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The Effect of Counterterrorism on Terrorism

A Case Study of Indonesian Jihadi Groups

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Abstract

As the Global War on Terror increased counterterrorism in Indonesia, Indonesian Jihadi groups found themselves in a new position. On the one hand, counterterrorism units destroyed their organization. On the other hand, it encouraged them to ally with international terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL. This thesis provides an analysis of the Indonesian government's counterterrorism strategy towards the rising threat of terrorism. In order to understand this relationship, this thesis looks into the role of counterterrorism on the alliance formation process of local Jihadi groups with larger international network. After the Bali bombings in 2002, the Indonesian government started to build its counterterrorism capacity according to good governance principles. Counterterrorism efforts where sharpened, and with success: Indonesia's largest Jihadi group Jemaah Islamiyah, was largely dismantled by Indonesian counterterrorism units. However, through the funding of Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah was able to conduct several other attacks. This left the government no choice than to increase the role of the Indonesian Military in counterterrorism operations. More raids, arrests and killings of Indonesian Jihadi members stimulated the number of terrorist attacks against the Indonesian government and thus, revenge became one of the primary reasons for terrorism. This thesis finds that the relationship between counterterrorism and terrorism is an increasing spiral of violence. Furthermore, counterterrorism units have been able to weaken local Jihadi groups' internal strength. The findings show that this internal breakdown has influenced some of the local Jihadi's group decision to ally with larger international networks such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance Program
BIN	National Intelligence Agency
BNPT	Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency
CENS	Centre of Excellence for National Security
FAKSI	Forum of Islamic Law Activists
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and The Levant
JAS	Jamaah Ansharut Syariah
JAT	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
JAD	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JN	Jabhat al-Nusra
LTTE	The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MIT	Mujahideen Indonesia Timur
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
PPATK	Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
POLRI	Indonesian National Police
POV	Pew Research Center
TNI	National Armed Forces

I. Introduction

After ISIL's then-leader Al-Baghdadi declared the creation of their long envisioned "Caliphate" or Islamic State in 2014, Indonesian Jihadis were to join this war. In 2014, in an eight-minute long video called "Join the Ranks", a man named Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi urged Indonesian Jihadis to join the fight with ISIL. Several important leaders of Indonesian Jihadi groups, together with many of their followers, pledged allegiance to Al-Baghdadi right after ISIL declared itself a worldwide Caliphate [Gal15]. The goal of most Indonesian Jihadi groups is to replace Indonesian Pancasila with Sharia law as a foundation for the creation of an Islamic State in Indonesia. Therefore, the local Indonesian terrorist groups share a common enemy: the Indonesian Government. However, there is still a lot of competition between Indonesian Jihadi groups and thus it will be unlikely for ISIL to form an Islamic province in Indonesia[IPA162].
ISIL suffered from major territory losses in 2016. In order to expand ISIL's geographical reach and strategic power, ISIL started to establish Islamic provinces in other regions than the Middle East, including one in the Philippines[Rah]. With more than 200 million Muslims, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. Furthermore, Indonesia is the home country of Southeast Asia's largest Muslim extremist group: Jemaah Islamiyah. Between 2002 and 2015, around 700 Indonesian Jihadis travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIL. The conviction rate of these Indonesian foreign fighters is almost 100% [USA161]. Around 200 of them have returned to Indonesia, providing an excellent link between Indonesian Jihadi groups and ISIL, for example as recruiter for ISIL. Rather than building new cells from scratch, ISIL has adopted already existing local Muslim fundamentalist groups in Indonesia [Rah]). It is estimated that Indonesia has around ten different Jihadi groups, of which seven expressed their loyalty to ISIL. According to a report published by USAID [USA16], around 1000-2000 Indonesians pledged allegiance to ISIL.

Indonesia has experienced several large attacks since the early 2000s, with the Bali Bombings of 2002 as one of the deadliest attacks and therefore best-known example of terrorism in Indonesia. From 2014-2017, 73% percent of the fatal terrorist attacks were conducted by local Muslim extremist groups aligned to ISIL [Dat18]. On the one hand, the influence of ISIL on Indonesian Jihadi groups is growing. On the other hand, old alliances between Al-Qaeda and Indonesian Jihadi groups are fading: some even shifted from an AL-Qaeda affiliate into an ISIL affiliate.

Above mentioned developments also gathered the attention of the Indonesian Government. After 9/11, the Global War on Terror led by the U.S. influenced Indonesia's counterterrorism policy. However, the effect of increasing counterterrorism measures is discussable.

The aforementioned creates a strong wondering: what is the role of counterterrorism on the alliance formation process of local Indonesian jihadi groups with international terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda and ISIL? And why did some of them changed their alliance from Al-Qaeda to ISIL?

It does so by examining the relationship between the impact of counterterrorism measures on local Jihadi group's internal structure and the local dynamics in Indonesia when Jihadi groups decided to join ISIL or Al-Qaeda. By that, I will argue that counterterrorism generates terrorism through the internal breakdown of local Jihadi groups. This internal breakdown encouraged local Jihadi groups to align themselves with international terrorist networks. In order to defend my hypotheses, data from different centres on transnational terrorism and newspapers has been retrieved.

II. Background: International terrorist organization in Indonesia

2.1 The formation of ISIL

A report published by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) states that there is a division between two Jihadis groups within Indonesia: Al-Qaida loyalists and ISIL supporters. ISIL and Al-Qaeda both follow the ideology of Wahhabism: an extreme form of Sunni Islam that insists on literal interpretation of the Koran. However, both have different interpretations of the readings of the Koran. It is valuable to look at the formation process of ISIL in the Middle-East in order to understand the division between pro-Al-Qaeda and pro-ISIL Jihadi groups in Indonesia.

In 2004, , Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi founded Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al-Qaeda provided financial support to al-Zarqawi, because Al-Qaeda was aiming to expand its power through the region. al-Zarqawi felt that the only way to save the global Islamic community was by purging it. Therefore, ISIL argues that the use of violence against non-Sunni Muslims is allowed. Bin Laden, on the contrary, believed that Muslims don't pose any threat to Islam, but the Western world[Zel14]. Thus, the West should be targeted. AQI established together with some smaller Iraqi Sunni groups the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). Al Zarqawi died after an US attack in June 2006 [Nur15]. In October 2006, MSC established the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In November that year, Al-Muhajir became the new leader of MSC and pledged allegiance to the leader of ISI, Al-Baghdadi. Al-Muhajir never pledged allegiance directly to Bin Laden. Therefore, al-Zarqawi's death officially disunited Al-Qaeda from MSC[Zel14].



Table 1. An Overview of ISIL's formation process[1]

Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) is Al-Qaeda's largest official branch and it aims to establish an Islamic state in Syria. ISI intended to merge JN into their organization in order to expand their territory. However, JN refused to join ISI and remained loyal to Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, Al-Baghdadi managed to convince many members of JN to join ISI. In the same year, overt enmity between Al-Qaeda and ISIL broke out in full when ISIL leader Al-Baghdadi announced that he was expanding the ISI into Syria and changed the name of the group to the Islamic State and the Levant [Zel14]. In 2014, the relationship between Al-Qaeda and ISIL deteriorated when Al-Baghdadi declared the proclamation of an Islamic State and himself as caliph.

2.2 ISIL in Indonesia

The establishment of the Caliphate by al-Zarqawi generated large discussion between Indonesian Jihadis about whether or not to support it.

Al-Qaeda loyalists in Indonesia argue that the use of violence is only legitimate if the majority of the Muslim community supports it. They prioritize creating Muslims' awareness for their ideology through education about the importance of jihad. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda loyalists value *qital nikaya*, emphasizing the use of multiple attacks to weaken a state's governance but not necessarily replace it with an Islamic government [Nur15]. ISIL supporters are proponents of armed struggle in order to implement Islamic law in conquered territories, also known as *qital tamkin* [Nur15].

Another debate between Indonesian Jihadis is about whether or not they could cooperate with Muslims who work for 'the enemy', e.g. the Indonesian government and if so, if they should be labelled as infidels. ISIL supporters believe that *takfir*, the act of labelling other Muslims as infidels, should be implied indiscriminately to Muslims who do not overtly support the implementation of Sharia law and acknowledge the Indonesian Government. Therefore, *takfir* supporters legitimize the killings of other Muslims. Al-Qaeda supporters, on the contrary, believe

1 Data retrieved from Zelin, A. (2014). *The War between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement*. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

that *takfir* should not go back to the level of the individuals and therefore only the West should be attacked [Wit16]

There are several reasons for Indonesian Jihadis to align themselves with ISIL. The motivation of joining ISIL differs per person, however, it has been influenced by local dynamics in Indonesia itself [CSI181]. After Jemaah Islamiyah denounced the use of violence in 2007, a debate about the meaning of Jihad awakened. In this debate, issues like the legitimacy of jihad and its effectiveness were addressed. An important explanation of the meaning of Jihad is the idea of the "End of Time". This idea was linked to natural disasters in Indonesia, destroying what has been built and therefore providing an opportunity to start an Islamic State in Indonesia. The creation of ISIL as a reaction to the Syrian war mirrored the apocalyptic temper in Indonesia[CSI181]. Furthermore, the idea that Shi'as were planning to take over Indonesia between 2018 and 2020 gained support. Indonesian Jihadis gladly supported the ISIL's war against non-Sunni Muslim groups in Syria and Iraq [Mut15].
Third, prominent Indonesian Muslim leaders like Ba'asyir and Abu Husna moved away from Al-Qaeda and towards ISIL and took many of their followers with them[Nur15]. In addition, counterterrorism units arrested and convicted most of the Indonesian jihadi fighters that fought in the Afghanistan War and had connections Al-Qaeda. Thus, their influence on the current generation of radicals faded away [IPA14].

The proclamation of the Caliphate by Al-Baghdadi was for many Indonesian Jihadis an answer to the debate about the meaning of Jihad. When the Al-Baghdadi declared the creation of ISIL in June 2014, all Indonesia's pro-ISIL groups pledged allegiance to him immediately. Although Indonesian Jihadis tried to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia, there would be a very small chance to actually establish one due to the Indonesian Government's counterterrorism strategy [CSI181]. Therefore, showing their support to ISIL was a way to compromise their loss and recruit Indonesian Jihadi fighters who wanted to live in a real Islamic State.

In Indonesia, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT), The Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI), Ring Banten, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and Tahwid wal Jihad are pro-ISIL organizations that pledged allegiance to

Al-Baghdadi[USA161]. A pledge of allegiance can be done by expressing an oath, or a *bayat*, where a person of one group pledges allegiance to the leader of ISIL, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi [Zel14]. The following section will discuss three of ISIL's most noteworthy alliances in Indonesia: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). Furthermore, it will highlight the contrast between pro-ISIL groups and two strong opponents of ISIL in Indonesia, namely Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jemaah Ansharut Syariah (JAS).

2.2.1 Pro-ISIL groups

1. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)

JAT arise when the former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, left the latter organization after a leadership dispute in 2008 [Jon11]. In 2011, JAT carried out different terrorist attacks like the killing of two police officers in Central Sulawesi and the bombing of a church in Central Java. Group members are former members of JI, MMI and teachers of the Ngruki School [Jon11]. The JAT Ideology is based on *Aqidah & Manhaj Kami,* or *Our Faith and Method.* They practice the ideology of Salafi jihadism and believe that the Indonesian government officials are their main target [Rot121]. It recruits most of its members in the city of Solo. In 2010, Ba'asyir supported the idea of establishing a jihadi training camp deep in the jungles of Aceh (Jones, 2011). In 2011, Ba'asyir was sentenced to 15 years in prison for funding the Aceh camp [The11]. During his time in prison, Aman Abdurrahman, Amir of JAT, was kept in the same prison. He convinced Ba'asyir that al-Baghdadi's Caliphate was the true *khilafa* [Sch181]. When Ba'asyir pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014 from prison, he called members of JAT to do the same[IPA14]. JAT members refused to pledge allegiance to ISIL, claiming that they are allied to Jabhat al-Nushra, Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria. In July 2014, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, posted a letter online in which he declared his support to ISIL. JAT members said that he was indoctrinated by Aman Abdurrahman. Mohammed Achwa, leader of JAT during Ba'asyir and Abdurrahman's time in prison. On Ba'asyir's decision to pledge allegiance, Achwan commented:

"He was influenced by Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab who are in Pasir Putih prison with him in Nusakambangan. I think Ustadz Abu [Bakr Ba'asyir] was swayed because he supported the establishment of syariah and an Islamic state for such a long time and when

ISIL declared the khilafa all he saw was that it had syariah and was an Islamic state. He also believed that a lot of ulama supported this. He showed us a list. This list had one who was listed five times with different names. It was totally inflated. A lot of the information he received was simply not correct. What worried us most was that he was so influenced that he didn't even believe his own sons [Sch181]

2. Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)

Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) was established in order to unite all pro-ISIL groups in Indonesia in 2015, including members of JAT and MIT. JAD is known as ISIL 'main weapon in Indonesia' [TRA17]. According to Schulze & Liow [Sch181], JAD is active in Greater Jakarta, Banten, Central Java, East Java, West Java, Lampung and Kalimantan. It has direct connections with ISIL and is responsible for the 2018 Surabaya bombings and a dozen of other terrorist plots [Cha18]. Aman Abdurrahman is believed to be the spiritual head of JAD [Lip18]. Due to his imprisonment, Abu Husna, a well-respected former member of JAT, is the current leader of the group. JAD has changed its name several times using the name Jema'ah Anshorul Khilafah (JAK) and Khalifah Syuhada [CSI18].

Abdurrahman pledged allegiance to ISIL from jail in 2014, together with 42 other prisoners including Ba'asyir [Sin181]. Unlike other Indonesian radical Muslim terrorist leaders, he never fought alongside fellow jihadi in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. His preaches about killing other Muslim 'infidels' (*takfir*) gained recognition by the domestic jihadi community after the establishment of ISIL in 2013. He declared war to anyone, including Muslims, who did not agree with their doctrine [Sch181]. According to former National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) chair Ansyaad Mbay, "Aman is IS' master ideologue in Indonesia. He has long preached the takfiri doctrine and IS has served his cause" [Wit16].

3. Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT)

Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) is based in Poso and active in central Sulawesi. It was the first Jihadi group in Indonesia that pledged allegiance to ISIL[Jon11]. According to Schulze and Liow [Sch181], MIT is the perfect example of "importing" ISIL into Indonesia. Santoso, Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist, used to be the leader of MIT. He died in 2016 after a firefight with the Indonesian police [Cha16]. Santoso reached out to ISIL to strengthen his group's Jihadi credentials and receive funding from ISIL for MIT's guerilla fight against the Indonesian National Police. Santoso argued that because MIT pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014, joining

their fight in Indonesia was the same as fighting for ISIL in Syria [Jon11]. Santoso was not the only one who promoted this thought; Abu Bakar Ba'asyir also urged those who could not leave Syria to join the MIT struggle in Poso [IPA164]. MIT's army consisted around 30 militants and were under siege from the policy and military [IPA163]. He pledged allegiance to the Islamic State on 1 July 2014 via a video, and called himself the "Indonesian Zarqawi", referring to the founder of ISIL, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. In the video, Santoso said:

"This is from Abu Wardah Santoso As Syarqi Al-Indunesi to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi as *Emir* [leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria] …We from eastern Indonesia are your soldiers and are waiting for your order and also need your hand to help our jihad in Poso which is still weak and needs weapons. MIT is a part of ISIL because Muslims are like one body…" [Sug14].

2.2.2 Anti-ISIL groups

1. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

With cells in different countries in Southeast Asia, JI is the largest and most widely known example of an anti-ISIL Indonesian Jihadi group[Abu03]. JI is aligned to Al-Qaeda and its Syria branch Jabhat Al-Nushra. Around 800 Indonesian mujahidin fought alongside the mujahidin in the Afghanistan War between 1983 and 1989 [Tem10]. Two Muslim clerks named Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir fled from Indonesia to Malaysia because they advocated the implementation of Sharia law in Indonesia. Sungkar travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1993-1994, where he met with Osama Bin Laden. There he pledged allegiance to Bin Laden's organization Al-Qaeda. In 1993, the Ba'asyir and Sungkar established Jemaah Islamiyah. JI's ultimate goal is to overthrow the Indonesian Government and establish a pan-Islamic State through Southeast-Asia[Sin17]. To pursue this goal, JI legitimizes the use of force against non-Islamic regimes. However, this should not go back to the level of the individual. On 12 October 2002, JI members conducted three bombings in the tourist district of Kuta, Bali, killing over 200 people and wounding more than 300 [Oak10]. The attack was a way to demonstrate the group's aversion against the West. An important figure within JI is Hambili, a devout Muslim, described as 'the main link between JI and Al-Qaeda'. He travelled to Afghanistan where he was trained by mujahidin forces that fought against the Soviets. During this time, he met with Bin Laden. When he returned to Malaysia, he became responsible for the

recruitment of Indonesian Jihadis. For a long time, JI served as Al-Qaeda's back office in Southeast Asia. It became an important regional component of Al-Qaeda. JI never merged with Al-Qaeda because it prioritized Indonesia and classical jihadism instead of Al-Qaeda's global jihadism against the West [Har14]. As a member of JI, it was no requirement to pledge an oath to Bin Laden; however, several JI leaders did pledge allegiance to bin Laden since there is a large overlap between both group's ideology [Abu03].

The group always remained loyal to Al-Qaeda, rejecting ISIL's self-declared Caliphate. However, it should be mentioned that many former JI members pledged allegiance to ISIL and that, although JI advocates strongly against ISIL, the organization still has an active military-wing and thus is a violent Muslim extremist group.

2. Jamaah Ansharut Syariah (JAS)

After Ba'asyir pledged allegiance from prison to ISIL in 2014, he ordered all the members of JAT to do the same. Mohammed Achwan refused to pledge allegiance. Together with Ba'asyir's son, Abdurrahim, Achwan formed a new organization on August 14 2014, named Jamaah Ahsharus Syrariah (JAS). When Achwan and Abdurrahim formed JAS, they took around 80% of former JAT members with them [Sam16]. JAS continued to maintain the traditional alliance with Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nusra Front [USA161].JAS views the use of attacks as legitimate if the majority of the Muslim community supports them. They prioritize creating Muslims' awareness through education about the importance of jihad[Nur15]. Its aim is to recruit members who support the implementation of Sharia law in Indonesia. The group operates in Jakarta, West-Java, Central-Java, East-Java, West-Nusa Tenggara and Bengkulu. It is estimated that the group has around 2000 members, of whom most are former JAT members [Sam16].



1. *Timeline of Indonesian Jihadi group's alliances with international terrorist networks [USA161]*

III. Methodology

3.1 Theoretical framework

The following theory provides an answer that gives us a better understanding of the alliance formation process, in particular why local Jihadi groups aligned themselves with international terrorist networks. Anderson [And10] describes terrorism as: "*the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted*". After 9/11, the interest in terrorism started to rise among academics. The Global War on Terror led by the United States mainly focused on a new form of terrorism: religious terrorism. In this form, terrorists use religious teachings in order to justify their use of violence [Hof96]

Morgenthau[Mor70] provides an explanation about alliances based on competition between nation-states in order to protect their own national interest. One way to do this is through balancing. The concept of balancing is defined as "…*the forging of countervailing strength against a potentially hegemonic or threatening power*" [Goh05]. A state can on the one hand choose unilateral or internal balancing, meaning that it builds up its own defensive capabilities as a deterrent against the raising or threatening power. On the other hand, it can choose to form alliances with, or create strategic partnerships with other states to contain or challenge the threatening state[Goh05]. When one state becomes too powerful, it can threaten another state's independence. The aim of an alliance in this case is to re-balance external threats.

Although the balance of power theory focusses on states, it is also applicable to terrorist organizations. In their situation, their own government is the external threat. Therefore, they face many of the same obstacles as states when trying to form alliances in the international system [Bac13]. Terrorist organizations perceive counterterrorism as an external threat to their organization. In order to outweigh a government's counterterrorism strategy, it seeks to form alliances with other terrorist organizations. Karmon[Kar05] argues that terrorist organizations ally when they a) perceive an external or internal threat, b) share the same perception of the threat and c) this threat is international or regional. Asal et al. [Asa16] state that sharing the same enemy is more important than sharing the same ideology. They call this "the enemy of my enemy", emphasizing the idea that ideologically or culturally contradictory organizations ally in order to

counterbalance the external threat. Vink [Vin15] argues that when a state does not have the capabilities to rely on its own military force to counterbalance the external threat, it will try to seek alliances with other states in order to grow its own military strength. In many cases, terrorist organizations are willing to make ideological compromises in exchange for material support [Kar05]. Alliances can tie terrorist organizations together and influence their original ideology. Naturally, the existence of concrete grievances towards an identifiable larger subgroup will create a bridge between separate terrorist organizations [Cre81].

Another reason for terrorist organizations to ally is in order to survive. This argument is defended by Keohane [Keo71], and could be applied to terrorist organizations as well because counterterrorism measures by the state will affect local Jihadi group's strength. Through alliances a terrorist group's military strength will grow, due to the exchange of new technologies and weapons with its ally. Alliances create a joint battle, making both organizations stronger in their fight against the government. Oots [Oot86] finds that terrorist organizations will cooperate when it is in their mutual benefit; especially when their ultimate goal is something that they could not fulfill on their own. However, a small terrorist group might not be interesting for (inter)national counterterrorism networks, but when a small terrorist group aligns themselves to a large terrorist group, it will generate more attention. Therefore, the argument that terrorist groups align in order to survive is discussable[Day16]. Despite the fact that a terrorist organization will almost never be able to overpower a state, this theory still is partly suitable regarding terrorist organizations, assuming that a terrorist organization aim to partially counterbalance a state's counterterrorism strategy through the use of force [Asa16].

The main response towards terrorism after 9/11 was through force. Critics of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) argue that America used the term 'terrorism' in order to justify their war. Especially according U.S. media, Muslims are associated with terrorists, whom are 'evil' and should be destroyed[Kap02]. The general idea of counterterrorism is to 'weaken and destroy the terrorist ability to consistently launch attacks' [Net87]. Citing Mathew Levitt [Lev03], "The goal of counter-terrorism should be to constrict the environment in which terrorists operate", including "their logistical and financial support networks", which "denies terrorists the means to travel, communicate, procure equipment and conduct attacks". The consequence of these anti-terrorist actions by government has only increased terrorism [Kap02]. It is an increasing spiral of violence

and in order to balance the governments counterterrorism policies, local terrorist groups seek alliances with international terrorist groups Thus, the relationship between counterterrorism and terrorism goes back and forth.

By that, my hypothesis is that local terrorist organizations form alliances with international terrorist organizations as a reaction to counterterrorism policies of their own government.

Counterterrorism, as external threat, leads to the internal breakdown of a local terrorist group. This will encourage the formation of an alliance with an international terrorist group. While external threats focus on the balance of power theory, and thus emphasizes on why terrorist organizations ally -in order to counterbalance an external threat-, an organization's strength and weaknesses depend on the balance of its internal factors [Gür17]. Due to the rise of counterterrorism, local terrorist organizations have faced internal struggles. Internal factors that may contribute to an organization's strength or weakness are financial resources and membership support. These factors should be pursued by the persons running an organization. When this is not the case, and there is dissension within the group, internal weaknesses can lead to the formation of an alliance with a larger international terrorist group that is able to support the local terrorist organization with establishing their goal. Weaknesses are always relative, focusing on the success of an organization compared to its competitors [Gür17]. Partnering with another terrorist organization creates opportunities to improve an organization's operational effectiveness and enhance the organization's legitimacy [Bac13]. If an organization's internal strength is affected by external threats, it is more likely for the organization to seek help through the formation of an alliance.

Partnering with another organization creates opportunities to improve an organization's operational effectiveness and increase an organization's credibility or legitimacy. Legitimacy can be defined as the right and acceptance of an overarching authority and its power, ergo the organization's leader [Ash91]. Legitimacy works in two ways: on the one hand, civil society accepts the organization and its leader and thus they are legitimate. Indonesian Jihadi groups are not against civil society, they are against the government. In order to increase their power, terrorist groups need the acceptance of civil society in order to obtain their goals [Ash91]. On the other hand, members of an organization should agree with the policies. If members or civils don't accept the way a leader and its organization are operating, they will not recognize the

organization’s authority. This will detach the organization from society and its members. Lack of acknowledgement affects the legitimacy of an organization. For terrorist groups, it is important to seek public support for their ideas. If a terrorist group has many followers, ergo has the ability to mobilize major public support for their causes, aligning with this terrorist group automatically increases another terrorist group’s legitimacy [Day16]. When members of a terrorist group do not accept their leader or policies, it can affect the internal weaknesses of a terrorist group. There is a constant struggle between competitors who seek to gain prestige, credibility, legitimacy and leadership of the community [Bac13]. In this thesis, leadership credibility will therefore be a part of the internal factors that define a terrorist group “internal strengths”.

By that, the observable implications for my argument that more repressive counterterrorism policies will create an external threat for local terrorist groups that will force local terrorists to join international network is as follows. Counterterrorism efforts will outrank the local terrorist groups and therefore weaken the internal strength of local Jihadi groups. Due to increased law enforcement, funding of terrorist groups will be more difficult. Due to the large numbers of arrest and prosecutions, the size of local terrorist groups will decrease. Leadership credibility will decrease because many Jihadi leaders have been arrested and support from members towards the leader is declining. In order to improve the legitimacy, creditably and reputation of the group or its leader, in combination with more practical needs such as finance and recruits the formation of an alliance with ISIL is a logical step. The role of ideology, as discussed, will be less important.

Other possible explanation

Another possible explanation that describes the alliance formation process of why local terrorist groups ally themselves with international terrorist networks is lack of political participation. Over the last decades, cultural and religious identity organizations who do not recognize a state's authority, have been a frequent point of discussion. Crenshaw [Cre81] identifies the lack of political participation as one of the main causes of terrorism. Minority organizations are often denied access to participate in politics by the government [New06]. When a government denies the right of political freedom, such as the right to participate in elections and the right to express their views, it can be a reason for dissidents to oppose the state [Sch96]. One way of expressing their disaffection with the state is the use of political violence. Different authors demonstrate through empirical research that democratic regimes experience more terrorism than authoritarian regimes [Wil06]. However, most democratic regimes only allow political freedom to the ethnic majority, to those who are culturally "fit" for it [Joh03]. Ethnic minorities with different perceptions on religion, politics, cultural and social matters are often poorly represented in politics. Examples of situations where religious minorities used terrorist attacks to counteract their government are The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) group in Spain [Arv16]. These two examples are also known for their ties to foreign funding and assistance. When a certain group experiences lack of political participation, it can encourage them to find other ways to obtain their political goals. In order to gain political support, establishing a transnational network to bypass political institutions is one of them. During processes of political mobilization in their home country, migrants can contribute to this political mobilization for example through the recruitment of members in their 'host country'. Furthermore, migrants can help to finance armed struggles in their home country through their social network [And10].

However, the theory of lack of political participation is not useful to explain the role of counterterrorism on the alliance formation process from Jihadi groups in Indonesia to international terrorist networks. As written in the previous chapter, both Al-Qaeda and ISIL affiliates consider the Indonesian government as illegitimate. Their goal is to replace Indonesian Pancasila with Sharia law as a foundation for the creation of an Islamic State. If they would participate in political elections, it would mean that they acknowledge the Indonesian

Government. It would harm their status as a Jihadi group and other Jihadi groups would label them as *takfir*. Furthermore, there are several groups that promote political Islam in Indonesia: the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Councils Fatwa (GNPF-MUI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Here, the irony is that Islam is known for promoting undemocratic values through Sharia Law, through democratic ways [Alv17]. Thus, it is not reasonable to apply the theory of lack of political participation in this case. A more suitable answer is that counterterrorism encourages terrorism, as discussed earlier paragraphs.

3.2 Data

In analysing these hypotheses, this thesis will mostly focus on secondary data, such as academic and newspaper articles along with descriptive statistics. Newspapers, especially The Jakarta Post, have been retrieved through Leiden University's Database. Besides, data provided by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Terrorism Research Analysis Consortium (TRAC) have been used. Literature and other empirical data have been found through the snowballing method [Bry12]. The snowballing method is "*a technique for gathering research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide the names of other actors" [Bry12]*. In finding the relevant material for this thesis, a criteria of peer reviewed articles and books have been applied. In relation to this a technique of triangulation is implemented to validate the findings and to eliminate or highlight any biases. The method is further used test the hypothesis [Mat88]. The purpose of triangulation is to provide different aspects or various lenses of understanding to the research area. This ensures a more holistic perspective and will find if the investigated data is either convergent, inconsistent or contradictory [Mat88]. In order to validate the findings of the thesis, it is a necessary element to reflect upon when analysing.

IV. Empirical findings and analysis

4.1 Increasing intensity of Indonesia counterterrorism policies

After 2002, counterterrorism units of the Indonesian Government became an external treat for local terrorist groups. The following section will first discuss two periods that describe the changes in counterterrorism policies of the Indonesian government. Furthermore, it will look into the rise counter terrorism through law enforcement and the creation of new counter terrorism units, such as Detachment 88. Indonesia's counter terrorism efforts outranked the local terrorist groups. The second section focusses on the consequences of the rise of counterterrorism. It finds that counter terrorism weakened local terrorist group's internal organizational structure, and in order to gain legitimacy or credibility, attract new members or receive funding, local terrorist groups allied to ISIL. The main conclusion to be drawn is that counterterrorism actually stimulated the alliance between local terrorist groups and ISIL, although its aim is to defend Indonesia's national security.

4.1.1 The legal and institutional dimension

President Megawati started to build on counterterrorism capacity according to good governance principles. After the Bali bombings in 2002, the Megawati administration immediately received support from the U.S. government through a $50 million counterterrorism aid package. President Megawati was the first Muslim leader who visited the White House after 9/11. The visit was part of a broader strategy that focused on Indonesia's participation in the global campaign against terrorism. Through funding from the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) from the U.S., Megawati's administration was able to set up a special counterterrorism unit under the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) called Detachment 88 in 2003, also known as Densus 88. The elite group is an Indonesian Special Forces counterterrorism squad and has received training from Australian and U.S. counterterrorism units. Since the Indonesian military was still negatively associated with Suharto's authoritarian government, President Megawati choose to focus on combatting terrorism through law enforcement [Car18]. Indonesia needed support from the West in order to combat terrorism, the Megawati Administration intentionally did not incorporate the National Armed Forces (TNI) in their counterterrorism strategy. Until 2000, the TNI faced

weapon embargos from the West for their involvement in human rights offences in East Timor [Mei12]. President Megawati said that Indonesia lacked a '*legal basis to act quickly and strongly to handle terrorism' [But]*. Several new laws were implemented in order to combat terrorism. First, 'Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism', also known as Indonesia's Anti-Terrorism-Law, was adopted in April 2003. This law made it possible to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects involved in the first Bali bombings. Second, Interim Law No. 4/2002 created the Terrorism Eradication Coordinating Desk (BNPT), an Indonesian agency that works to prevent terrorism. Third, Interim Law No. 5/2002 appointed the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) as the leader of all the state's intelligence agencies such as the National Police (POLRI) and the National Armed Forces (TNI). Australia supported Indonesia's war on terror with $10 million and helped with the establishment of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation in 2004, which focusses on "*a wide range of training and capacity building programs to enhance the operation expertise of regional law enforcement in order to deal with all forms of transnational crime, including terrorism"[JCL05]*. In addition, to manage the country's increasing number of terrorist related trials, the Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime was established in 2006.

President Yudhoyono assumed office in 2004. He started to increase the role of the TNI in counterterrorism operations from 2010 onwards [Mau09]. Human rights activist criticized this shift and expressed their concerns about TNI's involvement, mainly worried about the possibility that their abuse of power during the Suharto regime would repeat itself. Nevertheless, President Yudhoyono argued Indonesia's security policy needed greater TNI responsibility[Bur]. In order to enhance cooperation between TNI and POLRI's Detachment 88, the Indonesian government established the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) through presidential Regulation No. 46 in 2010. Given the long history of the TNI and POLRI being rather enemies than allies, an organization such as the BNPT was essential to oversee joint operations. The cooperation between the POLRI and TNI developed well. However, there was still no clear division of tasks between the two, as stated in [IPA141]: *"The BNPT structure effectively puts the police in charge of intelligence and operations and the military in charge of prevention, which does not make for smooth cooperation"*.

Furthermore, the long-debated "Intelligence Bill" was finally passed in 2011, giving the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) more power to conduct joint counterterrorism operations with the POLRI, Detachment 88 and TNI. It allowed BIN to conduct questionings, wiretappings and track

funds without court orders[ICG11]. Another subsequent effort to improve law enforcement was the revision of the 2003 Counterterrorism Law in 2012, criminalizing the act of leading a terrorist organization with a punishment of 12 years in prison. In addition, authorities were allowed to detain a suspect for a maximum of 120 days.

Another way to combat terrorism is through combat money laundering. In 2013, the Indonesian Government accepted Law No 9 of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Financing (TF Law) [Fen14]. Through this bill, the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK) was appointed as the leading institution for freezing bank accounts and confiscating assets related to terrorism and any terrorist organization. Any individual that is responsible for funding or collecting funds with the intention to assist terrorist attacks, can be sentenced to 15 years in prison under Article 4. Moreover, any company that is involved in the funding or collecting of funds can lose its license and assets. Article 27 of the bill gives the PPATK "*the authority to directly block bank accounts and confiscate all assets belonging to individuals or corporations that are allegedly terrorist*" [Ari12]. Fifteen suspects have been prosecuted under this law since its ratification [Ter14]. Furthermore, Indonesia is a member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units [Ari12].

4.1.2 Effective actions

In adopting "hard" counterterrorism measures, the Government of Indonesia has mainly focused on exterminating terrorist organizations and its members through raids, arrests and killings. Detachment 88 has been Indonesia's most successful counterterrorism unit so far, arresting more than 1000 terrorist suspects since 2002 [USA161]. These arrests have been made during several raids. In 2013, the POLRI and Detachment 88 were able to carry out 40 separate raids, leading to more than 75 arrests. However, the influence of law enforcement agencies on combatting terrorism should not be underestimated. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings in 2002, Indonesian prosecutors were able to convict more than 100 members of JI and its splinter groups on terrorism charges [USD04]. Also, the Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime contributed to the fight against terrorism, prosecuting 45 terrorists from 2006-2008 of which 26 were members of JI [Placeholder3].

An important breakthrough for Detachment 88 was the killing of Noordin Top. Top was one of Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist and therefore the main target of Indonesian counterterrorism units [USD06]. One month after the attacks on the Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in 2009, the police killed Top during a raid in Solo, Central Java. Sidney Jones, the Southeast Asia program director for the International Crisis Group, said that Noordin's death was "*a huge blow for the extremist organizations in Indonesia*", since there was no other radical leader in Indonesia that promoted the idea of an Islamic State to actively at that moment [AlJ09].

Moreover, in February 2010, Detachment 88 discovered a JAT terrorist training camp in the jungle of Aceh. Here, militants form nine different Jihadi groups united under the name 'Al Qaeda of the Verandah of Mecca', were trained. The camp was the idea of Dulmatin and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir [Placeholder1]. The crackdown led to a lot of new valuable information that helped counterterrorism units in their hunt for terrorists. In the aftermath of the Aceh camp, more than a hundred terrorist suspects, including important leaders of the participating Jihadi groups, have been arrested by Detachment 88[Jon14] . The leader of JAT, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison for providing financial support to the jihadi training camp [The11]. Dulmatin, brainchild of the camp and a senior figure of JI, was killed by Detachment 88 during a raid in Pamulang, Jakarta. Aman Abdurrahman, who also was involved, was arrested by Densus-88 in 2010 [Placeholder1].

Another result of the "hard" counterterrorism strategy by the Indonesian Government is the number of foiled plots by the POLRI and Densus-88. During an interview with Channel NewsAsia's Conversation With, National Police Chief of Indonesia Tito Karnavian said that more than 500 terrorist plots have been foiled since 2012 [Tan18]. In May 2010, Detachment 88 discovered a plot in which terrorists attempted to assassinate the then Indonesian President Yudhoyono, including foreign officials that were invited to attend Indonesia's Independence Day on August 17 [Sap10]. Another incident that attracted media attention was a plot to bomb the Embassy of Myanmar in Indonesia in 2013. The reason for the bombing was to take revenge on the Government of Myanmar for their crimes against Rohingya Muslims. The perpetrator, a Muslim extremist, was sentenced to six years in prison in 2014. Detachment 88 foiled the plot the night before the attack was due to take place [ABC14].

One could safely argue that without the large number of foiled plots, raids, arrests, prosecutions and convictions the number of terrorist attacks and the number of fatalities/ wounded would have been higher. Therefore, the strategy of "hard" counterterrorism has been effective in the breakdown of local terrorist groups.

4.1.3 Intensity of counterterrorism

Formal regulations on counterterrorism increased after the Bali bombings in 2002. Prior this event, the Indonesian government did not consider terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah as a threat to Indonesia's national security. Thus, there were no attempts to protect the national security from this threat. The Global War on Terror led by the U.S. after 9/11 was perceived by Indonesian citizens as a "War against Islam" in general. It was measured by the Centre for Study of Islam and Society (PMM) that 46% in 2001 and 54% in 2002 of Indonesian citizens agreed *"that the ideals and struggle of Islamic movements and organizations (like Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement Sharia Law in the government and society must be supported"* [Seb03]. Therefore, President Megawati's administration hesitated taking action against Indonesian Muslim extremist groups and ignored the warnings of U.S, Malaysian and Singaporean authorities about the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah[Uni02].

The Bali bombings in 2002 shifted Indonesia's counterterrorism strategy. Quite abrupt, the Indonesian government needed to anticipate to a homegrown terrorist organization with alliances in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other countries [Tem10]. Therefore, the Indonesian government accepted financial support from the U.S. in order to combat terrorism [Sen16]. Due to the rise of terrorist attacks, which killed many innocent Muslims, the support among Indonesian citizens for Megawati's counterterrorism policy started to grow. In 2002, a POV survey illustrated that of those questioned 27% "often" or "sometimes," 16% "rarely," and 54% "never" felt it was justifiable to attack civilian targets through suicide bombings and other violent means. In 2005, after another bombing by JI, a POV survey found that 66% of the questioned Indonesian citizens "never" justified targeting civilians [Pew05]. Therefore, increase of public support and foreign support for the government's counterterrorism strategy had major influence on the intensity of law enforcement and institutions created in order to combat terrorism. From

2002-2008, the government's strategy in order to combat terrorism was quit passive. This was a consequence of domestic sensitivities against the GWOT. It could be argued that every time a major terrorist attack occurred, the government responded with the implementation of a new law, the creation of new institutions and/ or more of raids. Every time a terrorist attack was conducted, it provided space for the government to expand their counterterrorism strategy. This is illustrated by Table 2.

Table 2. Terrorism generates counterterrorism [2]

Major terrorist attacks	**Law enforcement**	**Effective actions**
Bali Bombings, (2002)	• Anti-Terrorism Law (2003) • Detachment 88 (2003)	• 100 members of JI and its splinter groups were arrested and convicted on terrorism • Ba'asyir was arrested and sentenced to 2,5 years in prison
Jakarta Bombings (2003)	• the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2004)	• More arrests
Bali Bombings (2005)	• the Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2006)	• 2006-2008, 46 terrorist suspects were convicted of which 26 were JI members
Jakarta Bombings (2009)	• the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) (2010)	• Killing of Noordin Top (2009) • Discovering of the 2010 Aceh camp (2010) • Arrest of Ba'asyir, Dulmatin & Abdurrahman (2011)

After the Jakarta bombings in 2009, the Government of Indonesia shifted its counterterrorism policy from considering terrorism as a crime that harmed the safety of its citizens, to a threat for the national security [Placeholder1]. This resulted in the increase of more "hard" counterterrorism strategies. A notable trend from 2010 onwards is that terrorist attacks became low-casualty. JI was largely responsible for all the major terrorist attacks from 2002-2009 in Indonesia. However, the Jihadi group was weakened by counterterrorism units: several key leaders were in prison, and

2 Data retrieved from Fealy, G. & Fuston, J. (2016). Indonesian and Malaysian Support. US AID: Democracy and Governance and Peace and Security in the Asia and Middle East.

the members who were not acknowledged that the use of violence would not help them with establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia. Thus, counterterrorism units forced the group to switch to expanding their religious outreach (*dakwah)[Ari13]*. After JI ended their Jihad in Indonesia, smaller Jihadi groups such as JAT and MIT started to conduct low-tech terrorist attacks. On the threat of violent extremism after the Jakarta bombings in 2009, Jones [Jon14] writes: *"The typical terrorist suspect was not a mass killer with global ambitions; he was more likely to be one step up from a petty criminal whose efforts to make simple pipe bombs almost always failed."* Hence, the target of terrorists shifted from violence against citizens to violence against Detachment 88, mainly because Detachment 88 killed many members of Jihadi groups and thus revenge was the primary source for terrorism [Jon14]. In 2013, in a YouTube video published by MIT leader Santoso, he declared Detachment 88 as "*the real enemy, the real demon [...] Do not hesitate in facing the battle against Densus 88,".* A direct cause that increased killings on Jihadi members was the breakdown of the terrorist training camp in Aceh by Detachment 88 [Jon18]. Therefore, the increasing number of raids contributed to the rise of violence against Detachment 88 and other counterterrorism units. The rise of terrorism against police units is a consequence of increased intensity in the number of raids.

4.2 Local terrorist groups' internal breakdown

As aforementioned, the strengthening of counterterrorism policies has led to an increase of foiled plots, raids, arrests, prosecutions and convictions, creating an external threat for local terrorist groups. It could be argued that the rise of an external threat can encourage internal dissension within a local terrorist group. With several key leaders and members being arrested or killed by Indonesia's counterterrorism units, Jihadi groups in Indonesia had difficulty with recruiting new members. It became more difficult for Jihadi groups to finance their organization and carry out attacks. Since their internal structure was largely destroyed by counterterrorism units, it was impossible for them to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia by themselves. Benefits of aligning with an international organization could be the increase of size, new competences and access to monetary and human capital [Day16].

Therefore, aligning with ISIL or Al-Qaeda was a logical step because it would help them reinforce their own terrorist group, bringing them closer to their ultimate goal.

However, there are also many risks attached to aligning with Al-Qaeda or ISIL. One should not forget that a pledge of allegiance to a transnational terrorist organization generates more attention from national and international counterterrorism networks. Where a local terrorist group might not be considered as a threat to the international and national security, a local terrorist group with ties to a transnational terrorist organization is considered as one.
The following section will discuss internal factors (size, finance and leadership credibility) in order to analyze if the internal structure of local terrorist groups was 1) affected by the rise of counterterrorism and 2) therefore a reason to align themselves to ISIL or Al-Qaeda.

1. *Size*

Every Jihadi group in Indonesia suffered from the man hunt of Detachment 88 on members of their group. Two groups were affected the most in its size by the rise of counterterrorism: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Mujahideen Indonesian Timur (MIT). At JI's height in 1999-2000, the group had around 2,000 members [Cha09]. According to a report published by the International Crisis Group, only 900 JI members were left in Indonesia in 2007[Int07]. Detachment 88 managed to arrest 1,500 and kill 150 JI members since 2002 [Sin18].

Increased counterterrorism efforts managed to decrease MIT's size from from 40 to under 20 members [TRA]. The small size of MIT was problematic for Santoso and in order to attract Indonesian Jihadi fighters who joined ISIL in Syria, he pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014. Santoso argued that fighting for his war against the Indonesian government was the same as fighting with the Islamic State [Moo16]. However, it was still more desired by Indonesian Jihadi fighters to join the Islamic State in Syria. When the police had killed one of MIT's main recruiters in 2013, Muahmmad Hiyadat alias Dayat, it became more difficult for Santoso to recruit new members. For Santoso, the decrease of MIT's size due to counterterrorism efforts was a major reason to pledge allegiance to ISIL. His pledge of allegiance attracted a special Muslim group from China: Uyghurs. In 2015, Santoso posted a video online in which he said that he would welcome Jihadis from abroad and help them coming to Indonesia [Soe15].

Jemaah Ansharut Daulah became Detachment 88's main target after the group conducted the May 2018 bombings in Surabaya. Detachment 88 arrested 270 members of JAD. According to Wall

Street Journal, the group has around 1000 members through Indonesia with several hundred in prison [Ott18]. Counterterrorism affected JAD's size, however, it was not a reason for them to join ISIL, since JAD was created as an ISIL affiliate and never an independent group.
There has no specific data been published on the numbers of arrest and killings by Detachment 88 of members of JAT. Therefore, nothing can be said about the influence of counterterrorism on the size of this group, nor can it suggest that this was a reason for JAT to pledge allegiance to ISIL.

2. Finance

It became more difficult for local terrorist organizations to receive funding from international sources, given the fact that many of the important figures in the international fundraising network were killed or arrested by counterterrorism units. As aforementioned, several new laws were implemented that made it harder to attract (inter)national funding and donations for local terrorist groups. Therefore, all local terrorist groups where affected by the new regulations in order to combat financing of terrorism.

Jemaah Islamiyah has received large amounts of funding from Al-Qaeda. [Placeholder2]. Jones [Jon07] argued that the relationship between Al-Qaeda and JI was superficial, lacking any true influence of Al-Qaeda on JI. JI always remained loyal to their goal: establishing an Islamic State through Southeast Asia. Al-Qaeda was more focused on establishing a global Jihad. Apart from that, Al-Qaeda did finance the 2002 Bali bombings[Gwe03]. Thus, it can be argued that the alliance between Al-Qaeda and JI was established for financial reasons. In 2003, the Bank of Indonesia has frozen the accounts of seven Indonesians given their suspected connection to Al-Qaeda [The03]. JI was financially weakened by counterterrorism units, however, it was not a reason for them to pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda since the financial alliance already existed before counterterrorism units started to rise [Placeholder2].

Increased counterterrorism made it harder for MIT to conduct robberies, MIT's main way to finance its terror acts. In 2013 alone, MIT's funding arm, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), collected a total of Rp 1.8 billion (US$180,000) from a series of bank robberies. However, in 2014, MIB had largely been destroyed by Detachment 88 [Jon14]. There are reports published in

which is stated that Santoso received funding from ISIL to support his organization [Moo16]. Therefore, it could be argued that MIT pledged allegiance to ISIL in order to generate funding.

Again, no information has been found regarding the financial situation of JAT. However, what can be said is that JAT did not pledge allegiance to ISIL in order to generate funding. Media sources wrote that Ba'asyir's JAT was already financing and fighting for ISIL before he pledged allegiance in 2014 [Str14]. Ansyaad Mbai, head of the National Counterterrorism Agency, argued that Ba'asyir's pledge would stimulate radicals to raise money and join ISIL [Str14].

There is a direct financial relation between JAD and ISIL. In order to conduct terrorist attacks on behalf of ISIL in Indonesia, JAD is funded by ISIL. JAD's leader, Aman Abdurrahman, criticized using robbery as a manner to finance operations. He argues that the method "*could harm the organization's extremist support base*" [Ari131]. After the Surabaya attacks in 2018, JAD was banned in Indonesia, giving the Indonesian National Police the authority to freeze any accounts related to the funding of JAD [The18]. Because JAD unites different Indonesian pro-ISIL groups under one name, with each its own motive, there is no consensus on the main reason for JAD to ally with ISIL.

3. *Leadership credibility*

As discussed in the previous chapter, leadership credibility is needed in order to maintain a group's internal strength. Ba'asyir's position as a leader was weakened by counterterrorism units for several reasons. First, he spent most of his time as a leader, whether from JI or JAT, in prison. Debates about who should replace Ba'asyir's leadership resulted in more internal dissension within JI and JAT. Second, although JAT denounced the use of violence, some of its members still conducted terrorist attacks. The majority of JAT members saw it as Ba'asyir's responsibility to control his group and the fact that terrorist attacks were still conducted by members of JAT, damaged the support from members towards Ba'asyir. Third, Ba'asyir did not discuss his pledge of allegiance with the members of JAT, was not received well by his followers. One possible explanation is that Ba'asyir wanted to give his leadership credibility a boost and therefore pledged allegiance to ISIL. He was wrongly informed and thought that the majority of his group would support his pledge [IPA14]. Former JAT members argued that Ba'asyir was indoctrinated by Aman Abdurrahman. JAT lost 80% of its members after Ba'asyir pledged allegiance in 2014.

Since the split, JAT's influence and size have decreased remarkably. If Ba'asyir's intention behind pledging allegiance was to boost his leadership credibility, one could safely say that it did not worked out as he planned to.

Counterterrorism units did not affect Santoso's position as a leader. Santoso was a well-respected leader from the beginning of MIT until his dead. Although many members of MIT were killed or arrested, Santoso was able to hide himself and a small number of his followers in the jungles of Sulawesi Island [Jon11]. Until 2016, when Detachment 88 killed him in a firefight. Until his dead, no change of leadership took place. Santoso called himself the "Indonesian al-Zarqawi", referring to the founder of ISI, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Comparing himself to the holy founder of ISI indicates that his pledge of allegiance was also a way to increase its leadership credibility. There has no other reason been found that explains why he refers to himself as the "Indonesian al-Zarqawi". Al-Zarqawi was a very well-respected leader under ISIL members.

In 2011, Aman was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment for his involvement in the Aceh camp. Before he was placed in an isolation cell in 2018, he had full access to phones. This gave him the possibility to establish JAD. Six cellphones were confiscated in his cell, which he used to spread his message on *takfri* [Soe16]. During his time in prison, he translated ISIL texts into Indonesian and started to spread ISIL propaganda on the internet [Cou18]. Jones argues that now that he was put in solitary confinement, Aman's role in JAD has "declined substantially" [Lip18]. On June 22, 2018, Aman was sentenced to death for his involvement in various terrorist attacks [Soe18]. Even though Aman was in prison from 2004 to 2008 and from 2011 until now, he still managed to stay in contact with his followers via cellphones and online media tools. He is very much appreciated under his followers and Indonesian prosecutors expect that when he will be executed, his supporters will consider him as a martyr. This could eventually lead to more terrorist attacks [Lip18].

To summarize my findings, the table presented below demonstrates the main reason per local jihadi group to ally. Sometimes, a group is eligible for multiple indicators, because the reason of alliance formation is a combination of indicators.

Table 3. Findings [3]

Local Jihadi group	**International ally**	**Main reason to ally with an international terrorist network**
Jemaah Islamiyah	Al-Qaeda	Funding
Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid	ISIL	Leadership Credibility
Mujahideen Indonesia Timur	ISIL	Size, funding and leadership credibility
Jemaah Ansharut Daulah	ISIL	Size, funding and leadership credibility

V. Conclusion

This thesis concludes that it can accept the presented hypotheses, namely that local Jihadi groups form alliances with international terrorist networks as a reaction to counterterrorism policies of their own government. Empirical evidence has shown that more repressive counterterrorism policies such as effective law enforcement and actions generated higher intensity of terrorism attacks on the Indonesian government. Thus, we can conclude that there is a positive relationship

3 As discussed in Chapter IV

between counterterrorism and terrorism. Moreover, counterterrorism seriously affected all three indicators (size, funding and leadership credibility). However, to counterbalance the external threat was never a direct reason for local jihadi groups to align with international terrorist networks.

A main conclusion to be drawn is that the internal structure of local Jihadi groups was destroyed by counterterrorism units and therefore it was impossible for them to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia by themselves. Aligning with ISIL or Al-Qaeda was a logical step because it would help them to reinforce their own group and bring them closer to their ultimate goal: to create an Islamic State in Indonesia. Indonesian Jihadi groups based every decision on if it would contribute to their ultimate goal, including the decision whether or not to ally with international terrorist networks. Because the Indonesian government made it impossible for local Jihadi groups to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia by themselves, they started to create alliances with international terrorist networks. In that sense, it can be concluded that local Jihadi groups formed alliances with international terrorist networks as a reaction to counterterrorism policies of their own government.

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