to the sophist's ideas (ἰδέας! – interestingly on Plato's own terms), but the entire Greece, the whole world, as it were, has known of and is following Gorgias.

As we are moving to the as startling end of the letter, the empress is asked to persuade (πεῖθε; note the aspectual difference from πεῖσον) Plutarch (?) not to take any offence at the sophists nor vilify Gorgias. Regardless of the interpretative difficulty of this section[22], given that

[17] Cf. 'the most illustrious men' (τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους), in *VS* 493.
[18] *Ep.* 73: τὸ ῥητορεύειν γοργιάζειν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔσχεν; cf. *VS* 521.2–3; see also Pl. *Men.* 70a–b, where Socrates tells Meno that the Thessalians were in earlier times famous for their wealth and horse-riding, but ever since Gorgias came to their land he turned them into ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ (lovers of wisdom). For Gorgias in Thessaly, see also Isoc. 15.155–156, Cic. *Orat*. 52.175, and Paus. 6.17.8–9.
[19] *Ep.* 73.27.
[20] Costa (2001) *ad loc.*
[21] Cf. *VS* 501–502.
[22] See Penella (1979) 163–4 for a summary on the existing scholarship.

Plutarch had long before passed away, it is interesting that the author calls him θαρσαλεώτερον τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ. Many scholars have translated this as 'boldest among the Greeks', but I personally wish to construe τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ as *genitivus comparationis*, that is, 'too bold to be a Greek'. The idea of 'Greekness' was first introduced with ξύμπαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, which elevated Gorgias to a paradigm of Pan-Hellenic recognition. If we interpret πεῖθε Πλούταρχον as symbolic, it is possible that Philostratus here pictures members of the elite or intellectual rivals as opposing imperial ideology or/and his own profession. This would also justify why the author marshals successive authorities construed as subservient to Gorgias: if even Plato, and every other Greek followed Gorgias and the sophists, then, *a fortiori*, what legitimates Plutarch's stepping out of line? Provided that Julia was still alive[23], the author arguably asks her to stem the flow of a cultural move that is growing θαρσαλεώτερον than what the he and his patroness can allow.

In listing Gorgias' intellectual fan club, Philostratus subconsciously becomes a member himself, and in talking about Gorgias' rhetoric, he cannot resist a resounding 'Gorgiasm':

> ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω.
> I could tell you, but I cannott. *Ep.* 73.41–42

II. Towards the 'Father of sophistry'

Let us now move to *Lives*, where we happen on a more reifying account of the sophist. Before the actual lives start, Philostratus considers a cluster of intellectuals who, in ancient times, were deemed sophists but in *his* view were 'philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and fluency'[24]. The list of the eight philosophers who were wrongly called sophists (οὐκ ὄντες σοφισταί, δοκοῦντες δὲ παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην) starts with Eudoxus of Cnidus (early Hellenistic times) and finishes with Favorinus[25] (early Second Sophistic). Then follows a second group of sophists proper, who are deemed as forbearers of the Second Sophistic, originating in fifth-century Classical Athens with Gorgias of Leontini. This group, we are told later, also treated

[23] Demoen – Praet (2012) 438.
[24] *VS* 484.
[25] *VS* 484–489.

philosophical subjects. One would wonder what the actual distinguishing feature is between the two groups, since all those intellectuals more or less relished philosophy.'[26]

What seems more vital to our inquiry, however, is how this classification allows for a first definition of 'sophist' in Philostratus:

> The men of former days applied the name "sophist," not only to orators whose surpassing eloquence won them a brilliant reputation, but also to philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and fluency. *VS* 484

So ancient definitions of 'sophist' were broader and wrongly encompassed some philosophers. What are these philosophers doing here? Apparently, the only criterion of inclusion, was their eloquence, an implicit indication that rhetoric may co-exist with philosophy, but is always by convention superior. In principle, he disagrees with the second part of the ancient definition (ἀλλὰ καί…) but he seems to be fine with the first, judging from the οὐ μόνον, which we may construe as *not solely*. Consequently, the first thing we get to know about Gorgias is that he was righteously[27] considered a sophist, that is, a rhetor whose eloquence granted him great public reputation.

The second element is derived from the group where the sophist belongs. At the outset of book 1, the ancient sophistic is described as a form of philosophical rhetoric regarding its subjects, but with different methods than philosophy[28]. So Gorgias is one of the philosophical sophists. And not only just; he is – third element – the originator of the ancient (philosophical) sophistic[29] and – fourth – of extemporization:

> σχεδίου δὲ λόγου <sc. ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ> Γοργίας ἄρξαι—παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθήνῃσι θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν "προβάλλετε" καὶ τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἀνεφθέγξατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος δήπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ᾽ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ […]
>
> And (I think) that it was Gorgias who founded (ἄρξαι) the art of extempore oratory (σχεδίου δὲ λόγου). For when he appeared in the theatre at Athens he had the courage to say, "You may propose a theme" (ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν "προβάλλετε"); and he was the first to risk this bold announcement, making manifest that he was omniscient and that he could speak on any subject whatever, trusting to the inspiration of the moment; *VS* 482

[26] For possible explanations of the absurdity of the scheme see Anderson (1986) 10–12 and Civiletti (2002) *ad loc.*
[27] *VS* 492: οἱ δὲ κυρίως προσρηθέντες σοφισταί.
[28] *VS* 480: τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν; cf. *VS* 481: καὶ τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα ὑποτιθεμένη.
[29] *VS* 481.

This passage is a good example of what Philostratus exactly means by ἀρχή, ἄρξαι, and possibly ἀρχαίας or ἀρχαιοτέρας σοφιστικῆς. It is impossible to imagine that clever speaking in public contexts started in the fifth century. Already in Homer, the term σοφός (wise) often denotes the man of practical knowledge and prudence in public affairs; in Theognis, σοφίη (wisdom) assumes the meaning of duplicitous cleverness seen as superior to the greatest ἀρετή[30]. Also, in Plato's *Protagoras*, the sophistic art is said to have existed already in the times of Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, but those sophists of old laid no claim to such a name in fear of prosecution[31].

Gorgias is connected to the concept of ἀρχή because he was the first to give a definite form to the art of rhetoric, in which Philostratus roots *his* Second Sophistic. The birth of rhetoric is located in a specified time and space, that is, in 427 BCE in the theatre of Athens; it was an act of dear and hazard (πρῶτος ἐθάρρησε ... τὸ κινδύνευμα τοῦτο). Rhetoric – or at least the epideictic genre – is actualized *hinc et nunc*, and within a community. The audience literally put forward any topic (προβάλλετε), of which the public speaker must appear knowledgeable (πάντα εἰδέναι, περὶ παντὸς δ᾽ ἂν εἰπεῖν), using his invention and estimating the situational factors (ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ). To support his claim that Gorgias introduced the notions of improvisation and *kairos*, Philostratus shares an anecdote about a certain Chaerephon wishing to ridicule the sophist, an attempt which fell on face. We will return to this joke in chapter 3.

'Sicily produced Gorgias of Leontini, and we must consider that the art of the sophists carries back to him as though he were its father (ὥσπερ ἐς πατέρα)' just like Aeschylus in tragedy[32]. As a fifth clue, Gorgias is constructed as *father* of sophistry, an assertion of his authority serving to augment the idea of ἀρχή: in a way, all generations of orators to come will follow Gorgias' footsteps. The analogy to Aeschylus is telling; the construction of literary authority relies on common cultural knowledge, shared between author and reader, who is asked to perceive Gorgias' contribution to sophistic thought by analogy with Aeschylus' innovations in tragedy (εἰ γὰρ τὸν Αἰσχύλον ἐνθυμηθείημεν, ὡς πολλὰ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ξυνεβάλετο; note the use of first person plural).

What are these innovations? Some elements typical of Gorgias' style, such as daring and unusual expressions (ὁρμῆς τε καὶ παραδοξολογίας), a sense of sublimity (πνεύματος) and a grand style for great things (τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλως ἑρμηνεύειν), break-off's amid sentences (ἀποστάσεων), sudden transitioning (προσβολῶν), and the use of poetic words (ποιητικὰ ὀνόματα). To these we

[30] Theog. *El.* 1.1074.
[31] Pl. *Prot.* 316d–e.
[32] *VS* 492; see Civiletti (2002) *ad loc.*

should add the use of repetition of endings in words (ὁμοιοτέλευτα), corresponding structure in phrases or sentences (πάρισα), and antithesis (ἀντίθετα), of which we learn later in the life of Polus[33].

Finally, Philostratus pays extra heed to the speeches Gorgias delivered at some of the Pan-Hellenic shrines and festivals: he mentions Gorgias' Pythian oration at Delphi, his Olympic oration, and his funerary speech in Athens. If we compare those mentions to the previous passage about the birth of epideictic rhetoric, in the theatre of Dionysus, and the *letter's* ξύμπαν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, we can see that, in Philostratus, Gorgias' *sophia* and speeches on critical matters are routinely connected to Pan-Hellenic institutions and by extension elevated to Pan-Hellenic significance.

III. Syncrisis

Compared to the more scholarly *Lives*[34], which, despite the slips, manages quite ably to record sophistic activity in the first three centuries CE, the *letter* to Julia offers a more romanticized perspective about Gorgias; one that agrees with the less restrictive genre of (fictive?) correspondence. Yet, both texts give a good insight into Philostratus' construals of Gorgias. The *letter* establishes the universality of Gorgias and the applicability of 'Gorgianizing' in even the most unimaginable fields. Those who were emulous of Gorgias evolved to as high or even higher levels of success, engaged in φιλοτιμία (ambition), while those, who could not attain their goals, were invested in φθόνος (envy, malignity). *Lives* poses the notion of 'literary father' of various concepts regarding speech and delivery. Both texts propound the harmonization between sophistry and philosophy, with the latter subservient to the former. Finally, the *letter* indicates clearly the author's self-awareness about his own engagement in 'Gorgianizing'. These said, we are now ready to step into more difficult territory of intertextuality with Gorgias.

[33] *VS* 497.
[34] Philostratus calls his work φρόντισμα, that is, a well-thought-out piece.

CHAPTER II

Persuasion

The closing line of the *letter* to Julia (ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω) wittily captures the implied author as inadvertently becoming part of the 'Gorgianizing' tradition he has *just* been talking about. This tradition has been and will remain uninterrupted: from the old times of Periclean democracy through the days of the Severans, 'speaking in the manner of Gorgias' is constructed as a diachronic cultural phenomenon.

Numerous passages in the Philostratean corpus prove the author's precocious aptitude for 'Gorgianizing'[35]. A good example is the prominent section on Nicetes of Smyrna (*VS* 511), the father, as it were, of the Second Sophistic[36]. This passage abounds in Gorgianic figures[37]. In adopting Gorgias' style the implied author establishes a ring composition between the beginnings of his two books (and by extension a connection between the 'fathers' of the two sophistics), and expects us to see Nicetes in a light comparable to Gorgias. Imbuing a new stage of sophistic tradition with 'Gorgiasms' has cultural implications: the author-biographer has awareness that these 'new' features of the discipline are connected to the 'old and classic' ones. Innovation is not a break with tradition but rather a process of grounding and embedding.

This and the following chapter examine cases of 'allusive Gorgianizing' in *Heroicus*. As we will see, Philostratus was deeply invested in Gorgias' substantive thought and his contribution to the development of argumentation theory and art of persuasion. It goes without saying, that it is impossible to quantify in precision the extent, to which Gorgias had influenced Philostratus' thought, first and foremost because a great deal of Gorgias' writing is lost[38]. For instance, his predominantly philosophical work *On-non being* is available to us only through adaptations.

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[35] Demoen – Praet (2012) n.10 437.

[36] At the outset of *Lives* (481), Philostratus says that the distant father of the Second Sophistic is Aeschines, thus dating its inception back to the 4th century BCE. However, the beginning of the move is officially signaled by the biographer with Nicetes of Smyrna (1st century CE); Anderson (1993) 19.

[37] (1) homoeoteleuta: δικανικά…σοφιστικὰ, ἐκόσμησεν…ἐπέρρωσεν, (2) isocola (2 x 3 cola): τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικανικὸν / σοφιστικῇ περιβολῇ / ἐκόσμησεν // τὸ δὲ σοφιστικὸν / κέντρῳ δικανικῷ / ἐπέρρωσεν (3) parison in the last two sentences: the syntactical order in both sentences is as follows: object (δικανικὸν, σοφιστικὸν) – dative of manner (σοφιστικῇ περιβολῇ, κέντρῳ δικανικῷ) – main verb (ἐκόσμησεν, ἐπέρρωσεν), (4) antithesis: τοῖς μὲν δικανικοῖς… τὰ δικανικά // τοῖς δὲ σοφιστικοῖς τὰ σοφιστικὰ, (5) chiasmus: δικανικὸν…σοφιστικῇ // σοφιστικὸν…δικανικῷ, (6) the idiomatic adverb περιδεξίως, which is used only here, and is derived from περιδέξιος (bidexterous). Finally (7), all these elements together make the excerpt read as a wordplay, or *paronomasia*, another characteristic of Gorgias' style; cf. *VS* 606: δικανικοῦ μὲν σοφιστικώτερος, σοφιστικοῦ δὲ δικανικώτερος; for such figures see Porter (1997) 12.

[38] Consigny (2001) 4–10.

Philostratus, on the other hand, had more direct access to Gorgias. In *VS* 604, he says that his teacher Proclus of Naucratis was an admirer of Gorgias and imitated his style (ἐώκει καὶ γοργιάζοντι). Also, within the context of defining the third-century present by reference to the idealized past, a greater part of Gorgias' own works would go around and be discussed amongst the intellectuals of the imperial court, with whom Philostratus was associated. This creates a predicament for any modern scholar who wishes to measure how ancient sophists influenced Philostratus' literary ideas. However, there are reasons to see the glass as half full instead of half empty. Besides the two fully preserved speeches of Gorgias and Sextus and the anonymous' adaptations of *On-non being*, we also have at our disposal a plethora of ancient *testimonia* including Gorgias' own aphorisms, ancient ideas about Gorgias' teaching, as well as Plato's literary adaptations. The latter can be as helpful as detrimental for anyone who wants to recover the image of the real sophist, a danger on which McComiskey raises awareness[39]. We can be sure that Philostratus was aware of Plato's critiques on Gorgias, both because of the reconciliatory tone of *letter* 73 and most importantly because of the main role Platonic dialogues like *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias* played in two- and third-century CE education. Our approach in establishing that Philostratus engaged in 'allusive Gorgianizing' in *Heroicus* should therefore accommodate not only the original sophist's own fragments but also the ancient testimonies.

The main question I raise here is: How are patterns of reasoning used in Gorgias' *Palamedes* evoked in the vinedresser's argumentation in *Heroicus*? Before I take up this question, I will establish a few introductory points about *Palamedes* as exemplar defense speech, in juxtaposition to Gorgias' reception in Imperial education. Then I will introduce the argumentative patterns demonstrated in Palamedes' apology, and, in turn, examine how they are evoked and embedded in *Heroicus'* refutative discourse.

I. Why Gorgias' *Palamedes*?

Various sources make mention of the enormous impression Gorgias' clever use of argument made to the Athenians, when, in 427 BCE as ambassador of Leontini, he was sent to request the support of Athens. His *Palamedes* is intrinsically connected to the use of effective argumentation. According to myth, Odysseus plotted against Palamedes because he exposed his trickster in order

[39] (2002) 17–31.

to avoid joining the Greek expedition against Troy. Odysseus furnished incriminating proof and hided it in Palamedes' tent so that the hero would appear as loyal to Priam and traitor to the Greek cause. The myth supplied the framework of an exemplary defense[40]; Gorgias' main stake was to present an argumentation model, which would be operational for any defendant being unjustly accused. Its focus is on *inventio*, that is, a process of inventing logical, ethical, and emotional arguments from probability[41]. The strategies used pertain to deductive logic, such us apagogic argument or eliminative deduction, argument from antinomies, eikotic (probabilities) and ethotic argumentation (character). In all, the speech showcases methods of topical invention combining *logos*, *ethos*, and *eikos*. A prime mythic inventor, such as Palamedes, seems to be the perfect instrument to reflect on rhetorical invention, an idea we will see in comparison with Philostratus' Palamedes in chapter 3.

According to some sources, Gorgias composed a *techne*, that is, a handbook about rhetoric and speech making techniques, and he was a teacher of rhetoric[42]. Philostratus says he was teacher of the most illustrious men of the time. In fact, his two fictional rhetorical treatises, *Helen* and *Palamedes*, were transmitted in a manual of rhetorical instruction, which may have comprised model speeches memorized by students as exemplary pieces of the principles in rhetorical practice[43]. To this testifies the genre of the two texts: *Helen* belongs to the epideictic type of rhetoric while *Palamedes* is a blend of both judicial and epideictic elements, an *epideixis* of the author's method in argument[44]. Both *Helen* and *Palamedes* grapple with questions of *logos*, whether that be studies on language, its workings and power (*Helen*), or systematic approaches to reasoning and dicanic argumentation (*Palamedes*)[45].

Ancient authors regarded several innovations in artistic prose as typically Gorgianic[46]. Diodorus ascribes to Gorgias certain figures, which, according to him, were unknown to Athens before his arrival in 427, and were readily accepted thereafter[47]. Of these figures, *antithesis* is a particularly important element[48] for the purposes of the current analysis, in that it underpins the

[40] Consigny (2001) 38, Porter (1997) 11.
[41] McComiskey (2002) 47.
[42] Diod. Sic. 12.53.2 says that Gorgias was the first to invent technical manuals; see also Syr. *In Hermog.* 90.12–16, Quint. 3.1.8, Diog. Laert. 8.58; see also Cic. *Inv.* 1.7.
[43] Cole (1991) 75–6.
[44] Porter (1991) 44.
[45] Consigny (2001) 2, 38.
[46] For a discussion of both ancient and modern sources as well as the biases of ascribing these innovations to Gorgias see Finley (1939) 38 – 62.
[47] Diod. Sic. 12.53.4.
[48] Cic. *Orat.* 12.39, 52.175.

core of antilogical argumentation. Antithesis can be a rhetorical device whereby opposing structures are introduced to achieve a contrastive effect. By and large, it predicates the oppositional reasoning and the antagonistic environment, within which a debate – in this case, between Odysseus and Palamedes – takes place. Gorgias' *Palamedes* employs the antithesis in manifold ways: i) in phraseology (e.g. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδὼς> ὁ κατήγορος κατηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς οἶδα)[49] ii) in presenting his character in contrast to his opponent's (ἄξιον γὰρ καταμαθεῖν, οἷος ὢν οἷα λέγεις ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀναξίῳ)[50], and iii) in refutation (see below, II.II and II.III in this chapter).

For these reasons, one could possibly argue that texts like *Palamedes* or Antiphon's *Tetralogies* were in some way the forerunners of the preliminary rhetorical exercises, known as *Progymnasmata*, of the Imperial Era[51]. The purpose of these texts was roughly the same as the purpose of the *technai*, namely to equip students with inventional and dispositional strategies, which they were expected to implement in their future declamations[52]. According to the content of the extant *Progymnasmata* and the commentary of John of Sardis, these exercises trained the students to logically reason *against* an utterance or situation drawn from myths (refutation, ἀνασκευή), on the basis of improbability or inconsistency; they were also expected to argue *in favor of* something drawn from literature (confirmation, κατασκευή). Students were also trained to independently form their argumentation (θέσις), work out common places (κοινοί τόποι)[53], and attack or praise individuals (ψόγος, ἐγκώμιον). In addition, we do know that some of these exercises focused on crafting speeches attributed to the ghost of a mythical character, written in first person and in a style that would suit the figure's character. In this category of exercises, called *personifications* (προσωποποιίαι), students needed to *invent* a character that would apply to the given circumstances and would say appropriate things. The rivalry between Palamedes and Odysseus was a common theme in προσωποποιίαι[54]. From this perspective, it would not be inconceivable to suggest (and in doing so, let us not forget the notion of 'father of sophistry') that

[49] *Pal.* 5.
[50] *Pal.* 22.
[51] For the term see Kennedy (2003) v–vii and Webb (2017) 144–8.
[52] However, the handbooks of the first sophists 'should not be regarded as very sophisticated or theoretical treatments', as Porter (1991) 10 notes. These handbooks offered examples and *topoi*, which one could use for specific contexts. Russell (1983) 9–20 argues that the concept of *melete* (declamation) originated in the late fifth century with orators making up speeches in character for various purposes (see specifically 16–17). Mendelson (2002) 193 continues that declamatory exercises 'as literary models of discursive battle' were 'on full display in Gorgias' *Palamedes* and Antiphon's *Tetralogies* […]'.
[53] *Topoi* are not arguments *per se*, but places where one should look for arguments; Porter (1991) 95.
[54] Miles (2017)a 85; cf. Mantero (1966) 120 n.1.

Philostratus, read *Palamedes* as a text with progymnasmatic value, an exercise *avant la lettre*[55], which in the *Progymnasmata* of the Roman Empire, will be defined as *personification*[56].

Notably, in the *preface* of Nicolaus' *Progymnasmata* (5th century CE), Gorgias is explicitly connected to invention. Nicolaus subscribes to Theodorus' definition of rhetoric as 'a *dynamis* of invention (εὑρετική) and expression (ἑρμηνευτική), with ornament (μετὰ κόσμου), of the available means of persuasion (τῶν ἐνδεχομένων πιθανῶν) in every discourse'[57]. As δύναμις rhetoric is neutral and thus can be used for good or bad, comments Nicolaus, not aiming 'to persuade in every case, but to speak persuasively in accord with what is available'[58]. This is why, he continues, Gorgias defined it as creator of persuasion[59]. The implied passage is Pl. *Grg.* 453a, but apart from that, the idea of moral neutrality evokes several other passages of *Gorgias*, such as 457b on the unjust use of rhetoric (ἀλλὰ <δεῖ> δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι) or Socrates' objection in 459e–461a. It is also reminiscent of *Hel.* 14 where the function of *logoi* to the human soul is likened to the various ways different drugs affect the human body.

II. Argumentation structures

In the context of Periclean Athens and after the turmoil caused by the Persian Wars deliberative discourse and public discussions were a *sine qua non* for emergent democracy. In the fifth century, argumentation relied chiefly on opposing statements and the necessity for discussing the alternatives was experienced by every Athenian on a daily basis. Weighing the possible competing alternatives (the art of *dissoi logoi*) was the main concern of antilogic, which was in turn connected to sophistic argument and figures like Protagoras and Gorgias[60]. Athens was a metropolitan culture exposing its youths to daily argumentative debates and giving them lifelong lessons in refutation[61]. Life in a self-regulating city-state called for participation in public life, which often gave rise to disputes. Citizens exercised their democratic rights within enshrined public institutions such as the

[55] Chialva (2016) 21–2.
[56] Cf. Anderson (1993) 95–6 and 170.
[57] Nic. *Prog.* 1.2.
[58] Nic. *Prog.* 1.3.
[59] Nic. *Prog.* 1.3: διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸν ὁ Γοργίας ὡρίσατο.
[60] Mendelson (2002) 1–3, Kerferd (1981) 85.
[61] On antilogical pedagogy see Tindale (2010) 102-104 and Mendelson (2002) 171–2. A similar idea is reflected in Cic. *De Or.* 3.92 where Crassus reflects on the advantages of the *controversiae* in education.

Assembly and the law courts, where they needed to verbally persuade their fellow-citizens of the correctness of their views or prove their case just in front of the jury.

II.I. Argument from probabilities (*eikota*)

In the interest of persuasion, a speaker would need to enlist all his resources. When factual reality was irrecoverable and there was absence of witnesses, proof from probability was necessary[62]. The speaker tried to substitute likelihoods for facts[63]. This, however, does not mean that likelihood should be understood as necessarily opposite to factual truth[64]. Probabilistic argumentation is often regarded as an evolution first theorized in Sicily, with Tisias and/or Corax, the putative founders of rhetoric. Other thinkers, such as Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BCE) or Antiphon of Rhamnus (480–411 BCE) were also famous for their extended use of εἰκότα, a practice that was not always well-received[65]. Sophistic probability should not be confused with mathematical probability. It amounts to a personal determination based on what constitutes common experience and "commonly accepted knowledge about human behaviour"[66]. Protagoras, Gorgias and Antiphon often pushed the probabilistic argument to the extremes in order to show their conviction that factual reality cannot be determined and that a sophist should always be able to support by *logos* any thesis on the basis of what is likely[67].

Gorgias' *Palamedes* relies fundamentally on probability[68]. Palamedes was *indeed* innocent, but the lack of compelling evidence (ἄτεχνοι πίστεις) to persuade the jury renders factual reality

[62] *Rhet. Alex.* 7. 1428a25–34.

[63] For this reason, when direct or unartful (ἄτεχνος) evidence is at hand there is only relative or supplementary probative value in what is likely; Tindale (2010) 61, 67, 71, 79.

[64] As in Pl. *Phaedr.* 273a where Socrates thinks that arguments from probability serve to manipulate the crowd. For an analogous criticism see *Grg* 464d-465d where Socrates denies Gorgias' rhetoric the status of a *techne* and likens it to "baking pastry"; cf. Gagarin (1994) 56–7.

[65] In Pl. *Phaedr.* 273a–c, likelihood and truth are conceptualized by Socrates as binary opposites. See also Gagarin (1994) 51 on "reverse probabilities". Similarly, Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1401a) makes a further distinction between kairotic sophistic probabilities, on the one hand, and 'real' probabilities, on the other, and censures Protagoras for using proof from likelihood and making the weak argument appear strong; Tindale (2010) 70–1. For Aristotle's categorization of means of persuasion and the psychological effect of εἰκός arguments, see van Eemeren (2014) 118–19.

[66] Bons (2007) 41–42; Tindale (2010) 148–9 rightly points out that eikotic argumentation is audience-focused since its effectiveness relies on the ability of the arguer to understand the audience involved; likelihood has no significance if it falls outside of the grasp of a community.

[67] A good example is Antiphon's first Tetralogy or even his court speech *On the Murder of Herodes*; Tindale (2010) 75–6.

[68] For the use of *eikos*, see Tindale (2010) 76–7.

rather dormant. This does not mean that the sophist defied truth, as Plato suggested[69]; rather, he seemed to acknowledge that 'what counts as valid is that which is persuasive in a given context, not that which adheres to objective rules of reasoning'[70]. In his defense, Gorgias furnishes likelihood-based evidence in relation to two crucial elements, power and will: a) if I (Palamedes) wanted to betray the Greeks, I could not because I did not have the ability (δύναμις; sections 6–12) and b) even if I were able to become a traitor, I could not, because I had no such wish (βούλησις; sections 13–21). Odysseus' accusation entails a series of suppositions which are all proven practically implausible (e.g. the hero was unlikely to communicate with the enemy side). In the second part, Palamedes turns to examining possible motives, driven by which he would commit treason (e.g. money or power); each and every one of them again turns out to be inconsistent with the hero's character. In this light, I understand arguing from probability as the text's governing argumentation strategy, in the service of which Gorgias engages every other means of persuasion.

II.II. Argument from opposites

The evidential value of arguing from antinomy consists in showing that a statement proves wrong if one assigns contradictory properties to it[71]. In dialectic, it is also called the principle of the excluded middle suggesting for any proposition that either its affirmation or negation can only be true[72]. In order to prove that one proposition (Q) in relation to a certain entity or object is valid, one should prove that its opposite (-Q) is wrong[73]. In broader terms, arguing from antinomies can also amount to pointing out possible inconsistencies or contradictory premises in the argument of the opponent. In antilogical argumentation, this can often take the form of reverse-probability, a concept known as *peritrope* in rhetorical theory, a sort of 'table-turning' strategy. The main idea

[69] Gagarin (1994) 49–50 and 56–57; see also Dodds (1959) 7–10 and Spatharas (2001) 397.
[70] Consigny (2001) 185.
[71] Besides eristic or antilogic, arguing from antinomy is described also as a dialectic procedure related to Socratic *elenchos* (Pl. *Phaedr.* 261d, Arist. *Top.*1.2, 8.4–5); Socrates initially secures the agreement of his interlocutor and then directs the discussion towards a contradiction that will serve to refute the opponent's thesis; Kerferd (1981) 64–7, Tindale (2010) 48, and Liarou (2009) 39–41.
[72] Liarou (2009) 113; *Arist. Metaph.* 10005b, 1011b13 ff, and *Post. Anal.* 71a14, 88b1. Protagorean relativism clearly denies this law; Mendelson (2002) 22–23.
[73] Liarou (2009) 116.

is that a speaker turns a part of his adversary's argument against him often leading to self-contradiction[74].

Gorgias deploys the law of the excluded middle in all his extant works and not less so in *Palamedes*:

> You have accused me, in the speeches I have mentioned, of two things that are completely contrary to one another, craftiness (σοφία) and madness (μανία), of which it is not possible for the same man to possess both. For you accuse me of craftiness when you say that I am skilled, clever, and resourceful, but of madness when you say that I betrayed Greece. *Pal.* 25

The hero refutes Odysseus' accusation on the grounds of assigning two conflicting elements (i.e. σοφία and μανία) to one and the same person. However, the argument is cogent only within *Palamedes'* conceptual and ethical premises, where μανία is described by the hero as attempting impossible, useless, and disgraceful things, which will benefit the enemy and harm the friend[75]. Otherwise, madness and wisdom are not two elements necessarily mutually exclusive. A wise speaker may use his wisdom (here constructed as craftiness, skill, and resourcefulness) for malevolent purposes[76].

II.III Apagoge / *Reductio ad absurdum*

The apagogic method (ἀπαγωγή) is also used to indirectly prove a statement by demonstrating the absurdity or impossibility of the contrary. It is another modality of antilogical argumentation often resembling the argument from antinomies. In its simplest form, an apagoge is a series of concessions to the opponent's proposition whose inevitable consequences lead to impossible inferences. In extended rhetorical discourse, a speaker starts by conceding that the idea of his opponent is true. Now, this concession generates a series of necessary propositions, whose probative value is in turn scrutinized and refuted. All possible emerging assumptions appear to falter in the light of the absurdities they entail. In retrospect, the initial argument proves improbable.

[74] For the term, its use in Pl. *Theaetetus*, and its variants see Tindale (2010) 83–97.
[75] *Pal.* 25.
[76] Spatharas (2001) 401.

Gorgias' *Palamedes* makes the most exhaustive use of apagoge in the extant Greek literature. A brief example will make this clearer. In section 9, Palamedes concedes the possibility that he committed treachery motivated by money (P). If this premise is true, then one of the following propositions should also be true: Palamedes either received a great amount of money (Q) or he received a small amount of money (–Q). –Q is impossible since a small amount of money is *unlikely* (οὐκ εἰκός) to be worth one's great services; on the other hand, Q presupposes that the money was somehow transported. If so, then it was either Palamedes and someone else that did the job (Q1), or many men (Q2). Neither is plausible, since two men would not have carried much and if many were involved there would have been witnesses. Since neither Q1 nor Q2 are true, then Q is by no means true. And consequently, if neither –Q nor Q are true, then P is also not true. This example is part of a larger apagoge populating the whole first part of the speech. The hero's incapability of committing treason is proven on the basis of the serial absurdities inferred by conceding the opposite proposition. Schematically, the speaker selects and divides his material in a 'chain'[77].

III. The Mysian narrative (*Her.* 23.2–30)

III.I. Putting the record straight

> [Phoenician] What is this about the shield, vinedresser? It has never yet been told of by any poet, nor does it figure in any account of the Trojan War. *Her.* 14.1

After a barrage of first-hand information about bodies and bones of giant heroes (*Her.* 8), the vinedresser goes on to disclose the truth about the Shield of Telephus. The Phoenician acknowledges Protesilaus as a more trustworthy witness twice ('I believe you, vinedresser—by Protesilaus, I do'[78]; 'from now on, vinedresser, I shall be on your side, and allow no one to doubt such stories'[79]) in the course of an intermediate discussion about Protesilaus' advice to suppliants at his sanctuary (14.1–17.6) and about recent apparitions of heroes at Troy (18.1–23.1). What follows is a retelling of the story of the Battle at Mysia with a series of new elements and supplementations:

[77] Consigny (2001) 187. See also Bermúdez (2017) 16–18 and especially 17 n. 18.
[78] *Her.* 16.6.
[79] *ibid.* 18.1.

ΑΜΠ. Οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ φρονεῖς οὕτω, αἴρωμεν ἐξ Αὐλίδος, ὦ ξένε. τὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ξυνειλέχθαι σφας ἀληθές. τὰ δ' ἐμβατήρια τοῦ λόγου τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ εὔχθω. ὡς μὲν δὴ τὴν Μυσίαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ πρὸ Τροίας ἐπόρθησαν ἐπὶ Τηλέφῳ τότε οὖσαν, καὶ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μαχόμενος ἐτρώθη ὑπὸ Ἀχιλλέως, ἔστι σοι καὶ ποιητῶν ἀκούειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκλέλειπται αὐτοῖς ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ πιστεύειν ὡς ἀγνοήσαντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν χώραν τὰ τοῦ Πριάμου ἄγειν τε καὶ φέρειν ᾤοντο, διαβάλλει τὸν Ὁμήρου λόγον ὃν περὶ Κάλχαντος ἄδει τοῦ μάντεως· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ μαντικῇ ἔπλεον καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἡγεμόνα ἐποιοῦντο, πῶς ἂν ἄκοντες ἐκεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν; πῶς δ' ἂν καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν ὅτι μὴ ἐς Τροίαν ἥκουσι, καὶ ταῦτα πολλοῖς μὲν βουκόλοις ἐντετυχηκότες, πολλοῖς δὲ ποιμέσι; νέμεταί τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα μέχρι θαλάσσης καὶ τοὔνομα ἐρωτᾶν τῆς ξένης ξύνηθες, οἶμαι, τοῖς καταπλέουσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ μηδενὶ τούτων ἐνέτυχον, μηδὲ ἤροντο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ' Ὀδυσσεύς γε καὶ Μενέλεως ἐς Τροίαν ἤδη ἀφιγμένω τε καὶ πεπρεσβευκότε καὶ τὰ κρήδεμνα τοῦ Ἰλίου εἰδότε, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσι περιιδεῖν ταῦτα, οὐδ' ἂν ξυγχωρῆσαι τῷ στρατῷ διαμαρτάνοντι τῆς πολεμίας. ἑκόντες μὲν δὴ οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐληίζοντο, λόγου ἐς αὐτοὺς ἥκοντος ὡς ἄριστα ἠπειρωτῶν πράττοιεν, καί πῃ καὶ δεδιότες μὴ πρόσοικοι τῷ Ἰλίῳ ὄντες ἐς κοινωνίαν τῶν κινδύνων μετακληθῶσι.

[Vinedresser] Since you feel that way, stranger, let us set sail from Aulis—for the story that they mustered there first is true—and let the embarkation offerings for our story be made to Protesilaus. Now, that before Troy the Achaeans ravaged Mysia, which was then under Telephus' rule, and that Telephus was wounded by Achilles while fighting to defend his people, you can learn even from the poets; for they have not left out this part. But to believe that the Achaeans, in ignorance of the country, thought they were plundering Priam's land, does an injustice to Homer's account of Calchas the prophet. For if they sailed after consulting a seer and made his skill their guide, then how could they have landed in Mysia unwillingly? And even when they had landed, how could they not have known they came to Troy, although they encountered many cowherds and shepherds? For the country is inhabited right to the coast, and of course those who arrive somewhere by sea customarily ask the name of the foreign country. But even if they met no one, and asked no such questions, still Odysseus and Menelaus, who had both already gone to Troy as ambassadors, and had known the battlements of Ilium, do not seem to me to have stood by or to have allowed the army to miss the enemy completely. No, the Achaeans were raiding Mysia deliberately, since word had reached them that these were the wealthiest people on the mainland, probably also because they were afraid that, since they were Troy's neighbors, the Mysians would be summoned to join in the war. *Her.* 23.4–8

In the current passage, the vinedresser for the first time engages personally in criticizing older accounts of the Trojan campaign. In terms of *stasis* theory, that is, an invention process of rhetoric whereby the main issues or challenges emerging in a debate are determined by the defense[80], the main *crisis* in this particular scenario comes down to the following: Did the Achaeans sack Mysia *deliberately* (ἑκόντες) or *in ignorance* (ἀγνοήσαντες)? The vinedresser agrees with the poets that the Achaeans sacked Mysia before Troy, during the reign of Telephus, who was injured by Achilles (fact)[81]. He also agrees that this operation is best described as a 'plunder' since the Achaeans actually fought this people (definition). However, there is an objection as to whether or not there

[80] For *stasis* theory see Marsh (2005) 41–6.
[81] Contrary to Gorgias' *Palamedes*, where the probabilistic argument primarily challenges facts (*stasis coniecturalis*): Palamedes did not commit treason at all.

was a motive behind this plunder: Did the Achaeans actually mistook the land for Troy? At this point, the vinedresser raises a *stasis qualitatis*, that is, an objection regarding the quality of action and actor (Was there a motivation? Is the act justified?). His contention is that the Achaeans *knew* that this was not Troy and plundered it nonetheless, and therefore they should be held responsible for the pillage of Mysia.

Let us now examine how the aforementioned patterns of argumentation are implemented here to support this *stasis*. Supposedly, the Achaeans consulted a seer, Calchas, whom they made their guide to Troy. To suggest that the Achaeans were ignorant of their act downplays the status, which Homer credits to Calchas, says the vinedresser. The implied intertext here is *Il.* 1.68–72[82], where Calchas is called ἄριστος μάντις (excellent seer); his comprehensive knowledge of the past, present, and future made him lead the Achaeans to Troy. To accept that the Achaeans, according to the poets, were ignorant of the land, presupposes that the person who guided them was ignorant too. But ignorance (Q) and prophetic knowledge (–Q) are two mutually exclusive elements, which cannot be assigned to one entity (i.e. Calchas). From this antinomy we infer that the Achaeans could not plunder Mysia unknowingly[83].

Now this mode of arguing from antinomies operates *in tandem* with apagogical deduction. The following step is to assume that the Achaeans plundered Mysia *in ignorance* (A) (note the concessive πῶς δ' ἂν καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντετυχηκότες). This proposition entails a few other occurrences: as soon as they landed, the men would inevitably bump into local herdsmen and shepherds (A1), whom they would ask about the name of the foreign land, as per custom (A2); the locals would say this is the land of Telephus and the ignorant Achaeans would have left in peace. *But even if* we accept that they did not meet anyone, continues the vinedresser with a further concession (note the use of the counterfactual conditional), had they not seen the city before? Menelaus and Odysseus had been to Troy as ambassadors and had got sight of the city's battlements; if they had wanted to stay in peace with this people, they would have discouraged the Achaeans from attacking (A3)[84]. Consequently, the initial proposition is proven wrong and the inference is: ἑκόντες μὲν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐλαύνοντο.

[82] See also Grossardt (2006) *ad loc.*
[83] Or that Homer's definition of the excellent seer is not very accurate. But this is not the contention here. In chapter 3, we will see that Philostratus might indeed have a different understanding of prophetic knowledge than Homer.
[84] The reference to this mission has no validity though, since the negotiatory mission must have taken place after the battle at Mysia. There is no reason to assume that Odysseus and Menelaus first visited Priam and before fighting in Troy went to Mysia; Grossardt (2006) 468.

The idea that the Achaeans meant to plunder Mysia (ἑκόντες) resonates with the second thesis in Palamedes' defense: οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις (nor, even if I had been able to, would I have wished to do so)[85]. Contrary to Palamedes, who was neither capable nor willing, the Achaeans were both capable of ransacking Mysia and willing to profit from its commodities. It is also impossible that they were *ignorant* of the land (πῶς δ' ἂν καθορμισθέντες ἠγνόησαν ὅτι μὴ ἐς Τροίαν ἥκουσι) since Odysseus and Menelaus *knew* the battlements of Ilium (τὰ κρήδεμνα τοῦ Ἰλίου εἰδότε). The polarity ἀγνοεῖν/εἰδέναι is instrumental in delineating the grounds on which Odysseus crafted his false indictment in *Palamedes*[86].

Notably, the vinedresser engages personally in refuting the older accounts while he might as well rely on Protesilaus' omniscience to present the story about the Shield of Telephus[87]. Instead, Philostratus chooses to actively involve his main narrator and his interlocutor in an argumentative mode. Protesilaus might have achieved supreme knowledge when his soul was detached from his body[88], but his role is not to divulge all his divine wisdom. It is important that the rationalizing practice be conducted in present time by the two characters of the here and now, independently of an external authority. What Philostratus cares for is not so much to present an objective truth contradicting that of Homer, but rather to implicate his readers in interacting with traditional accounts while adopting themselves the role of interpreter. While interacting with the older accounts the vinedresser states: οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσι περιδεῖν ταῦτα (it does not seem to me that they (i.e. Menelaus and Odysseus) would have tolerated these things) implying that this is his personal opinion and therefore the truth he is sharing is partisan and perspectival.

From a narratological perspective, Philostratus routinely has the vinedresser depend on Protesilaus' authoritative knowledge and convey his informant's truth based on what the hero 'saw' or 'considered true' (embedded or secondary focalization)[89]; but now that the vinedresser holds the fort of argumentation, he becomes the primary focalizer[90]. His focalization transpires from the absence of indirect discourse in the vinedresser's speech (formerly premised on an

[85] Gorg. *Pal.* 5.
[86] A characteristic passage is *Pal.* 5: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδὼς> ὁ κατήγορος κατηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς οἶδα· σύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σαφῶς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον πεποιηκώς· οὐδὲ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τις ὂν τὸ μὴ γενόμενον. εἰ δὲ οἰόμενος οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν […] (Well, that the accuser has accused me without knowing clearly—this I know clearly. For I am clearly aware that I have done nothing of this sort. And I do not know in what way someone could know that what has not happened exists. But if it is because he supposes that this is how things were that he has made the accusation […]).
[87] Rusten (2014) 172n.
[88] *Her.* 7.3.
[89] For the term see de Jong (2014) 50-56.
[90] de Jong (2014) 20 and 49.

implicit 'Protesilaus says' or 'he agrees with X'). This said, shift in focalization entails shift in allocation of authority.

III.II. From 'Refutation' of Homer to verisimilar truths

Heroicus belongs to a tradition of texts. which purport to refine or supplement older accounts of the Trojan War, the most prominent of which were Homer's poems and fifth-century tragedy[91]. By way of fiction, authors like Philostratus relied on various rhetorical methods in order to assert their own account's credibility: eyewitness, historiographical tropes, archaeological evidence etc. One of these media is the argument from probability. Often the implied author claims to have access to supreme authorities serving to authenticate the framing narrative of these stories by disclosing a ground-breaking truth. This idea of 'revising' Homer should not, however, be taken at face value. It rather amounts to an interpretative practice of modernizing or rationalizing the Homeric myth (and the medium of epic) in order to serve certain literary or philosophical purposes or define the author's ideals, values and beliefs by reference to the past.

Paradoxically, in Philostratus' case, this practice ultimately reaffirms rather than downplays Homer as an authoritative source. Given the characteristic backward impetus that drives *Heroicus*' subject matter (i.e. heroes of the Trojan War) Homer is the ideal source for redefining Hellenic identity by means of its exemplary heroic value. Let us take Palamedes as an example, a theme introduced here and studied in more depth in the following chapter. Palamedes emerges as the most appalling and deliberate omission by Homer for the sake of Odysseus. The new story of Palamedes makes sense or is more plausible only under the assumption that Homer knew about him and deliberately suppressed his actions supposedly to promote Odysseus[92]. This automatically situates the relationship of Palamedes and Odysseus in an oppositional context. In other words, the idea of re-creating the Trojan narrative based on what Homer did not say or what Homer purposefully omitted acknowledges Homer as the fixed point, in relation to which *Heroicus* develops its themes, values, beliefs centripetally. The assertion that the vinedresser (drawing upon Protesilaus) can rationalize or even refute Homer's story or *aletheia* grants *ipso facto* authority to his account.

[91] Cf. Dio Chrys. *Or*. 11, Lucian's *Vera historia,* Dictys of Crete's *Ephemeris Belli Troiani* etc.
[92] *Her*. 14.3, 24.2.

In *Heroicus*, the source of this ultimate knowledge is Protesilaus, who died first at Troy and after his soul was detached from the body and its diseases, it communed with the divine and became an expert in Homer's poetry. This type of truth is deemed as divine, absolute, final, and objectified. However, the ghost of Protesilaus is silent. The knowledge that stems from him is mediated through the vinedresser, who, despite his sophisticated education, fails to fully convey the truth of his informant; many things Protesilaus denies to reveal, many he does not know, while in many cases we cannot discern if the narrator presents Protesilaus' standpoint or projects his personal ideas. In the Mysian section, as we saw, the vinedresser somewhat breaks away from his source and argues autonomously. Consequently, we cannot only talk about a single authority or a singular truth. Truth is also partisan, constructed, and contingent upon the Phoenician's acquiescence, acting as the community. Unless the interlocutor's initial disbelief and doubts are overcome, truth has no value.

The vinedresser's commitment to initiate the Phoenician into the truth of Protesilaus[93] triggers off the Shield narrative. The latter establishes a series of innovations in the myth preceding the Trojan War: i) the Greeks did not mistake Mysia for Troy (as we read in *Cypria*) and they ransacked it to exploit its wealth or to prevent future alliance with Troy (23.8), ii) the Battle at Mysia was the greatest contest for the Greeks, greater than both those at Troy and any other subsequent war between Greeks and barbarians (23.12), iii) Palamedes displayed great valor in killing Haimus along with Sthenelus and Diomedes (23.22), iv) it was Protesilaus who fought and disarmed Telephus, and Achilles who gave the final blow (23.24), v) the leader of the Mysian women who fought alongside the men, Hiera, was more beautiful (a Trojan?) than Helen.

In order for these novelties to be accepted, the vinedresser needs to afford Protesilaus' account a good degree of verisimilitude, so that it *appears* (ἔοικε) closer to what the Phoenician (or third-century society and readership) is willing to accept as true (see below). Let us briefly pinpoint a few factors that are conducive to these truths. As in any other case, Protesilaus is our main informant, but by time of conflict with the Mysians the hero was still alive, and therefore, had not yet acquired the authoritative knowledge he got later at Troy. What we have here, is a firsthand testimony of a man at war, not very different from the journal of Idomeneus' companion, which Dictys of Crete used as source to assert his own version of the Trojan War[94]. In addition,

[93] *Ibid.* 7.8.
[94] Dué–Nagy (2004) 54.

the main battle narrative is 'framed with rationalist, historiographical markers'[95]. The polemical tone as well as the formulaic assertion of 'a battle surpassing all other wars fought between Hellenes and barbarians' are only two indications of how the historiographical perspective is adopted here. This is how Herodotus begins his own *Histories* with the listing of the mythical and historical conflicts between Greeks and their eastern neighbors[96]. Thucydides, too, appropriates the same *topos* to justify his engagement in writing the history of the internecine conflict between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians[97].

As in *Palamedes,* εἰκός is crucial in lending the account credibility. Arguing from probabilities serves to disprove a *logos* construed as false and deceptive[98], whether that be Odysseus' false accusations or the 'poetic lies' about the Trojan War. Notably, Odysseus is seen in terribly unfavorable light in either of these scenarios[99]. Let us not forget that the most notorious lie of Homer, according to Protesilaus, was the *Odyssey*. In Gorgias' model defense speech, factual reality is unattainable due to absence of witnesses. Additionally, on Gorgias' own epistemological terms, it is impossible for *logos* (language) to describe the specificity of external realities, a conundrum Palamedes addresses already at the outset of his defense[100]. In Philostratus' fictional account of the Trojan War, factual reality is difficult to attain because of the vast perennial ἔκπληξις (awe) the poems of Homer have caused to readers[101]. To speak about the truth is the opposite of becoming oblivious[102] and this is precisely what this section aims to achieve. At the end of this story we learn about certain figures and one strife that are more memorable than what Homer and the poets mischievously imprinted to our memories. In a typically sophistic way, the author engages in making the minor statement appear as major, but in a way that that facilitates rather than vitiates *his* truth.

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[95] Whitmarsh (2009) 210.
[96] Her. 1.1; Grossardt (2006) *ad loc.*
[97] Thuc. 1.1.
[98] Consigny (2001) 52.
[99] Note that both Gorgias' *Palamedes* and Philsotratus' *Heroicus* grapple with setting right the falsehoods of Odysseus. Gorgias does not explicitly engage in Homeric criticism like Philostratus, but it would not be inconceivable that Philostratus read both *Helen* and *Palamedes* as responses to Homeric epic and the truths it established. This is in line with the fundamental questions of faith, belief, and truth, which *Heroicus* raises and which are emphasized in view of all those texts, including Gorgias, aiming to revise the Trojan tale (Schwindelliteratur).
[100] In section 4, ἀλήθεια along with ἀνάγκη (constraint) are called 'teachers who provide more risks than resources' (διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ ποριμωτέρων); cf. *Pal.* 35 and *Hel.* 11; see also Gorgias' *On-non being* where the third thesis about being, is that even if we understand it we cannot communicate it to our neighbors.
[101] *Her.* 14 (cf. 24).
[102] Ἀλήθεια derives from privative prefix ἀ– and λήθη, which means forgetfulness.

CHAPTER III

Re-enacting Palamedes' defense

Interpretation and revision are two activities informing a great deal of Imperial literature. We often see Second Sophistic authors invest the characters of their stories with hermeneutic vigor. Earlier we saw in *Heroicus* that the narrative voice of the vinedresser, acting as the mouthpiece of Protesilaus, engages in the process of 'correcting' older accounts of the Trojan tale, and predominantly that of Homer.

This chapter is concerned with myth *per se* and focuses on how Philostratus steers the reader to construct the image of the cultured (*pepaideumenos*) through the figure of Palamedes. The ancient reader – familiar with the Classical canon of texts – is actively involved in this process. In our discussion, we will approach section 33 of *Heroicus* as a re-enactment of Palamedes' apology refined with further sophistic details[103]. My argument is as follows: in a series of vignettes, which take the form of (sophistic) debate between Palamedes (protagonist) and Odysseus (antagonist or foil), the author engages certain themes and a literary exemplum, which link Palamedes with Gorgias. By Gorgias we should not only think of the sophist and his writings *per se* but also what had been established in collective memory as 'Gorgianic' through cultural transmission. This said, aside from the sophist's fragments, we will also consider ancient *testimonia* and literary adaptations (e.g. Plato's dialogues).

The questions I am raising are: a) what are the qualities constituting the portrait of the *pepaideumenos*? and b) how does Philostratus shape *his* Palamedes in ways that make him share common intellectual ground with Gorgias? How is this foil activated in the text? I will investigate these questions on the basis of the following three focal points: I. *inventio* or εὕρεσις, II. intellectual φθόνος, and III. the appropriation of the medicine–rhetoric exemplum from Plato's *Gorgias*. My aim by establishing these communalities here is to clear the grounds for evaluating how the strategy of referencing certain authorities is effective for Philostratus' own definition of *sophia* (chapter 4). Before I take up these questions, I wish to give a synopsis of the five vignettes, which frame our inquiries.

[103] The translation is by Rusten (2014) adapted. The text is de Lannoy's (1977).

I. *Heroicus* 33: mind-fights and the Achaeans

The first vignette (33.5–9) starts with a solar eclipse at Troy. The Achaeans worry that a divine sign (διοσημίαν) for things to come is at issue. Palamedes provides a scientific explanation (διεξῆλθε) of the natural phenomenon, justifies why the portent will be against the Trojans and not the Achaeans, and advises the army to pray and sacrifice a colt. The Achaeans praise him (τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπαινεσάντων) and seem fully persuaded by his reasoning (καὶ γὰρ ἥττηντο τῶν τοῦ Παλαμήδους λόγων). Then, Odysseus warns Palamedes to refrain from advising on divination and heavenly matters, Palamedes refutes him, and Odysseus leaves full of rage. The story closes with Palamedes preparing himself for future malignancies on the part of Odysseus (ὡς πρὸς βασκαίνοντα ἤδη παρασκευάζων ἑαυτόν).

The second vignette (33.10–12) takes place in an ἐκκλησία (assembly). Some cranes are flying in their customary formation. Odysseus observes that the birds call the Greeks to witness (μαρτύρονται τοὺς Ἀχαιούς) that it is them who discovered the alphabet and not Palamedes. Palamedes refutes him by judging him incompetent of understanding and interpreting the divine order (οὐδὲν ἂν περὶ τάξεως εἴποις).

A follow-up parenthetical section (33.13) comprises a remark by the vinedresser on Odysseus' growing emotions. The hero is nurturing φθόνος (envy), because he has been made to look childish in the assembly by someone younger (μειρακιώδης δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας δόξας καὶ πρεσβύτερος νέου τοῦ Παλαμήδους ἡττηθείς). His plan is to turn Agamemnon against Palamedes, a rising rival.

The third vignette (33.14–18) opens with wolves attacking the Achaean camp. This conflict simulates an *agôn logôn*, but only Palamedes' argument is fully developed. Odysseus proposes to wipe out the pack at Mt Ida. Palamedes judges that Apollo uses the wolves to foretell the upcoming plague (προοίμιον λοιμοῦ ποιεῖται[104]), so that they will take precautions. Then, he continues with a twofold advice: first, the Achaeans should pray to Apollo to avert the plague (religious advice), and, then, take themselves some proactive steps towards a light diet and vigorous movements (διαίτης λεπτῆς καὶ κινήσεων συντόνων[105]) (physical advice). The vinedresser describes all these at length. He also gives as much attention to the assembly's full adherence to Palamedes' words; not only were the Achaeans fully persuaded, but they also thought each of his words as θεῖον

[104] *Her.* 33.14.7.
[105] *Ibid.* 33.14.15.

(divine) and χρησμῶδες (oracular)[106] . Palamedes gains the full trust of the community and proves competent of understanding, handling, and resolving effectively a problem that would put the entire army in jeopardy. He remains pious all the same. For these reasons, adds the vinedresser, Palamedes was awarded the prize of wisdom (σοφίας ἀριστεῖα ἐστεφανοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων[107]), "while Odysseus felt shamed, and turned all his villainy (πανουργίας) against him"[108].

By the last extended vignette (33.20–37), all conditions have matured towards the foul plot. The important episodes are as follows: Achilles requests to campaign against the islands and the coastal cities together with Palamedes, during which Palamedes instructs Achilles in tactics by calming and rousing him when necessary (33.20–23); there follows a series of distinctions and achievements in battle – alien to the hero's ethos as shown in older accounts. In the meantime, Odysseus brainwashes Agamemnon against Palamedes (33.24–27). The Achaeans accuse him of bribery and treason, and the Peloponnesians along with the Ithacans stone him to death. Agamemnon issues an edict that forbids burying or sanctifying the corpse; Ajax opposes and buries him, Achilles returns and composes an ode to the hero's memory.

II. Inventio or εὕρεσις

II.I. Palamedes

As tradition wants, Palamedes was a prime mythic inventor[109]. His most exquisite achievement was arguably the invention of the alphabet[110]. In the second vignette (see above), Odysseus is presented to challenge this tradition by attributing this invention to the cranes (αὐταὶ <γέρανοι> γράμματα εὗρον, οὐχὶ σύ[111]). However, the antagonist, who challenges the authenticity of his rival's intellectual pursuits, fails because of his incapacity to offer an accurate interpretation:

[106] *Ibid.* 33.15.5. This adjective appears only here and in *VA* 6.11, where Apollonius expounds on Pythagoras' doctrine and wisdom in front of Thespesion and other Egyptians. Pythagoras' wisdom is called ἄρρητος (ineffable) and his philosophy χρησμώδης and ἀληθής (true). In this section, Apollonius explains that he rejected all other philosophical doctrines because they were centered on pleasure and passions. The main elements of Pythagoras' philosophy emphasized here is vegetarianism and abstinence from pleasure. In the passage from our text, the Achaeans take Palamedes' words as oracles right after the hero has suggested his proactive plan including a vegetarian diet. In this sense, Palamedes' wisdom borrows from the thaumaturge's extraordinary *sophia*.
[107] *Ibid.* 33.19.1.
[108] *Ibid.* 33.19.2–4.
[109] *Ibid.* 33.1.3–6; Grossardt (2009) *ad* Kapitel 33 and *ad* 33.1 (571–574).
[110] Stesich. *PMGF* 213, Eur. fr. 578 Kannicht, Gorg. *Pal.* 30, but also Philostr. *VA* 3.22.2 and 4.33.
[111] *Her.* 33.10.4–5.

καὶ ὁ Παλαμήδης “ἐγὼ γράμματα οὐχ εὗρον” εἶπεν, “ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν εὑρέθην· πάλαι γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν Μουσῶν οἴκῳ κείμενα ἐδεῖτο ἀνδρὸς τοιούτου, θεοὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δι’ ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν ἀναφαίνουσι. γέρανοι μὲν οὖν οὐ μεταποιοῦνται γραμμάτων ἀλλὰ τάξιν ἐπαινοῦσαι πέτονται· […] σὺ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν περὶ τάξεως εἴποις· ἀτακτεῖς γὰρ τὰς μάχας.”

Palamedes answered, “I did not *discover* writing—I *was discovered* by writing, since it had long been stored in the house of the Muses waiting for the right man; the gods make known such things through wise men. The cranes, however, do not claim to make letters; they show their admiration for military order and arrangement in their flight; but then, arrangement is something you cannot speak of at all, since you always ignore it in battle.” *Her.* 33.11.1–8

The hero’s response implies the claim that no function arose out of individual behavior. Palamedes did not actually invent the letters; rather, he was discovered *by* them by acting as an intermediate agent between humans and the Muses. Despite this crucial change in form, the meaning of Palamedes’ utterance is not essentially different from that of Odysseus. On the level of semantics, this shift in agencies serves to distinguish between *inventing* and *discovering* the letters, but the main point is that Palamedes *did* come up with the alphabet anyways. Yet, there is more to it than meets the eye. The negative potential optative (οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποις) serves to establish that Odysseus is completely disqualified from talking about these matters, as he is ignorant of τάξις. Even though the term here is used in its military sense, ‘arrangement’ and ‘order’ are concepts that informed the broader agenda of a sophist like Philostratus and I believe that the author does not mean his reader to pass this by. Like *inventio*, τάξις or *dispositio* was a crucial component in rhetorical theory signifying the proper arrangement of arguments (in this respect following *inventio*). Yet, it was a key element in astronomy. A good example can be derived from the third book of *Vita Apollonii*, where, in section 53, the author uses the term twice: first to describe the experienced naval discipline or skill of Nearchus, Alexander’s fleet commander ([…] Νέαρχον οὐκ ἀγύμναστον τῆς θαλαττίου τάξεως), and second, to make a comment on how astral positions look unnatural to someone who observes them from the Red Sea (οἵ τε ἐπίδηλοι τῶν ἀστέρων ἐξαλλάττοιεν τῆς ἑαυτῶν τάξεως). Order and arrangement apply to aesthetics and mathematics too[112]. Within the intellectual circle of Julia Domna, where Philostratus interacted with many Neo-Pythagoreans, mathematicians, natural philosophers etc.[113], it is reasonable to assume that the notion of τάξις often covered a broader nexus of meanings. In this light, Odysseus’ lack of τάξις

[112] Aristotle presents symmetry and definiteness as the main two forms of beauty and notes that the mathematical sciences demonstrate these two forms to the highest degree: τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι (*Metaph.* 1078ba36–b2).
[113] Philostr. *VA* 1.3; Aitken – Maclean (2001) xlvi, and Bowie (2009) 20.

implies the hero's general incapacity to behave and act in a way that complies with nature, contrary to Palamedes. He failed to grasp the solar phenomenon before, he does not see how cranes 'show their admiration for order' now, and for the most part his arguments and conduct are disorderly.

On the level of pragmatics, the fact that we as readers are asked to acknowledge no autonomous agency behind the invention of the alphabet, reduces the degree of the actor's reflexivity and makes the discovery of the alphabet seem like a natural consequence. The agent in this case implements a sort of indirect control over his own behavior, which purges him from every moral or ethical involvement in the given situation. While the hero refrains from directly crediting himself with the invention of the letters, he nonetheless manages to create an effective character-based argument by saying that he is the wise man, whom the gods chose to reveal their wisdom through. He was chosen to perceive and interpret the signs of nature's wisdom and organize these natural abstractions into comprehensible systems. Thanks to him, humanity reached a higher level of civilization[114].

Interestingly, Philostratus adjusts Palamedes' realization to a moderate rhetorical style. Inasmuch as the broader subject matter of the text is religious, the hero is cast as a humble companion of the god, hence the use of the passive voice. At first glance, this more self-effacing formulation is somewhat at variance with the assertive language culture heroes traditionally use to talk about their benefactions. A good example is *Prometheus bound*[115]: at 436–471, the main hero compares the previous state of humanity, whose understanding of things was infantile (νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν), to the level of intelligence it reached after Prometheus' gifts (ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους). The first-person point of view in the active voice evinces the agent's immediate consciousness of his cultural activity and intention: he did it out of good will (εὔνοιαν ἐξηγούμενος)[116]. Prometheus emphasizes on his ego (I showed them (ἐγὼ ἔδειξα) the hard-to-discern risings and settings of stars)[117] and asseverates his originality (And I was the first (πρῶτος) to bring beasts under the yoke)[118].

In the case of Palamedes, the emergence of the alphabet was a process of guided ἀνεύρεσις, a fact that legitimately led Grossardt[119] to compare this passage of *Heroicus* to the Platonic

[114] As we saw, in Gorgias' *Palamedes* the παροιχόμενος βίος of the hero (20, 28) furnished an ethotic alibi against Odysseus' accusations of treachery.
[115] But also fr. 181a and 182 Radt, Eur. Fr. 578 Kannicht, Gorg. *Pal.* 30, and *Her.* 33.1.
[116] Aesch. *PV* 446.
[117] 457–8.
[118] 462.
[119] Grossardt (2006) *ad* 33.11.

epistemological theory of recollection as formulated in *Men*. 81c–86c. A crucial difference is that, unlike Socrates, who leads an ordinary slave to solving the geometrical problem, Philostratus' Palamedes stands out for his *special* inventional capacities. To highlight the importance of the outstanding individual's beneficent activity (chosen by the Gods) adds more depth to Palamedes' sophistic portrait. Sophists were also known for their interest in linguistic thought; Aristotle says for Protagoras that he was the first to distinguish the genders of nouns[120]. Gorgias was the first to create analytical word lists[121]. The invention of the alphabet may from a semiotic point of view correspond to the assiduous studies the sophists did on language.

Previously, in the Mysian narrative, the vinedresser said that Tlepolemus dispatched a ship to Telephus to inform him about the Achaeans as 'letters had *not yet* been found' (γράμματα γὰρ οὔπω εὕρητο)[122]. The prime narrator here adheres to traditional conceptions of *heuresis*, which, however, are in contradiction to the episode with the cranes, where the letters appear as already there. The *heuresis* of the letters by Palamedes is in line with his natural inclination to *sophia*, a theme permeating the entire rivalry section and thus attesting its autonomy. Therefore, we should not be taken aback by such inconsistencies, which, to an extent, are unavoidable, if we consider the different perspectives deployed in each of the narratives; the historiographical, rationalist approach has nothing to do with reanimating intellectual quarrels of sophists framed with heroic texture.

Another significant invention by Palamedes was the game of backgammon, a game requiring skill and concentration[123]. At *Her*. 20.2 Ajax' ghost appears in his own tomb where two shepherds are playing backgammon and asks them to stop in affliction. The ghost remembers Palamedes and its conscience is troubled because Odysseus had wronged both the living Ajax and his close friend. The heroes are seen as miserable co-sufferers[124]. The expression Ajax uses for Odysseus' machination is ἄδικον εὑρὼν κρίσιν. The same term is used by Odysseus to describe his own plot against Palamedes later on: εὕρηται δέ μοι κατ' αὐτοῦ τέχνη[125].

Resourcefulness and ingenuity are qualities traditionally attributed to Odysseus. However, aside from the Trojan Horse, Philostratus confines all his εὕρεσις skill to dissimulation and

[120] *Rhet.* 3.5 1407b7–8.
[121] Whitmarsh (2005) 44.
[122] *Her*. 23.11.5–6.
[123] *Ibid.* 33.3.1–2; Eur. *IA* 192–198 locates the invention at Aulis as a game to kill waiting time; Soph. fr. 479 Radt, and Gorg. *Pal.* 30 refer to backgammon as an intelligent game, while Alcid. *Od.* 27 considers it as a dangerous pursuit.
[124] *Her*. 33.3.
[125] *Ibid.* 33.25.6–8.

chicanery[126], which might in turn be seen as reflecting the negative qualities of a sophist. A claim to 'correct' Homer may be implied here too. Book 9 of *Odyssey* tells the story of how Odysseus evaded Polyphemus, perhaps Odysseus' invention *par excellence*, which Protesilaus discards most categorically as a Homeric lie[127]. When the hero's escaping trick has succeeded, he comments with self-satisfaction:

> But I took thought how all might be the very best, if I might find some way (εὑροίμην) of escape from death for my comrades and for myself. And I wove all sorts of wiles (δόλους) and schemes (μῆτιν), as a man will in a matter of life and death. Hom. *Od.* 9.420–3[128]

Philostratus strips *his* Odysseus of such credit; his intelligence is always channeled to malignant purposes. Palamedes, on the other hand, engages in all types of εὕρεσις, which provide for the common good. When the farmer who used to give offerings to the hero´s tomb at Ilium is troubled with hailstorms, Palamedes appears as revenant and ties a strap around the vine to protect it. Then, the Phoenician comments: Σοφός γε ὁ ἥρως, ἀμπελουργέ, καὶ ἀεί τι εὑρίσκων ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (The hero is wise, vinedresser, and as usual he invented something to benefit humankind) [129].

It is crucial that this remark is made by the Phoenician given that he is a character of 'the here and now' constructed as a foreigner or outsider of Hellenic culture. The stories of Protesilaus, which are to a great extent Philostratus' literary εὑρέσεις, serve to initiate him into the real Hellenic world and the cult of its heroes. Palamedes embodies a great degree of ancient wisdom; his revenant draws on precisely this wisdom and utilizes it in order to solve today's problems. In this respect, *heuresis* becomes the vehicle whereby ancient heroic wisdom is channeled into the world where our two speakers now live. If the hitherto uninitiated 'foreigner' manages to grasp this interface between present and past, then the importance and relevance of antique myths, heroic cult, and values – constructed intersubjectively – is made more manifest.

[126] *Ibid.* 34.2.2–3. Even this invention is however indirectly downplayed when Sthenelus calls it 'not a siegecraft but battle by theft' (27.9).
[127] *Ibid.* 1.5.1–5, 25.15.5, and 35.8.2–4.
[128] Transl. Murray (1919).
[129] *Her.* 21.9.1-2.

Εὕρεσις (*inventio*) is, as we already saw, also relevant to rhetorical theory. It is one of the chief canons of rhetoric. In fact, Aristotle defines rhetoric primarily as invention, 'discovering the best available means of persuasion'[130]. The five canons of rhetoric or stages of developing a persuasive argument were first codified in classical Rome and were explored in more depth later on: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery[131]. However, as Spranzi notes, this division is implicitly present already in Aristotle's *Topica*. The philosopher notes: 'He who is about to ask questions must, first of all, choose the τόπος (*commonplace*) from which he should make his attack'[132].

Gorgias' *Palamedes* is probably the earliest text, which grapples with the question of inventing a timely argument. At the outset of his defense (section 4), the hero is facing an ἀπορία, which entails a series of questions: where to start his speech from (πόθεν ἄρξωμαι;), how to arrange his arguments (τί δὲ πρῶτον εἴπω;), and to where he should turn in his defense (ποῖ δὲ τῆς ἀπολογίας τράπωμαι;). Odysseus' accusation has come as a surprise to him (διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔκπληξιν), which has unavoidably led him to loss for speech (ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη τῷ λόγῳ). Gorgias (through the mouthpiece of Palamedes) articulates up front the orator's perplexity about what sort of arguments he should generate against a false accusation:

> […] ἂν μή τι παρ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς παρούσης ἀνάγκης μάθω, διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ πορισμωτέρων τυχών.
>
> […] if I do not learn from the truth itself and from the present constraint, through finding therein teachers who provide more risks than resources. Gorg. *Pal.* 4.4-6

According to McComiskey, the necessity of εὑρίσκειν recurs here in another form, that of μανθάνειν[133]. How Palamedes' speech will match up to Odysseus' is dictated by the speaker's two instructors: ἀλήθεια (truth) and ἀνάγκη (current constraint); the orator will be combining facts (Palamedes did not *actually* commit treachery) and a set of artful strategies necessitated by the present occasion[134] (Palamedes is tried for treachery) to exit ἀπορία and refute the charge.

[130] *Rhet.* 1355b25–26; see also 1355b8–17 and 35–39 on the purpose of artificial proofs (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις).
[131] *Rhet. Her*. 1.3; cf. Cic. *Inv*. 1.9, *De or*. 1.142, 2.79, and Quint. *IO* 3.3.
[132] *Top.* 155b4–8; see also Spranzi's (2011) 31.
[133] McComiskey (2002) 47.
[134] Ἀνάγκη here constitutes the rhetorical situation and is thus relevant to καιρός.

The sophist's concern with εὕρεσις is also implied by his choice of the main hero. As shown in chapter 2, Gorgias' *Palamedes* can be seen as a rhetorical treatise specially focused on how to *invent* topical arguments. This very preoccupation with finding or inventing is justified within the narrative framework of Palamedes who is considered the inventor *par excellence*. In section 30, the hero's mythic inventions and past-life benefactions become an organic part of *inventio* serving as proof of benign ethos; devotion to such and such intellectual pursuits would not allow for malicious activities like treason, a fact that testifies to his ἀρετή (virtue) and εὔνοια (goodwill)[135]. This set of inventions, to which the judicial audience must be alert, is subservient to the whole process of furnishing topical – in this part ethical – arguments from probability. If so, the invention-related process of μαθεῖν, exhibited as necessity in the very beginning of the speech and left pending ever since, is now reaching a climax with the hero's own inventions. Gorgias paves the way to identifying one of the myth's core elements (i.e. inventions) with solving current situational problems (i.e. *inventio*).

Conceivably, behind Palamedes' strong formulations in these lines, one could identify a touch of sagacious self-confidence. Such assertive claims were kin to the itinerant intellectuals of the fifth and fourth centuries who would liken their humanistic activity to that of culture hero[136]. Counting on the fact that Gorgias produced his own art and would charge his students huge fees, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that by μέγας εὐεργέτης ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων (a great benefactor for you, both for the Greeks and for all humans)[137] the sophist implicitly valorizes his own art; nor would it be untimely to proclaim that his inventional art (εὑρών) ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπειον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου (transformed human life from resourceless to resourceful)[138]. In this light, the concept of εὕρεσις evinces a degree of self-referentiality.

[135] McComiskey (2002) 19–20.
[136] A good example is the myth of Prometheus in *Protagoras*; see also Lanza (2012) 12 n. 43.
[137] *Pal.* 30.
[138] *Ibid.*

III. Intellectual φθόνος

III.I. Admirer of wickedness (Her. 34.1.2–3)

Unjust murder or unjust conviction is integral to the myth of Palamedes arguably since its inception[139]. Archaic and Classical accounts that reproduce the Trojan tale connect three names to the fatal end of the hero: Odysseus[140], Diomedes[141] and/or Agamemnon[142]. In *Cypria*, the oldest account at our disposal, we learn that Palamedes unmasked Odysseus' faked madness[143] causing the latter to grow anger and plot together with Diomedes Palamedes' murder[144]. There is no actual reference to any precedent feud or any sentiment whatsoever. It is implied, however, that Palamedes proved himself smarter when he risked the life of Telemachus in order to elicit the desired response from Odysseus and thereby expose his lies.

The theme of φθόνος is introduced in the myth in late fifth-century tragedy and rhetoric[145]. We know that Euripides' *Palamedes* was staged in 415 BCE (along with *Alexander* and *Trojan Women*) but we do not know for sure whether Gorgias' speech predated it[146]. In the latter work, φθόνος, κακοτεχνία (subterfuge) and πανουργία (wickedness) emerge as the probable motivations behind Odysseus' accusation[147]. For authors and mythographers to come, Roman and Greek, the tragic fate of Palamedes and Odysseus' envy will go hand in hand and will occasion multiple fertile contexts for political allusion and philosophical rumination[148].

About seven centuries later, Philostratus will treat this subject in much more depth in *Heroicus*. The serial clashes with Odysseus in section 33 show that the hero is given due

[139] For a detailed analysis of the murder of Palamedes and its treatment in various accounts see Lyra (1987) 145–192 and specifically 155–192 on the mythic accounts regarding the hero's execution.
[140] In older accounts, Odysseus is in full charge of the plot; Lyra (1987) 157.
[141] As Odysseus' partner in crime, most prominently in *Cypria*, Dictys 2.15, and the scholion to Eur. *Or.* 432.
[142] Agamemnon is mostly presented as being persuaded by Odysseus and Diomedes' planted evidence (Apollod. *Epit.* 3,8, Hyginus *fab.* 105, Servius sch. to *Aen.* 2.81); in some accounts he consciously implicates himself in Palamedes' prosecution (sch. to Eur. *Or.* 432, Philostr. *Her.* 33.27, Dio Chr. *Or.* 13,21, and Libanius *ep.* 791.3).
[143] Procl. *Chrest.* 80.30-33.
[144] *Cypria* fr. 30 Bernabé (= Paus. 10.31.2); see also Lyra (1987) 153–4.
[145] The word φθόνος or its cognates does not appear in the extant fragments of the *Palamedes*; yet, judging from fr. 588 Kannicht, where the chorus blames the Achaeans collectively for killing the wisest man (πάνσοφον), and from fr. 580, where most probably Odysseus addresses Agamemnon and states that even the σοφώτατοι are susceptible to bribery, we can assume that φθόνος was a central theme in the play.
[146] For suggested dates see Liarou (2009) 109.
[147] *Pal.* 3.6–7 (cf. 32.4 where Palamedes portrays himself as μὴ φθονερός).
[148] The ill-fated and maligned Palamedes becomes somewhat proverbial from fourth century onwards; see e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.33. and *Ap.* 26.

prominence if and only if he is seen in contrast to the antagonist or as anti-Odysseus[149]. Such clashes may mirror a degree of oppositionality between authors, genres, and traditions (i.e. Philostratus versus Homer, sophistry/*sophia* versus epic etc.). Envy is not just announced here; rather, its causes are unfolding gradually and, when necessary, the narrator intervenes and comments (see synopsis). The use of direct speech, the debating setting framed by a responding public of Achaeans, and the use of the imperfect (ἐπετείχιζεν, ξυνετίθει)[150] showing Odysseus' persistent envy, are some indications of the author's zeal to animate this conflictual relationship and underscore the tragic dimensions of the unjust prosecution. Tragic irony reaches its peak when the hero agrees to follow Agamemnon's plan and tension is resolved with the lyric verses from Euripides' *Palamedes*[151].

In order to create the narrative space needed for such purposes, Philostratus has the vinedresser initially refuse to follow the version we find in *Cypria* about Odysseus' madness[152]. Instead, for him Odysseus came to Aulis very eagerly, and he had already been famous for his cleverness by time of enlistment[153]. In locating the antagonist hero in Aulis of his own free will Philostratus restores Odysseus to his heroic ethos and starts the envy tale with the two heroes battling on equal terms.

After seven Teubner pages saturated in φθόνος, Palamedes is stoned to death. If there is any space to discuss Odysseus, this should be right here, so long as we, readers, are nurturing the most negative emotions. Yet, a good deal of his portrait is confined to his role as the protagonist's foil:

> Protesilaus describes Odysseus as follows: he was extremely skilled in speaking (ῥητορικώτατον) and clever (δεινόν), a dissimulator (εἴρωνα), lover of envy (ἐραστὴν φθόνου), and an admirer of wickedness (τὸ κακόηθες ἐπαινοῦντα). *Her.* 34.1.1–4

[149] Philostratus seems to be following almost the same path in his rendering of Odysseus and Ajax's relationship. The latter, who is close friend of Palamedes, is also a master of ἀρετή, yet this time expressed in terms of courage and warlike spirit (*Her.* 35.7–8). Odysseus does not manage to surpass his virtue, he feels φθόνος (*Her.* 20.3), concedes to the unjust decision of the Trojans (35.11.3–5) to pass Achilles' panoply to him, and then Ajax is maddened to death. Protesilaus disproves Homer's story that Ajax was outwrestled by Odysseus (35.8.3–5). The vinedresser links Odysseus directly to Ajax's death (καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ ἀπεύξασθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ νίκην ἐλέῳ τοιοῦδε ἀνδρὸς ἐπ' αὐτῇ ἀποθανόντος <sc. Αἴαντος>; 35.10.8–9). For the reception of Odysseus in Dictys, Philostratus, and Dares of Phrygium see Stanford (1968) 146–158.

[150] *Her.* 33.13.2 and 33.24.1.

[151] *Ibid.* 34.7.

[152] *Ibid.* 33.4.

[153] *Ibid.* 33.4.5–6.

This is how the section of Odysseus starts and its end is equally gloomy. In comparison with all other heroes of the text, his character is seen in singularly negative light. Such is the singularity in the attribution ἐραστὴν φθόνου. In the extant Greek, φθονεῖν and ἐρᾶν are combined together only in two possible ways regarding syntax: a) if X is jealous of their lover (φθονεῖν ἐραστήν)[154] or b) if a lover appears as φθονερός[155]. To my knowledge, this is the only incidence in which ἐραστής is construed with φθόνου as objective genitive, the exact counter-model of Palamedes as ἐραστὴς σοφίας.

III.II. Chaerephon's joke (*VS* 483)

While gathering and assessing Philostratus' material about Gorgias in chapter 1, we postponed the discussion about a joke made by a certain Chaerephon. In *VS* 483, Philostratus says that Gorgias did not escape people's envy and illustrates this with a joke[156]. Even though Philostratus distinguishes the Chaerephon of this story from the one called 'box-wood' in comedy, it appears that he is probably talking about the same person, who also happens to be in conflict with Polus (and by extension with Gorgias) in Plato's *Gorgias*[157]. The sources profile him as a character who fancies intellectual discussion and moves easily in the social circles of the day, but without any phenomenal IQ. In an attempt to ridicule Gorgias' ambitions, he asks him: 'Why is it that beans inflate my stomach, but do not inflate the fire?'. As Wright notes[158], the play is on the verb φυσῶ, which means both 'to blow out the bellows' and 'to inflate'. Gorgias responds: 'I leave this for you to answer, but I know that the earth grows canes (φύει νάρθηκας) for such as you'. This manifestation is comparable to the case of Odysseus' φθόνος against Palamedes that we saw earlier; Chaerephon's attitude is framed in terms of insolence (ὕβριν ἤσκει) as he is a resentful competitor for sophistic distinction (τὴν σπουδὴν Γοργίου διαμασώμενος).

[154] As in Pl., *Phdr.* 240a4, Lucian, *Dialogi marini* 1.5.3, and Philostr. *Ep.* 1.57.10.
[155] As in Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis* 4.2.4.43.
[156] Φθόνος and its cognates appear six times in *Lives*; of these, only two are instances of intellectual φθόνος, the one referring to Gorgias, and the other to Polemo.
[157] Pl. *Grg.* 447c-449a. Chaerephon was a close friend to Socrates so Philostratus' sources could well have been the following: Pl. *Ap.* 20e–21a, *Chrm.* 153b, Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.15, Athen.4.134–136.
[158] (1921) 11.

The use of double entendre in Chaerephon's joke is significant; stomach (γαστήρ) is mapped onto material appetite, and fire (πῦρ) onto intelligence. But what does the reference to canes (νάρθηκες) exactly mean in Gorgias' reply? Is it just a hit-back or does it convey more?

Partially Gorgias continues the joke. However, Philostratus seems to like ambiguity. Many times one sentence or word may allow for multiple meanings. In Hesiod[159], Prometheus uses a νάρθηξ (giant fennel[160]) as a stalk to pass the sacral fire to humanity. Like Palamedes, Prometheus is routinely referred to as culture hero, and interestingly, his and Palamedes' inventions are intermeshed in some sources[161]. The instrument Prometheus uses to spread civilization across humanity and the instrument Gorgias threatens to use to 'civilize' Chaerephon's attitude are identical. The overtones assigned to these two νάρθηκες are similar too: Prometheus' fennel will burn with the fire (i.e. an intelligent invention) that will change the world, while Gorgias' νάρθηξ will burn with the fire, which 'inflated' Chaerephon's envy. Going a little further, Xenophon says that the pedagogues or ναρθηκοφόροι (cudgel-bearers) often used such fennels to school their disciples[162]. Philostratus, too, makes mention of such rods for chastisement elsewhere[163]. Finally, the divine fire was brought to humankind as a form of wisdom, knowledge, and civilization. The sophistic movement can be seen in a similar light and framed as an intellectual progression upon humanity. Earlier we saw that one might identify some degree of sophistic self-referentiality on the part of Gorgias in Palamedes' enumerating his inventions. Similarly, the myth of Prometheus in Plato's *Protagoras* has favored analogous interpretations[164].

Let us now put this information together to see how φθόνος contextualizes rhetorical discourse. The elements residing in Chaerephon's joke (beans, fire etc.), which show his envy, trigger Gorgias' νάρθηξ-response. On the surface level, the reader perceives the sophist's response as a threat to beat Chaerephon. On a second glance, the use of νάρθηξ triggers a wider nexus of meanings, which depart from joke-area: the πῦρ is mapped onto the giant fennel, which carried the sacral fire, and is thus re-contextualized within the activity of Hesiod's culture-hero, Prometheus. Beating Chaerephon with a cane may as well serve to correctionalize his behavior and instruct him in some kind of way; in this respect, νάρθηξ stimulates the mind to think of the cudgel-bearers and their pedagogical techniques mentioned in *Cyropaedia*.

[159] Hes. *Theog.* 566–7.
[160] Thphr. *HP* 1.2.7, Dsc. 3.77.
[161] Gera (2003) 122-3 and specifically n.41 on Aesch. *Palamedes* fr.182a Radt, transmitted as a scholion to *PV* 459.
[162] Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.20.
[163] Philostr. *VA* 8.3.
[164] Denyer (2008) *ad loc.*

If we reflect for a moment on the vignettes, envy against both Gorgias and Palamedes arises in similar contexts[165]. Chaerephon maligned Gorgias because he practiced extempore rhetoric and as a speaker he seized the opportune moment (ἐπαφῆκεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ καιρῷ). Palamedes is also depicted to give speeches in front of the ἐκκλησίαι of the Achaeans. Kairotic argumentation is traced in *Her.* 33 too. The heroes' debate seems to follow a certain pattern, which consists in the inability of one to deliver a timely judgment and the natural disposition of the other to rectify him. Palamedes knows what is most appropriate in a given situation[166]. An external stimulus (i.e. the Moon/some cranes/wolves) operates in a certain way (i.e. block of the Sun's disk/customary flying formation/menacing attacks), which triggers Odysseus to make an inapposite judgment (i.e. man must not speak of heavenly matters/the cranes found the letters/wolves should be exterminated right away). Then Palamedes exhibits why these propositions are wrong (i.e. man first becomes wise about the earth and then about the heavens/the Muses needed a wise man to discover the letters through the cranes) or unfavorable (i.e. wolves express Apollo´s will and to exterminate them will not avert the plague).

Odysseus' φθόνος increases when he is outsmarted and ridiculed by a younger man *in front of* the Achaeans (community). He worries about his image and conceives the foul plot as soon he senses his social status is at stake[167]. There are some indications implying the transformation of the Achaean camp into a court: the use of the term μαρτύρονται, at 33.10.4, reads as if Odysseus addresses the Achaeans as though the jury to testify on his behalf regarding the invention of the alphabet. Palamedes' condemnatory tone (σὺ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν περὶ τάξεως εἴποις)[168] fits in a litigation setting. Additionally, Odysseus is implicitly portrayed as a malicious plaintiff, who uses his (rhetorical) *inventio* unjustly (ἄδικον εὑρὼν κρίσιν, εὕρηται δέ μοι κατ' αυτοῦ τέχνη; see II.I.). Last but not least, the reader is given occasional hints as to how the surrounding audience receive the hero's advice and interact with his performances. They are invited to opt for one λόγος over the other (antilogical mode); Palamedes' persuasiveness is such that they end up thinking every word of his like an oracle from god[169]. Λόγος here is as forceful

[165] Cf. Heracleides' delivery in the court of Emperor Severus and Philostratus' attendant remarks on envy in public contexts (*VS* 614.2–11). Here too, φθόνος is an anticipated feature in extempore speeches; in a way, it betokens the intellectual growth and status of a good speaker.
[166] For Palamedes as instructor also in juxtaposition with *Her.* 33.21 see Mariscal (2008) 148–149.
[167] *Her.* 33.13.1–2; the distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος are key elements also in Gorgias' *Palamedes.* The imaginary jury is invited by the speaker to consider Odysseus' accusation in terms of *opinion* as opposed to truth and actual knowledge (*Pal.* 3, 22, 24, 35.5,); cf. *Hel.* 9.1, 10.2–5, 11.7–9, 13.3–9, and 21.3.
[168] *Her.* 33.11.
[169] *Ibid.* 33.15.4–5.

as in *Hel.* 8 (λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν): καὶ γὰρ ἥττηντο <οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ> τῶν τοῦ Παλαμήδους λόγων[170]; it was the words of Palamedes, which made the Achaeans surrender or be enslaved (ἡσσάομαι + gen. rei)[171], and which incited them to action, just as Paris' word enslaved Helen (see following section).

Finally, φθόνος is constructed as 'anticipated' by the speaker in both *Palamedes*[172] and *Heroicus.* At *Pal.* 28, the hero feels the need to ask the jury not to feel envy at what he will say (μηδένα φθονῆσαι τοῖς λεγομένοις) a strategy aiming to pre-empt the emergence of φθόνος or minimize its vigor. Such an appeal shows that Palamedes is aware that to mention his inventions and benefactions may come across as invidious (περὶ ἐμοῦ βούλομαι εἰπεῖν ἐπίφθονον μὲν ἀληθὲς δέ). As we saw earlier, his defense is the product of what truth and compulsion will instruct him to say (*Pal.* 4). He mentions ahead that he only wishes to speak the truth in reply to terrible lies (δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καί τι τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰπεῖν) and not out of complacency. At *Her.* 33.9, too, after Odysseus' departure, Palamedes is becoming conscious of his opponent's envy and prepares himself for future malignances (παρασκευάζων πρὸς βασκαίνοντα).

IV. Recovering Gorgias through Plato: the medicine–rhetoric exemplum

Contrary to εὕρεσις and φθόνος, themes already inherent in the myth of Palamedes and thereafter reconsidered in rhetorical context by Gorgias, I now wish to focus attention on an element, which, I submit, was Philostratus' innovation. In the episode with the wolves (third vignette), Palamedes asserts the omnipotence of *sophia* and acknowledges that every other *techne* or *episteme* is subservient. As example he uses medicine, which earlier in the text Chiron offered to teach to him, and Palamedes rejected. This example is borrowed from Plato's *Gorgias.* So far I have been using intertextuality to address similarities between *Heroicus* and Gorgias' fragments. In no extant fragment, however, can we trace any claim about medicine being subordinate to rhetoric. It is possible that such an idea was never enunciated by Gorgias himself or that we simply lack the primary material to substantiate such a hypothesis. It is thus necessary to expand our intertextuality

[170] *Ibid.* 33.7.
[171] *LSJ* s.v. ἡσσάομαι (4).
[172] Cf. Gorgias' *Funerary oration* (DK B 6.11–13), where the speaker communicates his fear that his lavish praise of the fallen warriors might chance an invidious reaction in the audience. However, here φθόνος would be aroused not against the individual but against other agents of the community.

boundaries and consider not only Gorgias' texts, but also texts about Gorgias. Plato often mentions Gorgias in his dialogues, primarily in those concerned with rhetoric and virtue. It is not my intention here to decide whether or not Platonic adaptations do injustice to Gorgias' doctrine, which they do to a great extent[173]. My actual intention is to see how Philostratus appropriates a literary exemplum, which Plato attributes to Gorgias in the eponymous dialogue, in order to describe the functions of 'Palamedean *sophia*'.

Already in the first vignette, our hero indirectly claims to know much about the earth and to speak wisely about the heavens (λέγειν σοφόν τι περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων)[174]. The opposite goes for Odysseus whose understanding of τάξις (arrangement) is found fault with a few lines later[175]. In both astronomy and divination, the antagonist proposes a mythic figure to hold authoritative power. His argument is that if Zeus is the master of heavens (field of astronomy) and if Calchas is expert in the task of prophecy, Palamedes has no right to speak of any of these. Despite Odysseus' proposed limitations to human knowledge, Palamedes scores valid points in both divination and astronomy.

But what are the limits to our hero's *sophia*? Things are getting clearer in the third vignette, when Palamedes tries to persuade the Greeks that the menacing wolves are sent by Apollo to signal the upcoming plague. The proactive plan he is suggesting involves a series of changes in diet and physical condition:

> But we, men of Greece, let us take care of ourselves, and if we want to keep away disease we must have a light diet and vigorous movement. For even though I have not studied medicine, anything can be grasped by wisdom (ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἡψάμην, σοφίᾳ δὲ καταληπτὰ ἅπαντα).
>
> *Her.* 33.14.13–17

According to this excerpt, an individual does not need to master a specific *techne* as long as he is endowed with *sophia*. His wisdom suffices to make him efficient in various scenarios, which pertain to a specific area of expertise. In this illustration, the idea that numerous *technai* are subservient to the property of *sophia* is materialized by reference to medicine. Going beyond divination and astronomy, wisdom qualifies the hero to speak as a doctor. Similarly, the knowledge he exhibited formerly when he obscured the authority of Calchas and Zeus, now eclipses figures

[173] Consigny (2001) 35–37, 151, 165–169.
[174] *Her.* 33.8.1–4.
[175] *Ibid.* 33. 11.7–9.

such as Chiron and Machaon[176], who were well-known in the Trojan tale for their medical expertise.

A little while ago, Philostratus stressed twice that Palamedes did not actually ever study to become a physician:

> βουλομένου δὲ τοῦ Χείρωνος ἰατρικὴν διδάσκειν αὐτόν, "ἐγὼ" ἔφη, "ὦ Χείρων, ἰατρικὴν μὲν ἡδέως οὐκ οὖσαν ἂν εὗρον, εὑρημένην δὲ οὐκ ἀξιῶ μανθάνειν [...]
>
> When Chiron wanted to teach him medicine, he said, "I would gladly have discovered it if it had not yet existed, but since it is already discovered, I do not think I want to learn it [...] *Her.* 33.2

Even so, he is perfectly capable of speaking wisely of medical issues, hence the efficacy of his plan. The utilization of specifically the art of medicine as subordinate to the property of 'speaking wisely' calls to mind Gorgias' description of the power of rhetoric in *Gorgias*.

When Socrates goads Gorgias into defending and praising the power of rhetoric, the sophist first establishes that rhetoric has subsumed and taken control of all other powers or fields of specialist knowledge:

> GORG. Ah yes, if you knew all, Socrates,—how it comprises in itself practically all powers at once! And I will tell you a striking proof of this: many and many a time have I gone with my brother or other doctors to visit one of their patients, and found him unwilling either to take medicine or submit to the surgeon's knife or cautery; and when the doctor failed to persuade him I succeeded, by no other art than that of rhetoric (οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ). And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere, while the master of speech would be appointed if he wished (ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο). Pl. *Grg.* 456b–c[177]

On all these occasions, says Gorgias, the doctor has failed to make his patient follow the proposed treatment because of his lack of persuasive speech[178]. In this respect, the ῥήτωρ is privileged over the ἰατρός, because he can catalyze treatment implementation. The significance of science, its methods, tools, and practices are not at all downplayed. What Gorgias questions, instead, is the ability of a doctor to communicate the necessity of his discipline. This is the part where Gorgias

[176] Machaon is not mentioned by Philostratus. However, given the dense nexus of allusions to Homeric epic and especially to *Iliad*, it is impossible to imagine that the author and his reader were not aware of the hero's medical powers.
[177] Transl. Lamb (1925).
[178] Plato (*Leg.* 720d, 857c–d) opposes the idea that a good doctor should use rhetoric to overcome a patient's refusal to medical treatment; for sources on patients resisting treatment in medical texts see Dodds (1959) 210 *ad* τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι.

emphasizes the uniqueness of his profession with an emphatic active ἐγὼ ἔπεισα[179]. Ultimately, for Gorgias among the competing discourses (διαγωνίζεσθαι) rhetoric emerges as dominant[180].

There is evidence that Gorgias himself was associated with doctors and medicine. According to the passage above, his brother, Herodicus, was a doctor[181] and through him or other doctors, Gorgias met with many patients. In the life of Empedocles, Diogenes Laertius citing from Satyrus, says that Gorgias, who was a student of Empedocles (Γοργίαν οὖν τὸν Λεοντῖνον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι μαθητήν), claimed to have been present when Empedocles would perform magical feats (ὡς αὐτὸς παρείη τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι)[182]. Empedocles was a doctor and wrote many medical books[183]. It is important that Satyrus here refers to him as ἰατρός καὶ ῥήτωρ. If Gorgias' education was moulded on the basis of these two models, from which he rejected medicine and developed or, according to others, even initiated the art of language, we may suspect why Philostratus' Palamedes also rejects medicine in favor of a type of *paideia* that would afford him maximal comprehension (σοφίᾳ δὲ καταληπτὰ ἅπαντα).

There may be no text by Gorgias posing the subordination of medicine to the all-encompassing rhetoric, but there is a passage where the two are correlated. In *Hel.* 14, Gorgias likens the way, in which different kinds of drugs have ambiguous effects on the body, to the way, in which different kinds of λόγοι have ambiguous effects on the soul[184]. The analogy between the functions of *logos* and those of medicine raises the use of rhetoric to a matter of life and death. The sophist concludes his investigation about the possible outcomes of different *logoi* with an interesting addition: οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν <u>ἐφαρμάκευσαν</u> καὶ <u>ἐξεγοήτευσαν</u> (others drugged and bewitched the soul by some evil persuasion)[185]. This 'super-naturalist' worldview, as

[179] See also Olympiodorus' critique (*In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria* 6.11.8–21), who finds Gorgias' claim to be more efficient than his brother annoying and obfuscating.
[180] The idea recurs in Pl. *Phlb.* 58b–c, when Protarchus is invited to respond to Socrates' claim that the knowledge relating to being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest kind of knowledge (ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν). The man recalls Gorgias' conviction that the art of persuasion surpasses all other τέχναι (ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν) and makes them subject to itself by free will (ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων…ποιοῖτο). Keeping up with Plato's language, the trained orator is, then, an artful slave-master who influences decision making by means of persuasion.
[181] cf. Suida Γοργίας.
[182] Diog. Laert. 8. 58–59.
[183] Suida Ἐμπεδοκλῆς l.16.
[184] See Dodds (1959) *ad* 456b6. A similar comparison is made in Isoc. 8.39, which the orator might have borrowed from his teacher Gorgias. In Pl. *Tht.* 167a5–6 we read: So, in education, too, a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the doctor brings about the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words; translation is mine); the example medicine – rhetoric here switches to medicine – sophistry and the comparison is now made between a doctor's medical methods and a sophist's pedagogical activities.
[185] *Hel.* 14.

Segal puts it[186], relating to magic and trickery is reminiscent of two other aspects of *logos* in Gorgias: first, persuasion as mental enslavement, which we saw earlier, and second, persuasion as deception or ἀπάτη[187]. Rhetoric apparently triggers some sort of psychological coercion or compulsion. In the latter passage, it is made explicit that it can be used for either good or bad ends (πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ), hence its moral neutrality. *Helen* is deeply concerned with the *dynamis* and nature of *logos* (cf. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας at 8). For some scholars the speech should rather be read as an encomium of *logos*. Segal suggests it 'may even have served as a kind of formal profession of the aims and the methods of his (i.e. Gorgias') art'[188].

In sum, Philostratus harnesses the rhetoric–medicine exemplum to establish the omnipotence of *sophia*. A wise hero, as we saw, needs to speak wisely about any subject, a claim implied by Palamedes in his first encounter with Odysseus[189]. In *Lives*, we also saw that a sophist needs by definition to be an eloquent virtuoso. Palamedes' wisdom depends on his ability to invent and provide for the good of the community. Just as in the Gorgianic perception of rhetoric, intellect (not *sophia*) for Philostratus may be used for evil ends too, an idea exemplified by Odysseus, probably an example of sophist to avoid. Although the author is very careful with the terms he uses to describe Odysseus' intellectuality – all uncomplimentary[190] – (μηχανήματα[191], δεινόν, ῥητορικώτατον[192] etc.), he includes just once the possibility that *sophia* may indeed be ambivalent in terms of ethics: ἀλλ' ἔφθησαν αὐτὸν αἱ Ὀδυσσέως μηχαναὶ <u>σοφῶς</u> ξυντεθεῖσαι, καὶ χρυσοῦ μὲν ἥττων ἔδοξε <Παλαμήδης> προδότης τε εἶναι κατεψεύσθη (But the machinery of Odysseus' plots, which had been <u>ingeniously</u> constructed, overtook him, and Palamedes was framed for accepting bribes and falsely accused of treason)[193]. Even so, Odysseus is never called σοφός; even here, the phrase σοφῶς ξυντεθεῖσαι qualifies μηχαναί, a term often used to describe duplicity or trickery, and for this reason its combination with σοφῶς sounds a little oxymoronic compared to how Protesilaus or Palamedes' *sophia* is presented[194]. In any case, the myth of Palamedes and Odysseus, as said, was traditionally offered for reflection on the nature of *sophia*, and I hope to have satisfactorily shown that, in plugging himself in this tradition, Philostratus in his *Heroicus*

[186] Segal (1962) 112.
[187] Futter (2011) 7.
[188] Segal (1962) 102.
[189] *Her.* 33.8.
[190] Miles (2017)a 91.
[191] *Ibid.* 33.30.
[192] *Ibid.* 34.1.
[193] *Ibid.* 33.1.
[194] On the ambivalence of *soph-* terms in *Heroicus* see Favreau Linder (2015) 38.

relied a great deal on Gorgias. What remains now is to investigate how our sophist's dependence on Gorgias imports in *Heroicus'* literary, intellectual, and cultural world.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

In this chapter, I wish to discuss how 'Gorgianizing' contributes to the rhetorical and sophistic world of *Heroicus* as well as in what ways it enriches our understanding of Philostratus' intellectual agenda.

Gorgias was indeed a key figure in the transition from archaic poetry to Attic prose and from the late Archaic myth-based poetry to the Classical logos-driven prosaic philosophy. As cultural father of a series of intellectuals (see also *letter* 73) Gorgias sets the record straight as to what the prototypical sophist looks like or, put more accurately, he is the ultimate ancient source, in which Philostratus anchors his (re)conceptualization of sophist[195]. In this discussion, three different yet closely interrelated processes can be traced in order to assess what emulation of Gorgias imports in Philostratus' self-presentation: i) grounding (what common ground does Philostratus establish between Second Sophistic intellectuals (including himself) and their literary father?), reconstitution (how does Philostratus redefine the image of a sophist via Gorgias?), and innovation (how does Philostratus articulate independently his paradigmatic notion of *sophia* in *Heroicus*?).

I. Grounding

1. *Father of extemporization* (*VS* 482). The prominence that Philostratus gives to improvisational rhetoric in *Lives* is in line with the performative nature public speaking started to have especially from the first century CE onwards[196]. Speakers of the Imperial Era would perform their speeches in public on a plethora of subjects. In *Lives*, Gorgias is considered as father of extempore speeches; in a way, systematic improvisation, came along with the birth of rhetoric in the theatre of Dionysus. The emphatic 'προβάλλετε' illustrates the sophist's innate preparedness to answer whatever question his audience would pose[197]. Genuine extemporization is a must quality for all sophists

[195] Anderson (1986) 40 n.94 notes: 'To some extent Philostratus may misrepresent the activities even of Gorgias, in order to suit his own conception of a sophist'; cf. p. 35.
[196] Contrary for example to Hellenistic times; Whitmarsh (2005) 16.
[197] *VS* 482; cf. Pl. *Grg.* 447c, *Men.* 70b–c, and Cic. *Inv.* 1.7.

whom Philostratus in *Lives* regards as outstanding virtuosi[198]. Epideictic oratory would take the form of declamations (μελέται), formal talks (διαλέξεις), or tasters (προλαλιαί)[199], in which all sophists would fashion publicly oriented personae promoting certain beliefs, which held authoritative truths. In declamations, sophists in the audience were often asked for a theme or opinion[200].

Father of extempore speech entails father of *kairos* argumentation[201]. At *VS* 483, Gorgias ridicules Prodicus for recounting the same clichéd fable about the dilemma of Achilles in every Greek city and not opting for the opportune moment. In chapter 3, we saw how the argument of *kairos* informs a great deal of the debates between Odysseus and Palamedes too.

2. *Inventio/heuresis.* Philostratus uses Gorgias' rhetorical *heuresis* as a foil for his own literary inventions. Alcidamas, who perhaps was Gorgias' student, also used the myth of Palamedes presumably to respond to Gorgias' earlier defense[202]. But Philostratus was the only sophist to avail himself of Palamedes' mythic inventions so as to reflect on the meta-textual uses of *inventio* in *Heroicus.*

3. *Courtier of the Severans.* Gorgias paid his first (?) visit to Athens as ambassador to seek help for his hometown. In *Lives*, Philostratus emphasizes Gorgias' great political speech at Olympia[203] where by acting as the advocate of reconciliation (ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος) he tried to reconcile the Greeks against the barbarians 'His Olympian Oration dealt with a theme of the highest importance to the state'. His funeral speech in Athens was also about a civic matter, namely to commend the Athenian warriors who fell in the wars and whom the state buried in public expenditure. In the same speech, which was composed with extraordinary cleverness (σοφίᾳ δὲ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ξύγκειται)[204], he once again tried to unite the Greeks against the barbarians. From its inception with Gorgias, epideictic rhetoric was imbued with political and practical significance and was connected to Pan-Hellenic institutions. Gorgias was on good terms with authority figures like Jason of Pherae, tyrant of Thessaly, who must have been his patron[205]. Philostratus, too, was a sophist who, between 203 and 208 CE, was introduced to the Imperial family, became a member

[198] Anderson (1986) 32 (cf. 27–8, 47).
[199] Bowie (2009) 25.
[200] *VS* 572.
[201] Cf. Dion. Hal. *Comp. verb.* 12.68, who says that Gorgias was the first to write about *kairos*.
[202] Alcidamas wrote a speech entitled *Odysseus against the treachery of Palamedes* and defending Odysseus.
[203] *VS* 493: His Olympian Oration dealt with a theme of the highest importance to the state.
[204] *Ibid.*
[205] Consigny (2001) 221 n.9.

of Julia's circle, and accompanied Emperor Caracalla in some of his journeys[206]. The biography of Apollonius of Tyana was commissioned to him personally by the empress. In *Lives*, the author frequently refers to *his* sophists as diplomats, members of embassies, and imperial secretaries[207]. The most prominent speeches are speeches delivered also in Olympia, Delphi, and Isthmus. Recent research on *Heroicus* has suggested that the text promotes Alexander Severus' strategic policy towards the rising empire of Sassanians[208]. A sophist's advisory activity as well as his advocacy to political or ethnic matters is also an element Philostratus links with Gorgias.

4. *Antagonistic community.* The anecdotal story of Chaerephon's witticisms against Gorgias is a clear illustration of how a sophist's successful career in public speaking often occasioned envy and quarrels, as well as an indication of the demands of performing. Gorgias, too, censures Prodicus for his hackneyed subjects. In Philostratus' day, public performers often relied on making enemies in their various audiences – on and off stage – in order to establish and further their reputation amongst their pedantic rivals[209]. Quarrels amongst professionals is one of the main elements that influenced Philostratus' selection of material in *Lives*.

II. Reconstitution

Aside from establishing common ground between the ancient and Second Sophistic, Philostratus used Gorgias to redefine sophistic values and restore the image of sophist reaffirming his own positionality. As we saw, the second cluster of intellectuals in *Lives*, enumerates eight sophists who treated their topics philosophically. Gorgias was the first of this group and since he was the father of sophistry, then we infer that from its inception sophistry was philosophically-oriented. The opposite goes for the third group of sophists, in which Philostratus belonged himself. This group, starting with Aeschines, abandoned philosophical abstraction, grappled with more practical issues and in a more systematic way. Consequently, despite *Lives'* conviction that the intellectuals of the 'Next' or 'Second Sophistic' were the continuators of a long-lasting tradition, there is an implied discontinuity between these two moves. That explains why certain intellectuals

[206] Bowie (2009) 20.
[207] Anderson (1993) 31.
[208] Shayegan (2004) 285–315.
[209] Anderson (1986) 43–5.

from this period who practiced philosophy, such as Dio of Prusa, are not considered as genuine sophists and are treated parenthetically.

Heroicus is, at first glance, at variance with these theoretical divisions in *Lives*. Both the vinedresser (following the advice of Protesilaus) and Palamedes, the two prime *pepaideumenoi* of the text, engage in sophistic activities while at the same time embracing a philosophical way of life[210]. The vinedresser *changed clothes*[211] when he met Protesilaus and started to philosophize along with the hero[212]. Protesilaus shares his prophetic wisdom, interprets Homer's poems most accurately[213], and cures a number of diseases[214]. Palamedes' *sophia* is clearly constructed on a merging between the symbolic roles of both philosopher and sophist. His appearance was more of a philosopher's, hirsute and slovenly;[215] he was growing a light beard, while his face was earnest and kindly[216], but also with a great deal of dirt (αὐχμὸν περὶ τῷ προσώπῳ ἔχειν πολὺν)[217]; his life was self-sufficient, austere, and ascetic, without any furnishings (αὐτουργὸς βίος καὶ ἔξω τοῦ κατεσκευάσθαι)[218]; he was apt in divination[219] and in deciphering the signs of gods[220]. His dietary plan based on vegetarianism and intensive workout recalls the Pythagoreans[221]; overall, he embraces a set of moral values suggestive of a philosophical way of life (e.g. contempt for money, indifference to rewards etc.). Other elements emphasize the hero's sophistic outlook[222]: he explains scientifically a natural phenomenon, that is, a solar eclipse, and possesses knowledge of astronomy, for which he is censured by Odysseus (first vignette). Palamedes' assertion that everything can be learned by wisdom, as we saw, calls up the medicine versus rhetoric example in Pl. *Gorgias*, while his response to Chiron adds 'a touch sophistic arrogance'[223]. In addition, when the hero instructs the Achaeans to follow a specific diet and exercise by the sea, he sounds like a

[210] It might indeed be true that 'there was no real break in the history of 'Sophistic' at all' as Anderson (1993) 18 suggests. Even though he rightly raises this point, he does not delve into what the actual continuities in subject matter and performative value consisted in.
[211] *Her.* 4.9.
[212] *Ibid.* 2.6; cf. 4.10–11, 6.1.
[213] *Ibid.* 7.3–4, 11.5, 14.
[214] *Ibid.* 16.1–3; for the construction of Protesilaus' authority on the basis of philosophical and sophistic skills see Miles (2017)a 61–79.
[215] Sidebottom (2001) 82.
[216] *Her.* 33.39–40; cf. Sidebottom (2001) 84–5.
[217] *Ibid.* 33.41; cf. Sidebottom (2009) 84.
[218] *Ibid.* 33.44.
[219] *Ibid.* 33.7; cf. *VS* 481 where the method of philosophers is likened to prophetic art controlled by man.
[220] *Ibid.* 33.14.
[221] Philostr. *VA* 1.8.
[222] Miles (2017)a 89–90 and Favreau Linder (2015) 39–40.
[223] Anderson (1986) 248.

Homeric *iatrosophistes*[224]; he also invents writing and measurement. Odysseus calls him σοφιστήν pejoratively[225], a further attestation to his φθόνος. Some other aspects of the hero's behavior can be (mis)taken for either sophistic or philosophical: he was often engrossed in his thoughts and would isolate himself in the mountains, whence wise men took up the habit to observe the sky from the highest places[226]. Another example is the hero's attitude towards rewards of courage: he is twice distinguished in battle and yet gives all the credit once to Diomedes[227] and once to Achilles[228] keeping a low profile; however, if the Achaeans ever offered a prize for wisdom, he would not yield it to anyone else because love for wisdom was his constant pursuit[229]. Ambiguity is intentional here, in that it reflects the overlapping fluidity between these labels as well as the tensions amongst the elite who adopted these roles for their self-presentation.

This said, we see that through the narrative of Palamedes Philostratus promotes the reconciliation between sophistry and philosophy, an idea we also discussed in chapter 1 in relation to how Gorgias was presented in *Lives* and the *letter*. Palamedes was routinely used ever since fifth-century tragedy to reflect on the nature of wisdom as well as the ambivalence of knowledge[230]. Such problems reflected the undecisive debates of both Classical and Second-Sophistic intellectuals. In Philsotratus, the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes also translates to the competing models of *sophia* and education[231]. 'Palamedean *sophia*' has no ambivalence whatsoever; the hero always provides for the good of the community. In establishing that this type of 'Palamedean *sophia*' is only positively charged in terms of ethics, Philostratus once again uses Gorgias. Although rhetoric for Gorgias could be used for either good or bad purposes, wisdom is by nature good. In *Pal.* 25, σοφία is constructed as mutually exclusive with μανία. These two cannot go hand in hand because madness is defined as attempting things that are impossible (ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀδυνάτοις), useless (ἀσυμφόροις), and shameful (αἰσχροῖς); such acts harm the friend and benefit the enemy; they also cause the perpetrator's life to be disgraceful (ἐπονείδιστον) and precarious (σφαλερόν). As a token of his wisdom the hero invokes his previous life and former

[224] Anderson (1986) 246.
[225] *Her.* 33.25.
[226] *Ibid.* 33.41: τὴν γὰρ κατάληψιν τῶν μετεώρων ἐντεῦθεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτάτων οἱ σοφοὶ ποιοῦνται. Withdrawal from audience before declaiming was typical of a sophist's behavior (Sidebottom (2001) 77), but at the same time shunning admiration, glory, and crowds were a *sine qua non* for philosophers, according to Epictetus (3.23.19).
[227] *Her.* 23.23.
[228] *Ibid.* 33.30.
[229] *Ibid.* 23.23.
[230] Favreau Linder (2015) 33–36.
[231] Mariscal (2008) 150–154, Miles (2017)a 87.

inventions, which aimed at making life well-provided (πόριμον) and well-adorned (κεκοσμημένον)[232]. *Sophia* is framed in terms of artfulness (τεχνήεντα), aptitude (δεινόν), and resourcefulness (πόριμον)[233].

III. Innovation

The notion of 'universality of Gorgias' is diffuse in *Heroicus* and is re-activated in both the here and now of the dialogue and in the distant myth of Greek heroes, which frames it. It is time now to see how these intertextual establishments, in co-examination, facilitate Philostratus' articulation of (heroic) *sophia.*

Sophia is in nature transcendental and omnipotent, in that it acknowledges *epistemai* or *technai*, such as medicine and divination as subsidiary. Palamedes, in the third vignette, affirms that even though he did not study medicine, his wisdom suffices to *discover* the most suitable course of action. In the beginning of section 33, we read that Palamedes arrived at Chiron's already self-taught (αὐτομαθῆ)[234], he was practiced in wisdom (καὶ σοφίας ἤδη γεγυμνασμένον), and with more of it than Chiron (πλείω γιγνώσκοντα ἢ ὁ Χείρων)[235]. Αὐτομάθεια (*self-teaching* or *self-learning*) denotes one's inherent skill to supply the cognitive and technical content in order to solve a problem. Although Palamedes never studied medicine, he spoke like a physician because his wisdom enabled him to know this *techne* all alone. This addition is essential to our inquiry since it clarifies the epistemological grounds underpinning 'Palamedean wisdom'[236]. A true *sophos* is a good rhetor and a practical philosopher. The vinedresser enjoys the wisdom of Protesilaus who cures diseases and has prophetic knowledge. Engagement with heroic cult and the past affords today's man to partake of the divine knowledge of heroes. This is why, before the story of the Mysian campaign starts, the vinedresser asks the as yet uninitiated Phoenician to make offerings to Protesilaus (τὰ δ' ἐμβατήρια τοῦ λόγου τῷ Πρωτεσίλεῳ εὔχθω)[237]. Finally, what is most

[232] *Pal.* 30.
[233] *Pal.* 25.
[234] Cf. *VS* 498.11–13.
[235] *Her.* 33.1.1–3.
[236] To some extent, αὐτομάθεια is supported also by Gorgias: his third thesis in the *On-non being* is that even if the thing exists, and even if we are able to know it, still we cannot communicate it to our neighbor. However, *logos* and by extension rhetoric provide for the means whereby an individual learns. In Pl. *Meno* 95c (cf. Arist. *Soph. el.* 33.183b.36), Meno also presents Gorgias as ridiculing those sophists who professed to teach ἀρετή (virtue) and committing himself to only teach the method whereby someone knows ἀρετή (i.e. to be a skillful speaker).
[237] *Her.* 23.2.

important about the author's idea of wisdom is how it operates and where it is expressed. The answer to the first question is by means of inventiveness; in this thesis, we saw how *heuresis* as a rhetorical, compositional, and expositional element informs through the myth of Palamedes the core of sophistic declamation. The vinedresser by communing with Protesilaus is not taught the hero's wisdom; rather, he learns how to *discover* the truth himself, a truth that is already there, just like the letters were revealed to Palamedes; in like manner, Palamedes develops his own *eros* for *sophia*, independent of Chiron's private teachings, just like Gorgias, who only professed to teach his students a set of rhetorical methods whereby one masters virtue. As for the latter question, for Philostratus and for *his* Second-Sophistic declamatory world, exposing one's *sophia* makes sense in a society that is altogether antagonistic, a society where professional sophists and intellectuals boost their students to ruin their rivals' lectures and lampoon their performances, a society where φθόνος against an outstanding individual can grow so big that it would conceivably be no longer funny to say he would be stoned to death.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, I examined how two fundamental notions, which Philostratus ascribes to Gorgias of Leontini, are re-activated in *Heroicus*. Specifically, the idea of 'father of sophistry' conveys a twofold meaning: on the one hand, accepting someone as literary father entails authority. On the other hand, it also implies a (sub-)conscious fervor on the part of the upcoming author to challenge the imposed directives and surpass authority, ideas inherent in development of thought and sophistic sentiment; Gorgias provided a sturdy framework and a set of methods, which prospective students of rhetoric and public speakers adopted and adapted. As we saw, adaptation informed largely Gorgianic rhetoric, which acknowledged the importance of *kairos* and valorized truth as partisan and contingent upon community. Having studied exemplar material, Philostratus detached himself from authorities such as Gorgias and Homer and reconfigured his own literary persona.

The second notion, 'Gorgianizing', figures more prominently in the *letter* to Julia, where an author's (also Philostratus') success is attainable by way of emulation (φιλοτιμία), whereas those who failed in their careers, did so out of unproductive envy (φθόνος). These two notions justify why Philostratus saw Gorgias as the master of sophistic knowledge.

In the main part of the thesis, we saw how *Heroicus* engages in 'allusive Gorgianizing'. First, the universality of 'Gorgianic argument' was studied in relation to the revisionist project of *Heroicus* (Chapter 2); the vinedresser, in the course of initiating his Phoenician interlocutor into the true wisdom of Protesilaus, used argumentation strategies, which evoked Gorgias' *Palamedes.* As we saw, this playful 'refutation' does not at all deny the canonical status of prevailing accounts. Yet, it perceives this canonicity as historically contingent[238]. If they were to *invent* new stories and present them to their contemporary readers, authors like Philostratus, had to endorse the authoritative status of foundational texts and *at the same time* abrogate – with some plausibility – that authority to their own accounts. The *invention* of these 'new' stories occurred to Philostratus in the exact same *natural* way as the letters of the alphabet were revealed to Palamedes. Later on (Chapter 3), we focused on the rivalry between Odysseus and Palamedes as a re-enactment of Gorgias' *Palamedes*. Philostratus used Gorgias' rhetorical *heuresis* and rhetoric (as shown through the medicine example in *Gorgias*) as foils for his own record of the Trojan War and for articulating and promoting his own conception of *sophia*. The oppositional aspect of the rivalry reflected the

[238] Miles (2017)a 74.

competitive – often invidious – environment of Second Sophistic intellectuals, as well as the various models of *paideia* and *sophia* populating their debates.

In all, Gorgias served for Philostratus as a marker of (Pan-)Hellenic identity as well as a rhetorical vector of his literary self-presentation. Emulation in this case is not confined to sheer stylistic figuration; rather, Philostratus took pains at decoding and incorporating the sophist's substantive thought. A bunch of playful 'Gorgiasms' may reside in *Lives* or *Vita Apollonii* but mainly as a means of displaying Philostratus' erudition.

Finally, a few remarks about the text. *Heroicus* is an extraordinary piece of Imperial literature and quite suggestive of the cultural and social anxieties of the Second Sophistic world. The dialogue takes place at the very end of the Thracian Chersonese, what modern-day Greeks call Ελλήσποντος and what modern-day Turks call Çanakkale Boğazı. For sure, the prospective visitor will no longer hear the nightingales 'Atticize'[239] let alone 'Gorgianize' there. On the contrary, in Elaious as in many other places mentioned in our text, such as Methymna, Lemnos, or even Phoenicia, the modern visitor will happen on thousands of hopeless refugees, bereft of their 'sybaris', and requiring humanitarian assistance. Other than that, not much has changed over these eighteen centuries: land is constantly disputed, the threat of an uninvited interloper is ever-present, while most intellectuals tenaciously resist entering 'the Palamedean stage'. Gorgias says in *Helen* 11 that we humans operate in a state of *doxa* (opinion), which is a misleading counselor of our soul rendering it susceptible to persuasive yet false *logoi*. The reason for this is because we can neither remember the past (οὔτε μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον), nor examine the present (οὔτε σκέψασθαι τὸ παρόν), nor divine the future (οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον). *Heroicus* seems to point in a more optimistic direction; it poses the question of *how* one should look at their past in order to understand one's present and secure safe travels for the future. To this end, two points are crucial: on the one hand, cultural heritage is not something to *just* be quoted, 'twittered' or taken for granted; the narrative of the renaissance of ancient literary excellence – seen as a particularly distinctively Greek phenomenon – has nurtured and continues to nurture nationalist ideologies and hypostasize elite claims to cultural superiority[240]. *Heroicus* posits that we need to examine, interrogate, understand and, above all, adapt and reinterpret our past. On the other hand, losing touch with our past means losing touch with our human nature, while abolishing the valence of cultural tradition entails a weakness to rise above the problems of our days. As Tim Whitmarsh

[239] *Her.* 5.4.
[240] Whitmarsh (2017) 21–22.

points out, ‘the past is sublime, powerfully meaningful and self-present, but at the same time elusive and distant’[241]. Spectral and slippery though it remains, in order to perceive the epiphanically revealed ‘truth’ of the heroes, we need to keep cultivating their wisdom, update their stories, and establish continuities in ways that respond to the current states of affairs. This process of self-construction calls for a change of perspective, exploration of the alternative and the uncanonical; as Protesilaus would put it, a top-to-toe *metamphiesis.*

[241] (2009) 229.

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