The battle for democracy in Egypt

Understanding the imbalance of power in post-revolutionary Egypt

A thesis submitted to Leiden University Faculty of Humanities in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

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Date	July 3, 2020

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Abstract

A review of the literature on the political landscape of post-revolutionary Egypt identifies a widening gap between the elite. Scholars highlight the dominance of the Egyptian military's business empire, a combination of high-ranking government officials and big corporations that together forms the elite. In 2011, the people of Egypt successfully overthrew an authoritarian regime paving the way towards a democratic state and a relieve of economic injustice. To date, the people of Egypt still find themselves in positions defined by inequality of opportunity, *why?* Contributing to critical scholarship, this thesis builds upon various scholars to gain insights into the different mechanisms and social drivers that keep the elite in a position of dominance and identifies areas in which the public can acquire political power. Three spheres of power; politics, economics, and media, are explored to highlight the social relations that are often hidden in organizational structures. This research provides a new answer to the question why, and how, the elite maintains its dominant position in a state that desires democracy and civil liberty. The implementation of a combination of theories examines the class division and distribution of power to answer this thesis' main research question: *Through which means can the people of Egypt gain political, media and economic power to achieve democratic governance?* The findings of this thesis provide a contextualized account of the division of power in Egypt and give attention to the mechanisms that shape the relationship between the elite and the people.

Key words: Egypt, Elite, Class division, Power, Political Participation, Democracy.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Formulation

Egypt has a long history of strongman leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser being the first with many decades worth of successors continuing the trend such as Hosni Mubarak, who led Egypt for 31 years. Attempts were even made by Mubarak to revert Egypt to a pseudo inherited monarchy, by giving commanders and police chiefs government roles after retirement and bloating the size of the Egyptian public sector. Mubarak used the military and the police to legitimize his power, in an attempt to pass on the mantle to his son. Mubarak's systemic corruption and patronage is being used by the current president al-Sisi to give himself legitimacy and power, albeit more focused on the military due to his history as general in the army.

This corruption and bloated public sector are most visible in the Egyptian military's business empire which has had an ever-expanding role in Egypt's economy since Nasser's rule began in the 1950s. Through land reform and nationalization, the military began taking control over the Egyptian economy and this process has continued despite multiple regime changes up to, and after the 2011 revolution. There was a brief stint during Sadat's rule where this process was halted, but certainly not reversed, and as Mubarak came into power it resumed at full speed. Al-Sisi, a military man through and through, has picked up the torch and continues to support the military. Through the creation of institutions like the National Service Products Organization the military channels military career men into lucrative positions within its business empire and ensures that power is maintained and that economic capital continues to flow into the regime's coffers and the pockets of its managers. By establishing major construction projects and choosing the military to carry them out, private enterprise is stifled while the military expands (Al Aswaany, 2011).

In a 2011 UNDP report it is said that "a resurgent Arab region is seeking an end to a system marked by the political economy of rentier states and demanding developmental states with commitment to freedom, social justice, and human dignity" (UNDP, 2011, p. 1). The youth-led revolution in 2011 not only resulted in the end of the Mubarak regime, but it also uncovered the intrinsic problems that hinder the country's path towards democracy, namely, the military's role in governance. The next president, Muhammad Morsi, being elected by the people and Egypt's first civilian ruler, was a veteran leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 1952, every president up until Al-Sisi had a military background. The explanation of this continued trend is that these former generals have earned their recognition in the 1967 and

1972 wars with Israel and have cooperated closely with the US after the 1979 peace treaty with Jerusalem and are therefore popular and have a great influence in Egyptian society (Anderson, 2011). As Morsi failed to adopt the demands of the revolution and instead adopted many policies and programs that actually discredited the revolution, his administration lost the trust of the Egyptian people and resulted in another overthrow of a sitting president. The chief of the military al-Sisi issued an ultimatum, as the protests between pro- and anti-Morsi camps worsened on the streets. The ultimatum required Morsi to resolve the debate with the opposition within 48 hours or the military will intervene. The deadline passed, and Morsi's inaction resulted in the end of Morsi's presidency and the suspension of the constitution (Stein, 2012). Many pro-Morsi actors criticized the military intervention as a coup, but the interim government, and later al-Sisi, was sworn in, setting the country a step back in its attempt towards a becoming a democratic state. This thesis looks at the case of Egypt because it has faced many national and international efforts to promote democracy but simultaneously poses many distinctive challenges that have to date hindered the full transformation to a democratic state. The country's rich history of modes of governance and state construction portray a potential to reach a state of democratic governance. Many scholarly efforts try to analyse the determinants of and obstacles to democratisation by looking at regional politics and the interplay of diplomatic and economic relations between state actors. Other scholarly work primarily focusses on the role of religion on the development of government models and processes of democratization in Egypt, and in the Middle East in general. This thesis considers a narrower focus on what already exists on a domestic and local level through an implementation of various theories to establish spaces in which the citizenry of Egypt has the potential to gain political agency. By looking at Egypt's customary practices already in place and working with these instead of replacing these, this study attempts to provide a theoretical answer to the question: **Through which means can the people of Egypt gain political, media and economic power to achieve democratic governance?** An answer to this question allows for a better understanding the complex threefold relationship between the government, the military, and the people of Egypt.

1.2. Aims and Structure

The aim of this thesis is to assess whether democratic governance can be achieved in Egypt, and in particular, in which spheres of Egypt's political reality, power can be accumulated and how. The purpose of this study is not to promote democratic principles, nor does it claim that

Egypt should become a democratic state. It merely offers an objective case study of why the transformation has not been realised, and what can be done to realise it. The contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, it offers a new approach to political participation promotion and power accumulation in hybrid system states. It recognizes the fluid nature of power and is therefore better capable to explain civic engagement. Second, by putting emphasis on three different spheres of power this thesis fosters greater understanding of the power dynamics between the people, the government, and the military of Egypt. Third, this study provides a new take on the question why and how there is ample room for power accumulation and transition to a democratic state instead of why there is not or will not be.

Following this introduction, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. The "Methodology" chapter consists of a discussion and research design of the main theories used for power accumulation in three spheres of power, respectively, "Economic Power", "Media Power", and "Political Power". The "Literature Review" chapter comprises a review of the literature on democratic development in the Middle East and a closer look upon the historic and current state of Egypt's political economy and the role of the military. The following three chapters together form the analytical section of this thesis in which the theories of power accumulation are tested against the current trends in the three spheres of power in Egypt. Finally, the "Conclusion and Discussion" chapter offers a brief summary and provides an answer to the research question.

1.3. Data Collection

This thesis draws upon primary sources for the majority of the analytical section. In addition, this thesis corroborates analysis and findings through reliance on secondary sources too. Primary sources used are policy documents, reports, interviews, economic data, and other documents. In order to see how the extensive theoretical framework used in this thesis applies to the case of Egypt, it requires a profound knowledge on the recent and historic political, media and economic situation in Egypt and in the broader region of the Middle East and North. Secondary sources play an important role in the accumulation process of such knowledge. This provides the fundaments for a rigorous and solid analysis and application of the theories used.

This thesis

1.4. Data Analysis

1.5. Limitations

2. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will explore how alternative economic, media and political solutions can be used to improve the social position of the people of Egypt. Each solution consists of an amalgamation of the ideas of multiple theorists. The idea is that by combining these theories a comprehensive solution is constructed which could be implemented to solve low levels of democracy in Egypt that persist despite the 2011 and 2013 revolution.

This thesis borrows from Bourdieu the notion of conversion, the possibility of transforming one form of capital into another (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 24-26). This transformation (power exchange from now on) is relevant when one form of power could be used to gain power in a different sphere. Additionally, from Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* this thesis will borrow a dichotomous definition of revolution: the distinction between a political and a social revolution. Trotsky asserts that a social revolution is a revolution in which the fundamental structure of society is modified, specifically through changes in the control over the means of production, while a political revolution is merely the replacement of a regime with another, without any of the aforementioned fundamental changes being imposed (Trotsky, 1983, p. 248-254).

2.1. Three Spheres of Power

2.1.1. Economic Capital

To begin with an alternative system of economic power accumulation will be proposed. This alternative is based on Melman's concept of power accumulation in the capitalist system, where decision-making power rests in the hands of managers. This division serves the interests of the managerial and capitalist class, and perpetuates the capitalist system, at the expense of workers who are consequently separated from economic power. These managers engage in practices like downsizing and outsourcing whereby they ensure that profits take precedence over labour compensation and worker control over the mode of production. Moreover, in this system where state managers pursue power to expand their influence, business is in cahoots with the state and both cooperate to serve each other's interests (Melman, 2001, p. 3, 27-28 and 117-161). This is a system which Melman calls state capitalism, a system in which the militarisation of the entire society through the establishment of a permanent war economy leads to the powerless position of workers, as state- and business managers discard the notion of civilian production and focus their efforts on procuring or providing an ever-increasing amount of military goods (Melman, 2001, p. 49-51 and 98-132).

Melman's proposition of an alternative to this system is centred around taking over control of the decision-making process of the workplace and handing over the reins to workers, primarily through two ways: unionization and worker empowerment within the current form of organization through a negotiated democracy between union and management, and cooperatives, which supplant the manager/worker dichotomy entirely. These worker-controlled businesses can then attempt a conversion process from the production of military- to civilian

goods. In turn, the permanent war economy is gradually dismantled. (Melman, 2001, p. 351-371 and, 434-445).

Beyond the reorganization of the workplace, to ensure that workers are the ones who benefit from the economic system, it is important to consider how to organize the collective of workers and the collective of these pro-worker organizations to maximize the chance of success. For this, Castells elaboration on network theory can be used as a blueprint. Although Castells primarily deals with media power and communications networks, networks are still an equally important component of economic power. The globalized system is structured around networks: those who control them also hold the key to building an efficient alternative. Castells asserts that certain industries and service sectors function as key players in the global economic system, for example those in logistics nexuses who serve as the physical connections of economic networks, referred to as the "switchers" (Castells, 2009, p. 10-53). For the alternative solution it is therefore important that these key industries are the main priority for conversion to the alternative system, by empowering workers at vulnerable and key points in the networked capitalist economy, these sectors can be leveraged for greater power accumulation. The entire economic solution would benefit from considering the mechanisms of networks, by ensuring that they establish networks of their own to connect, share and cooperate. Networks in which worker interests come first.

Furthermore, worker accumulation of economic capital is not the entirety of this economic solution. It is also important to consider how to distribute this capital and how to ensure that this accumulation is durable. Three concepts are considered. First, the "shadow state" as conceptualized by Feldman. A system where workers create institutions and systems to replace those of the retracting welfare state (Feldman, p. 2007, 160-162). Second, "community banking", as conceptualized by Alperovitz in *What Then Must We Do*. Alperovitz proposes the public takeover of the banking sector. While this grand undertaking might not be viable in this case (at least at first), creating community banks, by the workers, for the workers, will ensure that the alternative economic system has access to the functions normally fulfilled by the capitalist financial system (Alperovitz, 2013, p. 213-234). Third, the concept of power exchange. Once economic capital is amassed, this power can be exchanged into other forms of power. This exchange creates an interplay with the solutions proposed in the media and political power sections. By enabling or assisting in its implementation, economic capital turns into media and political capital which allows for a holistic solution where the accumulation of all forms of power becomes possible (Bourdieu, 1986).

To summarize, the proposed economic alternative solution is a system in which networked, democratic workplaces are combined with a "shadow state" which provides education and welfare services, and a community run banking system that serves the people. This solution explicitly targets key industries to leverage nodes of power in the networked, global capitalist economy. Finally, the economic capital is also used to implement alternative solutions in the other spheres of power.

To demonstrate the causality of the problem of economic power accumulation vis a vis the proposed solution, see the table below. It is important to note that each part of the solution also has many interactions with each other. For example, the "shadow state" can help in the establishment of workplace democracy by giving a safety net for workers who lose their job due to union actions and conversely, the workplace democracy can be used to accumulate economic capital that can fund this "shadow state." Likewise, there is a plurality of interactions between all four components of the problem as well. Managerialism in a military economy leads to reduced funding for the welfare state, a retracting welfare state weakens the position of workers versus the manager class, thus entrenching managerialism.



2.1.2. Media Capital

Power can be viewed as dichotomous; some groups have power and others do not, i.e. lower class versus upper class, or social movements versus military industrial complexes. The alternative to this idea of power being dichotomous is that power is based on historical processes and systems of accumulation that render advantages (Feldman, 2019). The way

power is accumulated by elites or institutions can show how groups can gain power. The imbalance in power can partly be explained through the distancing of individuals from one another in combination with linking yourself to a group, i.e. political party or social movement, that makes certain claims on social problems in society, which causes further fragmentation in society. Silverstone argues that the media has a lot of power because of the social impact behind it. The media has the ability to change the agenda, shift the power balance or inform/deceive because media are material and symbolic objects that function as catalysts for action, and are effective as such only through the deeds of individuals and institutions (Silverstone, 1999).

Castells' theory emphasizes the role of communication networks in the accumulation of power in society. His definition of power is 'the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actors in ways that favour the empowered actor's will, interest, and values' (Castells, 2009, p.10). Power here is based on the relationship between actors and not on the power of an individual actor. He argues that communication networks are vital to the power-making process of any network; a political, corporate, financial or technology network for example. The programming of networks and the switching of different networks is where the sources of power are. This means that the network programmers, such as media companies, and switchers, people that link networks together, are the holders of power in Castells network society (Castells, 2009).

Programmers and switchers, according to Castells, are not individuals per se, but network positions embodied by social actors. He introduces four form of power in networks. Firstly, *Networking Power* entails the power over who and what is or is not included in the network. Programmers decide whether a person, message or medium enters the network. This however is the case with traditional mass communication media platforms, where the programmers are still very much in control of what enters the network. But with the rise of new media platforms, these networks are reprogrammed, and the power of programmers becomes limited. With new media Castells refers to 'mass self-communication', so media networks that allow its social actors to create private messages that can reach the masses. Secondly, *Network power* refers to the power of the protocols of a network. Communication in a network must adhere to the standards set out by the structure and the management of a network. In traditional mass communication networks these standards may be set by the programmers of the networks, however in the new media the standards are set out by the diversity of the formats, as the new media is harder to control by programmers, a common ground of standards is found by new media networks. Thirdly, *Networked power* is the power social actors have over other social actors within a network. So, these are the social actors that embody a network position that

exercise power over others. Castells refers here to managerial, agenda-setting and decision making in organizations that own and operate communication networks. Lastly, *Network-making power* refers to the network itself and the ability to create a network, i.e. a multimedia or mass communication network. Castells argues that the owners and controllers of these networks, as aforementioned, are the power holders in Castells' network society, be it media corporations, financial institutions, or the state (Castells, 2009).

The networks provide opportunity for mass self-communication. Mass communication in the sense that it has the potential to reach a global audience, such as media services like Facebook or YouTube. Self-communication in the sense that the messages in such networks are produced by individuals, directed to other individuals and the channel (medium of communication) is chosen by the individual (Castells, 2009). The rise of mass self-communication perhaps limits the power of the programmers, but Castells work shows how this reprogramming of networks has caused power relations to change. He demonstrates the potential the media of mass self-communication to organize counter power or directly change power relationships.

Bayat's theory on street politics explains how people can achieve political power through the accumulation of cultural capital. His theory suggests that public spaces can suffice as platforms for those who lack political agency and institutional resources to organize and mobilize through passive networks. Through this, collective action can be realised without using the official and often ineffective or slow routes such as active networks or organizations/institutions (Bayat, 2010).

The visualization of media power accumulation, and the proposed solution is as follows:



2.1.3. Political Capital

Carole Pateman's concept of participation and democratic theory is one of the most useful when it comes to alternatives to the current model within Egypt's pseudo-democracy. Pateman's work looks at how workers who have a feeling of political efficacy are more likely to take part in political institutions, whereas those who do not feel this do not. Pateman finds that "the sense of political efficacy is a sense of general, personal effectiveness, which involves self-confidence in one's dealings with the world. 'Persons who feel more effective in their everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to participate in politics" (Pateman, 1976, p. 46). Pateman's work explicitly tries to understand how to make even the lowest ranked worker in the company feel as though their decisions are important within the wider system, and by doing so the worker gets more satisfaction and takes with them this sense of participation into democracy.

"if in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has opportunities to participate in a wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well. Furthermore, participation in non-political decision making may give one the skills needed to engage in political participation" (Pateman, 1976, p. 47).

This concept of subservience to a larger authority figure is indeed one of the biggest issues with the Egyptian regime. The country itself relies heavily on a patronage system, and this patronage system has been evident long before the revolution occurred, the issue of the revolution however is that it did not break these long-established systems. “Mubarak reportedly appointed 63 former officers as governors out of a total of 156 during his tenure. Most were senior officers, including four of the seven commanders of the Republican Guard, and 11 of the 21 officers who commanded the Second and Third Field Army.” (Aziz, 2016). This case will be explored more within the analysis section. However, it is important to understand that within the Egyptian economy, the military which also controls large swathes of the government have control. This is important to mention as the military has a symbiotic relationship with its industry.

“The advocates for contemporary theory argue that certain personality traits (the ‘authoritarian’ or ‘non-democratic’ character) have to be taken as given – the active participation of such individuals would be dangerous for the democratic political system. The participation theory on the other hand, argues that the experience of participation itself will develop and foster the ‘democratic’ personality, i.e. qualities needed for the successful operation of the democratic system and will do so for all individuals” (Pateman, 1976 p. 64).

A real alternative to this system would be what Gar Alperovitz calls ‘Everyday Socialism’. Although the Military controls large percentages of the Egyptian manufacturing, shipping, and food sectors, what instead must happen is an efficient takeover by a democratically elected government. A good example of this is The Texas Permanent School Fund (Alperovitz, 2013, p. 80), “Half of all the land and associated mineral rights within the public domain was added to the fund, the state now owns 626,000 acres of surface land and 12 million acres of mineral land and submerged land. Every year a distribution is made from the profits of the publicly owned (‘Socialized’) fund to defray education costs for every county in the state” (Alperovitz, 2013, p. 80-81). This concept of socialization of public goods would give the Egyptian people all the benefits of the land, while ensuring that the Egyptian military did not use to further add to their vast coffers and increase their political control.

Swelam (2013) explores how “The flip side of Egypt’s rentierism is clientelism” a third of the labour force is within the public sector being one of the “most bloated and inefficient in the world”. “The seed of Egypt’s modern rentier/clientelist state was sowed under Nasser’s socialist economy. It flourished under the economic liberalisation of his successors. The model was simple: what the state collected in rents, it used to offer carrots in return for public acquiescence. Those that would not be bought were left with the stick of authoritarianism.”

To interlink the three theories, it is important to understand that participation within politics and the economy can counteract the issue of the overbearing military political economy. By actively taking part in political and economic issues rather than putting trust in the Egyptian military, a system of accountability begins to take form through which the educated and engaged citizenry can gradually undermine and replace the patronage-based economy. This concept of the participatory democracy puts the power in the hands of the people. Pateman's participatory democracy makes those who rely on patronage systems accountable to an educated public by ensuring that this public is willing and able to engage on every level of politics. Thus, by creating a citizenry which is able to demand accountability this will indirectly lead to the breakdown of the rentierism and clientelism systems of Egypt, workers will demand a more functional public sector and that rent-seeking behaviour is discouraged or even punished. For a visualization of how these theories come together and to demonstrate how Pateman's participatory democracy leads to Alperovitz's "Everyday Socialism and so indirectly solves the issue of the patronage system see the image below:



2.2. Research Design

This thesis uses a case study to show through various measures how the people lack power within each sphere of power (economic, media and political) in Egypt despite the 2011 and 2013 revolution.

The following table shows the indicators which will be used to explain, in detail, the problem of low levels of political agency in Egypt, with accompanying measures for each indicator. Finally, each indicator is followed by the theoretical solution that is meant to solve each specific problem.

Cause of lack of power - Indicators:	**Measures:**	**Proposed solution to achieve increased political power:**
Economic Power:		
Militarized economy controlled through managerialism	% of GDP controlled by the military, military involvement in the economy by sectors	Workplace Democracy: Worker control leads to economic power accumulation for the workers which in turn allows for conversion and thus demilitarisation
Retracting and/or inefficient welfare state	Social security programs: Efficiency and funding allocation	Establish "shadow state" that can fill in the gap left open by the state
For-profit banking serving capitalist interests	Absence of community- and public banks	Public takeover of for-profit banks, and establishment of community banking
State controlled economic networks	State/military control of key nodes in the Egyptian economy	Targeting key sectors to efficiently accumulate power
Media Power:		
Access to media content and information	Level of surveillance by state government	Knowledge dissemination and political participation through social media sources
Social and historical lack of power in an authoritarian regime	Lack of access to economic/political capital	Use of public spaces to accumulate political and/or media power
Gatekeeping practices by network programmers, i.e. the Egyptian state	Traditional mass media in control by the state (censorship)	Set up and link new/different networks of communication
Political Power:		
Disenfranchised citizenry which cannot or will not engage in both formal and informal politics	% of Egyptians taking part in informal political participation	Re-engage through Pateman's theory of participatory democracy
The rentier state	Corruption linked to government, continued placement of military officials in key positions	Establish an accountability system and so remove the patronage system that places military leaders in key positions
Military utilizing political power to expand its economic power	% of economy controlled by military, contracts awarded	Everyday Socialism: Redistribute contracts and ownership of economy

Without first checking whether the problem of an insufficient level of power of the Egyptian people exists as described in the theory section, and why it exists as such in Egypt, it

is quite challenging to theoretically establish what the potential barriers might be to accumulate power. However, the barriers might be those which allow for the "ways to accumulate power" above to exist.

Instead, the analysis section will establish if the problem of a powerless public exists as theorized above, and consecutively also what avenues and barriers exist for implementing each proposed solution. This further establishes the importance of presenting empirical data (examples) that shows how these solutions have worked under similar conditions elsewhere. The purpose is to help support the argument that these barriers can be overcome, and to show in what way.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Arab exceptionalism is a term often used to describe the deficit of democratic governance in the Arab world. It is argued that the Arab world represents an exception to the democratic wave that swept over the world. Many expected the Arab uprisings that started in 2010 to be the end of Arab exceptionalism. However, now almost a decade later, the outcomes have been unexpected. Many Arab countries have been troubled by a civil war that threaten their very existence as political entities (Hassan & Ali, 2019). Alternatively, democratization has been low on the list of priorities as states are preoccupied with regional security challenges. In other cases, the ruling elites have taken tentative steps on the path of political reform in an effort to divert the winds of change, modernizing authoritarianism rather than engaging with genuine processes of democratization (Hassan & Ali, 2019).

In some countries, such as Morocco, Algeria, Oman, and Jordan, these tentative steps translated into constitutional and legislative amendments. These amendments accommodated popular demands without allowing for any fundamental political, economic, or social reform. Legislative institutions and electoral systems were strengthened, restrictions on political parties and civil society organizations were alleviated, attempts were made to provide adequate funding for acute economic and social problems and strategies were created to fight corruption (Mainuddin, 2016; Davis, 2016; Hassan & Ali, 2019). Despite these reforms, the ruling regimes have managed to undermine the internal forces that drove the regime which resulted in hybrid systems where democracy is combined with authoritarianism. These hybrid systems do not represent a transition of non-democracy to full democracy but have borrowed elements from existing democratic systems and merged them to acclimatise to their new political

environments. In the aftermath of the emergence of these Arab hybrid systems the ruling regimes have adopted multi-party systems, but, at the same time, have put restrictions on opposition parties to maintain influence. There are regular local, legislative, and presidential elections but these are often intervened to change the outcomes. Civil society organizations are allowed to be established but the regime maintains control over them. Private and independent media channels and newspapers are permitted but restrictions are imposed on freedom of opinion and expression. Humanitarian rights are emphasized in constitutional and legal documents, but these rights are often violated. And lastly, the lack of impartiality and sanctity of the judiciary branch fails to guarantee fair trials because other government branches can and will interfere to prevent the implementation of judiciary decisions (Hassan & Ali, 2019).

Egypt, after the 2011 revolution, has been unable to reach a national consensus regarding democratization combined with conflicting agendas of political actors. Moreover, the country has been damaged by a deteriorating economic and security conditions and failing institutions. This invited non-governmental armed forces to sweep in. After the end of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in 2013, the Ansar Bait al-Magdis group committed various terrorist attacks in Sinai, pledged their loyalty to ISIS and now goes by the name Sinai Caliphate. As a result, the Egyptian army and security forces have drastically increased military operations. The economic and social conditions are compromised, which further impedes processes of democratization and defines the current government as a hybrid system (Rezaei, 2015; Hassan & Ali, 2019). A failed state is one that fails to deliver public services combined with a loss of legitimacy, trust, and control of its territory. This results in two particular outcomes: the emergence of tribal and religious identities as an alternative to the national identity and the emergence of a political and security vacuum exploited by armed non-state actors to gain and strengthen territory (Devlin-Foltz & Ozkececi-Taner, 2010; International Crisis Group, 2016; Ahram & Lust, 2016). The collapse of Arab states Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen jihadist terrorist groups have created an environment favourable for the expansion of ISIS and other militant groups. In every case, various local, regional, and international powers have engaged in these conflicts, arguably to further their own interests and security agendas. As peaceful solutions proved to be elusive, state structures and institutions collapsed, resulting in economic and social crises and further exacerbated the problem of displaced people and refugees. This created fruitful grounds for non-governmental armed forces to move in and gain control over territory and expand its regional influence.

For the implementation of the theories used in this thesis in the three spheres of power, it is useful to look at critical scholarship on democratic governance. Universally, one

of the most prominent problems with the development of democratic governance is the existence of corruption within governmental institutions. This promotes the argument that a universal guiding model of democracy-building is difficult to realise, and that each case is unique and should be looked at in the context of local and historical aspects. Whether democratic governance cain be achieved depends mostly on the rule of law (and its effectiveness) and the willingness of state and non-state actors to participate in this process of democratization (Mudacumura & Morgöl, 2014). Cronyism, where important state positions are filled by acquaintances and colleagues of the regime or the military rather than by people with the right qualifications, is very much present in Egypt. This raises questions about the legitimacy, and thereby the effectiveness, of Egypt's judicial branch. Moreover, as argued, Egypt can be classified as a hybrid system in which neoliberal principles are followed but state spending is not limited. Whether the al-Sisi government and the military is willing to participate fully in democratization is again questionable as they seek to continue fortifying their current positions of power.

Similarly, looking at the Japanese model, the core model that helped East Asian states to achieve democratic governance was assisted by the capacity of national institutions to overcome corruption, enhance the rule of law, and strengthen administrative capacities (Sutton, 2008). Through democratic oriented state institutions and improving the quality and practice of state governance can aid the improvement of human conditions (Cheema, 2005), in line with the demands of the 2011 revolution.

As a result of democratic governance, the economy of a country could improve drastically. The link between democratic governance and sectoral policy reform can be mutually reinforcing. Democratic policy processes can provide answers to how changes should be implemented, to whom they apply, and what the desired outcome should be. On the flipside, sectoral policies and programs contribute to achieving democratic governance by favouring social capital and thereby improving the state-citizen relationship (Brinkerhoff, 2000). This argument touches grounds with Pateman's participatory democracy, which can help accumulating power in various sectors of industry in Egypt.

The creation of democratic institutions where people are enabled to communicate their needs and demands freely to the government and where government officials are elected by the public so that they can be held accountable for their actions can further, in combination with a strong capacity and infrastructure that enables the state to deliver on those needs and demands of the public, especially the synergy between these two conditions can improve the functioning of the state (Norris, 2012).

Furthermore, it is argued that decentralization, applicable to the case of Egypt, serves as a mechanism of the process of democratization, and not vice versa (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2006). Meaning that there is not a causal connection between decentralization and democratization, but that the former can assist the latter. This decentralization creates another argument that use bottom-up civic engagement and social mobilization activities like demonstrations and unionization help keeping citizen's rights at the core of governance discourse (Osaghae & Osaghae, 2013), phenomenon illustrated by the youth-led 2011 revolution.

The January uprising has produced a different view of the state of the economy. It cemented continuities such as the division between systemic and anti-systemic opposition groups and brought about changes in the way elections are conducted and in the use of violence by the state. The state's neoliberal economic policies combined with the use of political repression by the state security forces are argued to be the cause of the revolution. The explanation of this argument is that Mubarak had implemented neoliberal policies that made the cronies, appointed friends or trusted colleagues of sitting politicians to positions of authority despite having proper qualifications, rich and negatively affected schools, health care systems, infrastructure, and social services. The Egyptian government restricted labour laws, lifted subsidies of everyday goods, withdrew various public services, privatized state assets, supported free market competition, and liberalized foreign exchange of currency. This resulted in the international market/capital penetrating Egypt thereby crippling the standard of living for the Egyptian people except Egypt's extremely wealthy elite. As the wages plummeted, worker's rights rolled back, farmers were stripped from their lands, and the prices of goods increased, the public's frustration with the hegemony of the neoliberal order resulted in multiple disparate protests over the course of a decade before coming together into the uprising that led to Mubarak's exit (Stacher, 2020).

A main obstacle in Egypt's implementation of neoliberal policy is that since agreeing to an IMF structural adjustment program in 1991, Egypt has pursued a different version of neoliberalism than the program recommends. The state maintained its public sector while simultaneously reallocating wealth into the pockets of connected capitalists. It is not fair, however, to accuse neoliberal economic policies alone to be the cause of the 2011 uprising. More accurately, it originated from the gradual and continuous decline of Egypt's fiscal health over the years. Neoliberalism helped drain the state's fiscal health, but the structural flaws of the economic system were already there, primarily as remnants of the political economy of Egypt after the revolution of the Free Officers in 1952. Therefore, Egypt's political economy

is a story of continuity rather than abrupt change. The state's fiscal health has been a recurring issue for Egyptian leaders since 1970. As the government keeps services, subsidies, and social expenses they actually cannot pay for, the state's debt will increase resulting in the state having to resort to external financial interventions. As politicians follow neoliberalism, civil servants, workers, and the poor are neglected in the process, and to push for regime-making at the same time is only feasible if accompanied by state violence (Stacher, 2020).

Before the 2011 uprising, simply put, the difference between money coming in and money going out contributed to the country's deficit and determined how citizens experienced these incremental normalizing cuts in social expenditures only because the governing elite had no inclination to cut expenditures. Revenues were dropping and so was the country's fiscal health. To maintain political stability in the country the elite was forced to maintain pay-outs, however, they favoured civil servants and security specialists over the Egyptian society. More importantly, the elites were faced with the question of how to incorporate the military into the regime's base as the country's fiscal health was further declining. The strategy was to allow the military to offset the decline in military spending by investing in commercial areas and thereby letting the military earn financial independence from the national budget. This was combined with the elite giving military officers preferential access to social services, as a result restricting the people's access to them. This created the military business empire Military Inc. (Stacher, 2020).

The military coup of 2013 ended the post-Mubarak experiment by the Muslim Brotherhood. This period reflected a political problem caused by a failing informal pact between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Like Mubarak and the SCAF transition in 2011, the same mistake that ended Mursi's rule was increased security spending even in times of crisis instead of implementing neoliberal austerity measures. This portrays a continuity in Egypt's post-1952 political economy. In the 2013 transition interim president was the judge Adli Mansur, who in turn, appointed Hazim al-Bablawi as interim prime minister. Bablawi was a prominent economist in international scholarly circles and served as finance minister under the first SCAF transition. His research, ironically, was about the rentier state. The more rents a state has access to the less incentives it has to be accountable to its citizens. The rentier mentality, no taxation no representation, was prominent among the governing elite. Bablawi, amidst a period where the state was receiving a lot of rent in the form of foreign aid urged the government that crisis spending could not continue (Stacher, 2020). "It is crucial that they understand the scope of the danger that the current size of subsidies imposes on Egypt's economy, and they must also feel that rationing

is done in a way that guarantees social justice" (Stacher, 2020, p. 149). Egypt's economy however signalled little to no sign of reversing its course and instead the gap between revenues and expenditures widened again, to the frustration of foreign donors like the United States. The Gulf states Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait threw in a lifeline of $12 billion to the interim government. But instead of changing to a new economic trajectory, the military elite generals used the occasion to consolidate its economic interest and insert themselves as the primary beneficiary of the country's economy, thereby trying to govern a society that has lived in a political economy of social revolt for years (Stacher, 2020).

The following years are characterized by further fragmentation as the Egyptian military furthers its commercial gains over the shoulder of the lower classes. Al-Sisi's regime building practices differ in those of Mubarak. While state expenditures are still outpacing rents, the biggest difference is that Mubarak entered into crisis spending to hold together the coalition comprising of civil servants, neoliberal businesses, security figures and the Military Inc., whereas al-Sisi is building a sector of elites that uses state violence and crackdowns on dissent. This crackdown policy is present not only in the economy, but in the media and political realm as well. Al-Sisi has started a number of projects to revitalize the country's economy mostly funded by foreign donors. These projects are undertaken by Military Inc. are not generating profit, but instead, are incurring loses which the military is willing to take for the sake of building a regime around al-Sisi. Instead of maximizing profits, the military business empire is spending its capital to fortify and extend their existing network of state employees, businessmen, and important security officials. These projects do provide jobs for Egyptian labourers, but this is nothing more than an effort to boost the legitimacy and popularity of al-Sisi's regime (Stacher, 2020). And while the military is engaging in projects to help construct al-Sisi's regime, the regime itself is preoccupied with combating any form of dissent, they have failed to tackle the problem that has been the main issue in Egypt since 1952: crisis spending, where the gap between expenditures and revenues is even bigger than under Mubarak, leading to a gradual decline in living standards and social provisions creating fertile grounds for social revolt.

The reliance on rents, most importantly Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and foreign aid from oil-rich Gulf states, shows the fragility of Egypt's political economy as it is incredibly vulnerable to changes in the local and international political economy. All the while the Egyptian government's expenditures are ever increasing and the living standards of the Egyptian people are worsening, yet this structure seems to offer no room for the society to hold the government accountable and to bring about real change in the conditions of the public of

Egypt, forcing it to resort to violence and revolutions. This study will research areas in the economic, media and political sphere where there *does* exist ample opportunity for society to enhance their social positions and conditions in an economy run by the military and a political arena in which any criticism is trumped altogether.

4. ECONOMIC POWER SPHERE

Despite a successful revolution resulting in regime change, Egypt's military remains in firm control over the country with a former military man, Al-Sisi, in charge as President. This is a recurring theme in Egypt. The military has long held a dominant position in the governing of Egypt and in particular a dominant position as an economic actor within Egypt. It is currently

estimated that the business ventures of Egypt's military amounts to 30-40% of the country's GDP (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 212).

Not only is there a business-state relationship but the two are closely intertwined, meaning that there exists an interplay between the two spheres. In this case, business managers are often also state managers and so it becomes hard to make a distinction between the two. Procurement is not as clearly a case of attempting to expand the influence and military power of the militarised state but also a part of an in-house rent-seeking system where the state is effectively procuring things from itself. For instance, the state awards contracts to these military business managers for major construction projects for which the primary purpose is to expand the economic power of Egypt as a whole, and the military business empire in particular, and so the pursuit of profit and power is more closely intertwined (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 212-213). In short, the state is for the most part in control. When the military hierarchy dictates that something is to be done, there is no civilian or regulatory framework capable of reigning in the military's might and ensuring that workers are not separated from power as a consequence. Indeed, these institutions are complicit in rendering the people powerless.

What then is the role of unions and cooperatives in Egypt, with regards to the means through workers can gain control over its economic position. The union movement is largely under government control with increasing pressure to reduce independence applied by al-Sisi's government. For example, by the outlawing of strikes and labour protests. The workers of Egypt have not surrendered easily, and strikes have continued ever since the 2011 revolution: in 2014 alone 1655 labour protests and actions took place (Hellyer, 2015, p 142-144). Beyond the negotiated solution of unionization, the new 2012 Egyptian constitution resolutely protects the rights of cooperatives to exist as independent entities which suggests that there is room to manoeuvre there, at the very least on paper (Egypt's 2012 Constitution). It is important to note that, in practice, most Egyptian cooperatives are in the agricultural sector and remain under tight government control for now (ILO, 2013).

In terms of wages, what does the data say about the power of Egyptian workers? Like many democratic states in the western world there has been an increase in nominal wages between 2013-2017, from an average wage of 3298 EGP to 4550 EGP (ILO, 2019). However, when one looks at the real wages, that same period has seen a decline in wages, for example in 2017 by -9.8% (ILO, 2019). In other words, workers are not benefitting from the profits generated in Egypt's economy, nor from the expansion of the military business empire. They remain separated from economic power both in terms of control over the workplace and in terms of capital.

What then is the state of Egypt's welfare state, banking, and key sectors and what can be done to implement an alternative solution in these areas? Helmy et al. have examined the economic reforms of al-Sisi's government aimed to improve the highly inefficient social security net of the past. Al-Sisi's reforms are an attempt to shift away from universal-type fuel and energy subsidies (previously amounting to 80% of social protection expenditure) to more targeted cash transfer programmes and while they have been an improvement, the verdict appears to be that they are far from perfect (Helmy et al. 2018, p. 2-7 and 22-24). The Egyptian welfare state remains inefficient and fragmented and so an alternative solution has much room to operate here. A solution might be a worker controlled "shadow state".

Egyptian banking is highly centralized, with parts of the market controlled by state-owned banks like the National Bank of Egypt. "The most visible legacy of the Nasser era is the continued dominance of state-owned institutions. Of the big-five commercial banks in the market, three are public institutions. The largest is NBE, which claimed 27.3% of the sector's combined loan portfolio in December 2016, holding total assets in excess of LE700bn ($46.1bn)" (The Report: Egypt, 2018) This, in Alperovitz perspective, ought to be a good thing, but it is not. Public control over banking is the means by which Alperovitz suggests that the citizens could reign in the profit-seeking greed of private banks in the west. But in this case, these banks are instead controlled by a military-lead regime. In other words, instead of business managers they are controlled by state managers (The Report: Egypt, 2018). These public banks will only serve the population as a symptom of worker empowerment once they no longer serve the state but rather the people. For this to happen (either piecemeal or through sweeping reforms) the people must already have a greater degree of power. Until then, the community banking solution whereby worker collectives and cooperatives establish their own banks appears to be the best path forward.

Moreover, while much of the manufacturing sector remains under direct military control, and is therefore difficult to affect, there are two other key sectors in Egypt that could be targeted for power accumulation. Agriculture, which amounts to one-eight of the Egyptian GDP, is already a decentralized sector in which the cooperatives (albeit not particularly independent ones) play a big role (Holt & Baker, 2020). Moreover, water shortages due to global warming and upstream state water usage on the Nile, as well as the reductions in fuel and energy subsidies make the agricultural sector very fertile ground for resistance and so a receptive stance towards alternatives (Holt & Baker, 2020).

The second potential key sector would be logistics, specifically all operations related to the Suez Canal. As one of the world's most significant trade chokepoints any disruptions to its

operations would be highly problematic for the Egyptian state, primarily in terms of political fallout and media coverage. “Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal for the 2017-2018 financial year rose 11.5 percent to a record high $5.585 billion (4.20 billion pounds)” (Elhamy & Davison, 2018), but it is the canal’s role as a physical network connection for the rest of the world that makes it such a prime target. Of course, because it is so significant, it might be quite difficult to mobilize and act to disrupt and demand changes in the organizations that operate the canal. However, as strikes at the Suez Canal Authority at the height of the 2011 revolution showed, it is certainly a possibility (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 1). By mobilizing both where it is most likely to succeed and where it is most likely to have a significant impact, in terms of networks, the solutions would have a greater impact. The economic data in these two preceding paragraphs comes from Egypt’s Ministry of Planning (Ministry of Planning, 2018).

These first pages of the analysis have detailed what the situation is like in Egypt and where power accumulation might work best. It is difficult to test the viability of a solution that has not been implemented yet but what can be done is to provide examples of where similar solutions have worked under similar conditions.

Starting with the unions and cooperatives, one does not need to look far necessarily. As has been shown above, both unions and cooperatives already exist in Egypt, so both are a viable approach. Of course, a divergence from state control might not be looked upon favourably by the state despite what the constitution says. However, there are historic examples of pro-worker cooperatives that flourish under much harsher conditions than the hybrid democracy of Egypt. For example, The Mondragon corporation. Mondragon came into existence under Franco’s fascist rule in Spain and perhaps most importantly at a time when there was a centralized pursuit of autarky, and where any anti-state elements were harshly punished (Flecha & Cruz, 2011). As far as unions go, there are plenty of examples outside of Egypt, for example in 2011 in Tunisia. A revolution took place which began with union resistance to the rule of dictator Ben Ali and ended with his removal (Yerkes & Yahmed, 2018). Unions can act but they should ensure that they do so with the right goals in mind. Namely, worker control over economic capital and decision-making control in the workplace, and with a plan to achieve this goal.

Building upon this idea, cooperatives and unions in Egypt could certainly be the right approach if they act intelligently. For example, they might begin by trying to avoid the military’s key industries so as to avoid the inevitable pushback if they do intrude on the military’s income. By circumventing the military, for example through cooperatives in the agricultural sector, there is potential to accumulate economic capital without painting a target on the movement’s back. The Mondragon corporation also shows that the concept of a “shadow

state" is viable even under these limiting conditions. The whole venture began as a vocational school for the disenfranchised workers in a northern village in Franco's Spain and then proceeded to create cooperative banking and social safety (Feldman, 2007, p. 161). By filling in the void left by the loss of fuel- and energy subsidies as well as the inefficiencies of the Egyptian welfare state as a whole, the worker-controlled "shadow state" could bring in more participants and bring them out of their powerless position and just as with Mondragon, community banks could service these endeavours. As the alternative solution begins to accumulate power it can gradually move into more contested areas of the economy, such as manufacturing, and so gradually challenge the power of the military regime. This alternative solution represents something much more akin to a social revolution as per the Trotskyist definition outlined in the theory section, whereas the 2011 revolution in Egypt (and the subsequent regime under al-Sisi), left the underlying economic conditions pretty much entirely untouched, more akin to a political revolution. Through this social revolution the demilitarisation project could begin. By establishing control over the mode and means of production the population could begin to decide what to produce, but also what to consume. As previously mentioned, the conversion projects could be implemented to gradually convert what was previously in the hands of the military into civilian manufacturing. Moreover, economically empowered citizens have more capacity to choose to consume goods which do not come from the military-controlled sectors of the economy and to instead support private enterprises that seek to compete with the military.

Finally, power exchange must be considered. Whatever accumulation might happen because of this economic solution, it does not end or begin there. Through exchange, economic power can be used to implement the media- and political solutions, and these too play a part in the creation and durability of the solution proposed above.

Proposed solution to accumulate power:	**Barrier:**	**Implementation:**
Economic Power:		
Workplace Democracy: Worker control leads to economic power accumulation for the workers which in turn allows for conversion and thus demilitarisation	The state has dominant control over certain areas, but not all	Circumvent the state by building cooperatives in sectors where the military has less control, continue union actions and continue to expand unions despite state crackdown

"Shadow State" fills the gap left behind by the state	The state is attempting to reform its welfare state to make it more efficient	Target those areas where these reforms have a negative impact, particularly the agricultural sector
Public takeover of for-profit banks, and establishment of community banking	The state already controls significant parts of the banking sector	Public ownership will help once the state serves the people, until then, community banking must suffice
Targeting key sectors to efficiently accumulate power	The military guards the sectors it has interests in closely	Focus efforts on agriculture to begin with, and later on the Suez Canal for publicity and political leverage

5. MEDIA POWER SPHERE

In 1958, a law was passed that enabled authorities to detain anyone who expressed criticism against the sitting government. This was called the Emergency Law. Journalists who would criticise the government would become subject to police harassment and independent media is still today under heavy surveillance (Khalil, 2012). The use of social media had become an important platform for mobilization during revolutions. Throughout history, social movements or public uprisings were often led by leaders, a face of the oppressed that the people could rally behind. Now, however, social resistance groups are self-generated, mostly online, where content and information are easily shared to a broad public. The reach of social media is incredibly extensive and has made creating a shared identity or common political goal vastly more accessible. Once individual actors are aware of what their impact can be by articulating their goals, motives, methods, and justifications, the potential to bring about real change grows larger (Bayat, 2010). Both social media and public spaces, like Tahrir Square, are places where the translation of political and societal goals to the mobilization of individuals in collective action against a regime happens.

Castells theory of power accumulation was present in Egypt's political revolution of 2011, especially the role of mass self-communication. In Egypt, activists against the Mubarak regime were engaged since 2009 in online discussions and debates on socio-political conditions, which eventually developed into the revolution. The rise of Castells new media constructed a new resource for collective action, in which debating, organizing, and planning could be realised faster and more efficiently. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter introduced a novel resource that provided swiftness in receiving and disseminating information; helped build and strengthen ties among activists; and increased interaction among protesters and the rest of the world (Eltantawy, 2011). Like Silverstone argues, the use of media is deemed effective by the actions of the individuals encouraged by the medium. New media

demonstrates the possibility of large-scale mobilization and the organization and implementation of social movements. In a state controlled by the military and under heavy journalistic surveillance by the state, new media helped to draw local and international attention to important activities that otherwise would have been shielded from the public view by the state with the goal of separating the people from political power. Through mass self-communication, the Egyptian people were able to construct their own network and through that amassed political power, by waging countermovement pressure against the state. They were able to communicate a continuous stream of text, video, and images from the streets of the revolution directly to millions of people, which Castells defines as broadcasting (Castells, 2009). And indirectly through the republication of these messages on outside news networks like Al Jazeera and CNN (Eltantawy, 2011). The linkage between media capital and political capital in the case of Egypt is a powerful instrumental resource for collective action and social change.

However, outside conditions, social, political, and historical context, as well as the actor's ability to effectively utilize available resources to meet their goals. Even after the revolution in 2011, the state of Egypt remained a military state, the state remained as the programmers of Egypt's traditional mass media network. In our increasing media-saturated world, content that is accessed in new media networks cannot always be deemed reliable, as sources are often unknown and can be produced by anyone. Political power by people may be amassed by improving knowledge and political awareness using media capital. Castells mass self-communication may be a powerful tool for mobilization, but by the very nature of it, unreliable in terms of trustworthy and valid knowledge dissemination. To promote knowledge and democratic principles one turns to traditional mass media networks, with the Egyptian military state as its gatekeeper. Furthermore, the concept of mass self-communication refers to new important forms of communication as a product of digital media, which is placed by Castells, between interpersonal and traditional mass communication (Castells, 2009).

This constructs an ambiguous definition of new media. Castells' new media refers to a convergence of communication forms creating a four-fold table. Senders and receivers in a new media network may be both public and private. These media networks have different user intentions, strategic possibilities, and risks. Especially these new strategic opportunities, allow for reprogramming communication networks, something that is ignored in Castells' work.

Mainstream media platforms have been mostly inaccessible to the public, social media platforms have created spaces for the public to express themselves politically (Howard & Hussain, 2013).

Reflecting on the theory used in this section, it can be stated that social media networks are important factors in political revolutions and have a liberating potential. However, it can only be an instrument of power accumulation, if it is employed in combination with other forms of power, i.e. political or economic power. The remaining control of the more important mass media by the Egyptian regime, including the constant attempts to censor social media, outweighs the liberating potential, and neglects the other side of the spectrum that includes privacy, security, and censorship risks.

Media Power:		
Knowledge dissemination and political participation through social media sources	The state controls the traditional mass media	Find, share, and/or create alternative media sources to spread political messages
Use of public spaces to accumulate political and/or media power	The nature of an authoritarian regime limits people's access to public spaces and the different forms of capital they need to organize into a resistance	Simply put, people must return to the informal spaces of Egypt. By gathering in public spaces to create social movements and common goals, media power can be accumulated from the grassroots, street politics as this is called is difficult to oppress because of its decentralized nature.
Set up and link new/different networks of communication	As the programmer and gatekeeper of the traditional media the state can ensure that pro-state and pro-military content is the only available content	Continuing the trend of establishing new networks of communication and linking these networks to shift the control over to the workers, will allow them to accumulate media power. Through power exchange, economic power can be used to further this solution.

6. POLITICAL POWER SPHERE

“The revolution of January 2011 has changed the concept of political participation in Egypt and encouraged people to take part at both formal and informal levels. Whilst the former still enjoys greater levels of support than the latter, it is important to note that just as concepts and means of political participation evolve over time so can citizens’ perceptions of them” (Refaei, 2015, p. 21). This begs the question of how and why the country is still being run like a one-party state. The people of Egypt desperately want to take part in formal elections, however, “The March vote will in no way confirm President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s popularity among the Egyptian people. This election campaign is merely an extension of the internal power struggle among the military and the regime’s security services, and it has nothing to do with democratic mechanisms worthy of the name"(Khorshid, 2018). It is clear to see that president al-Sisi, although claiming to give fair and free access to democratic elections in Egypt still has a heavy-handed approach to picking political opposition:

Candidate	**Party**	**Votes**	**%**
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi	Independent	21,835,387	97.08
Moussa Mostafa Moussa	El-Ghad Party	656,534	2.92
Invalid/blank votes		1,762,231	–
Total		**24,254,152**	**100**
Registered voters/turnout		59,078,138	41.05
Source: HEC			

“The January 25th Egyptian Revolution was an attempt to shake off the chains of the past for Egyptian subjects towards an Egyptian citizenship. The new or renewed identity as an

Egyptian citizen and the knowledge about social and political issues encouraged the participants to transform their reimagined ideas and identity of citizenship into actions." (Dorino, 2016, p. 321). This conclusion of the revolution echo Pateman's concept of active participation allowing for a more politically educated and engaged citizenry. The underlying issue within Egypt remains, regardless of the level of participation in the country, the government and consequently the military still are in control. al-Sisi's strangle hold on opposition parties leaves Egyptian voters with little choice regarding the outcome between an authoritarian leader versus a specifically chosen bad opposition.

To return to the data, there is a higher level of participation formally, but Egyptian citizens have become disengaged with informal political participation, this may be because of the events of the revolution. However, by becoming disengaged with informal political participation there is a lack of checks and balances to counteract al-Sisi's regime. "Only seven percent of the respondents claim to support demonstrations organized by students and political movements since October 2014. On the other hand, 63 percent of respondents said they were going to vote in the upcoming, yet delayed, parliamentary elections." (ES, 2015). The Egyptian people seem to be uninterested in informal political participation as Egyptian Streets explains "since 2013, participation in protests has decreased to eight percent under al-Sisi's rule. Nevertheless, formal means of political participation increased since Mubarak was toppled. While before 2011 only 37 percent had engaged in formal political processes, that number reached 83 percent after the revolution." (ES, 2015).

Post Arab spring, the Egyptian people did not secure their means of production, the people of Egypt put their trust in the military, as they long had, this flipped the switch on who controlled the most important sectors of the economy. "The military that overthrew Egypt's first democratically elected president last summer is positioning itself to become the country's uncontested economic power" (Hauslohner, 2014). The move to what has been describes as Military Inc. "In every government authority now, there is a military officer. You deal with him" (Hauslohner, 2014). Although Egypt has been a patronage-based economy for decades now, with bribery and corruption rampant, the move by al-Sisi to consolidate control has raised the bar far higher than previous governments. Although it is tough to find exact numbers, on the percentage of the economy controlled by the Egyptian military, Egypt's military amounts to 30-40% of the country's GDP (El Dahshan, 2015, p. 212). This explains why the military is able to amass so much political power. However, a secondary side effect of the military being at the helm of the country is that the state can award contracts to the military for public infrastructure projects. A high-ranking military officer "insisted in an interview that the armed

forces are not engaged in corruption. He agreed that the military appears to be getting more infrastructure contracts than it had previously, but he said that is because "the people trust the final product from the military" (Hauslohner, 2014). It is not a surprise to hear someone within the military saying this.

To counteract this, the Egyptian people must do as Alperovitz describes, and take back control of their countries means of economic production. By doing so, the people will push the military's purpose back to protection of the country against outside threats, rather than the self-appointed authoritarian saviour, that holds all the cards. The Egyptian Military are now using their political power to shut down attempts at informal political participation "Last month, the military stepped in to cripple a strike by Cairo's public transport workers – a sector beyond its usual control – by providing 500 buses and drivers to keep the system running."(Hauslohner, 2014). Therefore, there must be a move by Egyptians back to informal means of democratic participation such as protests and demonstrations, which could also work well in conjunction with the union actions (such as strikes) proposed within the economic solution.

A real-world example of a successful transition from autocracy to what is in its final phase of democratic transformation is Tunisia. A country that had its revolution during the same 'Arab Spring'. Tunisia unlike the military state that Egypt has long been, was rules by Ben Ali with the help of the police, while keeping the military underdeveloped and underfunded. With the toppling of Ben Ali, the police state of Tunisia was disbanded, with his party also being banned. Alongside this the government turned to the military to help stabilize and provide legitimacy. However, unlike Egypt the country has not fallen back to its autocratic style, and instead has made solid, although slightly stagnating movements towards democratic reform.

- *Management of the military has transitioned from the personalized rule of previous autocrats to more decentralized channels.*
- *The changing face of Tunisia's political leadership has spelled the end of privileging officers from the wealthy coastal regions from which Bourguiba and Ben Ali hailed.*
- *Tunisia's grave security threats have forced post revolution governments to enhance the military's budget, weapons, international linkages, institutional capacity, and political influence.*
- *Ex-military officers have enjoyed more transitional justice than other Tunisians.*
- *Retired officers have become active members of Tunisia's robust civil society, providing the military with a new lobby to advance its interests.*

(Grewal, 2016).

This seems to go against the concept of taking away military control and giving it to the people as previously stated, however, "Actors interested in democracy may naturally fear the growing influence of the military in the new Tunisia. Retired officers, at least in interviews, have expressed deep respect for the principle of civilian control over the military and the concept of democracy" (Grewal, 2016). However, the Tunisian government seems to be making active steps to ensure that civil society is balanced with the military and the police.

The Tunisian government have begun to reform in a way that has really opened up the chance for civil society, "The Tunisian parliament recently passed the long-awaited municipal elections law and is expected to hold its first democratic local elections by the end of 2017. In my discussions with Tunisian officials, it was clear that they see municipal elections as a chance for youth to play a more influential role in politics" (Yerkes, 2017). Although Tunisia is not the perfect example of a fully functioning democracy, it has made the most progress politically compared to its other neighbours who also took part in the spring. If the Egyptian people want the chance at democratic change within their country, they must remove al-Sisi and his military from the helm of the country and fix the institutionalized corruption within the production and manufacturing sectors of the Egyptian economy.

Political Power:		
Re-engage through Pateman's theory of participatory democracy	Egyptian public tired of informal participation after failures of revolution, more involved in formal participation.	Educate people that participation can make change. By taking part in workplace democracy people feel more politically inclined to reform their political sphere
Establish an accountability system and so remove the patronage system that places military leaders in key positions	Military Inc own large percentage of economy, and therefore can be self-sufficient.	By ensuring that a participatory democracy exists, accountability will follow. This will break down the rent-seeking systems within Egypt.
Everyday Socialism: Redistribute contracts and ownership of economy	Military is unique in sense that it can survive attempts at political change, if the military can keep producing then it can sustain itself.	Once the accountability system exists and is functional, Everyday Socialism can be pursued as a policy to break down the military's control over the economy and so its source of power.

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

What Egypt went through in 2011 and 2013 was not a social revolution, but a political revolution. The underlying economic structures have not been changed; the military business empire seems to be as powerful as ever even despite successful regime changes. Neither has the political or media spheres undergone fundamental change, the military dominates the state and pro-government media continues to support it. How then could change for the society of Egypt still be a possibility. In Egypt the possibility of "getting shot in the head" as a consequence of opposing the state certainly exists and yet this has not prevented Egyptians from rising up in the past, nor from continuing to do so today, so is this truly an unsurmountable, structural barrier? The following table shows what the barriers are when assessing the implementation of each solution and what can be done to circumvent or overcome these according to the empirical findings:

As is shown in the empirical analysis above there are spaces in which the military controlled state of Egypt does not have total control. By exploiting these openings, the solutions proposed can allow for workers to begin the process of accumulating power This power can then be used to begin the process of undermining the military's hold over Egypt. As power accumulation is implemented within those spaces the Egyptian state might eventually take notice and take offense and might seek to stop these efforts through legislation or temporary measures, perhaps eventually even through violence. Should it come to that, it is not long ago since the last revolution succeeded and while that did not threaten the military as a social revolution would, it also represented less of a reason to mobilize for the population. A social revolution (through bloodless, gradual reform in the best case scenario) that aims for actual power accumulation is truly in the self-interest of the vast majority of Egyptians and by implementing the solutions proposed above this can perhaps be made a reality, one that is even more worth fighting for. One that many thought they were fighting for the last time around.

This is sufficient to reject the notion that this is a naive, voluntarist argument. There are certainly structural barriers but, as shown above, this study shows what can be done to overcome and/or circumvent them, how this has been successfully done in other similar cases, and exactly where the preconditions are both well- and poorly suited for doing so within Egypt. The fact that the military will not sit on its hands in response to the power accumulation process does not mean that it cannot be achieved.

Accumulation of power within the three spheres suggests that there should be ample opportunity to utilize power exchange. For example, media-based power accumulation might not be sufficient as a solution on its own, especially in the face of the massive pro-government media apparatus that is already in play. However, through power exchange this situation can

be turned on its head. To challenge the pro government traditional mass media, economic capital can be used to set up new networks of communication, such as social movements, think thanks or pro-worker social media platforms. Similarly, economic power in the form of the "shadow state" is transformed into political power through the creation of a more educated, critically minded citizenry who are better suited and willing to be the participants in Pateman's participatory democracy.

This power exchange goes both ways of course, media capital can help to spread the influence of unions and cooperatives and increase their membership. It could also be used to influence consumer behaviour, towards consumption of civilian produced goods. Through political power checks and balances can be created to prevent the economic power accumulation of single actors such as the military characterised by its cronyism and corruption. These checks and balances can also ensure the independence of unions and cooperatives and the legality of the "shadow state", which would further assist workers in accumulating economic power. Media and political power can also be exchanged. Communication networks can provide a platform for civilians to be politically active and well-informed. These new networks are not perfect creations: pro-worker programmers are limited because of mass self-communication, since the content that enters the networks through that format is not entirely under the control of these programmers. The results can range from unreliable news sources or even anti-worker content on these pro-worker networks. However, this is still better than the current system, where the military and the state are the sole programmers, and can perhaps be mitigated by having switchers ensure that these networks do not allow pro-military content to enter (e.g. censoring pro-Sisi channels on a hypothetical Worker YouTube). Conversely, political power can be used to enforce the legality and independence of media, to ensure that media is free to exist, free to act and so free to spread the good word.

One might want to think about the chicken and the egg, what comes first: economic, media or political power accumulation? The answer seems to be that it is probably wherever these ideas find fertile ground first, because all three solutions can begin today and the more successful one is, the more viable its counterparts become because of power exchange. They all work best together.

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APPENDICES