



KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE KENYATTA AND MOI ADMINISTRATIONS: A ROLE THEORY ANALYSIS

Tony Oweke



**Universiteit
Leiden**

JULY 5, 2019

Student Number: S1677411

Master's Thesis: International Relations

tonyoweke@gmail.com

Word Count:16582

Abbreviations	4
List of Figures	5
1. Introduction	6
1.1 General Introduction.....	6
1.2 A Brief Overview of Kenya’s Foreign Policy	7
1.3 Introduction to Role Theory	10
1.4 Research Statement and Sub-Research Questions.....	12
1.5 Conclusion and Chapter Outline	13
2. Literature Review.....	14
3. Methodology	18
3.1 Introduction	18
3.2 National Role Conceptions: Theoretical Framework	18
3.2.1 NRCs	18
3.2.2 Link Between NRCs and Foreign Policy	21
3.3 Research Design.....	22
3.4 Data Sampling Procedure	22
3.4.1 Data Sampling for Speeches.....	23
3.4.2 The Rationale for the Selection of Periods	24
3.5 Limitations.....	26
4. Role Theory Analysis of Kenyatta’s Administration 1965-1975.....	28
4.1 Introduction	28
4.2 NRCs of Kenyatta’s Administration	28
4.3 NRCs and Performance: Translation into Foreign Policy.....	30
4.3.1 Enactment of the Dominant NRCs	30
4.3.2 Enactment of Other NRCs	31
5. Foreign Policy During the Kenyatta Administration 1964-1978	32
5.1 Introduction	32
5.2 Foreign Policy under Kenyatta (1964-1978)	32
5.2.1 Towards the Somali Question: Counter-Balancing	33
5.2.2 Towards East Africa: Good Neighbor Policy.....	34
5.2.3 Towards Africa: Neutrality	36
5.2.4 Towards the World: “Non-Alignment”	37
5.3 Conclusion	39
6. Role Theory Analysis of Moi’s Administration 1978-1988 and 1990-2000.....	41
6.1 Introduction	41
6.2 NRCs of Moi’s Administration 1978-1988.....	41
6.2.1 Comparison Between Moi (1978-1988) and Kenyatta (1965-1975).....	43

6.2.1	Enactment of NRCs: Translation into Foreign Policy	43
6.3	NRCs of Moi's Administration 1990-2000	44
6.3.1	Comparison of NRCs Between Kenyatta (1965-1975), Moi (1978-1988, and Moi(1990-2000) ...	46
6.3.2	Enactment of NRCs: Translation into Foreign Policy	48
7.	<i>Foreign Policy During the Moi Administration 1978-2000</i>	49
7.1	Introduction	49
7.2	Foreign Policy Under Moi 1978-2000	49
7.2.1	Towards the Somali Question: Continuation of Counter-Balancing	50
7.2.2	Towards East Africa: Reinvigoration of Good Neighbor Policy	52
7.2.3	Towards Africa: Assertiveness	54
7.2.4	Towards the World: Strategic Alignment.....	55
7.3	Conclusion	57
8.	<i>Conclusion.....</i>	59
	<i>Bibliography.....</i>	61
	<i>Appendix 1: Holsti(1970)'s Typology of NRCs</i>	65

Abbreviations

NRC(s)	National Role Conception(s)
BRL	Bastion of Revolution-Liberator (NRC)
RSC	Regional Sub-System Collaborator (NRC)
MI	Mediator-Integrator (NRC)
ID	Internal Development (NRC)
AI	Active Independent (NRC)
AIA	Anti-Imperialist Agent (NRC)
FA	Faithfull Ally (NRC)
LS	Liberation Supporter (NRC)
EAC	East African Community
UN	United Nations
O.A.U	Organization of African Unity
AU	African Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis

List of Figures

<i>Figure 1: A Picture of the Criteria Sent to Dr.Chweya to Assist His Search for the Speeches</i>	24
<i>Figure 2: NRCs Found During Kenyatta’s Administration 1965-1975</i>	29
<i>Figure 3: Hierarchy of NRCs During Kenyatta’s Administration 1965-1975</i>	29
<i>Figure 4 : NRCs Found During Moi’s Administration 1978-1988</i>	42
<i>Figure 5: Hierarchy of NRCs During Moi’s Administration 1978-1988</i>	42
<i>Figure 6: NRCs Found During Moi’s Administration 1990-2000</i>	45
<i>Figure 7: Hierarchy of NRCs During Moi’s Administration 1990-2000</i>	45
<i>Figure 8: Venn Diagram of the NRCs held by Kenyatta and Moi in the three periods</i>	47
<i>Figure 9: Percentage of Performed of the Overall NRCs and of the Dominant NRCs in the three periods</i>	60

1. Introduction

1.1 General Introduction

“Omnium Rerum Principia Parva Sunt” or in English: “the beginnings of all things are small” is a Latin phrase that can be utilized to explain the Republic of Kenya to a great extent. For one, Kenya only gained its independence from Britain 55 years ago. In essence, it is a country that is beginning to depart its nascent stages. Despite its young age, Kenya's story has mainly been one of positivity: it is one of the few countries that has avoided civil wars, enjoys steady economic growth and is active as the driving force within its sub-region of the East African community.¹ The Latin phrase above, can unfortunately also be applied to describe the literature on foreign policy analysis of Kenya thus far. Scholarly contributions tend to be descriptive, a feature that has been salient since the early contributions to analyzing the country's foreign policy. This is not to say there have not been attempts to examine Kenya's foreign policy through an analytical or theoretical perspective, there have been a few insightful contributions by scholars such as Wanyama (2011) and Mwangi (2016). Nevertheless, the majority of the theory-driven analysis on Kenya's foreign policy has focused on foreign policy after the Cold War, while the analysis of Kenya's foreign before the Cold War is overwhelmingly descriptive.

This thesis seeks to contribute to this growing literature on theoretical approaches regarding the latter, by assessing Kenya's foreign policy in the decades of 1965-1975, 1978-1988, and 1990-2000 through role theory. Specifically, this thesis is concerned with National Role Conceptions (NRCs) and the relationship between NRCs and enactment in the form of foreign policy behaviour. In order to outline the elements of this thesis, the following sections of the introduction will provide background information on Kenya, briefly discuss role theory and the framework to be utilized, provide the rationale for the study, before outlining the chapters ahead.

¹ Mabera, Faith. "Kenya's Foreign Policy in Context (1963–2015)." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2016): 366-367

Kenya formally gained its independence from Britain on December 12, 1964.² In its almost 55 years of existence, Kenya has transitioned into a sub-regional economic leader that is positively engaged in numerous initiatives within the subregion, continent, and in global affairs. Kenya has managed to remain relatively peaceful and stable, a considerable achievement bearing in mind the tumultuous regions of which the country resides in and is in close proximity to, East and Central Africa respectively. Moreover, Kenya has demonstrated a commitment to democratization through the implementation of various reforms, such as the advent of multiparty elections in 1991 and the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010. The path leading to this reality, however, has been far from smooth: obstacles emanating from abroad and within have impacted Kenya's socio-economic and political trajectory, sometimes bringing development to a standstill. How the various administrations have responded to the stimuli from the former, positive and negative, has shaped Kenya's identity in Africa and within the international community.

1.2 A Brief Overview of Kenya's Foreign Policy

Four administrations have governed Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta 1964-1978, Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013), and Uhuru Kenyatta (2013-present). The scope of this thesis falls under the administrations of Kenyatta and Moi. Bearing in mind the word and time constraints and the goal of attempting to illuminate changes in foreign policy, it seems reasonable to start from independence rather than from another period. For one, in the immediate post-independence period, principles were being established by Kenya and within Africa for the exercise of foreign policy. For instance, the policy of non-interference and sovereignty were enshrined by the African community of states in this period. Moreover, as the aforementioned foreign policy analysis during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations are abundant in literature, but few contributions assess this period through an analytical framework.

Foreign policy pressures under Jomo Kenyatta in the immediate post-independence era was characterized by dependence. The initial policies were a factor of the need to

² Ododa, Harry. "Continuity and change in Kenya's foreign policy from the Kenyatta to the Moi government". *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1986): 47-57

stimulate capital and ensure foreign investment in order to grow, the need to ensure access to markets in East Africa, and the need to ensure security against Somali irredentism.³ It was untenable, therefore, for a nascent state like Kenya to engage in foreign policy that would harm its attractiveness vis-a-vis foreign investment. It is within this context that Kenya engaged in what some scholars refer to as “quiet diplomacy.”⁴ Therefore, Kenya sought to maintain amicable relations with its immediate neighbours within East Africa, avoiding actions and policies that would harm its access to the markets in the region. Secondly, Kenyatta's administration moved to secure the territorial integrity against Somali irredentism by joining Ethiopia in a defensive pact, who was facing similar Somali nationalist claims.⁵ Lastly, Kenyatta positioned Kenya as a neutral party, vis-a-vis African affairs and the Cold War. Although the majority of Kenya's aid stemmed from the West and as a former colony of Britain, they had stronger ties, Kenya did not openly affiliate ideologically with the West. The reason being that the need to acquire foreign investment from every possible source negated the possibility of policy positioning in a way that precludes a potential source of aid.⁶ Within the continent, Kenya adopted a neutral stance at independence amidst a community of African states polarized around the issue of continental integration.⁷ In sum, this period under Kenyatta's administration was characterized by a cautious approach intended to ensure financial aid from external sources and security and territorial integrity.

Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta as the president of Kenya after the latter died. The period of Moi's reign covered here (1978-1988 and 1990-2000) was significantly longer than the ten years of Jomo Kenyatta. However, there was continuity in several facets of Moi's foreign policy from Kenyatta's in terms of the Somali dispute and policy of amicable neighbourly relations.⁸ Predictably, stimuli from both within and outside the country resulted in changes to some of the foreign policy pressures faced by the government. As regards the former, the leadership and advisors surrounding had changed, which impacted

³ Makinda, Samuel M. "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy." *Third World Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (1983): 302

⁴ Okumu, John J. "Some thoughts on Kenya's foreign policy". *The African Review: a Journal of African Politics Development and International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1973): P. 263

⁵ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 307

⁶ *Ibid.*, 303

⁷ *Ibid.*, 304

⁸ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 378

foreign policy in two ways. First, during the Kenyatta administration, foreign policy was dictated by the president and the Ministry of Foreign affairs. When Moi took power, he centralized power around the presidency at the expense of other organs of government.⁹ Therefore, foreign policy fell almost exclusively under his purview.¹⁰ Secondly, the new administration conveyed new ideas about Kenya and its place in the world; they were “eager and impatient to have its voice heard in the world.”¹¹ Consequently, Kenya stepped out of its role of “neutral” and started to assert itself more in foreign relations. For one, Moi’s Kenya broke with the tradition of non-alignment in the Cold War politics through offering military facilities to the United States in exchange for financial aid.¹² Secondly, Kenya increased its activity within the continent by playing an active role in establishing peace in regional conflicts within East Africa as well as the Great Lakes region in addition to providing military support to Namibia’s quest for independence.¹³ In light of this pronounced foreign policy action and the allocation of the headquarters of the United Nations Environmental Protection Agency, the decade of 1980-1990 has been dubbed Kenya’s “golden age of diplomacy”.¹⁴

During the '90s, widespread changes within the international system of states resulted in a reassessment of Kenya's foreign policy. For one, the end of the Cold War resulted in a wave of democratization wherein states that had previously had access to financial aid without significant donor pressure found themselves under pressure to institute democratic reforms. Kenya was threatened with the withholdment of vital financial aid unless democratic reforms such as multiparty elections and economic reforms were undertaken.¹⁵ Secondly, the rise in the threat of terrorism evidenced by the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya had the impact of designating strategic value upon Kenya in the fight against terrorism as well as emphasizing the necessity of a conducive foreign policy on border control.¹⁶ Lastly, the 1990s ushered in a new era of globalization wherein

⁹ Wanyama, Leonard. “Selected Cases In the Conduct Of Kenyan Foreign Policy Since 1992”. Masters Diss., University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2011. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39669766.pdf>. 11

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 314

¹² Ibid., 312

¹³ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 378

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 371

¹⁶ Ibid., 372

interdependence between states necessitated cooperation over conflict. The consequence of the three above mentioned factors caused Kenya's foreign policy to shift towards economic diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement in the East African region aimed at leadership.¹⁷

In sum, there has both been permanence and variation in the foreign policy of the Kenyatta administration and the Moi administration. The question then becomes, how does one explain the change? Through what analytical tool can the policy shifts and policy continuity be explained? This thesis posits here that this can be explained using role theory and specifically by looking at NRCs.

1.3 Introduction to Role Theory

Holsti (1970), through his articulation of NRCs, was the foremost to produce the connection across the disciplines. Role theory originates from sociology and social psychology,¹⁸ which postulates that:

“Role is a normative concept. It refers to expected or appropriate behavior and is distinct from the manner in which the role is actually enacted in a specific situation, which is role behavior or role performance.”¹⁹

Holsti (1970) contended that NRCs are a policymakers idea of what decisions and functions its country should play in international relations.²⁰ These NRCs are ascribed by states through an examination of their foreign policy documents and speeches. Since Holsti(1970)'s revelation, scholars have applied the theory for diverse research methods and have consequently provided key insights to the concept. Breuning (2011), for instance, argues that role theory is primarily about agent-structure relationship.²¹ She argues that:

“..national role conceptions function as a cognitive device that stands at the intersection of the ideational and material aspects of international relations. Hence, the national role conception brings

¹⁷ Ibid., 371

¹⁸ Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 237

¹⁹ Ibid., 238

²⁰ Ibid., 246

²¹ Breuning, Marijke. "Role theory research in international relations State of the art and blind spots". In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* by Harnisch, Sebastian., Cornelia. Frank, and Hanns Maull. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics; 90. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.16

together both agency and (perception of) the (material) international structure to explain foreign policy behavior."²²

The viability of Role theory to analysis in foreign policy lies in the theory's ability to "cross and bridge levels of analyses, as well as its ease of adaptation to other theoretical approaches."²³ For this reason, scholars have applied role theory in various perspectives and applied to diverse contexts, for some scholars within role theory scholarship focus on sources of NRC,²⁴ while others focus less on the conception and more towards its translation into foreign policy performance.²⁵ Some scholars tend to adopt an individual point of analysis,²⁶ looking at one state or one NRC stressing the ego, while others look at NRCs from a systemic perspective and focus on social interaction.²⁷ This malleability of the concept has provided a means through which scholars focusing on Africa can explain foreign policy on the continent. Adigbuo (2007) for instance, after overviewing some of IR paradigms and some theories of FPA, argues that NRCs are the best analytical tool for analyzing foreign policy in African state before the end of the Cold War.²⁸

As aforementioned, some scholars focus on the relationship between the NRCs held by a government and their subsequent foreign policy behaviour. The rationale behind this endeavour is that an NRC connotes parameters of acceptable behaviour that the state may engage in to fulfil that role. The NRC refers to the ego or the self-conception of a state's role in a system, which is used to guide its actions and functions within the particular system. This can be within a sub-region, a region, or any other form of grouping. Role enactment refers to the behaviour of the state in performing a particular role,²⁹ or simply foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, the NRCs that policymakers hold within a state can, in theory, be used

²² Ibid., 26

²³ Thies, Cameron G. "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America 1." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13, no. 3 (2017): 663

²⁴ Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (2012): 5-24.

²⁵ Walker, Stephen G. "The Correspondence between Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Behavior: Insights from Role Theory and Exchange Theory." *Behavioral Science* 26, no. 3 (1981): 272-80.

²⁶ Adigbuo, Richard. "Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions." *Politikon* 34, no. 1 (2007): 83-97.

²⁷ Harnisch, Sebastian. "Role theory Operationalization of Key Concepts". In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* by Harnisch, Sebastian., Cornelia. Frank, and Hanns Maull. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics; 90. London; New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 7-15

²⁸ Adigbuo, *Beyond IR Theories*, 87

²⁹ Harnisch, *Role theory Operationalization*, 9

as an explanatory factor for foreign policy behaviour. Because it is within NRCs that states determine what constitutes parameters of appropriate foreign policy behaviour.

1.4 Research Statement and Sub-Research Questions

Investigating the relationship between NRCs held by policymakers and foreign policy performance through the case study of Kenya is the aim of this thesis. Therefore, the broad research question is:

1. “How can Role Theory be Used to Explain Foreign Policy in Kenya during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations?”

In order to guide the research, the following sub-research questions have been selected:

- a. How many NRCs can be attributed to the decade in question?
- b. Is there a relationship between the NRCs and foreign policy?
- c. What are the Dominant NRCs, and how do they change across the decades?

In order to answer the research questions, 10 speeches by foreign policymakers will be analyzed per decade. This number is not arbitrary and takes into consideration the difficulty with gaining access to speeches, particularly for the early post-independence years. Due to financial constraints, the research had to be delegated to a correspondent in Kenya who spent weeks searching for speeches. As indicated by the methodology chapter below, the initial criteria for the selection of speeches for this study had to be adjusted in light of the difficulty of accessing speeches that pertained to foreign policy. If the number were above 10, the decade between 1978 and 1988 would have had to have been removed from the analysis. Any less and the representativeness of the sample would have plausibly been too small. Further elaboration on the data sampling method is provided in the methodology chapter.

1.5 Conclusion and Chapter Outline

The rationale for this thesis as provided by an analysis of the literature on role theory and Kenya's foreign policy is twofold. Within the expanding literature on role theory, there have been calls for further research to understand the process of change and adaptation of roles as well as for the extent to which states may hold multiple roles and how this plays into foreign policy behaviour.³⁰ Concomitantly, amongst the contributions from scholars to role theory, there is a lack of applications to African states. The majority of the contributions to Role theory tend to analyze the powerful states from the West.³¹ Moreover, from an overview of the literature on Kenya's foreign policy, there is a general lack of analytical contributions, especially concerning the early years. Indeed Oketch (2013) represents the only attempt found to do so.

Further elaboration of the literature on foreign policy analysis of Kenya will be provided in the subsequent Literature Review chapter. Following the Literature review, the role theory framework and apparatus to be applied in this thesis will be outlined in the Methodology chapter. Chapter 4 will present the NRCs found through the content analysis of speeches during Kenyatta's administration from 1965-1975. Descriptive analysis of foreign policy during the same period in order to establish congruency between NRCs and foreign policy will be provided in Chapter 5. Similarly, the NRCs of the two decades of Moi's administration followed by a descriptive analysis of foreign policy during those decades will be presented in chapter 6 and 7, respectively. A synopsis at the end will sum up the elements of the thesis and provide the overall results.

³⁰ Breuning, *Role theory research*, 27

³¹ Thies, *Role Theory*, 663

2. Literature Review

The purpose of this literature review is to analyze the literature on Kenya's foreign policy in order to identify themes in the period under the scope of this thesis. A secondary objective is to analyze the literature in order to situate this thesis within any existing gaps or areas of contribution. An overview of Role theory and NRC will be highlighted in the subsequent methodology chapter.

As aforementioned, there exists a tendency for the literature on Kenyan foreign policy to be descriptive in nature.³² The literature itself can be split into two camps, the contributions that detail Kenya's foreign policy before the Cold War and the contributions that depict foreign policy from the end of the Cold War to contemporary times. The former tends to be more descriptive, while the latter is more analytical. The consequence of the earlier analysis being mostly descriptive being that the scholars generally present the same events and shifts in foreign policy. There are some instances, however, where the way facts are presented or omitted in one scholar's work vis-à-vis the others that presents a different interpretation of events. For instance, Howell (1968) in his analysis of Kenya's foreign policy, argues that Kenya maintained a foreign policy that was radical based on idealism on the international stage but legitimist and conservative within East Africa.³³ The former is argued

³² Maberu, Faith. "Kenya's Foreign Policy in Context (1963–2015)." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2016): 365-84.

Okumu, J. "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy." *The African Review* 3, no. 2 (1973): 263-290

Nzau, Mumo. "The Strategic Art of Appeasing Old Lovers while Courting New Friends: Kenya's Foreign Relations in Retrospect". In *Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones* by Kithinji, Michael Mwenda, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich. African Histories and Modernities. 2016. Pages 137-164

Howell, John. "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1968): 29-48.

Makinda, Samuel M. "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy." *Third World Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (1983): 300-19.

Ododa, Harry. "Continuity and Change in Kenya's Foreign Policy from the Kenyatta to the Moi Government." *Journal of African Studies* 13, no. 2 (1986): 47-57.

³³ Howell, John. "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1968): 29

by Howell (1968) as a means to consolidate the domestic regime.³⁴ Okumu (1973) fervently rejects this argument, contends that Howell (1968) does not fully grasp how politics occurs in Kenya.³⁵ Okumu (1973) invalidates Howell's (1968) above point by stating that the people of Kenya do not relate to their domestic institutions, let alone foreign policy.³⁶ In contrast, he argues that the initial years of Kenya's foreign policy conduct has been defined by a cautious approach within the region and abroad, what he terms as "Quiet diplomacy".³⁷ Quiet diplomacy is said to be a factor of Kenya's need to consolidate its territories in the coast and the North Eastern province, the need for a "good neighbour" policy to ensure security and territorial integrity, the need for economic development through cooperation, and their position as a non-aligned country within the context of Cold War politics.³⁸ These are the only two points on which they disagree; however, the facts and events covered by both coincide.

Makinda (1983) does not entirely disagree with the points elucidated by Okumu(1973), but he argues for the concept of dependence as the factor behind Quiet diplomacy. He argues that Kenya was dependent on three factors: external finance, regional markets, and security. Financial dependency concerned the necessity to attract foreign sources of aid and investment to propel the economy and consequently the inability to enact policies that would threaten this.³⁹ Secondly, Kenya needed access to the East African market for the goods it produced as a result of this financial investment, and so avoided actions that would upset their neighbours and threaten this interest.⁴⁰ Lastly, the threat of Somali irredentism fostered a security dependence on Ethiopia, as a critical ally to balance against the threat of Somali nationalism.⁴¹ These three factors elucidated above conditioned the policy of "Quiet diplomacy" according to Makinda(1983). The above overview of the scholarly contributions indicates themes that can be attributed to Kenya's early foreign policy practice under Kenyatta. The need to address the Somali question, the policy of good neighbourliness within East Africa, neutrality towards Africa, and non-alignment within

³⁴ Ibid.,30

³⁵ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 264

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 263

³⁸ Ibid., 266

³⁹ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 303

⁴⁰ Ibid., 305

⁴¹ Ibid., 307

global affairs under the overarching umbrella of Quiet diplomacy. The Somali question, as defined here, refers to the threat to Kenya's territorial integrity and security emanating from the porous border with Somalia that factored into foreign policy practice. Absent of an official foreign policy document, this establishes not only the tenets or themes of foreign policy from the early years as a basis of comparison but also the domains or policy areas upon which foreign policy was geared towards. In terms of towards Security, towards sub-region, towards the continent, and towards the broader international system of states.

A secondary indication from an overview of the above literature is that the early literature on Kenya's foreign policy generally agrees on the facts and events in Kenya's twilight period under Kenyatta. Although there are some differences in interpretations, the facts hold and consequently the national role performances attributed to the country by the scholars such as "quiet diplomacy" and "neutral" are present in each literary contribution. This then provides a suitable base upon which to examine the national role conceptions as depicted by foreign policy speeches.

The literature on Kenya's foreign policy that is analytical tends to focus on events after the end of the Cold War and after the 1990s. Mwangi (2016), for instance, adopts the decision-making units approach from FPA to examine the impact of globalization processes in terms of new security threats and constitutionalism on internal circumstances and consequently, foreign policy.⁴² Specifically, he focuses on defence policy and how new defence actors have shaped foreign policy in the context of Kenya's intervention in Somalia.⁴³ This represents a worthy analytical contribution to the literature on Kenya's foreign policy but is specifically focused on employing the decisions unit approach on one aspect of foreign policy in defence policy at one specific period.

Oketch (2013), in contrast, employs various decision-making FPA models to describe foreign policy during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. Specifically, she applied the Rational Actor, Groupthink, Organizational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics models to establish a correlation between foreign policy behaviour and decision making models.⁴⁴

⁴² Mwangi Gakuo, Oscar. "Continuity and Change in Kenya's Defense and Foreign Policies: The Impact of the New Security Dilemma". In *Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones* by Kithinji, Michael Mwendu, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich. African Histories and Modernities. 2016. Pages 247

⁴³ Ibid., 245

⁴⁴ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 26

Through her analysis, she discovered that the Rational Actor and Groupthink models best describe the foreign policy of both Kenyatta's and Moi's tenures.⁴⁵ This is a key contribution to the literature on Kenya's foreign policy, and her insights and results shall be drawn upon during the analysis in this thesis. Secondly, Oketch (2013) 's contribution draws upon several sources that this thesis has not been able to access due to a lack of digitalization of sources amongst other issues, and as such can act as a secondary source to this information augmenting the quality of research.

In conclusion, the objective of this literature review was to depict the state of the literature on Kenya's foreign policy in order to situate this thesis. The literature, both descriptive and analytical, provide the foundations for the aims of this thesis. For one, the literature is mainly in agreement in terms of the themes and shifts in Kenya's foreign policy and therefore provides consensus on *national role performances* (or foreign policy behaviour) such as "quiet diplomacy", "neutral", amongst others. This provides a reliable basis upon which to evaluate foreign policy performance of NRCs and changes in NRCs across the decades analysed here.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 143

3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This section shall provide a discussion of the modus operandi for this thesis moving forward. In order to do so the following methodological considerations will be provided: a discussion on Role theory and the presentation of the theoretical framework, an overview of the research design, an explanation of the data sampling procedure, a section outlining the data analysis procedure, and an explanation of the limitations of this study.

3.2 National Role Conceptions: Theoretical Framework

3.2.1 NRCs

As aforementioned, Holsti (1970) provided the formative work for the application of role theory, originally a sociological and social psychological theory, to foreign policy analysis. Within the original role theory, he distinguishes between role prescriptions, role performance, and what he terms as role conceptions.⁴⁶ Role prescriptions are defined as the norms, values, and expectations a group places on a position (ego).⁴⁷ Role performance refers to behaviour or enactment of a role.⁴⁸ Role conceptions are the ideas that the ego has of his or her position within the groupings and the appropriate behaviours and functions of that position.⁴⁹ Adjusted to states and foreign policy, national role prescriptions refer to the structure of the international system of states, its values and norms, and legal obligations.⁵⁰ National performance is defined as the "general foreign policy behaviour of governments."⁵¹ Last but not least, National Role Conceptions (NRCs) are defined as

"the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate regional systems."⁵²

⁴⁶ See appendix 1

⁴⁷ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions*, 239

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 246

⁵¹ Ibid., 245

⁵² Ibid.

NRCs are informed both by internal and external considerations. The former may include socioeconomic considerations and interests, location, natural resources, and domestic audience opinion.⁵³ In sum, Holsti (1970) contends that by applying role theory to the analysis of states, foreign policy behaviour can be understood as a national role performance of NRCs.

NRCs, in turn, are determined by analyzing the foreign policy statements and speeches made by policymakers such as from the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the President, or any other government staff charged with foreign policy.⁵⁴ Holsti (1970) subsequently analyzed a total of 972 foreign policy statements from 71 governments covering three years of 1964-1967 to attain the NRCs.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Holsti (1970) surveyed the literature on roles which he combined with his analysis of state statements to propose a typology of 17⁵⁶ different NRCs states have.⁵⁷ Of note is his discovery through his analysis, of the possibility of states to maintain multiple roles at the same time, playing a different role according to the domain of interaction. This is logically coherent considering that the role a state may play differs across domain: sub-regional, regional, continental and global as well as in bilateralism and multilateralism. For instance, in the speeches made by foreign policymakers of Kenya, an NRC was identified 10 times by Holsti(1970).⁵⁸ The NRCs attributed to Kenya made up 5 of the 17 NRC identified by Holsti(1970), with the dominant roles being “Regional Sub-system Collaborator” and “Independent.”⁵⁹ This concurs with Kenya's policy of quiet diplomacy which centred on non-alignment and harbouring amicable relations within the East African region.

Holsti (1970) formative contribution has paved the way for successive scholars to expand the literature on role theory as a mechanism for foreign policy analysis. His work has not been, however, immune to criticisms. Cantir and Karbo (2012), for instance, argue that Holsti(1970) overemphasizes on elite statements and elites as a unit or “black box.”⁶⁰ They

⁵³ Ibid.,246

⁵⁴ Ibid.,256

⁵⁵ Ibid.,260

⁵⁶ See Appendix 1

⁵⁷ Ibid., 260-270

⁵⁸ Ibid., 275

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (2012): 8

argue that aggregating NRCs according to the manner proposed by Holsti (1970) ignores key issues of the degree to which a role is domestically contested and the inner and outer bounds of a role.⁶¹ The latter refers to domestic disagreement or agreement with role performance, and whether these assessments can be attributed to the inner role in its conception form or in the outer role in the way it was performed.⁶² This is a compelling criticism which holds in the contexts upon which these theories are usually applied, namely the West. In Africa, however, politics is exercised differently. In Kenya, for instance, from independence up until the promulgation of the new constitution, power has been centralized around the president at the expense of sectors of the government.⁶³

In consequence, vital sectors such as the Ministry of Foreign affairs has mostly been relegated to an advisory role.⁶⁴ Moreover, domestic contestation in the form of political parties was banned up until the 1990s. Foreign policy has primarily been executed by the president, with elites bought into the neo-patrimonial system via patronage.⁶⁵ Those who disagree or prove troublesome are ousted and in some instances tortured.⁶⁶ Worse still, assassinations were used as a tool against political opponents. Although it has never been proven, these are the allegations that have been levelled against Moi in the light of the death of the Minister of Foreign affairs Robert Ouko.⁶⁷ In sum, it is difficult to envision in such a hostile environment a situation in which NRCs are fruitfully contested amongst society and elites. For the analysis intended in this paper; therefore, 'black-boxing' elites or simply taking NRCs as reflective of the government's views as a unit is employed. This then represents a drawback of this study, but a necessary one considering the context in which politics is exercised in Kenya. Moreover, the focus of this paper is to establish a relationship between the NRCs held by Kenyatta and Moi and their translation into foreign policy exclusively, an additional analysis of the domestic sources is outside the scope.

⁶¹ Ibid.,7

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Oketch, Linda Gwada. *Decision Making Models and Kenya's Foreign Policy: 1964-2002: An Empirical Assessment of the Kenyatta and MOI Administrations*. Nairobi, Kenya: United States International University, 2013. 143

⁶⁴ Ibid.119

⁶⁵ Mwangi, *Continuity and Change*, 251

⁶⁶ Oketch, *Decision Making*,120

⁶⁷ Ibid., 74

The literature on role theory has greatly expanded since its inception through scholarly contributions to criticisms such as those levelled by Cantir and Karbo (2012) as well as through diversification of understanding and consequently application of the concept to FPA. Harnisch (2011) contends that early role theorists tended to focus on the Ego or the self-conception portion of a role and consequently broke with the foundations of role theory as a product of sociology and social psychology which emphasized social interaction.⁶⁸ Recent role theory, in contrast, places social interaction at the centre and has consequently moved towards a systemic analysis of roles as opposed to individual state.⁶⁹ Moreover, Harnisch (2011) distinguishes between new schools of Role theory thought, American and European. The former focuses more on material capabilities as the significant factor in defining roles and the latter stresses the important factors like language and interaction through employing a constructivist perspective.⁷⁰ This thesis situates itself within the contributions of earlier role theorists, focusing on the ego part of the NRC and relating it to foreign policy practice of an individual state.

3.2.2 Link Between NRCs and Foreign Policy

Early Role theorists have mostly explored the relationship between the NRCs that a country holds for itself and enactment of those NRCs into foreign policy. Holsti(1970), through his analysis, explored the relationship between NRCs and foreign policy behaviour but through a limited perspective. Holsti(1970) specifically looked at how certain NRCs connote a higher or lower level of foreign policy participation, hence his typology being organized from more active to less active roles. Walker (1981) similarly explored the link between rhetoric and foreign policy and found a correlation between the two variables for states within dyadic relations.⁷¹ However, Walker (1981) only examined NRCs that were related to the United States and the USSR, focusing like Holsti(1970) on just one issue or foreign policy behaviour.

The contribution of Wish (1980) further strengthens the utility of analyzing the link between rhetoric and foreign policy behaviour. Through her analysis, she established a link between NRCs and Foreign policy behaviour through an empirical assessment of NRCs

⁶⁸ Harnisch, *Role theory Operationalization*, 7

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Walker, *The Correspondence*, 272

coded into variables and foreign policy. Based on Holsti(1970)'s typology, she proposed a method to differentiate each NRC based on Status, Motivational Orientation, and Issue and Substantive Problem Area.⁷² She then juxtaposed these variables of NRCs to foreign policy behaviour in terms of International participation, Hostility, Independence of Action, and Resource Commitments.⁷³ Through her empirical assessments, she found amongst other conclusions that leaders who held more dominant roles for their country were more likely to participate in International Affairs and leaders who conceived of their country as performing economic rather than security roles were more likely to be more active.⁷⁴

3.3 Research Design

This thesis seeks to address the research question and sub-research questions through a single case study methodology. In the Role analysis chapters, 10 foreign policy speeches for each decade of 1965-1975, 1978-1988, and 1990-2000 will be analysed in order to ascertain the NRCs of the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. These NRCs will be attributed according to the typology produced by Holsti(1970). Subsequently, the correlation between the established NRCs and foreign policy will be briefly described. In addition, a comparison of the NRCs ascribed and the hierarchies of NRCs across the three decades covered would provide for an assessment of Kenya's foreign policy through role theory. The hierarchies of the NRCs per decade will be determined primarily by the number of times mentioned and secondarily by a translation into foreign policy in the event of a deadlock. Following the Role analysis chapters of each of the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, a descriptive overview of foreign policy during the decades in question will provide the context wherein NRCs were performed or not.

3.4 Data Sampling Procedure

⁷² Wish, Naomi. "Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (1980): 536-539

⁷³ Ibid., 541-543

⁷⁴ Ibid.,545

3.4.1 Data Sampling for Speeches

In order to pursue this thesis, a total of 30 speeches that described some aspect of foreign policy by various ministries and the President were required. These speeches were necessary in order to attribute NRCs that can then be used for analysis. However, this proved to be a challenge for various reasons.

For one, the obvious logistical constraints involved in engaging in a search for documents that are in Kenya from the Netherlands. Due to the costs of transportation and attendance requirements for master's classes, I was unable to access these resources on site and instead had to relay the task. In order to access these speeches, I had to engage with a contact within the Kenya National Archives and Documentation Services. The Deputy Director, Dr Naftal Chweya Oganga, assisted me in the search for the relevant speeches, the scanning, and sending. I provided him with the following checklist to guide me in search of the speeches as displayed by Figure 1. Secondly, there is a general lack of digitalisation of speeches by the Kenyan government sectors and the executive. Consequently, all the speeches utilised here were originally in paper form and had to be scanned and sent to in the Netherlands. Lastly, the process of scanning the speeches, some of which numbered up to 25 pages, was tedious, time-consuming and costly.

In light of these constraints, the number of speeches assessed per decade as 10 was chosen totalling 30. In total, I received 86 speeches with the majority not reflecting the criteria, in order to discern relevant from irrelevant speeches, a preliminary content analysis was undertaken. The speeches that fit the decades under scope and that either mentioned or were directed towards international affairs in terms of sub-regional affairs, African affairs, international affairs and organizations were selected. One exception was made with regards to the decade of 1978-1988, whereby one speech from 1977 was included due to inability to meet the requirement of 10. After 30 speeches had been selected fulfilling the content and temporal prerequisites, they were then analysed for NRCs. A role alluded to in the speeches had to match the conditions outlined by Holsti to be attributed as an NRC.⁷⁵ Moreover, the number 10 does not refer to 1 speech per year for the decade. The years from the speeches are arbitrary; consequently, there may be several speeches from one

⁷⁵ See Appendix 1

year and none from another. This was especially the case for the decade of 1990-2000. The criteria for the sampling of speeches can be found below.

-10 speeches from 1965-1975

-10 speeches from 1978-1988

-10 speeches from 1990-2000

From:

-Ministers of foreign affairs for each period e.g Wanyaki, Murumbi, Ouko,

-President's statements on foreign policy from Moi and Kenyatta in each period

Relevant foreign policy speeches addressed:

- To the United Nations

- To African countries(East African treaties, economic organizations, East African Community, etc)

- Towards Somalia (northeastern province conflict)

- [] Addressed to other countries outside of Africa

- [] Visits of international countries, either when a country visits Kenya or vice versa

-foreign economic policy

-Foreign security issues

-To the OAU organization of African Unity

Figure 1: A Picture of the Criteria Sent to Dr.Chweya to Assist His Search for The speeches

3.4.2 The Rationale for the Selection of Periods

Due to time and words constraints, this thesis aims to assess foreign policy during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations only, therefore foreign policy in Kenya after 2000 is not under consideration. The rationale for selecting the periods assessed in this thesis are multiple and specific to each decade. The period after independence, 1965-1975, was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, this period was marked by decolonisation processes across the continent; newly formed African states came together to establish the principles that would mark the exercise of foreign policy on the continent. Such principles as non-interference and territorial integrity formed the basis of foreign policy for the upcoming decades. Secondly, during this period, Kenya, as a novel state, was understanding and subsequently constructing its position vis-à-vis the sub-regional grouping of East Africa, the

African continent, and the wider international system of states. This period provides a basis upon which change in foreign policy through NRCs can be analysed across decades.

The period of 1978-1988 will be analysed due to the various stimuli from an internal and external perspective that had an impact on Kenya's foreign policy orientation. As regards the former, Daniel Arap Moi ascended to the presidency after Jomo Kenyatta's death in 1978. Investigating the differences between the NRCs held by Moi's administration in light of the continuous and alternating foreign policy pressures would be conducive to understanding changes in NRCs according to leadership. In addition to this internal change, numerous events in the regional and international stage impacted on Kenya's foreign policy. For instance, the triangular conflict with Ethiopia and Somalia,⁷⁶ the intensification of Cold war politics,⁷⁷ increased involvement in conflict resolution initiatives in Africa,⁷⁸ the collapse of the East African Community due to tension amongst the countries,⁷⁹ in conjunction with other developments within this period represent the importance of this period for foreign policy.

Last but not least, the period of 1990-2000 will be examined in this thesis as it represents a period of widespread changes in the international system of states. The end of the Cold War and the establishment of a dominant world power in the form of the United States had a widespread impact on values and norms. African countries like Kenya, who had hitherto unhindered access to aid regardless of their domestic political situation, were increasingly under pressure to engage in reforms aimed at democratisation. The combination of internal and external pressures culminated into a wave of democratisation that introduced widespread changes. Within Kenya, these democratic changes materialised in the form of reforms aimed at improving the rule of law and governance, such as legalisation of multiparty politics. Externally, Kenya had to reorient its foreign policy to adjust to the norms and values. Concomitantly, the rise in interstate wars and the failure of the states within the international system and regional and international organisations to effectively respond to these conflicts gave rise to the concept of intervention. The conglomeration of these two factors amongst others not explored here resulted in extensive

⁷⁶ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 308-309

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 300

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 309

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

systemic change within the international system, altering the expectations of the behaviour of states. This fundamental change in terms of the structure of the system of international states and the norms and values thereof is likely to cause a change in NRCs and consequently, foreign policy behaviour.⁸⁰

3.5 Limitations

Several limitations reduce the quality of the research produced by this thesis as a result of the word, time, and logistical constraints. For one, the lack of hands-on research as a consequence of the inability to travel to Kenya. This would otherwise provide for a more rigorous data sampling method for the speeches but at the same time could have increased research bias. The sampling of the speeches is more random as the individual helping to acquire them has not been informed of the research purpose or the methodology.

Secondly, the low number of speeches can also be considered as a methodological drawback from this thesis. This is, again, a consequence of the logistical constraints detailed above. A larger sample of speeches could have provided for more NRCs that can then be analysed for this thesis. This would have strengthened the results produced here but may have concomitantly proved to be too much considering the word constraints.

A further limitation of this study is arguably evident in the use of Holsti(1970)'s typology for the attribution of NRCs. Holsti (1970) provided a typology of 17 different NRCs from an analysis of government speeches and literature on roles. However, his analysis was conducted during the Cold War, and since then, several new roles have been attributed by states such as a mediator.⁸¹ Hence an argument can be made that this typology is outdated. However, considering that of the three periods assessed in this thesis, two coincide with the Cold War, this typology seems suitable.

Lastly, a methodological limitation of this thesis can be attributed to its scope. The focus is on NRCs, and the translation into foreign policy practice and as a consequence analysis on the sources of NRCS and how they evolve and change according to internal and external stimuli is absent. For many reasonings, including a lack of reliable data on domestic audience preference prohibits this. In any case, an improved method for future research

⁸⁰ Breuning, *Role theory research*, 30

⁸¹ Harnisch, *Role theory Operationalization*, 7

Tony Oweke
S1677411

would include a hands-on approach, more recent typology for NRCs, a larger sample of speeches, and analysis on sources of NRCs.

4. Role Theory Analysis of Kenyatta's Administration 1965-1975

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide the results of applying role theory to explain Kenyatta's foreign policy. Therefore, the following section will outline all of the NRCs that were found in the speeches during Kenyatta's administration from a period of 1965-1975. Subsequently, the correlation between the three most frequently mentioned NRCs and the actual foreign policy practice of Kenyatta will be determined. Lastly, a discussion of the other NRCs that are reflected by foreign policy performance will be discussed before providing a brief synopsis.

4.2 NRCs of Kenyatta's Administration

Through the analysis of 10 speeches related to foreign policy, several NRCs could be distinguished. These speeches were from Ministers of various sectors of government, Vice presidents, and the President himself. Of the 10 speeches, an NRC was found in 9, with the overall amount of 16. Of the 16 NRCs, 8 different NRCs were found, according to Holsti(1970)'s 17 point typology. The most frequently found NRC in the speeches was "Regional-Subsystem Collaborator (RSC)" which was found in 5 of the 10 speeches. Figure 2 further outlines the results of the analysis of the speeches as regards to the types of NRCS that were attributed. Figure 3 outlines the hierarchy of the NRCs found as determined primarily by the number of times mentioned and translation into foreign policy behaviour or performance.

Kenyatta Administration	Number of NRCs	Bastion of Revolution-Liberator	Regional leader	Regional Protector	Active Independent	Liberation Supporter	Anti-Imperialist Agent	Defender of the Faith	Mediator-Integrator	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Developer	Bridge	Faithful Ally	Independent	Example	Internal Development	Isolate	Protectee
1965 - 1975	16	1			2		2		1	5				1	2	2		

Figure 2: NRCs Found During Kenyatta's Administration 1965-1975

Source: Table produced by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

Hierarchy of NRCs	NRC	Times Mentioned	Foreign Policy Behavior (Role Performance)
1	RSC	5	Yes
2	ID	2	Yes
3	AI	2	Yes
4	Example	2	No
5	AIA	2	No
6	MI	1	Yes
7	BRL	1	Yes
8	Independent	1	Yes

Figure 3: Hierarchy of NRCs During Kenyatta's Administration 1965-1975

Source: Typology of NRCs provided by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

4.3 NRCs and Performance: Translation into Foreign Policy

4.3.1 Enactment of the Dominant NRCs

The three NRCs that were most frequently mentioned in the speeches analyzed were 'RSC' (5), 'ID' (2), and 'AI' (3) as depicted by figure 3. In terms of relation to the foreign policy practice of this period, these NRCs translated into foreign policy. Economic considerations primarily drove foreign policy Kenyatta. He sought to ensure foreign financial investment and access to the East African Markets in order to cultivate Kenya's nascent economy. He thus concentrated his foreign policy on cultivating ties within the region and avoiding policies that promoted disunity. It is within this context that Kenyatta eagerly participated in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the EAC in 1967,⁸² and Kenyatta avoided aggressive reactions to unfavourable policies leveraged by Uganda and Tanzania against Kenya.⁸³ Therefore, The NRC of 'RSC' as evident in 5 of the 10 speeches, was enacted by Kenyatta in Kenya's foreign policy.

Of similar importance to Kenyatta, was the need to stimulate foreign investment in order to spur development in the country. As a consequence, Kenyatta forwent an active foreign policy amidst fears of the damage of such a policy to the sources of financial aid that were so crucial to Kenya's internal development.⁸⁴ This desire to be noncommittal in International affairs as a consequence of the focus on domestic development is precisely what the role of Internal Development prescribes.⁸⁵ Therefore, Kenyatta's foreign policy as regards to the World is a performance of the NRC of 'Internal Development (ID)'.

The NRC of 'AI' found in the speeches was similarly translated in foreign policy from 1965 to 1975. This NRC; which connotes independence, non-alignment, and the desire to cultivate relations as far as possible;⁸⁶ was evident in Kenyatta's foreign policy. Initially, Kenya sought relations with as many countries as possible in order to cultivate economic relations as the role 'AI' would prescribe. While relations with Britain remained strong,

⁸² Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 48

⁸³ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 277

⁸⁴ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 303

⁸⁵ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions*, 269

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 262

Kenyatta fostered relations and economic ties with communist countries such as China and the Soviet Union.⁸⁷

4.3.2 Enactment of Other NRCs

Among the other NRCs found, 3 NRCs translated into foreign policy practice during the period in question. 'I', 'BRL', and 'MI' were present in Kenyatta's foreign policy during 1965-1975.

The difference between 'AI' and 'I' is centred around the level of activity. The latter reaffirms self-determination absent of any particular functions.⁸⁸ The role of 'I' was enacted when Kenya rejected Soviet Aid due to the condition of forced importation of Russian goods in 1966.⁸⁹ This was a move made to ensure Kenya's self-determination and against the economic and political influence of socialism.⁹⁰

Kenyatta enacted the role of 'BRL' through the granting of material and moral aid to South-West African liberation movements.⁹¹ The role of 'MI' was performed during the Congo and Angolan conflicts, wherein Kenyatta was asked to mediate as a consequence of Kenya's 'neutral' stance within the continent.⁹²

In total, 6 of the 8 different NRCs found in the speeches translated into foreign policy practice of Kenyatta during 1965-1975. The behavioural functions associated with 'ID', 'RSC', 'AI', 'I', 'BRL', and 'MI' were evident in Kenyatta's foreign policy. The roles of 'AIA' and 'Example' did not translate into foreign policy practice. This evidence supports the argument that foreign policy in Kenya can be explained by appealing to role theory and specifically analyzing NRCs and comparing it to foreign policy practice. However, the analysis of enactment here refers to isolated incidents, in order to determine a robust link between NRCs and patterns of foreign policy behaviour. A detailed overview of Kenyatta's foreign policy will be provided in the subsequent chapter.

⁸⁷ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 289

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 268

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 287

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 288

⁹¹ Howell, *An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy*, 31

⁹² Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 309

5. Foreign Policy During the Kenyatta Administration 1964-1978

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to outline the foreign policy conduct of Kenya under the Kenyatta administration from 1964-1978. The aim here is to provide a contextual background through which NRCs are formed and enacted. In order to do so, the discussion of foreign policy will be divided into policies regarding the Somali question, towards East Africa, Within African Affairs, and towards external partners.

5.2 Foreign Policy under Kenyatta (1964-1978)

When Jomo Kenyatta assumed the seat of the presidency of Kenya after independence in 1964, He faced several pressures that required immediate policy engagement. The Somali question, the desperate need for foreign economic investment, and the need to ensure access to neighbouring markets conditioned his early foreign policy outlook.⁹³ Principally Kenyatta was driven by the need to ensure state survival of particular pertinence considering its nascent stages, whereby foreign investment aid and security were prerequisites. It is only within the context of the three above mentioned pressures that Kenyatta's early foreign policy of "Quiet diplomacy" can be understood.

Quiet diplomacy refers to the cautious and prudent approach to sub-regional, regional, and international affairs that marked the early years of Kenyatta's foreign policy practice.⁹⁴ Kenyatta initially sought to ensure amicable relations within the sub-region, neutrality in the face of a polarized African Community of states, and non-alignment within the ideological struggle of the Cold War. The good neighbourliness within East Africa and the non-alignment tenets of this foreign policy were called into question by developments in the 1970s. Regarding the former, the deterioration of relations within the region that culminated in the fall of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 caused this tenet of the

⁹³ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 302

⁹⁴ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 263

policy to fail.⁹⁵ Moreover, the tenet of non-alignment within the Cold War was called into question by Kenya's intensification of links with the West as the decade proceeded.⁹⁶

5.2.1 Towards the Somali Question: Counter-Balancing

Perhaps the greatest threat to Kenya's security in the immediate post-independence period was the threat arising from the Somali question. Kenya's North Eastern province borders Somalia and is inhabited by a Somali ethnic majority who had expressed their desire to be part of Somalia even before independence.⁹⁷ Subsequently, a referendum was organized by the British before independence concerning this matter. The Somali's voted overwhelmingly to secede,⁹⁸ However, Britain, who were unwilling to anger Kenyatta and the soon to be independent Kenya, refused to heed to this request.⁹⁹

Consequently, the North Eastern Province remained under the authority of Kenya at independence much to the disdain of the inhabiting Somali population, which inevitably took up arms. These Somali insurgents or Shiftas declared war on Kenya that lasted from 1964 to 1967. These insurgents would not have presented as much of a threat to Kenya if it had not been for the support of the Somali Government who provided the Shiftas with arms and training facilities.¹⁰⁰ The war eventually ended when Kenyatta and Prime Minister Mohammed Egal of Somalia signed a memorandum of understanding that ceased hostilities and stipulated the reinstatement of diplomatic relations between the two.¹⁰¹

Somali nationalism extended beyond Kenya and impacted several neighbouring countries that harboured a Somali population such as Ethiopia, who were preoccupied with similar irredentist claims upon their territory of Ogaden. Faced with similar threats, Kenyatta sought a defensive pact with Ethiopia to ensure its territorial integrity and balance against the threat posed by the Somali question.¹⁰² Although hostilities ceased at the end of the war in 1967, the claims to irredentism were never renounced. Therefore the threat of the Somali question remained and consequently conditioned Kenyatta's foreign policy

⁹⁵ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 49

⁹⁶ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 148

⁹⁷ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 267-270

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 267

⁹⁹ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 306

¹⁰⁰ Howell, *An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy*, 38

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 39

¹⁰² Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 307

throughout his tenure as it necessitated measures to address it. It is within this context that Kenyatta sought to maintain defensive pact despite countervailing developments in the 1970s that put this alliance into question. The overthrow by Haile Selassie's government by the military in 1974 and the succeeding transition to a socialist government with links to the Soviet Union would have predictably led to a breakdown in the alliance from a West-leaning Kenyatta.¹⁰³ However, Kenyatta regarded the Somali question as more pertinent to Kenya's foreign policy and consequently maintained the alliance throughout his tenure.

5.2.2 Towards East Africa: Good Neighbor Policy

As aforementioned, Kenyatta's early foreign policy can be described as dictated by the need to access foreign financial investment into the country. Once this finance has been secured and invested within domestic industries, Kenya then needed a market for its products. This need for a market for its goods manifested in Kenya's dependence on the East African markets which in turn necessitated a policy of amicable relations with the other countries within the region or policy of good neighbourliness. This was the initial policy engaged by Kenyatta which was put into question by developments in the 1970s to the extent that by the end of his tenure, relations within the sub-region had deteriorated and the policy had failed.

From independence, Kenyatta sought close economic relations with Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya's immediate neighbours. In other words, the role of RSC was enacted to foster political and diplomatic connections as a prerequisite to economic relations. This triangular relationship culminated into the establishment of the EAC in 1967.¹⁰⁴ These relations were initially strained by the economic and ideological distance between Kenya's two neighbours. Economically speaking, Kenya's industries and services dominated those of its neighbours to the disdain of Tanzania and Uganda who regarded Kenya as unfairly benefiting from trade.¹⁰⁵ As regards to ideology, Kenya was firmly capitalist as a consequence of its British heritage while Uganda and Tanzania were initially leaning towards socialism.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ibid., 308

¹⁰⁴ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 48

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

For Kenyatta, however, economic over political considerations were paramount. In this sense, the economic dependency on the East African market necessitated a cautious approach to Kenya's neighbours, even in the face of unfavourable events within them and unfavourable policies enacted by them against Kenya. For instance, When both Tanzania and Uganda became socialist in 1967 and 1969, respectively, and when Uganda expelled all Kenyan workers as a consequence, Kenyatta refrained from aggressive reactions.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, When Uganda and Tanzania introduced and utilised a provision of the Kampala agreement that allowed them to impose a wide range of import restrictions on goods coming from Kenya to attempt to redress the balance account deficits the countries had,¹⁰⁸ Kenyatta agreed even though this was harmful to Kenya's economy. The need for the East African market was too great for Kenya to engage in any policy that would cause a loss of access to the markets. Therefore any behaviour that put this regional collaboration at risk was untenable; it is within this context that the enactment for NRC of 'RSC' can be understood. The enactment of 'RSC' role here prescribed a policy of engaging in political initiatives to foster integration within the region while at the same time avoiding policies that threaten the relations. Thus, Kenyatta forwent projecting Kenya to the role of "Regional Leader" which would be perceived by its neighbours as attempts to crystalise Kenya's already dominant economic position.¹⁰⁹

This good neighbour policy and Kenyatta's role of 'RSC' and the broader foreign policy of quiet diplomacy was brought into question by several developments and events in the 1970s. As regards relations with Uganda, The rise to power of Idi Amin provoked tension with Kenyatta and deteriorated relations between the two countries. The quarrel between the two countries lay in the treatment of Kenyans in Uganda and Idi Amin's claim to over half the territory of Kenya in 1976.¹¹⁰ The latter of which almost resulted in war between the two countries.¹¹¹ In light of these tensions, Kenyatta could have chosen to economically cripple Uganda as the landlocked country's only access to the sea was through Kenya's port

¹⁰⁷ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 306

¹⁰⁸ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 277

¹⁰⁹ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 48

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 49

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

in Mombasa.¹¹² Kenyatta however, decided against this policy as he deemed Uganda and the East African Market as too economically vital for Kenya.¹¹³

Relations with Tanzania during the 1970s were similarly frayed as compared to the immediate years after independence. Isolated incidents such as the deportation of each other's citizens, disagreements about Tanzania's military presence in Uganda, and mounting disagreements over issues within the EAC led to the collapse of the EAC and the closing of the border between the two countries in 1977.¹¹⁴ For Kenya, this meant a loss of not only the East African markets that is so vitally needed to market its products but also access to markets through Tanzania's borders of other countries like Zambia and Malawi.¹¹⁵ It is within this context that Kenyatta began seeking good relations with other African countries and outside the continent. Kenya, therefore, attempted to foster good relationships with Burundi, Rwanda, and a host of Arab nations.¹¹⁶ By the time of Kenyatta's death, the policy of good neighbourliness had largely failed. Relations with Uganda and Tanzania had deteriorated to the point that Kenya almost engaged in war with the former and closed borders with the latter. The result being that Kenya was hit hardest where it hurt the most, and where Kenyatta most sought to avoid, its economic access to the markets within East Africa and its links to other countries. The role of 'RSC' was initially enacted towards the region in terms of a policy of good neighbourliness. When this foreign policy failed, the domain in which the role was enacted changed from East Africa to the rest of the continent, as Kenyatta sought markets throughout the continent to offset the losses from the collapsed EAC. This does not mean that the 'RSC' itself changed, but rather, the performance of the role changed.

5.2.3 Towards Africa: Neutrality

If the foreign policy conduct of Kenya under Kenyatta was marked by a cautious and prudent approach within the sub-region, then within the continent this unassertive policy was even more pronounced. At independence, Kenyatta was a highly respected leader

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 310

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

within the continent as one of the forefathers of the Pan-African movement that fed into the liberation discourse.¹¹⁷ When Kenya assumed independence, the Pan-African movement and interpretation thereof had led to a polarisation amongst the community of African states. Some countries such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah preferred a more integrated union of African states, while the other camp led by Nigeria's Abubaker Balewa was unwilling to give up the sovereignty they had just desperately fought for and favoured gradual integration fostered by political and economic regional cooperation.¹¹⁸ Unwilling to endear themselves to one side over another, Kenyatta maintained a neutralist stance.

This initial neutralist stance resulted in the allocation of mediator status to Kenya in African conflicts. It is within this context that the 'MI' role identified in the previous chapter, was performed by Kenyatta. In 1964 just a few months after Kenya's independence, Kenyatta was selected to be the chairman of the ad hoc OAU Congo Conciliation Commission tasked with the mediation of the conflict to avoid escalation.¹¹⁹ Although this commission ultimately failed, this early imposition of a neutralist stance defined Kenya's stance within the continent. It was for this reason; therefore, that Kenyatta was called upon again to fulfil his role of neutral in the mediation of the Angola conflict in 1975. As this conflict unravelled, Kenyatta's position as a neutral was put to the test as the three factions involved moved away from the peace talks and began fighting.¹²⁰ This conflict polarised the continent with countries backing different factions for diverse interests, and Kenyatta was faced with a choice of doing the same.¹²¹ Ultimately, he chose to maintain his position of neutrality and forewent backing any faction despite interests Kenya had in the conflict.¹²² Kenyatta's policy of neutrality in African affairs was maintained throughout his tenure.

5.2.4 Towards the World: "Non-Alignment"

An analysis of the formative years of Kenya's foreign policy under Kenyatta would be incomplete without acknowledgement of the determining factor of external finance. In the

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 304

¹¹⁸ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 274

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 309

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

face of an underdeveloped economy and potentially dissenting political factions,¹²³ Kenya needed to secure external investment aid in order to stimulate internal development. From the onset, this aid was always likely to come predominantly from the West, given Kenya's close ties to Britain as a former colony. This colonial heritage had manifested in Kenya's political and economic apparatus. As regards the former, at independence, Kenya's constitution and structure of government organisations reflected the Westminster form of government.¹²⁴ Moreover, Kenya's economic infrastructure was characterised by capitalism.¹²⁵ Consequently, the majority of the foreign aid that Kenya received in the immediate independent period was from Britain.¹²⁶

The connection between Britain and its former colony rendered Kenya to be firmly within the sphere of Western influence. However, Kenya's position as a vulnerable new state precluded Kenyatta from taking any outright sides in the ideological struggle of the Cold War. The need for foreign investment negated the possibility of excluding a possible source due to foreign policy actions. It is within this context that the NRC of 'ID' was enacted. 'ID' is ranked as one of the passive NRCs and does not connote any foreign policy actions or functions but rather a preoccupation with domestic development as opposed to involvement in international affairs.¹²⁷ Kenyatta's position was that Kenya could be economically aligned with the West but not ideologically aligned in order to allow Kenya to cultivate economic relations with other communist countries.¹²⁸ Kenya may have engaged in the majority of its trade with the West, but did not engage in military alliances or provide for the use of their military bases by foreign powers.¹²⁹ This then forms the foundation for Kenyatta's policy of "non-alignment". Thus, Kenyatta sought economic relations with communist nations, such as China and the Soviet Union, who have, amongst other provisions, provided cash grants, loans, and scholarships to Kenyan students.¹³⁰ By doing so, Kenyatta enacted the role of 'AI'.

¹²³ Ibid., 303

¹²⁴ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 145

¹²⁵ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 302

¹²⁶ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 287

¹²⁷ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions*, 269

¹²⁸ Okumu, *Some Thoughts*, 289

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 54

This policy of non-alignment remained intact throughout Kenyatta's tenure. Although economic relations with its Western partners Britain and the US grew stronger in the 70s as indicated by growing volumes of FDI and exports and imports,¹³¹ economic aid and diplomatic relations continued to be accepted and sought from Communist countries.¹³² More importantly, Kenyatta did not signify allegiance to any side by offering military bases or engaging in military alliances. Thus 'AI' as one of the dominant roles identified in the analysis of speeches, translated not only into foreign policy but was a central tenet of Kenyatta's foreign policy.

5.3 Conclusion

In synopsis, foreign policy practice under Jomo Kenyatta can be described as a policy of Quiet diplomacy. The determining factor behind this approach being the need to ensure access to foreign direct investment for internal development and ensuring security. This policy of quiet diplomacy manifested in Kenyatta's foreign policy towards East Africa, towards continental affairs, and towards the polarised world within the context of Cold War politics. The threat arising from the Somali question necessitated a counter-balancing factor in terms of the alliance with Ethiopia, which held despite the socialist change of the latter. The NRCs that defined the foreign policy behaviour and patterns of this period were 'RSC', 'MI', 'AI', and 'ID'. Therefore, the three dominant NRCs of 'AI', 'ID', and 'RSC' as determined in the previous chapter, represent key explanatory factors for foreign policy practice during this era.

Kenyatta enacted the role of 'RSC' through a cautious approach to Kenya's East African nations as a consequence of Kenya's dependency on their markets. The Initial amicable relations within the East African subregion during the 1960s turned sour as tensions arose within the triangle of states in the 1970s. The collapse of the EAC in 1977 signified the extent to which relations had deteriorated and the failure of Kenyatta's good neighbour policy. Within the continent, Kenyatta maintained a low profile preferring to remain neutral in the face of polarisation throughout his tenure. This position, as indicated by the 'MI' NRC identified by the content analysis of the speeches, translated into foreign

¹³¹ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 147

¹³² Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 55

Tony Oweke
S1677411

policy when Kenyatta was requested to mediate in the conflicts in the Congo and Angola. Towards the polarised Cold War politics, Kenya preferred to remain non-aligned. Within this stance, the roles of 'AI' and 'ID' were performed, as Kenyatta sought to cultivate as many relations with countries as possible while avoiding making stances on key global issues as a way to ensure the widest possible sources of external investment for internal development. Kenyatta believed this non-aligned stance allowed for economic alignment with the West while refraining from ideological commitment as evidenced by the refusal to engage in military alliances or provide military bases to Cold War powers. Kenyatta's tenure ended with his death in 1978, and Daniel Arap Moi ascended to the Presidency. The NRCs that Moi during his Presidency will be presented in the next chapter.

6. Role Theory Analysis of Moi's Administration 1978-1988 and 1990-2000

6.1 Introduction

This section seeks to outline the results of the content analysis of the speeches during the two decades of Moi's administration in order to juxtapose to the NRCs of the Kenyatta administration. To do so, The NRCs outlined in each period will be presented, followed by a comparison of the current decade to the previous decade(s), and finally, an analysis of the performance of the NRCs will be provided in order to understand the relationship between NRCs and translation into foreign policy practice. Finally, the results of the overarching analysis of the speeches across the three decades will be discussed in conclusion.

6.2 NRCs of Moi's Administration 1978-1988

The speeches analysed here came from a variety of sources: Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Kenya Delegations to the UN, Permanent Secretaries to the President, and the President himself amongst others. The defining characteristic of this period in Kenya's history was the degree to which policy was centralised. Moi, in contrast to Kenyatta, almost exclusively defined and executed foreign policy.¹³³ So while various ministers communicated the foreign policy in various dimensions, the actual policy was orchestrated by Moi. Of the 10 speeches analysed during this period, NRCs were found in 7. In total, there were 8 instances of an NRC of which 4 were from Holsti (1970) 's typology, as shown in figure 4. 'RSC' was the most frequently mentioned role, as demonstrated by figure 5, and also translated into distinguishable foreign policy behaviour of Moi, as in the previous period of Kenyatta.

¹³³ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 76

Moi Administration	Number of NRCs	Bastion of Revolution-Liberator	Regional leader	Regional Protector	Active Independent	Liberation Supporter	Anti-Imperialist Agent	Defender of the Faith	Mediator-Integrator	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Developer	Bridge	Faithful Ally	Independent	Example	Internal Development	Isolate	Protectee
1978 - 1988	8					1				4					1	2		

Figure 4: NRCs Found During Moi's Administration 1978-1988

Source: Table produced by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study
Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

Hierarchy of NRCs	NRC	Times Mentioned	Foreign Policy Behavior (Role Performance)
1	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	4	Yes
2	Internal Development	2	Yes
3	Liberation Supporter	1	Yes
4	Example	1	No

Figure 5: Hierarchy of NRCs During Moi's Administration 1978-1988

Source: Typology of NRCs provided by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study
Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

6.2.1 Comparison Between Moi (1978-1988) and Kenyatta (1965-1975)

A comparison between the sets of NRCs attributed to the Kenyatta administration and the first decade of the Moi administration indicates aspects of continuity and aspects of change in terms of content and quantity of NRCs found. For one, the NRCs held by Moi during this period are all found in the content analysis of speeches during the Kenyatta administration, except for 'LS'. Moreover, the dominant NRCs held by the Moi administration replicate that of Kenyatta in terms of containing 'RSC' and 'ID'. This indicates some level of congruency in terms of the roles that the different administrations envisioned for Kenya and consequently, foreign policy. Bearing in mind that NRCs connote the policymakers definition of behaviour and functions appropriate to their state's position within international or regional affairs.¹³⁴ Thus if two administrations hold the 'NRC' of RSC with one succeeding the other, it is plausible that the foreign policy behaviour associated with the execution of that role would be similar or at the very least foreign policy outlook. This, however, will be verified through a descriptive analysis of Moi's foreign policy to be presented in the following chapter.

However, the NRCs found in the analysis of speeches during the first decade of Moi's administration were significantly less than Kenyatta's. 4 different NRCs were found in the former in contrast to 9 of the latter. 'AI', 'AIA', Independent, 'MI', 'BRL', and 'FA' were found in Kenyatta's decade but not the first decade of Moi's tenure. The reason why the first three do not feature in the NRCs during this period will also be made explicitly clear in the subsequent chapter.

6.2.1 Enactment of NRCs: Translation into Foreign Policy

When Moi came to office in 1978, he inherited the same issues that Kenyatta faced throughout his tenure. The underlying factor that determined his foreign policy during this period was economic considerations, much like his predecessor. At the time of his ascendancy to Presidency, Kenya was going through a severe economic decline and levels of

¹³⁴ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions*, 246

food shortages that were quickly approaching that of famine.¹³⁵ Moi needed to secure finances to cultivate internal economic development and to prevent the famine. Concomitantly, the fall of the East African markets and the seizure of access to other markets through the borders of the other East African countries was further damaging Kenya's economy.¹³⁶ Therefore, Moi signed an agreement with the United States to provide military bases in return for aid.¹³⁷ This aid was utilised to stimulate internal development and address the severe food shortages.

In response to the inherited frayed relations within East Africa, Moi cultivated relations with Tanzania and Uganda in the early 1980s. The impact of which was the reopening of the border between Kenya and her neighbours, which facilitated access to markets in East Africa and abroad in 1983.¹³⁸ Moi also sought to play a more active role for Kenya in foreign affairs. It is within this spirit that Kenya contributed political, logistical, and material support to the Commonwealth initiative to safeguard Zimbabwe's movement into independence in 1979-1980.¹³⁹ Therefore, the NRCs of 'ID', 'RSC', and 'LS' were reflected in the foreign policy practice of Moi from 1978 to 1988. The NRC of 'Example' was not reflected in the foreign policy practice of Moi during this period.

6.3 NRCs of Moi's Administration 1990-2000

The speeches analysed during this period were predominantly from the President himself. Moi produced 9 out of the 10 speeches aimed at a wide variety of contexts such as towards regional cooperation and the mediation of conflicts. Through an analysis of these speeches, NRCs were found 8 times representing 3 of Holsti (1970)'s typology as evident by figure 6. Figure 7 further displays the hierarchy of these three NRCs found.

¹³⁵ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 315

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 310

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 312

¹³⁸ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 49

¹³⁹ Adar, *The Internal and External Contexts*, 86

Moi Administration	Number of NRCs	Bastion of Revolution-Liberator	Regional leader	Regional Protector	Active Independent	Liberation Supporter	Anti-Imperialist Agent	Defender of the Faith	Mediator-Integrator	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Developer	Bridge	Faithful Ally	Independent	Example	Internal Development	Isolate	Protectee
1990 - 2000	8								3	4			1					

Figure 6: NRCs Found During Moi's Administration 1990-2000

Source: Table produced by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

Hierarchy of NRCs	NRC	Times Mentioned	Foreign Policy Behavior (Role Performance)
1	Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	4	Yes
2	Mediator	3	Yes
3	Faithfull Ally	1	no

Figure 7: Hierarchy of NRCs During Moi's Administration 1990-2000

Source: Typology of NRCs provided by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

6.3.1 Comparison of NRCs Between Kenyatta (1965-1975), Moi (1978-1988, and Moi(1990-2000)

As aforementioned, there were 9 NRCs attributed to the speeches analysed during the decade of Kenyatta's administration. 4 were attributed to the first decade of the Moi administration, and 3 for the second decade. The NRCs of the two periods of Moi reflected the NRCs found in Kenyatta's except for 'LS.' The NRC of 'RSC' was dominant across each period, indicating the importance of the East African Region to Kenya's foreign policy.

As compared to Kenyatta, the NRCs found in Moi's second decade did not include 'AI', 'AIA', 'I', or 'BRL'. While The NRCs found in both decades of Moi's administration diverged, those found in 1990-2000 radically departed from those of 1978-1988. The only similarity between the two was the dominance of 'RSC'. 'ID', 'Example', and 'LS' were not evident in the analysis of the speeches in 1990-2000 as they were in 1978-1988. Figure 8 displays the similarities and differences between the three decades in terms of NRCs.




Figure 8: Venn Diagram of the NRCs held by Kenyatta and Moi in the three periods

Source: Typology of NRCs provided by Holsti (1970) adjusted to Kenya as a single case study

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 275

6.3.2 Enactment of NRCs: Translation into Foreign Policy

'RSC' was again the most frequently mentioned NRC in the analysis of this period and likewise translated into foreign policy. Financial constraints as a consequence of the external financial pressure to reform by the United States, incentivised Moi to turn to the East African region. Economic cooperation with countries within the region was regarded as vital by Moi to offset the decreased financial aid from abroad.¹⁴⁰ It is within this context that Moi engaged in talks to re-establish the collapsed EAC, which came to fruition in 1999.¹⁴¹ Thus the role of 'RSC' was reflected by the foreign policy practice of Moi in the 1990s.

During this period, Moi's foreign policy was decidedly more active than the previous two decades covered above. Moi involved Kenya in almost 20 UN-mandated missions in the continent and other regions world, an unprecedented level of engagement in Kenya's foreign policy.¹⁴² Within some of these missions, Moi played a mediatory role to assist parties in finding peaceful solutions, such as the conflict in Sudan in 1995.¹⁴³ Thus the 'MI' NRC did translate into foreign policy practice during this period. The role of 'FA' did not, however, translate into foreign policy during this period.

¹⁴⁰ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 151

¹⁴¹ Wanyama, *Selected Cases*, 24

¹⁴² Adar, *The Internal and External Contexts*, 86

¹⁴³ Deng, Francis M. "Africa Notes: Mediating the Sudanese Conflict: A Challenge for the IGADD - February 1995." Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 1, 1995. Accessed June 25, 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-notes-mediating-sudanese-conflict-challenge-igadd-february-1995>.

7. Foreign Policy During the Moi Administration 1978-2000

7.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to outline the foreign policy practice of Moi from his ascendancy to the Presidency up until 2000. The aim here is to provide an overview of alterations and permanency in foreign policy practice from Kenyatta's to Moi's administrations. The proceeding sections will outline the latter's foreign policy as regards to the Somali question, Towards East Africa, Towards Africa, and on a global scale.

7.2 Foreign Policy Under Moi 1978-2000

Daniel Arap Moi became Kenyatta's Vice President after the resignation of Oginga Odinga due to communist leanings and other disagreements with Kenyatta.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, when Kenyatta died in 1978, Moi assumed the reins of the Presidency and did not leave the office until 2002. The early years of Moi's Presidency were marked by continuity in numerous foreign policy areas. However, Moi had a different foreign policy outlook for Kenya and a distinct style of leadership from Kenyatta. Whereas Kenyatta was happy to engage in a policy of Quiet diplomacy, Moi was eager to play a more active role in international affairs and thus have Kenya's "voice heard in the world."¹⁴⁵ Moreover, whereas during Kenyatta's administration foreign policy practice was primarily coordinated by the President with cooperation in coordination and execution by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,¹⁴⁶ Moi almost exclusively defined and executed policy. Moi centralised power around the Presidency at the expense of other organs of government, consequently foreign policy design and execution was mainly at his discretion.¹⁴⁷ Therefore his administration's foreign policy had a significantly personalised touch to it.

¹⁴⁴ Howell, *An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy*, 32

¹⁴⁵ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 314

¹⁴⁶ Mwangi, *Continuity and Change*, 251

¹⁴⁷ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 76

Moi inherited some of the same pressures and issues that fermented Kenyatta's foreign policy and consequently Moi maintained some tenets of Kenyatta's foreign policy initially. For instance, the Somali question was the main security issue that threatened Kenya during Kenyatta's administration and incentivised him to seek a counter-balancing force in the form of an alliance with Ethiopia. The saliency of the issue remained during the initial years of Moi's administration, and consequently, his policy towards the Somali question was unchanged. In addition, Moi inherited strained relations within the East African neighbourhood and the dependency on economic aid. As regards the latter, Moi had to ensure foreign investors that his policies would not change.¹⁴⁸ For these reasons, Moi's foreign policy in the initial years as compared to Kenyatta's was marked by more permanence than modification.

However, Moi also faced pressures and events emanating from changes within the International system that Kenyatta was not exposed to. The end of the Cold War and globalisation processes in the 1990's played a distinct role in the conduct of foreign policy. These changes manifested in Moi's foreign policy towards the Somali question, the sub-region of East Africa, within African affairs, and within affairs on a global scale. These new pressures, in combination with Moi's different leadership style, led to a differing foreign policy outlook through NRCs and in turn a differing practice to the Kenyatta administration.

7.2.1 Towards the Somali Question: Continuation of Counter-Balancing

As aforementioned, Moi's tenure inherited the Somali question in terms of the threat of irredentism from the largely-inhabited North Eastern Province in the initial years. This factored in Moi's mind, and he was unwilling to entertain any claims of Somalia to the North Eastern Province. Consequently, he renewed the defensive alliance with Ethiopia in 1980 to counter against any possible threat, a continuation of Kenyatta's foreign policy.¹⁴⁹

At the beginning of the '80s however, the picture began to change. Kenya had recently provided military bases for the United States who was searching for allies within the region to counter Soviet expansion, thus leading to a military alliance.¹⁵⁰ This new

¹⁴⁸ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 308

¹⁴⁹ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 76

¹⁵⁰ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 312

relationship was significant with regards to the Somali question, as Somalia was a friend of the United States.¹⁵¹ The United States could not have two friends fighting with each other amid the Cold War as this would have undermined their own goals of fighting Soviet reach.¹⁵² Subsequently, Moi and President Barre of Somalia were encouraged by the US to, at the very least quell the tension between them.¹⁵³ It is within this context that Somalia renounced its claims to the North Eastern Province, but continued in its claim of the Ogaden territory in Ethiopia.¹⁵⁴ Despite this détente in the Somali question, Moi took steps to ensure that the military alliance between Kenya and Ethiopia as a counter-balancing force remained healthy. In both 1980 and 1987, Moi sought to renew the defensive alliance with Ethiopia, although Ethiopia maintained strong links with the Soviet Union and was inherently socialist.¹⁵⁵

In the 1990's the threat emanating from the Somali question reared to the top of Moi's foreign policy agenda once again. This manifestation, however, was from a different perspective. Globalisation processes emanating from growing interdependency characteristic of the 1990s introduced new security threats for Moi's foreign policy.¹⁵⁶ The fractured state of Somalia became a haven for terrorist organisations and terrorist activities.¹⁵⁷ The porous border between Kenya and Somalia, provided an accessible mode of transport for terrorist aiming to engage in terrorist acts in Kenya. In short, this was a matter of territorial integrity, but instead of Somalia irredentism, terrorism became a security threat to Kenya. This threat was brought to bear by the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, wherein the terrorist group that perpetrated the attacks, AL Qaeda, utilised the Somali-Kenya border for transportation.¹⁵⁸ Moi initially responded by closing the border; however, it became clear that this was not a viable solution.¹⁵⁹ Consequently, Moi turned to the United States as a way to countervail this threat. The relationship between Kenya and the US was cultivated around the need to counter terrorism in the region, with

¹⁵¹ Ibid.,316

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.,317

¹⁵⁵ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 75

¹⁵⁶ Mwangi, *Continuity and Change*, 251

¹⁵⁷ Wanyama, *Selected Cases*, 58

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.,

Kenya recognising the need for aid towards this goal and the US recognising the strategic value of Kenya as a stable country within the tumultuous region.

Thus concerning the Somali question, Moi's policy displayed congruence with Kenyatta's in the initial years but diverged as a consequence of new security challenges, continued. Initially, Moi sought to renew alliances with Ethiopia in light of the traditional security threat of Somali irredentism. However, as new security challenges posed by terrorism, Moi sought assistance from the United States within a new nexus to counter the threat from the Somali question.

7.2.2 Towards East Africa: Reinvigoration of Good Neighbor Policy

By the time Moi became President in 1978, relations between Kenya and the countries in East Africa were at their lowest point since independence. Tension with Uganda just two years previously had deteriorated to the extent that the two countries almost to war.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, conflict with Tanzania over the perception of Kenya as a sub-imperialist benefactor of the EAC ultimately led to the closure of the border between the two and the collapse of the EAC. This was an economic blow to Kenya, who not only lost access to the East African markets but also the Zambian and Malawian markets they had access to through the Tanzanian border.¹⁶¹ As a consequence, by the end of Kenyatta tenure, He began searching for new trade partners within the Arab nations and other African countries like Burundi and Rwanda.¹⁶²

Moi reinvigorated Kenyatta's policy of good neighbourliness that had ultimately failed to keep relations within the region amicable. It is within this context that Moi engaged in various initiatives with Uganda and Tanzania to restore previously frayed relations. As regards the latter, Moi engaged in discussions to resolve disputes that had led to the Collapse of the EAC. In 1983, a solution was agreed upon by Kenya and Tanzania that resulted in the opening of the border between them and a reinstatement of diplomatic operations.¹⁶³ Thus, the NRC of 'RSC' that translated into foreign policy practice during Kenyatta's administration similarly held and performed by Moi.

¹⁶⁰ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 49

¹⁶¹ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 310

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 49

Kenya's relations with turbulent Uganda was less resolute in the initial years of Moi's Presidency. The relationship was varied, partly as a consequence of the high turnover of leaders and regimes from the 70s to the mid-80s.¹⁶⁴ Uganda represented a key partner for Kenya's economy as Kenyan goods readily found a market in Uganda and enjoyed a favourable balance of trade.¹⁶⁵ It was imperative, therefore, for Moi to maintain positive relations with Uganda for economic considerations and to take measures to ensure stability within Uganda. During Milton Obote's second Presidency of Uganda from 1980 to 1985, the relations improved. This was a factor of Uganda's movement away from Socialism and agreements over previous disputes regarding the EAC.¹⁶⁶ Within the context of needed to ensure stability to ensure uninterrupted economic benefit from the Kenya-Uganda trade,¹⁶⁷ Moi helped to broker a ceasefire of the conflict of succession between General Tito Okello and Yoweri Museveni.¹⁶⁸ This agreement ultimately failed, and Museveni overthrew the government and gained power in 1986.¹⁶⁹ Succeeding Museveni's rise to power, Kenya and Uganda's relations improved to the extent that Uganda was regarded as Kenya's "most strategic partner."¹⁷⁰ Relations within East Africa during the 80's improved to the extent that there were talks of a revival for the EAC.¹⁷¹

Indeed, these warm relations would prove pivotal to Moi in the 1990s in the face of new pressures. The end of the Cold War and the installation of the US as a dominant power which subsequently created the impetus for states that had previously engaged in authoritarian practices to undergo democratic changes. Foreign aid and the reduction thereof was instrumentalised as a method to coerce dependent states like Kenya into democratic reforms. For Moi, this leads to a decrease in foreign aid coinciding with an unsustainable increase in the budget deficit of government expenditure.¹⁷² Consequently, Moi depended on the countries within the East African neighbourhood for economic cooperation. This had the impact of shifting the focus of Moi's foreign policy towards

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Oketch, *Decision Making Models*, 82

¹⁶⁶ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 50

¹⁶⁷ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 310

¹⁶⁸ Ododa, *Continuity and Change*, 49

¹⁶⁹ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 150

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., 151

economic diplomacy and promoting trade within the region.¹⁷³ Consequently, Moi cooperation with the other East African countries facing similar pressures engaged in renewed efforts towards the revival of the EAC as early as 1991.¹⁷⁴

Moi continued Kenyatta's policy of good neighbourliness within the East African region. Similarly to Kenyatta, the policy of good neighbourliness was a consequence of economic considerations. Moi however, succeeded in cultivating amicable relations for Kenya within the sub-region to the extent that negotiations concerning the revival of the EAC took place in the 1990s. The treaty establishing the EAC was signed on November 30, 1999, and officially came to force on July 7, 2000.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, during the periods of 1978-1988 and 1990-2000, the NRC of 'RSC' played a pivotal role in the foreign policy of Moi.

7.2.3 Towards Africa: Assertiveness

As aforementioned, Moi represented a change in ideals in terms of the role he envisioned for Kenya within continental and global affairs. Moi was determined to have Kenya's voice be heard within the region and beyond, a considerable turn from Kenyatta's foreign policy of Quiet diplomacy.¹⁷⁶

Thus Moi initiated this assertive turn by involving Kenya in the Common Wealth Monitoring Force Zimbabwe (CMFZ) in 1979-80.¹⁷⁷ The mandate of the CMFZ was to facilitate a smooth transition for Zimbabwe into independence as well as to oversee the safety of processes related to, including elections.¹⁷⁸ This initiative was the first of many contributions to peacekeeping and conflicts within the auspices of the OAU and the UN. Within the 1980's Kenya contributed to missions in Chad, and Namibia in addition to Zimbabwe as mentioned above.¹⁷⁹ The support to the conflicts in Namibia and Zimbabwe were aimed at aiding transitions to independence. It is within this context that the NRC of 'LS' was performed from 1978 to 1988. In addition to conflicts within the continent, Kenya was contributed to almost 20 UN missions all over the globe between 1988 and 1998, an

¹⁷³ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 371

¹⁷⁴ Wanyama, *Selected Cases*, 24

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 314

¹⁷⁷ Adar, Korwa G. "The Internal and External Contexts of Human Rights Practice in Kenya: Daniel Arap Moi's Operational Code." *African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine De Sociologie* 4, no. 1 (2000): 75

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.,86

¹⁷⁹ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 152

unprecedented amount in Kenya's history.¹⁸⁰ In a number of these conflicts including Burundi and Sudan, Moi played the role of mediator, attempting to broker peace. It is within this context that the NRC of 'MI' was performed from 1990 to 2000.

In short, Moi was no longer content with maintaining Kenyatta's policy of "neutrality" and enacting a policy of Quiet diplomacy. He envisioned Kenya as an actor that can play a key role in the continent as and her engaged in numerous peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions to that effect. This active turn is envisioned by the NRC of 'LS' found once, and 'MI' found 4 times during the decade of 1990-2000.

7.2.4 Towards the World: Strategic Alignment

At the time of Moi's ascendancy to Presidency, Kenya's relations with the West were at their best point since independence.¹⁸¹ Kenya had traditionally maintained strong links with Britain as a natural consequence of being a former colony; however, during the 1970s, Kenya increasingly moved further away from Britain and closer towards the United States. This was evident in the fact that the United States supplied the most economic aid and military equipment to Kenya in the 70s.¹⁸² However, up until Kenyatta's death, Kenya maintained its position of non-aligned in terms of being economically aligned but not ideologically aligned as evidenced by military alliances and providing military bases to Cold War powers.

When Moi gained power, this policy quickly changed. Kenya effectively entered into the ideological struggle of the Cold War only two years after Moi's ascendancy to the Presidency. Moi offered the United States military and naval bases in exchange for vitally needed economic aid.¹⁸³ At the time Kenya's economy was tilting towards collapse, and the country was severely lacking food.¹⁸⁴ The aid was desperately needed to stimulate the economy and provide for famine relief.¹⁸⁵ By agreeing to facilitate military bases for the U.S. Moi departed with Kenyatta's foreign policy of non-alignment. Through this agreement, Kenya became one of the sites in the region used to fight against Soviet expansionist

¹⁸⁰ Adar, *The Internal and External Contexts*, 86

¹⁸¹ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 371

¹⁸² Makinda, *From Quiet Diplomacy*, 314

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 312

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 315

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

initiatives. Consequently, the NRCs that connote non-alignment of 'I' and 'AI' that translated into foreign policy during Kenyatta's administration were absent within the speeches analysed of Moi's administration. As Kenya could no longer be defined as non-aligned as a consequence of the alliance. A byproduct of this alliance with the US was a détente in relations with Somalia at the encouragement of the former. The extent to which relations were positive between Kenya and the West is evident in the unprecedented number of state visits to and from Kenya during the 1980s. In 1985, for instance, Kenya played host to Queen Elizabeth II and Pope John Paul II.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, in 1987 and 1988 respectively, Moi visited US president Ronald Reagan and hosted Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain.¹⁸⁷

The end of the Cold War strained relations between Kenya and the West. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US as the sole superpower was able to initiate its push for democratisation in domestic politics within countries. The US imposed restraints on the foreign aid available to Kenya unless it underwent democratic reforms to reinstate multiparty elections, fight against corruption, and to liberalise the economy.¹⁸⁸ Although Moi eventually conceded to reform, he was left bitter by the actions of the US and the UK whom he regarded as interfering in Kenya's domestic affairs.¹⁸⁹

Relations between Kenya and the West soured as a result but were not severed. Strategic cooperation resulting from globalisation processes somewhat restored Kenya-US relations.¹⁹⁰ The rise in interstate security threats, namely terrorist organisations and the proliferation of arms within the Horn of Africa and East Africa necessitated cooperation between the US and Kenya.¹⁹¹ Kenya, as a relatively stable country in the region, was regarded as a strategic partner in peace and security.¹⁹² Moi regarded the US as a key ally in the fight against terrorist organisations that had already infiltrated neighbouring Somalia.¹⁹³ The utility of this strategic relationship was further evidenced by the 1998 bombings of the

¹⁸⁶ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 372

¹⁸⁷ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 152

¹⁸⁸ Maberu, *Kenya's Foreign Policy*, 371

¹⁸⁹ Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 147

¹⁹⁰ Mwangi, *Continuity and Change*, 259

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 251

¹⁹² Nzau, *The Strategic Art of Appeasing*, 148

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

US Embassy in Nairobi. Consequently, Kenya became one of the highest receivers of US counter terrorism-oriented aid.¹⁹⁴

7.3 Conclusion

In synopsis, Moi's foreign policy marked a shift in Kenya's foreign policy as regards to the Somali question, towards East Africa, towards Africa, and towards the world. Similarly, to Kenyatta, the underlying factor behind the foreign policy of Moi's was economic considerations and particularly the dependence on economic aid. In contrast, Moi had a distinctly different leadership style and a different foreign policy outlook for Kenya than Kenyatta. Under Moi's administration, power was centralised, and he maintained control over the articulation and execution of foreign policy, a distinct personalised style. Concomitantly, Moi was determined to carve out a place for Kenya within international affairs through an active and assertive foreign policy practice as compared to the quiet diplomacy favoured by Kenyatta.

Economic considerations played into Moi's choice to align with the US within the context of the Cold War as well as to engage in a policy of good neighbourliness within the East African region. The choice to align with the US was a shift from Kenyatta's policy of non-alignment. Consequently, Kenyatta's NRCs of 'AI' and 'I' which were reflected in his policy practice, were absent in Moi's. As regards the latter, the relationship between Kenya and the US -(and the West) was put to the test in the 90s but stayed active in the face of strategic considerations. This alliance in turn initially reduced the saliency of the Somali question, as a détente occurred in the relations between Somalia and Kenya. However, the Somali question manifested again in the '90s in the form of terrorist organisations utilising the border between Somali and Kenya to engage in terrorism. This threat was brought to bear by the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Nairobi which was in part facilitated by the porous border.¹⁹⁵

In contrast, Moi's leadership style and foreign policy outlook for Kenya conditioned an assertive foreign policy within Africa. From 1978 to 1988, this manifested in support of

¹⁹⁴ Mwangi, *Continuity and Change*, 260

¹⁹⁵ Wanyama, *Selected Cases*, 58

Tony Oweke
S1677411

liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia, an enactment of the 'LS' role found in the content analysis of the speeches of the same period. Moi's involvement of Kenya in peacekeeping initiatives that began in the 80s, augmented from 1990 to 2000. Wherein Kenya contributed to an unprecedented number of missions within the continent and abroad. Several of which saw Moi playing the role of mediator, a foreign policy performance of the 'MI' role.

8. Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from the process analysis of the three decades above. First and foremost, a link can be established between the NRCs held by the different administrations across the decades and foreign policy performance. During Kenyatta's administration, 6 out of the total 8 NRCs were reflected in foreign policy performance. For the first decade of Moi's administration, 3 out of 4 NRCs were reflected by foreign policy performance. Lastly, the last decade of 1990-2000 demonstrated the performance of 2 out of 3 total NRCs. Overall, 72% of the NRCs translated into foreign policy behaviour across all three decades, as illustrated by figure 9. When looking at the performance of only the dominant NRCs, this figure improves to 8 out of 9 or 88%. The dominant NRCs were determined primarily by the number of times mentioned and by whether it translated into foreign policy in the event of a deadlock between two NRCs.

In addition to the link with foreign policy behaviour, the shifts and changes in the sets of dominant NRCs per decade could also be attributed to a shift in foreign policy. For instance, the roles of 'I' and 'AI' were found a total of three times during the decade of Kenyatta but was absent in the subsequent decades of Moi. This is due to the fact that Kenyatta maintained a foreign policy of non-alignment, Moi in contrast entered into a military alliance with the United States eliminating the possibility of a NRC of 'I' or 'AI'. Similarly, the first decade under Moi saw the NRC of 'LS' and reflection into foreign policy performance in terms of support to liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia but was absent in the second decade of Moi which featured the role of 'MI'. Whereas in the 1980s there were still countries on the continent under colonial domination (Zimbabwe, Namibia), there were none in the 1990s. Therefore the role of 'LS' could not plausibly be performed; this can explain as to why the role was not found through the content analysis of the decade.

Juxtaposed to the themes of foreign policy during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations as established by the literature, the NRCs provided explanatory factors for each theme of each administration except for the Somali question. An NRC as specified by Holsti (1970)'s typology could not be found in regards to this theme of foreign policy. As regards to the other foreign policy themes of East Africa, Africa, and to the wider

International system, the NRCs of 'RSC', 'AI', 'ID', and 'MI' were crucial explanatory factors for foreign policy during Kenyatta's administration. Similarly, 'RSC', 'ID', and 'LS' reflected the tenets of Moi's foreign policy from 1978 to 1988. However, only 'RSC' and 'MI' reflected the foreign policy practice during the period of 1990-2000 under Moi's administration. The dominance of 'RSC', the dominant NRC across all three decades, reflects the importance of the East African region to Kenyatta and Moi's since independence, as evident in the foreign policy literature.

In sum, the above thesis has argued that role theory can provide an explanatory tool for foreign policy during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. A strong relation between NRCs held and foreign policy behaviour of 72% was found across the three decades under scope. The dominant NRCs displayed an even higher percentage of enactment in foreign policy of 88%. Consequently, indicates a strong relationship between NRCs held and subsequent foreign policy behaviour, giving credence to the proposition that role theory can be used to explain the foreign policy of Kenya during the decades in question. However, there were several limitations to this study that reduced the quality of results. Such as the low number of 10 speeches, thereby reducing representativity, the lack of hands-on research, and the use of Holsti(1970)'s Cold War era typology to name a few. However, considering the numerous constraints, the lack of role theory research on African countries, the lack of analytical foreign policy analysis on Kenya, and the general lack of foreign policy analysis of African states, this thesis has attempted to tread along the path less trodden.

Years	Performed/ Overall NRC's	Overall %	Performed/Dominant NRC's	Dominant %
1965-1975	6/8	75%	3/3	100%
1978-1988	3/4	75%	3/3	100%
1990-2000	2/3	66%	2/3	66%
Total	11/15	72%	8/9	88%

Figure 8: Percentage of Performed of the Overall NRCs and the Dominant NRCs in the three periods

Bibliography

Howell, John. "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1968): 29-48.

Oketch, Linda Gwada. *Decision Making Models and Kenya's Foreign Policy: 1964-2002: An Empirical Assessment of the Kenyatta and MOI Administrations*. Nairobi, Kenya: United States International University, 2013.

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309.

Ododa, Harry. "Continuity and change in Kenya's foreign policy from the Kenyatta to the Moi government". *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1986): 47-57

Mabera, Faith. "Kenya's Foreign Policy in Context (1963–2015)." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2016): 365-84.

Makinda, Samuel M. "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy." *Third World Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (1983): 300-19.

Wanyama, Leonard. "Selected Cases In the Conduct Of Kenyan Foreign Policy Since 1992". Masters Diss., University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2011.
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39669766.pdf>

Muhumed Abdi, Ahmed. "Determinants Of Foreign Policy Formulation in Developing Countries/ A Case of Kenya". Masters Diss. University of Nairobi, Kenya. 2016.
http://www.iajournals.org/articles/iajah_v1_i1_1_53.pdf

Okumu, John J. "Some thoughts on Kenya's foreign policy". *The African Review: a Journal of African Politics Development and International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1973): P. 263-290.

Harnisch, Sebastian. "Role theory Operationalization of Key Concepts". In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* by Harnisch, Sebastian., Cornelia. Frank, and Hanns Maull. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics; 90. London; New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 7-15

Breuning, Marijke. "Role theory research in international relations State of the art and blind spots". In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* by Harnisch, Sebastian., Cornelia. Frank, and Hanns Maull. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics; 90. London; New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 16-35

Nzau, Mumo. "The Strategic Art of Appeasing Old Lovers while Courting New Friends: Kenya's Foreign Relations in Retrospect". In *Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical,*

Tony Oweke
S1677411

Political, and Policy Milestones by Kithinji, Michael Mwenda, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich. African Histories and Modernities. 2016. Pages 137-164

Mwangi Gakuo, Oscar. "Continuity and Change in Kenya's Defense and Foreign Policies: The Impact of the New Security Dilemma". In *Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones* by Kithinji, Michael Mwenda, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P. Rotich. African Histories and Modernities. 2016. Pages 245-266

Deng, Francis M. "Africa Notes: Mediating the Sudanese Conflict: A Challenge for the IGADD - February 1995." Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 1, 1995. Accessed June 25, 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-notes-mediating-sudanese-conflict-challenge-igadd-february-1995>.

Adigbuo, Richard. "Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions." *Politikon* 34, no. 1 (2007): 83-97.

Brummer, Klaus, and Cameron G. Thies. "The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, no. 3 (2015): 273-93.

Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (2012): 5-24.

Thies, Cameron G. "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America 1." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13, no. 3 (2017): 662-81.

Walker, Stephen G. "The Correspondence between Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Behavior: Insights from Role Theory and Exchange Theory." *Behavioral Science* 26, no. 3 (1981): 272-80.

Wish, Naomi. "Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (1980): 532-54.

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, "Kenya In a Troubled World"(speech, at The Patel Club, Nairobi, Kenya, May 15, 1965)

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, "Address To the Press Club"(speech, The Press Club, Nairobi, Kenya, October 4, 1965)

Tom Mboya, "Statement At the Opening of the Industrial Symposium"(speech, Cairo, Egypt, January 27, 1966)

Tom Mboya, "Minister at the Lions International Convention"(speech, Nairobi, Kenya, April 26, 1966)

Tom Mboya, "The Future of Africa- A Challenge to African Youth" (speech, World Youth Training Course, Kikuyo College of Social Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, December 28, 1966)

Tony Oweke
S1677411

Tom Mboya, "Minister at the Kenya National Farmers Union"(speech, National Farmers Union Annual Conference, Kenya,1966)

Njoroge Magana Mungai, "Dr.Mungai Speaks to Foreign Correspondents"(speech, Location Unknown, April 7,1971)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Kenya Government Statement Issued by His Excellency the Vice President Hon. Daniel Arap Moi, EGH., EBS, M.P"(speech, Kenya, September 22, 1972)

Jomo Kenyatta, "Speech by His Excellency the President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta at the Official Opening of the Nairobi Industrial Estates"(speech, Nairobi, Kenya, November 12, 1969)

Tom Mboya, "Statement to the Interplan Conference"(speech, Interplan conference, Caracas, Venezuela, 1966)

Geoffrey Kariithi, "Statement to the Occasion of the Members Luncheon of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers"(speech, Kenya, July 1,1977)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Speech by His Excellency Hon. Daniel Arap Moi, EGH.,EBS, M.P On the Occasion of His Installation as President of the Republic of Kenya" (Speech, Nairobi, Kenya, October, 14, 1978)

Jeremiah Kiereini, "Opening of the ACP Convention on Trade Promotion and Development" (speech, ACP Convention, Nairobi, Kenya, November 7, 1979)

Robert Ouko, "Address by the Minister for Economic Planning and Community Affairs to the ACP-EEC Negotiations"(speech, Location Unknown, May 1979)

Echakar Achiya, "Statement on Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interests Which Are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and In All Other Territories Under Colonial Domination and Efforts to Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid, Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa"(speech, 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, USA, November 11,1980)

Jeremiah Kiereini, "Remarks to the Cabinet On the Occasion of the Visit by the National Council for Science and Technology to State House"(speech, State House, Nairobi, Kenya, September 11,1980)

Godfrey Kariuki, "Regional Centre for Services in Surveying and Mapping"(speech, Governing Council, Nairobi, Kenya, April 13,1981)

Waruru Kanja, "Address by the Hon. Warura Kanja, Minister of Information and Broadcasting at the Opening Ceremony of the University of Nairobi Certificate Course On Communication Policy and Planning For Development" (speech, University Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, July 4, 1988)

Tony Oweke
S1677411

Warura Kanja, "Speech For the Official Launching of Mwangaza Rural Newspaper At Kabernet, By the Minister Of Information and Broadcasting, Hon. Warura Kanja, M.P." (speech, Kabernet, Kenya, May 28, 1988)

J.L. Lijoodi, "Speech by Hon. Assistant Minister For Information and Broadcasting Mr.J.L.Lijoodi at the Official Closing of ITU/FES Training Workshop"(speech, Milimani Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, April 11-22, 1988)

S.N. Arasa, "Opening Speech of the PTA Meeting of Directors of Agricultural, Livestock, and Fisheries Research" (speech, Nairobi, Kenya, September 3, 1990)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth's Birthday" (speech, Nairobi, Kenya, June 17,1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit-Djibouti" (speech, Djibouti, Djibouti, March 14, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Luncheon Hosted by the Uganda Manufacturers Association" (speech, Kampala,Uganda, May 29, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Madaraka Day" (speech, Nairobi, Kenya, May 29, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "The National Day of France" (speech, Location Unknown, July 14, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Official Opening of the East African Roads Network Donor's Conference AICC, Arusha" (speech, Arusha , Tanzania, May 24,1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "The Heads of State Summit of the Regional Sanctions on Burundi" (speech, Kampala, Uganda, January 22, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Regional Leaders Forum of Heads of State and Government and the World Bank President" (speech, Kampala, Uganda, January 22, 1998)

Daniel Arap Moi, "Presentation of the Queen's Baton for the 16th Commonwealth Games" (speech, Nairobi, Kenya, March 17,1998)

Appendix 1: Holsti(1970)'s Typology of NRCs

1. "Bastion of revolution-liberator. Some governments hold that they have a duty to organise or lead various types of revolutionary movements abroad. One task of their state, as they see it, is to liberate others or to act as the "bastion" or revolutionary movements, that is, to provide an area which foreign revolutionary leaders can regard as a source of physical and moral support, as well as an ideological inspirer."¹⁹⁶
2. "Regional leader. The themes for this national role conception refer to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements."¹⁹⁷
3. "Regional protector. This role conception, though it perhaps implies special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis, places emphasis on the function of providing protection for adjacent regions."¹⁹⁸
4. "Active Independent. Most government statements supporting the concept of non-alignment are little more than affirmation of an "'independent' foreign policy, free of military commitments to any of the major powers."¹⁹⁹
5. "Liberation supporter. Unlike the bastion of the revolution- liberator national role conception, the liberation supporter does not indicate formal responsibilities for organising, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements abroad"²⁰⁰
6. "Anti-imperialist agent. Where imperialism is perceived as a serious threat, many governments- by no means limited to communist party states-see themselves as agents of "struggle" against this evil."²⁰¹
7. "Defender of the faith. Some governments view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems (rather than specified territories) from attack. Those who espouse the defender of the faith national role conception presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of other states."²⁰²
8. "Mediator-integrator. In the sample of seventy-one states, a considerable number of governments perceived themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states."²⁰³
9. "Regional-subsystem collaborator. The themes in this national role conception differ from those in the mediator-integrator category in that they do not merely envisage occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict; they indicate, rather, far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the Communist movement."²⁰⁴
10. "Developer. The themes in this national role conception indicate a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries (note the reference to this national role in the previous

¹⁹⁶ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions*, 260.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 261

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 261-262

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 262

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 263

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 264

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 265

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

- Japanese statement). References to special skills or advantages for undertaking such continuing tasks also appear frequently.”²⁰⁵
11. “Bridge. This national role conception often appears in vague form, and the policies deriving from it, if any, do not seem apparent. Whereas the mediator-integrator role implies various forms of diplomatic interposition into areas or issues of conflict, the bridge concept is much more ephemeral”²⁰⁶
 12. “Faithful ally.... The role conception of faithful ally is used in this study only where a government makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government”²⁰⁷
 13. “Independent. Most statements affirming commitment to the policy of non-alignment indicate that the government will make policy decisions according to the state's own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states.”²⁰⁸
 14. “ Example. This national role conception emphasises the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies”²⁰⁹
 15. “Internal Development. This concept has little reference to any particular task or function within the international system. The emphasis, on the contrary, is that most efforts of the government should be directed toward problems of internal development. There is a suggestion of wishing to remain noninvolved in international political matters, but the statements do not preclude various forms of international cooperation, particularly in economic and technical matters.”²¹⁰
 16. “Isolate. The internal development role conception often includes references to external cooperation, particularly in the economic and cultural fields. The national role of the isolate demands, on the contrary, a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety. Statements, such as those below, reveal fears of external involvements of any kind and emphasise self-reliance.”²¹¹
 17. “Protectee. Some governments allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them, but otherwise do not indicate any particular orientation, tasks, or functions toward the external environment”²¹²

Source: Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 260-270

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 266

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 267

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 268

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 269

²¹¹ Ibid., 270

²¹² Ibid.