

The abolition of the one-child policy

A critical discourse analysis

Cindy Huijgen
s0903604
c.z.huijgen@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Master Thesis
Supervisor: Dr. F.A. Schneider
Second reader: Dr. J. Wang
Master Asian Studies: China Studies
Leiden University
July 14, 2016

Acknowledgement

After seven years of studying, two years abroad, two internships and two Master programs, I now write this final page of my thesis. It has been a period of intense learning for me, not only in the scientific field but also on a personal level. Writing this thesis is the finishing touch of my studies. I would like to reflect on the people who have supported and helped me so much throughout this project.

Firstly, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Florian A. Schneider of the Chinese department at Leiden University. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work while steering me in the right direction when he considered it necessary.

I would also like to thank the experts who helped me with linguistic questions: Ying-ting Wang (Leiden University) and Yang Zhang (Shandong University). They helped me whenever I had questions concerning the Chinese language.

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Jue Wang of the Chinese department at Leiden University as the second reader of this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank my initial thesis supervisor Dr. Taru M. Salmenkari, a former lecturer of the Chinese department at Leiden University. She helped me significantly during the first stage of my thesis, and I am thankful to her for her valuable comments.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my mother and to Elwin Jongeling, my boyfriend, for their unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you.

Cindy Huijgen

July 14, 2016

Contents

Acknowledgement	2
1 Introduction	4
2 The Study of Discourse: Constructing Society	6
2.1 Discourse analysis	6
2.2 Media in China	10
2.3 Xinhua as role model	14
2.4 One-child policy	16
3 Research Method	19
3.1 Selecting the source material	19
3.2 Conducting discourse analysis	22
3.3 Analyzing: quantitative and qualitative	24
4 Results	26
4.1 Quantitative data: word use and players	26
4.2 Structure of the source material	30
4.3 Discourse strands	31
4.4 Shift in discourse over time	36
5 Conclusion	38
Bibliography	43
A Source Material	44
B Conceptualizing the Material	46

Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis studies the discussion about the reforms of the Chinese government's family-planning law on the state-run news agency Xinhua. In particular, it examines the statements that authorities made about the abolition of the one-child policy. During the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2013, the Chinese government decided to drastically soften the one-child policy. Two years later, in October 2015, the CCP announced the change into a two-child policy.

Since it was introduced in 1979, China's one-child-per-couple policy has generally been considered one of the most troubling social policies of modern times. Not only did it bring social suffering, but it was also "out of touch with Chinese reality, especially in the countryside, where at least two children (including one son) were essential to family survival."¹ It therefore comes as no surprise that there has always been a great deal of discussion around this controversial family-planning policy, and not only in 'the West'.²

The Chinese government has always been an active player in the propaganda surrounding the policy, therein defending it and showing people its benefits. For example, it has been beneficial for gender equality, since the low fertility rate enabled mothers to have paid work.³ However, in announcing the abolition of the one-child policy, the government made statements about it that influenced a change in public opinion.

This thesis focuses on the power of state-run Xinhua News Agency in shaping and reshaping discourse around the one-child policy. It aims to make several contributions, most importantly in reconstructing and analyzing the statements that the Chinese government made regarding the one-child policy, before and after its abolition.

1. Susanne Greenhalgh, *Just one child: science and policy in Deng's China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 1.

2. In this thesis, I use the term 'the West' as a shorthand for societies in North America and Western Europe while acknowledging that these societies are far from homogeneous. I use inverted commas to represent such area-studies issues. For more on area-studies issues see Terence Wesley-Smith and Jon D. Goss, *Remaking Area Studies: Teaching and Learning Across Asia and the Pacific* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2010).

3. Vanessa L. Fong, "China's One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 4 (December 2002): 1098–1109, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3567099>.

The research question is as follows: What is the difference in the state-run news agency Xinhua's statements regarding the one-child policy, before and after its abolition? This thesis also aims to answer the following subquestions: What arguments did the Chinese government put forth for changing family-planning law into a two-child policy? How does the CCP legitimize the reforms? What structural and linguistic features does Xinhua use in order to convey its message? How does the CCP make use of Xinhua in order to propagate its view?

In chapter two I provide a theoretical framework by exploring the field of discourse analysis, particularly the approach towards critical discourse analysis and its relation to politics. I subsequently provide insights into the Chinese media market and the country's Party propaganda complex. Lastly, I describe the different views that the media offer regarding the one-child policy.

In chapter three I introduce the research method. Stepwise, I explain the choices that I made in selecting the source material and provide an analytical procedure within each step.

In chapter four I present the results of my analysis offering an overview of the quantitative data, followed by the results of the qualitative analysis.

In chapter five I present the conclusion, in which I connect my results to the theoretical notions presented in chapter two. I also discuss some of the shortcomings of my analysis and provide suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2: The Study of Discourse: Constructing Society

In this thesis, I explore the different statements made by state-run news agency Xinhua on the one-child policy before and after its abolition. This entails that I focus on the indirect power that the state has in shaping and reshaping public opinion regarding the one-child policy.

In this chapter, I explore the field of discourse analysis and in particular the approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Since CDA is a vast field, the main goal of this chapter is to review the literature on discourse analysis in such a way that it provides insights for the theoretical framework that I adopt. I subsequently offer a broad overview of the Chinese media market and the country's Party propaganda complex. I offer this overview in view of my focus on the power that the Chinese state exercises through articles written in Chinese and published by state-run news agency Xinhua. Finally, I examine the different views on the ever-changing one-child policy throughout its history, as a basis for the results of the analysis of this research.

2.1 Discourse analysis

The theory of discourse analysis has been used by many different academic disciplines. Each discipline has specific ideas regarding the approach of discourse analysis, which are due to the different meanings that are given to the term *discourse*, which can be confusing in understanding the theory. Discourse has been defined as “the use of language”,¹ as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts”,² and as “a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective.”³

These different definitions of discourse analysis have been divided by Schiffrin, Tannen,

1. Paul Chilton, *Analyzing Political Discourse* (London: Arnold, 2004), p. 16.

2. Ruth Wodak, “Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,” chap. 4, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001), p. 66.

3. Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language* (London: Longman, 1995), p.14.

and Hamilton into three categories that range from a broad to a more specific definition: (1) Discourse as language beyond the sentence, (2) discourse analysis as a study of language use, and (3) discourse referring to a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and nonspecific instances of language.⁴ The first refers to discourse analysts' focus on aspects that lie above sentence level, for example the influence of surrounding sentences on the meaning of one particular sentence.⁵ Charles Fillmore illustrates this by imagining two signs at a swimming pool. The signs read as follows: (1) "Please use the toilets, not the pool", (2) "Pool for members only". If one only reads one of the signs, either is reasonable. However, if one reads them together, the second sign must be reinterpreted, leading to the conclusion that members are allowed to use the pool as a toilet. In this case, sign 1 has a significant influence on the interpretation of sign 2 and vice versa.⁶

Gee divides the different approaches into only two categories: (1) descriptive (also called analytical) and (2) critical. The difference between these methods is that a descriptive approach aims to explain as realistically as possible, whereas a critical approach aims to judge. In Gee's words, descriptive discourse analysis only considers the content of the language that is being used, while critical analysis also examines how the structure of language helps to create meaning within specific contexts.⁷ To this division, Wodak adds another important approach towards conducting discourse analysis: the hermeneutic approach. Hermeneutic discourse analysis is "the method of grasping and producing meaning relations"⁸ and aims to understand the meaning of things.

Discourse analysis examines the structure of language and aims to understand how language constructs meaning. The theory of discourse analysis draws on the assumption that what a person does, says or writes must draw from a certain background knowledge, in order to make sense. Simultaneously, by doing, saying and writing, a person may also contribute to the formation of background knowledge. It is thus understandable that background knowledge changes over time and that it is accepted by a large section of

4. Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, eds., *The Handbook of discourse analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), p. 1.

5. Teun A. van Dijk, *Discourse as Structure and Process* (Sage, 1997), p. 7.

6. Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton, *The Handbook of discourse analysis*, p. 10.

7. James Paul Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method* (London: Routledge, 2014).

8. Wodak, "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis," p. 16.

society, constituting what discourse analysts call the ‘hegemonic discourse’.⁹

The knowledge base of participants within a certain society consists of four dimensions: (1) knowledge of language codes, (2) principles and norms of language use, (3) situation, and (4) the world.¹⁰ In other words, the concept of background knowledge draws from diverse aspects, such as general beliefs, values and ideologies.¹¹ In order to illustrate the concept of background knowledge, Wodak gives the simple example of a woman who walks along the street looking for a baker’s shop where she buys a loaf of bread. This person needs a large quantity of knowledge in order to be able to do so: she has to know where the bread is sold, that in order to buy bread a certain amount of money is needed, that she needs to wear certain clothes in order to go to the bakery, and so forth.¹² All of these actions and assumptions can be called background knowledge.

Background knowledge changes continuously because people constantly reshape it. However, there is a difference in the amount of power that certain people and/or groups have in reinforcing and challenging statements. Foucault (1926-1984) called this “the flow of knowledge through time.”¹³ Foucault, who is referred to as the father of discourse analysis as most of the approaches to it are based on his ideas, was a French philosopher and sociologist. In his book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he analyzes the relation between power and knowledge, arguing that assumptions that are accepted by a large section of society can be reinforced or challenged by certain people and/or groups.¹⁴ He believed that discourse is closely intertwined with power to the extent that it can both be used as an instrument with which to produce and reinforce power, and have an effect on power by undermining and exposing it.¹⁵ His key question is: “How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations?”¹⁶ By raising this question, he challenges the objectivity of the background knowledge that people use in order to construct meaning.

In accordance with Foucault, Jäger acknowledges the flow of knowledge through time, stating that a variety of themes arise within a discourse, which he calls *discourse strands*.

9. Wodak, “Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.”

10. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*, p. 33.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

12. Wodak, “Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,” pp. 58-59.

13. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the discourse on language*, ed. Alan Sheridan-Smith (New York: NY: Pantheon Books, 1972).

14. *Ibid.*

15. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: an Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: NY: Penguin, 1990), p. 101.

16. Paul Rabinow, “Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984,” in *Ethics*, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 318.

These strands can be knotted and moved in together and can shape each other.

Each discourse strand has a synchronic and diachronic dimension. A synchronic cut through a discourse strand has a certain qualitative (finite) range. Such a cut is made in order to identify what has been ‘said’ and/or what is, was and will be ‘sayable’ at a particular past, present or future point in time, in other words, in a respective ‘present time’ in its entire range.¹⁷

Jäger further defines the elements that comprise discourse strands as *discourse fragments*. When certain people and/or groups change the discourse on a certain topic, they change public opinion and the event that leads to this shift is called a *discursive event*.¹⁸

A Foucauldian focus on the relationship between discourse, power, text and society is an important feature of critical discourse analysis (CDA), an approach within discourse studies that aims to explain the structures of discourse in relation to power and/or dominance within society. CDA is mainly used to analyze discourses within social problems and political issues, such as racism and gender equality.¹⁹ The CDA approach has been adopted within studies in media and political discourse. Scholars of CDA perceive language as something that must be used by powerful people in order to become powerful, which is why CDA often focuses on the use of language of those who are in power.²⁰ Furthermore, since it focuses on the powerful people’s use of language, another important element of CDA is the concept of ideology. Wodak argues that CDA considers ideology as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations.²¹

In view of my discourse analysis, it is thus important to understand the ideology of China’s leadership: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the following section, I discuss the Party’s ideology, and how it connects to China’s propaganda system and its control of mass media.

17. Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis,” chap. 3 in *Discourse and Knowledge*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Sage Publications, 2001), p. 47.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

19. Anthony J. Barker, *The African Link: British Attitudes to the Negro in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1550-1807* (London: Frank Cass, 1978); Victoria L. Bergvall and Kathryn A. Remlinger, “Reproduction, resistance and gender in educational discourse: the role of critical discourse analysis,” *Discourse and Society* 7, no. 4 (1996): 453–479; Ruth Wodak, *Gender and Discourse* (London: Sage, 1997).

20. Wodak, “Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,” p. 10.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

2.2 Media in China

Traditionally, the Chinese press has been under full control of the CCP. The Party had a monopoly on Chinese media until the late 20th century, and used the media for its purposes in propagating its views and policies. Starting in 1979, the Party allowed newspapers, magazines and stations to support themselves by commercializing. However, the Party continues to have a significant influence on the press. In the words of journalist He, Chinese journalists are “dancing in shackles.”²²

Although it has been speculated that the commercialization of mass media is an indication of the CCP’s decline of political power within Chinese society,²³ Brady strongly disagrees. She argues that “propaganda and thought work has played a pivotal role in the repackaging of the CCP.”²⁴ This repackaging of the CCP was necessary after the failure and tragedies of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and Mao Zedong’s death (1976). At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the Party struggled to legitimize its power. Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and other reform leaders resisted the conservatives’ wishes to return to the communist ideology of Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism. As a result of Deng’s economic reforms, these decades are known as the opening-up and reform period. Simultaneously, Deng launched a campaign that criticized Maoism, which led to a decay of communist ideology and the so-called ‘three belief crises’ (*sanxin weiji* 三信危机): (1) the crisis of faith in socialism, (2) the crisis of belief in Marxism and (3) the crisis of trust in the Party.²⁵

After the crackdown of the student protests on Tiananmen-square in 1989, it became crucial for the Chinese leaders to re-establish an ideology so that the CCP could continue to legitimize its power. In 1992, the government launched a patriotic education campaign in order to propagandize nationalism as an official ideology. Deng, personally stressing the importance for strengthened ideological work,²⁶ started this campaign with the Southern

22. Qinglian He, *Media Control in China* (Human Rights in China, 2004), http://ir2008.org/PDF/initiatives/Internet/Media-Control_Chinese.pdf.

23. Daniel C. Lynch, *Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Chin-Chuan Lee, *Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism* (New York: Guilford, 1990).

24. Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 3.

25. Suisheng Zhao, “A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (September 1998): p. 288, doi:10.1016/S0967-067X(98)00009-9.

26. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 31.

Excursion.²⁷

This renewed ideology had an important influence on China's propaganda system, which in its turn was "the very life blood (shengmingxian) of the Party State, one of the key means for guaranteeing the CCP's ongoing legitimacy and hold on power."²⁸ The foundation of China's propaganda system is the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) (*zhong-gong zhongyang xuanchuan bu* 中共中央宣传部).²⁹ Each medium that relates to communication falls under its leadership, including the media outlets, and state institutions and organizations. The CPD is mainly responsible for the content of these sectors. Brady further divides the role of the CPD into three aspects: (1) overseeing everything that is related to ideological work in China, (2) a policy-making role in aspects of China's development and (3) being in charge of managing propaganda.³⁰ In her overview (see figure 2.1), she categorizes the sectors that fall under the department into two groups: those who are led by the department (*lingdao* 领导) and those who are guided by the department (*zhidao* 指导).³¹

Shambaugh agrees with Brady on the role of the propaganda system in China, further arguing that the CPD continues to be able to control the flow of information when it needs to.³² The CPD's methods in controlling information can be separated into proactive mechanisms and a more passive approach. Examples of proactive mechanisms are crackdowns, censorship, imprisonments, propaganda and establishing guidelines. Proactive propaganda can be manifest in the CPD's writing and dissemination of information as it believes it should be transmitted,³³ as well as in establishing guidelines regarding how departments should act in a particular situation.³⁴ This can extend to the micro level of

27. For more on these aspects of ideology, nationalism and propaganda in China starting from the 1970s see for instance Zhao, "A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China" and Jie Chen, "The impact of reform on the party and ideology in China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 4, no. 9 (1995): 22–34, doi:10.1080/10670569508724221.

28. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 1.

29. The English name of the Central Propaganda Department has recently changed to Publicity Department. This change was, as David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy," *The China Journal*, no. 57 (January 2007): p. 47, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20066240> argues, to avoid the negative connotations of the English word 'propaganda' (*xuan chuan* 宣传). However, it is important to note that in the Chinese language *xuan chuan* simply refers to the general shaping of ideology and does not have a negative connotation, see Yiwei Wang, "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): p. 259.

30. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 14.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

32. Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy," pp. 28-29.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

34. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 95.




Figure 2.1: China's Domestic Propaganda System³⁵

tifa (体法), meaning that the exact wording should be used. An example is the guideline of referring to Taiwan as a province of China (*taiwan sheng* 台湾省) and explicitly not to Taiwanese people (*taiwan ren* 台湾人), which would imply that they are not Chinese and that Taiwan is not a part of China.

35. Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 11.

According to Brady's overview, the media are led by the CPD, whereas the State Family Planning Commission and Xinhua News Agency are guided by the department. However, I believe that the reality is far more complicated than Brady's overview suggests. Xinhua News Agency has a particularly interesting privileged role within China's propaganda system, to which I will return through a more in-depth discussion in section 2.3. Firstly, in this section I explain more aspects of the Chinese authorities' use of mass media as a tool for propaganda.

Historically, the role of the mass media in China has changed several times. During the Mao-era, media outlets and in particular newspapers were strictly used as tools for propaganda, and while television already existed, only high-level cadres were permitted to use it. In the opening-up and reform period of the 1970s, television was rediscovered by the CCP as a promoter of Party ideology. This tool could reach lots of households quickly and easily and soon television broadcasting was state-funded. In 1979, the CCP allowed media outlets to support themselves through advertising.³⁶ Brady argues that in order to rebuild a relationship between the Party and the people, the media were given a limited watchdog role in the 1990s,³⁷ while at the same time leaders criticized the media for not being in line with the official view during the events leading up to June 4, 1989.

Post-Tiananmen, Jiang Zemin (born 1926) said in a speech that the media should function as a mouthpiece and the media were instructed to once again advocate the renewed nationalistic ideology of the Party. Media outlets should help Chinese people adjust to a market economy that slowly took shape, but were forbidden to speak about issues related to aspects of the CCP's power.³⁸ In the beginning of this century, the role of the media thus slowly shifted from publishing propaganda to publishing more entertaining stories that were safe from the threat of censorship. Shambaugh argues that this is due to the shift towards a more market-oriented media system, which meant that people with professions such as journalism had to be "commercially viable (...) which in turn means that their product must be appealing enough for people to pay for it."³⁹

With regard to the speech of Jiang, in which the Party leader refers to the media as mouthpiece, Brady stresses the exact words that he used: "the government's [not the

36. Susan L. Shirk, ed., *Changing Media, Changing China* (New York: Oxford Univ, 2011), p. 1.

37. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 82.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

39. Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy," p. 56.

Party's] and the people's mouthpiece".⁴⁰ These exact words are important. Although the Party, the Government and the State in China can difficultly be considered separately, they are not completely the same. The Party can be viewed as the political party in power, responsible for creating a political direction, as in Western countries, while Chinese state institutions are responsible for implementing this direction. The two appear to be the same because the CCP employs different methods in order to control the government and other bureaucracies, one of which is to place officials that both work for the state as well as the CCP in key positions.⁴¹

2.3 Xinhua as role model

For China, the 1990s were a period of developing a market economy with Chinese characteristics. As I have argued above and following the conclusions of Chinese scholars,⁴² this period was also memorable for the reform or transition of China's media towards a market-oriented system. Xinhua News Agency was no exception to this modern dependency on the market: despite its political mission and the privileges that it had due to its close relation with the CCP, the agency became partly government-supported and partially self-supported, as were other news organizations.⁴³ Before explaining what the mission and privileges of Xinhua News Agency are, I offer a brief overview of its history.

Xinhua emerged from Red China News Agency (*Hongzhong She* 红中社), which was founded in 1931 and had two departments, of which one was used to inform higher-level members of the Communist Party on local conditions. After the Long March (October 1934), this CCP-serving department of the news agency was renamed as Xinhua (*xinhua* 新华), which translates as 'New China'. In 1939, the agency became independent of the news organization and it had the responsibility of launching more CCP-oriented newspapers.⁴⁴

40. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 46.

41. Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From revolution through reform* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp.234-239.

42. See for example Chin-Chuan Lee, "China's Media, Media's China," chap. Ambiguities and Contradictions: Issues in China's Changing Political Communication, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 3-20; Zhongdang Pan, "Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China," chap. Improvising Reform Activities: The Changing Reality of Journalistic Practice in China, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 68-111 and Xin Xin, "A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers," *Media, Culture & Society* 28, no. 1 (2006): 45-66, doi:10.1177/0163443706059285.

43. Zhou He, "Power, Money and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China," chap. Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug-of-war: A Political-economy Analysis of the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (Evanston, ILL: Northwestern University Press, 2000), p. 113.

44. Xin, "A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers," pp. 47-48.

As Xin and Zhao conclude, this “started the period of the 1950s to the 1980s in which the Chinese press was dominated by ‘Party journalism’.”⁴⁵ After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (1949), Xinhua was referred to as the only official national news agency.

Its authoritarian power over other media outlets began to change in the 1980s, when Xinhua was forced to establish side-businesses because of financial needs. In the early 1990s, the news agency was on the edge of bankruptcy due to competition with other media organizations, which were given a limited watchdog role. In order to survive, Xinhua had to further commercialize and began asking for a fee from subscribers in 1995.⁴⁶ After media organizations were re-instructed to advocate the ideology of the Party which was now led by Jiang, Xinhua was once again given privileges that empowered it to monopolize certain sections of the media market. However, the struggle to dominate the media market remained a problem for the CC and at the beginning of this century, new regulations appeared which further strengthened the news agency’s market position.⁴⁷ Xin concludes that Xinhua changed from a politically-dependent agency that was guided by the CCP to an agency that is more controlled by “a mixture of Party logic and market logic”.⁴⁸

As an official national news service, Xinhua’s main mission has always been to propagate the ideology and ideas of the CCP. In the beginning, when it was still a department of the Red China News Agency, journalists of Xinhua had the dual role of educating citizens and producing internal reports on local situations.⁴⁹ When Xinhua separated from the news organization, it had to report news while advocating the CCP’s ideas and policies. After Xinhua officially became part of the State’s organ, it gained authority as official national news agency over other news organizations.

Xin distinguishes three main missions that accompanied Xinhua’s monopolized authority within China’s media market: (1) advocating political decisions as ‘throat and tongue’ of the Party, (2) controlling journalists of domestic media organizations, as well as foreign correspondents, and (3) guiding the rest of the media to follow the Party’s lead.⁵⁰ In order to fulfill these missions and as an official state-run agency, it has several privileges,

45. See for example *ibid.* and Zhao, “A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China,” p. 49.

46. Xin, “A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers,” pp. 52-55.

47. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 113.

48. Xin, “A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers,” p. 60.

49. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, p. 36.

50. Xin, “A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers,” p. 48.

including the exclusive authority to publish news about sensitive topics. Other media organizations are only permitted to use copies of Xinhua's content. Brady gives several examples of topics that the Party categorized as 'sensitive', such as the SARS outbreak and the dismissal of Beijing Deputy Mayor Liu Zhihua (born 1949).⁵¹ The guidelines for what the Party categorizes as a sensitive topic can change over time.

In the following section, I discuss the one-child policy and the changing views on its sensitiveness throughout the policy's history.

2.4 One-child policy

During the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in November 2013, one of the most important political meetings in China, the Chinese government released a document that was filled with reforms, called 'Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform' (*zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jue ding* 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定). One of these reforms was the further adjustment and relaxation of the one-child policy stating that couples are allowed to have two children if one of the spouses is an only child. Xinhua published an article stating that the one-child policy would be "adjusted and improved step by step to promote 'long-term balanced development of the population in China'."⁵² In October 2015, the CCP announced that family-planning law would change into a two-child policy.

State birth planning became an issue after the death of Mao Zedong (1893-1976), whose communist government condemned birth control, stating that more people would empower the country.⁵³ Some scholars estimate that the Chinese population doubled during the Mao-era, though in the 1950s, it was not permitted to research population growth.⁵⁴

Scholars do not agree on exactly when the one-child policy was introduced, and dates range from 1978 to 1980. In the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping came to power and introduced socialist modernization, the population growth became a problem. More specifically, the idea of population restriction comes from the Third Plenum of the 11th Central

51. Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, pp. 105-106.

52. News.xinhuanet.com, "China to ease one-child policy," 2013, accessed May 31, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891920.htm.

53. Malcolm Potts, "China's one child policy," *BMJ* 333, no. 7564 (August 2006): pp. 361-362, doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38938.412593.80>.

54. Susanne Greenhalgh, "Science, Modernity, and the Making of China's One-Child Policy," *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 2 (June 2003): p. 166, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115224>.

Committee of the CCP, in which the Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, national defense and science-technology) were developed and adopted as the main official goals for the decades to come.⁵⁵

In September 1980 the Central Committee circulated an Open Letter that introduced a policy of ‘one couple, one child’. Interestingly, this letter already included a time frame, stating that the one-child-per-couple policy should be maintained for the next 40 years or at least for the coming 20.⁵⁶ In the following years, the policy was enforced by sterilization campaigns,⁵⁷ which would continue until the 2000s, including the Iron Fist Campaign of 2010, in Puning.

From the beginning of family-planning law, however, Chinese government included exceptions to the one-child policy. Examples include families in rural areas whose first child was a girl, families whose first child was handicapped and ethnic minorities, who were exempted entirely from the policy. Scholars estimate that the one-child policy was only strictly imposed on 35 percent of the total Chinese population.⁵⁸

In addition to these exceptions, in the last few years the one-child policy has been reformed and relaxed twice before it changed into a two-child policy. In November 2011, all couples of which both spouses are an only child were allowed to have two children: an adjustment in the policy that in Chinese is termed *shuang du liang hai zhengce* (双独两孩政策). In November 2013, after the Third Plenum, the government allowed couples of which one of the spouses is an only child to have two children: an adjustment in the policy that is called *dan du liang hai zhengce* (单独两孩政策).⁵⁹ In October 2015, the policy changed to a two-child policy called *quan mian liang hai* (全面两孩), which literally translates as ‘all around two children’, or in other words: two-child policy for everybody. The terms for the different stages already suggest that the government intended to change the one-child policy to a two-child policy, as is stated the Open Letter in which the one-child policy was introduced.

Why did the Chinese government implement the one-child-per-couple policy? Greenhalgh argues that the population growth was framed as the biggest problem for economic and

55. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

58. Therese Hesketh, Lu Li, and Weixing Zhu, “The Effects of China’s One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years,” *The New England Journal of Medicine* 353, no. 11 (2005): 1171–1176.

59. I will call this the relaxation of the one-child policy, to avoid using the longer explanation.

demographic development, the standard of living and as the main cause for “ruining the environment, and preventing China from achieving its rightful place in the world”. Furthermore, the population problem was framed as the main reason for China’s backwardness and all other problems with which China struggled in the late 1970s⁶⁰ and Greenhalgh concludes that the one-child policy was described as China’s only chance to develop the Four Modernizations. By late 1981, the best-choice discourse was transformed into an ‘only choice’ discourse which legitimized the implementation of the one-child policy.⁶¹

What could have been the reasons for the Chinese government to gradually change the one-child policy into a two-child policy? In Western countries, the one-child policy has been viewed negatively and Greenhalgh identifies the discourse on China’s one-child policy in the United States as being shaped by anticommunist sentiments and the right-to-life position within the abortion debate. As I argue in another graduate thesis,⁶² ‘Western’ media framed the one-child policy as ‘horrific’ after the announcement of its further relaxation in November 2013. They published victim stories and called the relaxation “not good enough”, suggesting that it was too little, too late and adopting phrases such as “China will be old before it is rich”. Western journalists framed Chinese officials as liars, suggesting that the Chinese government’s official numbers on abortion were false.

Chinese media, on the other hand, framed the relaxation of the one-child policy of November 2013 as part of the Chinese Dream. This is a slogan that was popularized by Xi Jinping (born 1953), referring to ideals of the CCP and China as a nation which were both personal and national. Authorities stated that the one-child policy had completed its historical mission and that it had an important role. Due to changes in China’s situation, it was time to relax the policy in order to continue to stimulate China’s economic growth, though Chinese news articles stressed that it would be too soon to completely abolish the one-child policy. China still needed to control its population in order to prevent a baby boom that would pose great challenges to public services, such as education, health care and employment.⁶³

60. Greenhalgh, “Science, Modernity, and the Making of China’s One-Child Policy,” pp. 172-175.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

62. Cindy Huijgen, “Framing van omstreden Chinese wetten: Eenkindpolitiek en ‘heropvoeding door arbeid’-systeem in de Chinese en Nederlandse massamedia” (master’s thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2015).

63. *Ibid.*

Chapter 3: Research Method

In the previous chapter, I introduced the study of discourse, arguing that communication can shape society by shaping and reshaping public opinion and examined how the CCP uses the media as the government's mouthpiece. In this chapter, I describe my research method, which entails not only justifying my choices in selecting the source material but also explaining the working steps of the analytical procedure.

As stated in the introduction, I focus on the discourse of the one-child policy and particularly on how state-run Xinhua News Agency shaped and reshaped the policy's discourse at different points during its recent reforms. The research question of this thesis is: What is the difference in the state-run news agency Xinhua's statements regarding the one-child policy, before and after its abolition?

3.1 Selecting the source material

In order to analyze the discourse of the one-child policy at different times during the recent reforms of the policy, I selected articles that were published by Xinhua News Agency between November 1, 2013 and January 31, 2014, and between October 1, 2015 and December 31, 2015. This is called a diachronic analysis since I analyze material from two different time periods. Both time periods comprise three months.

As a point of departure, I chose November 2013, in which top leaders of the Chinese government came together for a four-day summit called the Third Plenary Session. Before the Third Plenum, Xinhua News Agency announced that president Xi Jinping planned to unveil a "blueprint of comprehensive reform." The Third Plenum took place one year after Xi became president of the People's Republic of China and chairman of the CCP. The Chinese government indeed released a blueprint filled with reforms, one of which was the further adjustment and relaxation of the one-child policy (see section 2.4). I consider the Third Plenum as a *discursive event* (see section 2.1), since the relaxation affected the

discourse on the one-child policy, and thus included the period around it in my corpus.

Another *discursive event* took place in October 2015, when the CCP announced that the one-child policy would change into a two-child policy (see section 2.4). I included three months around this period in my corpus in order to maintain its consistency with the other time frame. There is also a more practical reason for this decision: as I started this research in the beginning of 2016, it was not possible to include material future to this date.

As the source, I have chosen Xinhua News Agency because I believe that it most closely represents the discourse on the one-child policy that is argued by the CCP, as it is a state-run news service and, as I argued in section 2.3, because Xinhua is the official national news service. Furthermore, this news agency has authority over other news organizations, which means that articles in Xinhua will most likely be copied by other media outlets without any editorial changes.¹ It is thus reasonable to believe that articles in Xinhua have the authority and the audience to affect public opinion.

Lynch indicates that Xinhua is part of ‘the twin pillars’ of the Party’s media, the other pillar being People’s Daily. As he notes, People’s Daily’s role in affecting public opinion is as important as Xinhua’s,² but I have chosen to focus only on articles in Xinhua because of its authority within China’s news market. Furthermore, Xinhua is more representative of the Party’s ideas on policies than People’s Daily. The difference lies in their distinctive roles: as Xin describes, “Xinhua monopolized the releases of the statements of the Party’s policies and instructions while the *People’s Daily* was in charge of publishing Xinhua News Agency’s releases.”³

In selecting the source material, I needed to use a search engine. However, the website of Xinhua News Agency does not have a search engine of its own and redirects visitors to ChinaSo.com (*xinwen tansuo* 新闻探索), an official state-run search engine that searches all Chinese news websites.⁴ In order to make sure that I only included articles in Xinhua, I checked whether the article was published on its website (*Xinhua wang* 新华网).

1. Xin, “A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers,” p. 51.

2. Lynch, *Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China*, p. 160.

3. Xin, “A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers,” p. 51.

4. Chinaso.com arose from the merger of Jike and Panguso. Jike, originally named Goso, was run by the Chinese government. Panguso originated from a joint venture between Xinhua and China Mobile. For more on this topic, see Min Jiang and Kirsten Okamoto, “National Identity, Ideological Apparatus, or Panopticon? A Case study of the Chinese National Search Engine Jike,” *Policy and Internet* 6, no. 1 (2014): 89–107, doi:10.1002/1944-2866.P0I353



Figure 3.1: Print screen of the website ChinaSo.com. Only articles from the source 新华网 (see highlighted) are included in the corpus.

As search words, I used the following terms: 计划生育, 全面二孩, 全面二胎, 单独二孩, 单独两孩, 一孩政策, 一胎化, 一孩化.⁵ I found 63 articles using this method: 25 of which were published from November 1, 2013 until January 31, 2014 and 38 of which were published from October 1, 2015 until December 31, 2015. After the first coding round, however, I had to conclude that not all of the articles were relevant for my research, mostly because the term 计划生育 is also used in combination with other health issues. Furthermore, I chose to focus on text content only and one article was excluded because it only had video content. I did not particularly focus on pictures and figures, since that demands an entirely different kind of analysis.

Appendix A contains a list of all the articles that I found using this methodology. As it shows, some articles are not from the Xinhua website. I found these articles by using the same methodology (searching on ChinaSo.com and only including articles of 新华网), but, their URLs did not work. I subsequently searched their titles on Baidu.com, China's biggest and most popular search engine, and included articles of other websites that were

5. The English translation of these terms: family planning, two-child policy, two-child policy, two children when one of the spouses is an only child, two children when one of the spouses is an only child, one-child policy, one-child reforms, one-child reforms (see also section 2.4).

published on exactly the same day. As previously stated, other news organizations are likely to copy Xinhua's articles without changing them, due to its authority. My final corpus consists of 43 articles, 22 of which were published from November 1, 2013 until January 31, 2014 and 21 of which were published from October 1, 2015 until December 31, 2015.

3.2 Conducting discourse analysis

In section 2.1 I discussed the theory of discourse analysis, arguing that discourse can help to construct society and influence public opinion. Here, I move from the why to the how, providing a workable procedure by which to analyze the source material. As indicated in section 2.1, different views on discourse analysis exist. Consequently, scholars adopt different methods and procedures by which to analyze discourse.




Figure 3.2: Empirical research as a circular process.⁶

In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, six scholars offer their views on discourse analysis and some explain their analysis procedure.⁷ For example, Meyer argues that collecting and analyzing the data is a circular process, stressing that they are not necessarily separated and should be viewed within the tradition of Grounded Theory.⁸

Grounded Theory is a methodology that was developed by Glaser and Strauss and which stresses the connection between different phases while conducting empirical research: collecting, coding and analyzing. One does not necessarily have to complete the collection

6. Michael Meyer, "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis," chap. 2: Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Sage, 2001), p. 19.

7. Wodak, "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis."

8. Michael Meyer, "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis," chap. 2: Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Sage, 2001), pp. 18-19.

of data before starting coding, since coding will give insights into other material that may be worth including.⁹ In other words, the steps do not follow each other consecutively but are rather an ongoing procedure. The researcher is thus free to return to every step if the analyzed material provides new insights.

In its most basic form, Grounded Theory consists of three coding phases: open, axial and selective coding.¹⁰ Open coding means that the researcher conceptualizes the source material and Schreier describes it as follows:

You do so by looking at your data from up close, trying to take different perspectives, and pin-pointing any concepts that strike you as relevant. Over time, you will find the same concepts coming up again, or you will be struck by different descriptions, different events or happenings.¹¹

The second phase, axial coding, is defined as “a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories”.¹² Finally, selective coding is the deductive part of the analysis and is important at this stage in order to select coding data that lead to the results. Later in this paper, I explain how I used Grounded Theory in order to analyze my source material.

How exactly does one process the material? Jäger structures the analysis in a list which consists of two parts: one is concerned with the whole analysis, while the other is concerned with analyzing single articles. Regarding the first part, he stresses the importance of background information for the source that is used for the analysis (in this case Xinhua News Agency) as well as for the subject that is used for the analysis (in this case the one-child policy and the circumstances of the reforms).¹³ I have provided both in chapter two.

More interesting is his list for processing the material from individual articles, which he divides this into six main parts: (1) institutional framework: ‘context’, (2) text ‘surface’, (3) rhetorical means, (4) ideological statements based on contents, (5) other striking issues,

9. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, *The discovery of Grounded Theory* (Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).

10. Anselm Strauss and Juliet M. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998).

11. Margrit Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice* (London: Sage, 2012), pp. 111-112.

12. Strauss and Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, p. 96.

13. Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis,” pp. 54-55.

(6) summary: the ‘argument’ and/or the general ‘message’ and (7) interpretation of the discourse strand that is investigated with reference to the processed material that is used.¹⁴

The first category regards the context of the article: why analyze this article, who is the author and where is it published? I tackled most of these questions in chapter two and this chapter. The second category regards the layout of the article: pictures, headlines and subtitles, article-structure and discourse fragments that are used in the text. The third category is directed more towards language: what are the arguments and how are they constructed, which symbols, hyperboles or sayings are used and which players are mentioned in the text? The fourth category focuses on the background knowledge that one needs in order to understand the article and the concepts that are described in it.¹⁵ The other categories speak for themselves and/or are not further elaborated on by Jäger.

In my analysis, I mostly concentrate on the concepts and categories that are reflected and come forward in the text, on terms that describe the one-child policy and its relaxations, and other concepts, such as the authorities that are mentioned and how the text is structured. I also tackle some of the more linguistic issues, though this is limited, due to the fact that Chinese is not my native language and therefore unlikely that I will fully understand the linguistic meanings as required for an in-depth discussion on these issues.

3.3 Analyzing: quantitative and qualitative

In this thesis, I use a mixed method to analyze my source material. I began by collecting quantitative data by using NVivo 11 Starter and subsequently used these data in order to delve deeper into the analysis and to conduct a qualitative discourse analysis. I conducted the discourse analysis in the tradition of the Grounded Theory methodology. In the actual coding, I used Jäger’s list as a guideline.

In the first or open coding round, I wrote down all of the concepts that I could find which quickly rendered a large list of concepts and other striking issues that needed to be structured in order to make sense. It mostly consisted of themes that could be discourse fragments, arguments, terms by which to describe concepts and players who are mentioned. In the axial coding round, I structured this list by dividing concepts into categories and larger themes (see Appendix B). Finally, in the last round of selective coding, I combined

14. Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis,” pp. 55-56.

15. Ibid.

these themes in order to summarize the article's arguments and to interpret the discourse strands that emerged from the source material. I present my results in the following chapter.

Chapter 4: Results

In the previous chapter, I outlined the methodology for the analysis, using a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative analysis in the tradition of Grounded Theory. The actual analysis is based on Jäger’s guidelines for the analytical procedure. In this chapter, I present the results of the analysis, using articles to support my arguments. All of the translations of these articles are my own unless stated otherwise. Each example in this chapter is only an excerpt from the mentioned article.

Firstly, I offer an overview of the quantitative data, explaining frequently occurring words and elaborating on the terms referring to the one-child policy and its relaxations that are used in the source material. Furthermore, I focus on players who are present in the source material, after which I offer more information about the articles, how they are structured and what they are generally about. This is followed by a description of the discourse strands that are most prominent within the source material, describing how they are constructed, what arguments are used and what vocabulary is used to stress certain recurring themes. Finally, I explain how the discourse shifts over time.

4.1 Quantitative data: word use and players

The corpus consists of a total of 4.582 words. In the Word Cloud (figure 4.1) it is difficult to ignore the importance of the word ‘policy’ (*zhengce* 政策) which, as table 4.1 shows, is used 89 times: 30 times more than the runner-up. It may not be surprising that this word is used most often in articles that focus on the reforms of the one-child policy, though it does suggest, as do the other frequently used words displayed in table 4.1, that the government and its views have a strong presence in the articles.

Other interesting words that deserve to be noted are: China (*zhongguo* 中国), honest (*chengxin* 诚信), improve (*wanshan* 完善), development (*fazhan* 发展) and our country (*wo guo* 我国). These words are important because they form part of the prominent

discourse strands that I present later in this chapter.

Word	Translation ¹	Count	Word	Translation	Count
政策	Policy	89	经济	Economy	13
人口	Population	59	人民	The People	12
计生	Birth control	59	山西省	Shanxi Province	12
实施	Implementation	49	报道	Report	12
生育	Give birth	49	独生子女	One-child	12
单独	Alone	43	部门	Department	12
劳教	Re-education ²	42	修改	Amend	11
计划生育	Family planning	32	启动	Launch	11
中国	China	31	情况	Situation	11
诚信	Honest	31	特困	Especially hard	11
工作	Work	29	人大	NPC ³	10
家庭	Family	28	决定	Decision	10
制度	System	21	天津	Tianjin (place)	10
问题	Problem	21	夫妇	Husband and wife	10
全面	All-around	15	废除	Abolish	10
完善	Improve	15	教育	Education	10
国家	Nation	14	服务	Service	10
已经	Already	14	相关	Related	10
改革	Reform	14	劳动	Labor	9
政府	Government	14	发展	Development	9
条例	Regulations	14	常委会	Standing Committee	9
社会	Society	14	我国	Our country	9
表示	State	14	放开	Let go	9
全国	Nationwide	13	生活	Life	9
废止	Abolition	13	目前	Currently	9

Table 4.1: List of the 50 most frequently used words, conducted with NVivo 11 Starter.

In the list of the 50 most frequently used words, it appears that terms referring to the one-child policy and its relaxation are not represented, which is due to the fact that some of these terms are not added to Chinese dictionaries. One must know those terms, in order to understand that the characters are read together, rather than separately. I have listed the use of these terms in table 4.2, most of which are translated and explained in section 2.4,⁴ with the exception of 一对夫妇一对孩, 独生子女 and 计划生育. 一对夫妇一对孩 (*yi dui fufu yi dui hai*), meaning “a couple of spouses, a couple of children”. This is only mentioned once and refers to the two-child policy (*quan mian liang hai* 全面两孩).

1. Own translation according to the context of the subject

2. Re-education through labor.

3. National People’s Congress.

4. If the terms look very similar, but only differ from 两 (*liang*) to 二 (*er*) or from 孩 (*hai*) to 胎 (*tai*), then they are synonyms. There is minimal difference between 两 and 二, which both mean two, it mostly depends on personal preference. The difference between 孩 and 胎 is that the former has the broader meaning of ‘child’ and the latter more specifically refers to ‘baby’.



Figure 4.1: Word Cloud of most frequently used words in the source material, conducted with NVivo 11 Starter.

Word	Articles	Count
一对夫妇一对孩	1	1
一胎化	2	2
全面两孩	2	7
全面二孩	1	1
单独两孩	5	18
单独二孩	2	12
单独二胎	2	7
独生子女	4	11
计划生育	10	32

Table 4.2: Use of terms referring to the one-child policy and/or its reform.

More interesting is the difference between 独生子女 (*du sheng zi nü*) and 计划生育 (*ji hua sheng yu*), the former meaning ‘one-child’ and the latter meaning ‘family planning’. 独生子女, which is used eleven times in four different articles. It is interesting to note that three of these articles use this term while explaining the definition. For example:

Article 17, January 26, 2014

November 11, 2013, China’s Population and Family Planning policy underwent a significant reform. *Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform* announces that couples of which one of the spouses is an only child

could have two children (generally speaking, somebody is considered an only child if one does not have siblings from the same parents, the same father but another mother or the same mother but another father).

2013年11月，中国人口与生育政策做出重大调整，《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》发布，宣称夫妇一方为独生子女可以生育二胎(一般来讲，独生子女是指本人没有同父同母、同父异母或同母异父的兄弟姐妹)。

The last article in which 独生子女 is most frequently used (six times), is an article that gives an overview of foreign media’s coverage on recent reforms of the one-child policy (article 20, December 20, 2013). It uses the term 计划生育 three times and both of the terms 单独两孩 and 一胎化 only once. Why does this matter? As I show elsewhere, the term “one-child policy” in ‘the West’ is associated with negative ideas, while it is the term that is most frequently used by ‘Western’ media to cover the subject.⁵ The fact that in this corpus 独生子女 is almost exclusively used in an article that gives a broad overview of foreign-media coverage, suggests that Xinhua News Agency tries to avoid using this term. In section 2.2 I discussed guidelines that the CPD establishes regarding the exact wording that should be used (*tifa* 体法). If the term 独生子女 is an example of *tifa*, it supports the argument that Xinhua News Agency tries to be as positive as possible about the policy. The article was very modest about the one-child policy, especially compared to the frames that were used by foreign media (see section 2.4). However, this is only speculative and demands further research.

The idea that China’s authorities are highly represented in the source material is further strengthened by examining the players who are mentioned in the articles. As table 4.3 clearly shows, the articles appear to over-represent the government as a main player.

Player	Articles	Count
Citizen	1	4
Expert	1	12
Local Authority	1	3
Municipal Authority	5	16
Provincial Authority	3	8

Table 4.3: Amount of articles in which players occur and number of times mentioned.

5. Huijgen, “Framing van omstreden Chinese wetten: Eenkindpolitiek en ‘heropvoeding door arbeid’-systeem in de Chinese en Nederlandse massamedia.”

In the source material, three experts are mentioned, all of whom appear in the same article (article 15, January 23, 2014). Two of them are vice presidents of a hospital in the province Shanxi and the last is an expert on agriculture and food. They all stress that China should prepare before the relaxation of the one-child policy is implemented, in order to ensure that it does not create problems in public services such as health care and/or natural resources.

As I explain later, the experts mostly try to reassure citizens that the CCP considers all possible problems and that they address them by being well prepared before implementing the reforms: an argument which is supported by the fact that they think the reforms are a good idea. For example:

Article 15, January 23, 2014

“I think that it is appropriate to change the one-child policy now, the time is ripe,” Wang Huaiying [vice president of a hospital] said.

“现在推行单独二孩，我认为是适当的，时机已经成熟。”王怀颖说。

4.2 Structure of the source material

The structure of the articles, or text ‘surface’ as Jäger calls it, can be important for discourse analysis.⁶ The articles that are used in this analysis are all published by Xinhua News Agency and most of them are taken from Xinhua’s website. It should therefore come as no surprise that the layout is quite similar and that the articles more or less follow a standard format.

The website of Xinhua makes use of subsections for provincial, regional and local news. This is stated somewhere on the top of the page, mostly with the characters 来源 (*laiyuan*), which means ‘source’. The name of the journalist is stated either at the beginning of the article, directly after the title, or at the bottom.

Most of the articles use a certain standard format and begin with one or two lines of summary, sometimes even stating that in fact it is an abstract (*zhaiyao* 摘要). After the title, the article often starts with the date, followed by one or two sentences that repeat the title. A paragraph usually consists of no more than three sentences. The articles

6. Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis.”

included in the corpus often do not have pictures or other graphics. Only eight articles contained pictures, meaning that 35 articles consisted exclusively of text.

Most articles do not have subtitles, namely 35 out of the 43 articles. Those that use subtitles are often only partly relevant for this research because they are not solely about the one-child policy and/or its reforms. For example article 54 (December 31, 2015) looks forward to the new year while discussing some of the accomplishments of 2015, one of which is the announcement of the two-child policy.

Prominent themes can be found throughout the articles, while players are often mentioned at the beginning and/or at the end of the articles and used to introduce topics or to close the articles with a statement from the government.

The articles have a significant amount of repetition: not only are recurring themes often repeated, but also entire sentences. As previously stated, the title is often repeated in the first paragraph and it is quite frequently repeated more than once.

4.3 Discourse strands

In what follows I discuss the themes that were used in the source material. These themes consist of certain arguments that legitimize the reforms of the one-child policy, defend its implementation decades ago and/or deal with the doubts that people may have about the reform of the family-planning law.

4.3.1 From the masses to the masses

As I previously stated, the authority of the government plays a prominent role in the source material. The idea that the government is doing what is best for the people and that it listens to the people is a recurring theme that can best be described by the Chinese notion of “from the masses, to the masses”. This mass-line leadership (*qunzhong luxian* 群众路线) is an idea that played a crucial role in the propaganda thought work of the CCP during the Mao-era. The idea entails gathering information about the people, learning about their living conditions, participating in their struggles, knowing their concerns and subsequently creating and/or changing policies based on these data.⁷ This notion was popularized by Mao Zedong.

7. John A. Barlow, “Mass line leadership and thought reform in China,” *American Psychologist* 36, no. 3 (1981): 300–309, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.36.3.300>.

In the source material, arguments and ideas can be found that call for mutual trust place the government as the father of its citizens and/or stress that the government listens to the people and changes the one-child policy because that is what the people want. For example, in article 2 (November 14, 2013) Huangke (*huang ke* 黄克), the director of Chongzuo's Municipal Standing Committee, calls for better and honest population birth-control work in order to strengthen the mutual trust between officials and citizens:

Article 2, November 14, 2013

In the interview Huangke points out that a large group of villagers of Qujufeng supports the work of population birth control. It abides by the national family planning policy, that, even when village cadres try to develop, they do not forget about the national policy. Party members and cadres set an example and are the first to carry out family planning, launching honest birth control, promoting birth control and developing assistance to the poor, guiding poor families to get out of their situation, to obtain extraordinary result.

黄克在调研中指出，渠凤村的广大群众支持人口计生工作，自觉遵守计划生育国策，特别是村委干部在抓发展的同时不忘国策，党员、干部以身作则，带头实行计划生育，深入开展诚信计生，推动计生扶贫开发，带领贫困计生家庭发家致富，取得了非常好的成效。

As shown in table 4.1, the word “honest” (*chengxin* 诚信) is used 31 times in the source material. The idea that the government listens to the people is also used as an argument for the policy changes, so that couples are allowed two children if one of the spouses is an only child:

Article 53, December 31, 2015

It [the relaxation of the policy] is beneficial for the part of the masses that wants to have children and that have a tradition of giving birth.

有利于客观把握群众的生育意愿和生育行为。

The government is portrayed as a father figure that loves the country. This patriotic sentiment is especially recognizable while analyzing the use of ‘our country’ (*wo guo* 我国), which is used nine times in the source material (see table 4.1). The term is used by

government officials when referring to China. 我国 is a contraction of 我们国家 (*women guojia*), which means ‘our country’.⁸

Furthermore, the sentences regarding the authorities are usually formulated in the active voice. Frequently used verbs are ‘to introduce’ (*jieshao* 介绍), ‘to put forward’ (*tichu* 提出), ‘to state’ (*biaoshi* 表示), ‘to announce’ (*fabu* 发布) and ‘to confirm’ (*queren* 确认).⁹ As can be seen, these verbs are all synonyms and are used when the government makes an announcement to the public. For example:

Article 57, December 31, 2015

The Shanghai Municipal Health and Family Planning Commission states that Shanghai will implement the two-child policy starting from January 1, 2016.

上海市卫计委表示，上海自2016年1月1日起实施全面两孩政策。

The authorities are thus seen as the protagonists and reforming the policy proves that the government listens to the people, which is unsurprising given that one of the main missions of Xinhua News Agency is to advocate political decisions (see section 2.3).

4.3.2 Towards a better future

A second theme that recurs throughout the analyzed texts is the idea that reforming family-planning law leads China towards a better future, as is already apparent in the way in which the relaxation of the one-child policy was announced. The relaxation forms part of the blueprint called ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’ (*zhong gong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jue ding* 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定).

This document is very clear about its goal and starts with the following statement:

1. Reform and opening up is a new, great revolution, in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) leads people of all ethnic groups to carry out in the new era. It is the most distinctive characteristic of contemporary China. Since

8. The term first appeared in *Golden Coffer [of Zhou Gong]*, a chapter in the *Book of Documents*, part Zhou (《尚书·周书》中《金》). This book is one of the Five Classics of ancient Chinese literature and is believed to date from 479 BC. For more on this topic, see for example Ho-kin Tong, “The Family Instructions of Ji Dan Recorded in the Book of Documents,” *Asian Culture and History* 7, no. 1 (2015): 240–249, doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ach.v7n1p240>.

9. These verbs can be translated otherwise as well. I have used the translation that I thought fitted best within the context.

1978, when the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee was convened, the CPC, with great political courage, has firmly promoted reforms in the country's economic, political, cultural, social and ecological systems, as well as in the system of Party building. China's opening up has also been continuously promoted. The strength of the determination, the depth of the changes and the width of the influence are all unprecedented, and the achievements have drawn the attention of the world.¹⁰

(1) 改革开放是党在新的时代条件下带领全国各族人民进行的新的伟大革命，是当代中国最鲜明的特色。党的十一届三中全会召开三十五年来，我们党以巨大的政治勇气，锐意推进经济体制、政治体制、文化体制、社会体制、生态文明体制和党的建设制度改革，不断扩大开放，决心之大、变革之深、影响之广前所未有，成就举世瞩目。¹¹

In the source material, authorities stress that the reform of family-planning law is crucial in order to either prevent the economy from stagnating or to benefit China's economic growth. Furthermore, the reform of the one-child policy is legitimized by indicating all of the advances resulting from a more relaxed policy, such as economic growth and improvement of demographic problems. One of the main demographic problems which recurred six times in the source material, in three different articles, is China's aging population.

Article 20, December, 13, 2013

In the last few years, problems such as aging population and shortage of labor force have become more and more prominent. Thus, requests to reform the policy have gradually increased.

最近几年因为人口老龄化和劳动力短缺问题日益突出，要求改革这一政策的呼声渐多。

It is stressed that the reforms are an improvement of family-planning law and the authorities mention that the relaxation is an important step towards a two-child policy. In addition, while analyzing the use of the word 'improve' (*wanshan* 完善) it becomes clear

10. China.org.cn, "The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief," 2013, accessed May 31, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.

11. News.xinhuanet.com, "授权发布：中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定," 2013, accessed May 31, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm.

that the reforms are made to be regarded as beneficial. Used 15 times in the texts, 完善 always occurs in combination with the word ‘policy’ (*zhengce* 政策).

Article 9, January 31, 2014

Hubei Province Committee and the provincial government attach importance to revision the birth control policy to improve.

指出，湖北省委、省政府重视调整完善生育政策。

As I introduced in chapter two, from the beginning, the one-child policy was intended to last for only a few decades, which could explain the statement that the relaxation of the policy was only a step towards a two-child policy. Furthermore, this frame of a better future is in line with the primary mission that Xinhua News Agency always had: to propagate the ideology and ideas of the CCP (see section 2.3).

4.3.3 Only choice / best choice

Another theme that is represented a fair amount of times in the texts is the idea that reforming the one-child policy is the only choice and/or the best choice that the government could possibly make, concerning birth control. Not only do the authorities legitimize the reforms by arguing that it is appropriate to change them now, but they also legitimize the implementation of family-planning law and the one-child policy in the first place.

Statements that are often made by authorities in the source material includes that birth planning is essential in order to overcome the population growth and avoid a shortage of natural resources. They explain that now is the right moment to adjust family-planning law, as the birth rate is sufficiently stable:

Article 12, January 30, 2014

In the end of this year, Tianjin’s total population remains within 1.53 million, the populations birthrate is controlled to 9.5%.

今年年末，天津总人口控制在1535万人以内，人口出生率控制在9.5%。

The authorities stress that reforming family-planning law will not have a significant impact on the population and claim that traditional values, implying having many sons is preferable, have now changed. In addition, there is no longer a preference for having a

daughter or a son. The authorities also stress that China is well prepared to handle the extra births, proclaiming that public services will respond appropriately:

Article 15, January 23, 2014

After starting to implement the relaxation of the one-child policy in the province of Shanxi, there are also six additional policies needed.

山西省在启动实施“单独二孩”政策后，还需完善6项配套政策。

Another interesting concept which three articles stress is that it continues to be illegal to have two children until the reform of the policy is officially implemented. This goes as far as to state that fees that are paid for violating the one-child policy are not refundable after the policy changes:

Article 17, January 26, 2014

He [Chief of provincial statistics office] emphasized that the birth control policy currently has not yet changed in Hainan. Before this change, if a couple of whom one of the spouses is an only child have a second, they violate the law.

他强调，目前海南生育政策仍未变，“单独”夫妇若在政策改变之前生育二胎，也属违规。

In section 4.3.1, I stated that the authorities are usually presented in sentences that adopt an active voice. One exception to this is when the problems of family-planning law are highlighted, in sentences such as “the aging population forces the Chinese government to change its policy”.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the best-choice frame was also prominent in the discourse on the one-child policy when it was first introduced (see section 2.3).

4.4 Shift in discourse over time

Having discussed the most prominent recurring themes in the previous section and elaborated on the arguments that are used by the authorities in order to legitimize, defend and/or reassure the people, I here discuss how these themes and arguments change over time. The oldest articles that are included in my source material are regarding the relaxation of the one-child policy that was announced during the four-day summit, in November

2013. After this date, the articles portray the authorities arguing that it was the right decision and speculating about how the relaxation could influence the Chinese population. In the second part of the analysis in which the discursive event of the government announces the two-child policy, the same pattern can be found. However, there are two major differences in officials' arguments in the articles published by Xinhua News Agency, before and after changing the one-child policy into a two-child policy.

Firstly, as previously stated, the idea of 'from the masses to the masses' is a recurring theme in the source material. After the first analyzed time frame, the authorities stressed that the decision to allow couples to have two children if one of the spouses is an only child would be cautiously implemented. Officials reassure the people and defend the decision, though this changed after the announcement of the two-child policy. The idea that the relaxation was a step towards the two-child policy began to emerge in articles that were published within this time frame. Rather than reassuring the people about the change, the authorities stated that the relaxation of 2013 was only a first step in preparing for the two-child policy.

Article 53, December 31, 2015

It is a strong base for the implementation of a two-child policy.

为实施“全面二孩”政策奠定了坚实基础。

Secondly, the arguments are first presented within an only-choice frame and subsequently shift to arguments within a best-choice frame. After the Third Plenum, officials argue that China has no other choice than to relax the one-child policy and argue that this is the only way to improve demographic problems such as the aging population. Within this time frame, more passive sentences occur, for instance, the aging population which forces the Chinese government to change its policy. In late 2015, however, this view became more moderated and changing the one-child policy into a two-child policy is not legitimized, as the government had no other choice. Instead, officials emphasize the benefits of allowing all people to have two children, mentioning that this is what the people want. These articles do not use passive sentences.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

China's one-child policy has been gradually changed into a two-child policy in the last decade. In the coverage of these changes, the state-run news agency Xinhua used statements that legitimized the CCP's choices. The framing of these statements changed from an only choice frame to a best choice frame, with which Xinhua highlights that the CCP serves the people's best interests.

The articles that I have analyzed reveal three main discourse strands. Firstly, the government is portrayed as a protagonist that listens to the people: a frame which I have called 'from the masses to the masses'. Secondly, reforming family-planning law is beneficial for China's economic growth and demography, which is called 'towards a better future'. Lastly, adjusting family-planning law is first portrayed as essential (only-choice), but is later toned down to being the 'best choice' that the authorities could have made.

The research question of this thesis is as follows: What is the difference in the state-run news agency Xinhua's statements regarding the one-child policy, before and after its abolition? This research focused on the changes of family-planning law in 2013 and 2015. Borrowing Foucault's concept of discourse analysis and Jäger's guidelines for the analytical procedure, I have argued that in both time-frames, frames of 'from the masses to the masses' and 'towards a better future' are strongly represented, though there is a shift from an only-choice frame to a best-choice frame. Furthermore, in 2013 the authorities were very cautious and stressed that China was well prepared for the relaxation of the one-child policy, while in 2015 they claimed that the change of 2013 was only a step towards the new two-child policy.

However, this discourse analysis was text based and only included articles in Xinhua. For further research, I suggest to also include other content, such as video and figures, as well as articles from other sources. As previously stated, I chose Xinhua because it is a state-run news agency and therefore best represents the CCP's official view. Media that are more commercialized can give a broader view of China's discourse regarding the

reforms of the one-child policy. Furthermore, I only briefly touched upon how particular words are used in news articles (*tifa* 体法). Further research on this topic can offer more insights into the difference between using the term ‘one-child’ (*dushengzinü* 独生子女) and ‘family planning’ (*jihua shengyu* 计划生育).

The statements in Xinhua’s coverage on the reform of the one-child policy are examples of the ways in which the CCP legitimizes its political decisions. While examining the players that are mentioned in the source material, the authorities are over-represented, and the government and the CCP are portrayed as the protagonists. Sentences that mention the authorities are often written in the active voice and only in combination with problems such as China’s aging demography are they formulated in the passive voice.

As explained earlier, the relationship between discourse, power, text and society is important within the theory of discourse analysis. In the case that is studied in this thesis, the CCP used the state-run news agency Xinhua to propagate its official view and the source material frequently states the CCP’s ideology of family-planning law legitimizing the policy’s reforms.

Xinhua is an authoritarian power within China’s media market and the CCP is therefore an important actor in influencing and changing the discourse regarding family planning. Due to the unique and strong position of both the CCP and Xinhua, the public view towards the desired number of children may change. As I have shown, the authorities argued that the abolition of the one-child policy is in line with what the people want, though after propagating a one-child policy for such a long time, it may take some time before public opinion changes. Regardless, through Xinhua News Agency, the CCP has shaped the idea that the abolition of the one-child policy is positive for China.

Bibliography

- Barker, Anthony J. *The African Link: British Attitudes to the Negro in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1550-1807*. London: Frank Cass, 1978.
- Barlow, John A. "Mass line leadership and thought reform in China." *American Psychologist* 36, no. 3 (1981): 300–309. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.36.3.300>.
- Bergvall, Victoria L., and Kathryn A. Remlinger. "Reproduction, resistance and gender in educational discourse: the role of critical discourse analysis." *Discourse and Society* 7, no. 4 (1996): 453–479.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
- Chen, Jie. "The impact of reform on the party and ideology in China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 4, no. 9 (1995): 22–34. doi:10.1080/10670569508724221.
- Chilton, Paul. *Analyzing Political Discourse*. London: Arnold, 2004.
- China.org.cn. "The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief." 2013. Accessed May 31, 2016. http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. *Discourse as Structure and Process*. Sage, 1997.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*. London: Longman, 1995.
- Fong, Vanessa L. "China's One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters." *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 4 (December 2002): 1098–1109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3567099>.

- Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the discourse on language*. Edited by Alan Sheridan-Smith. New York: NY: Pantheon Books, 1972.
- . *The History of Sexuality: an Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: NY: Penguin, 1990.
- Gee, James Paul. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Glaser, Barney, and Anselm Strauss. *The discovery of Grounded Theory*. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967.
- Greenhalgh, Susanne. *Just one child: science and policy in Deng's China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- . “Science, Modernity, and the Making of China’s One-Child Policy.” *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 2 (June 2003): 163–196. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115224>.
- He, Qinglian. *Media Control in China*. Human Rights in China, 2004. http://ir2008.org/PDF/initiatives/Internet/Media-Control_Chinese.pdf.
- He, Zhou. “Power, Money and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China.” Chap. Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug-of-war: A Political-economy Analysis of the Shenzhe Special Zone Daily, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee, 112–51. Evanston, ILL: Northwestern University Press, 2000.
- Hesketh, Therese, Lu Li, and Weixing Zhu. “The Effects of China’s One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years.” *The New England Journal of Medicine* 353, no. 11 (2005): 1171–1176.
- Huijgen, Cindy. “Framing van omstreden Chinese wetten: Eenkindpolitiek en ‘heropvoeding door arbeid’-systeem in de Chinese en Nederlandse massamedia.” Master’s thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2015.
- Jäger, Siegfried. “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis.” Chap. 3 in *Discourse and Knowledge*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 32–62. Sage Publications, 2001.

- Jiang, Min, and Kirsten Okamoto. "National Identity, Ideological Apparatus, or Panopticon? A Case study of the Chinese National Search Engine Jike." *Policy and Internet* 6, no. 1 (2014): 89–107. doi:10.1002/1944-2866.P0I353.
- Lee, Chin-Chuan. "China's Media, Media's China." Chap. Ambiguities and Contradictions: Issues in China's Changing Political Communication, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee, 3–20. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
- . *Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism*. New York: Guilford, 1990.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: From revolution through reform*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.
- Lynch, Daniel C. *Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Meyer, Michael. "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis." Chap. 2: Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 14–30. Sage, 2001.
- News.xinhuanet.com. "China to ease one-child policy." 2013. Accessed May 31, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891920.htm.
- . "授权发布：中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定." 2013. Accessed May 31, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm.
- Pan, Zhongdang. "Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China." Chap. Improvising Reform Activities: The Changing Reality of Journalistic Practice in China, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee, 68–111. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000.
- Potts, Malcolm. "China's one child policy." *BMJ* 333, no. 7564 (August 2006): 361–362. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38938.412593.80>.
- Rabinow, Paul. "Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984." In *Ethics*, edited by Peter Singer. Oxford University Press, 1994.

- Schiffrin, Deborah, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, eds. *The Handbook of discourse analysis*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001.
- Schreier, Margrit. *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*. London: Sage, 2012.
- Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy." *The China Journal*, no. 57 (January 2007): 22–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20066240>.
- Shirk, Susan L., ed. *Changing Media, Changing China*. New York: Oxford Univ, 2011.
- Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet M. Corbin. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998.
- Tong, Ho-kin. "The Family Instructions of Ji Dan Recorded in the Book of Documents." *Asian Culture and History* 7, no. 1 (2015): 240–249. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ach.v7n1p240>.
- Wang, Yiwei. "Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 257–273.
- Wesley-Smith, Terence, and Jon D. Goss. *Remaking Area Studies: Teaching and Learning Across Asia and the Pacific*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2010.
- Wodak, Ruth. *Gender and Discourse*. London: Sage, 1997.
- . "Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis." Chap. 4, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 63–95. London: Sage, 2001.
- Xin, Xin. "A developing market in news: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese newspapers." *Media, Culture & Society* 28, no. 1 (2006): 45–66. doi:[10.1177/0163443706059285](https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443706059285).
- Zhao, Suisheng. "A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (September 1998): 287–302. doi:[10.1016/S0967-067X\(98\)00009-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(98)00009-9).

Appendix A: Source Material

List of the relevant articles. When a number is skipped it is either because the article is irrelevant or the article was not available anymore.

Article	Date	Title
1	05-11-2013 17:09	罗城民生工程跨新路
2	14-11-1013	黄克:努力推动全市人口计生工作再上新台阶
3	30-01-2014	沁阳市慰问计生困难家庭暖民心
4	30-01-2014	大方县春节前夕整合资源慰问农村计生“两户”
5	30-01-2014	新密市人口计生委开展“暖心行动”关爱计生老干部
6	28-01-2014 10:58	桂林市领导率队慰问特困诚信计生家庭
8	13-01-2014	桂林灵川县计生局被评为“人民满意的公务员集体”
9	31-01-2014	湖北省“单独两孩”方案获国家卫生计生委备案通过
10	30-01-2014	夏邑县人口计生委开展节前流动人口送温暖送服务活动
11	29-01-2014	36岁牛博杨: 不畅想“二孩”的生活
12	30-01-2014 10:52	天津上半年实施单独两孩实施前生育二胎按原政策处理
13	30-01-2014 10:11	单独两孩施行后杭州现“补证潮”
14	30-01-2014 9:58	单独两孩启动婚登处补证的中老年人比年轻人还多
15	23-01-2014 16:11	省人大代表热议“单独二孩”政策
16	26-01-2014 15:17	汇聚发展能量打造魅力乳城
17	26-01-2014 8:19	单独二胎尚未在海南实施政策改变之前生二胎违规
18	24-12-2013 9:53	新华快讯早讯2013年12月24日
20	30-12-2013 8:26	外媒热议中国废止劳教制度: 要防止出现替代品
21	28-01-2014 11:28	江苏将实行教师资格五年一认定不合格者退出
22	28-01-2014 9:56	2017年江苏高考英语“一年两考”
23	28-01-2014 9:44	地方两会热词透露地方发展新红利

24	28-01-2014 8:45	江苏英语有望“一年两考” 2016年或迎学前教育高峰
29	23-10-2015 15:52	钦州港区打造“海歌”民族特色文化名片
30	20-10-2015 17:50	田东县卫生计生系统后备干部集体“充电”
31	01-12-2015	自治区卫计委领导到那坡县调研
33	16-12-2015 16:47	平果县政协助力改革生育服务证制度工作
34	14-12-2015 9:31	凌云县推行“四位一体” 计生惠民套餐
35	10-12-2015 16:42	平果：委员为民提建议育龄群众少跑腿
38	25-12-2015	肖莺子到钦南调研生育服务证改革工作
39	24-12-2015	梧州市政府今年为民办实事工程提前超额完成任务
43	31-12-2015 11:45	永宁打造计生宣传亮丽工程
44	31-12-2015 12:23	副县长康秀莲走访慰问计划生育困难家庭
46	31-12-2015 15:31	威海市文登区供电公司：获威海市“优秀企业计生协”称号
47	31-12-2015	汪甸：1462户计生户免费参加新农合
48	31-12-2015	绥阳大路槽乡转变计生服务观
53	31-12-2015	广东有16.2万对“单独夫妇”申请生育二孩
54	31-12-2015 17:44	聚焦2016年民生改革起航全面两孩国家居住证时代到来
56	31-12-2015 17:40	石市新华区举办科学备孕知识讲座迎接全面两孩政策
57	31-12-2015 18:24:41	上海明起实施两孩政策已征收社会抚养费不退回
58	21-11-2015 8:44	姚余栋：2030年后社保空账率升高应尽早划转国有资产充实
59	03-12-2015 10:41	户口办理拟向“黑户”开放具体方案尚未发布
60	21-12-2015 19:50	台湾高中生：台湾缺乏国际观对大陆看法过度封闭
62	31-12-2015 16:14	2015大事记：它们影响了历史和世界，还有你我

Appendix B: Conceptualizing the Material

- Announcement
 - Official two-child policy
 - Official ‘two-children for spouses if one of them is only child’ policy
 - Third Plenum
- Authority
 - Citizens
 - Expert
 - Local
 - Municipal
 - Provincial
- Expectation
 - Growth
 - * Economic
 - * Modernisation
 - Natural resources
 - On population
 - * Birth growth
 - * Married women
 - * Wish for second child
- From the masses to the masses
 - Government as guide
 - Government listens to the people
 - Mutual trust
 - * Honest work
 - * Officials as example
 - * Rewarding one-child families

- 我国
- Implementation
 - Cautiously
 - Prepared
 - * Parents
 - * Public services
 - Still illegal
- Propaganda
 - Birth planning is essential
 - * Make sure people still want to have one-child
 - History
 - * Changes through history
 - * Reasons why it was implemented
- Terms for policy
 - 一对夫妇一对孩
 - 一胎化
 - 全面两孩
 - 全面二孩
 - 单独两孩
 - 单独二孩
 - 单独二胎
 - 独生子女
 - 计划生育
- Why change now
 - Best choice
 - Demographic problems
 - * Aging population
 - * Gender ratio
 - * Working population
 - Dissatisfaction
 - Economic stagnation
 - Improve birth control

- * First step towards two-child policy
- * Progressive
- Only choice
- Right moment
 - * Birth rate is stable
 - * Traditional values changed