

# Heirs of the Portuguese Sea

The importance of Imperial nostalgia to the CPLP

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## **Introduction**

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) emerged from the ruins and legacies of the Portuguese overseas empire by trying to bring together as equals the many states that have Portuguese as their official language. A monumental effort that aimed to make something positive of the long history of Portuguese colonial exploitation, and convert it to political and economic benefits for all its members. The extent that the organization is a neo-imperialism tool, however, continues to be a debated issue. Many see the Community as an attempt by Portugal to reimpose itself as the center of this Lusophone world in order to regain the prestige and relevance lost with its empire, as well as an attempt by Brazil to impose itself over the South Atlantic space. It is true that these two countries are at the center of the organization and its formation, however there is another layer to their interest in the CPLP is tied with the imperial nostalgia that permeates these countries.

Imperial nostalgia, as the name implies, deals with the memory of the imperial past, and was first conceptualised by Renato Rosaldo in his article “Imperialist Nostalgia”. Rosaldo defines the term as the desire of the former empires for the things that they have destroyed—especially the traditional lifestyle of conquered people (Rosaldo 1989, 107-108). This concept was further expanded by Paulo de Medeiros who described imperial nostalgia as “a form of longing for a past that never really existed except in our imagination” (de Medeiros 2016, 205). This expands Rosaldo’s concept by defining it as the process of idealizing the imperial past while downplaying its many atrocities (de Medeiros, 204). This phenomenon is not exclusive to Portugal, as its presence is still felt across Europe in the former colonial metropolis, as well as in the former *colonies such as Brazil, as it still holds a great space in the imagination of societies throughout the world*. However, these nostalgias do not manifest in the same way as—though the imperial nostalgias that permeate Brazil and Portugal may share a common origin—they drastically differ from each other. Whereas the Portuguese imperial nostalgia is externalized and focused in its ties with its former colonies (though with a new imperialist undertone), Brazilian nostalgia has been internalized under a cloak of post-colonialism.

These twin forms of imperial nostalgia have their intellectual origin in the works of the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and his theory of Lusotropicalism. Through its depiction of the Portuguese colonization as kinder and more humane than others, Lusotropicalism provided the intellectual basis for the formation of Portuguese Imperial Nostalgia and the Brazilian ‘Racial Democracy.’ Therefore, this research aspires to examine is the importance of Lusotropicalism for the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, through its engendering of Portuguese imperial nostalgia and Brazilian Racial Democracy. This research aims to better comprehend how

these imperial nostalgias affect the CPLP's post-colonial mission, and in turn how they are affected by it.

The relevance of this topic is revealed by looking at the contemporary Luso-Brazilian realities that continue to be deeply influenced by imperial nostalgia and its legacies. In Portugal, the belief that the Portuguese colonizer was a special and more benevolent type of colonizer continues to permeate society and shape the way that the country interacts with the world, as well as how it perceives itself. Imperial nostalgia is unapologetically displayed across Portuguese society and constantly reaffirmed through cultural manifestations, education, and media. However, it is not limited merely to how Portugal perceives and defines itself, as it also shapes the way in which the country interacts with the broader world—to the extent that, even within the context of the European Union, Portugal refers back to its former colonial ties as a way to gain relevance inside of the block. Brazil, in contrast, holds a much more subtle connection with imperial nostalgia as—despite not glorifying its past as part of the Portuguese Empire—the legacies of Lusotropicalism continue to dictate the way that Brazilian society perceives itself and its racial relations. This deeply problematic element of Brazilian identity has been questioned since the end of the military dictatorship in the 80s, but instead of vanishing has witnessed a counterresurgence led by conservative sectors of Brazilian society—as represented by the recently elected president Jair Bolsonaro. Despite his long record of racist statements, Bolsonaro perceives himself as incapable of being racist, as he embraces imperial nostalgia and claims that such forms of prejudice are a product of left-wing ideology and almost non-existent in Brazil. Consequently, this research brings to the light the deeply entrenched influence of imperial nostalgia in the Lusophone space, in the hopes of contributing to filling this gap in the literature, as it continues to be an under researched topic in the broader Anglophonic academia.

A focus on the significance of imperial nostalgia makes Postcolonialism an essential theoretical framework for analyzing the importance of this phenomenon in the Lusophone community. Its focus on the legacies of colonialism is critical in order to understand the long-lasting impact of the Portuguese Empire, and the idea of empire have over these societies. Moreover, Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* will be especially relevant, as its analysis of the Western essentialist attitudes toward non-western societies helps to bring Lusotropicalism, with its clear orientalist views, into the broader field of post-colonialism.

The methodology of this thesis will be a process-tracing aimed at better illustrating the impact of the independent variable—Lusotropicalism—on the creation of the dependent variable CPLP. This is because process-tracing unwraps the link between cause and effect that connects independent variables and outcomes, and divides it into smaller step, (known as causal mechanisms) in order to facilitate the process of finding observable evidence (Van Evera 1997).

A method that, together with the close reading of the works of Gilberto Freyre and relevant academic works surrounding the Luso-Brazilian imperial nostalgias, will help to enrich the academic discussion about the CPLP and post-colonialism. To do that, this thesis will be divided into three parts. The first part will focus on the independent variable, the second on the causal mechanism in both the Portuguese and Brazilian cases, and the last part on the outcome. The first chapter will center around a critical reading of the works of Gilberto Freyre, introducing and analyzing his theory and how it became central to the Lusotropicalism embraced by the 'Estado Novo,' whilst then connecting it with the broader field of post-colonial studies (through Said's Orientalism). The second chapter will focus on the development of Portuguese imperial nostalgia through the dictatorial last days of the Portuguese empire and its transformation into a democratic member of the European Union. The third chapter will analyze the development of the Brazilian racial democracy (through dictatorships and democracies) and how it ties with the Brazilian perceived exceptionalism in post-colonial matters. The last chapter will look at the CPLP as a micro-cosmos of post-colonial interactions, where new-imperialist agendas and orientalist presumptions coexist side by side with postcolonial narratives—reaffirming the importance of imperial nostalgia for the formation and problems of such organizations.

Consequently, this methodology will show how imperial nostalgia, in all its varieties, is central not only to the creation of the CPLP, but also central to its failures. However, it also shows how it coexists with many other driving forces (post-colonial ones in particular), to the extent that the very idea of imperial nostalgia in some areas has begun to merge with Post-Colonial perspectives. Thus, the CPLP—though not the most successful venture in history—is both unique and deeply tied with the broader field of post-colonial studies, making it a case that should be further studied outside of the lusophone academia.

## Literature Review

In order to best understand how the Luso-Brazilian imperial nostalgia affects these countries' perspective about their place in the CPLP, it is first necessary to analyze and compare what the academic literature has produced on the topic. Because of that, this literature review will first focus in the academic response to Lusotropicalism and its connections with Portugal. Following that, it will look at how academia views Brazilian Racial democracy. Lastly, it will focus on what has been said about the connection between the CPLP and imperial nostalgia.

The works from Cláudia Castelo, Teresa Serra Nunes, Jan Nemeč, and João Alberto da Costa Pinto each explain the core ideas of Gilberto's Freyre Lusotropicalism, as well as reflecting upon what they meant for the remembrance of the empire and how it affected Portugal. While Castelo aimed to show the great distance between Freyre's ideas and colonial reality, both Nemeč and Nunes focused on the development of these ideas and how they affected (and continue to affect) the CPLP and Portugal, respectively. Costa Pinto by contrast— while still talking about the origin of Freyre's ideas and how they were used for by the Portuguese dictatorship— places an additional emphasis on Freyre's agency and how his theories clashed with the Portuguese narrative. This is an important academic basis for illustrating the problems and consequences of Freyre's Imperial nostalgic ideas, whilst also showing how the importance of Lusotropicalism to Brazil tends to be neglected, despite it being equally central to both the country and the Lusophone space.

The connection between Brazil and Freyre is further explored through the works of Alexandre Da Costa, Antonio Guimarães, Gabriela Balanguer, Moura e Silva, and Sharon Stanley, who go in-depth about the origins of Lusotropicalism the many nuances that make Racial Democracy so central to Brazilian society. In his work, Silva presents and tries to justify Racial Democracy in the Brazilian context, while also showing how divisive it is in modern academia. This division is well represented by Guimarães and Balanguer, where the former while recognizes the shortcomings of the theory but sees it as an aspiration to create a society free of racism, while the latter sees it only as a distortion of the past used to legitimize racial exploitation. Criticisms against the dangerous aspects of Racial Democracy are reflected in the article from Stanley, which, by comparing it with the American Post-Racialism, shows the similar pervasiveness of both theories. Finally, Da Costa focuses on how recent Brazilian governmental programs and projects aimed to counter some of the most harmful effects that Racial Democracy can have on society. At the same time that these articles delve deep into the problems and continuous appeal of Racial Democracy in Brazil they do not explore the international effects that this imperial nostalgia has, especially in the case of the CPLP.

The connection of the CPLP with imperial nostalgia is central to the works of José Filipe Pinto, Wolfgang Döpcke, José P. Zúquete, and Shiguenoli Miyamoto, who look into the core paradox of the CPLP, its imperial nostalgic and neo-imperialist origin, and its post-colonial ambition. The paradoxical nature of the organization is the central topic of Pintos's article, as he presents the CPLP as a direct product of Portuguese colonialism. However, his argument is not limited to that of the Portuguese molding its colonies, but also explains how the colonies mould Portugal, thus seeing in the organization great opportunity but also the great danger of neo-imperialism. While agreeing that the CPLP is a product of nostalgia and imperialism, Döpcke is far more critical about the organization and its chances of being a positive force for its members—especially in its focus on the valorization of the Portuguese language. Conversely, the idea that Portuguese imperial nostalgia stands alone as the leading cause of the CPLP is contested by Miyamoto, Rizzi, and da Silva who, instead of putting the Brazilian initiative as secondary, set it as equally if not more important to the formation of the organization than the influence of the Portuguese. This is the case because—as they describe their articles—it was the Brazilian support that legitimized the organization, as (unlike Portugal) it always kept very amicable relations with Lusophone Africa. It should be noted that this series of articles, while reinforcing the importance of imperial nostalgia for the CPLP, neglect to discuss the effect that the organization had on Luso-Brazilian imperial nostalgia. This how the academic discussion almost entirely overlooks the connection between Brazilian imperial nostalgia and the CPLP.

This brief literature review, at the same time that establishing a background for topic, demonstrates the two core points that make this research relevant. At the same time that this research will bring an almost entirely Lusophone discussion into the larger Anglophonic sphere of academia, it also takes a closer look at the connection between imperial nostalgia and the CPLP—for Brazil, as well, instead of just Portugal. Thus, this gap in the literature opens the way for a broader discussion on the effects of imperial nostalgia on Portugal and Brazil, but also on how it reflects in the interests and expectations of these countries in the broader organization.

## **Chapter 1 – Gilberto Freyre and Lusotropicalism**

### **Chapter Introduction**

Few times in world history has a colony been so central to its colonial overlord as Brazil was to Portugal. Brazil's abundance of resources enriched Portugal beyond belief, its territory hosted and protected the royal court when the flames of revolution swept across Europe, and its growing global importance is one of the factors that preserves Portuguese as an international language. However, something else sets this relationship apart from the rest, as it was from the works of a Brazilian scholar that Portuguese imperial nostalgia took form and flourished into a core element of the modern Portuguese identity. The great importance of the trans-Atlantic exchange between colonizers and colonized would be the inspiration for Gilberto Freyre's ideas, and central to some of the most relevant developments in the Lusophone world. Freyre's belief was that the racial diversity and harmony that he perceived in Brazil was the result of the uniqueness of the Portuguese colonization, and so it became the basis for his theory of Lusotropicalism and the broader Lusotropical civilization. This was a groundbreaking theory that would drastically change the way that Portuguese speakers perceived themselves, their relationships, and even their place in the broader world. However, at the same time that Lusotropicalism attracted those who genuinely saw it as innovative and an ideal worth pursuing, it also attracted opportunists that saw in it a way to preserve their status and to further their ambitions. This gross misuse of Lusotropicalism highlights many of the shortcomings of the theory, making Gilberto Freyre a profoundly divisive figure.

### **The man and the idea**

Gilberto Freyre is one of the most renowned, innovative, and controversial Brazilian scholars of the 20th century<sup>1</sup>. His career profoundly changed his field in Brazil, but also drastically changed the way that Portuguese speakers saw themselves and their connection with the broader lusophonic community. Born into a wealthy family in Recife, he came in contact at a young age with the rich racial diversity and the many inequalities present in Brazilian society. These first-hand experiences would become central to his work, and set him apart from the prevailing racist ideology that was imported from places like the USA and Germany, and had been widely embraced by the Brazilian elites. Freyre rejected the perception that the "mixture of races" was one of the main causes of the "degeneration" of the Brazilian people, and instead embraced

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<sup>1</sup> Gilberto Freyre is the most awarded intellectual in Brazilian history. Among his awards stand out the Aspen Prize, the Italian prize "La Madonnina", the Order of the British Empire, the Jabuti Prize for Literature, the Machado de Assis Prize of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, the Literary Excellence Prize of the Paulistana Academy of Letters, Portuguese and Spanish medals, and the National Order of the French Legion of Honor.



miscegenation as something intrinsically good. Thus, in a revolutionary fashion, he extols the contribution of Africans and native Americans to the formation of Brazil as well as the great potential that comes from this harmonic diversity (Castelo 2011, 261-262). He perceives, however, that this harmony was only possible due to the uniqueness of the Portuguese colonizers and the intrinsic characteristics that set Portuguese colonization apart from the others.

The perceived exceptionality of the Portuguese is defined in the first pages of his magnum opus "Casa Grande & Senzala." In the opening pages, Freyre establishes that the organization of the Brazilian colonial society and economy were a direct result of the previous century of Portuguese control of tropical regions in Africa and India. Consequently, Brazil emerged from this hybrid and slave-based colonization—a system that Freyre claims to be a paradox, in that it subjugated with iron and fire, yet also offered respect and cordiality to the conquered (Freyre 1933, 1-2). This paradox emerges from the dualism and contradictions of the Portuguese identity, divided between its European Catholic roots and its African Muslim ones. In Freyre's view, it is this duality that gave shape to the Portuguese mobility, miscibility, and acclimatization, and thus set them apart from other Europeans. Mobility refers to the capability and disposition of the early modern Portuguese to set sail to conquer and settle around the globe, despite being a small and impoverished society (9). Miscibility suggests that this great expansion was made possible by the mixed ancestry of the Portuguese, who have their origins in the many social and sexual relations between neighboring peoples and invaders in the Iberian Peninsula. This culmination of a long history of cultural and racial miscegenation made the Portuguese, in Freyre's eyes, adepts at using sexual interactions and other social relations to build unprejudiced ties with their conquered peoples (10). The last characteristic that set Portuguese colonialism apart was its capacity for acclimatization to the tropics, one that (in his view) came from the Portuguese climate which is closer to the climate in North Africa than to that of the rest of Europe (15). This perceived lack of absolute ideals and unbroken prejudices therefore made Freyre conclude that the Portuguese were at the same time a terrible slaver and the European colonizer that best fraternized with the colonized peoples (197). From this analysis (that Brazil had a uniquely harmonious relationship between the races and that Portugal's uniqueness was the cause of it) Freyre would develop his grander theory of Lusotropicalism and thereby become central to the narratives of both Portugal and Brazil. His theory assumed the existence of a new and original civilization, one that emerged from the Portuguese expansion in the tropics and its relationship with its native peoples. The uniqueness of Portuguese colonization led to miscegenation not only of races but also of societies, as these interactions

led to a syncretism of the customs, and thus the creation of a hybrid civilization that, despite not being uniform, shares many historical and cultural ties (Nemec 2005, 3).

### **Academic response to Lusotropicalism**

There is little doubt that Freyre's work was a turning point in the way that the Lusophone world perceived itself and its history. However, as many later authors from both sides of the ocean show, this legacy is one rife with problems, as its idealization of the Portuguese colonialism and its practices left a dangerous precedent that was eagerly embraced by dictatorial regimes and used as an excuse for great excesses. As mentioned in the literature review, this is exemplified in the articles from Teresa Serra Nunes, Cláudia Castelo, Jan Nemec, and Gabriela Balanguer.

In her article, Nunes explores the lack of a scientific base for Freyre's claims, as well as the great distance that separated his ideas from the actual realities in the Portuguese colonies (Nunes 2017, 5). She does this by focusing on the famous miscibility of the Portuguese colonizers, as she points out that it did not emerge from a lack of racism and did not result in harmonious relations. The existence of prejudices and exploitation meant that sexual relations between colonizers and the colonized did not result in the pregnant slaves being accepted as wives, or as the bastards being accepted as heirs. This argument is further reinforced by the fact that these interactions were often a direct result of an imbalance in power and of sexual assaults (7).

Arguments about the limitations of miscibility were already present in the works of Cláudia Castelo, as she points out that—aside from the fact that it was not exclusive to the Portuguese Empire—miscibility was not proof of peaceful convivence and equality. Consequently, instead of being a result of superior moral characteristics of the Portuguese colonizers, miscibility was more the result of necessity, as well as power imbalance between the colonizers and colonized (Castelo, 275). Another of Castelo's criticisms about the dissonance between Freyre's ideas and the Portuguese colonial policies of the 30s and 40s regards the supposed lack of racism, and the harmonic miscegenation of cultures in the Portuguese empire. Central aspects of Freyre's theory were challenged by the widespread belief in the Portuguese racial and moral superiority—one that was ever present among the colonizers and the colonial authorities before the 50s (Castelo 2013). A pre-lusotropical discourse mixed fascist ideas of racial hierarchization with the centuries-old Portuguese belief in their sacred mission to bring Christianity and civilization to all corners of the globe (Nemec, 8). The contrast between lusotropical ideas and colonial realities and narrative is best exemplified by Salazar himself during one of his speeches where he declared that “we must organize more and more efficiently,

and better the protection of the lower races whose call to our Christian civilization is one of the boldest conceptions and highest work of Portuguese colonization”<sup>2</sup> (Salazar 1933).

The list of criticisms against Freyre's theory is further expanded by Jan Nemeč in his article about Lusotropicalism. As Nemeč points, another major flaw of Freyre's argument is Freyre's willingness to use his idealization of racial relations in Brazil as the bases for racial relations in all the parts of the Portuguese empire, and thereby failing to acknowledge not only the diversity of the Portuguese domains but also the complex and unequal racial relations in Brazil (Nemeč, 12). Criticism of Freyre's idealization of Brazilian society is central to Gabriela Balaguer's article about the connection between Capoeira and the myth of Brazilian racial democracy. To her, Freyre's idealization of the relationship between slaves and slave owners as a cordial and affective helps to reinforce the myth about a kinder and gentler slavery and thus excuse the vicious nature of this system. This distorted view on slavery is the basis for the Brazilian myth about its peaceful and friendly nature, one that still dominates the Brazilian imagination and social narratives (Balaguer 2016, 142).

### **Freyre & Salazar**

Lusotropicalism finally gained its name in the book “O Mundo que o Português Criou” (The World that the Portuguese have created), a new book that would become a defining point of his thesis and a dark mark on his career. Despite his many contributions to Brazilian sociology and anthropology, Freyre did not receive the recognition and support necessary to finish his grand theory from the academia of the industrial and cultural heartland of Rio-São Paulo. This initial lack of support at home led him to seek patronage with the dictatorial Portuguese “Estado Novo,” that saw in Freyre and his works a way to preserve its declining empire (da Costa Pinto 2009, 159). However, even while serving the Portuguese interests, he continued to be loyal first and foremost to himself and Brazil, and that is reflected in the way that his view of Lusotropicalism goes against Portuguese interests. Contrary to what the Portuguese proclaimed, lusotropicalism did not assume the continuation of the Portuguese empire necessary in order to validate Lusotropicalism. In Freyre's eyes, the empire had already fulfilled its mission of creating the civilization and now could give space to the creation of a federation of brotherly states. This federation, Freyre believed, should not be led by Portugal (as the country continued to be held hostage by the past), but instead by Brazil, which as a former colony had already realized its lusotropical potential and thus became the natural choice of leader for this diverse civilization (156). This shows that lusotropicalism was never intended as a legitimizing myth for the

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<sup>2</sup> my translation

Portuguese Imperialism, but was instead aimed at legitimizing Brazilian leadership in the south Atlantic.

Already during the genesis of Lusotropicalism had emerged an existential dispute between Salazar's and Freyre's camps about which country should be the leader of this lusophone world. This dispute continues to this day as, despite all the shortcomings of Freyre's career and its association with Salazarism, his theory continues to permeate the collective imaginary of the Lusophone world. It therefore provides an ideological layer to the dispute between Brazil and Portugal for supremacy in the CPLP, as it also is a dispute for the legacy of lusotropicalism.

### **Orientalist Lusotropicalism**

Although Freyre's thesis emerged to counter the racist theories of his time and create a better future for the Lusophony, this chapter has shown how these hopes were built upon idealizations and paternalist attitudes towards the colonized. A paradox between his valorization of African and Amerindian cultures, and his promotion of and essentialization can be better understood through the lens of orientalism, as it helped to shape the way that he perceived and studied the non-western origins of Brazilian society.

Despite its name, Edward Said's theory of Orientalism does not solely cover the way in which the West depicts the "Orient", but rather focuses on the Western domination of the non-western—not only through its military supremacy but also through its command of discourse (Said 1991, 12). Thus, as Said himself puts "Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them")" (43). A dichotomy of "us" versus "them" that is built through a series of stereotypes that divide the world into regions without any significant internal distinctions—such as how all individual differences between Arab countries were ignored when they were all combined into a single "oriental category" (37-38). Orientalism encompasses a series of lenses that serve to reinforce and legitimize Western dominion, and come to define how the non-western parts of the world were perceived and represented (44).

Orientalist lenses, on the one hand explain the intrinsic paradox inside of lusotropicalism, but on the other shows how Freyre's thesis—instead of valorizing non-western cultures—ends up legitimizing the Portuguese influence over them. Consequently, by constructing the African and Amerindian cultures as the origins of the affectionate, energetic, lighthearted, artistic, and sensual Brazilian nature, it only reinforces that the Portuguese are the source of the practical aspects of this nature. Thus, despite Freyre's great love for the African and Amerindian origins in Brazil, he ends up representing them as stereotypes instead of

cultures, and portraying the Portuguese as the enlightened and civilized colonizers that made it possible for other races to lend their best elements to the Brazilian identity. This is a deeply problematic facet of Lusotropicalism that helps to bridge the gap between Lusophone imperial nostalgia and the broader field of Post-colonial studies, a connection that becomes extremely relevant when looking at the CPLP and its contrasting origins and narratives.

### **Chapter Conclusion**

The importance of Lusotropicalism to both Brazil and Portugal cannot be understated. Its effects go beyond the realm of ideas, as it influenced the policies and fabrics of society in both countries. In the case of Portugal, Lusotropicalism's use by the Salazarist regime to justify its colonial empire resulted in a series of policies that would give a lusotropical makeover to various decadent colonial institutions. In Brazil, its adoption by white elites (during the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas) was a way to justify the stratification of society and the exploitation of the non-white working class in a post-slavery reality, which led to a social contract that came to define Brazil. The effects on both sides of the Atlantic made Freyre's work central to both Portuguese and Brazilian society and their imperial nostalgias—but also made it a focal point of criticism. Therefore, at the same time that Lusotropicalism praised miscegenation, rejected racism, and promoted an intimate connection between all the peoples shaped by Portuguese imperialism, it also justified horrific exploitation, idealized the worse crimes of colonialism, created contradictions still felt to this day, and reinforced orientalist notions. This paradox between the greatness and horrors of lusotropicalism nonetheless left a deep mark in the popular imaginations of both Brazilians and the Portuguese, and continues to influence their interactions both within their borders and in the wider Lusophone world. This conflicted legacy leaves Gilberto Freyre both loved and hated in equal measure yet central to any discussion related to the broader lusophone world—and by extension essential to the debate between the post-colonial aspirations of the CPLP and its imperial nostalgic origins. As for better or worse the CPLP unapologetically draws inspiration for its ambition to bring together the countries that have the Portuguese language as their cultural connector from Freyre (Nemec, 4).

## **Chapter 2 – Portuguese Imperial Nostalgia from empire to democracy**

### **Chapter Introduction**

Portugal is a country that is often fondly described by its inhabitants as “melancholic,” and that is reflected in all spheres of society—be through traditions, music or even poetry. A profound state of longing for something that is far away is in large part reflected in the proliferate reminders of past Portuguese glories—reminders that in the eyes of many Portuguese only serve to contrast with the country’s dull present. The Portuguese empire left a deep mark on both its colonies and the metropolis, as its over 500 year-long history (1415-1975) has profoundly shaped the Portuguese’s image of themselves and their notion of self-worth: being an empire became a core element of what it meant to be Portuguese. The great importance that the Portuguese placed on their imperial past only made the bloody and traumatic conclusion of its imperial days (with the collapse of the totalitarian ‘Estado Novo’ (New State), and the independence of Angola and Mozambique) even more impactful. It is in this context that the ideas of Lusotropicalism—so promoted during the dictatorship—gained a new democratic interpretation. Instead of promoting the continuation of the empire, Lusotropicalism would now only glorify the uniqueness of the Portuguese, as well as idealizing their golden days. This placed Freyre and his ideas at the core of the Portuguese imagination about its empire, would become central to the modern Portuguese narrative about themselves and their place in the world.

### **Lusotropicalism the ideology of the Empire**

In the first half of the twentieth century, Portugal was a country marked by a clash of contrasting ideas about what defined Portugal and what kind of future it should seek. The unquestionable decline of the Portuguese empire led to an age of instability that culminated (in the short span of three decades) in the bloody end of the monarchy, the instauration of a democratic republic, and finally, the coup that brought Salazar and his fascist regime into power. This dictatorial regime concentrated most of its efforts on the preservation of its colonial possessions, holding to the past glories of the early Portuguese empire while also embracing the racist discourse that came to define that period. Salazar’s belief in the racial superiority of the Portuguese over its colonized people made Freyre’s ideas unacceptable to him and his followers. Freyre’s ideas only became palatable to Salazar’s fascist Estado Novo after the end of the Second World War had made the colonialist and racist discourse of the regime unacceptable to the international community (Nunes, 9). It is in the post-war context that the figure of Gilberto Freyre became central to the Portuguese regime, as his theory and his reputation as a respected and

internationally recognized sociologist made the adoption of his theory essential to the preservation of the empire.

As the decolonization process gained momentum internationally, the Portuguese leadership feared that the international pressure would force it to give away its fully adopted national narrative of Lusotropicalism. The adoption of Lusotropicalism during the 50s marked a massive shift in the government's policies—both at home and abroad—as the regime initiated an extensive campaign to reform its image (Nunes, 10). In order to achieve this the Estado Novo had to convince the international community, all sects of the Portuguese society at home, and its colonial subjects that were already rebelling in the colonies. Thus, in the hopes of justifying its presence in Africa and Asia, Salazar's regime changed the Portuguese constitution to present itself as a pluricontinental state with overseas provinces instead of colonies, and launched huge propaganda campaigns in order to legitimize it (Costa Pinto 2012, 147). The propaganda campaign had lusotropicalism as its central banner to such an extent that during the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1961, the Portuguese delegate directly presented Freyre and his works as the legal basis for the Portuguese status as a pluricontinental entity (Castelo 2013).

The international campaign of rebranding that was accompanied by a parallel campaign inside of the empire, both in Portugal itself and in its colonies, and presented its own set of problems and limitations. In the overseas colonies, in response to the growing tensions and rebellion, the government focused on passing a series of legislative measures inspired by Freyre's works, in the hope of making the colonial reality closer to Freyre's idealization. These included the reorganization of the colonies as overseas provinces, the extension of Portuguese citizenship to colonial subjects, and was even a discussion on the possibility of federalizing the empire (Nemec, 17). However, despite all these changes, the totalitarian and conservative nature of Salazar's regime and its continuous (although now less visible) exploitation and racial discrimination meant that these reforms were unable to resolve the inequalities in the colonial system (Nunes, 11).

The challenge in Portugal was to convince the white Portuguese population that—despite what was previously promoted—they were not intrinsically superior to their colonial subjects, but instead equal parts of this broader fraternal Lusotropical civilization. To justify this discourse shift at home, the regime focused on convincing Portuguese society through extensive educational and propagandistic campaigns (Nunes, 15). This narrative shift is well demonstrated government-backed articles such as “Um povo na terra” (A people in the land), published in 1958. In this article, the geographer Orlando Ribeiro claims that “Portuguese is not a concept of race [...] but rather a unity of feeling and culture, one which brought people of various origins

together"<sup>3</sup> (Castelo 2013). This example illustrates how these campaigns shifted the focus from a racial superiority to a moral superiority, as they praised the “intrinsic” Portuguese uniqueness and thus promoted the “Portuguese way of being in the world”—as the government described it (Castelo 2011, 274). Material for these campaigns was produced by the “Junta de Investigações do Ultramar” (Board of Overseas Investigations), composed of a group of research institutes and centers of studies. Their main task was to justify Portuguese uniqueness and lusotropicalism by organizing and promoting a series of research activities and voyages to the colonies (da Costa Pinto, 149). However, their expeditions and studies failed to prove Freyre’s theory, and instead forced the government to reinforce its efforts in shaping the mentality of society. This was particularly the case for future colonizers and colonial administrators, who hoped to change the practices in the colonies. Because of this, elements of lusotropicalism entered the Portuguese imagination and contributed to the creation of the myth that the Portuguese are incapable of being racist and have a deep connection with their former colonies. This belief in the lusotropicalist ideals continues in one form or another to this day, and is central to the Portuguese interest in the CPLP (Castelo 2011, 274).

### **From Lusotropicalism to Imperial Nostalgia**

The Salazarist regime expended great effort trying to change the image of the Portuguese empire from an anachronic colonial one to that of a pluricontinental nation connected by miscegenation and a common hybrid Portuguese identity. It was not, however, enough to save the empire and its dictatorship (Nunes, 10). The enormous loss of Portuguese lives and resources in the colonial wars proved too much and, ironically enough, democracy was reestablished by the same means through which it was overthrown—by a military coup. This coup, romantically remembered as the “Carnation Revolution,” was led by dissatisfied soldiers tired of throwing their lives away in a pointless struggle against the inevitable end of the Portuguese empire. Despite being celebrated (as it had allowed Portugal to change itself from an isolated and colonialist dictatorship to a Democratic member of the European Union), this traumatic end to more than five hundred years of colonialism left a gap in the Portuguese identity. Being Portuguese had long been tied with being an empire that stretched all the way from Europe to the distant Timor-Leste, and was thereby deeply connected with the sea. This nautical belief about what it meant to be Portuguese died with the end of the empire in 1974, thus taking away a core element that defined Portugal as much as, if not more than, its European

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<sup>3</sup> my translation



borders. This opened the way for imperial nostalgia to fill this hole and become the new basis for Portuguese national myth.

As stated by Joseph Campbell in his book "The Power of Myth" (1990), myths are expressions of the human soul where the "archetypal dreams" of mankind emerge. Thus, they "feed human life, establish civilizations, instituting values, founding creeds and dogmas with the intention of revealing the most hidden mysteries of humanity, offering models of life" (Taufel 2006, 8). Therefore, as Campbell points out, myths imprint onto societies a perception about the responses they should have in the face of triumph and disappointment. The importance of myths is deeply relevant to the Portuguese case, as the long period of decadence that preceded the fall of the empire led to the construction of the myth about their glorious past—based on imperial nostalgia. This myth made Portuguese society base its hopes and dreams on this glorious past, thereby conditioning them to perceive both their history and perspectives for the future under the lens of this myth. Consequently, this imprinted into the Portuguese imaginary the idea that, in order to fulfill its potential as a nation, it is necessary to look beyond Europe to its former colonies.

The fall of Salazarism renewed the momentum of the myth, as these Lusotropical ideals were reshaped into the modern imperial nostalgia, as the focus shifted from the grim reality of the late Portuguese empire to the glorification of its early golden days of great voyages. This shift took place during the political chaos that dominated Portugal during the first years after the Carnation Revolution, as the rapid re-democratization and decolonization led to a severe state crisis and marked a dramatic schism with the past (Lobo, Pinto e Magalhães 2016, 165-166). The great uncertainty about the future made many of the Portuguese look back with nostalgia to the idealized and glorified early age of discovery, which opened the way for the newly democratic Portugal to embrace this emerging imperial nostalgia as its new national narrative, while also entirely rejecting Salazarism. The presence of Lusotropicalist ideas in the Portuguese narrative that is continuously reinforced, such as during the inauguration speech of the Portuguese president Marcelo de Rebelo de Souza, where he proudly stated that "Our [Portuguese] genius - what sets us apart from the rest - is the indomitable creative uneasiness that presides over our ecumenical vocation. Embracing the whole world (...). Great in the past. Great in the future."<sup>4</sup> (de Souza, 2016). However, this narrative is not exclusive to the political elites, as it is also reaffirmed through public discourse, education, and media such as during the European Championship in 2016. During the competition, the Portuguese success was many times attributed by the media to the diverse composition of the Portuguese team—supposedly

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<sup>4</sup> my translation

the result of the Portuguese exceptionality at multicultural harmonization (Valentim e Heleno 2017, 35).

### **Imperial nostalgia amidst the European Union**

The end of the empire and the eventual Portuguese integration to the European Union had a significant impact on Portuguese society and its imperial nostalgia. At the same time that these changes represented a breaking away from the country's dictatorial past and lusotropical identity, they also created fear about the survival of the Portuguese identity amidst the rising pan-European one. By embracing the EU and its ideals of national belonging (at the expense of the multiracial lusotropicalism), Portugal tries to reaffirm itself as a European state (Buettner, 402). However, in doing so, it creates a deep insecurity about the future of Portuguese society amidst this forming European identity. This fear drove many segments of Portugal to embrace lusotropical ideas as something that simultaneously defines them and sets them apart from the rest of Europe (Taufer 2006, 9). Consequently, Portuguese participation in the EU has split the Portuguese identity "between its assertively European geographical, ethnic, and cultural dimensions and its resurgent idealized identification with a multi-ethnic Lusophone community and culture spread across the world" (Buettner, 404). When this deep division, is combined with both the scars left by the dictatorship and the inferiority of its modern economy (compared with the rest of Western Europe), the result is that Portugal feels dislocate from the rest of the union (Taufer, 3).

The importance of the European Union to Portugal and its imperial nostalgia is further explored in the article by Rita Ribeiro. She opens her article by stating that "there is no doubt that Europe is the natural place of Portugal, but it is much less certain to say that Europe is its historical place" (Ribeiro 2011, 91). This strong declaration reflects on how the relationship between Portugal and Europe is defined by ambivalence—where Portugal's European aspirations are confronted by its Lusotropical and imperial vocation (Ribeiro, 92). On one hand, many in Portugal see the EU and its integration as the best way of escaping the stagnation and insignificance brought about by the glorification of the past (Ribeiro, 96,99). On the other hand, the inferiority complex and feeling of hopelessness caused by the imbalance of power only increases the feeling of distance between Portugal and the rest of Western Europe (Ribeiro, 96). This sense of disconnection is worsened by the experience of many Portuguese emigrants to more developed European countries, who are often harshly treated and seen as second-class citizens (Reiter, 84). Disappointment with the position of Portugal inside the block only reinforces the importance of the narrative of imperial nostalgia for many Portuguese, as it provides a sense of security amidst a world that no longer feels familiar and safe (Taufer, 7-8).

Moreover, this narrative also allows Portugal to differentiate itself from the rest of Europe, as it simultaneously reinforces the belief in core elements of Portuguese identity and sees the expansion of the CPLP's power and influence as a way to reduce the imbalance between itself and the other EU countries.

### **Chapter Conclusion**

Despite its purely pragmatic nature, the alliance of opportunity between Freyre and Salazar had a significant effect on Portuguese society, as it came to be seen as central to their identity and worldview. These lusotropical ideas were so deeply entrenched in the Portuguese imaginary that even the end of the dictatorship and the fall of the empire were not enough to shake them. This is because Portugal's transformation—from an isolated and colonialist dictatorship to a democratic member of the European Union—left an emptiness in the Portuguese identity that was filled with imperial nostalgia. The hopes of a bright future as a democratic European country were suddenly challenged by the comparative weakness of the Portuguese state vis-à-vis the rest of the union, and many found in imperial nostalgia a way to feel at home amidst a world that no longer felt familiar. Therefore, even with Portugal's intention to reject Salazarism by embracing European ideals, many in Portugal, in a Lusotropical fashion, still sees in its lusophone connections a way to stand out inside of the European Union. This desire for relevance inside of the European context helps to explain the great interest that Portugal has in the CPLP, as its ingrained lusotropical myths—if not outright controlling them—guide Portuguese actions in a set direction. Portugal's continuous belief in the importance of the South Atlantic zone is shared and contrasted by Brazil, and is central to the development and contrasts that exist at the heart of the CPLP

### **Chapter 3 – Brazil from Racial Democracy to Racial Diplomacy**

#### **Introduction**

Imperial nostalgia is a phenomenon present in many former colonial powers, as the memory of the relevance, prestige, and power that they used to hold continues to influence societies in the former metropolis. However, the allure of the nostalgia for the imperial days is not always exclusive to the colonizers, as the ramifications of the idealization of the colonial past can also become central to the narratives of post-colonial societies. Brazil is one such rare case, as it simultaneously presents itself as an example of a post-colonial nation and holds firmly onto the idealization of its colonial origins (and the belief that it is the true successor of the Portuguese empire in the Southern Atlantic space). Moreover, differently from Portugal, Brazilian imperial nostalgia was originally focused internally, rather than externally. Instead of mystifying past connections with colonies, it romanticizes the colonization process itself—as well as the racial relations that emerged in Brazil from this colonization. This idealization based on the works of Gilberto Freyre would take the name of Racial Democracy, a myth that—despite its many shortcomings and simplifications—dominated the Brazilian discourse and by extent its perception of society and its presence in the world. Therefore, by focusing on the importance of Racial Democracy to the Brazilian society, this chapter will reflect upon the impact of imperial nostalgia in a former colony and show how it shaped the Brazilian post-colonial mission and its interest in the CPLP.

#### **Through democracy and dictatorship**

Freyre's thesis emerged as a direct rebuke to the many anxieties held by the elites in post-abolition Brazil, elites who believed that the country was doomed to never attain modernity or become a civilized nation due to its large black population and widespread miscegenation (Stanley 2018, 728). These deep-seated insecurities and open racism kept the racial relations from the pre-abolition period mostly unchanged—despite the end of slavery and the universalization of the free labor during the end of the 19th century (Souza Lima 2017, 356). This is the case because the black population was abandoned by the government after the abolition, and were therefore incapable of competing with the highly educated European migrants that flooded into the country as part of the governmental ideology and policy of Branqueamento (whitening), thus guaranteeing that they continued at the bottom of Brazilian society (359). It is in this context that Freyre published *Casa Grande e Senzala*—a book that would drastically change the way that Brazil perceived its past, its society, and its racial relations. Contrary to how Branqueamento embraced miscegenation “for its capacity to expunge blackness and eventually

achieve a white Brazil,” Freyre praised miscegenation for its own sake as a defining characteristic of the Brazilian nation (Stanley, 730). Consequently, and unlike in Portugal, Freyre’s ideas were seen in his homeland as a validation of Brazil “as an original civilization, where miscegenation laid the foundations of a new model of coexistence between races, tending to spontaneously neutralize conflicts and differences” (Moura e Silva 2015, 4). Freyre’s work became central to the Brazilian narrative, as its ideas became one of the core elements that helped create a unified Brazilian identity during the twentieth century. Thus, despite never coining the term Racial Democracy, his belief in the peaceful and fraternal coexistence and miscegenation of whites, blacks, and Amerindians in colonial Brazil became the cornerstone from where Racial Democracy would take form—as well as—the origin of much of its controversy.

Because of Freyre’s belief in the unique miscegenation capacity of the Portuguese, he perceived that a uniquely kind relationship between masters and slaves had developed in the Portuguese colony. This ‘kinder’ colonization, together with the instinctive rejection of racism by most Brazilians, led to continuous miscegenation between these three races. Thus, to Freyre, it was a point of pride how Brazil combined the best cultural elements of different races to create a distinctive identity (Stanley, 730). Consequently, the perception of a unique colonization process shaped by miscegenation, —together with the lack of overt racial discrimination and institutional racism that were so common in countries such as South Africa—validated the idea of Racial Democracy to all layers of Brazilian society, despite its orientalist stereotypes. This validation, despite initially being rejected by the Brazilian elites and academia from the Rio-São Paulo Axis, received enthusiastic support from authors, intellectuals, and even from the Afro-Brazilian activists of Frente Negra Brasileira, the first black political organization of Brazil (732).

The Brazilian state only adopted Racial Democracy during the rule of Getulio Vargas, the man that led a military coup that ended the old republic in 1930. Vargas continued as de facto dictator of Brazil until he abdicated in 1945, only to be elected as president in 1951 and remain in power until his suicide in 1954. This period of Brazilian history was marked by the start of the industrialization of the country, regulation of labor laws, and the creation of a unified national identity as a way to foster modernity (Balaguer, 142). It is during this period of significant changes that Racial Democracy was embraced by the Brazilian government, as it offered a way for the Vargas republican moment to distinguish itself from its fascist past in light of the defeat of Nazi Germany (Guimarães, 270). However, even more impactful was the role of Racial Democracy in the creation of a unified Brazilian identity—one that used this imaginary harmonious past and the stereotyping of Afro-Brazilian culture in order to shape this artificial identity. This formed the idea of Brazil as a peaceful nation where its people are kind, sensual,

happy, friendly and incapable of accepting racial hostilities, while also elevating elements of popular culture such as carnival and football as defining elements of Brazil (Balaguer 2016, 142). This grand fantasy of Brazil as a tropical and multiracial paradise not only came to define how Brazilians imagine their own identity but also came to define Brazil in the popular international imaginary, thus forming an identity based on orientalist premises which was reinforced both internally and externally (Stanley 2018, 725). The powerful international image build from imperial nostalgia became central to Brazilian soft power and its acceptance by the countries of the global south, thus legitimizing the idea of the CPLP to its future members

### **A divisive legacy**

Despite its acceptance by authorities and its widespread support throughout Brazilian society, since the 70s Racial Democracy began to be greatly criticized by scholars for its idealization of Brazilian racial relations and its history of slavery. Its controversial legacy led to the formation of two distinct fields in Brazilian academia, each with opposite views on Racial Democracy. On the one hand there is the camp that perceives racial democracy and Freyre's works as a distortion of the past used to legitimize centuries of racial inequalities and oligarchical oppression. On the other hand, another camp emerged that saw Freyre's theories (and by extent, racial democracy), not as a tool to legitimize the control of the white elites, but instead as inspiration for creating a society free of racism.

This schism in Brazilian academia, as introduced in the literature review, is best exemplified by the articles from Antonio Guimarães and Gabriela Balanguer, where they each focus on one aspect of the legacy of Racial Democracy. Guimarães, whilst recognizing that Brazil is a country deeply divided by racial lines, where racism continues to permeate social relations, also sees the valor of the ideal of Racial Democracy and its concrete effects over society. Moreover, he points at how Racial Democracy is not only a myth, but also a social construct, one that aimed (to an extent) to integrate the black population into Brazilian class society without threatening the dominant position of the white elites—thereby diffusing the social pressures for change (Guimarães 2006, 270). Throughout the post-war period this social contract had produced many practical results, such as a greater participation of the non-white segments of society into the democratic process. This was significantly disrupted by the instauration of the military dictatorship in 1964 which, despite embracing racial democracy as a *de facto* ideology of the state, failed to honor many parts of this compromise. A good example of this failure is the disastrous and unorganized program of massive educational expansion, one that led to a considerable decrease in the quality of public schools, and reinforced the notion that higher education was something exclusive to members of the white elites who could afford private

schools (272). Therefore, Guimarães perceives that Racial democracy is not an unchanging myth, but instead had different interpretations and led to different outcomes during post-war Brazil (1945-1964), the years of the military dictatorship (1964-1985) and finally the new republic (1985-) (Guimarães, 283). Consequently, the myth of racial democracy—more than being a false conscience and a one-dimensional tool of oppression—is a set of values that has concrete effects on individual and social practices. These real consequences, if not rendering the myth a fact, make Racial Democracy more than a mere illusion, as it continues to play a role in reducing and curbing prejudices in Brazilian society (269).

Guimarães views about Racial Democracy are drastically different from Gabriela Balanguer, who sees Racial Democracy as much more problematic and detrimental to black Brazilians. As Gabriela Balanguer describes, in her article about the connection between Capoeira and the myth of Brazilian racial democracy, even if racism is not a policy of the state it exists on the personal level. Thus, despite the many evidences proving the existence of racism, the myth continues to be internalized and embraced by all levels of society (Balanguer, 145). One great rift between myth and practice is clearly seen in the way that the Brazilian state interacts with Capoeira—the traditional cultural manifestation of popular Brazilian black culture that was embraced as a symbol of Brazil. At the same time that Capoeira had some of its elements highlighted, others were erased; the martial aspects were set aside in favor of a more peaceful interpretation of capoeira as a sport and dance. Thus, even when embracing an afro cultural element, the Brazilian state went to great lengths to negate its potential for public disorder and contestation of racial inequalities. Consequently, in Balanguer perspective, the way that Capoeira is distorted and reinterpreted to fit into the official narrative in a non-threatening way is a representation of the insidious nature of racial democracy (Balanguer, 146-148).

This perspective on the problems of Racial Democracy is reinforced by how it's a rejection of racism and praise of miscegenation ends making any association with a particular race or ethnicity as contrary to the Brazilian national identity and belonging. Thus, instead of combating racism, Racial Democracy often legitimized the power imbalance, as it rationalizes unequal access to resources and opportunities, not as a matter of race but instead as a matter of status, gender, education, and class (A. Da Costa 2014, 26). This inequality is reflected in the distribution of wealth in Brazilian society: despite blacks and pardos respectively making up 8,2% and 47,2% of the Brazilian population in 2016, their income only corresponded to 55,6% and 54,9% of the income of the white Brazilians (Souza Lima, 360).

Moreover, Racial Democracy as the state ideology (especially during the military dictatorship) was shaped into a post-racial ideology, as its praise of miscegenation and harmonious coexistence were exploited in order to reinforce racial inequalities and structures

of power. Therefore, at the same time that Racial Democracy preaches a non-significance of race, it operates through racialized structures of power where the supposed post-racial race painted any personal associations to race as anti-Brazilian. Thus, Racial Democracy creates an artificial understanding of inclusion and belonging that, instead of addressing racial inequalities, only re-articulates the dominance of the Brazilian elites (Da Costa 2016, 347). Consequently, as Guimarães has argued, it is not possible to see Racial Democracy as a myth without tangible implications on society. Though Racial Democracy may have been used by unscrupulous elites to prevent challenges to their power, for better or worse it profoundly influenced the very way that Brazilians perceive race—even if not to the extent claimed by the myth. Therefore, because of Racial Democracy's influence, the very perception of the color of an individual can be deeply influenced by their social class and wealth, as in many cases what defines a person as white, black, or pardo to the Brazilian society is not solely their skin tone but also their position in the class hierarchy. Because of that, it is not uncommon for someone that would be perceived as a pardo in European or American contexts be seen as white in Brazil due to his or her economic background. This reinforces the often-overlooked fact of how central imperial nostalgia is to Brazilian society and, by extension, to the entire Lusophone space. Despite the growing awareness of the deep racial inequalities in Brazil, Racial Democracy continues to be central to how Brazilians understand their society and their position in the world. This belief survived the fall of the dictatorship and, as in the case of Portugal, resulted in the myth being reformed by the Brazilian leadership.

### **Reforming the myth**

Despite no longer being displayed as the ideology of the Brazilian state, Racial Democracy continues to permeate the debates about what defines Brazilian society and which path it should take going forward. Thus, despite the loss of legitimacy of Racial Democracy during the dictatorship, the myth started being reshaped after re-democratization during the 90s. During this process Racial Democracy came to be seen by the government authorities and the population as a goal that should be pursued and a natural inclination of Brazilian society. Moreover, the Brazilian authorities tried to reshape racial democracy into a more positive force by dropping the pretense that racism was non-existent in Brazil and recognizing the country as a multiethnic society—all while trying to preserve Racial Democracy as a national project.

An important element of the rebranding of Racial Democracy was the government approach to Afro-Brazilian activist groups, and the adoption of elements of their agenda into government policies (Guimarães, 278). This is especially relevant in the educational sphere where these activist groups have been fighting for the last three decades for the elimination of



racism in schools, the addressing of stereotypical representation of African elements, expansion of the curriculum, and facilitation of Afro-descendants' access to education (Da Costa 2016, 350). This series of topics has been picked up by the government during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), that resulted in a series of affirmative action policies. These policies included the reformulation and expansion of the curriculum to better address the African and native origins of Brazilian society, governmental support for Black rights activists, and the implementation of university quotas for non-white students. Despite still being small, this series of reforms gave momentum to the reformulation of Racial Democracy, a momentum that not even the conservative counterwave seem capable of completely suffocating.

The government's departure from the classical Racial Democracy became explicit during the presidency of Cardoso, as it marked a definitive shift in the way the Brazilian government approached race, by bringing the issues of affirmative action and multiculturalism into the governmental sphere (Da Costa 2014, 33). The shift in the governmental approach to racial issues is best represented in the speech of the recently elected president Cardoso, during the Installation Ceremony of the Interministerial Working Group for the Valorization of the Black Population. After admitting that racism exists in Brazil, Cardoso proclaimed that:

“we imagined living in a paradise where these [racial] differences would not count in terms of discrimination. From there much has changed. It changed in the sense that Brazil came to discover that we did not have so much propensity to tolerance as we would like to believe. On the contrary, there are some aspects of intolerance here, almost always disguised by the paternalistic tradition of our old patriarchy.” (Cardoso, 1996).

However, during the same speech, Cardoso also reaffirms his belief in the exceptional quality of Brazilian diversity by saying that “the fact that we Brazilians belong to a nation full of contrasts of all kinds [...] is a privilege. This grants us - if we organize ourselves democratically - a huge benefit.” (Cardoso, 1996). His speech reaffirmed that, while the Brazilian government was willing to reform and change its approach to race, the ideals imprinted by Gilberto Freyre and Racial Democracy continued to be central to the idea of what it means to be Brazilian—a middle ground that gained support from all but the more conservative groups.

The adapted Brazilian perception of its own coloniality, and the new centrality of African heritage to Brazilian culture made Brazil seek to project an image of a tropical yet industrial power that had once been a colony and was thus well equipped to understand the realities and needs of other former colonies—especially in Africa (Saraiva 2001, 43). This started to give shape

to a new and more externalized branch of Racial Democracy, one that looks not only at how racial relations define Brazil, but also at how this experience should be an example to other former colonies—a form of Racial Diplomacy. This was a swift change in the approach to the way that Brazil approaches Racial Democracy, that matched the vast expansion of Brazilian interest in fostering south-south relations. It was during this period that Brazil became central to the formulation of the CPLP, but also that Brazil began to present itself as a representative of the Global South in the world stage—especially since Brazil started seeing in its strong cultural ties with Africa a natural connection with the continent. This opened the stage for the new form of Racial Diplomacy (and its belief in Brazil as an example of a post-colonial nation and in the forefront of decoloniality<sup>5</sup>) to be embraced by segments of the Brazilian elite and to slowly gain ground in the Brazilian imaginary. Therefore, as Racial Diplomacy embraced the international appeal that Brazil already had thanks to Racial Democracy, and refocused it to better foster its international ambitions, it reinforced the importance of imperial nostalgia to the Lusophone community and to the formation of the CPLP itself.

### **Chapter Conclusion**

Racial Democracy as Portuguese Lusotropicalism emerged from the same ideas put forward by Gilberto Freyre, ones which idealized Portuguese colonization—and the racial harmony that emerged from it—as a way to counter the racist insecurities of the Brazilian elites. This would give rise to a myth that would later be adopted by the Brazilian government and used to give shape to a unified identity for a country of continental dimensions and a deeply diverse population. This process that reinforced and legitimized deeply exploitative and unequal racial relations also became an unquestionable source of pride to Brazilians of all layers of society. Thus, even when the myth lost all its legitimacy as a state ideology, it continued to be entrenched in the Brazilian identity—setting the stage for the Brazilian authorities in the 90s and early 2000s to reformulate Racial Democracy in a way that preserves it as a national ambition while still accepting its shortcomings. Therefore, even if the new Racial Democracy rejected the idea that racism didn't exist, it continued to embrace the idea that Brazil is an original and postcolonial civilization that can go beyond the crimes of colonialism and create a future where these ideals will be a reality instead of merely a goal. This made space for the formation of a new externalized Racial Diplomacy and the strengthening of the Brazilian perception that it is an example of

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<sup>5</sup> Decoloniality is a term commonly used in Latin America used to refer to attitudes, projects, goals and efforts to break the promises of modernity and the inhumane conditions created by colonialism. Decolonialism concerns the awareness and action necessary to detach the theological basis and European foundations for epistemology and hermeneutics

decolonization to other colonized nations. This belief in Brazil as an example of decoloniality would only grow, as Brazil increasingly expanded its presence in the South Atlantic zone and bring to question the interesting contradictions and similarities in the way that Brazil and Portugal perceive the CPLP and its effect in the organization.

## **Chapter 4 – The CPLP and the Luso-Brazilian Imperial Nostalgias**

### **Chapter Introduction**

The long history of the Portuguese Overseas Empire left many legacies across the world, as societies even today struggle to overcome the worst effects and to come to terms with their shared history. Regardless of all their rivalries and conflicting interests, these countries came together to establish this international organization—a moment that for many was a validation of Freyre's ideas and hopes for the Lusophone space. The importance of the Portuguese language to these countries brings to light one of the central contrasts of the organization, as—at the same time that it was built on jointly overcoming the legacies of colonialism—it also essentializes the language of the colonizer. Therefore, by focusing on the CPLP, this chapter will analyze the impact that imperial nostalgia had over its formation and its failures, but will also look at how this organization affected these imperial nostalgias.

### **The Lusophone Project**

The far reach of the Portuguese language is one of the defining legacies of the Portuguese Overseas Empire, as the imperial tongue continues to be spoken throughout five continents and is the sixth most natively spoken language in the world. The centrality of the Portuguese language to the regions that once formed the Portuguese empire explains why the Community of the Portuguese Speaking Countries would focus on the language as the cornerstone for this project. Such a linguistic focus is not unique in the CPLP, as it is also relevant in the case of the British Commonwealth, as well as being a core tenant of the Francophonie. The CPLP, however, drastically differs from the other two post-colonial intergovernmental organizations, as the Commonwealth—under British leadership—was part of a mostly orderly decolonization process and the Francophonie was independently created by former colonial states against the wishes of the French (Srinivasan 2006, 25). The CPLP, in contrast to the Commonwealth, only managed to emerge long after the end of the decolonization wars, and differently from the Francophonie—where France was deadly afraid of being labeled as neo-imperialist, Portugal actively sought the protagonism. Additionally, unlike with English and French, the Portuguese language does not have the same international status and relevance, making the valorization of the language a central goal of the CPLP.

Despite the Portuguese interest in creating the CPLP, Portugal alone lacked the strength and legitimacy to do so, thus it was necessary to add the strength and legitimacy that Brazil had in the Lusophony in order to make the organization a reality. This worried many segments of Portuguese society, who feared that Portugal would be overshadowed within the organization.

Also problematic was the absence of Brazilian interest in such a project, as—before the rise of Racial Diplomacy—it lacked the same form of externalized imperial nostalgia that had made the formation of such organization a natural choice as it was in Portugal. Therefore, despite the opportunities that the CPLP could create, Brazil remained indifferent to any multilateral arrangement amongst the Lusophone nations— in the fear that supporting an association proposed by Portugal would depict Brazil as driven by the same kind of imperial nostalgia (Lopes 2011, 143). Consequently, the CPLP was not founded until 26 years after the end of the Portuguese empire, as it required a change in Brazil’s approach to the community, Portugal’s stabilization of its Intereuropean position, and the easing of tensions with its former African colonies (Srinivasan, 26). The CPLP was finally founded in 1996 in Lisbon by seven countries<sup>6</sup> that all had Portuguese as their official language—it later expanded to include Timor-Leste after its difficult independence from Indonesia in 2002.

Despite the centrality of Brazil and Portugal to the organization, the presence of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) was also essential to the CPLP’s formulation and legitimacy. Their presence in the project, though essential, also brought a series of difficulties, as the PALOP countries were not only still struggling with their colonial legacies, but also suffering the consequences of the long-lasting civil wars and natural disasters that continue to plague the region to this day (de Freixo 2005, 1). Consequently, these countries had different interests in the CPLP than Brazil and Portugal, as—despite sharing an interest in economic development—they put a great focus on the valorization of the Portuguese language. As with many other former African colonies, the colonial language is often the only thing bringing together the diverse population of these countries, thus the former Portuguese colonies in Africa sought ways to strengthen Portuguese, in order to establish the language as a source of national unity and international connections. Despite not being universally accepted in these countries, this faith in the language is still firmly held by sectors of the African elites—as seen in the example of the Angolan diplomat and high-ranking member of the ruling party MPLA Pedro da Silva Feijó Sobrinho, who claimed that:

“The overall perception in the five African States of Portuguese Language on the CPLP is as follows: a) Portuguese is an instrument of integration and national unity, affirmation of cultural identity and national independence; b) the Portuguese language is the main vehicle for the affirmation, acquisition of knowledge and communication with the outside world” (de Freixo 2005, 3).

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<sup>6</sup> Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and São Tomé and Príncipe

This statement reaffirms the Portuguese language as the central element that brought all these countries together, while reinforcing variations in the goals of each country.

From the beginning, the CPLP was plagued by a contrast between highly ambitious objectives on paper and very limited expectations from its members. The organization sought to use the shared Portuguese language as the cornerstone for deepening the friendship among its members and building multidimensional cooperation in diverse areas (Nemec 2005, 18), however, there were no illusions about establishing supranational elements to it. This lack of concrete supranational ambitions is clearly seen in the great importance that the constitutional declaration of the CPLP put in the respect for the members' sovereignty, right to self-determination, and political development—even placed ahead of other central elements such as the respect for human rights and the preservation of the members' democracies (CPLP 1996). Consequently, at the same time that its members saw the CPLP as a way to expand their international relevance, there was little doubt about the intrinsic fragility of the project, to the extent that during its formulation, the Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio cautioned that without long-term commitment and energy, the organization would be little more than “a community of illusions which time will undo” (MacQueen 2010, 10).

Many of the fears about the project would be proven right. The CPLP's heterogeneity and clashing interests created structural problems that could not be easily addressed, not to mention the great power imbalance between Portugal and Brazil, and the rest that hindered any chance of an equal division of power in the organization. However, would be a mistake to claim that, because of its shortcomings, the CPLP failed at its core objectives, since it succeeded at strengthening the ties of the community and developing a series of projects that would enhance the international value of Portuguese and thus preserve the Lusotropical dream (Nemec, 21). Moreover, the CPLP despite all its difficulties still managed to become a reality, with real effects on the lives of its members and the capacity of being a relevant actor across the greater Lusophony—as shown during the crisis in Guiné-Bissau.

### **CPLP in Guiné-Bissau**

The successes and problems of the CPLP as an organization are clearly shown during the Guiné-Bissau crisis of 1998-99, where Portugal thought the CPLP took center stage in the attempts to bring the conflict in the small Lusophony country to a negotiated resolution. The crisis began when the pro-Francophonie president João Bernardo Vieira was ousted by the former chief of the military staff Ansumane Mané, and a coalition led by Senegal and supported by France intervened in the conflict in order to return Vieira to power. Despite the initial success of the

Senegalese-lead coalition, the conflict soon took a turn for the worse as the rebel forces gained momentum and popular support. The changing winds of the conflict that were also felt in Portugal where the media started framing the conflict as a foreign invasion and a French plot to usurp the Portuguese position in West Africa. The situation therefore became a catalyst for a much broader discussion about the “Portuguese ‘unresolved’ Post-imperial role in Africa” and created a great internal pressure for Portugal to intervene in the country and preserve the integrity of the Lusophony (7). Interestingly enough the crisis resulted in an explosion of Portuguese hostility towards France, one which—despite not leaving any lasting effect on the relationship between the two countries—still managed to create a diplomatic crisis between the two EU members (8).

This growing internal pressure led Portugal to seek a way to resolve the conflict without repeating the mistakes of the past, where its failed attempts to intervene and mediate the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique only revealed Portuguese political weakness and how unwelcome Portugal was in its former African colonies (9). It is in this context that the CPLP in its postcolonial framework became central, as—despite the internal divisions and the unwillingness of some of its members (especially Brazil) to commit to any form of intervention—it was accepted as a neutral party to the resolution of the conflict. Consequently, the CPLP intervention, even if later overshadowed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), succeeded in mediating a ceasefire agreement and thus preventing further destruction and chaos in the country. Moreover, this event is important because, at the same time that it allowed Portugal to enhance the standing of the CPLP as a serious organization, it also allowed to Portugal to frame its own intervention in the internal affairs of one of its former colonies by presenting it as a CPLP initiative (MacQueen 2010, 21). Thus, at the same time that this case showed that the CPLP had the capacity of successfully intervening in conflicts (something that it would do again in Timor-Leste in 2002), it also showed the organization’s capacity as a neo-imperialist tool. Guiné-Bissau showed that the CPLP was more than an illusion (as its role as a mediator had proven during the crisis), however it also brought to attention the neo-imperialist and imperial nostalgic side of the CPLP, as a great part of its success came from the Portuguese desire to preserve its historical zone of influence.

### **The CPLP: between post-colonialism and imperial nostalgia**

Since its formation the CPLP has been presented as a Post-colonial organization that aimed to rise above its colonial origins and bring former metropolises and colonizers together as equals and co-owners of the same language and legacy (Pinto, 115-116). However, this narrative is put into question by how easily the CPLP was used by Portugal to legitimize its meddling in Guiné-

Bissau, creating doubt that the organization could ever escape its imperial origins. This suspicion was made worse by the Lusotropical foundation of the organization, as it was the continuous belief in the Freyrian ideals (held firmly by intellectuals in both Portugal and Brazil) that drove the movement to restore historically Lusophonic ties throughout the CPLP (Nemec 2005, 4). Despite never gaining widespread support in Brazil, this academic effort managed to perpetuate in the Portuguese imagination the importance of its Atlantic connections to the Portuguese identity.

The cultural importance of imperial nostalgia in Portugal would gain a new dimension due to the pressures created by being a peripheral state inside the European Union. Portugal's modest relevance in the union became combined with its fear that its identity would be consumed by the growing unified European identity, and therefore lead Portugal to look into its colonial past for something that would make it stand out. Thus, since the 80's Portugal sought to expand its influence over its former colonial empire as a way to reaffirm its identity and work as a bridge between Europe and the rest of the Lusophony (Tannús, Pedrosa e Anselmo 2012, 92). Therefore, is undeniable that the CPLP is a direct product of Portuguese colonialism and a continuation of the Lusotropical views of the Lusophone space—however, the very essence of Lusotropicalism creates a division in how people perceive this legacy. the lens of Lusotropicalism, the colonial experience was not limited to Portugal molding its colonies, but also included the colonies molding Portugal. Thus, to some the Lusophony is a common heritage of all Portuguese speaking societies, and to others it is a form of neo-colonialism (Pinto 2011, 107).

There is a great debate regarding if the CPLP is a post-colonial organization or a neo-imperialist one, a debate that is reflected in the discussion surrounding the reasons why the project is so fragile. In the case of Portugal, the discussion is divided into two main opposing camps: those that blame the lack of Portuguese protagonism and those that blame the Lusotropical origins of the organization. The first camp argues that Portugal, as the former colonizer, has a series of duties and responsibilities in the Lusophone world that it created, and should thus have taken a more central and active role in all subjects concerning the CPLP. Therefore, envisioning a vibrant community that under a clear leadership, would better foster the ties of these countries that share a strong historical and linguistic heritage (Santos 2003, 56). Consequently, this view (usually seen in more conservative segments of Portuguese society) bases itself on a lusotropical worldview, but also fully embraces the imperial nostalgic idea that the CPLP should be centered around Portugal and its interests. This perspective completely ignores the reality of Portuguese economic weakness, whilst also revealing the deep insecurity



that still exists within segments of Portuguese society over the fear that the CPLP can be used by Brazil to usurp the Portuguese position in the Lusophone world. (Zúquete 2008, 498-499).

Contrary to the first camp, the second camp sees the fragility of the CPLP as the result of Luso-Brazilian protagonism: by being the leading forces, the two countries can control the development of the organization and thereby forward their national interests. The Luso-Brazilian hegemony in the CPLP made it impossible to counter the structural and ideological constraints imposed by the lusotropical origin of the organization (Santos 2003, 55). Therefore, the CPLP failed to truly embrace its postcolonial narrative and develop as a forum for egalitarian and open exchange between its members—without any hegemon it may better have respected its own diversity and countered the colonial origins of this community (56). This shows how the CPLP lies between these two antagonistic visions: at the same time that it brings great opportunity it also carries the great danger of becoming a tool for the glorification of the Portuguese imperial past, and for Portuguese or Brazilian neo-imperialism (Pinto, 107). The Importance of imperial nostalgia would gain a new dimension with the rise of Racial Diplomacy in Brazil, and with its effects on the Brazilian participation in the CPLP.

### **Brazil, CPLP, and Racial Diplomacy**

As previously mentioned, despite Portugal's importance in the organization, the CPLP's existence it is also deeply connected with Brazil, as Brazil served to counterbalance Portuguese power and legitimize the organization in the eyes of many of its African members. Positive relations between Brazil and the PALOP began to emerge due to Brazil's well-cultivated international image, as well as from the continued diplomatic support that Brazil had offered the PALOP countries during decolonization, where it had repeatedly denounced Portuguese colonialism (Nemec 2005, 15). This affinity was further encouraged by Brazil's Racial Democracy, which emphasized the great importance of African descent to the formation of the Brazilian Society (Miyamoto 2009, 27). However, despite this historical connection, Brazil was unenthusiastic about any multilateral project, as it preferred bilateral agreements with the individual member states; even after joining its enthusiasm for the project was limited at best.

Despite the initial apprehension and lack of participation in the organization, the CPLP gained a new dimension to Brazil during the early 2000s with the Racial Democracy reforms and the appearance of its Racial Diplomacy. This change in the way that Brazil perceived its position in the world began to gain momentum during the government of president Lula, as at the same time that Brazil tried to keep its good relations with the western economies it bestowed unprecedented attention upon the emerging economies of the global south (Ullrich, Carrion and Martins 2013, 6). This nascent state ideology saw in the South-South cooperation as perfect for

reinforcing this idea of a new Brazil as an example of a successful post-colonial nation and natural regional leader. As the South-South cooperation ideals of solidarity and more equalitarian relations between developing countries through the exchange of resources, knowledge, and technologies was a perfectly fit to the Brazilian interests and ambitions (1-2). Consequently, the growing importance of Racial Diplomacy expanded the Brazilian interest and opportunities in the CPLP. In the first place Brazil saw the CPLP as a way to expand Brazilian economic influence in Africa: through investments and the establishment of Brazilian companies but also in gaining new markets for Brazilian products, especially the manufactured ones—all this while avowing the connotation of neo-imperialism (Ullrich, Carrion and Martins, 11). In the second place, the CPLP offered a forum for the enhancement of cooperation with Portugal (and by extent the European Union), thereby solidifying the image of Brazil as a mediator between the Global North and South. In third place, Brazil saw in it an opportunity to further increase the valorization of Brazilian Africanism (as a connecting tool between Brazil and Africa) while also helping to counter some of the worst legacies of Racial Democracy in Brazil (Tannús, Pedrosa and Anselmo 2012, 93). Lastly, it was a way to boost the image of Brazil as a paragon of south-south cooperation, thus increasing its international image and legitimizing its position as a regional leader in the South Atlantic, as well as making it a prime candidate for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (Rizzi and da Silva, 55).

The grand Brazilian ambitions in the Global South reinforce the differences between its Racial Diplomacy and Portuguese imperial nostalgia. The ultimate goal of Portuguese imperial nostalgia is to gain influence in the Portuguese parts of the Global South, whilst the goal of the Brazilian one sees it as only one front of a larger campaign for greater protagonism. This reinforces the idea that—while the Portuguese continues to be a neo-imperialist tool that clings onto the memory of an empire long gone—Brazilian imperial nostalgia hides its imperial tendencies and orientalist origins under a cloak of post-coloniality.

Regardless of the enthusiasm that it granted segments of the political elites and academics, and regardless of the great success of its resulting foreign policy, Racial Diplomacy failed to penetrate the imagination of the greater Brazilian population. This, in part, was due to the political fragmentation and radicalization that Brazil began to experience during the second half of the Workers' Party government—responses to the face of ever-growing corruption scandals and economic recession. However, another part comes from the way that the most prominent media outlets have historically neglected to discuss the CPLP and its peoples, but also because of the oligarchical structure of the Brazilian media that is overwhelmingly controlled by eight particular families (Antunes e Góes 2015, 21-22). Such patrimonialism has resulted in the media being historically used to further these eight families' political agendas, and their

disagreements with the Workers Party led to the ideas of Racial Diplomacy never being propagated throughout Brazilian society to the same extent as Racial Democracy. Consequently, this lack of popular support, combined with the fall from grace of the Workers' Party, has at least for the time being condemned this ideology to oblivion, as Brazil continues to fall deeper into political crises and far-right populism. Therefore, the CPLP set the stage for Racial Diplomacy to flourish, but failed to create a solid enough foundation on which it could survive in the face of the Brazilian crisis. This proves that, at the same time that imperial nostalgia continues to be central to the development of the CPLP project, the CPLP now also has influence over the development of imperial nostalgia, even if still limited.

### **Chapter Conclusion**

The CPLP emerged from the interests and necessities of countries that, in many regards, have only their language as a common connector—a combination that make the organization seem incapable of truly Institutionalizing and going beyond its nostalgic origins. The fragility of the Lusophone project is worsened by the imbalance of power between Brazil, Portugal, and the rest of the community—an imbalance which has often rendered the organization a neo-imperialist tool. However, despite these criticisms, it is undeniable that the organization flourished into something completely different from what Brazil and Portugal had expected, as the presence of PALOP and Timor-Leste forces the organization to broaden its scope into attending their interests and aspirations—or else risk losing its legitimacy. Thus, despite its lusotropical and neo-imperialist origins, it was shaped by the inputs and interests of all its members, making it a creation that cannot be disconnected from the lusotropical ideas or Luso-Brazilian neo-imperialism, yet one that still manages to go beyond that and become closer to its aspired post-colonial narrative.

## **Conclusion**

In 2019 the CPLP will reach 23 years of existence, a relatively short period when compared to the over 500 year-long history of Portuguese colonialism. Nonetheless, this new page in the history of the Lusophony was marked by both disappointments and achievements. This new approach to the Lusophony promised to create a new basis for the relationship between its many peoples, one that—instead of an imperial relationship of exploitation and violence—would be based on equality and fraternity. Since its establishment, the Post-Colonial narrative of the organization has been at odds with the lusotropical origins of the CPLP and the neo-imperialist interests of its two most prominent members. Therefore, this research aspired to identify the importance of Lusotropicalism for the Community of Portuguese Language Countries by focusing on Portuguese imperial nostalgia and Brazilian Racial Democracy. It aimed to comprehend better how these imperial nostalgias affect the CPLP's post-colonial mission, and in turn, how they are affected by it.

This was done in the first chapter by analyzing the origins and themes of lusotropicalism in the work of Gilberto Freyre, demonstrating why it became so attractive to the dictatorships in both Brazil and Portugal—as well as revealing its orientalist undertone and the later academic criticism against it. In the second chapter, this research analyzed the formation of Portuguese imperial nostalgia by looking at the end of the dictatorship, re-democratization, and the nation's entrance into the EU, as this traumatic process allowed imperial nostalgia to survive and deeply influence Portuguese society and its foreign policies. In the third chapter, the research focused on the development of Brazilian imperial nostalgia in the form of Racial Democracy, and how—in the face of the re-democratization of the 80s—it began to change in order to address internal criticisms and justify the Brazilian belief in its post-colonial exceptionality. Finally, in the last chapter, the research discussed the connection between imperial nostalgia and the CPLP, as—despite being deeply intertwined with Luso-Brazilian nostalgia and neo-imperialism—it still managed to become a relevant factor for all its members.

Therefore, this thesis showed how Lusotropicalism, through the use of Luso-Brazilian imperial nostalgias, helped to shape both modern Portugal and Brazil and thus shaped the development of the CPLP and their own interests and hopes in the organization. However, it also showed how the CPLP developed into a micro-cosmos of post-colonial interactions, where even these imperial nostalgias were affected by the developments in the organization and by the interests of the other members. The result was an organization that despite its many flaws was still capable of pursuing the objectives of its members, affecting the regional realities—as well as fostering and shaping ideals, both post-colonial and imperial nostalgic.

Furthermore, even if it was born from Luso-Brazilian neo-imperialism and from the nostalgia for the past glories, the fact that the CPLP managed to become a reality is already striking in itself, as the period following the end of the Portuguese empire was a time where the very idea of the Lusophony was put into question. Even after the end of the empire and the destructive colonial wars, Portuguese-speaking countries were still faced with dictatorships, poverty, civil wars, and foreign occupations. This difficult time for the Lusophony was marked by the growing separation of this community, as the ties that, for better or worse, had connected these different societies for over 500 years were rapidly falling apart. Even after the situation began to normalize during the late 80s and early 90s, this dissolution seemed fated to break apart the entire idea of a Lusophony. In this context, the existence of the CPLP is in itself a remarkable achievement, as it managed to bring together countries that still hold deeply antagonist attitudes towards one another and are still plagued by internal problems, in the hope of strengthening their common language in the international arena. Despite its deeply problematic Lusotropical origins, the shared ambition to strengthen the Lusophony and its ideals continues to be a worthwhile effort—it encourages the hope that together these diverse countries can rise above their colonial past, and it is a reminder of the ever-present power of ideas.

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