

The 'immemorial ties'

THE EMOTIVE PORTRAYAL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE NETHERLANDS AND ISRAEL BY DUTCH SCHOLARSHIP

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LEIDEN UNIVERSITY, THE NETHERLANDS | JUNE 2019 | DR. N. SCHÖNMANN

Content

Introduction	p. 4
Methods and methodology	p. 6
The time period 1979-1982	p. 6
Case studies	p. 7
Methods and sources	p. 7
Limitations of the research	p. 8
Conceptual framework	p. 9
Definition of emotion	p. 9
Group emotion	p. 10
The state as a group	p. 13
Emotion in Foreign Policy and International Relations	p. 14
The relationship between Israel and the Netherlands	p. 19
Jews in the Netherlands	p. 19
After the Second World War	p. 21
1979-1982	p. 22
Emotion in Dutch Foreign Policy	p. 23
Chapter 1: The Declaration of Venice	p. 25
Historical background	p. 25
Dutch motivations	p. 26
<i>Government</i>	<i>p. 26</i>
<i>Media</i>	<i>p. 28</i>
Israeli reactions	p. 30
Conclusion	p. 31
Chapter 2: The Dutch participation in the MFO	p. 32
Historical background	p. 32
Dutch motivations	p. 33
<i>Government</i>	<i>p. 33</i>
<i>Media</i>	<i>p. 35</i>
Israeli reactions	p. 37
Conclusion	p. 37

Chapter 3: Sabra and Chatila	p. 39
Historical background	p. 39
Dutch reactions	p. 40
<i>Government</i>	<i>p. 40</i>
<i>Media</i>	<i>p. 42</i>
Conclusion	p. 45
Conclusion	p. 47
Bibliography	p. 49
Appendix A: Report of the Autumn meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, from 13 to 22 September 1982 in Rome	p. 53

Introduction

"The myth of the immemorial friendship [between the Netherlands and Israel] is fueled by the traditional Dutch tolerance since the Golden Age."¹

"[...] in December 1953, when the special relationship between the Netherlands and Israel already was established [...]"²

"Relations between the Netherlands and Israel have nearly always been cordial to very cordial in recent decades, an 'entente cordiale' in the true sense of the word."³

"The 'non-normal' of the relationship [between the Netherlands and Israel] indicates that it is friendly, tight, close, special etc."⁴

Statements like these, made by several Dutch scholars in their studies on Dutch-Israeli relations, show an interesting phenomenon: the emotive portrayal of a bilateral relationship.

In these Dutch language academic studies, often an emotive portrayal of the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel is maintained. This appears from the use of language, as is clear in the above mentioned quotes from academic works, but also from the motivations mentioned for certain actions. One of the most important motivations for the extensive weapon trade, economic and political support, for example, is the assumed friendship between the two countries.⁵ Only in recent years, Dutch scholars showed a less emotive view of Dutch-Israeli relations. The most important of these are Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans, who published a book on "The Holocaust, Israel and the 'Jew'" in 2017, analyzing the relationship between Israel and the Netherlands much less emotionally.⁶

This attributed value to emotion in academic studies is particularly interesting. The research of emotions in International Relations (IR) is a recent development that was not common in the 20th century. Still, rational reasons are considered to be the core motivations for states to behave in a certain way. This phenomenon led me to the following research question:

¹ *Idem*, p. 20

² *Idem*, p. 49

³ F. Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden : Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israël (Sworn friends: The secret alliance between the Netherlands and Israel)* Amsterdam [etc.]: Veen, 1997, p.20

⁴ F. Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten : De Nederlandse rol in de internationale politiek ten aanzien van het Arabisch-Israëliësch conflict 1973-1982 (The Netherlands and the Near East: The Dutch role in international politics regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict 1973-1982)* S.l.: S.n., 1991, p.31.

⁵ F. Peeters, *Sworn friends*, Amsterdam [etc.]: Veen, 1997, p.74-75; F. Grünfeld, *The Netherlands and the Near East*, Leiden 1983, p.64-65.

⁶ R. Ensel and E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the "Jew": Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society*, Amsterdam University Press, 2017.

Is there empirical evidence for the emotive portrayal of Dutch-Israeli relations by Dutch scholarship? Answering this question might lead to a better understanding of the role of emotions in International Relations, as well as give a deeper insight in the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel in this regard, even if the question appears to be only partially answerable.

Several studies have been conducted on the long-term relationship between Israel and the Netherlands, covering the years before the establishment of the State of Israel until the Lebanon War of 1982.⁷ One of the more in-depth studies covers the years 1973-1982 and is conducted by dr. Grünfeld⁸, also in Dutch. In several other researches on the European Union (EU), the Netherlands is mentioned, but no further detailed research is available. Identifying a 'gap' would therefore be an understatement, as there is more 'gap' than actual 'filling'. Although the small amount of existing literature might indicate the subject is not worth researching, the lack of material is most probably due to the fact that existing materials are only available in Dutch and Hebrew.

⁷ F. Peeters, *Sworn friends*, Amsterdam 1997; R.B. Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of principieel: Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van het Arabisch-Israëliësch conflict (Pragmatic or fundamental: The Dutch policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict)*, Leiden: Nijhoff, 1983.

⁸ F. Grünfeld, *The Netherlands and the Near East*, 1991.

Methods and methodology

For this study, I chose to look specifically at the years 1979 until 1982, as a longer period of time would not allow me to look into all sources of that period in-depth. These years are relevant as the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel was declining then, with the Netherlands supporting the Venice Declaration (Chapter 1), and attaching more importance to their own economic and political position than to their assumed friendship with Israel, as it seems. As most of the 'emotive' Dutch studies have been conducted in this period or shortly afterwards, none of them have paid much attention other than the following statement: the relationship declined in these years.

The time period 1979 until 1982

In these three years, or broader 'at the end of the seventies', Frans Peeters and R. B. Soetendorp (among others) notice a decline in the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel.⁹

The year 1979 is specifically chosen because it creates a clearer border to this research than 'end of the seventies'. It is also an event that reinforced this choice: in this year a Dutch unit was sent to Lebanon to support the UN force UNIFIL there, and the unit was stationed at the Lebanese-Israeli border, the first known Dutch action that was not supportive of Israel.

The year 1982 is considered the 'crisis year' of Dutch-Israeli relationships by the above mentioned scholars, starting with the invasion of Israel into Lebanon. The Dutch government, having high hopes for the success of the UN, expressed anger to Israel for ignoring UN forces and even attacking them, and additional to that, there was the Dutch unit which was still stationed in Lebanon. The massacre of the refugee camps in Lebanese territory occupied by Israel followed. However not executed by Israeli forces, the world blamed Israel for not protecting the camps, causing the Netherlands to condemn Israel sincerely for the first time in their relationship.¹⁰

⁹ Peeters, *Sworn friends*, 1997; Soetendorp, *pragmatic or fundamental*, 1983.

¹⁰ For a broader overview of these events, look at the subchapter The relationship between Israel and the Netherlands 1979-1982.

Case studies

To study these years, I applied a mixed qualitative and quantitative method: three cases are the core of this study, each one of them essential in the development of Dutch-Israeli relations in these years. For each of these cases, the discussions in the Dutch government, Dutch media and (briefly) Israeli government and media will be taken into consideration. The use of language and the motivations mentioned are the main focus: do they provide empirical evidence for the emotive portrayal that is presented in Dutch scholarship?

The first case is the Declaration of Venice of 1980, where the Netherlands, as member of the European Community (EC), signed a Declaration which first recognized the right of the Palestinian people to have a state and invited the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the negotiation table. In fact, not much changed, but the Declaration was received very negatively and emotionally by the Israeli prime minister at the time, and also blew life into discussions and debate in Dutch media.

The second case is the Dutch participation to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1981, a force consisting of units from several countries which would make sure the peace in the Sinai desert was kept, as part of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Israel did not agree with EC-countries participating in this force, but the Netherlands participated anyway with over a hundred units.

The third case is the massacre in the refugee camps Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon during the Lebanon War of 1982. The Netherlands was not involved in these events in any direct way, but due to extensive coverage in the media and discussions in the Dutch Parliament on the matter, it influenced the relationship between Israel and the Netherlands quite strongly, and is therefore the third and last case in this research.

To research if emotion plays a significantly bigger role in Dutch-Israeli relations than in other relations, it is necessary to look at the relationship of the Netherlands with other countries. This part has been added to the chapter on the relationship between Israel and the Netherlands.

Methods and sources

I studied Dutch governmental documents and records from Dutch parliamentary meetings in which these cases were mentioned to find out which motivations were mentioned inside the government and which were published. For each of these cases, I also looked at the three biggest Dutch newspapers at the time: *De Volkskrant*, *De Telegraaf* and *the Trouw* (*The People's Paper*, *The Telegraph* and *the Loyalty*). *De Volkskrant* was more at the right-wing side, usually being more pro-Israel and *the Telegraaf* was at the left-wing side, usually being more critical of Israel. *The Trouw* was more at the political center, together providing a balanced overview of Dutch public opinion on the developments. Newspapers are a good representation of the Dutch public

opinion at the time, as reading the newspapers was very common at the time and usually people do chose the newspaper that fits their political preference.

In government and media sources, articles and documents, emotions can appear in several forms. Sometimes they are expressed directly ('We are happy to...', 'It grieves us deeply...'). Statements or other use of language pointing to emotions like affection, betrayal, anger, and guilt are examined.

Retrieving documents from the Israeli archive was difficult, unfortunately, as most of the relevant documents are classified. Some of the documents were declassified on request. These were folders with Hebrew newspaper articles about the Netherlands in the years 1975 and 1978. Most of these are used to provide a better understanding of the years before the decline in '79-'82 and to show an impression of the Israeli perspective on the Netherlands.

As most of the primary sources I used were in Dutch or Hebrew, I translated the citations I used in the text and the titles of the books in the footnotes. The first time the book or article is mentioned, I provided the full title in Dutch or Hebrew with an English translation, and in later footnotes referring to the same source in English. In the bibliography, I only mentioned the original language.

Each chapter constructs an overview of motivations and the use of language in every of these three cases. All chapters contain a summarized conclusion of the role of emotion in the case, which will be taken into account in the final conclusion of this thesis.

Limitations of this research

As mentioned before, the preceding literature on the Dutch-Israeli bilateral relationship and the role of emotions in Dutch Foreign Policy is fairly limited, therefore providing only a rough framework which with I could work. This, in combination with the limited time there is provided for a Master thesis, resulted in a fairly restricted description of the subject. Not all details of the events preceding the years 1979-1982 are taken into consideration, nor of the years following.

As I chose to look at both Dutch government and media to create a more nuanced understanding of Dutch motivations, this also limited how far in depth I could go. More research into Dutch media, more newspapers and/or TV and radio will most probably give a more nuanced image. The same goes for looking into government documents and publications before 1979, to understand more of the preceding developments. Furthermore, the research of emotions in states and IR is fairly new and 'undeveloped'. I read a lot of what is published, but more research with newer insights will probably be published over the coming months or years. Such recent theories are thus interesting to look at, and I argue this topic is suitable for that, but it is still subject to change and development, which might set this research in a whole other light in a few years.

Conceptual framework

Since about the year 2000, theories and frameworks have been developed by several researchers on emotions and their role in International Relations. That emotions play a role in diplomacy and world politics is a widely shared observation, but which role they play and how they matter is highly debated by scholars in the field of IR. Simon Koschut and other scholars point out that it is necessary to ‘understand the concept of the state not only as a political regime but also as an emotional regime that sets the norms of appropriate emotional expressions through feeling rules, enacted via official rituals and discursive practices’.¹¹

The following paragraphs will discuss the definition of emotion and the theories that are adopted for this thesis.

Definition of emotion

In a thesis like this, it is impossible to propose and justify a definition of emotion that would cover the amount of research that has been done on the subject, especially as the definition differs per field. In the field of IR, Nida Crawford and Jonathan Mercer are two of the leading scholars on this subject.

Crawford states that ‘emotions are the inner states that individuals describe to others as feelings, and those feelings may be associated with biological, cognitive, and behavioral states and changes’.¹² Mercer adds two important principles to this, which I will also use and follow. The first one is to treat emotion and feelings as synonyms, and defining social emotion ‘as a feeling that has intrinsic importance to an actor in some relationship with an entity’.¹³ The second is that the experience of emotion and what is considered emotion changes with culture, language and over time.¹⁴ She does not explicitly mention the difference between affect, emotions and feelings. Affect is the very individual experience of bodily changes when one is angry, fearful, happy etc. When this feeling is expressed into words, it is described as emotion and can be shared with others, which can also be described as feeling(s). In this regard, this

¹¹ S. Koschut, “Can the bereaved speak? Emotional governance and the contested meanings of grief after the Berlin terror attack”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany 2019, p.2; D. Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma, and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006; J. Holland and T. Solomon, “Affect is what states make of it: Articulating everyday experiences of 9/11”, *Critical Studies on Security* 2(3): 262–267, 2014; E. Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2016.

¹² For a more extensive explanation of this definition, see N. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships”, *International Security* 24(4): 2000, p.125.

¹³ Mercer, Jonathan, “Feeling like a state: social emotion and identity”, *International Theory* 6(3): 2014, p.516.

¹⁴ *Idem*, p.520.

study will focus on emotions and feelings – therefore treating these two as synonyms –, and not on affect.

Duncan Bell adds to this that emotions, however individual and therefore subjective, are intertwined with social, cultural, and political contexts. Mercer describes this as social emotion, and explains with that how emotions can become shared among individuals when they ‘relate to something that people care about, whether it is power, status, or justice.’¹⁵

Group emotion

Individual emotion and group emotion

This shared experience of emotion, discussed in the last paragraph, is described as ‘group emotion’. Skeptics claim that ‘group emotion’ is nothing more than the sum of individuals feeling the same emotion and therefore experiencing a bond with the other individuals. However, many studies have pointed out certain ‘group behavior’ is based on ‘group emotion’ which is impossible to reduce to anyone of the group members.¹⁶ Therefore, the statement of Brent E. Sasley that ‘groups are not simply the aggregation of individuals, and understanding them as such would not help us understand or theorize about group emotions’ is the most suiting for this study.¹⁷

Individuals are not naturally member of any group, but usually identify closely with a group or several groups, adopting its perceptions and representations as their own.¹⁸ Membership of a certain group defines the members, so that ‘people do not think of themselves as unique individuals, but rather as relatively interchangeable members of the group’.¹⁹ Not only are individuals in name member of a certain group, they are part of it in the sense that individuals who self-categorize to a specific group see the world through that group’s ‘eyes’²⁰, namely ‘colored’ by that group’s norms and values, culture, language, emotions, etc.

Emotions are not only ‘products’ of groups, they are also binding groups and determining certain group actions and decisions. Emotions also help introduce new group members who do not have the same history or experiences as the other group members. Sasley writes on this that emotions are mediums that ‘can bind together all members of a group’. Also members that did not have the same experience, memory or trauma as those who did, can feel this emotion, which

¹⁵ D. Bell, *Memory, Trauma, and World Politics*, 2006, p.501.

¹⁶ B.E. Sasley, “Theorizing States’ Emotions”, *International Studies Review* 13(3): 2000, p.452–476; Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000; Mercer, *Feeling like a state*, 2014; Jasper, James M., “The emotions of protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements”, *Sociological Forum* 13 (3): 397-424, 1998.

¹⁷ Sasley, *Theorizing States’ Emotions*, 2000, p.456.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p.457.

¹⁹ Diane M. Mackie, Angela T. Maitner, and Eliot R. Smith, *Intergroup Emotions Theory, Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*, edited by Todd D. Nelson. New York: Psychology Press, 2000, p.287.

²⁰ Sasley, *Theorizing States’ Emotions*, 2000, p.461.

shows how group emotion is established.²¹ These group emotions are often the basis of individual emotions, giving the individual an insulted feeling when the group is addressed with a certain insult. This, of course, depends on the intensity with which people identify with their group, but when identifying strongly, an individual would not say 'it is my feeling', but rather 'it is our feeling'.²²

Group emotion is not explainable biologically, but rather psychologically or sociologically as a group does not have a biological 'body'. In that regard, it is hard to define who 'has' the emotion, when taking for example a state. Mercer writes that not even a head-of state 'walks around all day feeling like a state'.²³ It is evident then that every individual has several personal and social identities and switches often between them effortlessly and often un-self-consciously. To each of these identities belong shared emotions which we know and practice without even noticing, which means we can experience different group emotions at different times. This can be seen in the behavior of all individuals – we are people, members of different groups and social contexts, and often shifting between them. This does not break down the concept of group emotion, it even strengthens it, by showing that we are able to distinguish between these groups and how to behave in them.

These emotions, occurring from groups, motivating and binding them, cannot ontologically be reduced to individuals, as 'these structures (e.g. nations, states, cultures) are neither identical to, nor wholly autonomous from, the individuals who constitute them.'²⁴ Mercer provides an overview of group emotion and its function in four points. The first is that culture regulates emotion. Secondly, people are often in their own group and interact mostly with members of their group, which is their frame of reference. This makes members likely to influence each other. The third point is that emotion is contagious, namely 'as most people know and as psychologists confirm, other people's emotion influences one's emotion'. This means that an individual sees the feelings and emotions of others as confirmation of how they should feel. Fourth, events that have group-level implications elicit common group-level reactions.²⁵

These group emotions exist not only 'behind the scenes'. People are well aware of them and leaders use them in their rhetoric to motivate people into action. In sociology, research has been done on these emotions and their effect, and however researchers differ in their conclusions on how exactly it works, that emotional language motivates people, is a given fact.²⁶

²¹ *Idem*, p.455.

²² Mercer, *Feeling like a state*, p.526; Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The significance of status recognition", *International Theory* 3(1): 2011, p.118.

²³ Mercer, *Feeling like a state*, p.525; Eliot R. Smith., Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, "Can Emotions be Truly Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93(3):2007, p. 431–46.

²⁴ Mercer, *Feeling like a state*, 2011, p.521.

²⁵ *Idem*, p.523-24.

²⁶ *Idem*, p.398.

Rationalist and emotional motivations are, in this regard, not opposites, but rather reinforcing each other.

In groups, usually the strongest emotions are those binding the members and those making them distinct from other groups – for example, empathy, antipathy, hostility, anger, fear, pride, guilt, disgust, often affected by ethnocentrism and nationalism in the case of a state or country.²⁷ These emotions, however fleeting they may be, are ‘firmly rooted in moral and cognitive beliefs that are relatively stable and predictable.’ They help members of a group define their goals and motivate action toward them.²⁸ They are psychological (not physical) facts. Group emotion is real and members of (and often people outside of) one’s group recognize the experience of these emotions as real.²⁹

The phenomenon of group emotion can be approached from two sides, which are mentioned and discussed by Bell. The first is the ‘micro approach’, looking from the individual point and taking into account personal emotions and influences. The second is the ‘macro approach’, which starts at the ‘system’ (of the state or group) and the role of emotion in there. Bell offers a compromise between these two, as both approaches have their strong and weak points, and only a combination could offer the most complete view of the role of emotions in a group.³⁰

The function of group emotion consists of two parts, namely ‘selfness’: identifying yourself, binding group members and creating a common identity and/or purpose; and ‘otherness’: using emotions to distinguish yourself from the ‘other’.

Selfness means that emotions to create ties between individuals (affection), as they do between members of a certain group. As James M. Jasper explains briefly, emotions ‘give ideas, ideologies, identities, and even interests their power to motivate’. Movement organizers and participants appeal not only to moral visions, but also to emotions such as fear, outrage, or love. These emotions may be short-lasting responses to certain events or longer lasting affective ties, such as friendship.³¹

Earlier mentioned negative emotions, like antipathy, fear, hostility and to a certain extent pride, ethnocentrism, and nationalism, do create ‘otherness’ in regard to other groups. The influence of these emotions should not be downplayed, as a certain image of another group, mostly built up by emotions, has an enormous influence on events and contact between two groups. Crawford takes hostility and fear as an example, as well as positive emotions, like

²⁷ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p. 134.

²⁸ James M. Jasper, “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements”, *Sociological Forum* 13 (3), 1998, p. 421.

²⁹ S. Koschut, “Emotional (security) communities: the significance of emotion norms in inter-allied conflict management”, *Review of International Studies* 40:2013, p. 520.

³⁰ For an extended discussion on this topic, see D. Bell, *Memory, Trauma, and World Politics*, 2006.

³¹ Jasper, *The emotions of protest*, 1998, p. 420.

empathy. If one group thinks of another group as an enemy or fears it, and this idea is reinforced by the other group's tendency to issue warlike language when it feels threatened, misunderstanding between the two groups is more likely.³²

The importance of this emotional relationship shows itself during negotiations or other ways to try to reach an agreement. If one group or both groups express increased empathy to each other, this may lead to greater willingness and flexibility in the negotiations. In contrast, 'dehumanization, demonization, and enmity may have the opposite consequences', namely harsher interactions, stubbornness and inflexibility.³³ Things like dehumanization and enmity to the other group may lead the decisionmakers or negotiators from that group feel insulted, thus making the way to peace harder and the negotiations most probably less successful.

The state as a group

Several scholars debate if states can be characterized as groups³⁴, but Mercer poses the question 'whether one can (and whether people do) feel like a state. States are more than the sum of individuals that comprise them, but so are groups.'³⁵ If this is the case, these people would be members of the 'group' state, thus making group emotion theories applicable to the behavior of states.

Unconsciously, politicians and also other people tend to treat states like groups or at least as a 'body' or structure that can experience emotion, by, for example, shaming a state for certain behavior. That this behavior is considered 'normal', is because there are people identifying themselves with the state, so that the group's (or state's) shame is the member's own. Otherwise, this shaming would have no goal. Feeling this shame or pride in one's state 'is an example of feeling like a state. Although a person can feel like a state, a state cannot feel like a person'³⁶, as is the case with groups.

Mercer is not the only one looking at states as a group. Sasley also discusses the emotion of states, and from whom this emotion is coming. He states that in a dictatorial regime or absolute monarchy, the emotion of the dictator or king could be addressed, as this person acts as 'the state'. Usually, however, it is more complicated, and as it is impossible to address every singular individual that the state consists of, the state's decision makers are the one representing the state's emotions:

³² Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.134.

³³ *Idem*, p.135.

³⁴ Iver B. Neumann, "Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State", *Review of International Studies* 30(2):2004, 259-67; Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Relations Theory", *Review of International Studies* 30(2):2004, 289-316; Sasley, *Theorizing States' Emotions*, 2000; Lucile Eznack, "Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships", *Security Studies* 20(2): 2011, 238-65.

³⁵ Mercer, *Feeling like a state*, 2011, p.517.

³⁶ *Idem*, p.515.

*[...] we can use a third method: understanding the state as a group and following the internal process by which group members' (state decision makers') cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state will act. There are no assumptions of what the state will do before understanding these processes. [...] the study of groups is to understand the group not just as a corporate entity, but as a psychological process.*³⁷

Lucile Eznack adds to that:

*In this sense, when I describe a state as being affectively attached to its relationship with another one, I mean decision makers acting as the state.*³⁸

Sasley and Eznack prove that there is enough reason to practically define a state as a group, as their definition provides a framework that is fit for my research and well-based on existing theories in the field and theories on groups and group emotion.

Emotion in Foreign Policy and International Relations

The importance of studying emotion in IR

Foreign Policy and International Relations are closely connected, the main difference being that in Foreign Policy (FP) one state, nation or country and that nation's relations with and behavior regarding other nations is at the center, while in IR the focus lies on the relationships themselves, as the name implies. Therefore, the role of emotion in FP is different from the role in IR, as the 'emotive actor' in FP is the one nation that exercises its FP and in IR there is not one actor, but several actors which are involved in the relations. In these two fields, however, the same emotions play an important role and generally, they have the same effect, only perceived from a different perspective. Most researchers use FP and IR mixed, as they are both a subject that concerns people acting like states, and states having emotions.

That emotion plays a role as well in FP as in IR, is supported by several scholars, among whom Bianca Naudé. She states that materialism (rational motivations) are useful for understanding the temporal conditions within which FP is made, but it reduces interstate relations to an exchange of goods and services. Incorporeal processes that mediate relations are in that way of looking left out of consideration, leaving a half understanding or even

³⁷ Sasley, *Theorizing States' Emotions*, 2000, p.454. Note of Sasley: See Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987). This psychological process goes beyond the ascriptive, ideational, and normative facets to group formation often highlighted in IR and so provides a further contribution from social psychologists to the study of states-as-groups.

³⁸ Eznack, *Crises as Signals of Strength*, 2011, p.242; For a more developed analysis of this issue, see for instance Colin Wight, "State Agency: Social Action without human activity?", *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): p. 269–80.

misunderstanding of relations.³⁹ In her article, she argues that actions are made by an actor's experiences with other actors (as well negative as positive), but that this does not explain how these experiences cause actions. Her conclusion of the theoretical introduction is that identity, experiences and emotions do cause actions, which is 'an important move away from viewing the world in material terms and accepting underlying motive structures in society that are ruled by emotions.'⁴⁰

As concluded in the paragraphs before, emotion plays an important role in human decision-making, as do group emotions. Emotions, mainly the long-term ones (nationalism, hostility) are the basis of decision-making in groups – states, and between states. Emotion has always been part of theories of world politics and still is, although it is usually implicit and undertheorized.⁴¹

Crawford states that the 'basic' emotions 'fear, anger, and empathy, at least, deserve more systematic attention by scholars of world politics.'⁴² Sasley agrees with her in thinking that emotions should play a bigger role in IR, but that there is (yet) not much known or theorized, by saying that 'there is little to suggest that emotions are a methodological or epistemological part of an organized, recognized approach to IR or even Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)', concluding that it thus cannot (yet) be accepted as a part of 'mainstream' IR.⁴³

Despite this lack of knowledge and theories, Crawford, Mercer, Sasley, and several other IR scholars argue that emotion cannot be left out of the field of IR, as the intergroup emotions theory (based on the group emotions theory provided by Sasley) is a useful approach for 'more rigorous theorizing about emotions in IR, because the psychological studies that support the model underscore that emotions are an element of group decision making.'⁴⁴ This, however, does not mean that rational decision-making is subordinate to emotional decision-making, as most political scientist claim. It is a fact, however, that taking emotions, culture, discourse, and language into account when studying a state, does create a better understanding than just rational reasoning, as human decision making is partly based on emotions, as discussed in the conceptual framework of this study.⁴⁵

One example is the theory of analogical reasoning, which is an important aspect of foreign policy decision-making, which, according to Crawford, 'may be affected by emotion'. She cites Yuen Foong Khong, who argues that 'analogies are cognitive devices that 'help' policy makers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making. Analogies (1) help

³⁹ Bianca Naudé, "'States have emotions too': an affect-centred approach to South-African foreign relations", *The South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2016, p.476.

⁴⁰ *Idem*, p.477

⁴¹ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.116.

⁴² *Idem*, p.132.

⁴³ Sasley, *Theorizing States' Emotions*, 2000, p.453.

⁴⁴ *Idem*, p.470.

⁴⁵ *Idem*, p.472.

define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate options by (4) predicting their chances of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangers associated with the options.⁴⁶ At the base of this, a lot of emotions are going on, like fear, moral 'rightness', etc. These do not exclude rational reasoning, but they certainly do play an unignorable role that might provide a much better understanding of the decisions that are taken.

Negative and positive emotions in IR

Emotions like fear, anger, humiliation and revenge are considered core emotional motivations for groups or states to act or behave in a certain way, as they are powerful, 'basic' emotions that are strengthened by groups.

Fear is considered the most important of them, often regarded as the root cause of war. Fear and love are the deepest emotions and therefore ruling at situations⁴⁷ like an individual whose life is in danger or states at the brink of war. Morgenthau also claims that fear has a big role, mainly in the shape of anxiety: 'Personal fears are thus transformed into anxiety for the nation.'⁴⁸ Crawford adds: 'Further, it is widely believed that men will fight for love of country, and even more bravely out of their brotherly feelings [love] for their comrades.'⁴⁹

These emotions will be recognizable for individuals, but are usually enhanced at a group level of people who experienced a highly emotionally charged event, likely creating strong emotional memories of that event. Situations that arouse similar emotions will 'likely bring to mind those historical events that deeply affected the participants', often followed by analogical reasoning, whether the actual situation is similar to the historical event or not.⁵⁰ An example of such an event might be a long, violent war between two states, causing the two states to hate and fear each other, resulting in a desire for revenge. These emotions 'may interfere with the process of peacebuilding long after structural conditions that promote insecurity have been alleviated. These emotions, and deep distrust, can reduce the receptivity of populations to peacebuilding and may be why some wars recur.'⁵¹ Which happened for example after the First World War, when Germany was so deeply humiliated the German people longed for revenge and there was a rich breeding ground for extremist parties and a new war, resulting in the Second World War.

⁴⁶ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.141; Reference by Crawford: Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 10.

⁴⁷ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.118.

⁴⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, p.125.

⁴⁹ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.121.

⁵⁰ *Idem*, p.142.

⁵¹ *Idem*, p.150.

Just as negative emotions like fear, anger and revenge do influence relations between states, so do positive emotions like trust and affect influence the same between befriended nations or states. Eznack theorizes on these emotions when looking at crises between close allies and argues that affection between allied states is very important for understanding crises between them. He argues that affect certainly exists among close allies, and 'that it influences both their actions and their perceptions of each other's actions'.⁵²

Dichotomy between rationality and emotion?

As argued in the paragraphs before, emotion should be taken into account when studying interstate relations and international politics. This statement does not exclude or even belittle the role of rational motivations in IR. In recent years, a dichotomy between emotion and rationality seems to have arisen because of scholars who do acknowledge the role of emotion and those who do not. However, I do not want to advance a conceptual dichotomy in this thesis, but rather argue that the two factors complement each other – rationality that is influenced by emotion and vice versa. Crawford explains this by arguing that 'neither individuals or groups are rational in the utility-maximizing, unemotional way supposed by most theories of world politics. Nor are decision-makers necessarily irrational if they are not rational in a classical sense. Rather, humans reason; humans make decisions that are always both classically self-interested and emotional.'⁵³ This citation points out the balance between reason and emotion and why IR perceived world politics in the 'wrong' way.

Sasley comes to the same conclusion, namely that specific actions lead to specific emotions, but these emotions are contingent on the particular intergroup context relevant at a given time. This is highly interesting and relevant when looking at interstate behavior, given that 'decisions might be determined by specific causal factors (whether international forces or other material incentives, national identity, domestic politics, and so on) but other factors impact on policy implementation and outcomes.'⁵⁴

It is not the case that scholars and people were not aware of the existence of emotion as a factor. For example, in the field of security studies, the concept of perception – the interpretation of a material reality – is well-known. It is also known that at the base of perceiving such a reality are emotions like fear (e.g. is the material reality considered a threat?) or anger. Misconception of intentions or emotions is well possible between different states or cultures.⁵⁵

Not only scholars are aware of this, political leaders are as well and use it to their advantage, as 'they use emotional language and expressions to communicate their intentions vis-à-vis insiders and outsiders. In this sense, state representatives employ a vocabulary of

⁵² Eznack, *Crises as Signals of Strength*, 2011, p.241.

⁵³ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.156.

⁵⁴ Sasley, *Theorizing States' Emotions*, 2000, p.462.

⁵⁵ Crawford, *Passion of World Politics*, 2000, p.133.

emotional discourse accompanied by symbolic interaction to frame regional peace and to stabilize this peace system during times of internal conflict. Second, the study implies that violent conflict can at least in part be mitigated through the strengthening of emotional bonds.⁵⁶

In conclusion, both rational and emotional motivations should be taken in consideration when studying IR, to create the most complete image, as 'rationalist conceptions like (material) interests are only one manifestation of behavior in world politics among many.'⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Koschut, *Emotional (security) communities*, 2013, p.557.

⁵⁷ *Idem*, p.535.

The relationship between Israel and the Netherlands

The development of the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel was curious in the sense that there seemed to be a good relation between the two countries, even after the fairly late recognition of the State of Israel by the Netherlands in 1950.

This did not change in the years after. In his research, Peeters describes that the ties between the Netherlands and Israel have been warm or even very warm, in what he calls an 'entente cordiale' in the true sense of the word. His conclusion is that the base of this apparently sudden friendship is a stubborn myth, namely that the Dutch people in the past centuries have had great sympathy for the Jewish people. He adds that 'during the Nazi occupation this reached its sublime point which appeared in real solidarity with Jewish fellow countrymen and with the Jews that fled Germany.'⁵⁸

This 'myth', as Peeters calls it, serves as one of the strongest pillars of the Dutch-Israeli relationship and its development over the years. Several scholars, however, point out ambivalences in the Dutch opinion on Israel and Jews. To explain Dutch-Israeli relations, a history of the Jews in the Netherlands is necessary. However, as this is a vast topic on itself, this overview will be very summarized.

Jews in the Netherlands

The Golden Age

The Dutch 'Golden Age' took place in the 17th century, when the Dutch Liberation War against Spain (1568-1648) had just ended. The trade flourished and the Republic was established, granting some Freedom of religion as one of the main values of the newly established Republic. Tolerance was one of the main aspects the Dutch were (and are) proud of, and because of the freedom of religion Jews from Catholic countries (like Spain and France) came to the Dutch Republic. Although there was no sense of equality, the situation was better for the Jews than in surrounding countries and kingdoms, and a lot of Jews came to the Netherlands, especially to Amsterdam.⁵⁹ A peculiar thing that also arose in this time, is that 'comparisons with 'the People

⁵⁸ Peeters, *Sworn friends*, 1997, p.19.

⁵⁹ W. Frijhoff, *Religious tolerance in the United Provinces, from 'case' to 'model'*, in Po-Chin Hsia, R. & Nierop, H. van, *Calvinism and Religious Tolerance in the Dutch Golden Age*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.

of Israel' were popular in the Protestant experience of nationhood'⁶⁰, occasionally resulting in the Netherlands being nicknamed 'the Israel of the west'.

During the Nazi persecution

At the start of the German Occupation of the Netherlands, the Dutch Jewish community counted about 140,000 members. 104,000 of them, about 75%, were deported and killed. This percentage is considerably higher than in other Western European countries that were occupied by Germany (except for Germany itself). Of Belgium Jewry, about 40% perished, in France about 25%, in Norway 40% and in Denmark about 2%. Ensel, Gans, and Hans Blom are three main researchers on the Dutch Jews in the War, and they mention several reasons for this high percentage.

One of the main reasons is the fact that the Nazi occupiers considered the Netherlands as a 'Germanic' people⁶¹, which meant that the occupation, mainly in the first three years, was fairly 'soft'. The country remained, for war standards, prosperous and so the incentive to resist was much lower than in some other countries.⁶² Except for the February Strike of 1941, in which Dutch men protested against the anti-Jewish measures, no national protest arose. Another consequence of the 'Germanic people' was the appointment of a *Reichskommissar* (Reich Commissioner). He was at the head of a civilian administration which 'was not numerically significant, but was ideologically and organizationally extremely purposeful'.⁶³ This combined with the size of the German police apparatus in the Netherlands which consisted of 5000 men⁶⁴ (e.g. in France it consisted of 3000 men), the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch bureaucracy, and the Dutch legalistic and comparatively cooperative attitude towards the occupier.⁶⁵

Although these are considered to be the main reasons, there are side factors that also may have played a role: Dutch society at the time was split up in so-called 'pillars' – several social groups, e.g. the Catholics and the Reformed. All of these groups had their own political parties, schools, events, etc. The pillars were not really engaged on each other, and so the Jews were a slightly 'left out' pillar. Blom also mentions the absence of 'friendly borders' and with that, the lack of escape routes and the naturally flat and densely built landscape of the Netherlands as factors that may have played a role. Lastly, the low antisemitism rate and the

⁶⁰ Obermann & Dijkink, *Reframing international conflict*, 2008, p.161.

⁶¹ J.C.H. Blom., "The persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands: A comparative Western European perspective", *European History Quarterly* 19.3: 333-351, 1959, p.337-338.

⁶² R. Ensel and Evelien Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the "Jew": Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society*, Amsterdam University Press, 2017, p.62.

⁶³ J.C.H. Blom, *Persecution of Jews in the Netherlands*, 1959, p.338.

⁶⁴ *Idem*, p.340

⁶⁵ R. Ensel en E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the 'Jew'*, 2017, p.62.

1941 February Strike against the Germans may have provided the Dutch Jews with a sense of security – false, as it turned out.

The situation in the Netherlands and the passive attitude of the population cost the lives of 104,000 Dutch Jews – and caused Eichmann to say about the Netherlands: “There, the transports ran so smoothly that it was a joy to watch them.”⁶⁶

After the Second World War

The high percentage of Dutch Jews that perished during the war, was not commonly known among the Dutch population. If confronted with the deportation numbers, the often-heard excuse was that ‘we did do something for the Jews’⁶⁷, referring to the 1941 February Strike and the people that allowed Jews to hide in their homes. The Dutch did not believe it could be their fault’, and soon the stereotype of the bad *mof* (German) versus the good Dutchman appeared.⁶⁸ In the years following, this would be the main response to all questions related to the deportation of so many Jews.

Then, in 1948, the State of Israel was established. However many people supported the establishment of the State of Israel out of either belief in Biblical promises or out of a slight feeling of guilt about the Holocaust, the official recognition of the Netherlands came only in 1950. This is the same year as the Netherlands lost their colony in the Dutch-Indies, and so the Dutch had no reason to keep the relationship with the Indonesian Muslim population of their former colony intact anymore – as before the Dutch government feared that the recognition of the Jewish state would anger the population of their colony.⁶⁹

After the recognition, friendly ties developed rapidly. Obermann and Dijkink provide a good summary of the years 1950 until the end of the years ’70. Since 1950, the Dutch government provided Israel with support for their building and defense. Not only did the Netherlands supply large amounts of weapons, they also facilitated the transit of American weapons and materials, represented the Jewish state in Russia and so assisted large groups of Jews to immigrate to Israel, and paid large amounts of money. However, this (military) support did not go unnoticed and after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Netherlands faced an Arab oil boycott. Despite of this, the ‘unlimited support was widely approved by the Dutch public.’⁷⁰

Another important factor that strengthened a friendly relationship between the Netherlands and Israel, were the close and friendly ties between the Israeli prime minister Ben

⁶⁶ J.C.H. Blom, *Persecution of Jews in the Netherlands*, 1959, p.336.

⁶⁷ R. Ensel en E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the ‘Jew’*, 2017, p.155.

⁶⁸ E. Gans, *Goyse nijd & joods narcisme: over de verhouding tussen joden en niet-joden in Nederland (Goyish envy & Jewish narcissism: about the relation between Jews and non-Jews in the Netherlands)*, Platina Paperbacks Amsterdam 1994, p.9

⁶⁹ R. Ensel en E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the ‘Jew’*, 2017, p.162.

⁷⁰ Obermann & Dijkink, *Reframing international conflict*, 2008, p.162.

Gurion and his Dutch counterpart Willem Drees. There was a tacit agreement between the two men, as Willem Drees expressed: 'If you need us, just let us know.'⁷¹

In 1973, the Netherlands encountered the first real disadvantage of their support to Israel: after the Dutch government immediately and unilaterally branded Egypt and Syria as the aggressors of the 1973 October War, the Dutch Defense minister Stemerdink publicly attended a solidarity manifestation for Israel, and the mayor of Amsterdam was involved in fundraising initiatives for Israel, the Netherlands faced an Arab oil boycott.⁷²

In Israel, the Netherlands were not as much as a 'hot topic' as Israel in the Netherlands. Usually, only small, formal articles appeared, describing relevant events like a Palestinian protest against Israel in Amsterdam⁷³, the outcome of the national elections, etc. Usually these articles have a neutral tone or a positive tone, e.g. an article in Ha'aretz about the Netherlands being 'the standard bearer of morale' and an 'example for other states' and others.⁷⁴ Generally, the attitude of Israeli people towards Holland can best be described as 'friendly, yet ignorant'. The Netherlands is commonly seen as friendly towards Israel, but, as Ha'aretz writes, 'Holland is interested in Israel, Israel is indifferent towards Holland'.⁷⁵

1979-1982

In the years 1979 until 1982, the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel started to decline, as the before mentioned scholars state and is apparent from Dutch government documents and media.

After 1973, when the Dutch economy suffered under the Arab oil boycott, the public opinion started to shift more in favor of the Palestinian cause. It remained mostly pro-Israel, but there was more room for other sounds and more people expressing them. In 1979, the Dutch government decided to cooperate with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after they requested that, and a Dutch unit named Dutchbatt was placed in Southern Lebanon, close to the border with Israel.

In the same year, the Camp David Accords were signed by the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, ensuring the peace between these two

⁷¹ R. Ensel en E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the 'Jew'*, 2017, p.169; Peeters, *Sworn friends*, 1997, p.67, 104.

⁷² R. Ensel en E. Gans, *The Holocaust, Israel and the 'Jew'*, 2017, p.217.

⁷³ "נציגת רק"ח בהפגנה פלשתינית באמסטרדאם" (Rakah representative attends Palestinian demonstration in Amsterdam), Ha'aretz, May 15, 1978.

⁷⁴ "הבעיה של החרם הערבי קמה לתחיה" (The problem of the Arab boycott has come to life), Ha'aretz, May 9, 1978; "הולנד מנעה קבלת החלטה פרו-פלשתינית" (The Netherlands prevent pro-Palestinian resolution), Yediot Achronot, September 14, 1975; "סוכלה מזימת מחבלים ערביים לחטוף בני ערובה בהולאנד" (A plot by Arab terrorists to kidnap hostages in the Netherlands was thwarted), Maariv, September 8, 1975.

⁷⁵ "הולנד מנעניינת בישראל, ישראל אידישה להולנד" (The Netherlands is interested in Israel, Israel is indifferent towards the Netherlands), Ha'aretz, September 7, 1977.

countries. As this was mainly an 'American' achievement, the EU decided they also had to take initiative, and arranged the Summit of Venice, resulting in the Declaration of Venice, June 1980. The most important point of this declaration was the recognition of the right of the Palestinian People on an own state and the invite to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to join the negotiations. The Netherlands fully agreed with this declaration.⁷⁶

In the same year Israel declared Jerusalem to be the united capital of Israel, and the Netherlands moved their embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv as a reaction. At that time, the USA set up the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai desert, as the UN failed to create a force to keep the peace, as was stated in the Camp David Accords. In 1981, the Netherlands joined the MFO as one of the few European countries, which was not appreciated by Israel. Later the same year, Israel attacked a Iraqi nuclear reactor, causing a worldwide public condemnation. In public, the Netherlands also reacted condemning, as Israel 'increased the tension in the region'. However, it became soon clear that the Netherlands supported Israel in their attack.

The event that is considered a crisis in the bilateral relations is the Israeli invasion into Lebanon in 1982, where UNIFIL was still active, as was the Dutch unit. The Netherlands condemned Israel for ignoring UN forces and for escalating a conflict, and threatened with 'serious reactions' if the Dutch units would get wounded or killed by Israeli forces.

Shortly after, the two refugee camps Sabra and Shatila in Israeli occupied territory in southern Lebanon were massacred by Lebanese militants. The world strongly condemned Israel, who should have protected these refugees, and in the Dutch public fierce debates arose about Israel.

Emotion in Dutch Foreign Policy

Amry Vandenbosch describes the Dutch Foreign policy as one of 'small power politics'. After playing a leading role in world politics in the seventeenth century, the country veered towards a neutral policy in the second half of the 18th century.⁷⁷ After the separation of Belgium in 1839 (beforehand, Belgium was part of the Netherlands), the Netherlands 'completely withdrew from Great Power politics'.⁷⁸

After the Second World War, the Netherlands started to rethink their policy of neutrality – as it proved not to sustain for their security anymore –⁷⁹, and so became one of the initiator countries of a European union idea, and was the first to address their desire to also include the United States in such a union.⁸⁰ On March 17, 1948, the Netherlands finally abandoned their

⁷⁶ F. Grünfeld, *The Netherlands and the Near East*, p.167.

⁷⁷ A. Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: a study in small power politics*, The Hague 1959, p.2.

⁷⁸ *Idem*, p. 3-4

⁷⁹ *Idem*, p. 289

⁸⁰ *Idem*, p. 291

neutral policy by signing the Brussels Treaty, creating the Western European Union. A year later, the Netherlands also became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁸¹

So, as the Netherlands mainly has to deal with greater powers than themselves, the emphasis is much on security and fear – fear for their own security and thus abandoning the neutrality policy, fear for too much influence of Great Britain and France and thus inviting the USA to the union, fear for renewed German aggression, etc. This Foreign Policy is apparent in the way the Netherlands establish and maintain its relations with other countries. An example of that are Dutch-German relations, which were renewed soon after the Second World War. Although then, and even decades after, there were still ‘mixed feelings’ to Germany among Dutch politicians and in the Dutch public opinion, the interest of trade, a European Community and maintaining good relations with the biggest neighbor and trade partner always gained first place when deciding to reestablish the ties with Germany.⁸²

Regarding the Dutch-American relationship, that has been one of ‘ups’ and ‘downs’, according to Hans Krabbendam.⁸³ He writes on the colonizer- colonized relationship between the Netherlands and America to the current position of the Netherlands being a member of the European Union and the United States being a world power. In this relationship and its development appears again the trade and safety focused policy of the Netherlands, mainly in the 20th century and onwards.

This leads to the conclusion that emotional motivations do not seem to play a major role in Dutch foreign policy, which appears, among others, from the relationship from the Netherlands with Germany and the USA. Like the relationship with Israel, these relations are often depicted as ‘friendships’.

⁸¹ *Idem*, p. 302-303

⁸² R. Aspelag and H. Dekker, “An equivocal relationship: Germany and the Netherlands”, in C. Lankoswki, *Break Out, Break down or Break In? : Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam*, AICGS Research Report ; No. 8. Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998.

⁸³ H. Krabbendam a.o., *Four Centuries of Dutch-American relations, 1609-2009: A major contribution to Atlantic history*, University of New York Press, 2009.

Chapter 1: The Declaration of Venice

Historical background

On June 13, 1980, the nine member states of the European Community (Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, France, West Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland) signed the Declaration of Venice. The Declaration was formulated on the base of the Camp David Accords and the agreements signed between Egypt in Israel in March 1979, as the first point of the Declaration states. Another reason mentioned is that 'they [the member states of the EC] agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.'⁸⁴ In the second and third point of the Declaration, it is written to be based on UN-Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and on several European statements made in earlier years.

The following eight points describe the role the EC desires to play in the solution of the conflict and how they plan it to be negotiated. The most important points were the 'recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people', later defined as that the Palestinian people 'must be placed in a position [...] to exercise fully its right to self-determination.' It is also in this declaration that the EC first mentions the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of the Palestinian people – and so they 'will have to be associated with the negotiations.'⁸⁵

The eighth and ninth point of the declaration are on Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements. On the first is states that 'they [the EC members] will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem'. The declaration states the EC to be deeply concerned about the Israeli settlements in occupied territory and considers them 'a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East' and 'illegal under international law'. It concludes with saying that the EC has decided 'to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned' and that after this process will be determined in which 'form such an initiative on their part could take'.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Economic Cooperation Foundation, *Venice Declaration – English (1980)*, <https://ecf.org.il/media_items/1476>.

⁸⁵ *Declaration of Venice*, 13 June 1980, point 4, 6,7.

⁸⁶ *Idem*, point 10,11.

Dutch motivations

Government

The Dutch government was well-aware of the content and consequences of the Declaration of Venice. The Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Van der Klaauw, said that the Dutch point of view is completely described in the Declaration.⁸⁷

The main reasons that the minister and other governmental instances used in parliamentary debates are 'no isolation' and 'supporting the USA'. The 'no isolation'-argument is mainly based on the Dutch fear of a repetition of the events of 1973 and the following oil crisis, which made the Netherlands aware of their vulnerability when they might stand alone again. The 'support the USA'-reason is based on the strong Dutch belief that the United States have more possibilities and power to solve the conflict in the Middle East than Europe has.

No isolation

Grünfeld states that in the period 1974-1980, it was typical for the Dutch foreign policy to give into to foreign pressure. The reason for the government was simple: the Netherlands wanted a good position in the EC and in the European Political Cooperation (EPC)⁸⁸, and tried to prevent isolation at all cost. Sometimes it tried to retain the UK and France, but did not often get much support and suited itself to the will of other EC-member states. From the Dutch public did not arise much protest, as the pro-Israel consensus in the country decreased and more understanding for the Palestinian cause arose. The policy of the new right-wing premier of Israel, Menachem Begin, also met a lot of resentment among the Dutch public.⁸⁹

Despite of this, the Netherlands is by the other member states still considered as one of the core 'pro-Israel' countries, together with Denmark. The Dutch director-general of Political Affairs at the time states that this is true, but that the Netherlands were not as clear as before (1973) and mainly tried to express their opinion alongside allies like Denmark and West Germany.⁹⁰

Supporting the United States

Not only the Netherlands, but many members of the EPC focused on supporting the initiatives of the USA, or at least not crossing their path. Grünfeld writes: "This was proven again by the answer of [the Dutch] prime minister Van Agt on the question if he was happy with the

⁸⁷ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East*, 1991, p.167

⁸⁸ *Idem*, p.203.

⁸⁹ *Idem*, p. 174.

⁹⁰ Interview with Reinink, Dutch director-general of Political Affairs, 15-02-1987.

Declaration of Venice; he answered that he thought the Declaration would be acceptable for the US.”⁹¹

One of the ideas that lived among mainly France and the UK, was setting up a European peace initiative. Not all member states are convinced, however, and the Netherlands is one of the countries strongly opposing that idea. Van der Klaauw said that he strongly resisted it and wanted to know which initiative was meant in the Declaration. He did not get an explanation and thought if he agreed, there would be a *carte blanche* that would create an enormous pressure later on and disturb the relation with the Americans, who are not looking forward to an European initiative.⁹²

In the end, all member states agree with an ‘eventual initiative’, as is stated in point eleven of the declaration. Later on, Van der Klaauw admitted that he was not only afraid of a disturbance in the relation with the USA, but also that the French would come up with an initiative that ‘he would not like’, with the risk that the Netherlands would have to oppose again and move itself into a possible vulnerable position.⁹³

Already before the Declaration of Venice was clear that the Netherlands valued the relationship with the US highly, as is apparent from records of debates with Van der Klaauw in the First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament:

*Furthermore is my opinion that each initiative of the Nine, directed to speed up the peace process in the Middle East, only could be useful [if executed] in harmony with the United States.*⁹⁴

*For the Netherlands it was important – at least I followed that strategy – that at least a rupture between Europe and the US would be prevented. In the end, the US are the real power factor, and they should be in this crisis. Europe can offer its services, but it can never, also because of its structure, act as a mediator between the different parties.*⁹⁵

As the Declaration of Venice did not oppose nor cross American initiatives and did not press on a European initiative, the Dutch government deemed it ‘balanced and reasonable’.⁹⁶

⁹¹ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.196; De Volkskrant, 14-06-1980.

⁹² Interview with Van der Klaauw, Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, 31-08-1989.

⁹³ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.175.

⁹⁴ *Handelingen Eerste Kamer (Acts of the First Chamber of the Parliament)*, zitting 1979-1980, 28 May 1980, p781.

⁹⁵ *Handelingen Eerste Kamer (Acts of the First Chamber of the Parliament)*, zitting 1979-1980, 18 June 1980, p1001.

⁹⁶ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.181.

Trade

An interesting fact is that economic motivations are barely mentioned in this debates, nor to media. In one sentence, Grünfeld states that ‘the business sector had interests in the Arab world’.⁹⁷ The media however give some more attention to this.

Media

In the days after the Declaration, the Dutch newspapers published all extended overviews of the most important points of the document which had been signed by the nine EC-members. Soon after, analyses and commentary followed, mostly positive on the contents of the declaration and on the attitude of the European Community to restrain from an own peace initiative for the time being. Besides of that, there is generally a lot of attention for the Israeli reaction on the Declaration, which is described extensively by all three newspapers.

De Volkskrant explicitly mentions the EC-countries moving their opinion on the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Arab direction, and states that this shift does not cause a lot of controversy.⁹⁸ Four days later, the newspaper published an article on the Israeli reaction on the Declaration with the title ‘Israel: no role for the EC anymore’. The article uses a lot of emotional language and motivations, mainly negative:

*The sharp Israeli cabinet communique was written by prime minister Begin and is in fact an emotional charge against a Europe that left Israel alone.*⁹⁹

The rest of the article continues in this tone and cites different parts out of the Israeli cabinet communique¹⁰⁰. One statement that did not make it into the communique, but was still mentioned by the article, was that ‘the European countries should be deeply ashamed of their flattery with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in the interest of oil and petrodollars.’¹⁰¹

Not much later, two Palestinian mayors wanted to visit the Netherlands, which was rejected by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and encountered a lot of critique by the Dutch media, as this visit was considered a realization of the Declaration of Venice. A commentator in De Volkskrant writes:

*The ministry let go of this opportunity and, with that, reassured the image of the Netherlands as being one-sided pro-Israel, that over time got less dominant.*¹⁰²

De Telegraaf writes the least on the subject with twelve articles in total in which the Declaration is mentioned. It, however, sketches an interesting ‘preview’ or expectation of the

⁹⁷ Idem, p.203.

⁹⁸ “Verklaring” (Declaration), *De Volkskrant*, June 14, 1980.

⁹⁹ “Israël: geen rol meer voor de EG” (Israel: no role for the EC anymore), *De Volkskrant*, June 18, 1980.

¹⁰⁰ For more information, see the subchapter ‘Israeli view on Dutch motivations’

¹⁰¹ “Israel: no role for the EC anymore”, *De Volkskrant*, June 18, 1980.

¹⁰² “EG zet kwaad bloed in Israël” (EC makes Israel angry), *De Volkskrant*, June 20, 1980.

Declaration. This newspaper writes on the 13th of June that ‘no more than a moderate declaration’ is expected that is about the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and ‘the necessity that the State of Israel is recognized within safe borders by them’.¹⁰³

On the declaration itself, the newspaper is brief and only sums up the core points and how the Dutch policymakers were involved. On June 16th an extensive article was published on the reactions of Israel, the PLO and other countries, with the accent on the Israeli reaction. It pays a lot of attention to the ‘anger of premier Begin’ and quotes him that ‘the Declaration of the EEC [European Economic Cooperation] is a second Munich.’¹⁰⁴ The article mentions that Begin states that Israel is not planning on selling itself for Arab oil, ‘for which European countries are bowing wholesale.’¹⁰⁵ But the PLO is not happy, either. They call the Declaration a ‘product of American blackmailing’, as it does not recognize them as the only representor of the Palestinian people, as they had hoped.

In Trouw, very early on an analyzing article on the EC-summit is posted, written by R. Naftaniel, director of the Dutch Center for Information and Documentation Israel (CIDI)¹⁰⁶, in which he starts with stating which factors are disturbing a friendship between Israel and the Netherlands, namely the problems around UNIFIL, the support of Israel to the Christian major Haddad in Southern Lebanon and the Israeli settlement policy. He repeats the words of minister Van der Klaauw that an initiative would only be useful in harmony with the USA – the Netherlands does not want an EC-initiative. Naftaniel also mentions the oil argument, and writes that ‘Israel cannot expect much good from the oil-poor Europe’, but also states that taking initiative will not bring much good for the EC as well.¹⁰⁷

On the 14th of June, one day after the Declaration was signed, Trouw also writes on the core points of the Declaration and puts the accent on the invitation to the PLO as new partner at the negotiation table. As one of the few newspapers, it puts some own interpretation into the article by stating that ‘the new EC Declaration means for the Netherlands again a step towards the Palestinians, by the way’. The Declaration also rejects the settlement policy of Israel and the

¹⁰³ “Geen ‘hard’ EG-plan M.-Oosten verwacht” (No ‘stern’ EC-initiative expected for Middle East), De Telegraaf, June 13, 1980.

¹⁰⁴ “Israël woedend op EEG” (Israel enraged at EEC), De Telegraaf, June 16, 1980. ‘Second Munich’: in Munich was in 1938 decided that the Czech Republic would be annexed by Germany.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁶ CIDI is an independent organization taking a pro-Israel standpoint, established in the Netherlands in 1974.

¹⁰⁷ “Minister Sjamir pleit bij Van der Klaauw voor standvastigheid, EG kan Midden-Oosten geen oplossing opleggen” (Minister Shamir pleads Van der Klaauw to be steady, EC cannot force solution onto the Middle East), Trouw, June 3, 1980.

one-sided declaration about Jerusalem as being the one and whole capital of Israel.¹⁰⁸ The Netherlands were throughout the process mainly focusing on the American interests.¹⁰⁹

In the following days, *Trouw* also publishes an article on the reaction of several countries, with the accent on Israel and the Arab world. As in *De Telegraaf*, the article states how premier Begin compares the Declaration with 'a new Munich' and how the PLO states that it 'is a product of American blackmailing'. The conclusion is that the Declaration is trying to balance American and Arab interests and that its success is moderate to non-existent.¹¹⁰

The newspapers mainly use emotional language when writing on the reactions of Israel and other countries on the Declaration. Mainly 'anger' and 'shame' are repeatedly mentioned, which is interesting as the focus is more on rational arguments. These rational arguments (like the need for oil) are apparently considered 'shameful' and there is a lot of attention for the Israeli anger on the Declaration.

Both *de Volkskrant* and *Trouw* explicitly notice and mention the Netherlands 'moving towards the Palestinians / Arabs'. In opinion articles this shift is mainly considered negative, but none of the standard articles expresses any emotion on this shift.

Israeli reactions

As the Declaration of Venice was signed not only by the Netherlands, but by all nine members of the EC, the reaction of the Israeli government was not directed at the Netherlands especially, but at the whole of the European Community.

The cabinet communique that was issued by the Israeli cabinet was very sharp and condemning of the Declaration¹¹¹, which is already made clear in the first sentence: 'Nothing will remain of the Venice Resolution but its bitter memory'. In the following document the PLO is described as 'the Arab S.S.', and it states that since the publication of *Mein Kampf* 'have more explicit words been said [...] about the desire for the destruction of the Jewish state and nation'. The Declaration is considered a 'Munich-like surrender' to tyrannical extortion which undermines the Camp David Accords and the peace process in the Middle East.

Only in the last few paragraphs the communique names some rational arguments, but even than 'wrapped' in emotional language. For example, in the last paragraph Israel states to be

¹⁰⁸ This was the reason that, shortly after the Declaration, the Dutch embassy was moved from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv (August 1980).

¹⁰⁹ "Negen noemen Palestijnse organisatie als onderhandelingspartner, Europa dichterbij PLO" (Nine mention Palestinian organization as negotiation partner, Europe closer to PLO), *Trouw*, June 14, 1980.

¹¹⁰ "Verdeelde reactie op Venetië" (Divided reactions on Venice), *Trouw*, June 16, 1980; "Unanieme veroordeling van 'Venetië', Harde reactie Israël en PLO" (Unanimous condemnation of 'Venice', Harsh reactions Israel and PLO), *Trouw*, June 16, 1980.

¹¹¹ For the full text of the Cabinet Communique, see the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook4/pages/100%20resolution%20of%20the%20heads%20of%20government%20and%20mini.aspx>

willing to uphold the second part of the Camp David Accords, in which the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Districts is promised full authority. This statement is surrounded by words like 'sacrifices', 'faithfully', and 'meticulously'.

Summarized, the Declaration of Venice is considered a 'continuation' of the national socialism and a direct threat to Israel's existence, while Israel itself is trying to establish peace through the Camp David Accords and willing to adhere to the conditions stated in there.

Conclusion

The motivations of the Dutch government to support the Declaration of Venice are clearly rational and mostly considering the interests of the Netherlands, namely avoiding isolation and supporting the United States.

Emotional use of language and emotional motivations only come into play when the media are describing Israeli reactions, mainly the speech and publications of the Israeli premier Begin: 'deeply ashamed of their flattery', 'anger', 'second Munich', 'European countries bowing wholesale', 'tyrannical extortion', and 'a direct threat to Israel's existence' are a few examples of the many times emotional language is used. However, this is not use of emotional language or motivations regarding Israel by the Dutch government or media, it is only reporting the emotional language that is being utilized by premier Begin.

In conclusion, this case does not provide empirical justification for the emotive portrayal of Dutch-Israeli relations by Dutch scholarship.

Chapter 2: The Dutch participation in the MFO

Historical background

During the Camp David Accords, signed on the 17th of September 1979, it was decided that the Sinai desert would be guarded by a peace force established by the United Nations. The passage of the Accords state as follows:

United Nations forces will be stationed: in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, [...] and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members. ¹¹²

A few years earlier, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the UN stationed a peacekeeping force in the Sinai desert. This unit operated under the name United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), as it was the second time such an emergency force was used – the first time was the Suez Crisis between Israel and Egypt in 1956. It was initially stationed for a period of six months and prolonged by the UN Security Council (UNSC) until 1979.¹¹³ In 1979, the Soviet Union did no longer want to extend the mandate of UNEF II, which would end by the 24th of July that year. The USA, Israel and Egypt asked to prolong the mandate, but the Soviet Union rejected because they did not agree to the Camp David Accords.¹¹⁴

In this way, the UN was incapable of setting up a peacekeeping force in the area. The USA, Israel and Egypt then decide to establish a peacekeeping force themselves, which they agree on, on April 19, 1981. It is named Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the USA was willing to provide the main part of the units. Besides of the USA however, only the Fiji Islands, Colombia and Uruguay were willing to contribute.¹¹⁵

The role of the European Community and the Netherlands

The USA kept approaching the EC and the Netherlands with the request to participate. The United Kingdom, France and Italy were the first European countries to show any willingness to participate, whereas the Netherlands was holding back from contributing to a peacekeeping

¹¹² Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Avalon Project, *Camp David Accords*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp.

¹¹³ For a summarized overview of all activities of UNEF II, see the UN website: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef2backgr1.html>.

¹¹⁴ Security Council Report, 19-7-79, A34/584, S/13578.

¹¹⁵ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.219-220.

force outside of the UN. Creating such a force outside the UN was considered 'a further undermining of the peacekeeping task of the UN.'¹¹⁶

Even so, in the archive of the managing board for Africa and the Middle East no official request for participation in the MFO is kept. Despite of that, there was a sudden initiative, started by the minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Stoep, who asked the Director-General of Political Affairs Reinink to attend the meeting between the UK, France and Italy on the MFO.¹¹⁷ After this, the Netherlands officially states to be willing to participate in the MFO alongside the other three EC-countries, but as isolation had to be prevented, four conditions were stated¹¹⁸:

- 1) All ten members of the EC support the Netherlands in their participation;
- 2) Besides of the Netherlands, at least two other EC-members have to participate;
- 3) Within the MFO, there has to be conformity about juridical and practical aspects;
- 4) The Dutch parliament has to agree with the participation.

Condition two was already fulfilled by the participation of three other EC-members. From these conditions, the first one would appear to cause the most problems, as mainly Greece was not happy about the EC participating. However, after some lobbying from the UK, France and Italy, all ten members agreed. The Dutch parliament was quickly convinced and decided in addition that the Dutch soldiers participating in the MFO would wear an orange shawl and beret.¹¹⁹

Grünfeld considers the European participation to the MFO as the 'sealing of the failure of the EC-initiative in the Israeli-Arab conflict.'¹²⁰ Other researchers state that this, among other things, was caused by the fact that the Netherlands was the chairman of the EC in the first half of 1981. Within the EC, the Netherlands was the most reserved country in regard to inviting the PLO to the peace process and was still considered Israel's best friend within the Community.¹²¹

Dutch motivations

Government

Initially, the Netherlands was not really willing to participate in the MFO. One of the reasons for this was that the multilateral force was established outside of the UN, as stated before. This, however, was not the only reason, as the Dutch army already participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with 800 units and was asked by the UN to contribute to a

¹¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 218.

¹¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 231.

¹¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 234.

¹¹⁹ *Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of the Second Chamber of the Parliament)*, zitting 1981-1982, 2-2-82, p.2347 (*Acts Second Chamber of the Parliament, session 1981-1982, 02-02-1982, p.2347*).

¹²⁰ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.207.

¹²¹ I. Greilsammer and Weiler, J.H.H., "European political cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: an Israeli perspective", in: Allen and Pijpers, 1984, p. 150-151; P. Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation*, Gower Publishing Group, Aldershot 1987, p. 477-478.

UN-force in Namibia.¹²² Participation in the MFO would simply be too much and 'physically impossible', and there was also hesitation because of the uncertainty about the structure and functioning of the MFO.¹²³

But the USA kept approaching European countries, among which the Netherlands, and as the Netherlands values the relationship with the USA highly, participation was reconsidered. An important motivation for the Dutch MFA, Van der Stoel, was that 'the Netherlands can play a positive role at 'disentangling the knots' between the USA and the EC.'¹²⁴ In this regard he continued the policy of his predecessor Van der Klaauw: no crossing of the American policy and close consultation with the USA in peace process initiatives for the Middle East.

Another factor that played a more indirect role was the influence of the so-called 'NATO Double Track-decision' of December 12th, 1979.¹²⁵ This decision led to increased tensions between the Netherlands and the USA, as the Netherlands was opposed to this decision. A third reason connected to the USA was the recent accession of Spain into the NATO.¹²⁶ The USA encouraged and accepted this, despite protests from (among others) the Netherlands. As Van der Stoel a few years later would reveal in an interview: the Netherlands wanted to improve the relations with the USA, and participation in the MFO was a good way of doing that.¹²⁷

At the same time would participating in the MFO give the opportunity to 'hold grip' on the Middle East peace process and give a justification for the upkeep of the defensive apparatus of the Netherlands and provide them with operational experience. An additional benefit of willingness to participate was that the Netherlands moved from the sideline of the EC-debate to the center.¹²⁸ However, there was still the fear of the Dutch policymakers to move themselves into a vulnerable position once again, which lead to the four conditions mentioned before.

In the cabinet there was a widespread support for participation, partly because of the close cooperation between the government and the parliament in this regard. The initiative to participate was presented as being based on the Declaration of Venice.¹²⁹ Right-wing parties, which were at the moment the majority, wanted to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and

¹²² F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.221.

¹²³ *Idem*, p. 231; Interview with Rutten, 10-2-1987.

¹²⁴ *Idem*, p. 232.

¹²⁵ This was part of the Cold War and it was the decision to set up 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing 2-missiles in Western Europe, while at the same time offering negotiations to the Soviet Union to restrict similar weaponry at the Soviet side. For the full document on this decision, see the NATO website: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm.

¹²⁶ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.233.

¹²⁷ Interview with Van der Stoel, *NRC Handelsblad*, February 11, 1987 and January 20, 1988.

¹²⁸ F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.233-34.

¹²⁹ For a more extended explanation of this, see F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.237-40.

stated that the European initiative already hindered the Camp David process to much, thus supporting the Dutch participation in an American initiative.¹³⁰

Media

From October 1981, when the first initiative to participation in the MFO was taken by the Netherlands, until February 1982, newspapers are closely following the developments, again paying a lot of attention to the Israeli reaction on the participation of the Netherlands and the other EC-members.

One of the first commentaries on the Dutch participation appeared on October 28th in De Volkskrant and stated that the EC is doing well by joining the MFO, and by doing this is contributing positively to the Camp David Accords. It condemns the 'shuddery' attitude of the EC ministers of foreign affairs in regard to Arab countries which are condemning the EC participation to the MFO. It concludes that Europe, partly because their attitude and partly because of Greece, shows too much fear and does not instill any respect, not from Israel, not from Arab countries and not from the USA.¹³¹

In the following articles on the Sinai-peacekeeping force, as the MFO is usually mentioned in Dutch media, reactions of several countries are mentioned and discussed. Israel, Egypt, other Arab countries and the USA are in the center. Israel did not want an EC-peacekeeping force in the Sinai on basis of the Declaration of Venice and does not like the sympathy of the EC for the peace plan of the Saudi prince Fahd¹³², which Israel was opposed to. Israel would only accept the participation of the EC-members on basis of the Camp David Accords.¹³³

In the last weeks of 1981 the newspaper keeps following the developments and in December, Israel accepts the participation of the EC-members in the MFO, as their participation is an unequivocal reference to the Camp David Accords. A commentator writes on that:

*So, the advice is: keep the eyes and mouth shut, then there is a good chance that in five months there will be a few hundred British, French, Italian and Dutch soldiers stationed in the Sinai.*¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Motie 17.100 V nr.50, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, zitting 1981-1982, 10 februari 1982, p. 1965 en 16 februari 1982, p.2051 (Resolution 17.100 V no.50, Acts of the Second Chamber of the Parliament, session 1981-1982, 10 February 1982, p. 1965 and 16 February 1982, p.2051)

¹³¹ De Volkskrant, *Commentaar (Commentary)*, 28-10-1981.

¹³² The Fahd-plan was meant as 'supplement' to the Camp David Accords, which, according to Saudi-Arabia, missed some essential points in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the full eight-point Fahd-plan, see: <https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/fahd-plan>

¹³³ "'PLO zal Israël erkennen', EG positief over plan-Fahd" ('PLO will recognize Israel', EC positive about Fahd plan), *De Volkskrant*, November 9, 1981.

¹³⁴ "Commentaar" (Commentary), *De Volkskrant*, December 3, 1981.

For Israel and the US this would mean a success of the Camp David Accords, for the EC a success of the Declaration of Venice. The irritation of Israel is considered understandable, but Israel should have some understanding for EC-initiative as well. The commentator advises Israel and Europe to exercise some self-control so that there can be a small but useful EC-contribution to the MFO.¹³⁵

Almost one month later, the newspaper published the final decision of the government to participate in the MFO. Observers in The Hague considered the declaration of participation of the four European countries as 'kicking the ball back into the Israeli goal'.¹³⁶ On the 25th of February, the last facts are published: a large majority of the Parliament agreed to the emission of 105 Dutch voluntary soldiers to the MFO.¹³⁷

De Telegraaf shows a similar pattern, but writes more summarized on the events and pays a little more attention to the doubts of Israel on the participation of the four EC-countries. In the 23rd of October 1981, the first article on the MFO is published, declaring that the Netherlands is willing to participate in the MFO.¹³⁸ A few days later the participation of the Netherlands, Great Britain, France and Italy is confirmed and the newspaper writes that Egypt and Israel will hurry up the processes to give the West Bank and the Gaza Strip autonomy and to establish a Palestinian Council.¹³⁹

The articles that followed are focused on Israel's reaction and the discussion on the participation. The USA presses Israel to accept the participation of the four EC-countries, and Israel rejects as long as the participation is based on the Declaration of Venice.¹⁴⁰ After talks with the USA, Israel says to reconsider, but only after consultation on the conditions of this participation with Cairo and Washington.¹⁴¹ Only a few weeks after that, Israel declares to accept the participation. The European units would arrive at the 1st of March 1982, and on the 15th of April 1982 all Israeli units would be withdrawn, as stated in the Camp David Accords.¹⁴² On the

¹³⁵ Commentary, *De Volkskrant*, December 3, 1981.

¹³⁶ "Nederland blijft bij deelname aan Sinai-macht" (The Netherlands stick to participation in Sinai force), *De Volkskrant*, January 13, 1982.

¹³⁷ "Kamer accepteert Sinai-bataljon" (Parliament accepts Sinai battalion), *De Volkskrant*, February 25, 1982.

¹³⁸ "Nederland bereid tot deelname aan Sinai-vredesmacht" (The Netherlands willing to participate in Sinai-peacekeeping force), *De Telegraaf*, October 23, 1981.

¹³⁹ "EEG wil deelnemen aan Sinai-vredesmacht" (EEC willing to participate in Sinai-peacekeeping force), *De Telegraaf*, October 27, 1981.

¹⁴⁰ "Amerikaanse pressie voor Sinai-vredesmacht" (American pressure for Sinai-peacekeeping force), *De Telegraaf*, November 26, 1981.

¹⁴¹ "Uitstel over beslissing Sinai-vredesmacht" (Decision on Sinai-peacekeeping force postponed), *De Telegraaf*, November 30, 1981.

¹⁴² "Beslissing over Sinai-vredesmacht dit weekeinde" (Decision on Sinai-peacekeeping force this weekend), *De Telegraaf*, January 22, 1982.

11th of February, the newspaper writes that the Netherlands would send more than a hundred units instead of the initial eighty, because of a request of the USA.¹⁴³

In *Trouw* were published less articles on the Dutch participation in the MFO, and the articles that were published, are short or very similar to the ones in *De Volkskrant*. The newspaper has some interesting additions, though, as it explains that Israel does not accept the participation of the EC-countries on basis of the Declaration of Venice, because this declaration supports the right of self-determination of the Palestinians.¹⁴⁴ Another article, published on the 28th of January, 1982, states that the training of 81 soldiers for the MFO had started, despite the uncertainty whether Israel would accept or not. The unit completely consisted of volunteers, which was no problem, as more than 2500 men volunteered for the mission.¹⁴⁵

Israeli reactions

As mentioned in the chapter before, the Begin government ‘utterly rejects’ the Venice Declaration. Thus for Jerusalem, a ‘country’s participation [to the MFO] could only take place on the basis of the Camp David agreements and its subsequent treaties (including the Protocol of 3 August 1981).’ The EC-countries, among which the Netherlands, wanted to participate on basis of the Venice Declaration and Israel opposed. The Israeli minister of Foreign Affairs, Shamir, declared in early November 1981 that ‘any announcement accompanying participation in the multinational force or any statement indicating contradiction to the conditions of the Camp David Agreement [...] will disqualify the party so declaring from participating in this force.’¹⁴⁶

After discussions and pressure from the USA to accept the EC-declaration, it was described in such a way that the EC-countries participated on basis of the Camp David Accords, thus resulting in Israel accepting their contribution.¹⁴⁷

Conclusion

In this case study there is little use of emotional language in general. The Dutch government calls on arguments for participation in the MFO, like ‘the Netherlands can play a positive role at disentangling the knots’ between the USA and the EC, and that it is a good opportunity to ‘hold grip’ on the Middle East peace process and give a justification for the upkeep of the defensive

¹⁴³ “Meer Nederlanders in Sinai-vredesmacht” (More Dutchmen in Sinai-peacekeeping force), *De Telegraaf*, February 11, 1982.

¹⁴⁴ “Begin veroordeelt Sinai-vredesmacht” (Begin condemns Sinai-peacekeeping force), *De Telegraaf*, November 26, 1981.

¹⁴⁵ “Opleiding van 81 militairen voor de Sinai begint” (Training of 81 soldiers for Sinai starts), *De Telegraaf*, January 28, 1982.

¹⁴⁶ A. Pijpers, *European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, in: D. Allen and A. Pijpers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984.

¹⁴⁷ F. Grünfeld, F. Grünfeld, *Netherlands and the Near East 1973-1982*, 1991, p.235.

apparatus of the Netherlands and provide them with operational experience, as is explained in this chapter.

Again, Dutch media do not utilize emotional motivations or language when describing the developments. Only in commentaries, there is spoken about the 'shuddery attitude of the EC' which will not 'instill any respect', or 'kicking the ball into the Israeli goal'. In reports on reactions of other countries (Israel, USA) emotional language appears only when describing statements of leaders of these countries, but none of the newspapers uses clear emotional language.

Similar to the case of the Declaration of Venice, there is no empirical justification for the emotive portrayal of Dutch-Israeli relations by Dutch scholarship in this case.

Chapter 3: Sabra and Chatila

Historical background

During the Israeli occupation of the city of West-Beirut in 1982, a massacre took place in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila, executed by Lebanese Christian Phalangists. A storm of outrage from all over the world arose against Israel, not because Israel carried out the attacks on the camps, but because 'they should have protected the citizens'. The invasion, occupation and situation in Lebanon, however, were far more complicated.

Earlier, in the year 1978, another Israeli invasion into Lebanon took place, targeting to dislodge the PLO from its strongholds in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli prime minister Begin believed that the PLO provided the connection between the West Bank and Lebanon. If Israel could drive the armed factions of the PLO from Lebanon, then the Palestinians in the West Bank 'would be more isolated and susceptible for Israeli annexation.'¹⁴⁸ However, the invasion of 1978 failed and Israel had to retreat under pressure of the UN and the USA. As a result of this invasion, UNIFIL was established.

In Lebanon, a civil war was going on since 1975, mainly between the Muslim population of the country (joined by the Palestinian and Syrian inhabitants of Lebanon) and the Christian Phalangists (an extreme Maronite denomination), led by Bashir Gemayel. Several other militias are also involved, resulting in a complicated chain of events, actions, reactions and retaliations, in which Israel is more than once involved.¹⁴⁹

Bashir wanted to bring all militias under his command, and was 'determined to perpetuate the Phalangist version of Maronite domination in Lebanon.'¹⁵⁰ This goal led him to Israel, which was reconsidering how to eliminate the PLO-forces in Lebanon. In the early 1980's he had established extensive contacts with Israeli officials, with whom he shared a dislike for the Palestinian and Syrian presence in Lebanon.

This development fitted Israel's plans well, as they launched a plan with three main objectives. First, the destruction of the PLO as a fighting force. Second, the removal of Syrian troops out of Lebanon, as they established a 'threat to Israel's safety', and third, an alliance with the Maronite party which was led by Gemayel. So, the contacts were thriving and by spring 1982, the basis for a cooperation between the Israeli government and Gemayel was laid.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ William L. Cleveland, M. Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East, Fifth Edition*, Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 2013, p.383.

¹⁴⁹ For more information on the Lebanese Civil War, see Cleveland & Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2013, p.380-388.

¹⁵⁰ *Idem*, p.384.

¹⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

On the 6th of June that year, Israel launched a second invasion into Lebanon, this time under the name 'Peace for Galilee', which official purpose was to destroy PLO bases in Southern Lebanon. As later became apparent, there were more goals additional to that one: destroying the PLO infrastructure in West-Beirut and to ensure the election of Gemayel which would allow him to create a stable and pro-Israel government, which would 'leave Israel with a free hand in the occupied territories.'¹⁵²

Soon after the invasion, the Israeli troops reached Beirut and sieged the city, but the garrisoned PLO-units kept defiant unless of heavy bombing. Under international pressure, Israel signed on the 18th of August an agreement that the PLO-forced could retreat safely and civilians would not be harmed. Later that month, Gemayel was elected president, and two weeks after he was assassinated in his headquarters in East Beirut.¹⁵³ In this time, Israeli troops entered Beirut with unclear reasons, and Phalangist militia-members were allowed to enter the Sabra and Chatila camps 'to round up PLO-fighters'. This led to the massacre of over a thousand Palestinian refugees who were left unprotected because the PLO-fighters left, resulting in an international outcry against the Lebanon Operation and revulsion and protest within Israel.¹⁵⁴

Israel assigned a committee, the so-called Kahan-committee, to investigate the massacres, and their investigation stated that Israeli officials (as well civilian as military) were directly or indirectly responsible. Defense Minister Sharon was forced to resign and prime minister Begin would resign one year later.¹⁵⁵ Until the year 2000, Israel kept occupying a 'security zone' in southern Lebanon.

Dutch reactions

Government

Peeters states that the Dutch-Israeli relationship reached an all-time low after the Israeli army in June 1982 started Operation Peace for Galilee.¹⁵⁶ The Dutch government gave an official reaction to the events in Sabra and Chatila in the way of a declaration from the Inter-parliamentarian Union (IPU), which was at the moment of the events gathered in Rome.¹⁵⁷

This declaration opens with the sentence that the IPU 'expresses her deep outrage on the blood baths that are caused by invading troops into the Palestinian refugee camps Chatila and Sabra in

¹⁵² *Ibidem*.

¹⁵³ ThoughtCo, *Timeline of the Lebanese Civil War*, <https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-the-lebanese-civil-war-2353188>.

¹⁵⁴ Cleveland & Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2013, 385.

¹⁵⁵ *Idem*, p.386.

¹⁵⁶ Peeters, *Sworn Friends*, p. 252.

¹⁵⁷ Tweede Kamerzitting 1982-1983 (Parliament Sessions 1982-1983), 17 668, no. 1, p.14-15. For the full translated text of this declaration, see Appendix A.

Beirut' and states that 'this terrible deed is the pinnacle of collective atrocities against innocent people and against whole humanity.'

In section A, the IPU condemns the Israeli aggression, calls for a withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanese territory, calls for the release of all Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners, condemns the attitude of the Israeli Knesset which supported the aggression, calls on all parliaments to sanction Israel and suspend diplomatic and other ties with Israel, demands the USA to stop military and economic help to Israel and wants to establish a committee that will investigate the events.

Section B recalls upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, leave the existing settlements in these areas and stop building new settlements. It puts the accent on the importance of the solution of the Palestinian issue to reach a sustainable peace agreement and calls upon all parties to use the resources they have to reach a justified and sustainable peace in the Middle East on basis of all relevant UN-resolutions.

In the Parliament, mainly in the First Chamber, there was discussion on this declaration and on how the Netherlands should act in regard to Israel. Several Parliamentarians complain that the Dutch government does not take enough action against Israel.

Jan Christiaanse, member of the First Chamber of Parliament for the political party Christian Democrats (CDA, center-right wing) said that 'the blood bath among Palestinian refugees in the camps Sabra and Chatila shocked my faction'. The committee-Kahan, established by Israel in order to look into what exactly happened at Sabra and Chatila and who is responsible, is in his eyes a proof of the democracy of Israel. However, he said his party is 'increasingly worried about the stubborn leader of government Begin and the policy that is carried out by his cabinet.' He mentioned that the Israeli government rejects the plan of Reagan, and, with that, the Camp David Accords. He concluded that 'Israel should, for her actions in Lebanon, pay the price of an international isolation as never seen before.'¹⁵⁸

Another member of the First Chamber, Ria Beckers, was more critical. She was member of the Political Party for Radicals (PPR, left-wing). She condemned the declaration of the Dutch government that 'only speaks about disgust and not about the co-responsibility of Israel.'¹⁵⁹ By written questions to the minister, she asked if the ambassador would be called back from Tel Aviv.¹⁶⁰ However, at the moment of the events, the ambassador already was in the Netherlands. Because the debate [in which she spoke at that moment] was postponed by a week, the ambassador returned to Tel Aviv. Beckers was disappointed that 'he hid behind the European Ten, which stated that the exact events were not clear yet. On the radio, the minister spoke about

¹⁵⁸ Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1982-1983 (Acts of the First Chamber 1982-1983), 14-12-1982, p.9.

¹⁵⁹ I could not find the text of this declaration, but several politicians quote about it, in this way providing an overview of the core points of the content.

¹⁶⁰ Aanhangel Tweede Kamer 1982-1983 nummer 65 (Supplement Second Chamber 1982-1983, no.65).

the special ties of our country with Israel.' She criticized Israel because they started the invasion and they were responsible for the security of the Palestinians under their occupation, even more as they promised security to the women and children when the PLO-fighters were evacuated. They [Israel] cannot say 'we did not know', as it happened before in *Tel Za'atar* in 1976, and know from experience what terrible things men can do, as proven by the Holocaust. Critique on Israel is not antisemitism, it is injustice to the country and a pleasure for Begin – even in Israel itself people are protesting, 400,000 in Tel Aviv only. At the moment, recalling the ambassador or issuing sanctions against Israel would not be a solution, but 'peace and a solution to the Palestinian issue is necessary to guarantee Israel's safety and secure borders.'¹⁶¹

These reactions of two parties that are far from each other within the political realm show that, how 'special' the ties between the Netherlands and Israel might have been, as the ties were not as warm as they had been before. This showed again a year after, when queen Beatrix of the Netherlands visited the United States and wanted to give a present to the Jewish community. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised against this, as the Arab world might feel offended by this token of Dutch-Jewish friendship.¹⁶²

Media

The attention in the Dutch media for the events in Sabra and Chatila and the following events in mainly Israel is enormous. On the 20th of September, all newspapers have the Sabra and Chatila news on the front page, and the amount of articles, commentaries and analyses that follows is considerably higher than that on the other two cases.

Between the events on the 17th of September 1982 and the end of that year, *De Volkskrant* published 55 articles in which Sabra and Chatila are mentioned, and the headline on the 20th of September said: 'Sharp condemnation by America and the Security Council, Massacre among Palestinians arouses disgust' and starts with the fact that president Reagan of the USA says that Israel is responsible for the blood bath among the Palestinian refugees:

Filled with 'rage and disgust' states the president that Israel did not fulfill its promise [...]. In certain circles of the White House is whispered that the relations between the US and Israel are at an all-time low.

The article states that the UN Security Council condemns the massacre unanimously, reporting on emotional reactions among the Palestinian delegation that named the Israeli's 'Nazis' and

¹⁶¹ Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1982-1983 (Acts of the First Chamber 1982-1983), 14-10-1982, p.12-13.

¹⁶² Peeters, *Sworn Friends*, p.253.

'fascists', and Israel answered that these were lies and 'bloody defamation', as Israel was not responsible.¹⁶³

On the same day, a commentary was published, calling the circumstances around the massacre 'not without precedent, but poignant exceptional', as it was not the first time Phalangist units attacked a camp, but never before it was under Israeli control. There were even signs that the Phalangist units were consciously asked by Israel to search the camps for PLO-fighters. The USA and the international community failed to intervene more strongly when Israel invaded West-Beirut. The commentator finishes with the statement that he hopes that it will finally penetrate to the Likud-party that the policy of Begin and Sharon only leads the country into the marshes and discredits Israel: 'In any case, the government-Begin has lost any right of speaking about moral and humanitarian issues after the youngest drama in Lebanon.'¹⁶⁴

In the 'Abroad'-section of the newspaper, the same date, an article was written on the demonstrations in Israel and on Perez, demanding the resigning of Begin and Sharon, because 'Israel is directly and indirectly responsible for the blood bath.' The protests went along with extreme sharp slogans for Israeli standards, like 'Begin murderer' and 'Sharon war criminal'. The Israeli police had to disperse the demonstrations.¹⁶⁵

A few days later, the newspaper reports from Ha'aretz that Israel knew of the massacre that was going on and did not intervene. Haddad denies that his units were involved and the Israeli high command support that claim. Sharon will have to account for himself for the Israeli Parliament.¹⁶⁶

The events lead to a flood of opinion articles from both sides of the spectrum, reaching from statements as 'This should not lead to antisemitism' to 'The Netherlands have to recognize the PLO immediately'.¹⁶⁷

In De Telegraaf, the article on the 20th of September is comparable to the one in De Volkskrant, using the same wording, 'shocked', 'disgust'. After the first paragraph, it is stated that Israel is kept responsible and that sanctions are demanded against the Jewish state. The

¹⁶³ "Scherpe veroordeling door Amerika en Veiligheidsraad, Massamoord op Palestijnen wekt afschuw" (Sharp condemnation by America and the Security Council, Massacre among Palestinians arouses disgust), *De Volkskrant*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁶⁴ "Bloedbad – Commentaar" (Blood bath – Commentary), *De Volkskrant*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁶⁵ "Oppositie Israël eist aftreden Begin en Sharon" (Opposition Israel demands resigning Begin and Sharon), *De Volkskrant*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁶⁶ "Staf Israëlische leger in Beiroet negeerde moorden" (Staff Israeli army in Beirut ignored murders), *De Volkskrant*, September 24, 1982.

¹⁶⁷ "Dit moet niet leiden tot antisemitisme" (This should not lead to antisemitism), *De Volkskrant*, September 25, 1982; "Nederland moet PLO onmiddellijk erkennen" (The Netherlands have to recognize the PLO immediately), *De Volkskrant*, September 30, 1982.

article is more summarized and also talks about the protests in Israel, reporting that ‘the anger in Israel among the population is huge.’¹⁶⁸

A smaller article on the same day reports on the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo, who states that Israel has to retreat from Lebanon, after he returned from a visit to Egypt. This was his reaction to the Israeli ambassador to the Netherlands, Ya’akov Nechustan, who said that the Dutch UNIFIL-troops better should leave Lebanon ‘because they cannot prevent terroristic violations against Lebanon’. The article concludes that the weapon trade with Egypt most likely increased.¹⁶⁹

One day after, on September 21st, the correspondent in Israel wrote on the situation in Israel that the mood was ‘bitter as gall’, more bitter than ever before. He says:

No one we spoke to could even smile a little, and everyone repeated again and again ‘that there was committed a crime for which Israel is partly responsible’.

So, Israel takes responsibility and criticizes the policy of their government. According to the correspondent, the events also caused an all-time low in American-Israeli relations, and Perez demanding the immediate resigning of Begin and Sharon. He concludes with reporting that ‘the confusion in Israel has never been this big.’ Newspaper commentaries lament the shame, the disgrace of Israel’s name, the division within the country, and Israel’s co-responsibility in what happened.¹⁷⁰

In the week after, an article is published on the committee-Kahan, established by the Israeli cabinet to investigate the events in Sabra and Chatila.¹⁷¹ The newspaper closely follows the investigation of the committee-Kahan and reports on both the questioning of Sharon and Begin, saying that Sharon indeed gave ‘green light’ to the Phalangist militia to enter the two camps, but that ‘we [the Israeli High Command] never thought that something like this would happen’. On Begin the main line of the article is that he did not have ‘any foreknowledge of the military operation’.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ “Massamoord in Beirut schokt wereld” (Massacre in Beirut shocks the world), *De Telegraaf*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁶⁹ “Van Mierlo: Israël weg uit Libanon” (Van Mierlo: Israel has to leave Lebanon), *De Telegraaf*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁷⁰ “Trauma in Israël na massamoord” (Trauma in Israel after massacre), *De Telegraaf*, September 21, 1982.

¹⁷¹ “Kabinet Israël wil onderzoek naar bloedbad” (Cabinet Israel wants investigation into blood bath), *De Telegraaf*, September 28, 1982.

¹⁷² “Toestemming aan militia leidde tot bloedbad onder Palestijnen, Sjaron gaf persoonlijk ‘groen licht’ in Beiroet” (Permission to militia led to blood bath among Palestinians, Sharon gave personally ‘green light’ in Beirut), *De Telegraaf*, October 26, 1982; “Onderzoek naar bloedbad, Begin wist niets van noodlottige operatie” (Investigation into blood bath, Begin knew nothing of disastrous operation), *De Telegraaf*, November 9, 1982.

Many articles following are reporting on the progress of the committee-Kahan, mainly using titles containing words like ‘contradictions’, ‘doubts’ and ‘refusing’, and also the term ‘blood bath’ reappearing frequently.¹⁷³

The first article in *Trouw* on the events is similar to the ones in *De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf*, however the first paragraph appeals even more to emotion, by not only using the term ‘refugees’, but specify it to ‘innocent old people, women and children’ which are massacred in the night from Friday unto Saturday in the West-part of Beirut. The rest of the article focuses on Israel’s responsibility and that Israeli soldiers were close to the camps and knew of the presence of the militia troops in the camps.¹⁷⁴

As in the other newspapers, the commentary that follows one day later, is sharp and condemning, but starts, unlike the others, with the warning that Western Europe should be careful with teaching Israel ethics, looking back at what happened in the Holocaust. This, however, does not mean that the co-responsibility of the Government-Begin for the massacre should be concealed.

Two Israeli newspapers write that the Israeli army knew what was going on and did not intervene. The commentator states that it was ‘at least negligent in allowing Libanese militants into Palestinian camps short after the assassination of Gemayel, leader of the Phalangists and president of Lebanon.’ He reproaches the Israeli government arrogance and ignorance, if they really ‘did not know this would happen’, as they claim. He concludes that Israel better could have confessed their responsibility instead of concealing it and talking about ethics.¹⁷⁵ A second opinion article, published two days later, makes the same statement.¹⁷⁶

Conclusion

In the case of Sabra and Chatila, it was harder to entangle motivations and use of language. As the Netherlands was not directly involved in the events, the Dutch government joined the EC in their communal statements. This confirms the policy of non-isolation, as mentioned before. The EC statement, however, does contain a fairly high amount of times that emotional language is used (for the full text, see Appendix A): Outrage, atrocities, Israeli aggression, shocked, worried, disgust, disappointed. As mentioned before, the premier of the Netherlands spoke on the radio

¹⁷³ “Veel tegenstrijdigheden in bloedbad-onderzoek” (Many contradictions in blood bath investigation), *De Telegraaf*, November 10, 1982; “Getuigenis Begin tegengesproken” (Testimony Begin contradicted), November 15, 1982; “Twijfels om bloedbad versterkt” (Doubts around blood bath reinforced), November 19, 1982; “Begin weigert persoonlijk te getuigen in bloedbad-onderzoek” (Begin refuses to testify personally in blood bath investigation), December 6, 1982; “Sjaron moet tweede keer in getuigenbank” (Sharon has to testify a second time), December 21, 1982.

¹⁷⁴ “Bloedbad in Beiroet” (Blood bath in Beirut), *Trouw*, September 20, 1982.

¹⁷⁵ “Israëls verantwoordelijkheden – Commentaar” (Israel’s responsibilities - Commentary), *Trouw*, September 21, 1982.

¹⁷⁶ “Gezién hebben de Israëliërs het bloedbad misschien niet” (Maybe the Israelis did not séé the blood bath), *Trouw*, September 23, 1982.

about 'the special ties of our country with Israel'. Outside of this statement and the joint statement of the EC, the Dutch government did not publish any commentary on the events, although the debates in the Parliament on the topic were heated, as appears in, among others, the statements of Parliamentary Members Christiaanse and Beckers.

In the media, emotional language is mainly used in the titles of the articles, of which 'blood bath' and 'massacre' are the most used words indicating emotion. Besides of these, emotional language is only used to describe reactions of third parties: 'UN and USA condemn sharply', 'Palestinian delegation calls the Israelis Nazi's', 'massacre arouses disgust among Palestinians', 'anger among Israeli population is huge', etc. As the focus of the newspapers are on these reactions, there is much use of emotional language, but not directly from the author. Again, only commentaries and opinion articles show direct emotional language use from the author, using terms like bitterness, shame, and disgrace.

In conclusion, there is little empirical justification in this case for the emotive portrayal of Dutch-Israeli relations by Dutch scholarship. The government expresses some emotional language, e.g. when the premier talks about 'the special ties with Israel'. In the Dutch newspapers also appears some use of emotional language, but for such an event it is still little.

Conclusion

In this thesis, three cases were studied that were essential for the development of Dutch-Israeli relations in the years 1979-1982. These cases can be taken as prime examples of the development of Dutch-Israeli relations in these period: the Declaration of Venice, the Dutch participation in the MFO and the massacre in the refugee camps Sabra and Chatila. The use of emotional language and motivations in these cases have been the focus of this study. With that, this thesis contributes to the study of emotion in IR and to Dutch scholarly debate on Dutch-Israeli relations.

As concluded in the conceptual framework, the role of emotions in states and IR is undeniable and this study looked at the empirical evidence of the influence of emotion. For this framework, the works of Crawford, Mercer and Sasley were used as main references, as their studies on emotions in IR are the most advanced. This framework applies to each of the three cases.

Primary sources from the Dutch government, several Dutch newspapers and several Hebrew newspaper articles have been examined for each case. Among the primary sources from the Dutch government are the minutes of Parliamentary meetings, debates, and other documents. The newspapers consisted of the *Volkscrant*, the *Telegraaf* and the *Trouw*, giving a balanced overview of Dutch public opinion. The Hebrew newspaper articles were only available through the Israeli National Archive, and for this reason only articles from 1975 and 1978 have been used and studied.

The first case concerns the Declaration of Venice (1980). The Dutch government agreed with the EC in their recognition of PLO, against the will of Israel. The main reasons for this, appearing from the sources, were avoiding isolation and supporting the USA in their efforts. The Dutch newspapers were generally supportive of the government decision. The Israeli government was critical of the EC and its recognition of the PLO, but did not specifically target the Netherlands. This case provides therefore no empirical evidence for an emotional portrayal of the relationship between Israel and the Netherlands.

The second case concerns the Dutch participation in the MFO (1981). The Dutch government wanted to support the USA (which established the MFO) and listened to their request to participate in the force. The USA pressed Israel to allow EC-countries to participate. The Dutch newspapers did not write much on the subject, but were generally supportive of the government's decision. The Israeli government was critical of the EC participation on basis of Declaration of Venice, but agreed after American pressure on basis of the Camp David Accords. From the use of language and mentioned motivations in this case, there is also no evidence for an emotive portrayal of Dutch-Israeli relations.

The third case concerns Sabra and Chatila (1982). The Dutch government joined the general EC statement, which condemned the massacre. On the radio, the minister talked of the 'special ties with Israel'. The Dutch newspapers covered the matter extensively, using words like massacre and blood bath. The strongest emotional language was, however, quoted from third parties. The Israeli government was both defensive and ashamed, and there is no direct reaction regarding the Netherlands, as the Netherlands were not involved in the matter. There is a little more empirical evidence of emotional language in this case, but still not a major amount for a such an event.

In governmental publications and newspaper articles from the years 1979-1982 appears no extraordinary emotional use of language or motivations in comparison to Dutch relations with other countries and Dutch foreign policy. Only in citing third parties or in a way that is clearly opinion, such as commentaries, opinion articles and personal interviews with government members, there is clear use of emotional language. That is certainly not enough empirical evidence to see these emotions as the basis, main line or conclusion of an academic study on Dutch-Israeli relations.

This leads to the conclusion that emotional language and motivations have been used in Dutch scholarly work without clear empirical evidence, at least for the years 1979-1982. The emotive portrayal that is created by these scholars mainly seems to be based on opinion articles, informal relations like the friendship between the Dutch prime minister Drees and the Israeli premier Ben Gurion, and the interest of the Dutch public in Israel. The relationship between the two countries is early on depicted as a friendship, which is confirmed by the Netherlands supporting Israel in the UN and providing (military) support, and sometimes statements of Dutch governmental leaders like 'the special ties between Israel and our country' (Chapter 3).

This study leaves much more room for research. For example, assumptions or reasons for this emotive portrayal is are not completely clear. In the paragraphs above some possible reasons are mentioned, but more research into this might provide a better understanding of the study of Dutch-Israeli relations in this regard. The conclusion of this thesis might also be nuanced by studies of other periods in the development of Dutch-Israeli relations, depending on the occasion there appears any empirical evidence of an emotive portrayal at that time.

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Appendix A

Report of the Autumn meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, from 13 to 22 September 1982 in Rome¹⁷⁷

Expresses its deep outrage at the - during the time of this Conference, the 17th of September - invading troops in the Palestinian refugee camps of Chatila and Sabra in Beirut, which have cost the lives of thousands of unarmed innocent people;

Believes that this terrible act is the pinnacle of collective horrors against innocent people and against all mankind;

A

1. Strongly condemns the Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory and the violation of Lebanese sovereignty, and also condemns the Israeli acts of aggression in the murder of innocent civilians of the Lebanese and Palestinian nations, the destruction of houses, villages and cities, the siege and subsequent occupation of Beirut and the uninterrupted bombing of residential areas with all kinds of weapons prohibited by international law;
2. Calls for the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli offensive troops from all Lebanese territories and demands that legitimate Lebanese authorities be given the opportunity to extend their sovereignty over the entire Lebanese territory, and also calls for the implementation of the resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) of the Security Council;
3. Calls for the release by Israel of all detained Palestinians and Lebanese prisoners and demands that Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners be treated as prisoners of war, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention;
4. Strongly condemns the attitude of the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), which decided by a large majority to support the aggression of its government against Lebanon, and confirms that these and other previous decisions regarding the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan and support for aggressive and expansionist actions is contrary to the obligations entered into by the members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, whose primary concern is to guarantee peace, disarmament, the liberation of peoples and respect for human rights and international legitimacy, and calls for a re-evaluation by the Inter-parliamentary Union of the conduct of the Israeli Parliament with regard to the principles of the Union;
5. Requests all Parliaments to put pressure on their respective governments to implement the resolution adopted at the Ninth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 5 February 1981 and the Resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council during its

¹⁷⁷ Source: Dutch Parliament Session 1982-1983, 17 668, no. 1, p.14-15. (Language: Dutch)

meeting in Lagos on April 17, 1982, which resolutions appealed to all UN member states: a. to refrain from supplying Israel with any weaponry and related equipment, and to suspend all military assistance that Israel receives from them; b. to refrain from buying weapons or military equipment from Israel; c. to suspend economic, financial and technical assistance to and cooperation with Israel; d. to suspend diplomatic, trade and technical assistance to and cooperation with Israel;

6. Calls for the United States of America to stop all military and economic aid to Israel, which allowed that country to carry out its criminal aggression against Lebanon;

7. Calls for the establishment by the Inter-Parliamentary Council of a Commission to examine the following points: a. the bombing of residential areas, schools and hospitals in the blind and the bloody murder of the sick, women and children; b. the weapons that were used during the Israeli aggression against Lebanon; c. the conditions under which Lebanese and Palestinian combatants are detained, on the understanding that the Commission reports to the Executive Bureau on its activities, which report will be submitted to the next meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Council in April 1983;

B

1. Reiterates its call on Israel to withdraw immediately from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, to leave the settlements, to refrain from establishing new settlements, to facilitate the return of expelled Palestinians and to put an end to every oppression of persons who oppose the Israeli occupation;

2. Considering that the principles contained in the decision of the Twelfth Arab Summit in Fez on the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the Palestinian question, constitute a basis for a just and lasting solution of the Middle East problem and of the Palestinian issue, and confirms that international legitimacy must be the basis for a solution to the Palestinian question;

3. Invites all parties concerned, as soon as possible, to start negotiations within the framework of the United Nations with the aim of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including all relevant United Nations resolutions ;

Invites the Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to provide information in his annual report which he will submit to the 70th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Israel's implementation of this resolution and the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations and of the General Assembly requesting for immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon.