

Chinese Popular Nationalism and Consumer Boycott: a Weibo Discourse Analysis of the 2018 Dolce&Gabbana Controversy

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction	3
2 Studying Chinese Nationalism	5
2.1 Scholarship on Chinese nationalism: different approaches	5
2.2 The Century of National Humiliation: origins of anti-foreign sentiment	6
2.3 Popular nationalism: a threat to the state discourse?	8
2.4 Popular nationalism in the digital era	L (
2.5 Consumer nationalism: Chinese boycott of foreign products	3
2.6 Scholarship limits and research relevance	4
3 Methodology1	6
3.1 Methodological approach: discourse analysis	6
3.2 Methods of data collection and analysis	7
3.3 Limits of dealing with digital data	3
4 Discourse Analysis of Weibo Comments	9
4.1 Overview of the incident	9
4.2 Popular nationalism on Weibo. The ingroup	0
4.3 Humiliation and victimization. The outgroup	3
4.4 Boycott D&G: the language of resistance	0
5 Conclusion	7
Bibliography40	0
Comments Index4	4

1 Introduction

In the era of social media and keyboard warriors, the phrase "online outrage" is something many of us have come to accept as an inherent part of digital communication. But when the outrage is voiced by a community of over 400 million members and has the potential to disrupt the image of a well-established brand, the issue becomes worthy of closer inspection. ¹ The Italian company Dolce&Gabbana (D&G) learned this first hand in 2018 when it came under fire for creating a disputed advertisement campaign, later branded as offensive by the Chinese audience. The public contested the advertisement for an alleged ridicule of Chinese culture, and responded to the aggressive attitude of designer Stefano Gabbana towards Chinese people. The controversy around the commercial (which I describe in more detail in chapter four) caused a wave of indignation among Chinese consumers, who engaged in a nationalist defence of China's pride on social media and called for a collective boycott of the brand.

The account of Chinese citizens resorting to online platforms to vent their anti-foreign anger is not new and has led scholars to consider said attitude as a form of popular nationalism. Examples of boycott against a foreign offender can be traced back to 1905, with American products as their target. In recent years, the number of foreign companies who have suffered a backlash from Chinese Internet users has increased considerably. Among the most notable examples are the outrages against Nike (2004), Carrefour (2005), Toyota (2006), Hyundai Motor (2017), and Lotte Group (2017). The outcome of these outrages has been diverse, with some companies suffering substantial economic losses and others recovering with a simple video apology. The common denominator of these episodes, however, seems to be a steady pattern of offence, nationalist outrage, and eventually call for boycott.

What makes this issue intriguing is that, as theorised by the scholarship on digital technologies, the Internet has provided platforms to create communities and reshape national identity through the normalization of shared symbols and narratives (Lagerkvist and Sundqvist, 2013; Ismangil, 2019). Consequently, by looking at online outrage we can examine specific displays of popular nationalism. The D&G controversy presents a good case to examine what happens online in China when branding missteps meet cultural sensitivity and patriotic sentiment. Therefore, I decided to focus my research on the modes of expression employed by online users and observe whether they possessed the features

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¹ This number refers to the Weibo community, the subject of my analysis, which reported an average of 486 million monthly active users by the end of June 2019, according to a report from Xinhua Agency. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/20/c_138323288.htm on May 2020.

of Chinese popular nationalism. By analysing the discourse that emerged on Chinese social media Weibo amid the perceived offence from D&G, I aim to answer the question:

"What can the boycott D&G movement tell us about Chinese online popular nationalism today?"

First of all, it will be important to define nationalism and popular nationalism, and at the same time to look at how the newly available means of communication (such as digital technologies) have changed the conversation on the nation. Central to this thesis will be the concept of "national humiliation", the leading narrative to interpret the emotional nature of Chinese popular nationalism. The aim of chapter two is thus to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the Weibo outrage against D&G. Following an overview of the main approaches on Chinese nationalism I delve into what the "Century of National Humiliation" narrative entails for the creation of a shared national identity. Then, I integrate the debates on digital technologies in China and ICTs as platforms for civic engagement to argue that online platforms are a new crucial space for the building of national identity. Furthermore, I present the discussion on boycott trends, apply it to the Chinese case, and posit that Jiang's (2012) definition of "consumer nationalism" is a peculiar form of popular nationalism that best explains the hawkish attitude that draws Chinese online users to engage in boycott movements. In the third chapter, I outline my methodological approach and methods of research. I motivate why I opted for a discourse analysis and describe the advantages and disadvantages of this process. The fourth chapter is the analytical part of this research. I look at the Weibo discourse on the D&G controversy, describe the most relevant findings and discuss how they relate to the bigger debate on Chinese popular nationalism. Finally, I present appropriate conclusions and suggest how to further the analysis of brand boycott as an indicator of popular nationalism in China.

This study tries to shed light on the normalization of nationalist expression by Chinese Weibo users in response to perceived offences. In other words, I look at how market incentives get leveraged in the name of national pride, an attitude slightly different from the political focus on nationalism employed so far in the scholarship.

2 Studying Chinese Nationalism: a Theoretical Background

This chapter aims to summarize the literature regarding nationalist discourse in China, which will serve as a theoretical framework for my analysis. While describing the changing attitudes in the scholarship throughout the years, I focus on what is commonly referred to as "The Century of National Humiliation". I believe it still holds significant relevance in the shaping of current nationalist discourse within China. The framework of national humiliation as a strong element for Chinese identity alongside the concept of consumer nationalism will be useful to interpret the offence perceived following the D&G scandal.

2.1 Scholarship on Chinese nationalism: different approaches

Chinese nationalism has become an area of academic interest in light of China's economic achievement and its increasing presence in international politics. Scholars from different fields consider Chinese nationalism a fluid narrative of ideologies and emotions strictly intertwined with issues of ethnic representation, historical memory, and current international relations. For this reason, the literature on this topic is both diverse and extensive.

Traditionally, many scholars examined Chinese nationalism through the lens of foreign relations. They reserved much attention to finding its origins and defining its nature, in an attempt to cope with China's rise to power. Studies focused on Chinese New Nationalism (post Tiananmen) aimed at investigating nationalist ideologies to predict possible consequences of rising nationalism on international relationships (Link, 2008; Johnston, 2017). Other studies focused instead on the process of building the nation to further investigate how political institutions manipulate nationalist sentiment at will (Zhao, 2004; Callahan, 2006). Much of the focus in the discussion has been on the role that the Chinese government plays in shaping nationalist discourse. There has been considerable debate on whether nationalism in China is enforced by the government on citizens, for example through education (Wang, 2012) and cultural symbols (Callahan, 2010), or whether it is instead an expression of the will of the people.

Among these studies, some focused on the process of national identity formation (Darr, 2011) and gave more prominence to the individual level. Consequently, the academic scope has progressively shifted towards a specific type of nationalism, i.e. popular nationalism. Recent scholarship delved into the way popular mass movement is reshaping the nationalist narrative alongside (or in contrast with) the official discourse (Gries, 2004; Ma, 2018). Attempts at mapping a demographic of Chinese nationalism (Hoffman and Larner, 2013; Johnston, 2017; Weiss, 2019) show contrasting results,

raising doubts on the relevance of such practice in the dynamic context that is the Chinese society. Finally, some attention has been given to the role ICTs, new tools of expression for nationalist sentiment, have in reshaping the relation between popular sentiment and state narrative (Jiang, 2012; Schneider, 2018; Ma, 2018; Ismangil 2019).

2.2 The Century of National Humiliation: origins of anti-foreign sentiment

Nationalism as the space for the establishment of shared identities is certainly not an exclusively Chinese occurrence. Studies on the post-colonial birth of nation-states all over the world examined the differences between nationalism and patriotism and speculated on the role of political institutions in this process.² However, upon a first look, the framework of nationalism as an outgrowth of colonialism did not seem applicable for China, a country never officially colonized, where universalism and culturalism, existing within the political structure of the empire, tied the Chinese people together (Levenson, 1964). For these reasons, scholars trace nationalism in China to no earlier than the late 19th century. Zhao (2004: 50) sees Chinese self-image as based not on the nation-state but on culture and states that nationalism did not exist in pre-modern China, since loyalty to the political structure came from a universal set of values. Following a primordialist perspective, he theorizes the concept of China as a "nation state by construction". According to him, nationalist consciousness in China was triggered by external stimulus, when the elites questioned Confucian values in response to western aggression.

As it happens, any discussion on Chinese nationalism cannot be exempt from examining the so-called "Century of National Humiliation" (bainian guochi 百年国耻), a time of national suffering caused by repeated military defeats of the Chinese at the hand of western powers and Japan. This period started with China's defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842, following which there was the dismantlement of the empire and a succession of disastrous confrontations with "the West". In-depth examinations of this historical period increased in frequency after the 1990s, as China's role on the global scale became more relevant. Many scholars

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 $^{^2}$ In the bigger debate on nationalism, Chinese terminology offers an interesting opposition between patriotism ($aiguo\ zhuyi\$ 爱国主义), a definition often associated with the positive connotation of love of one's nation, in contrast to its counterpart nationalism ($minzu\ zhuyi\$ 民族主义), often considered negative in its ethnic implications. In my dissertation, I adopt Schneider's (2018: 16-24) discerning of the two terms. As he outlines, the similarities between patriotic and nationalist communities lies in their common attachment to a geographical place and the presence of a narrative of historical continuity; however he draws the line between patriotism and nationalism in the fact that nationalist communities connect this attachment to politics, to claims on the political autonomy of a certain imagined community.

³ The main events during the Century of National Humiliation include the two Opium Wars of 1839-184 and 1856-1869; the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895; the Boxer Rebellion of 1900; the War of resistance against Japan of 1937-1945; the unequal treaties of 1842 and 1895 signed with British and Japanese (Callahan, 2004; Wang, 2012).

(to name a few see Callahan, 2004; Link, 2008; Modongal, 2016), saw in the rhetoric of national humiliation the key to interpret the different phases of Chinese nationalism and the premises to speculate on Chinese foreign policy. What the Century of National Humiliation narrative entails is an anti-foreign behaviour that relies on a strong need for rivalry and self-affirmation (Harkavy, 2000; Gries, 2004). It therefore became of primary importance to understand this phenomenon and to determine if, and to what extent, this was a sentiment induced by the government to the people. To this end Zheng Wang (2012) gives an extensive report on the role of education in the construction

To this end Zheng Wang (2012) gives an extensive report on the role of education in the construction of this rhetoric. According to him, the discourse of national humiliation was utilized by the Communist Party starting from the 1970s; a political strategy needed to fill the ideological vacuum left by Mao's death. The once strong narrative of the CCP as representative of China's interest and defender of national pride (Zhao, 2004: 8), was now threatened by political and economic change in the country. Moreover, the need for a new ideological framework became an urgent matter for the Chinese government after the Tiananmen incident of 1989. For most scholars, it is at this moment that the Chinese Communist Party decided to establish national pride as the guiding narrative, and it did so by launching an impressive propaganda campaign to implement patriotic education. The goal was to establish a dialectic where love for one's country equals love for the Party (Zhao, 1998; Gries, 2004; Link, 2008). From this moment on, the state narrative stressed this period as a dark era for the Chinese nation and western countries are seen with scepticism and resentment. This type of nationalism is referred to as patriotic nationalism (Callahan, 2010; Modongal 2016).

The state-implemented patriotic education campaign exposed its citizens to a shared national identity image, which according to some scholars contributed to the spreading of generally accepted truths about the nation and what it means to be Chinese (Darr and Tang, 2012; Jiang, 2012; Weiss, 2019). Wang (2012) recounts how pervasive this campaign was in making nationalism a part of everyone's routine and explores the issue of historical memory. By analysing Chinese history textbooks of the time, he notices how they set the West as the historical usurper and made sure that people would "never forget national humiliation". Both Wang and Callahan delve into the impact of this collective remembering, and argue that the Chinese memory of the past not only was constructed by the party in an attempt of legitimization, but additionally had serious implications on collective identity, as it selectively chose the events to remember.⁴

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⁴With collective remembering I mean the framing of China's past by the authorities, which can be seen in the 1990s patriotic education. This created a specifically calculated narration of the century which preceded the birth of the Chinese nation-state. According to James Wertsch's (2002) sociocultural study on collective memory, *Voices of Collective Remembering*, remembering is an act of the individual, but is also socially coordinated and distributed. He argues that cultural tools and technologies are vital to the process of remembering, and he raises questions on the power structures that can have control over these narratives. Nationalism and remembering the past, can therefore be constructed for consumption (Callahan, 2010).

Scholars agree that the mission of the party after Mao's fall was to reaffirm a shared past for the Chinese people and create unity (Callahan, 2004; Zheng, 2007). The Patriotic education served this purpose exactly, and it was embedded with the national humiliation discourse, with "textbooks, novels, museums and parks devoted to commemorating national humiliation in China" (Callahan, 2004: 199). Further supporting this, Wang (2012) stresses China's uniqueness in the building of national humiliation memory sites such as the ruins of the Yuanmingyuan, a historical reminder of the violations China has suffered. The idea of the "raped motherland" is a recurring theme in this account, a powerful image that in a mechanism typical of nationalist narratives humanizes one's homeland and identifies a common enemy.

Among scholars interested in this field, Callahan's unique contribution lies in his social psychology approach, which invites us to reflect on the role of emotions in the humiliation rhetoric, especially that of guilt. Guilt is what the Communist Party exploited and commercialized to create a national identity (Callahan, 2010: 82-89) and it is what makes Chinese nationalists feel unique in their suffering. Through the construction of a shared memory, humiliation is the glue that ties together the multiplicity of the Chinese identity and identifies a "self" and an "other", a "domestic" and a "foreign" (Darr, 2011). In other words, the humiliation discourse is embedded in the "us versus them" narrative, strategically enhanced through the education campaign. This nationalization of shame is what makes Chinese nationalism so resilient to this day. When a violation from foreigners nowadays occurs, it is often described as a moral issue, as yet another humiliation like those suffered during the Opium Wars.

2.3 Popular nationalism: a threat to the state discourse?

In contrast to the narrative of modern Chinese nationalism as an exclusively state-led phenomenon, studies of the past two decades have recognized the importance of popular nationalism in China. Early signs of popular nationalism are observed following the patriotic education campaign and identified in the "China Can Say No" series of books, and more recent studies delineate a pattern of Chinese authors and commentators showing a disdain for "western intrusion" in Chinese affairs (see Jiang, 2012 for an analysis of anti- CNN articles and blogs). With the growth of the consumer market and the economic development of China, came the awareness for Chinese citizens of their changing global role, of a renewed self-representation.

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⁵The book "China Can say no" of 1996 from Song et al., is a series of essays. It can be considered the representative of a popular movement which wanted to stand up to western powers, in particular against the U.S.

Studies on Chinese popular nationalism follow two main approaches: the first one urges us to consider nationalism's emotional component, to better understand how it is connected to personal identity (Carlson, 2009; Darr and Tang, 2012). This was done by applying social sciences and cultural studies, corroborated by surveys that tried to define the level of nationalism of Chinese citizens (Hoffman and Larner, 2013). The second approach analyses how spontaneous nationalist sentiment influences the state narrative, to the point that it might pose a threat to the CCP supremacy (Zheng, 2007; Callahan, 2010).

The most ground-breaking findings on this topic are those of Peter Heys Gries. He is critical of those who interpret Chinese nationalism as state-controlled propaganda because they dismiss the role emotions play in the process. For him, nationalism has to do with social psychology, and it is connected to an ingroup-outgroup dynamic. He also identifies a shift in attitude in the state discourse, from a victory narrative typical of Maoism, to a victim role during the 1980s and 1990s. This victim narrative turns the historical humiliation into something personal and primes Chinese citizens to see western actions as aggressive (Gries, 2004: 43-56). Victimization is the way to glorify the success (economic and political) of the present. Gries explains this with the Chinese concept of face (*mianzi* 面子), a collective image of self, presented to the outside world. When face is assaulted, feelings get hurt. The importance of keeping face often results in the tendency to defend collective self-esteem (Gries, 2004: 21-27) and would therefore explain spontaneous forms of nationalism.

Examining Chinese nationalism with a social psychology approach is crucial to understand how national identity evolves through confrontation with others, and to explain why nationalism in China today seems to be particularly hawkish towards foreigners (Weiss, 2014). The current scholarship dismisses the idea of nationalism as indoctrination and has shifted towards studying it as a very emotional form of consciousness (Schneider, 2018: 31), a cognitive framework where members of the community share a common past and present habits. Nationalism as identification of self provides both an ingroup confirmation typical of all human beings, and a sense of historical continuity embodied in the state. Scholars recognize that there is a degree of psychological attachment to the nation at the individual level, which is supported by state education. This creates in the individual a favourable disposition towards the existing political institutions and a wary attitude towards whoever criticises it (Darr and Tang, 2012: 823). This intergroup attribution bias (Gries, 2004: 100) primes members of a group to be apologetic of ingroup members' negative behaviour and makes them intransigent towards outgroup mistakes.

Consequently, academics have analysed piqued moments of popular reactions such as the 1996 Diaoyu Island dispute, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2008 torch

relay protests, to examine the implication of this form of nationalism. Scholars found in Chinese people's attitude a recurring manifestation of anger and outrage often expressed through outgroup denigration (Gries, 2004: 110), which has been interpreted as the legacy of the humiliation education. Moreover, these studies outlined a new relationship between the state narrative and the bottom-up discourse. As many researchers point out, citizens now play a central role in the development and interpretation of Chinese nationalism and have created a dynamic duo where both the state and people can influence public opinion (Callahan, 2010: 25).

Much of the scholarship has focused on the meaning of this populist sentiment, with growing concern over whether it might pose a threat to state supremacy. Some scholars argue that the Communist party has lost its grip on the nationalist discourse and that popular sentiment is challenging the state hegemony (Gries, 2004; Liu, 2006). In their opinion, since the CCP has been successful in establishing a personal form of national identity, it becomes difficult to control that identity when it contrasts the state narrative, precisely for its emotional nature. Others instead suggest that state control has become more subtle, and that the Chinese government still asserts control over the nationalist discourse (Jiang, 2012; Weiss, 2014). This part of the scholarship sees popular nationalism as less political and more connected to the economic success of China. As such, it does not pose a threat to the state.

Many comparative studies on popular reactions and state representations have pointed out discrepancies between state and popular discourse and identified forms of "unofficial nationalism" (Liu, 2006, Ma, 2018). Some researchers instead found evidence of popular culture as complementary to the culture promoted by the party (Jiang, 2012; Ismangil, 2019); these scholars maintain that nationalist narrative originates within state discourse but is then reinforced and maintained through popular behaviour. Finally, focus on popular criticism of state policies identified a form of loyal dissent (Lagerkvist and Sundqvist, 2013), a type of ultimately non-subversive criticism that, even when in opposition with state discourse, does not result in protest or action.

2.4 Popular nationalism in the digital era

Despite the methodological differences and diverse findings, the common thread among the analyses on popular nationalism is their online component. Comparative studies of state and popular discourse make use of traditional media to discern what concerns the state narrative, but increasingly look at online discussions to determine public opinion (Ma, 2018; Ismangil, 2019).

Notably, the study of popular nationalism was born in conjunction with the rise of an abundance of scholarly work on the role of the Internet in China. The increasing use of the Internet in China after its permanent introduction in 1994 and its development into a PRC Internet, i.e. the Internet with Chinese characteristics (Leong, 2016), became the centre of academic discussion. A debate started, with some scholars predicting the democratizing potential of the Internet (Shirky, 2009), whereas others observed that it would reinforce state control and emphasised the implementation of censorship (Mackinnon, 2009; Wang and Mark, 2015). This second view considers the Internet a tool "open to both noble and nefarious purposes" (Diamond, 2010: 71) and contends that the CCP has proved adept in shaping the online conversation to its advantage. Scholars explored how the Party tolerated forms of online criticism and other popular nationalism manifestations (Mackinnon, 2011) and also consider that the Internet as a tool of expression is already manipulated towards a narrative in line with the state discourse (Schneider, 2018). In other words, for many scholars the Internet has proved to be another innovative propaganda tool, skilfully absorbed by the versatile CCP.

The debate on the democratizing potential of the Internet in China also relates to the bigger discussion on the role of ICT technologies in civic social engagement. Understanding whether digital technologies are at the source of civic engagement can be useful to explain online Chinese popular nationalism.

For some researchers, it is the technological medium that enables social action and many have been optimistic with regard to its power. This part of the scholarship argues that once technology has been set in motion it is hard to control, hence supporting the myth of autonomous technology, a powerful force capable of determining the individual's actions. In light of this new tool, a series of studies aimed at finding a relation between the advent of blogs/social media and political uprising, and came to the conclusion that the technological medium ultimately creates the premises for political and social change (Shirky, 2009). The Arab spring and the Me-Too movement are typically considered examples of situations where the technological tool enabled social engagement. In contrast to this, Fuchs (2015) maintains that such technologies can indeed create agency, but since agency does not equal power, it does not necessarily entail change. For him, there is a difference between online space and IRL (in real life), two dimensions which are not always intertwined. ICTs, and social media in particular, have the potential to support protest mobilisation (Fuchs, 2015: 2-6) and to shape collective discourse, but, at the same time, they can be easily monitored, controlled, and censored. Moreover, while it is agreed that these technologies create a new space for the individual's self-expression, some scholars argue it is unlikely that this expression will have an impact on society (Gladwell, 2010). This is because microblogging platforms, and the Internet in general, are not neutral tools but they instead represent the interest of specific people (Fuchs, 2015: 21). These scholars oppose technological determinism and are sceptical of the enabling power of social media; for them, ICTs do not necessarily stimulate political change, but they can in fact reinforce the already existing social order and power structures.

When applying these theories to the Chinese context, supporters of Internet democratization saw in online comments critical of the Party the seeds for democracy. However, it is now clear that the assumptions used for the western cybersphere cannot be applied to the PRC Internet. Scholars invite us to consider the Internet in China as its own separate entity with peculiar features: the main language is Chinese, social media and microblogging apps known in the West have their Chinese equivalent, and scanning patterns and aesthetics tend to be different (Leong, 2016: 120). Besides, peculiar to Chinese cybersphere is its state governance, which implies a combination of legislative actions and technologies aimed at regulating the flow of external information available to the Internet in China. Studies on the political role of technologies have demonstrated how artifacts are neither good, bad nor neutral (Kranzberg, 1986: 545), but can in fact be manipulated to shape our perception of the world (Winner, 1980). When considering the PRC Internet as a space for the discussion on national identity and the potential site for civic engagement, we therefore have to be aware that technologies can embody forms of authority and subordination, and question who are the actors involved in this power structure. Moreover, we need to consider how this power can be implemented through the properties of the technology itself. On this note, Schneider's (2018) study of Chinese online representation of Japan is a good example of how PRC Internet search engines and social media, crucial elements in constructing a shared narrative, are built in a way that promotes content in line with a national viewpoint.

With regard to Chinese ICTs' enabling power, Zheng Yongnian (2007: 11) considers the Internet as a new infrastructure that empowered both the state as well as citizens. While he admits that the new information technologies have posed challenges to Chinese leaders by breaking the governmental monopoly on information, he eventually concludes that the state has found balance in a form of liberalized authoritarianism (Zheng, 2007: 88-97). This is exemplified by a mix of control and a newfound willingness to allow a certain level of political participation in the form of online expression. The Internet is sometimes used as a "safety valve" (Xiao, 2011), which helps relieve social tension by allowing people to express nationalist anger, as long as it does not resolve in real life mobilisation. In cases where the mobilisation actually happened, like in 2005 with the anti-Japan protests, the government intervened to stop them. In the same way, the government will suppress Internet activists who directly attack the Party's leadership but will tolerate those who criticise policies in general (Zheng, 2007: 164-165).

Remarkably, many noticed how this political move managed to satisfy the need of Chinese citizens for a more liberal form of self-expression, and how it created a new efficient form of national pride rather than encouraging opposition to the state (Jiang 2012; Lagerkvist and Sundqvist, 2013; Ismangil, 2019). As a consequence, scholars maintain that the CCP has mastered governability of the Internet (Jiang, 2012) and that online popular culture normalizes the state narrative. Be it in the form of memes, songs or microblogging discussions, the online popular discourse is profoundly emotional and can contribute to reinforce myths and stories on the country and on the Party (Ismangil, 2019).

2.5 Consumer Nationalism: Chinese boycott of foreign products

As the discussions on national humiliation and online popular nationalism show, digital popular nationalism is not independent from government intervention, nor is it completely subjugated to its control. If we accept that popular nationalism has limitations, and that IRL civic engagement is discouraged, we also need to acknowledge that the Internet provided a new cohesive site for participating in the national identity discourse. Having also confirmed that identity creation goes through "us versus them" social dynamics, blogs and social media platforms become the perfect space to vent anti-foreign sentiments. Considering these two macro-themes together helps recognize a form of popular nationalist behaviour that seems to be free from constraints: the online expression of anti-foreign outrage, eventually resulting in threats of brand boycott.

The consumer market can prove to be a medium to both satisfy the individual's personal needs and promote the collective task of overcoming national humiliation. As Jiang (2012: 58) maintains, there is a connection between China's economic power and the strengthening of nationalism. According to her, the Party has created a form of consumer nationalism that encourages personal economic freedom to reinforce the narrative that personal success reflects the success of the Party and of the country. This line of thought triggers the emotional attachment to the "motherland" and it also meets the need to avenge the century of national humiliation. Jiang posits that Chinese people, especially those generations who grew up with the Internet, are not interested in the political discussion because they resort to online platforms for individual pursuit and have a certain degree of freedom. Online popular nationalism is therefore less political but still infused with a need for rivalry, and it is hawkish towards foreign representation of the Chinese world. People in China feel increasingly proud of their country's achievements and are finding in their newly acquired market power the premises to show their nationalism. We could go as far as stating that being a consumer is a new component of modern

Chinese identity. Said consumers rely on the Internet to vent their dissatisfaction and defend the nation's pride with their consumer choices (Jiang 2012: 22).

Scholars have engaged in the study of boycotting trends in China and noticed that while boycotting in general can be sparked by NGOs or collective entities, in China it is often the result of popular uprising and it is connected to matters of national pride (Smith and Li, 2010). Studies on consumer boycott mostly focus on the leading motives behind these protests. They consider consumer ethnocentrism, product judgment, and willingness to participate. There is common agreement that Chinese boycotts are expressive rather than instrumental, which means they focus on venting frustration towards the target of the boycott (Klein et al., 2004). On this note, researchers point out that Chinese anger is more likely to be ignited when a misrepresentation of "Chinese culture" by a foreign company occurs, when there is a perception of a judgmental attitude coming from the outgroup, and that online protest and eventually boycott rest on a sense of moral calling (Yang, 2009; Weiss, 2019). Previous research also found that higher consumer ethnocentrism makes boycott trends more likely (Barret et al., 2007), which would explain why the boycotting practise is not new to the Chinese context.

2.6. Scholarship limits and research relevance

Although several authors have begun to acknowledge the relevance that popular discourse has in the development of Chinese nationalism, they mostly focus on the relationship between the citizens and the Party, with much speculation on who holds the upper hand. For the most part the academic discussion is focused on people's reaction to political events and their influence on foreign policies. As a result, there is a lack in literature with regard to how this new form of online popular nationalism is affecting Chinese self-representation. I therefore side with those who maintain that understanding popular nationalism means studying the popular level and not elites in media discourse (Darr, 2011: 26). Moreover, the literature on digital and consumer nationalism is often fixed on the Sino-Japanese relationship (Smith et al., 2010; Wang, 2012; Schneider, 2018; Barwick et al., 2019), while it downplays the anti-foreign sentiment directed at other countries.

With regards to ICTs and their usage for political purposes, part of the literature contends that communication technologies, and social media in particular, possess the power to create agency. However, the PRC Internet's control mechanisms make it so that the majority of popular culture online is in accordance with the state narrative. Consequently, protests can count on social media to expand their range of influence but do not create an effective change in society. Nevertheless, the

consumer market proves to be an effective field for nationalist behaviour to unfold freely. Since ICTs provide the medium for the display of foreign resentment, looking at online discourse is important to witness the building of a collective national identity, reshaped online in light of perceived offences from outgroups.

Taking into consideration these major areas of research, I wish to explore the phenomenon of online nationalist outrage and boycott trends. An analytic focus on the popular expression of nationalism (such as comments on a major online platform) can help develop an understanding of the cultural system that creates the Chinese imagined community. My research aims to be a contribution to the literature on Chinese popular nationalism and will be relevant for issues of Chinese identity representation online. Online opinion is only a segment of popular nationalism, and it may not be representative of the entirety of the Chinese people, but it is still a source of self- representation worth observing. As noted by Xi Jinping in a 2013 speech, the Internet is not only a new battleground for struggle over public opinion (Huang and Zhai, 2013), but it is also the place for the normalization of narratives and accepted truths on the Chinese community, by the Chinese community. The national online outrage I seek to examine can therefore be considered a branch of the "National Humiliation" discourse. The same emotions and cultural premises are present, but the means of expression are different (ICTs) and involve a more present role of bottom-up nationalism. Ultimately, my research could be relevant for practitioners interested in how to prevent marketing scandals and boycotting trends. Regardless of the effectiveness of the boycott, it is important to understand why this consumer behaviour is a recurring reaction in the Chinese digital sphere.

3 Methodology

For the current study I have conducted an empirical discourse analysis of social media text. I have focused on posts collected from the Chinese microblogging platform Sina Weibo (*XinlangWeibo* 新 浪微博), following the controversy sparked by the D&G advertisement campaign in November 2018.

3.1 Methodological approach: discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is the study of written or spoken language in relation to its social context. It focuses on the purposes and effects of different types of language and cultural conventions, considering how values, beliefs and assumptions are communicated (Gee, 2010). Language plays an instrumental role in the construction of knowledge and in the reinforcement of commonly accepted truths (Schneider, 2018: 18), both at an individual and community level, therefore discourse analysis as the study of the language-in-use (Gee, 2010), demonstrates how language is deployed by taking the social, cultural, and political context into account. I considered here discourse analysis as the methodological approach resulting from Foucault's discourse theory (1989) and adopted Schneider's interpretation of discourse as the "communication practices, which systematically construct our knowledge of reality" that play "out in various modes, and across all media" (Schneider, 2013).

I believe discourse analysis is the most suitable approach for this research for two reasons. First of all, investigating social media text is an attempt at giving importance to the popular level of the discourse. As I previously stated, a big part of the scholarship on Chinese nationalism has been focused on the role of the Chinese Communist Party as promoter of ideas on what is (and what is not) part of Chinese national identity (Zhao, 2004; Callahan, 2006). By looking at online discourse instead of traditional media, I aimed to provide a more holistic picture of the values and images present in this discussion. Second, since social media platforms have become the place for discussion on cultural values and the sites for collective representation (Iacovino, 2014), looking at word choices and themes in this debate can shed light on the categories and assumptions the Chinese online community gravitates around. Digital communication, especially since the Web 2.0 innovation, creates dynamic streams where users are influenced by the online narrative while playing a vital role in constructing it, where they can recreate and reinforce certain concepts in a passive way (witnessing the microblogging discussion and internalizing it) and most importantly in an active way (posting on

social media) (Ismangil, 2019: 235).⁶ Therefore, discourse analysis needs to be brought to the online sphere.

3.2 Methods of data collection and analysis

With respect to data collection, I gathered and selected comments on Weibo at different stages between the months of February 2019 and March 2020. I searched for comments on the D&G mishap according the following relevant hashtags: **#D&GAdvertisement**; to #D&GSuspectedOfHumiliatingChina; #D&GHumiliatesChina: #D&GapologisesInChinese; #DolceGabbana; D&GGetTheHellOutofChina; #BoycottD&G. I then selected them based on a preliminary translation of their content, therefore excluding those posts which although containing the hashtag on the discussion did not actually comment on it. When selecting, I gave priority to the comments released in the two months immediately following the mishap. I also gave particular attention to those marked as popular, "hot" (remen 热门) by Weibo. Remen is one of SinaWeibo's functions, which allows the users to find the most frequently reposted and commented on posts (Lagerkvist and Sundavist, 2013: 142). At one point in the data collection, I realised the comments available were either reproducing the same exact slogans as those already collected, or they did not directly speak to the main discussion, therefore, since my research aims to be qualitative and not quantitative, I considered the body of comments collected until that point (150 in total) as sufficient material to conduct my analysis. The aim of my research is not to state that everyone on Weibo shared the same opinion on the topic, but rather to outline what were some of the imageries present in this discussion and to analyse to what extent they fit into the narrative of popular nationalism.

I coded the material by applying tags connected to key topics such as symbolic meaning of chopsticks, love for the nation, insulting slurs, self-critique, humiliation, boycott. For each post, I collected text, images (if present), and available metadata (time of posting, number of reports, geolocation if enabled). I looked at wording and grammar structures, alongside metalinguistic indications of tone and nuance (see for example Tang, 2014 for the use of homophones in the Chinese Internet) to see

⁶ Web 2.0 is where the users actively create content. It is a development from the type of Internet where users could just read content without interacting. Studies on the Web 2.0 focus on the agency this new mediational mean created and what it means to share it in a

without interacting. Studies on the Web 2.0 focus on the agency this new mediational mean created and what it means to share it in a social environment (see Jones and Hafner, 2012).

⁷ Of this 150, only 116 are shown in the table attached in the appendix. The remaining posts were identical repetition of comments from the same strand and they did not require an in-depth translation, so I decided not to include them in the table.

how arguments were constructed. All the comments were originally in Chinese and translated by myself, unless otherwise stated.⁸

3.3 Limits of dealing with digital data

Social media platforms as target data sources can at the same time pose opportunities and challenges, as many limitations have to be taken into account. First of all, the brevity of the messages and the lack of context (Van der Weel, 2011) can be an irksome obstacle to the analysis. Users sometimes refer to other comments or events without references, or they make use of a language decipherable only by those already knowledgeable of a certain situation. Secondly, it can be hard to grasp the tone of a message only by looking at the text; sarcasm, criticism, and irony are sometimes very subtle and impossible to discern with objectivity and clarity. I tried to overcome this by contextualizing the message, looking at the linguistic implication of the words and by looking at other parts of the textual communication such as punctuation and emojis. Finally, one of the features of the Web 2.0, namely its immediacy and availability, makes it hard (if not impossible) to determine whether a comment was posted out of a well-thought-out consideration or if it was a temporary outburst of a feeling.

Having taken the above limitations into account during my research, I still believe a discourse analysis of social media text is the best way to approach the popular level of the discourse. The scale of social media exceeds by far that of traditional media, and although for the Chinese case we cannot speak of an unmediated and free channel, there is much diversity in the online sphere, a feature that I personally consider a great advantage, rather than a limitation, when trying to uncover the theoretical knowledges with which a group identifies itself.

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⁸ The coded material is available in a table in the appendix. The appendix table includes both original comment in Chinese, my English translation, author of the post and time of posting (divided in macro time frames in the development of the incidents).

⁹ In his study of subversive use of Chinese memes, Ismangil (2019) defines this impediment within the theory of Poe's Law, which states that when writing on the Internet, without a clear indication from the author, the line between parody and truth can be very subtle.

4 Discourse Analysis of Weibo Comments

In this chapter I analyse and interpret some of the comments that appeared on Weibo following the D&G blunder.¹⁰ I present recurring discourse strands in the posts and frame images and discursive techniques typical of popular nationalism that were frequent among the Weibo community. Furthermore, I consider how the users came together in commenting on the incident and collectively demanded a boycott of the brand.

4.1 Overview of the incident

In November 2018 the Italian luxury brand Dolce&Gabbana ran an online marketing campaign titled "D&G Loves China" to promote their upcoming fashion show due to be held in Shanghai on November 23. The campaign consisted of a series of short videos that were first posted on social media app Instagram on November 18, and then reached the PRC Internet later that day on the company's official Weibo account. The now infamous videos featured a Chinese model clumsily using chopsticks to eat typical Italian food such as pizza, spaghetti, and Sicilian cannoli. ¹¹ The Chinese voice-over of the video engages with the model in an arguably patronizing tone that piques when it hints that the cannoli might be "too big for her". Moreover, it described chopsticks as "those two little wooden sticks", a phrasing to which Chinese Weibo users reacted with fervour. The videos were criticized for different reasons, the main one being the trivialization of Chinese culture, alongside claims of racism (Global Times, 2018).

The situation further escalated when screenshots of a private conversation between co-founder of D&G Stefano Gabbana and an Instagram user showed the designer insulting China and Chinese people for being overly sensitive about the advertisement. Consequently, the conversation on the topic gained more attention. During the week between the 18 and 24 of November 2018 the controversy topped the trending list of Weibo topics of discussion, and hashtags related to it were reported to have reached more than 400 million views (What's on Weibo, 2018). The first tangible consequences of the mishap could be seen when several Chinese models and brand ambassadors declared they would not attend the runaway and even receded their contract with D&G (South China

¹⁰ I display sample comments in Figures to provide a visual aid for the reader. I directly quote passages from the comments when using them to support an argument, and interested readers will find the full text in the respective Figures for illustration. Said comments appear in my translated version and are identified through their coding number. Eg: Comment 1 of the appendix is referenced C1 in the analysis.

¹²In the leaked conversation, Gabbana uses an approximate English and calls China a "country of *pooemoji*", and "China Ignorant Dirty Smelling Mafia".

Morning Post, 2018). On November 21 "D&G, The Great Show" was cancelled. At this point, the word boycott appears more prominently in the comments and retailers of e-commerce platforms in mainland China and Hong Kong drop D&G products from their websites (The Guardian, 2018). The video apology issued by the two designers on November 23 did not placate the discussion, and comments addressing the incident flooded Weibo under different hashtags.

4.2 Popular nationalism on Weibo. The ingroup

The first theme I explore deals with the role chopsticks have had in sparking the outrage. As a matter of fact, a common indication of what prompted the online reaction regarded the feeling of misrepresentation of China and Chinese culture that the video advertisement caused. Many users considered chopsticks as a quintessential element of Chinese culture, not simple tableware but a symbol of cultural heritage, and they agreed that their inept use was an "insult", a "humiliation" to China.

C85

(...) #D&GHumiliatesChina. Chopsticks are a symbol of our classical Chinese culture; they are the crystallization of the wisdom of the Chinese people. Having our children learn to use chopsticks implies a continued tradition of our ethnic group's culture. (...)

C95

#D&G #Dolce&GabbanaDesigner, chopsticks contain thousands of years of Chinese traditional culture. You massive dog. #BoycottD&G.

Figure 1: C85, C95

Comments C85 and C95 (see Figure 1) exemplify the high regard online users shared towards chopsticks. They present them as the embodiment of a long-standing tradition, illustrated by the use of terms such as "crystallization" (*jiejing* 结晶) (C85) and contain (*yunhan* 蕴含) (C95), where the latter has a connotation of not only containing, but also accumulating through time. Chopsticks become a symbol of historical continuity, an emblem of the "thousands of years of Chinese traditional culture", a "continued tradition", with the verb *chuancheng* (传承) in C85 indicating a sense of inheritance, of a passed-on custom. Moreover, users show how they considered the misrepresentation of chopsticks offensive by their association of hashtags, namely #D&GAdvertisement, #D&GHumiliatesChina.

Interestingly, the thousands of years of culture motif is often associated with the concept that the outgroup is incapable of understanding Chinese culture. The outgroup appears in the comments through the usage of the pronoun "you", both singular and plural, although it is not always specified.

When a reference to the target of the comment is present, it refers to either D&G as a company, to Italians, or to westerners in general.

C49

#D&GAdvertisment. This is the culture we have inherited and passed on for thousands of years. It is not something you can understand. Now you even dare to boycott us. You first learn to be a proper person, then open for business!

C38

#D&Gfuckoff, D&G, you don't understand Chinese culture, please get the hell out of China. The wisdom of the ancestor, we have passed it on by ourselves.

Figure. 2: C49, C38

The delineation of a dichotomy of opposition, of us versus them, appears regularly through the comments. The choice of words such as "you even dare" (C49), and "get the hell out" (C38) have a charged meaning and entail hostility (see Figure 2). The use of pronouns also contributes to demarcate the distinction between the ingroup "we" and the outgroup "you". The comparative narrative is further enhanced in the many posts where the use of chopsticks as opposed to that of knives and forks contributes to draw a line that distinguishes ingroup from outgroup (see Figure 3 below). When this comparison appears, comments present a certain degree of hawkishness.

C56

Do you know what chopsticks are? (they are) the five thousand years of Chinese history, an ancient civilization, how much culture has accumulated, how much knowledge has settled (in them)? What is culture? Knife, fork, spoon, you can only use one per hand, but the Chinese ancestors told us to use a pair of chopsticks with one hand, which requires team cooperation, which requires flexible fingers, (you) can't use them, so you are jealous, so you don't acknowledge (them), this means you still haven't fully evolved, (you) need to melt down and rebuild again! #fuckoff #ChineseChopsticks #D&GAdvertisment.

C45

#DGAdvertisment. Knife and fork are cutlery discarded by China, Pizza originated in China, pasta originated in China, do you know history? You don't even have it clear where your food and tableware come from, so how can you say they are mighty, who gave you this courage? It's ridiculous, really.

C71

Monkeys can indeed use knife and fork, but there is no monkey who can use chopsticks......This may be the fundamental difference between animals and people. Those who do not respect others will only be abandoned. D&G underestimated the cultural pride of the Chinese. #DGEnough #DGAdvertisment #DGHumiliatesChina.

Figure. 3: C56, C45, C71

Again, chopsticks are presented as a symbol of cultural pride, as a receptacle for accumulated culture and knowledge (C56). The texts also make use of similar discursive techniques when addressing their potential audience. Rhetorical questions are a recurring device to reinforce statements, as is clear from the phrasing "do you know history?" (C45) or "do you know what chopsticks are?" (C56). Moreover,

I see an underlying sense of superiority pictured in phrasings such as "this means you haven't fully evolved", or in the parallelism between monkeys using forks and not chopsticks, which I interpreted as slightly derogatory.

The comments analysed so far could be interpreted within the social psychology definition of ethnocentrism, i.e. "the view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it" (Summer, 1906: 13 as cited in Barret et al., 2007). However, talking about ethnocentrism in the Chinese context can be quite problematic. The Chinese territory officially comprises fifty-six ethnic groups, therefore pointing out to which and how many ethnicities the Weibo community is representative of would be hard to determine. Likewise, it would be incorrect to state that a cultural trait like the use of chopsticks uniquely belongs to a certain ethnic group. However, I found the overwhelming preference in the posts for the use of the term *zhonghua* (中华 China) worth observing. Among the words available to refer to China, the term *zhonghua* can in fact have ethnic implications. Link (2008: 2) makes the case that this term could imply a Han hegemony. As he posits: "*Hua* appears in the names of both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, and in that kind of formal context is clearly supposed to apply to all citizens of the nation. Just as clearly, though, in daily-life contexts *hua* refers exclusively to the Han". One comment above all seems seems to particularly support this theory.

C82

You should learn to respect the Chinese style which you don't understand. #DGhumiliatesChina @Dolce Gabbana Let me show you the MinHuaHall's work @Minhua Hall. "I would like to go back to the Han and Tang Dynasties, and walk the palace corners once more, wearing my Han style clothes, I will rejuvenate the country with the etiquette, I would like to go back to the Han and Tang dynasties (...)"

Figure 4: C82

The post C82 (Figure 4) quotes a song titled "Return to the Han and Tang" (*Chonghui Han Tang*, 重 回汉唐) which in 2017 became the unofficial anthem of the Hanfu revival movement, a pop culture movement where young Chinese dress in Hanfu, i.e. Han dynasty clothes, to inspire appreciation towards China's cultural heritage. The user attaches to this post a series of Han clothing pictures and also mentions in the comment both D&G and the MinHua Hall, a company specialized in professional research and restoration of the Han ethnic group clothing culture, thus creating engagement through the platform and emotionally presenting their cultural roots. Therefore, this post could be interpreted

not only as a possible jab at Italian fashion, but also as an indication that Chinese traditional (Han) culture is superior to that of the offender. ¹³

Other comments that implied the term *zhonghua* did not, however, indicate any other reference to the Han ethnicity, so it is possible that the term was merely used as a synonym of *zhongguo*, China. Yet, some of the comments expressing how distasteful the advertisement was, were very specific in outlining the elements they considered an offensive misrepresentation of China. As commented by one user "the qipao, the hair tied up, slender eyes, tantalizing facial expression, a stereotyped image of an Asian female". ¹⁴ Regardless of their ethnic origin, I would argue that by defining what they do not deem representative, Chinese users are in turn reshaping what is commonly accepted about themselves.

4.3 Humiliation and victimization. The outgroup

Many posts resonated with the theme of humiliation by presenting the discourse on the victimization of China and Chinese people at the hands of a foreign element. What transpires from these comments is a strong sense of indignity and the idea that if foreigners dare humiliate China now, it is either because of their cultural inferiority, or because Chinese people are quick to anger but forgetful towards past humiliating incidents. As repeatedly pointed out by scholars, Chinese nationalists "care intensely about China's international image" (Gries, 2004: 31), something that consistently presents itself throughout the analysis of this discourse.

The first sign of the humiliation narrative can be seen in one of the most recurring hashtags associated with the controversy, namely #D&Gruhua (#D&G 辱华). The character hua (华) translates into "China", with all the aforementioned implications. The character ru (辱), can be a noun or a verb, and translates into "dishonour", "to bring disgrace and humiliation", and ultimately, "to insult". Derived from it are the verbs shouru (受辱), "to suffer humiliation", and wuru (侮辱), "to insult", "to humiliate". Among the possible nuances of the term, I have decided to translate the hashtag into #D&GHumiliatesChina, to better show how the discourse associated with it resembles the nationalist narrative. Since the humiliation perceived has to do with defending the honour of the Chinese nation,

¹³ The concept of Han hegemony on cyberspace has been theorised also by Leibold (2016), who argued that Han nationalists have found in the Internet the place to construct a narrative of the Chinese nation-state as fundamentally Han in its identity. Also relevant with regard to the Hanfu movement is Carrico's (2017) ethnographic work on race and nationalism in China. According to his research, the practice of wearing ethnic clothes is not just an innocent hobby, but a conscious affirmation of Han supremacy.

¹⁴ C43 in the appendix

I believe the translation "humiliates China" rather than "insults China" to be better suited for this context.

C

#DGHumiliatesChina. Here is China CN, for thousands of years how many foreigners have wanted to bully us? In the end there are only two words Fuck Off!

C98

#DGHumiliatesChina. Please don't bring this brand back in the future. Even after the situation subsides and cools off. Even if you don't buy this brand, the Chinese will not die, and furthermore it will not affect the country's development! Then

we have to boycott with honour until the end! [We]cannot be looked down upon by foreigners.

C66

#DGAdvertisment #GetTheHellOutofChina, [we] must never forgive, and there's also that idiot model, the great majority of foreigners still think themselves infallible, they look down on Chinese people while shamelessly earning our money.

Figure 5: C3, C98, C66

Several comments of this category employ a collective tone which tries to be representative of the community (see Figure 5). Phrases like "Here is China" (C3) emanate a sense of collective action, where the user is the spokesperson for the group. These posts emphasize that such a humiliation must not be forgotten. They also point to the humiliators, indicated with the generic term "foreigners". Said foreigners "think themselves infallible", "look down upon Chinese people" (C66) and want to "bully" China (C3). The recurrence of the term "bullying" (qifu 欺负) and phrasing like "we cannot be looked down upon" (kan bu qi 看不起) in C98 can be interpreted as the heritage of the national humiliation narrative. The phrasing "foreigners still think themselves" (hai shi hen zi yiwei shi 还是很自以为是) in C66 also confirms this hypothesis, in that it establishes a sense of historical continuity between the past and the present where foreigners are being accused of feeling superior to China. The term "bullying" is also frequent in one of the different nationalist slogans born from the D&G controversy, namely the sentence "China cannot be bullied, cannot be humiliated" (zhongguo buke qi buke ru, 中 国不可欺不可辱), which effectively embodies the emotional response the discourse sparked. 15 Moreover, with regard to the humiliation, many users resorted to expressions such as "who gave you the courage/the confidence to humiliate China", a rhetorical phrasing which implies anger and irritation. 16 The humiliation is perceived strongly as something to which the users have to react to, as shown by the sentence "we have to boycott with honour until the end" (C98). Defending the ingroup's honour is thus a central theme in the discourse. Humiliation and face are once again intertwined, and

¹⁵See for example C93 and C106.

¹⁶See for example C32; C45; C76; C97.

the tendency to defend collective self-esteem as a way of restoring face (Gries, 2004: 21-27) is here presented.

The comments reported in Figure 6 below also show some compelling findings. They outline an image of foreigners very much in line with nationalist hawkish attitudes, and declare that discriminatory behaviour is something that foreigners inherently possess. According to scholars of popular Chinese nationalism, it is the discourse on humiliation that creates the idea that the West is hostile to China (Ma, 2018: 307) and it could be on this premise that the culprit of the humiliation is here extended from D&G to a more generalized "foreigners". User from C32 asserts that D&G's discrimination is not casual, but specifically targeted towards Chinese people. The victimization narrative is once again disclosed; there is an underlying idea that such humiliation would not happen to other communities because, as other comments suggest, the discrimination has shifted from black people to the "yellow race".¹⁷

C32

#D&GHumiliatesChina, #D&GAdvertisment. Patriotism is indeed the main topic, Discrimination against Chinese means that regardless of your nationality or political tendency, as long as you have Chinese blood flowing in you, you will be discriminated against by D&G. If this situation had been discriminating black people, D&G would have gone bankrupt in three days, but instead now they dare do this, it means [for them] that bullying Chinese isn't that tough enough to make a sense out of it.

C34

#DGHumiliatesChina. There are some Westerners, especially the part of arrogant and ignorant ones, who can't change the inferiority of barbarism in their bones. As soon as they came down from the trees, they killed and plundered the world, thanks to this they made a fortune and felt superior because of it. They simply don't comprehend what the splendid civilization of China has meant for thousands of years. Hard power and fist are the only languages they can understand. To win their respect from the bottom of their hearts, all the Chinese people have a long way to go.

C40

#D&GAdvertisement. I personally believe that racial discrimination is a very Western hemisphere's concept, it can be used and reused in the American continent and the European continent This D&G Case is more like stereotyping Chinese culture from a Eurocentric perspective.

Figure 6: C32, C34, C40

C34 and C40 also contribute to the victimization discourse and to outline the outgroup. Not only was the D&G mishap generalized into a more general western hemisphere type of behaviour, but C34 also presents an evident degree of hawkishness in asserting that "some westerners (...) can't change the inferiority of barbarism in their bones". By employing terms such as "barbarism" (yeman 野蛮) and "in their bones" (guzi li 骨子里), the user refers to the nature of westerners as something that "cannot change" (gai bu liao 改不了), as inherently inferior. The comment further enhances boundaries between ingroup and outgroup with its opposition of terms: yeman, barbarous, as opposed to wenming

¹⁷See C1 and C114 in the appendix.

(文明) civilized; between *liegenxing* (劣根性) deep rooted bad habits, inferiority and *canlan* (灿烂) splendid, dazzling (civilization). With a strong emotional tone, the post concludes with an inward reflection, which warns the community that in order to gain the respect of westerners, Chinese people "have a long way to go". The four-character expression employed to convey this concept is also significant, since *renzhong daoyuan* (任重道远) entails a tortuous journey made of suffering and challenges. Said choice of words is in line with the general tone of the post, overflowing with aggressive language like "hard power and fist" (*queshili he quantou*, 硬实力和拳头); the only possible way to tackle the coming journey toward respect. Additionally, it is important to notice how, when mentioning foreigners, some of these comments refer to a specific kind of foreign bully, as they often mention the so called *oumei guojia* (欧美国家), European countries and the U.S. For part of the Weibo community, as explicitly shown in C40, this is therefore the west some users refer to, this the outgroup, this the "them". 19

One of the features of Chinese popular nationalism described in the literature review, is the individuals' psychological attachment to the nation (Darr, 2011: 59), which creates an emotional form of consciousness (Schneider, 2018: 31) among the members of the community. For this reason, it is common in popular nationalist discourses to witness the coexistence of a personalized relationship between the individual and the nation, and at the same time a form of group loyalty shared with the community. As shown in the scholarly discussion on Chinese nationalism, humanizing one's homeland is a distinctive mechanism of nationalist narratives. In many of the analysed comments, users refer to China as a mother or a father, and to themselves as sons and daughters.²⁰

The prevailing sentiment emerging from such texts (see Figure 7 below) is that of love for the nation. In conjunction with this emotional tone, there is a clear pattern of personification of the nation, as evident in the different epithets conferred to China. China is "the motherland" (C31), the "father you'll never have" (C77) or is directly addressed in evocative phrasing such as "China, you are the best" (C30), "I love you China" (C27). Moreover, alongside the personification of the country into a parent figure, the attribute "my", in "my great China" (C105), "my motherland" (C31), conveys the idea of a personal relationship between the individual and the nation. In these comments, the "motherland" is glorified and appreciated with phrasings of the like "nothing can compare to you".

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¹⁸The expression derives from the Confucian Analects 8.7 and can be translated into "to bear heavy responsibilities through a long struggle".

¹⁹Other significant comments containing this explicit transposition are C40, C76, C114.

²⁰ See also C61, C80 and C81.

#DGDesignerRespondsOncemore #Dolce&Gabbana. I love my motherland.

C27

D&GAdvertisement. Fuck off fuck off fuck off, there is no one and nothing that can compare with my country, I love you *China flag emoji*

C30

China *Chinese flag emoji*, you are the best. #DGDesignerRepliesOnceMore #Dolce&Gabbana.

C105

#BoycottD&G starts with me. My great China cannot be violated.

C77

There is no such thing as bad chopsticks, there are only bad brains. China is the father you'll never have. #DGhumiliatesChina.

C112

My country, I won't let you belittle it, DG please get the hell out. #DG

C78

#dgAdvertisement #GetTheHellOutofChina. I came to this life in China without regrets, in the next life I will also be Chinese.

Figure 7: C31, C27, C30, C105, C77, C112, C78

Furthermore, Weibo users resorted to sentences such as "I won't let you belittle it", "it cannot be violated" (C105) to defend the nation. This last comment in particular, is significantly aligned with the rhetoric of victimization since it presents a vulnerable, abused, "motherland". A notable manifestation of national pride can also be seen in C78. The post conveys that being Chinese is an inherent characteristic of the individual, and through an almost poetic phrasing that can be summarised as "once Chinese, always Chinese", efficiently portrays that the users' loyalty lies in their nationality. Interestingly, the original Mandarin term the user selects to refer to their origin is first "Cathay" (huaxia 华夏), an ancient name for China, and then becomes "person from China", "Chinese citizen" (zhongguoren 中国人). This second part of the statement thus reinforces the historical continuity between the past "Cathay" and the present nation state, the People's Republic of China.

Among all the comments that manifest national pride, C27 and C30 exemplify a trend worthy of further analysis. Many comments included the emoji of the Chinese flag in their posts, something that I interpreted as an indication of nationalism. Such a display of love for the nation could lead the reader to make the assumption that they are in fact signs of patriotism. However, the flag is a symbol of national sovereignty and I posit that by including it in their comments, Weibo users are expressing a nationalist form of loyalty to Chinese institutions and their political autonomy (see Schneider's discerning of the terms in footnote 2).

Different researchers have pointed out that the Internet can become a channel for Chinese users to vent nationalist anger and build hostility towards a common target (Herold, 2012; Weiss, 2019). This trait appears consistently in the D&G controversy online debate, as evident from the overwhelming part of the comments which resorted to coarse language and name-calling to delineate the object of their statement. As Link (2008: 4) points out, "the negatively based nationalism can be stronger than the sympathetic version". The company has been defined as a "peasant brand", a "rotten thing", "inferior", "low brand". The designers and Italians were described as "uncivilized", "stupid bitch", "shitmakers". Posts also employed a wide range of terms to indicate foreigners, from the neutral "person of a foreign country" (waiguoren 外国人), to others with recognized negative connotation such as "foreign devils" (guilao 鬼佬). The company name appears distorted in several comments into "DoG", "D*pooemoji*G" and trashD&G. Lastly, part of the insults contained in the posts were also directed at the model acting in the advertisement, who was called "dumb" or "demented" and even disgraced for having accepted such a job.

C44
#BoycottDolce&Gabbana, the table manners of trash D&G are fucking disgusting! This fucking advertisement is racial discrimination! Who the fuck uses chopsticks like this?

Figure 8: C44

Comment C44 (Figure 8) is illustrative of the issue I just raised. What is immediately striking is the repetition of swearwords and the derogatory attribute "trash" associated with D&G. Both elements were however displayed in the original comment through an indirect mode very common in Chinese online communication, namely the use of homophones or morphs. The creator of this post adopts the characters 辣鸡 (*laji*), spicy chicken, as equivalent for the term 垃圾 (*laji*), trash, thus conveying mockery and dislike in an indirect way. Likewise, the cursing terms repeatedly utilized appear in a contracted form "tm" or "tmd", a short version of the vulgar *tama*, *tamade*, which can be translated with a generic "fuck". Elements such as this are what make online textual communication difficult to access, as this shared set of meanings that Internet communities create further enhances the distinction between who can understand the reference and who cannot. In other cases, however, the vulgarity was not this subtle, as demonstrated for example by a comment which quotes "you have holes full of shit in your brain". ²²Overall, comments from this category are indicative components of the emotional quality of the discourse. Alongside vulgarity and derogatory adjectives, the posts often

²¹I use here Chen et al.'s (2013: 96) definition of morph in Weibo usage: "A morph is an alternate form of a preexisting, original word or phrase. In conversation (online or offline), the morph can be substituted for the original". Morph is a variant word adopted in place of another word, which differs in characters but maintains phonetic resemblance to the original meaning. In Chen et al.'s research, morphs are employed to avoid censorship on Weibo.

²² C67 in the appendix

make display of sentiments of anger, frustration, embodied in phrasing like "your brand has angered us", with verbs like "provoke anger" (renu 惹怒) or "righteous ardor" (rexue 热血).

Another prominent element in the posts was the extension of the target of the anger from D&G to Italy. As I mentioned before, it is notable to observe how this pattern of denigration of the other does not seem to have a stable target. If the majority of comments is directed at D&G as a brand or at Stefano Gabbana in particular, there is however a clear trend of extending the sentiment initially targeting the brand to Italy or to the West (see Figure 9 below).

C83

#dgAdvertisment. Now I've really started to dislike those Westerners, to dislike Italians, to dislike this utterly unfriendly race of people, boycott them.

C100

#DG. Italy is a magical country, after 2000 years since Rome was defeated in battle, after the colonial times when it was beaten by Ethiopians, the most magical thing is that they still discriminate all over the place.

C65

#DGAdvertisement. I have already suffered this long enough, other than grandpa Lippi and Gattuso the rest of Italy is trash.

Figure .9: C83, C100, C65

What C83 presents is exactly this process of blame extension. The verb employed in the comment is *taoyan* (讨厌), which I translated as dislike to be faithful to the grammar structure of the original, but that could also be translated as "cannot stand" and even "hate". The dislike it describes is charged with emotions and resentment, first towards D&G as evident from the hashtag, then toward westerners, towards Italians and to "this race of people". The term employed to refer to westerners is also not a neutral one. The term *guilao* derives from the Cantonese *gwailou*. It is an ethnic slur Cantonese people used to refer to Caucasians. It derives from the Cantonese belief originated in the 19th century that white people are mostly red-bearded and green eyed. Whether this term is still considered pejorative or not has been much debated, however without a prevailing argument (Cummings and Wolf, 2011). C100 and C65 are other remarkable comments that belittle Italians.

Among the vulgar language examined so far, a consideration is in order with regard to a specific term, namely *gun* (fuck off 滚). The swear word was one of the preferred modes of expression of anger throughout the whole discourse. I here posit that it has a charged meaning, which has implications of defending the national sovereignty of China, and is, therefore, a clear sign of popular nationalist discourse. The word has the meaning of "get out", "leave", but brings with it a sense of hostility to the argument, a connotation of lashing out, and it is consequently more correctly translated into

"scram", "fuck off". The primary use of the term *gun* is hence to confer hawkishness to the posts. More interesting is the second purpose it can serve, that is the aggressive defence of China's right to rule its borders. One of the formulations in which the character often appears is in the compound "D&G, get the hell out of China" (*gunchu zhongguo* 滚出中国). With this phrasing, Weibo users are defending the nation's political as well as geographical boundaries and are expressing a politically charged nationalist sentiment.

Comments such as these are in line with the idea that Chinese popular nationalism is significantly driven by a moral calling to defend the "motherland" from humiliation as theorised by authors like Callahan and Gries. They are embedded with an emotional tone which draws from the historical sense of victimization and aims to clearly define a distinction between the ingroup and a different other, sometimes resorting to coarse language in doing so. It is fair to also acknowledge that although not prominent in the discourse, some users were critical of the sometimes extreme aggressiveness on Weibo, especially when derogatory comments were directed at the model of the advertisement. Notably, one user (C58) said they felt the ingroup had to protect the girl instead of insulting her and secure her safe return to the "motherland".

4.4 Boycott D&G: the language of resistance

From the beginning of the controversy, the Weibo response to the humiliation presents a call for a collective action to boycott the brand. First signs of this tendency are noticeable in the comments as early as November 19, one day after the incriminated videos were released. Ever since then, Weibo users urged their countrymates (and celebrities in particular) to firstly not attend the D&G fashion show as a form of protest, and then to not purchase D&G products altogether. We can therefore see a first stage of boycotting targeted specifically at the event (which was eventually cancelled) and a second one aimed at damaging the brand itself. The second phase became a more consistent movement after Stefano Gabbana's comments were leaked to the PRC Internet on November 21. Posts containing a call to boycott manifest the features of consumer nationalism as described by Jiang (2012) in that they see in the act of boycotting a moral duty of every Chinese citizen to defend their nation.

In the framework of consumer nationalism, people defend the nation's pride with their consumer choices. Accordingly, many comments (such as those displayed in Figure 10) demonstrate that Weibo users felt confident in their market power and exploited it (at least in words) to show loyalty to the

nation. Phrasings like "let's see how they are going to survive without China" (C36) or "you wouldn't exist without Chinese people's consumption anyway" (C67) are examples of this.

C36

Let's see how they are going to survive without China, quickly withdraw from the Chinese market! #DGAdvertisment.

C67

(...) Take your low-quality D&G products and get the hell away from here, you wouldn't exist without Chinese people's consumption anyway, that's right! (...)

C12

#DGShow #DGAdvertisement. A brand that should get the hell out of China, but any Chinese who has a bit of moral integrity and self-respect will not go.

C74

When a brand doesn't understand how to respect a country's culture, it is time for this brand to perish. #DGsuspected of insulting China #DGAdvertisment #DGDesignerRepliesAgain. As a Chinese person, can you accept this?

C86

(...) I ask you; do you still care about the honour of the Chinese? How many more of such incidents can we tolerate? Can we boycott until the end? Can we let those who humiliate China die and leave China? Can the Chinese brace up together? #DGHumiliatesChina #KoreanSade #TheWholeCountryBoycottDG

C89

I am in support of kicking D&G out of China forever and vow to never buy D&G products. I love China CN (...).

Figure 10: C36, C67, C12, C74, C86, C89

Moreover, many users urged the other members of the community to understand that boycotting and self-respect are necessarily intertwined. C86 resorts to the word *lianmian* (脸面) to formulate this concept. The term literally translates into "face" but can equally be interpreted with honour, as suggested by Gries (2004). Therefore, it is the duty of the Chinese Weibo community to restore face (which was damaged by the humiliation suffered from the outgroup) by "boycotting until the end". C74 unfolds along the same rhetorical technique by asking: "as a Chinese citizen, can you accept this?". Typical of the boycott strand's posts is a very evocative language, which invites compatriots to "wake up", "brace up", and "boycott altogether". This emotional tone is particularly strong in C89, where the user "vows" (*lishi* 立誓) to never buy D&G products out of love for China.

Another recurring trait in this category of comments was the referral to the 2017 boycott of Korean conglomerate group Lotte (*letian* 乐天).²³ Some users resorted to the incident either as a positive case of successful Chinese consumer boycotting, thus reinforcing the demand for D&G boycott, or to stress

²³In 2017 the Korean Lotte group was the target of Chinese consumer boycott after the company agreed to provide one of its golf courses (situated in China) for the instalment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence), an American anti-missile defence system.

the importance of continuing the boycott. The parallelism "boycott Lotte, boycott DG" (C84) hence demonstrates how consumer nationalism is not an isolated case, but rather a recurring behavioural trend. C72 (Figure 11) also offers a compelling consideration, since the comment directly tags the Communist Youth League Central, thus trying to stimulate the support of official institutions to the boycott.

C72

DGTheGreatShow #DGadvertisement #They said that this incident is the same as the other incidents except for Lotte. They said the media will cool off and things will return to normal. So, I was thinking, can we apply for a festivity called DoG? Every year we let the @Communist Youth League Central come.

C84

#DGinsults/humiliatesChina #LotteMatel I just went on Baidu and searched for Lotte, of all the 115 stores in China, it said that most of them went out of business, but actually Haoliyou and Haoduoyuare still being sold, I firmly believe [we have to] boycott Lotte, boycott DG.

Figure 11: C72, C84

A recurring expression in the boycott comments was the phrasing "D&G boycott starts with me". Traditional media reported of people throwing away their D&G bags and of main e-commerce platforms removing D&G products from their websites, showing in this way a form of tangible IRL boycott. However, when looking at textual online discourse, it is difficult to demonstrate that words were actually followed by action, as in the best of cases the posts only present the users' proclaimed intention to boycott.

C88

After hearing about the #D&GhumiliatesChina incident, I was very angry. I went back to the house to look for DG products but I found that I had nothing of the sort. Eventually, I pulled the letters D and G off the keyboard and threw them away. Patriotism must entail some kind of action.

C39

DGhumiliatesChina, I want to boycott, in any case I didn't like (their clothes) and I can't afford them anyway.

C11

(...) Take your keyboard and let's together insult DG to go back to their rightful place.

C94

People with money are all boycotting DG, I am a poor person, I looked thoroughly but discovered I don't have a single D&G item in the house, I was so mad that I removed the D and G from the keyboard.

Figure 12: C88, C39, C11, C94

The analysis of the comments seems to suggest that the D&G boycott was based on participation rather than action. According to this trend, the boycott's main achievement seems to be not so much creating economic damage to the brand, but rather reinforcing the ingroup's cohesion through the establishment of a common enemy. Texts including this type of 'keyboard boycott' (such as those

shown in Figure 12) present an apparent discrepancy between the act of boycotting, namely an intentional refrain from the purchase of something, and statements such as "I couldn't afford them anyway". By removing (or claiming to have removed) the letters D and G from their keyboards, Weibo users demonstrate how consumer nationalism is centred on its participatory nature, where joining the conversation is sometimes more important than taking action. As C88 maintains "patriotism must entail some kind of action", a phrasing which itself contains a visible discrepancy in the opposition of the strong modal verb "must" (bixu 必须) and the undetermined "some kind of action" (you suo xingdong 有所行动). Boycotting is therefore a participatory phenomenon expressed through the sentiment of anger and solidarity to the offended nation, where people are "angry to the point that" (C94) they would rather remove keys off their keyboards than not show their support.

This way of participating in the debate might appear questionable to some, if not completely out of the category of boycott, or it could be interpreted as an ironic way of some users to make fun of the outrage sparked online. Noticeably, a few users did claim they could not understand what the fuss was about or that it was ridiculous of their compatriots to claim they all possessed D&G products to throw away.²⁴ Nevertheless, it is still interesting to notice how this participatory element fits well into the description of Chinese consumer nationalism, where boycotting is expressive and it is focused on venting nationalist anger while at the same time providing ingroup cohesion.

When looking at the language in the comments focused on boycotting D&G, it is striking how an overwhelming part of the terms employed belong to the realm of militancy. The theme of struggle that is resolved with the boycott is best expressed in C115 (Figure 13 below), a comment imbued with the terminology of resistance. The user addresses their compatriots in "persevering" (jianchi 坚持) with the boycott, continuing to "resist" (fankang 反抗) and "fight until the end" (kanzheng daodi 抗 争到底). The comment also presents various of the other themes typical of popular nationalist narrative outlined so far. For example, it claims that a successful perseverance in boycott will "prevent the repetition of other humiliating incidents" and that the country cannot be offended.

²⁴ C46 and C116 in the appendix

Do not buy any D&G products to resist any discrimination against China.

C79

Chinese people have moral integrity, let DOG see, what is the so-called lowly money of the Chinese, what is the persistence of Chinese people #DGhumiliatesChina.

C115

(...) To be honest, our compatriots must persevere with the resistance, humiliating China can only be a big matter, not a small one, at present, the Italian news has indicated that they will not eat Chinese food, and they think that this matter will be diluted by time. I disapprove, if we really give up in such an environment, if after a bit of time has passed we really don't continue to resist, what will the Chinese nation be regarded as? As only knowing how to spend money? In the eyes of others, we will have become a banknote machine, with people coming and going as they please? D&G has suffered some financial losses so far, we just have to continue, and let the completely die in the Chinese market, and this will also effectively prevent the repeat of other humiliating incidents. Let other countries see that China is not a country that only knows about shopping, if you don't offend us, we'll let you make money; if you offend me, we will make life hard for you. Finally, I want to say that we must have perseverance to fight to the end, we mustn't let humiliation incidents happen again and again, we don't have to be those who are indulging in a life of luxury in the eyes of others. We must drive out D&G completely and let the world know the might of the Oriental Lion #D&G #D&GdesignerHumiliatesChina #dg #DGAdvertisement #StrictlyCannotTolerateViolation.

Figure 13: C41, C79, C115

Moreover, it shows the importance the user gives to China's image as presented to the world and emotionally addresses the ingroup with the question: "if we don't continue to resist, what will the Chinese nation be regarded as?". The user appears ultimately confident in China's power, as shown by their appeal: "let other countries see", "let the world know the might of the oriental lion". The image of China as a lion is particularly significant, since it has been associated before with Chinese popular nationalism discourse. As Gries (2004: 43-45) recounts, the idea of the sleeping lion that has awoken became in the 80s a symbol of resistance against old and new enemies (namely the imperial forces and, in the Deng era, the U.S.), a symbol of China's power and strength.

Another intriguing feature of Chinese popular nationalism is that a strong national pride is tantamount to a severe self-critique. In the Weibo discourse, those who do not persist in the boycott are branded as lacking moral character and blamed for being forgetful of previous humiliations (see Figure 14 below). Such comments are a general critique of Chinese people for allowing foreign forces to bully them, but were also prompted by D&G's counter marketing operations.²⁵

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²⁵Allegedly, according to some of the comments on Weibo, D&G shops all over China offered discounts to regain customer loyalty. I was not able to find any article officially confirming this practice across Chinese or English media, there is, however a consistent perception that discounts were offered that appears throughout the analysed Weibo discourse.

#DGHumiliatesChina, the Lotte case, the Sade[2], from something as big as country to a small shop and then even a person? Why do you repeatedly dare bully us Chinese sons and daughters? Perhaps sometimes the problem really lies with us, we are too forgetful. #DGHumiliatesChina #dg.

C48

#dg #DGAdvertisment. Fellow countrymen, other media has said about us that we are happy with discounts. Can't you help yourself? Do you have no appreciation for other products except dg ones? Don't wait for future generations to grow up and ask what brand are your clothes, then how will you explain it to them? Will you say that this is a brand which back in the days humiliated China? How will you explain it? Will you say that [they] came to teach us how to use chopsticks? Wake up, won't you? It's not like there isn't any other shop other than theirs. China, I love you.

C24

[1] feel sad for someone's misfortune, and feel angry for their non-resistance #DGHumiliatesChina

C50

#DGAdvertisement of course it's a humiliation against China, and of course we as a group are outraged, but many Chinese don't have a good memory! A humiliation against China is a humiliation against China, but will it be the same after a few days? Do you still remember the time of the Sade [incident]? Not long ago weren't Korean pop stars invited back [into the country] to make money?

Figure 14: C80, C48, C24, C50

The idea of not forgetting those who humiliated China resonates with the 1990s patriotic education's preaching, and the concept that Chinese people will not stand for other such humiliations in the future is present in many comments. Remembering the humiliation is an element to pass on to the future generations (C48) so that they, too, shall not forget who are those who humiliated. The posts present a tone of admonishment and disappointment towards the forgetful members of the ingroup, as evident in phrasings such as "can't you help yourself" (C48), "perhaps the problem lies with us, we are too forgetful" (C80). C24 is particularly hermetic in expressing its critique. The comment is a quote attributed to Luxun, a well-renowned yet controversial figure in Chinese literature, and translates into "feeling sad for someone's misfortune and feel angry at their non-resistance". When interpreted within the strand of self-critique, it could indicate a judgment of the author who feels sad for the ingroup's misfortune, perhaps for the humiliation suffered, but also feels angry at the ingroup's non-resistance to said humiliation.

Lastly, a comparison with the Lotte incident appears again in a self-critique mode in C50, since a year and a half after the Korean group incident, the user considers letting "Korean pop stars come here to make money" a sign that the boycott has faded, and admonishes the ingroup not to repeat the same mistake with D&G. Overall, the forgetfulness of the Chinese is addressed by Weibo users either as a positive encouragement or with a more subtle, pungent form of critique (see Figure 15 below for a further example of both).

It's 2019, let's not forget these two dogs!! D&G forever the hell out of China!!!!

C102

The Chinese truly are particularly forgetful. With every sort of humiliation incident against China, there is also every sort of boycott, but after a while there is also every sort of forgetfulness! Foreign brands, if you believe that you haven't reached your annual sales target, then welcome a wave of humiliation against China, this way not only you won't suffer financial losses, on the contrary, this will raise your total income, it is even more useful than an advertisement! Really, the memory of Chinese anger is very short, D&G has once again proved it.

Figure 15: C110, C102

Self-critique aside, boycotting as a response to the humiliation was mostly considered a successful way to demonstrate love for one's country and to preserve China's collective image to the world. To this day, the brand's products are not available on list.tmall.com and JD.com, the two most important e-commerce platforms in China.²⁶ Through the act of supporting the boycott movement (which does not necessarily entail IRL engagement) consumer nationalism meets the rivalry need set by the humiliation rhetoric. As triumphally put by one Weibo user: "Those who humiliate China will bring dishonour upon themselves, this is the best lesson we can learn from this", since "Ultimately, China is our most cherished luxury product".²⁷

36

²⁶This information was accessible with a simple search of D&G's name on the platforms, which simply did not appear. Retrieved from https://www.tmall.com/?spm=a220m.1000858.a2226n0.1.37c63cb4YKhCyQ and https://global.jd.com/ on 26 April 2020. Updated on 6 June 2020: the items are still not available.

²⁷ C106 of the appendix.

5. Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have discussed how the Weibo community reproduced specific narratives and discursive techniques typical of Chinese popular nationalism amid the "D&G humiliates China" incident. The research and its findings contribute to the debate on online Chinese popular nationalism and also shed light on boycotting practices as a new form of nationalist expression employed by Chinese Weibo users.

The analysis in chapter four presented a discourse that marks a clear distinction between ingroup and outgroup. The ingroup is offended for a misrepresentation of their culture, and accuses the outgroup of humiliating China. The online community then responds and defends collective self-esteem through a very emotional type of language. This includes on one side showing love and support for the nation, humanizing it and defending its sovereignty. On the other side, it results in extending the target of the outrage from the single company to a foreign nation, or to the West, often describing the outgroup through derogatory terms and insults. The perpetration of the images of "5000 years of culture" and "dazzling Chinese civilization" contributes in reaffirming historical continuity and pride felt by the ingroup. Accompanying this pride is also the rhetoric of national humiliation and victimization, pervasive throughout the discourse, where many users felt that this episode was another case of a foreign country bullying China and Chinese people.

The case examined seems to fit into Jiang's (2012) description of consumer nationalism outlined in chapter two. The discussion of the findings indicated that Weibo users found within their market power the premises to show support to the nation and initiated a boycotting movement through their comments. Expressing the will to boycott on the social media platform met the need for rivalry against the offender, and at the same time created cohesion among members of the online community. Indeed, by only looking at textual evidence, it was impossible to determine whether the online call for boycott was followed by IRL engagement, and to what extent this movement actually damaged the brand. Nevertheless, the discourse presented a collective call to action where users described participating and boycotting as a moral duty. The boycotting trend emerged on Weibo is therefore a form of retaliation focused on participating in the conversation and dismissing the foreign threat, something in line with the definition of expressive boycott (Klein et al., 2004).

Finally, I would argue that what makes this online debate compelling is that it is a conversation from the ingroup to the ingroup. The fact that this outrage emerged on Chinese social media (although admittedly it did start on Instagram), suggests that this conversation is important for Chinese's definition of the collective self. What unfolded on Weibo is a narrative from Chinese people, for Chinese people. While I am aware that my limited sample of comments might not be representative

of the discourse in its entirety, the aim of this research was not to trace and analyse all the comments discussing the controversy, but rather to test whether the features emerging from this discourse had any relation to the bigger debate on Chinese popular nationalism. Comments with less aggressive, milder language were present in the discourse, but were never directly contrasting the nationalist narrative coming forth from the rest of the debate, nor were they redirecting the outrage towards other issues as in similar cases of online popular nationalism studied before.²⁸ What remains clear and important to notice is in fact the perpetration of a dichotomy of us versus them, of respect and retaliation, themes that resonate loudly with the framework of popular nationalism.

All of the above elements contributed to answer the question: "What can the boycott D&G movement tell us about Chinese online popular nationalism today?". They outline a nationalist attitude naturalised through the online discourse and present social media platform Weibo as the site for the discussion of collective self. Moreover, they demonstrate how popular nationalism can stem from apparently superficial incidents that have little to do with political debates. What the D&G case emphasises is also the employment of brand boycott as a response to a perceived humiliation, thus showing how Chinese popular nationalism and boycotting practices are intertwined. This is especially relevant when considering that they increasingly appear as two associated phenomena, something I was able to notice while conducting my research. As a matter of fact, since the D&G case, many other brands were subject to Chinese consumers' outrage and social media platforms like Weibo were once again the preferred site for users to vent their dissatisfaction. Among the most recent cases, Burberry was accused of misrepresenting a traditional Chinese family (2018), Leica was targeted for portraying a foreign reporter witnessing the event of Tiananmen (2019), and lastly both the NBA and Versace were accused of intervening in China's internal affair for their stance of the Hong Kong protests of 2019. The triptych misrepresentation - nationalist outrage - boycott is shaping up to be a consistent trend worthy of close examination. Consequently, my dissertation could serve for future scholars and practitioners interested in the development of nationalist discourse online in response to alleged foreign misrepresentation of China. Furthermore, this study could call for further research on the IRL engagement following boycott trends and verify in detail the loss that D&G suffered following this controversy.

My personal prediction is that this type of phenomenon will continue to arise and will inevitably be enhanced by the volatile, fast-paced nature of social media. Nationalist outrages online seem to generally fade away with time, but they certainly can say a lot about the collective image of a community and might have an impact on the shaping of said communities in the long term. Therefore,

²⁸ See Feng and Yuan's (2014) study on Weibo's opinion over the Diaoyu Island dispute.

anyone who is interested in the direction of Chinese popular nationalism and the way China at the popular level is formulating ideas and accepted truth about itself, should definitely look at platforms such as Weibo, in the context of apparently trivial incidents like the one I have analysed.

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Comments Index

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
1	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	不良老猫	#DG广告非常种族主义#仔细看了这个广告,简直可以做种族主义的典型案例了。中国作为一个单一种族(黄色人种),在文化语境里根本没有种族主义的经验,有的人看不明白,有的只能诉诸民族主义。显性的种族主义:公开贬低有色人种,不跟有色人种有任何往来接触;隐性的种族主义:能跟有色人种往来一起工作甚至交朋友,但是受不了"什么?你们有色人种后然想要求跟我们一样的权利!!!"这个广告根本不敢把那位亚洲面孔女士换成黑人	#DG 广告 很 racial 主义 # After reading this ad carefully, it can be a typical case of racism. As a single race (yellow race), China has no experience of racism in the context of culture. Some people cannot ignore it, and some can only resort to nationalism. Explicit racism: openly depreciating people of color and not having any contact with people of color; implicit racism: being able to work with or even make friends with people of color, but can't stand "What? You people of color I actually want to claim the same rights as us!!! "This advertisement did not dare to replace the Asian face lady with black	
2	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	张德基MT	#DG辱华。中国有句老话自作孽nie不可活在 我看来这已经不是一般的错误了而是骨子里 的卑劣这种卑劣行为是文化根基的必然果我 是一个文明人但此意大利在我心里就是一坨 狗屎'shit emoji'感恶心到想吐	#DG humiliating China. There is an old Chinese saying you cannot escape a disaster/ sin you committed (note: Mencius said this). In my opinion, this is no longer a common mistake, but the despicable behavior in the bonnes is the inevitable result of the cultural foundation. I am a civilized person, but this Italy is a shit in my heart. * shit emoji * feeling sick and vomiting	ITALIAN CULTURE INFERIOR AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE HUMILIATION HASHTAG
3	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Philchu	#DG辱华 这里是中国cN, 几千年来了多少想欺负我们的歪果仁,最后只有俩字滚(Gun)蛋(Dan)!	#DGinsultsChina, Here is China CN, for thousands of years	US VS THEM VICTIMIZATION, WE'VE BEEN BULLIED GUN COARSE LANGUAGE, BEAT IT
4	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Sophia tsitsi	#DG Get the hell out of China!! (comment in English)	#DG Get the hell out of China!! (comment in English)	
5	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	多lzn	DG不是爱中国,爱中国人民币	DG doesn't love China, it loves Chinese people RMB	DG ONLY WANTS MONEY CONSUMERISM
6	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Mmmmmmmong	粉丝粉的脑子都进水了 国家荣誉感都没有的人其实很可悲.不仅是粉丝.明星也一样。 圈钱的同时希望还是保留一点自尊和人格	Fans' brains are full of water People who don't have a sense of national honour are actually sad. Not only fans, but also stars. At the same time, I hope to retain some self-esteem and personality.	NATIONAL PRIDE NATIONAL HONOUR
7	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	喜欢最好的	能怎么办。。。你说说骂着爱豆不要去吗?赶 紧把修挂了的好 爱豆也不用毁约这破玩意 也可以滚的好。	What can be done you talk about cursing them/scolding the idols (superstars, fashion models) into not going? Let's hurry up and shut down the show for good. The idols don't have to breach contract and this rotten thing can go fuck off/get the hell out.	GUN, FUCK OFF BOYCOTT: SHUT DOWN THE SHOW
8	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Gachy	跟这种有歧视实锤的品牌合作,感觉反而会 影响形象,我觉得粉丝还是联名向公司提议 不要去比较好吧	Cooperating with such a discriminatory real hammer brand, it feels that it will affect the image (of those cooperating with it), I think the fans better jointly propose to (their) company to not go (to the show), that way would be better. // jointly propose to the company they will not go.	
9	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	一人之语	所以小时我就知道大利不是 啥好东西 #DG 辱华 "XXX的屁,震天地穿过铁丝网,来到意大利意 大利的国王正在看 戏闻到这股屁,非常的满 意召集全国,都来放屁放的响,当校长放的臭, 当教授不响不臭,思想落后"	So when I was little, I already knew that Italy is not something good. #DGhumiliatesChina. "XXX's fart, shattered through the barbed wire, and arrived to Italy. The king of Italy was watching a game and smelled this fart, and was very satisfied so he summoned the whole country. They all came to make farting noises, the headmasters fart was stinky, the professors' fart was soundless and not stinky, their backward thinking'	NURSERY RHYMES DG=ITALY, insults Italy to insult DG
10	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	共青团中央 CCP YOUTH LEAGUE VERIFIED ACCOUNT	我们欢迎外国企业来华投资兴业,同时在华 经营的外国企业也应当尊重中国,尊重中国 人民。这也是任何企业到其他国家投资兴 业、开展合作最起码的遵循。@ Dolcegabbana #自取其辱	We welcome foreign companies to invest in China, at the same time foreign companies operating in China should respect China and the Chinese people. This is also the minimum requirement for any enterprise to invest in other countries and start cooperation. @Dolcegabbana # Self-inflicted dishonour	RESPECT CHINA SELF-INFLICTED DISHONOUR AUTHORITIES APPROVAL OF POPULAR DISCOURSE
11	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	你说6不6	人家是大使 人家都不去了还发表了自己的立场。祖国被骂了不是让你来辱骂迪丽热巴的。带着你的键盘一起骂DG去对的地方出力吧	Everyone is an ambassador. Everyone is not going and expressing their stance/opinon (sarcasm?). The fact that the motherland has been insulted doesn't mean you can insult Dilireba. Take your keyboard and let's together insult DG to go back to their rightful place.	INTERNET FOR CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BOYCOTT MOTHERLAND INSULTED
12	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	沂风公么哒	#DGshow/DG广告 一个应该滚出中国的牌子但凡有点骨气和自尊的中国人都不会去的	A brand that should get the hell out of China, but any Chinese who have a bit of moral backbone/integrity and self-esteem will not go.	BOYCOTT (1st phase, boycott the show) GUN. Fuck off, not a neutral term _o Used in colloquial MORAL INTEGRITY
13	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	小87呢	你他妈到底是在意辱华还是在意今天你巴姐有没有被黑?她呼吁爱国以及带动爱过的能力都大过你几千几万倍:)。国家高于一切。这时候就别黑华人了,有这利害劲对辱华的使去:)	In the end do you fucking care about having humiliated China or that you (and your sister) were hacked today? Her ability to call for patriotism and drive love has been thousands and thousands of times greater than yours:). The country is above everything else. This time don't vilify the Chinese, let this person who has such an interest in insulting China go/leave.	Emoji sarcastica look for info Aggressive language NATIONAL PRIDE: the country is above everything else PATRIOTISM/nationalism
14	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	对对对我是乔妹	G哟别取消啊,真的蛮期待的哎 *dog emoji* 想看几百件衣及空着乱 飘	Don't cancel it I was looking forward to see many dresses floating	POSITIVE OPINION
15	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	长腿秀妍的毛毛丝	关注你自家就好了别刷存在感了	Just pay attention to yourself and it'll be enough, don't give (them) attention (reason to exist)	AVOID CONFLICT The best way to fight them is not talk about them POSITIVE OPINION
16	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	咸猪elen	路人,人家都表态了并且作为品牌大使损失应该也很大这个时候就不要借机踩人了	Hey strangers, everyone has expressed their views and the loss as a brand ambassador should also be great. Don't take the opportunity to step on people at this time.	POSITIVE OPINION
17	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	KUN我是你的喵	赶紧滚出我大中国1#DG广告	Quickly get the hell out of China	GUN

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
18	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	陈胖嘟嘟呀	哈哈哈取消了	Haha show is cancelled	SHOW CANCELLED
19	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Sabrinashangs	I挺心疼为这个秀付出心血的中国工作人 员 为这么个作死的品牌工作	I feel sorry for those Chinese workers who put heart and blood working for a dead brand.	IN AND OUT GROUP: compassion for compatriot and death for outgroup EMOTIONS
20	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	我所看到的不归路	欢送DG下线	Let's send DG off to get off line	BOYCOTT hint ONLINE ENGAGEMENT to send someone offline
21	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	享受孤独的欢愉	中国人的凝聚力不可小 觑 *emoji del braccio che resiste* 这种乡巴牌子永远滚出 中国!	The cohesion of the Chinese cannot be underestimated. This kind of peasant brand has to get the hell out of China forever!	OUTGROUP DENIGRATION: paesani COHESION OF THE PEOPLE: group movement
22	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	流浪的鱼 yucky	矮油这么巧,自己傻不要就认为别人不聪明?中国不欢迎你么!	Oops, what a coincidence, Don't think others are not smart just because you are stupid? China doesn't welcome you!	CHINA DOESN'T WELCOME YOU OUTGROUP DENIGRATION: you are stupid
23	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Junzlixx	今晚的dg秀我不去了不好意思大家 im Chinese	Tonight I'm not going to the show, I'm sorry everybody, I'm Chinese	NATIONALITY= source of personal pride
24	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	大小齐齐小大。	袁其不幸,怒其不争 #DG辱华	feel sad for someone's misfortune, and feel angry and regretful for his / her non-resistance.	ANGER CHINESE SYMBOLS: LU XUN
25	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	lion r念	不取消等着被人 砸场吗对哦我们是有素质的 人, 还是自己滚回你们国家去吧	You don't cancel the show, are you waiting to be hit off the stage by people? Yeah, we are people with character/inner quality, you better let yourself sod off to your country.	GUN MORAL QUALITY US VS THEM dialectic
26	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)		#D&G大秀取消 D*shitemoji*G辱华!遭到那 么多本土明星抵制果然晚上的上海大秀取消 了吧!真是作得一手好死, 活 该!	DG the great show canceled, DshitG insulted China! After so many local celebrities boycotted the show naturally the night in SH was cancelled! You really did this to yourself(death), serves you right!	BOYCOTT DEROGATORY TERM: SHITemoji
27	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	我心似猛 Tiger	#DG广告 滚滚滚,没任何人事能和我的国比, 我爱你 Chinese flag emoji	Fuck off fuck off, there is no one and nothing that can compare with my country, I love you (China flag)	GUN: sovereignty PATRIOTISM: I love u nothing compares
28	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	橘子橘子橘子皮W	就拜托彻彻底底再您妈的见吧!中国不需要 你们这种又当又立的人	Goodfuckingbye! (added nima between zai and jian) China doesn't need people like you who are bitches but act innocent.	They speak on behalf of the country. Me=the country COARSE LANGUAGE
29	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	虎门太平小子★	D&G设计师被曝辱华遭众人抵制,上海大秀已宣布取消!这是不够的,应该令其产品从此在中国市场销声匿迹!	D&G designers have been accused of insulting China and boycotted by the public. Shanghai grand show has announced its cancellation! This is not enough, (we) need to make those products disappear in the Chinese market from now on (lit. vanish without trace)!	воусотт
30	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	Adam0616	中国*ChinaFlagemoji*你是最好的. #DG设计再次回应. #杜嘉班纳	China you are the best	PATRIOTISM CHINESE FLAG
31	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	唐艺昕	#DG设计再次回应 #杜嘉班纳. 我爱我的祖 国	I love my motherland	PATRIOTISM: personification of country EMOTIONAL: love
32	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	咕咕kk	扯爱国才是偏主题, 歧视华人的意思就是,无论你什么国籍,什么zz倾向,只要你流着华的血,你都被D&G歧视了。这事要是歧视黑人,D&G能三天破产, 现在他们敢这么搞, 就是欺负华人没那么强硬敢闹好不好.	Patriotism is (indeed) the main topic, Discrimination against Chinese means that regardless of your nationality or political tendency, as long as you have Chinese blood flowing in you, you will be discriminated against by D & G. If this situation had been discriminating black people, D & G would have gone brankrupt in three days, (but instead) now they dare do this, it's (for them) bullying Chinese people isn't that big of a deal.	POLITICAL ORIENTATION. BULLY and VICTIMIZATION narrative RACISM
33	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	嘿皮太暴躁了	希望以后别买这个牌子,就让他凉了吧,长长 记性	I hope in the future (we) won't buy (from) this brand, let him cool down (i.e. become unpopular), and always remember (lit. have a long memory, learn from our mistakes)	BOYCOTT MEMORY
34	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	上善同海波	DG辱华。有些西方人,尤其是其中狂妄愚昧的一部分,骨子里就改不了野蛮排它的劣根性。他们自己刚从树上下来就满世界杀戮、掠夺、靠此发了财便自以为优越,根本不了解中华几千年的灿烂文明意味着什么。硬实力和拳头是他们唯一听得懂的语言。要赢得他们发自内心的尊重,全体华人任中道远。	Some Westerners, especially the part of arrogance and ignorance, can't change the inferiority of barbarism. As soon as they came down from the trees, they killed and plundered the world, and made themselves proud by making a fortune there. They simply did not understand what the splendid civilization of China has meant for thousands of years. Hard power and fist are the only languages they can understand. To win their respect from the bottom of their hearts, all Chinese are in charge	CULTURAL SUPERIORITY
35	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	橘子橘子橘子皮W	就拜托彻彻底底再您妈的见吧!中国不需要 你们这种又当又立的人	Please thoroughly go fuck yourself! China doesn't need	
36	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	不知道叫什么的大白 yoyo	我还等着他们没有中国好好的活下去呢,赶 紧退出中国市场吧#DG广告	Let's see how they are going to survive without China, quickly withdraw from the Chinese market.	CONSUMER NATIONALISM
37	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	等等42510=	最近看了关于二战的视频才发现,原来意大利当初只是德国法西斯的狗腿子而已,好意思不尊重别人.	Lately I've watched a video on World War II, originally Italy was merely the fascist lapdog of Germany, now wonder they don't respect others (and it has the nerves to not respect others.	GENERALIZATION: DG→China RESPECT
38	Unspecified	米卡门商	#D&G滚. D&G,你不懂中国文化,请滚出中国! 老祖宗的智慧,我们自己传承	DGfuckoff, D&G, you don't understand Chinese culture, please get the hell out of China, the wisdom of the ancestor, we have inherited/passed it on by ourselves.	CULTURAL differences: you don't understand. A tradition from the ancestors we passed on
				, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	INGROUP-OUTGROUP: our culture, you can't understand.

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
39	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)	軽 不归	D&G号华了,我要抵制反正既不喜欢,也买不		BOYCOTT CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: failure of
		释不归	起!		it it
40	Unspecified		#D&G广告. 我个人觉得种族歧视是一个很Western hemispheres的概念在美洲大陆欧	I personally believe that racial discrimination is a very Western	ORIENTALISM
		pr3ssna	洲大陆用一用可以这次D&G这个Case更像 'stereotyping Chinese culture from a	concept, it can be used and reused in the American continent and the European continent This D&G Case is more like 'stereotyping Chinese culture from a eurocentric perspective	WEST VS EAST, US VS THEM RACISM: a western concept
41	18-21 Nov (pre		eurocentric perspective.	conscripting commence can are now a career man paraperation	BOYCOTT
	Gabbana leak)	头号管家婆	不买D&G任何产品来反抗对中国任何的歧视行为	Do not buy any D & G products to resist any discrimination against China	DISCRIMINATION
42	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)			There are people who say that this sharp and mean derogation	FACE
		好大一只奶皇包	还有人说这种尖酸刻薄的贬低不是岐视,是国人不自信?拜托不自信验红的该是D&G,	is not discrimination, it is Chinese people who are not confident? The one not confident should be D & G when testing	DISCRIMINATION MORAL CHARACTER
			2018了思想还如闭锁落后气量也如此之小 丢的怕不是你高贵意国的脸。	the people. In 2018, the ideology/thinking is still this locked and backwards, the moral character lost with so little, I am afraid that it is not the face of your noble country.	SELF CRITIQUE, we should not lose face.
43	Unspecified		@ Dakotaaaan.这广告到底想说明什么??@ 满城狂草加. 旗袍, 挽发,细长的眼睛,挤眉弄	@ Dakotaaaan. What does this advertisement really mean? @ 满城 狂草 加. Qipao, hair tied up, slender eyes, tantalizing	ORIENTALISM
		五 举 65.1#	眼的挑逗,一个刻板到极致的 亚洲女性形象。	facial expressions, a stereotyped extreme image of an Asian female. Coupled with dimly lit, strange Chinese decoration, and	
		语养的描	配上昏黄灯光 诡异的中式装修, 和台词里的性别歧视。这哪是一个品牌的广告,简直像 1920年拍摄的异国风情妓院介绍片,D&G把上海当成什么了.	sexism in the script. (how is this) This is not a brand advertisement. It simply looks like the presentation of an exotic brothel filmed in 1920. What does D & G want to make of Shanghai?	representative, outdated and sexist
44	18-21 Nov (pre Gabbana leak)		#抵制杜嘉班纳辣鸡D&G的吃相真tm恶心!这	#Boycott Dolce&Gabbama, the table manners of trash	BOYCOTT early stages
		樱花下的喵小	广告tmd就是种族歧视!谁tm会这样用筷子?	D&G are fucking disgusting! This fucking advertisement it's racial discrimination! Who the fuck uses chopsticks like this?	RACIAL DISCRIMINATION COARSE language
45	22-23+ Nov		#DG广告#刀叉都是中国淘汰了的餐具, 披萨起源于中国, 面食起源于中国, 你 们懂不	Knife and fork are cutlery discarded by China. Pizza originated in China and pasta originated in China. You do n't understand	allapativa valupavit
		八月飞雪54710	懂历史, 你们连自己的食物和餐具是怎么来的都弄不清楚就在那里 说伟大, 谁给你的勇气?真可笑	history. You do n't even know how your food and tableware come from, so you say great there , Who gives you courage? It's ridiculous	CHOPSTIKS, YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND OUR CULTURE
46	22-23+ Nov		整天要把人家 视频里的模特是要逼死么 就 特别没意思 没有脑子		
		Phaeton	要骂去骂设计师啊 导火索是设计师的话。斗自己人神经病啊 非得看人家要自杀了才高	I think that chopstick video is nothing to fuss about	POSITIVE COMMENT
			兴? 而且我个人觉得那个筷子视频没什么大惊小 怪的		
47	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba		D&G辱华事件已经过了很久, 身为学生也不知道现在中国民众的态度, 其实最怕的就是	The D & G insult to China has been a long time ago. As a	
			有些人的风向会转向同情D&G上,不管是出于何种理由,他都不值得同情。说实话,同胞	student, I do n't know the attitude of the Chinese people now. In fact, the most feared thing is that some people 's wind will turn to sympathize with D & G. For whatever reason, he is not	
			们要坚持抵抗, 辱华事件只可大, 不可小, 目前意大利的新闻有表示不吃中国餐, 还认为	worthy of sympathy. To tell the truth, compatriots must persist in resistance. The incident of insult to China can only be big	
			这件事会被时间冲淡,我不以为然,如果在这样的环境下我们真的放弃,时间久了以后	and not small. At present, the Italian news has stated that it will not eat Chinese food. It also thinks that this matter will be	
			真的不再继续反抗,中华民族会被当成什么,只知道花钱?在别人眼中变成了一个钞	diluted by time. I do n't take it for granted. I really give up. After a long time, I really don't continue to resist. What will the Chinese nation be regarded as, and only know how to spend	
		玺欢你的星	票机, 想来就来想去就去? D&G目前已经遭	money? In the eyes of others, it has become a banknote machine. Come and go whenever you want? D & G has	BOYCOTT. ENDURE. EASTERN LION
			受一定损失, 只要我们继续, 让它在中国市场彻底失去活力, 也会有效杜 绝其他的辱华	already suffered certain losses. As long as we continue to make it completely inactive in the Chinese market, it will	EASTERNLION
			事件的重蹈覆辙, 让其他国家看看, 中国绝不是只知道购物的国家, 你不犯我们, 我们	effectively prevent the repeat of other insults to China. Let other countries see that China is by no means only a country that knows about shopping. You do n't commit us, We will give	
			就给你钱赚:你们若犯我,我们让你吃饭都难。最后我想说,我们一定要有毅力去抗争	you money to earn; if you commit me, we will make it difficult for you to eat. Finally, I want to say that we must have	
			到底,不要再让辱华事件层出不穷,不要成为别人眼中的纸醉金迷,我们要把D&G彻底	perseverance to fight to the end, do n't let the insults happen in endlessly, and do n't become a jealous fan in the eyes of	
			赶出去, 让世界知道: 东方雄狮的威 #D&G##D&G设计师辱华##dg##DG广告#	others. We must completely drive D & G out and let the world know: the power of the Eastern Lion # D & G ## D & G designers shame ## dg ## DG 广告 # Strictly not to be violated	
48	22-23+ Nov		严不容侵犯(爱你) #dg##DG广告# 国人们, 人家媒体都这样说	# da ## DC 广生 # Poople and other modic hous said this to	
			咱们了, 人家就是打折, 你 们就忍不住了吗?除了dg你们对其他的商品就没有欣 赏力	# dg ## DG 广告 # People and other media have said this to us, they just discount it, can't you help it? Do you have no appreciation for other products except dg? Don't wait for future	
		Meydng	了吗?别等到后代长大成人了,问起你这衣服是什么牌子的,你怎么解 释?你会说这是	generations to grow up and ask what brand of clothes you have, how do you explain? Would you say that this is a brand	CONFUCIAN VALUES. GREAT CHINA. BOYCOTT
			当年侮辱我大中国一个牌子 吗?你会这样解释吗?你会说为了教我们大中国用筷子吗?	that insulted my Greater China back then? Would you explain it this way? Would you say to teach us how to use chopsticks in Greater China? wake up? May I? It 's not that there is no other	
			醒醒吧?可以吗?不是除了它没有其他商品了,中国CIN我爱你	product besides it, China CN I love you	
49	22-23+ Nov	慕容梓皓	#DG广告# 这就是我们传承了几千年的文化 不是你们能理解的. 现在还敢抵制我们 你	#DG 广告 # □This is the culture we have inherited for thousands of years. It 's not something you can understand.	CONFUCIAN VALUES. GREAT
			们先学会做人 再开门做生意吧.	Now dare to resist us. Learn to be a person first, then open a door to do business.	CHINA. BOYCOTT

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
50	22-23+ Nov	勤奋的王菀之	#DG广告#当然是辱华了, 我们当然群情激奋了, 但是很多中国人就是没 记性啊, 辱华就辱华了, 过不几天还不照样哈上去?还记得萨德那会儿不, 前不久 韩国明星不是又被邀请来捞钱了?	The DG advertisement of course it's a humiliation against China, and of course as a group we are outraged but a lot of Chinese people don-t have a good memory!. A humiliation is a humiliation, but will it be the same after a few days? Do you still remember the time of the SADE incident? Not long ago weren't Korean pop stars allowed back in the country to make money?	BOYCOTT. BOYCOTT IN SOUTH KOREA
51	22-23+ Nov	北冥游的逍遥鱼	最近发生的事情太多了。先#DG广告#引发热议,后#薛之谦起诉李雨桐#,热搜的更新越来越快,似乎每一天都有明星出轨、都有企业倒闭,以及那些关于某事件千次百次的反转出现——随后网民的倒向就偏来偏去。那如果当群体的力量具有了这纯好——到群体的力量具有纯粹的破坏性,这将是一种什么样的存在呢?当群体的力量具有纯粹的破坏性	There have been too many things happening recently. First #DG 广告 # caused a hot discussion, and then # 薛之谦 suited Li Yutong #, search engines updates are getting faster and faster, it seems that every day there are celebrities derailed, there are business failures, and those reversals about an event thousands of times Appeared-then the netizens turned around in reverse. So if the power of the Dang group is purely destructive, what kind of existence will it be? When the power of the group is purely destructiver	Consideration on chinese internet users
52	22-23+ Nov	是顾慧欣啊	#DG广告#才突然想起去年在朋友那里用拿货价几百块买了副镜框,就是杜嘉班纳的,因为不常戴眼镜还没来的及配镜片就出事了现在真的是戴之无味,弃之可惜	#DG 广告 # Suddenly I realized that those glasses support I bought last year at a friends' place was actually Dolce and Gabbana. Since I dont wear glasses that often it slipped my mind, ut nowit feels really itchy to wearwhat a pity	BOYCOTT SARCASM
53	22-23+ Nov		D&G道歉做假, 可谓铁证如山	Their excuses are false	APOLOGY NOT ACCEPTED
54	22-23+ Nov	单口相声式黏人慕	#DG广告# 对于一个群体, 不好的刻版印象, 就应该算歧视。和玻璃心, 和不了解无关。	DG advertisement, a bad stereotype of a community counts as discriminatiion, it has nothing to do with beign soft hearted/overly sensitive.	DISCRIMINATION
55	22-23+ Nov	Conqueror——	#DG涉嫌辱华##DG广告#筷子七寸六分, 代表七情六欲;一头圆一头方,天圆地方;太 极是一,阴阳是二,合二为一,阴阳调和,万 物归一。自己知识浅薄导致内心单薄的骄傲 自大,不反省,必灭亡!	Chopsticks are 7 inches in 6 points, representing 7 emotions and six wishes, one side is round, the other is squared, just like the sky and heart. Tai Chi is one, Yin and Yang are two, the two are one, reconciled together and all is one. The superficial knowledge of choptsicks brings upon pride and arrogance. If you don't reflect on yourself, you will perish!	CHOPSTICKS
56	22-23+ Nov	牛轶慧	知道什么是筷子吗?中国五千年历史, 文明 古国, 有多少文化底蕴, 有多少知识沉淀? 什么是文明, 刀, 叉, 勺, 你只能一只手用一 个, 可是中国老祖宗就告, 诉我们一只手用一 欠好, 需要团队合作, 需要手指灵活, 不会 用, 就嫉妒, 就不承 认, 说明你还没进化完 全, 需要回炉再造! gun#中国的筷子##DG 广告#	Do you know what chopsticks are? (they are) the five thousand years of Chinese history, an ancient civilization, how much culture has accumulated, how much knowledge as settled (in them)? What is culture? Knife, fork, spoon, you can only use one per hand, but the Chinese ancestors told us to use a pair of chopsticks with one hand, which requires team cooperation, which requires flexible fingers, (you) can't use them, so you are jealous, so you don't acknowledge (them), this means you still haven't fully evolved, (you) need to melt down and rebuild again! #fuckoff #ChineseChopsticks #D&GAdvertisment.	SIMBOLO KUAIZI. NOI SIAMO PIU EVOLUTI
57	Unspecified	shanning宁二	我真的,不能不发个微博了,shit#DG广告# 2长沙·咸嘉新村	I really can't help but post a Weibo, shit # DG 广告	Shit DG, the ad was racist
58	22-23+ Nov	-MengZhi-	()孤儿剪辑坑了多少人,"塑造"了多少和模特本人性格想法完全不符的情况屡见不鲜。一个年纪轻轻的女生在国外打拼,在这个水数的时候真的很了不冠军,有的人直过了18岁。屈指可数的世界冠军,有的人直过了18方。有的人直过了18方。在,脑子里还在装屎!看到许多人都那里了解到这几天都在为模特本人做思想在恶了解到这几天都在为模特本人做思想工作。一个女孩"被"背负这他与看到出了事法的人是如此的陌生与恐怖,看到出了事法,我们不是伸手希望她不要在外跑,实验上看,我们不是伸手希望她不要在外跑,实验不是她的人是如此的时间,而是抗拒她,拒绝一个现在不是他的难过,她面对的不是她身边的人,而是,国人们	She is still in a foreign country. Seeing that people in her country are so strange and terrifying. After seeing what happened, we are not reaching out to hope that she will not go outside and hope that she will return to the motherland, but resist her and reject her.	DON'T INSULT THE MODEL MOTHERLAND
59	22-23+ Nov	李安豆豆	#中国筷子文化##DG设计师再次回应##DG 广告# 你这个品牌已经惹怒我们,请滚出 去,再怎么回应都没用。L李安豆豆的微博 视频	#中国 咕子 文化 ## DG Designer responded again ## DG 广告 # Your brand has angered us, please get out, no matter how you respond, it is useless. L Li An Doudou's Weibo video	GUN, ANGER
60	22-23+ Nov	instahp	#DG广告# 视频解读本来就有很强的主观性,不同人有不同看法。说实话如果没曝出辱华言论,我没觉得广告有什么问题□况且我们看到的是最终的广告视频,模特可能也并不了解后期的制作和宣传。也给明星艺人提个醒,接活的时候真得考虑周全。但解读真的很有主观性。模特最好也该道个歉,但网友有些过激了	#DG 广告 # Video interpretation is inherently subjective, and different people have different opinions. To be honest, if there is no humiliating remarks, I do n't think there is any problem with the advertisement. Moreover, what we saw is the final advertisement video, and the model may not understand the post-production and promotion. It also reminds celebrity artists that they really have to be thoughtful when picking up the job. But the interpretation is really subjective. Models should also apologize, but netizens are a little too aggressive	NO PROBLEM, BUT THE MODEL SHOULD APOLOGIZE SELF CRITIQUE

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
61	22-23+ Nov	刁民走开莫挨老子zzz	希望中国人少一些贱骨头,少一些记吃不记打的奴才,不要风浪过去之后接着跪舔。举国反抗歧视,很感动也很热血,各身是靠了一把。台独藏独什么独的,这是我们中国人的态度,不拿自己当中国人就别逼逼了,因为你连最基本的人种歧视都看不出来,是非正义都不分,没资格跟我们这个文化水平的人。话。杜嘉班纳设计师本身就人品有问题,在杜交网络上评论新娘子和服 cheap,说赛有所铺垫了,这个设计师活该有此一报应。或早或晚,是不过让你中国爸爸赶上了,you are branded for life,for racism. #DG全网致歉#DG用中文道歉##DG大秀取消##DG两贯发声明##d嘉班纳视频致歉声明##杜嘉班纳中文道歉##杜嘉班纳	I hope that the Chinese people have less bones and less slaves who remember to eat and don't remember to beat. The whole country resisted discrimination and was very moved and enthusiastic. The major e-commerce companies finally became nationally conscious. The celebrities are finally reliable. Taiwan is independent and Tibetan is independent. This is our Chinese attitude. Do n't force yourself if you do n't treat yourself as a Chinese, because you ca n't even see the most basic racial discrimination. People of this level of education speak. Dolce & Gabbana designer himself has problems with his character, commenting on the bride's dress cheap on social networks, saying that Selena ugly now this kind of thing happened, it was already foreshadowed in heaven, this designer deserves it This retribution. Sooner or later, it is just to make your Chinese dad catch up, you are branded for life, for racism.	SELF-CRITIQUE DADDY CHINA INTERNAL POLITICS CULTURAL SUPERIORITY
62	22-23+ Nov	魏子碩Astro	刚从终于把杜嘉班纳的"起筷吃饭"看了两遍。可能我是颗钢化玻璃心,只能把它归为毫无笑点的调侃。就像我们调侃印度人会下手抓饭一样,只是不同的在于,我们还拿不出什么国际奢侈品来让人家举国抵制。 #杜嘉班纳##DG广告# 2杭州·转塘	Wei Zishuo Astro I have just finally read Du Jiabanna's "Eating Up Chopsticks" twice. Maybe I'm a toughened glass heart, so I can only classify it as a ridicule without laugh. Just like we ridicule Indians for pilaf, the only difference is that we can't come up with any international luxury products to make the whole world resist.	воусотт
63	22-23+ Nov		去找你洋爹, 中国筷子养不起你。#DG广告#	Go find your foreign father, Chinese chopsticks can't afford you. #DG 广告 #	ANTI FOREIGNER
64	22-23+ Nov	明月照芳心	每一双,都不简单。说句不好听的,不仅每一双"筷子"你用不起,连它夹过的每一道菜肴你都吃不起。"筷子"不仅是中国人的餐具,更是一种文化,一种传承。#DG广告#	Each pair is not simple. It's not good to say that not only can you not use every pair of "chopsticks", you can't even eat every dish it has sandwiched. "Chopsticks" are not only Chinese tableware, but also a culture and a heritage. #DG 广告 #	CHOPSTICKS CULTURAL ELEMENT DENIGRATION OF OTHER
65	22-23+ Nov	曹振坤1015	#DG广告#我已经忍很久了, 意大利除了银狐大爷里皮和加图索都是垃圾 2深圳·梅林居	DGadvertisement, I have endured this long enough, other than for silver fox Lippi and for Gattuso the rest of italy is trash	ITALY SUCKS
66	22-23+ Nov	虞姬的弓	#DG广告#滚出中国, 永远不要原谅, 还有那个白痴模特, 大多数外国佬 还是很自以为是一边看不起中国人一边又不要脸的赚着我们中国人的钱	#DG 广告 # Get out of China, never forgive, and that idiot model, most foreigners still think that they look down on the Chinese and shamelessly earn our Chinese money.	GUN HUMILIATION (foreigners look down on us)
67	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba	HLMR·华利美人	想说————————————————————————————————————	Does D & G designer Stefano Gabbana have a split personality or get ghosted? ? The logic of various insults in the front, but also like Chinese culture in the back? ? Our Chinese culture tells you: "There are five evil people, but theft is not arrogant: one said that the heart is up to the risk, the second one is remote and firm, the third one is hypocritical and defensive, the fourth one is ugly and boisterous, and the five is ugly It's a matter of course. If there is one of these five, you can't avoid the sentence of a gentleman. "Oh, I'm afraid I will translate it for you, and you won't understand it. Such an idiot, we in China don't need you to like it and take you with you. How far does the "low-level DG" brand roll out, exit the Chinese market, anyway, you do not survive on Chinese consumption, right! !! Hard gas point to be rolled! !!Oh, and then that advertising video, without saying what it wants to express, just say the picture, how beautiful do you think you guys are shooting? How advanced is it? ? How creative is it? ? ? You look at the model, the ugliness is pretentious, the posture is pretentious, and the yin and yang are strange, what is a great pasta? Obviously, why should the noodles be eaten with a fork? There are pits and shit in the brain. Our tableware is called "great chopsticks", and the disgusting model with incomplete hand and foot cerebellar development is really not used? *POG 大 秀 更新 ## DG 广告 ## 杜 嘉班纳 #Finally, to say that you do n't need to direct your self-directed apology. You, get out first and then disappear completely. !!But you need to remember that when we are in China, you TM is still mud!	AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE CONFUCIAN QUOTE You wouldn't understand our culture
68	22-23+ Nov	JAMIſĖ	#杜嘉班纳#发布涉嫌歧视华人的#DG广告#中国明星群体抵制"辱华"品牌秀】17日,Dolce&Gabbana特别拍摄了一个把中国传统文化与意大利饮食相结合的广告片, 我在此代表着贵州省贵安新区,做为一个中国公民应做的事情,不会同意有那一个人侮辱国家的人!中国区N(CHINESE FLAG IMAGE)	Dolce & Gabbana specially shot a commercial that combines traditional Chinese culture with Italian food,I am here on behalf of the Gui'an New District of Guizhou Province. As a Chinese citizen, I will not agree to someone who insults the country! China CN	CULTURE MISREPRESENTED=NATION INSULTED POPULAR NATIONALISM (making a stance for your country)
69	22-23+ Nov	余温浅浅77	要学会先做人, 在做事。人都做不好, 做的就不叫事了, 那叫 □#DG广告#	You have to first learn to be a person, then do stuff. if what you do isn't good, then it's not called business, it's called shit. DGadvertisement.	CONFUCIAN VALUES AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE
70	22-23+ Nov	Zym温暖	我们不接受道歉 凉了已经 中国不会相信第二次。昨天为什么不道歉 现在才道歉你觉的可能吗有钱也不买Dg 垃圾 特嘛的 #DG广告#LZym温暖的微博视频	We do not accept the apology. It is already cold. China will not believe the second time. Why did n't you apologize yesterday? Now I apologize. Do you think it 's possible? Do n't buy Dg garbage if you have money. #DG 广告 # LZym Warm Weibo video	BOYCOTT CHINA DOESN'T ACCEPT THE APOLOGY

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
71	Unspecified		猴子 确实也会用刀叉 , 却从没有哪个猴	Mankaya II da yaa kabaa aad fada II badaa aadaa I	CULTURAL PRIDE
		倪小妮anny	不可以 不可以 不可以 不可以 不可以 不可以 不可以 不可以	Monkeys □ do use knives and forks □, but no monkey □ uses chopsticks This may be the fundamental difference between animals and people. Those who do not respect others will only be abandoned. D & G underestimated the cultural pride of the Chinese. # DGEnough ## DG 广告 ## DG 辱 华 #	CULTURAL DIFFERENCES CHINESE CULTURE MORE EVOLVED
72	22-23+ Nov	茧微微cc	#DGTheGreatShow##DG广告#他们说这次事件除了乐天以外的其它事件一样,新闻冷处理,然后就又回归正常,所以我觉得吧,可不可以申请个节日叫dog节呀每年一次来着@共青团中央	# DGTheGreatShow ## DG 广告 # They said that this incident is the same as the other incidents except LETIAN (KOREAN), the media will cool off and things will return to normal, so I think, can we apply for a festivity called DoG? Every year we let the Communist Youth League Central come.	DENIGRATING LANGUAGE/TAG REFERENCE TO BOYCOTT NATIONAL PRIDE
73	22-23+ Nov	中意0938	自取其辱!长点心吧以后!世界上人人平等,文化不同但不等于你就可以歧 视, 可以去侮辱。学会尊重,特别是你要去赚中国人的钱, 就更该了解和尊重中国的文化。你们的广告包括平面广告都打着擦 边球, 其实并不是这次事件的导火索, 设计总监的不当言论才使事件闹大。是你们自己的管理出了大问题, 去反省反省吧。@DolceGabbana #dg广告##D&G#	Despise yourselfl After a long snack! Everyone is equal in the world, and different cultures do not mean that you can discriminate and insult. Learn to respect, especially if you want to make Chinese money, you should understand and respect Chinese culture even more. Your advertisements, including print ads, are all playing with the sidelines. In fact, it is not the fuse of this incident. The inappropriate comments of the design director made the incident big. It's a big problem with your own management, let's reflect on it. @DolceGabbana #dg 广告 ## D & G #	GABBANA IS THE PROBLEM DONT DISCRIMINATE
74	Unspecified	今天吃瓜了吗-	当一个品牌不懂如何尊重一个国家的文化的时候也是你这个品牌可以灭亡的时候了#DG涉嫌辱华##DG广告##DG设计师再次回应#O网页链接ODG再发声明,并用中文道歉,作为中国人,你接受吗?	When a brand does n't understand how to respect a country 's culture, it 's time for your brand to perish. # DG-legal humiliation ## DG 广告 ## DG the designer responded again # Oweblink ODG to reissue and apologize in Chinese , As a Chinese, do you accept it?	воусотт
75	22-23+ Nov	Mr 大	DG在ins上撤销了道歉视频, DG你真的刚! 我真希望你能一战到底。#DG辱华	DG has already removed the apology from Instagram. DG you are so awesome! (sarcasm). I really hope you can be fought til the end #DGhumiliatesChina	воусотт
76	22-23+ Nov	丘无貉	#辱华。追了好久的POP醒和PIPI凡第十期。 白金之醒和界非凡痛打意大利佬的片段竟糟 强制删除?后来搜索才知道DG辱华广告和 INS的事。那个广告也是 逻辑清奇,为什么要 用筷子吃披萨?卧糟(WOCAO)中国人为啥 要吃披萨?怪特是被降智打击了么根本不会 用炭子好吧。在美留学表示西方那些资 有灵魂的辣鸡食物,著不是没有正经中餐,狗 才会吃啊!而且炸薯条坡萨意面沙拉蛋糕冰 淋统统拿筷子吃给你看好嘛(仅限外卖拿回 家吃的情况)沙雕洋鬼子(SHADIAO 杀掉)! 谁给你们的自信,自己的食物不好吃还觉得 美食世界第一的中国人会喜 欢吃西餐。	#Humiliation/dishonour to China. I've been following the 10th season of POPxing and PIPI van (satirical online cartoon)for a long time. 白金之醛和界非凡 (due weibo blogger famos') beated the Italian fella and forced him to delete his leaked (comment)? Only later after I searched (online) I found out about DG's insulting advertisement against China and the stuff about INS. That advertisement is also logically clear/strange, Why use chopsticks to eat pizza? For fuck's sakes Why would Chinese people eat pizza? Was the model hit by dementia? would n't it use chopsticks at all? Studying in the U.S. shows that those soulless spicy chicken foods in the West are not eaten without serious Chinese food, and dogs will eat it! And the French fries Possa pasta salad cake ice cream all eat with chopsticks. (Take-out only when you take it home) The sand carving foreign devil! Who gives you confidence, your food is not delicious, and you think that the world's first Chinese food will like Western food.	foreign invaders Foreign = American
77	22-23+ Nov	m林深涉鹿	哪有不好用的筷子,只有不好用的脑子.中国, 是你永远得不到的爸爸 #DG辱华	There is no such thing as difficult to use chopsticks/bad chopsticks, only difficult to use brains/ bad brains. China is the father you'll never have. #DGhumiliates China	DENIGRATION OF OTHER CHINA=DAD
78	22-23+ Nov	文轩 Sandy	#dg广告#滚出中国! 此生无悔入华夏,来世还中国人!	Chinese without regrets in this life, Chinese after life!; (I entered) this life without regret into China, the afterlife/next life (I) will also be Chinese!	NATIONALISM: Chinese forever CHINA= HUA No mention of the add aside from fuck off from China
79	22-23+ Nov	叶竹离叶篱.	中国人有骨气一回 . 让D0G看看,什么叫中国人的底线,什么叫中国人的坚持 #DG辱华	Chinese people have moral integrity/strength of character, let DOG see, what is (called) the lowly money of the Chinese, what is (called) the persistence of the Chinese . #DGhumil/insult	Chinese people moral strength PERSISTENCE CHINESE FLAG ATTACHED
80	22-23+ Nov	Dylan儿是个小太阳.	#DG辱华, 乐天事件、萨德 大到一个国家小到一家店一个人?为何敢频频欺压于我们中华儿女头上也许有时候问题真的出在我们自己身上,我们实在太健忘了#DG辱华井#dg #中国一点都不能少(la cina non e da meno)	DG insults China, the Letian case, Sade, from a (whole) country to a small shop and (even) to a person? Why do you repeatedly dare bully us Chinese sons and daughters, Maybe sometimes the problem really lies with us, we are too forgetful	Mention other cases of boycott Chinese sons and daugthers Bully Victimization Self-criticism! So as to REMEMBER!!never forget
81	22-23+ Nov	次元包V	#DG华#DG大秀取消DG设计师再次回应 文诛笔伐,为祖国妈妈尽一孝心《小强100》日 更	Here's an art attack, to show filial piety to the motherland	MOTHERLAND FILIAL PIETY DOG shit
82	22-23+ Nov	二九乔	你应该学会尊重你不懂的中国 风. #DG辱华 @ Dolce Gabbana小秀一下明华堂@明华堂 【我愿重回汉唐,再角徽宫商。着我汉家衣裳, 兴我礼仪之邦我愿重回汉唐,再谱盛世华章 何惧道阻且长,看我华夏儿郎。】2018年12月 01日	You should learn to respect the Chinese style you don't understand #DGinsultsChina @ Dolce Gabbana Let me show you the MinhuaHall (work)@Minhua Hall [I would like to go back to the Han and Tang Dynasties, and then the corner emblem palace business. In my Han family's clothes, I like the country of etiquette. I would like to go back to the Han and Tang Dynasties, and make another magnificent chapter. Don't be afraid of the way and long, look at my Chinese son Lang.] □ incorrect.	HAN nationalism In group-outgroup You don't UNDERSTAND chinese customs (misunderstanding) HANFU revival
83	22-23+ Nov	用户6611600881	#dg广告现在开始讨厌那些鬼佬,讨厌意大利人,讨厌这个一点也不友善的人种,抵制他们.	Now I start to loathe/dislike/ I cant standthose Westerners, to loathe Italians, to loath this utterly unfiendly race of people, boycott them.	BOYCOTT FOREIGN DEVILS HATE DG= HATE ITALIANS = HATE WESTERNERS

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
84	22-23+ Nov	乔慧子	#DG辱华#乐天玛特 刚刚去百度搜乐天,115家在华超市 说是差不多都倒闭了,但确实好丽友,好多鱼还在卖呀,坚定信念,抵制乐天,抵制DG。	#DGinsults/humiliatesChina #LotteMatel I just went on Baidu and searched for Letian, of all the 115 stores in China, it said that most of them went out of business, but actually Haoliyou (brand of cake) and Haoduoyu (nome di un prodotto di snack coreano, sono sottomarche del Gruppo Letian), are still being sold, fortify your conviction, boycott Letian, Boycott DG。	BOYCOTT (2° phase, don't buy). Letian comparison Strengthen your faith, belief (believe in the cause)
85	22-23+ Nov	娄情mon	#DG辱华 DG前段时间辱华的事件同得沸沸扬扬。这一起由筷子引发的事件辱华事件,身为中国人我们要明白。筷子是我们中国的古典文化的象征,也是中华人民智慧的结晶,孩子们学会使用筷子,意味着咱们民族文化的传承! 今天营老师就针对宝宝应不应该学用筷子,怎么学,给大家好好讲讲。希望每位中国妈妈们都能让孩子把筷子这个老祖宗留下来的好东西用好。	The incident of DG's insult to China some time ago received a lot of buzzing. We as Chinese must understand this incident which humiliated China and was caused by chopsticks. Chopsticks are a symbol of our Chinese classical culture, and the crystallization of the wisdom of the Chinese people. Children learning is the inheritance of our national/ethnic culture! Today, Yu the honorable XX teacher focuses on whether babies should learn to use chopsticks, how to learn, she will show it to everybody. I hope that every Chinese mother can let the children use this good things left by the ancestors called chopsticks.	CHOPSTICKS CULTURAL VALUE CHOPSTICKS SYMBOL OF CHINESE ETHNIC GROUP
86	22-23+ Nov	w09668	D&G已经删除了官方道款视频,决心与中国断裂。还推导意大利人不要购买 Made in china的产品。他们还说放心,他们抵制不了多久的。杭州大厦的 D&G店有一顾客要求,希望能退存款。中国店员却回应:"放心啦,这两天生意还好,抵制只是暂时的,这只是临面在哪里?2017萨德事件,乐天照样凉掉。乐天说:"不用担心,他们非常市侩,无骨气无血性,我们降价他们就买。根据以往的经验,他们最多抵制一段时间,像刮阵冈。"甚至韩国媒体说:"中国人已经这样的事件还有很多,我们就可以能不能抵制到底?能不能让辱华者死出中国?中国人能不能振作起来?#DG辱华排(Discrimination)#辱华#韩国萨德#萨德#china##全民抵制DG#收起全	D & G has already deleted the official video of apology, determined to break off with China. It also infered that Italians should not buy Made in china products. They also said they rest assured that the boycott will not resist for long. The D & G store in Hangzhou Tower has a customer request, hoping to refund the deposit. The Chinese shop assistant responded: "Relax, business has been okay in these two days, and the boycott is only temporary. This is only a temporary storm. It will be fine in two days." Where is the face of the Chinese?. With The 2017 Sade incident of Letian also cooled off, and Letian said: "Don't worry, they are very marketable/profiteer, consumers, they have no moral integrity, no blood. If we reduce the prices they will buy. Based on past experience, they will boycott at most just for a period of time, like scraping. Even the Korean media said: "The Chinese have forgotten! I ask you, do you still want the face of the Chinese? How many more of such incidents can we (endure/tolerate)? Can we boycott til the end? Can we let those who humiliate/insult China get the fuck off/die while leaving China? Can the Chinese brace up/ pull themselves together? #humiliation #discrimination #the whole nation boycott	BOYCOTT till the end BOYCOTT comparison with sade SELF CRITIQUE Chinese ppl should not endorse this MEMORY let's not forget the past humiliation or they will come back VICTIMIZATION how long will we endure stuff like this FACE, mianzi 脸面 smth on face and self-respect. Honour. Aggressive language: die out of China Forgetting and not boycotting is dishonourable, is losing face.
87	22-23+ Nov	章鱼王的宝贝们2018	#DG辱华 #DG再发声明D&G创屎人死不认错	#DGhumiliatesChina #DGissuesanotherstatement DG shitmakers won't recognize his/their mistakes.	OUTGROUP DENIGRATION Aggressive language
88	22-23+ Nov	凡大人的宝宝十关注 2018-11-22	听说了D&G华言论事件后,非常生气,回去满屋子找DG产品,发现没一样沾边的,最后把键盘上的D和G抠下来扔了,爱国必须有所行动.	After hearing about the D & G Hua speech incident, I was very angry. I went back to the house to look for DG products. I found that their had nothing like it. Finally, I pulled the D and G on the keyboard and threw it away. Patriotism must have taking action.	BOYCOTT: must take action, throw away clothes/letters PATRIOTISM EMOTIONS: anger
89	22-23+ Nov	小丸子的亲故	支持D&G永远滚出中国,立誓(vow)永不购买D&G产品。我爱中国CN. D&G撤销道歉视频,确这样做了只是在30号中午的时候才迫于压力又把道款视频挂上去了哪怕删除一分钟这个事情性质已经变了并非想蹭热度带节奏而是犯我中华虽远必诛12月03日11#抵制?	I support D & G to get out of China forever and vow to never buy D & G products. I love China CN. D&G withdrew the apology video and did it, it actually did that on the afternoon of the 30th after it was under pressure and again shut down the video. Even if it was deleted for a minute, the nature of this matter has already changed, I didn't want to follow this rhythm and rub it against it, but this is a crime against China, even if it's far away. (it happened a while back)	BOYCOTT: I will never buy it SOLEMN LANGUAGE: I vow to (language analysis) NATIONALISM: I love China boycott+I love China, i don't buy it COZ I love china OFFENCE: crime against China GUN
90	22-23+ Nov	Dottand	有钱人都下抵制 D&G, 而我就不得了了,我在 监督	Rich people are all boycotting, D&G, but I have no way, I'm just supervising.	BOYCOTT: as team effort
91	22-23+ Nov	月庄先生	为了配合明星媒体共同抵制 D&;G 我把我唯一仅有的D&G扔了 #DG抵制	In order to cohoperate with the stars and the media together boycotting DG, I have thrown away the only DG thing I have. PICTURE removing keyboard pieces	BOYCOTT: to show solidarity, keyboard, not clothes CIVIC ENGAGEMENT jointly boycott
92	22-23+ Nov	叔	抵制D&G从我做起。找了半天家里没有一样 产只能把键盘D&G拆了	DGboycotts starts with me. I looked for half a day (for ages) but I have nothing in the house that looks like a DG product so I can only remove the keyboard DG letters. PICTURE removing keyboard pieces	BOYCOTT: keyboard, to show solidarity CIVIC ENGAGEMENT boycott starts with me (duty)
93	22-23+ Nov	我就是好好先生	看到这么多人在抵制 D&G,身为中国人,我觉得自豪, 小 DG滚吧.中国不可欺不可辱 #抵制DG	I've seen so many people boycotting DG, being a Chinese (citizens), I feel proud, littleDGget the hell out. China cannot be bullied, cannot be humiliated.	HUMILIATION PROUD to be Chinese BULLY BOYCOTT
94	22-23+ Nov	食宵夜了	有钱人都在抵DG, 我一个穷人在家里找了个便都没DG的东西, 气得把键盘上D和G都抠了.	People with money are all boycotting DG, I am a poor person (nota, no way of determining the gender)? look thoroughly and in the house I have not a single DG thing, I was so mad that I (grammar structure to give emphasis qide, angry to the pont that) removed the D and G from the keyboard.	BOYCOTT: poor but shows solidarity, remove key from keyboard EMOTIONS: anger
95	22-23+ Nov	贵州茅台正品专卖	#D&G杜嘉班纳的设计师,筷子蕴含了中国几千年的传統文化,你个大狗 #抵制DG	Chopsticks contain thousands of years of Chinese traditional culture, you dog #boycott DG.	CHOPSTICSK BOYCOTT DEROGATORY TERMS: you dog

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
96	22-23+ Nov	用户6611600881	#dg广告#哪有坐着道歉的,要是广告D&G改成dog就原谅	Since when are apologies done while sitting down, If the D&G add changes into DOG then I shall forgive.	DEROGATORY TERMS: you dog NOT FORGIVING
97	22-23+ Nov	O姜子O	#dg广告顾客就是上帝,你连上帝都不尊重还想来捞钱?谁给你的自信悔辱中国?拍广告来证明你们有多么蠢?	#dg advert, the customer is always right (lit: the customer is God), you don't even respect God and you want to come and pull money out (of us)? Who gave you the confidence to humiliate China? You shot this advertisement to prove how stupid you (PLURAL) are?	HUMILIATION: DEROGATORY TERMS: stupid CONSUMER NATIONALISM: the customer is GOD
98	22-23+ Nov	leefansile	#DG辱华。请以后不要再把这个牌子引进回来。即使事态平息之后。不买这个牌子,国人死不了,更不会影响国家发展!那我们就有尊严地抵制到底!不能被外国人看不起!	#DG humiliating China. Please don't bring this brand back in the future. Even after the situation subsides& cools off. Even if you don't buy this brand, the Chinese will not die, and furthermore it will not affect the country 's development! Then we have to boycott with dignity/honour till the end! (We) cannot be looked down upon/despise by foreigners!	BOYCOTT: dont buy, dont let them back in. boycott til the end RESPECT and humiliation: don't let FOREIGNERS look down upon us Punctuation, use of 尊严 zunyan dignity, honour
99	22-23+ Nov	Daphne	To #dg,你们的数学是怎么考的?来我一个初1生教你啊! 好好听清楚!中国,加上台湾,日本,韩国新加域,马来西亚,和其他我没标记的家,使用筷子的人口至少没少过13亿。13亿乘于2又会等干多少?我们良心点,一人只用一个筷子,都可以淹没你!所以筷子并不是"小小的棍子	To #dg, how did you test the math? Let me, first grade student teach you! Listen well! China, plus Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and other countries! I have not marked, the population using chopsticks is at least 1.3 billion. How much is 1.3 billion multiplied by 2? But let-s be a bit more kind, one person only having one chopsticks, (still) can overwhelm you (til u re not there)! So chopsticks are not at all "little sticks".	CHOPSTICKS
100	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba				From DG to ITALY
		镇江路上。	意大利是个神奇的国家,罗马之后逢战必败 2000年,殖民时代被埃塞俄比亚狂揍,更神奇 的是还整天歧视这个歧视那个	Italy is a magical country, after 2000 years since Rome was defeated in battle, (after) the colonial times when it was beaten by Ethiopians, the most magical thing is that it still discriminates all over the place (lit. this and that.	Discriminates Colonial past□ remember Italy among the allied forces who humiliated China.
101	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba	炸药包再爆炸就自炸	不要说什么正式取消,是被迫取消好吧。。。 难道真让你们的辱华设计师自己走秀?我敢 保证他还没下台就被打掉牙	You can't talk about an official cancellation, you were forced to canel ok? You think (we) would have let your designer who humil'ated China walk the fashion show alone? I dare guarantee you he wouldn't have had time to step down the stage and he would already have been beaten up.	BOYCOTT: pressure were successful, you were forced to cancel Aggressive: physical violence beat up the designer
102	22-23+ Nov	黄射脑酱	中国人真的特别健忘,各种辱华事件,当下也是个种抵制,过不了多久就会各种忘记!国外的品牌如果觉得本年度的销售额没有完成任务,都来一波辱华,这样不但不会让你们有所损失,反而,会提高你们的销售额,比广告都有用!真的中国人的愤怒记忆很短的,D&G有一次证明过的	The Chinese are really particularly forgetful. Various incidents of humiliation against China, at the time are also boycott, they will be forgotten in no time! If foreign brands feel that this year's sales have not completed their tasks, then comes a wave of humiliation, this will not only not make you(company) lose money, but on the contrary it will increase your sales, which is more useful than advertising! The memory of Chinese anger is really short, D & G has once again proved it	SELF CRITIQUE: memoria corta
103	22-23+ Nov	你可真是个小机	大家不要再骂D&G, 骂意大利了, 要不是平安格勒战役用人家意大利炮, 二战还要再打几年。	Everyone shouldn't insult DG anymore, or insult Italians. If it weren't for the battle of PingAn using italy's fireworks, the second world war would have been fought for a few years.	POSITIVE COMMENT POP CULTURE REFERENCE
104	22-23+ Nov	稀土部队	自取其辱(immagine)DG你的屎掉了还给你	Self-inflicted dishonour. DG here's the shit you dropped/I return to u the shit u dropped	FACE COARSE LANGUAGE
105	22-23+ Nov	爱会象头饿狼嘴巴似级	8.#抵制D&G从我做起. 我大中国不可侵犯	DGboycott starts with me. My great China is inviolable/cannot be violated	BOYCOTT PATRIOTISM: my great China
106	22-23+ Nov	饰鞋	D&G因设计师发表辱华言论集体抵制。大秀被迫取消、产品被电商下架, 辱华者,自取其辱,这是最好的数训。"筷子吃技萨"有刻意讽刺之嫌,更不能被接受的是吃饭硬锅,当面一套背后一套。中国向来对外企友善,但绝不代表没有底线,有尊重才有买卖。中国才我们最珍视的侈品,中国不可欺不可辱。	D&G was boycotted collectively because of the insults made by designer. The big show was forced to cancel, their products have been removed from e- commerce platforms, those who disrespect/humiliate China, will bring dishonour upon themselves, this is the best lesson we can take from this. "Using chopsticks eat pizza" there is the suspicion it is being deliberately sarcastic, what is even more unacceptable is when they had to take the blame they were hypocritical China has always been friendly to foreign companies, but it does not mean that there is no bottom line, only with respect there can be business. China is our most cherished luxury product. China cannot be bullied or humiliated.	PATRIOTISM CONSUMER NATIONALISM RESPECT
107	22-23+ Nov	用下独之族	#抵制DG。DG事件升级!负责人在外网呼吁"抵制所以中国产品"	BoycottDG. DG incident raised again, their responsible person online stated they want to boycot chinese products!	воусотт
108	22-23+ Nov	贾森王	现在去刷料音,是不是能刷出来很多去 D&G 店里喊抵制口号的人?	I just went on douyin and isn't there a lot of ppl going to the stores DG shouting boycott slogans?	IRL CIVIC engagement.
109	22-23+ Nov	狂龙飞舞8	#D&G辱华遭抵制:辱华品牌请滚出中国!	Brands who humiliate/disrespect China, please get the hell out!	GUN
110	22-23+ Nov	金小毛lucky	#范思誓道歉 并范思誓又在作死, 搞 这些小动作挑战中国主权, 你的下场会和DG一样,滚出中国, 中国一点都不少.	#Versace swore an apology. Versace vows to die again. They take these small actions to challenge China's sovereignty. Your fate will be the same as that of dg, get out of China. There are many in China	DG VERSACE COMPARISON FOREIGNERS challenge China sovereignty
111	22-23+ Nov	学做一个公关人	2019年,不要忘记这两条狗!!D&G永远滚出中 国!!!!	It's 2019, let's not forget this two dogs!! D&G forever the hell out of China!!!!	GUN BOYCOTT: MEMORY:

Numeric Index	Date	User	Original comment	Traslation	Category
112	22-23+ Nov	天下第五物	我的国, 不容你贬低, DG请你滚出中国!	My country, I won-t let you belittle it, DG please get the hell out of China	GUN PATRIOTISM
113	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba	硪没哭只是睫毛溺了水	黑客表示不背锅,辣鸡设计师敢做不敢当,滚 出中国1	Hackers said they won't take the blame, the trash designer dares do it and doesn't dare taking(responsibility), get the hell out of China.	GUN
114	18-21 Nov (pre Gabba	Harukana-yakusoku	今天无星可追于是关心了一下星外的世界 恶 Dolce&Gabbana曾经是我特别喜欢的品牌,但不知品的营销团队是发了什么疯,在ig发了三个视频一个小眼睛中国女人用中式 发音念这念那,敢情奢侈品牌最看重的市 场之一在你眼中就这个形象?真是看得人非常窒息。2018了欧美社会里敏感到极限 "刺板印象"换到黄种人身上一个国际大品牌真的不在乎了吗?动动你的小手指举报一下 updated 举报路径: report- hate speech or symbols因为由用 Racist更会适。不要 说我敏感黄种人已经活得够苦了,自己不为自己争取,别人永远不会为你争取.打扰首页了种族面前我觉得品牌算个p.open your eyes your mind stop stereotyping	Dolce & Gabbana used to be my favorite brand, but I don't know what got into their marketing team. They posted three videos on Instagram with a Chinese woman with smalls eyes reading this and that in a Chinese accent. Is this the image that the most one of the most important markets for luxury brands is in your eyes? It really looks very suffocating. In 2018, in Western countries (Europe and US) the sensitivity to the limit "stereotype" has shifted to the yellow race. Does an international brand really not care? Move your little finger to report the updated report path: report- hate speech or symbols hears used.	
115	22+ Nov		#D&G辱华事件已经过了很久,身为学生也不知道现在中国民众的态度,其实最怕的就是有些人的风向会转向同情D&G上,不话,心不话,的风间会转向同情。说实可比,不话,如果这样事件只可大,不有餐,还不得,如不不,如果的有,如果我们,可以是有好,不不,如此,对在这样的环境下,对于,如果以此,对于,如果以知道花钱。是大路,也是有少少,也是有人。我是我们继续反抗,也是有人。我是我们继续人工,想来发,是要我们继续人工,也是有效和。是人民力,也会有效社。看看,们,让其他国家,你不犯我们的重点,你不是只知道购物的国家,你不犯我们的一定要有级的,我们会大路,我们的大路,我们就会是大活力,也会有效社。看看,们,你吃玩的事件的知道,你们去犯罪,你们去,我们就是我们,我们一定要明直,你不是只知道,我们看我们,让其他国家,你不是只知道,你们去不要再让辱华绝所以,我们一定要对,我们就是一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个一个	It's been a while since the D & G humiliation incident, and being a student, I don't know the attitude of the Chinese people now, In fact, what I am most afraid of is that some people will change attitude and turn to sympathize with D&G, regardless of what are the reasons, he (D&G) is not worthy of sympathy. To be honest, our compatriots must persevere with the resistance, humiliating China can only be a big matter, not a small one, at present, the Italian news has indicated that they will not eat Chinese food, and they think that this matter will be diluted by time, I disapprove, if we really give up in such an environment, if after a bit of time has passed/after a while we really don't continue to resist, what will the Chinese nation be regarded as? As only knowing to spend money? In the eyes of others, we will have become a banknote machine, with people coming and going as they please? D&G has suffered some financial losses so far, we just have to continue, and let the completely die in the Chinese market, and this will also effectively prevent the repeat of other humiliating incidents. Let other countries see that China is not a country that only knows about shopping, if you odn't offend us, we'll let you make money; if you offend me, we will make hard for you (to eat). Finally, I want to say that we must have perseverance to fight to the end, we mustn't let humiliation incidents happen again and again, we don't have to be those who are indulging in a life of luxury in the eyes of others. We must drive out D&G completely and let the world know: the power/might of the Oriental Lion # D&G ## D&G WH P B&G WH P	MILITARY LANGUAGE: resist CULTURAL SYMBOL: The lion US vs THEM:
116	22+ Nov	Coklewan	抵制DG。全民愤而谴责。好像你们从头到脚有意见人家产品死的	BoycottDG. The whole country is outraged and is condeming. It look like you all have these products from head to toe.	BOYCOTT SELF CRITIQUE