



MSc International Relations and Diplomacy
Master's Thesis:

Public Opinion and China-Europe Relations

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1. Introduction

The rise, or the return to great power status, of China has been a topic of much debate internationally over the last decades. The growing weight and involvement of China in international affairs has compelled scholars, observers, and foreign policy makers alike, to increase their understanding of who and what shapes Chinese foreign policy making and guides relations with foreign countries. The general sentiment among many of these scholars, observers, and foreign policy makers has been one of measured fear and concern for how far China will rise and what the implications will be for the predominantly liberal international order and its future stability.¹ China has, however, attempted to reassure both its worried neighbours and the rest of the world that the country is committed to developing peacefully, and that there is thus no need for concern.² Yet this policy emphasis adopted by Hu Jintao has brought only limited reassurance. Whether or not the fears about China's rise and its impact on the country's foreign relations are overstated is debateable. However, it seems inevitable that China will continue to be a force to be reckoned with in international relations. Therefore, it becomes increasingly

1 See for example: Andrew Osborne, 'Russian rearmament: Moscow fears China and Islamist insurgents' in *The Telegraph*, 25 February 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8346056/Russian-rearmament-Moscow-fears-China-and-Islamist-insurgents.html>, (06.05.2012), Daniel Blumenthal, 'What happened to China's 'peaceful rise'?', *Foreign Policy*, 21 October 2010, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/21/what_happened_to_chinas_peaceful_rise, (05.12.2011); G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west>, (05.12.2011); Barry Buzan, 'China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?' in *The Chinese Journal of International Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010.

2 Bingguo Dai, 'China is Committed to Peaceful Development and Win-Win Cooperation', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 2011, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t861704.htm>, (05.05.2012).

important to understand where Chinese foreign policy comes from and what influences decision-making with regards to relations with foreign countries.

Many studies have examined external influences on Chinese foreign policy; however, a growing body of literature is dedicated to exploring domestic factors that have the possibility to influence foreign policy, arguing that foreign policy making in China is becoming less top-down allowing for more injections of outside influences into the policy-making process and decisions.³ It has been argued that China now is what can be characterised as a 'horizontal authoritarian' state, where, although power is still highly centralised, there are a number of power centres at top level that influence decision-making.⁴ One aspect of domestic politics that can potentially influence foreign policy is public opinion. Public opinion and its influence on foreign policy in China is the particular focus of this thesis. Many observers of developments in China agree that domestic developments have allowed for public opinion to have a greater influence on foreign policy making in China. However, such assumptions are at times largely unsubstantiated. The aim of this research is to establish whether public opinion can influence foreign policy in China and how this is possible.

Generally, the Chinese population has become more aware and interested in foreign affairs and diplomatic issues. The social media in particular is awash with discussions and comments on foreign affairs, and many of such comments are rather critical of the governments' handling of diplomatic issues.⁵ Information about current and foreign affairs has become much more readily available to Chinese citizens, including through international

3 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, 'The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of "Peaceful Rise"' in *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 190, 2007, p. 309.

4 Zhao Quansheng, 'Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism' in *ANNALS AAPSS*, Vol. 519, 1992, p. 161.

5 Mu Chunshan, 'China's Diplomacy Anxiety', *The Diplomat*, 19 April 2012, <http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2012/04/19/china's-diplomacy-anxiety/>, (22.04.2012).

sources where the news have not already been shaped by the Chinese policymakers.⁶ Furthermore, as a result of the commercialisation of extensive sections of the Chinese media and the expansion of internet provision, there are many more domestic news outlets that are ready to publish information and views, even ones that are not in line with the party views.⁷ No longer is China ruled by a strongman like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, who could make policy decisions without regard for opinions of colleagues and gone seem the days when Chinese leaders need not worry about the public's views on foreign affairs issues.⁸

The thesis aims to be both hypotheses testing as well as exploring new dimensions of the relationship between China and Europe⁹ in the context of public mobilisation in China. The thesis will answer the question of whether Chinese public opinion influences China-Europe relations by firstly appraising the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, with particular reference to China. Secondly the thesis will lay out the framework developed by James Reilly in *Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*,¹⁰ which will form the basis of the study of public opinion in China-Europe relations. Reilly's framework will be tested on the relations between China and France during the period of Chinese public mobilisation in the spring of 2008 before the Beijing Olympic Games. The study of public opinion's influence on China-France relations will thereafter be extended to include an initial appraisal

6 Susan L. Shirk, 'Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy' in Susan L. Shirk (ed.), *Changing Media, Changing China*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 234.

7 Melissa Murphy, 'Decoding Chinese Politics: Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter', Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2008, p. 4.

8 Zhao Suisheng, 'Understanding China's assertive foreign policy behaviour during the global financial meltdown', *The World Financial Review*, <http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=409>, (21.04.2012).

9 The European Union (EU) and Europe will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

10 Hereafter *Strong Society, Smart State*.

of the role played by the European common foreign policy in relation to China during the period of public mobilisation. Over the past decades the European common foreign policy has achieved increasing status and attention in international affairs making it interesting to explore the role it plays in China-Europe relations in a specific incident. The thesis concludes that public opinion can influence China-France relations and it largely follows the model laid out in *Strong Society, Smart State*. The extra level, which is added to China-Europe relations in the form of the European common foreign policy, plays only a limited role in China-Europe relations during the Chinese public mobilisation.

2. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Public opinion and its link to foreign policy is a complex topic to study. Research on the links between public opinion and foreign policy, and especially the possibilities for public opinion to influence foreign policy, has focused predominantly on democratic states. The majority of these studies have explored the links between public opinion and foreign policy in the United States.¹¹ Studies of public opinion and foreign policy in other countries have been fairly limited and research on public opinion in non-democratic states has been rare, given the assumption that authoritarian regimes do not consider public opinion in their decision-making.¹² The majority of scholars have found that the factors, which make it possible for public opinion to influence foreign policy in democracies, are ones that are not present in authoritarian regimes, and therefore limited attention has been paid to public opinion in foreign policy

11 See for example: James M. Lindsay, 'The New Apathy: How an Uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign Policy' in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5, 2000; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, 'Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?' in American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, 2005; Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

12 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy, New York; NY: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 3.

making in authoritarian states. For authoritarian regimes there should be no fear of voter punishment as is the case in democracies. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are unlikely to possess the characteristics of a society, which have been identified as making it more likely for public opinion to be able to influence foreign policy. Such characteristics include an autonomous media sector, strong civil society, democratic norms, and decentralised state institutions.¹³ Where democratic leaders arguably have to be careful about and consider public opinion in their foreign policy making for fear of repercussion, authoritarian leaders are seen to be free from such domestic constraint.¹⁴

Other scholars, however, argue that authoritarian regimes cannot avoid paying attention to, or being influenced by, public opinion.¹⁵ Authoritarian leaders also depend, although less formally, on popular support for their survival. As Da Wei argues, “while leaders in Western democracies pay especially close attention to public opinion in election years, Chinese leaders must pay careful attention to grassroots sentiments on a daily basis.”¹⁶ Yet, as Susan Shirk argues, while democratic leaders pay attention to the people who elect them, authoritarian leaders are less worried about the average citizen and voter. Authoritarian leaders concerned with their own survival are more worried, besides divisions in the top leadership and military coups, about mass political actions. “They have to be attentive to the people who feel so strongly about something that they might actually come out on the streets to demonstrate about it. The individuals who are taking the small political risk of venting emotionally on the Internet are the people more likely to take the

13 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 3.

14 Peter Hayes Gries, ‘Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 109.

15 Shibley Telhami, ‘Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War’ in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 3, 1993.

16 Da Wei, ‘Has China Become “Tough”?’ in China Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2010, p. 99.

greater risk of participating in, or even organizing, mass protests.”¹⁷ James Lindsay agrees, although speaking in the context of democratic states, and argues that for politicians the main concern is not what the public thinks of an issue but rather about to what extent they care about the issue.¹⁸ This is presumably the same concern for democratic and authoritarian leaders and as Lindsay notes, “in politics, as in the rest of life, squeaky wheels get the grease.”¹⁹

Until recently the topic of public opinion and its influence on Chinese foreign policy was an understudied topic. This was for obvious reasons, given the difficulties of measuring public opinion in non-democracies and due to the fact that the policy making process is very unclear and secretive in China.²⁰ Yet, an increasing number of studies are conducted into the influence of public opinion and Chinese foreign policy and mostly in the form of descriptive accounts of foreign policy incidents involving China.²¹ Scholars conducting such studies and China observers seem to have reached a consensus that public opinion in China is important and it does influence foreign policy. Peter Gries argues that foreign policy making in China is a ‘two-level game’ where the Chinese diplomats need to keep a close watch on the domestic public while they are negotiating with counterparts internationally. Especially popular nationalism is increasingly constraining diplomats who make Chinese foreign

17 Susan L. Shirk, ‘Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China’ in Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, pp. 60-61.

18 Lindsay, ‘The New Apathy: How an Uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign Policy’, p. 2.

19 *Ibid*, p. 3.

20 Alistair Iain Johnston, ‘Trends in Theory and Method in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy’, Paper for China Studies Conference, Fairbank Center for East Asian Research December 2005, revised February 2006, pp. 29-30.

21 Such as Peter Gries, ‘Nationalism, Indignation and China’s Japan Policy’ in SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2005; Peter Gries, ‘Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reaction to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing’ in China Journal, No. 46, 2001, pp. 25-43.

policy.²² Evidence of nationalism, both elite-level and popular nationalism is widespread, and has surfaced in various instances, ranging from China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and bilateral relations with the United States, Japan and Russia.²³ Economic, social and also political developments in China have arguably led to a situation where public opinion is increasingly putting pressure on the regime in their conduct of foreign policy. Especially advances in media and other information technology has had an impact on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, where commercialised media has grown in influence and internet forums and blogging sites have become important avenues for information gathering and sharing for the public.²⁴ In addition to serving as a space for information exchange, online forums are also increasingly used to mobilise campaigns and social movements.²⁵ The government stays updated with online opinions and take these into consideration in foreign policy making.²⁶

As scholars seem to generally agree that public opinion does play a role in shaping foreign policy in China, debate has gradually moved to focus on explaining how public opinion can influence foreign policy and under what circumstances such influence is more likely to take place. The study of causal mechanisms is in its early stages, however a number of studies have emerged which develop frameworks for studying public opinion's influence on foreign policy. Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen have been the first to attempt a

22 Gries, 'Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', p. 104.

23 Murphy, 'Decoding Chinese Politics: Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter', p. 15.

24 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, 'New Foreign Policy Actors in China', SIPRI Policy Paper, Stockholm: SIPRI, 26 September 2010, p. 41.

25 Junhao Hong, 'The Internet and China's Foreign Policy Making: The Impact of Online Public Opinions as a New Societal Force' in Yufan Hao and Lin Su (eds.), China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Forces and Chinese American Policy, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005, p. 101.

26 *Ibid*, p. 98.

more general study of the topic of public opinion and foreign policy in China. They argue that three factors shape the likelihood of public opinion being able to influence foreign policy, which are levels of activism, divisions among top policy makers, and external tensions.²⁷ Patrick Douglass sees two ways in which public opinion can possibly influence foreign policy: through setting 'boundaries of the permissible' or if public opinion converges with the interests of the political elite.²⁸ Two more recent contributions to the study of public opinion and Chinese foreign policy are the works by Jessica Chen Weiss and Reilly. Weiss looks at when the Chinese regime tolerates or oppresses public protests and other public displays of opinion.²⁹ She argues that authoritarian regimes allow anti-foreign protests in order to raise their international negotiating stance by generating domestic audience costs.³⁰ However, such steps by the Chinese regime can also be very risky, leading to oppression of the display of public opinion. Reilly explores the influence of public opinion on the foreign policy of China towards Japan, demonstrating how the 'waxing and waning' of public mobilisation contributes to the heightening or lowering of tensions in the China-Japan relations. With the book *Strong Society, Smart State*, Reilly is the first to go beyond speculating and assuming that public opinion influences Chinese foreign policy making, to systematically study and provide evidence for the causal mechanisms.

3. Theoretical Framework

In *Strong Society, Smart State* Reilly argues convincingly that public opinion does influence China's foreign policy towards Japan, and furthermore maintains

27 Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State*, p. 16.

28 Patrick Douglass 'Public Opinion's New Role in Chinese Foreign Policy', JHU SAIS, 1 Feb 2009, [http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Chinese%20Public%20Opinion%20Paper%20\(Modified\).pdf](http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Chinese%20Public%20Opinion%20Paper%20(Modified).pdf), p. 6.

29 Weiss in Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State*, p. 16.

30 *Ibid*, p. 16.

that China's relations with Japan do not represent a unique case. With a basis in the framework developed by Reilly to study China-Japan relations, this thesis will explore the relations between China and Europe and how they are influenced by Chinese public opinion, testing Reilly's contention that the framework developed with regards to Japan can be used to model the influence of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy towards any country. The following study tests Reilly's framework with regards to the relations between China and France, and subsequently expands on the framework to include an investigation of the role played by the European common foreign policy in this relationship during a period of public mobilisation. Thus the thesis aims both to be theory testing, with regards to Reilly's framework, and to conduct initial explorations into the role that was played by the supranational dimension of the China-Europe relationship within the context of public mobilisation. █

Through his study of relations between China and Japan, Reilly develops a framework for understanding the role of public opinion in shaping China's foreign policy and the interaction between state and society in this game. Reilly expands on the concept of 'responsive authoritarianism' to understand how the Chinese authorities can allow influence of public opinion on foreign policy while being able to follow the same overall foreign policy trajectory. In *Strong Society, Smart State* Reilly argues that public mobilisation, defined as "a rapid shift in public opinion and popular emotions, growing political activism, and expanded sensationalist coverage in popular media,"³¹ can occur outside of the party state and therefore be treated as an independent variable.³² The framework developed in *Strong Society, Smart State* provides a model for the study of the 'waxing and waning' of the Chinese government's toleration of public mobilisation, and hence also of the possibility for public sentiment to influence foreign policy. Reilly's research suggests that the Chinese regime is capable of controlling public opinion and mobilisation through repression and censoring the flow of information. Yet if and when top leaders are distracted by

31 Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State*, p. 24.

32 *Ibid*, p. 208.

other issues or divided among themselves, then their influence on public attitude is less all-encompassing and thus the way is opened for public mobilisation to occur and potentially influence foreign policy or as Reilly states, “the Chinese government may be capable of doing nearly anything, but it can certainly not do everything.”³³

Once public mobilisation occurs, the Chinese authorities have to decide whether to tolerate or repress the mobilisation.³⁴ If the government does not decide to initially tolerate public mobilisation and the voicing of opinion, then the possibility for the Chinese public to influence foreign policy is limited. However, by initially tolerating public mobilisation, an opening has been made for public opinion to influence foreign policy making. Reilly argues that the authorities are most likely to tolerate the mobilisation of the public if tensions are high and the top leadership divided over the issue at hand or at a time of leadership succession.³⁵ Whether the government decides to tolerate public mobilisation or not depends on various factors. It can be risky for an authoritarian government to tolerate public mobilisation because it can backfire, however, toleration of public mobilisation, at least initially, can also be useful for the regime. “Protests provide the leadership with information on the relevant aspects of popular sentiments. They also serve as a release valve, directing popular anger toward a foreign country rather than at the Chinese Communist Party itself. By responding to public expressions of anger with symbolic or partial policy shifts, Chinese leaders can demonstrate their responsiveness to the people’s concerns, thus alleviating potential criticism from some of the most mobilised segments of society.”³⁶

33 *Ibid*, p. 211.

34 *Ibid*, p. 26.

35 *Ibid*, p. 26.

36 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, pp. 24-25.

Once the authoritarian Chinese regime has decided to tolerate, or perhaps even encourage in some instances, public voicing of opinion through protests and activism, then the public pressure generated can potentially influence foreign policy through having an impact on the Chinese governments negotiating strategy, official rhetoric, elite's public discourse, and foreign policy decisions.³⁷ Yet, the authorities also have the capacity to reign in on public mobilisation again, through a mixture of repression and persuasion, once they believe the populations has been allowed to express their opinion or if they fear that the mobilisation may get out of hand and potentially harm China's core interests and the regimes stability. Thus, public mobilisation is only likely to be tolerated over a short period of time, and the influence of public opinion on foreign policy will be of a limited nature in order to avoid altering the overall foreign policy direction of China.³⁸

Reilly's framework pertains to relations between sovereign states. However, in Europe, an extra dimension is added to relations between China and European countries due to the existence of the European Union (EU) and the effort to establish a common European foreign policy. Unlike any other regions of the world, Europe features a unique international organisation in the form of the European Union, which has seen an unprecedented degree of integration and the ability to act as a 'prominent international actor'.³⁹ This makes Europe an interesting region to explore, especially considering the developments made towards increasing the competencies of the European common foreign policy project. The European integrationist project has taken large steps forward in recent years, which is also reflected in the developments towards a common foreign policy for Europe that has advanced steadily over the past nearly sixty years. The increased integration between the European states with the establishment of the EU has added a third level to the 'two

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 24.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 130.

³⁹ Ivor Roberts, Satow's Diplomatic Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 399.

level' game of international bargaining among states. The existence of this supranational level is reflected in the European policy process and the decisions; in the words of Helmut Hubel, "EU decisions on policies toward third parties should be understood as the outcome of three-level games: the domestic policies of the Member States; the decision-making processes between EU Member States and among the EU institutions; and the interactions and negotiation processes between the EU and its partners."⁴⁰ The introduction of a supranational level to the policy making in Europe has the impact, as Frederick Mayer argues that it makes sense to add an extra level of analysis when the collective actor possesses substantial internal differences, and the collective institutions are "incapable of adjudicating among the contending interests".⁴¹ In the case of Europe, where the EU has become an influential international player, without being all encompassing and fully controlling of member states' foreign relations, complexity is added by the varying views of the different member states and the different emphases and motivations of the various institutions.⁴²

The integration process in Europe has also created momentum in the direction of a common foreign policy for Europe, and since the initial steps were taken towards cooperation between European states on external affairs, the notion of a common foreign policy has developed greatly. The European Parliament especially, has, since the 1970s, been one of the main promoters of the development of foreign policy cooperation among the European states.⁴³

40 Helmut Hubel, 'The EU's Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours' in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2004, pp. 349-350.

41 Frederick W. Mayer, 'Multi-level games' in Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti and Michael Zürn (eds.), Handbook on Multi-level Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 57.

42 Sarah Collinson, 'Issue-systems', 'multi-level games' and the analysis of the EU's external commercial and associated policies: a research agenda' in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, p. 220.

43 Dieter Mahncke, 'Post-Modern Diplomacy: Can EU Foreign Policy Make a Difference in World Politics?', Bruges: College of Europe, EU Diplomacy Paper 4, 2011, p. 10.

Following the establishment of the Unified External Service of the European Commission (UES), which opened its very first delegation in London in 1955, many more representations have followed throughout the world, adding to Europe's bid to establish a fully fledged diplomatic service. The purpose of the UES was to manage the Commission's trade agenda and the development aid provided to third countries by the Community.⁴⁴ The more explicitly political aspect of European foreign policy is the coordination of the member states' foreign policies, which was "pursued outside the legal framework of the community" before 1986 when the Single European Act (SEA) was signed.⁴⁵ The SEA organised the European Political Community (EPC), which was the precedent of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) or the Maastricht Treaty, signed in January 1992 that replaced the EPC process and committed the member states to establish a common foreign and security policy. Since then the UES has been charged with more traditional diplomatic functions, and the TEU requires the EU delegation and the member state embassies to cooperate in the third countries where they are located.⁴⁶ The latest step towards creating a more integrated European foreign policy was taken in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty was signed and the separate European External Actions Service (EEAS) was established. With the EEAS in place, the EU is fast developing a fully-fledged foreign service.⁴⁷ Considering the weight of the EU as an international actor and the huge strides it has made in developing a common foreign policy for Europe, it is expected that the European common foreign policy will play a role in the China-Europe relations.

44 Jozef Bátora, 'Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?', ARENA Working Paper 3, Oslo: Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, 2006, p. 22.

45 Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, Oxon: Routledge, 2007, p. 55.

46 Bátora, 'Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?', p. 22.

47 This development will, however, not be considered in this paper given that the EEAS was established after 2008, which is the time period of the case studied in this thesis.

Evaluating the role of the common European foreign policy in China-Europe relations during the period of public mobilisation will proceed by firstly looking at the development of the Sino-Europe relations. Secondly, the Chinese view and perception of the European common foreign policy in China-Europe relations will be analysed. Thirdly, the actions and responses of Europe and China respectively, during Chinese public mobilisation, will be reviewed in order to evaluate the importance of the European common foreign policy during public mobilisation. Finally, explanations will be sought for the nature of the role played by the European common foreign policy in the case study.

3.1 Conceptualisation of Terms

Public mobilisation, which will be treated as the independent variable in this thesis, provided that it can be determined that mobilisation has its roots outside the party state. Public mobilisation will here be conceptualised, similar to Reilly's conceptualisation, as a sudden shift in public opinion, increased public activism and media coverage. The occurrence of an instance of public mobilisation will be taken as evidence that, at least some segments of the Chinese population, has views and opinions on, and is concerned about, the Chinese governments policies towards foreign affairs issues and foreign countries. Public mobilisation will be measured through investigating the extent to which the population is involved in policy activism, such as internet activism and demonstrations, and the level to which sensationalist media covers the issues that the public is concerned with. Internet activism is especially important in this regard, since this is a tool that allows many people to express their opinions and join political activism at a relatively low cost.⁴⁸ Demonstrations and marches are rarely allowed in China, and therefore the internet plays an important role for political activists.

⁴⁸ Bruce Etling, Robert Faris and John Palfrey, 'Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise of Online Organising' in *SAIS Review*, Vol. 30, no. 2, 2010, p. 42.

Public opinion is an elusive term, which is difficult to conceptualise and thus no consensus exists on a definition of public opinion. Traditionally in studies of public opinion in democracies, public opinion has been conceptualised and measured through public opinion polls, which are intended to capture the opinions of the average voter.⁴⁹ Extensive and reliable opinion polls are rarely available in non-democratic states, yet if such opinion polls were available, finding out the opinion of the average voter is less of an interest when studying the influence of public opinion on foreign policy in authoritarian states. Therefore, for the purpose of this study public opinion will be conceptualised as the sentiment, which comes out of public mobilisation; those declarations and opinions that are voiced in the public mobilisation campaign. While the sentiment, which is expressed in sensationalist media, online and during demonstrations by political activists may not be entirely reflective of the opinion of the general population, the opinion of these active people who try to make their voices heard is the one that ultimately has the chance to influence policymakers. The opinion of the silent population is potentially not as influential because they will not go out and make their voices heard and influence decisions by voting on election day. Therefore, it is the opinion of the 'loud' segment of the population that is the focus here, as they make their voices heard and can put pressure on the policymakers.

Foreign policy will in this study be conceptualised rather broadly as encompassing the entirety of a state or an organisations' external relations with another state or organisation,⁵⁰ thus encompassing economic and trade relations as well as the traditional political aspects. European common foreign policy is hence also conceptualised more broadly than the policies of the CFSP. Karen Smith defines the EU as a 'foreign policy system', which composes the

49 Philip E. Converse, 'Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1987, p. 12.

50 In this context the EU is also considered an organisation.

three pillars and also includes the foreign policies of the member states.⁵¹ The EU produces foreign policies in many areas, within all three pillars and across the pillars. An impact on foreign relations with another state, which is the dependent variable in this study, will be conceptualised as a change or adaptation of the official policy stance of the Chinese government. As noted previously, Reilly identifies four different ways that public opinion can impact China's foreign relations; by influencing the Chinese governments negotiating strategy, the official rhetoric of the Chinese authorities, the elite's public discourse, and the timing and content of foreign policy decisions.⁵² The impact will be 'measured' by identifying the official Chinese position on a specific issue concerning a country prior to public mobilisation and looking at whether this policy changed in the aftermath of public mobilisation.

3.2 Case Selection

Since one of the aims of this study is to test whether public opinion is indeed able to influence foreign policy and under what circumstances it is most likely, the study will look at a case where there has been a high degree of public mobilisation with regards to foreign policy issues and evaluate whether the opinion expressed by the mobilised public appears to have influenced the policymakers. Most literature, which finds that public opinion can influence foreign policy in China, builds on research of China-Japan relations. The aim of this study is to test whether this contention holds true, and whether Reilly's claim that the influence of public opinion on China's Japan policy does not represent a case of *sui generis* is right⁵³, and therefore the case studied here will be one that does not relate to Japan. The framework will be tested on Sino-France relations and the role of the European common foreign policy during the period of mobilisation will be studied as an extension of the impact

51 Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, pp. 2-3.

52 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 24.

53 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 213.

of public mobilisation on China's relations with France. In the spring of 2008 public mobilisation in China occurred against France in particular, but the mobilised also turned their attention to other, particularly Western countries and Western companies.

3.3 Data Collection and Methods of Analysis

The method of analysis that will be employed in this thesis is case study method. The process tracing method will be used to identify whether public opinion influences foreign policy in China in the selected case. Process tracing method uses evidence to “affirm some explanations and to cast into doubt, through eliminative induction, explanations that do not fit the evidence.”⁵⁴ Process tracing allows for a detailed and in depth analysis of each case, and can potentially discover other causal mechanisms and explanatory factors at work. As George and Bennett highlight, the “process tracing can strengthen the comparison by helping to assess whether differences other than those in the main variable of interest might account for the differences in outcome.”⁵⁵ The process tracing method also allows one to consider degrees in foreign policy impact.

This study will make use of both primary and secondary sources. News and media reports, both English domestic and international, will be utilised to follow developments in public mobilisation and relations between China and its foreign counterparts. For evaluations of Chinese foreign policy stances, and possible changes in these, official government papers and statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China and other relevant ministries, where available in English, will be studied. Furthermore, secondary sources in the form of previous studies and analysis' of the case studies in question will be

54 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, pp. 503-504.

55 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 89.

used where possible and necessary. Opinion polls of Chinese opinions on various countries and issues will be included where appropriate, while taking into consideration that often such polls are very biased. Furthermore, interviews with relevant academics will be conducted and contribute to the evidence presented in the paper. Such interviews are helpful in establishing general timelines of events and as well as offering interpretations of relations between China and foreign countries and how they have been influenced by the mobilisation.

There are some issues related to the study, which must be kept in mind. Foreign policy making in China is very secretive and processes can be difficult to identify, making it challenging to attempt to establish what exactly happens, and why, in the closed circuits of policy making in China. Not much information in the form of archives is available publicly, and information, such as transcripts of press conferences at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, that appears to have once been available online, have been deleted. Additionally, this thesis relies only on sources that are available in English, which limits the amount of information available. However, attempts have been made to find as much information as possible, as well as make use of relevant studies where Chinese primary sources have been used and translated by the author.

4. Case Study

4.1 Chinese Olympic Mobilisation

Hosting the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, which had been a goal of China for more than a century, was supposed to be a display of Chinese achievements and symbolise the country's final step onto the world stage. President Hu Jintao spoke after the summer games were awarded to China, asserting that "the Olympic Games is the common aspiration of our peoples, is a century-old hope of the Chinese people, and is a major event in the country. We must do our best to perfect the Olympics in order to enhance the

self-confidence and fighting spirit of the Chinese people, and strengthen the nation's sense of pride and cohesion to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."⁵⁶ China desired respect for the developments made since the initiation of reforms over three decades earlier.⁵⁷ On several occasions sports have "represented the broad Chinese determination to achieve national independence and rejuvenation and has served as an expression of defiance at critical moments."⁵⁸ It was believed that hosting a successful Summer Games would win legitimisation from the rest of the world, which would lead to China being treated as an equal member of the global community.⁵⁹ Under the slogan of 'One World, One Dream', the Chinese Olympic organisers had prepared for a grand celebration of sports and of China and the country's achievement. Symbolically, the Opening Ceremony was held on 8 August 2008 at 08:08 pm, chosen because 8 is considered a lucky number because the sound is similar to that which means 'getting rich.' What the Chinese leaders wanted the world to see was a "modern, confident and nonthreatening emerging world power".⁶⁰ As Huang Jing explains, "the Chinese looked to the Olympic Games as the long-heralded symbolic moment when their country might at last shake off old stereotypes and spring forth on the world stage reborn as the great nation it

56 James Prieger, Wei-Min Hu, Canhui Hong and Dongming Zhu, 'French Automobiles and the Chinese Boycotts of 2008: Politics Really Does Affect Commerce', Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy Working Papers, Paper 5, 2010, <http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/5>.

57 Sukhee Han, Ho Cheong Cheong, Pieter Stek, 'Public Diplomacy Between China and the World: The 2008 Olympic Torch Relay, A Test Case', <http://sloc.cafe24.com/upload/publication01/sukheehan-hocheongchoeng-pieterstek.pdf>, p. 374.

58 Xu Guoqi, 'Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008', Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2008, pp. 3-4.

59 Xu Guoqi, 'Beijing Olympic Torch relay and its implications for China and the rest of the world', Harvard University Press Author Forum, 22 May 2008, http://harvardpress.typepad.com/off_the_page/2008/05/beijing-olympic.html, (19.05.2012).

60 Jim Yardley, 'Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet Crackdown' in New York Times, 31 March 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/asia/31china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all, (20.05.2012).

once was.”⁶¹ However, an equally, if not more important, goal for the communist leadership, was to gain validation for their continued hold on power.⁶² The development of a ‘harmonious society’ that has become an important focus of president Hu Jintao in order to overcome the divisions and tensions that have emerged in Chinese society and this notion and goal fit very well with the ideals of the Olympic movement.⁶³ The Olympic propaganda domestically in China, which was different from the messages that the Chinese state sought to spread internationally, was oriented towards gaining popular consent for the continuance of CCP rule and to build national pride.”⁶⁴

This ambitious purpose for the Olympic Games had been developed over the many years of preparation for the event, and a successful and extravagant Beijing Olympic Games had turned into a matter of national pride and importance.⁶⁵ The campaign to welcome the Beijing Olympics, which was the final stage of this long process of preparation and ensuring the successful hosting of the Games, was launched in February 2006, more than two years before the opening ceremony. This campaign was “the final stage of a long-term effort to link China’s successful Olympics bid to ongoing efforts to maintain political credibility of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] government.”⁶⁶ The campaign involved everyone in China and there was widespread coverage in all sections of the Chinese propaganda machine, and

61 Huang Jing, ‘The Clash in Public Opinion between Europe and China: What, How and Why’ in Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2010, <http://www.cicir.ac.cn/english/ArticleView.aspx?nid=1922>, (02.06.2012).

62 Yardley, ‘Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet Crackdown’.

63 C.R. Pramod, ‘The ‘Spectacle’ of the Beijing Olympics and the Dynamics of State-Society Relations in PRC’ in China Report Vol. 44. No. 2, 2008, p. 119.

64 Anne-Marie Brady, ‘The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction’ in The China Quarterly, No. 197, 2009, p. 10.

65 Suisheng Zhao, ‘The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism’ in China Security, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008, p. 54.

66 Brady, ‘The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction’, p. 5.

beginning as early as three years before the Opening Ceremony the newspapers held daily countdowns to 8 August when the Games kicked off.⁶⁷ The media was given instructions to only report on positive stories when it came to the Olympics, and there were further orders from the propaganda department for the media to seek out and actively counter any negative reporting about the preparation for, and the hosting of, the Games.⁶⁸ By unequivocally connecting support for the Olympics to patriotism in the campaigns, the government made sure that criticism at home of the Olympics would be considered “unpatriotic, for foreigners, anti-Chinese.”⁶⁹ As Brady concludes, the campaign was largely successful and the media obeyed the rules of reporting on the Olympics.⁷⁰ Shortly before the Olympics began 79 percent of the respondents in a poll conducted by the Pew Institute answered that the Olympics were important to them personally.⁷¹ Therefore, when the first reports began to filter into China about negative receptions of the torch relay in Europe, large segments of the Chinese population were baffled by the European reactions, and a great number of people sought out various ways to express their frustration with the foreign perception of the China and Beijing’s Olympic Games.

4.2 The Torch Relay and Chinese Public Mobilisation

The elaborate torch relay around the world brought the torch from Olympia, Greece over five continents and up the highest mountain in the world, before touring China and arriving in Beijing for the Olympic opening ceremony on 8

67 James K. Yuann and Jason Inch, ‘Supertrends of Future China: Billion Dollar Business Opportunities for China’s Olympic Decade’, Singapore: World Scientific, 2008, p. xii.

68 Brady, ‘The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction’, p. 14.

69 *Ibid*, p. 12.

70 *Ibid*, p. 13.

71 Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘The Chinese Celebrate their Roaring Economy, as they Struggle with its Costs’, Washington, D.C: Pew Research Center, 2008, <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/261.pdf>, p. 24.

August 2008. The protests and demonstrations in China, which followed the torch relay in Europe and the United States, were the biggest display of popular nationalism against foreign countries in China since the anti-Japan protests in 2005. The voyage of the Olympic torch, which was accompanied by the two slogans, “the journey of harmony” and “light the passion, share the dream,” was planned and anticipated by the Chinese organisers to be a triumphant march.⁷² The Olympic organisers and the Chinese authorities seem not to have anticipated, and was therefore unprepared for, the protests and the hostility with which the torch was greeted in many countries, particularly Western countries and neighbouring Asian countries.⁷³ While the organisers had expected some demonstrations in connection with the torch relay, the number of demonstrations and their intensity stunned the Chinese authorities, the Chinese ambassador to the United States revealed in an interview.⁷⁴ Just like the Chinese authorities, the Chinese public also appeared to have been caught off-guard by the negative reception of the Chinese Olympic event in the West.

The torch relay, which was run from 24 March to 8 August, encountered significant obstacles in London on 6 April, where there were clashes between pro-Tibet demonstrators and police, as demonstrators attempted to snatch the torch from a torchbearer and the route of the relay had to be changed due to protests before the torch was eventually put on a bus for the remainder of the route.⁷⁵ The Paris leg of the relay presented the most dramatic of all on the Olympic torch’s relay around the globe. On 7 April, large numbers of protesters, demonstrating for Tibetan independence and for human rights and democracy

72 Xu, ‘Beijing Olympic Torch relay and its implications for China and the rest of the world’.

73 David Askew, ‘Sport and Politics: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games’ in European Studies, Vol. 27, 2009, p. 118.

74 Online NewsHour: Newsmaker Interview, 13 May 2008, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june08/ambassador_05-13.html, (09.06.2012).

75 BBC, ‘Clashes along Olympic torch route’, BBC News, 6 April 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7332942.stm, (10.06.2012).

in China showed up for the relay. The protesters in Paris involved hundreds of people, even ones who had travelled from outside France to make their statement against China, as well as activists from the Green Party and local officials who had hung a banner with the message 'Paris defends human rights everywhere in the world' outside the Paris City Hall.⁷⁶ There were a number of fairly successful attempts to grab the torch from the torchbearers, most significantly from the disabled fencer, Jin Jing, who nonetheless managed to hold on to it and gained nationwide Chinese acclaim for her heroic efforts. The scuffles led to the torch being extinguished on a number of occasions and as a result the route of the relay was shortened and part of the relay was yet again completed with the torch aboard a bus.⁷⁷

The Chinese media reported extensively on the torch relays abroad, but the protests against the torch relay were heavily played down or ignored.⁷⁸ State media also did not lend much coverage to the pro-China rallies that were staged in connection with the torch relay, mainly by Chinese students, but also included Chinese nationals of in other walks of life, who resided overseas.⁷⁹ Information about the real nature of the demonstrations against China in Europe was relayed back to China, mainly through the internet by overseas Chinese students in Europe and the United States, where large overseas Chinese populations angered by the events and by the portrayal of China, spread information in the internet sphere to be viewed by fellow Chinese at

76 John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, 'Paris Protests Disrupt Torch Relay', *The Washington Post*, 8 April 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/07/AR2008040700229.html>, (15.06.2012) and BBC, 'Paris protesters claim Olympic win', BBC, 7 April 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7335684.stm>, (15.06.2012).

77 F. Hong and L. Zhouxiang 'The Politicisation of the Beijing Olympics', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2012, pp. 157-183, p. 160.

78 BBC, 'Clashes along Olympic torch route'.

79 Barry Sautman and Li Ying, 'Public Diplomacy from Below: The 2008 "Pro-China" Demonstrations in Europe and North America', CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy Paper 11, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2011, p. 6.

home.⁸⁰ The internet played an important role in the mobilisation of segments of the Chinese public against foreign countries in 2008, connecting overseas and mainland Chinese, and serving as a venue for sharing information, expressing opinions and organising boycotts in the spring before the Olympics. Estimates suggest that the number of internet users in China had reached 253 million by mid-2008 and thus making China the largest internet market in the world.⁸¹

The events in Paris and the pro-Tibet protests in other, primarily European countries were perceived in China as criticism of China and its ambitions and achievements and aimed at spoiling China's Olympic dream. Writings expressing anti-foreign sentiments had already appeared on some internet blogs and websites, after overseas Chinese students initiated their online campaigns to expose false reports in the Western media regarding the Tibetan riots in mid-March and write about their pro-China activism in the countries they were residing. However, after the start of the torch relay and the spectacles in London and especially Paris, the internet activism surged, both from Chinese overseas and mainland Chinese internet users, who could find information online on popular blogs and internet forums about the negative reception of the Olympic torch in cities abroad. It is always difficult to determine with certainty whether these feelings of frustration, the voicing of anti-foreign sentiment and the protests online and on the streets were an independent and non-state directed reaction to events in Paris and elsewhere, given the all encompassing role of the Chinese state in trying to determine and direct public opinion. Censorship of the media and of the internet is extensive, and it is a well known that the Chinese authorities even employ internet

80 Pal Nyiri, Juan Zhang and Merridan Varrall, 'China's Cosmopolitan Nationalists: "Heroes" and "Traitors" of the 2008 Olympics' in The China Journal No. 63, 2010, pp. 25-55, p. 29.

81 David Barboza, 'China Surpasses U.S: in Number of Internet Users', New York Times, 26 July 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/worldbusiness/26internet.html>, (21.06.2012).

'commentators' to attempt to guide and control public.⁸² Winnie King, however, argues that the show of popular nationalism most certainly had its roots outside the party state.⁸³ Jeffrey Wasserstrom echoes this sentiment, when arguing that "the [Chinese] government has not so much stage-managed the outburst as scrambled to jump ahead of public sentiment and channel anger"⁸⁴ after the Paris torch relay. Considering the timing of events to see if public opinion shifts before any policy changes, as Reilly notes, it is possible to get an indication of the genuineness of the public mobilisation.⁸⁵ The mobilisation was initiated abroad mainly by Chinese students who had followed the European and American media coverage of the lead up to the Olympics, including the March Tibetan unrest, and who witnessed the clashes that marred the torch relay. Contrary to popular belief in many foreign countries, Barry Sautman and Li Ying find, based on extensive interviews with Chinese students involved in the pro-China demonstrations in cities in the United States, Germany, South Korea, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Australia that these actions were not "organised at the behest of the Chinese government."⁸⁶ The first signs of mobilisation after the torch relay appeared on the internet with condemnation of the events in especially Paris soon after the torch relay took place there, and before the Chinese authorities began to comment extensively on these events. It therefore appears to be the case that this instance of public mobilisation did indeed have its roots largely outside the party state, which Reilly suggests, would be the case. However, one expert has noted that "to

82 Michael Bristow, 'China's internet 'spin doctors'', BBC News, 16 December 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/7783640.stm>, (25.06.2012), and Interview with Chinese democracy activist 16 May 2012 in Beijing.

83 Winnie King, 'Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests' in Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds.), Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations, Lanham, MD and Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010, p. 181.

84 Jeffrey Wasserstrom, 'China's Inauspicious Year', The Nation, 20 May 2008, <http://www.thenation.com/article/chinas-inauspicious-year>, (23.05.2012).

85 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 19.

86 Sautman and Ying, 'Public Diplomacy from Below: The 2008 "Pro-China"', p. 9.

say this was not coordinated by government officials would be speculation... it is safer to say that the government was very much aware these things were being organised and allowed them to go ahead.”⁸⁷ It is difficult to determine the exact nature of events, however, the available facts suggest that the protests by Chinese abroad and subsequently at home, were largely spontaneous.⁸⁸

The public mobilisation that ensued after the Paris leg of the torch relay was anti-foreign and France in particular was targeted, and it involved extensive internet activism; condemnations of foreign countries on blogs and social media websites and calls for boycotts of foreign media and French products, as well as demonstrations in China outside especially the French supermarket chain Carrefour. The angry youth, or the ‘fen qing’, as they are referred to in China, who participated in this instance of anti-foreign mobilisation, constituted mainly of Chinese young urban elites.⁸⁹ The sentiments that these nationalist activists voiced online and during street demonstrations in China were ones of support for China, anger and frustrations with the media, politicians and publics of certain primarily Western countries, for example there were extensive calls for boycotts of French products and Western media, with the Atlanta based CNN being targeted in particular. The Chinese population was frustrated by the anti-Chinese sentiment, which had accompanied the torch relay.⁹⁰ Moreover, the Chinese blamed American and much of the West European media’s “prejudice against China for turning the Olympic Torch processions into controversial publicity stunts around the globe

87 Robert J. Saiget, ‘Fresh Anti-Western Protests Rock China’ in The China Post, 21 April 2008, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/national/%20news/2008/04/21/152848/Fresh-anti-Western.htm>, (14.05.2012).

88 Jane Macartney, ‘Reporting the Olympic Year’, 69th George E. Morrison Lecture, Australian National University, Canberra, 22 October 2008.

89 Lijun Yang and Yongnian Zheng, ‘Fen Qings (Angry Youth) in Contemporary China’ in Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 76, pp. 641- 642.

90 King, ‘Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests’, p. 178.

and tarnishing their pride in the long-awaited games.”⁹¹ The American CNN was at the centre of the ant-foreign media campaign, however, the BBC of Britain, German Der Spiegel and RTL and other European media outlets were also targeted by a disappointed section of the Chinese public who had considered these media outlets to stand for fair and un-biased reporting.⁹² The most notable expression of this disappointment came from the student, Jin Rao, who established the website anti-CNN.com on which he called for “netizens” (internet citizens) to “collect, classify, and exhibit the evidence of misbehaviors of Western media, and to voice our own opinion.”⁹³ The website received many passionate responses from mainland and overseas Chinese, gathered evidence, and sorted and translated news reports from Western media in order to highlight the distortions in the Western reporting.⁹⁴

France was targeted particularly strongly because the dramatic anti-Chinese demonstrations and the attack on Paralympic fencer Jin Jing in Paris disappointed the Chinese and was seen by the Chinese public to be a French ‘attack’ on China. Therefore France, and the other European countries where demonstrations had occurred, became the target of Chinese anti-foreign nationalism.⁹⁵ How, and if, this Chinese public mobilisation affected China’s relations with France will be explored in the next section by looking at the nature of the Sino-French relationship and what its nature was leading up to the April mobilisation in China.

91 Stephen D. Reese and Jia Dai, ‘Citizen Journalism in the Global News Arena: China’s New Media Critics’ in Stuart Allan and Einar Thorsen (eds.), Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives, New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009, p. 225.

92 Jing, ‘The Clash in Public Opinion between Europe and China: What, How and Why’.

93 Reese and Dai, ‘Citizen Journalism in the Global News Arena: China’s New Media Critics’, p. 225.

94 *Ibid*, p. 225.

95 Shaun Breslin and Simon Shen, ‘Online Chinese Nationalism’, Asia Programme Paper 2010/03, London: Chatham House September 2010, p. 8.

4.3 China-France Relations

France was one of the first countries to recognise the People's Republic of China in 1964. General de Gaulle's pioneering decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC came at a point where only a few North European Countries had already done so.⁹⁶ Although nothing much concrete came of de Gaulle's recognition, it was an important symbolic breakthrough for China.⁹⁷ De Gaulle soon came to the realisation that after the communists had won the civil war they were there to stay, and ignoring the mainland regime was not feasible in the long run.⁹⁸ In the early 1960s the obstacles to Sino-French rapprochement, which had previously existed, such as the Algerian war and the heightened tensions of the Cold War, had disappeared.⁹⁹ Moreover, both France and China were seeking more prestige and power and were therefore looking to break what de Gaulle called the 'double hegemony' of the United States and the Soviet Union¹⁰⁰ at a time when France's relations with Germany and the United States became more strained and China fell out with the Soviet Union. As Martin explains, "France and China saw their rapprochement as part of their—albeit different—global strategies and as a stepping stone for regional aims. The French president perceived China as a springboard into Asia, whereas the Chinese saw through France an opportunity for better relations with the other states of Western Europe."¹⁰¹ De Gaulle had a keen interest in securing French influence in Southeast Asia, where China was becoming increasingly

96 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, 'Relations between France and China: Towards a Paris-Beijing Axis?' in China: An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, p. 327.

97 David Shambaugh, 'China and Europe' in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 519, No. 1, 1999, p. 104

98 Garret Martin, 'Playing the China Card? Revisiting France's Recognition of Communist China, 1963-1964' in Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 52.

99 Martin, 'Playing the China Card? Revisiting France's Recognition of Communist China, 1963-1964', p. 55.

100 Stephen Erasmus, 'General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking' in The China Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1964, p. 198.

influential, and in the words of the general “no imaginable peace or war took place without China being implicated.”¹⁰² For added drama, de Gaulle did not let any other countries in on his plans to establish relations with China, and most of his own French staff was also unaware of the direction and speed of developments.¹⁰³

During the 1970s and 1980s the bilateral relations developed steadily, and in the spring of 1991, two years after the Tiananmen crack down; France was one of the first countries to resume dealings with Beijing. After his election as President, Jacques Chirac visited China in 1997, and the relations rose to new heights. During his visit France and China established a ‘comprehensive partnership’.¹⁰⁴ The main sources of friction during the 1990s were the recurring French sales of military equipment to Taiwan.¹⁰⁵ During Chirac’s second term in office, the relationship was elevated to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2004. France thus had a closer relationship with China than most other Western countries, resulting, in addition to what is mentioned above, from a number of factors, including reassuring statements from the French that France supports the ‘one China, two systems’ with regards to Taiwan and the relationship was also positively influenced by the French effort to convince other European countries to lift the arms embargo on China.¹⁰⁶ The two countries have overall enjoyed good, although not unproblematic, relations, ushered along by similar stances on various issues, including North

101 Martin, ‘Playing the China Card? Revisiting France’s Recognition of Communist China, 1963-1964’, p. 68.

102 Erasmus, ‘General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking’, pp. 198-199.

103 *Ibid*, p. 200.

104 Cabestan, ‘Relations between France and China: Towards a Paris-Beijing Axis?’, p. 328.

105 Eberhard Sandschneider, ‘China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe’ in The China Quarterly, Vol. 169, 2002, p. 37.

106 Cabestan, ‘Relations between France and China: Towards a Paris-Beijing Axis?’, p. 330.

Korea, Iraq, non-proliferation and multilateralism. Most importantly, according to Li Minjiang, the close cooperation between France and China was based on a shared wish to “make the world more multi-polar and plural than it is today because they think that balancing the US’ overall domination will contribute to alleviating international tensions and solving pending problems.”¹⁰⁷

A recurring issue of annoyance for the Chinese leadership, however, has been the continued French support for the Dalai Lama, yet the relations have remained stable, and in 2007 during a meeting between Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, Wen emphasised the good nature of the relationship between France and China, and highlighted how China’s relations with France have always remained a step ahead of relations with other developed countries.¹⁰⁸ French President Nicholas Sarkozy visited China in November 2007, and ahead of the visit the Chinese media praised the Sino-French relationship, pointing to how “the China-France partnership is based on expansive political consensus, common economic interests, culture of mutual understanding and growing mutual confidence.”¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the media delighted in the fact that Sarkozy had so far “dismissed some of his rivals’ pledge to boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympics during the presidential election campaign and made public his desire to attend the Olympic Games opening ceremony in Beijing in August next year.”¹¹⁰ Further cementing the bilateral relationship was the signing by President Hu Jintao and Sarkozy of \$30 billions worth of trade deals while the French president was in

107 Minjiang Li, ‘China-EU Relations: Strategic Partnership at a Crossroads’ in China: An International Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2009, p. 235.

108 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Wen Jiabao Meets with French Foreign Minister Kouchner’, 31 October 2007, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/gjlb/3291/3293/t378000.htm>, (21.05.2012).

109 China Daily, ‘Sarkozy visit marks new phase in relations’, 26 November 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/international/opinion/2007-11/26/content_1233093.htm, (21.05.2012).

110 China Daily, ‘Sarkozy visit marks new phase in relations’.

China.¹¹¹ There was thus no indication that the Sino-French relations were anything but positive and stable before the Olympic torch relay came to Paris.

4.4 Public Opinion and Sino-France Relations

The Chinese public had traditionally held a very favourable view of France, and when polled in 2007 for the BBC Public Opinion Polls 62 per cent of the respondents said they held a positive view of France's influence globally, while 9 per cent held a negative view of France.¹¹² However, as the events unfolded in Europe, and the internet in China, with its micro blogs, forums and chat rooms, became filled with strong responses to the torch relay, some called the pro-Tibet protesters 'saboteurs' and supporters of the 'Dalai Lama clique.'¹¹³ After the first petitions and calls for boycotts of French products appeared online on forums such as "Tianya", "Xici", "Mop", Sohu on 9 April,¹¹⁴ and after a short period of time the anti-French commentary online had reached two million messages.¹¹⁵ Many French products were targeted, including L'Oreal, Givenchy and Louis Vuitton, Dior, Citroen and Peugeot, but Carrefour bore the brunt of the anger.¹¹⁶

111 Qin Jize, '\$30 b seal French relations', China Daily, 27 November 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-11/27/content_6281479.htm, (21.05.2012).

112 BBC Public Opinion Poll 2007, p. 12, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_ViewsCountries_Mar07_pr.pdf. (23.06.2012)

113 King, 'Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests', p. 182.

114 People's Daily Online, 'Chinese netizen discussion of "boycott on French goods"' <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6392966.html> (23.06.2012)

115 Tony Lee, 'In Search of China's Perception of Europe through the Tibet Incident: Memory, Complex, and Symptoms' in *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2010, p. 139.

116 King, 'Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests', p. 183.

The absence of comments by the Chinese authorities, and the reporting by state media of the protests, can be interpreted as initial tolerance from the government's side of the protests. As the criticism of France grew more widespread online the official media followed suit by voicing the disapproval of the events that took place in Paris. On 15 April, during a regular press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, in what was the first official reaction to the Paris events, explicitly voiced the authorities' understanding of and support for the protests by stating that "some Chinese people have expressed their opinions and feelings recently. All these are by no means accidental, and the French side needs to ponder and reflect upon them."¹¹⁷ As a further criticism of France, Jiang added that the Chinese people's appeals to France were reasonable and that maintaining friendly ties were a two-way effort that the French side had not respected by tolerating incidents that were "incomprehensible and unacceptable" to the Chinese people.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, on April 16 the government hinted support for the protests by noting that "the informal boycott push had merit."¹¹⁹

Up until 19 April, the anti-French activism had primarily been taking place online, except for the report of a lone demonstrator outside a Carrefour store in Beijing and a couple of residents protesting outside Carrefour in Qingdao.¹²⁰ One popular website, netease.com, polled its users about their views of a boycott of French products, in which it found that of 95.4 % of the

117 Xinhua, 'France urged to reflect upon Chinese public's opinions', 16 April 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/international/foreign_ministry/2008-04/16/content_14961174.htm, (10.06.2012).

118 Xinhua, 'France urged to reflect upon Chinese public's opinions'.

119 Voice of America, 'Europeans Weigh Likelihood of Chinese Trade Retaliation', 17 April 2007 (updated 27 October 2009), <http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-04-17-voa35-66643607/557164.html>, (16.06.2012).

120 Keen Zhang, 'Carrefour boycott and sophisticated CNN', 16 April 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-04/16/content_14966297.htm (20.06.2012)

43,880 respondents were in favour of such a boycott.¹²¹ So great was the anti-French anger that a sina.com poll revealed that 90 % of those polled believed that Sarkozy should not be welcomed to Beijing for the Olympics.¹²² On 19 April anti-Western and boycott Carrefour street protests were staged in Beijing, Qingdao, Wuhan, Hefei, Kunming and Xian. On 20 April demonstrations in Xian, Wuhan, Harbin, Dalian and Jinan drew up to 2000 demonstrators.¹²³ There were even small-scale protests at Carrefour stores in Beijing, shouting slogans such as “Oppose Tibet independence,” “Oppose CNN’s anti-China statements” and “Boycott Carrefour”, and in Qingdao, Wuhan and Hefei Carrefour had to close due to the protests.¹²⁴ The demonstrations on this day defied police efforts to disperse demonstrations, as the government, after demonstrations the day before, began to reign in on the public display of anti-foreign attitudes.¹²⁵

The Chinese authorities once again faced the familiar dilemma. While the state enjoyed high levels of support, the leaders worried that the outpouring of nationalist sentiment and protests aimed at foreign countries would negatively impact foreign attendance at the Olympic Games, and possibly harm the long term goals of economic development and modernisation for China.¹²⁶ The Beijing leadership was further worried that the anti-Western sentiment would evolve into anti-government sentiment with a focus on unemployment, inflation and corruption.¹²⁷ The party newspaper People’s Daily

121 King, ‘Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests’, p. 191.

122 Han, Cheong and Stek, ‘Public Diplomacy Between China and the World: The 2008 Olympic Torch Relay, A Test Case’.

123 Japan Today, ‘China urges ‘calm’ as anti-Western protests continue’ 21 April 2008, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/chinese-in-europe-rally-to-protest-biased-reports-on-tibet>, (15.06.2012).

124 Saiget, ‘Fresh Anti-Western Protests Rock China’.

125 *Ibid.*

126 Suisheng Zhao, ‘The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism’, p. 54.

127 Saiget, ‘Fresh Anti-Western Protests Rock China’.

carried a front-page editorial on 20 April urging the Chinese people to express their patriotism rationally and “in an orderly and legal manner.”¹²⁸ The editorial added that “the more complicated the international situation is, the more calmness, wisdom and unity need to be shown by the Chinese people.”¹²⁹

By the end of April the Chinese authorities were actively seeking to dismantle the boycott movement. The authorities began “the delicate work of trying to rein things in without offending the nation's more hot-blooded nationalists” by April 20 and denied extending further permits for demonstrations and websites became more closely monitored and the most severe opinions were censored.¹³⁰ The name of the French supermarket chain ‘Carrefour’ was censored in Google, and some people reported difficulties sending text messages using the China Mobile network if the messages included mentions of ‘Carrefour.’ The Chinese official media, while still praising the patriotism of the people, advised them that they must voice their patriotism in a calm, rational and orderly manner and avoid creating impediments for China’s ‘economic and social modernisation.’¹³¹ Two influential newspapers in Beijing, The Beijing News and China Youth Daily, called on 22 April for the Chinese public to consider less assertive ways of showing their unhappiness with France.¹³² Chinese and French business interests were also involved in trying to dampen the nationalist outcry in China, in the hopes that business relations would not be too badly affected. On 22 April chairman of Carrefour in an interview denied all rumours that the chain supported the Dalai

128 BBC News, ‘China urges ‘rational’ protests’, 20 April 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7357258.stm>, (16.06.2012).

129 BBC News, ‘China urges ‘rational’ protests’.

130 The Economist, ‘China: Manage that anger’, 24 April 2008, <http://www.economist.com/node/11090574>, (14.05.2012).

131 Zhao, ‘The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism’, p. 54.

132 Chua Chin Hon, asiaoneNews, ‘Appeals for calm in China amid French boycott calls’, 23 April 2008 (17 April 2008) <http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Story/A1Story20080423-61437.html>, (22.06.2012).

Lama, and reiterated the company's backing of the Olympic Games in Beijing.¹³³ The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) went on state television to remind the Chinese public that of the 40,000 Carrefour employees in China, 99 per cent were Chinese and 95 per cent of the products that the chain carried were produced in China.¹³⁴ A study shows that the French companies were right to fear the Chinese nationalist protests. James Prieger, Wei-Min Hu, Canhui Hong and Dongming Zhu find that in the period of and after public mobilisation against France in China the market share of French branded cars in China declined. The overall sales losses of French cars became larger as the Olympics approached.¹³⁵ The state-run papers proceeded by encouraging all Chinese people to welcome all foreign friends coming to Beijing for the Olympics.¹³⁶ However, demonstrations continued into the beginning of May, with demonstrations with hundreds of participants outside Carrefour outlets taking place in Changsha, Fuzhou, Beijing, Xi'an, Chongqing, Nanjing, Fuzhou and Xiamen on 1 May.¹³⁷ Despite the efforts of the state-led propaganda system and the restrictions of the internet, popular nationalism was not immediately stopped. There was, however, according to Suisheng Zhao, a shift in the projections of nationalist sentiment away from being anti-foreign.¹³⁸ What did indeed displace the demonstrations from the top of the agenda in China was the tragic earthquake that struck Sichuan province on 12 May, which diverted

133 Xinhua, 'Carrefour chairman: Carrefour supports Beijing Olympics', Xinhua News, 23 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/23/content_8034795.htm, (22.06.2012).

134 Zhao, 'The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism', p. 54.

135 Prieger, Hu, Hong and Zhu, 'French Automobiles and the Chinese Boycotts of 2008: Politics Really Does Affect Commerce'.

136 Zhao, 'The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism', p. 54.

137 Shaoting Ji, Jianmin Li, 'Protests erupt at Carrefour outlets in China' 1 May 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/01/content_8085889.htm, (10.06.2012), and China Daily, 'Hundreds hold rallies at Carrefour', 2 May 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/02/content_6657006.htm, (10.06.2012).

138 Zhao, 'The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism' in China Security, p. 55.

focus almost completely away from the anti-foreign nationalist protests and saw the Chinese rally around the relief effort in Sichuan.

The French and Chinese leaders' efforts to avoid extensive impact of the nationalist demonstrations in China, led to an extensive round of shuttle diplomacy between China and France. First was former Chinese ambassador to France, Zhao Jinjun, who as special representative of Hu Jintao, visited France from 18 to 22 April in order to show the French that China strongly values the relationship between the two countries.¹³⁹ As emissaries to China, Sarkozy sent president of the French Senate, Christian Poncelet, former prime minister and diplomatic advisor to Sarkozy, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and former ambassador to the UN and Washington, Jean-David Levitte visited China from 19 April and onwards.¹⁴⁰ Christian Poncelet, embarked on a five day high level trip to China on April 21, where he delivered a letter of apology to Jing Jin, and relayed President Sarkozy's apologies for the April 7 events and reaffirmed to the Chinese the French position in support of the "one China" with regards to Tibet.¹⁴¹ During a meeting with Hu Jintao, the Chinese president stressed that the Chinese people's feelings had been hurt and pointed out that incidents such as the ones in Paris are not conducive to good Sino-French relations, and expressed hopes that "the French side could face squarely the current problems and work with the Chinese side to eliminate disturbance and properly handle the new situation and new problems of the bilateral ties."¹⁴² Poncelet

139 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 'Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 22, 2008', <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t428243.htm>, (23.06.2012)

140 Steven Erlanger, 'Honor for Dalai Lama by Paris is Provocation, China says' in the New York Times, 22 April 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/world/europe/22iht-france.4.12237319.html>, (14.05.2012).

141 King, 'Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests', p. 190.

142 Xinhua, 'President Hu: China values ties with France, unwilling to see events hurting Chinese feelings' 24 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/24/content_8044081.htm, (22.06.2012).

was photographed bowing and kissing the hand of the unfortunate Chinese torchbearer, the disabled Jin Jing, and this was presented in the Chinese media as “France on its knees before China.”¹⁴³ Commenting on the visit by former French Prime Minister Raffarin to Beijing 25-27 April, a foreign ministry spokesperson expressed Chinese appreciation for France’s efforts to promote the bilateral relations and ‘build up mutual understanding’ between the Chinese and French populations.¹⁴⁴

The public mobilisation against primarily France and impact on Sino-French relations appears to have followed the pattern laid out in Reilly’s *Strong Society, Smart State*. Public mobilisation seemingly originated largely outside the party state, although the Chinese public was invariably influenced by the Olympic mobilisation campaign that the state had successfully orchestrated in the years leading up to the Olympics, similarly to how Reilly finds that the demonstrators participating in protests against Japan have been influenced by the patriotic education campaign.¹⁴⁵ The authorities did not comment on the events in Paris to begin with, and when public mobilisation appeared, they came out in support of the movement. Yet, when mobilisation spread and seemed to begin to threaten wider aspects of China’s foreign relations, the Chinese authorities began to reign in on the demonstrations using measures of persuasion and repression; permissions for further demonstrations were denied and internet censorship increased, and the state controlled media began to appeal to the public to tone down their frustrations at the same time as the authorities tried to explain that continuing the boycott of French products would ultimately harm China, which was the case when officials from MOFCOM on national TV reminded the Chinese that Carrefour

143 Lee, ‘In Search of China’s Perception of Europe through the Tibet Incident; Memory, Complex, and Symptoms’, p. 138.

144 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2008’, 25 April 2008, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/fyrth/t429018.htm>, (22.06.2012).

145 Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State*.

products were produced in China. The period from the start of the mobilisation until the authorities began to reign in on it was very short, reflecting the pressure, which the authorities were under to not have a public relations disaster shortly before the Olympic Games. The Chinese government was determined not to have China's great 'coming out party' spoiled. Moreover, the devastating earthquake that shook Sichuan 12 May 2008 was instrumental in shifting attention away from the anti-foreign public mobilisation and thus diffusing the activism by the Chinese nationalists, which might not otherwise have happened so quickly.

The opinion that the public voiced during the mobilisation, in online forums and during street demonstrations, was one of irritation and disappointment with segments of the Western media for its perceived biased reporting on China and anger at the French reception of the Olympic torch and attempts elsewhere to spoil China's Olympic moment. The demonstrations called for boycotts of French products and boycotts of Western media. These opinions influenced the Chinese authorities by bringing the issue on the agenda, when it appears that the tactic they would have preferred was to ignore the incidents at the torch relay abroad, if it had not been for the public picking up on the events and mobilising against these incidents and in support of the Chinese Olympics. The Chinese government was thus forced to consider the issue and public mobilisation did appear to have an impact on the official rhetoric of China towards France. The relations with France, prior to when public mobilisation picked up after the Paris torch relay, were solid and with no signs of immediate friction, however, as mobilisation mounted, the official government statements were filled with references to how the torch relay incident in France was unacceptable and not good for the China-France relationship, and had seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese population and strongly urged the French government to consider the feelings of the Chinese population and work towards improving the bilateral relations with China. The mobilisation and the tension it created between the two states also precipitated an extensive exchange of high-level visits, as the French and

Chinese leaders aimed to ensure that bilateral relations were not entirely derailed. Business interests were also considered here, giving the extensive calls for boycotts of French products that were part of the public mobilisation. Between 19 and 27 April three high-level visits in the form of Poncelet, Raffarin and Levitt came into Beijing from France, and besides meetings with Hu Jintao, they met with other key senior Chinese state figures. Former Chinese ambassador to France visited the French capital 18-22 April as a special envoy of Hu Jintao to present the Chinese views and get assurance of the French commitment to the bilateral relationship. The mobilisation without a doubt caused a stir in the otherwise historical and largely positive relations between China and France, yet, mobilisation was reigned in before it potentially got out of hand and could have more negatively impacted the relations. Considering alternative explanations for the fall-out in Sino-French relations, the Paris City Council decided on 21 April to award the Dalai Lama with a honorary citizenship for Paris, much to the dismay of the of the central government in France.¹⁴⁶ The decision by Paris City Council was met with strong reactions from China, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson stating in a press conference on 22 April that “this act grossly interferes in China's internal affairs and severely infringes on Sino-French relations, as well as the existing friendly relations between Beijing and Paris in particular,” and further adding that “the Paris city council's awarding at present will be taken as another severe provocation to 1.3 billion Chinese people including Tibetans, and will further encourage the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan secessionists.”¹⁴⁷ This Parisian move did not please the Chinese, however, it happened at a time when the Chinese authorities had initiated the process of ‘de-mobilising’ the public and could therefore not be seen as an initial driver of public mobilisation and the influence of public opinion on bilateral relations. In the demonstrations and boycott activism that

146 New York Times, ‘Paris makes Dalai Lama an honorary citizen’, 22 April 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/world/europe/22iht-france.2.12228237.html>, (26.06.2012).

147 People’s Daily Online, ‘China opposes Parisian award of honorary citizenship to Dalai Lama’, 22 April 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6397072.html>, (22.06.2012).

continued to take place in China after the initial steps by the government to reign in on the activist undertakings, the focus of the public opinion continued to be on the same issues as had initially started the mobilisation; the Dalai Lama's honorary citizenship for Paris was not a major theme among the mobilized public.

4.5 China-Europe Relations

China and the EU (then the European Economic Community (EEC)) established diplomatic relations in 1975 and in 1978 the first trade bilateral agreement was signed. What started out as a primarily a trade related relationship, has since developed to become much more broad and multifaceted, although trade remains an important component. The 1978 trade agreement was upgraded to a more comprehensive one in 1985 with the conclusion of the *EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement*. The first representation of the Commission in China was opened in Beijing in 1988 to further EU trade interests in China. From the mid-1990s the bilateral relationship really started to take off, and more dimensions were added to the relationship.¹⁴⁸ The EU-China human rights dialogue was established in 1995, and after a period of interruption, it was resumed in 1997. Especially the European Parliament is active in monitoring the human rights situation in China. The two sides began holding regular summits from 1998, which more formally broadened the relationship to include political dialogues, and thus elevating the relationship with China to the level that the EU accorded to the relations with the United States, Japan and Russia. In 2001 the EU and China tried to boost bilateral relations further by announcing their intentions of working towards a comprehensive strategic partnership.¹⁴⁹ In early 2000 the bilateral relationship entered what some have

148 Jing Men, 'EU-China Relations: from Engagement to Marriage', EU Diplomacy Papers, Bruges: College of Europe, 2008, p. 5.

149 Bates Gill and Melissa Murphy, 'China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States', Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008, p. 4.

referred to as ‘the honeymoon years’, signified by relatively high common understanding and close interaction. This is witnessed by the fact that during 2003 and 2004, 206 high level officials from the EU conducted visits to China.¹⁵⁰ The EU communication from 2006 *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities* signified a development in EU’s view of China, stating that China had emerged as a great power in economic and political terms, and focused on partnership and cooperation as the way forward for the two parties.¹⁵¹ In 2006 it was agreed to start negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

However, despite the steps taken in recent years to step up bilateral cooperation, by the mid 2000s, friction began to emerge again over various issues of contention in the relationship, propelled in part by the rise to power of a generation of European leaders such as Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Gordon Brown, who held more sceptical views of China.¹⁵² Yet, in a speech given in London in December 2007, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi insisted that despite the difficulties that were evident in the EU-China relationship, it was important that the EU and China continued to move forward and strengthen their partnership, which was in the best interest of both sides.¹⁵³ And despite differences, the *Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit* from November 2007 went on to cover an extraordinary wide range of issues on which China and the EU intended to cooperate, providing a testament to the potential for the relations between the EU and China.¹⁵⁴ The major issues of difference

150 Men, ‘EU-Chin Relations: from Engagement to Marriage’, p. 6.

151 Cameron, ‘The Development of EU-China Relations’, p. 54.

152 Gill and Murphy, ‘China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States’, p. 6.

153 Jiechi, Yang, ‘Work Together to Build a Common Future’, 5 December 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t387186.htm>, (30.05.2012).

154 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit’, 28 November 2007,

between the EU and China include problems that stem from the impact of the US on bilateral EU-China relations, problems resulting from the different political systems in the countries, varying levels of economic development, diverse ideological backgrounds, as well as different approaches to human rights issues. The issue of Darfur and China's relations with certain African states has long posed problems for China's engagement with other, especially European, states. There are also contentious issues related to trade and economics that pose difficulties for the EU and China, namely the EU's large trade deficit, the EU arms embargo on China that was put in place after the Tiananmen crackdown, the EU's claim of limited access to the Chinese market for EU companies, and China's complaint about not being granted Market Economy Status by the EU. These issues at times dominate over the common interests of China and the EU, which include the promotion of multilateralism in international governance, the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the words of a former EU ambassador to China, "relations between the European Union and China have intensified tremendously in recent years... To some extent this is the natural consequence of China's impressive economic growth and increasing importance on the world stage. But substantial impetus for this rapid development also stems from shared interests... In many of these areas China and the EU face similar problems and favour similar approaches to solving them."¹⁵⁵

4.5.1 China and the common European external policy

Although China has been a steady supporter of European integration, the country has also found it difficult to pursue relations with the EU and its member states. The nature of the EU, being an intergovernmental institution comprised of 27 member states that do not always share the same vision for the relationship with China, means that there are complications for the EU and

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t386520.htm>, (30.05.2012).

155 Gill and Murphy, 'China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States', pp. 4-5.

China when conducting bilateral relations. The many institutions and states involved in European foreign policy confuses the Chinese policy makers, who are often unsure of how serious the common foreign policy should be taken.¹⁵⁶ Most notably, the overthrow of the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 could not help but be interpreted by third country partners of the EU that the member states were less keen on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which served to undermine the integrationist project further. When it comes to negotiations over trade and economic related issues, China “knows to whom it talks to and with whom it needs to work out an agreement”, but when it comes to political and security issues, it becomes more diffuse.¹⁵⁷ For the arms sales ban to be lifted, all member states must agree, as this issue fall under the CFSP.¹⁵⁸ Observers argue that China finds that the diffuse decision-making processes in the EU makes the organisation “complex and incomplete as a system of governance” and therefore China in many situations prefer to deal with the individual member states, which are more predictable and have more clear lines of authority.”¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the rotating presidency adds to the confusion about EU policy-making for outsiders and also means that compared to China, the EU has a much shorter time horizon for planning and initiating policies for further cooperation.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, China has reservations about the EU’s “influence and effectiveness as a political entity.”¹⁶¹ China has, according to some, found it hard to relate to the EU because it is not clear what the Europeans expect from China and what they want from a relationship with

156 Mingli Liu, 'Reflection on EU-China Relations' in *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2010, <http://www.cicir.ac.cn/english/ArticleView.aspx?nid=1931>, (02.06.2012).

157 Men, *EU-Chin Relations: from Engagement to Marriage*, p. 17.

158 *Ibid*.

159 European Union Committee of the House of Lords, 'Stars and Dragons: The EU and China', 7th Report of Session 2009-10, 23 March 2010, London, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/76/76i.pdf>, p. 76.

160 *Ibid*, p. 26.

161 *Ibid*, p. 17.

China.¹⁶²

CFSP governed by unanimity for one reason: sovereignty¹⁶³

While the Chinese authorities can be confused and frustrated about the complexity and obscurity of the EU decision-making process, the Chinese side has also found that they can take advantage of the varying views towards China of the EU and the different member states. China has learned to exploit divisions among EU member states and has in instances resorted to treating “its relationship with the EU as a game of chess, with 27 opponents crowding the other side of the board and squabbling about which piece to move.”¹⁶⁴ China knows its strengths and no longer afraid to hide them. Generally the perspectives of China varies greatly among member states; from central European countries who appear more hostile towards China, and to the Mediterranean countries who are rather naïve, to the more sceptical countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries and the UK who tend to hold a more positive view of China.¹⁶⁵ China has recognised that the to deal with Europe most effectively it is necessary to maintain and build relations both with Brussels and with the individual member states. The attention given to the member states versus Brussels has been varied. Before the Maastricht Treaty came into force, China focused mainly on the large European states, but with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty China seems to have been hopeful about European integration and there was a period during which focused more on Brussels. However, the attention has once again turned to the member states.¹⁶⁶ The big three member countries had their own

162 *Ibid*, p. 18.

163 Asle Torje, ‘The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy’ in Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2008, p. 130.

164 John Fox and Francois Godement, ‘A Power Audit of EU-China Relations’, Policy Report, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 3.

165 European Union Committee of the House of Lords, ‘Stars and Dragons: The EU and China’, p. 28.

166 *Ibid*, p.19.

strategic relations with China, while other member states had less interest in bilateral security cooperation with China, thus creating extra work and overlapping exchanges when the EU and member states engage China on similar issues.¹⁶⁷

4.6 European common foreign policy during Chinese public mobilisation

European common foreign policy is defined very broadly in this study, as it refers to entirety of Europe's external relations with China. As mentioned earlier, China appeared to have been taken by surprise by the serious tension that erupted in public in 2008 between China and Europe. The anti-French attitudes prevalent in the spring of 2008 in China also spilled over into wide-scale anti-European and anti-Western sentiment more generally. During the demonstrations and especially in the online protests against Europe in the wake of the torch relay and the debates in Europe about a boycott of the Olympic opening ceremony, there was, amongst Chinese commentators, reference to the 'century of humiliation' in China by the European powers. As one scholar notes, "as the invasion of the eight-power forces had done in the nineteenth century, Europe's alliance against China's Tibet policy once again triggered narcissistic, paranoid, and nationalist symptoms in China, which were evident in its vulnerability to Western criticism, apparent feelings of being surrounded by enemies, suspicion (misperception) of the West, and use of the anti-West movement as a means of self-defense... China again appeared to have been humiliated by the West, as it had been in the past."¹⁶⁸ The Chinese public had traditionally held an overwhelmingly positive view of Europe¹⁶⁹, however the reaction in Europe to the Tibetan riots and the subsequent

¹⁶⁷ Charles Grant 'Can Europe and China shape a new world order?', London: Centre for European Reform, May 2008, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/p_837-611.pdf, pp. 23-24.

¹⁶⁸ Lee, 'In Search of China's Perception of Europe through the Tibet Incident; Memory, Complex, and Symptoms', p. 139.

negative reception of the torch relay in first London and then Paris, and the general anti-Chinese sentiment which was perceived by the Chinese to be pervasive in Europe, disappointed the Chinese populations. As King argues, when the European leaders and the European Parliament began to openly discuss the issue of whether they should boycott the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony they had “inadvertently provided a foundation upon which protesters could mobilise and challenge Sino-European relations.”¹⁷⁰

After the crack down on the Tibetan unrest in March, calls followed in Europe in late March for a boycott of the opening ceremony of the Beijing games. The president of the European Parliament voiced support for the idea, which had originally been voiced by French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, who later backed away from the notion,¹⁷¹ and on 10 April the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the European leaders not to attend the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing.¹⁷² The parliament called for Europe to “find a common EU position with regard to attendance at the Olympic Games opening ceremony” and suggested that European leaders should observe non-attendance in the event that the dialogue between the Tibetan exiled leader Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities were not resumed.¹⁷³ Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu responded to the resolution with a statement in which Jiang said that it “flagrantly distorted the history and

169 Jing, ‘The Clash in Public Opinion between Europe and China: What, How and Why’.

170 King, ‘Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests’, p. 190.

171 Robert Verkaik, ‘Calls for boycott of Olympic opening ceremony’, The Independent, 25 March 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calls-for-boycott-of-olympic-opening-ceremony-800202.html>, (10.06.2012).

172 Oana Lungescu, ‘MEPs call for EU Olympics boycott’, BBC News, 10 April 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7340119.stm>, (02.06.2012).

173 OneNews, ‘EU moots Olympics ceremony boycott’, 10 April 2008, <http://tvnz.co.nz/content/1703279/4042040.xhtml>, (26.06.2012).

modern reality of Tibet, rudely interfered into China's internal affairs, openly supported the secessionist stand of the Dalai Lama, confounded black and white on the violent crimes in Lhasa, groundlessly condemned the Chinese government, deliberately linked the Tibet issue with the Beijing Olympics, and seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people."¹⁷⁴ The call by the European Parliament for a boycott of the ceremony was an attempt to convince the European leaders to take a united stand towards China and try to persuade the Chinese government to pursue serious dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama in the wake of the March Tibetan unrest. However, the resolution sparked fury among the Chinese population and drew great criticism from the Chinese authorities, but the European leaders remained divided on the issue. In the end the UK prime minister Gordon Brown, Germany's Angela Merkel, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, and the Czech president Vaclav Klaus all confirmed that they would not be attending the opening ceremony of the games in Beijing. The French president, who had initially expressed doubt about his attendance, eventually decided to go to Beijing for the opening ceremony, leading some observers to suggest that he was bowing to pressure from China.¹⁷⁵ On this issue, Europe was communicating very mixed messages to the Chinese side, by having the parliament call for boycotts, and the European leaders being divided over whether to follow the Parliaments calls, and in the end Europe failed to make a common stance, as individual member states have different interests they wanted to pursue.¹⁷⁶

Additional Chinese confusion resulted from another EU institution, the

174 People's Daily Online, 'Spokesperson: European Parliament resolution "rudely" interferes into China's internal affairs', 12 April 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6391252.html>, (23.05.2012).

175 Der Spiegel Online, 'Sarkozy Has Lost All Credibility on Human Rights', 23 April 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-sarkozy-has-lost-all-credibility-on-human-rights-a-549172.html>, (27.06.2012).

176 Francois Godement, 'China rising: can there be a European strategy?' in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2008.

Commission, sending different signals than the parliament on the issue of boycotts of the Olympics. From 24 to 26 April president of the Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, came to Beijing along with eight other EU commissioners to attend the first China-EU High-Level Economic Dialogue, which was intended to address differences over issues of trade and economics. During the High-Level Dialogue in Beijing, Barroso voiced his objection to the boycott of the Olympics by saying that “the Olympics must be a celebration for the youth of the world and that it must be a success.”¹⁷⁷ A Chinese scholars’ expectation for the meeting was that it would hold substantial significance, however for different reasons than originally intended, since the main goal of the Dialogue became to “mend the fissure that occurred in the Sino-EU relationship.”¹⁷⁸ The official China appeared to have held the same view as the scholar about the focus of the meeting. In a regular press conference, spokesperson Jiang Yu from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that China looked forward to the Dialogue, but also said with regards to the Tibetan issue that, “we hope that the EU will respect facts and fully understand and support the Chinese Government and people's position on major issues that bear on our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”¹⁷⁹

The common European foreign policy played a role, albeit limited, during the period of public mobilisation in China, but there was not much ‘common’ about the overall European approach. The role, however, only seemed to be able to confirm to Beijing that the EU institutions and the member states in Europe are very divided on approaches to China, as suggested in earlier sections. The European Parliament, being traditionally very occupied with

177 Xinhua, ‘China, EU start up high-level economic, trade dialogue’, 25 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8052180.htm, (01.06.2012).

178 Xinhua, ‘EU leader Barroso visits China with large delegation at special time’, 24 April 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/24/content_8044440.htm, (26.06.2012).

179 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2008’, 25 April 2008, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/fyrth/t429018.htm>, (22.06.2012).

human rights issues in China, did with their resolution address the Chinese government's Tibet policies. However, they had no success in promoting a common line among the member states. Member states took different stances on attendance at the Opening Ceremony, where some stayed away from the Opening Ceremony, but did attend the closing of the Games. The Commission, which is most concerned with trade and economic relations with China, was instead trying to mend ties and dismiss the talks of boycotts during the High-Level Dialogue in Beijing, which went ahead as planned. Europe and China are very dependent on each other for economic success, and already in 2004 they became each other's largest and second-largest trading partners.¹⁸⁰ Liu Mingli argues that most often, even if the EU-China relationship is disrupted, both parties appear to want to minimise the impact on economic cooperation so that neither side suffers economically.¹⁸¹ Despite the protests that called for boycotts of French products, which were the centre of the public mobilisation against France, it appears the boycott calls were limited to French products and not to European products as a whole. And the trade and economic related exchanges at the EU level did not seem to suffer during the period of public mobilisation. The high-level meetings and dialogues, which were planned for the period during where public mobilisation took place in China, went ahead as planned. This included both economic and trade related gatherings, as well as political and human rights in meetings.¹⁸²

5. Discussion and conclusion.

This study finds that public opinion can influence relations between China and France, and that public mobilisation and influence largely follows the pattern that is developed by Reilly in *Strong Society, Smart State*. The evidence

¹⁸⁰ King, 'Online Chinese Nationalism Toward the European Union: Economic and Diplomatic Implications of the Olympic Torch Relay Protests', p. 184.

¹⁸¹ Liu, 'Reflection on EU-China Relations'.

¹⁸² European Union Committee of the House of Lords, 'Stars and Dragons: The EU and China', p. 129.

presented suggests that public mobilisation can be treated as an independent variable, as argued by Reilly, and that the initial tolerance of mobilisation by the Chinese authorities enabled public opinion to influence China's relations with France. It is unclear why the government tolerated, and even supported the mobilisation in the initial week, however, it seems that the Chinese authorities were caught off guard by the negative reception of the torch relay abroad and the anti-foreign mobilisation with which segments of the Chinese population responded at home. The impact on Sino-French relations appeared as the Chinese government used an increasingly harsh and negative rhetoric towards France. However, there is no evidence that the overall long-term foreign policy line of China towards France changed as a result of the public mobilisation. The Chinese government allowed mobilisation for only a short time, which is what Reilly predicts. After letting the public voice their frustrations and anger for about two weeks, the government initiated a campaign of persuasion and repression to reign in on public mobilisation again. Although mobilisation did not die down immediately, the attention of the Chinese public shifted towards the relief effort following the catastrophic earthquake in Sichuan on 12 May. However, the Chinese government had briefly allowed the frustrated segments of the Chinese public to voice their opinions and show their frustrations, which Reilly argues is a characteristic of China as a 'responsive authoritarian state.' This finding suggests support for Reilly's contention that public opinion's ability to influence Sino-Japanese relations is not a case of *sui generis*.

The study further finds through the preliminary exploration of the role of the European common foreign policy, defined for the purposes of this study in a broad manner to encompass all external relations of Europe towards China, that the common foreign policy played a limited role during public mobilisation in China, yet there was not much 'common' about the common foreign policy. The experience of the role of the common foreign policy in this case study thus seems to confirm to the Chinese their perception that Europe so far is not a power to be reckoned with in political terms, although both the European and

the Chinese sides would not want to see the economical and trade aspects of the relationship disturbed. Given the growing importance of China internationally, and the developments in European integration, further exploring the role of the common European external policy towards China should prove interesting.

Despite launching the comprehensive strategy in 2003, many scholars argue that the Sino-EU relationship is strategic merely by name.¹⁸³ Although, as the overview of the development of EU-China relations can attest to, more political dimensions have been added to the overwhelmingly economic driven relationship between China and Europe, it remains the high level of economic dependency between the two parties that drive the relationship forward. Therefore it is trade and economic considerations that form the cornerstone of the entire Sino-European bilateral relationship.¹⁸⁴ For China and the EU to achieve strategic partnership, it would, according to Gustaf Geeraerts, require that the two sides reach “a pragmatic consensus on how to gradually turn joint strategic interests into more result-driven cooperation.”¹⁸⁵ Moreover, there appears to be no long-term vision, from either side, for the relationship. The definition of the relationship is in constant flux, and has been denoted a ‘comprehensive partnership’, ‘maturing partnership’, as well as a ‘strategic and enduring partnership.’¹⁸⁶ Compared to the bilateral relations between China and the US and China and Japan, where Taiwan and war-time atrocities

183 Jonathan Holslag, ‘The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership’ in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011, p. 295.

184 Feng Zhongping, ‘A Chinese perspective on China-European relations’ in Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), ‘Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia’, Chaillot Paper no. 109, May 2008, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 77.

185 Gustaf Geeraerts, ‘China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity’ in *European Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011, p. 64.

186 Xiudian Dai, ‘Understanding EU-China Relations: An Uncertain Partnership in the Making’, Centre for European Union Studies, University of Hull, Research Paper 1/2006, p. 11.

respectively, have a strong influence on the relations, the EU-China relations lack such issues that define their relationship.¹⁸⁷ “In the balance between multilateralism and multipolarity, the notion of a Chinese-European convergence of views is underpinned by much ambiguity. Europe is not a major strategic actor in East Asia because it does not share military responsibilities in the region’s hot spots.”¹⁸⁸

The Chinese government acknowledges that there is no vital conflict of interest between China and the EU, since neither side poses an existential threat to the other. The basis of collaboration between the EU and China is found instead in the common ground between the two parties, the institutionalised cooperation mechanisms and “the commitment of the leadership to engaging with each other and to working together to promote international peace and security.”¹⁸⁹ Given the limited ‘depth’ and strategic aspects of the Sino-European relationship, it is interesting to find that the Chinese felt so strongly and mobilised against France. What gets the Chinese public mobilised provides an interesting topic for further research. As discussed above, the Sino-European relationship does not appear to have the same ‘depth’ and ‘breadth’ and therefore not the resulting inherent controversies, which can bring about strong reactions from the Chinese public. The case studied here appears to be the only incident of anti-foreign public mobilisation of this scale in recent years that has not involved the United States and Japan. In this case, the combination of the upcoming Olympic Games, which had come to be viewed with great importance by China and by the Chinese public, and the Tibetan dimension, which brought into the picture one of China’s ‘core interests,’ was ‘enough’ to set off public mobilisation.

187 *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.

188 Francois Godement, ‘The EU and China: a necessary partnership’ in Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), ‘Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia’, Chaillot Paper no. 109, May 2008, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 63.

189 Men, *EU-Chin Relations: from Engagement to Marriage*, p. 18.

However, the right mechanisms and opportunities also need to be present for public mobilisation to happen. Despite the enormous economic, social and political developments that have taken place in China in the past decades, and which have served to greatly diversify China, it is still very much a state controlled society. Yun Sun highlights how the Chinese party-state still holds immense power over information flow and thus also public opinion formation in China, and therefore one must be careful when examining “the causal links in any assessment of public opinion as a force driving Chinese foreign policy.”¹⁹⁰ Yet the importance of the internet as not only a tool for the dissemination and sharing of information, but also for organisation of protests and demonstrations, as has been described above, has the potential to be an influential factor in shaping public opinion. Moreover, increasing numbers of Chinese expatriates and students studying abroad, stay connected with friends and family at home via the internet, and filter information back into China through micro blogs and internet forums. And in contrast to a few decades ago, many overseas Chinese are not critical to the same extent of the Chinese government, as many earlier emigrants who left China for example after the Tiananmen crackdown. These patriotic overseas Chinese appeared to play an important role in initiating mobilisation in the case in the spring of 2008. Sautman and Ying, in their study of demonstrations in other countries by overseas Chinese, point to the fact that the 2008 demonstrations “represent a new kind of Chinese overseas activism that is relatively autonomous, but at the same time is not anti-government.”¹⁹¹ The influence of these developments; the changing Chinese diaspora, the developments of the internet and the growing European integration and China-EU relations, on bilateral relations and on the willingness and ability of the Chinese public to mobilise and thereafter to

190 Yun Sun, ‘Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?’, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary No. 55, The Brookings Institution, December 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1213_china_public_opinion_sun.aspx (16.12.2011).

191 Sautman and Ying, ‘Public Diplomacy from Below: The 2008 “Pro-China” Demonstrations in Europe and North America’, p. 10.

potentially influence the foreign policy of China towards other countries are interesting lines of further research.

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