"The More You Sweat in Peace, The Less You Bleed in War?"

Security Sector Reform and its Contribution to Post-conflict State building in Somalia and Sudan

Name:	Wessel Thomas Toonen, B.A.
E-mail:	Toonen.Wessel@gmail.com
Student number:	1456458
Supervisor:	Prof. dr. B. (Ben) Schoenmaker
Second reader:	Prof. dr. I.G.B.M. (Isabelle) Duijvesteijn

Word count:	30.000
Version:	March 22, 2016

Acknowledgements

There are a couple of organizations and institutions that deserve my recognition for their (in)direct contributions to this inquiry. First, the *Netherlands Institute for Military History* (NIMH) of the 'Command and Services Centres' (CDC) of the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Here I was provided with a research assignment that helped me to familiarize myself with the issues regarding international military involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particularly, I got acquainted with the concepts of SSR and DDR and learned how to scrutinize these in military conduct. In turn, this learning and thinking process helped me to streamline my thoughts on the subject matter of this inquiry. Second, the Dutch NGO *Pax for Peace* provided me with primary statistical measures of the effects of DDR as seen from the perspective of local Sudanese communities. This source material offers comparable samples that helped me to make a reflective assessment of post-conflict state building efforts. Third, I would like to thank *The Hague Academy for Local Governance* for providing me with an opportunity to discuss questions regarding state fragility, the rule of law and theories of change with various practitioners in the development world. This has helped me to translate my thoughts into text and allowed me to unravel the conceptual relationship between process legitimacy and liberal-democratic benchmarks such as the rule of law.

There are also a number of individuals to whom I would like to express my academic gratitude. First of all, I am most grateful to my supervisor and intellectual sparring partner Prof. Dr. Ben Schoenmaker of Leiden University, who despite his demanding schedule found the time to guide my research and whose methodological suggestions have undoubtedly enhanced its quality. Next, I would like to thank Dr. Christ Klep of the University of Amsterdam for bringing me in touch with Mr. Hans Rouw of the aforementioned NGO. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Marjolein 't Hart of the VU University of Amsterdam for her recommendations on literature that proved significant to my theoretical framework. Finally, I would like to express my personal gratitude to a selected number of people. In the first place, my parents – Willem Toonen and Marga Verdonschot – who endlessly supported me throughout my studies. They e.g. provided a calm home environment that was conducive to my overall progress. On a close second place, I preserve my special thanks to my greatest friend and beloved girlfriend Tatevik Manucharyan, L.L.M, who tirelessly kept supporting me by her words and actions. In her own unique way, she thereby gave me the comfort and peace at mind I needed to finally complete this dissertation.

Table of contents

Glossary of terms 4

Introduction 5

1. Toward State Building in the Horn of Africa 10
- 1.1. Armed State Building: A Reflective Definition 10
- 1.2. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 20
- 1.3. Struggles in the Horn of Africa 27

2. Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform 34
- 2.1. Defining the Concept 34
- 2.2. Problems and Pitfalls 41

3. Confronting State Failure in Somalia 47
- 3.1. UNOSOM-II in Somalia 47
- 3.2. Challenges for AMISOM 60

4. Clashing Identities in Sudan 68
- 4.1. AMIS in Darfur: 'African Solutions to African Problems'? 68
- 4.2. UNMIS: Contributing to Post-conflict State building? 76
- 4.3. UNAMID: A Preliminary Assessment 88

Conclusion 92

Bibliography 100

Glossary of terms

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan (2004 – 2007)
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia (2007 – present)
AU	African Union (2001 – present)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan, 2005)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement (2006)
FSI	Fragile/Failed States Index
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HDI	UNDP Human Development Index
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (1986-1996)
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NCP	National Congress Party (Sudan)
NSSP	National Security and Stabilisation Plan
OAU	Organization of African Unity (1963 – 2001)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SLM/SLA	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
SPF	Somali Police Force
SSANSA	South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSPS	Southern Sudan Police Service
SSR	Security Sector/System Reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia; 2004)
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (2007 – present)
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (2005 – 2011)
UNOSOM-I	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II (1993 – 1995)

Introduction

"*Some of our missions are extending initial security and stability gains into longer-term peacebuilding. More and more frequently peacekeeping operations are expected to initiate early peacebuilding activities in the immediate aftermath of conflict and carefully designed transitions to ensure that sufficient resources and expertise are maintained to consolidate the peacebuilding efforts.*"[1]

Throughout the Cold War, the possibilities of UN peacekeeping were limited by a stifling East-West deadlock in the Security Council. Thereafter, in the early 1990s, the widespread optimism about the supposedly new peacebuilding capabilities vanished with humanitarian crises in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994). The subsequent terrorist attacks of 9/11 then inaugurated a renewal within the international security agenda. Post-conflict states were increasingly branded as 'fragile' and treated as potential threats to international law and order, to justify international military involvement.

Simultaneously, there emerged a growing consensus that in order to create a fertile soil for socio-economic development in these states, the international community first had to reform or develop their security and justice sectors. The OECD's handbook on security sector reform, for instance, constitutes a very recent example of "the assumed interconnections between security and development as a taken-for-granted point of departure."[2] Policymakers, moreover, tend to present the 'security-development nexus' as a causal relationship. This fuelled the notion that security serves as the key prerequisite for socio-economic development after civil conflicts. In turn, this has fed an international consensus that the probability by which fragile states relapse into conflict is inversely proportional to the level of progress made in security sector reform during periods of relative peace. This corresponds to the precept that "the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war"[3], which is now typically invoked to justify international attempts at post-conflict state reconstruction.

---

[1] Statement by Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN General Assembly Thematic Debate: 'UN Peacekeeping – Looking into the Future' (22-06-10) pp. 1-5, there: p. 3. ; For full speech see: http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/thematic/peace/usg.pdf.

[2] M. Stern & J. Öjendal, 'Exploring the Security-Development Nexus', in: Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal (ed.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development* (Anthem Press, 2013) pp. 13-40, there: p. 15.

[3] Author's note: The saying "The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed a war" is supposedly an old Chinese proverb. It has however increasingly been attributed to U.S. General George S. Patton Jr. (1885-1945). More recently, the predicate was also used to outline e.g. the Dutch approach to fragile states in a foreign policy document titled *Veiligheid en Ontwikkeling in Fragiele Staten*, © Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008).

In an attempt to question the former line of thinking, this inquiry tries to answer the following research question: to what extent has post-Cold War *Security Sector/System Reform* (SSR) contributed to post-conflict state building in Somalia and Sudan? This means unravelling the problems with applying the former precept to Somalia and Sudan. In particular, this inquiry will critically appraise its theoretical premise – the notion that 'institutionalization before liberalization' is the most suitable method to realise peace and security in post-conflict environments.

As a theoretical framework, this inquiry adopts Paul D. Miller's concept of 'armed international liberal state building' (hereafter: 'armed state building'). This is the "attempt by liberal states to use military, political and economic power to compel weak, failed, or collapsed states to govern more effectively and accountably, as understood by Westphalian and liberal norms."[4] Miller furthermore distinguishes between different types and degrees of state failure and hypothesizes that "armed state building is more likely to succeed if state builders adopt a strategy that corresponds to the *type* and *degree* of state failure; more invasive efforts for aspects of statehood that show a greater degree of failure and less invasive in areas that show less failure."[5] The following case studies will help to indicate the problems with this hypothesis.

In adopting Miller's concept, this inquiry will look exclusively at military efforts to rebuild the security and legitimacy domains of the state. This means that "political and economic power" shall be left beyond the scope of attention. While this has the advantage of a straightforward focus on state institutions and the efforts of military interventions, 'state building' as a field of study however remains hard to isolate because of its close relationship to widely different international actions.[6] Inevitably, the limited scope of this inquiry shall therefore place the subject-matter in an artificial analytical vacuum.

First, chapter one will start by providing a theoretical reflection on armed state building. The second section will then place it in the historical context of 'liberal peacebuilding'[7] and discusses the definition of a 'post-conflict' zone. The third section will then examine the nature of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and reflects on the 'crises of citizenship and

[4] P.D. Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012* (Cornell University Press, 2013) p. 7.
[5] Ibid., p. 80.
[6] Ibid., p. 7.
[7] Here defined as the "promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with "modern" states as a driving force for building "peace"'. See: E. Newman, R. Paris & O.P. Richmond, 'Introduction', in: E. Newman, R. Paris & O.P. Richmond (ed.) *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2009) pp. 3-25, there: p. 3.

legitimacy in the state' as chameleonic key phenomena to understand their root causes.
Chapter two reflects on the concept of SSR in relation to armed state building and its potential contributions to security and legitimacy. This inquiry measures contributions to the security domain by looking at both the qualitative and quantitative progress made in the restoration/establishment of the 'monopoly on the use of force' of the state. This will conveniently be defined as the state's control over the core security actors and their management and oversight bodies, combined with the effectiveness of justice and law enforcement institutions. As a part of its analysis, this inquiry will also address the progress made within *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) programs in cases where these have been implemented.
Furthermore, the contributions to state legitimacy – here perceived as input or process legitimacy[8] – are measured by assessing the process of establishing state institutions together with the empowerment of civil society representatives, which could potentially broaden the overall participation in the peace agreement. In addition, the inquiry will look at the progress made in community confidence-building measures to build legitimacy. This will be supplemented by qualitative discourse analyses, based on primary sources from local media and NGO reports.

Next, chapters three and four will scrutinize the activities of the international peacebuilding missions called UNOSOM-II (1993 - 1995), AMIS (2004 – 2007) and UNMIS (2005 – 2011). After unpacking the post-Cold War problems of Somalia and Sudan, we will start by determining the missions' relationship to SSR. Next, we will reflect on the progress made within relevant activities throughout the missions' deployment. This involves e.g. analysing reports by the Secretary-General and field reports by NGOs.
This inquiry shall then attempt to provide a measure of the missions' contributions to the security and legitimacy domains of the state. Thereafter, these chapters will also offer some preliminary thoughts on the early deployment phases of AMISOM (2007 – present) and UNAMID (2007 – present). While it is too early in time to draw up conclusions about these missions, they could nonetheless assist us in further elaboration on the efforts of preceding missions. Finally, chapter five will attempt to answer the main research question by analysing the international military efforts vis-à-vis the encountered problems in Somalia and Sudan.

[8] "When the legitimacy of the state is tied to agreed rules of procedure through which the state takes binding decisions and organizes people's participation." ; See, e.g.: *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity* (© OECD, 2010) p. 23.

This inquiry is prone to a number of methodological problems. First, the subject-matter concerns very recent developments, which diminishes the historical detachment and blurs the distinction between primary and secondary source material. This might make it difficult to produce a reflective and contentious treatment of the norms and values that are integral to building liberal states in illiberal contexts. The analysis, however, thankfully builds on the work of authors e.g. Jackson and Egnell & Haldén who have already succeeded in critically reviewing the relationship between SSR and state building. Similarly, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond have already questioned recent international military interventions with the purpose of building a 'liberal' peace.
Second, the study of SSR continues to lack an established method to holistically assess the contribution of various activities to state building. Undoubtedly, this is related to the ongoing absence of an integrated approach to SSR in the UN system.[9] In this sense, the measurements in this inquiry may therefore also be disputable. Notwithstanding, they have been cemented in the historical context of state building in Somalia and Sudan. At the very least, they could therefore help to elucidate the a variety of problems that policy makers should consider.

Third, it is valuable to briefly explain the selection of case studies. Somalia and Sudan both fall within the bottom 20% of the UNDP's Human Development Index. Unsurprisingly, these countries have also experienced devastating civil wars and violent conflicts between ethnic-, region- and clan-based groups. In addition, the vast majority of international involvement in the Horn of Africa over the past twenty years has been directed at Somalia and Sudan. This means that both of them have been subject to changing trends in post-1989 peacekeeping, but consistently remained ranked in the top-5 of the FSI. Taken together, Somalia and Sudan also cover a wide theoretical span of intra-state conflicts, since group identities and political loyalties here have been formed along ethnic, tribal, clan-based or geographic lines. In this way, the cases of Somalia and Sudan both provide ample space for a historical analysis of the central research question.
Moreover, the ethnic- and region-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa are essentially reflections of the challenges of state and nation-building.[10] A study of past international military efforts in this region could therefore potentially help us to better deal with these

[9] H. Hänggi & V. Scherrer, 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 15 No. 4 (2008) pp. 491-494.
[10] K. Mengisteab, 'Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013) pp. 26-39, there: pp. 26-28.

challenges in the future. In particular, measuring past military efforts could articulate key security and legitimacy issues that may entail some *lessons learned* for upcoming international military interventions. Studies of this kind will testify to the indispensable value of scholarly practice to the military profession. This particular study, however, should only go in pair with a responsible amount of academic modesty.

1. Toward State Building in the Horn of Africa

"*Processes of peacebuilding and state building are designed to develop a liberal social contract in contrast to the predatory state that mainstream state formation expects.*"[11]

1.1. Armed State Building: A Reflective Definition

Based on a century of US/UN-led efforts (1898-2012), Miller defines 'armed state building' as an exercise of military power by 'great powers.'[12] This has the purpose to compel failed or collapsed states to govern more effectively. Armed state building is marked by *the presence of international military forces*, which influences the dynamic between international and local actors. This process typically occurs in concentrated 'pockets' of time and consists of technical exercises in institutional capacity development. It is also a process in which one state (or a collection of states) exercises political, military and economic power over another. The presence of international military forces is crucial because it alters local balances of power and partially overrides or supplants a weak state's sovereignty.
This is justified by the need to compel weak states to abide by the international norms of statehood. These norms reflect the Westphalian system of individual, coexisting and coequal sovereign units. On the other hand, they represent the liberalism that has defined armed state building since the end of the Cold War.[13] Historical analyses of state building inevitably involve tackling some fundamental questions about the meaning, activities and nature of the state. This section will therefore start by reflecting on the historical state formation process in Western Europe vis-à-vis post-colonial Africa. It will then suggest an ideal-typology of different kinds and degrees of state failure with matching strategies of state building.

Prominent western scholars have indicated the inextricable links between coercion, legitimacy and the Westphalian state. In his *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes perceived the state as a sovereign power to which men granted authority to use coercion "[…] so it can bring an end to the brutal state of nature" of human life as an endless war. In his *Politics as a Vocation*,

---

[11] O.P. Richmond, 'The Legacy of State Formation Theory for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 20 No. 3 (2013) p. 308.
[12] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012*, p. 7.
[13] Ibid., pp. 4-6.

Max Weber defined the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[14] In Weberian terms, the process of claiming legitimacy while exercising political, legal and military authority necessarily involves appealing to a normative framework of right and wrong ways by which to exercise that authority. In this way, the state lays claim to legitimacy by invoking its own theory of justice to validate its actions, coercion and existence. To this end, the state begins to embody and spread public norms about justice and legitimacy. Norms legitimize power, and theories of justice thus grant legitimate power to the state.[15]

Furthermore, the late Charles Tilly, a prominent historian of state formation, distinguished four essential activities that defined the European state. (1) 'State making' – the attacking and checking of competitors and challengers within the territory claimed by the state; (2) 'War making' – the attacking of rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state; (3) 'Protection' – the attacking and checking of rivals of the rulers' principal allies, whether inside or outside the state's claimed territory and (4) 'Extraction' – the drawing of resources from the subject population to pursue the former activities. The latter required state authorities to bargain with other power holders and groups of ordinary people over the conditions under which the state could extract or control.[16]
Tilly also suggested that the relative balance among these four activities affected the emerging states: "To the extent that war making went on with relatively little extraction, protection, and state making […] military forces ended up playing a larger and more autonomous part in national politics."[17] However, the modern European state ultimately arose from a historical process that involved monopolizing the use of force and bargaining with power-holding elites to gain legitimacy. In this way, legitimate rule became tied to accountability to 'checks and balances' and subordination to the rule of law, which is reflected in the aforementioned process legitimacy.

States that historically demonstrated the former four activities are characterized by intensive rural-urban trade that provided rulers with an opportunity to collect revenues through customs

[14] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (1651) p. 76. ; Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* (1919).
[15] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 40, 42.
[16] C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1990* (Cambridge, Massachusetts etc.: Blackwell 1990) pp. 96, 99.
[17] C. Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (ed.) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 169-191, there: pp. 183-184.

and excise taxes. Cities served as containers and distribution points for the capital by which urban ruling classes extended their influence through the urban hinterland.[18]
Ndulo, director of the Cornell University's Institute for African Development, contrastingly argues that colonialism divided Africa into two societies. The great majority of people lived in rural areas, which made it fall largely outside the framework of colonial elitism. Meanwhile, the urban economy and culture formed the link between the metropolitan country and colony. Ndulo therewith suggests that this colonial rural/urban divide has continued and grown until present-day. This process has left the rural areas neglected, marginalized and impoverished. As a consequence, the state here has become "extremely weak" and "almost completely irrelevant as a provider of services."[19] Jeffrey Herbst advances Ndulo's argument by remarking how contrary to Europe, the current states in Africa were created well before many of the capital cities had reached maturity. While the European colonizers created many urban areas, these cities subsequently failed to instigate the same processes of state creation as in Europe. Colonizers, according to Herbst, were not interested in duplicating the same power infrastructure that bound cities to hinterland in their homelands. Rather, they mainly used the capital cities of Africa for their own colonial economic needs and purposes.[20]

This helped to create a particular urban/city vs. rural/hinterland dualism in African states, which in turn determined how national politics and legitimacy took shape after independence. While urban-based leaders of Africa still struggle to establish physical control over substantial parts of the population, their physical control over the capital city did however become the easiest discernible form of political authority. For example, it can hardly be called a coincidence that the attendees of the post-independence Organization of African Unity (OAU) summits were all in control over their capital cities.[21] Furthermore, in the early 1990s, it was argued that the post-colonial history of Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by an unresolved political struggle that reflects exactly this particular divide: "On the one hand, political elites wish to extend the authority of the state over scattered populations, most of whom live in rural areas; on the other hand, peasants remain determined to preserve a realm of authority

[18] Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, pp. 49, 51.
[19] M. Ndulo, 'The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building', *National Black Law Journal* Vol. 16
No. 1 (1998) pp. 76-77.
[20] J. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press 2000) pp. 15-16.
[21] Ibid., pp. 18, 111.

within which to make decisions about their own lives."[22] African rulers, moreover, often incorporated ethnic groups into their patronage networks through ethnic intermediaries. 'Ethnicity', in this way, became a predominantly political phenomenon in which political leaders were able to define its content and set the stage for ethnic competition. Crucially, most of these rulers were often unable to meet the needs of their growing urban populations, which frequently resulted in ethnic or religious-based coups, revolutions and intergroup conflict.[23] State formation in Sub-Saharan Africa has thus been a severely fragmented process which has severely limited the state's power over elites. Inevitably, this fragmentation has also affected the state's monopoly on the use of force, its claim to legitimacy and its capacity to rule.

Armed state building, the effort to compel failed states to govern more effectively, is based on the premise that states can experience failure. A range of scholars have explored the characteristics of a 'failed state', emphasized different criteria and developed various albeit inconclusive typologies.[24] Kraxberger – who authored the book *Failed States: Realities, Risks and Responses* – remarks how the European-inspired, Westphalian framework for the modern territorial state has gradually been established as the global norm. 'Stateness', in this sense, refers to the degree in which states fulfil common expectations held by the international community e.g. providing a level of physical security for citizens and promote economic and human development. States thus 'fail' when they experience a decline in legitimate and effective governance along Westphalian lines.[25]
Miller identifies 'institution-building' and the role of power and norms as chief elements of armed state building. This is consistent with Acemoglu & Robinson's recent emphasis on political and institutional factors in their treatise on the origins of failed nations.[26] Similarly, Paris advocates the 'institutionalization before liberalization' approach to fragile states. He argues that "what is needed in the immediate postconflict period is not democratic ferment and economic upheaval, but political stability and the establishment of effective administration over the territory. Only when a working governmental authority has been

---

[22] M. Bratton, 'Peasant-State Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement', in: Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli & Vivienne Shue (ed.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 231.
[23] C.G. Thies, 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 69 No. 3 (2007) p. 719.
[24] For a theoretical discussion see: Miller, pp. 53-58.
[25] B.M. Kraxberger, 'Rethinking Responses to State Failure, With Special Reference to Africa', *Progress in Development Studies* Vol. 12 Nos. 2-3 (2012) pp. 99-100.
[26] See: D. Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (London 2013).

reestablished should peacebuilders initiate a series of gradual democratic and market-oriented reforms."[27] State builders, however, cannot simply build a working governmental authority without regard for the fundamental problems that underpin specific post-conflict environments. Egnell & Haldén have for instance criticized the "lack of contextual understanding" which has created an "ad hoc and piecemeal approach to SSR based on normative assumptions rather than theoretically and historically informed strategies for the specific operational context."[28]

Nonetheless, armed state building is underpinned by the norms, values and institutional infrastructure of liberal democracies. This corresponds to Newman, Paris & Richmond's observation that contemporary peacebuilding is often described as 'liberal peacebuilding', given the emphasis on institution-building based on democracy. This focus, in turn, is vested on the idea of a 'liberal peace' – the idea that particular kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful in their domestic affairs and international relations.[29] In this way, the justification of international military state building efforts thus stems from predominantly Western norms about the primacy of the Westphalian 'liberal-democratic state' over other (more autocratic) models.
However, the primacy of the '(neo)liberal approach' to state building has been subject to a variety of criticisms. Newman, Paris & Richmond point out that the liberal peace and its neo-liberal economic dimensions are not necessarily appropriate for conflicted or divided societies.[30] Paris himself argued that the process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, which only hindered the consolidation of peace and sometimes even sparked renewed fighting.[31] In order to prevent or mitigate these effects, liberalization must be preceded by institutionalization.[32] Podder, however, argued that the adoption of a liberal agenda of technocracy, institutionalisation and procedural democracy can encourage a somewhat incomplete and, at times, opaque understanding of the interactions and exchanges between actors, norms and practices. This becomes especially dangerous when these processes are accelerated under conditions of

[27] R. Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 187-188.
[28] R. Egnell & P. Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious: Security Sector Reform meets State Formation Theory', *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 9 No. 1 (2009) pp. 48-49.
[29] Newman et al., *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*, pp. 3-25, there: pp. 10-11.
[30] Ibid., pp. 3-25, there: p. 12.
[31] R. Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 2 (1997) p. 56.
[32] Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, pp. 187-188.

externally supported reconstruction.[33] In addition, Egnell & Haldén out that the "attempt to achieve increased state control, legitimate government, civil society engagement and democratisation synchronically will be highly difficult because these factors [in modern countries] evolved in sequence."[34]

Regardless of these criticisms, the (neo)liberal approach remains a useful lens by which to look at post-Cold War international military involvement. This does not take place in a vacuum, but constitutes an ongoing process in which valuable lessons continue to be learned. This is evident from e.g. the given that "democracy assistance programs have [finally] come to acknowledge the role of power in making democracy possible; the plurality of paths toward democracy; and the importance of local conditions."[35] It is moreover observed by e.g. Berdal that neither the "peacekeeping failures of the early and mid-1990s [...] nor the changes in the strategic environment spawned by the events of 11 September and their aftermath, have weakened a trend that has seen 'a continued increase in international peacebuilding in the face of the enormous practical and legitimacy challenges'."[36] Miller, in addition, points out how local actors in every post-Cold War case have in fact demanded some form of democracy as the basis for political reconstruction; a trend which shows no sign of abating. Despite its imperfections, the liberal-democratic paradigm of the state thus appears to remain the prevalent international norm. This in turn justifies the continued focus on liberal state building as the paradigm of international military efforts in fragile states.[37]

Miller distinguishes between five types of state failure: (1) 'Anarchic', (2) 'Illegitimate', (3) 'Incapable', (4) 'Unproductive' and (5) 'Barbaric'. Anarchic states lack security; Illegitimate states no longer possess their peoples' belief in their claims about justice; Incapable states are unable to deliver public goods and services; Unproductive states cannot extract sufficient resources; Barbaric states treat their own peoples as enemies and systematically murder large numbers of them as a matter of policy. This typology also testifies to the inextricable link between security and legitimacy: states that are widely perceived to be illegitimate by their people are also most likely to experience anarchic failure. It further seems plausible that the imposition of security measures without regard for the norms of legitimacy is simply planting

[33] S. Podder, 'State Building and the Non-State: Debating Key Dilemmas', *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 35 No. 9 (2014) pp. 1616-1617.
[34] Egnell & Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious', p. 49.
[35] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 96.
[36] M. Berdal, *Building Peace After War* (Routledge/The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009) p. 15.
[37] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 89.

the seeds for renewed armed conflict.[38]
Similarly, barbaric policies aimed at a specific group could be legitimate in the eyes of government beneficiaries. In turn, the lack of physical security could be the most imminent to the livelihoods of particular minorities. Chronic lacks of security and contested legitimacy could decrease the state's capability to deliver public goods and services. Ultimately, security has intrinsic value to the state's capability to 'espouse good governance with transparency and accountability and enforce law and order throughout the country'[39] which grants it process legitimacy. In this way, the security and legitimacy domains of the state are the key focus areas of this inquiry.

Miller describes how different historical pathways to security failure generally lead to different degrees of failure: (1) 'Weak-Unstable' states present permissive security environments – probably most common in newly independent states that emerged from imperial rule. (2) 'Failed-Violent' states emerged from a recent civil war and represent a harder security environment. (3) 'Collapsed-Anarchic' states are in the midst of an ongoing civil war and therefore represent the most difficult security environment. Local perceptions, moreover, form the causal mechanism that link historical circumstances to security outcomes. Table 1.1 matches the different strategies of rebuilding security to the degree of security failure in the target state.[40]
This table, however, raises the question of how to define (in)security? First, it is important to acknowledge that the concept of security tends to take on very different meanings, according to which side of the conflict one belongs to. State actors are mostly concerned with restoring their monopoly over the use of force, enforcing law and order and protecting their country against external threats. Power contenders, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the existing and perceived insecurity for the large parts of the population they represent and, of course, for themselves.[41] The next part of this chapter will further elaborate on this.

[38] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 33, 57-58.
[39] Ndulo, 'The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building', pp. 73-74.
[40] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 83, 88.
[41] V. Dudouet, H.J. Giessmann & K. Planta, 'General Introduction', in: Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012) pp. 1-13, there: p. 6.

Table 1.1. Matching Strategy to Degree of Security Failure

Degree of Failure	**Strategy of State Building**
Weak-Unstable Newly independent states Security forces minimally capable Combatants cooperative with DDR	Observe Deploy peacekeeping force Monitor ceasefire Facilitate DDR Monitor security forces
Failed-Violent Recent civil war Security forces incapable, underpaid, untrained Widespread, overt, organized criminality	Train/Equip Provide security assistance Train/equip local security forces Embed international with local forces
Collapsed-Anarchic Ongoing war Combatants resistant to DDR	Administer Deploy peace enforcement force Execute combat operations and foreign internal defense Establish military government/transitional authority

Seen from liberal state building, it is relevant to assess the restoration/establishment of the state's 'monopoly on the use of force'. This type of international military efforts are categorized under the 'Train/Equip' strategy in 'Failed/Violent' states. Typically, they are characterized by security forces that "are unable (or unwilling) to provide security, and ex-combatants turned into criminal forces [that] threaten the state's stability."[42] The most successful security strategy here would encompass the full range of what the UN calls *Security Sector Reform* and what the US military calls 'security assistance'. These, according to Miller, will help to "strengthen the security institutions of the state, consolidate a ceasefire, and allow political and economic reconstruction to move forward."[43] Upcoming sections will further elaborate on (the use of) this concept.

In addition to process legitimacy, Ian Hurd – a political scientist – has defined 'legitimacy' as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed […] when an actor believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest…control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as 'right'."[44] Hurd's definition of legitimacy is linked to security because "many political conflicts are rooted in the adoption of violent strategies by societal actors who dispute the legitimacy of a state that they perceive to be unwilling to provide security and welfare to all of its citizens."[45] In turn, the state tends to criminalise all of these societal or non-state actors by publicly rejecting them as being illegitimate, regardless of the different aims, identities and interests that they represent in armed conflicts.

---

[42] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 84, 88.
[43] Ibid., pp. 84-85.
[44] I. Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics', *International Organization* Vol. 53 No. 2 (1999) p. 381.
[45] Dudouet, Giessmann & Planta, 'General Introduction', pp. 1-13, there: p. 2.

Because these actors often enjoy social legitimacy in their own environment[46], the link between security and legitimacy in a post-conflict context thus becomes problematic. Furthermore, there are two distinguishable kinds of legitimacy in post-conflict settings: (1) the perceived legitimacy of the intervening force, which is both a function of its conduct, identity and ability to meet local expectations, and (2) the structures of governance that the intervening force helps to implant, nourish and consolidate.[47] Following from this, the legitimacy of the intervention and the target state itself are closely interconnected; local populations may simply refuse to cooperate with an intervention which they view as illegitimate.[48]

Table 1.2. Matching Strategy to Degree of Legitimacy Failure

Degree of Failure	**Strategy of State Building**
Weak-Fragile Consensus * Agreement on political reconstruction in place and holding * Civil society supportive of agreement	Observe * Monitor elections * Monitor compliance with power sharing or consociational agreement and establishment of transitional authority * Monitor state-civil society relations
Failed-Widespread Disenfranchisement * Agreement not yet in place * Agreement in place but parties unwilling or unable to implement some provisions * Some civil society actors unsupportive of agreement	Train/Equip * Give technical assistance to elections * Broker talks for power sharing or consociational agreement * Give technical assistance to transitional authority * Train and support civil society actors to speak out freely for their views
Collapsed * No agreement on political reconstruction * Actors incapable of holding elections * Civil society not consulted	Administer * Establish path of political reconstruction by international decree * Administer elections * Disempower elites of old regimes in favour of reformist elements in civil society

Table 1.2 lists Miller's ideal-types of legitimacy failure degrees and the subsequent strategies that armed state builders should pursue. This inquiry will give particular attention to post-conflict situations in which there is a 'weak-fragile consensus'. In such circumstances, there is a post-conflict agreement that presents a type of prisoners' dilemma: actors take risks when they cooperate with the peace agreement "because they don't know if all actors will cooperate, and each actor stands to lose if he or she invests resources in a failing process. Defectors stand to gain by hedging against failure, whether or not others cooperate, making

[46] Dudouet, Giessmann & Planta, 'General Introduction', pp. 1-13, there: p. 2.
[47] Berdal, *Building Peace After War*, pp. 98, 100.
[48] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 96-97.

defection the most rational course of action."[49] Upcoming sections will further elaborate on these 'spoilers' in peace processes and explain their relation to rebuilding security and legitimacy.

Miller proposes a 'trainer strategy' for legitimizing the fragile, post-conflict state. To this end, he argues that international interventions reduce the risk of cooperating and the likelihood of failure and thereby increase the incentive to cooperate. In his view, state builders should broaden participation in the peace agreements by empowering civil society representatives e.g. religious groups or tribal elders: civil society is "a key source of legitimacy, more active involvement by civil society actors can alter the terms of a peace plan, broaden the base of support for it, and increase the likelihood that it will be implemented."[50] Though Miller remains vague about the nature of this "incentive to cooperate", it seems to imply that both the state and non-state signatories to a post-conflict peace agreement share an overall concern with safeguarding their own security and material interests. Local ownership of the peace process and civil society engagement are then believed to grant legitimacy to the armed state building effort.

However, this ignores the more fundamental question of the 'theory of justice' that is to underpin the new cooperation in the state. In fact, there is no explicit reference to 'justice' in Miller's modelling of legitimacy failures and rebuilding strategies. Armed groups, however, often engage in judicial proceedings as part of routine efforts to enforce the rule of law. In select cases, their role as providers of justice may even become the basis for their claims to legitimacy.[51] The different roles and statuses of these non-state groups do not appear to have been included in Miller's proposed strategies for rebuilding security and legitimacy. Nevertheless, he does make the general recommendation that armed state builders should provide their expertise "based on prior experience with post-conflict agreements."[52]

[49] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 97, 101.
[50] Ibid., pp. 97-98.
[51] Podder, 'State Building and the Non-State: Debating Key Dilemmas', p. 1623.
[52] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 98.

1.2. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

This inquiry conventionally identifies 'post-conflict' environments by the recent signing of peace agreements. These agreements need to facilitate organizational shifts toward conventional politics by offering incentives for political participation. According to Dudouet, the 'demilitarization of politics' requires a democratic transition to open up the political system to opposition groups that were previously denied representation. She notes how "in immediate postwar contexts, transitional democratization measures usually take the form of multilateral consultative mechanisms and joint decisionmaking bodies, interim power-sharing governments, election of a constitutional assembly, establishment of a new constitution and bill of rights introducing institutional and electoral reforms, or devolution of power and competencies to local/regional institutions."[53] Including such provisions in peace agreements thus helps to institutionalize the role of ex-combatants within state structures prior to competitive democratic elections.[54] Paris, moreover, stresses the "problems and dangers" that occurred in post-conflict countries, where elections took place prior to the establishment of effective judicial and police institutions.[55] Focusing on the former institution-building and reform related tasks thus allows us to indicate if these efforts sufficed to at least mitigate these problems and dangers in Somalia and Sudan.

Post-conflict periods begin "after the (formal) termination of armed hostilities."[56] Berdal distinguishes between this critical early phase, when violence is pervasive and institutions are rudimentary, weak or non-existent and the longer-term challenges of rebuilding war-torn societies. This "distinction between phases is not simple and clear-cut; it is broad and often hazy and, indeed, cannot be defined in purely temporal terms, with the implication this usually carries of a sequential approach to tasks to be taken by external military or civilian actors."[57] Nevertheless, the formal termination of armed hostilities remains the preferred starting point of the case studies. This is because the provisions in peace agreements generally define the UN's involvement in SSR. Typically, all of these agreements implicitly mention SSR-related tasks such as DDR, integration of armed forces and police reform, although none

[53] V. Dudouet, 'Nonstate Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security Governance', in: Melanne A. Civic & Michael Miklaucic (ed.), *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR* (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2011) pp. 3-26, there: p. 21.
[54] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[55] Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, p. 190.
[56] C.T. Call & E.M. Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies', *International Studies Perspectives* Vol. 9 (2008) p. 4.
[57] Berdal, *Building Peace After War*, p. 20.

of them explicitly refer to SSR.[58]

To comprehend the fundamental reasons for the success or failure of peacebuilding, we have to consider why belligerents would prefer to continue violence over adhering to peaceful settlements. To this end, Snyder & Jervis have examined the explanatory value of the 'security dilemma' for civil wars, albeit the term is usually applied to inter-state warfare. The security dilemma is "a situation in which each party's efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others."[59] Snyder & Jervis argue for an interaction between security and predatory motives. 'Predators' are actors who prefer exploiting others over cooperating with them, even when their imminent security threats are quite small. Their security fears are likely to be especially acute in an anarchical balance-of-power system where aggression provokes resistance and hostility among other parties. Moreover, the security dilemma often transforms security-driven actors into predators. This is because the enduring desire to protect one's future position can still make exploiting others the preferred alternative to mutual cooperation.[60]

Stedman's work on 'spoiler' problems in peace processes adds that parties in civil wars differ in their goals and commitment. 'Spoilers' are "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it."[61] According to Stedman, spoilers predominantly differ from each other in terms of the goals which they pursue and their commitment to achieving them. Furthermore, he contends that the role played by international actors, charged with overseeing the implementation of peace agreements, determines the spoilers' success or failure. In the 1990s, these actors have pursued three major strategies to manage spoilers: (1) inducement: giving the spoiler what it wants, (2) socialization: changing spoiler' behaviour to adhere to a set of established norms and (3) coercion: punishing spoiler behaviour or reducing the capacity of the spoiler to undermine the peace process.[62]

In turn, Greenhill & Major largely concur with Stedman's typology and the role he ascribes to international actors. They however reverse his logic by demonstrating that the spoiler-type does not determine the kinds of possible outcomes. Rather, it is the number of possible

---

[58] Hänggi & Scherrer, 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', p. 494.

[59] J. Snyder & R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', in: Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder (ed.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999) pp. 15-37, there: p. 15.

[60] Snyder & R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', p. 21.

[61] S.J. Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 2 (1997) p. 5.

[62] Ibid., pp. 10-12.

outcomes that determines the type of spoilers that emerge. The analytical difference between Stedman and Greenhill & Major is that the latter stress the influence of structural factors over actors' intentions in the implementation trajectory of peace processes. In their view, international actors have the responsibility to shift the 'prevailing opportunity structure' to restrict the spoiler and its room for manoeuver. Ultimately, it is the relative distribution of power and the availability of sufficient 'carrots and sticks'[63] determine if a spoiler will undermine a given peace process.[64]

Similar to Greenhill & Major's work on spoilers, the 'relative deprivation theory' also stresses structural factors in explaining renewed violence. This theory attributes collective violence to the gap between what a social group believes it deserves vis-à-vis what it actually receives. It is most relevant to the Horn of Africa[65] and closely connected with attributing conflicts to ethnic identification.[66] Furthermore, if the relative deprivation of social groups is driven by structural factors, then these must also play a role in the spoilers' needs and thus help to explain ongoing violence. Together with security and material concerns, they provide for plenty of reasons to protract or worsen conflict. For instance, Snyder & Jervis argue that the disintegration of state authority could not only give rise to security fears, but might also induce behaviour that gradually renders the situation intractable. In anarchic circumstances, mobilized political groups – often with local support bases – could become explosively dangerous when their security concerns get implicated with the fate of their existence. Group identity can be fuelled by security concerns and thereby constitute a consequence of conflict as much as a cause of it.[67]

In the 1990s, the international community adopted an institution-building approach to prevent the renewal of conflict. This is reflected in Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* – which also included the first public usage of the term 'peacebuilding': "So at this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats […]", for which the UN must e.g. "[…] stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the

[63] This refers to the 'Carrot-and-Stick' approach in International Relations. For a definition, see: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/carrot-and-stick.
[64] K.M. Greenhill & S. Major, 'The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords', *International Security* Vol. 31 No. 3 (2006/07) pp. 8-10, 36-37.
[65] Mengisteab, 'Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', pp. 29-31.
[66] R. Bereketeab, 'Introduction', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013) pp. 3-25, there: p. 6.
[67] Snyder & R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', pp. 22-23.

institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; […]"[68] The twenty-first century *Brahimi Report* further stated that effective peacebuilding requires an active multidimensional engagement with local parties. The report also emphasized the role of civilian police and the rule of law for peacebuilding. In addition, it attaches key value to the *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) of former combatants to ensure immediate post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of recurring conflicts. The report also recognized how demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of violence when they fail to find a legitimate alternative livelihood.[69] The broad ambitions of the *Brahimi Report* however lead to a number of problems, as they touch on the realms of peacebuilding, state building and different perceptions of peace.

First, there is a complex relationship between state building and peacebuilding. Whereas some scholars classify the former as a subtask to support peacebuilding, others point out that state building could undermine peace when it threatens the interests of local elites. For example, Call & Cousens' definition of 'State building' as "actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform or strengthen the institutions of the state *which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding*"[70] (see: Table 1.4.) reflects this complexity and illustrates the need to make trade-offs in choosing between building peace and building states. According to Miller, state building "is best seen as a contributor to long-term peace building by addressing the conditions that give rise to conflict, but also as a potentially destabilizing activity that can hurt

Table 1.4. Related Concepts, Terms and Definitions

Peacebuilding—Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. **Post-conflict peacebuilding** is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities.

Peace implementation—Actions undertaken by international or national actors to implement specific peace agreements, usually in the short-term. Where operable, usually defines—and either enables or constrains—the framework for peacebuilding.

State building—Actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding.

Nation building—Actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and usually to mobilize a population behind a parallel state building project. May or may not contribute to peacebuilding. Confusingly equated to post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding in some recent scholarship and popular political discourse (as in President George W. Bush's injunction: "no nation building").

Stabilization—Actions undertaken by international actors to reach a termination of hostilities and consolidate peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict. The term of art dominant in U.S. policy, usually associated with military instruments, usually seen as having a shorter time horizon than peacebuilding, and heavily associated with a post-9/11 counterterrorism agenda.

Reconstruction—Actions undertaken by international or national actors to support the economic, and to some extent social, dimensions of post-conflict recovery. Also a familiar term in the World Bank and U.S. policy circles (e.g., Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction) and reflects roots in the experience of post-war assistance in Europe after World War II.

Peace operations—Operations undertaken by international actors in the midst of or after armed conflict, usually consisting of peacekeeping but may also encompass a range of civilian and political tasks ("multidimensional peacekeeping" and peacebuilding).

[68] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31th January, 1992, A/47/277-S/24111 (17th June, 1992) pp. 1-23, there: pp. 3-4.
[69] L. Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* a.k.a. the 'Brahimi Report', © United Nations Security Council, A/55/305/S/2000/809 (13th November, 2000) pp. 1-58, there: pp. 6-8.
[70] Call & Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', p. 4.

short-term prospects for peace."[71] In order to get a better grasp of this complexity, it is useful to distinguish between a 'positive peace' and a 'negative peace'. The latter refers to the absence of direct violence. This reflects a narrow security interpretation of state actors, whose contested authority and legitimacy have given rise to the conflict. 'Positive peace', by contrast, is seen from the security perspective of self-defined resistance and liberation movements. Peace for them entails the fulfilment of various human needs ranging from personal safety to socio-economic wellbeing or political freedom.[72]
This discrepancy, combined with the fact that state building is meant to establish, strengthen or reform the institutions of the state, lead to the risk that efforts to strengthen the state's security apparatus will antagonize the former movements. Although these efforts would be part of the signed peace agreement, Miller's view of state building still entails that to prevent the alienation of parties to the peace process, the military must address the "conditions that give rise to conflict."[73] This would e.g. mean pursuing long-term efforts to reconcile former adversaries who, as pointed out, have very conflicting interests to build peace. By contrast, Miller's observer strategy for legitimacy building (see: Table 1.2.) seems insufficient to addres the 'root causes' of conflict, as it prescribes a mere monitoring role for the international military forces.

Despite the considerable pitfalls, it is also crucial to not underestimate the contribution of armed state building to post-conflict environments. When observing periods up to two years after the end of war, it is clear how civil wars with any form of UN operation have nearly been twice as likely to enjoy success in the form of 'participatory peacebuilding' i.e. building a positive peace, than conflicts without a UN presence. (48% against 26%).[74] After statistically analysing all civil wars since 1945, Doyle & Sambanis moreover conclude that multidimensional UN missions significantly reduce the chances of large-scale violence and enhance the chances for minimal political democratization.[75] Similarly, Call & Cousens argue how successful state building can support the consolidation of peace. SSR activities could enhance mechanisms – e.g. justice systems and policing systems – for security and conflict resolution at the national level. This process, however, tends to be problematic as

[71] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 8.
[72] V. Dudouet & K. Planta, 'Security Transitions in Perspective', in: Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012) pp. 231-259, there: p. 231.
[73] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 8.
[74] Call & Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', pp. 4, 8.
[75] M.W. Doyle & N. Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace* (Princeton University Press 2006) p. 90.

international military efforts to establish national coercive institutions – armies, police or other forces – bear the risk of empowering some segments of the population over others. Should these groups have an interest to resist state authority, then empowering them could militate against political moderation and reconciliation and undermine institution-building and peacebuilding.[76] In this way, limiting international military efforts to a narrow focus on the security sector could backfire against the legitimacy of the state building project or the force itself.[77]

During the 1990s, the international community experienced the limitations of its own ability to restore peace and order in civil war-torn countries. This has led theorists to contend that, given the impossibility of devising a peacebuilding intervention strategy that takes all contextual variables post-conflict environments into account, the international community has instead opted for a disciplinary security regime to domesticate and normalize states that are perceived as potential sources of threat and instability.[78] This stance is reflected in e.g. the changing U.S. strategic perceptions and interests in Africa after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 2002, the White House National Security Strategy for instance 'recognized that our security depends upon partnering with Africa to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under control of effective democracies.'[79]
In this way, the peacebuilding optimism of the early 1990s transformed into a post-9/11 security regime. Following e.g. the debacle in Somalia, the UN and US increasingly began to cooperate with local partners. Twenty-first century approaches to security threats therefore experienced a growing importance of regional organizations such as the African Union (AU). The AU, moreover, has strongly promoted the idea of 'African solutions to African problems', which corresponds to the inclination to close partnerships with Africa. For instance, it is argued that conflict management in Darfur and Somalia has become so complex and dangerous for foreign troops that non-African actors gladly opt for 'African solutions' to security challenges there.[80] However, while these local partnerships may present a new strategic framework, there is no evidence that would suggest a departure from the same liberal principles that also underpinned the 'domestication' and 'normalization' of states in the

[76] Call & Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', pp. 9-10.
[77] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 34.
[78] L. Zanotti, 'Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 13 No. 2 (2006) p. 151.
[79] G.R. Olsen, 'Great Power' Intervention in African Armed Conflicts', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2014) p. 4.
[80] Olsen, 'Great Power' Intervention in African Armed Conflicts', pp. 2-3.

1990s. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the increased predominance of the international security agenda after 9/11 has favoured transforming behaviour in post-conflict states through institution-building over contextual needs to address the root causes of conflict.

1.3. Struggles in the Horn of Africa

There are two interpretations of African state formation. The 'mainstream' view holds that colonial rule amounted to a fundamental break within African history. On the other hand, there are scholars who suggest a 'moderate' view of colonial impact on African states. Robert Jackson, for instance, notes the relatively small size and little executive capacity of colonial administrations. Terrence Ranger aims to diversify the effects of colonialism by arguing for "a pluralism both before, during and after colonialism". Jeffrey Herbst, in addition, focuses on 'boundaries' and 'authority' while placing African state formation in a wide-ranging comparative perspective.[81]

In this way, Herbst explains how the failure to physically extend power of the central state apparatus to the rural areas led the colonialists to manipulate local structures instead. He contends that the European interest in Africa produced a confused and unsystematic rule, which is illustrated by the fact that even the official historian of the colonial office was unable to trace any guiding principles of the native administration during the interwar years.[82]

This inquiry concurs with the moderate view because it is analytically better substantiated. Problem factors such as 'territoriality', 'ethnicity', and 'tribalism/clanism' have become key mobilizers in contemporary African politics and, hence, in civil conflicts. These factors did undergo a transformation during and after colonialism, which makes it important to consider their origins and nature.

Colonizers, according to Herbst, had never been interested in duplicating the same power infrastructures that bound cities to hinterland in their homelands. Similarly, the post-independence leaders of Africa had no interest in organizing boundaries beyond the territories that were controlled by the capital cities. They recognized that violently redrawing boundaries would only threaten their own positions. Additionally, their colonially inherited urban-based state apparatus did not provide for true pan-territorial rule, partially because the new post-independence administrations lacked time to expand their control over the country. As a result, national boundaries became based on the *de facto* territory that each state controlled.

---

[81] R.H. Jackson, 'Sub-Saharan Africa', in: Robert H. Jackson and Alan James (ed.), *States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 139. ; T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa', in: Terrence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (ed.), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene* (London: Macmillan, 1993) p. 80. ; J. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press 2000).

[82] Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, pp. 91-92.

The actual territory that was subordinate to state authority thus became relatively small.[83] Moreover, The OAU expressed reluctance to get involved in civil wars, except for situations in which there was clear evidence of an external military intervention.[84]
In 2001, the OAU was replaced by the AU. Rechner examined the normative and peacekeeping differences between the organizations. He concludes that "the creation of a PSC ('Peace and Security Council') authorized to deal with many issues of peace and security is a step forward from the OAU."[85] This is echoed by Brosig, who remarks that the AU has expressed its commitment to protect member states' populations against severe human rights violations.[86] In doing this, the AU reflects a less rigid adherence to the principle of non-interference by preserving "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of *grave circumstances* (my Italics), namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."[87] This suggests a growing shift from inter-state Westphalian sovereignty and non-interference to a more intra-state orientated and 'human'-centred view of security.

Abbink et al. further note that studying African boundary problematics is a good start to develop an understanding of the conflicts related to problems of ethnicity and identity. It is not the presence of ethnic divisions between peoples as such that necessarily creates an environment for civil conflict: even the strongly divided pre-colonial Somali clans deployed a complex system of boundaries and demarcations, yet they lived relatively peaceful alongside each other. Colonial powers, however, transformed the pre-existing group dynamics by creating new ethnic groups, tribes and administrative units[88] to assist them in their rule. After independence, this 'ethnicization' of African politics together with the development of patronage networks and personalist loyalties significantly contributed to the chronic instability of countries in the Horn of Africa. Notwithstanding, Lewis' work on nationalism and the Somali identity identifies that "the resilience of this social [clan] system in adopting and adapting to the forces of 'modernization' has made a bewildering impression on those

---

[83] Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, pp. 16, 103.
[84] J. Busumtwi-Sam, 'Redefining 'Security' after the Cold War: The OAU, the UN, and Conflict Management in Africa', in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) pp. 257-287, there: p. 264.
[85] J.D. Rechner, 'From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 39 No. 2 (2006) p. 575.
[86] M. Brosig, 'The Multi-actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 17 No. 3 (2010) pp. 330-331.
[87] 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union', (Lomé, Togo; 2000) entered into force: 2001, pp. 1-21, there: p. 7.
[88] Abbink et al., 'Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, conflict en de grenzen van de staat', pp. 5-7.

with a Eurocentric bias who considered it incompatible with 'progress'."[89] Thus, while colonial influences may have created new differences between groups of people, the extent to which indigenous systems of governance have persisted can indeed be considerable.

The factors of 'ethnicity' or 'tribe' also persist as points of reference for group identities. Frequently too, they are used as a political instrument to mobilize groups for armed conflict. Here, this inquiry concurs with Thies that "African ethnicity is a political, and not a cultural phenomenon […] the state often is able to define ethnicity, as well as set the stage for competition between ethnic groups."[90] Thus, the political category of 'ethnicity' serves as a fluid identity-marker and is susceptible to political manipulation by state elites.
In the Somalia and Sudan, there has been a complex historical and political interplay between 'ethnicity' and the state. 'Clanism' is the Somali version of ethnicity or tribalism. According to Adam, the cynical manipulation of clan-related differences by Siad Barre's regime ultimately led to bad governance in the Somali state. This is because the severely negative and destructive manipulation of clan consciousness by political elites contributed to the inability of civil society to recover when Siad fell from power.
Siad, moreover, had recognized the importance of controlling other state sectors and civil society by means of e.g. the military, security, paramilitary, an elitist vanguard political party and so-called mass organizations. To this end, he modified the Soviet-introduced concept of *nomenklatura* – the appointing of loyal political agents to guide and control civil and military institutions – to 'clan-katura'. This led to the establishment of security organizations along clan-based lines. In particular, the majority of forces in the *Hangash*, (military-intelligence) the *Dabarjebinta* (military-counterintelligence) and the military police were drawn from president Barre's own clan. In this way, 'clan-katura' effectively threw conventional state security institutions into gridlock, jealousy, confusion and anarchy.[91]

On the other hand, Sudan suffers from complex and multiple 'society-society' and 'society-state' conflicts. Political marginalization, alienation and discrimination by the centre against the peripheries have plunged the country into a perpetual state of conflict since independence in 1956. According to Bereketeab, the society-society category is expressed by the struggle

[89] I.M. Lewis, 'Zichtbare en Onzichtbare Verschillen: De Somalische Paradox', in: J. Abbink & A. van Dokkum (ed.), *Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, Conflict en de Grenzen van de Staat* (Diemen 2008) pp. 42-73, there: p. 61.
[90] Thies, 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 719.
[91] H.M. Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) pp. 169-192, there: pp. 170-174.

between ‘African Christian animists’ (South) and ‘Arab Muslims’ (North). Furthermore, the fact that the state is dominated by the ‘Arab Muslim’ community makes this a conflict where the central state wages war against a section of society.[92] In addition, Ali & Matthews stressed that the ideological divide in Sudan has not been along north-south lines, but between those who aspired to a new Sudan and those who wanted minimal changes to the status-quo. They point out how the rebelling *Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement* (SPLM/SPLA) linked the political marginalization, economic underdevelopment and cultural domination by the north of Sudan to national processes.
They called for a “radical restructuring of the power of the central government in a manner that will end once and for all the monopolisation of power by any self-appointed gang of thieves and criminals, whatever their backgrounds, whether they come in the form of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers.” This, however, antagonized the dominant elite in Khartoum that believed it would have no configuration of power within this new Sudan. Therefore, the majority of the northern political and bureaucratic elites opposed contact with the movement. Sectarian elites, moreover, found the SPLM/SPLA’s aspirations particularly alarming because they perceived the movement’s demand for national unity as a threat to their power bases and the foundation of their claim to legitimacy.’[93]

Taken together, the structural factors of the ‘urban/rural divide’[94] and the ‘ethnicization’ of politics provide ample fodder for the relative deprivation of groups. The same goes for the issues of territoriality, identity and belonging between the state and its people. In turn, this myriad of structural factors and processes culminated in the ‘crises of citizenship and legitimacy’ in the state, which underpin the communal conflicts that often lead to state disintegration.[95] These crises take place when political discontent and a widespread sense of relative deprivation occur in tandem with mutual distrust and wariness among different groups of ‘citizens’. Ultimately, these crises may lead to the failure or total collapse of state institutions.[96]
Recent work on ‘conflict constituencies’ – the segment of the population most proximate to

[92] Bereketeab, ‘Introduction’, p. 8.
[93] T.M. Ali & R.O. Matthews, ‘Civil Wars and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) pp. 193-222, there: pp. 200-201, 216.
[94] Ndulo, ‘The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building’, pp. 76-77.
[95] S. Adem, ‘Political Violence in the Horn of Africa: A Framework for Analysis’, in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013) pp. 115-137, there: p. 117.
[96] Ibid., pp. 118-119, 121.

the armed movements – has linked the former crises to conflict narrative development. The latter occurs when "negative events and processes regarding certain volatile issues come to be seen as being connected to specific groups perceived to be responsible. […] Perspectives then spread and find fertile ground among others who feel similarly aggrieved, which renders them both more simplified and acute. In this way, the accumulation and aggravation of grievances jointly produce shared or collective narratives of injustice, which could then serve to rationalize certain responses."[97]
Undoubtedly, part of the problem is the fact that the post-colonial African state tended to institutionalize ethnic entitlements, rights and privileges. This created differentiated and unequal statuses of citizenship which, in turn, has made it more of a group phenomenon. People's loyalties have in this way become divided, rather than united by a state through the tie of citizenship, with equal rights, privileges and obligations. Unsurprisingly, civil wars and conflicts in Africa stem therefore mostly from tensions and contradictions within the public sphere, when claims of marginalization, exclusion and domination among individuals and groups are widespread.[98] 'Citizenship' has in this sense become an instrument of social closure, through which the state lays claim to and defines its sovereignty, authority, legitimacy and identity.[99] In this way, military operational decisions e.g. whether to cooperate with or disarm Somali warring factions thus bear the risk of worsening existing problems by reifying or further entrenching particular groups. Crucially, these kind of choices remain inherent to the trade-off between short-term stabilization and long-term state reconstruction which international military forces need to make.[100]

Given the problems that underpin the African state, it is often argued that the tenets of liberal peacebuilding – liberal democracy, human rights, market values etc. – are not necessarily universally applicable values. The notion of a 'liberal peace' moreover may not present the appropriate solution to conflicted or divided societies.[101] Lonsdale already noted that "liberal assumptions about the development of individual citizenship were no further off the mark than conventional Marxist class analysis." There was "no conviction that any social structures stood between individuals and full participant citizenship, other than residual communalisms

[97] J.D. Unruh, M.A. Abdul-Jalil, 'Constituencies of Conflict and Opportunity: Land Rights, Narratives and Collective Action in Darfur', *Political Geography* Vol. 42 (2014) p. 106.
[98] S. Adejumobi, 'Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa', *Human Rights Quarterly* Vol. 23 No. 1 (2001) pp. 148-149.
[99] Ibid., pp. 151-152.
[100] Snyder & R. Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', pp. 28-29.
[101] Newman, Paris & Richmond, 'Introduction', p. 12.

below and the selfish abuse of disproportionate state power above."[102] Such statements are based on the notion that liberal-democratic states derive from processes of modernization – e.g. urbanization, universal education, access to mass media and industrialization – that conform to states in Western Europe but do not apply to post-colonial Africa. In his analysis of economic growth in Africa, Englebert for instance argues that African states often lacked legitimacy from the beginning. They were not the result of a social contract or formed to reduce transaction costs. Instead, they became instruments of the ruling class to appropriate resources and dominate competing groups in society.[103] Similarly, Bates concludes that the new African states failed to effectively engage in war making, state making, protection or extraction.[104] According to Thies, this lack of modernizing processes resulted in the 'urban/rural' divide and the 'ethnicization' of African politics[105] which in turn helped to engender the former problem with citizenship and the absence of liberal-democratic 'stateness'.

Robinson, however, demonstrates that the colonial diversity and partition of African societies have not rendered these states immune to the unifying effects of modernization. Her research is based on individual-level-survey data on 'national vs. ethnic identification' from a representative sample of citizens in sixteen African countries and a novel compilation of ethnic group and state-level data.[106] Robinson concludes that living in urban areas, having more education and being formally employed in the modern sector are positively correlated with national over ethnic-group identification. Given the known, positive impact of increased national identification on rates of inter-ethnic cooperation, these findings become important for the purpose of building peace and stability in civil war-torn countries.[107] Conversely, Robinson's survey data focus on the individual level, while the crises of citizenship and legitimacy predominantly stem from group phenomena. In such a context, national

---

[102] J. Lonsdale, 'States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey', *African Studies Review* 24 (1981) pp. 196-197.
[103] P. Englebert, 'Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', *Political Research Quarterly* Vol. 53 (2000) pp. 1-20. ; P. Englebert, 'Solving the Mystery of the Africa Dummy', *World Development* Vol. 28 (2000) pp. 1821-1835. ; See: P. Englebert, *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 2000).
[104] See: R. Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development* (W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
[105] Thies, 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 719.
[106] None of Robinson's subject-countries is situated in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, they represent the wide diversity of states in Sub-Saharan Africa of which the Horn is also part and in which context it thus needs to be analysed. Out of 22.155 respondents, 42,2% identifies equally with 'ethnicity' and 'national', as opposed to 30,6% with only 'national' and a mere 5,7% with only 'ethnic'. See: A.L. Robinson, 'National versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism', *World Politics* Vol. 66 No. 4 (2014) pp. 720-721.
[107] Ibid., pp. 710-711.

identification is likely to remain confined to urban-based people who are affiliated with the national government.

Crucially, the defining and granting of citizenship is usually done by this particular group of people. It is an integral part of a nation-building process, led by the same power holders who also lay claim to the state. Mengisteab therefore asserts that "ethnic- and region-based wars in the Horn of Africa are essentially reflections of the challenges of state-building and nation-building processes […]."[108] Moreover, international military forces deployed to tackle the challenges related to state building often encounter a parallel, local development of institutions, mechanisms and loyalties next to the state. For example, while the territorial integrity of Somalia effectively vanished in the 1990s with the secession of Somaliland and Puntland in the north, the latter two have not been recognized by either the Somali federal government or the international community. Rather, they retained their focus on Mogadishu as the capital of a unified state. Meanwhile, Somaliland and Puntland developed into self-governing enclaves, providing administration to their self-declared independent republics.[109]

This chapter has argued that armed state building is inextricably linked to the post-Cold War paradigm of liberal-democratic institutionalism. It has been argued that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa critically deviate from the historical process of Western European state formation, that serves to underpin this paradigm. A wide array of structural factors and processes, including the urban/rural divide within the state, the ethnicization of politics and the subsequent development of patronage networks and clientelism have resulted in the relative deprivation between groups in the state. In turn, this has led to crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state, which represent structural challenges to state building and help us to define and explain spoiler behaviour in peace processes. Furthermore, this chapter has explored the complex relationship between peacebuilding and state building and pointed out the problems of defining 'post-conflict' environments. We have indicated Miller's typology of these environments and specified his strategies for rebuilding security and legitimacy, including SSR as "the most successful security strategy" in failed or violent states.[110] The next chapter will further operationalize this key concept.

[108] Mengisteab, 'Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', p. 28.

[109] A. Hills, 'Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014) pp. 168-169.

[110] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 84-85.

2. Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform

"Thus, both stabilization and SSR concepts become intimately linked

and should be considered as part of the wider state-building agenda."[111]

2.1. Defining the Concept

Peacebuilding in the 1990s seems to have been flawed by the same false assumption as the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s: first, the belief that developing states naturally evolve towards liberal market democracies and second, that this evolution becomes self-perpetuating after initiation.[112] In the late 1990s, the term SSR was coined in development policy circles upon the recognition of a close link between the previously separated fields of security and development. SSR has in this way been driven by "an understanding that poorly governed and unreformed security sectors in states are an obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development and democracy, as well as to peace and security."[113]
It is however important to distinguish the narrow 'sector' from the wider 'system'. Jackson indicates this difference by noting that the acronym 'SSR' initially referred to security sector reform but within the OECD has come to denote security system reform. The widening of this conceptual scope occurred together with an increasing shift from the 'hard' security of militaries towards the 'soft' security of the human security agenda.[114] Contrary to the narrow 'state security', the broader notion of 'human security' does not limit security conditions to traditional matters e.g. national defence and law and order. They rather incorporate broader political, economic and social issues to ensure a life free from risk and danger.[115]

According to Jackson, the conceptual difference between the 'sector' and the 'system' is more

---

[111] A. Fitz-Gerald, 'Stabilization Operations and Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform: Strange Bedfellows or Close Allies?', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 154-168, there: p. 159.
[112] Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', p. 57.
[113] Egnell & Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious', pp. 29-30.
[114] P. Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 32 No. 10 (2011) p. 1811.
[115] N. Ball, 'The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*
© (CIGI) – The Centre forInternational Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 29-44, there: p. 32.

than mere semantics: it represents a deeper debate over the scope and boundaries involved in the security area.[116] This corresponds to Hänggi & Scherrer's division between the 'narrow' and 'broader' notions of SSR. The former reflects a traditional state-centric understanding of security by focusing on the public sector institutions charged with the provision of internal and external security, as well as on the civilian bodies relevant to their management, control and oversight. The latter also includes the 'justice sector' in recognizing the linkages and complementary relationship between security and justice.
Broader understandings of SSR, moreover, emphasize that civil society organizations have an important role to play in monitoring government policy and practice on security and justice issues.[117] Likewise, Miller emphasises the importance of empowering civil society to grant legitimacy to fragile post-conflict states. However, it seems that attempts by religious groups or tribal leaders to "decentralize the government and deconcentrate power away from the executive"[118] would contradict the security perception of state actors. Similarly, failing to include civil society actors in the peace process would effectively undermine the positive peace that is preferred by non-state resistance and liberation movements. In this way, the conflicting security perceptions and material interests of state and non-state actors alike could seriously hamper post-conflict state building. International military forces charged with implementing confidence-building measures to reconcile these epistemologically different groups moreover face the problem of targeting them. In Somalia, for instance, civil society is particularly hard to define: any social or civic organization has basically been a 'non-state actor' since the collapse of the central government in 1991.[119]

Figure 2.1. displays the UK Department for International Development's understanding of the 'security sector'.[120] This inquiry perceives security *sector* reform as a predominantly security orientated affair that covers the state's 'core security actors', the non-state's 'non statutory forces' and their 'security management and oversight bodies'. This broad understanding of the 'security sector' is also presented in the OECD/DAC's *Handbook on Security System Reform*, which includes "all those institutions, groups organisations and individuals – both state and

[116] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1811.
[117] Hänggi & Scherrer, 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', pp. 487-488.
[118] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 98.
[119] K. Menkhaus, K. Sheikh, H. Quinn, S & I. Farah, 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', in: T. Paffenholz, Lynne Rienner Publishers (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, 2010) pp. 321–349, there: pp. 325-326.
[120] See: E. Rees, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the Field', © United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2006) p. 7.

non-state – that have a stake in security and justice provision."[121] Next, by including 'justice and law enforcement' institutions' in security *system* reform, this inquiry concurs with the broad definition found in the SSR literature. This states how post-conflict SSR is bound up with the wider process of state-building and chiefly characterized by a high level of influence of external actors.[122]



Figure 2.1. *Relations between Security Actors and Institutions*

Moreover, the aim of 'state building' to "establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state"[123] also includes justice and law enforcement institutions. States, in addition, claim legitimacy by invoking their own theories of justice, which validate their actions, coercion and existence.[124] This makes it important to consider the judicial and penal institutions by which the state, in theory, provides security and claims legitimacy through upholding the rule of law. The next section of this chapter shall discuss this matter at greater length.

In 2008, the UN described the 'security sector' as "the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country."[125] Efforts within the core 'security' realm thus pertain to traditional security actors and their civilian management and oversight bodies. Together, these should theoretically enable the state to provide security in legitimate ways. The progress – or lack thereof – made in *Disarmament,*

---

[121] An authorative definition generally cited in the literature: *OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, © OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007) there: p. 22.
[122] P. Jackson, 'SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 118-135, there: p. 120.
[123] Call & Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', p. 4.
[124] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 42.
[125] UN Report of the Secretary-General, 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform', A/62/659–S/2008/39, © United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (January 23, 2008) pp. 1-19, there: p. 5.

Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) offers a tool for measuring the reestablishment of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in post-conflict settings. Traditionally, DDR has been treated as a separate issue or discipline that only has common features with SSR. According to Knight, SSR in post-conflict environments can best be understood as the state's equivalent to insurgency movements undergoing a DDR process. There is, furthermore, the idea that SSR will follow-on from DDR and that DDR represents an entry point for SSR. Moreover, DDR is predominantly intended to return the monopoly of force to the state and thereby is considered sequential (first 'D', then 'D', then 'R'). By comparison, SSR is exclusively focused on the state's apparatus engaged in the monopoly on the use of force, which is conceived as an open-ended process.[126]

However, given the potential overlap between actors in the security sector (see: Figure 2.1.), it is important to consider that former combatants could act as both state-related and non-statutory security actors. The legitimacy of these actors in their different capacities in turn may influence the post-conflict armed state building project. Rees, for instance, states that ex-combatants should be viewed as key players in SSR as they consistently seek to manipulate or dominate indigenous security sector institutions: "Without their consent, or participation in, SSR will fail."[127] Significantly, the practice of DDR could have implications for both security and legitimacy within post-conflict state building. The incorporation of DDR projects as a discrete part of detainee operations may provide a bridge between the removal of imminent security threats on the one hand, and community-based justice, reconciliation and reconstruction efforts on the other.[128] Thankfully, civil society organizations produce studies that e.g. measure *de facto* security improvements after DDR and the security perceptions of the civilian communities involved. These perceptions allow us to identify the impact of DDR on the relationship between citizens and their government.[129]

It has already been indicated that peace can either be 'positive' or 'negative.' Essentially, this reflects the discrepancy between the narrow interests of state actors and the broad aspirations of non-statutory actors. The same phenomenon appears to occur between the international

[126] M. Knight, 'DDR and SSR: Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding Assistance', in: Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012) pp. 17-29, there: pp. 24-25, 28.

[127] Rees, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the Field', p. 9.

[128] H.H. Gaffney Jr., Franklin D. Kramer, R. Megahan & T.A. Dempsey, 'Implementing Security Sector Reform', in: T.A. Dempsey (ed.), *Security Sector Reform Workshop Interim Report* © Centre for Naval Analyses and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2008) p. 39.

[129] See: http://ssansa.org/ ; Geoffrey L. Duke & Hans Rouw, *The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives on Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State*, © SSANSA – South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (September 2013).

military forces and the civil society organizations which, according to Miller, are "a key source of legitimacy."[130] For instance, Hänggi & Scherrer observe that post-conflict environments are typically characterized by a discrepancy between the peacekeeping community, i.e. international military forces and the state actors whose cooperation they require, and the conflict-transformation community which also includes civilian organizations. The former views Security *Sector* Reform – emphasizing security actor capacity-building – as a short-term exit strategy. The latter considers Security *System* Reform – emphasizing the governance dimension – as a component of a longer-term reconstruction and development.[131]

Recent contributions to the study of SSR have increasingly began emphasizing the latter governance dimension. In 2008, the UN for instance stated how "ideally, security sector reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should be incorporated into early recovery and development strategies."[132] In 2010, the Executive Director of the Centre for Security Governance added that SSR is innately a political process which, in post-conflict contexts, should be incorporated into the peace agreement or political settlement.[133] SSR [should], moreover, move far beyond narrow technical definitions of security institutions. Instead, it should follow a more ambitious agenda of reconstructing or strengthening the state's ability to govern the security sector. This, in turn, should be done in a way that serves the population as a whole rather than a narrow political elite.[134]
Thus, a general consensus has developed that SSR is a "highly political process which […] is inherently linked to […] relationships between different institutions and groups within a country."[135] For instance, Wulf has defined the concept in a way that appears to reconcile the former division in scope between the 'sector' and the 'system', stating that Security Sector Reform is "*the transformation of the security system* (my Italics) which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus

---

[130] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 98.
[131] Hänggi & Scherrer, 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', p. 491.
[132] UN Report of the Secretary-General, 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform', p. 13.
[133] M. Sedra, 'Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 102-116, there: p. 105.
[134] Jackson, 'SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?', p. 124.
[135] UN Report of the Secretary-General, 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform', p. 11.

contributes to a well-functioning security framework."[136] This is deemed necessary because "responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development."[137] For this reason, the overall objective of SSR is to "contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development."[138]

Jackson, however observes that the study of SSR efforts is a relatively new field which has been subject to so-called 'benign analytical neglect.' Rather than being rooted in conceptual or theoretical approaches, much of the literature on SSR has focused on practical, policy-related analysis. As a result, the work on SSR has largely been very specific. It has focused on particular activities rather than conceiving them within a framework of broader interventions as an expression of, and in relation to, wider social and economic reform.[139]
Egnell & Haldén arrived at a similar conclusion, stating that the "lack of contextual understanding of the aims of SSR activities and state-building, as well as of the host countries in which such activities take place, has created an ad hoc and piecemeal approach to SSR based on normative assumptions rather than theoretically and historically informed strategies for the specific operational context."[140] Illustrative of this is the example of the British intervention in Sierra Leone from 1997-2007. The process here is deemed successful: although Sierra Leone remains near the bottom of the HDI, the conflict has ended, the police and military function well and justice is available at some level to most people. On the other hand, the political and civil control over these institutions remains weak, which means that SSR-led state building in Sierra Leone led to the development of a competent security sector 'within a vacuum.' In order to make SSR more effective, the reforms need to be part of a broader process of state formation.[141]
In this regard, Egnell & Haldén point out that while many of the activities associated with SSR are not in any way new, the concept epitomizes an important novelty by introducing a coherent, coordinated approach to such activities. Furthermore, while most other concepts

---

[136] H. Wulf, 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries', in: C. McCartney, M. Fischer and O. Wils (ed.) *Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation*, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series 2 (© Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004) pp. 9-28, there: p. 10. ; Definition borrowed: *OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, there: p. 21.
[137] Wulf, 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries', p. 10.
[138] Ibid., p. 10.
[139] Jackson, 'SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?', pp. 124.
[140] Egnell & Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious', pp. 48-49.
[141] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1815.

within the comprehensive or holistic school of thought come from defence thinkers, the concept of SSR derives from the development community. Thereby, it represents a significant junction in the security-development nexus, involving all concerned actors from development agencies to military peacekeepers.[142] However, Mannitz remarks that while state institutions must be included in SSR, it is insufficient to direct the intended changes at this formal sector alone. Crucially, researchers have found that 'external actors are particularly ill-equipped to deal with the informal sector.[143] In particular, post-conflict contexts are generally characterized by populations that are mistrustful of security services and frequently hostile to organizations that could be perceived as a direct threat to their own individual security.

In turn, post-conflict SSR seeks to construct states that are 'capable' in a liberal sense, i.e. provide good governance, democracy and security. These military interventions seek to develop security systems that provide security to both the indigenous populations and the international community of states as a whole.[144] However, many post-conflict countries lack exactly the kind of political leadership that would be able and/or willing to deliver security as a public good for all. For this reason, SSR programmes that merely include the ruling elites of the state face the risk of contributing to the prolonged existence of dysfunctional governance and unequal access to political power.[145]

In addition, SSR interventions in troubled post-conflict situations naturally also contain elements of stabilization. The main features of post-conflict SSR usually are the need to provide immediate security, the need to demobilize and reintegrate combatants and the need to downsize security actors.[146] Especially in failed or violent security environments, it may be more tempting for international actors to opt for a 'stabilizing' exit-strategy of train-and-equip efforts rather than incorporating the broader aims of SSR, which would require the intervention to become a long-term commitment. Conversely, both of these approaches should be considered part of the wider state building agenda.[147]

[142] Egnell & Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious', p. 30.
[143] S. Mannitz, 'From Paternalism to Facilitation: SSR Shortcomings and the Potential of Social Anthropological Perspectives', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014) p. 272.
[144] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', pp. 1817-1818.
[145] Mannitz, 'From Paternalism to Facilitation', p. 271.
[146] Jackson, 'SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?', pp. 119-120.
[147] Fitz-Gerald, 'Stabilization Operations and Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform', pp. 159, 162-163.

2.2. Problems and Pitfalls

This section attempts to indicate the possible problems and pitfalls for SSR regarding the 'rule of law' and 'local ownership'. A key problem in post-conflict environments is the establishment of the rule of law, defined as "that system which defines the broad parameters of the citizens' relationship to the state and vice versa as well as amongst themselves."[148] (see: Figure 2.2.)



Figure 2.2. *A Circular Relationship*

In the Horn of Africa, the bond between citizens and states has however been historically disturbed and fundamentally deteriorated through crises of citizenship and legitimacy. In particular, there are conflicting perceptions of the 'citizen/state' relationship between international actors and local communities.

Reno, for instance, introduces the notion of a 'rebel citizenship' or a local social contract between community members and armed fighters. Inhabitants of Darfur speak of these community members as the "immediate support base for the armed movements, providing them with legitimacy, shelter, materiel and recruits, and the primary participants in narrative formation and development."[149] This particular relationship stands at odds with most international NGOs that propagate the extension of individual civil and political rights to people in conflict zones.[150] Similar findings emerge from a U.S. panel discussion on the implementation of security sector reform. Rather than trusting government institutions and forces, local militias are often drawn from and are closely associated with village, community or tribal societies.

Next, these local militias often become the 'protectors of last resort' for communities which cannot rely on functioning state security forces. Crucially, while intervening forces may achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with these militias in such situations, the

---

[148] Rees, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the Field', pp. 8-9. ; also see figure 2.2. (p. 8).
[149] Unruh & Abdul-Jalil, 'Constituencies of Conflict and Opportunity', p. 106.
[150] W. Reno, 'African Rebels and the Citizenship Question', in: Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett & Paul Nugent (ed.), 'Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship', *African Social Studies Series* Vol. 16 (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007) pp. 221-240, there: p. 228.

latters' legitimacy typically does not extend to the broader district or provincial level.[151] In post-conflict environments, security and legitimacy thus tend to become severely localized and fragmented. SSR approaches, in turn, have increasingly become top-down and focused on state institutional development.[152] The result has been a problematic "disconnect between the reality of plural security and justice providers and donor-led state-centric security and justice reform."[153]

Importantly, the very focus on rule of law (re)establishment efforts responds to a top-down, institutional logic of state development. It presupposes that the state's security and justice sectors enforce the rule of law. If there would be no monopoly on the legitimate use of force, then state security services could thus not legitimately enforce the rule of law. State laws that would be enforced nonetheless are then unlikely to be perceived as legitimate by the populace, together with the state and security actors behind them. In this way, the process of (re)establishing of the rule of law can be used as a tool to measure state-society relations. This (re)establishment can also be viewed as a means to improve the legitimacy of the state by making it accountable to laws.
For instance, Van Veen & Derks argue that justice bodies and security forces "need to become increasingly accountable if they are to retain legitimacy and confidence."[154] Moreover, the promotion of the rule of law directly addresses the issue of legal accountability by "making the state abide by law, ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing efficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights."[155] These are vast challenges in post-conflict environments, where state institutions have become either absent, weak or oppressive. In this sense, international military efforts to (re)establish the rule of law could at provide insights into the problems with the relations between the citizen/state and the security sector.
Following from here, Denney notes that while it might be true that people in some instances rely on a more plural set of security and justice providers because the state is weak, absent or

---

[151] Gaffney Jr., Kramer, Megahan & Dempsey, 'Implementing Security Sector Reform', pp. 23-24.
[152] M. Caparini, 'Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 244-262, there: p. 251.
[153] L. Denney, 'Overcoming the State/Non-state Divide: An End User Approach to Security and Justice Reform', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014) p. 251.
[154] E. van Veen & M. Derks, 'The Deaf, The Blind and The Politician: The Troubles of Justice and Security Interventions in Fragile States 1', *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* Vol. 4 No. 1 (2012) p. 83.
[155] M. Heupel, 'Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform: Common Principles, Common Challenges', *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* Vol. 4 (2012) p. 158.

oppressive, it is important to take such plurality seriously rather than dismissing it as the result of 'unfinished' development. Instead, she argues that "these states should not be considered from the perspective of being 'not yet properly built', but from a perspective that tries to 'comprehend the context of what truly constitutes political order in those regions of apparent fragility.'"[156] Similarly, critics of the liberal peace approach concede that what is "really required is a rebalancing of external regulation and internal voice that could lead to an effective state that is locally accountable."[157]

Despite these criticisms, it is also observed that "while virtually all current analysts accept that there are problems with the nation-state in many of the contexts in which states are failing, there is still a tendency to accept the technocratic parameters of state building. This casts the nation-state as the norm in international relations, ignoring […] particularly the intra-state nature of much conflict, international conflict actors and also the role of the state itself as an actor in non-state conflict. There remains an assumption that if we can develop the right mixture of policies then we can create a healthy nation-state which can exist in the international order […]."[158]
The continued focus on technocratic state building is not unjustified. Indeed, there exists an understanding that effective security services and justice institutions – accountable to elected officials and citizens – are critical to economic and social well-being. Furthermore, the activities of civil society organizations around the world demonstrate that the principles of liberal-democratic state building – transparency, accountability, inclusiveness etc. – are widely supported.[159] These organizations, however, have criticized the top-down approach to SSR for assuming that policies, developed at the national level, would adequately consider or reflect the needs of the people and local communities. This has led authors e.g. Caparini to maintain that civil society has largely continued to be marginalized from efforts to foster local ownership of SSR, despite the growing recognition that excluding civil society representatives is harmful to long-term development.[160]

The principle of 'local ownership' takes as its basis the notion that reforms need to be shaped

[156] Denney, 'Overcoming the State/Non-state Divide', pp. 253-254.
[157] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1818.
[158] Ibid., pp. 1807-1808.
[159] Ball, 'The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda', p. 40.
[160] Caparini, 'Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform', pp. 247-248.

and driven by local actors to be properly implemented and sustained.[161] In practical terms, the 'local ownership' of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external ones.[162] However, Wilén & Chapaux point out the problem of deciding *who* the local actors are and how they concretely should get involved? Moreover, state-builders often prefer to work with local elites who have a specific set of Western credentials, such as education and English language proficiency. In many cases, however, this elite has little or no contact at all with the reality facing the majority of the local population.[163] In turn, the practice of SSR deploys a concept in which the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and a role of being the security service provider. However, the provision of security services to the people has generally not been the preoccupation of ruling authorities in Africa.[164] In addition, Baker argues that persisting with the state-centric paradigm and its normative emphasis on the necessity of a state monopoly on force will only bring disappointment: the post-conflict state is unable (and unwilling) to deliver policing to a majority of its population and neither is it the principal actor in policing provision.[165]

It is therefore a considerable pitfall that 'local ownership' has gradually come to mean 'national ownership,'[166] which exclusively focused on the government and narrow political elites. For instance, the UNSC states that SSR "should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question."[167] However, overemphasizing the ownership of the central government in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa could mean that important non-aligned communities are bypassed in the reform process. Given that state actors' peace and security interests are mostly a reflection of their own desires for self-preservation, too much ownership on their behalf could therefore create the circumstances for renewed conflict.

Crucially, while the "SSR community has a good idea of how civil society operates in liberal-

---

[161] L. Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* (University of Birmingham, 2007) p. 3.

[162] Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*, p. 4.

[163] N. Wilén & V. Chapaux, 'Problems of Local Participation and Collaboration with the UN in a Postconflict Environment: Who are the 'Locals'?', *Global Society* Vol. 25 No. 4 (2011) pp. 534-535.

[164] L. Hutton, 'Following the Yellow Brick Road? Current and Future Challenges for Security Sector Reform in Africa', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 192-207, there: p. 193.

[165] B. Baker, 'The Future is Non-State', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 208-228, there: p. 211.

[166] E. Mobekk, 'Security Sector Reform and the Challenges of Ownership', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010) pp. 230-243, there: pp. 231-232.

[167] 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2007/3, © United Nations Security Council (21 February 2007) pp. 1-3, there: p.1.

democratic states […]. Post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, however, are “complex spaces, not blank slates devoid of civil society, as is often assumed.” This is part of the frequently noted continuing failure to contextualize SSR assistance: to better understand the specific history and socio-political environment in which SSR programs are planned and implemented. This includes knowing the nature of contemporary state-society relations within a given, post-conflict setting.[168] For instance, Reno argues that the historical state-building process helps to explain why some groups would be more willing or able than others to pursue a long-term strategy of cooperation. A key generalisation is that leaders who appear in areas that were marginal to pre-conflict patronage networks subsequently have to rely on locally legitimate authorities to provide them with access to resources and organised armed combatants.

For example, Northern Somali elites had to rely on local elders to protect their dealings in the smuggling trade against presidential interference. These elders also managed the use of local customary social arrangements to guarantee contracts, given that the elites could not rely on formal courts or the president’s militias for their protection. Conversely, the Somali areas which had their pre-war patronage networks based in Mogadishu had the most dominated economies and remained the most fractured and violent.[169] In 1989, a visitor to the north contrasted it to southern Somalia by noting “the difficulty of shooting young apprentice *shiftas* [bandits] because their clan and family backgrounds had to be taken into account, and the same holds for any person who might kill.”[170] In this way, informal networks constitute a structural reality in which the institutions of the state may be subordinate or of secondary importance.[171]

Finally, post-conflict environments typically express a discrepancy between the peacekeeping community and the broader conflict-transformation community. The former views SSR as a short-term exit strategy and therefore emphasizes security actor capacity-building; the latter sees it as a component of longer-term reconstruction and development and stresses the governance dimension. Similar differences can also be identified in the conflicting perceptions of peace (‘negative’ vs. ‘positive’) and security (‘state’ vs. ‘human’) between respectively state and non-state actors. These contrasts in turn make it very difficult to grant the ownership of the reforms to either state or non-state actors.

[168] Caparini, ‘Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform’, p. 257.
[169] Reno, ‘African Rebels and the Citizenship Question’, pp. 232, 235.
[170] Interview, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo [former chairman of Somali National Movement], Hargeisa, June 2006.
[171] Podder, ‘State Building and the Non-State: Debating Key Dilemmas’, p. 1617.

Crucially, SSR requires the close collaboration between these epistemically very different groups of people, which appear to have different ideas on which parts of SSR should be adopted and how they should be practiced. This is particularly critical when it comes to human security, given the (unwritten) assumption that it can best be served by creating a functioning state that will then provide security as a public good. However, human security can be defined as 'freedom from fear' or as citizen security in terms of people's entitlement to protection by the state in which they are citizens. Both of these remain elusive[172] given the crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state to which the problems with the local ownership are connected. On the other hand, the conflicting views and interests of local actors, combined with the lack of a common definition and approach in the international arena have helped to sustain *Security Sector/System Reform* as a piecemeal strategy for post-conflict state building.

[172] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1809.

3. Confronting State Failure in Somalia

"*Even in Somalia, the UN force did not resolve the underlying political issues, and once it withdrew chaos was quick to return.*"[173]

3.1. UNOSOM-II in Somalia

After the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction that supported the Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the one that supported General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Together with the OAU and other organizations, the UN sought to resolve the conflict. In April 1992, the UNSC therefore established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I). This [174] was followed by the establishment of the United Task Force (UNITAF) in November, 1992, which was authorized by the UNSC to use "all necessary means to establish a secure environment for the relief effort."[175] In early 1993, the Secretary-General subsequently organized a meeting in which fourteen Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM-I. In addition, the leaders of fifteen Somali political movements endorsed an accord on disarmament, reconstruction and the formation of a transitional government. In March 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the presence and

[173] T.M. Ali & R.O. Matthews, 'Conclusion: Conflict, Resolution, and Building Peace', in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) pp. 288-312, there: p. 301.
[174] See: 'Somalia – Maps', http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/somalia/maps.htm.
[175] See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html.

operations of UNITAF had a “positive impact on the security situation in Somalia […].”[176] He, however, also pointed out that a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia: there still was no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The Secretary-General therefore concluded that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM-II should endow the latter with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enable it to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. Under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, the new UNOSOM-II mission would thus seek to “complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability and order.”[177]

In February 1994, the UNSC revised UNOSOM-II’s mandate to encourage and assist the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements. The UNSC then revised UNOSOM-II’s mandate to encourage and assist the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements. Signed in March 1993 by fifteen Somali political movements, these agreements represented a UN-sponsored framework to build peace by e.g. rebuilding the political and administrative structures in Somalia. Moreover, the signatories to the Addis Ababa Agreements – including General Aidid’s faction – committed themselves to “complete, and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the disarmament concept and timeframe set by the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1991.” Furthermore, they agreed on the “need to establish an impartial National and Regional Somali Police Force in all regions of the country […] through the reinstatement of the former Somali Police Force and recruitment and training of young Somalis from all regions.”[178]
In this way, the Addis Ababa Agreements reflected a traditional state-centric understanding of security: it focused on public sector institutions that were charged with the provision of internal security, as well as on the civilian bodies relevant to their management, control and oversight. Meanwhile, the provision of external security now became the responsibility of UNOSOM/UNITAF forces.[179] Furthermore, the liberal-democratic content of this state-centrism is clearly reflected in the mission’s mandate to assist in the reorganisation of the Somali police and judicial system and in the ongoing political process, given that the latter

[176] See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html.
[177] Ibid.
[178] ‘Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993’, © United States Institute of Peace, pp. 1-6, there: pp. 2-3.
[179] Ibid., p. 2.

"should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government."[180]
In terms of armed state building, the security environment represented a clear example of a 'Failed/Violent' state: there recently had been a civil war and the security forces were incapable, underpaid and untrained. (see: Table 1.1) However, despite the emphasis on broad police and judicial reform, these efforts did however not constitute a SSR process that began "at the outset of a peace process" or had been "incorporated into early recovery and development strategies."[181] Historically, the concept of *Security Sector/System Reform* did not even enter policy discourse until 1997.[182] This means that the mission could not possible have adopted the same grounded doctrine as the subsequent AMISOM. Nevertheless, the mission's firm emphasis on police and judicial reorganisation and disarmament does constitute at least a few key tenets of subsequent SSR approaches.

On the basis of the Addis Ababa Agreements, senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM developed a 'Somalia Ceasefire Disarmament Concept'. This required the "establishment of cantonment, for storage of heavy weapons, as well as transition sites for temporary accommodation of factional forces while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received training for eventual reintegration into civilian life."[183] With respect to this initiated DDR-programme, the UN Secretary-General reported in May 1994 that "the Somali faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. Regrettably, this commitment has not yet been honoured. Voluntary disarmament will be successful only if the Somali parties display the necessary determination to settle their disputes peacefully."[184] Only two months later, the Secretary-General noted that "it is evident that militias have been rearming and replenishing their weapons supplies."[185]
It would not take long before the UN observed the reasons behind these rearmaments and replenishments: "While some progress has been registered at the local and regional levels in

[180] Resolution 897, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3334th meeting, on 4 February 1994, S/RES/897, © United Nations Security Council (1994) pp. 1-4, there: pp. 2-3.
[181] UN Report of the Secretary-General, 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform', p. 13.
[182] See: e.g. Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1805.
[183] See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html.
[184] 'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 14 of Resolution 897 (1994)', S/1994/614, © United Nations Security Council (24 May 1994) pp. 1-22, there: p. 11.
[185] 'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 923 (1994)', S/1994/839, © United Nations Security Council (18 July 1994) pp. 1-15, there: p. 10.

the implementation of this Agreement, repeated violations of the cease-fire and lack of progress in disarmament, as well as factional disputes, inter-clan rivalries and conflicts have made it impossible to proceed with the establishment of a central administrative mechanism."[186] Thus, even though it had been one of the main mandated tasks, the mission made little to no progress with disarmament activities. Illustrative of this is the fact that the word 'disarmament' does not appear at all anymore in the Secretary-General's final (publicly available) report on the situation in Somalia.

Because DDR is often seen as an entry point for SSR[187], the problems that were encountered in the disarmament phase could therefore undermine longer-term reform efforts of the state's security and justice institutions. Crucially, UNOSOM-II lacked a "clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed."[188] There also was "no clear evidence of political will on the part of the warring parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution."[189] Without first addressing these problems and their violent consequences, it retrospectively could have been expected that the police and justice programmes would have become unsustainable as well. With regard to the police programme, the Secretary-General reported that by March 1995 UNOSOM-II had assisted in the reestablishment of a 8.500-strong Somali police force that was operational in 82 district stations. These officers had a visible presence on the roads and in various communities: "They engaged in foot or mobile patrols and other forms of static and fixed-point duties, receiving complaints from the public and conducting investigations into criminal cases."[190] Regarding the justice sector, UNOSOM-II in turn supported the establishment of 11 appeal courts, 11 regional courts and 46 district courts functioning in all regions and 46 districts of Somalia, with a total staff of 374. In addition, the mission provided training for judicial personnel in judicial administration and ethics, juvenile justice, sentencing practices and attitudes, human rights and the rule of law.[191]
At first sight, these would seem significant capacity improvements of the security and justice institutions of the Somali state. However, the mission did not make any attempts to address the root causes of the aforementioned, ongoing violence and lack of political will among the

[186] 'Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia', S/1994/977, © United Nations Security Council (17 August 1994) pp. 1-7, there: p. 2.
[187] Knight, 'DDR and SSR: Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding Assistance', p. 28.
[188] Clarke & Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', p. 78.
[189] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', p. 16.
[190] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', S/1995/231, © United Nations Security Council (28 March 1995) pp. 1-18, there: p. 12.
[191] Ibid., p. 12.

parties. Conversely, the UN Secretary-General stressed that "the most the international community could do for the Somali parties was to afford every opportunity for them to agree among themselves on the modalities to re-establish their political and administrative structures based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country."[192] UNOSOM-II did however manage to assist in the formation of fifty-three district councils out of eighty-one and eight out of thirteen regional councils.[193] In theory, this should have helped to re-establish the former structures. In practice, however, affording the Somali parties "every opportunity" alone clearly did not suffice.

Moreover, UNOSOM-II lacked a strategy for the transition from a failed state to a democratically elected government. Clarke & Herbst state that "in Somalia there was no clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed. […] The expectation was that the combatants, after years of fighting a civil war, could somehow resolve their differences in a few months."[194] In this sense, a lack of 'local ownership' to the efforts also appears to have alienated Somalis from the process. For instance, other than a general declaration that the "uprooting of banditry and crime is necessary for peace, stability, security, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in Somalia,"[195] there was no real clarity on how Somali actors could accomplish these objectives themselves or how much agency they have in the process. Adam furthermore criticizes UNOSOM for lacking insight into the general situation. He argues that the mission's disarmament strategy would have needed a demobilization program to provide job-training for youth militias, a serious program to train and equip local police forces and a program to equip and restore the judicial system.[196]
Conversely, the mission did not promote demobilization programs during its mandate in southern Somalia. Meanwhile, the northern Republic of Somaliland began to carry out demobilization programs on its own behalf. This phenomenon reflects a much higher degree of 'local ownership' than the police training programme, in which UNOSOM-II forces increasingly undertook joint operations with the Somali police to help ensure their

[192] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', p. 15.
[193] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', p. 186.
[194] W. Clarke & J. Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75 No. 2 (1996) pp. 78-79.
[195] 'Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, p. 2.
[196] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', p. 186.

participation in security activities.[197] However, the historical context of the mission should be observed. UNOSOM-II was the first real test case of post-Cold War peacekeeping, which means that most lessons still had to be learned. This made the mission highly prone to misjudgements and failures.
The qualitative contribution of UNOSOM-II to security in Somalia was therefore small. Both the disarmament and police programmes had the characteristics of exit-strategies, aimed at providing short-term stability by training and equipping rather than establishing long-term reform. This corresponds to the fact that "following the commencement of the withdrawal of UNOSOM-II, vehicles and military equipment in stock from supplies provided by the donor community were shipped out of Somalia […]" and "international support for the programme, which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, ceased on 31 March 1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate."[198] It is probable that the security conditions would deteriorate if the Somali police stopped receiving salaries. Indeed, Ali & Matthews point out that with the exception of Somaliland – which has declared its (internationally unrecognized) independence and established a modicum of stability – the inter-clan fighting continues especially in and around Mogadishu. The structures of the central state remain in a state of collapse.[199]

Given the warring parties' lack of political will to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution, the presence of UNOSOM-II arguably failed to provide a legitimate basis for peace in Somalia. In turn, the mission's leadership had never been concerned with its own role in resolving the communal conflicts. Instead, it focused exclusively on a short-term exit-strategy which arguably did not change the prevailing opportunity-structure of the situation.
For instance, the Secretary-General reported in August 1994 that "certain members of the Security Council, as well as many troop contributing countries, have conveyed to me in clear terms that they are not prepared to continue indefinitely their costly commitments, particularly when there are no encouraging signs of the Somali leader's readiness to assume responsibility […] on the basis of a durable national reconciliation." Furthermore, "the Security Council may wish to address a direct message to the principal Somali leaders to remind them that the

[197] 'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 923 (1994)', p. 6.
[198] 'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia', p. 12.
[199] Ali & Matthews, 'Conclusion: Conflict, Resolution, and Building Peace', p. 295.

future of their country lies in their hands."[200]

Looking at figure 2.1, it is tenable that UNOSOM-II ultimately only ended up addressing the 'security actors and forces' whilst severely underestimating the problems that underpinned the establishment of civilian 'management and oversight bodies.' The mission assumed that these would emerge naturally out of a national reconciliation process. Crucially, this was never fulfilled during the mission's mandate, thus the monopoly on violence of the state was not restored and Somalia remained highly insecure. Illustrative of this is the fact that the country has consistently topped the FSI for more than ten years after the UNOSOM-II intervention.[201]

Given that the civilian management and oversight structures were lagging behind, together with the broader political and administrative structures behind them, the Somali security sector was thus strengthened in a vacuum.

Importantly, there seems to have been a major underappreciation of the degree to which Somalia experienced a legitimacy failure in the 1990s. According to Miller's typology (see: Table 1.2) the fact that there was an agreement in place means that the international military forces should have adopted an observer strategy for rebuilding legitimacy. The image of troops that monitor compliance with power sharing agreements, with the establishment of transitional authority and monitor state-civil society relations[202] is indeed what emerges from the accounts of the Secretary-General. However, the deteriorating security and political situation in Somalia throughout UNOSOM-II's deployment suggests that a more proactive strategy would have suited better. This mismatch between strategy and reality increases the likelihood that the mission itself came to suffer from legitimacy problems that, in turn, could have helped to induce spoiler behaviour.

SOMALIA

1941	Defeat of Italy, Four Powers to decide fate of Somalia
1948	Four Powers refer Somalia to UN
1950	Italy and Somali Trusteeship
1960	Somalia becomes independent
1964	War between Ethiopia and Somalia
1969	Military coup by General Siad Barre
1977–78	War between Ethiopia and Somalia
1981	Outbreak of civil war
1991	Collapse of the Siad Barre regime
1991	Somaliland declares independence
2000	Formation Transitional National Government
2004	Formation Transitional Federal Government

Figure 3.1. *Timeline of events in Somalia*

To further substantiate this, we also need to consider the legitimacy of possible outcomes to the peace process as an explanatory tool for spoiler behaviour. Unfortunately, there are

[200] 'Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia', S/1994/977, © United Nations Security Council (17 August 1994) pp. 1-7, there: p. 6.
[201] For the 'FSI' rankings, see: http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview.
[202] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 101.

methodological problems in measuring contributions to the legitimacy domain. In Somalia, there has been no functional, central governing authority since January 1991. Prior to 1996, the country did not experience at least modest levels of administration that maintained a level of peace and rule of law. As a consequence, the period in which the mission had been deployed lacks formal records. Crucially, because Somali indigenous sources have not been documented, they are now absent at worst or scattered/fragmented at best.
An additional problem is the fact that the majority of Somali media were only founded at the dawn of the twenty-first century with the formation of transitional governments. (see: figure 3.1.) The lack of primary sources from local media during the period of UNOSOM-II's activities thus makes it impossible to measure contributions to the legitimacy domain by qualitative analyses of public discourse. With respect to non-Somali discourse, Luling remarks that "well before the departure of the last UN troops, Somalia had almost vanished from the international news media. Since then, the Somali people have been left, with greatly reduced support and interference from abroad, to struggle with the problem of what comes next."[203]

However, in October and November 1993, The New York Times published two articles that might offer insight into the legitimacy of the mission:

""Boutros Boutros-Ghali has bombed us and murdered us!" A man screamed through a loudspeaker. "We do not want him here!" The crowd, mostly women and children, paraded with "Long Live Aidid" banners and chorused back: "Boutros-Ghali down! Unosom down!""[204]

"Asked whether his move would not undermine the Addis Ababa meeting, the general [Aidid] said this was not his aim, but he repeated his view that the United Nations presence should be replaced. "Unosom has failed because it has prescribed the medicine before it knows the disease," he said, referring to the United Nations Operation in Somalia."[205]

Given the Secretary-General's ample references to threats and attacks by violent militias against UNOSOM troops throughout 1994 and in 1995, it can safely be suggested that the mission lacked legitimacy among local actors in its field of operation. Furthermore, it seems

[203] V. Luling, 'Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State', *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 18 No. 2 (1997) p. 287.
[204] D. Jehl, 'Mission in Somalia; In a Gesture, Somalis Dismantle Barriers', *The New York Times* (October 17, 1993).
[205] [Author unknown], 'Somali Demanding that U.N. Get Out', The New York Times (November 30, 1993).

that the UN-sponsored and US-backed manhunt on General Aidid from June to October 1993 significantly contributed to the declining legitimacy of the UN forces. This forced attempt to remove General Aidid from the playing field even though he retained his status as a key political and military figure led to the killing of eighteen American soldiers in the 'Black Hawk Down' catastrophe.[206] Subsequently, the fact that General Aidid organized his own 'Somalis for Somalia' peace conference (including all Somali groups present at the Addis Ababa meeting) while confirming that he would not take part in the UN-sponsored conference[207] might demonstrate that he indeed wanted peace, but on different terms. Here, it can be suggested that the politicized, clan-based antagonisms of the Siad Barre-regime were incompatible with the apparently voluntary national reconciliation as propagated by the UN. The former has resulted in crises of citizenship and legitimacy in Somalia, while the latter assumes that all Somali clan-based groups would simply put their grievances aside and work towards the installation of a democratically elected government.

In this way, the mission ignored the historical legacy of the Siad Barre era. During Siad's reign, it were the Daarood who held power through him, but not all of them. The three clans whom he used as his chief supporters were his own clan the Mareexaan, and the Ogaadeen and Dhulbahante (connected to him through marriage). All of these are Daarood, but so are the Majeerteen who became one of the main opposition forces, as eventually did a section of the Ogaadeen. At the same time there was fierce competition *within* these large groupings, between their constituent lineages, for jobs and the spoils of office. In this way, the anti-government movements which overthrew Siad were based on clans or clan-families and became the contestants in the civil war.[208]

In addition, the UN-led attempt at state building in this context disregarded the Somalis' fundamental lack of trust in central government. As one young Somali man put it: "Because of the past five years, Somalis have come to rely on themselves, and this is working. No one is helping them, there is no government—and business is booming and everyone is working for him or herself, there is no welfare system. So who is interested in government? No one is interested. We only need a government to represent the name of Somalia—we don' t need one which interferes in the affairs of the people."[209] In this way, it appears that UNOSOM-II

[206] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', pp. 185.
[207] [Author unknown], 'Somali Demanding that U.N. Get Out'.
[208] Luling, 'Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State', p. 293.
[209] Ibid., p. 300. ; See: J. Abbink, 'The Total Somali Clan Genealogy' (second edition), African Studies Centre Working Paper 84 / 2009, © Jan Abbink (2009) pp. 1-45.

paved the way for the emergence of spoilers by working towards outcomes that were neither desired nor perceived favourable by local parties. Retrospectively, it could therefore be argued that UNOSOM fostered the conditions for lasting conflict by antagonizing and consolidating the clan-based factions, including Aidid's.[210]

Regardless, the Secretary-General noted in 1994 that "during the past few weeks, there have been some signs that the withdrawal of UNOSOM-II may have triggered among Somali leaders an awareness of their responsibilities. […] I am encouraged by the fact that the withdrawal of UNOSOM-II has coincided with the signing of agreements that have so far helped to avert fighting over the sea and airports in Mogadishu."[211] Again, this would suggest that the UN mission effectively came to dominate the security and justice reform process in a way that did not include Somali actors. The efforts therefore failed to incentivize 'bottom-up' state building like in Somaliland.

Nevertheless, UNOSOM's massive economic presence *did* produce lucrative opportunities in procurement, construction contracts, property rental, private security and currency exchange. This led war merchants and militiamen into more respectable livelihoods[212] and thereby contributed to DDR. After the departure of the mission in 1995, conditions had changed in ways that made a livelihood of plunder both more dangerous and less remunerative. Easily lootable assets were scarcer; businessmen had secured robust private security forces to protect their wealth, and they were able to tap into their clans to deter or punish bandits. Meanwhile, traditional elders had also begun to reassert customary clan law, which held criminals and their blood payments groups accountable for theft and assaults. While predatory behavior was still an option against weak social groups (IDPs, minorities, and low caste lineages) bandits were confronted with the fact that many of these groups had armed themselves and therefore became more dangerous than in the past.[213]

Thus, it appears that the mission helped to build longer-term security, albeit unintentionally, by initiating a process that had not been part of the mandated activities. For instance, despite the inability of international actors to influence Somalia's security environment fundamentally, the Somali police forces have become 'functionally conventional': they are

---

[210] A. Linke & C. Raleigh, 'State and Stateless Violence in Somalia', *African Geographical Review* Vol. 30 No. 1 (2011) p. 51.

[211] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', p. 17.

[212] Menkhaus, 'Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia', p. 158.

[213] K. Menkhaus, 'Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia', *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 4 No. 2 (2004) p. 161.

structured on lines familiar throughout Africa and express awareness of international practices and procedures as they filter them through local interests and dispositions. They are both a conventional state institution and a negotiated form of state authority.[214] According to Hills, there are identifiable security organizations such as police, military and intelligence agencies, although the boundaries between them are sometimes ambiguous. In the core Somali security sector, some of Mogadishu's police are little more than militiamen in uniform while even the UN defines the Somali armed forces as 'those fighting *Al-Shabab*, including militias not formally integrated into the military.'

On the other hand, these militiamen are often seen as police. According to both the Observatory on Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) and Mogadishu's Police Advisory Committee (PAC), Somalis are aware of the distinctions between police and military enforcement agencies, but are less concerned with the difference between police and militia. Interestingly, although a significant proportion of officers may not see themselves as police, this does not stop them from acting or being regarded as such.[215] This stands in sharp contrast with UNOSOM-II that focused on Mogadishu while carrying out its mandated activities. Hills notes that international efforts that focus on transforming the SPF into a national force capable of supporting the federal government will find that the line ministries that theoretically manage it are little more than a minister in an empty office.[216]
In addition, Adam already argued that "with the departure of UNOSOM-II troops in March 1995, it has become even more obvious that Somali civil conflicts have to be resolved internally by the parties themselves rather than through external intervention."[217]
This process of internal reconciliation seems exactly what has happened in e.g. Somaliland, where traditional secular and religious (local) elites, modern elites, representatives of NGOs and ordinary citizens have participated in peace and reconciliation conferences in virtually all the main towns.[218] Moreover, this already resembles a holistic SSR approach that may provide a more fertile soil for the restoration of the monopoly on violence than the one offered by the stabilization efforts of UNOSOM-II.

In this way, some developments in the security system did take place. Menkhaus pointed out

[214] A. Hills, 'Somalia works: Police development as State Building', *African Affairs* Vol. 113 (2014) p. 94.
[215] Hills, 'Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia', pp. 169, 176.
[216] Ibid., pp. 174, 176.
[217] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', pp. 179-180.
[218] Ibid., pp. 186-187.

that the most dramatic change in governance in Somalia since 1992 has come at the neighbourhood or municipal level. These local polities have attracted the most actual day-to-day governance and reflect local communities' attempts to provide core functions of governance in a context of state collapse. Furthermore, in the immediate post-UNOSOM period, this manifested itself mainly in informal, overlapping polities loosely held by clan elders and others. Over the course of the second half of the 1990s, however, these local polities often became more structured and institutionalised.[219]

Moreover, while the regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu have different visions of Somalia, they have consensus on what the police should look like.[220] While all three governments represent clan-based administrations, Somaliland has the most developed police system and coherent governance structures because its government is publicly committed to developing a civilian police force aligned to international standards. Similarly, Puntland is publicly committed to developing a rule of law and reduced violence, however this did not prevent tensions about power sharing between different Majerteen sub-clans to which its less-developed police can only react. Still, the development of governance and security along legitimate lines in Puntland and Somaliland remains highly distinct from Mogadishu's federal government and its Somali Police Force (SPF). The latter now survive primarily because the international community supports it and the state it claims to represent.[221]

In theory, the fact that the national reconciliation process was not more successful could not have been due to a lack of civil society involvement. There have been two National Reconciliation Conferences: first in March 1993, which led to the Addis Ababa Agreement, then followed in March 1994 by consultations in Nairobi. According to the Secretary-General, there was "significant representation of the civil society of Somalia at each of these major conferences. More than 250 representatives of community organizations, elders, scholars, as well as women's groups, participated in the Addis Ababa Conference, while a significant number of elders was present at the consultations […]."[222]

However, these representatives of civil society had for decades been controlled and manipulated by the Siad Barre-regime through all kinds of mass-organizations. This manipulation of clan consciousness moreover contributed to the inability of civil society to

[219] Menkhaus, 'Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia', p. 155.
[220] Hills, 'Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia', p. 174.
[221] ——, 'Somalia works: Police development as State Building', p. 97.
[222] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', pp. 1-18, there: p. 6.

recover when Siad fell from power and. As a result, the clan political identities in Somali society were in a state of constant flux.[223] In such an immediate post-civil war context, it can moreover be hard for an outside force to determine which groups belong to civil society and how they perceive their own roles and identities. Ultimately, the decision to monitor relations instead of actively empowering societal groups may have been politically more prudent. Following Greenhill & Major's analysis of the 'prevailing opportunity structure' to explain spoiler behaviour,[224] it were the UN's flawed plans for national reconciliation in Somalia, its mismatch between strategy and reality therein and UNOSOM-II's self-disqualification by declaring war on Aidid that contributed to the emergence of peace spoilers in Somalia. Undermining the peace process by rejecting UN troops posed a better alternative to armed militias than complying with their demands for national reconciliation. Moreover, the fact that different regions had different visions of Somalia also helps to explain why the "broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country"[225] UNOSOM-II propagated failed to take place.

Rather than pursuing this goal, different clan-based administrations developed their own security forces. These demonstrated governance structures and maintained order in ways that were perceived more legitimate by the local populace than the unitary Somali reconstruction agenda that was championed by the mission. Moreover, the lack of international military involvement in Somaliland and Puntland suggests a voluntary 'bottom-up' state building process. Thus, it seems that 'stateness' in Somalia developed along fragmented lines in the post-UNOSOM period, even though 'the state' had formally collapsed. These kinds of developments also gives us reason to question the feasibility of installing a 'democratically elected government'[226] in Somalia. In turn, they demand a 'reality-check' of the way in which the new Somali state could be shaped.

---

[223] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', pp. 170-174, 179.

[224] Greenhill & Major, 'The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords', pp. 8-10.

[225] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', p. 15.

[226] Resolution 897, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3334th meeting, on 4 February 1994, pp. 2-3.

3.2. Challenges for AMISOM

AMISOM was deployed to Somalia in March 2007, which followed the Ethiopian military campaign that had installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in December 2006. The mission was endorsed by the UN and had a mandate to e.g. facilitate civil-military operations and conduct military enforcement operations against anti-government actors, principally *Al-Shabab*. AMISOM's small police component was mandated to help train, mentor and advise the SPF, although very few of them deployed to Mogadishu before 2011 because of the dire security situation on the ground.[227] In January 2007, the *African Union Mission in Somalia* (AMISOM) was mandated to work with all stakeholders in supporting the dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. The mission was to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) of Somalia, in particular, the effective reestablishment and training of all Somali security forces.[228] Contrary to UNOSOM-II, this mission was installed in a period when SSR concepts had found their way into foreign policy discourse. The new AU strongly promoted the idea of 'African solutions to African problems' which was generally backed by Western powers. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had changed the USA's strategic objectives in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. This made the USA the largest individual financial contributor to the AU mission.[229]

In short, the thought of peacekeeping had shifted towards multidimensional peacebuilding operations. Policy makers recognized the need to include local actors for sustainable reform of the security and justice sector. These principles are reflected in the new NSSP for Somalia. The *United Nations Political Office for Somalia* refers to this document as a "Somali-owned plan that defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will lead in re-orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justice institutions and groups in Somalia." It is "designed to serve as the main conduit for alignment of both national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized, coherent, harmonized and sustained interventions in Somalia."[230] AMISOM thus constitutes a

[227] P.D. Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* Vol. 17 (2013) p. 224.
[228] 'Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 19 January 2007) pp. 1-4, there: p. 3.
[229] Olsen, 'Great Power' Intervention in African Armed Conflicts', pp. 3, 12.
[230] See: 'UNPOS' and 'Joint Security Committee':
http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11458&language=en-US.

multidimensional peacebuilding mission in a complex security environment. The lack of a post-conflict peace agreement and the ongoing war with *Al-Shabab* suggests a 'Collapsed/Anarchic' context that would require strategies to administer security and legitimacy. In turn, the mission's integrated focus on police reform with the ownership located at the federal government level suggests a 'Train/Equip' strategy for rebuilding security. (See: Table 1.1/1.2) This proactive attitude is also reflected in AMISOM's Civil Affairs Unit's objectives to conduct "activities towards confidence-building, conflict management, support to reconciliation and engaging in supporting the restoration and extension of state authority."[231]

While AMISOM's recognition of its own roles and responsibilities in legitimacy building marks a clear difference with UNOSOM-II, the mission nonetheless encountered fierce armed resistance from *Al-Shabab* militias. For instance, in April 2008, the Peace and Security Council of the AU strongly condemned "the attacks against AMISOM positions […] the killing of Government Officials, as well as all other acts of violence perpetrated by those elements seeking to undermine the political process, hinder the operations of AMISOM and undermine regional peace and stability."[232] Similarly, in May 2009 the Council strongly condemned "the aggression perpetrated against the TFG of Somalia and the civilian population in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by armed groups, including foreign elements, bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process, as well as regional stability."[233]

To understand *Al-Shabab's* armed resistance to the mission, it must be stressed that the movement has since 2008 transformed itself from a "predominantly nationalist organization with the localized agenda of driving Ethiopians from Somalia to a 'hybrid movement' that has increasingly embraced the *Al-Qaeda*-led global jihad against the West."[234] This means that the militias principally developed out of a general resentment of the Ethiopian military campaign that had installed the TFG. According to Williams – an associate professor who extensively studied the African Union Mission in Somalia – the AU mission was widely regarded as a provider of cover for the imminent withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Mogadishu: "Having

[231] See: http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-civilian-component/.
[232] 'Communique of the 123rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/Comm (CXXIII), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2008) pp. 1-3, there: p. 2.
[233] 'Communique of the 190th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/COMM (CXC), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 22 May 2009) pp. 1-4, there: p. 2.
[234] D. Agbiboa, 'Shifting the Battleground: The Transformation of Al-Shabab and the Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* Vol. 42 No. 2 (2015) p. 185.

installed the TFG in Mogadishu, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops stirred up a considerable local backlash and violence intensified dramatically throughout 2007 […]. Ethiopian authorities were thus well aware that the presence of their troops in Mogadishu was undermining the legitimacy of the TFG they had installed but they were unwilling to withdraw without an alternative force to fill the subsequent security vacuum. AMISOM was conceived as the solution to that problem […].”[235]

This again suggests that the new AU mission suffered a considerable decline of legitimacy by cooperating with the Ethiopian-established Somali TFG. In November 2009, the Puntland-based *Horseed Media* published an article that appears to confirm this problem. This medium was established by a "dynamic and intellectual group of Somali Diaspora in Netherlands and Finland." Its purpose is "to advocate for peace and development in Somalia while informing the public on current affairs in a balanced and non-stereotyped manner."[236] The November 2009 article stated that:

"The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has become overanxious to hear existing and viable other authorities when the TFG is faltering and falling apart. Furthermore, some TFG members have the assumption that the existing of a functioning separate State within Somalia is perilous to their AMISOM guarded authority. They privately argued that any other authorities within Somalia, in the eyes of the international community, will degrade the legitimacy of Somali Government.
[...] The gap of priorities and political growth of Puntland and that of the Transitional Federal Government is too wide and too hard to reconcile. Puntland is a relatively progressive and stable semi-autonomous State, where the Transitional Federal Government is a physically, socially, politically and economically blockaded entity. Moreover, Puntland's priority is to develop its territory's social and economic infrastructures. On the contrary, the Mogadishu based TFG is focused on their daily survival and regrettable social development issues is an alien concept to them."[237]

It is noteworthy that the publication of this article followed the second iteration of the TFG in early 2009. In turn, this configuration of the TFG was still criticized by many Somalis that it was too close to Ethiopia, too heavily influenced by diaspora elites and one particular clan, the Hawiye. In addition, it was widely perceived as corrupt, ineffective and largely uninterested in pursuing a strategy of conflict resolution and political reconciliation across Somalia.[238] Furthermore, a subsequent article clearly illustrates the incredibility of the TFG

[235] Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', pp. 227-228.
[236] 'About Horseed Media', see: http://horseedmedia.net/profile/.
[237] O. Farah, 'Somalia: Why Somali Government and Puntland State of Somalia fail to agree?', *Horseed Media* (November 21, 2009).
[238] Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', pp. 231-232.

and the indispensability of AMISOM as its protection force:

"“Without us the transitional government would collapse immediately,” said one [AMISOM] colonel, whose men in forward positions regularly come under gunshot and mortar fire. The airport and seaport remain open, at least. The headquarters complex was largely spared the effects of the daily clashes between pro-[TFG] government militia and Islamist fighters, due to what one officer involved in military-civilian operations described as their friendly ties with local villagers. That was until a double suicide attack in September killed 17 peacekeepers, including their second in command, who was a Burundian general."[239]

In this way, the combination of the TFG's weakness and local hostility towards Ethiopian troops provided ample fodder for *Al-Shabab* to intensify its attacks on the AU force.[240]
The issues related to fragmented 'stateness' in Somalia were already encountered by UNOSOM-II. Here, they also began to pose challenges to AMISOM's state building capability. According to its mandate, the mission's troops were to assist in the effective reestablishment and training of all Somali security forces in accordance with the Federal-Government owned NSSP.[241] However, Human Rights Watch reported in May 2010 that "many Somalis already view the TFG, […] as merely another armed faction.
For example, Abdi – a teenager who staggered into the Dadaab refugee camps – did not know whether the mortar attacks that killed his family and his three friends were the work of *Al-Shabab* or the TFG, but he feared both equally. "For a time you will see Al-Shabab in control and then you will see the government in control," he said of his neighbourhood in Mogadishu. "The only thing that doesn't change is the suffering of the people.""[242] In the light of these first-hand accounts, it seems justified to argue that because the TFG in Mogadishu lacks local stability and credibility, it is also unable to maintain professional and accountable security forces. In turn, AMISOM's support to the Somali government degrades the mission's own legitimacy in the eyes of competing Somali factions, to whom the TFG merely represents another contender for power.
This, again, is due to the historical legacy of the Siad Barre era: it created a specific arena of segmentary political conflict and predatory violence which has marked Somali society throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s. Such rivalry was even visible within the TFG,

---

[239] 'AFP' News Agency, 'No peace for the peacekeepers in Somalia', *Horseed Media* (December 2, 2009).
[240] Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', p. 231.
[241] 'Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', pp. 1-4, there: p. 3. ; See: 'UNPOS' and 'Joint Security Committee': http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11458&language=en-US.
[242] L. Tayler, 'Somalia's Saviors Are Making Everything Worse', *Human Rights Watch* (May 5, 2010).

which certainly helps to explain why even after lengthy negotiations and a complex power-sharing agreement, it has become virtually defunct.[243] Specifically, by early 2005, serious splits occurred within the TFG after which the so-called 'Mogadishu Group' – a coalition of clans, militia leaders, civic groups and Islamists – also became divided and fighting erupted in early 2006. This pattern repeated itself until late 2007 when open splits occurred in both the opposition and the TFG.[244] These splits reflect the rivalry and divisions within the Somali state, as well as the inability of the TFG to pose a legitimate government institution. Moreover, state failure in the Somali context still followed the Weberian definition of an entity that commands a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a territory.[245] In this way, the former splits constituted a major problem for the state building project: how could a government that experiences such a lack of domestic legitimacy possibly claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of force?
In turn, AMISOM's activities towards confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation[246] so far proved insufficient to provide stability within the government, let alone resolve its underlying problems. By contrast, the mission began to support a regime that had been imposed by a foreign military intervention and clearly lacked sufficient legitimacy. This demonstrates the profound disregard of the mission for the challenges of Somali state building. In turn, these challenges seem not to have been on the agenda of the liberal international community, which made AMISOM's approach rather technical and focused on capacity building in ways similar to UNOSOM-II.

Importantly, the focus on capacity building in Somalia has not been entirely unjustified. From a liberal-institutionalist perspective, there were considerable problems with the capacity of state institutions that required attention. However, as the Somali security sector effectively became politicized via 'clan-katura' during the Barre-regime, these institutions themselves were essentially linked to processes of state disintegration. By 2012, the Somali security forces were still in a dire state: the narrow 'security sector' suffered from unreliable salaries because not all Somali soldiers received their monthly 100 US$ stipends. In addition to an ineffective logistical and medical support capacity, the forces also lacked modern weaponry –

[243] Abbink, 'The Total Somali Clan Genealogy' (second edition), pp. 1-45, there: p. 4.
[244] K. Menkhaus, 'Somalia: They Created a Desert and Called it Peace(building)', *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 36 No. 120 (2009) pp. 224-225.
[245] Linke & Raleigh, 'State and Stateless Violence in Somalia', p. 53.
[246] See: http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-civilian-component/.

many Somali National Army weapons actually belonged to warlords, clans and individuals.[247] Indeed, the TFG still lacked an effective fighting force beyond a core group of militia that served as the president's private army. Moreover, TFG troops and police quickly became associated with illegal roadblocks and looting. AMISOM even accused them of selling operational information about its activities to *Al-Shabab*. Furthermore, the most severe and urgent problems that undermined the security sector were those of unresolved clan loyalties between e.g. clan leaders and warlords.[248] Thus, the lack of a credible central government with a functioning security system, as well as the failure to establish one due to unresolved crises of citizenship and legitimacy means that there was no 'state' to render 'capable' in the liberal-democratic sense.[249] In this way, attempts to increase the capacity of institutions therefore seemed out of touch with the reality of security and governance in Somalia.
Crucially, the international community's insistence to keep on treating Somalia as a 'post-conflict' setting was increasingly out of touch with the grim realities on the ground. This involved political pressure from key donor states on aid agencies to downplay the humanitarian crisis, stay silent on TFG human rights abuses, and maintain aid programmes in order to help maintain the legitimacy of the TFG.[250] In such a context, it is virtually impossible for any international military force to restore the monopoly on violence in favour of any party without becoming part of the conflict itself.

Given this preliminary conclusion, what could still serve as prospects for future state building in Somalia? The latest report of the chairperson of the AU commission on the situation in Somalia, issued in October 2014, has outlined the technical and capacity building performances of AMISOM. In terms of security building, these include e.g. a "community-based policing course for 160 police officers […] in proactive policing, in partnership with the concerned communities." This came together with a "community awareness and response program […] to sensitize members of the public on the need to partner and work with the police."[251] In terms of legitimacy building, AMISOM's Civil Affairs Unit has "engaged community elders at different levels in order […] to mobilize the communities in support of the military operations." Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Unit has been working "to sensitize

[247] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', p. 233.
[248] Author's interviews with AMISOM officials, Nairobi, August 2012 and Mogadishu, January 2013, in: Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', pp. 232-233.
[249] Jackson, 'Security Sector Reform and State Building', p. 1817.
[250] Adam, 'Somali Civil Wars', p. 231.
[251] 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia', PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), © African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 October 2014) pp. 1-12, there: pp. 6-7.

members of Somali Civil Society on Government policies […]" which in turn "agreed to create a Somalia Civil Society Consortium that will work with the FGS."[252]

This seems hopeful for the prospect of state building, albeit at the community level. However, the fact that the NSSP remains a federal government-owned project could make it difficult to substantiate these developments. In the light of the federal government's ongoing legitimacy problems, it may therefore be necessary to rethink the liberal-democratic emphasis on the national state that underpins AMISOM's international military efforts. In particular, the assertion that a liberal-democratic government that successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is incompatible with the Somali context is not without historical precedent. Research shows that before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, president Siad Barre commanded the means to the use of force more than other actors. By contrast, the means to coercion in stateless societies are privately provided, and while these private organizations that challenge state authority can become quite powerful, historical records show that no internal group in Somalia commanded the most substantial forms of military machinery.[253]

Thus, the history of Somalia shows that apart from the dictator Siad Barre – who was backed by the Great Powers in the context of the Cold War rivalry – not a single legitimate authority in Somalia has been able to claim the monopoly on violence. Given the recent stress on developing 'capable' states along liberal-democratic lines, it is furthermore improbable that the international community will again support another Barre figure. On the other hand, while the Federal Government's claim of sovereignty enjoys some international credibility, local power structures based on political clans exercise de facto authority in most regions of Somalia. Meanwhile, the mission's preference towards Mogadishu is detrimental to the purpose of peace and reconciliation because Mogadishu's exclusivist politics, exacerbated by government corruption, alienates certain regions of the country and contributes to instability.[254]

It therefore would seem that AMISOM's activities require a 'reality-check' of the path to dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and the type of administration and security sector this is supposed to engender. For instance the 'quasi-states' of Somaliland and Puntland – where no international military force has intervened – exercise some meaningful control over their respective territories, while south-central Somalia completely lacks any Weberian 'monopoly

[252] 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia', PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), pp. 1-12, there: pp. 8-9.

[253] Linke & Raleigh, 'State and Stateless Violence in Somalia', p. 48.

[254] Y.M. Hassan, 'Somalia is Tired of Conflict and Destruction', *Garowe Online* (June 6, 2015).

on the legitimate use of force' and various other actors are the real power-holders.[255] This again suggests the need to rethink the liberal-democratic model that so far has underpinned the armed state building efforts in Somalia. In this regard, many would concur with the leader of a (Somali) women's organisation: "I don't believe the country can be united in the near future. It should be built up from the bottom from the smallest possible neighborhoods or villages." There are even calls for what is in effect a return to traditional *xeer* law: "Each clan should sort itself out and neighboring clans should have arrangements for compensation."[256]

[255] B. Møller, 'Militia and Piracy in the Horn of Africa: External Responses', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013) pp. 178-196, there: pp. 186-187.
[256] Luling, 'Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State', p. 300.

4. Clashing Identities in Sudan

"British colonialism did nothing to foster a sense of a national Sudanese identity – in effect, the opposite occurred…The policies of the colonial government undermined any possibility of constructing Sudanese national unity after independence. The Sudan that emerged as an independent state in 1956 was a loose confederation of tribal, racial and regional identities."[257]

4.1. AMIS in Darfur: 'African Solutions to African Problems'?

Map 14 Darfur

Given Darfur's history of inter-tribal, resource-based clashes, it is not surprising that British politics initially interpreted the new developments in 2003 through established historical frames. Descriptions of the violence in fact began with 'unconfirmed reports of tribal conflict' in January.[258]

Subsequently, the conflict in Darfur has generally presented as a fight of two blocks, respectively between the rebel [259] movements *Justice and Equality Movement* (JEM) and the *Sudan Liberation Movement/Army* (SLM/A) against the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Khartoum, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the

---

[257] N.R. Bassil, *The Post-Colonial State and Civil War in Sudan: The Origins of Conflict in Darfur* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2013) p. 88.

[258] S. Srinivasan, 'Negotiating Violence: Sudan's Peacemakers and the War in Darfur', *African Affairs* Vol. 113 No. 450 (2014) p. 31.

[259] For 'Map 14: Darfur', see: R.O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 273.

Janjaweed militia. The latter covers a variety of tribal militias that operated in Darfur, each with its own resources and autonomy of command.[260] Of the two rebel movements, the JEM is the smallest and does not claim to be fighting for independence, but only to obtain participation in government. It is more multi-ethnic than the SLA and open to all who advocated an African Islam. The SLA on the other hand consists mainly of Furs, Masalits and Zaghawas; groups which have been fighting Arabs for a longer time. It is regarded as the armed part of the SLM, which was formed in response to the "unfair political, economic and social practises of the Sudanese government towards black Africans of Darfur." In this way, the SLA entered into the struggle alongside the JEM for the equal rights of Darfur and its inhabitants against the government, which favoured the Arab component of the Sudanese peoples.[261] However, the rivalry between the two SLA leaders, Abdel Wahid al-Nur (Fur, with a following among diverse ethnic groups) and Minni Minawi (Zaghawa) became intense and bitter. Similarly, the differences between these two and the leader of JEM – Khalil Ibrahim – were also significant. According to De Waal, these divergences prevented the Darfur resistance from forming a united political front.[262]

With respect to the Sudanese armed forces, the pre-eminent scholar of Sudanese history M.W. Daly notes that "from the mid-1980s, both the regional government and national armed forces stationed in Darfur became, in effect if not always by intent, parties to ethnic conflict. Officials recruited ethnic Fur to the security forces, where they played a dual role of secret insurgents everywhere: police by day, thugs by night. Arab officers and soldiers followed suit."[263] This process reached a new level of intensity when the neighboring Chad's interethnic warfare merged with Darfur's in the late 1980s.[264] It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to elaborate on the results of Chadian influences on the conflicts in Sudan. However, it remains noteworthy that the Janjaweed originated from armed groups that formed during the civil wars in Chad between 1962 and 1991.[265] Furthermore, the *Janjaweed*[266] militia used

---

[260] M. Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2009) p. 256.
[261] V. Danielová, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003: Analysis of the Darfur Conflict from the Times of First Clashes to the Present Day', *Ethnologia Actualis* Vol. 14 No. 1 (2014) pp. 45-46.
[262] A. de Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs* 1944-) Vol. 83 No. 6 (2007) p. 1040.
[263] M.W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 244.
[264] Ibid., p. 245.
[265] Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, p. 256.
[266] People in Sudan usually translate the word 'Janjaweed' as 'Aspirit' or 'Devil riding a horse'. See: S.M. Hassan & C.E. Ray, *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). ; J. Levy (2009): *Genocide in Darfur* (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc. 2009).

rape and other forms of sexual violence as a weapon of terror and humiliation. Additionally the militias used strategic landscape burning in order to destroy everything that could be useful for inhabitants of Darfur. As a result, the people who survived the massacre did not have a place where to return and became IDPs.[267]

Crucially, the Darfur conflict had also been part of a broader, national struggle between northern and southern Sudan. According to Ali & Matthews, most of the southern elite gravitated towards regional political parties, contested elections and became entangled in Khartoum's power struggles. Due to their narrow base of support and meagre resources, these parties were too weak to influence Khartoum's policies towards the south or other national issues. When it emerged in 1983, the SPLM/SPLA sought to change the status-quo by challenging this political impasse. To this end, the movement linked political marginalization, economic underdevelopment and cultural domination by the north of Sudan to national processes. It refused to operate from within these prevailing structures that favoured the dominant bloc and expressed its commitment to end the monopoly of power in Khartoum. The SPLM/SPLA ruled out the option of working within the existing system because it facilitated the abuse and manipulation of liberal democracy by the dominant bloc in Khartoum. Consequently, the movement called for a "radical restructuring of the power of the central government that will end once and for all the monopolisation of power by any self-appointed gang of thieves and criminals, whatever their backgrounds, whether they come in the form of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers."[268]

At first, the *African Union Mission in Sudan* (AMIS) was deployed to "monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the GoS and the SLM/SLA of 8 April, 2004." AMIS troops were to protect civilians under imminent threat and within close proximity, while the responsibility to protect civilians remained with the GoS.
On 5 May 2006, the focus of the mission shifted to support and implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the former parties. In this context, AMIS continued to monitor and verify "the cessation of hostilities by all parties, hostile militia activities against the population and attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias."[269]
Unlike AMISOM that predominantly focused on training and equipping activities, AMIS in

[267] M.A. Suleiman, *Darfur, A Crisis of Identity & Governance* (Bloomington: Author House, 2010) p. 9.
[268] Ali & Matthews, 'Civil Wars and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan', pp. 199-200.
[269] For 'AMIS mandate', see: http://www.amis-sudan.org/amismandate.html.

Sudan followed the observe and monitor strategy to provide immediate security (see: Table 1.1). Unfortunately, there are no available primary accounts of the AU 'Peace and Security Council' on AMIS' activities. Nevertheless, the mission's progress is amply covered by civil NGOs, human rights organizations and not least by the scholarly literature. Luqman for instance points out that while the initial deployment of AMIS peacekeepers led to a reduction in violent attacks against the civilian population, the mission was unable to maintain this momentum.[270]

This is also reflected in the findings of *Refugees International* – which advocates for the protection of displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises.[271] In 2005, the organization already noted that "the international presence in the form of AMIS and the humanitarian agencies has helped to deter attacks on civilians in the IDP camps and major urban centres." However, the period from "August through October of 2005 saw a re-escalation of the conflict, with AMIS becoming a prominent target of violence itself."[272] Notwithstanding, the international community accorded a high degree of legitimacy to AMIS, and the mission obtained the official consent of the GoS and the other belligerent parties. In addition, it was hailed as a first concrete example of 'African solutions to African problems' in practice. This, however, placed a major burden of the responsibility to protect upon the continent least able to marshal the necessary troops, funds and material to conduct a large-scale civilian-protection operation.[273]

A part of this problem has certainly been the mission's lack of experience. *Refugees International* argues that AMIS initially was deployed to Darfur with minimal planning and preparation: "Because this was the very first AU mission of this size and scope, the AMIS officers have had little experience with drafting plans on such a scale."[274] Next, there also were substantial problems with the force capacity. Given the assumption that 2-10 troops are required for every 1.000 inhabitants within the crisis zone, Darfur's population of approximately 6 million people means that AMIS should have had 12.000-60.000 personnel. Furthermore, given that the GoS army had a logistical capacity for 60.000 soldiers and the *Janjaweed* militias were an estimated 10.000-20.000 strong, AMIS should have comprised a

[270] S. Luqman, 'From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan', *Canadian Social Science* Vol. 8 No. 1 (2012) p. 63.
[271] For 'General Information about Refugees International', see: http://refugeesinternational.org/who-we-are.
[272] S. Chin & J. Morgenstein, *No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, © Refugees International (November, 2005) pp. 1-2.
[273] P.D. Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 13 No. 2 (2006) p. 178.
[274] Chin & Morgenstein, *No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, p. 22.

minimum of 10.000 and potentially 45.000 troops. However, on neither of these measures the number of 3.320 AMIS' personnel, including 2.341 military personnel, sufficed to offer genuine protection to a majority of Darfur's civilians.[275] This deficiency largely rendered the mission incapable to carry out its mandate, with devastating consequences for local civilians. According to Murithi, the AU monitoring operation was "floundering and enabling government forces, the *Janjaweed*, and the armed resistance groups to continue fighting amongst themselves and to continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of Darfurians."[276]

In turn, it appears that the mission's problems have informed a public perception that AMIS is incapable of enforcing its mandate effectively. This stems from the fact that AMIS troops came under constant harassment, with casualties inflicted by parties to the Darfur conflict.[277] Illustratively, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in Sudan placed the responsibility for the "deteriorating security situation in the AMIS Force Sector 2 Area of responsibility in South Darfur" in June 2005 squarely on the SLA and the JEM.[278] Shortly thereafter, two Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers were killed in action by "men dressed in SLA uniform that […] escaped in typical SLA vehicles into which they loaded their own casualty."[279]

Of course, it would be overly simplistic and unjust to blame the enduring insecurity of Darfur entirely on AMIS' lack of performance. In areas where the mission established its presence, both the security and humanitarian situations improved. The Joint Implementation Mechanism for instance concluded in June 2005 that AMIS's presence 'provided a very positive influence' since it helped to diminish 'the number of clashes between the belligerent parties and the number of attacks on civilians.'[280] This was confirmed by a UN official who added that "more people would have died if AMIS had not been there. We're getting a huge result

[275] Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan', pp. 176-177.
[276] T. Murithi, 'The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia', *African Security Review* Vol. 17 No. 1 (2008) p. 78.
[277] Luqman, 'From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan', p. 65.
[278] 'AMIS–Press Release on the deteriorating security situation in South Darfur', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (June 6, 2005).
[279] 'AU accuses rebel SLA of killing peacekeepers in Darfur ambush', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (October 9, 2005).
[280] Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan', pp. 178-179.

from a very few troops. Most people say that they are better than UN peacekeepers."[281] Notwithstanding, to gain insight into the problems that were encountered by this stabilization mission, we need to reflect on the legitimacy of the peace process that underpinned it.

First of all, the integrity of the peace process that led to the signing of the DPA had been compromised from the beginning. In most circumstances, the political and diplomatic objective is to obtain a peace agreement. The deployed peacekeeping force then comes secondary to that agreement and supports it. In Darfur, however, it was the other way around. The primary international objective had been to dispatch a UN force and the DPA negotiations became a prop for achieving that.

In turn, the prospect of being 'saved' by UN troops raised the hopes of Darfurians and made them consider any political compromises or offer of AMIS peacekeepers as an unacceptable second best. Despite being praised as the first real example of 'African solutions to African problems', AMIS' troops "in effect were told that they were the second-best option and would not be staying long, let alone reinforced and resupplied."[282] Among other factors, this seems to have considerably undermined the legitimacy of the peace process. Luqman, for instance, concludes that "given the inability to buy the non-signatory groups into the agreement, the continued fragmentation of the rebels front, increasing violence, the allegation that the AU is bias[ed] [against] the non-signatory groups by these groups and Darfurian in refugee and displaced persons camps and the lack of commitment to implement the text of the DPA by the government of Sudan seriously undermined the peace agreement."[283]

Specifically, suspicion arose among civilians and parties to the conflict that AMIS was biased towards the GoS and the SLM/Minnawi faction. To a certain extent, this had been the mission's own fault because it failed to take sufficient community confidence-building measures. According to *Refugees International*, AMIS officers tended to concentrate their discussions and relationship-building with those in power – the sheikhs of the villages and camps – as opposed to reaching out to the broader community. Displaced persons, in turn, said they could not tell the difference between an AU soldier and any other soldier in uniform. However one woman said "I know who the AU soldiers are because they are the soldiers that don't shoot at us", this was followed by assertions that GoS troops were operating in white

[281] 'AU Peace Monitors creating pockets of security in Darfur', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (February 25, 2005).
[282] De Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect', pp. 1045-1046.
[283] Luqman, 'From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan', p. 64.

vehicles that mimicked those of AMIS.[284] In this way, it seems likely that the mission came too closely associated with the pro-Arab parties to the Darfur conflict.

Second, the issue of disarmament offers deeper insight into the problems with state building. The official position of the AU was that the GoS should fulfil its obligation under UNSC Resolution 1556 and disarm the *Janjaweed*. According to De Waal, however, there was no prospect of reaching any agreement on a definition of these militia. The GoS insisted that the Janjaweed consisted solely of 'outlaw militia' i.e. bandit groups. In this way, no group or individual would ever admit to being associated with the *Janjaweed*. Conversely, many among the armed movements – especially the Minni Minawi – insisted that the *Janjaweed* consisted out of all groups that had obtained weapons with the support or consent of the government.[285]

The disagreement over the *Janjaweed* is indicative of a contrast between the 'negative' and 'positive' peace i.e. conflicting security interests between the parties. This is because the *Janjaweed* militia, which committed the most atrocious war crimes, had been backed by the GoS. Specifically, it was amply stated in news articles from prominent media e.g. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* that the government was not only "supporting their activities", but also "recruited *Janjaweed* members, supplied resources to the militia and provided air support to *Janjaweed* land attacks."[286] In turn, the GoS tried to distance itself from the activities of these militia and did not want to be held responsible for their actions. Already in 1990, however, this government was organizing militias in Darfur.[287] Whereas the GoS could still justify the participation of the Sudanese armed forces in clashes on the pretext of suppressing rebels who first attacked official military bases, the government support to *Janjaweed* militias remained a contentious and strongly criticized issue.[288] This created a particular legacy for UNAMID that will be discussed in the third part of this chapter.

Third, there also were significant problems with SSR at both national and local levels. In particular, the DPA security arrangements included provisions for the demilitarization of

---

[284] Chin & Morgenstein, *No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, p. 19.
[285] De Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect', p. 1050.
[286] N. Theerasatiankul, *Patterns in Reporting African Conflicts: The Case of Darfur* (Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC. 2008) p. 74.
[287] M. Mamdani, 'How can we name the Darfur crisis: Preliminary Thoughts on Darfur', in: F.M. Manji & P. Burnett (ed.), *African Voices on Development and Social Justice: Editorials from Pambazuka News 2004* (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010) pp. 256-262, there: p. 259.
[288] Danielová, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003', p. 50.

displaced persons' camps and their perimeters. Inside these camps, a 'community police force' was to be established, to be trained by AMIS civilian police. Thereby, it was envisioned that this community police would be a volunteer force drawn from the community itself that would ultimately become part of the regular police.[289] However, the state of the 'regular police' remained abysmal during AMIS' deployment. According to Williams, the "responsibility for the direct physical security for the IDP camps lay primarily with the Sudanese police, not AMIS – a police force widely distrusted by the IDPs because many of them turned out to be 're-packaged' *Janjaweed* or GoS soldiers."[290] This is echoed by *Refugees International*, which states that there is a "huge gulf of mistrust" between the Sudanese police and the local population as women have reported being harassed and raped by GoS police officers.[291] As long as these problems with the national police remain unresolved, the establishment of a local community police force will at best lead to security in a vacuum.

These problems with the security sector are indicative of the 'criminalization of the state' that preceded the government's marginalization of Darfur. This is because the Sudanese state became a participant to the conflict and directed violence against a particular group of inhabitants, the Darfurians. The fact that these phenomena are also connected with the Sudanese police, armed forces and the *Janjaweed* militia[292] represents serious obstacles for institutional reform within the context of liberal-democratic state building. It effectively means that Sudan at this point constituted a barbaric state that treated its own people as enemies and systematically murdered large numbers of them as a matter of policy.[293] Given the vast challenges inherent to this type of environment and AMIS' problems, the mission's efforts at providing immediate security therefore at best had a superficial effect on the prospects for post-conflict state building.

[289] De Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect', p. 1052.
[290] Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan', p. 179.
[291] Chin & Morgenstein, *No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, p. 16.
[292] Danielová, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003', p. 50.
[293] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, p. 33.

4.2. UNMIS: Contributing to Post-conflict State building?

Map 12 Southern Sudan

According to Mamdani, the debate on socioeconomic change in independent Sudan was framed by a contest between tradition and modernity. 'Tradition' was defended by chiefs in the native authority system and by religious leaders: forces that organized around the identity of tribe and religion and provided urban politicians with a rural base. 'Modernity' was typically defended by urban-based social classes and groups, particularly those who belonged to the ranks of the intelligentsia, the army and the merchant class. However, despite the decades-long contention between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of power, both shared certain assumptions. They identified historical change with 'modernity' and believed that 'tradition' was inimical to change. Furthermore, both believed that the colonial system had conserved tradition. Postcolonial politics thus chose the modern over the traditional, which locked both sides into a cul-de-sac: because only a minority of the population participated in the modern sector, modernists had no way to think of change except as an imposition from above. At the same time, traditionalists tended to regard all change as a treat to tradition. It is this assumption that explains "why "modernists" in Sudan were inevitably anti-democratic, why they assumed that the vast majority of people — those living in the traditional sector — would oppose modernity and change."[294] Moreover, while 'modernity' prevailed after independence, it did not proliferate Western notions of citizenship. Instead, post-independence rulers chose to build on the colonial legacy of indirect rule: a system of governance that combines a highly centralized system with decentralized local administration. This resulted in politicized racial and ethnic identities in both North and South Sudan. In the latter case, this led to a

[294] Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, pp. 171-173.

fragmentation of society along ethnic lines, the result being that South Sudan now consists of societies of individual nations.[295] The 'modernizing' minority in turn had no choice but to look for a vehicle to mobilize the majority. This vehicle was the nation, which raised another question: If the end of colonialism meant the independence of the nation, then who constituted 'the nation'? In this way, the battle between 'tradition' and 'modernity' became joined over the nation. This led to state-sponsored 'Arabization', which not only reinforced a self-conscious Arab power at the centre but also broadened the resistance that began in the south to other marginal areas in northern Sudan.[296] In this way, the Sudanese post-colonial history can be perceived as a struggle to define the nation and citizenship. Moreover, the present practice of 'indigenization' – in which citizenship is an exclusive right reserved for indigenes, natives, sons and daughters of the soil – increasingly leads to violence. Excluded groups start seeking their own homeland and, where this proves futile, the outcome is often institutional discrimination and/or violence.[297]

On 24 March 2005, the UNSC decided to establish the *United Nations Mission in the Sudan* (UNMIS). The mission was to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GoS and the SPLM/SPLA. This agreement also stipulated that, after a transitory period of six years of cohabitation by the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), a referendum on self-determination for the South would be held. This eventually determined Sudan's division into two countries in January 2011, with 98 percent of the population voting in favour of separation.[298] In order to support the CPA's implementation, the mission was mandated to e.g. "assist the parties to the CPA in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability; to assist the parties to the CPA […] in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of police; to assist the parties to the CPA in promoting understanding of the peace process *and the role of UNMIS* (my Italics) by means of an effective public

[295] C. Zambakari, 'Sudan and South Sudan: Identity, Citizenship, and Democracy in Plural Societies', *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015) pp. 73, 75.
[296] Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, p. 180.
[297] Zambakari, 'Sudan and South Sudan: Identity, Citizenship, and Democracy in Plural Societies', p. 74.
[298] W. Deng Deng, 'Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan', Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012) pp. 163-175, there: p. 163.

information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society; to assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in the CPA […] and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction."[299]

UNMIS' mandate reflects a clear holistic understanding of *Security System Reform*. It emphasizes the need to establish democratic security forces and promote the rule of law. Additionally, it was also promising that the mission acknowledged its own role in the peace process and proactively tried to explain it to local communities through a public information campaign. In June 2006, UNMIS Radio started broadcasting and aired news bulletins in English, Arabic and Juba Arabic which were updated three times per day. The GoSS approved the roll-out of this station, where after UNMIS planned for complete coverage of the largest population centres in southern Sudan.

By the end of UNMIS' mandate, successful demobilization operations had taken place in Wau, Kadugli and Khartoum. "As a result, a total of 7.030 ex-combatants, including 1.666 women and 420 disabled participants were demobilized. As of 29 March 2011, the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had demobilized a total of 44.263 ex-combatants: 32.298 in the North and 11.965 in the South." Furthermore, at the "end of February, 27.280 ex-combatants had been provided with information on reintegration opportunities in Northern and Southern Sudan. Of that number, 17.354 registered for reintegration support with the UNDP implementing partners: 12.081 completed the training component of the programme and 8.700 received reintegration packages." However, "despite significant progress and efforts, the gap between demobilization and reintegration caused concern […] posing a potential threat to security and stability in Southern Sudan and the border areas."[300]

In South Sudan, civilian disarmament efforts went hand in hand with unnecessary violence and brutality perpetrated by the soldiers in charge. In September 2008, the Lakes State Legislative Assembly condemned the "disarmament atrocities" after a series of events in Rumbek that resulted in at least seven people severely or fatally injured and thousands of Sudanese pounds looted from local businessmen. In a civilian disarmament round from June to December 2008, the battalion carrying out the operations allegedly seized vehicles at gun-point, beat, looted and raped women in Yirol, Pacong and Akot. In addition, Akolde Jinub – a

[299] For 'UNMIS mandate', see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/mandate.shtml.
[300] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2011/239, © United Nations Security Council (12 April 2011) pp. 1-24, there: p. 12.

resident of Rumbek – blamed the GoSS for the atrocities as it was President Salva Kiir who on May 22, 2008 decreed a 'shoot-to-kill' order with respect to the disarmament process. In response to these events, the Assembly stated that "the honourable members were not disobeying the Government of South Sudan presidential decree that ordered disarmament to be carried out in all Southern Sudan", but that they as lawmakers were seeking to resolve "problems intensifying against Rumbek civilians."[301]
Furthermore, in April 2010 the Secretary-General reported that serious challenges remained with respect to the justice system throughout Sudan: "The judiciary in general has limited independence and transparency […] in Southern Sudan, a key challenge is the lack of legislative, judicial and law-enforcement institutions."[302] In terms of judicial reform, it however was already hopeful that the Assembly publicly condemned these excesses by security forces. Similarly, its public expression of the intention to resolve the insecurity of civilians displayed an attitude conducive to the implementation of the rule of law.

Figure 4.1. *Community Expectations from Disarmament*



Reflecting on the aftermath of the disarmament efforts in South Sudan may lead to important insights. From March 2012 to July 2013, the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) monitored a disarmament scheme in the Jonglei State. Figure 4.1 shows the community expectations regarding the disarmament campaign within this territory. Roughly one out of three people (29%) expected disarmament to translate into peace and/or security. Interestingly, the same number of questioned people

[301] M. Mayom, 'Lakes State lawmakers condemn violence during disarmament process', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (September 10, 2008).
[302] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2010/168, © United Nations Security Council (5 April 2010) pp. 1-21, there: p. 16.

expected disarmament to bring basic services (11%), socio-economic development (10%) and business and trade (8%).[303] This means that for these people, peace and security are connected to or even equated with human development. Furthermore, in 2006 the government indicated that insecurity related to the abuse of small arms and light weapons was the biggest factor undermining government attempts to provide services, attract investments and development. However, after the disarmament round in 2006, communities still did not experience any of the promised socio-economic development,
investment or services. Whereas it would be infeasible to realise all of these promises overnight in a post-conflict environment, one can nevertheless "hardly conclude that states having lower levels of arms misuse have higher levels of development. While such promises might be intended to induce voluntary arms surrender, it can also create unrealistic expectations, misunderstandings, frustrations and further conflicts impacting negatively on future engagement with state authorities."[304]

The latter is crucial: according to figure 4.2, the vast majority (61%) of all respondents in the Jonglei State suggested that the government should take full responsibility to protect communities by strengthening the state's security sector. Here it can be recognized how disarmament efforts were followed by a need for SSR, given that the "collection of civilian held arms might mean more work for the security services, because the youth who might have been providing protection to community members had been disabled by removing their arms. This meant that, the full responsibility including failure to provide protection to civilians shifted to the



Figure 4.2. *"What should be done to maintain security and peace after disarmament?"*

[303] G.L. Duke & H. Rouw, *The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives on Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State*, © SSANSA – South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (September 2013) pp. 22-23.
[304] Ibid., p. 24.

state."[305] In both the North and the South, however, there were significant problems with the establishment of state security services. Under the CPA, the Sudanese armed forces and the SPLA would remain independent bodies with separate military command structures and 'both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan's National Armed Forces.' They were complemented by Joint Integrated Units that consisted of approximately 40.000 troops which were equally composed of elements from both the SAF and SPLA and positioned throughout Southern Sudan, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei.[306]
These units were formed as an experimental mechanism to fill post-war security vacuums in areas where the reach of the state was limited. In addition, they were to serve as a means of building confidence between the former warring parties, given the prospect of a potential integrated army. However, with the secession of South Sudan in 2011 the Joint Integrated Units were dissolved and only some of their members were likely to join the new security apparatus. Furthermore, policing had been solely addressed by the GoS in the pre-CPA period, which created a need to develop a completely new police structure for Southern Sudan. However, the creation of a modern civilian policing service did not seem to be a priority of the GoSS. Moreover, as many former SPLA soldiers were absorbed into the new Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), with little to no training in human rights, this institution had little to no personnel who were trained in policing civilian populations.[307]
In December 2010, the Secretary-General reported that "to date, UNMIS police have trained 25.840 Southern Sudan Police Service […] in referendum security duties." This, however, stands in sharp contrast to the mere 1.448 officers that were trained in "the protection of civilians and an appropriate response to disruptions in law and order."[308]

This reflects a discrepancy between the peace and security needs of the state vis-à-vis those of its people. In turn, UNMIS also experienced major problems in cooperating with the governments of (South) Sudan. First, the authorities in Khartoum continued to oppose UNMIS Radio broadcastings in the North, which contradicted the obligation under the status-of-forces agreement to allow the station to broadcast countrywide.[309] Furthermore, the Sudan Radio and Television Commission stated that UNMIS will not be able to broadcast

[305] Duke & Rouw, *The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament*, pp. 35-36.
[306] Deng Deng, 'Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan', pp. 163-164.
[307] Ibid., p. 170.
[308] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2010/681, © United Nations Security Council (31 December 2010) pp. 1-17, there: p. 9.
[309] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2006/728, © United Nations Security Council (12 September 2006) pp. 1-18, there: p. 9.

independently in Darfur or areas of east Sudan but may be allowed some airtime on Government transmitters. Crucially, such a limitation in the light of the "overall mandate of UNMIS and the larger problem to be addressed in Darfur after the reaching of a peace agreement severely restricted the Mission's broadcasting capability."[310] Importantly, Van der Lijn argues that the strength and capacity of the leading National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum had been large, compared to that of the governments of countries where peacekeeping operations are usually deployed. This meant that UNMIS had less leverage to carry out its mandate and required the 'goodwill' of the GoS in Khartoum, which was often missing. Within the ranks of the NCP, there were moreover 'hardliners' who viewed the CPA as "a trap that might cause the loss of power for the NCP." On the other hand, the 'reformers' viewed the CPA as the only way to maintain the unity of the country and integrate the SPLM into the elite. Crucially, the disposition of the NCP towards UNMIS became less favourable and cooperative as the hardliners were gaining momentum: "At the beginning of 2006, the NCP supported protests and campaigns against the United Nations […] restricted the freedom of movement from UN personnel and Sudanese UNMIS staff were arrested."[311] "As a result, for example, the rule of law unit of UNMIS faced large obstacles in implementing its policies as Khartoum is uninterested in cooperation."[312]
On the other hand, it is a myth that Khartoum is in control of all government structures throughout the country. While there is a solid security apparatus, the other parts of the government are either not aware of what the rest is doing or even thwart each other. It is no secret that the GoS in Khartoum suffers from hampering issues of legitimacy. For example, in May 2009 a political alliance of 17 parties accused the NCP of seeking to control power and wealth; they expressed their scepticism about the ruling party's commitment to ensure fair and free elections. In response, a government spokesperson said that there is no legal basis for the claim that the government is illegitimate and those who stand behind it are "fooling people in the name of law and constitution." Next, he called for the said parties to resort to the constitutional court for a ruling on the issue.[313]

Because the North was generally less open to assistance, UNMIS directed most of its attention

[310] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2005/821, © United Nations Security Council (21 December 2005) pp. 1-17, there: p. 9.
[311] J. van der Lijn, 'Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations: UNMIS in Sudan', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010) pp. 40-41.
[312] Ibid., p. 40.
[313] [Author unknown], 'Sudan's ruling NCP says Supreme Court determines government legitimacy', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (May 27, 2009).

for capacity and institution-building to Southern Sudan. However, the GoSS and SPLM were often criticized as being unrepresentative of all the ethnic groups residing there. According to Laudati – who carried out three months of fieldwork in three states of South Sudan between January and April 2008 – the failure of the "less than Comprehensive Peace Agreement" to consider the marginalization of different groups means that the material deprivations and structural inequalities faced by many ethnic groups in South Sudan will continue even as the SPLA transitions from a military organization into a governance institution. In terms of representativeness, it is noteworthy that the CPA negotiations had been limited to the NCP for the North and the SPLM/A for the South. While it remained an accomplishment that all armed factions of the North and South committed themselves or at least tended to respect the CPA, the northern opposition's support for the CPA was however based on the premise that it would lead to democracy. According to them, by contrast, it only appears to have provided legitimacy to the NCP and the SPLM, which caused their support to wane.[314]
For instance, with regard to the northern Blue Nile State, the Secretary-General noted in April, 2011 that "while there has been some progress towards the implementation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on popular consultations, significant work remains […] 69.429 people expressed their opinions on the implementation of the agreement [during a series of public hearings]. Messages conveyed during the hearings focused on forms of governance and development needs in the State. The next stage involves the conduct of thematic hearings in March with the participation of political parties, civil society, members of State and National Assemblies, native administration and intellectuals. This process has been delayed owing to various political and procedural disagreements."[315]
This means that the mission was already in the process of implementing the CPA before the members of civil society were even consulted, let alone included in the provisions. In this way, the CPA became a treaty which predominantly served the interests of the SPLM and the NCP, at the detriment of excluded ethnic groups.

Furthermore, next to its status as a political movement and security institution, the problems

[314] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', UN doc S/2005/411 6 ; 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', UN doc S/2005/821, 3 ; John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Force in the Wake of the Juba Declaration* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2006) ; 'Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)', 8 January 2006; 'Interview with Sudanese journalist' ; 'Interview with Sudanese scholar' ; 'Interview with Sudanese politician' ; Lijn, van der, 'Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations', p. 43.

[315] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2011/239, © United Nations Security Council (12 April 2011) pp. 1-24, there: p. 6.

with the DDR programme also indicate the SPLM/A's role as an income provider. According to the CPA, the SPLA was supposed to start demobilizing 90.000 out of its approximately 230.000 combatants in January 2006. In practice, however, the process only began in June 2009. By May 2011, merely 12.252 ex-combatants had been demobilised. This delay is mainly due to the difficulty to convince combatants to demobilise voluntarily. On the one hand, the SPLA commanders had been reluctant to downsize their troops as they perceived their political strength as deriving directly from the number of men under their command. On the other hand, many combatants themselves preferred to stay in the SPLA since they viewed it as a secure source of income, especially after the SPLA started paying salaries in 2005.[316] Moreover, the SPLM/A managed to effectively mobilize political discourses of 'victims' vs. 'liberators' to legitimize the violent means by which they appropriate tenure and resources. The SPLA largely viewed civilians as a resource for plunder […] through the expropriation of taxes, food and labour.[317]
Meanwhile, in October 2008, UNMIS reported increased engagement on human rights issues by civil society organizations and government representatives in Southern Sudan. Nevertheless, the report also stated that "institutions involved in safeguarding the rule of law need to be strengthened. Access to justice remained a challenge."[318] For instance, while UNMIS' Rule of Law Division in Southern Sudan has been quite effectively co-located in the GoSS ministries, its Human Rights Division has been much more directed at Darfur at the expense of the rest of the country. In addition, the traditional tribal structures, including tribal courts, were barely supported despite their substantial capacity to resolve conflicts.[319] Thus, UNMIS helped to consolidate the SPLM's political primacy in South Sudan, despite the movement's limited ethnic support base there. Moreover, the mission's bias towards formal state institutions led it to ignore the availability of pre-existing, indigenous methods of conflict resolution.

With respect to the Jonglei State, figure 4.3. displays how the five communities surveyed perceive their security since the beginning of the disarmament campaign in March 2012. It must be emphasized that this survey instrument did not assess the extent to which Jonglei has

---

[316] Deng Deng, 'Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan', pp. 165-166.
[317] A. Laudati, 'Victims of Discourse: Mobilizing Narratives of Fear and Insecurity in Post-Conflict South Sudan — The Case of the Jonglei State' *African Geographical Review* Vol. 30 No. 1 (2011) pp. 17, 26-27.
[318] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2008/662, © United Nations Security Council (20 October 2008) pp. 1-20, there: p. 11.
[319] Lijn, van der, 'Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations', pp. 45-46.

Figure 4.3. *Perceived Security Effects of Disarmament*



	Ayod	Akobo	Bor	Duk	Twice East
Improved Significantly	0,00 %	0,00 %	3,33 %	0,00 %	0,00 %
Improved a little	60,00 %	72,58 %	66,66 %	55,00 %	0,00 %
Remain the same	40,00 %	27,42 %	30,00 %	40,00 %	6,78 %
Is worst	0,00 %	0,00 %	0,00 %	5,00 %	93,22 %

become peaceful in relation to the disarmament campaign. Regardless, it is striking how only 3,33% of the respondents – all from Bor county – stated that security had improved significantly. This, however, is unsurprising, given that the state capital has been relatively secure even during the worst inter-communal clashes. On the other hand, 60% of the respondents in Ayod, 72,58% in Akobo, 66,66% in Bor and 55% in Duk stated that security improved but only a little. Meanwhile, 40% of the respondents in Ayod, 27,42% in Akobo, 30% in Bor, 40% in Duk and 6,78% in Twic East felt that security remained the same. Crucially, however, “stayed the same or only improved a little” could mean that there remain considerable levels of insecurity, given the high levels of violence prior to the disarmament campaign. In this way, security remaining the same does not necessarily mean that the government is doing well with regard to providing protection to the populace. Furthermore, 93,22% of respondents in Twic East indicated that they felt less secure since the disarmament campaign begun. According to SSANSA, the “striking fact here is that, Twic East is also the county that accounted for the highest level of voluntary surrender and the lowest level of community resistance. This is problematic because the community members accepted to lay down arms expecting state protection.” In this way, the data collected in Jonglei State suggest that DDR will ultimately fail if the government, police and armed forces do not provide the population with security in return.[320]

Similarly, Kwaja identifies the key issues in Sudan as “the provision of security for the people on the one hand and the control of institutions providing security on the other, so that they provide security to the citizens and not the regime in power.” Conversely, he also notes that reforming the security sector “should also be geared towards repositioning the armed forces to

[320] Duke & Rouw, *The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament*, pp. 31-32.

protect the national security and territorial integrity of the Sudanese state."[321] In the context of Sudan, however, the need to have security institutions that provide security to the people and not to the regime in power, while simultaneously requiring the Sudanese armed forces to protect the state, appear to be mutually incompatible. This is because Sudan suffers from crises of citizenship and legitimacy that manifest themselves in the perceived dichotomy between 'tradition' and 'modernity' in the state. This has split the Sudanese society between urban-based elites and rural natives, as expressed by the continued marginalization of many ethnic groups while the GoS in Khartoum and the GoSS in Juba served only a narrow elite. Crucially, the CPA had never provided for these marginalized groups in the first place. UNMIS, in turn, tried to support the implementation of the agreement through capacity and institution-building. Its local partners – embodied by government authorities in the North and South –however were highly problematic. On the one hand, the mission sought to address the ongoing Darfur crisis, whereby it antagonized the northern Khartoum administration. On the other hand, the GoSS also suffered from insufficient legitimacy that sometimes alienated UNMIS from local ethnic communities. This is because the SPLM/A too represented only a narrow ethnic faction, despite its key roles as a political institution, security organization and income provider which the mission helped to consolidate.

In both the North and South, the state's security services are interwoven with these fundamental problems within the state. In this way, the joint UNMIS-GoSS draft justice and security interim review to "strengthen local ownership of the development process in these sectors, increase the understanding of formal and informal security and conflict resolution mechanisms and assisting the Government of South Sudan in setting priorities for the transformation and revitalization of the justice and security sector"[322] could at best have resulted in short- to middle-term capacity improvements. Nevertheless, there has indeed been a real tension between the two partners, which is evident from e.g. the words of the SPLA commander Bahr el Gazal: "UN people visit us to tell us that we are not civilised because we do not understand human rights… We had our own rules long before they came!"[323]
In addition, Baker & Scheye pointed out the unsustainability of the then current justice sector development design. They drew upon more than 200 interviews which they undertook in 2007

[321] C.M.A. Kwaja, 'The Feasibility of Security Sector Reform and Access to Justice in Sudan: Challenges in Prospects', *African Security Review* Vol. 19 No. 1 (2010) p. 7.
[322] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', S/2011/239, © United Nations Security Council (12 April 2011) pp. 1-24, there: p. 17.
[323] Interview, SPLA commander, Bahr el Gazal [rebel-held Sudan] 2003.

in three towns (Juba, Yei and Malakal) and their surroundings in southern Sudan. One of the interviewees concerned a police officer with years of experience in southern Sudan, who stated the infeasibility of establishing a police service that would "cover south Sudan … [It] would be impossible. You couldn't do it." In his opinion, which was echoed by UNMIS officials, the best that "can be achieved, after 30 years, is a state police service working primarily in the former 'garrison towns', leaving most of 'the population of southern Sudan with no contact with the [state] police.'"[324]

In this sense, there has been some progress because "UNMIS police also conducted 3.255 patrols in the Mission area, including 638 joint confidence-building and long-range patrols with local police."[325] However, many former SPLA soldiers were absorbed into the new SPSS.[326] This contributed mostly to consolidating the SPLA in the security sector, while the SPLM in the GoSS continued to marginalize many of South Sudan's ethnic groups. For this reason, the contribution of the former UNMIS' effort to liberal state building becomes questionable at the very least. Ultimately, although negative peace in the 'North-South' conflict had *grosso modo* been achieved, UNMIS' contribution to durable peace through institution-building thus seems rather superficial.

[324] B. Baker & E. Scheye, 'Access to Justice in a Post-Conflict State: Donor-supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 16 No. 2 (2009) pp. 172, 176.
[325] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', pp. 1-24, there: p. 12.
[326] Deng Deng, 'Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan', p. 170.

4.3. UNAMID: A Preliminary Assessment

The scope of the ongoing crisis in Darfur relative to AMIS' capacity and mandate led to calls for the deployment of a more substantial UN peace operation with a robust civilian protection mandate. In 2007, the international community heeded these calls by authorizing the *African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur* (UNAMID). This was an "unprecedented joint peace operation constituted by forces of 'predominantly African character, while being largely and externally financed and structured by UN command and control and backstopping."[327] UNAMID was given a mandate to e.g. "support, in coordination with the parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to support capacity-building of the Government of Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of the movements." In this respect, the mission was to "support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan *and of the police of the movements* (my Italics) to maintain public order and build the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement […]." In terms of judicial reform, the mission was mandated to e.g. "assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity."[328]

The predominant image that arises from previous military deployments in Sudan is that they were mainly able to provide for short- or middle-term adjustments in the security and justice sectors. UNAMID, in this sense, demonstrates a clear progression vis-à-vis earlier deployments because it recognized the status of non-state political movements as 'non-statutory security forces' (see: Figure 2.1.). With respect to the DPA, the mission's leadership also seems to have learned its lessons as it, for example, stated that "a negotiated political settlement that includes all armed groups, including the non-signatory armed movements, remains a key element of a comprehensive solution to the conflict."[329] More than its predecessors, UNAMID reflects an understanding of the problematic context in which it operated. The mission's troops were required to provide immediate security, demobilize and reintegrate combatants and downsize security actors, of which the latter two were

---

[327] D. Mickler, 'UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur?' *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 13 No. 5 (2013) p. 487.
[328] For 'UNAMID mandate', see: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/mandate.shtml.
[329] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur', S/2013/607, © United Nations Security Council (14 October 2013) pp. 1-17, there: p. 16.

characteristic of post-conflict SSR.[330] However, as the 'post-conflict' context of Sudan kept changing, UNAMID became increasingly impeded in carrying out its mandate. According to Luqman, the DPA ended any semblance of unity within or between the SLM/A and the JEM when major factions refused to sign the agreement. They cited the lack of ownership by parties to the peace process as its most critical shortcoming. Thereafter, the rebel movements in Darfur splintered into several factions which effectively reinforced the mistrust among parties to the conflict. This, in turn, resulted in constant breaches of the ceasefire agreement and increasing attacks between parties and against civilians.[331] Crucially, the controversy and fractionalization that surrounded the signing of the new Doha peace agreement in 2011 has had adverse consequences for UNAMID's authority. This is evident from the events on e.g. 24 March, 2013, when "an armed convoy of UN soldiers escorting a group of displaced people to a peace conference surrendered the group to armed abductors without resisting." The abductors belonged to the hard-line SLA faction that refused to participate in the Doha peace process and now opposed the conference.[332]

Hostilities perpetrated by the SLA against international troops in Darfur were not a new feature. In late 2005, two Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers were already killed by "men dressed in SLA uniform that […] escaped in typical SLA vehicles […]."[333] The reason for this local hostility is also similar. Whereas AMIS came too closely associated with the GoS and the SLM/Minnawi faction, UNAMID too had to rely on the "willingness of the Government of Sudan at both the national and the local levels to undertake significant reform of its security and judicial institutions."[334] Meanwhile, the government's military operations in Darfur continued throughout 2009, reflecting a "lack of readiness on the part of the movements and the Government" to engage in the Doha peace process. In response, the Secretary-General called out to "all parties to the conflict to use this opportunity to re-engage with the peace process in good faith, with a view to achieving a sustainable peace for all Darfurians."[335] While the head of UNAMID indicated in April 2009 that the mission still spoke "with

[330] Jackson, 'SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?', pp. 119-120.
[331] Luqman, 'From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan', p. 67.
[332] Radio Dabanga, 'Sudan Leaks: UN surrendered displaced to abductors', *Radio Tamazuj | Sudanese news crossing borders* (April 7, 2014).
[333] 'AU accuses rebel SLA of killing peacekeepers in Darfur ambush', © *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan* (October 9, 2005).
[334] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)', S/2009/592, © United Nations Security Council (16 November 2009) pp. 1-20, there: p. 19.
[335] Ibid., p. 13.

increasing authority on the ground", he also cautiously stated that "[…] civilians continue to face unacceptable risks *and no solution has been found to remedy the great wrongs and injustices that have been committed.* (my Italics)"[336] Ultimately, finding such a solution entails not just the rebuilding of state institutions, but also processes of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Here, we arrive at an understanding of Call & Cousens definition of state building as "actions undertaken […] which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding"[337] Given UNAMID's focus on state institutions and its capacity-building efforts to rebuild them, the mission does not appear to possess the appropriate set of tools to offer support processes to the former processes. Arguably, it is UNAMID's continued reliance on the GoS together with the mission's inability to change the status-quo for civilians that made it into a target for hostilities.

Prior to the elections of April 2010, the Secretary-General urged "all stakeholders to take concrete steps at the political level to guarantee a credible electoral process […] to ensure that all groups in Darfur, especially internally displaced persons, are able to participate in an atmosphere of free expression and with full freedom of movement."[338] Conversely, the elections were not available to all voters and some could not vote because of lasting violence in the region. The result was that the NCP won the elections and its leader, president Omar al-Bashir (who ultimately was accused of involvement in the Darfur genocide by the International Criminal Court) remained in office.[339] Crucially, if the potential "problems and dangers"[340] of organizing elections in post-conflict states cannot be resolved only by establishing effective judicial and security institutions, then this would justify a 'reality-check' of viewing democratically held elections as the preferred outcome and final exit-point for an international military intervention.

In October 2010, the Secretary-General reported that the leaders of SLA and JEM continued to refrain from participating in the peace talks. The GoS also had yet to demonstrate a willingness to make sufficiently attractive concessions to these parties. For the AU-UN led international community, it was however important that all parties would enter into the negotiations: "Only a comprehensive and inclusive negotiated political settlement can bring

[336] 'UNSC 6112th Meeting', S/PV/6112, © United Nations Security Council (New York; 27 April 2009) pp. 1-4, there: p. 4. ; Mickler, 'UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur?', p. 503.
[337] Call & Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', p. 4.
[338] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)', pp. 1-20, there: p. 13.
[339] Danielová, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003', p. 54.
[340] Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, p. 190.

about a credible cessation of hostilities and address the root causes of conflict in Darfur."[341] In this sense, there was widespread agreement on the root causes of the conflict and key issues affecting the Doha peace process among civil society actors, who represented various constituencies across Darfur. They had been brought together by UNAMID, which organized and held a series of preparatory workshops and forums to sensitize and mobilize civil society representatives for the peace process.[342] While this increased focus on civil society empowerment does correspond with Miller's recommended 'Administer' strategy for legitimacy building (see: Table 1.2.), both security and legitimacy are ultimately contingent upon the ability of the GoS and the armed movements to reconcile their differences. These groups, however, continued to clash along the lines 'Arab' vs. 'African' and, more deeply, according to the dichotomy between 'traditional' and 'modern' identities. Indeed, some would argue that the situation still could not be called 'post-conflict'.[343] When observing the period from 2007 to 2011, it can be concluded that UNAMID effectively managed to put plasters on a wound that desperately needs a long-term, complementary and more multifaceted treatment. Despite the lessons which UNAMID had learned vis-à-vis previous military deployments, it was still beyond the mission's scope to provide such a treatment.

[341] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)', S/2010/543, © United Nations Security Council (18 October 2010) pp. 1-17, there: p. 16.
[342] Ibid., p. 2.
[343] Danielová, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003', p. 54.

Conclusion

This inquiry has tried to assess the extent to which post-Cold War *Security Sector/System Reform* (SSR) has contributed to post-conflict state building in Somalia and Sudan. To this end, it has focused on the liberal-democratic approach of institution-building which, despite a vast number of criticisms, has remained the prevalent paradigm of state reconstruction. As a theoretical framework, this inquiry has adopted the concept of 'armed state building'. This is based on a century of US/UN-led efforts to use political, military and economic power to compel states to govern more effectively.

It is important to reiterate that the analysis has focused exclusively on international military efforts as an artificially isolated exercise of power by liberal states. For this reason, the inquiry has not methodologically embedded the influence of political and economic power on the interactions with Somalia and Sudan during periods of military deployment. This calls for further research in this direction, which could include e.g. the roles of international negotiation and diplomacy, as well as ODA by donor states. Regardless, this inquiry has conducted four case studies of past international military efforts in Somalia and Sudan. Thereby, it has also offered preliminary analyses of two missions that are currently still deployed. These insights allow us to test the hypothesis that armed state building should involve more invasive efforts in greater degrees of failure, and less invasive efforts in lesser degrees.

Furthermore, this inquiry has critically appraised the notion that 'institutionalization before liberalization' is most suitable to realise peace and security in post-conflict environments. To this end, it has attempted to measure the qualitative and quantitative contribution of SSR in the restoration/establishment of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Part of this has been an assessment of the progress made within *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) programs. In turn, the inquiry has examined the legitimacy of the state institutions that were under construction. To this end, it has tried to measure input or process legitimacy by looking at the establishment of state institutions. In turn, it has scrutinized attempts to build legitimacy by empowering civil society representatives and implementing community confidence-building measures.

In addition, this inquiry has looked at efforts to (re)establish the rule of law to pinpoint the

problematic relationship between state and society. To this end, it has unravelled the historical problems with liberal-democratic state building in these countries. In this way, we have found that a myriad of predominantly structural factors and processes – the urban/rural divide and the ethnicization of politics together with contested issues of territoriality and identity – have jointly culminated in the 'crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state'. In particular, the different relations between the central government and a variety of groups have over time resulted in unequal statuses of citizenship. This process has divided the political loyalties of these groups of people and fuelled the relative deprivation between them.

This myriad of factors and processes underpins the communal conflicts that often lead to state disintegration. In this way, the crises of citizenship and legitimacy are chameleonic phenomena that manifest themselves differently in varying contexts. Nonetheless, they all stem from structural factors that have historically determined the relationship between the state and society. These structural factors also help to explain the problems with 'spoilers' in peace processes. In addition, anarchic circumstances often add immediate security concerns to these factors. This combination of factors and concerns could render the development of mobilized political groups even more intractable. Together, these crises and spoiler problems have been used to interpret the state building challenges of Somalia and Sudan.

With respect to the restoration/establishment of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, comparing the efforts in Somalia and Sudan have led to a number of observations. First of all, the contributions were all quantitative or numerical i.e. focused on increasing the capacity of the state's security and justice institutions. Qualitative contributions would, for instance, have aimed at gradually improving the authority and sustainability of these institutions within their local contexts. In turn, the missions can all be said to have followed the post-Cold War, liberal-democratic approach of building institutional capacities. There are, however, two comments to be made on this point.

First, the practice of this approach became subject to change as the rocky 1990s culminated into the twenty-first century. For example, the deployment of UNOSOM-II still expressed the features of an exit-strategy, which is illustrated by the fact that "international support for the programme, including the payment of salaries for the Somali police, ceased on 31 March 1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate."[344] This mission, moreover, lacked a strategy for the transition from a failed state to a democratically elected government: "in

[344] 'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia', p. 12.

Somalia there was no clear vision of how reconciliation should proceed. […] The expectation was that the combatants, after years of fighting a civil war, could somehow resolve their differences in a few months."[345] By contrast, UNAMID's leadership emphasized the importance of including non-signatory armed movements in order to arrive at a comprehensive solution to the conflict.[346] Although the task of building capacities and institutions in post-conflict environments was never abandoned, a decade past of accumulating experience in the practice of these activities has taught the international community to include non-statutory security forces, non-state political movements and non-signatory armed movements into their state reconstruction efforts.

Next, the liberal-democratic state remains the normative framework in which these efforts take place. In South Sudan, samples of local field survey-data moreover suggest that people, even in the most war-torn environments, still require the government, police and armed forces to protect them after disarmament rounds. For this reason, the ongoing focus on capacity and institution-building is not misguided. Nevertheless, within Miller's typology of state failure, these efforts correspond to the inability of 'incapable' states to deliver public goods and services. In Somalia and Sudan, however, the state has experienced a complex intertwinement of 'anarchic', illegitimate and barbaric failures.[347] These failures have been fuelled by structural, historical factors which contributed to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. Ultimately, the outcome of these processes confronted the international military deployments with fundamentally different challenges than merely fixing a state that lacks the technical capability to govern.

In this way, the restoration of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been infeasible as an a-contextual and strictly technical exercise. In Somalia, the international community propagated the re-establishment of the "political and administrative structures, based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of the country."[348] Not only did UNOSOM-II fail to provide a platform for such reconciliation, but the Secretary-General's rhetoric also reflects a profound lack of contextual understanding of the Somali state. Specifically, the only political and administrative structures that could have been re-established were those of the Siad Barre-regime. In the history of Somalia, only this dictator

[345] Clarke & J. Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', pp. 78-79.
[346] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur', S/2013/607, © United Nations Security Council (14 October 2013) pp. 1-17, there: p. 16.
[347] Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure*, pp. 33, 57-58.
[348] 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', p. 15.

had been able to claim a monopoly on violence. For this purpose, Siad used the method of 'clan-katura' to dominate civil and security organizations, while interchangeably being backed by the contending powers of the Cold War era. This dictatorial system effectively collapsed in the early 1990s and, for obvious reasons, could not have been reinvented by the liberal international community. Instead, the latter tried to establish a democratically elected government without first resolving the root causes that led to state collapse. Under AMISOM, the negative impact of this attitude became even more severe as the mission began to support a Somali government that had been imposed by Ethiopia.

The international military efforts thus helped to establish a ruling authority without regard for the Somali context. This is illustrated by the fact that thee TFG was criticized by many Somalis and widely perceived as corrupt, ineffective and largely uninterested in pursuing a strategy of conflict resolution and political reconciliation across Somalia.[349] In this way, the TFG is therefore likely to have contributed to Somalis' distrust of central government, rather than re-establishing a legitimate national government authority. Thus, while remodelling Somalia according to Barre's dictatorial style evidently was not an option, UNOSOM-II and AMISOM instead propagated an a-historic and a-contextual type of government that was perceived as an illegitimate external imposition. This did not leave the Somalis with many options and it therefore is hardly surprising that the voluntary disarmament ended in a failure.

Moreover, the lack of a legitimate, functioning government implies that the monopoly on the legitimate use of force could not have been restored. While the institution and capacity-building efforts that targeted the Somali security sector might have been useful, the lack of a legitimate and functioning state meant that these efforts were performed within a vacuum. For 'best practices', the international community could alternatively have looked at parts of the country were marginalized under the Siad Barre-regime. While the south of Somalia remained in a state of collapse, the northern Somaliland and Puntland developed into self-governing enclaves.[350]

In particular, the fact that these areas had largely fallen outside Mogadishu's framework resulted in the primacy of informal networks and more indigenous modes of governance. Northern Somali elites for instance had to rely on local elders to protect their dealings in the smuggling trade against presidential interference. Given that these elites could not rely on formal courts or the president's militias for their protection, the elders had to use e.g. local

[349] Williams, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', pp. 231-232.
[350] Hills, 'Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia', pp. 168-169.

customary social arrangements to manage their affairs.[351] By contrast, the TFG did not even have the semblance of national unity. Occurring splits furthermore disproved the idea that the TFG was a unitary whole that itself was not prone to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. Even with the international support, the TFG thus constituted merely another party to the conflict.

This tendency can also be observed in Sudan, where the GoS became a participant to the conflict and directed violence against the Darfurians. Here we have a clear example of a barbaric state, which also problematizes attempts to restore the monopoly on the use of force. Next to train/equip efforts, this would also have required activities towards justice and reconciliation. In turn, such efforts could have contributed to restoring the rule of law, given that they help to influence the broad parameters of the citizens' relationship to the state and vice versa. On the contrary, Miller's strategies for building security and legitimacy make no explicit reference to these concepts or their treatment. Considering the experiences from Sudan, it may however be deemed critical to consider these politically contentious issues. AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID all had to rely on the willingness of the GoS at the national and local levels. In turn, the GoS' military operations in Darfur continued throughout 2009, which worked against the efforts of the missions.

Thus, in spite of the international military presence, it is therefore unlikely that significant changes occurred in the situation of the Darfurians. Next, it appears plausible that this could have induced spoiler behaviour, such as the SLA's recurring hostilities against the international troops that worked with the GoS. In theory, this lack of change may very well have contributed to the perpetuation of Darfurian conflict narratives that would justify the SLA's actions. Processes of justice and reconciliation could help to transform these narratives by resolving the relationship between state and society. Looking at figure 2.2., repairing this relationship could then help to benefit the security sector and the rule of law. In this way, the institutional development of the state goes hand in hand with transforming the relationship between the government, ex-combatants and their constituents.

Conversely, the disposition of the NCP towards UNMIS gradually became less favourable and cooperative as the CPA became viewed as "a trap that might cause the loss of power for the NCP." This was unsurprising, given that the Sudanese modernists were inevitably anti-democratic. Moreover, their spheres of influence stretched out to the Sudanese government, police, armed forces and *Janjaweed* militia. In this way, the restoration of the monopoly on

[351] Reno, 'African Rebels and the Citizenship Question', pp. 232, 235.

the legitimate use of force in Sudan would still require a profound restructuring of the relations between the state and society. The hostilities perpetrated against AMIS and UNAMID suggest that these missions themselves had already become part of the conflict, whereas UNMIS' efforts towards Joint Integrated Units were cancelled in 2011. Crucially, while these missions' efforts may have increased the capacities of the police and armed forces, they have not resolved the legitimacy problems that underpinned both the GoS and GoSS. This aspect, however, remains indispensable to the restoration of the state's monopoly on the use of force.

Comparing the missions leads to a number of distinguishable differences, similarities and trends. First, they all suffered from declining legitimacy due to the weak political foundations of their post-conflict state building efforts. In Somalia, UNOSOM-II first lacked a pathway for the political reconstruction of the state, after which AMISOM supported a process that was owned by an illegitimate federal government. In Sudan, both the DPA and CPA lacked comprehensiveness and the representation of all parties' interests – both signatory and non-signatory – as well as the signatory parties' commitment to implementation. In turn, the missions' cooperation with government authorities has commonly been problematic. Effectively, it has repeatedly hampered the local legitimacy of the international armed forces. The violence perpetrated against AMIS and UNAMID, for instance, can be seen in this light. Nevertheless, AMIS' lack of capacity has also contributed to its declining credibility as a peacekeeping force. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the 'post-conflict' nature of these environments merely referred to the absence of direct violence between parties. In these fragile circumstances, the combination of weak political foundations and the missions' firm reliance on government parties at the expense of ownership at other levels has helped to spark renewed violence.
Second, a growing trend has seen the missions increasingly recognizing their own roles and responsibilities in the process of legitimacy building. This is reflected in the missions' mandates and in the emerging civilian-military units for confidence-building. Similarly, the missions have expressed their growing attention for the empowerment of civil society representatives and the incorporation of non-statutory security forces into SSR efforts. In this sense, the military focus on civil society itself has however remained a fairly technical exercise. In Somalia and Sudan, it has mostly been aimed at including the representatives rather than empowering them. UNMIS, for example, already began to support the CPA's implementation before civil society members had been consulted.

One the one hand, this attitude is related to the top-down, state-centred nature of SSR in which civil society involvement has become supplementary rather than integral. One the other hand, the missions' treatment of civil society also seemed to presuppose that these representatives comprised a consistently unitary and independent socio-political group which has been resistant to the crises of citizenship and legitimacy. In Somalia, however, it already became clear in the 1990s that the Siad Barre-dictatorship had manipulated civil organizations to the extent that they had become part of the state collapse as well.
Finally, the missions' focus on the institutional development of the state through capacity-building has in all cases neglected the value of indigenous providers of security and justice. This can be observed in Southern Sudan, where UNMIS barely supported the traditional tribal structures despite their substantial capacity to resolve conflicts.[352] In addition, the liberal international community has also ignored the meaning or significance or parallel developments, such as in Somaliland and Puntland, where no international military force was deployed. Conversely, the bottom-up voluntary demobilization here was more successful than the top-down military efforts to achieve the same in the Mogadishu area. The result of the missions' focus, in turn, has often been the support or consolidation of state institutions that either did not fit into the context, provoked resistance or were established prematurely. While the paradigm of liberal state building remains intact, there are thus contextual factors that also determine whether or not institution-building will contribute to peacebuilding. 'Institutionalization before liberalization' therefore does not serve as a panacea for peace and security in fragile environments. For this reason, both the practice of institution-building and its preferred exit-point of democratically held elections require a reality-check in each case.

In sum, international military attempts to rebuild the state's security and justice sectors alone cannot deliver long-term contributions to post-conflict state building. While such attempts however remain essential, in Somalia and Sudan they mostly contributed short- to middle-term improvements. These conversely led to e.g. security in a vacuum and have nowhere been praised for their sustainability. This, in turn, corresponds to the frequently cited criticisms of the liberal-institutionalist approach as being static, technical, a-historic with little or no regard for local contexts. Moreover, it has been indicated that resolving the crises of citizenship and legitimacy would also require long-term peacebuilding. This could mean e.g. protracted efforts to change the contours of the relations between parties to the conflict. In theory, this

[352] Lijn, van der, 'Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations', pp. 45-46.

could help to establish a set of norms to which all parties could adhere, in order to transform spoiler behaviour through socialization. It is noteworthy that none of the missions adopted the 'socialization' strategy of spoiler management.[353] The general picture that emerges from the sources is that such activities remained confined to the Secretary-General's exercise of political pressure. In this regard, the only real exception has been AMISOM's military action against *Al-Shabab*, which to a significant extent can be explained by the fact that the movement was branded a terrorist organization. Further research is needed to complete this image, but for now the evidence suggests that additional effort is required to rebuild the state in a manner that deals with all parties.
Nevertheless, it remains an illusion to think that peacekeeping alone can replace the political and diplomatic processes needed to reach agreements and reconciliation in the longer term: "the best soldiers in the world can only lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself."[354] Crucially, these international military forces are bound to manoeuver in a highly complex and dangerous force-field. In fragile environments, they face the complicated task of retaining their credibility as a neutral powerbroker. On the other hand, both Miller's typology and hypothesis of armed state building can be described as static, technical and unresponsive to contextual circumstances. For this reason, it becomes problematic to use them to label and prescribe behaviour towards the constantly changing realities of failed and fragile states. Nor do they provide solace for efforts that reach beyond institution and capacity-building and move into the relations between different groups of people.

For this reason, this inquiry concludes by suggesting that this kind of peacebuilding efforts do not belong to the military domain. Donor and development organizations might be more suitable for these tasks, while the military continues to focus on institutional development. The prospects for such a cooperation would provide a fertile soil for additional follow-up studies. Similarly, further research is needed to place Somalia and Sudan in their regional and geopolitical contexts. Looking at the historical interactions between e.g. Ethiopia and Somalia and Chad and Sudan may help us to arrive at a broader understanding of the predominantly structural factors that underpin the challenges of state building here. As the twenty-first century unfolds, the Horn of Africa continues to lag behind. The cross-border spill-overs of these chronic problems in turn demand a focus on the regional totality of their root causes.

---

[353] Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', pp. 10-12.
[354] S.E. Kreps, 'The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success', *African Security Review* Vol. 16 No. 4 (2007) p. 77.

Bibliography

'Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan', several articles.

'Radio Tamazuj | Sudanese news crossing borders', one article.

'Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993', © United States Institute of Peace.

'Resolution 897', Adopted by the Security Council at its 3334th meeting, on 4 February 1994, S/RES/897, © United Nations Security Council (1994).

'Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia', S/1994/977, © United Nations Security Council (17 August 1994).

'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 14 of Resolution 897 (1994)', S/1994/614, © United Nations Security Council (24 May 1994).

'Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 923 (1994)', S/1994/839, © United Nations Security Council (18 July 1994).

'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994)', S/1995/231, © United Nations Security Council (28 March 1995).

'The Constitutive Act of the African Union', (Lomé, Togo; 2000) entered into force: 2001.

'Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 19 January 2007).

'Communique of the 123rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/Comm (CXXIII), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 April 2008).

'Communique of the 190th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council', PSC/PR/COMM (CXC), © AU – African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 22 May 2009).

OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, © OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007).

'AFP' News Agency, 'No peace for the peacekeepers in Somalia', *Horseed Media* (December 2, 2009).

Ban Ki-Moon, *Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in supporting Security Sector Reform*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, © United Nations General Assembly; Security Council (23th January, 2008).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31th January, 1992, A/47/277-S/24111 (17th June, 1992).

Brahimi, Lakhdar, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* a.k.a. the *Brahimi Report*, © United Nations Security Council, A/55/305/S/2000/809 (13th November, 2000).

Chin, Sally & Jonathan Morgenstein, *No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, © Refugees International (November, 2005).

Duke, Geoffrey L. & Hans Rouw, *The Catch-22 of Security and Civilian Disarmament: Community Perspectives on Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State*, © SSANSA – South Sudan Action Network on

Small Arms (September 2013).
Farah, Omar, ‘Somalia: Why Somali Government and Puntland State of Somalia fail to agree?’, *Horseed Media* (November 21, 2009).
Jehl, Douglas ‘Mission in Somalia; In a Gesture, Somalis Dismantle Barriers’, *The New York Times* (October 17, 1993).
Mayom, Manyang, ‘Lakes State lawmakers condemn violence during disarmament process’, © Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan (September 10, 2008).
Tayler, Letta, ‘Somalia’s Saviors Are Making Everything Worse’, *Human Rights Watch* (May 5, 2010).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, S/2005/821, © United Nations Security Council (21 December 2005).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, S/2006/728, © United Nations Security Council (12 September 2006).
‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, S/PRST/2007/3, © United Nations Security Council (21 February 2007).
UN Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform’, A/62/659–S/2008/39, © United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (January 23, 2008).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, S/2008/662, © United Nations Security Council (20 October 2008).
‘UNSC 6112th Meeting’, S/PV/6112, © United Nations Security Council (New York; 27 April 2009).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)’, S/2009/592, © United Nations Security Council (16 November 2009).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, S/2010/168, © United Nations Security Council (5 April 2010).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)’, S/2010/543, © United Nations Security Council (18 October 2010).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’, S/2011/239, © United Nations Security Council (12 April 2011).
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur’, S/2013/607, © United Nations Security Council (14 October 2013).
‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia’, PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), © African Union (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 October 2014).

Abbink, J., R. van Dijk & A. van Dokkum, ‘Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, conflict en de grenzen van de staat’, in: J. Abbink & A. van Dokkum (ed.), *Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, Conflict en de Grenzen van de Staat* (Diemen 2008).
———, ‘The Total Somali Clan Genealogy’ (second edition), African Studies Centre Working Paper 84 / 2009, © Jan Abbink (2009).
Adam, Hussein M., ‘Somali Civil Wars’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999).

Adejumobi, Said, ‘Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa’, *Human Rights Quarterly* Vol. 23 No. 1 (2001).

Adem, Seifudein, ‘Political Violence in the Horn of Africa: A Framework for Analysis’, in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013).

Agbiboa, Daniel, ‘Shifting the Battleground: The Transformation of Al-Shabab and the Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’, *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* Vol. 42 No. 2 (2015).

Ali, Taisier M. & Robert O. Matthews, ‘Conclusion: Conflict, Resolution, and Building Peace’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999).

———, ‘Civil Wars and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999).

Baker, Bruce & Eric Scheye, ‘Access to Justice in a Post-Conflict State: Donor-supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan’, *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 16 No. 2 (2009).

———, ‘The Future is Non-State’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Ball, Nicole, ‘The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Bassil, Noah R., *The Post-Colonial State and Civil War in Sudan: The Origins of Conflict in Darfur* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2013).

Berdal, Mats, *Building Peace After War* (Routledge/The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).

Bereketeab, Redie, ‘Introduction’, in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013).

Bratton, Michael, ‘Peasant-State Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement’, in: Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli & Vivienne Shue (ed.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Brosig, Malte, ‘The Multi-actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa’, *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 17 No. 3 (2010).

Busumtwi-Sam, James, ‘Redefining ‘Security’ after the Cold War: The OAU, the UN, and Conflict Management in Africa’, in: Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews (ed.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999).

Call, Charles T. & Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies’, *International Studies Perspectives* Vol. 9 (2008).

Caparini, Marina, ‘Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Clarke, Walter & Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention’, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75 No. 2 (1996).

Collins, Robert O., *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge University Press 2008).

Daly, Martin W., *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Danielová, Veronika, 'Darfur Crisis of 2003: Analysis of the Darfur Conflict from the Times of First Clashes to the Present Day', *Ethnologia Actualis* Vol. 14 No. 1 (2014).

Denney, Lisa, 'Overcoming the State/Non-state Divide: An End User Approach to Security and Justice Reform', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014).

Deng Deng, William, 'Linking DDR, Security Sector Development and Transitional Justice in Southern Sudan', Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012).

Doyle, M.W. & N. Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace* (Princeton University Press 2006).

Dudouet, Véronique, 'Nonstate Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security Governance', in: Melanne A. Civic & Michael Miklaucic (ed.), *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR* (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2011).

———, Hans J. Giessmann & Katrin Planta, 'General Introduction', in: V. Dudouet, H.J. Giessmann and K. Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012).

———, & Katrin Planta, 'Security Transitions in Perspective', in: Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012).

Egnell, Robert & Peter Haldén, 'Laudable, Ahistorical and overambitious: Security Sector Reform meets State Formation Theory', *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 9 No. 1 (2009).

Englebert, Pierre, 'Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', *Political Research Quarterly* Vol. 53 (2000).

———, 'Solving the Mystery of the Africa Dummy', *World Development* 28 (2000).

———, *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 2000).

Fitz-Gerald, Ann, 'Stabilization Operations and Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform: Strange Bedfellows or Close Allies?', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Gaffney Jr., Henry H., Franklin D. Kramer, R. Megahan & T.A. Dempsey, 'Implementing Security Sector Reform', in: T.A.Dempsey (ed.), *Security Sector Reform Workshop Interim Report* © Centre for Naval Analyses and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2008).

Greenhill, Kelly M. & Solomon Major, 'The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords', *International Security* Vol. 31 No. 3 (2006/07).

Hänggi, Heiner & Vincenza Scherrer, 'Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 15 No. 4 (2008).

Harald Sande Lie, Jon & Benjamin de Carvalho, 'Between Culture and Concept: The Protection of Civilians in Sudan (UNMIS)', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010).

Hassan, Yusuf M., 'Somalia is Tired of Conflict and Destruction', *Garowe Online* (June 6, 2015).

Herbst, Jeffrey, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press 2000).

Heupel, Monika, ’Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform: Common Principles, Common Challenges’, *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* Vol. 4 (2012).

Hills, Alice, ‘Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia’, *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014).

———, ‘Somalia works: Police development as State Building’, *African Affairs* Vol. 113 (2014).

Hurd, Ian, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, *International Organization* Vol. 53 No. 2 (1999).

Hutton, Lauren, ‘Following the Yellow Brick Road? Current and Future Challenges for Security Sector Reform in Africa’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Jackson, Paul ‘SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?’, in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

———, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building’, *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 32 No. 10 (2011).

Knight, Mark, ‘DDR and SSR: Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding Assistance’, in: Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta (ed.), *Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts* (Routledge, 2012).

Kraxberger, Brennan M., ‘Rethinking Responses to State Failure, With Special Reference to Africa’, *Progress in Development Studies* Vol. 12 Nos. 2-3 (2012).

Kreps, Sarah E., ‘The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success’, *African Security Review* Vol. 16 No. 4 (2007).

Kwaja, Chris M.A., ‘The Feasibility of Security Sector Reform and Access to Justice in Sudan: Challenges in Prospects’, *African Security Review* Vol. 19 No. 1 (2010).

Laudati, Ann, ‘Victims of Discourse: Mobilizing Narratives of Fear and Insecurity in Post-Conflict South Sudan — The Case of the Jonglei State’ *African Geographical Review* Vol. 30 No. 1 (2011).

Lewis, I.M., ‘Zichtbare en Onzichtbare Verschillen: De Somalische Paradox’, in: J. Abbink & A. van Dokkum (ed.), *Verdeeld Afrika: Etniciteit, Conflict en de Grenzen van de Staat* (Diemen 2008).

Lijn, Jaïr van der, ‘Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations: UNMIS in Sudan’, *Journal of International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010).

Linke, Andrew & Clionadh Raleigh, ‘State and Stateless Violence in Somalia’, *African Geographical Review* Vol. 30 No. 1 (2011).

Lonsdale, John, ‘States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey’, *African Studies Review* 24 (1981).

Luling, Virginia, ‘Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State’, *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 18 No. 2 (1997).

Luqman, Saka, ‘From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan’, *Canadian Social Science* Vol. 8 No. 1 (2012).

Mamdani, Mahmood, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (Pantheon Books, New York, 2009).

———, ‘How can we name the Darfur crisis: Preliminary Thoughts on Darfur’, in: F.M. Manji & P. Burnett (ed.), *African Voices on Development and Social Justice: Editorials from Pambazuka News*

2004 (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010).

Mannitz, Sabine, 'From Paternalism to Facilitation: SSR Shortcomings and the Potential of Social Anthropological Perspectives', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 21 No. 2 (2014).

Mengisteab, Kidane, 'Poverty, Inequality, State Identity and Chronic Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013).

Menkhaus, Ken, 'Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia', *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 4 No. 2 (2004).

———, 'Somalia: They Created a Desert and Called it Peace(building)', *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 36 No. 120 (2009).

———, K. Sheikh, H. Quinn, S & I. Farah, 'Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State', in: T. Paffenholz, Lynne Rienner Publishers (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, 2010).

Mickler, David, 'UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur?' *Conflict, Security & Development* Vol. 13 No. 5 (2013).

Miller, Paul D., *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012* (Cornell University Press, 2013).

Mobekk, Eirin, 'Security Sector Reform and the Challenges of Ownership', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).

Møller, Bjørn, 'Militia and Piracy in the Horn of Africa: External Responses', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013).

Murithi, Tim, 'The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia', *African Security Review* Vol. 17 No. 1 (2008).

Nathan, Laurie, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* (University of Birmingham, 2007).

Ndulo, Muna, 'The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building', *National Black Law Journal* Vol. 16 No. 1 (1998).

Newman, Edward, Roland Paris & Oliver P. Richmond, 'Introduction', in: E. Newman, R. Paris & O.P. Richmond (ed.) *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2009).

Olsen, Gorm Rye, 'Great Power' Intervention in African Armed Conflicts', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2014).

Paris, R., 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 2 (1997).

———, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Podder, S., 'State Building and the Non-State: Debating Key Dilemmas', *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 35 No. 9 (2014).

Rechner, Jonathan D., 'From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 39 No. 2 (2006).

Rees, Edward, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the

Field', © United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2006).
Reno, Will, 'African Rebels and the Citizenship Question', in: Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett & Paul Nugent (ed.), 'Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship', *African Social Studies Series* Vol. 16 (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007).
Richmond, Oliver P., 'The Legacy of State Formation Theory for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 20 No. 3 (2013).
Robinson, Amanda Lea, 'National versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism', *World Politics* Vol. 66 No. 4 (2014).
Saeed, Abdalbasit, 'Border Changes: North Sudan–South Sudan Regional Dynamics', in: Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* (Pluto Press, 2013).
Sedra, Mark, 'Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform', in: Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, © (CIGI) – The Centre for International Governance Innovation (2010).
Stedman, Stephen John, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 2 (1997).
Stern, Maria & Joakim Öjendal, 'Exploring the Security-Development Nexus', in: Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal (ed.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development* (Anthem Press, 2013).
Snyder, Jack & Robert Jervis, 'Civil War and the Security Dilemma', in: Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder (ed.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999).
Srinivasan, Sharath, 'Negotiating Violence: Sudan's Peacemakers and the War in Darfur', AfricanAffairs Vol. 113 No. 450 (2014).
Suleiman, Mahmoud Abbaker, *Darfur, A Crisis of Identity & Governance* (Bloomington: Author House, 2010).
Theerasatiankul, Nicole, *Patterns in Reporting African Conflicts: The Case of Darfur* (Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC. 2008).
Tilly, Charles, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 – 1990* (Cambridge, Massachusetts etc. : Blackwell 1990).
———, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (ed.) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Thies, Cameron G., 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 69 No. 3 (2007).
Unruh, Jon D., Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, 'Constituencies of Conflict and Opportunity: Land Rights, Narratives and Collective Action in Darfur', *Political Geography* Vol. 42 (2014).
Veen, Erwin van & Maria Derks, 'The Deaf, The Blind and The Politician: The Troubles of Justice and Security Interventions in Fragile States 1', *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* Vol. 4 No. 1 (2012).
Waal, Alex de, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs* 1944-) Vol. 83 No. 6 (2007).
Wilén, Nina & Vincent Chapaux, 'Problems of Local Participation and Collaboration with the UN in a Post conflict Environment: Who are the 'Locals'?', *Global Society* Vol. 25 No. 4 (2011).
Williams, Paul D., 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 13 No. 2 (2006).
———, 'Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges', *Journal of International*

Peacekeeping Vol. 17 (2013).

Wulf, Herbert, 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries', in: C. McCartney, M. Fischer and O. Wils (ed.) *Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation*, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series 2 (© Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004).

Zambakari, Christopher, 'Sudan and South Sudan: Identity, Citizenship, and Democracy in Plural Societies', *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015).

Zanotti, Laura, 'Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization', *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 13 No. 2 (2006).