**Master International Relations & Diplomacy**
**Leiden University**
**Master Thesis**


The Path to Ideological Moderation in the Post-revolutionary Period: The Case

of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood




**First reader: Drs. R. Tromble**

**Second reader: Dr. L. Seymour**

**Name:** Iba Abdo

**Student number:** 0732168

**Date**:15 June 2012

# Contents

**1. Introduction**

'In Egypt, churches are not allowed to be built or renovated. Coptic Christians are not loyal to the Egyptian state.'[1] This is a statement by a member of the Guidance Office of the Muslim Brotherhood, the highest legislative authority, in 1980. In 2011, however, it was announced that 'Copts have the same rights and duties as Muslim' and that in Egypt full citizenship rights and the freedom of religion will be guaranteed.[2] Is this a sign of ideological moderation in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, academics and policy makers have been engaged with the question of whether the inclusion of Islamists in the political process will result in moderation in their thinking. The answer to this question is relevant to the specific countries in which the inclusion process should take place, but also to the national security of Western countries, especially the United States. Authoritarian regimes and consequently the lack of democracy were namely believed to be the breeding ground for terrorism.[3] Following a setback in the desire of the United States to push the democracy project forward in 2006, the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 rendered this debate even more crucial. In several Arab states, the electoral rise of Islamist parties has namely been an undeniable and an unavoidable fact.

This research aims to answer the following question: what is it that leads to ideological moderation? Many scholars have explored the underlying reasons for the occurrence of moderation in the thinking of parties. One of the most useful theories studying the phenomenon of moderation is the moderation theory. The hypothesis generated by this theory, the inclusion- moderation hypothesis, is adopted in a large body of literature to examine the moderation of parties. According to this hypothesis, it is expected that the inclusion of radical parties in multiparty political processes will lead to an increase in the level of moderation.[4]

1 Newspaper 'Al-Dawa', No. 56. December 1980, in Ali, A. (2005). Al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimien, Fatawi (*Fatwa's of the Muslim Brotherhood)*, Cairo: Al-Mahrousa Publisher, pp:24

2 Election Program of the Freedom and Justice party, 2011, pp:37

3 Hamid, S. (2007), 'Engaging Political Islam to Promote Democracy', *The Progressive Policy Institute*, on, http://www.dlc.org/documents/Political_Islam_06272007.pdf, pp:1

4 Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp:165

Political opportunities and institutional constraints are thus considered as the primary forces producing moderation.

In this research, I tested the inclusion-moderation hypothesis but my fieldwork suggested that while inclusion is a necessary condition for moderation to happen, it is not sufficient. Therefore, in this research, I offer propositions about new variables that give a richer understanding of the different dynamics of the process of moderation.

This research proposes that a transition from a low to a high level of inclusion will not be translated into an increase in the level of ideological moderation unless attention is paid to the following organizational and contextual factors: the intra-organizational competition and the existence of internal democracy, the existence of an ideological competitor on the political scene and the nature of the political structure in which the inclusion takes place. Further application of these propositions on other cases will enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the process of moderation.

This research is organized as follows. The first chapter discusses the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and reviews different debates about the applicability of this hypothesis. Subsequently, this chapter contains the theoretical framework and the methodology of the research. The second chapter provides a brief background of the development of the Muslim Brotherhood. The third chapter shows evidence for the insufficiency of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis for explaining the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the fourth chapter, I provide my own propositions. Finally, the fifth chapter sums up the research and provides an answer to the research question.

**Chapter 1: Literature review & Theoretical Framework**

One of the most influential academic scholars to write about the moderation in the thinking of parties is Samuel Huntington. In his famous book, '*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*', Huntington introduced the participation-moderation trade-off, which is about the moderation process that radical actors/parties experience as a result of their involvement in a pluralist democratic political system.[5] This process, also called 'the democratic bargain', characterized party politics in the transition periods of countries that were part of the first wave of democratization in Europe and the Third Wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America.[6] As a reaction to the inclusion of opposition parties, movements and persons that were formerly excluded, a process of moderation took place in which these actors committed themselves to the rules of the democratic game. During the transition period that accompanied the process of political liberalization, there was an implicit or an explicit common understanding that moderation would be the price of inclusion.[7] Radical socialist parties decided to abandon violence and to accept the principles of democracy in return for the ability to gain power and push through their policies. Revolution through violence was thus replaced by revolution through the ballot box. The participation-moderation tradeoff has been applied by many scholars on the development of Socialists and Christian parties and has been confirmed.

In order to broaden the scope and increase the validity of the moderation theory, different scholars have examined the relationship between the inclusion of Islamist parties in the political process and moderation in their political thinking (e.g., Wickham, 2004, El-Ghobashy, 2005, Schwedler, 2006, Browers, 2009, Tezcur, 2010). In academic debates, this relationship is also known as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, defined as the encouragement of leaders of opposition groups to moderate their political views as a consequence of the existence of a political opening. Furthermore, 'the inclusion-moderation

---

5 Huntington, S., *The Third Wave*, pp:165

6 Huntington, S., *The Third Wave*, pp:169

7 Ibidem.

hypothesis explicitly suggests a theory that causally connects elite-led inclusion to oppositional moderation as a concrete policy for incumbent regimes to deflate challenges to their rule.'[8]

In the literature about the concept of moderation, two definitions can be identified. The first definition is provided by Schwedler, according to which moderation is defined as a movement 'from a rigid and closed world view to one relatively more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives.'[9] Furthermore, Schwedler argues that participation in elections is not a sufficient indicator of moderation, as the participation can be used strategically in order to expose a moderate position while still harboring a radical political agenda. Wickham adds to this definition the necessity of 'the embracement of liberal and democratic values, including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship.'[10]

In reviewing the literature on this hypothesis, two forms of moderation can be identified: behavioral moderation and ideological moderation. Despite the differences in defining the concept of moderation, there is a consensus among scholars about the necessity to distinguish between behavioral and ideological moderation. Scholars disagree, however, on the sequence of the occurrence of these two forms of moderation. In general, scholars agree that behavioral moderation occurs as a consequence of the existence of political openings in the political space initiated by the regime. The inclusion and participation of groups in the system that were formerly excluded exerts pressure on its members to produce a behavior that is influenced by the institutional constraints.[11] This strategic change in the behavior of political actors is recognized as moderation.

Mona el-Ghobashy has examined the change in the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt since the 1980s up to 2000. El-Ghobashy concluded that the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics and electoral competition has 'irrevocably

---

8 Schwedler, J. (2006). *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp:25

9 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:22

10 Wickham, C.R. (2004). 'The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp:206

11 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:23

transformed them into a flexible party that is highly responsive to the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics.'[12] The engagement in the political process has stimulated the Muslim Brotherhood to distinguish itself from the radical Islamist ideology of Sayyed Qutb and to revert to the more moderate thinking of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna.[13] In this sense, the metamorphosis of the religiously oriented Muslim Brotherhood is not different than that experienced by the Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America.[14] According to El-Ghobashy, the 'institutional rules of participation' and interaction are the main drivers of 'the organizational and ideological moderation' of the Muslim Brotherhood.[15]

The behavioral moderation in the thinking of Islamist parties is also confirmed in the study of Omar Ashour in which he tries to explain why radical Islamist groups decide to abandon militancy.[16] Ashour argues that moderation occurs because of 'domestic and international structural constraints'.[17] The process of moderation is driven by strategic calculations made in response to political opportunities and openings. Ashour also stresses further the need for charismatic leaders in order to successfully justify the change in the orientation of the group.[18]

When considering the process of moderation as a continuous process, behavioral moderation does not mark the end of the process. According to several scholars (e.g., Schwedler, 2006, Tezcur, 2010, Wickham, 2007), it is necessary for behavioral moderation to

---

12  El-Ghobashy makes no distinction between different forms of moderation. El-Ghobashy, M. (2005). 'The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood', in *Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35*, pp:390

13 El-Ghobashy, M., The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, pp:374

14 Ibidem, pp:376

15 Ibidem, pp:390

16 Ashour uses the term 'deradicalization' instead of 'moderation'. Ashour, O. (2009). *The De-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*. New York: Routledge, pp:8

17 Ashour, O., *The De-radicalization of Jihadists*, pp:12

18 Ibidem.

be followed by ideological moderation in order to consider the process of moderation as complete. In her book, '*Faith in moderation*', Schwedler even argues that the core issue of moderation is ideological rather than behavioral.[19] The possibility of a political actor professing to have moderated the political views and to be committed to the rules of the democratic game while still harboring a radical agenda is always present. Skeptics of the intentions of Islamist parties use this argument to convince others not to trust the moderate rhetoric of Islamist parties.[20] How can this dilemma be solved? And can one determine whether the political views of Islamist parties have substantially evolved and whether they are only not using a moderate democratic façade to hide their radical ideology? The relevance of these questions is confirmed in several studies of which the conclusion is that moderation in behavior does not always lead to moderation in political ideology. Janine Astrid Clark has, for example, examined cross-ideological coalitions between political parties in Jordan and concluded that while the Islamist party was willing to join the coalition, there are still red lines that cannot be crossed by the party. Those matters on which the party was not willing to compromise were issues concerning the implementation of Shari'a.[21]

Although several scholars seek to distinguish between behavioral and ideological moderation, they ultimately fail to operationalize these as separate concepts. Ideological and behavioral moderation are simply too closely intertwined. In order to avoid making tautological mistakes and in order to be able to formulate well-specified indications of the process of moderation, this research will introduce a new method to make distinction between behavioral and ideological moderation. The distinction will be presented in the theoretical framework.

## 1.1. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework in this research will be based on assumptions derived from the moderation theory. Although the prediction made by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis about the moderation of radical parties as a consequence of their inclusion in the political

---

19 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:19

20 Pargeter, A. (2010). *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, India: Thomson Press, Ltd, pp:12

21 Clark, J.A. (2006). 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp:540

process, is initially meant to take place in a democratic context, it can also be applied to semi-democratic countries such as Egypt. In the 1980s the Mubarak regime aimed to liberalize the political space, and made possible the participation of parties that were formerly excluded. The process of political liberalization was, however, limited and controlled by the Egyptian regime. Nevertheless, political openings emerged, rendering the political space more open than in the period before.[22] Moreover, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis suggests that the openings in the political space should be initiated by the regime itself. However, the openings that emerged in the political space in Egypt after the departure of Mubarak in 2011 are the result of the revolution and are thus not regime-led. This is interesting because it enables the researcher to observe whether there are differences in the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in regime-led political liberalization and in non-regime-led political openings.

   Mona el-Ghobashy, among other scholars, has examined the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to show empirically that shifts in the thinking of this movement have happened. This research aims to go beyond this in two ways: first, by introducing a theoretical perspective; second, by exploring the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in the post-revolutionary period, which to my knowledge has not been conducted yet in any other academic research. Furthermore, in order to gain a better understanding of the factors that contribute to the presence of absence of ideological moderation it is important to make a distinction between the concept of moderation in itself and the way to measure the level of moderation. As will appear in the remaining of this chapter, making this distinction is especially important in studying ideological moderation of Islamist parties.

### 1.1.1 Concept of moderation

In this research, I define the concept of moderation based on the criterion of the use of violence. Moderation means the rejection of the use of violence in order to achieve specific goals. Theoretically, Islamist movements can be classified in two categories based on the criterion of the use of violence. The first category of Islamist movements is formed by the Islamic religious movements, among which are the Jihadist movements.[23] The ideology of these movements is based on the conviction that the society has strayed from the true Islamic creed (*'akida*). Movements in this category consider the rulers and the citizens as infidels and

---

22 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:22

23 Ibidem.

seek therefore to correct this failure to establish a pure Islamic society and state. [24] The main priority of these movements is to re-Islamize society, according to a top-down approach. The use of violence by this group is one of the possible means to rescue the Islamic religion and reintroduce it into society. [25]

The second category of Islamist movements is formed by the socio-political movements with an Islamic agenda.[26] Movements in this category do not believe that the society has fundamentally strayed from the true Islamic *'akida*. The main priority of these movements is, however, to bring the social and political system more in line with *Sharia* law. The main responsibility of this group of movements is 'to apply the rulings of the *Sharia* and not to correct the religious doctrine'.[27] As such, they seek a more temperate type of social and political reform, often from the bottom up, and through non-violent means.[28] The use of violence is only acceptable when faced with a foreign occupation.

Therefore, religious movements that focus on the importance of the implementation of the *Sharia* in order to create an ideal Islamic state, through the use of peaceful means, are considered to be moderate. In contrast, religious movements that focus of the importance of the protection of the '*akida* by the use of violence are not considered to be moderate. Based on this criterion, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered to belong to the first group, if not being the main representative of this group. The primary aim of the Muslim Brotherhood is to restructure society and the political system according to Sharia law, through the use of

---

24 Examples of movements in this group are the Jihad, the Jama'a al-Islamya and Jihadist Salafist groups.

25 The Jihadist movements can be further distinguished in two groups according to the two periods in the life of the Prophet Mohammed. In *Mecca*, the position of Muslims was weak and Islam was propagated through peaceful means (*da'wa*). In *Medina*, the position of Muslims was strong and the use of violence in order to spread Islam was possible. For further specification, see 'God and the cause', by Dia Rashwan.

26 Rashwan, D. (2001). 'God and the Cause', Al-Ahraam Weekly, on http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/588/op2.htm

27 Interview with Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 8 Mei 2012

28 Rashwan, D. (2001). 'God and the Cause', Al-Ahraam Weekly, on http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/588/op2.htm

democratic tools.[29] This also appears in the letters of Hassan al-Banna, who was against the idea of revolution or attempt to overthrow the existing political order. Al-Banna considered the Brotherhood rather as a 'reform movement' with a gradual approach. According to this criterion, *in principle* the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered as a moderate religious movement. Within this category, however, the level of moderation concerning the appropriate way to organize society and politics varies. Here, the dynamics of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis come at work and are relevant.

**1.1.2 Level of moderation**

In order to be able to measure the *level* of moderation, the concept of democracy will be applied. In this research democracy is conceptualized as a set of procedures and principles. By procedures, I refer to the acceptance of processes through which collective decisions are made, such as the organization of the political system, free elections and the rule of majority. Principles are taken to mean the ideological underpinnings of democracy, also called substantive principles, such as the liberal principles of equality, citizenship and freedoms.[30] These two components of the concept of democracy enable the researcher to distinguish between behavioral and ideological moderation conceptually, but also in terms of measurement.

In this research the concept of behavioral moderation will be linked to the concept of procedural democracy while the concept of ideological moderation will be linked to the level of acceptance of the liberal principles. It is the combination of the procedural and principal components of democracy that defines the level of moderation in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The concept of behavioral moderation will be defined as the acceptance of the rules of the game and the respect for political pluralism while the concept of ideological moderation will be defined as the acceptance of the primacy of democratic principles, such as equality and citizenship rights.

**1.2 Research question**

In this research, the main aim is to provide an answer to the following research question:
What is it that explains ideological moderation?

---

29 Mitchell, R.P. (1969). *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, UK: Oxford University Press, pp:235

30 Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2002). 'Deliberative Democracy beyond Process', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* Vol. 2. No. 2, pp:154

**1.3 Hypotheses**

The general hypothesis in this research will be derived from the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in its simplest form. Two main hypotheses are formulated as:

➢ The inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political system will lead to behavioral moderation.
➢ The inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political system will lead to ideological moderation.

**1.4 Operationalization of variables**

The dependent variable in this research is the level of moderation in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The level of behavioral moderation will be measured based on the views of the Muslim Brotherhood on the principle of political pluralism. With political pluralism is not only meant the acceptance of other parties but also the ability to forge alliances and work together. The level of ideological moderation will be measured based on the position of the Brotherhood towards three criteria: the role of women and Egyptian Christians, Copts, in political life and the position of the *Sharia* in politics. With the role of women and Copts in political life, it is the aim to assess whether the Brotherhood applies the principle of equality and citizenship, which are considered to be among the core values in a democratic system, in practice. The third criterion for the measurement of ideological moderation is the role of the *Sharia* in politics. This criterion is important because it defines the view of the Brotherhood towards the role of religion in political life and whether the ultimate sovereignty lies in the hands of God or the people.

The level of moderation will be characterized using three measurement levels: low moderation (1), medium moderation (2) and high moderation (3). Altogether, the Brotherhood is able to gain 12 points on the four abovementioned issues. If the Muslim Brotherhood scores 0 to 4 points, the overall level of moderation will be marked as 'low'; 4 to 8 points relate to a 'medium' level of moderation; and 8 to 12 points relate to a 'high' level of moderation.

| Criteria | Indicator | Coding |
| --- | --- | --- |

| The position of women in political life | Equality between man and women concerning political rights.[31] | 1= low equality concerning **political rights**: woman are not allowed to run for president/fulfill high positions in the army/be a judge and not allowed to be represented in parliament. 2= Partial equality between men and women concerning **political rights**: women are not allowed to run for president/fulfill high positions in the army/be a judge but are able to join the political life in parliament/parties. 3= Full equality between men and women concerning **political rights**: women can be represented in parliament and run for president/fulfill high positions in the army/be a judge. |
|---|---|---|

31 In first instance, the indicator for 'the position of women in society' and 'the position of Copts in society', civil rights were also considered as an indicator. During my fieldwork, it appeared that, concerning 'the position of women in society', civil rights are not a proper indicator of moderation because they have always been based on Islamic law. This is not the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood, but has been a societal demand since the 1970s. Also concerning Copts, the indicator of civil rights is not relevant because Copts have always had the right to be governed by their Christian rules in terms of marriage and divorce issues. So, the equality between Copts and Muslims in civil rights is not relevant.

| | The representation of women inside the Muslim Brotherhood. The representation of women inside the Brotherhood gives an indication of the role of women that the Brotherhood seeks to establish in the society and the extent to which this role is achieved internally. | 1= Women are not represented in the higher levels of the movement: the Guidance Office and the Shura Council<br>2= Women are represented in the higher levels of the movement: the Guidance Office and the Shura Council |
|---|---|---|
| The position of Coptic Christians in political life | Equality between Copts and Muslims concerning political rights. | 1= Low equality with Muslims concerning **political rights**: Copts are not allowed to run for president/Copts are not able to become member of the Muslim Brotherhood/Copts are not able to be in parliament.<br>2= Partial equality with Muslims concerning **political rights**: Copts are not allowed to run for president/Copts are able to become member of the Muslim Brotherhood party/ Copts are able to be in parliament.<br>3= Full equality with Muslims concerning **political rights**: Copts are allowed to run for president/Copts are able to become member of the Muslim Brotherhood/Copts are able to be in parliament. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The position of *Sharia* in politics (Islamic law) | The level of willingness of the Muslim Brotherhood to implement Islamic law in politics | 1= Full application of *Sharia* law (Iran/Afghanistan). Legislation is fully based on *Sharia* law or religious council. 2= Partial application of *Sharia* law (Egypt during the Mubarak regime): legislation is partially based on *Sharia* law. 3= No application of *Sharia* law (division between state and mosque): legislation is not based on *Sharia* law. |
| Political pluralism | The acceptance by the Muslim Brotherhood of actors/parties with secular or liberal background in the political sphere and outside. | 1= Low acceptance of political pluralism: no tolerance for secular/liberal points of view. 2= Partial acceptance of political pluralism: partial tolerance for secular/liberal points of view, especially in periods when it is beneficial for the MB to do that. 3= Full acceptance of political pluralism: full tolerance for secular/liberal points of view. |
| | The ability of the Brotherhood to work together with other political forces. | 1= The Muslim Brotherhood has forged alliances with other parties and has participated in joined joint actions of the opposition. Integration with the political forces. 2= The Muslim Brotherhood has not forged alliances with other parties and has not participated in joint actions of the opposition. Isolation from |

| | | the political forces. |
|---|---|---|
| | | |

*Table 1: Indicators of the dependent variable*

Here it can be argued that judging the Brotherhood on the basis of equality between men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims in political rights might not be fair. The value of equality and citizenship, which has been developed and applied in the West should not be applied to the Muslim countries. Arabs should have the right to define the content of these values in a way that fits the Arab culture, in which Islam has the defining role. Although these claims are justified, the issue here is that even in Islam, different interpretations exist about how the recent society should be organized. The choice in favor of a certain interpretation and the rejection of the other, still gives an indication of the level of moderation within the limits of Islam. Moreover, the Brotherhood argues constantly that the values of equality, freedom and citizenship are in essence values that have been derived from Islam.

Independent variables

The independent variable in this research is the 'inclusion', defined as 'an easing of centralized restrictions on political activities (organization, mobilization and public debate).'[32] This variable thus refers to the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood is able to be part of the political process in Egypt, especially in the parliamentary elections. The period that will be studied starts in 1984, the year in which the Muslim Brotherhood participated in parliamentary elections for the first time, continuing until May 2012.

The electoral impediments to the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political arena and the repressive measures taken by the regime in these periods will be examined. Here it is important to mention that the organization of electoral laws was not only intended to complicate the entry of the Brotherhood to parliament and protect the monopoly of the NDP, but also to prevent an electoral victory of any possible opposition party in Egypt. In concrete terms, three factors will be examined in order to measure the level of inclusion/political liberalization. First, an assessment will be made of whether the Muslim Brotherhood was

32 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:36

legalized and was able to run in parliamentary elections as a political party. Second, the organization of electoral laws during the above-mentioned parliamentary terms will be examined. More concretely, an assessment will be made of whether changes in electoral laws have taken place with the aim of restricting the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the electoral process in parliament or in syndicates. The inclusion of certain thresholds for a party in order to qualify for parliamentary representation and redrawing electoral districts will also be assessed. Third, the extent to which the regime initiated repressive measures to restrict the presence of the Brotherhood will be outlined.

The electoral restrictions and repressive measures that are institutionalized by the Egyptian regime to complicate the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary process will be determined by using two measurement levels: low inclusion and high inclusion. The level of 'high inclusion' refers to a situation in which the Muslim Brotherhood is able to form a political party and is free to participate in elections, without any electoral restrictions and repressive practices. The level of 'low inclusion' refers to a situation in which the Brotherhood is not able to form a political party; the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the electoral process is made nearly impossible by the regime because of repressive practices (detentions, military trials and arrests) and electoral restrictions.

## 1.5 Case study

The case that has been selected in this research is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and most prominent opposition force in Egypt.[33] Changes in the political views and behavior of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, especially in the post-revolutionary period, will probably have an influence on the course of action in branches of this party/movement in other Arab countries. Egypt is always considered as an example for other Arab countries, on how to deal with political and religious matters. Especially in the recent times of revival of political Islamism in several Arab countries, it is important to focus on the 'mother party' which was established in Egypt. Furthermore, the departure of President Mubarak in February 2011 enables the researcher to observe the ideological and behavioral changes of the Muslim Brotherhood in a relatively free environment. Therefore, the long history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the current political opening in the political structure makes this case unique.

---

33 Pargeter, A., *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:15

Following the Arab Spring, inclusion no longer seems to be a choice. It is rather a reality which the West should learn to live with. In order to be able to understand this process, it is important to know why the inclusion of Islamists in certain Arab countries has proven more successful than in others. A comparative study between Egypt and Tunisia would have been fruitful for this purpose. This is also important because of the other Arab countries which are on their way to democratization. However, due to the lack of space and the lack of time to conduct this study in a proper way, the focus in this study will be only on Egypt. This study should also be considered as a first step in the conduction of a broader comparative research which includes Arab countries that have been affected by the Arab Spring.

Nevertheless, any study that aims to examine the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood should start by examining the 'mother organization' in order to understand the ideological and organizational roots of this movement. The choice for Egypt in the case study is therefore justified. Despite the fact that the national context in each Arab country has an influence on the strategies and tactics of each branch, it is nevertheless possible to derive general propositions from the case study of Egypt, as the 'mother branch', that could be applicable in other Arab countries. Repression and authoritarianism have been a common denominator among all Arab countries in the Middle East.

## 1.6 Data Collection and Method of Analysis

In order to test the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, different sources have been consulted. The data for the dependent and independent variables consist of official documents, public statements, articles and learning material published by the Muslim Brotherhood. A series of interviews have also been conducted with members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 (March-April), as well as with activists, independent journalists and experts on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. Primary and secondary literature on the evolution of the Brotherhood has also been used. The archive of Al-Ahraam Newspaper in Cairo has further been used in order to collect data, especially newspaper articles. The data collected will be analyzed by means of a within- case analysis, also making use of the tool of process tracing, which helps to identify sequences (how events trigger other events) of a chain of causality.[34]

---

34 Georege, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, USA: Belfer Center for Sciences and International Affairs, pp:116

**1.7 Scope and limitations**

The instance of class of events that this research aims to explain is 'ideological moderation', more concretely 'ideological moderation in the thinking of Islamist parties'. A potential methodological problem in this research is that the data that has been collected by conducting interviews does not necessarily reflect the real intentions of leaders or members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Not only the collected answers but also the measurement and interpretation of answers are also often very personal. The issue of reliability is however a general weakness of field research. Learning how to interpret certain answers, asking indirect questions and double checking given answers have however been useful to go beyond statements simply made for media consumption.

An additional limitation in this research is the ability to generalize. The focus in this research has only been on one case study, which limits the possibility of making generalizations. However, this is not considered as a problem because the aim of this research is not to be able to generalize as such but rather to offer the early elements of a new theory that can help explain what I see is missing from the inclusion moderation hypothesis. In the near future, I hope to be able to test the propositions offered in this research on other cases in order to enhance their validity.

**Chapter 2: Background**

The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a reaction to the colonialist presence in Egypt and the end of the last Caliphate. Since its foundation, the aim of the Muslim Brotherhood has been to create an Islamic state based on *Sharia* law. The strategy of al-Banna to reach this goal was based on a gradual, peaceful, bottom-up approach, which starts with the 'reform of the individual'. The aim of the Brotherhood could be achieved through religious and political means. What is meant by religious is the preaching or '*da´wa*', which aims to reform the individual in a religious way. Political refers to the use of state apparatus to establish an Islamic state. Until the end of the 1940s, the religious method was dominant in achieving the goal of the Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the political approach has been considered to be more effective.[35] The political engagement of the Brotherhood, especially since 1984, reached its peak in 2011, after the Egyptian people managed to oust Hosni Mubarak.

Since 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has gone through three historical stages. During the first stage, which lasted from 1928 to 1954, the focus of the Brotherhood was on missionary and educational work. Through preaching (*da'wa*), Hassan al Banna aimed to broaden the base of the Brotherhood in order to be able to Islamize society from the bottom upwards.[36] The second stage started with a clash between the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, and lasted until 1974. After having helped the Free Officers with the revolution of 1952, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the demands of the leadership of the Brotherhood started to increase and began to threaten the rule of Abdel Nasser. As a result of this clash, the movement was dissolved in 1954 and a massive arrest campaign was initiated by Abdel Nasser against its members.[37] Up to the beginning of the 1970s, the most prominent members of the Brotherhood were in prison. The organizational framework of the movement was weak and fragile. Ideologically, however, a new trend emerged which came to the fore in the radical writings of Sayyed Qutb.[38] Starting

---

35 Shadid, A. (2002). *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam*, USA: Westview Press, pp:50, 256

36 Pargeter, A., *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:18

37 Interview with Jamal al-Banna, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012

38 Pargeter, A., *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:38

with the rule of Sadat in 1970, the policy towards members of Islamist groups changed considerably as Sadat aimed to use these groups as a counterbalance to the left. In order to achieve this goal, Sadat released members of the Brotherhood from prison in the mid-1970s and adopted religious rhetoric in order to gain legitimacy from the public.

The third stage started with the release of the members of the movement from prison in 1974. In this stage, a rejection of the thinking of Qutb occurred. In 1977, the second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Hudaiby, published the book 'Preachers not Judges', in order to distance the Brotherhood from the radical thoughts of Qutb. The focus was again on the continuation of the bottom-up approach to Islamize society, combined with an increased representation in state institutions. Gradualism remained the main focus of the movement.[39] The writings of Sayyed Qutb, however, left its mark on the thinking of several members, especially those who were imprisoned by Abdel Nasser. The adherents to the writings of Sayyed Qutb and the adherents to the moderate book of 'Preachers not Judges' existed in parallel in the subsequent period. As will be discussed later, both sides have produced leaders who tried to pull the Muslim Brotherhood in a direction that fitted their ideology. After the assassination of Sadat by a radical Islamist in 1981, Mubarak came to power. In the following chapter, the ability of the Mubarak regime to include the Muslim Brotherhood in the political system will be reviewed.

---

39 Pargeter, A., *The Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:36

**Chapter 3: The Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis: An Application**

According to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the inclusion of a political group in the democratic process will increase the level of moderation in its thinking. In order to assess whether this hypothesis is also applicable to the Muslim Brotherhood, the level of inclusion in the political process and the level of moderation in the thinking of the Brotherhood will first be determined. This chapter will focus on the governing period of President Hosni Mubarak, which started in 1981 and in which the Muslim Brotherhood participated for the first time in parliamentary elections in 1984. In the later sections of this chapter, the level of inclusion and the level of moderation will be determined in the period from 1984- May 2012. This period will be divided into two sub-periods (1984-2010 and 2011- May 2012). The occurrence of the revolution in 2011 is the critical juncture on the basis of which this period is divided.

**Level of inclusion: 1984-2010**

From 1984 to 2010, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime can be characterized as a competitive zero-sum game. Mubarak constantly aimed to restrict the influence of the Brotherhood through constitutional, judicial and military means. Based on the indicators identified above; the level of inclusion in this period can be characterized as 'low'. Throughout this period, the Brotherhood did not have the opportunity to establish a political party due to constitutional law 44 which placed a ban on the establishment of parties based on religion. Several electoral laws were adopted in order to limit the participation of the Brotherhood in parliament (law 144 and law 188 in respectively 1983 and 1986) and in syndicates (syndicate law 100 in 1993).[40] In 2007, a new constitutional amendment was approved in which political activity by religious groups was forbidden. Through this amendment, the government created the necessary constitutional framework to justify its arbitrary arrest campaigns of members of the Muslim Brotherhood based on the fact that they were members of an illegal religious movement.[41] Although during the 1980s, the existence of the Muslim Brotherhood was restricted but tolerated, the 1990s witnessed an open confrontation with members of the Brotherhood. The reason for this reversal in policy is the

---

40 Kassem, M. (2004). Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp:59, 112

41 Stacher, A. J. (2008). 'Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt', *Institute for Public Policy Research*, pp: 1

increased level of Islamist violence and the infiltration of the Brotherhood in political and social life. In order to halt any attempt to increase the political presence, leading members of the Brotherhood were made to appear before military trials in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001 and 2006.[42] While the period after the events of September 11 witnessed a relative improvement in the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime, the military grip of the regime intensified after the electoral victory of the Brotherhood in the parliamentary election of 2005. In 2007, some 2,669 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested, 1320 of whom were detained.[43] The number of members arrested by the security forces in 2008 was 3,674.[44] In 2009, the number of members of the Brotherhood arrested culminated, reaching 5,022 members.[45] In July 2010, the military approach of the government intensified and resulted in the arrest of 6,001 members of the Brotherhood.[46] Because of these repressive measures, the leaders of the Brotherhood became risk-averse; they played the political game inside the limits that were given by the regime and they were even inclined to cooperate with it, when possible.

When comparing the number of seats gained by the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections since 1984 until 2010, the difference in the strategy of the regime towards the Brotherhood becomes clear.

| Election Year | Numbers of seats (total number of seats 448) |
|---------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1984 | 8 |
| 1987 | 38 |
| 1990 | - |
| 2005 | 88 |

| Election year | Number of seats |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1995 | 1 |
| 2000 | 17 |
| 2010 | 0 |

42 Report on the Military Trials of the Leadership
Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination, 2009, pp:7

43 Interview with the lawyer of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Meniem Abdel Maksoud, Cairo, 7 Mei 2012

44 Ibidem.

45 Interview with the lawyer of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Meniem Abdel Maksoud, Cairo, 7 Mei 2012

46 Ibidem.

**The level of inclusion: the post-revolutionary period**

In 2011, a significant political opening occurred in the political system as the result of the departure of President Mubarak. The level of inclusion in this post-revolutionary period is characterized therefore as 'high'. The Muslim Brotherhood has been able to establish a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party; it has participated in the recent parliamentary elections and it has even won an impressive 47% of the seats in parliament.[47] The repressive measures used by the Mubarak regime to limit their electoral gain in parliament and to prevent them from being a social and political force have been abolished. For the first time in history, in 2011, all the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were released from prison. The Freedom and Justice Party is now considered as one of the existing political parties, if not one of the leading parties on the political scene. Did the increased level of inclusion, however, cause an increase in the level of moderation in the thinking of the Brotherhood?

**The level of Moderation in the Thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood**

In this section, the level of moderation concerning the four issues will be reviewed before and after the revolution. Here, the focus will be on the major statements of the Brotherhood concerning the respective issues.

**Political pluralism**

From the 1980s onward, the Muslim Brotherhood accepted a principle that was previously rejected: the principle of political pluralism and thus participation in elections. During the 1980s, the only option for entering parliament was through an alliance with another party. In the parliamentary elections in 1984 the Brotherhood forged an electoral alliance with the secular Wafd party, and in 1987 they joined forces with the Labor Party and the Liberal Party.[48]

Although officially the Brotherhood accepted the principle of pluralism, the fourth General Guide, Nasr Hamd Abu Elzaid, issued in 1987 a troubling statement which casts

---

47 Website the Guardian: 'Egypt's Islamists win 75 percent of parliament', on http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10053165

48 Al-Anani, k. (2007). Al-Ikwaan al-Muslimoun Fi Masr: Sheiguga tusare' al-Zaman (The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: An Aging Movement in Fight with the Time). Cairo: Shorouk International, pp:138

doubt on the credibility of the earlier statement about respect for the democratic rules and political pluralism. During an interview, Abu el-Zaid stated that the Brotherhood affirms that political pluralism is necessary and that the leaders of the Brotherhood are considering the option to establish a political party. In the same interview, the General Guide issued a negative statements about *Hezb al-Tagammu'*, which is a communist party, and stated that this party should have no right whatsoever to exist. According to Abu el-Nasr, the communist party is aversive to religion and there is no place for such a party in such a religious country such as Egypt.[49] This statement shows that while the General Guide expressed its desire to establish a party based on religion, he rejected the right of another non-religious party to exist.

In 1994, the Brotherhood issued a document in which it confirmed the necessity and the importance of political pluralism.[50] According to the Brotherhood, the existence of parties with different ideological backgrounds should be considered as an enrichment of the Egyptian politics. No restriction should be placed on the activities of parties to promote their agendas to the public. In this statement, it was furthermore argued that as long as *Sharia* is the highest law, whose implementation is protected by an independent judicial power, it is guaranteed that the principle of political pluralism will not lead the Egyptian society 'in a wrong direction'. Since 1994 onwards, the content of this document formed the official view of the Brotherhood towards political pluralism. In 1997, however, another troubling statement was issued about this principle. The fifth General Guide, Mashhur, stated that: 'For now we accept the principle of party plurality, but when we have an Islamic rule we will either accept or reject this principle'[51]

Besides the forged electoral alliances in the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood also joined the social and political forces during the 2000s that aimed to challenge the rule of Mubarak. Especially since 2004, a period of activism and social change started in Egypt, especially with the establishment of the Kifaya movement. Several civil society organizations were established during this period. This activism in the social sphere that aimed to challenge the

49 Rageb Awd, H. and Tawfik, H. (1995). Al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoun wa al-Siasa fi Masr (*The Muslim Brotherhood and the Politics in Egypt)*, Al-Mahrusa Publisher, pp:337

50 Al-Sha'ab newspaper: 'A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood for the people', 2 Mei 1995 (al-Ahram Archive).

51Khalil, M. (2006). 'The Muslim Brotherhood and the Copts', on http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2006/04/the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the/

boundaries imposed by the regime was especially led by the youth and was encouraged by the West. The Muslim Brotherhood made use of this activism to weaken the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime in an indirect way.[52] They supported the social movement campaigns in their struggle against the authoritarian regime and used their large base to help other forces to organize demonstrations, marches and sit-ins. This was also confirmed during a personal interview with Subhi Saleh, an official in the Brotherhood and a prominent member of parliament for the Freedom and Justice Party. He stated that the aim of the Muslim Brotherhood in this period was to help those trying to push the 'red lines' from behind the scene. When this job was finished, the Brotherhood went on the scene in full force and took over power.[53]

*Level of moderation*

The Brotherhood accepted officially the principle of political pluralism, which indicates a 'high' level of moderation. It was also able to work together with other political forces in the 1980s and 2000s. The level of moderation will, however, be characterized as 'medium' and not 'high'. This is because of the presence of conflicting statements about the acceptance of the principle of political pluralism which create doubts about the intentions of the Brotherhood.

**Political pluralism in the post-revolutionarily period**

After the replacement of Mubarak in February 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood kept initially its promises concerning respect for political pluralism and the rule of law. The Brotherhood expressed several times its respect for 'the freedom of the people' to choose the appropriate party, if democratically elected, even if this is contrary to the interests of the Brotherhood.[54]

Concerning the criterion of the ability to work together with other forces, there are several indications that show the unwillingness of the Brotherhood to fulfill this criterion. The most important event that indicates the unwillingness of the Brotherhood to put ideological differences aside and work in the interest of the country occurred in March 2012, when the new Constitution should have been written. Initially, the whole problem was caused because

---

52 Al-Anani, K., The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, pp:240

53 Interview with dr. Subhi Saleh in the office of the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria, 10 April 2012.

54 Election Program of the Freedom and Justice Party 2011, pp:27

of the vague formulation of Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration, in which it was stated that the new Constitution will be written by a 100-member assembly. It was, however, not determined how the assembly should be appointed.[55] Here, a division occurred between the Brotherhood and the other political parties about the way the members of the assembly should be appointed. The Brotherhood argued that the 100-member assembly should be elected from the parliament itself, the majority of which was formed by Islamists. Liberal and leftists parties demanded instead that the assembly should represent the whole society and should include women, young people, Copts and Muslims in equal percentages. The Brotherhood rejected this demand and formed an assembly which was composed of 70% of Islamists.[56] Out of protest against the attempt by the Brotherhood to monopolize the composition of the assembly, almost all the liberal forces left the assembly. Also, representatives of al-Azhar and the Coptic Church decided to resign. This assembly was later suspended and blocked by the court because 'it did not reflect the diversity of the Egyptian society.'[57] This event shows that after the departure of Mubarak, and especially after the electoral victory in parliament, the willingness of the Brotherhood to form coalitions and work together has decreased. After the realization of the common goal, the departure of Mubarak, the political forces that worked together became enemies. This is logical: parties should aim to maximize their electoral gain and power. However, the situation in a transition period is different and it makes necessary a certain degree of cooperation for the common good. Drafting a new constitution is moreover not an act that should be accomplished only by one political power.

*Level of moderation*
As prior to the revolution, in the period after the departure of Mubarak the Brotherhood stressed the importance of the principle of political pluralism. This indicates a 'high' level of moderation. However, in practice it appears that the Brotherhood has difficulties putting aside the ideological differences and working together with other forces in the interests of the country. The interests of the Brotherhood itself were considered more important than the

_____

55 Website BBC: 'Egypt court suspends constitutional assembly', on
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17665048

56 The main aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was not to protect Article 2 of the Constitution but rather to add a clause which prevents the early dissolve of Parliament.

57 Ibidem.

interests of the country. The overall level of moderation here should therefore be characterized as 'medium'.

**The position of women in political life**

In 1981, the *mufti* of the Muslim Brotherhood and also a member of the Guidance Office, Mohammed Abdallah al-Khatib, issued religious proclamations (*fatwa's)* concerning the attitude towards women in the newspaper of the Brotherhood, '*al-Dawa'*. Concerning the political rights of women, al-Khatib argued that women are not allowed to occupy important positions in politics such as the presidency, the post of a minister or a seat in the Shura Council.[58] The sheikh justified this religious opinion based on two versions of the Quran in which is stated that man should rule over women. The sheikh further argues that if the Quran states that the man is the head of the house, how could we allow women to be the head of the country?

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood issued in March 1994 a document about the view of the movement towards the position of women in a Muslim society. This document stated that the main task of women is to raise children and to take care of the husband and the house. Concerning political rights, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that there is no verse in *Sharia* which prohibits women from voting in parliamentary elections.[59] In certain circumstances, the participation of women in elections is even necessary in order to increase the percentage of votes of Muslim candidates. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood believes that women also have the right to be candidates in representative elections. The right of the women to vote and to be elected should however be conducted in a way that prevents '*ikhtilaat'* (mixing between men and women). Women should also be committed to the Islamic dress code. The Brotherhood rejected the Western model of the treatment of women and their position in society, which is based on a 'pornographic philosophy' and which opposes the principles of the holy *Sharia*.[60]

---

58 Newspaper 'al-dawa', No. 58. February 1981, in Ali, A. (2005). Al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimien, Fatawi (*The Fatwa's of the Muslim Brotherhood)*, Cairo: Al-Mahrousa Publisher, pp:97-98

59 The Muslim Brotherhood, (1994), 'Al-Mar2a al-Musla fi al Mugtama al-Muslim' (*The Muslim woman in an Islamic society)*, The Islamic Center for Studies and Research, pp:22

60 Ibidem, pp:28

The statements of the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the rights of women to be candidates in representative elections were translated into action in the parliamentary elections of 2000. In these elections, the Brotherhood fielded their first female candidate, Gihan al-Halafawi. The contents of the document issued in 1994 concerning the political rights of women is repeated in the reform document of 2004, the election program of 2005, the platform of the party of 2007 and the election program of 2010.

On the level of public statements, however, there seems to be disagreement about the role of women in political life. In 2006, for example, two conflicting statements were issued regarding this topic. A member of the Guidance office, Abu el-Fettouh, argued that 'women have the right to hold any position. As political institutions develop and governance improves, it will be wholly legitimate for a woman to assume the presidency, just as a man would do.'[61] In an official document of the Brotherhood about the role of women in society it is, however, argued that 'the only public office which it is agreed upon that a woman cannot occupy is the presidency or head of state.'[62]

### The representation of women inside the Muslim Brotherhood

While the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood claim publicly to improve the position of women in society, the position of the women inside the movement itself indicates a different attitude towards them. First of all, the organization of women inside the Brotherhood has a loose character compared to that of male members. Inside the Brotherhood there is a separate section for women, which was established by Hassan al-Banna in the 1930s. In the higher levels of the movement, this section is represented by a man. The coordination between the women's section and the other organizational levels therefore always takes place through a male member.[63] Inside the Brotherhood, the idea is namely not accepted that women would be present in the same commission or council together with men.[64] There is a complete

---

61 Abu el-Fettouh, A. (2006): 'The Muslim Brotherhood comments on 'Grazyzones', Carnegie Paper, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FutouhEnglishFullText___5_.pdf, pp:4

62 Website Ikhwan Web: 'The role of Muslim women in an Islamic society', on http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4914

63 The man should be above the age of forty; should be married and should be highly religious.

64 Interview with Aly al-Meshad, Office of Al-Tayar al-Masri Party, Cairo, 7 Mei 2012

separation between men and women, also during the weekly and monthly meetings. According to former members, inside the Brotherhood there is an unwritten rule which regulates the relations between the male and the female members inside and outside the movement. This rule says that it is better not to achieve a possible interest/gain, if it is likely to involve a 'moral corruption', i.e. contact between males and females.[65] In order to prevent the occurrence of moral corruption, the interaction between men and women inside the Brotherhood is thus minimal or non-existent. The leading elite of the Muslim Brotherhood has always applied this rule to regulate the interaction between men and women. One of the interviewees, Muaaz Abdel-Karim, even stated that the elite of the Brotherhood consider women as a source of '*fitna*' (seduction or temptation). They are of the opinion that women and men, if possible, should be completely separated in order to prevent the likelihood of *fitna*. This opinion has been confirmed by other three former members of the Brotherhood.

Second, women are not represented in leading positions in the Brotherhood: Shura Council, Guidance Office or provincial offices. The female candidates that have been fielded in parliamentary elections since 2000 thus have not even the right to run for a position in the internal organization. The exclusion of women from leading positions inside the Brotherhood has always been justified in terms of protection. The leaders wanted to spare women from the arrests and detentions that often took place against leading figures.[66]

*Level of moderation*
Based on the indicator of political rights, the level of moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the period before the revolution (1984-2010) can be characterized as 'medium'. The Brotherhood accepts namely the representation of women in parliament but prevents them from fulfilling the post of the presidency. However, when considering the low representation of women inside the Brotherhood itself, it appears that the level of moderation should be considered as 'low'.

**The position of women in political life in the post-revolutionary period**

---

65 Ibidem.

66 Interview with dr. Subhi Saleh in the office of the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria, 10 April 2012.

In the election program of 2011, it is stated that women have the right to work and participate in political life as long as this does not contradict the *Sharia* and the primary tasks of women inside the house.[67] The position of the Brotherhood regarding the possibility of women to become a president remained the same as in the previous period.

### *Representation of women inside the Muslim Brotherhood*

After the revolution of 2011, the representation of women in the Brotherhood remained at the same level as in the previous period. Since the revolution of 2011 and the increased level of inclusion, the previous justification for the exclusion of women from representative positions in the Brotherhood no longer applies. Almost a year and a half after the departure of Mubarak, no initiatives have been taken to include women in leading positions and to increase women's level of representation through the different levels of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also in the newly established Freedom and Justice Party, the representation of women in higher positions is lacking. With the internal organization, the Muslim Brotherhood could have set the right example on how to include women in society and in politics. The reality, however, shows a different view of the position of women inside the Brotherhood. Words about equality and the need of empowerment are not translated into deeds. This forms a great handicap for the Muslim Brotherhood and raises doubts about the intentions of its leaders.

An example of the prominence of the conservative view towards women in 2011 is the statement issued by the former presidential candidate of the Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater[68]. During a conference, al-Shater argued that women do not need to be on stage and talk if this is not necessary. Al-Shater argued also that women should not be inspired by Western ideas and should not demand the abolition of the separation between men and women.[69] These words of a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood render the statements of the Brotherhood about the participation of women in society and the principle of equality less credible. How is the Brotherhood claiming to improve the position of women in the society if women's presence on stage is considered by the elite to be troublesome?

---

67 Election Program of the Freedom and Justice Party 2011, pp:53

68 Khairat al-Shater is one of the leading figures in the Muslim Brotherhood. He is considered to have the final word on organizational issues. Al-Shater is also considered to be the main financer of the Movement.

69 Statement Khairat al-Shater on women, May 2011, on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpJ7R6C0Rmg

*Level of moderation*

In the post-revolutionary period, the Brotherhood did not change its position towards the political rights of women, which indicates a 'medium' level of moderation. However, the representation of women inside the Brotherhood remains non-existent. Even though that the position of the Brotherhood towards the political rights of women is characterized as 'medium' and the internal representation of women indicates a 'low' representation, I ultimately characterize this at the 'low' category. The reason for this is that the Brotherhood does not seem to apply the values internally that it advocates in society. Excluding women from of representative positions in the Brotherhood is moreover no longer necessary since the revolution; the security reason is no longer applicable.

**Coptic Christians**

In the previously mentioned newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood, '*al-Dawa*', the vision of the Brotherhood towards Egyptian citizens from the Coptic religion is specified. Concerning the political rights of the Copts, the sheikh of the Brotherhood, al-Khatib, argued in 1981 that the Islamic *Sharia* does not allow a Christian to become a president of a Muslim country. As justification for this, al-Khatib argued that the president has the responsibility 'to protect the religion' and act in accordance with it. A Christian president is simply not able to fulfill this task. Therefore, the loyalty of Christians to the protection of the interest of a Muslim state is problematic.[70] Al-Khatib argued further that when the Islamic state is strong and there are enough Muslims figures with knowledge and experience, Copts should not be engaged in the state apparatus or apply a vision which is contrary to the Islam. Only when the Islamic state is weak, the engagement of Copts is permitted, but still within certain limits.

In 1994, however, the Muslim Brotherhood had issued a document in which the movement expressed its position about the Copts. In this document, the movement stressed the principle of equality between Muslim and non-Muslims.[71] Compared to the previous statements at the beginning of the 1980s, the content of this document is written in a more liberal and moderate tone. In this statement, it was decided that Copts can be representatives in parliament but can never fulfill the post of the presidency. In 1997, the General Guide of

---

70 Fawzy, S. (2009). *Citizenship in confrontation with sectarianism*, Cairo: Al-Ahram center for political and strategic studies, pp:131

71 Al-Sha'ab newspaper: 'A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood for the people', 2 Mei 1995 (al-Ahram Archive).

the movement, Mustafa Mashhur, however declared in an interview that 'in an Islamic state, Coptic citizens should be barred from top posts in the army in order to ensure complete loyalty in confronting hostile Christian states, and a special tax (*gizya*) would be collected from them in exchange for protection by the state.'[72] This statement has been criticized by certain members of the Brotherhood itself as well as by the Christian community and liberal parties.

In the Reform Initiative that was issued in March 2004, the platform draft of 2007 and the election program of 2010, the Brotherhood issued statements about the political rights of Copts comparable to that in the document of 1994.[73]

*The level of moderation*
Based on the aforementioned, level of moderation in the pre-revolution period should be considered as 'medium'. Copts are allowed to be represented in parliament but do not have the right to become president or to fulfill high positions in army institutions.

**The position of Copts in the revolutionary period**
In the post-revolutionary period, the Brotherhood maintained its opinion about the political rights of Copts. During a personal interview, Medhat al-Hadad, the head of the Brotherhood's office in Alexandria, explained the reason for the rejection of the rights of Copts to fulfill the post of the presidency as the following: 'The president has two main responsibilities: the protection of religion and the initiative to wage war. In case Egypt is engaged in a war with a Christian country, it will be difficult for a Coptic president to remain loyal to the Egyptian state. This is why we decide not to give Copts responsibilities they can never fulfill in a proper way.' [74] This hypothetical example indicates that there is still doubt about the loyalty of Copts towards the Egyptian state. The exclusion of the Copts from the post of the presidency indicates also that the idea of full citizenship is lacking in the thinking of the Brotherhood.

---

72 El-Ghobashy, M., 'The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood', pp:386

73 Essam El-Din, G. (2004). 'Brotherhood steps into the fray', Al-Ahraam Weekly, on http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/681/eg3.htm

74 Interview with Medhat al-Hadad, Office of the Muslim Brotherhood, Alexandria, 2 April 2012

*The level of moderation*

No difference in the level of moderation took place after the revolution. The level of moderation will be characterized as 'medium'.

**The position of Sharia in politics**

The stance of the Brotherhood towards the position that *Sharia* should have in politics has stayed roughly the same since 1984 up to the recent day. Since its establishment, the main focus of the Muslim Brotherhood has been to affirm its willingness to implement *Sharia* in the legal and political system. In general, the urge to implement *Sharia* law is based on the following logic: 'If God has revealed clear principles of what is to be  encouraged and what is to be proscribed, then human desire and man-made law have no place in tampering with these prescriptions and prohibitions'.[75] For the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic society is not a society with an Islamic civilization or in which the majority of the citizens are Muslim, but rather a society in which *Sharia* is implemented. Here the question arises about a possible clash between the sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of the people. The Muslim Brotherhood asserts that there should be no clash. In an ideal Islamic state, the rules of *Sharia* should form the main cadre under which the 'rule of the people' should take place. The Islamic system of values should be embodied in constitutional provisions according to which the state will be governed. In contrast to the democratic systems of the West, in which there are no limits for human action, the Islamic model of democracy considers the Islamic principles as the upper ceiling which cannot be challenged. The former General Guide, Mohammed Mehdi Akef, argued during a personal interview that the principle of *Shura* (consultation) in Islam is better and much deeper than the Western model of democracy because the Islamic version puts limits to human action.[76] One of the principles which is constitutionally possible in Western democracies and which will never be possible in an Islamic democracy is gay marriage. 'Legalizing gay marriage is the top point of radicalism', as Medhat al-Hadad pointed out in a personal interview. Therefore, 'in the Islam there are certain rules and limits that define the broader space in which the people can move as they wish, as long as it is not in objection with these Islamic principles'.[77]

75 Fuller, G.E. (2004). 'Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance Around Democracy', *Carnegie Papers No. 49*, pp:4

76 Interview with Mohammed Mehdi Akef, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 6 Mei 2012

77 Interview Abdel Rahman al-Bar, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012

In the written statements of the Brotherhood, a change in rhetoric can be conceived concerning the issue of the establishment of the Caliphate (*khilafa*). While the aim to reestablish the caliphate was constantly been expressed during the 1980s and 1990s, in the 2000s a change can be conceived in the official stance of the Brotherhood towards this issue. Especially in the programs of 2004 and onwards, the emphasis has been on issues of reform and the everyday problems of Egyptians such as corruption and unemployment.[78] Because of the intensive involvement of the Brotherhood in politics, the original aim of its establisher has become blurred with the national problems of reform and democratization. In the recent election programs of the Brotherhood, the establishment of the *khilafa* has been exchanged for a new term, namely: a civil state with an Islamic background. A 'civil state' means that the state will not be governed by the military or by religious groups (theocrats). It will rather be governed by civilians.[79] Civilians will have the power to govern and make laws, as long as this does not conflict with the *Sharia*. According to Mohammed Mehdi Akef, the aim to establish the *khilafa* is still present, but in a way that fits with the present time: 'In the recent time, the *khilafa* can be established by the establishment of the Arab Union, which would be the Arabic equivalent of the European Union'. The wording of an 'civil state with an Islamic background' emerged as a reaction to the insistence of liberal and leftist parties to call for the establishment of a civil state, with the Islamists demanding the establishment of a civil state with an Islamic background. The discussion about the wording emerged thus from this clash with the liberal forces and is a clash about the identity of the state rather than about the content.[80] According to Rashwan, 'The existence of Article 2 of the Constitution is *de facto* guaranteed; the society is Muslim in any case, the mosques are completely full on Fridays, the civil rights are already based on *Sharia* law. What more can Islamists wish?'

When questioned on this issue, members of the Guidance Office referred to the following additions: restructuring the financial system according to the *Sharia*, abolishing the sell and consumption of alcohol in public places, introducing Islamic values to the educational system and the media, restructuring the family laws that have recently been introduced by Susan Mubarak and supervising television channels on the production of material that is

---

78 Tamam, H., (2010). *Tahawelaat al-Ikhwaan al-Muslemien (The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood)*, Cairo: Madbouly Books, pp:9

79 Election Program of the Freedom and Justice Part, 2011, pp:30

80 Interview Dia Rashwan, al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 8 Mei 2012

acceptable to Islam.[81] Another issue that is conceivable in the vision of leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood is to consider circumcision as a legal act. The Freedom and Justice Party is even providing free circumcision operations in villages as a way of campaigning.

The implementation of the *Sharia* has thus always been the main focus in election programs. The Brotherhood has, however, never specified what these principles exactly are, who has the right to interpret them and how they should be implemented.[82] In 2007, the Brotherhood issued a draft platform in which a clear vision is laid down about these issues. This draft contained a call for the creation of a council of religious leaders with the task of advising the legislative and executive authorities on issues concerning religious law. The advice of this body was considered to be binding concerning issues in which *Sharia* rule is evident, based on the text of the Quran, and not dependent on the interpretations of religious leaders.[83] This new provision caused a storm of criticism and was considered by many observers and scholars as the first step towards the creation of a religious state, comparable with the Iranian example. This statement reduced the credibility of the earlier statements on respect for democratic institutions. In the election program of 2010 however, this point has been rescinded.

*The level of moderation*

Based on the aforementioned, the level of moderation can be characterized as 'medium'. A complete separation between religion and politics will never be an option. The model of Iran is also not the appropriate model in the opinion of the Brotherhood. Instead, the Brotherhood argues for the establishment of a civil state with an Islamic background in which civilians will have the task of applying the general principles of the *Sharia*. In case the *Sharia* does not contain rulings on certain issues, the parliamentarians will have the right of interpretation (*Ijtihad*). In fact, the only difference between the Iranian and the Egyptian model of governance would be that instead of the existence of the commission of religious leaders who decides whether laws are in accordance with *Sharia*, in Egypt this task will be fulfilled by

---

81 Interview Abdel Rahman al-Bar, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012

82 Brown, J. N., Hamzawy, A. and Ottaway, M. (2006). 'Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones', *Carnegie Endowment*, No. 67, pp:8

83 Hamzawy, A. and Brown, N. (2010). 'The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment', Carnegie Endowment, No. 19, pp:10

parliament itself. This is why the Muslim Brotherhood contends that the sovereignty of the people will remain guaranteed.

**3.1 Assessment: does inclusion leads to moderation?**

After having determined the level of inclusion and the level of moderation in the period prior to and after the revolution, in this chapter an assessment of the data will be made. According to the expectation of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the post-revolutionary period should have witnessed an increased level of moderation due to the transition from a low to a high level of inclusion. Does this expectation apply in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood?

**Behavioral moderation**

The variable on the basis of which the level of behavioral moderation is measured was the acceptance of the principle of political pluralism.

|  | **Level of inclusion** | **Level of moderation** |
|---|---|---|
| **1984-2010** | Low | Medium |
| **2011** | High | Medium |

*Table 3: Political pluralism*

As can be seen from the table 3, the level of moderation concerning the principle of political pluralism remained the same in the period prior and after the revolution. This indicates that the hypothesis about the increase in the level of behavioral moderation as a result of an increased inclusion cannot be confirmed.

**Ideological moderation**

Concerning the indicator of ideological moderation, the position of women, the position of Copts and the position of *Sharia* in politics, the level of moderation in the pre- and post revolutionary period remained unchanged (table 3, 4, 5).

|  | **Level of inclusion** | **Level of moderation** |
|---|---|---|
| **1984-2010** | Low | Low |
| **2011** | High | Low |

*Table 4: The position of Women in political life*

|  | **Level of inclusion** | **Level of moderation** |
|---|---|---|
| **1984-2010** | Low | Medium |
| **2011** | High | Medium |

*Table 5: The position of Copts in political life*

|  | **Level of inclusion** | **Level of moderation** |
|---|---|---|
| **1984-2010** | Low | Medium |
| **2011** | High | Medium |

*Table 6: The position of Sharia in politics*

Based on the data, in the period 1984-2010, in which the level of inclusion was low, the overall level of moderation is characterized as medium and earns score of '7': medium moderation concerning political pluralism (2), low moderation concerning women (1), medium moderation concerning Copts (2) and medium moderation concerning the position of *Sharia* in politics (2).

In the post-revolutionary period in which the level of inclusion was high, the overall level of moderation remains medium but the score has remained '7': medium moderation concerning political pluralism (2), low moderation concerning women (1), medium moderation concerning the position of Copts (2) and medium moderation concerning the position of *Sharia* in politics (2).

Therefore, the expectation of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis according to which the level of moderation should have increased by an increased level of inclusion, does not seem to apply in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood.

*Final note about the assessment*

A possible critic of the application of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis could be that the time period (January 2011- May 2012), is too short in order to be able to observe real changes in the level of moderation. I may be proven wrong in terms of my critic of the hypothesis in the long run. The short-term data suggest, however, that the validity of this hypothesis is lacking. The great pressure under which the Brotherhood is performing at the recent time might function even as a catalyst in the process of moderation. However, after almost a year and a half no any indication of moderation has taken place. By looking at the ability of the Brotherhood to work together with other political forces and the representation of women inside the movement during the post-revolutionary period, it seems that the Brotherhood has become less moderate. And even if we assume that the period is short, what would otherwise a justifiable alternative period be? In any case, it might be interesting to replicate this research later on in order to examine whether there are changes in the outcome.

## Chapter 4: Why Does the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis Not Apply?

As appears in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, an increased level of inclusion did not result in an increased level of moderation. The dynamics of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis seem thus not to be enough to explain the appearance or the absence of

moderation. In order to account for the lacking applicability of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it is important to complement the hypothesis with other factors. Based on the field research conducted, I will offer propositions that can help explain what is missing from the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. The first two factors are connected to the internal dynamics of the party: the intra-organizational competition and the internal democracy. The other two factors are connected to the context in which inclusion takes place: external inter-party competition and the character of the period in which the inclusion takes place. In contrast to the inferences made by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, which focus on structural changes, the variables proposed in this research take more account of the micro-dynamics inside the movement. These four factors will be further explained in the remainder of this chapter.

**4.1 Intra-Organizational Competition: A Clash between Generations**

The first factor that could complement the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in explaining the lack of appearance of moderation is the intra-organizational competition inside the Muslim Brotherhood. The internal composition of the Brotherhood affects the ability of the movement to react to the political openings in a way that produces moderation and prevents the Brotherhood from speaking with one disciplined voice. Since the middle of the 1970s, two groups can be distinguished in the Muslim Brotherhood: a conservative and a reformist wing. The main difference between these two groups relates to their opinion concerning engagement in 'public work'. While the conservative group is considered to be the 'kitchen' of the Brotherhood, the reformist group is no more than the Brotherhood's 'shopping window'.

The conservative group is constituted of senior Brotherhood members that were released from prison in 1974. The members are averse to adopting progressive interpretations of religious texts and their ability to forge alliances and make compromises in the political field in general is less.[84] Because of the long period of repression and imprisonment during the regime of Abdel el-Nasser, they remained caught up in the idea of being 'the historic victims'.[85] Moreover, this group has been influenced by the radical ideology of Sayyed Qutb which strengthened the feeling of religious superiority. This conservative group controls the most important sections in the Brotherhood, namely; the preaching/educational-, the financial- and foreign affairs sections. More importantly, they also control the file of the internal

84 Interview with Ahmed Ban, Nile Centre for Strategic studies, Cairo, 29 April 2012

85 Ibidem.

organization of the movement. After the release from prison these figures aimed to rebuild the Brotherhood and to strengthen its structure which was weakened after twenty years of repression and detentions. They were influenced in this task by their earlier experience in the secret para-military apparatus of the movement in the 1940s. The structure of this military apparatus and its values were internalized into the movement. An expelled member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Aly el-Meshad, characterized the working method of this group as 'closed and secretive'.[86] In dealing with political developments, this group relies on two strategies. Concerning ideology, the strategy of *al-tiqyya* is followed, according to which deception/dissembling is legitimate in times of danger. This strategy was linked to the 'thinking of ordeal', or '*mihna*', which emerged as a consequence of the longstanding repression and detention of the members by the regime. Concerning the organization, however, this group preferred the constitution of a rigid hierarchical structure and the application of the 'cat-and-mouse strategy', a strategy which they knew well how to apply based on their past experiences during the several clashes with Abdel Nasser and Sadat.[87] Among others, the most famous names of leading figures in this group are Mustafa Masshur, Mehdi Akef, Abdalla al-Khatib and Mahmoud Izzat.

The reformist group is made up of former university students who became members of the Brotherhood in the mid- 1970s. Initially, these students were members of the Islamic Group, *al-Jama'a al-Islamya*, in which several radical Islamic movements were united, and were later recruited by Omar al-Tilmisani (the third General Guide). This group of students was heavily influenced by the Salafist thinking, which was the leading Islamic ideology during the 1970s. Their higher aim was to establish an Islamic state based on *Sharia* law in which even the system of Islamic punishments (*hedood)* are applied. [88] After the recruitment of these figures in the Muslim Brotherhood, this group continued its activities in university unions, which started already at the beginning of the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, this student generation, also called 'the middle generation', became the face of the Brotherhood in university unions and later in syndicates and in parliament.[89] It was Abdel Meniem Abu El-Fettouh who took the first initiative to participate in the Doctor's

---

86 Interview with Ali el-Meshad, Office of the 'Tayar al-Masri', Cairo, 2 Mei 2012

87 Al-Anani, K., The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, pp:172

88Abu el-Fettouh, A. (2009): Diary, on http://www.alhoukoul.com/printarticle/2411

Syndicate elections in 1984.[90] The reason for their flexibility and openness is their early engagement in public work such as student unions and syndicates. This interaction with members of different parties produced a degree of political learning. Consequently, these members came to understand the need to adapt Islamic ideology according to current time, and to be engaged in politics and thus to make compromises. In addition, these experiences in public work made their commitment to the legalist frameworks even stronger.[91] Until the beginning of the 1990s, when the Mubarak regime started a heavy crackdown campaign against members of the Brotherhood, the elections of student unions and syndicates were namely conducted in a more transparent and democratic manner as compared with parliamentary elections.

Furthermore, in contrast to the conservative senior members, the younger members are different in their formation and the way they have developed. They emerged in the 1970s when there was a considerable level of cooperation between the political forces in order to confront the rule of Sadat. The atmosphere of 'clash, conflict and suspicion' between the Muslim Brotherhood and the other political forces that was present in the 1940s was not typical of the 1970s.[92] The material situation of this group was also better than that of the older generation. The group was part of the new social classes that benefited from the economic reforms implemented by Abdel Nasser. They went to universities and engaged in public life. In contrast to the group of the older generations, the reformist group emerged in a period in which several Islamic movements and groups existed and were active, not only in Egypt but worldwide. The members of the conservative group experienced, however, a period in which the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the leading Islamic forces in the world, beside

89 Al-Shobki, A. (2009). *The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood*, Cairo: Al-Ahraam Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, pp:5

90 Ja'afar, H. (2009). 'The Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syndicate Elections in Egypt', in Al-Shobki, A. (ed.) (2009). *The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood*. Cairo: Al-Ahraam Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, pp:101

91 Tamam, H., *The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:43

92 Interview with Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 8 Mei 2012

the Islamic Group in India. This gave these members a feeling of superiority in contrast to the generation of the 1970s which considered their contribution to the Islamic revival as relative.[93]

Additionally, there is a difference between the two groups in the way they view the role of the Brotherhood. While the former university students considered the Brotherhood as part of a national framework in which political forces aim to improve the political and economic situation of Egypt, with the Islam as a source of inspiration, the conservative group views the Brotherhood as the leading opposition group that represents the will of God on earth. Because of this pretention to be 'the protectors of Islam' and to apply the will of God, the conservative leaders considered themselves to be superior to the other political forces.[94] This 'divine responsibility' forced the Brotherhood to aim for the implementation of the Islamic values through the state apparatus, despite the level of societal acceptance. With 'the acceptance of these values', it is not referred to the values themselves. Egyptian society is a religious society and will never refuse to involve Islam in everyday life and in the way the state is organized. It is rather referred to the interpretation and the way of implementation of these values. Here the problem arises that because of the aim of the Brotherhood is to implement the will of God on earth; this means that their interpretation of the Islamic values is the only 'true' interpretation. This specific aspect is considered as problematic due to the 'ideological stagnation' that characterizes the thinking of the leading members of the conservative wing due to their past experiences and way of socialization.

In contrast to the conservative group, the reformist group adheres to a progressive ideology and are, for example, of the opinion that women and Copts are able to fulfill the post of the presidency and that *Sharia* should be seen as a source of inspiration for organizing the state in combination with other traditions, and not as the leading text.[95] Examples of the leading persons of the reformist camp are Abdel Meniem Abu el-Fettouh, Islam al-Arian, Ibrahim al-Za'farani and Kamal al-Hilbawy.

Therefore, the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political process has not lead to the moderation of the Brotherhood as a whole but only to the moderation of certain

---

93 Rashwan, D. (2006). *Dalil al-Harakaat al-Islamya Fi al-Alam (The Guidebook of the Islamist Movements in the World)*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, pp:35

94 Tamam, H., *The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:21

95 Tamam, H., *The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:45

members inside the movement. This phenomenon, which I propose to call 'fractionalized moderation' is the result of the intra-organizational competition that has been fostered by the low level of inclusion and the repressive measures applied by the regime. The politically engaged group of the Brotherhood was more willing to accept the rules of the game and to cut off the conservative edges in their ideology. Even if they did not want to adapt to the rules of the game initially, reality simply forced them to adapt because of their consistent engagement in public work. In contrast to the conservative group who preferred to remain isolated from the society, members of the reformist/political group engaged fully with the public, which forced them to adapt the radical elements in their thinking to reality.

Based on the arguments postulated above, the intra-organizational competition is the result of the interaction that took place between members of the 'middle generation' and people from other ideologies through their engagement in public work. This mechanism falls properly in line with the findings of Wickham who has examined the establishment of the moderate Wasat party in Egypt. According to Wickham, ideological shifts happen because of 'a process through which people modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations and dramatic changes in the environment.'[96] Ideological moderation is therefore a product of cross-ideological cooperation and not an effect of it. Wickham further states that the instrumental adaptation of political positions will metamorphose into matters of principle, eventually producing ideological moderation. This is true according to the reformist group. The shift from strategic/behavioral moderation to ideological moderation thus takes place through the process of interaction and political learning.

In my view, the case of the Muslim Brotherhood contains another important aspect that accounts for the appearance of ideological moderation. This aspect is derived from the models of the political life cycle in political psychology and concerns the ideological starting point of actors. Based on the brief description of the earlier experiences of the conservative group it can be argued that their development follows the persistence model. According to this model, 'residues of pre-adult learning persist through life, perhaps even hardening with time.'[97] For ideological moderation to occur, not only is cross-ideological interaction necessary but a more important consideration is the extent to which an actor has been affected

---

96 Bermeo in Wickham, C.R., The path to moderation, pp:214

97 Sears, D.O. and Levy, S. (2003). 'Childhood and Adult Political Development' in Sears, D.O., Huddy, L. and Jervis, R. (eds.)(2003). *Political Psychology*, USA: Oxford University Press, pp:78

by his understanding of the past. Therefore, interaction and political learning will not produce the desired effect when dealing with actors that have been formed/socialized by their earlier experiences. The 'historical baggage' of these figures presumably prevents the mechanisms of political learning from producing ideological moderation, even if it happens.

The existence of these two groups makes clear that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be approached as a unitary actor. This dichotomy explains, at the same time, the source of the conflicting views of the members. In the following section, the interaction between these two groups will be reviewed.

***The inclusion-moderation hypothesis through the lens of intra-party competition***

From the 1980s onward, the interaction between the conservative and the reformist groups was influenced by national and regional religious and political developments. And also by the ideological background of the General Guide and the composition of the executive authority of the Brotherhood, the Guidance Office (majority reformist or conservative). The balance of power between the two wings has been determined depending on these factors.

After the release of members of the Brotherhood from prison in the middle of the 1970s, the realization grew that the use of violence and the policy of confrontation with the regime, that was used in the 1940s and 1950s, has merely resulted in political isolation. The new strategy was to continue the bottom-up approach of the mobilization of members and to complement this effort with a presence in parliament. The realization of the goal of the Brotherhood, which is the establishment of an Islamic state based on *Sharia* law, was therefore dependent on the ability of the Brotherhood to be present in parliament and to change the political structure from within. The bottom- up approach of Hassan al- Banna was thus still in place, but the focus was in this period more on politics and on the transformation of society by using state power.[98] The participation in parliamentary politics was also considered as a mean to spread the *da'wa*, but through new channels. This willingness to be part of the system made the acceptance of other parties necessary. The choice to participate in parliamentary elections and to form electoral alliances with secular parties was thus based on a simple cost-benefit analysis. The Muslim Brotherhood provided the secular parties with a massive, already mobilized electoral base and gained in return a legal status to participate in elections. The formation of electoral alliances with these parties was therefore beneficial for

---

98 Interview with Abdel-Rahim Ali, Cairo, 27 March 2012

both sides. The use of the rational choice approach by the leaders of the Brotherhood is characteristic for all the decisions that will be taken in subsequent periods. Every decision that will bring the movement some benefit and which is in accordance with *Sharia* is appropriate to take. As a member of the Guidance Office Abdel Rahman al-Bar put it, 'Roughly since the1980s, every decision is taken based on a cost-benefit analysis.'[99]

With the recruitment of the university students, al-Tilmisani aimed to bring new and fresh life into the Muslim Brotherhood. This was necessary because the recruitment of new members had stopped for twenty years due to the repressive policy applied during the rules of Abdel Nasser and Sadat. This recruitment initiative of the General Guide reflected his own personality, which was characterized by openness, flexibility, respect for the views of others, the ability to mobilize people and the ability to build bridges with opposition forces. Compared to al-Banna, al-Tilmisani was not an ideological genius but rather an organizational one. After Hassan al-Banna, Omar al-Tilmisani is considered to be one of the most important figures to have contributed to the second constitution of the Brotherhood in the 1970s. The focus of al-Tilmisani in this period on the organizational work, gave the hardliners the opportunity to fill the ideological gap with their own thinking, which by then was influenced by the Jihadist-Salafist religious tone.[100] Elements of this thinking were expressed in the earlier mentioned *fatwa's* that were issued by the mufti of the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the 1980s. Compared to these *fatwa's*, the document that was issued by the Brotherhood in 1994 was inspired by liberal notions and contained less radical views. As mentioned before, in this document the Brotherhood stressed, among others, the right of women to work, vote and be engaged in political activism. This positive change in rhetoric in 1994 compared to 1981 is interesting, especially because of the fact that in the 1990s, the military clampdown campaign on members of the Brotherhood was at its highest level and consequently, the level of inclusion was at its lowest. According to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this period should thus have shown a setback in behavioral and ideological moderation. What is the explanation for the adoption of a more liberally inspired document in a period in which the Mubarak regime was cracking down heavily on the members of the Brotherhood?

---

99 Interview Abdel Rahman al-Bar, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012

100 Interview with Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 8 Mei 2012

One of the reasons for this change can be found in the (religious) developments in the national arena. From the 1970s and during the 1980s, an Islamic revival took place in Egypt in which the conservative ideology of the Islamic and the Jihadist groups were predominant. Several reasons can explain this Islamic revival, including the defeat in the 1967 war which was attributed to the lack of religion at that time; the emergence of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 which functioned as a source of inspiration and the failure of the economic policies of the Arab regimes by that time. An additional reason was the return of exiled members of the Brotherhood from Saudi Arabia to Egypt who brought with them radical Wahabist ideas.[101] As mentioned before, inside the Brotherhood two different trends of thinking coexisted: one group was affected be the thinking of Sayyed Qutb and the other aimed to revive the moderate thinking of al-Banna, which was also expressed in the book 'Preachers no Judges'. The emergence of the radical Islamist revival in this period gave an impetus to the hard-liners inside the Brotherhood. This was translated consequently in statements and fatwa's such as those issued by al-Khatib. According to Dia Rashwan, the response of the conservative members to this conservative religious tone was also in order not to miss out: 'The Muslim Brotherhood is a grass-roots movement. Not only does it respond to societal developments in the country, it gets also affected by it'. The appearance of the conservative wing inside the Brotherhood in the form of the radical fatwa's of al-Khatib can thus be explained by this development. In a meeting, Ibrahim al-Hudaiby, the grandson of the second General Guide, provided another reason for the appearance of these radical statements of al-Khatib. Al-Hudaiby argued that the appearance of the fatwa's is due to the fact that an important current in the Muslim Brotherhood has been a part of the Salafist movements. The Salafist school, that was highly present in Saudi Arabia, made in the 1970s its way to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[102] Ahmed Ban confirms this view and states that the mufti of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s was a member of the Brotherhood but with the Salafist orientation.

In the 1990s, Islamic violence increased in Egypt due to several internal and external factors. The Jihadist groups initiated several attacks on foreign tourists, government officials and public figures and the state retaliated. In this violent context, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to distance itself from these events by issuing statements in which the use of the

101 Rashwan, D., *The Guidebook of the Islamist Movements in the World*, pp:32

102 Interview with Ibrahim al-Hudaiby, Cairo: 9 Mei 2012

violence was condemned and rejected. Particularly in the first part of the 1990s, it was important for the Muslim Brotherhood to make a distinction between the radical Jihadist groups and the moderate Islamist ideology which they claimed to represent.[103] The release of the document of 1994, should been seen in this pattern.

An additional reason for the adoption of the document of 1994 is the emergence of the ideas of the 'new Islamic thinkers' in the 1990s which influenced the thinking of the Brotherhood; thinkers such as Tarek al-Bishri, Fahmy Huwaidi, Mohamed Imara and al-Qaradawi.[104] These thinkers were originally acquainted with ideologies such as Marxism and nationalism and got later involved in the Islamic ideology. They were influenced by the liberal and the democratic wave that emerged after the end of the Cold War, and managed to merge these ideas together with Islamic ideology. The ideas of these thinkers were accepted by certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood because they came in first instance from Islamic thinkers and not from liberals or leftists. This enhanced the richness of the political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. This influence was however restricted to certain groups inside the Brotherhood, especially to the 'middle generation'. The older generations were not open to these progressive ideas.[105] Therefore, the adoption of the document of 1994 can be accounted for by the push of the middle generation for change, accompanied with political developments on the national scene.

In the second half of the 1990s, a general change in the course of the Muslim Brotherhood occurred when Mustafa Mashhur became the General Guide in 1996. As Ammar Ali Hassan pointed out: 'This event should be considered as a critical juncture in the history of the Brotherhood. Until the recent day, it exerts an influence on the ideology of the movement.'[106] In fact, the guidance of the Brotherhood has already been indirectly concentrated in the hands of Mashhur since 1986 (when Hamid Abu el-Nasr fulfilled officially this position). Mashhur is known to be one of the most conservative and rigid members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who has served in the secret apparatus of the

---

103 Interview with Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 8 Mei 2012

104 Al-Qaradawi after he left the Muslim Brotherhood

105 Interview Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahraam Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 8 Mei 2012

106 Interview Ammar Ali Hassan, Nile Centre for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 3 May 2012

Brotherhood in the 1940s. This became clear immediately in the statement of Mashhur in 1996 about the religious legality of the participation of Copts in the army. Moreover, in this period, the Mubarak regime was cracking down on members of the Brotherhood; several military trials took place, and the majority of the Brotherhood's junior leadership members were in prison. Using the term of Hamid, in this context, the main aim of Mashhur was 'self-preservation and not political contestation'.[107] During his guidance period, Masshur invested all his energy in strengthening the hierarchical structure of the Brotherhood in order to make it immune for the repressive waves of the regime. In fulfilling this task he managed to put like-minded/ conservative members in key positions in the movement. Until the events of September 11th, it can be said that the leading group inside the Muslim Brotherhood was the conservative/religious wing.

After the events of September 11th, the Muslim Brotherhood benefited from the pressure that was put on Mubarak by the United States in order to democratize the political system. In the meantime, the majority of the members of the political wing came out of prison and was given more room for maneuver by the leaders of the Brotherhood. In the documents that have been released by the movement since the beginning of 2000 up to 2005 the discourse of democracy was used clearly. This strategy was adopted because of the growing realization that it was in the self-interest of the Brotherhood itself to adopt the democratic rhetoric and to be engaged in the events of social protest in this period. The Brotherhood aimed namely to portray itself as a moderate Islamic movement. Realizing that it was beneficial for the Brotherhood to engage in the democratic rhetoric, Akef (General Guide by that time) gave a green light to the representatives of the political/reformist wing to stress the democratic intentions of the Brotherhood. Thus, while still keeping an eye on the activities of the 'middle generation' in the political field, the conservative leadership members agreed to 'go with the democratic flow' in order to gain political legitimacy and to weaken the Mubarak regime.

In 2006, the Mubarak regime initiated a crackdown campaign on leaders of the Brotherhood.[108] Inside the movement, the realization grew that the high representation in parliament and the adaption of democratic rhetoric did not prevent the regime from adopting

---

107 Hamid, S. (2011). 'Arab Islamist Parties: Losing on Purpose', *Journal of* Democracy, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp: 68

108 Tamam, H., *The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood*, pp:156

old means to crush the activities of the Brotherhood. This brought the conservative leadership to conclude that all the progressive statements and this political engagement did not pay off. Consequently, the conservative leadership decided to take a step back and return to the isolationist strategy that was followed at the end of the 1990s by Mustafa Mashhur. Thus, since 2006, the conservative group took the reins back again. An indication of this was the earlier mentioned draft party platform of 2007 in which it was stated that a council of Islamist jurists would check all laws to ensure that they conform to the *Sharia*. During this period, an internal struggle inside the movement also occurred as a consequence of which several members of the political wing decided to resign or were expelled. Thus, internal and national pressure forced the elders of the leaders to take back the maneuvering space that was given previously to the political 'middle generation' and to lead the movement through these difficult times, according to the strategy that they thought was the most appropriate. Here, a positive relationship can be observed between the intensification of the military campaigns against members of the Brotherhood and the change in the internal balance of power to the benefit of the conservatives.

During the 2000s, the prominence of the conservative group in the leading positions of the Muslim Brotherhood was protected by an unofficial policy which supported the promotion of like-minded members to higher organizational levels and the isolation of figures of the reformist/political wing. In the latest election of the Guidance Office in 2009, the majority of the people elected were from the conservative camp.[109] At the beginning of 2011, the majority of the members of the Guidance Office, which is the executive authority of the Brotherhood, came out of the conservative camp, with Badi' as General Guide and Khairat al-Shater as one of his most influential deputies and the key financier of the Brotherhood. Al-Shater is reputed to be one of the representatives of the conservative/salafist stream in the Brotherhood.[110] Ammar Ali Hassan makes a comparison between al-Shater and Mashhur and argues that 'al-Shater is the actual General Guide and not Badi', as in the 1990s; Masshur was the actual General Guide and not Abu el-Nasr.'[111] The mentality of this group, which has been formed by

---

[109] Abu Germa, S. (2009): 'The Results of the Elections of the Shura Council Cause Conflicts Again', on http://alghad.com/index.php/article/347872.html

[110] Website BBC: 'Egypt candidate: Muslim Brotherhood's Khairat al-Shater', on http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17583661

[111] Interview Ammar Ali Hassan, Nile Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2 May 2012

a long history of repression and detentions since the 1950s is translated in their behavior even in an open political structure as such after the revolution of 2011.

**Post-revolutionary period: the Muslim Brotherhood at a crossroad**

The eruption of the protests on January 25th, 2011, made clear the prominence of the conservatives in leading positions of the Brotherhood and their use of the same old means and strategies to deal with the new developments. Several events took place in this period which demonstrated the mentality of the Brotherhood in dealing with the political developments in the transition period. This mentality and strategy fits in the pattern of thinking of the conservative wing. This group is blocked by their experiences in the past, which have been marked by a bloody clash with Abdel Nasser and the attempt of self-preservation during Mubarak's regime. 'Path dependency' was thus initially characteristic for dealing with political upheaval since January 2011.[112]

This path dependency in revolutionary times has caused growing schisms, not only between the conservative and the reformist groups, but also between young and senior members. The discord between the young and the senior members has become evident from the start of the political upheaval on the 25th of January 2011. From the 25th to the 28th of January, the official position of the Brotherhood was not to join the demonstrations. This policy can be explained by the historic mindset that was inherited from al-Banna and which contained that the Muslim Brotherhood should not pursue the participation in revolutions, but should support a gradual change in society.[113] Moreover, in the first days of the demonstrations, there was uncertainty about the way the situation would develop and the reaction of the regime. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood did not want to clash with the regime because of the high price it might pay otherwise. The leaders therefore preferred to prevent the clash and to function only within the limits that the regime gave the movement. When the leaders could not justify their refusal to join the demonstrations any longer, they officially joined on the 28th of January.[114]

---

112 Here it is not the aim to judge the Brotherhood based on that but only to analyse their behavior

113 Hassan al-Banna was namely of the opinion that revolutions never brought the desired outcome.

114Website al-Ahram: 'How divided is Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood?', on
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/8949/Egypt/Politics-/How-divided-is-Egypts-Muslim-Brotherhood.aspx

Despite the official order not to participate, several members of the Brotherhood took part in the demonstrations during these three days.[115] However, this order caused a lot of frustration at grass-roots levels, especially in the levels of the university students who were engaged in the organization of the demonstrations. Muaaz Abdel-Karim, one of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who was expelled because of his engagement in the organization of the demonstrations, expressed his frustration as follows: 'The Muslim Brotherhood has always fought against the repressive and corrupt regime of Mubarak. Over the years it has paid a high price for this struggle. Therefore it was understandable why it did not want to pay the price of reform on its own anymore. But now that hundreds of thousands of people are demonstrating for the same goal in Tahrir, it is difficult to understand why the Brotherhood takes a step back and prevents us from joining these historical events!'[116] Additional indicators for the initial willingness of the Brotherhood to follow the path of the past (acting cautious and risk-aversive) are the declarations of the Brotherhood not to field a presidential candidate and its so-called 'negotiations' with the military establishment one day before the departure of Mubarak, the 10th of February, with the aim to negotiate a deal between both forces.

While initially the Brotherhood aimed to follow the well-known path of the past and not to fully engage in the uncertain protests, it realized that it cannot neglect the historic chances that were unfolding after the departure of Mubarak. Slowly but certainly, the Brotherhood started to adopt its strategy and concentrated all its energy on achieving an electoral victory (parliament/presidency/constitution). The person that is said to have pushed for this change is Khairat al-Shater, who together with Badi', Mursi and Izzat is considered to be one of the leading figures of the conservative camp. The difference in the urge for political contestation between the conservative and reformist figures (such as Abu el-Fettouh and al-Za'farani) is concentrated in the manner of contestation. While both groups have claimed to stress the importance of consensus and cooperation with other forces, the *actions* of the conservative figures indicated another approach; one that is primarily based on self-interest and excessive need for victory, even if it was at the expense of the stability in the country.

The ideological discord between the reformist and the conservative camp started to become evident for the outside world a day before the departure of Mubarak, on the 10th of February 2011, when there was a meeting of al-Katatni and Mohammed Mursi with Omar

115 Ibidem.

116 Interview Muaaz Abdel-Karim, Cairo, 29 March 2012

Suleiman, who was by then Vice- President. By now it is said that the aim of this meeting was to negotiate a deal between both forces after the departure of Mubarak. Abu el-Fettouh was present during the meeting on the 10th of February 2011. When he saw that Mursi and Katatni were on their way to meet Omar Suleiman in order to negotiate their benefits after the departure of Mubarak, he left the meeting out of protest. He was therefore not present when the Shura Council took the decision not to field a presidential candidate in 2012. A couple of months after this event, Abu el-Fettouh pronounced his candidacy for the forthcoming presidential elections. This decision was against the earlier decision of the Shura Council that the Muslim Brotherhood will not field a presidential candidate. Abu El-Fettouh was therefore expelled from the movement. Contradictory to the earlier statements, the Brotherhood declared the candidacy of Khairat al-Shater for the presidential elections in 2012. When al-Shater was disqualified, Mohammed Mursi was pushed forward as a replacer of al-Shater. Both candidates are considered to be part of the conservative religious/organizational oriented members of the Brotherhood. This move damaged the credibility of the Brotherhood and decreased the popular support of its political arm.

Several other events occurred between 25th January, 2011 and May 2012 which led a number of prominent figures of the reformist group to leave the Brotherhood out of protest against its policies after the revolution. Except for Abu el-Fettouh, who is considered to be the leader of the political 'middle age generation', Ibrahim al-Za'farani, Mohammed Habib and Kamal al-Hilbawy all resigned. The departure of these moderate figures, who were prominent members of the student group that joined the Brotherhood in the 1970s, indicates that the Brotherhood is moving on with the conservative mentality of the persons that left the prison of Abdel Nasser in the 1970s and their adherents. Some issues that have led these figures to leave were linked to the major inconsistencies in the political behavior of the Brotherhood and the inability of the leaders to keep their word on several issues, including: the change in the percentage of the seats that the Brotherhood aimed to contest in parliament (from 25% to 50%); the issue of fielding a presidential candidate (after strong statements and reassurances that the Brotherhood is not interested in the presidential position and that the presidency should not be fulfilled by a candidate of an Islamic parties, they fielded Khairat al-Shater and Mohammed Mursi). Moreover, after winning almost half the seats in parliament, the Brotherhood and its political arm supported the Ganzuri government that was installed by the military establishment. At this time, major demonstrations were organized against this installation of this government that has clear affiliations with the SCAF. When the 'interest

game' between the Brotherhood and the SCAF ended, the Brotherhood attacked the Ganzuri-government in an open and direct way and demanded its resignation. This policy was clearly driven by the strategic calculations of the Brotherhood that aimed to bring as many gains to the movement as possible. This game is also referred to by Rif'at al-Saied as 'the game of common interest with the enemy', which means that the Brotherhood is even able to work with the enemy if it serves its interests.[117] Finally, the role that the Freedom and Justice Party played in the earlier effort to draft a new Constitution, which has briefly been reviewed in the prior chapter, is also heavily criticized, both from within and outside the Brotherhood. All these events indicate that the Brotherhood is being headed by the conservative wing that has changed its gradual approach and long-term vision for a quick victory at the short term.

**Intra-organizational competition: mixing the religious with the political**

One of the chronicle problems of the Muslim Brotherhood is its lack of a well-defined political ideology. In my view, this can be explained due to the failure of the Brotherhood to make a distinction between politics and religion. As a result of the inability or the unwillingness of the Brotherhood to make this distinction, it has used the political to justify the religious and it used the religious to justify the political.

Since the appearance of the book of al-Hudaiby 'Preachers, not Judges', no ideological rethinking has taken place on the basis of which the Brotherhood could form a coherent political ideology. The lack of clear political ideology resulted in the production of different ideological 'point of views' by different ideological trends, which, at the end, all exist next to each other. The conservative group develops religious opinions[118], which are used to mobilize and attract members, and the reformist group develops political opinions, which are used to reassure the society and the West that the Brotherhood is a moderate religious movement that respects democratic principles. Therefore, two rhetorical trends exist inside the Brotherhood: an internal and an external one. While the external message has become more moderate with the time, the internal message remained conservative[119]. The leaders of the Brotherhood have been keen to maintain the coexistence of both rhetorical paths in order to

---

117 Interview with Rif'at al-Saied, Office Tagammou' Party, Cairo, 30 April 2012

118 Such as the religious opinions of skeikh al-Khatib.

119 Moderate in the same pattern as described in the chapter in which the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is tested.

prevent the fragmentation of the movement. Therefore, the Brotherhood has not only chosen for 'self-preservation above political contestation', but also 'self-preservation above ideological coherence'. This has also been confirmed by Ammar ali Hassan, Aly el-Meshad, Ahmed Ban, Muaaz abdel-Karim, Sameh Fawzy and other persons I have interviewed.

Taking the intra-organizational competition into consideration, in general, it can be stated that the adoption of democratic rhetoric by the Brotherhood was enforced form outside rather than by internal demand. It can therefore be argued that the adoption of democratic principles and rhetoric was strategic and was not a result of an internal rethinking of the importance of these values.[120] These values, such as political pluralism, transparency and the empowerment of women, have not even been internalized in the structure of the Brotherhood, prior to or after the revolution. The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections of student unions, syndicates and finally parliament were moves which were not preceded by prior theoretical/ideological thinking. This caused a gap between the practice and the theory/statements of the Brotherhood. [121]

The intra-organizational competition is reflected in the recent vague relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Since the 1990s, the reformist wing aimed to push the senior leaders to change the character of the Brotherhood from a religious movement to a political party. These demands have constantly been rejected by the conservative leaders based on the argument that the Mubarak regime would not permit the existence of such a party. Even in the post-revolutionary period, it seems that the long existing debate about the status that the Brotherhood should adopt has not been sorted out. In theory, the leaders of the Brotherhood and the FJP have argued that both institutions are independent from each other. In practice however, the FJP is closely related to the leading figures in the Brotherhood and the decisions are taken after receiving a green light from the Guidance Office.[122] It is namely practically impossible that parliamentarians of the FJP who have been educated and socialized inside the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to take a decision which is contradictory to the view of their 'spiritual mentors'.

---

120 Al-Anani, K., The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, pp:133

121 http://main.islammessage.com/newspage.aspx?id=8748

122 Brown, N. J. (2012). 'When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success', Carnegie Endowment, pp:18

**4.2 Internal Democracy**

The second factor that could help determine the appearance of moderation is the existence of internal democracy in the movement. As has been highlighted by the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, an increased level of inclusion does not necessarily have to produce an increase in the level of moderation if it was not accompanied by a change in the internal organization of the movement. During a period of authoritarian rule, the movement is excused for not being able to establish an internal organization that is fully transparent and democratic. In a repressive climate, organizational preservation is more important than accountability and transparency. This was also applicable to the Brotherhood which was constantly under pressure from the regime. However, after the removal of the military and judicial obstacles, as a consequence of a change in the political structure in 2011, the movement should have adapted its internal structure to the new context. This is important in order to prevent the alienation of the members. As will appear in the remainder of this section, the embracing of the democracy rhetoric in its public statements since the 2000s has not been internalized in the internal organization of the Brotherhood. Also in the post-revolutionary period, the internal democracy in the Muslim Brotherhood is lacking and raises doubts about the reliability of the Brotherhood's rhetoric on the primacy of democracy.

This proposition is also in accordance with the findings of Schwedler, who has examined the occurrence of ideological moderation in Jordan's IAF party and its absence in Yemen's Islah party, both branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the findings, one of the elements that are important in producing ideological moderation is internal group

dynamics.[123] Specifically, 'the ways in which the organizational structure and practices of each group have evolved (or not) in response to shifting opportunities associated with limited political openings.'[124] One of the reasons for the appearance of ideological moderation in the Islamist party in Jordan is because it managed to restructure itself in a democratic way, in contrast to the Islamist party in Yemen. In the following, some elements of the internal organization of the Muslim Brotherhood will be reviewed that will demonstrate the lack of internal democracy in response to the political opening in 2011.

**Internal democracy: some observations**

The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood was created by its founder, Hassan al-Banna, and is comparable to the structure of a state. The Brotherhood has a pyramidal structure; with the General Guide at the head of the pyramid. The two main institutions inside the Brotherhood are the Shura Council, which is the highest legislative authority, and the Guidance Office, which is the executive authority. The Shura Council is constituted of about a 100 to 150 members, who have a history in preaching and religious work (*Da'wa*). The main task of the Shura Council is to set out the general lines of policy of the movement. The further implementation of the movement's policy and the coordination of its activities is the task of the Guidance Office. [125]

At the next level are the regional offices, which are further divided into 'districts', 'branches' and 'groups'. In 1943, a new layer was introduced to the organization of the movement due to an increase in its membership. The new layer was the 'family', which consisted of ten active members of the groups. Four families constitute a 'clan' ('*ashira*), five clans form a 'group' (*rahta*), and each five groups form a 'battalion' (*katiba*).

Besides the hierarchical organizational levels inside the Muslim Brotherhood, there are also three functional levels that can be distinguished in order to become a full member of the

---

123 Schwedler, J., *Faith in Moderation*, pp:117

124 Ibidem, pp:85

125 Mitchell, R.P. (1969). *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, UK: Oxford University Press, pp:168

Muslim Brotherhood: 'assistant' (*musa'id*), 'related' (*muntasib*), and 'active' ('*amil*).[126] Only the active members have the right to vote and to become candidates in the elections.

## The mechanism of decision taking

In response to the repression by the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood centralized decision-making and decentralized the implementation of decisions.[127] At each organizational level inside the Muslim Brotherhood, decisions should be taken according to the *Shura* (consultation) principle. This principle means that after consultation, decisions are taken according to the majority rule. Khalil al-Anani, an expert on Islamist movements, describes the decision-making inside the Brotherhood, however, as 'an authoritarian *Shura* based on the principle of 'overwhelming majority' without respect for the opinion of the 'dissenting minority''.[128]Although the result of the voting is considered to be binding, several events occurred in which the voting was only considered by the leaders as advisory. In certain instances, the Shura principle has not even been applied. This was the case, for example, during the selection of a new General Guide in 1996. Especially after the death of the General Guide Hamid Abu el Nasr in 1996, tension arose about the way the new General Guide should be selected. During the funeral of Abu el Nasr, Ma'moun al-Hudaiby appointed Mustafa Mashhur as the new Guide without any consultation. This event is also referred to as 'the cemetery oath of allegiance'.[129] The unilateral action caused a high degree of tension between the members of the Brotherhood who opposed this unilateralism.

In the period after the revolution of 2011, the discontent about the lack of application of the Shura principle arisen again. Ahmed Ban, a researcher and one of the active junior members of the Brotherhood who have recently resigned, expressed his discontent as follows: 'Before the revolution, the Brotherhood had a legitimate reason for its secret meetings and hierarchical structure. Why are they not applying the principle of *Shura* after the revolution?

---

126 Mitchell, R.P., *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, pp:183

127El-Houdaiby, M. (2011). 'The Muslim Brotherhood's Trial of Pluralism', on http://www.midanmasr.com/en/article.aspx?ArticleID=59

128 Al-Anani, K. (2008). 'Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Democratic Organization?' on http://globalmbreport.org/?p=1121

129 El-Ghobashy, M. (2005). 'The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood', in *Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35*, pp:368

Even before the revolution, the principle of *Shura* was not applied properly. The opinion of the members was asked, but in a consultative way. It was not considered as binding.'[130] Even concerning the candidacy of al-Shater for presidential elections, three rounds of votes have taken place in the Shura Council in order to achieve the desired outcome. The result of the first vote was 81% against the candidacy. The result of the second and third votes was respectively 62% and 52%. According to Ahmed Ban, the decision of the candidacy for the presidency should have acquired at least the two-thirds of the votes, and not the mere majority (50+1), because it concerns a crucial decision for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to another former member the principle of *Shura* is only applied when it fits the interests of the leadership: 'In reality it is not about *Shura*. We only have to hear and obey.'

**The principle of 'hearing and obeying'**

One of the prime leading principles in the Muslim Brotherhood is the principle of hearing and obeying. This principle implies that members should follow the decisions that are taken in higher organizational levels without questioning them. According to ten interviewees from the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who are still members; have left the movement or have been expelled, this principle is indeed applied. 'A critical mind inside the Brotherhood is not appreciated. The Brotherhood aims to educate members who all think and behave in the same manner; the manner that is thought by the leaders to be appropriate and to represent the right version of the Islam', according to Aly el-Meshad. This means in the same time that the Brotherhood is claiming to speak in the name of the Islam. This claim is troubling since in the Islam there are different interpretations of religious texts.

An often heard argument of the members that have recently left the Brotherhood is that they do not agree with the leaders on their interpretation of the Islamic texts. 'The leaders choose a certain religious interpretation concerning a certain topic, adopt it in the policy of the movement and aim to apply it in the society. Why should I follow these specific interpretations of the leaders when I personally think that it is more appropriate to follow another religious interpretation?'[131] For example, concerning the political rights of women and Copts, the interviewees were of the opinion that there is in Islam no clear text that prohibits the possibility of the presidency of women and Copts. In the Quran, this issue is not clearly determined. It depends therefore on the interpretation of the religious scholar, which is

---

130 Interview Ahmed Ban, The Nile Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 29 April 2012

131 Interview with Aly el-Meshad, Ahmed Ban and Muaaz Abdel-Karim.

colored by his own religious background. The interpretation of famous religious leaders such as al-Qaradawi and al-Ghazzali, is for example not averse to the possibility of the presidency of women and Copts. Moreover, the leader of the Tunisian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood also did not reject the right of women and Copts to become president either. Therefore, it is not about Islam in itself, but about the ability of the religious scholar to interpret religious sources in a way that fits the current time. Since the 1970, in case two different interpretations exist about certain topics, such as concerning the issue of the presidency, the leaders chose always for the most radical one. Fahmy Huaidy, a prominent Egyptian thinker and researcher, regretted during a personal interview this phenomenon, which he referred to with 'ideological freezing': 'It is regrettable that the Muslim Brotherhood failed to adopt progressive interpretations of Islamic texts, despite the fact that there are several prominent religious scholars and thinkers who advised them to do that.'[132]

The principle of hearing and obeying is applied, not only concerning ideological issues, but also concerning the internal organization of the Brotherhood. The extent to which a member adheres to this principle is namely decisive for being able to gain a higher position in the organizational levels or in the levels of membership. The loyalty to the organization is thus a decisive factor.[133] On the other hand, a member can be demoted if his behavior is not accepted by the leaders. Consequently, members that get promoted and have access to the Shura Council or the Guidance Office have more or less the same mindset. Therefore, the principle of *Shura* has here no meaning. According to Muaaz abdel-Karim, 'the voting has marginal significance because eventually the composition of the important offices in the Muslim Brotherhood is already in favor of a certain opinion, i.e. the opinion of the conservative camp.' Especially after the recent expulsion or resignation of members who are known to be part of the reformist wing, this mechanism prevents the existence of plurality within the most important organizational levels in the Brotherhood.

**Coherence**

Concerning the coherence of the parliamentary group, it can be argued that since the first participation in parliament in 1984, the parliamentary groups of the Muslim Brotherhood have been coherent. No incidents have taken place in which floor-crossing has occurred. Here it is important to mention again that in order for a member to be represented in the higher levels of

132 Interview with Fahmy Huaidy, Cairo, March 26 2012

133 Interview with Aly el-Meshad, Muaaz Abdel-Karim, Ahmed Ban.

the Brotherhood, loyalty to the principles and rules of the movement are more important than the qualifications required to fulfill the specific job.[134] This explains the external coherence of the parliamentary group of the Brotherhood.

However, the internal coherence is lacking. As mentioned before, intra-organizational competition has constantly caused friction inside the Brotherhood. The need for reorganization and transparency has always been expressed by its members, especially since 2005. Although, there was a lot of discontent inside the movement due to the hierarchical and non-transparent organization, splits and defections did not often take place. The reason for this was simply that outside the movement of the Brotherhood, there was no alternative party or even a legal opportunity to establish a new party or movement. Therefore, several discontented members remained in the movement and aimed to reform the Brotherhood from within. Before the revolution, only one major split emerged as a consequence of this friction. In 1996, a faction of the Brotherhood's members split off and established the al-Wasat party as the consequence of a clash with the leaders on the issue of the effectiveness of the establishment of a political party.[135] After the revolution however, three parties emerged as offshoots of the Brotherhood: al-Nahda, al-Tayar al-Masri and al-Ryyada. The main point of protest, which has lead to the departure of prominent members, was the lack of separation between the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, because of the declaration of a ban on joining political parties other than the FJP, hundreds of youth members either left the Brotherhood out of protest, or have been expelled.

As demonstrated in the preceding text, the absence of ideological moderation in the post-revolutionary period can partly be accounted for by the absence of democracy in internal structure of the Brotherhood. While prior to the revolution, this lack of internal democracy was understandable because of the repressive regime, after the revolution, no justification can be given for this structure except of the monopolization of the conservative camp of the organizational agenda of the Brotherhood. After the revolution, the Brotherhood could at least have organized new elections in all levels of the movement in order to elect persons that are reflecting the will of the members in an inclusive and open period. This could be an indication

---

134 Interview with Aly el-Meshad, Muaaz Abdel-Karim, Ahmed Ban.

135 El-Ghobashy, M. (2005). 'The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood', in *Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35*, pp:386

of the willingness of the leaders to democratize the internal system. This demand that has been issued by members of the reformist group has been rejected by the leaders.

## 4.3 Competition with Salafism: Fishing in the Same Water

The third factor that could help explain the appearance or absence of ideological moderation is the external inter-party competition. Here it can be argued that the level of moderation will be affected in case the movement is functioning in a context in which there is competition from another movement that bases its ideology on the same background.

Before 2011, there were no indications of competition between the Salafist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Salafists were namely focused only on preaching in mosques and were not considered as political competitors. The Brotherhood benefited from the (non-political) existence of the Salafists because they kept 'the Islamic spirit alive' which the Brotherhood could mobilize easily in time of elections, as Subhi Saleh argued during a personal interview. Another benefit from the existence of the Salafists was the ability of the

Brotherhood to portray itself as a moderate Islamic movement to the West and to the general public, in contrast to the radical Salafists. Although the history of existence of Salafism in Egypt is longer than that of the Muslim Brotherhood, the political translation of this merely religious Salafist presence after the revolution is a new phenomenon. At once, the Muslim Brotherhood was confronted with a highly present religious non-political unstructured group that aimed to mobilize voters on the same foundations as that of the Brotherhood, i.e. the Islam. Although initially the expectation of an electoral gain for the Salafists was not high, they managed to become the second biggest political party after the revolution, with 25% of the votes. The two main Islamist political parties in parliament are the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Nour Party, the political arm of the Salafi Call.[136]

Not only in time of elections, but in general, the religious culture in the rural areas defines the rhetoric that is used to mobilize and educate the members. In rural areas the religious culture is considered to be more conservative compared to the religious culture of the city.[137] The word 'conservative' refers here to the interpretations of the religious leaders of the texts of the Quran and the sunna, with the addition that the more issues are considered as 'banned by the Islam', or *haram*, the more Islamic the religious leader is considered to be. In rural areas, following the opinion of a religious leader is a duty, despite the level of religious education of this person. Moreover, according to Muaaz Abdel-Karim, the educational material of the Brotherhood is flexible and can be interpreted in different ways according to the intentions of the teacher/preacher. This gives the opportunity to those in the rural areas who find themselves in a more conservative religious context to interpret the text in such a way that it fits the leading religious tone.[138] Because the majority of the *potential* members of the Muslim Brotherhood are from rural areas, the fear was always that a leak could emerge in the circle of the Brotherhood members in favor of the Salafists. In order not to lose members to the Salafist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to adopt a more conservative religious rhetoric than in the cities. According to Shadi Hamid, this strategy is frequently applied by the Brotherhood, namely adapting the rhetoric to the constituency they are talking

---

136 Website BBC: 'Egypt's Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament',
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16665748

137 Interview Aly el-Meshad, Cario, Office of al-Tayyar al-Masri Part, Cairo, 2 Mei 2012

138 Interview Muaaz Abdel-Karim, Cairo, Mei 2012

to.[139] This was also confirmed during the interviews that I conducted in al-Sharkia (governate in upper Egypt) where the majority of the people I talked to knew about the *fatwa's* of the Khatib and claimed that it has been discussed during the sessions while in Cairo only the minority of the members I talked to in Cairo knew about these fatwa's.

Although before the revolution, the Brotherhood benefited from the religious presence of the Salafists, after the revolution the relationship became blurred. Although it is too early to judge how the situation between the Brotherhood and the Salafist movement will evolve, it seems initially that there is a 'love-hate relationship' between both parties. The existence of the Nour Party on its right side gives the Brotherhood still the ability to portray itself as the moderate Islamist party. When it comes to campaigning for religious issues[140], however, the Brotherhood and the Salafists can also form a unified front against the liberals and the leftists. However, in parliament itself, the presence of Salafists parliamentarians brings Brotherhood parliamentarians in an awkward position. Parliamentarians of the Nour party force the members of the Freedom and Justice Party to talk about issues the Brotherhood wants to avoid, such as the lowering the marriage age. Normally, the Brotherhood always avoids elaborating on details concerning religious issues, which form the main/favorite topic of the Salafists in parliament. The members of the Freedom and Justice Party find themselves thus in a difficult position: one the one hand, they cannot attack the Salafists in a clear and direct way, out of fear that they will lose the Islamist base. On the other hand, they also cannot agree with the Salafists on certain issues, even if they wanted to, out of fear that they will be portrayed by liberal forces as having shifted their ideology towards the radical Salafism.

Another indication of this relationship appears in an article that was published in the daily newspapers of the Freedom and Justice Party on the 6th of May 2012. This article is written by Mahmoud Guzlan, the spokesperson of the Freedom and Justice Party. In this article, Guzlan admonishes the Salafists for supporting Abu el-Fettouh in the presidential elections instead of supporting the presidential candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, Mohammed Mursi. Guzlan condemns this choice of the Salafists and argues that the Freedom and Justice Party is closer to the thinking of the Salafist movements compared to Abu

---

139 Hamid, S. (2012):'Why is America reaching out to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', on http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/revolution-in-cairo-foreign-affairs-defense/why-is-america-reaching-out-to-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/

140 Such as the referendum in March 2011

el-Fettouh, who is flirting with the liberals and the secularists.[141] The aim of this article was to embarrass the leaders of the Nour Party in front of the members, hoping to win votes from the Salafist cadres to support the presidential candidate of the Brotherhood.

### 4.4. Inclusion After a Revolution

The fourth aspect that could account for the absence of moderation in the post-revolutionary period, and which is worth extensive examination in future research, is the influence that an inclusion after a revolutionary period has on the process of moderation. I assume here that there is a difference between regime-led inclusion and non-regime-led inclusion, i.e. inclusion after a revolution. Despite the fact that the level of inclusion throughout the rule period of Mubarak was low and the Brotherhood was not able to be genuinely included in the decision-making process, there was a certain degree of toleration. The increased level of inclusion in 2011 was, however, the result of the popular revolution and was not initiated by the regime. In this case, another dynamics comes into play, depending on the institutional

---

141 Guzlan, M. (2012). 'A Letter to the Salafist Brothers', on
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=107902&SecID=391

structure of the country. In Egypt, the army is influential and is the only countervailing power that could counterbalance the power of the Brotherhood. The liberal parties are weak and fragmented. The Muslim Brotherhood, by its existence, is the strongest and best organized political force in Egypt. It was therefore unavoidable that the transition period should be influenced by the wishes of the army and the Brotherhood, which sometimes were conflicting and sometimes overlapping.

The Brotherhood is included in a system that has yet to be constructed; the 'rules of the game' are not yet known. There are no strong institutions that could safeguard democracy. The results of the latest parliamentary elections play also a role in the challenge that the Brotherhood is facing in Egypt. In contrast to Tunisia, where al-Nahda Party, the political Aram of the Tunisian branch of the Brotherhood, won only 38 percent of the votes and was therefore forced to forge a coalition with other non-Islamist parties, the Brotherhood in Egypt won 47 percent. This electoral victory which made the FJP the dominant power in parliament enabled the party in a great extent to construct the rules of the game in such a way that it matches its interests. This has been clear in the attempt to write the new constitution and the role of the Brotherhood within this. This factor, in combination with the domination of the conservative wing which aims to maintain the hierarchical structure of the Brotherhood, does not form the appropriate atmosphere for the Brotherhood to become integrated into the system. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis should thus pay attention to the following question: inclusion in which political system and as a consequence of what?

Empowering the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution will be beneficial for the movement in the long run because it will be forced, internally but also externally, to provide ideological and political concessions. The coherence and the secrecy that were accepted during the repressive Mubarak regime will not be accepted by the grassroots. There is namely no longer any justification for these practices. However, for the transition period itself, it might be an unavoidable but a less appropriate option. The – possibly over high- ambitions of the conservatives to win as much power as possible have resulted, for example, in the recent scenario in which presidential elections are held without knowing what the powers of the president will be. The constitution has namely not been written yet due to the ambition of the FJP to monopolize the former constitutional assembly. Therefore, no consensus has been reached on the specific constitutional arrangements for producing a democratic government. Therefore, the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in a political system in which there are great possibilities to gain power (compared to the earlier period) and in which institutional

regulations are absent may not be the ideal structure that could produce moderation as a result of inclusion.

Thus, to date we are dealing with an eighty-four year old movement in which the conservatives are taking the lead, from which several prominent figures of the reformist wing have left, the ideology has become obsolete, the internal structure and the internal values do not fit the recent political structure and show clear democratic deficiencies. The younger generations are bored with the hierarchical structure and do not have an understanding of the political decisions of the movement which are in the interest of the movement itself and not of the country as whole. In this challenging context, it can be conceived that the Brotherhood is trying to maintain the status quo when it comes to its ideology and its internal organization, while engaging fully in a political system in which 'the rules of the game' are not even known and trying to gain as much political power as possible.

**Chapter 5: Conclusion**

This research aimed to uncover the factors that can contribute to the appearance of ideological moderation. As many scholars have been engaged in providing an answer to this question using the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, I started my journey by testing this hypothesis. In order to do this, I first made a distinction between behavioral and ideological moderation by linking these concepts respectively to the concept of procedural and substantive democracy.

Based on the condition of behavioral moderation, political pluralism, it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood has come a long way in accepting this principle. While the cooperation with other political forces proved difficult, especially in the post-revolutionary period, in general it cannot be denied that the Brotherhood has accepted the existence of other

parties and has committed itself to pluralist political practices. However, the conditions of ideological moderation, the position of women and Christian Copts in political life and the position of *Sharia* in politics, show that the level of moderation in the thinking of the Brotherhood did not change according to the increase in the level of inclusion in 2011. In line with what Clark has concluded about the existence of red lines in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, also in Egypt the presidency of Copts and women and the role of religion in politics still seem to be the red lines which the Brotherhood is unable or unwilling to cross. From the application of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, it appeared that the expectation of the hypothesis is not fulfilled. An increase in the level of inclusion has resulted in an unchanged level of moderation. This does, however, not mean that the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is irrelevant in explaining the occurrence of moderation. The inclusion of a party into the political system is just not enough to explain the occurrence or the absence of moderation. Therefore, it can be argued that inclusion is a necessary condition for moderation to happen but it is not sufficient. In order to supplement this hypothesis I offered propositions about new variables that might help explain what leads to moderation and that I suggest should be tested in future research.

The first two factors are organizational factors and refer to the effect that the level of inclusion has on the internal dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood: the intra-organizational competition and internal democracy. The intra-organizational competition inside the Muslim Brotherhood and the primacy of the conservative wing above the reformist wing, put an end to the ability of the Brotherhood to interact fully with the public and consequently to change its ideological propositions. The interaction and engagement of the reformist/political group with the public, in student unions, syndicates and parliament, has however resulted in ideological moderation; a phenomenon which I called 'fractionalized moderation'. Depending on the national and international context, one wing became stronger and more vociferous than the other.[142] When the Mubarak regime was aimed to liberalize the political system under national or international pressure, such as in the beginning at the 1980s and the after the events of September 11th, the reformist 'middle generation' members came on the foreground. However, when the regime intensified its military grip, the conservative wing took back the lead. Even when the repressive grip of the regime diminished, as occurred in the post-revolutionary period, the conservative wing was still taking the lead; rendering the departure of leading figures of the reformist wing from the Brotherhood inevitable. Thus, the

---

142 Tamam, H., The Development of the Muslim Brotherhood, pp:8

case of the Muslim Brotherhood highlights the fact that a movement should not be treated as a unitary actor.

The second variable that could help determine the occurrence or the absence of moderation is the internal democracy in the movement. As the case of the Muslim Brotherhood has highlighted, an increased level of inclusion does not necessarily have to produce an increase in the level of moderation if it is not accompanied by a change in the internal organization of the movement. Therefore, in a more inclusive political system, the probability of moderation of parties will increase when democracy has reached the internal structure of the party itself. In a relatively closed and controlled political system, such as during Mubarak's rule, it is more effective for a movement to have a hierarchical system. Because of the repressive political climate, members are willing to accommodate more and follow the line of the leaders in order for the organization to survive and to function efficiently. However, when the margin of freedom increases, the values of secrecy and principles such as 'hearing and obeying' will be outdated. This will alienate members and lead probably to their departure. The existence of an alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood in the political arena will trigger those who are unhappy with the internal organization to leave, putting the coherence of the Brotherhood under pressure. Moreover, the lack of internal democracy inside the Muslim Brotherhood contributes to the consolidation of the primacy of the conservative group. The hierarchical structure of the Brotherhood and the norms and values that have been internalized prevents the emergence of any other religious interpretation than that of the recent leadership. Reformist figures that have more progressive thoughts about the position of *Sharia* in politics, women and Copts, are isolated or have been ousted. It is hence expected that the hierarchical structure of movements, in which decisions are taken top-down and in which the aggregation of preferences of the members is not taken into consideration, will be an impediment to moderation, even if the level of inclusion is high.

The remaining two variables are contextual variables and refer to the status of the context in which the movement is included: the inter-party competition and the nature of the institutional system in which the movement is included. With inter-party competition, I refer to the existence of an ideological competitor on the political scene which limits the ability of the movement to change its ideological thinking (despite the willingness of the leaders to adopt this change). In Egypt, the existence of the Salafists in the religious sphere, and after the revolution also on the political arena, has contributed to the inability of the Brotherhood to shift the 'red lines' in anticipation of a possible leak of members to the other camp. Finally,

with the nature of the institutional system in which the process of inclusion takes places, I refer specifically to non-regime-led inclusions, such as these after a popular revolution, and the different dynamics that are at work in this context, which affect the level of moderation.

After the change in the political arena in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood, represented politically through the Freedom and Justice Party, had the opportunity to rethink its agenda and the means by which it can reach its goals. During the recent period, no changes have been conceived in the aims and means of the Brotherhood before and after the departure of Mubarak. This indicates that the Brotherhood is using old means and messages to reach the same goal in a more open and inclusive political space. It does not have the ability yet to rethink its ideology, following the change in the society and the political field. As long as the conservative wing is monopolizing the decision-making process and the internal organization has not become more open, transparent and inclusive, no ideological changes are expected to be reached in the ideological thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The absence of moderation after a period of high inclusion does not, however, mean that inclusion of Islamists in pluralist politics is pointless. It rather shows the complexity of this process. After the revolution, the inclusion of the Islamists in the political system is no longer a choice but is rather a reality. As mentioned before, the Brotherhood falls into the category of socio-economic movements with an Islamic agenda. It has renounced violence since the 1970s and has accepted the alternation of power. It will therefore not consider the road to power as a one-way road, as Bernard Lewis argues, but rather as a temporary period in which it should perform. The inclusion of Islamists in the political game is essential in order to make them able to integrate in the mainstream politics and to put pressure on the Brotherhood in order to change its internal dynamics. After all, the phenomenon of 'fractionalized moderation' could have never taken place without the existence of a certain degree of inclusion that allowed former university students to engage in public work. In addition, although the increased level of inclusion has not resulted in an increased level of moderation, it has certainly created new channels that could be used by reformists to bring about the change that they aim to see in the Brotherhood.[143]

Although in the 1980s, the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood was 'participation, not resistance'; in the period from 2000 to 2010 the slogan became 'participation, not

---

143 I refer here to the opportunity to resign and be able to form a new political party and mobilize members, which was not an effective possibility under the rule of Mubarak.

domination'. The behavior of the Brotherhood and its political arm at the present moment indicates that the recent slogan is 'participation and domination'. At decisive moments, such as when the Constitution had to be written, the leaders of the Brotherhood adopted a policy that is in the interest of the Brotherhood itself and not in the interest of the country as a whole, despite the fact that the leaders always stress the importance of reaching a consensus with all the political forces.

Finally, in examining the factors that leads to moderation, it should not be forgotten that public opinion has a great influence on the ideological composition of the Brotherhood. As long as there are high percentages of poverty, analphabetism and unemployment, the public opinion in Egypt will remain weak, rendering the Brotherhood able to influence the public in an easy way. However, at the longer run, when the quality of education improves and the political awareness increases, the society will be able to influence the Brotherhood and not the opposite. As Ammar Ali Hassan pointed out: 'The pressure from other political forces is interpreted by the Brotherhood in terms of 'competition.' The pressure from the regime is interpreted as an attempt to destroy the movement. The pressure from the society, however, will leave the Brotherhood with no choice but to adapt its thinking to the leading values.' As long as an 'informed and educated' society is absent in Egypt, the internal dynamics of the movement will remain the main determinant of the ideological thinking of the Brotherhood.

The greatest challenge for the Brotherhood remains the ability to divide the religious from the political. This is important in order for the FJP to be able to operate independently from the movement, reach ideological moderation and integrate into the Egyptian political system as a normal political party, which is not connected to any religious institution. This will prove to be the main challenge of the Brotherhood because it touches the very essence of the ideology of the Brotherhood which is concentrated in the view that Islam 'is a complete, active religion that must relate to all aspects of life.'[144] Therefore, as a consequence of the increased level of inclusion in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood is faced with challenges which are more threatening to its existence than these in the previous periods. The path to ideological moderation will nevertheless remain a passable path, but not an easy one.

---

144 Moussalli, A.S. (1999). *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State*, USA: University Press of Florida, pp:109

**Bibliography**

Ali, A. (2005). Al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimien, Fatawi (*The Fatwa's of the Muslim Brotherhood)*, Cairo: Al-Mahrousa Publisher.

Al-Anani, k. (2007). Al-Ikwaan al-Muslimoun Fi Masr: Sheiguga tusare' al-Zaman (The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: An Aging Movement in Fight with the Time*)*. Cairo: Shorouk International.

Al-Shobki, A. (2009). *The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood*, Cairo: Al-Ahraam Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.

Al-Shobki, A. (ed.) (2009). *The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood*. Cairo: Al-Ahraam Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.

Ashour, O. (2009). *The De-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*. New York: Routledge.

Brown, J. N., Hamzawy, A. and Ottaway, M. (2006). 'Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones', *Carnegie Endowment*, No. 67.

Browers, M. (2009). *Political ideology in the Arab World: accommodation and transformation*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, N. J. (2012). 'When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success', Carnegie Endowment, pp:1-19.

Clark, J.A. (2006). 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp:539-560.

El-Ghobashy, M. (2005). 'The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood', in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 35, pp:373-395.

Fawzy, S. (2009). *Citizenship in confrontation with sectarianism*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

Fuller, G.E. (2004). 'Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance around Democracy', *Carnegie Papers No. 49*.

Georege, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, USA: Belfer Center for Sciences and International Affairs.

Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2002). 'Deliberative Democracy beyond Process', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 2. No. 2, pp:153-174.

Hamid, S. (2011). 'Arab Islamist Parties: Losing on Purpose', *Journal of* Democracy, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp: 68-80.

Hamzawy, A. and Brown, N. (2010). 'The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment', Carnegie Endowment, No. 19, pp:1-45.

Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ja'afar, H. (2009). 'The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syndicate elections in Egypt', in Al-Shobki. A(ed.) (2009). *The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood*. Cairo: al-Ahraam Centre for Strategic Studies.

Kassem, M. (2004). *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mitchell, R.P. (1969). *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, UK: Oxford University Press.

Moussalli, A.S. (1999). *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State*, USA: University Press of Florida.

Pargeter, A. (2010). *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, India: Thomson Press, Ltd.

Rashwan, D. (2006). *Dalil al-Harakaat al-Islamya Fi al-Alam (The Guidebook of the Islamist Movements in the World)*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

Rageb Awd, H. and Tawfik, H. (1995). Al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoun wa al-Siasa fi Masr (*The Muslim Brotherhood and the Politics in Egypt)*, Cairo: Al-Mahrusa Publisher.

Shadid, A. (2002). *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam*, USA: Westview Press.

Schwedler, J. (2006). *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stacher, A. J. (2008). 'Brothers in arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt', *Institute for Public Policy Research*.

Sears, D.O. and Levy, S. (2003). 'Childhood and Adult Political Development' in Sears, D.O., Huddy, L. and Jervis, R. (eds.)(2003). *Political Psychology*, USA: Oxford University Press.

Tamam, H., (2010). *Tahawelaat al-Ikhwaan al-Muslemien (The Developments of the Muslim Brotherhood)*, Cairo: Madbouly Books.

Tezur, G.M. (2010). 'The moderation theory revisited: the case of Islamic political actors', *Party Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp:69-88.

Wickham, C.R. (2004). 'The path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp:205-228.

**Primary documents**

The Muslim Brotherhood, (1994), 'Al-Mar2a al-Musla fi al Mugtama al-Muslim' (*The Muslim woman in an Islamic society)*, The Islamic Center for Studies and Research.

Draft Program, Muslim Brotherhood, 2007.

Election Program, Muslim Brotherhood, 2010.

Election Program, the Freedom and Justice Party, 2011.

Report on the Military Trials of the Leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sawasya Center for Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination, 2009.

**Internet sources**

Al-Anani, K. (2008). 'Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Democratic Organization?' on http://globalmbreport.org/?p=1121

Abu Germa, S. (2009). 'The Results of the Elections of the Shura Council Cause Conflicts Again', on http://alghad.com/index.php/article/347872.html

Abu el-Fettouh, A. (2006). 'The Muslim Brotherhood comments on 'Grazyzones', Carnegie Paper, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FutouhEnglishFullText__5_.pdf

Abu el-Fettouh, A. (2009). 'Diary', on http://www.alhoukoul.com/printarticle/2411

El-Houdaiby, M. (2011). 'The Muslim Brotherhood's Trial of Pluralism', on http://www.midanmasr.com/en/article.aspx?ArticleID=59

Hamzawy, A. and Brown, N.J. (2010). 'The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist participation in a closing political environment', Carnegie endowment, on http://carnegieendowment.org/files/muslim_bros_participation.pdf

Hamid, S. (2012). 'Why is America Reaching out to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', on http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/revolution-in-cairo-foreign-affairs-defense/why-is-america-reaching-out-to-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/

Hamid, S. (2007), 'Engaging Political Islam to Promote Democracy', *The Progressive Policy Institute*, on http://www.dlc.org/documents/Political_Islam_06272007.pdf

Khalil, M. (2006). 'The Muslim Brotherhood and the Copts', on http://threatswatch.org/commentary/2006/04/the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the/

Rashwan, D. (2001). 'God and the Cause', Al-Ahraam Weekly, on http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/588/op2.htm

Essam El-Din, G. (2004). 'Brotherhood steps into the fray', Al-Ahraam Weekly, on http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/681/eg3.htm

Guzlan, M. (2012). 'A Letter to the Salafist Brothers', on http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=107902&SecID=391

Website Ikhwan Web: 'The role of Muslim women in an Islamic society', on http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4914

**Website newspapers**

Website the Guardian: 'Egypt's Islamists win 75 percent of parliament', on http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10053165

Website BBC: 'Egypt court suspends constitutional assembly', on http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17665048

Website BBC: 'What the rise of political Islam is likely to spell', on
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-15454217

Website BBC: 'Egypt candidate: Muslim Brotherhood's Khairat al-Shater', on
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17583661

Website BBC: 'Egypt's Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament',
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16665748

Website the Independent: 'Egypt's women excited over new divorce law', on
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/egypts-women-excited-over-new-divorce-la
w-703786.html

Website al-Ahram: 'How divided is Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood?' on
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/8949/Egypt/Politics-/How-divided-is-Egypts-
Muslim-Brotherhood.aspx

Statement Khairat al-Shater on women, May 2011, on http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wpJ7R6C0Rmg

Al-Sha'ab newspaper: 'A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood for the people', 2 Mei 1995
(al-Ahram Archive).

**Interviews**

Interview with Fahmy Huaidy, Cairo, 26 March 2012.

Interview with Abdel-Rahim Ali, Cairo, 27 March 2012.

Interview with Muaaz Abdel-Karim, Cairo, 29 March 2012.

Interview with Medhat al-Hadad, Office of the Muslim Brotherhood, Alexandria, 2 April
2012.

Interview with Subhi Saleh in the Office of the Muslim Brotherhood, Alexandria, 10 April
2012.

Interview with Ahmed Ban, Nile Centre for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 29 April 2012.

Interview with Rif'at al-Saied, Office Tajammou' Party, Cairo, 30 April 2012.

Interview with Aly al-Meshad, Office of al-Tayar al-Masri Party, Cairo, 2 and 7 Mei 2012.

Interview with Mohammed Mehdi Akef, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 6
Mei 2012.

Interview with the lawyer of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Meniem Abdel Maksoud, Cairo,
7 Mei 2012.

Interview with Ibrahim al-Hudaiby (on the Phone), Cairo, 9 Mei 2012.

Interview with Jamal al-Banna, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012.

Interview with Dia Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 8 Mei 2012.

Interview with Ammar Ali Hassan, Nile Centre for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2 Mei 2012.

Interview Abdel Rahman al-Bar, Headquarter of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 9 Mei 2012.