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Introduction

The politics of language can be a thorny topic. The dominant language of a state may seem like "a voice from nowhere" (Woolard 2005, 5), but its dominance tends to stem from a long and contested history. The major languages in Europe today developed from small regional bases, usually centred around modern-day capitals, gradually spreading until they became the standard across large swathes of territory. This thesis will look at some of the languages, once dominant in their territory, that were affected by this spread. Minority and regional languages are spoken by millions of people in Europe, but their status is patchy, depending on the country they find themselves in. Some minority and regional languages possess a relatively high status, while others are neglected by the state and have fought for survival and recognition. The status of languages in this thesis will therefore be determined through the prism of economic and political power. It is important to define what these terms mean.

When a language community plays a role in driving industry and commerce and a language's speakers are relatively well-off, we can say it has economic power. Economic power ensures a language's survival and can then guide a language community towards political power, which is when the community finds itself possessing autonomy or its members holding high office. The acquisition of some economic power is usually necessary for political power, but it does not guarantee it. A language may grow alongside a community into one of economic and political power, or it may later be adopted by a group who believe the language to be an authentic but previously missing part of their identity. If that group then gains political power, the language will benefit.

This brings us to our research question: how does the trajectory of these languages reflect the economic and political power of its speakers? This thesis will demonstrate that as the economic and political power of a language community increases or decreases, the status of their

language becomes stronger or weaker in turn. The status of a language is generally expressed through what rights exist to protect the language. Both forms of power are required for a language to grow. Economic but no political power will mean no institutionalisation and the risk of language decline, while political but no economic generally leads to communities drifting towards a more economically powerful language. The structure of thesis is made up of a theoretical chapter plus three cases studies: Ireland, Northern Ireland and Spain.

The case studies were chosen because they all exist in the same rough geographic area of Western Europe and the author of this thesis has studied Irish and Castilian/Spanish. The case studies will utilise the theoretical findings from the first chapter and connect them with historical elements. They are laid out in mostly chronological order for ease of comprehension for readers who are unfamiliar with Irish and/or Spanish history. The comparative method will also be used to find parallels and differences between the case studies in terms of how their economic and political power reflects their languages' statuses.

The thesis will use a theoretical framework based around two central ideas: language rights and linguicism. Language rights refer to the rights surrounding the choice of language used by an individual or a group in a private and public context. Linguicism is discrimination against a language and its speakers as a tool to encourage them to speak the majority language. The rights held by a language will show us where that language stands with regards to political power, while linguicism is evidence of a language lacking in it. Some form of economic power is considered here as a prerequisite for obtaining political power.

A mixture of resources has been consulted for this thesis. Academic works which deal with the role of politics in language are the main source of information for the first chapter. The case studies make use of both historical and contemporary texts to examine the trajectory of the languages in question. There are also texts not available in the English language which are referenced to paint as full a picture as possible. Certain news stories and scholars have not received much attention beyond a language community or country but are extremely relevant to points made in the case studies. The author of this thesis employed their knowledge of Irish and Castilian/Spanish to comprehend and translate these texts.

The chapter on Ireland will take you through the trajectory of a minority language as its power declines. The Irish language first lost political power, with the traditional nobility incorporated into the English system and the English language. There is then the loss in economic power upon the Great Famine (1845-50), where the status of the language diminishes due to its

association with poverty. We see afterwards that accessing economic power can get a language into political power. This economic elite who adopted the Irish language in the late nineteenth century become leaders of the political class after independence. However, we also learn that economic power needs to be spread more widely for a language to prosper, as historic Irish-speaking communities continue to live in poverty.

The third chapter starts with the story of Ireland's northern province, Ulster. The Irish language there undergoes the same process up until the late nineteenth century. However, it is not adopted by Ulster's economic elite as they are primarily of British Protestant heritage. The status of Irish does not get the same boost, so when part of Ulster forms the British region of Northern Ireland after Irish independence, the Irish language holds no power. The result is the language's disappearance among the remaining native communities. A language must have some form of power to survive when its base is small to begin with. Then we get a textbook revival, where the language is rebuilt from the ground up by activists who grow in economic and political power alongside the language, culminating in language rights.

The chapter on Spain highlights how the trajectory is not always smooth. A period of autonomy for the 'historic regions' of Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country ends when the dominant Kingdom of Castile seeks to centralise, stripping the regional languages of their political power in the process. However, Catalan and Basque mostly maintain their internal status due to their regions' economic power. Galician declines because its local elite speak Castilian/Spanish. A brief return to autonomy is squashed by Franco's regime. The regional languages survive and emerge with more political power than ever following Franco's death. The current federal model allows for political power in all regions. All languages get an equally significant status, even if Galician has never managed to attain the same level of economic power as Catalan or Basque.

To help us understand all these case studies from the perspective of economic and political power, we must delve into the theoretical details that will provide the necessary framework.

Chapter One - Theoretical Understandings

This opening chapter will look at theoretical work on the relationship between language and the state. The initial focus will be on rights, giving us a useful framework for discussing the status of languages in subsequent chapters. A language's economic power often creates its political power, which is then reflected in the rights it holds. Therefore, having a detailed typology of rights is a key element for examining the trajectory of languages in the case studies. A language that lacks political and/or economic power is a frequent target for linguicism and the reduction of rights, consequently it is crucial to consider the theories behind linguicism and official monolingualism. As we see high economic and high political power through strong rights, we see low (although occasionally high) economic and low political power through linguicism. The chapter will finish with pro-linguicism arguments and the response provided by Suk's (2007) concept of relational resources.

Rights:

We must first understand what language rights entail. There are various potential models one can observe when states interact with minority and regional languages. Language rights pose one of the greatest challenges to the smooth running of a liberal democratic society (Rubio-Marín 2007). The *laissez-faire* approach liberal societies take to topics like religion do not work when it comes to language. A government needs language to operate, so one language is generally prioritised (2007, 52). Rubio-Marín is critical of the common division between toleration and promotion. Toleration is where the state allows a language to be used but there is no government assistance provided, while promotion means that a language receives funding and the state purposely tries to maintain it. The criticism of this model stems primarily from the fact that it is easiest for the state to pick one standard language, therefore privileging one language community and empowering them (Rubio-Marín 2007; Patten 2008). Moreover, defining promotion is difficult. A language can be accommodated but not promoted. An example of accommodation is when an interpreter is provided to a defendant if they cannot follow a trial in the language it is being conducted in. However, their language has no official status outside of the courtroom. Finally, toleration may be more useful than its

description suggests. State non-interference might be enough for a community to practise and maintain their language.

Instead of the toleration versus promotion model, Rubio-Marín proposes instrumental versus non-instrumental rights. Instrumental rights are more focused on practical matters, like the court interpreter mentioned above. These are rights which allow a person to live their life through the relevant language. Meanwhile, non-instrumental rights mean a community does not have to compromise its cultural identity to be citizens of the state. This is generally done through self-governance, working best in a federal state like Spain where language communities are based in territories. This has also been mentioned as a potential model for the Irish language in Northern Ireland (Nic Craith 1999). A language community is not forced to assimilate into the majority language or culture to be considered citizens. The state provides education and media in their language and suited to their culture. Communities avoid being sucked into the "economic and political power of the culturally dominant majority" (2007, 57). Non-instrumental rights come in a variety of forms.

In fact, minority language rights can be interpreted as a spectrum, where a language goes from being banned up to being promoted by the state (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995, 79). At one end, there is the outright prohibition of a language. Catalan, Basque and Galician were close to illegal during the early years of the Franco dictatorship, for example (Miller & Miller 1996; Pérez-Agote 2006; Beswick 2007). Then it is followed by toleration. Non-discrimination prescription comes next, where discrimination on the basis of language is forbidden. Finally, there is permission and promotion. Concerning the Irish language, the Northern Ireland Executive is moving towards a stance of permission, where the conditions are created to allow groups to speak their language freely, resembling Rubio-Marín's (2007) non-instrumental rights. In Ireland, the government promotes the language, with funding provided for groups and all official documents available in Irish. Without active promotion, minority languages stay on the fringes, unusable when someone wants to gain power.

One can refine the spectrum further to yield more complex ideas on how and why a language is promoted (Patten 2008). This spectrum also comes in five parts: toleration, accommodation, context-of-choice, end-state and fairness. The spectrum at first looks like that of Skutnabb-Kangas et al (1995) with toleration. Then we have accommodation, which involves helping someone with poor skills in the standard language of the state to access public services. Examples include court interpreters and state-funded language classes. Both

categories fall into a broader set of rights (right to a fair trial, freedom of expression) which supersede the right to a given language. Context-of-choice concerns the availability of choices in any language. Essentially, its description mostly matches that given by Rubio-Marín (2007) for instrumental rights: you can live your life without any issues in your native language. End-state justification means that a state should provide language rights because a language could one day disappear, in the same way conservationists protect an endangered species. Lastly, fairness rights address the unfair design of society that has resulted in a language being minoritised, a form of reparations for linguicism. The fairness argument moves beyond the level of individual choice and takes a constructivist approach. Not every language can be successful though, defined by Patten as "used in a variety of high-status contexts, such as white-collar employment, popular culture, politics" (2008, 117). It may simply be too late to save a language, or it may be too big a task for the majority group to accept. Those opposed to Patten's ideas might say that we cannot structure society to disproportionately favour a minority. The concept of fairness rights forces us to examine the societal processes which promote the dominant language and erase the voice of other language communities. When a government harnesses these processes, the effect can be particularly devastating.

Linguicism:

Some states actively pursue monolingualism as opposed to plurilingualism. Governments often suppress minority languages and only allow their use in society on a private level (toleration) or if another right supersedes it (accommodation/instrumental). To help us understand the actions of states in the case studies, it will be useful to consider what motivations there are for such suppressive practices. These practices are often grouped together under the term linguicism (Hernández Chávez 1989). Linguicism occurs when a majority group decides to justify its superiority by marking themselves as speakers of a particular language (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). To carry this out, languages are pushed down to the lower end of the spectrum, neither promoted nor protected by anti-discrimination legislation. Prohibition can be deemed too extreme a step to take, so toleration is a common stance for governments which promote a monolingual state. Minority populations are relegated to secondary roles and the dominant language and culture hold a disproportionate amount of power. One major cause of

linguicism appears in the beliefs of Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland and Spanish dictator Francisco Franco: multilingualism leads to conflict and strife while monolingualism guarantees a more harmonious society (Parkinson 2012; Encarnación 2004). In other words, minority languages "are often perceived as threatening and generating instability" (Nic Craith 1999, 498). Hernández Chávez (1989) argues that linguicism ultimately stems from a fear among the powerful of what a minority united in culture and language could do to the majority group. What begins as a demand for "an ever greater share of the resources that the dominant group considers its property" (1989, 127) can logically be extrapolated to the stage where the minority group demands a voice in the decision-making process. Economic power feeds into the political. Linguicism is a tool for those in charge to preserve the disproportionate power of the majority group.

Through the process of linguicism, the majority language is regarded as the language of the present and the future (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995, 104-106), and minority and regional languages are of the past. In other words, majority languages are "vehicles of modernity" while minority languages are "carriers of culture and tradition" (May 2007, 124). Linguicism makes minority languages invisible in wider society. Over time, society is structured in such a way that knowledge of the majority language is a pre-requisite for economic success. Minority language speakers recognise this, which is why we often witness a process of language shift. The shift begins with a monolingual generation raising a bilingual generation, who speak their mother tongue at home but use the dominant language in school and elsewhere. This generation then transmits the dominant language instead of the mother tongue to their children, and the shift is complete. The power remains with the economic and political elite, whose culture becomes accepted by all. Anyone who is left speaking a minority language can feel like an outsider within their own society.

This sensation felt by minority language speakers of not being 'normal' finds an explanation in work done on stigma (Goffman 1963). Minority language speakers are stigmatised and excluded by the majority group. The phenomenon is often noted in matters of economic power. Irish and Galician became associated with poverty through various factors (Moriarty 2015; Beswick 2007). As a result, the languages suffered a decline as young people were encouraged to speak the majority language instead and not to engage with their mother tongue outside of the home, usually resulting in language shift. Negative associations are made between the language and the status of the people who speak it and stigma ensues. Conversely, the majority language is recognised as the only avenue to success.

Arguments in Favour of Linguicism and Official Monolingualism:

If someone chooses not to blend in and speaks their own language openly, then they come into conflict with a monolingual state. One can recognise that a shared language is a solid base for social cohesion, albeit not the only one (Patten 2008). This is where nationalism and secession enter the discussion (Taylor 1998). Without linguistic and cultural homogeneity, we would probably not have modern states as we know them today (1998, 193). Anyone who is not part of the homogenous group either learns to live in it, assimilates or tries to break away. The last element is what those in power fear. Speakers who do not wish to engage in language shift sometimes end up pushing for their own state. They seek political power on their own terms, which would allow them to promote their own culture and not adopt the customs of another group. Senz Bueno (2014) sees this situation developing in Catalonia, where Catalan and Castilian/Spanish have a difficult co-existence. Bilingualism is hard to manage in this context, as she fears that there is one group who will attempt to consume the other (2014, 352).

However, one cannot always blame state suppression or a power struggle for the emergence of a monolingual state. Sometimes disparate factors mean that a language ebbs away (Weinstock 2003), and we understand what end-state rights (Patten 2008) would try to combat. The influence of the market is significant. Over time, a language may simply lose its value in an economic sense and become irrelevant in an industrialised society. Rural-to-urban migration plays a role, as centres of economic power attract a diverse range of people who become cut off from their homes. Regional languages in Britain during the Industrial Revolution were victims of this (Gates 2010, 8). In some cases, there is nothing to be done for a language. Global forces promote an economic system which is beyond the scope of any one state. If a language community engages in language shift to reap the available economic benefits, there is often little that political leaders can do.

Leaders can enact some form of legislation, but there are several criticisms of it, one being that they ‘freeze’ the linguistic landscape (Weinstock 2003). Focusing on ‘native’ languages is viewed as the wrong approach (2003, 261; Gates 2010). Based on the number of speakers, there is now as much logic, if not more, for supporting Urdu and Bengali in the UK as there is for supporting Welsh and Cornish. Privileging ‘native’ languages repeats a harmful cycle, where migrant populations are placed on the margins. Immigrants can access full citizenship, so denying them their native language is harder to justify. The power dynamics are locked into

place. Migrant communities are unable to move their languages up the spectrum, and protection is reserved for communities who know how to access power by integrating and adapting. It is not necessarily given to the communities most in need of assistance. The question it raises is: if we cannot provide language rights for all, is it fair to provide them to a select few? Allowing power to run its course and avoiding the tyranny of the minority is one implication of this thinking.

The cosmopolitan model of language rights is a variation on such thinking (Waldron 1992; Barry 2001). This approach is a natural product of a neoliberal mindset where regulations are considered restrictive and choice is king. We live in an interconnected world, so staying within the boundaries of a single culture seems outdated. Members of a minority community can use their own judgment to assimilate, giving themselves and their children better prospects in life (Barry 2001, 75). If they want to access economic power by leaving their language behind, so be it. This is evident even in languages which possess political power, like the Irish language in Ireland. The loss of a language in a case like this should only be mourned by linguists and anthropologists (2001, 76). When the speaking of a language becomes a statement or an act of resistance, it is an indication that its speakers are no longer practising their culture organically (Waldron 1992, 757). This is in clear opposition to something like end-state rights (Patten 2008), which are implemented specifically to keep an endangered language alive. A further argument against minority protections is that they exclude outsiders from communities and limit the choices available to the people on the inside (1992, 758). Here, there is no questioning of power, citizens should merely react to it without taking radical action. The work of Waldron (1992) and Barry (2001) is focused on minority communities in former settler colonies like the United States and New Zealand, and one could dispute its relevance in a European context where the majority culture has deeper roots. However, what were once homogenous societies on the island of Ireland and in Spain are becoming more and more cosmopolitan with each passing year. Therefore, we need to take the utilitarian perspective seriously.

Relational Resources as a Response:

Relational resources serve as one counterpoint to utilitarian ideals (Suk 2007). Effectively, we are talking about what money cannot buy: friendship, family and community. Liberal states should be obliged to protect minority languages because a language keeps its speakers

connected to their ancestry (2007, 136). A state must balance the economic opportunities afforded by the majority language with the need for citizens with a minority language background to speak their 'ancestral tongue'. It is difficult for the political class in neoliberal countries to marry these two competing demands, so economics generally wins, but the state does sometimes value relational resources. Maternity leave is one example, as the state does not force a woman to choose between her gainful employment and the relationship with her baby (2007, 142). She does not have to sacrifice economic power. Nonetheless, in a system where everything has a price, understanding language rights in this abstract way has proven to be tricky for governments. In societies where minorities often feel stuck between two worlds, promoting minority languages is a simple way to help people. Speaking a majority language is currently too difficult to avoid in most countries, as it opens pathways to not just economic power, but political power too (2007, 146). Economics and politics are the two hard currencies that lawmakers comprehend.

Conclusion:

Economic and political power lies at the heart of the theoretical considerations that exist around state language policy. Some argue in favour of redistributing power by assigning worth to different linguistic communities. Others point out the difficulty in doing so properly when a society is cosmopolitan, with burgeoning nationalism and secessionism viewed as risks. Done correctly, language rights can bring communities into the fold and allow them to play an active role in the economic and political elite. If suppressed, communities turn away from their native language which has been made useless within the state. This results in an embrace of the majority language and culture, providing a path to power that could not be held in any other way.

Chapter Two - Ireland and the Irish Language

The history of the Irish language is one of conflict with the English language, whose massive economic and political power jeopardised Irish's very existence. From the twelfth until the sixteenth century, there was an uneasy co-existence between the nominal English rulers and the Gaelic nobility. As suggested in Chapter One, such a dichotomy would end with one group swallowing the other (Senz Bueno 2014). The political power of the Irish language was invested in the Gaelic lords, who then joined the English political system. Irish was still tolerated, but the new system favoured English for bringing all parties together. Irish hung on as a majority language until the early 1800s but declined thereafter. The Great Famine firmly stigmatised the language as a marker of poverty. Emigration to the English-speaking world followed and the English language was perceived as the principal avenue to success. People chose to stop transmitting Irish to their children and instead encouraged English, the "vehicle of modernity". The native elite subsequently woke up to Irish culture and the Irish language. The Gaelic Revival, as it was known, harnessed the power of relational resources to attract people to the language. This elite became the political elite in post-independence Ireland, resulting in political power for the Irish language in the new state. The final part of the chapter shows how the weak position of the language today is connected to the lack of economic empowerment provided to Irish-speaking communities, who are stuck in a modern pattern of uneasy co-existence.

The First Wave of Linguicism - Political Disenfranchisement:

By the sixteenth century, co-existence was no longer an option. The choices for the Gaelic Irish were basically those laid out earlier by Taylor (1998): learn to live in the official language, assimilate or break away. King Henry VIII decided that Ireland should assimilate and become a 'second England'. Eliminating the native language and culture was imperative (Curtis 2002, 148). Many nobles realised that they needed English to communicate with their increasingly hands-on rulers (Mac Giolla Chríost 2006, 260). Education provided in England to Irish nobles created a generation of bilingual lords. Henry's policy of 'surrender and regrant' saw many Gaelic lords keep their land but adopt the language, customs and religion

of England (Maginn 2007). In return, they received protection and a seat in the colonial parliament. The attack on the Gaelic political class continued after the English Civil War. A succession of failed uprisings killed off the Gaelic system and the English decided to create a new class of British landowners. The 1652 Act for the Settlement of Ireland stripped Gaelic landowners of their property and reassigned them land in the west of Ireland.

The Second Wave of Linguicism - Economic Disenfranchisement:

The Gaelic Irish had lost their land and Irish was the language of the past, rich in Suk's (2007) relational resources but lacking use for people who wanted to be successful. In the urban centres of power, it held no sway. Conversely, English was the language of the present (Moriarty 2015). Combined with the disappearance of Irish-speaking nobles, this had a severe psychological impact on people, now saddled with the worst land across the country. This caused disappointing harvests and a reliance on the high-yield potato crop. It culminated in a potato blight and the Great Famine (1845-50), perhaps the most devastating blow of all to the Irish language. A million people died, and a million people left Ireland in the space of a few years. The main destinations for migrants were English-speaking countries, while others headed for the English-speaking cities of Ireland. All this reinforced the necessity of learning English (Ó Riagáin 1997). For decades afterwards, *Gaeilgeoirí* (Irish speakers) continued to leave rural areas in search of a better life, much like their counterparts in Britain who had left their regional tongues behind and found work in the cities (Gates 2010, 8). The world that *Gaeilgeoirí* entered was based around English. Irish was only permitted as a language of communication between private individuals, putting it at the level of toleration. The language sat low on the linguistic spectrum, not even reaching non-discrimination (Skutnabb-Kangas et al, 1995). Official business had to be done through English. In important matters like court cases, interpreters could be provided (Ó Ciosáin 2015), reflecting the accommodation model that prioritises other rights over the right to a language (Rubio-Marín 2007). Regardless, the shift to English was now unstoppable.

The Gaelic Revival – The Economic Elite Adopts Irish:

The Gaelic Revival marked a brief but important pushback in favour of Irish. Beginning in the 1870s, it saw an increased interest from the economic elite in Gaelic sports, music, dance and literature. At the Revival's heart was its deliberate choice of Irish as its language of

transmission. Language choice matters (Rubio-Marín 2007), selecting Irish marked the movement as something distinct from Englishness.

Before the Revival, living Irish culture had been suppressed. Removing the living elements of a language is a common theme of linguicism (Hernández Chávez 1989). Because of the lack of access to the existing culture and language, previous interest from the elite in the Irish language had been of an antiquarian nature (Doyle 2015, 165). Scholars put Irish in the same bracket as Ancient Greek and Latin, two dead languages. However, Gaelic culture and the Irish language were alive and well in remote parts of the country, places which later became sites of cultural pilgrimage (Nic Congáil 2012). There was a concerted effort to promote learning Irish as a form of patriotic duty, underlining the link between language and nationalism (Taylor 1998). Incorporating Irish into the education system would be vital. The introduction of the national school system in 1831 gave an indication of the low status of Irish. Pupils could learn English, French, Latin and Greek, but not Irish. In fact, pupils were punished if they spoke it instead of English (McDermott 2011, 26). The Revival had serious work to do.

The work was undertaken by the core of the Revival: members of the intelligentsia, the clergy and the Anglo-Irish gentry. They were well-educated and cosmopolitan, with access to all sorts of cultures. Their decision to converse in a minority language was the kind of statement that some scholars would dismiss as artificial (Waldron 1992), but these new *Gaeilgeoirí* believed that they were restoring a tradition which had been unfairly taken away from them, echoing fairness rights (Patten 2008). The archetypal figure was academic Douglas Hyde, the son of a Protestant rector who embraced the Irish language as a young man through conversations with the local gamekeeper. Hyde co-founded the Gaelic League in 1893. The League had several tangible successes in the early 1900s. They succeeded in getting Westminster to introduce Irish into national schools in 1900 and they convinced the National University to make Irish a compulsory subject for matriculation from 1913 onwards (Bew 1994, 86). A good education is the starting point for the most powerful in society, these policies thus represented a great way to ensure the next generation of leaders had an appreciation for Irish. The language was beginning to appear in parts of society that mattered.

Another part of Irish society which really mattered was the Catholic Church, and despite a historically underwhelming record in supporting Irish, it did help the Revival. This was a clear indication that the Revival was easier to back due to its elite leaders. The Gaelic League received support from Cardinal Michael Logue, the highest-ranking member of the Catholic Church in Ireland at the time, as well as from “many of the prelates” across the country

(Monaghan 1899). Father Eugene O'Growney penned the popular textbook *Simple Lessons in Irish.* Another priest, Father Peadar Ua Laoghaire, wrote *Séadna*, the first great literary work of the Gaelic Revival. Drawing from Goethe's *Faust* and *seanchas*, the art of Irish storytelling, it demonstrated that Irish was more than a language with a noble history, it could have a bright future too.

That future would only happen if certain elements were present. Irish would fall victim to economic forces if emigration was not curbed somehow. Economic power did exist among the Revival's members, but this did not address the poverty among Irish-speaking communities. The League did not focus on empowering those communities and has been criticised for wanting to keep the communities "unchanged" (Doyle 2015, 202). On the ground, those who hosted and taught eager proponents of the Revival did benefit (2015, 204), but many *Gaeilgeoirí* continued to scrape by through farming and fishing. On the political front, the Gaelic League avoided activism, and were ignored by the British government. They gave no political platform to Irish-speaking communities. As the League did not represent a unified voice for the desires of *Gaeilgeoirí,* Westminster had little reason to engage with them. The Revival was too romantic to succeed by itself.

This rediscovery of Irishness was romantic, but it could not live peacefully within a British society. Taylor (1998) showed how nationalism is only around the corner in such a scenario. The romantic Revival gave way to the bloody Irish independence movement, and many *Gaeilgeoirí* played a leading role in the latter as well. Before then, language had not been an important facet of Irish rebellions. Past leaders had had little familiarity with the living language and culture. The organisers of the 1798 Rebellion, the United Irishmen, had an antiquarian perspective on the Irish language (Kirk 2015, 144). Daniel O'Connell, a folk hero who fought for Catholics' rights in the early 1800s, believed that Irish should be left to die. To him, English was clearly the dominant language and that was that (Geoghegan 2008). It matches the utilitarian view that some languages simply cannot keep up and should not be mourned (Barry 2001). However, the new wave of Irish republicans in the early twentieth century included many who had developed a love for Irish thanks to the Revival and the League. A perfect example was Patrick Pearse, the Dublin-born son of an Englishman who worked as a barrister but was a lover of contemporary Gaelic culture. Pearse was a central figure in the 1916 rebellion that is now known as the Easter Rising, an event which shocked those expecting a more civilised path towards Ireland's future.

Before the Great War, Ireland had been moving towards a Home Rule model. This would have provided limited sovereignty to Ireland after a century of direct rule. A federal system

may have granted some political power and non-instrumental rights for the Irish language, but there now existed radical factions who wanted Ireland to push for independence. The Gaelic League had a decision to make. Pearse had been heavily involved in the League and had started to believe in armed struggle as the way forward for the Irish cause (Nic Congáil 2012, 445). Douglas Hyde wanted the Gaelic League to stay apolitical. Perhaps naively, he imagined that the Irish language could always be something for people of any political persuasions to enjoy. When the League's pro-independence faction won out in the summer of 1915, Hyde stepped down and watched on as the League voiced its support for Ireland's full independence.

Independence – The Economic Elite Become the Political Elite:

A bold approach was required if independence were to be achieved. The Irish language would stake its claim as the language of political power and of the present. In 1919, an Irish 'parliament' convened despite Ireland still being ruled directly from London. It was given an Irish name, *Dáil Éireann*, and the entirety of the first meeting was conducted through Irish. From its inception, Dáil members argued that Irish should be the first language of an independent Ireland (Dáil100 2019). This highlighted the difference between it and the British Parliament, as well as the Irish Parliament which had existed before direct rule. The theme of difference was reinforced through the 'Message to the Free Nations of the World', asserting Ireland's right to statehood because of its distinct culture.

Statehood did arrive in 1921. However, if you do not change the structure of society, the roots of language shift cannot be attacked (Patten 2008). A clear hierarchy was established, 'freezing' the linguistic landscape (Weinstock 2003). The 1922 constitution recognised Irish as Ireland's first national language, with English as the other official language. This fits with Rubio-Marín's (2007) conception of non-instrumental rights, but little instrumental action happened in the early years of independent Ireland with regards to language policy. The appetite for change stalled after a year-long Civil War, fought over the divisive treaty which saw only 26 of Ireland's 32 counties gain independence (Rowland 2014, 35). The new government also had "an aversion to the working class" (Lee 1989, 109), a group which contained basically everyone living in Irish-speaking parts of the country (later named the *Gaeltacht)*. There was little effort to empower *Gaeltacht* residents, and its formation created a boundary which rendered the needs of *Gaeilgeoirí* in other areas invisible. Irish no longer fully belonged to its speakers, it instead became a tool used by the state.

Soon, minority protections were perceived as artificial and exclusionary (Waldron 1992), and the needle was primed to shift from promotion to permission (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). The Gaelic League had lost any radical edge after its incorporation into the new political elite (Rowland 2014, 5). The Irish language, previously a marker of radical anti-British sentiment and willingly adopted by the elite, became associated with conservative Catholic values and wasteful state-mandated policies (Walsh 2015). Irish had become "insular, antiquated and superfluous to contemporary Ireland" (Ó Conchubhair 2005). This led to the establishment of the Language Freedom Movement (LFM) during the 1960s, which sought to end the privileged role of Irish in the education system and the civil service. Its members felt that the position Irish held at state level was leading to discrimination against monolingual Anglophones. The movement represented the frustration of a generation of young Irish people with the old guard, who had not ceded power since independence (Rowland 2014, 3). In 1973, a new government ousted the Fianna Fáil party and delivered on promises that pleased the LFM. Irish lost some of its political power and its status dipped, as it was soon no longer mandatory for civil servants or for students trying to obtain their secondary school diploma. The period of linguistic deregulation had started.

Deregulation reflected a lower status for the language, left to the utilitarian ideology promoted by the likes of Waldron (1992) and Barry (2001). In the 1990s, Ireland's economy was booming and the country finally became a cosmopolitan place as defined by Waldron (1992). There was an influx of immigrants and cultures. The economic power came from the English language, leaving the Irish language behind. The modern Irish heroes, playing at World Cups or in packed concert venues, presented an image of a successful Ireland that was English-speaking only (Ó Conchubhair 2005). The place of Irish in public discourse had practically disappeared. The idea of Irish being Ireland's first language seemed laughable.

Irish in the Twenty-First Century:

Today, there is a widespread acceptance that Irish is a minority language, and that conversations about it should match those about other minority languages. It was finally time to bring in some enforceable instrumental rights. The political power of Irish had done nothing to boost the number of speakers, something had to change. In 2003, the Irish government finally moved to give the use of Irish some solid legislative backing. The Official Languages Act was inspired by similar legislation in Wales and Canada, laying out "when

and where Irish is to be used in the delivery of public services" (Walsh 2015, 73). The language is better protected than ever before.

Opposition to the protection of Irish today is often rooted in the language of cosmopolitanism which began to emerge in Ireland during the boom. A student writing to the *Irish Times*, Elster (2006) provides arguments given many times over throughout this century: immigrants' languages like Polish are spoken more in Ireland and are more deserving of protection (linguistic situation is frozen (Weinstock 2003)); the economic boom was thanks to Ireland being an English-speaking country (a language's value is derived from its economic worth (Barry 2001)); Irish is just hard to learn (English is conversely easy and "a language from nowhere" (Woolard 2005)).

There may be several arguments against protections for Irish, but the current high position of the language on the Skutnabb-Kangas et al (1995) spectrum makes them hard to dismantle. The better discussion to have is how to empower Irish-speaking communities. Former Minister for the Gaeltacht Éamon Ó Cuív has reiterated the importance of economic power to a language community:

"No stability can be reached in relation to the future of the language unless there is an Irish-speaking middle class, not only in the *Gaeltacht*, but throughout the country." (Ó Cuív 2005)

The Irish language may currently hold a solid status thanks to its importance among the political elite, but its future is threatened if its communities continue to reside on the economic fringes of society. Any language strategy for the *Gaeltacht* has been hamstrung by the lack of coordination between a linguistic plan and a socio-economic one (Walsh 2015). Economic empowerment is vital for these communities' survival.

Conclusion:

This central tenet can lead us to some concluding thoughts. British colonisation trapped Irish in a precarious position for many centuries. The pre-existing Gaelic elite ceased to rule due to a mix of coercion and conflict. *Gaeilgeoirí* became the have-nots in society, leaving a deep psychological scar on the language. Those who fought for Irish freedom before the Revival did not place much value on Irish and many considered it a hindrance, not an asset. The movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century finally saw an alignment between Irish patriotism and an Irish-speaking Gaelic identity. The language was no longer just a "carrier of culture and tradition", it could now be a "vehicle for modernity" as well. The adoption of the language by the economic elite, who eventually took over as the political elite in Ireland,

ensured the language has held some status up until the present day. However, the status of the language in an independent Ireland has stagnated due to the lack of economic power given to Irish-speaking communities.

Chapter Three - Northern Ireland and the Irish Language

Although Irish is spoken all over the island of Ireland, its story in the last 100 years has been completely different between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In the Republic, Irish is treated as a cultural issue, but its promotion in Northern Ireland is more of a political matter (Pritchard 2004, 62). This shows that the Irish language in Northern Ireland is weaker in the area of political power and its high status is still to be fully confirmed. The country's predecessor, Ulster, gained more economic power than the rest of the island and aligned closely with British values. This power was tied to the English language, so upon partition, Northern Ireland remained an officially monolingual Anglophone state while Ireland proceeded to adopt Irish as the national language. The political class in Northern Ireland viewed Irish as a tool used by their enemies to promote an anti-British ideology. The result of such suspicion was linguicism, removing any gains in power the language had made in pre-partition Ireland. The Irish language has since been revitalised by a community which holds more economic power, and which opposes linguicism more vociferously than the Irish-speaking communities which had undergone language shift by the 1950s. The reformulation of politics in the region during this century has also increased the political power of the language. This has led to a push for language rights in recent years.

Irish in Northern Ireland before 1922 - The History of Ulster:

The story of Northern Ireland is closely aligned with that of Ulster, one of Ireland's historic provinces. Largely as the result of the Nine Years' War (1594-1603), the province was set on a different path to the rest of Ireland. The conflict pitted the Gaelic nobility of Ulster, the Earls, against the British monarchy. After succumbing to defeat, the Earls left Ireland and tried to drum up military support from their Catholic allies in continental Europe. They failed in this task and they subsequently failed to return.

Ulster was vulnerable after the Earls' departure, and the British quickly claimed their lands. The Irish-speaking political class was no more, and the language was only tolerated in private spheres. Lesser chiefs, seeing an opportunity to gain power, swore loyalty to the British crown and British customs in exchange for land. The remainder went to Protestant bishops and veterans of the war (Robinson 1984, 42). The new owners brought over British settlers to instil their values. Irish people in Ulster were economically segregated and moved to "the poorest and most isolated sections" of land (Robinson 1984, 102). Gaelic Catholics were

fixed as an economic underclass. Protestants came to dominate across Ireland in a phenomenon known as the Protestant Ascendancy. The Irish language grew less and less important as English-speaking Protestants held the most important roles in society. Irish was firmly a language of the past (Moriarty 2015). However, Ulster was unique in that it was developing a strong British identity, due to the successful plantation and the pre-existing ties between Ulster and Scotland.

The Industrial Revolution caused Ulster to grow even more British. The linen industry drove a boom in Belfast and the wider region. This attracted a fresh wave of British immigrants and the English language was perpetuated. The other provinces remained mostly agricultural. Ulster carried positive connotations of success, as depicted in a 1912 pro-British postcard which dubbed Ulster the 'Prosperity Province' (Connacht, Ireland's western province and the one with the highest concentration of *Gaeilgeoirí*, is the 'Poverty Province').

The Gaelic Revival naturally posed issues for the ruling Protestant class in Ulster who were happy with the status quo and their prosperity. The Revival could unite the Catholic minority of Ulster in language and culture. We observe the same trend of elites worrying about what a unified minority would be able to do and to demand (Hernández Chávez 1989). The Unionist movement was created in response, which sought to keep the union between Britain and Ireland. English was the root of social identity and the language of business. Irish was "a useful pastime but useless in commercial terms" (Williams 2008, 200). The Irish language held symbolic power, but it would never be economically or politically significant. James Craig, a future leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, admired those who learned it as a hobby, but nothing more (Bew 1994, 84). Unionists were happy to provide some space to *Gaeilgeoirí*, registering as non-instrumental rights (Rubio-Marín 2007) or permission on the spectrum (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995), reflected in a 1904 article from the unionist Belfast News Letter:

"While they hold from a business point of view the Irish language is altogether unnecessary […] they are willing that where the parents desire it their children should have every facility for learning the language" (as cited in McCoy 2006, 147).

Minority protections can sometimes be perceived as exclusionary (Waldron 1992), and it was feared that unionists uninterested in the Irish language would lose political power if Ireland gained any degree of sovereignty. The controversy over making Irish mandatory for entering the National University was one notable debate. Enforcing compulsory Irish would remove the choice people had to speak a language or not, going against a liberal idea of how language should work (Barry 2001). John Dillon, a prominent voice in the Home Rule movement,

spoke of "gross oppression" if "Protestant boys" were forced to study Irish to gain a scholarship (Bew 1994, 89). Home Rule was a threat to Protestant power, so the Ulster Covenant criss-crossed the province. Signed by approximately 500,000 people, it was a solemn pledge to reject the principles of Home Rule.

The battle lines were drawn. A balance could not exist in the linguistic sphere, one group would look to dominate the other (Taylor 1998). The decision made by the Gaelic League to end their apolitical stance and support the drive for Irish independence is commonly regarded as the event which separated Protestant Unionists from the Irish language (Ó Riagáin 1997; McMonagle 2010). Irish could no longer be a hobby for Protestants, the language could hold no status for them. The ensuing vilification and rejection of Irish in the Protestant community meant an erasure of their own history, due to the enormous role played by Anglo-Irish Protestants like Douglas Hyde in the Gaelic Revival. Irish identity was morphing into something far removed from Hyde's idealistic, inclusive vision (Nic Congáil 2012).

The spread of nationalism to the masses through the Gaelic Revival resulted in the movement being more devoted to dismantling Protestant/Anglo-Irish superiority than to promoting romantic Gaelic ideals (Pritchard 2004, 73). Unionists feared a turning of the tables, with their culture and language occupying a new, lower place on the spectrum. Instead of being actively promoted, they imagined complete prohibition or mere toleration (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). The Unionist movement was unequivocal: an independent Ireland would spell trouble for them. Following the conclusion of the Irish War of Independence, a deal was struck between Britain and Ireland for the Ulster counties with a Protestant majority to remain part of the United Kingdom. The six counties in question became Northern Ireland.

The Irish Language in Northern Ireland (1922-1960s):

Non-instrumental rights were secure as Unionists did not have to compromise their cultural identity (Rubio-Marín 2007), something which may have happened in an independent Ireland. For the first fifty years of its existence, Anglophone Protestant Unionists had political hegemony in Northern Ireland (Mac Giolla Chríost 2006, 257). Unionists justified this by indicating the presence of radical Irish Nationalists among the political elite in Ireland. The Dublin government considered Northern Ireland an occupied territory, a belief that made its way into the 1937 Constitution. Aggressive governance was required to protect the region from the external threat, plus the internal threat from disgruntled Nationalists who did not recognise the legitimacy of Northern Ireland (Parkinson 2012, 301). Westminster was

simply happy that there was less violence after years of conflict and ignored the plight of subjugated Catholics (2012, 302).

Protestant Unionists ran Northern Irish society, meaning Irish did not even provide relational resources (Suk 2007). Northern Ireland's lineage was depicted as exclusively British Protestants. Accommodation is not considered promotion by some (Rubio-Marín 2007), but it was in Northern Ireland. Giving the Irish language any space was considered dangerous. The small communities of *Gaeilgeoirí* in Northern Ireland after partition were removed from public discourse. A prime example of this ignorance is the fact that the Northern Irish Census contained no question about the Irish language until 1991. Irish became more and more invisible: It was banned from road signs in 1949, even though many place names were derived from the language; Irish was not allowed in Belfast City Council; Irish could not be used in courtrooms (Mac Giolla Chríost & Aitchison 1998, 307). Irish was mostly non-existent in the education system as well but remained an option for pupils attending Christian Brothers schools, reinforcing the link between Catholicism and Irish (Callahan & Hamalien 1997, 16). A Protestant could spend their whole life in Northern Ireland without ever coming across the language. Although it is hard to say with total confidence when the process of language shift finished in Northern Ireland, experts estimate that inter-generational transmission stopped in communities during the 1950s (Mac Giolla Chríost & Aitchison 1998; Doyle 2015).

In the 1960s, however, *Gaeilgeoirí* began to fight back in Northern Ireland. Self-taught, they looked to revitalise the language in urban areas. Some have disputed this approach as an admission that a language is no longer organic (Waldron 1992), and this argument was heard in Northern Ireland (Nic Craith 1999, 497). After all, these people could speak English too, but the use of Irish marked a broader political and cultural awakening. The disappearance of the historic communities had allowed the language to start over. The new generation of speakers did not carry the stigma which had burdened others. This strategy of urban revitalisation was completely different to that of the Irish government, who still focused on rural communities. Ignored by politicians, Irish-speaking families took it upon themselves to form an economically viable community that would perpetuate the language. Without any state assistance, they established an Irish-language school and several other initiatives. Their presence in Belfast instead of an isolated rural area meant that the political class could not deny their existence. A Catholic civil rights movement sprung up in the city around the same time, inspired by the African American community in the United States. Catholics came together to demand equal rights in a society which had been run by Protestants for decades.

Language during ‘The Troubles’:

Sadly, what started as a civil rights movement evolved into a sectarian conflict known as ‘The Troubles’, lasting over 30 years. The primary belligerents were the nationalist Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the unionist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Many IRA members learnt Irish in prison. It is a perfect example of individuals valuing a language for its relational resources above all else (Suk 2007), because despite the inmates’ affection for Irish, they doubted its ability to give speakers economic and political power (Mac Giolla Chríost 2006, 330). Strangely, IRA prisoners were echoing views held by leading Ulster unionists before the creation of Northern Ireland. Like James Craig and his peers, the IRA members felt like the language could only be a hobby. Linguicism had been so effective in Northern Ireland that only its relational resources were left.

Hope emerged for the Irish language in 1998, a turning point in Northern Irish history. Britain and Ireland joined forces to solve the problem of Northern Ireland. Out of their negotiations emerged the Good Friday Agreement, marking the end of Protestant hegemony. The Irish language would receive a certain level of non-instrumental rights as defined by Rubio-Marín (2007). The language community would have more space to practise their culture, with extra funding promised for Irish in education and in media, less than twenty years after a broadcast ban on the Irish language had been lifted (McMonagle 2010, 256). The 1991 Census, the first in Northern Irish history to feature a question on Irish, highlighted the new status of the language in the country during the 1990s. According to the Census, Northern Irish *Gaeilgeoirí* were well educated, overrepresented “in the professional, managerial and technical classes” and thus described as “an emerging elite” (Mac Giolla Chríost & Aitchison 1998, 305). The Good Friday Agreement promised even more job opportunities too. The language community was finding an economic status in Northern Ireland that their southern neighbours had yet to lock down. The next step was securing backing from the political elite.

The Adoption of Irish by the Nationalist Political Elite:

Managing bilingualism is extremely difficult (Taylor 1998; Senz Bueno 2014), even more so when a country is emerging from a long-running conflict. The problem with discussions of political elites and language in Northern Ireland is that we are dealing with a binary executive. The 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement created a power-sharing system comprised of

the nationalist Sinn Féin party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Despite the importance of 'third way' parties in ending 'the Troubles', twenty-first century politics has been dominated by Nationalists and Unionists. Culture has subsequently turned into a zero-sum game (McMonagle 2010, 267). The true status of Irish cannot be reflected in such a fraught environment. Irish is central to Sinn Féin's image (its name means 'Ourselves' in Irish), indicating clear support for protection on one side. On the other side, the DUP know that making a large concession on Irish would infuriate their base. A counterweight is needed. Some argue that language rights should primarily focus on helping languages that were deliberately suppressed by the state (Patten 2008). In Northern Ireland, the need for community balance is more important, so Ulster-Scots serves as 'the Unionists' Irish'. Ulster-Scots is not the same as Irish, though. Firstly, some regard it as a dialect of English. Secondly, it was never spoken by a subjugated group, as it is descended from the language of Scottish planters. For a long time, Unionists did not pay much attention to it, but it has become more relevant as the Irish language movement has grown (McMonagle & McDermott 2014). Ulster-Scots was put on an equal footing to Irish in the Good Friday Agreement, demonstrating the balanced approach required to complete the complex negotiations. The St. Andrew's Agreement then featured a clause on the creation of an Irish Language Act, setting off a whole new debate.

The DUP dug their heels in on the creation of an Irish Language Act, employing some of the arguments that we have seen before against minority language rights. The party was frustrated at the actions of Sinn Féin, who would only return to power-sharing if a Language Act was delivered. During the 2017 general election campaign, DUP leader Arlene Foster spelled out the modern Unionist position on the Irish language. Foster's main argument was a retelling of the 'frozen situation' idea, where a territorial language should not be considered inherently more important than an immigrant language (Weinstock 2003; Gates 2010). Foster claimed that a Polish Language Act would be more useful than one for Irish. Although more people have some knowledge of Irish, it is true that more people in Northern Ireland use Polish than Irish as their main language (MacGuill 2017). Nonetheless, it is a tactic that ignores centuries of systemic neglect. Sinn Féin and its supporters would find relevant the concept of fairness rights (Patten 2008). An Irish Language Act is a step towards righting a historical wrong. Another strategy sees the old spectre of Irish as a political tool being brought out once more. Foster maintained in the same speech that the language was being used to "beat Unionism over the head" (Irish Times 2017). Comments of this nature were also in use over a century previously, when James Craig described Irish as "a political lever"

(Bew 1994, 84). Foster later compared Sinn Féin to greedy crocodiles for their demands, a comment construed by most to be targeted at Language Act campaigners. She later apologised for the remark, stating "I have always made it clear that if people want to converse or learn the Irish language then they should be allowed to do so" (Irish Times 2017). As an approach to the language, it ranks at the basic level of toleration (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995), far removed from what a Language Act would entail. The outcome of this dispute was political deadlock.

The beginning of 2020 signalled an end to years of stalemate between the two camps. The era of toleration ended, with permission becoming the norm (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). A few months previously, Arlene Foster remarked that the Irish language and Unionism were "not incompatible" (Hughes 2019), a notable admission. Seeing as the support of both Nationalists and Unionists was required to restore power-sharing, a standalone Irish Language Act never came to fruition. Provisions for both Irish and Ulster-Scots have been brought in instead, including two language commissioners and two translation services in the Northern Ireland Assembly. One significant move is the repeal of the act which banned the use of Irish in courtrooms. In areas like parliamentary sessions and legal cases, the Irish language will finally be accommodated. The top politicians are keeping control over the process, though. For example, any recommendation from the commissioner will need to be approved by the leading Nationalist and Unionist member of the Assembly before action is taken (Meredith 2020). The Irish language has clearly gone up in status, but another language is needed for its presence to be permitted.

Conclusion:

Northern Ireland is an incredibly fascinating case study as it shows how a language rises and falls as a reflection of the economic and political status of its speakers. Ulster was set on a distinct path several centuries ago, which slowly severed it both economically and culturally from the rest of Ireland. The Gaelic Revival, a momentous period in Irish history, only served to polarise identities even further in the province. The Irish language was a victim, as many felt that it did not belong to the whole population anymore. The Protestant elite in Northern Ireland ensured the disappearance of Irish from public life in the country. Since the end of armed conflict, the Irish language has grown in profile and legal status. Sinn Féin helped the Irish language by throwing their weight behind it, but the power-sharing structure means that elites who support the language will always have to accept political bartering as a reality.

Chapter Four – Spain and its Regional Languages

The case of Spain shows that the path minority languages take is not necessarily straightforward. These languages did not see a steady accumulation in economic and political power, resulting in decreasing linguicism and more rights. Instead, Spain's history has witnessed swings between greater power for regions and their languages (hence the use of the term 'regional languages' in this chapter) and centralisation and official monolingualism. Conflicting views over how to keep Spain unified has seen the state attempt both promotion and prohibition of regional languages at different points in its history. This chapter will focus on the 'historic regions' of Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country and the languages spoken in each: Galician, Catalan and Basque, as well as the language of central power, Castilian/Spanish. The poor, rural nature of Galicia resulted in stigmatisation for Galician, while Catalan and Basque maintained a reasonably high status in society due to the economic power of its speakers. Currently, all these languages benefit from political power and well-defined language rights thanks to the devolved system of regional autonomy now in place in Spain.

Linguicism and Regional Power in Spain before the Twentieth Century:

Galicia became a part of the Kingdom of Castile, the predecessor of modern Spain, in the fifteenth century, with Catalonia and the Basque Country being incorporated in the following century. All the regions enjoyed reasonably long periods of autonomy. However, the situation would not last forever as political machinations determined the fate of these regions. Without linguicism, some regions had proven troublesome for the ruling class, as theoretical writing would suggest (Hernández Chávez 1989). Castile stripped Catalonia of its political structure after the War of Spanish Succession (1701-15). The monarchy used language to punish Catalonia, who had backed the losing side in the conflict. The *Nueva Planta* accords removed the Catalan language from official use and replaced it with Castilian. Inspired by the centralisation project undertaken in France by Louis XIV, it was a display of force from the new king, Philip V. It also confirmed the political power of Castilian. Despite the official policy of prohibition towards the Catalan language in political and judicial institutions, Catalan cultural expression persisted - indeed, thrived - with Catalan printing and literature extremely active. Royal conflict may have ended Catalonia's political autonomy, but Catalan speakers continued to have a voice and a defined identity.

The Basques were similarly punished for their role in a royal power struggle. Autonomy ended after the final Carlist War (1872-76). Like the Catalans, the Basques backed the losing side and the monarchy took away their autonomy. Despite this, Basque nationalism blossomed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the region industrialised (Pérez-Agote 2006). This new nationalism, like any, needed a language to rally around (Taylor 1998). The outcome was a renewed interest in the Basque language in urban areas, then undergoing a process of economic modernisation (Agirreazkuenaga 2012, 500). Their newfound economic power added to Basque frustration that the region was politically beholden to Castile, a region which provided much less to the national economy. This marked an evolution in Basque nationalism, which had in the past been an agrarian and anti-modernist movement (Ben-Ami 1991, 494). It was crucial that "modern classes" (i.e. a well-educated middle class) appeared who could "create a new nation-state around their interests" (Pérez-Agote 2006, 60). Senz Bueno (2014, 341) describes the stereotypical supporter of Catalan independence of that era in a similar vein: middle-class liberals with a good education. This profile meant that the "anarchist working class both Catalan and immigrant remained suspicious of nationalism on class grounds" (Hobsbawm 1990, 140). Like their Basque counterparts, the Catalan middle class could switch between Castilian and their regional language with ease, enabling social mobility without abandoning their mother tongue.

Social mobility for Galician speakers had been harder to achieve. The majority language was the way to get ahead in life (Barry 2001), so parents urged their children to learn Castilian. As in Ireland, the native nobility had been replaced. The shift in political power made language shift much easier (Beswick 2007). The clergy were also replaced, removing the last of Galician's social status. The region did not cause much trouble for Castile, so autonomy was tolerated until 1833. The end of autonomy was not a punishment but merely part of a wider project to divide Spain territorially. This division was yet another attempt by the monarchy to centralise power in the country. Writing in Galician practically vanished, and the language was roundly mocked as a dialect for "country bumpkins" (Light 1993). The region was not economically successful, so richer and more powerful regions looked down upon on it. Like Irish, a stigma came to be attached to the language. Another similarity with Ireland was the trend of rural-to-urban migration. This led to the formation of an educated middle class who did not view Galician with shame but instead believed that it deserved a place equal to that of Castilian (Beswick 2007). Their dreams of co-officialdom would one day come true, but the lack of autonomy at the time made such demands hard to realise. This

regional pride, also apparent in Catalonia and the Basque Country, is now supported by the Spanish state, but the Spanish government was hostile towards it for a large portion of the twentieth century.

Regional Languages under Franco:

Today a bastion of multilingualism, Spain had an entirely different attitude when it was ruled by Francisco Franco following the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). He identified monolingualism as a strategy for fostering social cohesion, something which scholars have also remarked upon (Patten 2008; Rubio-Marín 2007). Franco's policies had a strong historical precedent. It has been argued that the actions of the Bourbon monarchy to promote Castilian were driven more by a desire to foster a collective identity than a desire to cut off regional language speakers from sources of power (Mar-Molinero 1997, 9). Before Franco's victory in the Civil War, the short-lived Second Republic had ratified autonomy for the 'historic regions'. Spain's dictator believed that the Second Republic, with its embrace of diversity and regional autonomy, summed up Spain's struggles (Encarnación 2004). The Industrial Revolution had only arrived in Catalonia and the Basque Country, leaving the rest of the country a bystander as Western Europe modernised. During the early twentieth century, Spain sought to find meaning after the events of 1898, when it lost the last vestiges of its colonial empire (Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines). The outcome was political extremes, with Spain experiencing fascist authoritarianism under Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-31) and then socialist democracy under the Second Republic (1931-36), but minority identities were about to face their greatest threat yet under Franco.

Franco wanted the policies to remove any space for minority identities from the cradle to the grave. Non-instrumental rights and having the space to practise one's language is vitally important (Rubio-Marín 2007). As we saw in Northern Ireland, removing a language from public discourse can have a devastating impact on its speakers. At the cradle, a 1938 order in the Basque Country highlighted the "unhealthy provocation […] of regionalist sentiments", which had caused parents to give their children Basque names. The order demanded that an end be put to this practice and that all Spanish children be given Spanish names. According to the document, Basque names carried "a meaning contrary to the Unity of the Fatherland" (as cited in Pérez-Agote 2006, 82). At the grave, headstones with Basque epitaphs were destroyed (Light 1993; Kasmir 1996). Basque was too different to ever be incorporated into a Spanish identity and it had to be eliminated.

However, all other regional languages in Spain were related to Castilian, so the Franco regime decided to designate them as dialects. This stigmatised the regional languages as only being useful to "the uneducated and peasantry" (Mar-Molinero 1997, 12), leaving Castilian as a "vehicle of modernity". Galician and Catalan were placed in a position of inferiority. Another discursive act from Franco was calling Castilian (*castellano*) just Spanish (*español).* Castilian was tied to Castile; Spanish was a national language. To reinforce this notion, cultural expression in regional languages was minimal in the early years of Franco's rule. Films originally made in regional languages had to be reissued in Castilian. Publications in regional languages were restricted to certain genres and heavily censored. The idea of Castilian superiority was reinforced throughout society.

To relieve some pressure, a shift from prohibition was eventually necessary. The regional languages would be inching up the Skutnabb-Kangas et al (1995) spectrum. The 1966 Freedom of Expression Law meant that regional languages were permitted in sectors which had been off-limits since the Civil War. Magazines could be published in Basque, Catalan and Galician again. This law also allowed for the private education of children in regional languages for the first time under Franco. This was particularly important for Galician, which lacked a standardised form (Beswick 2007). Up until then, schoolchildren had learned only Castilian, and teachers who could teach regional languages were frequently moved out of their native regions (Light 1993). Entering the 1970s, there was some hope that autonomy was just around the corner for the historic regions.

In the end, Franco was not overthrown in a bloody coup, nor did he face a jury of his peers. He was a leader for life, dying of heart failure in 1975. However, the Basque terrorist group ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, Basque Homeland and Liberty) had already struck the vital blow for the regions by assassinating Luis Carrero Blanco two years prior. Franco had chosen Carrero to fill the post of Prime Minister after doing without one for decades. He considered Carrero his one and only successor (Share 1986, 561). With both Carrero and Franco gone, there was no Francoist politician strong enough to take over (1986, 567). A constitutional monarchy was adopted, and the first free elections since the 1930s were held. They yielded strong results for regional parties, meaning language communities now had the political power to bring in rights to protect themselves.

Regional Languages Post-Franco:

For the most part, the regions wanted promotion, the highest level on the linguistic spectrum (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). The 1978 Constitution allowed for regional autonomy, which came into effect for the historic regions from 1981. The last period of federalism had ended in the Civil War, so there was anxiety around the decision. The remaining Francoists were dismayed at the death of centralisation, while regional separatists believed that the level of autonomy provided was not enough (Encarnación 2004). However, each region did receive control over education and cultural policy, giving them plenty of room to promote their local languages as they saw fit.

Promotion does have its downsides in the Spanish context, particularly in Catalonia. We see many of the same arguments that we observe in other cases. For example, there is anger over the 'freezing' of the linguistic landscape (Weinstock 2003; Gates 2010). Roughly 10% of the population speak neither Catalan nor Castilian as their first language, but their languages are excluded from debates on language use in the region (Senz Bueno 2014). Catalonia's capital, Barcelona, is the perfect example of a cosmopolitan location. Some could argue that language laws in such a multicultural and modern place impose excessive boundaries (Waldron 1992). Others criticise Catalan's preservation as undemocratic and not coming from "a collective will" (Lodares 2000, 29). There is then frustration that non-natives are obliged to learn Catalan to work in the government, even though all Catalan speakers understand Spanish. This goes against the context-of-choice principle, where a monolingual speaker can live their life without any problems (Patten 2008). In Catalonia, where a monolingual Castilian Spanish speaker should be able to live their life unhindered, they are being denied access to certain jobs. Opposition to this rule echoes the statements of the Language Freedom Movement in 1960s Ireland. In spite of these issues, the Catalan language is kept strong politically thanks to its economic power.

In Catalonia, the economy performs better than anywhere else in Spain on many key metrics, such as GDP and level of foreign investment (Romei 2017). There is a strong sentiment that they will never get a fair share if they stay in Spain, as central authority will grow weary of the increased demands from the region (Hernández Chávez 1989). In this context, grievances over Catalan profits being used to help poorer regions are combined with the desire to have linguistic and cultural autonomy, thus birthing the strong independence movement of recent years (Boylan 2015). Secession and full independence become more attractive options as time goes on (Taylor 1998). Catalan retained its status among speakers throughout even the

most difficult years due to its economic importance (Goldstein 1997; Woolard 2005). During the period of Franco's rule, when the state was trying to stigmatise Catalan, the language still had power through its use by those in "prestigious economic and occupational positions" (Goldstein 1997, 60).

The issue of stigma has not materialised in the Basque Country either, as it also holds economic power. The region became a key financial centre for the whole of Spain during the late nineteenth century. In recent times, the temperate climate and the threat of ETA attacks forced Basque entrepreneurs to steer clear of tourism and property, sectors which most of Spain embraced post-Franco. As a result, the industrial Basque economy has stayed largely stable, while southern regions have endured periods of boom and bust. The south was particularly affected by the housing crash and recession of 2008 (Cooper 2012). A healthy regional economy means less emigration and a solid foundation upon which the Basque language can thrive. Like the Catalans, Basques know what they contribute to the state and are proud of their unique identity. All this reinforces the notion that economic power has helped these languages to maintain their self-worth, and that the present regional tensions in Spain stem from a political imbalance rather than an economic one (Encarnación 2004).

The political imbalance has been remedied somewhat by the current federal model which allows for languages to hold political power. In each of the relevant regions, non-discrimination is a key part of the legislation. The regional language is also actively promoted by the local government, showing that elements of the linguistic spectrum can be combined (Skutnabb-Kangas et al 1995). Galician, Basque, Catalan and Aranese hold co-official status with Castilian (Aranese is a language spoken in Catalonia with only 5000 speakers, hence the lack of focus on it in this thesis).

Having multiple co-official languages means that balancing the demands of the regions with Madrid's needs is a tricky task. Regions often want to "correct historical situations of imbalance of one language with respect to the other" (Milian i Massena 2010), which we could also call fairness rights (Patten 2008). However, Madrid values non-discrimination above all. For example, the central government went to the Constitutional Court to have the preference given to Aranese in its native territory overturned and deemed unconstitutional (EFE 2018). Equality is essential for the system to work. In the same year, the Court struck down a complaint from the Basque government relating to perceived central interference in language education. The autonomous government was unhappy that Basque and Castilian were being taught in the same way. The Court once more refused to allow preferential treatment. Equality is the key to keep the system of regional autonomy going.

Conclusion:

Spain has a complex history when it comes to its regional languages. The economic power of Catalonia and the Basque Country has not always been reflected in political power and increased rights, while Galicia's weak economy caused the Galician language to be stigmatised. Spain is unusual in that its centre of economic and political power do not align (Miller & Miller 1996), so we have not always seen economic clout directly lead to political might. Language discrimination has been used both as a tool to punish rebellious regions and to foster a homogenous identity. The current federal model accepts that the historic communities hold power in a democratic system and therefore have the right to promote their regional languages, although they must not supersede the rights of the Castilian language.

Conclusion

The previous chapters have demonstrated how the trajectory of a minority or regional language is tied up in its economic and political power. When a language is lacking in both, linguicism is basically inevitable. *Gaeilgeoirí* across the island of Ireland have suffered from both economic and political disenfranchisement. The actions of the British, combined with the failures of Gaelic lords, left native communities cut off from the traditional hierarchy. The growth of urban areas and the devastation wrought on rural Ireland by the Great Famine caused an inexorable decline in the Irish language. In Ulster, this trend was combined with a strong British identity. Spain's regions started out as associated members of the Kingdom of Castile, but a lack of loyalty to the Bourbon royal family cost them their autonomy. The attempts at 'Castilianising' the country were then replicated by Franco. Language, as a distinct marker of identity, became an easy target during these centralisation projects. Language as a political weapon has come up frequently in this thesis, it is a topic that could be extended into research of its own.

In all the cases bar one, political power was derived from the economic success of a language community, either acquired via deliberate adoption by an elite group or developed organically. The Gaelic Revival brought Irish into a new realm. It was carried upwards by the intellectual, urban elite into a higher status. A similar process happened nearly a century later in Northern Ireland, with Irish taken up as an identity marker by a group of activists and grown from there. The lack of stigma and the affluence of both communities helped Irish enter the political sphere when the time came. In contrast, Catalonia and the Basque Country have long been centres of trade and industry for Spain, giving their languages a purpose even when all the political power lay in Madrid. The one exception, Galicia, benefitted from its status as a 'historic region' and was put on the same level as Catalonia and the Basque Country. The relational resources offered by the Galician language offer one possible explanation as to why intergenerational transmission continued in the face of low economic and political power. This is a situation which could be examined further by future analysis, as this thesis can naturally only go so far.

The economic power in each case led to political power, albeit achieved in different forms. In both jurisdictions on the island of Ireland, violent rebellion played a part in removing British/Protestant hegemony. In the Basque Country, ETA's assassination of Luis Carrero Blanco most likely prevented the continuation of Francoist rule. As in Ireland and Northern

Ireland, the unrest generated showed what the dominant group had feared: the underclass was now united in language and culture (Hernández Chávez 1989).

The final step was ensuring language rights as the definitive expression of a language's high status. The Irish language was much loved by the men and women who fought for independence from the British, so the new Irish state ensured its prominent position. This paper did not have the scope to fully discuss the failures of language revitalisation in Ireland. Further research into this topic using economic and political power through the prism of language rights and linguicism could yield some interesting findings. Irish language rights in Northern Ireland arrived in 2020 after the development of the language through a community with burgeoning economic power and strong backing from one of the country's main political parties. However, it had to be balanced out by equivalent rights for Ulster-Scots, whose claims for protection are much shakier when analysed with Patten's (2008) typology of language rights. This case shows us that theoretical thinking often brings us to different conclusions than what we end up with in reality. Northern Irish politics requires balance, and the 2020 Language Act sums that up. Spain's shift from political power to rights was relatively smooth, mainly thanks to the regional nature of the languages discussed. A federal model was possible to help Spain's regions support their native languages. Language rights in Spain have not been without issue, though. Like in Northern Ireland, balance is more important than what is arguably best for the health of each language. That is why preferential treatment for regional languages over Castilian has been struck down several times by the Constitutional Court.

This thesis lays out the process that certain language communities have undergone to move from powerlessness to legislative strength. It could be generalised further to turn it into a sort of handbook for language activists on how to gain rights and recognition within their native territory. Despite the gains made by the languages mentioned here, there are many other cases in Europe of languages that are ignored by the government. Catalan and Basque are well protected in Spain but have no official recognition in France, where sizeable 'historic' communities also exist. There is still a way to go for minority language communities worldwide in the fight for status and recognition.

The final thought for this thesis is that while it may seem at times that minority groups gaining power and status is a linear process, particularly in the democratic age, one must always remain vigilant and keep fighting for the place of minority and regional languages in society.

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