THESIS

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Taming the Media Beast:

The Effects of Media Commercialization in Personalist and Military Regimes

Abstract

In authoritarian regimes, media is often suppressed and information is reduced to a uniform message so it is of no threat to the regime. In the last two decades, the general rise of media technology and the increase of commercial media sources has made increasingly difficult for autocratic regimes to control the information flow that reaches society.

Looking at all authoritarian regimes in the world, one can observe a positive relationship between media marketization and the plurality of information output in the media. However, there are major differences among autocratic states.

Based former literature, we expected differences to be explained by different ruling bases of personalist and military regimes. I found that personalist regimes are better in controlling the media than military regimes, because of a stronger motivation, better patronage networks and a more effective state apparatus. Thus personalist regimes are significantly better in keeping the media output uniform, despite media marketization.

It is well-known that many authoritarian regimes are not eager of free and plural media, because these media have a tendency to display diverse political information. When this information reaches society it could possibly harm the authority of the regime and/or destabilize the regime's power position. Hence, controlling the media flow is important for dictators, because it enhances authoritarian stability and survival. Therefore, the success of authoritarian governments to keep political information uniform can be seen as a *virtue* of autocratic regimes. For a long time, dictatorships have been able to control political information through direct ownership of media; so called state-media. However, since the 1970's, in most authoritarian regimes the media markets have been opened-up (Stockmann, 2012: 2). So called *media marketization* has been increasing because of political, economic and technological

pressures. This increase of media marketization is generally associated with an increase of plural information in the media output. Nevertheless, media marketization has not the same liberalizing effect[1] in all autocratic states. Moreover, it could be expected that differences among countries are not random, and can be explained by regime type. Geddes (1999) has argued in her path breaking work that *military*, *personalist* and *single-party* regimes differ in their capacity to cope with exogenous and internal threats. Based on this tripartite regime type classification, Stockmann (2012) showed that in single party regimes (juxtaposing it to military and personalist regimes) are better in coping with media marketization: the positive relationship between media marketization and the diversity of political information disappeared. Thus these regime types are better able to control the information flow in the media, despite media marketization. At the same time, in the group of military and personalist regimes[2], the effect was still strongly present. Nonetheless, it is not very unlikely that there are strong differences between personalist and military regimes as well. Existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, showed that they differ in several governing areas on their policies and policy outcomes. The possibility that military regimes also differ from personalist regimes in their media control should be explored. It is exactly this paper's goal to do so. The research question is therefore as following:

Both in countries with personalist and military regimes there is a positive relationship between media marketization and the plurality of media. Is the effect in military regimes different from personalist regimes?

If yes, how large is this difference and how can this difference be explained?

[1] Diversification of political information

[2] This group consisted of all non-single party regimes. Based on Geddes' (1999) three-partite division, I assume that the rest-group consists of military and personalist regimes (and of course in-between amalgams). Many scholars such as Slater 2003, Hadenius and Torrell (2007), Ghandi 2008, would argue that this group consists of other/more regime types than military and personalist regimes. They maintain that Geddes' (1999) regime categorization is wrong or at least not complete. This debate will be discussed later in this work, thereby arguing why I follow Geddes' original coding.

In this equation media marketization and media plurality are respectively the independent and dependent variable. For their operationalization, the IREX' Media Sustainability Index (MSI) will be used. The data on regime types will be adopted from Geddes' (2003) list of regime categorizations. All data are provided by Stockmann (2012), although some cases were added.

Before starting the empirical analysis, this paper starts with elaborating on the role of the media in the process of democratization and thereby its effect on authoritarian resilience. Subsequently, it will be explained why authoritarian countries differ in the control of media output. This will reveal the scholarly blind spots of authoritarian resilience. Accordingly, it will show how these gaps should be filled; thereby more elaborately evincing the relevance of this inquiry. Then, the main hypotheses will be lied down and elucidated. This will be followed by the empirical testing of the hypothesis. This analysis will include 29 authoritarian countries from Europe, Central Asia, Africa, Middle-East and Southern American regimes.

Literature review and Theory

Before elaborating the literature on media in authoritarian regimes, let us first define the concept *authoritarian regime*. This thesis will define countries as authoritarian when they do not live up to the standards of democracy, thereby using Huntington's (1991) definition of democracy, namely: "*the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes*" (p. 7). The words *free* and *fair* are in this case very important. It presupposes that just elections are not enough to be democratic. Thus, regimes that are "ambiguous" or "hybrid" could also be included into the group of

non-democratic regimes[3]. Therewith, I follow Larry Diamond's (Diamond, 2002: 26) definition and coding of authoritarian regimes: all regimes that do not score between 1.0 and 2.0 (i.e. >2.0) on the Freedom House[4] scale are not considered democracies.[5] Using this scoring, 62% of the countries in 2001 were non-democratic or authoritarian (Diamond, 2002).

Media and Democractization

Research on media in authoritarian regimes was often approached from a democratization view. The idea was that modernization, driven by economic development, would drive countries eventually towards democracy. As Lipset (1959) put it "*The more well-to-do a country, the greater chances that it will sustain democracy*" (p.75). Lipset was also one of the first to recognize the influence of media on democratization. He argued that the chances of becoming and remaining a democracy are better in affluent countries, *particularly* where the rise of wealth is accompanied with general access to mass media. The positive effect of mass media on democratization is attributed to its effect on civil society. According to Norris and Inglehart (2009), media have a positive "… *impact upon attitudes at the heart of civic engagement, exemplified by social tolerance confidence in political institutions, as well as the involvement in practices such as voting turnout, political activism and protest politics.*" Therefore, mass media strengthen social capital, essential for democracy.

In autocracies, independent media thank their democratization strength to the fact that they can be destructive for authoritarian survival. According to Egorov et al.

[3] For an elaborate discussion, see Diamond (2002: 21-29)
[4] www.freedomhouse.org
[5] I also chose this because Dani Stockmann (Stockmann, 2012) chose the same cut-off point using Diamond (2002). She provided me with her data which I have used for this thesis.

(2010), an important aspect of authoritarian regimes is the fact that the preferences of the regimes do not match the majority of preferences of the population. Or at least the regime's preferences would conflict if citizens would have the space to develop their own ideas and preferences about how the country should be ruled (Schedler, 2002). In fact, one of the main reasons that autocratic regimes are assumed to be non-democratic is because they know they will lose the democratic struggle for power: free and fair elections (Egorov, 2010). In democracies, leaders rule because the people have tacitly accepted the system through which the leadership is chosen, namely: elections (Linz and Stepan, 1996). This creates accountability and responsiveness. To stay in power, democratic leaders have to satisfy at major part of the population, because citizens influence the fate of the leadership. People in democratic countries can hold leaders accountable for their ruling; they can punish bad leadership and reward good leadership. Accountably makes leaders responsive to the demands and preferences of the population. Moreover, interaction between the electorate and politicians creates a system through which politicians get feedback about those societal preferences, which gives democratic governments a better view of what society wants from them (Wintrobe, 1998). Thus, democracy does not just make leaders more *willing* to be responsive to the people; it makes them more *able* to be responsive.

On the contrary, authoritarian leaders do not have to fear that they will lose office through elections, so they have less direct incentives to be responsive to the entire population's preferences. They most often lose their power when regime loyalists/elites turn against them or, more rarely, when the population successfully revolts against the regime (Geddes, 1999) Therefore, authoritarian leaders have more interest in satisfying the incumbent elites they need for their survival and building a

strong security apparatus to control possible societal opposition (Ulfelder, 2005). Moreover, even if authoritarian regimes would want to follow the people's will, they are often not able to do so, because of the lack of societal feedback (Wintrobe, 1998). They lack the democratic institutions, such as elections, that could provide this feedback. Additionally, people in authoritarian countries are often afraid that critique on the regime will result in punishment. Though, this problem varies among different regimes. Some dictatorships surely have channels through which they get societal feedback. Single-party autocracies such as China and Soviet Russia obtain(ed) feedback via their regime party (Stockmann 2012, Remmington 2010). Also, in electoral authoritarian states, (non-competitive) elections could be used to poll the population's opinions (Schedler 2002, Magaloni 2006). Nevertheless, we can assume that authoritarian countries are still less able to know the population's preferenes and, more importantly, less willing to be responsive to the people. Considering this, one can assume that the conflict of preferences between government and population is much bigger in authoritarian countries than in democracies.

Hence, one can expect that free and plural media will contribute to autocratic breakdown in two ways. Firstly, independent media can delegitimize autocratic regimes by providing objective information about the regime's policy and behavior. This will open 'Pandora's Box'[6] and make the population aware of the aforementioned conflict of interest between government and population. When regimes are more abusive of their population (and the countries' resources) the effect will obviously be stronger[7]. Moreover, international media are capable of

[6] Expression that means: starting/revealing something that unleashes process of evil or chaos that cannot be undone once it has started. Thus plural media opens pandora's box from the dictators perspective.

[7]To illustrate this: In 2006 a video of the ostentatious wedding of the Burmese leader's daughter was put on youtube. This resulted into anger and upheaval in the country (Press: The Guardian 3-11-2006). This wedding video showed a lavish party with champagne fountains, million dollar cars, diamonds

delegitimizing autocratic regimes through the spread of democratic (and Western) values into non-democratic countries, "*thereby it strengthens reform movements, grassroots activist and public support for democratic reform*" (Norris and Inglehart, 2009: 1 Ch. 9) When democratic elections are held in Ghana it may contaminate opposition forces in, for example, Zimbabwe to demand such rights as well (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). As people see that more freedom is possible in culturally and politically 'close' states, they will tend to believe it is possible in their own country as well.

Secondly, the media provide the soil for opposition and protest against the regime. Lerner (1964) was one of the first to implicitly recognize this. He argued that plural and free media have a democratizing effect on society because it stimulates political participation of civil society. Therefore, it creates a better societal source for possible opposition and revolutions. It is therefore not surprising that when countries have witnessed strong civil freedom in the past, it tends to be harder for the regime to suppress their population and to stay in power (Gandhi, 2008). Huntington (1991) also showed that media, particularly television, mobilized Eastern European citizens to protest against their regime during the late nineties. Television signaled problems with the totalitarian regimes, and more important, it showed that more people were dissatisfied with the regime; television took people out of their isolation; one could see that other people were also willing to protest against the regime. Thus, media is not only able to make the bad performance of a regime commonly known; it makes it common knowledge, which is critical for a revolutionary overthrown of a regime (Egorov et al., 2010). Revolutions have a coordination problem, because people will

and "well-fed smiling guests in their finest clothing". Since Burmese population lives under severe poverty, the furious reaction on such video was logical. When, for example, such video of a Singaporean official's wedding was leaked, there would be probably hardly any anger, considering the affluence of the Singaporean population.

only participate when they know that others will do the same. The media can help overcome this coordination dilemma (Egorov et Al. 2010. Chwe 2003, Persson and Tabellini 2006, Tilly 1978). Thus, free and independent media can -and often will- be very destructive for authoritarian regimes.

Media Control

However, media are not necessarily negative for authoritarian stability/survival of a country. Media can be used as an instrument of authoritarian control. Authoritarian regimes create restrictive media environments for two reasons. Firstly, providing for regime-positive news or propaganda and, secondly, suppressing dissent (Norris and Inglehart, 2008: 3). Both will be elaborated below.

In almost every autocratic regime we can witness some propaganda that is aimed at glorifying the regime and its leaders, often broadcasted on state television (Lynch, 1999). If negative information about the regime circles in civil society, the state can use its state media to display counter messages. In general, autocratic regimes use media to gloss over negative aspects of its rule (Lynch, 1999).

Propaganda could also help a dictator to prevent, or crash, revolutions of the population for two reasons. Firstly by showing in the media that the regime's strength is so overwhelming that opposition forces and protesters do not have a chance. Secondly, state (related) media can continually image regime-supportive civilians, from which many could get the image that there is no support for a regime overthrow, therewith worsening the collective action dilemma of a revolution. However, when people are aware of the fact certain media are owned by the regime, many civilians could duly question the credibility of these state media (Stockmann, 2012). Therefore, one should not overestimate this effect.

Nonetheless, Norris and Inglehart (2008) argued that propaganda could influence people's attitudes. In their research they looked at four countries (Iraq, Vietnam, China and Russia) in which the media are severely restricted and supportive of the regimes. In these countries they argued that people that where regularly exposed to television and radio were more nationalist and more supportive of the regime than other people. They additionally found these same people had more negative values towards democratic values. They tested this mechanism also for three democratic countries (The Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago and Finland) and found that it has no effect in these free and plural media environment. Consequently, Norris and Inglehart (2008) argued that their observed correlation showed that propaganda influences attitudes of the population. However, their research cannot differentiate whether people's attitudes were being influence or already existent. Many political psychology scholars would empathize with the latter. From "selective exposure theory" it is argued that people will avoid information that conflicts with their ideas and beliefs, and, at the same time, will embrace information that is in accordance with one's own beliefs (See, Tichenor 1970, Donohew and Palmgreen 1971, Klapper 1960, McGuire 1968, Jonas et al. 2005). As a result, people that are more supportive of the regime will be more likely to watch programs that glorify the nation and regime. At the same time, there is a large amount of researchers that questions the role of selective exposure theory[8]. According to Zaller (1992) *"Most people…are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking behavior that they will expose themselves only to ideas that they find congenial"*.

Whether or not propaganda will effectively affect people's attitudes remains a complex debate. Nevertheless, authoritarian regimes will use it to more or lesser extent (Linz, 2000).

[8] For the entire debate, see Stroud (2008).

Oppressing dissent

Authoritarian regimes will try to eliminate media coverage that could have the opposite effect; media coverage that changes attitudes towards the regime negatively. Therefore it is important for authoritarian regimes to keep the flows of political information as uniform as possible. This could be done through the oppression of independent and commercial media. This rigorous way of keeping the information flow uniform, can be witnessed in the more suppressive autocracies. According to Levitsky and Way (2002), in these "…*full-blown autocracies, the media are entirely state-owed, heavily censored and [if necessary] systematically repressed … [and] journalists who provoke the ire of the government risk arrest, deportation, and even assassination*" (p. 57). In some authoritarian countries, such as Cuba, independent media are officially forbidden by law. In other countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, media are de facto prohibited (Levitsky and Way, 2002). These highly suppressive regimes (in contrast to the more 'open' autocracies[9]) tackle possibly negative information output by the roots of the media system. Thus, in these highly oppressive countries (e.g. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Cuba etc.) we can hardly speak about media marketization. Answering the question 'How do these regimes deal with media marketization?' is quite simple: preventing any media marketization in the first place.

However, in this paper we research the different outcomes of the relationship between media marketization and media plurality under different regime conditions. This supposes that there is actually media marketization in authoritarian countries, but that the regime is able to influence the effect of marketization on plurality of the news flow. Indeed, apart from some rare exceptions, we can see media marketization in many autocratically ruled countries. Most authoritarian governments allow (some)

[9] States that allow some political and/or civil freedom, which Diamond (2002) calls "hybrid regimes".

independent and commercial media. Still, these independent and commercial media are everything but free. There are several ways to prevent commercialized media from covering political plural information.

Firstly, governments can make laws that proscribe how the media should operate, even though most authoritarian regimes have a constitution that ensures civil freedoms, including media freedom. Under the guise of “national “interest” or “national security” countries make rules that restrict the space of operating. In the case studies chapter in the end of this paper, we can see that almost all African autocracies have liberal constitutions, but nevertheless use the “national interest” or similar arguments[10] to prohibit certain information from diffusing. There are several ways to bypass the constitution. In Russia for example, president Putin appoints the constitutional court (White et al., 2010). Often, this is also the case in democratic regimes (for example in The United States). However, in democracies there is a culturally and institutionally founded independency between the judicial power and the political powers. In many autocratic countries, in this example Russia, there is no such balance. The law often works an instrument of power rather than a check on power (White et Al., 2010). In many other authoritarian regimes we can also witness a general weakness in the judicial area, which gives regimes the possibility to control the media through the legal system (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Herewith regimes can forbid information that they find “threatening” to the aforementioned interests. Moreover, governments often put pressure on media stations not to provide platforms to opposition movements (Schedler, 2002). This could be done by directly threatening with the closure of a media station. Another way is to tag opposition parties as illegal; this consequently criminalizes media that are providing a platform for these opposition parties.

[10] See: African Media Barometer (AMB)

Punishment of the media and its journalists for infringing the regimes' law and unofficial rules are multifarious and partly depend on the level of authoritarianism. Firstly, regimes could withdraw media licenses from media stations or journalists when they offend the rules. Secondly, government agencies could give fines to media enterprises or put them under a unfair and expensive tax regime. Thirdly, government owned or government related companies often dominate the advertising market. This makes the media financially dependent on those advertisers. Withdrawing these advertisement contracts could therefore cause the bankruptcy of media companies. According to the African Media Barometer, most African media companies strongly dependent on state-related advertising. Fourthly, the state could use more radical measures to enforce compliance, such as imprisonment, harassment and sometimes even murder (Source: Irex)[11]. These violent moves are often not officially implemented by government agencies, but by paramilitary groups. According to Irex analists, is it often hard to prove whether or not government official are responsible for these acts of violence. But considering the motives of the regime in certain cases, and the lack of protection of journalists, we could assume that the government has, at least, some responsibility in many of the cases. Finally, and most importantly, regimes can create an environment of informal rules in which journalists and media companies know that overstepping certain boundaries is not completely safe. This creates self-censorship within the media (Becker 2004, Graham-Jones 2000, Kalathil 2001).

The effect of these latter punishments depends on how effectively the regime is in scrutinizing the media. Many regimes have monitoring agencies that decide whether information is allowed or not. Moreover, monitoring agencies can trace offenders.

[11] www.irex.org

Finally, one of the most effective ways of keeping in control of the media is patronage. In other words, regimes put government personnel or regime supporters on important media positions. When this is successful, these patrons can internally discipline journalists and make sure no negative information reaches society. Moreover, this patronage system allows regimes to use these media as pseudo state media; therefore it can be used to spread propaganda. The advantage is that propaganda works more effectively in commercial media, because people see these media as more credible (Stockmann, 2012).

Thus, containing the possible dangers of marketized media is difficult and requires a lot of effort and "incumbent capacity"[12]. Therefore regimes need a network of loyal elites that could be used to implement the policies that are used for media control. Later on, it will be explained why personalist regimes are assumed to be better at this.

Variation in media freedom

Before discussing why regime type matters, let us first explain why media freedom differs among countries. In general, these differences are connected to the state's capacity and willingness to control the media system. Former literature has identified several specific reasons, including the following seven arguments.

Firstly, allowing media freedom could help a regime's international viability (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Upwards of the WWII, the international community has had a strong bias towards liberal values, including press freedom (Janos, 2000). Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: "*Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold*

[12] Way (2005): A term that refers to the capability of governments to implement policies and reach the periphery of society with its policy.

opinions without interference and seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (in: Norris and Inglehart, 2008) The general denunciation of media oppression (and other form of authoritarianism) caused by the current democratic hegemony, places big constraints on authoritarian governments that want to be respected internationally. Although this argument is very eloquent, one could question its validity. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt seem to have suffered little from their highly non-democratic rule. Both, especially Saudi Arabia, have been strong allies of the United States, despite their practical denunciation of democracy (Hart, 1998). It seems that countries that are able to offer something else[13], are not repelled because of their lack of democracy. Nevertheless, we could expect that the level of press freedom can be influenced by countries' international desires.

Secondly, and related to the former, allowing media freedom could enhance internal and external legitimacy (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Many recent authoritarian regimes want to become more legitimate by creating some democratic (looking) institutions; most autocratic regimes have some form of elections nowadays (Diamond, 2002). Countries use these elections to keep up the façade of democracy. By pretending they are democratically chosen by the people, they hope to gain internal and external support for their rule. Regimes could liberalize the media system for the same reasons.

Thirdly, propaganda through commercial and (seemingly) independent media could work better. Stockmann (2012) showed for China that political messages, covered in commercial media, were assessed as more credible than information in state media. Consequently, if a regime is able to infiltrate commercial media and make

[13] Saudi Arabia has been a strategic ally of the Americans because of their oil-trade relationship and military-strategic relationship.
Egypt has been favored because of their positive stance towards Israel

them propagandize the regime, this course of action should be preferred over propaganda through state media, because the former works more effectively.

Fourthly, it has financial benefits to allow media marketization (Stockmann, 2012). A flourishing media industry could yield large (tax) profits and provide for numerous jobs. Generally, commercial media are better able to appeal to the people, because attracting consumers is their main drive (Stockmann, 2012). Therefore, a marketized media industry has more potential to grow and gain more profits. Additionally, the privatization of state media could enlarge the state treasury. On the short term by the profits gained from selling of media assets and on the longer term by reducing the costs of having state media.

Fithly, and adding to the former section, in countries with high amount of natural resources or “unearned income” there is less diversity in the media output and less media freedom (Egorov et al., 2010). In resource-rich countries, regimes have lesser incentives to allow free and plural media compared with countries that are not endowed with natural wealth. In resource poor countries, free and independent media could play a positive role for the authoritarian regime. Namely, commercial media can help a dictator in his control over the bureaucracy (Egorov et Al., 2009). When societies are closed, it is difficult to assess how well policy is implemented by the leadership’s subordinates. A possible solution is the use of a monitory agency (for example an intelligence service) to control bureaucrats, but this will often not be effective because of the collusion between bureaucrats and those agencies in these societies. To prevent this, a regime could create a system of competing agencies to monitor each other. Nevertheless, this is very costly and not always effective. Corruption in authoritarian regimes is often rampant and the difficulty of combatting this corruption shows that monitoring agencies cannot solve these problems always

(Kaufman, 2006). For resource poor countries, that do not have the abilities to set up a costly monitoring network, free and commercial media could be the solution. Independent media are well-able to reveal the performance of bureaucrats. Therewith, independent media can discipline the bureaucracy, because bureaucrats know disobedience could come easily to daylight. Kleimann (2005) explained how independent and free commercial media could have helped the Chinese government in combatting the SARS disease in the period 2002-2003. Kleinmann exposes how the local and lower bureaucracies did not adequately react to the outbreak of this disease. In fact, officials did not react at all, they tried to conceal or transferring the SARS cases, thereby worsening the problem. Free media could have been an incentive for the bureaucracy act appropriately.

Sixthly, and parallel with the former argument, commercial media can be used to eliminate corruption. Kaufman (2006) and Reinikka & Svensson (2005) have shown that corruption declines under the influence of free media. Moreover, combatting corruption could enhance the international position of a country. There is a strong normative pressure on from the international community to fight corruption. Therefore, to attract international support and investment, countries need to combat (or at least show that they try) combat corruption. Many investment/developmental banks, such as World Bank, give loans only on the condition that the borrowing regime shows it makes an effort to fight corruption (Huther and Shah, 2000). For this reason, autocratic leaders could consider to open up the media system.

Finally, the access of foreign media and new media can make some media system more plural and free. These media are often hard to control for dictators (Lynch, 2011). The difference in supply of international television channels can strongly differ from country to country (and region to region). Language plays an

important role. In most countries in the Middle East the population speaks (some Arabic); therefore channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al Arabia could transmit the message to many countries in the Arabic world. In contrast, in a country such as, for example, Vietnam, satellite television cannot play a big role since there are no relevant international channels that can transmit their message in the Vietnamese language[14]. Thus, in areas where there is more relevant satellite television access, media plurality rises automatically. The same goes for new media on the internet. These media can, apart from marketization, duly influence the plurality of media output (Lynch, 2011). Since internet media have extremely low distribution costs (one only needs a website), their dynamics should be significantly different from media marketization. The latter process is based on the fact that changing financial incentives change the media output. Because of the distinctiveness of new media processes, this will not be included in this research, even though it would be very relevant.

Regime Type

The former mainly explained why exogenous factors (/limitations) cause differences in media freedom among different states. There is, however, little research that investigates how the nature of authoritarian rule, namely regime type, influences the resilience to the increasing media marketization. Despite the fact that various scholars have shown that regime types matter a lot, at least for democratization and authoritarian breakdown. Geddes (1999) was the first to recognize the importance of regime types. She showed in her highly influential work "*What do we know about*

[14] Admittedly, some Vietnamese speak some English or Cantonese.

democratization after twenty years", that military regimes, personalist regimes and one-party regimes survive respectively 8.5, 15.0 and 22.7 years. It was argued that the nature of the regime and its ruling base makes some regime-types intrinsically stronger than other types. The results of Geddes' (1999) seminal work suggest that the ruling base of autocracies has a big influence on their survival rate. If so, it should also have influence on other aspects of political life in these countries. This inspired several other scholars to study aspects of political life based on regime-type categorizations, including Przeworski (2000), Boix (2003), Smith (2005), Ulfelder (2005), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), Geddes (2006), Brownlee (2007), Wright (2008) and Pepinsky (2008). Although not always following Geddes' tripartite classifications, these latters examined the nature of authoritarian rule to explain political life. They mainly studied authoritarian regimes from a democratization (-related) approach; thereby primarily focusing research on explaining authoritarian change or stability and the different paths to democratization. Besides scholars that describe the stability and change of authoritarian regimes, there are also researchers that looked at the impact of regime types on government quality and policy outcomes (Persson and Tabellini 2003, Sung 2004, Keefer 2007, Bäck & Hadenius 2008, Charron & Lapuente 2010).

Unfortunately, hardly any research has combined the knowledge about the authoritarian regime types with the literature on media control in non-democratic countries. The scarce exception is Stockmann (2012). She compared single-party regimes with all other authoritarian (non-single party) regimes and found that single-party regimes are not more successful in general regime survival (see, Geddes 1999), but that these regimes are better in keeping commercialized and independent media uniform[15]. Considering the possible negative effects of plural political

[15] Uniformly positive about the regime

information in the media, we can say the regimes are 'more successful' in managing the media[16]. She tested this by looking at the relationship between media marketization and the plurality of (political) information in the media. Overall, when media marketization rises, the information output in the media becomes more plural as well. In single-party regimes, however, the effect partly vanished. Therewith she showed that one-party regimes are better able to keep the media output uniform.

However, no distinction was made *within* non-single-party regimes, namely: personalist and military regimes. This leaves us with gap in the literature on media and regime types. This research will attempt to empirically and theoretically clarify this blind spot in literature.

Based on the implication of previous research on personalist and military regimes, we could expect differences between these two regime types. The following will explain why, and in what direction, we expect differences between personalist and military regimes in coping with media marketization.

Personalist regimes

Personalist regimes can be distinguished by the fact that they are ruled by one single person. Many personalist regimes could appear as military or single-party regimes, because the leader uses the military or a party to rule the country[17], however, the fact that is no other institution or person, besides the leader, that has independent power over government policy and the recruitment of state officials, makes them personalist (Geddes, 1999). Nevertheless, there are often still other powerful people within

[16] Additionally, Stockmann (2012) found that the Chinese government was able to use the commercial media to their benefit: increasing popular support and improving policy of local governments.

[17] For example, the authoritarian Libyan regime of Kadhafi could began as military regimes, but evolved in personalist regime along the way as the regimes revolved eventually around the leader. In addition, communist Romania started as a single-party (communist party) regime but eventually the country was ruled by the decree of one person: Ceausescu.

personalist regimes; however the power of these people can be ended any time when the leader wishes so. The state can be considered as an extension of the individual leader (Charron and Lapuente, 2010).

Unlike other regimes, personalist regimes cannot lean on ready-made institutions, such as military regimes have the army as institutions. Therefore, the ruling base of personalist leaders consists of cliques: relatively small groups of elites based on family, tribe, ethnicity, friendship, kin-ship etc. (Geddes, 1999).

These cliques of "followers" are kept satisfied by a bargain between them and the leaders. They are being fed by the spoils of being the leader's protectorate (Charron and Lapuente, 2010). This positive discrimination of the regime followers is often in stark contrast with the rest of the population (Linz and Stepan, 1996). This antagonizing policy of "divide and rule" creates a loyal group of followers, from which the dictator has little to fear (Ulfelder, 2005). The regime elites are so embedded into the personalist regime, there is no post-regime life for them possible. Therefore, they either "have to swim with, or drown" (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 86). The absoluteness of the elite's status (tribe, ethnicity, language, familiy etc.) makes it almost impossible to switch sides during a revolution against the leader[18], because people will recognize them as regime loyalists. Thus, personalist regimes are not vulnerable to internal splits and, moreover, their loyalist-elites are often prepared to fight until the bitter end.

Whereas personalist regimes are not particularly vulnerable for internal splits, they should fear for opposition in the population, since personalist regimes are relatively often removed through violent revolutions (or the death of the leader). The

[18] We could observe this during the upheavals in Libya in which a part of the population violently revolved against the personalist regimes of Muamar Kadhaffi. The tribes that belonged to the dictator's 'in- group' could not switch sides when it was clear that the regime was losing; they were inextricably liked to the leader.

‘divide and rule tactics’ makes the “out-group” particularly worse of than the intra-regime, because most privileges and resources are directed to the regime clique. Also, personalist regimes have little upwards mobility (Geddes, 2003). Consequently, one could expect strong antagonism against a personalist regime.

Criticism Geddes’ regime types

Since Geddes came in 1999 with her path breaking categorization of authoritarian regimes, many have criticized or adjusted her classification. This criticism is related to the concept of *personalist* regimes. I will discuss these criticisms and argue why Geddes’ original tripartite division is still the most appropriate for this research.

Firstly, virtually all scholars use *monarchy* as a classification for authoritiarian regimes. Scholars such as Charron & Lapuente (2010) and Ulfelder (2005) argued that *personalist regimes* should be sub-divided into civilian-personalist regimes and monarchies, thereby creating an extra fourth category. Besides the former Many others emphasized on the use of monarchy as well (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Hadenius and Torrel 2007, Slater 2003). However, they deviated further from Geddes (1999), which will be explained after the next section. Let us first discuss monarchies.

A monarchy can be defined as a regime in which the head of state has inherited his position from a royal family member, according to the rules of the monarchic constitution. They argue that it is not enough for a leader to proclaim himself as the “King”; the leadership position must be inherited. These autocratic monarchies differ from constitutional monarchies, because they do not share any power with non-royals. The main argument by which monarchies allegedly differ

from other personalist regimes is that they have a ready-made institution: the dynastic family (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Charron and Lapuente 2010, Hadenius and Torrel 2007, Slater 2003, Ulfelder 2005).

However, it is not clear why a monarchy should be different from a long-lived personalist regime in which the leaders calls himself (for example) “leader of the revolution” instead of “King”. Personalist regimes (in Geddes’ definition) also lean on small groups, including family, just like monarchies. The dynamics should therefore not be very different from non-royal personalist regimes. Fact is that personalist regimes, whether monarchies or not, have a sovereign leader that relies on a close and relatively small group of loyalists that have no future outside the regime, whether tribe, ethnicity, kin-ship or (indeed) family (Geddes, 1999). Thus, one cannot maintain they are an entirely different regime type just because they call themselves kings.

Secondly, according to Slater (2003), personalist regimes do not exist. He argued that personalism is just a component of any authoritarian regime; personalism differs among regimes, independently from the ruling base of a regime, whether they are military regimes, party regimes or monarchies. Thus, personalism cannot be conceptualized on the same dimension as regime type. Regime type is based on the ruling base or the institutions through which regimes rule (royal families, political parties or the military), not on the level of a leader’s power (Hadenius and Torrel 2007, Slater 2003).

The latter’s argument is very eloquent and even partly true. Indeed, a level of personalism could be independently of (Geddes’) regime types. Nevertheless, a *personalist regime* differs from a *personalist dimension*. The former refers to the ruling base of the regime while the latter refers to the intensity of a leader’s power. In fact, *personalist regimes* can differ in their *level of personalism*. Admittedly, a

personal dimension is one necessary aspect of personalist regimes; however, it is not the only criterion. What particularly defines personalist regimes is their distinctive ruling nature: the fact that they rule through networks family, tribe, ethinicity, friends, kinship etc., whereas military regimes' and single-party regimes' rule through the army and a political party. As Geddes (1999) showed, this difference in ruling base gives very distinctive ruling and incentive structures to the regime. Admittedly, and in defense of Slater's (and other scholars') criticism, there are still regimes that are coded by Geddes (2003) as personalist regimes, even though the leader either wears a military uniform or is the leader of a regime party. This makes is hard to make dichotomous or discrete regimes divisions. This problem with construing a absolute divisions, whereas in reality these divisions are continuous is a common problem in social science. The same problem we see, for example, within the division between authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes and democracies. Where does a regime stop to be a military regime and where it begins to a personalist regime? This remains a difficult question, nevertheless it is answerable. The fact remains that in personalist regimes the defining institutions (military and party) have no sovereign power on their own. The real power lies in the elite networks around the leader (these elites could well be generals or party apparatchiks). On this aspect regimes are coded as personalist. Moreover, Geddes (1999/2003) has left room for in-between cases. She coded many countries as single-party/personalist, personalist/military and even as military/personalist/single party.

In addition to the former section, the consequence of the denial of personalist regimes creates problematic regime type classifications such as *civilian regimes*, used by Gandhi and Przeworski (2007). In their classification they distinguished between monarchies, military regimes and civilian regimes. Consequently, regimes which, for

example, evolve around one sovereign leader that leans on a certain ethnic or tribal group (instead of a royal family), is essentially placed in the same category as full-blown one-party regimes, only because they are both 'civilian'. Following this reasoning, the Libyan regime of Kadhaffi is placed in the same category as a single-party regime such as China. This is a highly remarkable merge, since single-party regimes are famous for their distinctiveness from other authoritarian regimes. Single-party regimes differ significantly on: regime survival (Geddes, 1999), quality of government (Charron and Lapuente 2010), retaining societal feedback (Wintrobe, 1998), organizational strength (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Way 2009), infrastructural power (Mann, 2008) and, most importantly, on their coping with media marketization (Stockmann, 2012). And they differ, because they have a regime-party, not because they are civilian. Thus, merging non-single party regimes with single party regimes would be far more problematic than merging non-dynastic personalist regimes with dynastic personalist regimes, especially since there are not very strong reasons to believe that these latter regime types strongly differ from each other.

Military regimes

Military regimes are ruled by the army leadership, generally consisting of the highest generals. This board of leading generals is often called a "junta"[19]. In contrast with personalist regimes, military regimes can rely on their own institutional and organizational structure: the army. Therefore it has fewer incentives for building institutions and a solid state bureaucracy.

According to Geddes (1999) these regimes have a very specific incentive structure. Military regimes place a high value on the success and survival of the

[19] Junta is named after the Latin-American dictatorships in that existed in the second half of the twentieth century. Junta means "counsil" or " board" in Spanish.

military institution than anything else (Geddes, 1999). Thus, maintaining in political office is not necessarily the main goal of a military regime; they have no intrinsic interest in ruling the country. The military's main concerns are enhancing and safeguarding the position of the army and territorial integrity. A divided military is the biggest harm to military interests, evermore since military unity is an intrinsic military value in itself. Therefore, military leaders will place great value on sustaining cohesion within the military, which has two important consequences for officers' behavior. First, when some military leaders want to retried from politics and go back to the barracks, the rest has to follow to sustain cohesion. Second, in decision making the junta is characterized by consensus seeking a deliberation.

The military's preoccupation with its own corporate interests makes them not very suitable for longer term development of a country. According to Liewen (1961: 145) "*…the military, as a reactionary force, is lacking the political and administrative resources necessary for the pursuit of a successful long-term policy*" (in: Remmer, 1978). Needler (1972) draws a comparable conclusion for Latin American military regimes: they are conservative and reactionary forces and therefore bad for a country's development (in: Remmer, 1978). Thus, military regimes generally lack what Mann (2008) calls "infrastructural power; the capacity to make policy that successfully penetrates in society (in: Stockamnn, 2012: 367). Also, "*the professional military expertise cannot be readily transferred to civilian politics. Military lacks bargaining and communication skills. Civilian regimes are more likely to posses political skills, experience, rational planning and engender public support for developmental efforts* (Remmer, 1978: 41).

At the same time, military regimes are infamous for their coercive capacities. According to Poe and Tate (1994: 858) "*Military juntas are based on force, and force*

is the key to coercion". However this virtue of coercion seems to be solely effective against subversive and violent opposition groups, "*…but when it comes to controlling groups that need more subtlety, for example universities or the state bureaucracy, the military has showed to be ineffective* (Cardoso, 1979: 48). Similarly, Ulfelder (2005) argued that military regimes are best in coping with violent upheaval and opposition, while they are much more vulnerable to non-violent opposition, because that delegitimizes the regime.

Moreover, military regimes generally place a relatively high value on legitimacy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Poe and Tate 1994). Often military rulers agree on the fact that there is a higher authority above them, namely: the constitution. Though, because certain interests are damaged they temporarily 'switch off' the constitutions through the proclamation of a state of emergency. Violence and anarchy are therefore situations that increase the junta's legitimacy, whereas peaceful protest could crumble the regimes authority.

Hypothesis

From description of military and personalist regimes, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

In both personalist and military regimes there will be a positive relationship between media marketization and the plurality of political output in the media. In military regimes this relationship is expected to be stronger.

There are several reasons why military regimes should be worse in keeping media uniform in an era of rising media commercialization. Earlier it was argued that it takes a lot of effort to control the media, especially since the rise of new media. It requires a sophisticated organization of systematic repression and/or co-optation of potential

opponents within the media and the capacity to build infrastructure within society. These measures require elite cohesion, an effective state apparatus and “incumbency power” (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The military often has introvert, conservative and short-term scope (O ‘Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Therefore, it can be assumed to have a less efficient and cohesive state organization. At least not for handling these complicated issues. The military is build and trained for violence, and therefore it less suited to deal with more subtle and complicated issues.

Moreover, because personalist regimes cannot (or at least less than military regimes) lean on a readymade institution, they will take more effort in penetrating civil society To keep in of the country, personalist regimes are more inclined to build patronage and kin/ally-networks to spread their tentacles through society. Job assignment in personalist regimes is more often based on loyalty to the leader, than on any other value. Thus, personalist regimes tend to put their patrons into media companies and their patrons will be resilient, because of their fate that is intertwined with the fate of the regime. As argued earlier, in personalist regimes, the followers/incumbents have to ‘either swim with, or drown’. They have a very bad future when the regime would fall. Therefore, I expect that personalist regimes are, if necessary, more willing to use measures that are very harmful for the economic and international political position of the country. Since losing office is always the worst outcome possible (Geddes, 1999).

Moreover, as personalist regimes are very sensitive for revolutions by the population, plural media are very dangerous. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, media can trigger opposition and help coordinate a revolution. For this reason, one can expect personalist regimes are particularly afraid of diverse political information.

Additionally, according to Schmitter and O'Donnel (1986), military regimes are often more dependent and distinguishable from the economic elite (although interests are often intertwined). In personalist regimes, the regime elites *are* the economic elite. Therefore, these elites are more powerful vis a vis the market, including media companies, since they are more infiltrated into the economy through their patronage networks.

Also, the fact that military regimes have a more deliberative consensus-seeking nature makes them less resolute. Thereby, the fact that there is a post-political life for a military junta makes the stakes less high when leaving office. Under great pressure military regimes will often choose to leave politics instead counter attacking. In personalist regimes there are no options but defeating the opposition. Therefore, they will act more resilient and thoroughly.

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Research:

Conceptualization (1)

To test the hypothesis we should firstly conceptualize the two main variables: media marketization and the plurality of media output. Alhtough already touched upon, the will be elaborately explained in the following.

The dependent variable, *media plurality,* can be defined as the diversity of political information that is displayed in the media and is able to reach society. This necessarily means that diverse political views are covered and that certain (pro-regime) views are not over-dominant in the media coverage. This plurality can only take place in a transparent and free environment wherein journalists are free to say, broadcast or write what they want. Moreover, the actual transmission of the media coverage to the population must also be free from interference, since plurality

gets its meaning from the fact that plural views reach society, when it does not reach society, one cannot duly speak of media, or at least to a lesser extent.

The independent variable, *media marketization* is often interchanged with media commercialization. Nevertheless, although media commercialization is the main aspect of media marketization, it is not the same. According to Stockmann (2012: 12), media marketization includes the following three related processes.

First, *media deregulation* refers to the process in which the government diminishes its role of managing the media. According to Stockmann, the deregulation of the media "…is visible in areas such as licensing, personnel appointment, management, and business operations" (2012: 12). Thus, deregulation presupposes that not the state determines the day to day business of the media, but that the industry has the freedom to determine what to do.

Second, *media commercialization* refers to the shift from being managed by the state (or a person that has other goals than profit) to being guided by the market principles. Essentially, when media commercialize, the main goal becomes: making profit and survive. Then, the income of commercial media comes from private consumers. Therefore, the information that is displayed in commercial media will be mostly aimed at attracting consumers in order to realize profit[20], instead of displaying information that pleases the state. The change in incentives (from state driven to market driven), makes them more responsive to the population's will (Stockmann, 2012: 13). This is *exactly* why one would expect to see more diverse and plural information in commercial media.

Third, *media privatization*, is the process of displacing state ownership to private ownership. It involves the state's selling of their media companies/shares.

[20]More consumers ensure more direct income: consuming payment. Also, and more importantly, advertisement income is geared by the amount of consumers.

Privatization is not necessarily a parallel process with deregulation. A state could sell its media assets, but still control it through regulation. Nevertheless, in practice this is hardly possible. When media firms are privatized, they need be responsive to the marked, because the market becomes their source of income. Thus, when media are more deregulated and privatized it becomes automatically dominated by the rules and demands of the marked. Therefore, privatization and deregulation logically pass into media commercialization. At the same time, the process could also work the other way around: the pressure on state-owned media to conform to the market demands could force governments to deregulate and privatize (Stockmann, 2012).

Finally, in the former it was shown that privatization involves conscious act of the state selling its media assets, therewith transferring a bigger proportion of the media shares from public property to private property. This presupposes that governments control the public/private-ratio of media ownership. However, this ratio could also shift through the 'indirect privatization': the relative grow of private media enterprises. Thus, even though the state does not privatize, it can still lose its relative media share through the growth of new and existing private media. In such case we can duly speak about an increase in media marketization. This process will be called "relative privatization".

In essence, media marketization causes media plurality, through the new incentive structures of media commercialization. The fact that commercial companies follow the 'market's will' instead of the state's will makes them more sensitive and responsive to the population (Stockmann, 2012). That is exactly why media marketization is related to the increase in plurality of (political) information in the media. Considering this, one could argue that one should use only media commercialization as independent variable, because media commercialization is and

not include deregulation and privatization. However, (relative) privatization and deregulation are inescapably intertwined with media commercialization and often used as measurement of media commercialization. For example, Freedom House's *Press Freedom Index* is predominantly based on the percentages of (relative) privatization.

There are several approaches to the assessment of media marketization. Firstly, one could just look at the quantitative numbers: count the amount of consumers of private media channels and compare it the amount of state-media users. However, it is questionable if one can get reliable numbers in authoritarian states. Thereby, how do you compare a newspaper user with an internet user or television user? Can one address the same weight to different media? Moreover, what is '1 media consumer', somebody that uses that media once or a daily user? The answers on these questions can differ from person to person and from country to country. This makes cross-country quantitative data very unreliable and hard to compare. Another even more important problem is that media are not always *either* state owned *or* perfectly commercialized. There are many cases in which enterprises are party market based (Source: African Media Barometer). A dichotomous count could not distinguish for these in-between companies.

Secondly, to resolve this former problem one could measure media marketization by comparing the proportion state (related) and private income sources of media enterprises. These quantitative measurements capture the commercialization and overall privatization of the media landscape. However, these numbers could give a biased view of reality. In Russia, for example, we can observe many television channels that are 'officially' market based. While in reality, these channels are owned by companies or individuals that are strongly related to the state or even state owned

(Morosov 2008, White et Al. 2010)[21]. When a researcher would only look at quantitative measures, he/she would risk missing these nuances.

Thus, an analysis of the independent variable, *media commercialization*, cannot withstand by only looking at the straightforward percentage of market revenues of different media. To make a good assessment of the media commercialization in a country one should use the results of in debt analysis of experts to assess whether the media are truly market-driven.

Operationalization

For these later reasons, the data from IREX' Media Sustainability Index (MSI) are used for the measurement of the independent and dependent variable; *media marketization* and *media plurality.* The data are not directly obtained from IREX. I have used the data from an existing data collection, constructed and provided by Dani Stockmann. I have added some extra countries and expanded on the time period to complete the data set for this paper.

IREX, a component of USAID[22], is an international organization that provides in-depth information about media in 80 non-democratic countries. Their index, the MSI, is built from five components, which they call "objectives" of media sustainability. On each of these five components a country gets a numerical scoring between 0 and 4, ranging from non-sustainable and not free (0) to fully sustainable and free (4). The grade for each country is based on two analyses, which is executed in two steps. First, the scoring of media is done by panelists. These panel members are considered to be local media experts and often work in media outlets, NGO's

[21] It can be expected that many countries will try to start media channels and that claim to be independent, because these 'commercial' channels will be more useful from propaganda, because they will be evaluated as more credible (Stockmann, 2012). Additionally, pretending to have free and independent helps authoritarian regimes to keep up the internal and external façade of being a democratic and modernly ruled country (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

[22] Part of the ministery of International Development, see http://www.usaid.gov

academic institutions etc. The panelist are elaborately instructed and informed how to code on the different components. Each panelist individually evaluates the media by filling in a questionnaire. After that, the panelists meat each other and discuss the questionnaires they have filled in. Then, the scoring and discussion is evaluated by IREX employees, this is the second way of coding countries. These IREX employees also give a score based on the local discussion and questionnaires. Finally, the scores of the panelists and IREX employees are equally weighed and constitute the end score. I will only use two of these components.

First, to measure the dependent variable –the diversity of information - I will use IREX' measurement *media plurality*: the extent to which "multiple new sources provide citizens with reliable, objective news". This measurement is built on 8 criteria essentially covering two dimensions: media diversity and media freedom; see Appendix 1. Four criteria refer to the diversity of public and private news sources (including internet, print, broadcast and mobile) and the diversity of its content. Diversity is measured through all areas: covering multiple political-, ethnic-, geographic- and social views and interests. The other four criteria try to measure the freedom in which the news can be gathered, constructed and distributed.

One can see that this index is very diverse and comprehensive. It covers all possible news sources: printed media, TV broadcast Internet and mobile phones. It also covers the access of foreign media. It also covers the ownership balance, social interests, objectivity etc. Thus, this indicator measures all dimensions of freedom, diversity and inclusion.

The independent variable *media marketization* is measured by IREX *business.* This measurement indicates to what extent the "media are well managed enterprises, allowing editorial independence" and how to what extend media are owned by private

market based actors. This measure is built of 7 components, see Appendix 2. These components mostly cover the extent to which media are ruled by market principle, instead of state control. It also includes the numerical independence of the media. In other words, to what extent the media are financially dependent on the state and to what extent on the market. Moreover, IREX *business* also covers how the government regulates or distorts the media market through law and subsidies.

Although the IREX data are approximating the aforementioned conceptualization of the independent and dependent variable, the data are certainly not ideal. One could criticize them for several reasons. Firstly, the IREX data are not complete. They do not cover Asian countries, apart from some post-Soviet central Asian states.

Secondly, it is questionable whether a Western organization, created by the American government is completely neutral in their approach. Rational choice theorists would claim that such government related organizations are serving the goals of its creator: the American government (see, for example, Arrow 1959, Banton 1995, Hall & Tailor 1996). Thus, if one would (partly) accept these assumptions, one should conclude that IREX is (partly) a lobbying tool of the United States that is used in their foreign policy towards these countries. Nevertheless, it could be the case that the interest of the organization is to stimulate media freedom by analyzing it first. Therefore, there are no strong arguments to believe that the data are unacceptably subjective.

Thirdly, one could imagine that the occupation of the panelists –working for NGO's and in academics- gives them a negative bias against their own regime, for they often suffer the most of regime repression. Therefore, panelist could try to 'punish' there government by giving too negative evaluations. However, these

problems of panel-objectivity are hard to solve and can never be fully eliminated. The fact that IREX employees specifically instruct the panelists and analyze the transparent panel discussions, should clear out much of this problem.

Fourthly, the fact that local experts are different from country to country creates the risk that the evaluation is not coherent. However, Irex anticipates on this by elaborately instructing the panelists. Thereby, measurement are based on very specific criteria Thus, the risk of incongruence in evaluation should not be overestimated.

Fifthly, these criteria do not include robust and quantitative measures of how the ratio market and state is in the media landscape. Irex merely gives a reflection the commercialized and independent character of the media. Moreover, the data on media commercialization say little about the absolute supply of commercialized media in a country.

An alternative and often used measure for the independent variable –media commercialization- could be found in Freedom House's *Freedom of the Press* index. In this index it is measured to what extend media are intertwined with the market economy. Unfortunately, freedom house provides no sufficient dependent variable –media plurality-, only some measures that somewhat approach it. For the sake of consistency of measurements, it is better to use a dependent and independent variable from the same data source. Additionally, the Irex data are based on a more in-debt analysis, therefore it gives a more specified and detailed picture. Hence, the Irex data are for this research the best one can get.

Case selection regimes

This research includes all military, personalist and the in-between military/personalist regimes for which Irex data are available over the period 2001-2010. The regime division is based on Geddes' (1999/2003) classifications of regime types. As mentioned before, monarchies will also be divided into the category of personalist regimes. Because Geddes' (1999/2003) did not include several monarchies, these are drawn from Brownlee (2007). Again, these data are for the larger part taken from Stockmann's (2012) data set.

There are two pure military regimes in the data set: *Algeria and Rwanda*; three military/personalist regimes: *Burundi, Mauritania* and *Sudan;* and 24 personalist regimes: *Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela* and *Yemen.*

Admittedly, this selection of personalsit regimes makes this research particularly sensitive for Slater' (2003) criticism. H

Ideally, one would only compare full-blooded military regimes with personalist regimes. However, considering the small data set can be very relevant to include these amalgams into the analysis. Especially, since this gives us the chance to assess whether military personalist regimes are more military or 'more personalist in nature, at least in their way of dealing with media marketization.

Control variables

Based on the existing literature, the following six control variables are included. Firstly, *regime length*, this will be measured as the amount of years the autocratic regime is in power, using Gandhi's (2008) data. It is known that long lived regimes are better in controlling the civil society. Therefore, it is not entirely unthinkable that long lasting regimes are better equipped to influence commercial media to their benefit. Secondly, *economic development* is measured by the GDP PPP, extracted from the World Bank[23]. This measure captures the standardized GDP for each country in US dollars. Thirdly, the Freedom House scores will be used to measure the *level of autocracy*. There is a chance that the intensity of authoritarianism is strongly related with regime types and could therefore be the 'real cause' behind the effect. Fourthly, countries are divided into *regions*: Sub-Saharan Africa, post-soviet Eastern-Europe/Central Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (including Supra-Saharan countries in Africa). Fifthly, *natural resources* are included and measured by the amount of Oil export, using the same data as Egorov et Al. (2009); the data from BP[24]. This measurement is somewhat problematic because it only covers Oil and no other natural resources. Nevertheless, we included these control variables because of time limitations and because Egorov et Al. (2009) showed an effect of the availability Oil resources on media control[25]. Finally, we will control for the *years* in which the data are collected. Although all data are collected from the period 2000-2010, they differ from country to country within this time span. This could control for time related events and developments, such as the rise media technology availability, which is strongly related to time.

[23] http://www.worldbank.org
[24] http://www.bp.com
[25] For the specific reasons why not to include other natural resources data, see Egorovet Al.

Empirical Analysis: Descriptives

As mentioned before, it is generally assumed that there is a positive relationship between media commercialization and media uniformity. In figure 1 this relationship is shown for all countries included in the research data set. Indeed, one can clearly see that media marketization is strongly related with the plurality of media output (although not perfectly linear). Specifically, we can see that there is an ascending regression line with a significant slope of 0,746. Thus, for every point increase in media commercialization, media plurality rises with three quarters of a point

Figure 1: Media Marketization and Media Plurality



*Each country has several case, each case stand for one year between 2001-2010

Slope=0,746 (sig. P<0,001)

In figure 2 media marketization is plotted over time. It shows that media marketization is (indeed) increasing. In the period 2001-2010 the media commercialization has risen with approximately 0.3 point on the MSI scale. Although intuitively a small increase, one should not underestimate this rise, since most authoritarian regimes are located in the range between 1.5 and 2.5. A rise of 0.3 in an interval of 1.0 is far from marginal. Thereby, there are two biasing countries in the data set: Belarus and Uzbekistan. These latter are very underdeveloped in terms of media marketization and have witnessed a sharp decline. Therefore, these countries curtail the average increase.

In figure 3 one can see that media plurality has also incremented, even somewhat stronger; approximately 0.5 point on the MSI scale. The assumption is, that this rise is related with the rise in media commercialization.

Interesting to note, in the same period (2000-2010) we can witness a decline in general freedom in the same countries set, see figure 4. Thus, although the "authoritarianness" has risen (states have become more suppressing) and freedom has declined, in the media area there has been a slight liberalization. This confirms the assumption that the process of rising media plurality influenced by a rising marketisation of the media, is unavoidable eventhough states are becomming more suppressive. Alternatively, the causation could also be the other way around, namely: the general media rise has forced/stimulated autocracies to intensify their oppression.

Figure 2: Media commercialization over time



Figure 3: Media plurality over time



Figure 4: Freedom over time



The Effect of Regime Type

Before analyzing the conditional effect of regime type, let us first find out how the in-between regime type, military/personalist, should be coded. To explore this, for all three regime types[26] the relationship between *media marketization* and *media plurality* calculated. Remarkably, the results a very clear: personalist regimes and military/personalist regimes hardly differ in this relationship. The slopes of personalist and military/personalist regimes are comparably steep (resp. 0.7 and 0.6). Whereas the slope of military regimes is much steeper: approximately 2.4. Results are plotted in figure 5. It is clear that the data set has to be split into one group of military regimes and another group of both personalist and military personalist regimes.

Figure 5: Regime types and media commercialization

[26] Military, military/personalist and personalist regimes.



To test the effect of regime types on the relationship between *media marketization* and *media plurality* we use a so called Bivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. This latter method is used to calculate the correlation and regression slope between a dependent variable and independent variable that have a linear relationship. Since media marketization and media plurality are somewhat linearly connected, this method is appropriate. The regression slope will show the effect of one point increase in X on Y. Thereby, the correlation coefficient shows how much of the variance (around the regression line) is explained. In this case I want to explore the effect of a conditional variable, regime type, on the linear relationship between media marketization and media plurality. This is executed by calculation the interaction effect of Z (regime type) on the linear relationship between

X (media marketization) and Y (media plurality). Therefore, the following formula is used:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \epsilon$$

In this formula, β_0, β_1, β_2, β_3 are the regression coefficients and ε the residual. With this model one can test what the effect of media commercialization is on media plurality when regime type (Z) is changed. The Z is the conditional variable, regime type, which will be coded as a dummy 0 for personalist regimes +military/personalist regimes and 1 for. As one can see in the formula, to create an interaction variable, the dummy variable (Z) is multiplied with the independent variable: *media marketization*. One should interpret the formula as following. Because the conditional variable in this analysis is dichotomous (Z=0 or Z=1), one can immediately read the interaction effect from formula one (Brambor et al., 2006).

The slope of the condition Z=1 (military regimes) can be interpreted as $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, whereas the effect of the condition Z=0 (personalist regimes + mil/pers.) as β_1. The symbol β_0 shows the constant or intercept of the regression line when Z=0. The symbol β_2, the dummy variable, shows the difference between the intercept of the regression line when Z=0 and when Z=1. The intercepts are the points where the regression line 'touches' the Y-axis. So these points are the difference between military regimes and personalist regimes when X=0, in other words, when *media marketization* is 0. This is not so meaningful since we are looking for the different effects of an increase in media marketization. Consequently, we should only look at β_3, which shows the difference between military regimes and personalist regimes. That is why it is called the *interaction coefficient.* Nevertheless, all other constitutive term should be included into the equation for the interaction coefficient to be meaningful. For an elaborate discussion see Brambor et Al. (2006). In addition, normally one also needs the

standard deviation to calculate the significance of the constitutive terms. However, because this paper uses SPSS, significance is automatically calculated.

Results

The interaction formula was calculated using a bivariate OLS regression. Results are shown in table 1. The output shows a Pearson correlation coefficient of R^2=0.86. This means that 86% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the constitutive variables. This confirms that the variables are very comprehensive in explaining media plurality. Accordingly, the theoretical basis on which these variables are chosen, prove to be empirically correct. Secondly, the results show a strong *interaction effect* of military regimes on media plurality. In personalist regimes the slope has a coefficient (β_1) of 0.403, whereas in military regimes the slope is approximately 7 times steeper, namely: (β_1+ β_3) 2.821. However, both independent variable and interaction variable are not statistically significant, neither are control variables *natural resources, level of authoritarianism, region, year* and *regime length.* Only *economic development* has a small significant effect. Since the data set is very small, this risk of insignificance was expected to be high.

Table 1: OLS Regression of Media Commercialization and Media Output Plurality in the period 2001-2010

	Media Plurality
Independent variables	(coefficient)
Media Marketization (β_1)	**0.403**
Media Marketization*Military Regimes (β_3)	**2.418**

Region	**-0.039**
Level of Authoritarianism	**-0,616**
Economic Development (GDP PPP)	**-0,145***
Year	**-0,187**
Natural Resources	**-0,292**
Regime Length	**-0,131**
Constant	
Correlation coefficient R^2	**0,86**

***p<0.05, **p<0.001**

Nevertheless, after some additional tests[27], I did found that there are significant effects if one drops the following control variables from the equation: *Natural resources, regime length* and *year*. The results of this second model are shown in Table 2. Admittedly, it is a serious weakness to leave out these variables, since they have proven to be relevant. Nonetheless, this model is the strongest model possible, with the available data. The elimination of these control variables is reflected in a decrease in the Pearson's correlation coefficient, which is now R^2=0.71. Still, this shows that the model has a large explanatory power (Field, 2005: 111). In this model, both independent variable and interaction variable are statistically significant. The interaction slope is 1.315, that means that when regime type changes from personalist and personalist/military (Z=0) to military regimes (Z=1), the slope (β_3) increases with 1.315 point for each media marketization point. In personalist regimes for every point increase in media commercialization, media plurality rises with ($\beta 1$) 0.626 points. In

[27] Testing al possible combinations of control variables

military regimes, fore every point media marketization rises, media plurality rises with (0.626+1.315=) 1.941. Thus, in military regimes, the effect of media marketization on media plurality is almost three times stronger, at least in this model.

To test robustness we have replaced the IREX variables in turn with the Press Freedom Index[28] measurements of media marketization and media plurality. These are respectively *economic press freedom* and *political and legal freedom*. This test showed that in the difference between military regimes and personalist regimes remained significant after replacing the independent and dependent variables in turn.

Nevertheless, the external validity of the results remains questionable. Solely two military regimes were included. Although the statistical results were significant, it is not indecisive whether the results are a reflection of a genuine regime variety or merely a reflection of these just two countries. Nevertheless, these are the only countries for which data were available

Table 2: OLS Regression of Media Commercialization and Media Output Plurality in the period 2001-2010 (Without control variables: *Oil, Year* and *Regime length)*

	Media Plurality
Independent variables	(coefficient)
Media Marketization (β_1)	**0.626****
Media Marketization*Military Regimes (β_3)	**1.315***

[28] Is a part of Freedom House

Region	**0.107****
Level of Authoritarianism	**-0222****
Economic Development (GDP PPP)	**-0.005**
Constant	**1.460***
Correlation coefficient R^2	**0.71**

***p<0.05, **p<0.001**

The control variables also show some interesting results. The Freedom House scores, *the level of authoritarianism,* are negatively related with the plurality of information in the media. For every point a country scores higher on the Freedom index, the media plurality declines with 0,222 point on the IREX measurement of media plurality. This not a big surprise; obviously, the degree of authoritarianism has on itself a negative effect on the plurality of media. Also, region has some influence on media plurality. However, one cannot quantify these numbers and one cannot see which regions are influencing the data. This requires an additional analysis.

To analyze this regional exceptionality more deeply, I have constructed an additional analysis, testing the interaction effect of the different regions stepwise, controlling for the former control variables and regime type. I found that being a County in Africa, on average, makes the effect of media commercialization on media plurality slightly stronger. With every point increase in media marketization, media plurality rises on average 0,126 more than other countries in data set. In the Middle East we can observe the same; however, the effect is lot smaller: 0,064. Being a country in Central Asia slightly weakens the effect of media commercialization with -0,049. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether these results are caused by coincidence,

because none of these results are significant. Nevertheless, it would be interesting for future research to investigate these regional differences more closely.

Qualitative analysis

The former has shown that there is a different interaction effect of military and personalist regimes on media commercialization and media output plurality. The hypothesis is thus confirmed.

Based on the literature on regime strength in personalist and military regimes one can generally explain these differences. To clarify more elaborately why military regimes are more sensitive to media marketization than personalist regimes, one should take a closer analysis of how these different regimes types and how cope with the media. That is why the next section will analyze one military regime, Algeria, and compare it with one personalist regime, Uganda.

Ideally, one would look at two “most similar systems”, because it gives you a stronger proof that the observed differences are really caused by the stimulus; in this case regime type (Collier, 1993). Unfortunately, Algeria and Uganda are too different on some relevant control variables to consider it as a real most similar systems design. Due to data restrictions (there are only two military regimes in the data set: Algeria and Rwanda) and the lack of good sources that provide deep analyses there was no opportunity to find a better comparison. Even though a most similar system design would be desirable it is in this research it is not necessary, because the statistical relationship has already evinced a correlation. The following two cases are merely

used to *illustrate* the differences, not to proof them. Nevertheless, one can still examine on what relevant aspects Algeria and Uganda are similar or different to assess the quality of the comparison. By elaborating on the similarities, we can see that Algeria and Uganda have some relevant aspects in common, which strengthens the comparability.

Firstly, both regimes have a history of enduring civil war and conflict. In Algeria, between 1991 and 2002, the government has been involved in a bloody civil war with the Islamic opposition movement (Dillman, 2000). In Uganda one could witness comparable distress; the Ugandan regime has been in recurrent violent conflict with several rebellion movements, especially in the south of Uganda (Trip, 2010). Secondly, both countries have witnessed a steady economic growth. Thirdly, both Algeria and Uganda have a long lasting regime that has been more than two decades in office. Fourthly, the degree of authoritarianism is not very different. Both are so called "electoral authoritarian states" or "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002, Brownlee 2007). In other words, both regimes have some quasi democratic institutions, including a legislature that is elected through popular elections. Also, according the African Media Barometer (AMB), there are some other forces, such as opposition parties or the judicial power, which cannot be fully neglected by these regimes, since these have some power. However, in these regimes it is clear who will win the election: the regime incumbents. Thereby, the parliament does not have a lot of power (source: AMB). Also, the judges are not very independent and will often fulfill the wishes of the regimes (source: AMB). These observations about the "authoritarianess" are in line with Freedom House's assessments[29]. Both countries are

[29] www.freedomhouse.org

categorized as “not free”. Algeria has scored 5.5 every year, whereas Uganda’s scored in a range between 4.5 and 5.0.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are also two big differences (besides regime type) that could influence the media. First, the GDP per capita in Algeria is approximately 6 times the GDP per capita of Uganda. Second, and most important, Algeria is strongly endowed with natural resources. Hydrocarbons are the backbone of the Algerian economy: 60% of the government budged (30% of the GDP) comes from this industry (Source: CIA Factbook).

Let us look at the media marketization and media plurality in Uganda and Algeria. In Figure 6 media commercialization is plotted against time and in Figure 7 media plurality is plotted against time. This shows that media have been more commercialized and are more plural in Uganda than in Algeria. This could be well contributed to the resource endowment of Algeria. As argued before, countries with resource abundance have generally more oppressed and less developed media (Egorov et Al, 2009). In Uganda, media commercialization has strongly increased whereas in Algeria there was hardly any increase in media commercialization. In a ceteris paribus condition, one would expect media plurality to be somewhat parallel with media commercialization. Therefore one would expect a rise in Uganda’s media plurality, whereas in Algeria one would expect it to remain the same. However, the contrary seems to be true: media plurality has risen in Algeria and remained stable in Uganda. These observations are in accordance with the quantitative results: personalist regimes associated with a stronger capacity of keeping the information flow uniform, despite rises in media commercialization. Let us now look at whether and how the different regime policies in personalist Uganda and military Algeria have possibly caused this difference by zooming in on these cases.

Figure 6: Media commercialization over time in Uganda and Algeria



Figure 7: Media Plurality over time in Uganda and Algeria



Algeria

In 1962, Algeria became independent from their French colonists after six years of civil war. Although new leaders aimed at both an independent and democratic Algeria, they only fulfilled the ambition of independence; Algeria has never become a real democracy (Source: Freedom House). The Algerian regime between 1962 and 1991 could be best defined as what Geddes (1999) would call a personalist-military regime. In 1991, the country made a step to democratize: general elections were held. The elections were won by the opposition movement, the Islamic Salvation Front. Although the regime had promised to accept the outcome of this democratic result, some parts of the old regime opposed this. They were not pleased with the result;

especially the military were discontent with this unexpected victory of the Islamic party. Therefore, the army eventually committed a coup d'état to preserve the status quo and protect the old elites' privileges and assets (Evans, 1997)

Since the military coup, a civil war between the Islamist opposition and the military has been going on and lasted until 2001. This civil war has ended quite successful for the regime; it destroyed/marginalized the Islamist opposition and made the country safer; there is relatively little violence currently (African Media Barometer). Although this militant opposition has been beaten, the military junta has been confronted with popular uprisings during the 'Arabic Spring'. Just like in many other Arabic countries, these uprisings seriously challenged the military junta. That is why the government lifted the 19-years old state of emergency in 2011 as a gesture to the protesters. Until then, the military had ruled through a state of emergency, which is, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), the classic way of legitimizing a military's authoritarian rule.

Media in Algeria

Figure 6 and 7 showed that the diversity of political information has risen in Algeria. Nevertheless, media are still far from free and plural. The rapports of IREX and the African Media Barometer (ABM)[30] describe the different methods the Algerian junta uses to keep the information uniform.

Theoretically, the Algerian constitution guarantees all human rights; including freedom of expression and freedom of media (most autocratic regimes have such constitutional provisions). However, the constitution is omitted by the regime through

[30] African Media Barometer (AMB) in April 2005, a self assessment done by Africans themselves according to homegrown criteria. The project is the first in-depth and comprehensive description and measurement system for national media environments on the African continent.
Source: http://fesmedia.org/african-media-barometer-amb/

the state of emergency. In practice are the basic constitutional rights are often violated; panelists of the ABM suspect the government of systematically violating the constitution, including the use of violence against journalists. Last decade, several reporters of private newspapers have died under “odd circumstances” (AMB Algeria, 2009). Although it cannot be proved that these deaths can be blamed on the regime, local experts believe that the government is responsible for these killings.

The oppression of media is becomes very clear when one looks at the television and radio landscape. There are no privately owned television or radio channels yet admitted to the system. The entire broadcasting system is in the hands of the Algerian state. Private companies are not allowed. Of course, Algerian people can watch satellite television such as Al Jazeera or Al Arabia from abroad. However most Algerians cannot afford a satellite dish (ABM, 2009). Therefore, Algerians are generally devoid of plural information via the radio and television.

The largest area of commercial media consists of printed press. There are many more or less free and independent daily and weekly papers. Although there is a strong marketization in the Algerian newspaper-business, these newspapers are not proficient in providing plural information to the public for two reasons (ABM, 2009). First, the Algerian government directly and indirectly owns several newspapers. Second, the Algerian state uses allocation of advertisement contracts to bring media owners into heel. Since the Algerian state provides one third of the advertisement for private media, the different newspapers are strongly dependent on the blessing of the authorities. The government allocates advertisements to newspapers solely based on their loyalty to the regime, only those who support the regime get the advertising (AMB, 2009).

Additionally, the Algerian state uses fiscal measures against media that write negative about the regime. There is some flexibility within the Algerian tax system, which gives the government the opportunity to give regime-negative media the most unfavorable treatment within the limits of the existing fiscal law (AMB, 2009). Another way of suppressing diverse information is sheer censorship. Through the Algerian Press Service, a regulating government organ, it is checked whether media report is in conflict with “national defense, economic, strategic or diplomatic secrets” or whether media “endanger the national unity, security or the security of the government” (Article 35 of the emergency law). Obviously, based on these provisions, it is easy to attack government critic as “endangering” one of the aforementioned values. Thus, this law makes it easy to criminalize and prosecute journalists (AMB, 2009).

At the same time there is, according to the AMB, a positive side. Most private media are independent and not related to the government. Therefore, most positions/jobs in the private media are not politically motivated. There is relatively little patronage in the main private newspapers. Thus, although the existing private media are operating in a non-free environment, they can (at least) choose their own employees. Moreover, the Algerian government is very lenient towards the internet. Websites do not need a permission to go online, but providers do need a yearly license to operate. The Algerian government exercises some control on the internet communication via these network providers. These latter are instructed to remove website that display information of “extreme virulence”. However, according to the AMB panelists, the Algerian government has not put much effort in restricting the internet communication. This laconic attitude can be explained from the low internet penetration in Algeria: in 2007 only 1.06% of the population had a personal computer.

In sum, the Algerian government controls the media flow through monitoring agencies and the use of advertising money as financial incentive for media to be compliant with the government. Additionally, the military government uses the provision and withdrawal of media/journalist licenses a way to either put regime friendly media in place or punish regime unfriendly media ex post.

Uganda

The in central Africa located Republic of Uganda has been ruled since 1986 by one man: Yoweri Museveni. With his rebel army the “National Resistence Army” (NRA), he took power by violently disposing the former regime. Since Museveni is ruling, the country has been plagued by brutal civil conflicts (Trip, 2010). Although, President Museveni promised to create a democracy, Uganda has never become one. At best, Uganda has a “hybrid” regime, because some formal power is centered into the judiciary and the legislature. Also, the constitution grants considerable media freedom and civil freedom to the population. However, the law is more used by the regime as an instrument of power, than as a check on that power (Trip, 2010). In this sense, the Ugandan legal system is comparable with the Algerian.

In Uganda, the most important media source is radio. Because of the poor economic conditions, television is much less influential; most Ugandans cannot afford a television (only 6% of the population), whereas most Ugandans have radio access (AMB, 2010)

The last decade, the media has come under more pressure. Just like in Algeria, the Ugandan government prosecutes journalists and radio owners. Thereby, broadcast licenses are often withdrawn when radio channel are contradicting with the “national security, stability and unity”. The government determines which information is

appropriate to be broadcasted. Often, government officials call radio bosses during a broadcasting show to demand that the show is suspended. These requests are almost always conceded by the media. Also, journalists are frequently threatened, harassed and sometimes even killed. As often, one cannot always prove that these violent acts against journalists are the governments work. However, in these cases the government is the only one with a motive, since mostly regime-critical journalists are confronted with violence (AMB, 2010). Many of the television and radio channels are directly owned by the state or regime. Also, just like in Algerian, the government is a big player in the advertising market. Therefore, media can be blackmailed by the government, just like in Algeria.

However, there are three important differences with Algeria, which could have contributed to the difference different relationship between media marketization and media plurality. First, the Ugandan government has intensified the monitoring of media (AMB, 2010). Although it hard to observe whether Uganda has intensified its media monitoring stronger than Algeria. Nevertheless, there are some developments in Uganda which were not present in Algeria. Namely, two new monitoring offices are created: the “Residence District Commissions” and a special media police force, the “Media Offences Department”. These institutions seem to be little bounded by the law and often use violence. The personalist regime of Museveni does apparently not care a much about keeping up the façade of being a state ruled by law, whereas in Algeria there are somewhat higher legal standards (ABM, 2009/2010). This is in line with an earlier argument about military regimes: they put a greater value on constitutionality and legitimacy.

The Second and most important difference is that almost all high media positions in Uganda seem to be distributed through patronage (AMB, 2010). Only

regime-supporters are able to get a media/journalist license. Thus selection of journalists and media owners already begin at the gates. People that are not clearly supporters, do not get a job in the first place, whereas Algerian journalists often do get the job notwithstanding there political view, but get suspended when they turn out to be regime-negative. In Uganda the president yearly meets with all media owners and threatens them personally not to cross him (AMB, 2010). Through carrots (financial incentives) and sticks (punishment) the president keeps those bosses in line. It appears that the use of patronage is more common in personalist regimes. Other countries like Chad or Sudan use patronage to control the media system. This observation strokes with earlier assumptions about personalist regimes. In these regimes there is a stronger diffusion between public and private; private positions/jobs in the 'market' are more often determined by the regime, whereas military regimes seem less prone to forming patronage networks.

Thirdly, accordance the former, one of the biggest Ugandan media companies, "The Vision Group" which is partly owned by the regime, conglomerate is expanding every year by buying popular media channels (radio, television and newspapers). Herewith the state indirectly influences other (still) independent media channels. Journalists and media management that anticipate on the future, know that there is a big chance that they are taken over by this Vision Group. Therefore, it smart not cross the regimes, so have a better chance of keeping their job after the take-over. Thus the 'shadow of the future' could make media staffs more compliant in advance. Generally, most censorship in Uganda, as in many authoritarian states, is done by journalists themselves, before they even have been punished (AMB).

Thus, president Museveni's regime has compensated for the increased media marketization by expanding his tentacles through patronage networks and through the intensified regulation through local and national commissions.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to combine two strands of literature. On the one hand, the research on authoritarian regimes and media, which mainly explains why independent and free media have a negative influence on the survival of authoritarian regimes and how these autocracies deal with the media threat. On the other hand, the theoretical work on different regime types or authoritarian nature, from which Geddes (1999) work is the most famous. By combining these strands of literature it has become clear that the differences in resilience to media marketization are not random. Although the liberalizing effect of media marketization was visible in both military and personalist regimes, the effect was much stronger in military regimes. The difference can be contributed to military regimes' more limited capacity to make their policy penetrate society. Particularly the personalist regime's greater ability to spread their tentacles through society with patronage networks is decisive. At the same time, the greater resilience to media in personalist regimes should only be attributed to the capabilities of these regimes. It could be well argued that military regimes are also less willing to interfere with civil institutions such as media.

This work is a contribution to the argument that regime types *do* matter for political outcomes. It strengthens Geddes' (1999) argument that authoritarian regimes are systematically different, and should be treated as such. At the same time, one should always be critical of these classifications. The discussion about whether personalist regimes are a genuine regime type or just another dimension of

authoritarianism remains difficult to solve. Although there are strong arguments in favor of a personalist regime type, on could duly argue that every regime has a certain level of personalism. The fact that this paper found a difference between personalist regimes and military regimes on one aspect of politics, namely, the coping with media marketization, does not make the regime classification necessarily valid. Another weakness of this paper is the limited data set.

The outcomes of this work have implications for democratization theory. Although the goal was not to explain why military regimes survive shorter than personalist regimes –respectively 8.5 and 14.0 years- , these results add to a better understanding of different survival chances of military and personalist regimes. According to Geddes, military regimes live shorter because they are more vulnerable to elite splits. Based on the results of this paper, one can assume that the inability to cope with media commercialization has also influenced these low survival rates. Lacking grip on the media contributes to autocratic breakdown. Moreover, in this day and age in which autocratic regimes increasingly allow semi- or non-competitive elections (hybrid regimes or electoral authoritarian regimes), the influence of the media seems to have grown. The media have become one of the major contestation areas in which liberalization and authoritarian control clash. Those how can control the information flow will be in advance. Nevertheless, diversity of political information should not have the same catalyzing effect everywhere. It would be interesting for future research to look at these differences more closely. Moreover, liberalization does not only depend on how plural or uniform the media are, it matters *how* regimes use the media. Whether they can provide credible propaganda through the state media, or whether uniform media makes people more cynical and prone to alternative sources of information. One can already observe (for many more reasons)

that people who live in oppressing regimes increasingly use the internet a source of information and communication channel. In this research we have only shortly touched upon new media. Nevertheless, one can expect that this development will bring new dynamics to the media playing field. It would therefore be relevant for future research to investigate how different regimes types cope with these new media.

From a normative democratization perspective this' papers should be slightly positively received. Although it is often assumed that authoritarianism has increased and intensified the last decade, still we can see that in area of media plurality, they are losing ground, at least in personalist and military regimes.

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Appendix 1: IREX *plurality*

Indicators :

1. Plurality of public and private news sources (e.g., print, broadcast, Internet, mobile) exist and offer multiple viewpoints.

2. Citizens' access to domestic or international media is not restricted by law, economics, or other means.

3. State of public media reflects the views of the political spectrum, are nonpartisan, and serve the public interest.

4. Independent news agencies gather and distribute news for media outlets.

5.Private media produce their own news.

6.Transparency of media ownership allows consumers to judge the objectivity of news; media ownership is not concentrated in a few conglomerates.

7. A broad spectrum of social interests are reflected and represented in the media, including minority-language information sources.

8. The media provide news coverage and information about local, national, and international issues.

Appendix 2: IREX *Business*

Indicators :

1.Media outlets operate as efficient and self-sustaining enterprises.

2. Media receive revenue from a multitude of sources.

3. Advertising agencies and related industries support an advertising market.

4.Advertising revenue as a percentage of total revenue is in line with accepted standards.

5. Government subsidies and advertising are distributed fairly, governed by law, and neither subvert editorial independence nor distort the market.

6.Market research is used to formulate strategic plans, enhance advertising revenue, and tailor the product to the needs and interests of the audience.

7. Broadcast ratings, circulation figures, and Internet statistics are reliably and independently produced.