

Redeeming the Promised Land

An analysis of the popularity of religious Zionism in Israel after the Yom
Kippur War



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Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction	4
1.1 Introduction to the research question	4
1.2 Methods and methodology	5
1.3 Conceptual framework	6
1.3.1 Religionization	6
1.3.2 Religious Zionism	8
1.4 Literature review	10
1.4.1 Civil religion	11
1.4.2 International factors	12
1.4.3 Mizrahim	13
1.5 Theoretical framework	14
Chapter 2: Manifestations of religionization in Israel	16
2.1 Individual level	16
2.1.1 Statistics on religiosity	16
2.1.2 Statistics on Zionism and Jewish nationalism	18
2.1.3 Conclusion	18
2.2 Politics	18
2.2.1 Knesset election statistics	19
2.2.2 Religionization of political issues	20
2.2.3 The National Religious Party	20
2.2.4 Conclusion	21
2.3 Discourse	21
2.3.1 Events	22
2.3.2 Reader's letters	22
2.3.3 Conclusion	23
2.4 State institutions	24
2.4.1 The Israeli Defense Force	24
2.4.2 Education	25
2.4.3 Conclusion	26
2.5 Conclusion	26

Chapter 3: Analysis	27
3.1 Analyzing previous literature	27
3.1.1 Ethno-nationalism and Jewish solidarity	27
3.1.2 Labor delegitimation and the pioneering spirit of Gush Emunim	29
3.2 The significance of religionization	29
3.2.1 The exploitation of the absence of values	30
3.2.2 Religionization of religious Zionist discourse	31
3.2.3 ‘Saints despite themselves’	32
3.2.4 Problematizing the causal relationship	33
Chapter 4: Conclusion	34
4.1 Answer to the main question	34
4.2 Implications	35
4.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research	36
Bibliography	38
Bibliography	38
Primary Sources	44
Appendices	46
Appendix A: Statistics	46
Appendix B: NRP Election advertisements	49
Appendix C: <i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	52

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the research question

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, multiple events happened that are considered to be defining for its history. 1967 is regarded as one of its watershed years, as it overturned the notion that Israel was a weak country at the mercy of foreign powers. In this year, Israel won a war against its neighboring enemies in a mere six days, even though it seemed to be headed for disaster in the months leading up to it. This triumph in the Six Day War resulted in a wide-spread euphoria among Israeli citizens, not in the least because one of the territories that Israel gained was Jerusalem, a city of unsurpassed religious importance for the Jews (Gordis, 2016, ch. 12). Both this victory and the resulting euphoria contributed to the rise of religious Zionism, a type of Zionism that did not only strive towards a sovereign state for Jews to live in, but also propagated that said state explicitly needed to include the land of their forefathers: the entire biblical Land of Israel, also known as *Eretz Yisrael* (Taub, 2010, p. 15). The ‘miraculous’ victory led religious Zionists to the conclusion that it was a sign from God (Gordis, 2016, ch. 13, para. 3), and could even lead to the redemption of the Jewish people during their generation (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, pp. 104-105).

In contrast, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 caused the opposite of euphoria in society. Although Israel won without civilian casualties (Liebman, 1993, p. 401), the war was unexpected and a sign that Israel was not as invincible as it seemed. The Israelis had trusted their government and military power, which had let them down. This trust was known as the *conceptzia*, a concept that vanished when it became clear that the Yom Kippur War resulted from failure of the ruling Labor government (Gordis, 2016, ch. 14). Israeli society entered a crisis and re-examined many of its values after this war, but religious Zionism did not suffer from it. The movement did not falter, but instead, increased its influence in Israeli society. For example, the settler movements, consisting of religious Zionists who actively tried to redeem *Eretz Yisrael*, began in 1968 but grew large only after 1974 as settlement of the Land became a dominant current within religious Zionism (Ariel, 2010, p. 11). Although many Israeli Jews feared the effect religious Zionism might have on democracy, the movement grew larger as did its influence on the state. For example, Religious Zionists gained many prominent positions in the army (Levy, 2014, p. 276), and would be supported by the conservative Likud party, which became the largest party in 1977 (Taub, 2010, p. 65).

This increase in popularity and influence seems counter-intuitive, especially because the initial popularity boost of religious Zionism stemmed from euphoria and self-confidence, whereas the Yom Kippur War led to contrasting developments like self-doubt. Moreover, from an outsider's perspective, the Yom Kippur War formed an obstacle to the redemption of the people, and shows that the Six Day War was no sign from God after all. Despite this, the religious Zionism movement continued to flourish. This is seemingly very contrary to previous occurrences, as, opposed to the *conceptzia*, it was not cast aside. This begs the question of why religious Zionism became more popular after the Yom Kippur War instead of fading out of existence, like the *conceptzia* did.

This thesis argues that the religious Zionists deliberately framed themselves as the new generation of pioneers, in contrast to the Labor government which took the blame for the Yom Kippur War. Moreover, the religious Zionists downplayed the influence of earthly events on redemption, and the movement could therefore survive the setback. Finally, religious Zionism was also appealing to secular ethno-nationalists, as they also wanted to keep the territories even without religious justifications. However, even after an elaborate analysis, I am unable to prove that the religionization of society played a large role in the rise of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War.

1.2 Methods and Methodology

This thesis employs the historical approach, as it will serve to explain a historical event (the popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War) through understanding the causal mechanisms behind it. The popularity of religious Zionism had multiple causes, of which most have already been studied by previous research, listed in the literature review. However, while said research may have looked into certain aspects, none of the papers looked very in-depth into the role religion might have played in appealing to followers. This seemed strange to me before starting this thesis, as religious Zionism is an inherently religious movement. Therefore, this thesis mainly commits to research on the religionization of Israel and whether there was a causal relationship between that phenomenon and the rise of religious Zionism. Additionally, it reevaluates answers offered previously by authors for my main research question.

This research rests partially on primary sources: issues of the newspaper *The Jerusalem Post*, from the years 1972 and 1976; statistics on the religionization of society on an individual level; and election advertisements issued by the National Religious Party in 1955 and 1977. These will be further elaborated upon in chapter 2. The rest of this research depends on

secondary sources. The timeframe of this case study covers the period from the Six Day War (1967) to the late 1970s, some years after the Yom Kippur War (1973). Gush Emunim, the most significant settler movement at the time, was established in 1974, and would affect Israeli politics in the years after (Sharot, 2007, p. 688). As the election results of 1977 show the influence that religious Zionism had, (Likud won the elections and allied itself with the movement), it is important to include the late 1970s in this analysis.

As is the case with all historical case studies, the researcher will run into limitations. Firstly, there are not many statistics on the religiosity of the society at that time available, as the state had not yet committed to in-depth research of the religiosity of different groups in society. Therefore, it was necessary to rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, such as statistics on religious primary education in comparison to secular education. Secondly, I simply did and do not speak Hebrew. This thesis employs a few sources in this language, but I could only use them with the help of a translator. As a result, out of the many Israeli newspapers that I could have studied for a change in discourse, I had to rely on *The Jerusalem Post*. This newspaper had Anglophone Israelis and Diaspora Jews as its target audience at the time, rather than a more representative overview of the population. However, by comparing the ‘Readers’ Letters’ section of *the Jerusalem Post* in different years, one can perceive a considerable change in the worries of society, spurred on by national events. It is very plausible that these trends existed beyond the Anglophone Israelis as well.

1.3 Conceptual framework

As noted above, this thesis studies the movement of religious Zionism. Religious Zionism becoming increasingly popular can be considered a form of religionization, as the secular Labor Zionist movement lost terrain in favor of a religious movement, which religionized the discourse around certain political issues. It is necessary to explain the concept of religionization before engaging with it further, as most of the research in subsequent chapters is centered around religionization. Furthermore, this paragraph also provides a brief overview of the development of Zionism, and how religious Zionism differs from it.

1.3.1 Religionization

The use of the concept ‘religionization’ by social scientists has been relatively rare: it is mostly used by non-native English speakers (Zuckerman et al., 2016, ch. 3 n. 77), and even then mostly

in the Israeli context as a translation for the Hebrew term *hadata*. *Hadata* was coined only recently, as many Israelis feel that the religionization of Israeli society has increased rapidly in the last few years (Peri, 2012, p. 1). I shall discuss here both the term ‘religionization’ in general and the four manifestations in society that will be studied further in Chapter 2.

While the term ‘religionization’ is not synonymous with ‘sacralization’, the two do have many similarities. N.J. Demerath III (2007) calls sacralization a dialectically opposing process to secularization. Secularization is ‘a process of change by which the sacred gives way to the secular, whether in matters of personal faith, institutional practice, or societal power’ (pp. 65-66). Sacralization is thus:

The process by which the secular becomes sacred or other new forms of the sacred emerge, whether in matters of personal fate, institutional practice or political power. Sacralization may occur gradually or suddenly, and may also be sometimes temporary and occasionally reversible (Demerath III, 2007, p. 66).

This definition describes sacralization as something which can happen gradually, and thus rejects the dichotomy that Émile Durkheim once invented. Durkheim stated that the secular and profane are radically opposed to one another, as ‘worlds with nothing in common’ (Durkheim, 1996, p. 36). This distinction would later be refuted by José Casanova, as religions can become secularized internally with religious reforms, in the form of de-ritualization (Casanova 2012, p. 455). The reverse can also happen, as was the case in Israel: the four groups distinguished by social scientists are the secular (*hiloni*), traditional (*masorti*), religious (*dati*) and ultra-Orthodox (*haredi*). Although the *hiloni* and *masorti* claim to be non-observant, they still participate in various religious rituals such as lighting Hanukkah candles (Ben-Meir & Kedem, 1979, p. 359).

The difference between sacralization and religionization is that the latter is narrower. In the words of Zuckerman et al. (2016): ‘Religionization induces people or institutions to adopt ideas, identities, symbols or practices generally recognized as religious’ (ch. 3 n. 77). In other words, religions themselves can become more sacralized. Religionization, in contrast, only happens outwards: it denotes the influence of religions or religious aspects on other phenomena. Like sacralization however, it is a process, reversible, and can occur in different ways.

What are the phenomena that become religionized? I have separated these in four categories, which will be further studied in the second chapter. Firstly, religionization can

happen on an individual level. People can adopt religious practices, send their children to religious schools, or even become Orthodox themselves.

Secondly, religionization occurs frequently in correlation to politics. An example is a study by Mark Juergensmeyer (1996), who found that political issues in many countries were put within a religious context. A political platform in a country with religious nationalism has to be compatible with religious goals for it to be acceptable (p. 5). The same was visible in Israel during the seventies, when Israel's claim over the occupied territories became a religious question, and even secular political parties invoked religious arguments to support this claim.

The third category is discourse in society, which shows some overlap with politics. Nonetheless, it will be given its own section, as my research of it is mainly focused on the opinions of regular Israelis in *The Jerusalem Post*. The criteria of whether discourse is religionized in this work is whether the people use religiously motivated arguments in debates, or whether they express themselves with help of religious symbolism. This does not have to concern politics per se.

Finally, the state can also be religionized, by using religious symbolism, creating laws that support one religion over another or by religionizing institutions (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983). Although Israel does not have an official state religion as of August 2018, it also does not have a separation between church and state, like France has (Bellin, 2008, p. 336). As this relates to the state institutions themselves instead of to political issues that become religionized, this will subsequently also be given its separate category in which I study the military and the education system.

1.3.2 Religious Zionism

Religious Zionism relates strongly to the religionization of society, as the assertion of its influence can be considered a form of the religionization of society. Religious Zionists contributed to the religionization of the political issue of the new territories by encouraging others to use religious discourse. This paragraph will describe the brief history of religious Zionism, as it did not originate after the Six Day War. It will also describe the debate around the terminology used for religious Zionism.

Religious Zionism is one of various forms of Zionism that resulted from the original secular Zionist movement, founded by Theodor Herzl (1860-1904). He found that the only solution to the 'Jewish Problem', the marginalized position of Jews in Europe, was for the Jews to secure their own sovereign nation (Hertzberg, 1997, pp. 202-203). Herzl considered the

Jewish community to be ethnic in character rather than religious (Mignolo, 2014, p. 67), which is also why he also considered Uganda and Argentine as alternatives for the location of the Jewish state, instead of *Eretz Yisrael* (Hertzberg, 1997, p. 579).

However, many Zionists disagreed about the character of the movement. The core definition was still about the struggle of the Jewish people for their own state, but there were internal disagreements about how this state should be achieved, and the character of this future state. Should it be secular, focused on protecting the Jews from antisemitism, or a religious return to the Homeland, focused on hastening the advent of the Messiah? The group that supported the latter, the religious Zionists, established an organization called the *Mizrachi* in 1902 (which would later become the National Religious Party), and cooperated with secular Zionists as long as the new state would uphold the precepts of Judaism (Sharot, 2007, p. 675). The religious Zionists should, however, not be confused with the ultra-Orthodox: while many ultra-Orthodox Jews are Zionist, many others refuse to acknowledge the state of Israel. They consider Zionism to be against God's will, as He meant for the Jews to live in exile (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 144).

Religious Zionism would later go through a change under two rabbis: Avraham Kook (1865-1935) and his son Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891-1982). Avraham Kook argued that the state of Israel was not merely instrumental for the religious Jews (to provide them with security), but imbued with sacred meaning. Even though the secular Jews established the state without religious motives, they were inherently holy ('saints despite themselves') because God sparked them to do so (Sandler, 1996a, p. 3). The most important aspect that the Kooks propagated, however, was an optimistic message: the Jewish people were on a one-way track to redemption, and had to actively strive towards it (Taub, 2010, p. 39).

One watershed moment of religious Zionism came in 1967, the year of the Six Day War. Zvi Yehuda Kook gave a speech about how everyone seemed to have forgotten the part of *Eretz Yisrael* outside the state borders. 'Where is our Jericho? Where is my Jerusalem?', he asked his students. A mere month later, the Israeli Defense Force claimed these areas. As the outcome of the Six Day War appeared to fulfill his prophecy, Zvi Yehuda was seen as a prophet (Gordis, 2016, ch. 12). This ignited a messianic spark in the movement, as their goal was to hasten the coming of the Messiah. It also spearheaded the start of the settlement movements, religious Zionists who actively built settlements in *Eretz Yisrael* for the purpose of hastening the redemption. Gush Emunim was considered the most important of these movements (Taub, 2010, pp. 42-43), which is why a large part of the analysis will focus on it.

There are other names for religious Zionism in use. Uri Ram coined the term neo-Zionism, which he uses for denoting religious Zionism after the Six Day War. He identified a large split in the movement after this year, as the war ‘reanimated the old (predominantly right-wing) creed of Greater Israel’ (Ram, 2011, p. 36). He uses the term ‘neo-Zionism’ pejoratively, because he considers religious Zionism a fundamentalist, racist movement. It has the concept of a Jewish state at its center, committed to ethnic and religious cultural symbols, instead of a democratic state which happens to have Jews as a majority – the latter is at the center of post-Zionism, which Ram adheres to (p. 35). However, religious Zionism existed a lot earlier than 1967, and merely became more popular because of the Kooks and the wars. Ram, on the other hand, considers neo-Zionism to be a replacement of Labor Zionism (socialist Zionists who tried to achieve a Jewish state through working the land), even though the two ideologies had existed at the same time before.

Another term for Religious Zionism is New Zionism, but it has an alternative origin. Ofira Seliktar (1983, p. 120) and Lilly Weissbrod (1981, p. 777) use the term not for religious Zionism, but rather for a type of Zionism that stemmed from Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s (1880-1940) thought and only developed religious components in the 1970s. Jabotinsky, the father of Revisionist Zionism, emphasized Jewish nationality and establishment of the Jewish state through violent struggle (Seliktar, 1983, p. 121). Seliktar and Weissbrod place Gush Emunim in this tradition, rather than in the tradition of religious Zionism. They argue that religion was mainly co-opted by New Zionism because it justifies the occupation of the new territories, and because religious values are a large part of the Jewish national identity (Weissbrod, 1981, p. 795). However, they both place the inception of this New Zionism around 1977, when the National Religious Party allied itself with the conservative Likud party. This thesis concerns religious Zionism, and considers Gush Emunim and other settler movements a continuation of religious Zionism. This is not only for clarity, as many other social scientists do the same, but I also argue that at least the leadership of the settler movements was inherently religious, rather than coopting religion as a national identity. The reason is that they consider the settlement of *Eretz Yisrael* not their final objective, but rather a means to an end to hasten the arrival of the Messiah and redeem the Jewish people (Taub, 2010, p. 14). Moreover, Gush Emunim was established by Zvi Yehuda’s followers (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 200). The ideology of Likud is different, as this political party is not religious itself but allied itself with religious Zionists: Likud could indeed be New Zionist (Sandler, 1996b, p. 137).

1.4 Literature review

There is a lot of literature on Israeli society and the changes it went through around the wars of 1967 and 1973. However, said literature does not go deep into the main question of this work. Many authors do not think the growing popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War puzzling, or they dedicate a short statement to it and move on. Gadi Taub, for example, stated that religious settlers were shaken by the war, but quickly recovered and redoubled their efforts to achieve the redemption of the Jewish people (Taub, 2010, p. 52). This does not explain why this movement could recover so quickly from this unexpected obstruction to the redemption and a negation of Rabbi Avraham Kook's prophecies. However, there are many other authors who offer more thought-out explanations.

1.4.1 Civil Religion

Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983) argued that Israel had transitioned between various 'civil religions', a concept they define as 'a symbolic system that provides sacred legitimation of the social order' (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 5). They claim that Israel has had three civil religions since the Second Aliya (1904-1914), a wave of immigration from the diaspora. Firstly, pre-state Israel had Zionist-Socialism: Jews who moved to Israel were united by socialist values in order to redeem the land, whereas Jewish identity had a lower priority. Secondly, with the creation of the state, the focus shifted to the state itself: one had to be loyal to Israel, and the existence of the state became the symbol to unite the citizens. The second civil religion was statism, and the bonds with the diaspora were broken off (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 218). Finally, from 1956 onwards the symbol of the state became less effective, as the ingathering of exiles was almost complete and the political issues and ethnic divisions in the country became visible. Moreover, Israel would go through a crisis of legitimacy and soul-searching, mostly around the Six Day War: why would the Jewish state be in Palestine? Was it righteous to challenge the Arabs' right to the land? As religion offered a satisfactory answer, the state adopted a 'New Civil Religion' which was no longer secular, but rather filled with religious symbolism (p. 129). Thus, the religionization of Israel was in part instigated by the state system.

Liebman's and Don-Yehiya's view of the Yom Kippur War is that it was not that different from the Six Day War, and both wars had the same effects on religious Zionism. The Six Day War was not just a short war followed by euphoria: the weeks of apprehension before the war were also important, as these strengthened Jewish solidarity from over the world and

subsequently the feeling of the Jewish people against the rest of the world. The trauma of Yom Kippur invoked a similar feeling. Moreover, the Yom Kippur War should not be associated with just trauma: it was interpreted by the religious Zionists as a reassurance, rather than a shattering of the messianism sparked by the Six Day War. It was a consequence of the establishment of the Kingdom of Israel, and to many it was a confirmation of the eternal truth: the gentiles would always fight against the Jews. The strengthening of the Jewish identity in both wars went hand in hand with the strengthening of religion in society (pp. 201-202). Thus, the state and the wars both made the growth of religious Zionism possible.

Although the reasoning of these authors seems solid, there is room for criticism. Firstly, they admit in their introduction that they cannot actually measure civil religion, but rather rely on their 'sense' that such an integrated symbol system exists (p. 11). Secondly, the authors have a very top-down view of the spread of religious symbolism. Civil religion uses religious symbols to legitimate the state. Stating that religious symbols were merely instruments to bind the people together (p. 136) deprives religious groups of their agency. Instead, the state system might have followed a social development of increasing religiosity instead of consciously instigating it. The coming chapters will investigate this further.

1.4.2 International factors

Seliktar (1983) presents another convincing argument, although I do disagree with her usage of the term New Zionism, as noted before. Seliktar's argument, later backed up by Shmuel Sandler (1996a; 1996b), partly overlaps with Liebman and Don-Yehiya. Israelis increasingly felt that the wars between Israel and their neighbors were part of the conflict between Jews and gentiles, which is expressed in the Torah: the Jews are 'a people that shall dwell alone' (Num. 23:9, Jewish Virtual Library Version). The Judaic notion of 'fused time' further influenced this view: the history of the Jewish people repeats itself and therefore, Jews would always be pariahs (Seliktar, 1983, p. 124). Israel becoming an international pariah therefore drove Israelis towards religious Zionism. Seliktar and Sandler direct our attention to the international community and the renewed interest in the Holocaust, which both contributed to this prevalent opinion that the entire world was against Israel.

Israel found itself increasingly isolated within the global system. Just before the Six Day War, France banned all weapons sales to Israel, and the Israelis felt that only the United States and the Jewish diaspora still supported them. Part of the post-war euphoria also stemmed from this: despite having almost no help from other nations, Israel had won swiftly (Gordis, 2016,

ch. 12). The Yom Kippur War, even though Israel had not struck first like before, did not better Israel's image: the United Nations welcomed Yassir Arafat, and most of the world - except the US - broke off relations with Israel. In 1975, the UN also ruled in Resolution 3379 that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination (Sandler, 1996a, p. 4). The despair that the Israelis felt after the Yom Kippur War was thus not shared by the international community, a fact which frustrated them.

In addition, the Adolf Eichmann trial of 1962 ended the silence around the Holocaust, and as the years of commemoration and historiography went on, the Israelis identified themselves more with the Diaspora, and against the antisemites of other societies. Many Israelis felt that the Holocaust was not a German phenomenon, but could happen anywhere (Hever, 1994, p. 239). Both factors combined strengthened the assumptions of Israeli citizens that they could not depend on the gentile nations and had to deal with wars themselves, with help from the Diaspora and the United States. This feeling expressed itself in the strengthening of the Jewish identity, and support of religious Zionism and movements like Gush Emunim, the pioneers of the new generation.

This reasoning also has its merits, but it once again rests on the association between nationalism and religious Zionism. Although Seliktar briefly mentions the religious notion of fused time, the emphasis of the two writers lies on the feelings of relative deprivation by the international community, which expressed itself in ethno-nationalism (Sandler, 1996b, p. 135), and the renewed pioneering spirit of Gush Emunim as an attraction (p. 139). This does not mean that their argument is wrong: cases like the Yugoslav wars show that religion is a way to strengthen ethnic identities, as Croats found themselves going to church in order to distance themselves from the Muslim Bosniaks (Demmers, 2012, p. 35; Christie, 1993, 41:50-42:18). However, whereas Liebman and Don-Yehiya hold a functionalist view of religion from the top-down, Seliktar and Sandler neglect its role in favor of the nationalistic aspect, and prefer to view religion as part of the Jewish identity, instead of investigating it on its own merits. This is worthy of further examination.

1.4.3 Mizrahim

An aspect that this thesis will not delve deeper into is the relationship between different ethnicities within Israel. The so-called 'Mizrahim', or 'Oriental Jews' immigrated from the Middle East, North Africa (also known as Sephardim), India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early decades of the state. Even though they have different cultures, all Jews from these

countries have been grouped together under the term ‘Orientals’ in order to differentiate them from the European Jews, the Ashkenazim (Peres, 1971, p. 1022; Roumani, 1988, p. 423). The Mizrahim were economically and socially marginalized in the first decades of the state, which resulted in the second generation’s establishment of the Black Panthers protest movement (Ram, 2011, p. 63). Moreover, many Mizrahim had a *masorti*, or ‘traditional’ identity. The Ashkenazim were unfamiliar with their idea of religiosity in the early decades, as they used a dichotomy between secular and religious. Therefore, the Ashkenazim characterized the *masorti* as religious instead, even though the religious rituals they performed had different meanings beyond the Ashkenazi framework (Goldberg, 2013, p. 584).

The Mizrahim surprised many political analysts in 1977 when they voted en masse for Likud, which contributed to the overthrowing of Labor Zionism. Analysts and sociologists would come up with various explanations for their vote. Said explanations ranged from it being a protest vote because the Mizrahim felt marginalized, to their relative religiosity compared to the predominantly secular Ashkenazim (Shamir & Arian, 1982, pp. 322-324). Some even attributed the rise of Gush Emunim in part to the Mizrahim, like Boaz Evron, who claimed that the Mizrahim were from pre-political societies and thus did not go through processes of secularization (Evron, 1988, p. 381).

However, this has already been disproven by other social scientists. As mentioned earlier, the *masorti* identity of many Mizrahim was not understood correctly, and secondly, it shows the disdain for the Mizrahim by many Ashkenazim at the time, as they were associated with backwardness (Shenhav, 2003, p. 77). Finally, statistics show that despite voting for Likud (which would later condone settlement in the territories), the Mizrahim were relatively absent from religious Zionist organizations like the National Religious Party or Gush Emunim (Roumani, 1988, p. 427). If they had been religious Zionists, they would have been more active there. Thus, although the theory of Mizrahi contribution to religious Zionism has been refuted, the debate uncovers the underlying prejudices concerning ethnicity and religion. Many West-European Jews had been secularized, and felt they were more advanced than the non-Western Jews.

1.5 Theoretical framework

As the section on the Mizrahim shows, there are many inherent prejudices about religion in sociology that have only recently started to unravel. The most prominent example is the ‘secularization theory’, which presumes that the more societies develop, the less they will rely

on religion (Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 301). It stems from the works of Max Weber (1864-1920), Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), the three founders of sociology.

Weber attributed the origins of capitalism in northern Europe to the unintended consequences of Protestantism. By abandoning the Catholic authority, the lifestyle that the people took for granted had been changed. Instead of leaving asceticism to the clergy, they now made conscious efforts to be productive and without sin in order to please God (Weber & Giddens, 2005, pp. x-xiii). Just like the reduced role of Catholicism had led to rationalization in the past, the world would become even more 'disenchanted' (*Entzauberung der Welt*) in the future and lead to modernization (p. 178). Marx went even further, and condemned religion as the 'opium of the people', that prevented them from asserting their own interests (Collins, 2007, p. 20). Durkheim, on the other hand, took a functionalist approach to religion, which was also apparent in Liebman & Don-Yehiya's work (1983). Durkheim theorized that God and society were one and the same: primitive religions ensured that communities would have a common identity (Durkheim, 1995, p. 351). Modern societies have less of a need for religion as social cement, as this role has been taken over by the nation-state, which polices the community through surveillance and bureaucracy. Therefore, modern societies would have less of a need for religion (Bruce, 1996, p. 44).

Following the work of these founders, sociologists have attributed religiosity to other characteristics of the social structure such as social inequality, instead of studying religion in an attempt to understand the phenomenon (Wuthnow, 2012, p. 5). This has reduced religion to a placeholder for scientific knowledge or something that only persists in vulnerable societies (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 4). However, more recent contributions criticize this view, like Talal Asad, who uncovered the normative dimension behind the sociology of religion. Asad claims that it comes from a European, Enlightened perspective: the secular was the domain of state authority over the public sphere, and as state power grew, the state had an interest in secularization of the public sphere and the relocation of religion to the private sphere (Brittain, 2005, p. 149). That this happened in the West does not mean that privatization of religion is necessary for modernity in every country (Asad, 1999, p. 179).

Israel is a relevant case study for studying public religion in contemporary times: Judaism increasingly pervaded the public sphere from the 60s and 70s onward. The sociology of religion, on the other hand, is largely Americentric and divides religion into private and public spheres, with an underlying assumption that religion is largely located in the private sphere. Israeli sociology, in contrast, is more focused on the public dimensions of religion, and

sociologists rarely study Israeli Judaism in the private sphere (Kopelowitz & Israel-Shamsian, 2005, pp. 73-74).

As religion plays such a large role in Israeli society, it seems peculiar that none of the authors from the literature review delve deeper into the role of religionization as an influence on religious Zionism. Instead, like many other social scientists at the time, they seem to ‘explain away’ religion in favor of nationalism and other factors. The coming chapters analyze whether this is indeed the case, or whether religionization was not important after all. As the role of religionization seems to be underestimated, I investigate the causes for the persistence of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War through the lens of religionization in Israeli society. Moreover, I research whether the works discussed in the literature review still hold up despite my criticism.

Chapter 2: Manifestations of Religionization in Israel

The goal of this chapter is to find out whether Israel was religionized during the 60s and 70s, and if so, in what ways. It will be done by means of compiling empirical data, primary sources and secondary literature. The next chapter will study the implications of these findings for the research question, but this chapter will focus only on visible elements of religionization and nationalism during the aforementioned period.

2.1 Individual level

2.1.1 Statistics on religiosity

When a secular Jew converts to Judaism, or was already religious but becomes perhaps even ultra-Orthodox, that person is religionized on an individual level. Although the focus of this research relies on the religionization of society in the public dimension, statistics about increasing religiosity of individuals can be illustrative of a larger trend of religionization.

However, these statistics must be looked at critically. As argued by Yehuda Ben-Meir and Peri Kedem (1979), the scale of religiosity cannot accurately be divided into groups of non-religious, traditional and religious, even if people define themselves as part of one of these categories. Indeed, while someone might be religious, this would not necessarily mean that they believe everything that is written in the Torah. Ben-Meir and Kedem interviewed a sample

group of which 64% believed in God, but only 36% believed in the coming of the Messiah (Appendix A, Table 1).

Three separate researches, by Antonovsky (1963), Arian (1969) and the General and Panel Study (1973) were done on a cross-section of urban populations in Israel. The researchers asked people whether they considered themselves observant of the *mitzvot* (commandments). In 1963, this was the case for 30 percent, in 1969 for 24 to 26 percent and in 1973 30 percent once more (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 173). If these statistics would be taken at face value - which they should not - , there is no noticeable 'religious revival' from these alone.

Some other data can give more insight in trends of religiosity in society. Whether parents send their children to secular state schools, religious state schools or independent religious schools can be seen as an indicator for the parents' religiosity. The independent religious schools were recognized by the state, but were free to pursue an orthodox curriculum focused on *haredi* children that often rejected Zionism, whereas the religious state schools did not reject Zionism and still instilled religious values on the children (Goldberg, 2013, p. 586). Table 2 lists the distribution of primary school students in various years. The relative number of children in secular state schools went up between 1953 and 1985, whereas the religious systems noted a downward trend.

Generational differences are also an indication for change in religiosity. Judah Matras researched mothers of newborns in his study of 1959 to 1960. He found that around 38% of the maternity cases in hospitals of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv considered themselves to be less religious than their own mothers, and around 60% just as religious (Matras, 1964, p. 467). Simon N. Herman reported similar results in his research of high school students and their parents in 1970. He concluded that 42 percent of the students considered themselves less religious than their parents, and 51 percent just as religious as their parents. The parents, meanwhile, regarded their own parents as more religious than they were (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, pp. 173-174). If there were a trend in religiosity in the 1960s and 70s, it would have to be towards increased non-observance.

Demographics could also indicate religiosity, as Mizrahim were considered to be more religious, like many Americans who went to Israel for spiritual resolution (Aviad, 1983, pp. 2-4). However, although there are statistics on immigration from each continent and also demographics, it would be over-simplifying matters to characterize these people as based only on their continent of origin. As argued in the Literature Review, the Mizrahi 'religiosity' was founded on an orientalist misinterpretation of traditionalism. To base conclusions on the premise that Asian and African Jews were more religious, or that all the Americans who came

to Israel after 1967 went there for their religion, would be shortsighted. Therefore, there are fewer applicable and relevant statistics about the religiosity of immigrants than would be necessary for a well-supported argument.

2.1.2 Statistics on Zionism and Jewish nationalism

From the literature can be concluded that many authors attributed the success of religious Zionism to its nationalistic aspects, rather than religious. Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1971) and Oved Cohen (1975) found that there was a positive relationship between religiosity and Zionist commitment, as religious high school students attributed more importance to the Zionist ideology than the non-religious or traditional (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 173). Moreover, religious Israelis in 1975 felt more connected to Jewish people in the world than non-religious (Table 3). Religiosity was thus linked with Jewish identification.

Apart from the relationship between religion and nationalism, the identification with Israel and the Jewish people in general increased over time as well. Various surveys conducted between 1966 and 1973, collected by Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Rina Shapira (1977) even show a direct relationship to the Six Day and Yom Kippur War. Tables 4 and 5 show the aggregation of surveys conducted through time. University students felt increasingly Jewish and Israeli over the course of three years, as seen in table 4. Moreover, the combined surveys of table 5 show changes in mentality before and after the Yom Kippur War, and report an increased commitment to Zionism before the war, but also a rapid descent between October 1973 and April 1974. Finally, many more people in 1974 wanted to leave Israel than in 1973, right after the Yom Kippur war.

2.1.3 Conclusion

Taking all data into consideration, there is no proof of a ‘religious revival’ in the sense that Israelis became more religious in the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary: data show either little change in religiosity or a downward trend. The statistics on Jewish nationalism are different, and clearly show that events of national importance had an effect on national identification: the Six Day War aggregated more people to the Zionist ideology, but the Yom Kippur War caused a demonstrable dip.

2.2 Politics

2.2.1 Knesset election statistics

The most obvious way to measure religionization of politics is to characterize political parties as religious or secular, and then compare election results over time in order to show whether religious parties had more votes relative to secular parties. However, there are various problems with this method, especially in the Israeli case. First of all, religious voters do not just have to vote for religious parties, as they might find that a secular party represents their interests better. Secondly, party programs never stay constant: parties can change their opinions on issues of religiosity, become more or less religionized in an attempt to gather votes, or merge with other parties. Moreover, the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) elections of my concern were for the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Knesset, in the years 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 respectively. This did not match up exactly with all the governments, as for instance Golda Meir's cabinet from 1973 resigned after a month and got replaced by a new government under Yitzhak Rabin. This shift was unaffected by the elections beforehand, but caused by the report of the Yom Kippur War (Gordis, 2016, ch. 14, para. 14).

Even so, the election results (Israel, Knesset, 2015) provide a general overview of shifts in the political landscape. Based on the results of these four Knesset elections, I calculated the percentage of votes for religious parties, of which four were active in this period. The four were as follows: the National Religious Party (NRP), which was the party representing religious Zionism; Agudat Yisrael, the ultra-Orthodox, non-Zionist party; Po'alei Agudat Yisrael, the ultra-Orthodox Worker's Party; and finally the United Torah Front, which was a temporary merger of Agudat Yisrael and Po'alei Agudat Yisrael in 1973.

Of the four Knesset elections (Table 6) the amount of votes for religious parties stayed relatively constant: they ranged between 12,1 to 14,8 percent of the total amount of votes, with the NRP consistently being the largest party. The NRP grew largest in 1969 (9,7%), two years after the Six Day War, as did the socialist-Zionist Alignment. Moreover, all of the coalitions included at least one religious party. The real shift, also called the 'Upheaval', was between the Alignment and Likud, as the perpetual opposition member Menachem Begin of Likud finally headed the largest party in 1977, and the Alignment lost relevance. This loss of relevance also becomes clear from the establishment and instant coalition membership of Dash, the party established for the sole purpose of protesting against the Alignment. Apart from this, the base statistics of the elections do not say a lot about religionization.

2.2.2 Religionization of political issues

According to Mark Juergensmeyer's ideological approach to religious nationalism, politics become religionized by putting 'political issues and struggles within a sacred context' (Juergensmeyer, 1996, p. 5). Analyses of politics go beyond studying the election results: additional sources such as political debates and election posters must also be studied in order to show that contemporary issues are indeed placed in a religious context. In Israel, this has been happening since the establishment of the state. David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, used the term 'Messianic mission' for the establishment and leadership of the State of Israel (Beit-Hallahmi, 1973, p. 239). He was a Labor Zionist, but that did not make him secular per se as he was religious in his private life (Ben-Gurion, 1970).

From 1967 onwards, politicians used more religious language than before. The cause was the greatest question of foreign politics after the Six Day War: whether Israel should keep the newly occupied territories, or withdraw its forces from them. There are multiple arguments for retaining the territories, like the national-security rationale. One could assert that withdrawal would destabilize Israel's security, which is an argument that became prevalent especially after the assassination of Rabin in 1995 (Taub, 2010, p. 100). In the early 1970s, however, secular and religious politicians alike would instead invoke religious arguments to keep the territories. Deputy Minister Ben-Meir of the NRP called the problem of the territories 'a Halachic, not a political question', referring to Jewish religious law, and said that giving back the territories would be a 'non-confidence vote in God'. Menachem Begin, who would later become prime minister as leader of Likud, stated that as Providence brought the territories into their hands, further partitions could not be permitted. Finally, the socialist Ygal Allon said that it would be unthinkable that Jews could not settle in the 'City of Patriarchs', an alternate name for Hebron (Hallahmi, 1973, pp. 237-238).

2.2.3 The National Religious Party

Aside from secularist leaders borrowing religious notions to argue for retaining the territories, the NRP became more assertive as well. Because foreign policy post-1967 was focused on a religious issue (the occupation of the territories), the NRP became involved in the debate, whereas they had been more passive before (Waxman, 2006, p. 40). It can also be attributed to the change of guards in the NRP, as the moderate leaders were replaced by a youth faction headed by Gush Emunim supporters like Yehuda Ben Meir (Newman, 2005, p. 203). Changes

in election posters and advertisements showcase the shift within the party very well. One advertisement from either 1955 or 1961 depicts a broom sweeping away unkosher elements from society (Appendix B, Image 1). The NRP was then mostly focused on seeking compromises with their leftist coalitions about observing religious laws within Israel (Newman, 2005, p. 203). The acquirement of other parts of *Eretz Yisrael* transformed the party politics incredibly, which is visible in Images 2 and 3 (Appendix B): the adverts were focused on the territories and settlements instead, and said that voting for the NRP was necessary to return to these lands. As the NRP became more involved in international politics, the debates religionized as well.

2.2.4 Conclusion

To conclude, election posters and quotes from politicians uncover considerably more about the religionization of politics than election results. The NRP was the largest influence in the religionization of politics, but other parties, even secular ones, contributed as well. Politics in Israel had never been fully secular, as there had always been a religious party in any coalition up to 1974. However, these parties had until then been content with establishing rules of daily life, instead of becoming a serious factor in deciding foreign policy, as they became from 1967 onwards. As they were on the same side as secular factions which also wanted to keep territories despite doubting Israel's legitimacy over them, secular politicians found themselves employing religious argumentation and language as well.

2.3 Discourse

This paragraph is based exclusively on my own research on *the Jerusalem Post*. The archives of the University of Amsterdam include volumes of this newspaper of the years 1972 and 1976, and I studied a few months of each of these years. *The Jerusalem Post* made a swing to the right in 1989 after interventions by its new owners (Shalev, 2018). In the 1970s, however, the paper still supported the governing coalition and included many diverse opinions, though mostly in support of Zionism. Its target audience included both the Anglophone (Ashkenazi) Diaspora as well as Anglophone Israelis, and both secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews. As 55% of society in 1976 consisted of Mizrahim (Eliachar, 1976, p. 8), the *Jerusalem Post* cannot be considered an accurate source for the *entire* society of Israel, but rather of a select few groups.

The trends I was trying to find were twofold: whether religious issues became more important than others – judged by the amount of articles dedicated to them – , and whether readers from Israel also noticed a change and invoked more religious language, or gave priority to nationalism instead. Many debates were, of course, influenced by contemporary events, but even with this, these give an insight in the perceived importance of the various issues plaguing society.

2.3.1 Events

In early 1972, from January to March, most articles were about economic troubles, in part resulting from the large immigration (*aliya*) from the Soviet Union (Appendix C, Article 1), and the social gap between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (Article 2). 1976, by contrast, was very different. Emigration became more prominent than immigration, and in November 1975, the UN equated Zionism with racism in an official resolution. The reporters of the *Post* were outraged at the accusation (Article 3). Moreover, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a Holy Place for both Jews and Muslims, created tensions. A judge ruled in January 1976 that Jews could pray there, which renewed Likud efforts to demonstratively try to pray at the Temple Mount (Article 4), despite not being a religious party. Moreover, there were heated debates about the recently established movement Gush Emunim and whether it positively or negatively influenced society. As more events concerning nationalism and religion took place in 1976, it is inevitable that the articles as well as the readers' letters were more concerned with these issues.

2.3.2 Readers' letters

There are few readers' letters concerning religion in early 1972: there were not many incidents provoking more letters, as in 1976, but some are worth pointing out. One letter (Article 5) is especially interesting, as a group of parents talks about settlement of the land before the Yom Kippur War, and praises both settlement and conscription as 'part of observing the Laws of the Tora': the nation and Judaism have shared goals to these parents, and service in the army is thus religionized. In the same year, an American immigrant voices his despair that religious Jews in Israel might become second-class citizens, as someone was fired for refusing to work on Sabbath, and that religious Jews have more rights in the US than in Israel (Article 6). In his

eyes, the government does not take religion seriously enough. And, in addition to those two specific letters, there were many others about ungrateful immigrants who dared to complain about the country, while the previous generation had had a harder time.

By contrast, the readers' letters section from 1976 was filled with heated debates about Gush Emunim and the occupied territories. One of these was initiated by Harry Stark (Article 7), who feared the effects this movement could have on democracy, and is countered by two supporters of Gush Emunim, H. Goldman and Eric Graus (Article 8). It is interesting that H. Goldman refers to Gush Emunim as a movement also made up of non-observant Jews, and Eric Graus uses no religious terminology at all. Instead, Graus uses the word 'defeatist' for Israel, a word in common use by Gush Emunim in their criticism of the state (Levy, 2014, p. 277; Sivan & Friedman, 1990, p. 5). As a result, Gush Emunim is effectively de-religionized by these readers, who place focus on their Zionist mission and criticism of others (emigrants and politics) instead. By contrast, Saul Sigelschiffer (Article 9) complains that the government uses dereligionized terms for the territories: in his opinion, if the government was truly Zionist, it would have referred to the ancient territory of Israel, and called the territories 'redeemed' rather than 'occupied', as true Zionism is 'in accordance with the divine promise.'

An editorial (Article 10) sums up the social crisis quite accurately: Israel was in a crisis of legitimacy, partly influenced by the question about the territories but mostly by the UN resolution. The religious Jews were able to deal with this crisis, as their answers to the questions plaguing their time came from the Tora, but secular Jews had little to no answers as for why Israel needed to be in Palestine, or why they needed to be Jewish in a Jewish state. This mirrors Liebman & Don-Yehiya's argument concerning the reason for the adoption of civil religion: only religion could challenge the crisis (p. 129). A debate that ties into this crisis of legitimacy concerns the essence of Jewishness: what makes a good Jew, and what Jewish values should the country have? Are Jewish values even necessary to the country? Articles 11 and 12 show differing opinions: Baruch Sternthal considers knowledge of Jewish traditions mandatory for representatives of the state, among which education of the Jewish religion is a large part. By contrast, Stark, in a later letter, finds universal human values more important than Jewish ones, especially since religious leaders like Gush Emunim's leader frequently contradict those.

2.3.3 Conclusion

Whereas in 1972 the main concerns of Israel were with economic and social troubles that immigration brought, in 1976 Israel was wrestling with its collective identity and values:

whether Israel was a religious or secular state, whether Zionism was religious or secular, and whether or not they could hold on to the territories. Although Gush Emunim and other settlers had a lot of support, there was also a difference in opinion about their goals: had they settled *Eretz Yisrael* out of nationalist or religious considerations? The fine line between this is visible in Likud's attempts to pray at the Temple Mount (Article 4): one of the leaders was a rabbi, but many others in the group came without skullcaps of their own in order to assert their influence over the Mount. What is certain is that while religious identity was already up for debate in 1972, it became more central in public discourse in 1976, in both readers' letters and editorials (Article 10 and 12).

2.4 State institutions

One of Liebman & Don-Yehiya's arguments was that the state system itself incorporated religious symbolism in order to 'serve as a basis for integration, legitimation and mobilization.' (1983, p. 135). The state used religion for its own benefit, in order to unite society. This chapter will look for evidence of whether this was the case or not; did the state system become religionized, and if so, was it consciously molded from above, or also influenced by the society itself? As Liebman & Don-Yehiya study two 'instruments of socialization', the Israeli Defense Force and the education system, I will re-examine these institutions below.

2.4.1 The Israeli Defense Force

Not long after the establishment of the state, prime minister David Ben-Gurion installed the universal draft, and with this, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) became a 'people's army'. Its function was not only to protect Israel from its neighbors, but its universal draft (including women) was instrumental in uniting Israelis from different backgrounds (Cohen, 2016, p. 36). The only groups exempted from this draft were religious women and, at the time, an amount of 400 *yeshiva* students: *haredim* who studied in the Torah and Talmud in these rabbinical colleges. This was not a large problem at first, as their population was still small (Kaufmann, 2010, p. 220). However, Ben-Gurion did not expect that the amount of *yeshiva* students would grow so exponentially that in the 1990s as much as 30,000 *yeshiva* students avoided service and relied on state subsidies (Waxman, 2006, p. 133).

That a certain amount of *haredim* did not serve in the army does not mean that the army was free of religious influence, though. Before the 1970s, religious recruits tried to avoid

combat roles because of their anxiety of secular soldiers who could turn them away from their beliefs (Levy, 2014, p. 272). However, religious Zionism brought a change: since the 1970s, young conscripts began to see a link between the national mission (the defense of Israel) and their religion, and became more enthusiastic about fighting. Two developments were of a large influence on this newfound enthusiasm: the acquisition of the new territories, and the Zionist project becoming inherently religious according to the Kooks. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, new institutional arrangements enabled religious conscripts more freedom of practicing their religion. The *Yeshivot Hesder*, a program that combines Talmudic studies with military service, has existed since the 1960s, but expanded in the 1970s because the IDF required more manpower (p. 276). Religious Zionists could thus combine their religious identity with their appreciation for Zionism by fighting for their country while striving towards redemption. Their enthusiasm did not stay unnoticed by officers. In a series of interviews in 1974, all eleven interviewed field officers declared that they would ‘do everything within their power to have religious officers assigned to their command’, because said soldiers had both a greater commitment to national objectives and a greater appreciation of their significance (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 131). In order to stimulate the amount of religious conscripts, the IDF even discussed the character of the military service with the heads of *yeshivot*, and adjusted the service to some of their demands (Levy, 2014, p. 277).

As the army’s reliance on religious soldiers grew, so did the influence of rabbis on the army: the soldiers were loyal to both their commanders and to the rabbis. This problem of autonomy would only be recognized in the 1990s, but in the 70s, it would only be cultivated and encouraged by the religious Zionists as a necessary defense of the settlements in the West Bank. The IDF needed the rabbis, who could in turn influence their policies (p. 277). The religionization of the army was thus both cultivated by the army itself, through creation of the *Yeshivot Hesder* and an increase of freedom of religious conduct, as well as by religious Zionists, who instead of dodging the draft began to see the army as a pathway towards redemption.

2.4.2 Education

One of the most well-known ways for governments to mold societies is through schools. The government can, for instance, instill national values in the new generation through history textbooks (Brehm, 2014, p. 319), or force indigenous minorities to adapt to ‘modernity’ and consequently wipe out their culture (Barber, 2015). In Israel, both processes were at work. In

1963, then minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan, said that the Bedouins should be transformed into an urban proletariat through ‘governmental direction’, by making them go to school (Abu-Saad, 2001, p. 241). While Israeli Arabs had a separate education system sponsored by the state, the Jewish children were also subjected to changes. In the early years of the state, when public education had not taken form yet, a movement called the Canaanites proposed that Israel should discard the Jewish identity altogether. In order to counter these ideas, the government installed the Jewish Consciousness Program in 1955, which was designed to instill a Jewish awareness into the Israelis in both secular and religious state schools (Rebhun & Waxman, 2005, pp. 315-316). Here, the word ‘Jewish’ did not just refer to the history of the people, but also to religious traditions: children were taught the religious aspects of Jewish holidays and read the Bible as a book of prayer instead of as literature. According to the minister of Education, the goal of this program was not to convert children, but it was ‘for the national education of the Hebrew nation’ (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, pp. 171-172).

As such, religion was a part of the national identity, instilled into society by the government. The only education system not part of the state was the independent religious system, focused on *haredi* children, but as Table 2 of Appendix A shows, the importance of this system was reduced with time. Although the secular state schools grew, they were not strictly secular because of this Jewish Consciousness Program, with an influence on the curriculum that has expanded in the decades since its implementation (p. 173).

2.4.3 Conclusion

Both the military and education systems are heavily regulated by the government, which use them as tools to not only unite the people, but also to ensure that the values of this government spread through society. Liebman and Don-Yehiya’s argument that the state used Judaism as a part of its ‘civil religion’, is thus true, though not as one-sided as they say. While the religionization of state schools was indeed ‘molded from above’, the IDF was religionized because of its reliance on religious Zionists, and the government changed the institutional frameworks in the hope to attract more religious soldiers.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that most of the religionization of society at the time was event-driven, heavily influenced by the acquisition of the territories. Although the Israeli people did not

become more religious overall, secular politicians would use more religious rhetoric to support their arguments, and the NRP, although it did not gain more votes, involved itself more in questions of international importance instead of limiting itself to the position of a coalition partner. Society started debating the Jewish identity more than before, and used increasingly religious rhetoric as well. Finally, the state institutions were also religionized, both by regulation from above as well as influences from rabbis. Society was thus indeed religionized, in a way that went beyond individual observance.

However, there was clearly more going on than religionization. Nationalism was on the increase as well, as evidenced by surveys and the reader's section of *The Jerusalem Post*. Followers of Likud prayed at the Temple Mount out of nationalist considerations as well. The following chapter will find out whether there is a causal relationship between religionization and the increased popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War.

Chapter 3: Analysis

First of all, this analysis is dedicated to critiquing the works written by Liebman & Don-Yehiya (1983), Seliktar (1983) and Sandler (1996a; 1996b). As the explanation for the main research question is multi-faceted, I will first analyze whether their (non-religious) explanations hold up despite my earlier criticisms, by using the evidence collected in the previous chapter to check different arguments from their works. Secondly, I will analyze whether religionization contributed significantly to the popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War, and why it did not fade out of existence like the *conceptzia*. Thirdly, I will formulate the final explanation for the main question at the end of this chapter.

3.1 Analyzing previous literature

3.1.1 Ethno-nationalism and Jewish solidarity

Liebman & Don-Yehiya (1983, pp. 201-202) argued that the period leading up to the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War alike evoked a sense of Jewish solidarity and distinctiveness from the gentile nations. Sandler (1996b) also saw the same effect after the Yom Kippur War, as the 'prevalent atmosphere of doubt (...) strengthened ethno-nationalism in Israel and prompted the development of Gush Emunim' (p. 142). Finally, Seliktar (1983, p. 127) argued that rather than the Yom Kippur War, a gradual development was responsible for the assertion

of the unique position of the Jewish people: the transformation of Israel into an international pariah (p. 129) as well as the preoccupation with the Holocaust after the Eichmann trial (p. 130). One of the tenets of religious Zionism is the belief that the Jewish people are unique (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 117), and religious Jews felt more connected to the Diaspora (Appendix A, Table 3). This causal relationship between increased ethno-nationalism and the rise of religious Zionism is plausible, especially since more ethno-nationalism in society reduced opposition to religious Zionism. Moreover, the alliance between nationalists and religious Zionists enabled the latter to assert their influence more (Sandler, 1996b, p. 142).

As noted in table 4 and 5 of Appendix A, the identification of Israelis with other Israelis and with world Jewry had risen considerably. The change between 1967 and 1977 (provided that university students in Tel Aviv are as representative as the group surveyed in 1973) is considerable (67% in 1970 to 96% in 1973), but it has to be kept in mind that the ways of surveying were different. Moreover, table 5 states that more Israelis felt like they were part of the Jewish people than Zionist in both 1973 and 1974. These data are supported by discourse. In article 4 of Appendix C, Eli Schweid states that as of 1972, many Israelis felt Zionist instead of Jewish instead: their bond with the Diaspora rested on the possibility of *aliya* (immigration), instead of direct identification with Jews outside of Israel. This changed around the Yom Kippur War. Article 13 condenses a conversation between army officers a few months before the war. They argue that the myth of the Diaspora Jews being of lesser worth than Israelis is untrue: they struggled as much as the Israelis did because of the Holocaust and other anti-Semitism, and the bond between the two should therefore be restored. This attitude was also visible in politics, especially after the 1975 UN resolution had been passed. Yitzhak Rabin organized a conference for Jewish Solidarity to improve the bond between the diaspora and Israel, and to unify against their 'enemies' in the UN (Jerusalem Conference, 1975, p. 47). This conference was different than the World Zionist Congress, due to there being a focus on the Jewish identity instead of on Zionism.

The fact that ethno-nationalism was on the rise is therefore true, as the Israeli society was affected by both the Yom Kippur War and other developments. Religious Zionism gained at least part of its popularity because of ethnic nationalists, as seen in the last paragraph of article 4 (Appendix C): a large amount of the group who wanted to pray at the Temple Mount were not religious, but nationalist. For religious Zionists, as well as many nationalists, it was unthinkable to give the territories, or 'liberated territories', as Gahal and Likud preferred to refer to them (Mendilow, 2003, p. 68), away to Arab nations (Beinart, 2012, p. 104). The two

camps therefore joined forces, as seen by the decisions the Likud coalition made from 1977 onwards – the legitimization of settlement beyond the Green Line (Taub, 2010, p. 64).

3.1.2 Labor delegitimation and the pioneering spirit of Gush Emunim

Although parties adhering to the ideology of Labor Zionism had headed the government since its inception, 1977 brought ‘the Upheaval’, after which Likud became the largest party instead. The authors from the literature review claim that there is a link between this political shift to the right, and the popularity of religious Zionism. Seliktar (1983) claims that the legitimacy of the Labor government was not only gradually eroded by its mismanagement over the years (p. 120). Sandler sees the rise of religious Zionism as an effect of its adherents’ assertion that they were the new vanguard of Zionism, instead of the Labor movement, which relinquished its pioneering spirit when Israel was established (1996a, p. 4). Religious Zionism filled a gap, as it had solid ideas while the government seemed to be on the verge of collapsing (1996b, p. 141).

The Alignment was re-elected shortly after the Yom Kippur War (before the report about the government’s mistakes came out), so its delegitimation was not instantaneous, but gradual. Said delegitimation can be divided into three periods: a period of high approval of government policy between 1967-70; an intermediate period between 1970-73, and a low period from 1973 onwards (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 97-100). The crisis was palpable, because even though the *Jerusalem Post* supported the Alignment at the time, in 1976 the newspaper included many articles about the crisis in the regime (Appendix C, Article 14). Moreover, although Gush Emunim was detested by many, the group had a great number of admirers who saw them as selfless pioneers, in contrast to the defeatist and corrupt government (Article 8). This was no coincidence, as the settler movement framed itself in that way. In 1980, the settlers’ magazine *Nekuda* stated: ‘the pioneering of the ‘80s does exactly what the Labor movement did in the days when it gained its enormous credit’ (Taub, 2010, p. 63). The Labor government had since succumbed to indecisiveness and corruption, and the religious Zionists represented the new generation. They brought energy back to politics and could renew the strength the Israelis had once felt, even if many Israelis saw them as fanatics and a danger to democracy (Article 7). My research therefore supports this argument as well.

3.2 The significance of religionization

In this paragraph, I will study whether there is a causal relationship between the religionization of society and the rise of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War, by analyzing the ways the two influenced each other. As correlation does not imply causation, there has to be definitive proof to conclude whether this causal relationship exists.

3.2.1 *The exploitation of the absence of values*

As Liebman & Don-Yehiya claimed (1983, p. 128), the state developed a new, religious civil religion after the ingathering of exiles was mostly complete. This civil religion adopted Judaic values in order to cope with the crisis of legitimacy that Israel went through after the territories were acquired. The *Yeshivot Hesder* and the Jewish Consciousness Program are clear examples of this, even though the latter program had already existed for many years prior to the Six Day War. However, apart from state-sponsored initiatives, chapter two showed that society was religionized through other means as well, means which were mostly indirectly driven by the Six Day War. The issue surrounding the territories were framed as a religious issue by the religious Zionists, and as they reformed the NRP from within, the party became more involved in debates. The acquisition of the territories also furthered the religionization of discourse by politicians of secular and other religious parties alike. As religious language was increasingly used in the debate on the central issue of the territories (which later became a question about the character of the state in general), civilians, in turn, also started to use increasing amounts of religious discourse. Whereas economic issues were deemed more important in 1972, the people (or, at the very least the readers and editors of *The Jerusalem Post*) focused on religious issues instead. This was thus not only driven by the religionization of politics, but also by the events that caused said politics to become more religionized in the first place. Moreover, the perceived absence of values by the Labor government (Article 14) stimulated this debate even further, and left a gap for the NRP and settler movements to exploit (Sandler, 1996b, p. 141).¹

Sandler argues that religious Zionists were able to exploit this gap because of nationalist tendencies and the energy of the movement in contrast to the government (1996a; 1996b). However, there might have been another reason. Because religious Zionism was inherently religious, many secular Israelis could have been scared off by the radical religious discourse Gush Emunim and similar movements used, and branded them as fanatical (Article 7). This would have hurt their appeal to the broader secular audience. Therefore, the reception of these

¹ Appendix B, Image 3 shows the slogan 'Alternative of Values' underneath a NRP advertisement. This is a clear stab at the government, as the poster implies that the NRP *did* have values in contrast to the government.

religious arguments mattered as well, which is also where the religionization of society comes in.

Religious symbolism, themes and discourse can be very effective for social movements to gain social influence when applied as answers to contemporary social challenges (Beckford, 1990, p. 9). This can be the case even if the majority of society is secular, as was the case in Israel at the time. However, this saliency is increased if the secular part of society is not antagonistic to religious symbolism. If religious elements were already mainstream in society, the disparity between religious Zionism and mainstream politics would be smaller, and the arguments of the movement thus more salient.

3.2.2 Religionization of religious Zionist discourse

The religionization of society would especially matter because religious Zionists used more religious discourse over time (Aran, 1990, p. 168). Instead of utilizing religion to explain contemporary events, religious Zionists used contemporary events to validate their interpretation of Judaism and to achieve Redemption. However, with the trauma of the Yom Kippur War, the contradiction between Zvi Yehuda Kook's prophecy (that the Jews were on a one-way track to redemption) and reality became even greater. Religious Zionists could resolve this contradiction in various ways. Firstly, they could do this by attributing the Yom Kippur War to the hatred the gentiles had harbored towards them since biblical times, and therefore striving more towards redemption despite this reality, like the religious Zionist Rabbi Ephraim Tsemel did (Seliktar, 1983, p. 127). This view was easily combined with nationalism, and appealed greatly to secular Jews as well. Secondly, the movement could shift the metaphorical goalposts of the redemption. Whereas right after the Six Day War, this war had been interpreted as proof that redemption was on the way, the Yom Kippur War with its trauma negated this view. Therefore, members of Gush Emunim changed the nature of redemption to a 'cosmic event', and gave more weight to the 'inner essence of things', turning away from recent history as irrefutable proof (Aran, 1990, p. 168). Thus, apart from becoming more nationalist, religious Zionism itself also became more religionized.

Religious symbolism did become more mainstream within Israel over the years, just as Judaism in general gained more leverage over society, despite a decrease in the religiosity of individuals. Therefore, there could be a causal relationship between the religionization of society and the popularity of religious Zionism.

3.2.3 'Saints despite themselves'

However, even though society might have been religionized in a certain way, it does not mean that the relations between the observant and non-observant Jews were good. Although the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War both had a positive effect on (reported) solidarity between the observant and non-observant, it declined immediately afterwards for both parties involved. In a collection of surveys by Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, less than half of the people questioned between the two wars thought that relations between the observant and non-observant at the time were good (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, pp. 190-192).

A counterargument to this is that religious Zionists do not equal all the observant Jews. Most religious Zionists were religious, but there were also many *haredim* who protested against the movement. A notable aspect in which they differed was their acceptance of secular peers. The religious Zionists were relatively accepting of secular allies. The *haredim*, by contrast, consciously segregated themselves from the secular part of Israeli society by organizing themselves in different neighborhoods, schools and by not serving in the army (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 54).

Settler movements were relatively open to secular Jews, as long as they strived towards the same goal, the redemption. The alliance with Likud fell into this strategy, which stems from the teachings of Rabbi Avraham Kook: secular Zionist Jews, even if they did not realize it, were inherently holy as their deeds were indirectly instigated by God ('saints despite themselves') and therefore an alliance with them was not sinful, provided that the religious Zionists led the way (Sandler, 1996a, p. 3). Following this line of thinking, the secular settlers could have felt more comfortable in allying themselves with religious Zionists, because the latter were not antagonistic towards them, on top of the seculars being comfortable with their religious language because they had also been religionized beforehand.

This did not mean that religious Zionist movements like Gush Emunim were wholly inclusive. The alliance with secular Jews was only allowed if these secular Jews supported the road to redemption; if not, they were enemies. The adversaries of religious Zionists were thus not only the Arabs, but also the Israeli Jews who opposed the occupation of the territories, and 'the Left' in general. The religious Zionists framed their opposition in contrast to themselves: the Left lacked values, was materialistic, unpatriotic and individualistic, in contrast to the self-sacrificial settlers who redeemed the territories for the common good (Taub, 2010, pp. 113-114).

3.2.4 Problematizing the causal relationship

On the other hand, the causal relationship between religionization of society and the rise of religious Zionism can still be problematized. The religious Zionists' acceptance of secular supporters meant that the secular supporters could feel the same about the religiosity of religious Zionists: they had a common goal, keeping the territories, though for different reasons. The religious did so in order to restore the wholeness of *Eretz Yisrael*, which would lead the people closer towards redemption (Taub, 2010, p. 45). The secular settlers did so because they had a historical right to the land of their forefathers, and because if enough settlements were to exist, it would be harder for the state to evacuate them or to relinquish the territories during peace negotiations (Taub, 2010, p. 64). This common goal meant that they could both consider themselves to be using the other party for their own purposes.

The assertion that religionization was a cause for religious Zionism can be challenged further. This is the case because the causation was partially the other way around: religious Zionism was in many aspects a cause for religionization. My analysis of social discourse was complicated by the fact that only newspapers from the years 1972 and 1976 were available. The religionization of discourse I found in 1976 already occurred after Gush Emunim had religionized the discussion about the territories. Moreover, the religionization of the army happened in the 1970s, in part because religious Zionists made the IDF depend on them so much that the commanders adjusted the character of military service to the wishes of rabbis (Levy, 2014, p. 277).

On top of that, chapter 2 proves that the religionization of society happened in politics, social discourse and state institutions, but not on the individual level (although the effects of immigration have not been analyzed extensively due to a lack of data). It might have been the case that secular supporters of religious Zionism, because of its religious aspects, increasingly did so because they were used to more Judaic symbolism than before. However, as seen in the readers' letters of Article 8 (Appendix C), the two supporters of Gush Emunim defended the movement with secular arguments when confronted with a critique of its religious fanaticism, instead of with religious arguments.² Moreover, if they did use religious arguments, it is hard to prove whether they were secular or religious unless they explicitly stated it.

When considering the lack of evidence and arguments to the contrary, the research I have done is thus unable to provide a final answer on whether the religionization of society was

² However, they might have kept their audience in mind, knowing that religious arguments would not prove Stark's critique wrong.

indeed a cause of the rise of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War. Gush Emunim did receive more support from the NRP, which granted Gush Emunim a lot of influence in their early years (Arnoff, 2018, ch. 4). The NRP became also more actively involved in debates. However, this was mostly because the NRP was revolutionized from within by politicians like Yehuda Ben Meir, who were religious Zionists themselves. Moreover, it is more likely that the secular supporters of Gush Emunim were attracted to the non-religious features of the movement and the shared goals, rather than to their religious discourse.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

4.1 Answer to the main question

The multicausal explanation of this thesis for the popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War is largely in line with the literature. After the empirical research done in chapter 2 and the analysis in chapter 3, I have to conclude that while my research does prove the arguments of Liebman & Don-Yehiya (1983), Seliktar (1983), and Sandler (1996a; 1996b), it is insufficient for proving that the religionization of society was another cause for the rise of the movement. Instead, the failing legitimacy of the Labor government³ and the vitality of Gush Emunim and other religious Zionists attracted people to the movement. Secondly, when the legitimacy of Israel was in danger, the ideology of Labor Zionism could not counter this crisis, but religious Zionism could. Thirdly, the prospect of settling in the territories was easily combined with nationalism, and the religious Zionists tolerated secular supporters as long as they did not get in the way of redemption.

Moreover, in the introduction chapter, I asked why religious Zionism did not falter after the Yom Kippur War, even though the *conceptzia* did and the events of the Yom Kippur War seemed to contradict the road to redemption. First of all, the fact that the trust in the government shattered explains rather than contradicts the popularity of religious Zionism, as the NRP and Gush Emunim made sure to attribute the failure of the security systems to the Labor government and to frame themselves as the new generation of pioneers (by which they meant that the old generation, the Left, had lost track of their ideals). Moreover, religious Zionists downplayed the impact of the Yom Kippur War as an event: they interpreted the war as labor pains on the road towards Redemption (Taub, 2010, p. 52) and the significance that they had attributed to

³ This delegitimization was also supported by NRP advertisements.

the Six Day War before was replaced by a view of redemption as a cosmic event. Finally, religious Zionists as well as Israeli society attributed the Yom Kippur War and the international community's lack of support to the hatred of gentiles. The contemporary state of Israel thus seemed to become part of the cyclical continuum of Jewish history (Seliktar, 1983, p. 124), which had always led towards redemption as well. Therefore, the Yom Kippur War did not counter the view that redemption was nearing; instead, it was, at most, delayed. Although the main question seemed to be puzzling, delving deeper into religious Zionism and the effects of the Yom Kippur War shows that the rise of religious Zionism was actually a logical consequence.

4.2 Implications

Apart from finding out the causes for the popularity of religious Zionism, this thesis had another goal: to find out whether religionization contributed to this event, with the help of recent literature criticizing the secularization thesis. Chapter 1 criticizes the authors of the literature review, by stating that they seemed to ignore religion in favor of other factors, despite Israel being so molded by public religion. These authors therefore seemed to either be part of the tradition of modernists who argue that secularization is an integral part of modernization, something influenced by the normative view of the secular society as an ideal; or of the tradition of seeing religion as a purely functionalist phenomenon, the social cement that loses its necessity in the modern age. Both views have increasingly been contested since 11 September 2001, as it showed social scientists that religion was still a decisive factor in the world (Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 300), but also in the years beforehand by Casanova and Asad (Asad, 1999, p. 178). Because of recent developments of desecularization in many parts of the world, the secularization thesis stemming from Weber's, Marx's and Durkheim's work is increasingly considered to be outdated. Religion is studied more nowadays as a social phenomenon that merits its own attention (Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 301). Therefore, I partially conducted this research because the works of Liebman & Don-Yehiya, Seliktar and Sandler seemed to be outdated and were worthy of reexamination.

However, contrary to my expectations, it seems that the authors did not ignore religion because they felt it was not an important social force in general. Rather, like me, they could most likely not find any definitive proof that religionization played a large role in the increasing popularity of religious Zionism. Although my research finds that Israeli society did become

religionized on an institutional level, political level and in social discourse, I could not find any link between said religionization and the popularity of religious Zionism.

Therefore, despite not finding this causal relation, my thesis does help in proving the secularization thesis wrong, when secularization is understood as ‘a process of change by which the sacred gives way to the secular, whether in matters of personal faith, institutional practice, or societal power’ (Demerath III, 2007, pp. 65-66). In matters of personal faith, Israel was secularized, but the other aspects (institutional practice and societal power) were sacralized instead. This religionization happened a long time before 9/11, and therefore, the secularization thesis should be tested on other case studies of the twentieth century as well to find out whether it once held any merit.

4.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research

As discussed earlier in the introduction, I could not study all aspects of Israeli society as in-depth as I would have wanted. One of the aspects that definitely deserves a closer look is the discourse amongst regular Israelis. Although I tried to research the opinions of the society in depth through *The Jerusalem Post*, its reader base is not at all representative for Israel at the time, as it only focused on Anglophone Ashkenazim. Moreover, the Special Collection of the University of Amsterdam only included a few years, and 1972 and 1976 were the most relevant years I could find for my research. Had there been a collection of 1973, 1974 and 1975, this might have showed a clearer change in discourse around the Yom Kippur War. Apart from this war, a lot of different things happened in the four years in between 1972 and 1976: the establishment of Gush Emunim for example, the resignation of Golda Meir’s coalition, and the UN resolution condemning Zionism. All these have affected the discourse in their own ways as well, and it could have aided my research to study the impact of these events around the time when they happened.

Although I do not speak Hebrew, I tried to get around it with the help of Jacob Mogerman, who offered to translate the NRP advertisements for me. This aided me in the research of the change within the NRP, but if I had actually been able to read Hebrew texts myself, I could have read much more secondary literature about the Yom Kippur War and the rise of religious Zionism that has never been translated into English. I could also have broadened my lens of social discourse by studying a wide range of newspapers. Another researcher with knowledge of the language can therefore gain more insight in this subject.

A final aspect that I admittedly neglected was the role of *aliya* (immigration) on the rise of Religious Zionism. I briefly discussed that many religious Americans and other Diaspora Jews came to Israel to help settle the territories, but as I lacked statistics, it would have been irresponsible to base my conclusions on generalizations. The same goes for the Mizrahim, Sephardim and ‘Oriental Jews’: they were more religious than secular Israelis with their *masorti* identity, but did not actively contribute to religious Zionism (Roumani, 1988, p. 427). However, the large influx of Mizrahim after the establishment of the state did have an impact on the Israeli society itself, as the Ashkenazim were no longer the dominant group, clearly visible from the Likud victory. As Liebman and Don-Yehiya argued that the government used traditional elements from Judaism to bind these groups together, it might also have been more effective to the largely non-observant albeit traditional Mizrahim, than to many strictly secular Ashkenazim. Moreover, despite religious Zionists being mostly Ashkenazim, the Mizrahim might have contributed to the religionization of society without contributing to religious Zionism.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Statistics

Table 1: Adherence to certain beliefs of Judaism in ascending order (Ben-Meir & Kedem, 1979, p. 357, table 1) [translated from Hebrew]

Sample group of 1530 Israeli Jews in 1979. Question: ‘Do you believe...’

1. That the soul continues to exist after death?	29%
2. In the coming of the Messiah?	36%
3. That something supernatural directs the history of the Jewish People?	47%
4. That God gave the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai?	56%
5. That the Jewish people is a Chosen people?	57%
6. In God?	64%

Table 2: Primary Education (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 52, table 2)

The distribution of primary school students by educational stream and year (in percentages)

	Secular State School	Religious State School	Independent Religious School
1953	68,5%	24,5%	7,0%
1963	64,6%	28,8%	6,6%
1978	72,9%	21,3%	5,8%
1985	74,2%	19,9%	5,9%

Table 3: Distribution of Jewish identification by extent of religious observance (Levy & Guttman, 1976, p. 44, table 1).

Religiosity	Feeling of identification with the Jewish People			
	Definitely yes	Yes	No	Total
Strictly observe all religious obligations	85%	13%	2%	100%
Observe to a great extent	74%	25%	1%	100%
Observe somewhat	67%	29%	3%	100%
Totally unobservant, completely secular	56%	34%	10%	100%

Table 4: Israeli Identification and Jewish Identification of Tel Aviv University Students (in percentages) (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 165, table 8.3)

	Sample group (1966-1967) (shortly before the war)		The same sample group (1969)		Comparison group (1970)	
	Israeli	Jewish	Israeli	Jewish	Israeli	Jewish
Strong	90%	56%	96%	66%	97%	67%
Weak	10%	44%	4%	34%	3%	33%
N	560	560	560	560	174	174

Table 5: Israeli's Sense of Belonging to the Jewish People in the World, Commitment to Zionism and the Land of Israel, 1970-1975 (in percentages), based on various surveys by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 166, table 8.4)

	June-July 1970	June- July 1971	August- September 1973	October 1973	November 1973	March 1974	April 1974	November 1974	April 1975
N	1,945	1,770	1,825	400	Unknown	Unknown	2,270	Unknown	1,111
1*									
Yes				96%			90%		
No				4%			10%		
2*									
Yes	77%	84%	82%	90%			79%	80%	
No	23%	16%	18%	10%			21%	20%	
3*									
Yes					5%	16%	13%	14%	9%
No					95%	89%	87%	86%	91%

1*: Feels self to be part of the Jewish people of the world

2*: Views self as a Zionist

3*: Would like to live in another country if possible

Table 6: The results of the Sixth to Ninth Knesset Elections (in percentages) (Israel, Knesset, 2015).

Elections	Sixth Knesset	Seventh Knesset	Eighth Knesset	Ninth Knesset
Date	2-11-1965	28-10-1969	31-12-1973	17-5-1977
First coalition after the election	Alignment 36.7%	Alignment 46.2%	Alignment 39.6%	Likud 33.4%
	NRP 8.9%	GAHAL 21.7%	NRP 8.3%	Dash 11.6%
	MAPAM 6.6%	NRP 9.7%	LAMED-AIN 3.6%	NRP 9.2%
	LAMED-AIN 3.8%	LAMED-AIN 3.2%	KU/Arab list 2.4%	Agudat Yisrael
	Po'alei Agudat Yisrael 1.8%	KU/SV 3.5%		3.3%
	KU/SV 3.2%			
Largest Opposition	GAHAL 21.3%	Agudat Yisrael 3.2%	Likud 30.2% United Torah Front 3.8%	Alignment 24.6%

Parties appearing in this diagram:

Leftist Parties

Alignment Leftist merger party: in 1965, of MAPAI and Achdut Ha'avoda, in 1969, between ILP and MAPAM.

KU/SV/Arab List Kidmah Ufituah, Shituv Ve'avhav and the Arab List for Bedouins and Villagers. Arab Minority Parties associated with Mapai, following an initiative of David Ben-Gurion to include Israeli Arabs in the government.

MAPAM United Worker's Party

Center-Right Parties

Dash Democratic Movement for Change. A protest party against the Alignment after the Yom Kippur War, formed by former members of the Alignment and Likud.

GAHAL Herut-Liberals Bloc. A predecessor of Likud.

LAMED-AIN Independent Liberals

Likud Center Right Alignment. Merger of GAHAL, Free Center, National List and the Movement of Greater Israel.

Religious Parties

Agudat Yisrael Orthodox Religious Party

NRP National Religious Party, the religious Zionist party. Also known as Mafdal.

Po'alei Agudat Yisrael Orthodox Worker's Party

United Torah Front Merger of Po'alei Agudat Yisrael and Agudat Yisrael.

Appendix B: NRP Election Advertisements

I would like to express my gratitude to Jacob Mogerman for providing me with the translations of these three sources. The footnotes contain the translator's notes.

Image 1: Clean Sweep [Poster] (National Religious Party, either 1955 or 1961)⁴.



National Religious Party

HaMizrahi, HaPo'el HaMizrahi, and unaffiliated⁵

[sweeping, the Hebrew letter Bet (ב)]⁶

[scrap right:] Pignpens

⁴ 1955 is more likely because of the references to the merger parties, but two different sources showed this poster with different years.

⁵ These parties merged together in 1955 to form the new party.

⁶ The party's election symbol.

[scrap left:] Villainy and Non-kosher [food]

Image 2: A Jewish State [Advertisement] (National Religious Party, 1977a)

מדינה יהודית
אצביע בעד המפדל

כי לחמתי בעד הקמתה של מדינה יהודית. אני רוצה לחיות במדינה יהודית. שאיפתי היא, שילדי יחיו חיים יהודיים מלאים במדינתם העצמאית. איני רוצה לחיות במדינה שתהיה מדינה ככל הגויים. אני שונה מהגוי. העם היהודי שונה מעמים אחרים, וארצי חייבת להיות שונה משאר הארצות. המפדל אינה מסתפקת בזעקות נגד טמיעה, התבוללות ונישואי־תערובת. היא פועלת נגדם. באהבת ישראל, בציונות, בהזדהות־יהודית.

אני מאמין שאין אומתנו אומה אלא בתורתה

אצביע בעד המפדל

זכותנו על ארץ־ישראל מבוססת על הבטחה אלוקית. קשר הדתי בין ישראל לנחלת אבותיו הוא שהביא להקמת מדינת ישראל. קשר זה הוא שליכה בעם בשנות הגלות את האהבה והגעגועים לארץ־ישראל. זכותנו על ארץ־ישראל אינה מעוררת ולא בחסדי הגויים אנו חיים בה. אני שואף לשלום עם שכני. אך אעשה הכל להגן על מדינתי ועל זכות בני עמי לשוב לארצם ולהתנחל בה.

**אני מאמין בברית:
לזרעך נתתי את הארץ הזאת**

נחלת אבות

[large, right page] A Jewish State

I will vote in support of Mafdal⁷ because I fought in support of establishing a Jewish state. I want to live in a Jewish state. My aspiration is for my children to live full Jewish lives in their country. I do not wish to live in a country like those of non-Jews. I am different than non-Jews. The Jewish people is different than other peoples, and my land needs to be different from other lands. Mafdal is not satisfied with just shouting against absorption, assimilation, and intermarriage. The party is active against them. From a love for Israel, from Zionism and from Jewish identity. **I believe that our nation is not a nation without its Torah.**

[left page] I will vote in support of Mafdal

Our right to *Eretz Yisrael* is based in a divine promise, [and] the religious connection between Israel⁸ and the inheritance of their forefathers is what brought about the establishment of the

⁷ The National Religious Party.

⁸ Here referencing Israel as a people, not the modern state.

State of Israel. This connection is that which kindled the love and longing for *Eretz Yisrael* in the people in the years of exile. Our right to *Eretz Yisrael* is not weakened, and it is not through the benevolence of non-Jews that we live here. I strive for peace with my neighbors. But I will do everything to defend my country and my people's right to return to their land and settle there. **I believe in the Covenant: 'To your seed I have given this Land'**⁹

[large] Heritage of our Fathers



Image 3: 10 Years. 20 Settlements! [Advertisement]. (National Religious Party, 1977b)

1967-1977. 10 Years, 20 Settlements!

Keshet, Yonatan, Argov, Ramat Magshimim, Nov, Avnei Eitan, Kfar Nagat, Mercas Hispit, Havan, Beit Ramon, Malkhishua, Makhulda, Efra, Rosh Tzorim, Alon Shabot, Kfar Etzion, Elazar, Kfar Darom, Netzer Hazani, Migdal Oz.¹⁰

Certainly those that settle *Eretz Yisrael* know to protect its integrity.

This time, you too can vote ב¹¹

Mafdal

Alternative of Values¹²

⁹ Genesis 15:18.

¹⁰ Settlement names from top to bottom.

¹¹ Bet, the party's election symbol.

¹² They are the ones with values, and form an alternative to other parties.

Appendix C: *The Jerusalem Post*

Article 1: Excerpts from: Are we still Zionist? (Ben Dor & Reuel, 1972). January 20, p. 6-7, an interview with multiple experts.¹³

Reuel: I'd like to quote to you a statement made only last week by a recent immigrant from the Soviet Union, Dr. Meir Gelfond, now a physician at Beilinson. He told a *Post* reporter that one of the things that hurt him most in Israel was that this country which, as he put it, "should be leading the world in Zionist faith," is not Zionist. And he went on to say that if anything affects the Russian Jews painfully here, it is the fact that Zionism is ignored in our public life.

He added that also work and a decent home are of course indispensable, but that "the Russian Jew asks himself why he took all the trouble if the Israeli doesn't seem to care." About Zionism, that is. Now, is it true? Perhaps we should start off with Dr. Zaretsky. Is it true that this is what hurts immigrants from the Soviet Union so badly? And is it true that Israel is not Zionist?

(...)

Schweid: I think that Dr. Gelfond really says two things. He says that Israelis lack Zionist consciousness; and he says that the Russian *oleh* asks himself whether it was worth his trouble in coming if the Israelis are not Zionist. And both statements must be answered.

The first statement I think incorrect, though I understand the reasoning. The thing is much more complicated, as Mordechai said. But I would say that it is complicated in a different way:

I think that there is a certain ambiguity in the Israeli's consciousness. As a member of the collective, he has a Zionist consciousness, and he understands the importance of *aliya*. I know it quite clearly because before the big *aliya* came to Israel, every Israeli asked: "Why are they not coming? I feel that they are Jews only when they come to Israel, when they are Zionist." And they really could understand the connection with the Diaspora only in terms of Zionism, and not of Judaism. I think it is a big lack, but that's the way they understood it. And even now there is a collective consciousness that *aliya* is in the supreme interest of the Jewish nation and of Israel. And everyone understands it. Therefore the state, as a collective, is really a Zionist state.

But now you have the opposite response on the social level. And I think that you have to understand why. I don't think it is the problem of being so directly Jewish. The Israeli who was born here is not directly Jewish.

(...)

¹³ Ya'akov Reuel is one of the interviewers, Eli Schweid is an expert on the ideology of Jewish nationalism, and Avraham Harman is a former leader of British Zionism and a former ambassador to Washington.

Harman: I had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Gelfond last week at a meeting devoted to this subject. And his very participation in that meeting was an indication that these are the last questions that he is thinking about in relation to himself or in relation to the movement.

Now, every Jew who wants to has the right to come here. What is at stake here is the transfer of this right and this desire into a practical state of affairs, which means helping him. In practical terms this is a question

of hundreds of millions of dollars a year, which the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency must find. And there are three points I want to stress in this connection.

First, that no country in human history ever before encouraged a movement of people into its borders during wartime — and this is not a small movement. In 1971, we had an immigration of 41,000 people — in wartime. Fortunately, there was no shooting in 1971. But it was a year in which Sadat's promise of war was constantly being restated.

The 41,000 who came in 1971 is equivalent to 3m. people coming to the U.S. or the Soviet Union, which is just unthinkable, which couldn't happen as a wanted immigration movement. Even in peacetime, the U.S. doesn't have a tenth of that. That's a tremendous load for any government to accept.

Secondly, note the reaction of the Government of Israel and of the Jewish Agency to the increased flow of immigration from the Soviet Union. We are now in the midst of the most bitter budget discussion in the history of our country, and our great vulnerability is not security or even political, but economic. Even now, we know we must accept this massive movement of people, receive them in the best possible conditions, no matter what the budgetary consequences are.

Thirdly, I wish to say this. The political situation of 2½ million Jews in Israel would be very different if the Jews of Israel, the Government of Israel, were prepared to accept the Arab slogan of "De-Zionizing." We have always rejected this. Our Government, with the authority of the people, has been acting on the assumption that there is no meaning to the State of Israel except as a state whose doors are open to Jews, except as the homeland of the Jewish people.

ISRAEL IS A LAND FLOWING WITH PROBLEMS

By **ARIEL FINZI** Grade 11
Hugim High School

SINCE the ceasefire agreement last summer, the press and public have turned their attention onto Israel's internal problems, interest in which had been eclipsed by the war of attrition. The under-privileged classes are complaining about the contrast between their poverty and the relative affluence of the middle-classes. Radical movements such as the Black Panthers are exploiting the discontent of the lower classes to spread unrest. News of Israel's social problems has not failed to reach the foreign press, which, during recent years, has covered the Middle East conflict intensively. The rise of the Black Panthers has been erroneously interpreted as a sign of decay in Israel's society. The leaders of the underprivileged classes are demanding

equal opportunities for less educated youth. The main demand is for proper housing instead of slums, such as those found in the Hatikva quarter. The rising cost of apartments has resulted in a campaign for the housing of young couples, in which some privileged families are also participating. The Government, pressed by more urgent needs, has only partly responded to these pleas. This has caused violent reactions, such as the occupation of new houses by young couples.

Israel's social differences are partly connected with the cultural differences between the veteran Israelis (plus immigrants from Western countries and Russia), and some members of the Sephardi community. The educational system and the Army have failed to bridge the cultural gaps. Only further efforts in the educational field can solve this aspect of the problem.

The war and the economic problems it causes must be blamed for the deprivation from which the lower classes suffer. The problem of poverty is connected to the general state of finance in Israel.

Close gaps

What should not be expected is the closing of all economic gaps in Israel. Income is a natural incentive to business and must be used to encourage success. Only the need for higher salaries will bring about an effort by the under-privileged to improve their education, and to seek a more productive role in Israel's economy. Although we owe sympathy and goodwill towards less fortunate citizens, only they, and not the Government, can improve their social and economic conditions.

Like any other modern country Israel is not free from environmental problems. The side-products of economic development and population growth are increasingly making themselves felt. The recent discussion about the construction of a power station at Nahal Tzinim is an example of a conflict between short-term economic interests and environmental needs. The small size of this country is a particularly strong reason for preserving as many natural beauty spots as possible.

Unfortunately, ecological considerations have not always been given the weight they deserve. The construction of the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, although seemingly justified economically, has caused considerable damage to the Ashkelon seashore; the spilling of oil in the Gulf of Aqaba may prove even more harmful due to the narrowness of that gulf. Should Eilat's tourist industry be seriously damaged by an oil spill in the future, the economic advantage of the pipeline would be partially offset. The real damage would be much greater.

The pollution of Kinneret is a further example of artificial damage to nature. Since that lake provides a large part of the nation's water, the consequences of its pollution may be serious. The ill-effects of that pollution were felt in Jerusalem last year,

when Kinneret water was pumped into that city's water supply. Although public health was not endangered the taste of the water was unpleasant. The pollution which is primarily due to the use of fertilizers in the Hula area is preventable, although a reduction in the use of fertilizer would involve considerable expense. The improvement of Tyberias' primitive sewage system would also be helpful.

Ecological issues

Urban sprawl is a major ecological problem all over the world. The expansion of built up areas besides increasing cities' air pollution problems, (which in Israel are still within tolerable proportions) - deprives the public of green areas. For example, the development of the Danya quarter in Haifa may eventually reduce the size of Mount Carmel's open area. Although the intensive construction methods used in Israel save building land, the structures are more unsightly than lower homes. The cement inevitably used here is particularly unsightly. Such environmental and aesthetic problems are very serious.

The immigration of Jews has had many beneficial effects in this country. Swamps have been drained and wastelands reclaimed. Irrigation has achieved striking results, turning former desert land into arable farmland.

Now these effects are beginning to be reversed, and the damage currently being done to this country by excessive and unplanned development may ever outweigh the good. Only by great efforts can this country be turned into the homeland of an increasing wave of immigrants without suffering irreparable damage.

CULTURE ON

From a Special Correspondent

TEL AVIV. — FOR IL15, a youth in Tel Aviv may acquire a subscription worth IL100, enabling him to go to the theatre and acquire books and records at reduced prices. The subscription also entitles him to free access to all municipal museums. The prerequisite for getting the booklet from the Tel Aviv Fund for Literature and Culture is that the boy (or girl) is between 17 and 27 years old, and is recommended by an institution which warrants that the youth is going to profit from the arrangement, while he is unable to foot the full cost of the facilities he is offered.

"The idea behind the project is to bring more people to appreciate and enjoy the cultural aspects of life, though by up-bringing these boys and girls have never thought of going to a theatre or buying a book before," Mr. Matityahu Kalir, who manages the Fund for the Municipality, told *the Jerusalem Post* this week. So far, 750 young people have become subscribers, and the Fund hopes to reach 1,000 before the end of the year. "We shall expand next year, I hope," Mr. Kalir said.

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Faculty of Science

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For further information to the Admissions Office of Jerusalem. Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. Israeli universities should apply to the Admissions Office, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Israel's distorted image

By MARK SEGAL
Jerusalem Post Correspondent

LONDON. — THE OLD ADAGE that "Jews Make News" certainly holds good as far as Israel is concerned, for the Jewish State is constantly on the front pages of the British press and in the top spots of the media.

On the official level, Israel did not do too badly in 1975, but there are certain warning signs for the future that must not be ignored.

The UN motion equating Zionism with racism was condemned by the leaders of the three main parties and by the Scottish Nationalists, in both the Commons and the House of Lords. Heads of three of the principal churches also condemned the UN vote — the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Coggan (for the Anglican Church); the late Cardinal Heenan for the Roman Catholics, and the Reverend Donald Soper, convener of the Methodist Church.

In addition, one-third of all members of both Houses of Parliament appended their signatures to a declaration denouncing the UN motion and resolving to support Israel as the legitimate expression of the Jewish national liberation movement. The signatories include all wings of British politics — from Lord Avon (formerly Anthony Eden) on the Conservative right to Ian Mikardo, MP, on Labour's left.

The present sympathetic official attitude is undoubtedly the result of the personal commitment to Israel and the Zionist cause of Premier Harold Wilson and such veteran Labour leaders

as Deputy Premier and Leader of the House of Commons, Edward Short, MP. Even President Sadat went so far as to reveal, at his press conference during his recent visit to London, that Wilson had intervened in the interim agreement negotiations because of his good relations with Israel's leaders.

Flow of VIPs

Undoubtedly this friendship is enhanced by the constant flow of VIPs between the two countries. This will reach a new height — it is hoped — following the scheduled official visits of the two Prime Ministers in the spring, preceded by that of Mrs. Thatcher.

OFFICIAL SENTIMENTS at Prime Minister and Labour Party level are one thing. Foreign Office activities are another, although on such matters of principle as the anti-Zionist resolution, Britain's UN delegate lined up with the other Western democracies. However, it was the same UN delegate, Ivor Richards, who made the scathing attack on U.S. Ambassador to the UN Patrick Moynihan, for his 'outspoken remarks on the Afro-Asian and Arab delegates' behaviour. Many people here are still convinced that Richards was prompted to make his speech by Foreign Secretary Callaghan, act-

ing in concert with U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger.

While the British delegate did vote against inviting the PLO to the Security Council, there are signs indicating support inside the Foreign Office for the Saunders document. After all, the Foreign Office sidestepped the Home Office and granted entry visas to the PLO delegates to the conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

In fact, the PLO representative in Britain, Said Hammami, is intensifying his activities here. Admittedly he has no official status as far as the government is concerned. Unlike the Health government, the Labour government, largely due to Wilson, has not blindly followed the French lead at the UN. In the recent UN Middle East vote, the EEC bloc split. France and Italy took a pro-Arab line and Britain voted with Germany, the Dutch and the Danes for a more balanced view.

IN RECENT WEEKS, Israel's image has been presented in the press in distorted fashion — partly due to deliberate editorial policy to highlight negative sides of Israeli life, and partly due to the nature of reports emanating from Israel. Thus the shaky position of Israel's economy has been described in a series of articles in the "Sunday Times" and other weeklies, while the fact that emigration is equaling, if not topping, immigration, has provided constant material for the newspapers. The "Guardian," for example, has printed gloomy prognoses about Israel's future that undoubtedly warmed the hearts of Israel's enemies.

Many of the reports coming out of Israel tend to confuse our friends here, above all the Jewish community, which on the whole remains totally committed to Israel, but many of whose members are deeply concerned at the news reaching them. This is mainly due to the lack of proper explanations, of

rather of the timing — as in the case of the raids on Lebanon.

What upsets Israel's friends and British Jews most are the reports of the darker side of Israeli society. These include the flight of the American Jewish immigrant family from Mevasseret Zion, stories of protection rackets and spread of violence even on the football field.

What one does see here is a waste of the few resources we have in the face of the near unlimited means of the Arabs and their friends in Britain. There is no coordination of information activities, with the result that reaction is invariably late. For example, when the Arabs and their leftist friends banned Jewish students from a rally at the University of Strathclyde's Students Union because "all Jewish students are Zionists and would thus threaten our rally" — I found no one ready to furnish an immediate reaction. "Such matters," I was told, "have to be decided by the right kind of committee." Now I learn that the Jewish students at the Scottish college are planning to take legal action (under the Race Relations Act) in the face of strong disapproval from the official communal bodies who prefer to act discreetly.

Arab propaganda

Actually, the Strathclyde incident served to bring some measure of life to Jewish students, most of whom are usually hesitant to take any clear stand. In addition they are being pushed to do something in the face of massive Arab propaganda at the universities by the tiny Israeli Students Association.

Two other examples come to mind of the improper use here of limited resources. The first is the spending of thousands of pounds (sterling) on the publication of an expensive magazine by the British JNF, largely devoted to "ego massage" of local functionaries, instead of

combining the JNF propaganda outlet with the official Zionist weekly — "The Jewish Observer and Middle East News" — of which it was originally a part. The second characteristic example was when the Israeli trade delegation, led by Commerce and Industry Minister Haim Bar-Lev, was here. No one saw fit to interest any of the radio and TV networks in interviewing Kamal Mansour, the senior Druse official at the Ministry. He could have presented the positive side of the life of minority communities in Israel, who are being presented as "victims of Zionism" in so many newspapers.

Furthermore, there is little coordination between the various organizations bringing top speakers here. I have heard innumerable complaints from Jewish youth leaders and Zionist youth movement heads that too often Israeli VIPs refuse to address youth rallies. They compare Golda Meir and the late Pinhas Sapir (who were both always ready to meet even small circles of youth) with Haim Bar-Lev and Abba Eban who refused to address youth rallies during their visits here.

The results of years of left-wing propaganda from the World Zionist Organization's Information Department and the "new left obsession" in its Youth and Hehalutz Department could be seen at last week-end's conference of the Union of Jewish Students and in general in the activities of the London-based World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS).

The Union of Jewish Students' conference adopted a key resolution, reading: "We recognise the right of Israel to exist and also of the Palestinian people to an independent state. This right is not negated by the PLO's activities..."

When one delegate asked why the conference should include mention of the terrorist organization in its resolution, he was shouted down.

It may interest Israeli readers to know that the latest Bulletin of the Union of Jewish Students contains the following assertion: "We do admit with regret that the creation of Israel caused some injustice to the Palestinian Arabs..."

READERS' LETTERS

'GIVING AWAY' THE TEMPLE MOUNT

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post Sir, — According to your report of December 28, Jerusalem's Mayor Teddy Kolek asserted: "The Arabs today have absolute and practical possession (of the Temple Mount)." He is also reported as saying that the fact that Jews are forbidden by their own religion to rebuild the Temple on the Temple Mount until the arrival of the Messiah opened the way for a long-term compromise in Jerusalem.

If Mr. Kolek is actually waiting for the Messiah, then there can be no "long-term compromise" because those who do so await his appearance daily.

The fact that we cannot, unfor-

tunately, build our Temple today by no means justifies giving away "practically and absolutely" the site holiest to the Jewish people. What is actually called for is the moral and spiritual upgrading of our society so that we can create the proper environment in which the Temple could be rebuilt.

What right does Mr. Kolek have to give away something that is not his, and, definitely, not his alone?

I think there are many people here who will not stand for any compromise because, on this issue, there is no room for compromise.

DAVID RAAB

Kiron, December 28.

March 8, p. 3.

Police turn back Jewish bid to pray on Temple Mount

By ABRAHAM RABINOVICH
Jerusalem Post Reporter

The first organized attempt by Jewish nationalists to pray on the Temple Mount since a magistrate court's ruling last January permitting such prayer was turned back by police yesterday.

Some 50 blue-uniformed Betar youth led by two Likud city councilmen — Rabbi L. I. Rabinowitz and Gershon Solomon — were halted just outside Mograbi Gate, on the ramp leading up from the Western Wall, by Jerusalem Police Chief David Kraus. He was backed by a line of blue-uniformed police firmly blocking the entrance.

When Solomon announced the group's intention of entering the Temple Mount to pray, Kraus said: "Since there is reason to believe that your entering the Temple Mount and praying there will lead to a disturbance of the peace, we forbid you to enter."

Solomon accused Kraus of holding in contempt the ruling by Magistrate Ruth Or on January 28 that Jews had the right to pray on the Mount. "The ruling," said Solomon, "explicitly states that banning of Jews from praying on the Temple Mount is a violation of the law."

Kraus said he was not holding any court ruling in contempt. "As commander of police in Jerusalem, I have reason to believe that this would cause a public disturbance. I will do everything to prevent the peace from being disturbed."

Police Minister Shlomo Hillel, in ordering the police to prevent Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, cited a Supreme Court decision of 1970 that, while Jews had the right to pray there, the authorities had the right to withhold that right if its exercise would lead to a public disturbance.

Solomon said there was no other place in the world where Jews were prevented from praying in a place holy to them.

"We haven't come to demonstrate, only to pray quietly. I don't think that praying in our most holy place is a disturbance of the peace."

When one of the Betar leaders asked whether the police were unable to preserve the peace if Jews prayed on the Temple Mount, Kraus said, "At this stage, no."

After an exchange that lasted five minutes, Rabbi Rabinowitz led the group in the *mincha* prayer, after which they peacefully dispersed.

While this confrontation was going on, close to 100 Arab youths were milling about on the Temple Mount outside Al-Aksa Mosque, where a smaller number of adult Moslems were waiting for the beginning of the evening prayer. At one point, two teenagers dumped a pile of metal rods at the edge of the group with a gesture that seem-



Jewish youths (and a few not so young) are blocked at the entrance to the Temple Mount yesterday, where they attempted to hold a pray-in. The sign over Mograbi Gate says "Notice and Warning: Entrance to the area of the Temple Mount is forbidden to everyone by Jewish law owing to the sacredness of the place, The Chief Rabbinate of (Rahamim Yisraeli)"

ed to call upon the youths to take the rods up as weapons. The reaction was mixed. While some of the youths moved to pick them up; others who appeared to be somewhat older moved to stop them and attempted to keep emotions leashed.

One of the older youths pushed one of the teenagers who had brought the rods, and a fight almost broke out between them. The rods had apparently been taken from the side of the mosque, where repair work is underway.

Inside Mograbi Gate were a small number of police with shields, helmets and batons. However, the police maintained a decidedly low profile on both sides of the gate, both in numbers and deportment; and their defusing efforts were successful. Although they were aware of the presence of the potentially dangerous iron rods in the midst of the group of Arab youths, they made no effort to seize them, to break up the group or even to approach them.

Only an occasional Arab policeman casually patrolled around the Temple Mount, the rest of the police keeping their positions at the gate. Tourists who continued to visit the mosques during the incident sensed the tension in the air but did not know what was happening.

At a press conference afterwards, Solomon said attempts would be made now on a daily basis to pray on the Temple Mount. Kraus told reporters that the ban on Jewish prayer there would continue to be enforced.

Betar, the Revisionist-Herut youth movement, has a nationalist rather than religious orientation; and many of the participants in yesterday's attempted pray-in wore the paper skullcaps issued at the Western Wall rather than headcover of their own. Before they mounted the ramp to Mograbi Gate they were harranged by a black-garbed Orthodox Jew, who accused them of violating religious law by entering the Temple Mount.

Religious parents urge voluntary service

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post
Sir, — We are the parents of boys and girls serving in religious units of Nahal and are proud that they are following in our footsteps. They joined, not in spite of being observant, but because they are observant, and service in the Army is part of observing the Laws of the Tora. We are also proud of those girls who volunteered for national service.

We strongly protest against proclamations and rulings which forbid girls from joining Nahal or volunteering for national service, and this in the days of struggle for our very survival when, according to Jewish Law, even brides and grooms are conscripted. Religious youth which leave the defence of their country and their people to their non-religious brothers are desecrating God's Name. We invite those rabbis and yeshiva heads who are the authors of such a ruling to visit farms, villages and immigrant settlements to learn and to teach: to learn how well our observant sons and daughters are working and abiding by the law which calls for settlement of the land — not with declarations, but with their very presence — and to teach these youngsters Tora and Mitzvot.

When religious girls were released from military duty, this encouraged

many non-observant girls to claim they were religious; in the same way, the rulings will encourage many girls to avoid national service in order to get a two-year advantage over other girls in the field of studies and employment. Of course, we agree it is right to release from all service girls who have been brought up to stay home, and who are not planning to go to university or work in public offices, as long as this is carefully checked.

The silence of the Chief Rabbinate, as well as the silence of those rabbis and yeshiva heads who, in their hearts, do not fully agree with the above-mentioned rulings (although they sometimes insinuate it and should be congratulated for this) is interpreted by the general public as agreement with these rulings. We appeal to them to let their voices be heard clearly on the subject.

We appeal to all those who agree with us to contact the Parents Committee, P.O.B. 7370, Jerusalem.

YONA BEN-SASOON
YOSEF WALK
MIRIAM MEYER
GAD BEN-AMI TSARFATI

(In the name of a group of 48 parents.)
Jerusalem, January 2. -

Article 6: Open letter to Mrs. Golda Meir¹⁴ (Weingarten, 1972). January 21, p. 4.

Mrs. Golda Meir
Prime Minister
Hakirya
Jerusalem.

Dear Prime Minister:

I write this open letter to you, as a Jew who has resided in the United States for 30 years, and has been living in Jerusalem these last 18 months. I have come here to learn — not to teach. I am here to give, not to take; and to help build, not to criticize.

However, I feel it necessary now to address this open letter to you, at my own expense, by virtue of an inherent right which exists in a free democratic society, namely, the right of petition to the high officers of state, while duly observing the dignity and respect appropriate in the exercise of such a right.

As a true Zionist, I believe that my place is here in Israel. Not because my being a Jew in the U.S. might mean imminent physical danger, but rather because I believe that only in a Jewish State can a Jew live and lead a full Jewish life according to the dictates of his conscience, free of fear and persecution, and enjoying in full equality all the opportunities which life offers.

For years I argued with my Jewish brethren that only in Israel can a Jew lead a full Jewish life and that our inborn Jewishness could never be adequately expressed in New York or elsewhere in the Diaspora.

But now I have some misgivings.

Last week I read that a Jew had been dismissed from his work as a porter at an airport, because he refused to work on Shabbat. Where did this dismissal occur? In New York, London, Prague? No. It occurred at Lod Airport, Israel.

This shocking fact brought back to me memories of my youth, when as a young refugee from Europe I worked in a Brooklyn laundry for five dollars a week, because I refused to accept a higher-paid job in which I would have been compelled to work on Shabbat. I recall many of my contemporaries who preferred to give up good careers rather than abandon their religious conviction and tradition by breaking the Shabbat. To me this was all a true symbol of Galuth. In the Golah we had to fight a continuing battle for the right to live as Jews according to our religious principles. In the United States the Jews fought and won the right not to work on Shabbat. Last year a number of test-cases, of Jews being compelled to work on Shabbat, were brought before the United States courts of law. The judges held that the act of compelling a religiously observant Jew to work on Shabbat constituted a violation of a human right.

And what happens here?

Allow me to make my views clear. I do not speak of essential services that are vital to the security of the State or to the life of its inhabitants. But the Minister of Labour has granted work permits wholesale to keep industrial plants open on Shabbat. So what are Shabbat-observing Jews supposed to do? Are they to be debarred from enjoying the principle of equal opportunity in regular employment just because they happen to be religious Jews living in a Jewish State? Are they thus to become second-class citizens? Are we going to create a system in Israel, where for certain jobs, the manpower-recruiting announcements will stress that "Religious Jews need not apply"?

Immigrant Jews from Soviet Georgia, who by sheer religious tenacity managed to remain Jewish under Stalin, are now compelled to work on Shabbat at Lod Airport. The top official in charge had the temerity to dismiss a number of Jewish porters of Soviet Georgian origin, because, as he explained, in a vulgar statement unworthy of an official in the State of Israel, they signed papers promising to work on Shabbat.

And the Minister of Transportation has added to the injustice of it all, by expressing surprise and annoyance that Shabbat-observers should at all seek employment at Lod Airport.

The situation in Lod Airport on Shabbat is rather foggy. I think that the whole truth is not being told, either here or in the Diaspora.

It seems little short of tragic to read in the newspapers that at a meeting you had with Soviet Georgian olim one of the problems on the agenda was the "right" not to be compelled to work on Shabbat.

Such problems do not plague us in New York or in Chicago, nor, for that matter, in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. In the free world, such civil rights are protected by law. And in Soviet Georgia the authorities let us Jews alone. But in Israel, in the 24th year of its independence, and five years after Jerusalem's reunification, we do have these problems.

What disturbs me is the profound silence observed by the "heroic" defenders of civil rights, by the manifesto signers, and by the great columnists. Pray, Madam, what are civil rights? Are they only the right to publish pornographic literature and to stage obscene theatricals? Must we conclude

¹⁴ One sentence is omitted because of my unfamiliarity with the microfilm conversion system.

I have been a Zionist all my life. Do not, I beg you, place me in a position where I will have no answer to give to my Jewish brethren who maintain that in many ways it is easier to be a Jew in New York than in Jerusalem; that traditional Jews are becoming second-class citizens in the Jewish State; that the Tora will come forth from Brooklyn and the word of the Lord from Golders Green — not from Zion and Jerusalem.

I have always publicly and privately opposed those Jews who have attacked the State and who have maligned you and other Government officials. I shall continue to do so because my thinking is worlds apart from theirs. And there are many thousands like me in this country. And more are coming in, many thousands who are intellectually honest but fundamentally disturbed by what is happening here.

We ask for consideration and understanding of our civil rights just as we enjoy them in enlightened and democratic countries in the Diaspora: The right to practise Judaism unimpeded, without having to suffer for it in any manner by the authorities.

Therefore, may I respectfully suggest that the Kneset enact a law which will state clearly that every man and woman living in this country, regardless of religion and national origin, will not be compelled to work on his "Sabbath" and cannot be dismissed from his job for such reasons. It seems that the present laws of Shabbat do not give the proper safeguards.

I ask you, Madam, as a former American Zionist yourself, who immigrated to this blessed country, to do your best to put an end to the callous discrimination and to assist those who have followed you here, to live a full Jewish life according to the tradition in which they have been raised.

Jerusalem, 5 Shvat 5732,
January 21, 1972.

Respectfully yours,
DAVID WEINGARTEN

Article 7: Reader's letter: The dangers of extremism (Stark, 1976a). January 11, p. 8.

THE DANGERS OF EXTREMISM

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post

Sir, — Gush Emunim settlers in Camp Kadum will be provided with housing outside the army camp and once again, as in Kiryat Arba, the Government has capitulated to the group's strong-arm tactics. This marks another successful step in the efforts of a religious-nationalist minority to impose on the entire nation its philosophy in matters of internal and foreign policy.

The Government's spineless surrender to Gush Emunim's tactics can only have one effect — namely, an escalation in the use of these tactics. The spectre of an Israel torn by civil strife and anarchy hovers not far behind.

The erosion of democracy in Israel as exemplified by these events, is having a most damaging effect on allya from the West, and adding impetus to the already frightening rate of emigration. Even more important, the actions of Gush Emunim, if allowed to succeed, may seriously threaten our national security. It is an undisputed fact that the main strength of Zahal lies in the morale of our soldiers — in the fact that each and every citizen sincerely believes that he is defending his home and family, and that every war has been forced upon us by our enemies. It is not difficult to picture the danger to morale, and to Zahal's

effectiveness that could arise from a situation where even a minority of Israelis should begin to wonder whether the next war may be fought over certain parties' concepts of "historic rights," or over Rabbi Levinger's right to live in Hebron under Zahal's protection.

Gush Emunim has, in its statements and actions, shown the major elements of fanaticism — namely, the belief that its members know better than all others what is best for the nation, and the willingness to go to extreme ends to impose their beliefs on the majority. Fanaticism, by its very nature, carries greater momentum than moderation. Dedicated minorities have time and again dictated their policies on entire nations.

At a time when the nation is most preoccupied with the dangers from without, it is doubly important that we become aware of the danger to our democratic way of life and to national morale, posed by attempts of religious and nationalist extremists to impose their philosophy on the nation. The Israeli majority cannot afford to remain silent.

H. STARK

Ramat Hasharon, January 4.

DANGERS OF EXTREMISM

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post
Sir, — With reference to H. Stark's letter, "Dangers of extremism" (January 11), may I point out that Gush Emunim is made up of a group of dedicated people, including many non-observant Jews from all walks of life, who realize that the areas that we won in a war forced upon us by our enemies must not be returned to those who have promised to annihilate us in the near future. May I remind the writer that, if not for the small groups of religious zealots all through our history who have kept the torch of Judaism alive against all conceivable odds, he and I would not be living as Jews in a free and democratic Israel today.

Let me also correct the writer on the point of aliya and emigration. What is causing emigration today is the gravitation toward greener fields and the false illusion that life will be easier somewhere else. The majority of those coming on aliya from the West are young religious couples to whom the Gush Emunim group is a shining light by virtue of their selflessness and dedication.

May I suggest to H. Stark that he take a trip to Kadum to meet personally with the settlers who have given up all their personal comforts and live in extremely primitive conditions in order to awaken and remind our people and our Government of our historical rights.

H. GOLDMAN
Ramat Chen, January 11.

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post
Sir, — With reference to the letter, "Dangers of extremism" (January 11), I had the honour to visit Camp Kadum with members of the South African delegation during last week's session of the General Zionist Council.

Without going into political arguments, I would just like to express my admiration for the settlers and members of Gush Emunim for their courage and determination. They are the true pioneers of today.

As Co-Chairman of the Aliya Committee of the Zionist Federation in England, I can only say that, in my opinion, all youth groups visiting Israel should be taken on a tour of Gush Emunim settlements to inspire them. Maybe with this inspiration the Jewish youth again can be induced to play their part and come and join in this great Zionist revival.

Contrary to H. Stark's opinion, instead of having a damaging effect on aliya from the West, the Gush Emunim people are an inspiration and example to the Jewish youth outside Israel.

With all the corruption, emigration and defeatism prevalent in Israel today, Gush Emunim brings a breath of fresh air and hope for the future of Israel.

ERIC GRAUS,
President, Herut-Hatzohar
Great Britain

Tel Aviv, January 11.

READERS' LETTERS

UNFORTUNATE TERMINOLOGY

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post

Sir, — No one but the Israel Government itself is to blame for the switch by the U.S. at the UN Security Council to its supposedly abandoned Rogers Plan, which envisions a return by Israel to the 1967 lines. The Labour government cannot be forgiven for its unfortunate labelling of the West Bank as occupied or administered territories. Such terminology is completely out of character with Zionist ideology.

A truly Zionist government would have termed these territories redeemed or restored. They are part of the ancient territory of Israel, envisioned in the return to Zion, and the Labour government will never be able to live down its failure to recognize them as such and to act in conformity with this concept. It is no wonder that the U.S., not to say the UN, has rejected what Israel, through its Government, has rejected.

Had the Labour government indeed redeemed and restored the territories, many problems would have been avoided. The Arabs would not have raised any issues about Jewish settlement in the territories or the status of Jerusalem. They would have accepted the situation as a logical and natural result of the restoration, in accordance with the divine promise — the true basis of Zionism. The Christian world — and many Christians have already done so despite the Israel Government's attitude — would have seen in it the fulfilment of the divine plan as revealed through the prophets. Sun-

whom? The Jordanians? An choate and ill-defined West Bank tity? An as yet unorganized terror organization like the P.L.O.? United Nations? To whomever was, the intention was clear the Israel declared no title to them would use them only as a bargaining point for peace.

The bankruptcy of this position further seen in that pressures to lock these territories without peace are difficult to resist, especially by little country like Israel, surrounded by a hostile world.

As I see it, there is only one way retrieve the situation; we must reverse our stand about the territories; we must assert that these territories are ours because they are part of our heritage from which we were driven out 2000 years ago. But the question is whether the Labour government can do it.

Haifa

SAUL SIGELSCHIFFER

¹⁵ Because of a mistake during the photographing, the bottom sentence is regrettably out of frame.

Education for Jewish survival

A FEW WEEKS ago I was invited to address the men at an army base in the Sinai Desert. I was to speak on the foundations of Jewish tradition and values. The Base Commander wanted a series of talks on the subject because men in uniform were asking why we need this Land: Shocked, he felt that such a course would not only answer that question but would also be helpful in connection with problems such as hashish and crime.

Apparently the general educational system of Israel has failed to transmit the urgency of being a Jew or of living in the Land. Many feel, like our lieutenant-general, that a reach back to our heritage will help. The issue is underlined by the infamous U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism. Bad enough the world views Zionism adversely; we must make sure that our youth is not so negatively inclined.

So Jewish education is the issue. It was the theme at the Zionist General Council sessions and at the Prime Minister's Solidarity Conference. But what does Jewish education mean? All use the same term. Each views it in his own image. The Jewish people and its values somehow begin and end with each speaker.

I submit that Jewish education must be based on the answer to one primary question. There may or may not be several answers. Any system that does not have a clear, unequivocal answer to it is doomed to failure. The question is "Why be a Jew?"

If we have an answer to this question, one that is meaningful and demanding, our school system will have no trouble in teaching these values. If not, then all we are teaching is platitudes and words, such as Jew, Judaism, Zion, Zionism. These words, if they are unaccompanied by a content that constitutes a *raison d'être*, are mere shells. For one, two or three

Why Israel? Why be a Jew? The secularists, charges Simon A. Dolgin, have failed to provide our troubled youth with convincing answers to these questions.

generations, these shells may exert some emotional power. Then the emotional charge expires and the shells are left meaningless. The result is apathy towards Judaism and Zionism, *yerida*, assimilation.

The "Why be a Jew" must be compelling enough to convey "Why not be a non-Jew." Many of our people, throughout our history, failed to find the answer to this question, positively or negatively stated. The result: they ceased being Jews. That is our challenge as we are troubled about those who flee the Land, intermarry or assimilate otherwise. Education has not taught them why they must be Jews and continue their heritage, or in what respect they are different — and should remain different — from non-Jews.

For the religious the answer is the command of G-d, the life of the *mitzva*. For the non-religious another answer must be given (although history has not evidenced a secular answer to date). But whatever the answer, it must be forthright and committing. When we know why we are Jews, we well know who is a Jew, what is Judaism and why the Land.

FOR THE religious person any alternative to being a Jew is inconceivable, as is the equating of

any other country with Israel. As a descendant of Abraham, he is bound to live the Torah life as an extension of G-d's covenant with Abraham. The Torah encompasses all areas of life. Without Torah there is no Judaism and history thus far indicates, no Jews. Education for Zionism is but a branch of education for Jewish living. Zionism, removed from religion, finds itself exposed to attacks on nationalism and racism. Zionism, divorced from Torah, may be a shell, for its essence — the establishment of a Jewish national state — has been realized. Zionism thus remains a quantitative exercise in bringing more Jews to Israel, instead of a qualitative, spiritual ideal.

For the non-religious Jew, the question "Why be a Jew" or "Why not be a non-Jew," presents the sharper challenge. What is Jewish about secularism? What is the difference between his Jewish and the non-Jewish way of life? Is being Jewish just an accident of birth? Will secular Judaism — if there is such a thing — withstand assimilation now, any more than it did in the past when it led to defection from Jewish ranks? The signs of the times do not portend any bright promise.

Jewish education cannot succeed unless our teachers — clearly, logically and committedly, to the exclusion of whims and nostalgia — can justify our remaining Jews.

CORRECTION

A brief report that appeared on Sunday on Prof. Moshe Arens MK quoted him incorrectly on the electoral prospects of the Likud. Prof. Arens believes the Likud indeed has a good chance of succeeding in the next elections.

Prof. Arens lectures part time at the Faculty of Aeronautical Engineering at the Technion and is not head of the department as reported.

Article 11 (left): Reader's letter: Jewish education (Sternthal, 1976). May 13, p. 8.

Article 12 (right): Reader's letter: Jewish values (Stark, 1976b). October 17, p. 8.

JEWISH EDUCATION

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post

Sir, — In an effort to improve the image of the State of Israel abroad, the Ministry of Education has come up with a new way to celebrate Independence Day: it is sending abroad 35 young people as "representatives" of Israel to join and share in Independence Day ceremonies in various communities (April 26).

You further report that these volunteers were carefully chosen from 400 applicants, and that "most of them have no knowledge of the basics of Judaism, and for many it will mean their first visit to a synagogue."

Now I ask, what country in its right mind would send abroad "representatives" who are ignorant of their own customs, history, and religion?

How are these youngsters going to be looked upon by serious Jewish parents contemplating aliya and concerned with improving their children's education here? Jews do not have to come to Israel to raise Jewish basketball players or for their children to join Jewish clubs! Such facilities are available in abundance in the Galut.

When will the Education Ministry of all people wake up to the fact that its business should be Jewish education?

BARUCH STERNTHAL
Savyon.

JEWISH VALUES

To the Editor of The Jerusalem Post

Sir, — In recent weeks, *The Jerusalem Post* has regaled us with numerous articles pleading, directly or indirectly, for a return to Jewish values among the citizens of this country. Such pleas always leave unanswered, in my mind, the most important question; just what are these specifically Jewish values? Are they exemplified by the actions and utterances of the highest representatives of our religion, the Chief Rabbis? Or perhaps the performance of those watchdogs of Judaism in our State, the leaders of the religious parties? Did those respected members of the religious community who abducted children and hid them in defiance of court orders act according to Jewish values? Could it be possible that we are all being asked to follow the example of the pious Rabbi Levinger?

Too much damage has already been done by individuals and groups acting according to so-called Jewish values, as defined by their own criteria. What is needed is a return to those *human* values that are an integral part of Jewish philosophy and tradition, even if ignored by many religious leaders and activists. I refer to values such as respect and concern for your fellow citizen, be he religious Jew or non-believer, Christian or Moslem; respect for the law of the land and for its democratic institutions; concern for the common good, even at the price of certain personal sacrifices; and a preparedness to give the maximum to country, community and fellow-citizen, in place of our present obsession with taking as much as opportunity will permit.

HARRY STARK
Ramat Hasharon.

win Frankel
Editor

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It is an honour for us to bear arms in defence of our existence and the values we hold dear, but our fathers and brothers in the Diaspora were and are no less honourable than us when, in the past, they found ways suited to the circumstances of their places and times and when, today, they find other means of defending themselves, preserving their iden-

I SHOULD LIKE to discuss two days of the Israel calendar: Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day and Independence Day, two days which were not handed down to us by our forefathers but were fixed by our own generation and which, together, symbolize our people's past and future.

The first of the two days is generally referred to as Holocaust Day (Yom Hasho'ah), though its official name is Yom Hashikaron LaSho'ah Velagvura; (in English: Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day). The writings on the subject continue to teach that "Holocaust" means the Six Million going "as sheep to the slaughter" while "Heroism" means the revolts of the ghettos and the resistance of the Jewish partisans. In the schools and youth movements we were taught that these ghettos revolts retrieved the honour of the Jewish People. Studies have been written with the intention of proving that the proportion of fighters and insurgents among the Jews was greater than among other nations.

I have doubts about all that. The ghetto risings, for all their grandeur, teach us nothing about the Holocaust or about "Jewish" traits. In the Holocaust Jews lived and died like human beings. There were good people and bad among them, heroes and cowards. The terrible thing about the Holocaust isn't that Jews died in one way or another, but that civilized nations and a silent world condemned an entire people to death.

THE REVOLT of the ghettos was a revolt of those who wanted to take their own revenge, while most of the others left the task to coming generations. The death of the ghetto fighters was no more honourable than the death of the other Jews and is not proof that Jews are better than other people. Death while bearing arms is no more honourable than any kind of death in which a person holds on to his principles, to his humanity.

A Jew wrapping himself in his *Tallit* (prayer shawl) as he goes to his death and a Jewish mother walking with her children to the gas chambers and soothing them have no less dignity than a fighter in the Warsaw Ghetto.

Many of the Holocaust survivors, who had no opportunity to fight in Europe, fought in the War of Independence and fought well. They fought when there was a point in doing so and they went "as sheep to the slaughter" when fighting was futile.

It is sometimes hard to understand why we indulge in so much self-justification over what happened in the Holocaust. I think this stems from the way our education has accustomed us to thinking about the Diaspora. We were taught that we here are better than the *Galut* (Exile) Jew, who was debased, humiliated, servile type and therefore developed negative traits, whereas we are proud, erect and free. I question the validity of this myth. The *Galut* Jew, was, indeed, persecuted and suffered, but he never regarded himself as a lesser creature. Jews always considered themselves superior to their neighbours and in their hearts were always proud and erect. We created an image of the *Galut* Jew to suit us, so that we might feel ourselves superior to him. Our good attributes we ascribed to our own achievements and the bad we blamed on the legacy of our ancestors. But often the opposite was the case.

WE BEAR ARMS and defend our homes and families with them not because we're better people than our ancestors but because we enjoy an enormous advantage over them: the opportunity to bear arms in defence of our existence. In the conditions in which our *Galut* forebears lived the possession of arms was pointless, so they sought other ways of safeguarding their wellbeing and their existence as Jews — ways which were particularly suited to the circumstances of each period and place.

It is an honour for us to bear arms in defence of our existence and the values we hold dear, but our fathers and brothers in the Diaspora were and are no less honourable than us when, in the past, they found ways suited to the circumstances of their places and times and when, today, they find other means of defending themselves, preserving their iden-



A STATE IS NOT ENOUGH

"A State of Israel cut off from the legacy of the Holocaust and the Diaspora becomes a marginal phenomenon in human history, perhaps just a small detail in the history of national movements," writes a senior Israel Defence Forces officer, identified only as YA'ACOV.

It is customary to say that when the State of Israel came into being, it straightened the back of the Jewish People. The State and its achievements are presented as the zenith of Jewish history — the State of Israel transformed its destiny of the Jewish People and it is once again a nation like all the other sovereign states.

I question all that. The State of Israel didn't straighten the back of the Jewish People; when the Jewish People straightened its back, it established the State of Israel. The Jewish People's awakening in the past century expressed itself in the establishment of the State of Israel and in the struggle of Diaspora Jewry for their survival as a people. The Jews of the Diaspora continue their struggle for survival no less energetically than Israel continues hers.

Israel's wars, then, and the struggle of the Jews of the Diaspora merge into one supreme effort of the Jewish People to preserve its identity and existence in the modern world.

I don't know whether we really are a culmination of Jewish history. True, we have gained political sovereignty, but our culture and our spiritual values have, in the process, become inferior to those of our forebears in the Diaspora. This country was built by pioneers and immigrants who came here as young people, and whose spiritual and intellectual baggage was mainly acquired or created in the Diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael they were busy mainly with material construction, and the higher our buildings grew the more our values shrank; most of our Jewish spiritual aristocracy remained in the Diaspora. So when millions of Jews perished in the Diaspora, most of the bearers of the Jewish People's cultural and spiritual legacy perished with them.

If that were not enough, there came the blow of denial and assimilation: many of our people in Eretz Yisrael and in the Diaspora have turned their backs on their past. Young Jews in the Diaspora have become the standard-bearers of ideologies based on hatred and violence, and in many areas of our life in Eretz Yisrael we find ourselves copying second-rate cultural fads.

THE STATE of Israel will only fulfil its mission in Jewish history if its political and military ac-

complishments become an instrument for fostering our own people's spiritual legacy and values.

I don't believe that victory is proof of justice. The history of mankind is full of victories won by scoundrels, and Jewish history is a tale of the suffering of a nation with a mission and values.

The only thing we can really be thankful for is that for our generation of Jews, justice and might have joined forces. But this cannot be construed as "proof" of our moral and ethical attainment or of the quality of our values. The Jews in Auschwitz were just as right as the Jews who conquered Jerusalem in the Six Day War.

I doubt whether the Jewish People's destiny has really been transformed by the establishment of the State of Israel. To be sure our people has thereby acquired a powerful instrument for continuing the struggle for its existence, but the sense of "a people dwelling alone" that accompanied us in Exile is still with us, and the threat to Jewish survival that loomed over our forefathers. So, for all the changing circumstances, the continuity of the Jewish People's destiny remains.

THERE IS a lot of talk about our right to this land and about the link between the Jewish People and Eretz Yisrael. It is argued that it is the relics of our people's past — the Western Wall, Masada — which certify our right to this land. This is true, but it is not the whole truth: between the Exodus from Egypt and the Bar-Kochba Revolt less time passed than between the destruction of the Second Temple and our own period. For most of these years we lived in Exile and other people occupied our land.

None the less, Eretz Yisrael was never Homeland to any other people, which it has always been to us. The synagogues in the Diaspora that were built orientated on Jerusalem, the prayers of Diaspora Jews concerning the Return to Zion, and our people's unbroken affinity to Eretz Yisrael — these grant us title to Eretz Yisrael no less than the Western Wall and Masada.

The Diaspora Jews are not a marginal part of the Jewish People but an equal partner in everything connected with the building of our culture and her of Israel's independence and not political instruments are merely values in themselves, but merely a means for the Jewish People's continuity and the fostering of its culture.

A State of Israel cut off from the legacy of the Holocaust and the Diaspora becomes a marginal phenomenon in human history, perhaps just a small detail in the history of national movements, and perhaps even an insignificant and late stage of colonialism.

Since antiquity, the carrying of the sword has symbolized the right of individuals and of nations to liberty. This has been true of all the nations, including the Jewish People. So we should be proud of our weapons and consider it an honour that we have once again learned how to wage war. But one of the things that distinguishes the Jewish People is not an end in itself but an instrument for achieving spiritual and cultural objectives which alone give meaning to freedom. We must recognise these objectives as the sole purpose of our existence and struggle.

Fighting for a just cause is an honourable deed. We foster fighting values in our soldiers, we educate them to self-sacrifice, comradeship, and setting a personal example. All of these are admirable when they are in the service of a just cause, but are liable — when void of spiritual content — to degenerate into a cult of mercenaries.

We are in duty bound to inculcate the fighting spirit upon our soldiers and to teach them that, in the world we live in, the freedom to wage war is a duty and a privilege for the Jewish People. But at the same time, we must remind them again and again of the aims of our struggle, of our rights, and of the justice of our cause.

(The author is a senior Israel Defence Forces officer, several times wounded in action and cited for valour, and working for a doctorate in Modern Jewish History. The above is his summing-up of a discussion by a group of officers on how they see their task in the army of the Jewish State, held late in the summer of 1973 and subsequently published in "Maarochot," Condensed and translated by Moshe Kohn.)

For the people

There is no sign on the door, and only the very in people really know that one of the finest places to stay in Tel Aviv is the Habakkuk Apartment Hotel. Here you can enjoy the privacy of your own home together with all the luxury of a first class hotel.

The Habakkuk Hotel opened 3 years ago in the vicinity of the Pal Hotel, down the road from the Hilton and Tel Aviv's restaurant hotels. It is very close to the sea and near lovely Herta Park, in the most pleasant area of Tel Aviv, 7 Rehov Habakkuk (Tel. 443110).

In all, there are 26 apartments of various sizes, ranging from one to two rooms. All the rooms are exquisitely furnished to suit the most discriminating of tastes, with beautiful furniture and wall-to-wall carpeting. Each flat has a kitchenette equipped with a refrigerator and gas-electric stove, though utensils are not supplied. There are separate bathrooms and toilets.

And together with all this, you have absolutely no household worries. The apartments are cleaned daily, bed linen is supplied as well as towels and kitchen towels. There is constant hot water and in summer while in the winter they are heated. And of course each apartment has television, radio and telephone. The management of this hotel — experts in creating a special atmosphere and offering superior service, point out that the public rooms are currently under construction, as they are being joined with the adjacent hotel now being built by the same firm.

The hotel is very popular with foreign embassies, which frequently keep a number of the

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A remedy for the body politic

THE VAGUE sense of public malaise over the disquieting drift of political affairs—both external and domestic—has burgeoned into a growing crisis of confidence in Israel's top political leadership. Since Prime Minister Rabin's return from his visit to the U.S. several weeks ago, a number of leading political figures have publicly called for major changes at the top or have been authoritatively reported to be sounding out possibilities towards this end.

Proposals have been mooted, placed in cold storage, continue to make the political rounds or considered and temporarily rejected for the following:

- replacing Prime Minister Rabin with another Labour Party leader: the candidate most often mentioned — and rejected — is Defence Minister Shimon Peres

- replacing the present coalition government with a Likud-Rafi-Religious grouping — again, the name most frequently mooted as Premier is Mr. Peres. There seems little chance, however, of putting together a 61-member Knesset majority for this alternative.

- advancing elections for the Ninth Knesset. Labour's septuagenarian maverick, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, came out last weekend for a far-reaching ideological reshuffling of Israel's political party map as a necessary prelude.

- establishing a government of technicians — with or without a Man-on-Horseback premier — a proposal made with increasing frequency in newspaper columns.

None of these proposals offers a panacea.

MR. RABIN on assuming office spoke of Israel's need to gird herself for a lean seven years. Whether they will be more or less than seven years can safely be left to the realm of prophecy, but that they will be lean is beyond dispute.

In these circumstances what is needed is an atmosphere of confidence in the leadership permitting the government maximum flexibility in navigating a small beleaguered country through difficult times.

It would allow flexibility in yielding to pressures when there is no choice — and to carry public opinion for such a decision; to resist pressures when need be and be certain of public consent in paying the sometimes inevitable price for such daring; and to feint and dissemble to the outside world when need be, without having to cross every "i" and dot every "j" for home consumption.

There is no evidence that a reshuffle of the political leadership, with or without early elections, would create the necessary atmosphere of confidence.

The problems are deeper than questions of personality or style; they derive from a breakdown in the political system that has led to a politics of stalemate.

The Government has been beset by a perennial inability to apply discipline on the Ministers and to implement a long list of Cabinet decisions which have remained dead letters.

Lack of Government effectiveness was partly compensated for in the

Israel's present political disarray could be cured by a constitutional convention which would bring new order into Israel's body politic. It would have the effect, too, of injecting new blood into public life, writes YOSEF GOEL

past by a strong team of Prime Minister and Finance Minister working through informal kitchen cabinets. This system of informal, but functioning government was the major victim of post-Yom Kippur War suspicion of rule by charisma and clique.

For a long time, Israel's ruling party, Mapai and then Labour, coordinated policy between focal points of political power—the Government, Jewish Agency, Histadrut and local government. The party was the link between the leadership and the various levels of politicians and politically aware rank and file throughout the country.

This remarkably effective — if not always aesthetically edifying — political mechanism worked political wonders in the past. But it has broken down — perhaps irreparably so — beginning with the

Labour Affair of the early 1960s.

What is true for the Labour Party is true of the other parties in varying degrees. The parties lack internal unity over policy, a development which has paralysed nearly all the political parties for the past five years, turning Israel's political map into a meaningless hodge-podge for the electorate.

And the electorate, especially the less tradition-bound younger voters and new immigrants, have reacted by "turning-off" from the system. This, in turn, has heightened the intensity — or more correctly, the ferocity of pressure-group politics and the trend towards political paralysis, social anarchy and an undermining of national self-confidence.

IT IS IRONIC that the Rabin Government — to a greater extent than its predecessors — has shown an awareness of many of these ills, paralleled by an apparent inability to tackle them effectively: witness the frittering away of the well-meant income-tax reforms, and the inability to set in motion an effective economic policy.

Perhaps the start of a solution is a return to square one. At the end of 1948, in the euphoria of newly-acquired independence, Israel elected a Constituent Assembly; its main purpose was to write a constitution which would set out the rules of the game according to which the new state and society would function. The Constituent Assembly of 1949 turned itself into the First Knesset and in effect repudiated the main function assigned to it by the electorate.

This may well have been political wisdom in view of the stupendous tasks of nation-building confronting the fledgling country in the 1950s when it could be argued that flexibility was preferable to the arbitrary restraints imposed by a constitution. But the accumulation of political malfunctioning since then would seem to indicate the urgency of developing a national consensus at least in regard to the basic rules of the game.

The election of a constitutional convention would attract into the political process outstanding figures and people of talent, drawn by the opportunity of bringing order into chaos. This could prove invaluable in injecting much-needed new blood into the hitherto self-perpetuating body of political functionaries and leaders.

The convention would sidestep such emotionally-laden and divisive issues as the status of religion, the rights of women, Arabs and other groups. It would introduce electoral reform, define the powers of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, lay down the rules governing the relationship between the Government and the Knesset, and deal with judicial review of legislation and supervision of political parties.

It is specifically in the present crisis of confidence, in an atmosphere of political confusion and depression that a proposal for the election of a Constitutional Convention should be given serious consideration, as an alternative to the more conventional proposals for changing the Cabinet or moving up the Knesset elections.