Bachelor thesis:

The impact of discrete negative emotions and perception of threat on political tolerance, evidence from the Netherlands

Corné Anceaux

Student number: 0803553

Word Count: 8.328

Intructor: Rebekah K. Tromble

Version 2, date 18-06-2012

The impact of discrete negative emotions and perception of threat on political tolerance, evidence from the Netherlands

The main goal of this article is to find out in what way discrete negative emotions are of influence regarding a person's level of tolerance. To investigate this matter, an experiment among Dutch citizens was conducted to discover the impact of fear, anger and hatred on tolerance attitudes. Besides that, a person's perception of threat may be an important factor in explaining already existing emotions like fear. Because previous literature has pointed out that a person's perception of threat and felt emotions towards a certain group are closely connected, the research in this article will combine findings of threat perception and emotional responses in explaining political tolerance attitudes. The research question for this study is therefore: In what way do discrete negative emotions and perceptions of threat regarding a certain out-group effect a person's level of tolerance towards that out-group.

The importance for society in this case, is that we could discover more evidence about the role of anger, hatred and fear in causing intolerance. This means that we would know more about which emotions are the most dangerous to stimulate. When politicians in a democracy would try to scare people or make them hate a certain group, we know the expected consequences if they succeed to create such emotions. Regarding the perception of threat, that was also measured in this study, it will be interesting to see whether the perception of cultural, economic and/or safety threat regarding Muslim-fundamentalists form significant predictors of more intolerant attitudes. The importance for society in this case is similar to the emotion related one, because individuals and namely politicians are able to influence a person's perception of threat.

Through this research we can discover the consequences of an increased perception of threat regarding tolerance. Although different types of threat perception have been investigated in previous research, these threat perceptions have never been investigated in the Netherlands regarding Muslim-fundamentalists. A similar study has been done in the past involving immigrant minorities in the Netherlands, this study showed that Dutch citizens were mostly concerned with the cultural threat posed by immigrant minorities. However, because Muslim-fundamentalists are often associated with violence, the biggest concern for this group may be a perceived safety threat. This study will therefore hopefully shed some light on the potential explaining variables of tolerance towards groups that are associated with violence. At the same time the study will also show whether Dutch citizens have a high perception of

threat regarding Muslim-fundamentalists and if so, this might explain the rising party of the PVV that has managed to get substantial support as a new party in the Dutch parliament. Many believe that the party's success was established through their focus on the Islamic religion as a supposed threat to the Dutch society.

Besides, this study will look at the influence of emotions on tolerance in a way that might open the debate about the impact of emotions on tolerance. While most of the studies about this subject are focused on groups of emotions such as positive versus negative emotions, this study will investigate the possible different impacts of anger, hatred and fear on tolerance. The results will then be compared to a similar study that was done in Israel, which showed that hatred turned out to be the most dominant predictor of intolerance. It is useful to repeat this research in a different environment, because one can argue that Israel can be seen as an area of conflict and could therefore easily show different results than a similar study that is carried out in a peaceful environment.

Literature review

The meaning and implications of political tolerance have been investigated in multiple previous studies, for the purpose of this study in which political tolerance is the dependent variable it is therefore important to address a basic understanding of the concept. Political tolerance can be explained as a political objection of a group or an idea, in such a way that a person has to make a decision to be tolerant or intolerant towards that group or idea. The decision is absent in the situation where a person has no objection towards the idea or the group, the problem of tolerance therefore only exists when a person has some kind of negative affiliation with the group or the idea (Sullivan et al, 1979: 781).

Being tolerant means that a person allows a disliked group to have the same rights as other citizens in a society and being intolerant means that a person does not grant the same civil liberties for the group-members of a group that he or she does not like. The same goes for a political idea, because publicly supporting a certain belief can be prohibited by law and people can either support or not support the freedom of speech related to a certain topic. It is therefore important to study tolerance for the sake of a good functioning democracy, because after all a democracy is giving different groups in society the right to vote. If these groups do not tolerate each other and when in power are making laws to restrict the rights of other

groups, this will result in hostile behavior with the worst case scenario being a civil war. Therefore if one wants a democracy to exist peacefully, it is important that different groups in a society can tolerate each other to a certain needed extend.

Tolerance however can also be perceived as a person's position on a specific political issue, like the immigration policy of a country for example. Tolerance in that case is not measured as the willingness to grant civil rights for a group that one does not like (Gibson, 1982: 603). This study however focuses on tolerance towards an unpopular political minority in many western countries, namely Muslim-fundamentalists and therefore is measuring political tolerance in the traditional most used way. This means that this study will measure tolerance through confronting respondents with a group that is unpopular and ask on to what extend respondents are willing to let the members of this group enjoy the same political and civil rights as other citizens.

During a survey that measures tolerance, previous research also showed that it makes a difference whether or not respondents are allowed to pick their least liked group. A famous study of Sullivan and others proposed a content-free measurement method to measure tolerance, which contained letting respondents pick their least liked group. The idea was that when respondents are able to choose the group they liked the least, this will control for differences in tolerance levels that are being caused by the group that is chosen in the study (Sullivan et al, 1979: 784). In this study however it was chosen not to use this measurement strategy, which will be explained in the research design section.

While this study is focused on measuring the influence of discrete negative emotions on tolerance attitudes, it is at the same time also measuring the influence of negative emotions in general. This means that because this study is measuring the discrete negative emotions: fear, anger and hatred, the combined levels of these three emotions can provide an index that indicates the general level of negative emotions felt by each respondent. To be able to know what to expect about the influence of negative emotions, one would have to look into previous literature that has been written on this matter. Social scientists have in the recent two decades shifted the focus of explaining tolerance attitudes from a purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition perspective. One important example of this approach showed that influential political thinkers like Rousseau and Spinoza have given us a perspective that many social scientists today are not even aware of. The perspective they gave us is to prefer systematic thinking over giving gut-level responses. Many political scientists do not question

the idea that systematic thinking by citizens is highly preferable, if one wants to live in a functioning democracy. The citizen as a deliberate thinker versus the citizen as an emotional reactor has therefore set the framework for a long history of research in which contradicting evidence was found (Kuklinski et al, 1991: 2). The contradicting evidence showed that in some studies respondents showed more tolerance when being primed to think more systematic, while other research showed that respondents could also become more intolerant because they were primed to think more systematic.

The meaning of the concept systematic thinking is that a person thinks more about the consequences of a certain act and imagines what will happen after a certain development and why this would be good or bad for society or themselves. A gut-level or emotional response would make a judgment that is more based on whether a person likes the group that he or she is judging. For example, if one has to decide about the freedom of speech of the Ku Klux Klan, one could do that based on what a person thinks or feels about the group, which is a gut-level response. If a person however thinks about the consequences of whether or not granting certain rights to the Ku Klux Klan will have positive results, then he or she is making a more systematic judgment. This is an important factor in explaining different levels of tolerance, since multiple studies in the past have pointed out that there exists a nearly universal endorsement of democratic principles by citizens in the abstract, but that there exists substantially less support for specific applications of those principles to certain groups. Stouffer was one of the first to discover this regarding specific applications of democratic principles to communists in 1955 (Kuklinski et al, 1991: 3). Later on multiple other studies showed the same result, like the study of Prontho and Grigg (1963: 272) and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1979: 792).

The above described phenomenon is caused by emotions towards groups and by systematic thinking about the consequences of allowing certain groups to have certain rights. One could never totally separate both ways of thinking though, because as social psychologists recognize, affect and cognition are always intertwined (Marcus et al, 1995: 172). Although this is true, there are situations in which an individual thinks more emotional and in which an individual will think more systematic. Before looking deeper at the consequences and differences regarding an emotional way of thinking, it is important to see how a person's threat perception is connected to his or her felt emotions. Much research has pointed to high perceptions of threat and feelings of fear as causes for intolerant attitudes. Most of this research however, has not focused on the impact of different sources of threat in explaining

intolerant attitudes. Threat can be broken down to a threat on the individual and collective level. A threat on the individual level can for example be caused by negative stereotypes of out-group-members and is mostly connected to a safety threat. This means that people are afraid not so much of the group as a whole but more of the actions like terrorist acts that can be caused by members of a certain group. Although they know that only a few persons in that group are causing a threat, they still perceive the group as a whole to be threatening. This is different for threats on the collective level like realistic/ economically related threats, because those threats focus more on the possession of jobs and resources that in the eyes of the individual are threatened because of the actions of multiple group members. The same goes for a threat to cultural values and believes that can only be changed through collective effort and therefore is understood as a threat on the collective level (Canetti-Nisim, 2008: 91).

The threats are however in recent research mostly distinguished in three different types: economically, safety and culturally related threats. (Canetti-Nisim, 2008: 91-92). Research has shown that different types of perceived threat can be a predictor of intolerant attitudes, depending on the characteristics of the group considered a possible threat. This depends on the actions of the group and the size of the group. If a group is associated with violence then it is likely that people will have a high perception of safety threat regarding this group and therefore will be intolerant towards the group regarding safety issues (Canetti-Nisim, 2008: 98). Besides this it has been proven that a high perception of physical security threat is related to the emotion of fear. Economical and cultural perceived threats have an impact on negative emotions, but not on specific negative emotions like fear, anger or hatred. Measuring a general index of the different perceptions of threat mostly forms a predictor of negative emotions, because cultural and economical perceived threats predict that when this perceived threat becomes higher, the more likely a person will experience negative emotions regarding that group. Previous research also pointed out that according to these findings an index of the three perceptions of threat forms a predictor of intolerance, in the sense that the higher the general level of perceived threat regarding a group, the more likely a person will have an intolerant opinion towards that group (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005: 785-786).

Although emotional experiences are hard to capture in a single word, this study will try to measure the effect of the discrete negative emotions: fear, anger and hatred. In most present research emotion is defined as an individual's affective response that was developed in reaction to an environmental stimulus or cognitive appraisal, causing a motivation for the individual to take action until a return to the balanced relationship between the individual and

his or her environment has been achieved (Halperin, 2008: 715). Different emotions therefore also imply different motivations for an individual to restore the balance. However, why the emotions anger, fear and hatred were chosen in this study is because many research has pointed out what is best explained by a quote from Halperin: "It is commonly assumed that the perception of negative consequences for the individual or his or her group resulting from the behavior of out-group members is a precondition for the development of all three negative emotions toward the out-group" (2008: 719). Halperin is talking about anger, fear and hatred at this point and since the goal of this study is to capture all relevant discrete negative emotions that people could feel towards Muslim-fundamentalists, the choosing for these three negative emotions was not too difficult.

The next logical question seems to be if anger, hatred and fear are independent enough to be measured separately and if so, in what way these emotions had an impact on tolerance in previous research. One important study on this matter by Skitka and others pointed out that the effects of anger on tolerance were translated through moral outrage and out-group derogation. The same study showed that fear had its impact on tolerance through a feeling of personal threat, in-group-enhancement and value affirmation (Skitka et al, 2004: 753). It showed that people are willing to decrease civil liberties for a group they fear and that terroristic acts were a good example to create such fear. Also it seemed that anger was associated with more optimistic appraisals of risk, compared to fear that was associated with pessimistic thinking about the risk a certain group poses. Although anger and fear had an overlapping impact to some degree, it was clear that the impact of both emotions on political tolerance was achieved through largely different social psychological processes. One of the consequences of fear, namely value affirmation even caused people to be more tolerant according to their research. Value affirmation in this study meant the embracement of values such as civil rights and other rights that equal all citizens in a society. If one wants to be consistent when embracing civil liberties, one should also apply them to unpopular minorities and therefore this development led to more tolerant views. Fear and anger however both still predicted more intolerance because all the other consequences of both emotions predicted intolerant behavior (Skitka et al, 2004: 744).

Another study about the consequences of fear and anger showed that people have the urge to aggress against a group that angers them and to escape a group that frightens them (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005: 786). Both consequences of the two emotions predicted more intolerance, but the cognitive processes that lead to more intolerant behavior were different. These

cognitive processes are different because intolerant policies can be made to escape a group in a way that the policy for example doesn't allow a certain group to get a passport, or the policy can be aimed to hurt the interests of a group, which is an act of intolerant aggressive behavior.

The difference between anger and hatred is harder to determine, because there is no commonly accepted definition of hate. An important study done in Israel about people's perception of the word hatred however showed that there are general characteristics of the emotion that most people share. Hatred according to this research turned out to be a powerful, extreme and persistent emotion and related to tolerance the emotion rejects a group in a generalized and totalistic fashion. Another characteristic that most people shared was the perception of members of the group to be evil and violent actions for example were therefore not perceived as coincidental or occurring because of a one-time event. This was different for the emotion anger that turned out to be more of a temporary emotion, that is aimed at the actions of a group and does not mean that the group is rejected in a totalistic fashion (Halperin, 2008: 718).

The study of Halperin furthermore showed that anger, hatred and fear were all correlated when aimed at the same group, but these correlations were lower than the accepted level for multicollinearity. Every emotion therefore showed different intentions aimed at the out-group, where creating a safer environment was one desire that was achieved through all three emotions. Group based hatred was however the only emotion that was related to the desire to do evil, remove or destroy the out-group. Anger turned out to be a positive emotion compared to the other two, because it was the only emotion that was related to improve the out-group and willingness to change the perceptions of its members (Halperin, 2008: 727-728).

Although the mentioned study of Halperin showed good evidence for the different ways in which anger, fear and hatred effect tolerance, it did not directly measure the effects on a respondents level of tolerance. Halperin and others did measure this in another study which showed that in the case of Jews in Israel, hatred turned out to be the biggest predictor of intolerance (Halperin et al, 2009: 115-116). This particular study has the goal to repeat their research in a peaceful environment, namely the Netherlands and to do this in a slightly different way. The slightly different way will be explained in the research design section. It will be interesting to see whether for Dutch citizens, the emotion hatred will also be the biggest predictor of intolerance. Because of the characteristics of the emotion hatred that were just described, one would logically expect that people that feel hatred, will also be more

intolerant than people that merely feel fear, anger or a combination of those two. On the other hand there are some environmental circumstances that could predict different results, because the studies of Halperin and others mostly took place in Israel. Therefore it is possible that people who are frequently exposed to violence and are involved in a violent conflict, have stronger perceptions of the word hatred, because they have experienced more hatred than most people in a peaceful situation. The results of the study also showed clearly that the respondents that chose Palestinian citizens of Israel as their least liked group, felt more hatred on average than respondents that chose a different group (Halperin et al, 2009: 106-107).

Therefore this difference might have biased the results, because hatred against a group that one is in conflict with is expected to be much more intense than hatred against a random group. Because the perceptions of the emotions were also measured in Israel, it is useful to see whether the words hatred, anger and fear might be perceived and felt different in a peaceful environment. Therefore I expect the case of the Netherlands to show different results, because most Dutch citizens have not really experienced hatred in their lives. This is because in a situation such as Israel, most of the respondents must have known people that died during the conflict and therefore an experience of hatred will be much more aimed at hurting or destroying the out-group.

Therefore, because of the different setting, I expect that hatred and anger will be highly correlated, more than in the Israeli case. This is expected in this study because most Dutch citizens these days have no experience of war, which could make their perception of hatred much softer. History has given us indications for this in multiple conflicts, as for example the first world war. In the first world war it turned out that the most reliable and motivated regiments on both sides were the ones that suffered the most casualties. This is proving the importance of casualties in fueling hate and the motivation to fight the enemy (Ferguson, 1998: 339). Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused many casualties and in the Netherlands, Muslim-fundamentalists are rarely violent, this means that there is less hatred involved in the Dutch situation. Therefore I expect Dutch citizens to have a softer perspective towards the emotion hatred than Jews in Israel. Besides this, it is expected as previous research also showed that the emotions hatred, fear and anger will be highly correlated in predicting intolerance, but not in a way that it passes the critical line of multicollinearity. For the particular group of Muslim-fundamentalists who are being studied here, it must be said that they are often associated with violence. Therefore I expect intolerant attitudes to be correlated to a high perception of physical safety threat and to the emotion of fear. It is logical

to assume that it will be related to the emotion of fear because as mentioned earlier, previous research has shown that fear and a high perception of physical safety threat are strongly correlated. All the above described thinking and research have therefore led to the following hypotheses:

hypothesis 1: People who are being influenced to feel fear, anger and/or hatred are more likely to have intolerant opinions, than people who are not being influenced in such a way.

hypothesis 2: People who hold high perceptions of threat regarding a certain group are more likely to be intolerant than people who hold lower threat perceptions regarding that group.

hypothesis 3: The experience of hatred by a person in a peaceful environment will on average not be a greater cause of intolerance than the experience of fear and/or anger.

hypothesis 4: People with a high perception of physical safety threat regarding a group that is often associated with violence, are more likely to be intolerant towards that group, than people who hold a lower perception of physical safety threat regarding that group.

hypothesis 5: People who experience fear towards a group that is often associated with violence, are more likely to be intolerant towards that group, than people who experience less fear towards that group.

Research design and methodology

The Netherlands was chosen as a country where one could speak of peace without doubt. However, although there is no violent conflict going on in the Netherlands, recent political developments have shown a growing intolerance of the Dutch society towards Muslims. This can be concluded after the rising of the right wing PVV party in every election. For the last ten years this party that calls the Islamic way of life a ridiculous culture has been growing and gaining more support. So as Jews in Israel towards Palestinian citizens of Israel, one could expect Dutch citizens to be especially intolerant towards Muslims-fundamentalists. This is expected because Muslim-fundamentalists are associated with Muslim-terrorists and since the attacks on the World Trade Center, the bombing in London and various minor attacks and murders by Muslim-terrorists, people in the Netherlands as in other western countries have started to have more criticism on the extremists within the Islamic religion. Muslim-fundamentalists are the Muslims that interpret the Koran in a literal way and occasionally approve of violence when this is called a Jihad (holy war). So since believing in

the Koran in this way is causing some people to act violently, this type of believing in the Koran is expected not to be popular among Dutch citizens. This leads us therefore to a case that has some similarities, without the violent conflict however. Other research that has been done in the Netherlands regarding this matter showed that high perceptions of a culturally related threat had the largest impact in provoking intolerant attitudes towards minority groups (Sniderman et al, 2004: 38). Since this study is focused on a group that is often associated with violence, it is not expected that a culturally related threat will predict the most intolerance among Dutch citizens towards Muslim-fundamentalists. When the results will show the expectations of this study, it will therefore in some way contradict the results of the study of Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior. Furthermore it will be interesting to know how much intolerance Dutch citizens hold against Muslim-fundamentalists. Since intolerance against this group and average Muslims is expected to have caused the success of the right wing party of Geert Wilders' PVV, this research could give an indication about the current status of this intolerance. This will be of influence during the next upcoming elections in the Netherlands and if the PVV will increase its support, this will also put pressure on the European Union, since it is known that Geert Wilders has anti-European beliefs.

Two surveys were therefore conducted to find answers to the hypotheses given earlier. The first 73 respondents were recruited through an online survey, of which the link was posted on diverse social media websites, this happened to be the survey that reminded people about a murder committed by a Muslim-fundamentalist. This method to gather respondents was however not fast enough to make sure that enough people participated. In the interest of this study it was therefore decided to do the second survey through hardcopy versions that were handed out on the street in front of a supermarket, in front of a train station and in the main library of the university of Leiden. That way 143 people participated in the surveys, of which the first 29 participated in the survey that mentioned the murder. The other 114 respondents participated in the survey that measured the respondent's perception of threat and these respondents were not reminded about the murder. From these 114 respondents, however 13 had to be deleted because they did not completely fill in important control variables, this sample therefore contains 101 people. The online sample combined with 29 participants on the street, became the first sample with 100 respondents, because two online respondents stated that they were Muslim-fundamentalists themselves and were therefore deleted from further research.

The two samples combined measured the difference between a situation where the emotions of respondents were stimulated and where they weren't. In one survey the respondents were asked to re-experience the thoughts and feelings they felt when they first heard about the murder that took place in 2004. The murder victim in this case was a known Dutch producer of films and documentaries. He made a documentary about the Islamic religion that many Muslims did not like and a man named Bouyeri decided to kill him because of that. The producer Theo van Gogh got shot by eight bullets while he was driving on his bike through Amsterdam, Bouyeri then walked up to him and cut his throat with a knife and stuck another knife with a letter in his chest. Respondents were asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how much fear they remembered feeling at the time with 1 being no fear and 5 being very strong fear. These questions were then asked regarding anger and hatred. Hereafter this survey is to be called survey 1.

The second survey (hereafter to be called survey 2) did not show a text about the murder and measured the threat perception of the respondents towards Muslim-fundamentalists regarding culturally, safety and economically related threats. The questions in this case were: "On to what extend do you think Muslim-fundamentalists form a threat to the Dutch culture?", "On to what extend do you think Muslim-fundamentalists form a threat to the Dutch economy?" and: "On to what extend do you think Muslim-fundamentalists form a threat to the physical safety of Dutch citizens?". The threat perceptions were measured also on a scale of 1 (no perceived threat) to 5 (very high perception of threat). The different threat perceptions and emotions automatically also formed independent variables on their own in this research. Besides these important independent variables, six control variables were measured that focused on age, income, place of residence, level of education, religious belief and gender. The appendix at the end shows the two entire surveys.

For the two samples it was important however that the two groups of respondents were more or less comparable. Because a large amount of the people that filled in the online survey turned out to be students, a substantial amount of the second sample was gathered in the

library of the university of Leiden, to make sure that this sample also contained enough students. After providing enough young respondents with low incomes and high education levels on the second sample, I tried to accomplish enough diversity on these and the other control variables, so that in as many ways as possible the two samples of the two surveys were not too different. Survey 1 therefore contained 57 percent of the respondents that were age 18-25 and survey 2 had 54,5 percent of the respondents in that category. One control variable however had to be deleted from the research, because there were too many respondents in one category. This was the case for religiosity where in sample one 75% of the respondents had no religious belief and in sample two 80,2 percent of the respondents had no religious belief. The level of income in both samples was pretty evenly matched, around 50 percent of the respondents in both samples were in the lowest two categories of income, due to the high amount of student respondents.

The biggest difference between the two samples was caused by the area of residence, because in sample 1, 30 percent of the respondents was from Leiden and in sample two this was true for 81,2 percent of the respondents. Therefore area of residence is not included as a control variable in the second sample, but it is in the first sample to see if there's a contrast between people from a town or a city. The difference in this is caused by the fact that the first 73 respondents from sample 1 participated online while all other respondents were in Leiden at the time of participating. The dependent variable in this study is of course tolerance, and as mentioned earlier it was measured through six questions that formed an index together. Political tolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists was assessed using a six-item scale that was employed in the study in Israel and elsewhere (Halperin et al, 2009: 105). The answers were measured on a scale of 1 (very strongly disagree) to 5 (very strongly agree), and questions focused on the following topics: Muslim-fundamentalists should be outlawed; Muslim-fundamentalists should not be allowed to speak on television; elected in the Dutch Parliament; vote in Dutch national elections; ought to have their phones tapped by the police; allowed to be a prime minister candidate.

The internal reliability was measured through Cronbach's alpha and for the formed index of political tolerance it turned out to be excellent (a = *.877*). Because the Israeli study showed that all six questions together measured tolerance in an accurate way, in the sense that they were in the same category during a factor analysis, I expect the questions to accurately measure tolerance. Their study however contained 4 samples of which one allowed respondents to pick their least liked group and right after reminded respondents about violent

actions caused by the group they chose. After this, the respondents were asked to re-experience the thoughts and feelings they got after hearing about these events and to give information about their level of fear, anger and hatred at that time (Halperin et al, 2009: 105). This difference is expected not to be problematic, because the goal of this and their research was to measure the effects of anger, hatred and fear on tolerance attitudes. This means that although different groups are involved, the level of the emotion measured is still the most important variable that counts in explaining different levels of tolerance.

The Israeli study besides showed that multiple words related to fear, hatred and anger turned out to be highly correlated and were significantly loaded as three different categories in a Factor analysis (Halperin et al, 2009: 107). In this study it is argued that Dutch citizens compared to Israeli Jews could have a different perception of the word hatred and therefore it would have been useful to repeat the factor analysis in the Dutch case. This however has not happened and therefore this might be a problem for the results of this study. The correlations between anger, hatred and fear as separate predictors of tolerance however have been measured and will give an indication of whether these three emotions can all be viewed as separate predictors of tolerance in this study.

The technique that was used in this study to measure the predictive values of the independent variables was an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Since all the items in the two surveys that formed the essential independent and dependent variables were scales, this model of analysis fitted the study in the best way.

Results

The descriptive statistics of the first survey regarding the emotional variables show that levels of fear (M = 2,68, SD = 1,154) were significantly lower than the levels of hatred (M = 2,83, SD = 1,198, t = 23,621, p < ,001) and anger (M = 3,74, SD = 1,097, t = 34,078, p < ,001). Levels of anger were according to the given information also significantly higher than the levels of hatred. A brief overview of this is to be seen in table 1. As for the correlations between anger, hatred and fear, it appeared that hatred and fear were highly correlated (,538, p < ,001), just as fear and anger (,492, p < ,001) but the highest correlation found that is just under the norm of 0,7 of multicollinearity, was between hatred and anger (,619 p < ,001) which indicates that the difference between anger and hatred in the perception of Dutch citizens might not be so big as in the Israeli case. As for the threat perceptions, levels of perceived safety threat were higher (M = 2,94, SD = 1,199) than levels of perceived cultural

threat (M = 2,46, SD = 1,100, t = 22,429, p < ,001) and perceived economic threat (M = 2,05, SD = 1,043, t = 19,751, p < ,001). The correlations between the threat perceptions showed that cultural and economic threat perception were correlated (,494 p < ,001) as also safety and economic threat perceptions (,394 p < ,001). The correlation between a perceived cultural and safety threat however was the highest (,649 p < ,001).

Table 1. Levels of emotions (Survey 1) and threat perceptions (Survey 2)

	Fear	Anger	Hatred	Cultural threat	Economic threat	Safety threat
Mean	2,68	3,74	2,83	2,46	2,05	2,94
Std. error of Mean	,115	,110	,120	,109	,104	,119
Median	3	4	3	2	2	3
Standard deviation	1,15	1,1	1,2	1,1	1,04	1,2
N = 100				N = 101		

The first hypothesis is tested in table 2 through combining the samples of the two surveys, to see what kind of impact the story about the murder of Theo van Gogh had on the level of tolerance of respondents in both surveys. The independent variable here is showed as the "exposure to violent story".

Table 2. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance (Survey 1 and 2 combined)

Independent variables

Exposure to violent story	,302	**
	(,991)	
Gender	,021	
	(,894)	
Age	,027	
	(,044)	
Education	-,248	**
	(,396)	
Income	,023	
	(,394)	
Area of residence	,063	
	(,595)	
Constant	15,98	**
	(2,633)	

N = 201

R2 = ,181**

* = p ≤ ,05   ** = p ≤ ,001

As the results show, the exposure to the story about the murder had a significant impact on the respondents. The direction of the relationship is that the people who participated in survey 1 (M = 14,48, SD = 6,39) were on average more intolerant than the people that participated in survey 2 (M = 10,16, SD = 6,46). These findings therefore support the first hypothesis that people who are being influenced to feel fear, anger and/or hatred are more likely to have intolerant opinions. The results also show that for the tolerance index that has possible scores from 1 to 25, the median for sample one was 15, and for sample two it was 9. This means that more than 50 percent of the respondents of sample 1 were on the more intolerant side of the index, which is above the middle value of 12,5 and that more than 50 percent of the respondents of sample 2, were on the more tolerant side of the spectrum. Besides this, table 2 shows that education significantly predicts tolerance in this study, in a way that the more educated a person, the more likely it is that this person will have tolerant opinions. The third table shows the separate impact of the three emotions in sample 1 and this was measured while including the control variables: area of residence, gender, age, income and education.

Table 3. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance (Survey 1)

Independent variables

Anger	,184

	(,684)	
Fear	,199	
	(,586)	
Hatred	,231	
	(,662)	
Gender	,066	
	(1,156)	
Age	,061	
	(,049)	
Education	-,102	
	(,565)	
Income	,145	
	(,467)	
Area of residence	-,027	
	(,742)	
Constant	7,821	
	(4,571)	

N = 100

R2 = ,344**

* = p ≤ ,05 ** = p ≤ ,001

The results show that none of the control variables nor the emotions anger, hatred or fear are separately successful in significantly predicting values for the tolerance index. Hatred and fear were close however with significance levels of ,066 for hatred and ,063 for fear, which leaves the possibility that they could be significant in future research that uses a larger sample. This still means however that the results do not support the fifth hypothesis, because fear was expected to have a significant impact on tolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists. The results however do support the third hypothesis, because there is no significantly greater impact of hatred on tolerance, compared to the other two emotions. The impact of the three emotions measured together in an index can be seen in table 4.

Table 4. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance (Survey 1)

Independent variables

Emotion index	,514	**
	(,195)	
Gender	,064	
	(1,123)	
Age	,058	
	(,046)	
Education	-,105	
	(,542)	

Income	,145
	(,460)
Area of residence	-,027
	(,734)
Constant	7,928
	(4,465)

N = 100

R2 = ,343**

* = p ≤ ,05   ** = p ≤ ,001

Table 4 shows us that an index of the three emotions appears to be a significant predictor of tolerance in the way that the higher the emotions measured, the more intolerant a person is expected to be. This is showing that although the separate emotions are not significantly predicting intolerance in this study, the index of the combined emotions do manage to predict a more intolerant attitude when the score of a respondent on the index becomes higher. Table 5 is showing the results of the second sample and therefore the impact of the different threat perceptions by respondents.

Table 5. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance (Survey 2)

Independent variables

Safety related threat perception	,393 (,646)	**
Economically related threat perception	,136 (,564)	
Cultural threat perception	,215 (,725)	
Gender	-,065 (,990)	
Age	-,030 (,070)	
Education	-,094 (,451)	
Income	-,028 (,489)	
Constant	8,333 (3,276)	

N = 101

R2 = ,466**

* = p ≤ ,05   ** = p ≤ ,001

Table 6. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance (Survey 2)

Independent variables

Threat index	,639 (,185)	**
Gender	-,082 (,980)	
Age	-,058 (,069)	
Education	-,091 (,488)	**
Income	-,023 (,394)	
Constant	9,183 (3,143)	

The results of table 5 show that only the variable safety related threat perception is significantly predicting tolerance in a way that the higher this threat perception, the higher a respondent's intolerance is expected to be. This is supporting the fourth hypothesis that states that high perceptions of physical safety threat predict intolerant attitudes when measuring tolerance towards a group that is associated with violence. Besides these results it is interesting to see the impact of the three threat perceptions measured together, which is shown in table 6. This table clearly shows that the three threats measured together as an index, are significantly predicting more intolerance when a respondent scores higher on the threat index, meaning he or she has a higher general perception of threat posed by Muslim-fundamentalists. This is supporting hypothesis 2, that stated this expectation. Additional interesting results in this study were found when looking at the impact of the separate threat perceptions and emotions on the six different questions that formed the tolerance index. As table 7 shows, fear turned out to be a significant predictor of intolerance on the issue whether Muslim-fundamentalists should be allowed to vote. On the same issue it also turned out that a high perception of safety related threat and economically related threat were successful in predicting more intolerance.

Table 7. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance on statement: *"Muslim-fundamentalists should not be allowed to vote"*

Independent variables	Survey: 1		Independent variables	Survey: 2
Anger	,148		Safety related threat perception	,258 *
	(,157)			(,117)
Fear	,261 *		Economically related * threat perception	,251
	(,135)			(,102)
Hatred	,010		Cultural threat Perception	,142
	(,152)			(,132)
Gender	-,027		Gender	-,056
	(,265)			(,180)
Age	,107		Age	,126
	(,011)			(,013)
Education	-,230		Education	-,215
	(,130)			(,082)
Income	-,001		Income	-,075
	(,107)			(,089)
Area of residence	-,105		Constant	,792
	(,170)			(,595)
Constant	1,792		N = 101	
	(1,049)		R2 = ,423**	

N = 100

R2 = ,226*

Table 8. Ordinary least squares regression model predicting political intolerance on two statements (Survey 1):

"Groups of Muslims with fundamentalist ideas should be outlawed. "		
Anger	,112	
	(,156)	
Fear	,169	
	(,134)	
Hatred	,265	*
	(,152)	
Gender	,050	
	(,264)	
Age	-,236	*
	(,011)	
Education	-,099	
	(,129)	
Income	,210	
	(,107)	
Area of residence	-,032	
	(,170)	
Constant	1,447	
	(1,046)	

N = 100

R2 = ,226**

"Muslim-fundamentalist should not be allowed to run as candidates for prime minister of the Dutch government"	
Anger	,001
	(,124)
Fear	,140
	(,124)
Hatred	,297*
	(,140)
Gender	-,211
	(,244)
Age	,220
	(,010)
Education	-,040
	(,119)
Income	,060
	(,098)
Area of residence	-,267 *
	(,156)
Constant	3,003 *
	(,963)

N = 100

R2 = ,299*

Table 8 shows that hatred could predict a significant part of the variance on the issue that stated: groups of Muslims with fundamentalist ideas should be outlawed. Besides this, hatred was also successful in predicting intolerance on the question related to whether Muslim-fundamentalists should be allowed to become prime-minister candidates for the Dutch government. Besides the table shows that age was successful in predicting tolerance in a way that the older the respondent, the more likely this person would not allow the existence of groups of Muslims with fundamentalist ideas. The results also showed that people who live in a village are more likely to allow a Muslim-fundamentalist to become a candidate for the job of prime minister, compared to people who are living in a city.

Discussion

The most important result of this study, is that the Dutch case contradicts the findings of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler in their research that was done in Israel about the impact of discrete negative emotions on tolerance. Their study of 2009 showed that hatred had a greater impact on political tolerance than anger and fear. The findings of this study done in the Netherlands showed that while measuring political tolerance with the same questions as in Israel, the separate emotions anger, fear and hatred had no significant predictive impact on tolerance. This contradicted the results of the Israeli study in more than one way, because in the Israeli case all the separate discrete negative emotions had a significant correlation with political tolerance. However the sample that measured the impact of discrete negative emotions in the Dutch case only contained 100 participants and this might be the reason that none of the separate emotions anger, fear, or hatred were significant in predicting more intolerance. Even though the sample of respondents in this study is relatively small, it does indicate however that hatred played some role in predicting tolerance levels. Hatred turned out to be a significant predictor of intolerant attitudes for two of the six items that formed the tolerance index. However the overall impact of hatred was not so big as in Israel because hatred could explain the least of the variation in tolerance, when compared to anger and fear.

A possible explanation of these findings, is that the results in Israel are heavenly influenced by a much deeper feeling of hatred than people in a peaceful situation as the Netherlands have ever experienced. The results have indicated this, as it was clear that hatred and anger were

highly correlated. Even though anger is always a necessary component of hatred, the high correlation between the variables might imply that when a Dutch person has felt anger, the respondent thinks more easily that he or she has also felt a level of hatred. This perception may be different for people that live in a conflict situation, who because of their experience could have a better understanding of the difference between hatred and anger.

Besides these findings, the study also showed that a high perception of physical safety threat was successful in predicting a more likely intolerant attitude. This was expected because Muslim-fundamentalists are often associated with violence and a high perception of physical safety threat is therefore logically connected to an intolerant attitude. However even though previous research showed that fear and perceived physical safety threat are highly correlated, fear was in contrast to the perception of physical safety threat not significant in predicting more intolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists in this study. Especially since this group is associated with violence, one would expect fear to be related to intolerant attitudes towards this group. The p value of fear on this matter was however close to being significant and therefore future research with a bigger sample would have to prove whether fear as a separate predictor of tolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists could be successful in predicting intolerance.

The results furthermore supported the idea that the difference between the two surveys in this experiment was caused because in one survey, negative emotions were stimulated and in one the perception of threat was measured, without stimulating any emotions. It turned out that the people that participated in the first emotion-stimulated survey were on average much more intolerant than the group of respondents that formed the second sample. On this matter it does make logically sense to be intolerant against a group that poses a threat to your own security and it does not, when the group does not pose a threat. This way of thinking was probably less present in the first survey where respondents were reminded about a murder committed by a Muslim-fundamentalist and had to determine their levels of emotion. Also because respondents could have felt multiple emotions when reading about the murder again, it may be that other emotions than fear became stronger predictors of intolerance. This therefore forms another possible explanation of the difference between a perceived security threat and fear in significantly predicting intolerance.

The Dutch case however did not show too many differences with previous research, as it was clear that an index of economically, culturally and safety related threat perceptions accurately predicted levels of tolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists. The higher the general perception of threat by the respondent, the more likely it turned out that this respondent had intolerant attitudes towards Muslim-fundamentalists. The same was true for an index that measured the influence of anger, fear and hatred together. Therefore this result was comparable with earlier research that showed the impact of negative emotions. Besides these findings it is hard to draw any conclusions about the average level of Dutch tolerance towards Muslim-fundamentalists. This is because the first survey influenced the results through the negative emotions that were stimulated. The second sample with 101 participants is too small to be used for any conclusion, but it does indicate that more than half of the Dutch population could be on the more tolerant side of the spectrum towards Muslim-fundamentalists. This indication only holds though when there are no negative emotions actively stimulated.

Literature

Sniderman, P.M. Hagendoorn, L. Prior, M. (2004)"Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 35-49.

Marcus G.E. Sullivan J.L. Theiss-Morse E. (1995) *With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kuklinski, J.H. Riggle, E. Ottati, V. Schwarz, N. Wyer, R.S. (1991)"The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 1-27.

Canetti-Nisim, D. Ariely, G. Halperin, E. (2004)"Life, Pocketbook, or Culture the Role of Perceived Security Threats in Promoting Exclusionist Political Attitudes toward Minorities in Israel", *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 90-103.

Cottrell, C.A. Neuberg, S.L. (2005)"Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 88, No. 5, pp. 770-789.

Skitka, L.J. Bauman, C.W. Mullen, E. (2004)"Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach", *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 743-756.

Halperin, E. Canetti-Nisim, D. (2009)"The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 93-123.

Halperin, E. (2008)"Group-based Hatred in Intractable Conflict in Israel", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 713-736.

Ferguson, N. (1999) *The pity of War 1914-1918*. London: Penguin Books.

Prothro, J.W. Grigg, C.M. (1963)"Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement", *Journal of politics*, Vol. 22, No 2, pp. 94-276.

Appendix

Survey 1:

Politieke enquête

In het belang van de democratie in Nederland is het erg belangrijk dat er onderzoek gedaan wordt naar de politieke opvattingen van mensen. In deze enquête herinner ik u aan een tragische gebeurtenis, namelijk de moord op Theo van Gogh en wil ik graag uw opvattingen die met deze politiek beladen moord gepaard gaan te weten komen. Hieronder een korte beschrijving van de moord: Op dinsdag 2 november 2004 fietste Van Gogh om half negen 's ochtends door de Linnaeusstraat te Amsterdam. Toen hij voorbij het stadsdeelkantoor Oost/Watergraafsmeer reed, werd hij door een andere fietser, Bouyeri, met een pistool onder vuur genomen. Van Gogh werd door acht kogels getroffen. Ook twee omstanders werden geraakt. Hierna kwam Bouyeri naar Van Gogh toe en sneed hij met een groot mes de keel van Van Gogh door. Vervolgens stak hij dit mes diep in het lichaam van Van Gogh. Van Gogh overleed ter plekke. Met een kleiner fileermes stak Bouyeri een brief gericht aan Ayaan Hirsi Ali op het lichaam van Van Gogh. Bouyeri gaf met enkele uitspraken direct een indruk van zijn motieven. Volgens twee getuigenverklaringen sprak hij kort na zijn daad een omstander aan: Bouyeri: "Wat kijk je?" Omstander: "Dat kun je toch niet maken." Bouyeri: "Dat kan ik wel, waarom niet... hij heeft het ernaar gemaakt." Omstander: "Dit kan toch niet, dit kan je toch niet maken." Bouyeri: "Dat kan ik wel en dan weten jullie ook wat je te wachten staat." Hierna liep Bouyeri rustig het nabijgelegen Oosterpark in. Deze enquête zal onder andere uw mening vragen over moslimfundamentalisten zoals Bouyeri. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat de daad van Bouyeri door elke moslimfundamentalist uitgevoerd zou kunnen worden, onder moslimfundamentalisme wordt in het belang van dit onderzoek verstaan: een zodanige interpretatie van de Koran die ertoe leidt dat in specifieke gevallen geweld als rechtvaardig wordt gezien als het is gericht tegenover "vijanden van de Islam".
*Vereist

*Terug denkend aan de dag waarop Theo van Gogh werd vermoord, kunt u proberen de gevoelens te herbeleven die u voelde ten aanzien van moslimfundamentalisten op het moment dat u het nieuws over de moord te weten kwam? *Op een schaal van 1 tot 5, hoe boos voelde u zich ten opzichte van moslimfundamentalisten?*

	1	2	3	4	5	
totaal niet boos	○	○	○	○	○	heel erg boos

Op een schaal van 1 tot 5, hoe angstig voelde u zich ten opzichte van moslimfundamentalisten? *

	1	2	3	4	5	
totaal niet angstig	○	○	○	○	○	zeer angstig

Op een schaal van 1 tot 5, in hoeverre had u haatdragende gevoelens ten aanzien van moslimfundamentalisten? *

	1	2	3	4	5	
geen haatdragende gevoelens	○	○	○	○	○	intense haatdragende gevoelens

Geef bij de volgende stellingen aan in hoeverre u het hiermee eens bent:

Het bestaan van groepen moslims met fundamentalistische opvattingen moet bij wet verboden worden

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Voor moslims met fundamentalistische opvattingen moet het niet mogelijk zijn om zendtijd op tv te krijgen *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Telefoongesprekken van moslimfundamentalisten mogen door de politie worden afgeluisterd *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Een moslimfundamentalist zou geen kandidaat mogen zijn om minister-president van Nederland te worden *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Moslimfundamentalisten mogen niet verkozen worden in het Nederlandse parlement *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Moslimfundamentalisten zouden niet mogen stemmen bij nationale verkiezingen *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Wat is uw geslacht? *

- ○ Man
- ○ Vrouw

Wat is uw leeftijd? * [   ]

Heeft u een religieuze overtuiging? *

- ○ Nee, ik heb geen religieuze overtuiging
- ○ Ik ben katholiek

- ○ Ik ben protestant
- ○ Ik ben moslim
- ○ Ik ben joods
- ○ Ik ben hindoe
- ○ Ik ben boedhist
- ○ Anders: [   ]

Wat is uw woonplaats? * [   ]

Hoe hoog is uw bruto inkomen? *

- ○ Ik heb geen inkomen
- ○ Minder dan 1450 euro per maand
- ○ Tussen 1450 euro en 2500 euro per maand
- ○ Tussen 2500 euro en 5000 euro per maand
- ○ Meer dan 5000 euro per maand
- ○ Ik weet het niet/ geen opgave

Wat is het niveau van uw hoogst genoten opleiding? *

- ○ WO
- ○ HBO
- ○ MBO
- ○ VWO
- ○ HAVO
- ○ VMBO / MAVO
- ○ basisschool

Survey 2:

Politieke enquête

In het belang van de democratie in Nederland is het erg belangrijk dat er onderzoek gedaan wordt naar de politieke opvattingen van mensen. Deze enquête zal uw mening vragen over moslimfundamentalisten. Onder moslimfundamentalisme wordt in het belang van dit onderzoek verstaan: een zodanige interpretatie van de Koran die ertoe leidt dat in specifieke gevallen geweld als rechtvaardig wordt gezien, als het is gericht tegenover "vijanden van de Islam". De enquête gaat over moslims met dergelijke "opvattingen" en dus niet perse over moslimfundamentalisten die daadwerkelijk gewelddadig zijn.
*Vereist
Geef bij de volgende vragen aan op een schaal van 1 tot 5, in hoeverre u denkt dat moslimfundamentalisten een bedreiging vormen.

In hoeverre denkt u dat moslimfundamentalisten een bedreiging vormen voor de Nederlandse cultuur?

	1	2	3	4	5	
Geen enkele bedreiging	○	○	○	○	○	Zeer ernstige bedreiging

In hoeverre denkt u dat moslimfundamentalisten een bedreiging vormen voor de Nederlandse economie?

	1	2	3	4	5	
Geen enkele bedreiging	○	○	○	○	○	Zeer ernstige bedreiging

In hoeverre denkt u dat moslimfundamentalisten een bedreiging vormen voor de veiligheid in Nederland?

	1	2	3	4	5	
Geen enkele bedreiging	○	○	○	○	○	Zeer ernstige bedreiging

Geef bij de volgende stellingen aan in hoeverre u het hiermee eens bent.

Het bestaan van groepen moslims met fundamentalistische opvattingen moet bij wet verboden worden

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Voor moslims met fundamentalistische opvattingen moet het niet mogelijk zijn om zendtijd op tv te krijgen *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Telefoongesprekken van moslimfundamentalisten mogen door de politie worden afgeluisterd *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Een moslimfundamentalist zou geen kandidaat mogen zijn om minister-president van Nederland te worden *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Moslimfundamentalisten mogen niet verkozen worden in het Nederlandse parlement *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Moslimfundamentalisten zouden niet mogen stemmen bij nationale verkiezingen *

	1	2	3	4	5	
Helemaal mee oneens	○	○	○	○	○	Helemaal mee eens

Wat is uw geslacht? *

- ○ Man
- ○ Vrouw

Wat is uw leeftijd? * [   ]

Heeft u een religieuze overtuiging? *

- ○ Nee, ik heb geen religieuze overtuiging
- ○ Ik ben katholiek
- ○ Ik ben protestant
- ○ Ik ben moslim
- ○ Ik ben joods
- ○ Ik ben hindoe
- ○ Ik ben boedhist
- ○ Anders: [   ]

Hoe hoog is uw bruto inkomen? *

- ○ Ik heb geen inkomen
- ○ Minder dan 1450 euro per maand
- ○ Tussen 1450 euro en 2500 euro per maand
- ○ Tussen 2500 euro en 5000 euro per maand
- ○ Meer dan 5000 euro per maand
- ○ Ik weet het niet/ geen opgave
- Wat is uw woonplaats? * [   ]

Wat is het niveau van uw hoogst genoten opleiding? *

- ○ WO
- ○ HBO
- ○ MBO
- ○ VWO
- ○ HAVO
- ○ VMBO / MAVO
- ○ basisschool