

**Caught between the Netherlands and the Republic:
the position of the Federal Consultative Assembly
– ‘Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg’ (BFO) – during the
Dutch-Indonesian conflict, 1945-1950.**

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Introduction

It was at a round table conference from August till November 1949 in The Hague that representatives of the Netherlands finally granted independence to Indonesia after years of violent struggle.

Additionally, the present parties agreed that the new Indonesian state would become a federation known as the *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS), or Federal United States of Indonesia. Consequently, the new-born state saw the light of day as a federation: an Indonesian archipelago consisting of multiple islands and regions with their own self-governments and a federal government that would work together in harmony for the sake of a common Indonesian future – the adage being all for one, one for all. Or at least that was the hope of some parties. In eight months, the federal structure was aborted, making way for a unitary Indonesian nation .

Its brief existence may already provide some explanation as to why the federal narrative never gained much attention in Indonesian history. According to Mohammed Hatta, the first prime minister of the RIS, the federal idea was equated with the Dutch way of regaining control of their former colony, namely a strategy of divide and rule. As a result of this connection with the former colonizer, the federal structure was doomed to fail. Actual independence was equated with unity.¹

However, such an answer ignores the fact that, while independence was signed in The Hague, the Dutch and Republican representatives were also in the company of representatives of 'De Bijeenkomsst voor Federaal Overleg' (BFO), known in English as the Federal Consultative Assembly. The BFO was assembled in 1948 by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Prime Minister of the state East-Indonesia, and Adil Puradiredja, Prime Minister of the state of Pasundan (West Java). They assembled after the Bandung Conference held by Lieutenant Governor General Huib van Mook from 8 July till 15 July 1948. Almost every member of this assembly was born and raised in Indonesia and therefore the argument that federalism was but a mere Dutch scheme, is only half the story. Instead, Anak Agung argued that the reasoning behind the assembly of the BFO was the actual fear of several Indonesians for a Javanese-centred unitary state and a permanent peripheral status for the outer islands, including regions such as Bali – Anak Agung's home – and the Maluku Islands.²

Considering these motivations, one could argue, that the transfer to a unitary system made their greatest fear a reality, yet the story of these local federalists is hardly described in the historiography.

¹ A. Reid, *To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century* (Singapore 2011) 213.

² R. A. Gase, 'Portret van Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung', in *Vrije Nederland* (18 May 1985).

Reasons for their virtual absence from the literary debate

Interestingly, there are plenty of indicators for their story's absence in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Many historians on the subject seem to agree with Hatta's statement on the role of these federal Indonesians in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The Australian historian George McTurnan Kahin speaks of "Dutch-created" and "Dutch maintained" states headed by Dutch selected local aristocrats for reasons of economic and political "opportunism."³ This meaning either losing their aristocratic position or wealth under a unitary Republican regime. Since Kahin wrote his work in 1952, many historians followed his vision, using a multitude of synonyms to address them in the same way, as mere opportunists or pawns of the Dutch strategy of divide and rule.⁴ Consequently, readers are fed the idea that there is little more to their story.

Another explanation for the underrepresentation of the federalists points to the overwhelming attention for the Indonesian revolution. Since the Indonesian revolution took on the form of a nationalist revolution, the reasoning for a federal approach by local aristocrats was quickly associated with anti-revolutionary motives.⁵ Historians like Herbert Feith, Anthony Reid and Robert Elson, emphasize the year 1945 soon after the Japanese capitulation, when Sukarno and the nationalists had already declared independence and decided on a unitary state model. They argue that because of this decision, federalism was doomed in advance, since the nationalist revolution would sweep away any view opposing this unitary plan. Assuming only the start and the end of the conflict, one would indeed conclude that the nationalist finished what they started, yet, such arguments have little regard for the indefinite progression of the conflict at that time and lean towards a linear view on the history of the conflict. These historians portray the nationalist cause as a predestination. Elson even going as far as to claim that from 1912, when a nationalist "embryo" had taken root, everything had to make way for the growth of this ideology.⁶

However, a "whirlwind" called revolution, is not easily tamed by one man, party or ideology, J. Dunn would say. He argues that even at their peak, revolutionaries rode the revolutionary whirlwind rather than actually shape the destinies of its future nation and inhabitants, because no

³ G.M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca 2003) 351-352.

⁴ For instance, R. Chauvel, 'Tarred with the Dutch brush: The fate of Federalism in Indonesia' (Den Haag 1996); G. Ferrazzi, 'Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse' in *Publius*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2000); A. Reid, 'Indonesia's post-revolutionary aversion to federalism' in B. He, B. Galligan, T. Inoguchi (ed.) *Federalism in Asia* (Cheltenham 2007); M. Collins, 'Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment"' in *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24, (2013).

⁵ H. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (New York 1962) 71; A. Reid, *To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century* (Singapore 2011) 213-216; R.E. Elson, *The idea of Indonesia: a history* (Cambridge 2008) 151-152. All three authors imply that nationalism was the way to go and Indonesia was destined to be a unitary state.

⁶ Elson, *The idea of Indonesia*, 151-152.

revolutionary at that time had any way of knowing when the post-revolutionary period would commence and how it would look like.⁷ Eugen Weber, while researching how peasants were turned into Frenchmen during the French revolution, noticed that the myth of the French revolution exceeded reality. The French elite assumed that a majority of peasants had been turned into Frenchmen during the revolution, when in actuality it took another century for them to truly perceive themselves as such.⁸ Feith's argument is most illustrative for the contradictory treatment of federalism in Indonesian history. He argues that federalism was: "barely relevant to a situation where revolutionary political reality was so rapidly outstripping legalities of every kind."⁹ Using his own words against him, one could argue that, if revolution outstripped every legality, then nationalism had as much a chance of becoming a victim of the revolution as federalism did. Thus, at the time of conflict the iron of the Indonesian state structure was still hot and malleable.

The story of the BFO is rarely picked up because most histories on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict are macro histories. Stasis Kalyvas and Daniel Branch point out in their civil war studies, that a macro approach on history has a particular weak point: it presumes universal actors.¹⁰ Locals who worked together with the colonizer are regularly depicted as "unconscious" agents doing the colonizers bidding.¹¹ These arguments deny the agency of those agents working on a meso or micro level and present them as replicas of macro agents, like the metropole, colonial administration or the rebel party.¹² This is also the case in the literature on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. An example is the work of H.W. van den Doel, who, dedicates a chapter to the federal policy with the subtitle "Van Mook's federal Indonesia" – a hint to his macro approach.¹³ Consequently, the BFO is mentioned in a couple of pages, but presented as a sideshow to Van Mook's one-man show.¹⁴ Another example is Reid's article on Indonesia's aversion to federalism. He argues that federalism was a feudal façade orchestrated by a colonial power that was dismissed by nationalists like Hatta who did not favour it.¹⁵ Reid does not even mention the BFO, the federalists are again presented as pawns of the colonial administration and the nationalist agency is reduced to that of Hatta and Sukarno. For this reason, it is important to finally bring these federalists to the fore of history.

⁷ J. Dunn, *Modern revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political phenomenon* (Cambridge 1989) 2.

⁸ E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchman: The Modernization of Rural France* (Stanford 1976) 9.

⁹ Feith, *The Decline of*, 32.

¹⁰ S.N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge 2006) 38; D. Branch, *Defeating the Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and Decolonization* (Cambridge 2009) 4.

¹¹ Branch, *Defeating the Mau Mau*, 4.

¹² *Ibid*, 4.

¹³ H.W. Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië: de val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië* (Amsterdam 2000) 238.

¹⁴ Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 268.

¹⁵ Reid, 'Indonesia's post-revolutionary aversion to federalism' in B. He, B. Galligan, T. Inoguchi (ed.) *Federalism in Asia* (Cheltenham 2007) 152.

Filling a complex gap

Although their story has been treated as a side-note of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and history, some authors lifted a corner of the federal veil without explaining it further. For instance, Van den Doel briefly mentions that an individual, like Anak Agung, was not the kind of person to “follow his masters voice”,¹⁶ assuring that Anak Agung had an agenda of his own. Similarly, historian Louis de Jong dismissed a statement by Willem Schermerhorn, Chairman of the Commission General for the Dutch Indies, depicting the Indonesian federalists as merely doing the bidding of Van Mook, as “too simple”,¹⁷ especially in the case of state of East-Indonesia. Therefore, listening to the story of local powerbrokers, like Anak Agung and other members of the BFO who co-founded the East-Indonesian state, might provide key information to the federal narrative, but there is something off about their testimonies.

In her doctoral thesis on the state of East-Indonesia Petra Groen stressed that this state is “exemplary” for the way the federal project and its structure developed.¹⁸ She also got the opportunity to interview Anak Agung, whose testimony was conflicting and raised an important question. When asked by Groen how great the support for the federalists was among the local nobility, Anak Agung said: “If you ask who were federalist in Eastern Indonesia, it is – not because I am a federalist, because I am not – most of the population except the group of convinced Republicans [...]”¹⁹ The fact that one of the assemblers of the BFO and the prime minister of a federal state does not consider himself a federalist, is odd to say the least and adds another layer of complexity to the federal story.

In his own work on the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations Anak Agung is remarkably quiet about the dismantlement of the federal structure in 1949-1950. Any critique on the event is hard to find, he only speaks of an actuation of federal states to discredit the federal system and to embrace a unitary system, followed by a disclaimer that juridically the RIS had every right to oppose the federal system and return to the proposed unitary system of 1945.²⁰

As a result, the federal story so far has been largely neglected by historians, some pointing to local federalists for future answers, yet those provide conflicting testimonies of its history.

¹⁶ Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 268.

¹⁷ L. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Part 12, Epilogue, 2nd half, Leiden 1988) 781.

¹⁸ P.M.H. Groen, *Oprichting, Functioneren en Opheffing van de Deelstaat Oost-Indonesië* (Doctoral dissertation, Utrecht 1979) 3.

¹⁹ Groen, *Oprichting, Functioneren en Opheffing*, 174-175.

²⁰ I. Anak Agung Gde Agung, *‘Renville’ als keerpunt in de Nederlands-Indonesische onderhandelingen* (Doctoral dissertation, Utrecht 1980) 355.

How can the neglected role of federalism, Hatta's statement and the conflicting story of Anak Agung be reconciled? Frederick Cooper provides the first guideline in his work on decolonization and the labour question in French and British Africa. In this work he coins the phrase: "we know the end of the story."²¹ He considers it problematic that experts, scholars and readers of colonial history have the tendency to read the story of colonialism "backwards", meaning the tendency to privilege "the process of ending colonial rule over anything else that was happening in those years."²² According to Shipway, Cooper invites scholars to look for *late colonial shifts* – profound shift in the way colonizer and colonized think about the purpose and future of their colony.²³ These shifts are relevant, because they mark the moment of no return where the colony enters the phase of decolonization commencing a pathway towards a new nation. It is generally assumed that the loss of empire would provide a serious blow for the image and national identity of the colonizer.²⁴ For this reason, empires invented pathways of decolonization known as the Commonwealth idea and federalism.²⁵ Exemplary is the case of British Malaysia, where the British colonizer instigated a pathway of decolonization by reinstating a Malay elite as sovereign rulers. Through a combination of a federal administration, reinvention of Malay court traditions, effective state propaganda and the crush of nationalist opposition by the British army, this Malay elite was capable of prolonging the façade of indirect colonial rule long enough for the British empire to exit their colony gradually.²⁶

Consequently, Cooper and the example of Malaysia cast doubt on the predestined outcome of the unitary Indonesian state, assuming the pathway of decolonization and the occurrence of a late colonial shift, sheds more light on the federal Indonesian narrative than the current national revolutionary image of its history for independence.

According to Ronald Robinson, the pathway of imperialism and the course of decolonization was heavily determined by the European power's access to local collaboration in the colony.²⁷ His theory of collaboration, explains how European powers at a particular point in time were able to rule large colonies over the world with few troops and at low costs and how they eventually left those colonies or were made to leave by independence movements. His main argument is that colonizers

²¹ F. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: the labour question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge 1996) 6-7.

²² Cooper, *Decolonization and African*, 6-7.

²³ M. Shipway, *Decolonization and its Impact: A comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Oxford 2008) 13.

²⁴ B.C. Reis, 'Myth of Decolonization: Britain, France, and Portugal compared' in M.B Jerónimo & A.C. Pinto (ed.) *The end of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (New York 2015) 143.

²⁵ Reis, 143.

²⁶ D.J. Amoroso, *Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial Malay* (2014 Malaysia) 3-6.

²⁷ R. Robinson, 'Non-European Foundation of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration' in: R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (ed.) *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London 1972) 119-120.

in the long run became increasingly dependent upon local collaboration, because their use of coercion – gun-boat diplomacy, military violence etc. – could only exercise control on a short-term base. Long term control suited their need for financial gain and economic stability in the colony and was only possible, if domination translated to local collaboration. As a result, colonial institutions were built around this source of collaboration, making it vulnerable to anti-colonial forces who could use these same networks against the colonizer to make him leave and proclaim independence.²⁸

In consonance with Robinson's theory, this could mean that the collaboration of Anak Agung and other federalists, became an increasingly important asset to the Dutch and the Republic. Subjecting them to the cause of either the colonial power or the Republic would provide an important key to ensuring a victory and certain pathway of decolonization.

However, a colonial administration does not stand and fall by the grace of its local collaboration alone, it has the opportunity to enforce this collaboration by use of violence. Charles Tilly, sociologist and historian, explained the idea behind violence during war as follows: "coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance."²⁹ Warring parties, according to Tilly, are also aspiring state makers: they challenge each other's means of coercion to obtain the monopoly on violence necessary to force the population in submission and 'make' a new state that meets their demands.³⁰ Additionally, he also explains the dual role of collaboration and violence, by stressing that the presence of an adversary in a region, made internal state formation necessary to keep up the current status quo and defences, enabling the military to cope with the adversary.³¹

This might provide a military reason for the importance of the BFO members and the need of the Dutch for a state such as East-Indonesia. Kalyvas points out that, just like collaboration, the use of violence also serves as a double-edged sword for the warring parties.

Kalyvas acknowledges the fact that violence is mainly used by warring parties for reasons of control, yet the type of violence – discriminate or indiscriminate – can have a serious impact on the number of local loyalists at a powerbroker's disposal.³² He prefers "loyalists" to Robinson's usage of the word 'collaboration' and emphasizes that a loyalist does not mean someone who is loyal to the cause of a certain powerbroker, like the Dutch or the Republic, but that his actual loyalty remains

²⁸ Robinson, 'Non-European Foundation of', 118-120, 138-140.

²⁹ C. Tilly, *Coercion, capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge 1992) 70; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 197.

³⁰ Tilly, 'War making and State making as Organized Crime' in P.B Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (ed.) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge 1985) 171-172.

³¹ Tilly, 'War making and', 181.

³² Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 231-33.

largely invisible. He can be loyal to one powerbroker, multiple or none at all. All we know for sure, Kalyvas argues, is that a loyalists' compliance depends on the amount of control a particular powerbroker has in a region and what type of violence he uses – discriminate or indiscriminate. What sets both types of violence apart is the way of assigning guilt. If a powerbroker has little to none control over an area, he usually resorts to indiscriminate violence due to a lack of evidence and therefore assigns guilt by association. This means, for instance, that violence is applied to a certain group or village and has the tendency to be counterproductive in the long run, because the division between guilt and innocence is removed. Consequently, innocent loyalists can become the victim of retaliation and will likely choose to comply with the rule of another powerbroker. This is why discriminate violence is essential, but only possible at a specific amount of control and with information about the whereabouts of specific targets: the insurgents.³³

Knowing the end of the colonial story of Indonesia, one could ask if this quick dissolution of the federal structure was a result of the federal loyalists choosing to side with the Republic in the end? And if so, was this willingly or due to violence by the Dutch or the Republic?

Research-question and theory

This thesis attempts to write about the history of the BFO and the way their agency became important in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The aim is to answer the following question: *how did the federalists of the Federal Consultative Assembly (BFO) position themselves between the Dutch and Republican powerbrokers during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict 1945-1950, while also safeguarding their own interests?*

To answer the research-question, I will use the following concepts and theories: firstly, I will explain the usage of the concept political culture by political scientist H.J. Wiarda and how it is related to studies by Kahin and Benedict Anderson. Secondly, the idea behind the federal or commonwealth idea, also known as either official nationalism or traditionalism, will be explained. Thirdly, Robinson's theory of collaboration will be explained. Fourthly, related to Robinson's theory, I will shortly explain how colonial rule also depended on a balance between metropolitan politics and colonial politics, as argued by John Darwin. Fifthly, I will explain the duality of war-making and state-making, according to Tilly. Lastly, the connection between Robinson's theory and Kalyvas approach on the logic of violence will be explained along with its connection to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, in particular the role of the State of East-Indonesia.

³³ Ibid, 42, 219-220.

Political culture, means: “deep-seated ideas, beliefs, values, and behavioural orientations that people have, or carry around in their heads, toward the political system, [...] that specifically affect the political system, processes, or policy outcomes.”³⁴ Political cultures are not inherent to the character of people, but political culture is *socialized* through learning.³⁵ Wiarda argues that, from birth, people experience this socialisation by being part of “clan groups”: family, friends, classmates, church, classes, caste systems, regions and nations etc. A person’s place amongst a group and what they learn or experience, affects the political beliefs of these people and how to politically behave.³⁶ Additionally, a genuine change in a political culture usually takes up to two or three generations – about 50 to 75 years.³⁷ Such a finding is important considering the history of Indonesia.

Kahin argued that Indonesian aristocrats sought the aid of the Dutch for reasons of opportunism or fear of losing aristocratic privileges.³⁸ He therefore assumed that their perception of politics was guided by their aristocratic status. Additionally, Anderson noted that those colonial agents highly educated in the colony, perceived the political structure of the Dutch-Indies as being centrally controlled from Batavia.³⁹ As a consequence, they were never educated in seeing it as a federation and their perception of politics was centralized prior to the federal project.⁴⁰ Political culture, according to these authors, assumes continuity over discontinuity, yet these arguments also assume that an agent’s decision is guided by the principles their status or education. In short, their decision-making is guided by pre-war principles. However, as will become clear from Robinson and Kalyvas, political culture should also include political decision-making enforced by violence.

Anderson and Amoroso note that a federal project in a colonial context is mostly used as official nationalism or traditionalism.⁴¹ If colonial administrators decided on federalism, like in British Malaysia, this was usually a reaction to an anti-colonial nationalist elite threatening colonial rule. To fend off these nationalist challengers, four important vessels were used: a noble ruling class restoring its position through mass mobilisation campaigning for localism instead of nationalism. Secondly, a federal tradition like the Federated Malay States (FMS) that made nationalism seem artificial. Furthermore, state propaganda by the installed nobility against visions other than federalism. Lastly, the presence of police and military colonial forces repressing the activity of adversaries.⁴²

³⁴ H.J. Wiarda, *Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics. An Uneasy Alliance* (New York 2014) 1.

³⁵ Wiarda, *Political Culture, Political Science*, 1.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 1-2.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 1-2.

³⁸ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 351-352.

³⁹ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London 2006) 121.

⁴⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 121-122.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 86-87; Amoroso, *Traditionalism and the Ascendancy*, 225.

⁴² *Ibid*, 4, 223-226.

Systems of collaborations, as Ronald Robinson would describe traditionalism, were perhaps the most crucial pivots in the machinery of colonialism. Collaboration influenced the course of imperialism in multiple ways. Different phases of imperialism had to meet the demands of the European and the local community in a colony. The dismantlement or reconstruction of collaborative systems determined the extent to which the colonial powers had to intervene in local society. Consequently, the available local collaborators and those picked for jobs in the colonial administration heavily determined the way colonial rule would be organised and developed. In the long run this meant, that the economic policies of the European powerbrokers became intertwined with the social, political and economical way of life in these colonies and what hold them together were systems of collaboration. Once the well of collaborators had run dry, the European powers either left the colony themselves, or were made to leave by local powerbrokers. In the latter case, the local anti-colonial elite had succeeded in cutting off the colonial regime from its local network of collaborators, who by now had formed a coalition of non-collaboration with the colonial adversary. The timing of this switch of local collaborators to non-collaboration also determined the timing of decolonisation. The switch to non-collaboration does not mean the former collaborators of the colonial power favoured the new anti-colonial elite. Many systems of collaboration comprised involuntary collaboration, which was also the case with non-collaboration. This evident from the fact that most coalitions of non-collaborating local parties seized to exist, after the colonial power left. To prevent a coalition on non-collaboration the colonial power used a form of indirect rule that served three purposes: “they strengthened local and ethnic compartmentalisation and so raised obstacles to anticolonial agitation on a national scale; they tightened the rural elite’s grip on peasant and tribe against the possibility of radical efforts to loosen it; and they reduced contacts between ‘graduates’ in the central administration and the provincial and local rural societies to a minimum.”⁴³

Darwin notes that, while systems of collaboration can make the difference between the survival and the end of colonial rule, a colonial administration should also not become too dependent on the metropole. If this does happen, then the changes of survival of colonial rule become intertwined with the politics of the metropole, which usually indicates that the colonial administration cannot uphold colonial rule alone and becomes depended on financial and military aid from the motherland. This can have consequences in case of an open state model of decolonization, where colonial politics become intertwined with cold-war politics and a powerbroker like the U.S., can force his allies to cease colonial warfare in order to contain communism.⁴⁴

⁴³ Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations’, 136-140.

⁴⁴ J. Darwin, ‘What was the Late Colonial State?’ in *Itinerario*, volume 23, issue 3-4 (Cambridge 1999) 75-76.

States make war and war makes states, is the short explanation of Charles Tilly's theory. Powerbrokers, like state governments or insurgents, can make the population comply with their rule, through violent coercion, in order to create their desired state structure. Additionally, war-making neutralizes opposing powerbrokers, but in order to this successfully administrations are installed to keep up defences and maintain the status quo, also known as internal state formation. Furthermore, continuation of war-making depends heavily on the availability of finances, resources etc. – known as the means of extraction. According to Tilly, an army can function as the primary vehicle to create a state, because it either has the monopoly on violence or the means to attain it by crushing challengers for the monopoly of violence.⁴⁵

Kalyvas's logic of violence stresses that violence, especially in a civil war, creates its own dynamic of alliances: those powers that control the violence are often forged alliances with, because they can control the amount of violence imposed on a country, city or village. As a consequence, "collaboration follows the temporal variation in control. Gaining control over an area brings collaboration, and losing control of an area brings much of that collaboration to an end."⁴⁶ Violence is used to raise opportunities for defection, protect collaborators or coerce the population into non-collaboration with opposing powerbrokers. The powerbroker with most control also has the most credibility, which according to Kalyvas creates expectations amongst the population that this powerbroker might become the victor of the conflict and remain a power in the area in the future.⁴⁷ However, this process that was unpredictable and its outcome uncertain. An explanation of Kalyvas theory by Branch, emphasises the relation between violence and collaboration – or what he calls soluble allegiances. These soluble allegiances "they dealt in the currency of survival rather than ideology, lending the civil war its chief characteristic; ambiguity."⁴⁸ This means that collaborations were fluid during most of the conflict. Depending on the level of violence and those who exercised the violence, locals could be loyal to multiple parties at once. However, as Kalyvas adds "obviously, the best indicator [to the collaborators] that a group is winning is a decisive shift in control."⁴⁹ Consequently, the moment violence peaked during a conflict, was usually also the moment to either fully comply with one powerbroker or the other. The moment a coalition of collaboration shifted to a coalition of non-collaboration against the colonial empire and the end of colonial rule.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Tilly, 'War making and', 181.

⁴⁶ Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*, 191.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 197-201.

⁴⁸ Branch, *Defeating the Mau Mau*, 14.

⁴⁹ Kalyvas, 201.

⁵⁰ Robinson, 'Non-European foundations', 138-140.

Methodology

A number of sources have been used for this research. Most primary sources derive from the archives of the Dutch colonial administration in the National Archives of the Hague. It is important to note that these sources are biased, as explained by Ann Laura Stoler. Stoler argues that such sources primarily describe the way colonial agents looked at the colonial world and its inhabitants. Colonial agents ascribed categories to the colonized and certain categories changed over time to fit the image of the colonial administration in that period. These agents provide “confused assessments of what kinds of knowledge they needed, what they needed to know – and what they often knew they did not.”⁵¹ Something scholars have to take into account while reading and using this archival material.

Heading the advice of Stoler, I made use of a diverse amount of source material. Sources from: the Collection of H.J. Van Mook, the Collection of Mr. A.J. Vleer, the General Secretary of Dutch-Indies Government and deposited archives, the archive of the Navy and Army Intelligence service; the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) and the Central Military Intelligence Service in the Dutch East Indies (CMI), the Ministry of Defence and of the Armed forces in the Dutch East Indies and sources of the Documentation Office Collection for Sea Law (DOR). I sympathize, however, with the argument of Remy Limpach, that colonial archives still contain voices of the colonized that puncture the image described by the colonizer.⁵² For instance, the collection of Vleer, the secretary of the BFO, provided insight in how the BFO perceived federalism. It was his job as a secretary to put these thoughts on paper without censorship from the colonizer. Additionally, I made use of documents describing meetings between Dutch, Republican and BFO representatives that uncover the different views of these powerbrokers. Furthermore, certain types of sources - for instance those of the Intelligence service - give a more realistic image of the situation in Indonesia than Stoler argues. Stoler’s assumption that the colonizer mainly paints a politically biased image, does not always apply in the case of the sources provided by R.W. Kofman, Head of the Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) Office at Macassar. He describes in many cases that the East-Indonesian state does not function well and sometimes has doubts on the federal project, which, considering the history of the Indonesian federal project, can be considered as fairly realistic.

Further used sources include newspapers and the *Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950*; a collection of already selected primary colonial sources about the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and a large number of secondary sources to place the BFO story in historical context.

⁵¹ A. L. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton 2009) 2-4.

⁵² Mathijssen, ‘Onderzoek Indonesië “45-“50. Een stromingenstrijd. Heeft een gedicht ook gewicht?’ in *De Groene Amsterdammer* (17 April 2019).

The selected primary sources for this research are all written in Dutch. I must emphasize that I cannot speak nor read the Indonesian language. Naturally, for this reason, it is highly difficult to study sources in this language. However, as said by Remy Limpach and also determined by my search in the archives at The Hague, in a large number of documents the BFO members speak the Dutch language instead of their Indonesian language. They were educated in the Dutch colony and in the metropole. Thus, the BFO can be studied without necessarily knowing the Indonesian language. Furthermore, since the BFO was an important pivot in the federal plan of Van Mook, the Dutch-Indies Government and The Hague wanted to know to what extent the BFO was acting in consultation with their federal vision. For this reason, people, like Kofman, were tasked to write regular reports about their actions in which BFO members were also cited. Hence, it is possible to construct an Indonesian voice from the documents of the Dutch colonial administration, as long as one heeds the advice of Stoler, pays attention to the BFO members meetings and their observed actions by informants.

Chapters division

This research is divided into four chapters. In chapter one, the most important agents are presented: Van Mook, Sukarno and Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Each of these agents represent one of the major powerbrokers, namely the Dutch colonial administration, the Indonesian nationalists and the federalists. Their biographies will be explained and tested against the theory of Kahin and Benedict Anderson. Kahin's argument, as mentioned earlier, is that he believed those who formed an alliance with the Dutch were either aristocrats or opportunist scared of losing their privileges. In short, pre-war cleavages: whether someone belonged to the local aristocracy, was an anti-revolutionary, nationalist, or part of the colonial administration, determined the choice for his alliance to a specific party. Therefore, someone's place in the colonial community initially played a part in forming alliances on the eve of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Anderson also point to the role of someone's upbringing and education and how this influenced the perception of agents, arguing that Dutch colonial schools educated its colonial inhabitants a centralised way of rule, that indirectly taught them that federalism is by no means a Dutch way of ruling a colony. In particular Kahin's statement will be questioned, once agents experienced revolutionary violence.

In chapter two will be explained what the real reason was for the Dutch to decide on a federal pathway of decolonization. Following Robinson's theory on collaboration, it will be explained how the Dutch first tried to form an alliance with moderate nationalists like Sutan Sjahrir in order to regain stable government in Indonesia. Striking a deal would prove difficult however and made a federal project seem the only viable option. The federal project would follow a two-way strategy: Van Mook would approach representatives of the outer islands of the Indonesian archipelago with

whom he would later organize several conferences to determine the future federal structure of Indonesia. Meanwhile General Spoor would attempt to organize a federal military police force to attain control in Dutch-ruled federal states. This two-way approach is in line with both Robinson's theory on collaboration and Tilly's theory on the use of violence and coercion. In the wake of the Bandung Conference, Anak Agung founded the BFO and it will be argued that Van Mook not only thought of this BFO as merely collaborators, but official nationalists in correspondence with Anderson's theory on official nationalism.

Chapter three opposes Van Mook's imagery of the BFO by showing that the BFO members, and especially Anak Agung as the prime minister of East-Indonesia, chose a different approach to federalism than opted by Van Mook. An approach that matched more their own interests and provided them with the possibility of getting the nationalists of the Republic on board. Such an approach had severe consequences for Van Mook's position. Additionally, a glimpse into the East-Indonesian state structure and political practice is provided and the growing influence of the Republic in East-Indonesia. It is argued that the East-Indonesian state had a state-structure where newly formed institutions allowed the Dutch to control the federalists, but also gave these federalists the opportunity to settle old feudal scores amongst themselves.

In chapter four is explained why federalism was a short-lived pathway of decolonization. It describes how politics and military were intertwined during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The Republican military anticipated the Dutch plans for a federal structure and army. Like Spoor, they wanted to use their military apparatus to maintain control and achieve their desired unitary state structure. This usage of military violence had a tremendous impact on both the Dutch approach to federalism and BFO loyalists. Following the theory of Kalyvas, it is argued that BFO members never willingly decided to comply with the Dutch way of rule, because their persuasion was enforced by military force, yet the Republicans followed that same approach. East-Indonesia was not only a political target, but also a military one. The Second Police action by the Dutch shall be explained as a last resort to gain the amount of control necessary to persuade their federal loyalists not to defect to Republican side. Internationally the Republic had the upper hand and once it seemed like the Netherlands had no means to regain their control, the BFO decided to defect to the Republican side. As Kalyvas would argue this must be seen as the necessity of the moment, because the Republic would become the only patron in control. Their defection must not be seen as an act of opportunism or loyalty, but other risks led to this decision.

Chapter 1: the main agents and their experience of colonial politics

This chapter will paint a picture of the political culture of the Dutch-Indies before, during and shortly after Japanese rule and how the main agents – Van Mook, Sukarno and Anak Agung – experienced these changes in colonial leadership. First will be described how the Dutch colonial administration, following Robinson's theory on collaboration, tried to re-invent their relationship with the locals through an ethical policy. Secondly, the dissatisfaction with the elaboration of the policy led to opportunities for both Van Mook and Sukarno. Thirdly, the upbringing and the education of the agents will be mentioned and how this shaped their perception of the colony, following Anderson's theory. Furthermore, the ideas each agent developed will be related to their choice for loyalists and their role in shaping the future nation, according to Darwin's theory on pathways of late colonialism. Lastly, it will be noted that retaining pre-war privileges was a reason for aristocrats, like Anak Agung, to initially seek help of the Dutch, but, following Kalyvas, one may doubt whether this was the main reason.

The Dutch-Indies 1901-1942: a conflicting ethical policy

On September 1901, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina spoke of an ethical obligation and a moral responsibility to help the people of the Dutch East-Indies. Consequently, the Dutch planned a re-invention of the ties between the Dutch metropole, the colonial administration and the colonized, known as the Ethical policy. Promises were made, including: improvement of the social status of the colonized, improved education that was more in-line with metropolitan standards, improved infrastructure etc. For a few decades the progress on the ethical policy seemed to live up to its expectations. However, it soon became apparent that the Dutch metropole used the ethical policy to make the Dutch Indies economically stronger for the purpose of more profit, while early anti-colonial organisations pointed to the still unfulfilled promise of assimilation rights, painfully portrayed by colonial employers refusing to raise wages of their employees to newly promised standards. This resulted in an imbalance in the equilibrium of European intervention in local society and its translation to local politics, as Robinson would describe it.⁵³

Van Mook

Born on the 30th of May 1894 in Semarang, Central Java, Van Mook experienced this imbalance up close. Many of the colonial administration's adversaries were located in Semarang. Budi Otomo, a Javanese nationalist movement, held its meetings there.⁵⁴ Douwes Dekker, an Indo-European

⁵³ N. Roberts, *The emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague 1960) 243-245; Robinson, *Non-European foundations*, 120.

⁵⁴ T. Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook, 1894-1965: Een Vrij en Gelukkig Indonesië* (Bussum 2014) 52-53.

nationalist, would organise a congress in Semarang in 1913 against the colonial order.⁵⁵ In 1914 Henk Sneevliet installed the first social democratic movement in Semarang, 'De Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging', that would become the earliest communist movement.⁵⁶ Van Mook experienced how nationalism could whip up the people against the colonial order, but he did not consider nationalism to be an evil ideology. He saw these revolts as a result of the colonial state's inability to act in accordance with the goals of the ethical policy.⁵⁷ Van Mook assumed that this process did not go fast enough and therefore many locals demanded change.

In three publications, he would picture his vision on the future Dutch-Indies. In the *Indisch Maçoniek tijdschrift* – Indies Masonic Magazine – he claimed that both the Dutchman and the Javan had to be each other's equals. In a publication in the magazine 'Oostwaarts' – Eastwards, he stated that this unfortunately would not happen, because the Dutchman would never open up to the Javanese.⁵⁸ He also indirectly claimed with his texts about the Javanese and the Dutch that a solution to this discord must be found in the Dutch Indies not in the overseas metropole. In relation to Darwin's theory, Van Mook argued that a restoration of the imbalance between European administration and local politics, also meant a better balance between motherland and colony – the latter must be able to attend to its own affairs. Van Mook's clearest insight into nationalism's contribution to the future Dutch-Indies is described in a publication of the 'Stuw' – a progressive magazine led by a.o. Van Mook that strived for emancipation of the natives under colonial direction.⁵⁹ For the future of the Dutch-Indies and fulfilment of the ethical policy, guided nationalism by a decent leader was his solution. A role he would gladly take upon himself.

Sukarno

Sukarno saw the future of the Dutch-Indies in a different light. Born in Surabaya, a port-city on the island Java, on the 6th of June 1901 to a Balinese mother and East-Javan father, Sukarno experienced the daily life in the Dutch-Indies as one guided by a class-system and tradition. His parents' marriage was frowned upon. A Hindu woman of the Brahman class could not simply marry a lower classed Javanese nobleman, a 'priai', who was also a Muslim.⁶⁰ Following the tradition of the 'Santri'⁶¹ – a search by noble Javanese youngsters for a wise leading figure that could guide him along his path to adulthood – the young Sukarno searched for a wise leader. According to Anderson, this 'Santri' tradition made Javanese youngsters class-conscious at an early age, hoping to climb the social ladder

⁵⁵ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 52-53.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 52-53.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 79.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 124.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 90.

⁶⁰ L. Giebels, *Soekarno. Nederlands onderdaan: Een biografie 1901-1950* (Amsterdam 1999) 31-34.

⁶¹ Anderson, *Java in a time of revolution* (Cornell 1972) 9-11.

through the wisdom of a Santri. Sukarno found his Santri in the person of Raden Soetomo, an early Javanese nationalist and co-founder of Budi Utomo. This organisation was founded by Javanese students of the 'School tot Opleiding van Inlandse Artsen' (STOVIA), an educational institution for doctors.⁶² The students were generally children of the aristocracy or nobility. Some members had early self-determination ideals, yet they were silenced by a large majority of conservatives who cared more for the interests of the nobility. Sukarno would enlist in Budi Utomo's youth organisation. On his path to adulthood, Sukarno followed elementary school at the 'Europese Lagere School' (ELS) and pre-university education at the 'Hogere Burger School' (HBS) – Higher Civic School – in Surabaya. The ELS was originally meant for European children in the Dutch-Indies and followed the principle of concordance: the education was equal to that of the primary schools in the Dutch metropole. Sukarno was taught that the Dutch-Indies were a colony of a metropole he had never seen, that the Dutch freed themselves from Spanish and French dominion, and his Surabaya was a dot in a Dutch-ruled archipelago. Being one of few Javanese at the ELS, Sukarno was taught to think Dutch though he was never perceived as Dutch. He and people like him were called 'inlanders' – locals of the Dutch-Indies. Anderson argues that, as a consequence of this education, Sukarno was taught that the Dutch-Indies was a unified whole controlled from Batavia and though his education would be equal to that of Dutch, he would never share an office with them.⁶³

When his educational career eventually brought him to the 'Technische Hogeschool Bandoeng' (TH), a graduate school for technology located in Bandung,⁶⁴ education and politics became intertwined. Sukarno would write his first critical essay on nationalism 'Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka', an article that he would later use for his 'Pantja-Sila' speech: the speech held on the 1th of June 1945 in the company of Japanese officials that promised Indonesia independence. It contained 5 principles: nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social-justice and religious tolerance. His views were inspired by European and Japanese thinkers, stressing the importance of: one unified nation under nationalism, a non-western international community that acknowledges Indonesia as a country, a non-capitalist democracy – ergo an anti-colonial form of democracy, social-justice according to Marxian standards and religious tolerance amongst the many different faiths found in Indonesian archipelago. Hence, Sukarno tried to convince locals and loyalists of non-collaboration with the Dutch. A popular vision that led to great unrest and his arrest.⁶⁵

⁶² L. Dalhuisen, et al (ed.), *Geschiedenis van Indonesië* (Zutphen 2006) 93-94.

⁶³ Giebels, *Soekarno. Nederlands onderdaan*, 41-42, 56-59. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 121.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 41-42, 56-59.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 333-340; E. Mark, *Japan's Occupation of Java In the Second World War: A Transnational History* (London 2018) 300-302.

Anak Agung

Anak Agung was born on the 24th of July 1921 on the Island of Bali and a son of Raja of Gianyar. He was born into the Balinese Hindu caste of Kshatriya – a highly regarded warrior class, destined for rule.⁶⁶ He was expected to become the next monarch of Gianyar. Gianyar was one of multiple kingdoms on the Island of Bali, its royalty originating from Java. Most of these kingdoms were captured by force by the Dutch between 1906-1908, yet the Kingdoms of Karangasem, Gianyar and Bangli were granted indirect rule.⁶⁷ The relations between these kingdoms and the Dutch colonist were largely co-dependant: in exchange for (financial) cooperation from the local feudal lords, the kingdoms could appeal to the Dutch to restore order in their societies in case this was necessary. Still, although their relationship could be co-beneficial, his education would too provide a conflicting imagery of the colonist. Anak Agung's early education was at a local primary school – Hollandse Inlandsche School (HIS) – in the regency of Klungkung on Bali. The HIS followed the same principle of concordance as the ELS. Just like Sukarno, he would receive his secondary education at the HBS in East-Java, to eventually end up at the 'Rechts Hoge School' – Law School – in Jakarta.⁶⁸ In accordance with Anderson, Anak Agung would also have concluded early on that the Dutch-Indies were ruled as one country from Batavia and that his education would not provide him the means to become the Dutch's equal. It was not until the 1920's that the supporters of the Ethical policy turned their heads towards the outer-islands. These late attempts of implementation, presented the feeling of subordination of the outer islands to Java and Sumatra. Hence, a plan to overcome the disbalance in importance with Java was welcome, yet the ethical policy mainly exposed the neglect of his Bali.

Prior to the Japanese takeover, the agents envisioned different futures for Dutch-Indies, that matched their political culture and the way they experienced it. Van Mook favoured a form of leadership still dependant on loyalists and a Dutch maintained administration, while Sukarno aspired to convince loyalists of a pathway of non-collaboration towards a nationalist state. Meanwhile, Anak Agung did not perceive the Dutch as an adversary the way Sukarno did, but he did hope Dutch would do more to mitigate the disproportionate relationship between the outer islands and Java.

Under Japanese rule

The Japanese, who invaded the Dutch Indies on 11 January 1942 and ruled until the 15th of August 1945, changed the political environment and attitude of the Indonesian people rapidly. An important change was the abolition of the Dutch language and the introduction of the Indonesian language as

⁶⁶ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *From the Formation of the State of East-Indonesia Towards the Establishment of the United States of Indonesia* (Jakarta 1996) 899; Giebels, *Soekarno. Nederlands onderdaan*, 26.

⁶⁷ Schulte Nordholt, 'The Making of Traditional Bali', 244; H.A. Willard, *Bali Chronicles: Fascinating People and Events in Balinese History* (New York 2004) 247-252.

⁶⁸ Gde Agung, *From the formation*, 900.

prior language of communication within the colony.⁶⁹ The Japanese allowed the Indonesian press to publish and distribute works on Indonesian nationalism.⁷⁰ Besides freeing the Indonesians of the language of their former oppressors, the Japanese instated their own national symbols. Dutch national symbols were ceremonially removed – emphasizing the change in leadership from colonial rule to an Asian brother in arms.⁷¹ Japan militarized Indonesian society. About 37.000 Javanese, 20.000 Sumatran and 1.600 Balinese men enlisted for the ‘Pembela Tanah Air’ (PETA) – Protectors of the Fatherland, a volunteer army that was installed by the Japanese to aid their army in case of an Allied invasion.⁷² They were taught to fight for their homeland. A homeland that Sukarno was allowed to sketch.

Under Japanese rule, Sukarno was given opportunities to shape his nationalist agenda. Especially when it became clear that the Japanese rule had an expiration date. Sukarno’s moment came in June 1945 with the ‘Piagam Jakarta’ – or Jakarta Charter, a report of the committee of inquiry consisting of multiple nationalists including Yamin, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta and Muslims. This committee was set up with the permission of the Japanese ruler and its report served as guideline for the future Indonesian constitution. A number of things were recorded. Firstly, every born Indonesian is an Indonesian citizen. Secondly, the Indonesian state would become a Republic. Thirdly, the territory of the future state of Indonesia followed the idea of ‘tanah tumpah daerah’, meaning the future Indonesian state would consist of the territories of Dutch-Indies, Malacca, British Borneo, Portuguese-Timor, New Guinea and the Philippines. Lastly, the future state of Indonesia would become a decentralized unitary state. Though many of Sukarno’s demands were met, not everyone was immediately convinced. Hatta opted for a more limited territory for the future state of Indonesia, encompassing only the Dutch-Indies and Malacca and he favoured a federal state structure over a unitary one. He and Sukarno, who actually wanted a centralized unitary state, came to the compromise of a decentralized unitary system. Additionally, the document said little to nothing about the right of minorities in future Indonesia. Making the liveability of Chinese, Arab, Eurasian and Dutch people in the future Indonesian state uncertain.⁷³

Due to a difference of opinion between the Japanese army commander that occupied mainland Java and Sumatra, and the commander of the navy, responsible for the outer islands, Anak Agung’s experience of the occupation was different from that of Sukarno. Nationalism was allowed on Java, whereas it was repressed in the outer islands. Moreover, the Dutch indirect rule was

⁶⁹ Reid, *To Nation by Revolution*, 161.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 161.

⁷¹ Ibid, 161-162.

⁷² Ibid, 255.

⁷³ Giebels, *Soekarno: Nederlands onderdaan*, 336-340.

Japanized. Meaning, Bali's monarchy only had to share power with the Japanese, but not with nationalists. The Japanese rule must have left a different impression on Anak Agung than the Dutch. The Japanese locked his father up on the suspicion of insurrection and Anak Agung had to take his father's place. This must have taught Anak Agung, that he ruled by the grace of the colonial power.⁷⁴

As a result, Sukarno and Anak Agung experienced Japanese rule differently. The way of rule implemented a way of politics that Sukarno could use to its advantage. He could already create certain conditions for his future state of Indonesia. But this opportunity also showed that the nationalists were not unified, but separate agents with their own ideas on the future state structure. This is reflected by Hatta's initial opposition to Sukarno conditions. Anak Agung experienced more continuity than discontinuity under Japanese rule. The way he was obliged to take his father's place, must have taught him that his rule depended more than ever on the goodwill of the colonizer.

Independence and signs of revolution

Around the time the USA launched their atomic bombs, Japanese Field Marshall Terauchi Hisaichi met with nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta, promising them independence of the territories of the Dutch East Indies, excluding Malaya and British Borneo.⁷⁵ This gave Sukarno the opportunity to see whether his nationalist program would take root, but the tradition of the Javanese youth and the militarization by Japan had created an a new phenomenon: the Pemuda. These youth militias turned against the Japanese as defeat seemed imminent, demanding rapid change and independence by force. Sukarno initially refused their radical terms, but both he and Hatta were eventually forced at gunpoint to declare national independence. Resulting in a rushed independence: the nation was present, but the nation-state with stabile institutions was absent. As a consequence, this fragmentary authority could not prevent the violence by the pemuda against former colonial subjects of Dutch, Chinese or Eurasian decent, known as the Bersiap.

Sukarno's choice to side with the Japanese, was the reason for Van Mook not to include him in his pool of potential nationalists. The exit of Japan provided possibilities for Van Mook's plan. After his appointment as Lieutenant Governor General of the Dutch-Indies in 1944, he said to his secretary that he "would bring Sukarno back in a cage."⁷⁶ Van Mook had noted that the nationalists did not spoke with one voice. In his pamphlet 'Onze Strijd' – Our Struggle, Sjahrir contemplated why Indonesian nationalism had failed so far. Its current leaders were "generally

⁷⁴ Gde Agung, *From the formation*, 900-901.

⁷⁵ Reid, *To Nation by Revolution*, 259.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 204-205.

former abbots or helpers of the Japanese.”⁷⁷ The Indonesian youth had to be cleansed from the “murderous [...] Japanese disease”, meaning the pemuda.⁷⁸ “The late arrival of the allied army [...] gave an opportunity to instate the Indonesian Republic. However, this has not led to the desired result.”⁷⁹ Sjahrir refers to the arrival of the British forces who did not want to negotiate over a conflict they saw as a Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Finally, Indonesians so far had not submitted to “humanitarian ideals and social justice.”⁸⁰ Van Mook must have seen Sjahrir as a nationalist who argued that persons like Van Mook still had an important role to play as a guide of nationalism.

Whereas the revolution provided Sukarno with possibilities, Anak Agung was confronted with a social revolution that perceived him, a monarch, as a threat. His rule was threatened by nationalist and communist leaders who could now rally forces to protest against his monarchic power, who would have otherwise been silenced by the colonial power. The danger posed by the revolutionaries to Anak Agung’s rule became apparent when they abducted him on the 20th of September 1945 in Tegallalang, part of Agung’s Gianyar Regency on Bali.⁸¹ He was at the mercy of young pemuda leaders. Eventually he was released, but in the following days Anak Agung still had to escape multiple attempts of abduction. In this insecure environment Anak Agung organised his own Pemuda Pembela Negara (PPN) – Youth for the Defence of the Kingdom, to ensure his safety. This PPN served as his bodyguard and also repressed armed resistance in his kingdom from opposing pemuda.⁸² Prior to the Dutch return, his status, as an aristocrat with a private militia that resisted pemuda threatening his reign, made him an anti-revolutionary in the eyes of his adversaries.⁸³ For reasons of preservation of privileges and personal safety, he would therefore welcome the Dutch colonizer back to their former colony.

The rushed independence provided opportunities to Sukarno, but new obstacles for Van Mook and Anak Agung. Due to the absence of government control, revolutionary violence was not maintained. At times it looked like Sukarno would also become the victim of revolutionary violence, yet Anak Agung had to fear more for his life. It makes sense, given the practice of revolutionary violence by the pemuda, that Sutan Sjahrir would opt for a different nationalist approach, one that was less radical and violent. Something Van Mook would perceive as a call for guided nationalism.

⁷⁷ “Our Struggle”, consideration by Sutan Sjahrir regarding the nationalist endeavor, National Archives, The Hague, Collection 176 H.J. Van Mook. Entry number 2.21.123. Inventory number 277. [Hereafter NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 277]

⁷⁸ “Our Struggle”, NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 277

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ G. Robinson, *The dark side of paradise: political violence in Bali* (London 1995) 170-172.

⁸² Robinson, *The dark side*, 170-172.

⁸³ Ibid, 170-172.

Conclusion

The political culture of the Dutch-Indies between 1901 and 1942 was mostly guided by a conflicting ethical policy of unkept promises. Although, for instance, levels in education rose, the absence of social equality remained a grievance for many locals, which became a breeding ground for anti-colonial sentiment. Following Robinson's theory this caused a disbalance in the equilibrium between European activity in the colony and its translation to local politics that needed to be improved in order to secure colonial rule in the long-term. Van Mook believed that guided nationalism would provide the answer, silencing anti-colonial sentiments, yet Sukarno envisioned a nationalist Indonesian state not headed by a former colonial leader. Anak Agung would not go as far as to envision a new nationalist state, he favoured a future state where the relationship between the outer islands and Java and Sumatra was mended. Both, Sukarno and Anak Agung, however, would have been taught, according to Anderson, to perceive the Dutch Indies as one whole and their role in society as the lesser version of a Dutchman. Lessons that would eventually play a role in the future implementation of federalism. Japanese rule gave Sukarno the opportunity to document his nationalist agenda with the aim of realising a decentralized unitary Indonesian state without the Dutch. For this reason, he was not a potential loyalist to work with, yet, as Robinson argues, the fact that Hatta objected some conditions of Sukarno, shows that these nationalists were not a unified agency, but individuals with own voices. It shows that there was still an opportunity to negotiate with some of these nationalist agents. Anak Agung suffered some setbacks from Japanese rule. It was made clear to him that he ruled by the grace of Japanese colonizer that could replace him if they felt like it. Eventually, the independence granted by Japan had to be the start of Sukarno's favoured nationalist state, but rushed by armed pemuda the new state lacked institutions to control revolutionary violence. As a result, Sutan Sjahrir opted for a different kind of nationalism that favoured a more moderate and less violent approach, consequently paving the way for Van Mook's guided nationalism. Anak Agung saw his Bali suffering from revolutionary violence. Violence that he also could not escape and led to the organisation of his own pemuda forces to keep him safe and fend off revolutionary resistance. According to Kalyvas, experiencing violence is often the main reason for choosing to be loyal to a powerbroker. Anak Agung's reason to do business with the Dutch once more, seems more based on a lack of security than on the wish to preserve his aristocratic privileges.

Chapter 2: Divide and rule

The Dutch instigated the venture for a federal Indonesia. This chapter will describe the Dutch approach to federalism. A number of things will be explained. First, Van Mook's administration became dependent on the decision-making from the Dutch metropole, which Darwin believes could eventually weaken colonial rule. Secondly, the failure of negotiations with Sutan Sjahrir, would make federalism the only option. In accordance with Robinson's theory, Van Mook would search for other loyalists to back up his federal project.

Sukarno proclaimed independence on the 17th of August 1945, but his state was unorganised. The lack of state control made it possible for the pemuda to inflict massive violence upon people of Dutch, Chinese and Eurasian decent. This Bersiap was the reason the Dutch quickly wanted to restore order in their colony. Therefore, they initially thought their return would not invoke much protest. The Civil Affairs Agreement signed on 24th of August 1945 by Dutch and allied forces – Americans, British and Australian – prescribed clearly the return of Dutch authority to the colony once the Japanese and British had left.⁸⁴ However, their return soon led to disagreement.

Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, and Philip Christison, Lieutenant general of the Allied forces, did not keep to the agreement. Fearing Indonesian hostilities against his British troops, Mountbatten refused to uphold law and order until the Dutch would come to an agreement with Sukarno. Christison forbade Dutch troops entrance to Java and even acknowledged the Indonesian Republic.⁸⁵ Van Mook was furious and had ordered Charles van der Plas, Financial Director of Internal Affairs, to notify Christison of the precarious situation on Java. Cities like Batavia had multiple problems: food scarcity and the danger of the pemuda which Sukarno tried to control, but he was actually at their mercy, Van der Plas stated in a memorandum to Christison. Amongst the victims of the Bersiap was a British military officer, Aubertin Walter Sothern Mallaby.⁸⁶ According to Van Mook, this showed that Indonesians could not remedy the chaos on their own. Mediation by the Republicans would be futile, he argued.⁸⁷ Eventually, the British Empire, represented by diplomat Archibald Clark Kerr, would lead new negotiations between Dutch officials, including Van Mook, and a Republican delegation headed by Sutan Sjahrir in March 1946.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 205.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 205.

⁸⁶ Memorandum of Financial Director of Internal Affairs (Van der Plas), 11 November 1945 in S.L. van der Wal(ed.) *Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950*, II (hereafter referred to as *NIB*) 39-41; R. McMillan, *The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian revolution* (Abingdon 2005) 49-50.

⁸⁷ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Commander of the Allied Forces, 3 December 1945 in *NIB*, II, 276-277.

⁸⁸ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 217.

Van Mook had informed Minister of Overseas Territories, Johan Logemann, that Sjahrir had not worked with the Japanese like Sukarno did and had made sure Sukarno was less in the picture.⁸⁹ Prior to these official negotiations on March, informal meetings between Van Mook and Sutan Sjahrir were already held in February at Clark Kerr's house. Although, Sjahrir was not Sukarno, he already made it clear during those informal meetings that the Republic had several demands, like having their own representative of foreign affairs and a clear position for the Republican army.⁹⁰ Van Mook made it clear that such demands could not be met. During the official meetings they did reach to a draft-agreement: the Batavian concept. Sjahrir agreed to the outer islands having their own authorities, admitting that the Republic was not the only authority in Indonesia. In turn, Van Mook acknowledged Republican authority over Java and Sumatra. Dutch and Republican forces agreed to a temporary cease-fire, that would allow them to exercise law and order. Lastly, the Dutch and Republic would build an Indonesian federation.⁹¹

The Batavian concept would lead to several benefits for the Republic and the Dutch. The recognition of the Republic meant recognition of legitimate power and control. According to Tilly, this made them a more legitimate power for exercising violence. Kalyvas would argue that this made the Republic a more credible power for the future. On the other hand, the Republic agreed to share control, which gave Van Mook the opportunity to realize his plan of indirect rule. Furthermore, the Republic and the Dutch would exercise law and order to prevent further violence.

Negotiations in four stages: 'Hoge Veluwe', Malino, Linggadjati, and Denpasar

Hoge Veluwe

Van Mook still had to convince the Dutch metropole of this draft-agreement. However, negotiations in The Hague failed. The Dutch cabinet's post-war situation was the main problem. Cabinet Schermerhorn was an emergency cabinet and was in no position to make such decisions, according to most members.⁹² A newly elected government would have a more proper mandate and make more weighted decisions.⁹³ Additionally, the Catholic People's Party, one of the largest political parties, was against it.⁹⁴ Van Asbeck, Law Professor at Leiden University and staff member of Van Mook, had pointed out that international law was vague about arrangements between governments

⁸⁹ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 15 November 1945 in *NIB*, II, 74; Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 16 November 1945 in *NIB*, III, 92.

⁹⁰ Giebels, *Soekarno Nederlands onderdaan*, 410.

⁹¹ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 30 March 1946 in *NIB*, III, 685-686; Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 217.

⁹² I.A.A. Gde Agung, *'Renville' als keerpunt in de Nederlands-Indonesische onderhandelingen* (Utrecht 1980) 31.

⁹³ Gde Agung, *'Renville'*, 31.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 31.

and dissident parties, like the Republic. As long as no recognized deal was signed, the Netherlands could continue to regard maintenance of order in their colony as domestic affairs.⁹⁵ The Dutch government blamed Van Mook for preparing a deal that made this more difficult. In their view, the arrangement was not a compromise, but a yield towards the Indonesian Nationalists.⁹⁶

On the 14th of April 1946, negotiations between representatives of the Dutch, Dutch-Indies and Republican government took place at the 'Hoge Veluwe' in the Dutch province Gelderland. Sjahrir was not part of the Republican delegation. Instead, the Republican Suwandi took the floor stating: 'the draft agreement, which was brought from Batavia, is not of Indonesian origin.'⁹⁷ Moreover, recognition of the Republic remained important, because 'the people' would then recognize the Republic as 'an opposing party from the Dutch government'.⁹⁸ The Dutch could not comply with these demands leading to the failure of the Hoge Veluwe negotiations. Sjahrir was clearly replaced by Republican hawks accepting only unconditional recognition, which showed that Sjahrir was but one of view possible collaborators in the nationalist camp, the Dutch could negotiate with. That is why Van Mook urgently needed to extend his pool of collaborators.

Malino

Van Mook informed Logemann, that he would organize a conference at Malino, a village in South Sulawesi. Here representatives of the future states of the federation would enter a series of discussions in order to make arrangements for a federal Indonesia.⁹⁹ This conference was held 16-25 July 1946. On the 16th of July Van Mook would speech in front of the representatives of the states. The representatives came from Borneo, Bangka, Belitung, Riau and the Great East, comprising the island Celebes; the Moluccas; West New Guinea; Bali and the Sunda Islands. Van Mook assured the representatives that that his administration would break with the way of rule of the pre-war colonial administration. Van Mook said that he could understand that this goal of self-determination 'is difficult to comprehend for those who grew up under old relationships and now have to make the necessary changes.' Van Mook wanted to assure that 'those growing up under old relationships', a reference to the nobility amongst the representatives, still had a part to play in future Indonesia, but in a different way. They had to realise that 'relationships have developed, causing for example economic dependency between each other [...]. Java cannot exist [...] without the other islands'.

⁹⁵ Memorandum of Van Asbeck (Professor at Leiden University) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 4 March 1946 in *NIB*, III, 489-490.

⁹⁶ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 218.

⁹⁷ Documents concerning the negotiations in the Hoge Veluwe between representatives of the governments of the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies and the Republic. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 128.

⁹⁸ Documents concerning the negotiations in the Hoge Veluwe. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 128.

⁹⁹ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 13 May 1946 in *NIB*, IV, 298.

Van Mook stressed the different merits of each independent region while claiming one cannot live without the other. Van Mook argued in favour of a federation, that 'is not based on some theoretical preference or on the wish to divide and conquer. On the contrary, a unitary state could lead to domination by certain parts of Indonesia over the whole, which could lead to internal divides that endanger the whole.' At the end of the conference the thirty-nine delegates from fifteen different areas in the Outer Islands determined, that these Outer Islands together with the Republic would become a Federal Indonesian commonwealth, in accordance with the articles of the Linggadjati agreement.¹⁰⁰

After the Malino conference Van Mook messaged Logemann and specifically remarked that he worked from an Indonesian framework 'for now' while closely following Republican activity.¹⁰¹ Van Mook's initial plan was also to have an Australian Officer to attend the Malino conference on the day Van Mook would transfer authority to representatives of the Outer Islands. It could give this transfer of authority a certain international recognition. However, the officer in question cancelled, because he was an Allied Commander and his attendance could be interpreted as 'a British entry on to the political aspects of the Outer Islands which [...] the British Government is anxious to avoid.'¹⁰²

Linggadjati

Progress had to be made with the Dutch plan of federalism to have a better negotiating position once negotiations with the Republic would continue in October 1946. The result of these negotiations was a new treaty: the Linggadjati Agreement, signed by the Dutch and the Republic on the 15th of November 1946. This agreement comprised 17 articles, a number of which are important to mention. In article 1, The Dutch government recognized the 'de facto' authority of the Republic over Java, Madura and Sumatra. These areas will be introduced in Republican territory through 'mutual cooperation', a process linked to a timeline in article 12. Consequently, article 12 states that both Dutch and Republican government will ensure the establishment of 'the United States of Indonesia and the Dutch-Indonesian Union before 1 January 1949.' These united states will become a federation, according to article 2 and 5, with a federal constitution that guards the interests of the Republic, the states of Borneo and the Great East and minority rights. The territory of this federation, according to Article 3 and 4, encompasses the whole Dutch-Indies territory, but the population of a territory has the option to enter a 'special relationship' with the Netherlands, if they democratically

¹⁰⁰ Ibid; Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 225-226; Minutes and meeting documents of the Malino Conference; with resolutions and conclusions. National Archives, The Hague. Collection 414 Mr. A.J. Vleer 1932-1955, Entry number 2.21.216. Inventory number 69 [Hereafter NL-HaNA, Vleer, 21.216, inv.nr. 69].

¹⁰¹ Ibid; Note of Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook), 24 June 1946 in *NIB*, IV, 515-517.

¹⁰² Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Logemann), 31 May 1946 in *NIB*, IV, 384-385.

decide to part ways with the federation. The Dutch-Indonesian Union, according to article 6 and 8, is headed by the Dutch crown and comprises the Netherlands, the Dutch-indies, Surinam and Curacao. Article 10 and 11, prescribe the rights of Dutch and Indonesian citizens in the Union, that need to be recorded at a future conference. Articles 14 and 16, prescribe the Republic's obligation to return Dutch-owned properties in their area and the mutual obligation of both parties to reduce and pull back their military from Dutch or Republican territory. Finally, article 17 prescribes the instalment of an institution monitoring Dutch-Indonesian negotiations and able to intervene should hostilities persist. In that case, a UN envoy will be appointed acting as independent judge with a decisive vote.¹⁰³

Many of the Linggadjati articles are deliberately vague to serve the need of the Netherlands. Especially Articles 3 and 4, because Indonesians can reconsider their position vis-à-vis the Republic and establish a direct link with the Netherlands. This overrides the other articles on state formation. Robinson would argue that this served the Dutch need for indirect rule in two ways. First, it strengthened local compartmentalisation: the option for a direct link with the Netherlands, raised local obstacles against the Republican unitary nationalism. Secondly, separating these local territories from possible Republican radicalism made it more convenient, for rural officials in the outer islands to tighten their grip on the locals. The vague descriptions made for a weak mandate, which also provided military possibilities. Repositioning could be enforced by violence. If done properly, Kalyvas would argue, locals could defect to the Dutch side. This treaty could not prevent further hostilities.

Van Mook had already informed the Dutch Government, that, if Linggadjati failed, three options remained available: a military intervention with the pretence of evoking a colonial war, concentration of Dutch forces in the outer islands and a naval blockade of Java and a deal through international action.¹⁰⁴ Since the Dutch government had made it clear that the Republic should not get its way nor gain international support, the second option became the only option. He assumed a dual strategy: in line with Tilly's theory. Van Mook would set-up an administration in the outer-islands to foster internal state-formation and challenge Republican authority and General Spoor would install a federal army that could challenge the Republican T.N.I. army and re-establish the Dutch monopoly of violence. This made the ascertainment and operationalisation of the federal states very important. Therefore, the Malino participants agreed to another conference planned for this purpose.

¹⁰³ Brochure containing the text of the Linggadjati agreement and the radio readings of Van Mook and Sjahrir as a result thereof, published by Balai Poestaka in Jakarta. In Malay, Dutch and English. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 281.

¹⁰⁴ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 218.

Denpasar

The Denpasar Conference would be held from 7-24 December 1946 in Den Pasar, a city on Bali. Van Mook explained the purpose of the Denpasar Conference in a message to Logemann. The purpose was installing East Indonesia, as the first of several future states of the federation, and to make representatives of this state to speak out against the Republic.¹⁰⁵

Van Mook elaborated on his strategy for East-Indonesia in a letter to M. Brouwer, Commissioner of the Crown for East-Indonesia and a confidant of Van Mook. He wrote: "I will soon take up the issue of army and navy propaganda here with Spoor [Army Commander in the Dutch East Indies] [...] while emphasizing that we must support East Indonesia with all our forces, both against the left Republican action and against the separatism of the right [Ambon and Minahassa]. Once one turns to a certain political direction, all forces must be concentrated on it, while, furthermore, it is inconceivable that a restoration of the old colonial relationships would have any success beyond those very small part of East Indonesia, from where we have lived on the export of KNIL soldiers for decades."¹⁰⁶

It shows that Van Mook's federalist project was meant to restore colonial relationships. East-Indonesia should be protected from incorporation in the Republic and fragmentation. The Republic was not the only Dutch concern. Van Mook acknowledged to Bouwer that every region beyond East-Indonesia was in fact a lost cause. His observation, that colonial ties could not be restored in KNIL areas shows that he concluded that separatism in these areas prevailed over his federalist approach.

Van Mook encouraged Brouwer to make preparations 'behind the scenes' to ensure the East-Indonesian government could unite Republican adversaries: "the moderates, self-rulers and would-be-separatists."¹⁰⁷ Then the East-Indonesian government could form a majority and more easily cope with the Republican insurrection. They did have to follow the democratic path, because, as Van Mook argued, the success of the Republic on Bali can be attributed to the "retarded and autocratic character" of self-government.¹⁰⁸ According to his knowledge, the Anak Agung extorted the population on Bali, leading to protests. Van Mook emphasized that Brouwer, while operating behind the scenes, must make sure to acquire the consent and cooperation of the East-Indonesian government to prevent his actions being considered as 'a final colonial convulsion on our part'.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Jonkman), 23 December 1946 in *NIB*, VI, 633-634;

¹⁰⁶ Documents concerning political development in the State of East-Indonesia. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 116.

¹⁰⁷ Documents concerning political, NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 116.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Linggadjati: additional demands

While the Den Pasar Conference was ongoing, the Dutch government was busy downplaying the Linggadjati agreement. Uncertainty about the accessibility to raw materials and the Dutch business community in Indonesia for the reconstruction of the post-war Netherlands, led to the 'motion Romme/Van Goes'.¹¹⁰ This motion, named after its submitters, added additional demands to the Linggadjati agreement, guaranteeing the rights and access of Dutch business in Indonesia and preserving a separate place for New Guinea, that did not become part of the state of East-Indonesia. This dressed agreement of Linggadjati – in Dutch *Aangekleed akkoord van Linggadjati* – would settle Dutch-Indonesian hostilities in favour of the Dutch, or so they hoped. Prime Minister Schermerhorn came up with the idea of this dressed agreement.

An important motive for this idea was his dissatisfaction with the federal project. Van Mook was elated by the steps made at Malino and Den Pasar, but Schermerhorn was fed-up with the newly appointed Dutch Minister President Louis Beel who had named East-Indonesia in the same breath with the Republic, as if these two states were already each other's equals.¹¹¹ Schermerhorn argued that East-Indonesia was not even close to being the Republic's equal in political nor popular strength. Representatives, such as Sukawati, merely "sang the song of Van Mook, but nothing more."¹¹² A report on the situation in Bali and Lombok of December 1946 proved Schermerhorn right. The report stresses the unpopularity of president Sukawati, who had but a few followers while federalists like Anak Agung had many, but his showed dangerous signs of becoming "a state within a state."¹¹³ Moreover, representatives of East-Indonesia preferred to await the Republican reaction, before determining their position.¹¹⁴ Thus, the federal project was not capable of standing on its own feet.

Naturally, the Republicans did not agree to the additional demands, a scenario the Dutch had foreseen, since a note was added to the agreement that the Republic is not bound to the dressed-version of the accord.¹¹⁵ This vague construction paved the way to the signing of the Linggadjati agreement on the 25th of March 1947 by both parties, for the simple reason that each side had the opportunity to sign their own version of the agreement: the Dutch signed the dressed version, whereas the Republic signed the unadded version. The result was an agreement of empty promises and thus a political failure. A continuation of politics between the two parties asked for other means.

¹¹⁰ 'Linggadjati', *Andere tijden* (2006). <<https://anderetijden.nl/aflevering/373/Linggadjati>> 02-12-2019

¹¹¹ De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, 780.

¹¹² *Ibid*, 781.

¹¹³ Political report Bali of the resident of Bali and Lombok (Boon) about the second half of December 1946, *NIB*, VI, 709-711.

¹¹⁴ Political report Bali, 709-711.

¹¹⁵ 'Linggadjati', *Andere Tijden*.

The imminent Police Action

On the 13th of March 1947, a few weeks before the final signing of Linggadjati, Van Mook contemplated his possible resignation. His reason: the Dutch government was already aware that the signed agreement would be a political disaster and encouraged a possible military intervention, a responsibility he did want to take.¹¹⁶ According to Van Mook, Linggadjati had become ‘a smoke screen to initiate a violent action’ and every challenge on the political stage by the Dutch since the signing of Linggadjati was raised to save time for a military intervention.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile hostilities between Dutch and Republican forces continued and both sides blamed each other of violating the agreement. Eventually, the Dutch government asked Van Mook to deliver an ultimatum to the Republic. The reasoning was not so much the continued hostilities, but the miserable conditions of the Dutch treasury. On the 17th of May, Van Mook negotiated the ultimatum with Sjahrir in which Van Mook gave the Republic the opportunity to form an interim government with their own foreign policy.¹¹⁸ On the 8th of June 1947 the Republic responded that they would only agree to this ultimatum, if they could pick half of the representatives of this government and if the function of Lieutenant Governor General was abrogated, an outcome the Dutch government nor Van Mook could agree to.¹¹⁹ The result was an impasse that, according to the Dutch, could only be remedied with a military intervention that was euphemistically called a ‘police action’.

A federal defence apparatus: In Line with the Police Action

In view of the impending Dutch military action, it is important to first discuss, General Spoor’s preparation of the plan that would come into effect after this police action, dating back to 9 December 1946. In a very secret memorandum, Spoor writes: “[...] I have the honour of offering [...] a memorandum on the organisation of the land forces in the East Indonesia in the new construction of the Dutch-Indonesian Union.”¹²⁰ Striking is his introduction prescribing that “while merely the principles and main lines of a possible political solution are known [...] and the elaboration is still in the hands of the gods, a starting point is in order.”¹²¹ This sentence shows that Spoor already contemplated a military option, if ‘the gods’ stood in the way of a political solution. He assumed, in accordance with Linggadjati, that “Indonesia would form a federation and together with the Netherlands and West-Indies become part of union headed by the Dutch Crown, whereby the

¹¹⁶ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 238.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 238.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 240.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 241.

¹²⁰ Documents concerning the plans for the organization of the army and police in Indonesia under the Dutch-Indonesian Union. December 1946 – September 1948. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 100.

¹²¹ Documents concerning the plans, NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 100.

general management of foreign policy, defence, finance if necessary, as well as topics of an economic and cultural nature, remain with the designates bodies appointed by the Crown.”¹²² Consequently, “the political-strategic leadership of the defence therefore remains in Dutch hands, naturally in collaboration with the relevant Indonesian authorities of the federative government.”¹²³ Spoor would not share Dutch military leadership with Indonesians and the East-Indonesian government was only allowed to exercise domestic affairs, while foreign affairs – the ministry that contacted foreign powers, including the Republic – remained in Dutch hands.

About the general task of the ground forces in Indonesia, he wrote: “ground forces are characterized by a more regional-defensive character, the primary task of which is to defend and protect the bases for offensive quantities, perhaps overpower and retain at a later stage.”¹²⁴ Spoor did not rule out the possibility this initial defensive task of the ground forces could make way for an offensive task to overpower and retain certain territories. Which precise territories he did not mention: “those parts of the territory, which are considered to be of vital strategic and political importance for warfare within the territory of Indonesia.”¹²⁵ A very broad formulation, that contains the dilemma of Tilly’s theory that warfare itself would determine which territory was important. Spoor summarized the army as having three purposes: “the defence of territory, which from political-strategic reasons for waging a war must inexorably remain in their own hands for the purpose of offensive warfare”, “a limited strategic offensive task, in order to be able to co-operate in allied context [...] and for the occupation of enemy territory,” and, “as the highest power apparatus of the state for the restoration and maintenance of order and peace, when the available police organs prove unable to do so.”¹²⁶

It shows the tasks of Van Mook and Spoor were closely related: the first would establish federal states that could be propagated as legitimate powers and withstand Republican interference, whilst the other used the established federal states, as military bases that would occupy hostile territory, if the opportunity presented itself. Furthermore, it shows how the upcoming First Police Action coincided with the plan for a federal army.

Spoor argued that the army was also served additional goals for future Indonesia. He explains the use of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army – *Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger* (KNIL). He wrote: “Besides the good qualities, which from a military point of view could certainly not be denied

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

to a Professional army, one of the biggest disadvantages that the army, the *Kompanie* [KNIL], has, is that it was an institution that stood outside the popular community and relied on intensive contact with and sympathy from certain limited groups of people (Ambon, Manado) and the population centres around the large garrisons, from which many sons of the country were pre-eminently attracted to the military profession.”¹²⁷ He blamed the pre-war colonial administration for not allowing the Indonesian population “to participate in the defence of its own country.”¹²⁸ He argues that it is important “[...] to give the defence organisation of the future Indonesian armed forces a strong local, rather ‘territorial character’, so that the objective for these armed forces can be brought within the existing sentiment and attainable understanding of the ethics of national defence.”¹²⁹ Spoor wanted “a national military force – *Rijksweermacht* – as the embodiment of the over-arching defence policy in the Dutch-Indonesian Union and for the protection of Dutch interests in Indonesia.”¹³⁰ This force would provide the core around which the Indonesian federal army would be build and consisted of both KNIL soldiers and soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Army – *Koninklijke Landmacht* (KL). This would prevent that “the connection with the Netherlands would become vacant [...] and offered adequate guarantees for a good connection with the various population groups in Indonesia.”¹³¹

So, the military apparatus would serve offensive warfare, but it would also educate the enlisted population in rebuilding a federally divided nation that would defend the connection between colony and metropole. Furthermore, Spoor argued: “during the design and construction of the new Indonesian defence apparatus, the *Tentara Republic Indonesia* (T.R.I.) [The Republican Army renamed T.N.I. in 1947] cannot be included in its current form.”¹³² Moreover, the Dutch appointed military cadre served ‘to get rid of the currently appointed numerous [Republican] generals, colonels and other high-ranking officers who are naturally unable to find a place in the newly formed military.”¹³³ Thus, Spoor saw the army as a vehicle for war making and state making that could reinvent the nation.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

The First Police Action

On the 21st of June 1947 the Dutch military operation named 'Product' commenced, with the goal of seizing the most important economical areas on Java and Sumatra.¹³⁴ Although the important economical areas were quickly seized by the Dutch military, the military leadership was not satisfied with the course of the operation. During a meeting of the General military staff on June 26, 1947, most military leaders claimed the goal of the operation as too limited. Instead, they argued that Yogya, as the heart of Indonesian rebellion, should be conquered.¹³⁵ However, in a message to Spoor Liaison Officer C. Moolenburgh claimed that, although the operation did not have the intended result, continuation of the military operation would be interpreted by foreign countries as a colonial war.¹³⁶ Moolenburgh was proven right once international pressure, especially by the United States, compelled the Dutch to stop their military campaign on the 4th of August. Negotiations under the guidance of the UN started to cease hostilities; the Dutch government and the Republic agreed a truce – the Renville Agreement – signed on the USS Renville on January 17, 1948. In a special meeting, the Dutch Council of Ministers evaluated the aftermath. While some ministers, including Jonkman, blamed Spoor for the failure of the operation, most voices, including Prime Minister Beel, argued that Van Mook was responsible for the failure.¹³⁷ Since a new military intervention was out of the question, the federal project was continued.

The 9th of May 1947, a month before the police action, Van Mook had already advised his confidant Brouwer to once again change up the composition of the East-Indonesian government behind the scenes should the opportunity present itself. The reason for Van Mook's renewed involvement was the appointment of Tadjoeidin Noor from the Progressive fraction, a party affiliated with the Republic, as chairman. However, the cabinet had fallen, which gave Van Mook the opportunity to appoint a new formateur via Tjokorda Gde Rake Soekawati, appointed as the president of the East-Indonesian government during the Den Pasar conference. Van Mook wrote Bouwer: 'If Soekawati has to come up with a new formateur, I think Anak Agung is the most suitable candidate'. Followed by the message that '[...] if they [the East Indonesian Ministry] are strong enough, they can get rid of Tadjoeidin Noor.'¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 218-219.

¹³⁵ Records of a meeting held at the headquarters of the General Staff, 26 July 1947, in *NIB*, X, 74-75.

¹³⁶ Message of the Liaison Officer from the cabinet of the Prime Minister (Moolenburgh) to army commander (Spoor), 27 July 1947, in *NIB*, X, 89.

¹³⁷ Records of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23 August 1947, in *NIB*, X, 578.

¹³⁸ Documents concerning political development in the State of East-Indonesia. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 116.

Van Mook believed the East-Indonesian government had potential and his vision of Anak Agung had changed. Presumably, Boon's report stressing Sukawati's unpopularity versus Agung's popularity together with his ability to get people behind him, must have made Van Mook think this Balinese Raja had taken the democratic path and might become the 'stronger brother' he needed. More importantly, of course, he was not a Republican.

The Dutch government, however, did not see this potential, especially after the few results of the Police Action. The 4th of February 1948, representatives of the Dutch government held a meeting, known as the 'Romp-Departments council'. They doubted whether Van Mook was truly committed to the union-idea, because progress was made with federal institutions, but not with the Dutch-Indonesian Union, the overarching institute that had to uphold the ties between the Netherlands and the Indonesian federation. The poor progress with the union project was the result of BFO members who had little interests in the idea. One member of the Romp-Departments council specifically stated that "People here [the Netherlands] actually want to keep matters under control, out of mistrust for the Dutch-Indies policy.' Thus, the distrust focused more on Van Mook than the actual progress on federal Indonesia.¹³⁹ The latter was still important to the Dutch Government, as can be deduced from an urgent message of the Chief Executive Officer in Indonesia, L. Neher, to Beel. He urges to establish more contacts in the outer states and villages, because the Committee of Good Offices, a committee founded after the First Policy Action to ensure co-optation between the Dutch and Republican government because of the Renville Agreement, needs to know that 'the Republic and Indonesia are not identical'.¹⁴⁰

The emergence of the BFO

Van Mook organised a meeting to discuss a new approach towards the Republic and federalism. According to Van Mook, the progression of the federal approach was important, because the Dutch were 'serious' on building the United States of Indonesia. This federal system would provide the inclusion of Republicans in the interim government and bring the whole archipelago together: 'to establish and develop the relationship of that whole with Netherlands and abroad on a healthy footing.'¹⁴¹ Van Mook, thus, tried to convince his Dutch colleagues that he heeded their advice, making sure his approach was now more in line with the Dutch metropole. This also affected his expectations at the Bandung Conference that had to install a temporary federal government.

¹³⁹ Report of the meeting of the 'Romp-Departmentsraad', 4 February 1948, in *NIB*, XII, 693.

¹⁴⁰ Message of Chief Executive Officer (Neher) to Prime Minister (Beel), 23 April 1948, in *NIB*, XIII, 518.

¹⁴¹ Note from Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook), 5 February 1948, in *NIB*, XII, 698-699.

The Bandung Conference held on the 27th of May 1948, continued where Malino and Den Pasar had begun. At this conference three subjects would be discussed: the internal structure of Indonesia and how to fit in the Republic as a federal state in the Dutch-Indonesian union, the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, and the transition or inter-period between the temporary government and the eventual lasting government. The conference was set-up with the intention that Indonesian federalists could both share their thoughts at the conference meetings and during so called 'daerah-meetings' – meetings in the different home provinces of the federalists. Additionally, working groups were formed for in depth discussions on one of the three subjects.¹⁴² As an extension of the Bandung Conference, a couple of federal representatives would form the BFO and help design the federal structure in more detail.¹⁴³ Van Mook's expectations of this newly formed association called the 'Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg' (BFO), also referred to as 'Bijzonder Federaal Overleg', were high and must be viewed in the light of his weak position vis-à-vis the Dutch metropole. The fact that this newly formed body was instigated by the Indonesian federalists would prove Van Mook's critics in the metropole wrong. Moreover, this federal body – instigated by Indonesians – showed international arbitrators, like the US, that the Dutch were not set on colonization, but that the Indonesians were definitely divided between nationalists and federalists.

¹⁴² 'De Federale conferentie te Bandoeng. Het doel: geen bindende beslissingen, maar overleg over federale opbouw', *Nieuwe Courant*, 13 May 1948.

¹⁴³ Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Minister of Overseas Territories (Jonkman), 1 August 1948, in *NIB*, XIV, 491-492.

Conclusion

Sjahrir appeared to be a lone voice in a radical nationalist camp that was difficult to negotiate with. Due to failed negotiations Van Mook launched a federal project, following a dual-strategy of administration and military intervention. But the Dutch metropole proved to be an obstacle to Van Mook. The government in The Hague was not shy of dictating their wishes to Van Mook, which was at the expense of his political playing field. According to Darwin, this increasing dependence on the Dutch government could eventually cause problems for Van Mook's administration and colonial rule in the long run. Renegotiations led to a treaty of empty promises, known as the Linggadjati Agreement. Its articles were deliberately indefinite to suit indirect rule and military purposes. The Dutch anticipated military intervention. Therefore, it was important to include articles that made compartmentalisation and defection possible, so the population could join the Dutch side via a political and a military way, as stated in Robinson's and Kalyvas' theories.

While Van Mook would set up administration in the outer islands and foster internal state-formation to suit the need of a balanced status quo and defences, Spoor would build a federal army to crush the Republican military. Consequently, the Dutch approach to federalism became a divide and rule strategy. This two-way approach is in line with both Robinson's theory on collaboration and Tilly's theory on the use of violence and coercion.

The design of these administrations in the outer-islands was discussed at multiple conferences from Malino to Den Pasar. From the way Van Mook installed the East-Indonesian government as an adversary of the Republic, the control he carried out in the East-Indonesian state 'behind the scenes' through his confidants and how he perceived the birth of the BFO, one can only conclude that he saw the federalists to be traditionalists that could keep up colonial rule, as pointed out by Anderson and Amoroso.

Chapter 3: Collaboration – ‘a dangerous game’

This chapter will take a closer look at the interests of the BFO and the internal state formation of the East-Indonesian state. It will be argued that BFO's composition showed that it was not a united interest group and their resolution made it clear that they were not the collaborators Van Mook had hoped for. As a result, this affected the Dutch approach of indirect rule, according to Robinson's theory. Because the collaboration of the BFO with Van Mook reached a dead end, the Dutch metropole stepped in. This had major consequences for Van Mook and, according to Darwin, would further complicate colonial rule. Further, it will be discussed how the East-Indonesian state was the stage of rivalries between aristocrats, like Anak Agung, that cut-across the interest of the Dutch colonial administration. More importantly, the case of East-Indonesia shows how the Republic exercised control in this state by means of political control and violence. In line with the theory provided by Tilly, Kalyvas and Robinson, it will be argued that many of the Dutch collaborators, by threatening them were made to comply with the Republic and this diminished the Dutch system of collaboration. For those aristocrats that remained loyal to the Dutch it became increasingly difficult to express their support openly. According to Amoroso, this difficulty of propagating support for the Dutch made it also problematic to uphold the role of official nationalists.

The BFO's composition and imagined state institutions

The initial BFO comprised 19 members, coming from several *negara's* and *daerah's* – federal states and separate provinces. Some prominent members, who would regularly represent the BFO's voice:

- T. Bahriun, Chairman of the BFO and director of State of East Sumatra,
- Sultan Hamid II, Head of the 'daerah-istimewa Kalimantan Barat' and representative of West-Borneo,
- Anak Agung Gde Agung, representative and Minister president of East Indonesia,
- R, Adil Puradiredja, representative- and Minister President of the Pasundan,
- A.J. Vleer, Secretary of the BFO and Chief Officer for the Government Commissioner of Borneo and the Great East,
- R. Moh. Kosasih Purwanegara, representative- and Director of the Cabinet of Pasundan

With the fall of the East-Indonesian Cabinets, the composition of the BFO often changed, though it were these prominent members that would be responsible for the important BFO resolution, prescribing their desired state-institutions on 15th July 1948. This resolution would give a clear vision on how these Indonesians perceived their future federal states. And it would elicit a response from Van Mook that was characteristic of his federal vision. In addition, this resolution would lead to the first direct negotiations between the Indonesian federalists and the Dutch government.

The adopted resolution consisted of six fundaments. Most fundaments were derived from the Linggadjati Agreement. A federal Indonesia would encompass the entire former territory of the Dutch-Indies. The whole of states would form a federation. Each and every formed Negara and Daerah would be acknowledged. The authority of each state including the Republic would be acknowledged and Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia would apply as long as the whole of federal states had not yet been installed.¹⁴⁴ The last fundament was derived from the Renville Agreement signed by the Dutch and the Republic on the 17th of January 1948 to officially end the First Police Action. This treaty redrew the geographical lines of Dutch and Republican authority in Indonesia and recorded Dutch authority in Republican conquered territory, whilst the Republic maintained authority over their capital Yogya.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, the BFO acknowledged the principles of this treaty.

The resolution itself consisted of 26 articles. The first three articles mention that the instalment of a temporary federal government must meet certain conditions: the BFO considers a temporary government to be a necessity and must be seen as a precursor of the future federal government, and this temporary government should only consist of Indonesians. Articles 4 till 8 mention the powers of these federal states and the scope and limitations of these powers. These articles state that the federal powers should not be limited further than necessary in accordance with Dutch sovereignty during the interim period. For this reason, the BFO wanted to divide the powers into sub-areas from Dutch and Federal level to state level. The Dutch would only have the responsibility of guaranteeing the progression of Indonesia to a constitutional state, leaving most other powers in the hands of the Federal government and the sub-states governments. The BFO heeded the suggestion of a Dutch Commissioner of the Crown, but his powers are tied to the limited responsibility of ensuring the progression of federal Indonesia to a constitutional state.¹⁴⁶

The other 18 articles mentioned the instalment of several state organs, their powers and division of roles. The BFO believed that four state bodies were essential during the transition period to an independent Indonesian state:

- the government in the shape of a directorate – “Directorium”- occupied by Indonesians who cannot be removed from office and are appointed by representatives of each individual state.

¹⁴⁴ Gde Agung, *Renville*, 386.

¹⁴⁵ Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 256.

¹⁴⁶ Resolutions and conclusions of the BFO on the foundations for the formation of a Federal Interim Government; with memoranda and pre-advice, National Archive, The Hague, General Secretary of Dutch-Indie Government and the deposited archives, Entry number 2.10.14, Inventory number 2376 [Hereafter NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14., inv.nr 2376]

- the Heads of Departments, named Secretaries of State, which secretaries are appointed and fired by the Directorium, to which they are also accountable.
- a Federal Council occupied by the leaders of the negara's and daerah's with an advisory role vis-à-vis the Directorium.
- a Representative Body that could not be dissolved, which members are from the individual states of the federation and appointed by democratic means as far as possible. This organ is specifically meant to expose the potential disputes between the different states and can be overruled by the Directorium in consultation with the Federal Council.

Furthermore, Indonesian-Dutch contact bodies would be established, each with their own agenda like Defence, Foreign Relations and Finance, that would advise the Directorium as well as the High Commissioner of the Crown.¹⁴⁷

The resolution was concluded with a message of the BFO members, marking a discord between the members. BFO representatives of Banjar, East-Indonesia, Kalimantan Tenggara, Kalimantan Timur, Madura and Pasundan wanted the establishment of the states of the federation to take place on the 1th of January 1949. Representatives of other negara's and daerah's like Bangka, Billiton, Dajak Besar, Kalimantan Barat, Riouw, Sumatera Solatan and Sumatera Timur saw the same date only as a target date that could be deviated from if this was impracticable.¹⁴⁸

This resolution confirmed a number of issues. The BFO did not agree to the propositions recorded at Malino and Den Pasar, considering the desire for a Directorium with far-reaching powers and the imposed limitation on the Dutch authorities, in particular the power of the Commissioner of the Crown. Moreover, the power restrictions resulting from Dutch authority on the Directorium and other federal bodies, were of temporary nature. The fact that the Directorium and the Representing Body cannot be removed from office, shows that they did not necessarily want a democratic federation. The presence of Dutch authority was of temporary nature – and their departure was desired; only Indonesians were included in their federal bodies. Lastly, as recorded in the Linggadjati Agreement and confirmed by the resolution, the BFO wished the inclusion of the Republic as a partner in future talks on the Indonesian federation. Consequently, the BFO diverted from the Dutch plans for the future federation of Indonesia. If they were to share a future federation with the Indonesian Republic, as one of the states of the federation, then Republicans also had to be involved in the development of that federation.

¹⁴⁷ Resolutions and conclusions of the BFO, NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14., inv.nr 2376.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

The BFO was installed by federal Indonesians in reaction to Van Mook's propositions at earlier conferences. The absence of the Republic at Malino and Den Pasar was the reason for Indonesians Anak Agung and Adil Poeradiredja to install this body on the 8th of July 1948, because they were more open to the idea of involving the Republic in the federal experiment.¹⁴⁹ Anak Agung would later name it 'the small Bandung conference' to endorse a political gap between this body and the 'Voorlopige Federale Regering' (V.F.R.) – Provisional Federal Government – headed by Van Mook. It was A.J. Vleer, who thought of the name of 'Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg' (BFO) – or Federal Consultative Assembly – to also emphasize this difference.¹⁵⁰

Van Mook's response

The BFO members sent both the Lieutenant Governor General and the Dutch government a copy of the resolution. The next meeting between the BFO and Van Mook on July 17, 1948, to discuss the resolution, was uncomfortable. Van Mook would have vituperated the whole delegation, because they had come to this resolution without consulting him and asking his consent.¹⁵¹ He put them in their place by saying that it was a 'misunderstanding' to think the BFO would be a 'third power in the Indonesian problem'.¹⁵² He also refused to offer this resolution to the Dutch government, as requested by the BFO.¹⁵³ Van Mook had more than dropped his guard during his outburst. His choice of words had shown the BFO members their role in his strategy: they were either with him – and thus his official nationalist servants, or against him – and thus part of the Republican problem. This outburst confirmed BFO member's suspicions, that Van Mook wanted to exclude the Republic.

The BFO and The Hague

The Dutch government had also been working on a preliminary draft for the federal government of Indonesia. Unlike Van Mook, they were prepared to discuss this resolution, hoping for a synthesis of their draft and the BFO resolution. A couple of meetings took place in August 1948 in The Hague between representatives of the Dutch government and the BFO. On behalf of the BFO, there were: Bahriun, Hamid II, Anak Agung, Puradiderdja, Malik and Vleer. On behalf of the Dutch government were present: Prime Minister L. Beel, Deputy Prime Minister W. Drees, Minister of Overseas Territories J.A. Jonkman, and Minister without Portfolio, L. Götzen.

¹⁴⁹ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 254.

¹⁵⁰ Decision of the B.F.O. meeting on the adoption of the general regulations of the Federal Consultative Assembly, stencilled. NL-HaNa, Vleer, 2.21.216, inv.nr 119.

¹⁵¹ Van den Berge, *H.J. van Mook*, 255.

¹⁵² Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 268

¹⁵³ An explanation from the archivist of the resolutions and conclusions of the BFO, no. 2376, underlines the fact that this specific copy was meant for the Dutch Government, however, Van Mook never forwarded it to them. Presumably, because he firmly disagreed with the content and feared the Dutch response.

Firstly, the composition of the Provisional Federal Government was discussed. According to the Dutch proposal eight governmental seats were intended for Dutch representatives. To the dismay of the BFO members desiring a government only occupied by Indonesians. According to the Dutch, the motivation for a Dutch-Indonesian government stemmed from the Renville Agreement that prescribed the Dutch sovereignty during the interim period. The future federation of Indonesia would merge into a union with the Netherlands headed by the Crown. A combination of Dutch and Indonesian government representatives would be appropriate and the Representative of the Crown had the final say. Jonkman saw the idea of Dutch-Indonesian contact bodies, as suggested by the BFO resolution, as the precursors of possible union bodies. Beel stressed that the provisional federal government should have Dutch representatives, because the Indonesians lacked both administrative experience and a capacity of Indonesian administrators.¹⁵⁴

The BFO members disagreed. According to Puradiderdja, the preference for Dutch people had derogated the BFO resolution. The fact that the Indonesians lacked experts in the field of governance, was confirmed by Puradiredja, but 'a first requirement is that one is free to choose his experts', he replies. Anak Agung argued that the Dutch preference for their own representatives 'did not do justice to Indonesian national feelings' and the Dutch-Indonesian contact bodies were by no means precursors to union-bodies, but were responsible to the provisional federal government. Sultan Hamid II explained that 'We [the Indonesians] now wanted to do it ourselves, also during the transition time'. Thus, no Dutch were to be allowed in the government, because the Indonesians were to handle their own affairs.¹⁵⁵

A second issue was, what was to be understood as an Indonesian citizen. Jonkman pointed out that it was not clear from the BFO resolution what rights minorities, like the Arabs, Chinese- and Indo people had in their federation.¹⁵⁶ According to Anak Agung, one had to assume that Indonesians citizens were 'Indonesians by birth'.¹⁵⁷ He did not give a further elaboration of what was to be understood as 'Indonesians by birth', therefore certain guaranties of these minorities were not determined and it most likely would come down to the future Indonesian government deciding who could claim a place in federal Indonesia as Indonesian citizen.

A third issue was the Directorium. Jonkman posed the question whether the Directorium should be seen as the replacement of the Lieutenant Governor General. The BFO members answered

¹⁵⁴ Reports of the discussions of the BFO delegation with the Dutch Government in the Hague, August 1948. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2365.

¹⁵⁵ Reports of the discussions, August 1948, NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2365.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

in agreement. Jonkman and Beel wanted to know how this Directorium would operate and suggested an alternative: a parliamentary system based on Dutch or British example or a presidential system like the United States. One could think of a system with a presidency assisted by ministers, with the possibility to grow into a presidential system once the Indonesians would have gained experience. A council of ministers would need more experts on governance and since the Indonesians lacked these experts, this would mean that they would be dependent on Dutch expertise, which Sultan Hamid therefore did not consider possible. A meeting, to which the chief executive officer in Indonesia, L. Neher, was invited, exposed an important dispute. According to Neher, the BFO's desire for a Directorium was 'a sentiment' that 'will give a certain degree of political satisfaction, but this figure does not provide the best guarantees for the future'. With this Directorium 'they were on their way to a dictatorship'. An allegation that led to a response from Bahriun: 'does the current situation in Indonesia suggest something else?'. The BFO remained vague about the range of powers of the Directorium. Typical in this case are Puradiredja's words that 'The practice will show who of the members is most prominent, will also learn how the members will work together'.¹⁵⁸

During another meeting of the BFO members on the 22nd of August 1948, Anak Agung would state that he would not accept the Dutch proposal, because the proposal "was not in accordance with the national aspirations of the Indonesian people."¹⁵⁹ He warned that a federal government that did not meet the national aspirations of the Indonesian people, would be 'catastrophic' ¹⁶⁰ His criticism led to new talks between BFO and Dutch government officials in September and October 1948, which resulted in the approval of a bill, 'Bewind Indonesië in overgangstijd' (BIO) – Administration Indonesia during transition period. However, just like Van Mook, the Dutch government did not consult the Republic, which again went against a request from the BFO.¹⁶¹ Thus, the Dutch government continued to use the BFO in the same way Van Mook did. For Van Mook a direct line with the Dutch Government had made his position as a negotiator with the BFO superfluous. Van Mook resigned on the 11th of October 1948 and would be replaced by Beel.¹⁶²

East-Indonesia: traditional rivalry and Republican constraint

The development of the administrative organisation in East-Indonesia followed a certain path after its founding at Den Pasar. East-Indonesia was a negara with multiple daerahs. At the top of the Negara resided the Central Administration in the city of Macassar, responsible for all affairs regarding

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Gde Agung, 'Renville', 191.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 192-193.

¹⁶² Lieutenant Governor General (Van Mook) to Prime Minister (Drees), 11 October 1948 in *NIB*, XV, 404.

the Negara. The Daerahs formed the next layer and many functioned as a federation of self-governing regions. Two distinct systems amongst these daerah's had developed throughout history: a group of daerahs governed by an elected Council that appointed a committee in charge of the daily affairs. Examples of this daerah-system were the Minahassa and the Southern Moluccas, known in pre-Second World War times as the directly governed territories. The other system was based on the pre-Second World War structure of self-governing territories of which Bali and Southern Celebes are the primary examples. This second model had two administrative bodies: a Council of local rules with executive powers and an elected representative Council with joint legislative and budgeting powers. The administration of the Daerahs carried out administrative tasks in their region, but were also charged with executing laws and regulations fixed by the Central administration of the Negara. The Central administration in this federal structure had the superposition whilst the Daerahs had a certain form of autonomy.

An East-Indonesian parliament was also established, because of the condition for democratization - article 15 of the Linggadjati agreement. Three fractions arose in this parliament: the Progressive Fraction led by Arnold Mononutu, a party sympathetic towards the Republic, the National Fraction consisting mainly of the local nobility and a Democratic Fraction consisting of European, Indo-European, Chinese and Christian minorities.¹⁶³

The state-structure of East-Indonesia operated in a difficult way. A number of issues will be highlighted: the great influence of the Republic in parliament that endangered the federal structure, the East-Indonesian government's rejection of placing federal troops for 'politically strategic purposes', the difficulty of the local princes to play the game of official nationalism in the parliament, the multi-layered battle Anak Agung fought as Minister-President, and his increased unassailable position within this system that weakened East-Indonesia in relation to the Republic.

That the parliament was eminently suitable as an instrument for the Republic is evidenced by the number of pro-Republican motions adopted. The 6th and 7th of May 1947, Brouwer, noted the following motions: the Red and White Nationalist Flag must be recognized as the official flag of East-Indonesia, the Indonesian language must become the official language spoken in the military apparatus, the 17th of August – the day of Republican independence – must be adopted as a national holiday in East-Indonesia and a Minister of Public Safety has to be installed. The Pro-Republican

¹⁶³ Reflection by N.N. on the formation and development of the federal states of Indonesia in 1948. In English. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123. inv.nr. 287; "Political perspectives in East-Indonesia", note of R.W. Kofman, Head of the Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) Office at Macassar. National Archives, The Hague, the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service [NEFIS] and the Central Military Intelligence service [CMI] in the Dutch East Indies. Entry number 2.10.62. Inventory number 1306. [Hereafter NL-HaNa, NEFIS and CMI, 2.10. 62, inv.nr. 1306]

motions shows the Republican huge presence and control. The Republican flag, their language as anti-imperial power tool within the federal military apparatus and the celebration of the Republicans claim of independence confirmed that they wanted to legalize the rule of the Republic in East-Indonesia through symbolism. A Ministry of Public Safety, garrisoned by a Republican sympathiser, would be a strategic asset since martial law was proclaimed in Eastern-Indonesia, which hampered free movement of people, goods and communication between the parts of the archipelago. Possible infiltration by overseas Republican agents was made difficult. For comparison, only two pro-Dutch motions were adopted, one by Chinese minorities urging the East-Indonesian government to take the necessary steps to ensure Van Mook would remain on his post until the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands was settled. Another motion, supported by local aristocrats, demanded the repeal of article 11 of the Den Pasar conference, stating the Negara's were allowed to form more daerahs. This last motion was related to the struggle between the nobility, the Republican sympathizers and Anak Agung.¹⁶⁴

On the 8th of December 1947, the parliament of East-Indonesian wanted to install a Ministry of Domestic Security with the wish of a territorial army that could maintain domestic order and security and support the federal army in case of a foreign invasion. However, 'The government of East-Indonesia considers the establishment of a security battalion for military police purposes [...] unnecessary.'¹⁶⁵ Thus, East-Indonesia merely wanted a defence force and not one that could also be used in Spoor's vision of a 'strategic' force to overpower and acquire enemy territory.

A dispute between the aristocrats Anak Agung, the Bugis Sultan of the Southern Celebes Daerah with the noble title of Arumpone, the Ternate Sultanate of the Moluccans and the rulers of the Buleleng and Karangasem regencies on Bali unfolded showing a traditional power struggle. The Arumpone is described by, R.W. Kofman, Head of the Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) Office at Macassar, as 'initially too conservative, [...] his attitude was, as in the old past, a guideline for the other self-rulers. He lacked education in both self-governance and [Negara] governance. He did not like the new, least of all its exponent, A.A [Anak Agung]. He showed that the ancient Southern Celebes nobility did not want to be ruled by a stranger, least of all an infidel Balinese.' The Arumpone's wished a separate Daerah from Macassar, because the progressive fraction was largely in charge there. For that reason, he claimed: 'I equally desire "kemerdekaan" – Independence – as any nationalist, but do not wish to be governed by the Pemuda.' Meaning, he did

¹⁶⁴ Documents concerning political development in the State of East-Indonesia. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123. Inv.nr. 116.

¹⁶⁵ Documents concerning the formation of the office of the President and the Prime Minister of East Indonesia, their status, housing and titles. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2485.

not desire to be governed by the Republic. However, earlier attempts to create a separate Southern Celebes Daerah from Macassar had failed, because ‘attempts [...] to include the influence of the royalty in modern way by involving them in party formation failed. The establishment of the Daerah South Celebes initially failed because of the unwillingness of – not informed – self-governments.’ Kofman argues, that Anak Agung, because of this unwillingness ‘apparently lost courage with respect to Southern Celebes.’¹⁶⁶

The hostility between Anak Agung and the Arumpone also had consequences for the Dutch colonial administration. The Arumpone was one of few who had argued in favour of the First Police Action, wanted to maintain the BFO and challenged the idea of a Yogya Goodwill-mission. Kofman writes: “on this occasion, the strongest opponent of the Anak Agung [the Arumpone] [...] was given the opportunity to speak [...] his impressive speech, almost conceivable as a program, in which he expressed the awareness of the strong unity of the Southern Celebes princes leaning on the adat and willing to support a democratic structure [...]. Sharp was [...] his comment that some feudal governments, by people perceived as incapable of being democratic, had in fact always been democratic rulers, after all they focused on the well-being of the people whose relationship with the prince is based on ancient lontars, containing each other’s rights and obligations[...] A word, not to be misheard by the Min. Pres [Anak Agung], was the statement of appreciation for the bond to be maintained with the House of Orange, the cooperation with the Netherlands and the Dutch, a very clear statement, moreover that [...] was not included in the official information of the East Indonesian Ministry of Information regarding this ceremony.” Kofman argues: “it is not impossible for me to see an unwanted omission in this [...] covered by the policy of the entire Cabinet, since the point “Union Netherlands – Indonesia” is preferably quoted as little as possible.”¹⁶⁷

The post of the Ministry of Information, tasked with public publications and propaganda, was exercised by Doko. According to Kofman, he was “a collaborator and one of those figures whose resignation was demanded by the aristocracy [...] not in the least because they wanted the Daerah bodies to exercise this right themselves.”¹⁶⁸ Consequently, pro-Dutch aristocrats, like the Arumpone, were censored. Their official nationalists’ statements would, therefore, not reach the public and Anak Agung allowed this censorship.

Anak Agung would find two old adversaries opposing his legislation to centralize the power of the Negara. “Against the strive of the Min. Pres [Anak Agung] to create a direct agreement with the Negara, the self-governors of Ternate and Buleleng [...] found each other in a tight block, arguing

¹⁶⁶ “Political perspectives in East-Indonesia”, NL-HaNa, NEFIS and CMI, 2.10. 62, inv.nr. 1306.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

'that this should be a triangular relationship in which the [Dutch] Crown still has a word.' Buleleng, as a regency, shared the Balinese Islands with the regency of Gianyar – Anak Agung's regency. Anak Agung kept ruling Gianyar via his brother, Tjokorde Oke, who was under pressure from the other regencies, because Oke had achieved the chairmanship of the Dewan Radja, a Dutch installed council of Balinese aristocrats. The opposing aristocrats argued that Oke 'through this dual function, abandoned the interests of his regency.'¹⁶⁹

Kofman's conclusion on Anak Agung: "One could speak of a skilfully played 'three kings game' by A.A., in which Bone, Sumbawa and Ternate were played against each other. The fact that A.A. is still self-Governing (from Gianyar), is only of relative importance to his attitude. Both the development of Gianyar in Bali and the [...] "three kings' game" points to a struggle for power, played on the pattern of the progressive group. [...] Regardless of the direction he [Anak Agung] follows, there is no one else in the N.I.T. [East Indonesia] who fulfils the role of Min. President like him. Whether the direction is correct, remains a question. [...] Meanwhile, the consequences for the N.I.T. are the balance of the virtues and defects of the Anak Agung"¹⁷⁰ The survival of East Indonesia depended on the road that Anak Agung would take. His power struggle with the other lords shows that he used his power as the Prime minister of East Indonesia for more than the role that Van Mook had assigned him. He settled old scores with the regencies, while also making sure the aristocrats' pro-Dutch sentiments were not heard. His inviolable position within East Indonesia and the fact that he was considered the only qualified ruler, made the future of the East-Indonesian experiment completely dependent upon his qualities and choices. This also made him a key-figure within the BFO.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Conclusion

The BFO members were not the federalists Van Mook had hoped for. Their composition showed the BFO was a collaborative system assembled from numerous local aristocrats that had lived most of their lives in isolation from one another on different islands and in different regions. According to Robinson, this made it difficult for the Dutch colonial administration to forge a unified system of collaboration from the BFO. Additionally, the BFO resolution made painfully clear that the BFO members did not follow Van Mook's vision of federalism. The fact that they sent the resolution to the Republican and Dutch government, had far-reaching consequences. For preservation of indirect rule, according to Robinson, it is also important that contact between 'graduates', meaning the educated anti-colonial elite, and systems of collaboration, like BFO, is kept to a minimum, because the BFO might be convinced to join a republican coalition of non-collaboration. Such contact was disastrous for Van Mook's federal policy, which was evident from his harsh reaction. Due to Van Mook's loss of control over the BFO, his work was no longer needed by the Dutch government, who continued his work themselves. Van Mook's substitute Beel was more a man of the metropole than one of the colonies. According to Darwin, this complete bypass of colonial government, made the future of colonial rule now more dependent on the capacity of the metropole than before. The East-Indonesian internal state formation was a maelstrom of aristocratic rivalries and Republican constraint. In his theory, Robinson compares collaboration with a dangerous card game. Anak Agung's promotion to prime minister was a card dealt by Van Mook to install one of his more political heavyweight collaborators in an effort to create a more stable system of collaboration. But Anak Agung's interests cut-across those of Van Mook and he settled old feudal scores. Not only did this make the system of collaboration less stable, but because Anak Agung was seen as the only one capable to exercise this kind of power amongst the collaborators, the internal state formation became highly dependent on his actions. The Republican presence in the East-Indonesian Cabinet and society proved to be equally problematic for the internal state formation. The Republicans specifically wanted to acquire those positions that served their strategy of infiltration and coercion and opposed any motions that would increase Dutch security in eastern Indonesia. By making East-Indonesian society unsafe, they – in accordance with Kalyvas and Tilly - provided the opportunity for locals to defect to the Republic or coerce them into non-cooperation. This might explain why Anak Agung allowed many acts of the Republic, because his early acquaintance with the pemuda made him aware of the fragile position of the aristocrats. For this reason, the Bugis Sultan also protested out of fear against Republican influence from Macassar. His calls for Dutch support were stopped by Republican confidants, making the effort to propagandize his role as official nationalist impossible.

Chapter 4: Unite and rule

In this chapter will be described the Republican counterstrategy to the Dutch divide and rule operation and how the BFO became a part of this counterstrategy. The Republic anticipated Van Mook and Spoor's divide and rule strategy and the Republican army became the primary institution to create the future Indonesian state, in accordance with Tilly's theory on state-making. The Republic's strategy of insurrection became an important tool to keep the Dutch military at bay and created an unsafe environment in East-Indonesia. BFO members would eventually help to maintain this unsafe environment, which is in line with theoretical framework of Kalyvas. This undermined Dutch control and indirect rule. The intervention by the U.S. undermined Dutch means of extraction to continue state-making, tremendously reduced their credibility to the Indonesian population and exposed the weaknesses of a late-colonial 'open-state' model. The BFO's contribution to the Inter-Indonesian conference provided the means to dismantle East-Indonesia and left the Republican army to deal the final blow to the federation. The East-Indonesian abandonment by the BFO has do with Anak Agung's participation in Sukarno's government; a decision made for reasons of violence and security. A Republican and BFO coalition of non-collaboration only served the need to make the Dutch leave and that their departure showed how this coalition non-collaboration was short-lived, following Robinson's idea on coalitions of non-collaboration.

An army as state-maker

A Republican note - originating from the Staff Political Education of the Army- shows how the Republican Military leaders perceived the Dutch desire for a federal army. The note prescribes the following: "[...] the armed forces are in principle opposed to the creation of a federal army, which should be installed as a consequence of the acceptance of the Renville Agreement." With the following reason: "What really matters to us is: how our army could be included in a federal army without compromising our own views on our army, which essentially reflects the politics of our state and is therefore interwoven with the sovereignty of our Republic." Additionally: "Of particular importance [...] is the army command when the RIS [Republik Indonesia Serikat] will be or have been formed. Our army command has [...] the experience in handling our national defence and more importantly: in organizing the system of popular defence." Popular defence, being a reference to the Republican strategy of guerrilla warfare: "Foreigners (the Dutch) have no understanding on how to organize a popular defence. Thereby it will be very difficult for us to accept their leadership, as they appear to expect (according to plan Spoor) if [...] the federal army shall be formed." With this understanding the Republican military leaders concluded that: "a. We [the military leaders] accept the formation of a federal army, as a consequence of the Renville-Accord. b. The conditions for this federal army are: 1. the command should permanently remain in the hands of the T.N.I. Command.

2. The Dutch officers are not to be involved in the army politics. The Dutch officers will act as military instructors [...] under the orders and control of our officers. 4. In the opinion of our army command, the “Saudara’s” [Republican brothers] of the N.I.T. [Negara Indonesia Timur = State of East Indonesia] who have acquired a military training [...] and have experience, are allowed to enlist in our army command. c. Our army will always be: the champion and guardian of the results of the Indonesian people.”¹⁷¹

Hence, the Republican army knew of Spoor’s plan and their army also functioned as a state-maker. Popular defence became their form of warfare and was invented by Nasution who devised a ‘Wehrkreise’ strategy, that entailed a cooperation of army, administrators and population. Together they would ensure the creation of Wehrkreise: districts where guerrilla fighters enlisted – voluntarily or pressured, could get resources, shelter and information in order to fight the Dutch another day.¹⁷² The goal of this strategy was to ensure that Dutch forces were slowly wiped out and people under Dutch protection felt insecure.¹⁷³ Additionally, the enlisting of N.I.T. soldiers sympathetic towards the Republican goals, shows aspirations to incorporate N.I.T. citizens – via the T.N.I. – in the Republic. Enlisting also provided a means to defect to Republican side.

Republican agents in East-Indonesia at invitation?

Republican agency in East-Indonesia came in various forms. Their activity in the parliament has already been noted, but they were more present in East-Indonesian society, seeking confidants among youth associations in Macassar. A report describes this infiltration: “Mid 1947 arrived from the Republic (Djocja) a certain Pondaäg [...]. Pondaäg soon succeeded in gaining a leading position in the Republican orientated “Saweri Dispute” – School in Macassar. Mid-April 1948 [...] he succeeded in becoming chairman of a group of 14 youth associations including the BBPI that covered the entire boy scout movement. The BBPI is the Badan Pemipinan Pemuda Indonesia whose bundling position of all scout organisation was achieved by the completely Pro-Republican Minister Mononutu – president of the Gapki.”¹⁷⁴ The presence of this pemuda explains why the Dutch wanted to maintain martial law in East-Indonesia and why local rulers, like Aroempone, feared Macassar.

¹⁷¹ Letter from the Army Commander in Indonesia [Spoor] regarding views in leading TNI circles regarding a federal army. National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Defence: Armed forces in the Dutch East Indies. Entry number 2.13.132. Inventory number 711. [Hereafter NL-HaNa, Armed forces Dut-Indie, 2.13.132, inv.nr 711].

¹⁷² Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen*, 117; R. Frakking, “‘Who wants to cover everything covers nothing’: the organization of indigenous security forces in Indonesia, 1945-1950’ in Bart Luttikhuis and A. Dirk Moses (ed.) *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence* (New York 2014)114.

¹⁷³ Abdul H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of guerrilla warfare and the Indonesian defence system, past and future* (Djakarta 1953) 20-21, 192, 212; Frakking, ‘Who wants to cover everything’, 115.

¹⁷⁴ Documents concerning the visit of the republican goodwill mission to Negara Indonesia Timur [East Indonesia]. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2496.

A month after the signing of the Renville Agreement on February 1948, two Republican agents, Mohammed Arief and Abbas Bangasawan, arrived in East-Indonesia pretending to be evacuees. From an interrogation, it became apparent both had been sent to East-Indonesia with specific missions. Arief had orders: “to analyse the situation in Southern-Celebes and rapport to the Republican administration, to organise strikes, to organise riots and disturbances around the 1th of January 1949 and to contact Pondaäg. The other agent, Abbas, was given orders to: ‘observe the situation, find a job in a hospital and influence its personal for the sake of the Republic, and organise a RK teams [teams prescribing the virtues of the Republic] for eventual situations happening on the 1th of January 1949.’ Both agents had thus been informed to strengthen the pemuda in East-Indonesia, at the promised moment of independence. In the presence of Arief was another Republican agent, Adam Malik, who was also arrested. He worked as a policeman in East-Indonesia and during his interrogation, he speaks of the existence of “league without a name”: ‘this league without a name is led by Pondaäg who wants to bundle all Pemuda forces on the 1th of January 1949 if “Kemerdekaan” – independence – has not been granted. They worked in a cell-network’. Papers found in Malik’s possession indicate a dual agenda of anti-imperial nationalism and homeland nationalism, prescribing among other things: ‘a government of, for and by the people, one army of, for and by the people, [...] establishing trade contacts with foreign countries and socio-political contacts with proletarians abroad on equal footing.’ Followed by an argument in which the High Commissioner of the Crown is identified with the fight against capitalism. It was an anti-imperial agenda together with a homeland nationalist agenda, presented as a communist manifesto.¹⁷⁵

April 1949 arrived at Macassar a Republican member of parliament, Mohammed L. Latjuba, where he attended a congress of a Muslim group, whose agenda prescribed: ‘1. To ensure the establishment of an Islamic front in East Indonesia. 2. Make every effort to organize an “All Muslim conference” at the instigation of “the brothers overseas.”¹⁷⁶ Not only nationalist and communist sentiments were appealed, but the Republic also tried to appeal to Islamic sentiments to achieve their homeland nationalist agenda.

A higher authority has also prompted the cause of the increased number of Republican agents. On February 14, 1948 the East-Indonesian Government agrees to a ‘Goodwill mission’ to the Republic, followed by a mission of the Republic to the East-Indonesian government. The Dutch believed this mission from East-Indonesia to the Republic would strengthen the East Indonesian

¹⁷⁵ Documents concerning the visit of the republican goodwill mission to Negara Indonesia Timur [East Indonesia]. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2496.

¹⁷⁶ Weekly territorial intelligence reports from the office Macassar/CMI and from the Staf Quarter of East-Indonesia and New Guinea, 1949 April 21 – 1950 January 1950. NL-HaNa, Armed forces Dut-Indie, 2.13.132, inv.nr 990.

position vis-à-vis the Republic. However, during their mission “certain Republican suggestions regarding the Interim-Government have found a willing ear [...], it would be considered fair if they could themselves ‘initiate’ foreign affairs, which means sending their own envoys apart from Dutch diplomatic representatives.” Therefore, the East-Indonesian representatives, including Anak Agung, made it legally possible to send certain agents from the Republic to the East-Indonesian Negara, disguised as envoys. Local rulers, including the Arumpone, protested the access of these envoys to East-Indonesia, but his words were but one of few. Additionally, “Also a Dutch proposal to get Indonesia admitted to the United Nations during this transitional period would be welcomed from East-Indonesian side.”¹⁷⁷

Thus, prior to the Second Police action, Anak Agung was under the control of the Republic. This goodwill mission must also be seen as an extension of a strategy by Hatta. Prior to the Second Police Action on 14 February 1948, the Republic represented by Hatta had declared they were willing to join the Inter-Federal Government. In the words of Hatta, “[the foundation of a United States of Indonesia] has always been a wish of Indonesians”.¹⁷⁸ According to a representative of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) from which this information originates, Hatta had clearly distanced himself from the policy of the Republic that had been conducted so far: an indivisible Republic.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, on 2 February 1948 they had adopted two laws that offered room for renewed negotiations: one law would grant Indonesians in Dutch service a full pardon and the opportunity to keep working for the Dutch government while the other law gave official approval for Republicans in Dutch territory to participate in elections that were held by the Dutch.¹⁸⁰ Both Hatta’s statement and the laws seemed to bring about rapprochement between the Republic and the Netherlands. However, this rapprochement was short lived, because its final result, the Cochran plan, did not meet Dutch demands.

The Cochran Plan and the ‘Mission Stikker’

In September 1948 the United Nations tasked a diplomat with breaking the impasse between the Dutch and the Republic. This diplomat was the American, H. Merle Cochran. The Committee of Good Offices, an institution whose task as arbiter had already been recorded in the Linggadjati Agreement article 17, appointed him. This specific article states that the United Nations could appoint an

¹⁷⁷ Documents concerning the visit of the parliamentary goodwill mission of East-Indonesia to Djokjakarta. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2495.

¹⁷⁸ Shortened political situation overview of the NEFIS, closed on 15 February 1948 in *NIB*, XII, 790-791.

¹⁷⁹ Shortened political situation, 790-791.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 790-791.

independent arbiter with a veto to settle a possible impasse between the two parties.¹⁸¹ The motivation of Cochran was not so much the pursuit of Indonesian independence, but rather the containment of communism that emerged in Indonesia.¹⁸² Cochran was looking for a compromise. His plan described a federal Indonesia that would enter into a union with the Netherlands, comprising a parliamentary system and including both a High Commission of the Crown and an Indonesian Prime Minister of which the former could only make a decision with the consent of the latter.¹⁸³ Thus, the Republic would have the final say, according to Cochran's plan.

Spoor and Vice Admiral Pinke stressed the danger of this plan for the Dutch military. According to them: "due to the powers assigned to the Federal Interim Government and the restrictive powers of the representative of the Crown, this could bring Dutch forces [...] under the authority of the then Republican Federal Interim Government." Additionally, "[...] this means that one cannot ensure the cooperation of the KNIL anymore, considering a certain situation will be perceived by the native military as a Republican victory and one will therefore try to look for an escape [...]. These are not acts of disloyalty, though one knows as a KNIL soldier that in the event of a Republican victory one belongs to the enchained and there is little left for their existence and family."¹⁸⁴

The Dutch government send Dirk Stikker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Indonesia to change Cochran's mind. They thought he could be persuaded by depicting the nationalist leaders as communists. The Dutch claimed they had proof. A testament describes the following content: "If in some way we are not capable of continuing or battle for the Independence of the 'Negara Republik Indonesia', we transfer power to: 1. Comrade Tan Malakka., 2. Comrade Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, 3. Comrade Sukarni, 4. Comrade Sjahrir." A Dutch explanation to this testament claims: "now it has been established that from the outset the Republic has recognized Tan Malaka and Iwa Kusama Sumtri as leaders. [...] this is proof to the 'public' that the Republican government has been [...] under communist influence from the outset."¹⁸⁵ However, Cochran was not willing to budge to Dutch pleas, because a few months before the Second Police Action an uprising took place in the city of Madiun, known as the Madiun uprising or Madiun Affair.

¹⁸¹ Brochure containing the text of the Linggadjati agreement. NL-HaNa, Mook, van, 2.21.123, inv.nr 281.

¹⁸² Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, 280.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 281.

¹⁸⁴ Telegram from Vice Admiral A.S. Pinke and Lt. General Spoor to the Ministers of the Navy, War and Overseas Territories concerning the danger of an overpowering position of the Republic in the Interim government on the basis of the bill Governing Indonesia in Transitional Time. Information copy. October 1948. NL-HaNa, Mook, van 2.21.123, inv.nr. 111.

¹⁸⁵ Memoranda and NEFIS reports on the so-called political testament of Sukarno and Moh. Hatta. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2533.

Indonesian armed communists led by Musso, took hold of the city. It was their belief that Indonesians nationalist leaders, had turned their back on the real revolution: not national, but a social revolution was Indonesia's prime concern.¹⁸⁶ For the Republicans this created both a threat and an opportunity: an ideological opponent to nationalism had presented itself, which also led to division in the Indonesian militia – the Indonesian National Armed forces or 'Tentara Nasional Indonesia' had until then been an instrument of the Republic, yet sympathisers to the communist cause left the TNI to fight for Musso and other communist leaders.¹⁸⁷

Sukarno and Hatta made a clear statement that the Madiun Affair was an illegal gathering. The protest was stopped by TNI forces led by nationalist military commander Nasution and order was restored to the city.¹⁸⁸ This had far-reaching consequences. In a political report on the situation in Mid-Java in September 1948, Government Commissioner Angenent had to admit that the course of Madiun Affair had increased the popularity of the Republic.¹⁸⁹ Cochran's plan had taken its toll, as Angenent reports: 'they [the Indonesian civilians] did not understand why the federal government did not respond with a military advance, especially when Musso threatened to overthrow the Republican government'.¹⁹⁰ Angenent continues: "Advocates of more positive federal thoughts were accused that in the long-term this all may seem beautiful, but that this could mean their death in the short term."¹⁹¹ "Hatta's victory over Muso has given the people a better idea of the Republic than of the vigour of the Federal government."¹⁹² Federalism lost much credibility amongst the population and therefore Angenent believed that the Dutch should initiate a Second Police Action.¹⁹³

Since the Indonesian nationalists fought communism, Cochran was assured they were allies in the Cold war against Russia and Dutch military intervention would weaken this containment.¹⁹⁴ Cochran's position in relation to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the Stikker's mission and the crush of a communist uprising by the Republic were noticed by the BFO and would have far-reaching consequences for their attitude towards the Dutch. The failure of Stikker's mission led to a request by Beel to the Dutch government to initiate a Second Police action. In his words: "Let us not forget,

¹⁸⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of*, 281-282.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 281-282.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 281-282.

¹⁸⁹ Political report of Central Java of Government Commissioner for Administrative Affairs of Central Java (Angenent) on the month September 1948 in *NIB*, XV, 271-272.

¹⁹⁰ Political report of Central Java, 271-272.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 271-272.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 271-272.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 271-272.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 281.

that we shall not give into possible international intervention, if we do then the Indies will be lost.”¹⁹⁵
The Dutch rejected Cochran’s plan and were prepared to risk international intervention.

According to Kofman, Anak Agung knew of the upcoming Second Police Action and could benefit from it. “On the 18th of December 1948 a motion [...] was adopted condemning a possible police action by the Netherlands in advance.” Should a Dutch military intervention commence, Anak Agung could profit: “[...] giving him a certain glory as martyr to the Indonesian cause in both BFO and Republican circles. More importantly, it gave him the opportunity to finally implement a longed-for reconstruction. [...] installing a new government in accordance with the changed position as a state.”¹⁹⁶ To strengthen this adopted motion, Anak Agung wrote a statement to the Dutch administration. He recalled the ideas behind the Bandung Conference and the resolution: building a federation and finding a solution for the Indonesian issue. According to Anak Agung, the mission of Stikker had shown that the Dutch had deviated from their earlier standpoint: ‘Instead of establishing an interim government, people now have the possibility of consultation with the Republic and if this has now come to the point, then one must continue, because political public opinion takes these steps in this sense, that the first position is abandoned and one is now to face another possibility.’¹⁹⁷ Anak Agung believed that a federation according to the wishes of the Dutch, that excluded the Republic, was impossible. He advised against a second police action, because this would make the Dutch position in the conflict untenable and would in fact force the federalists to side with the Republic for fear of becoming part of the Dutch problem.

¹⁹⁵ Records of the meeting of the Council of Ministers on September 29 1948 in *NIB*, XV, 257.

¹⁹⁶ “Political perspectives in East-Indonesia”, NL-HaNa, NEFIS and CMI, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 1306.

¹⁹⁷ Note with appendices regarding the changed views within the BFO, November 1948, NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2381.

The Dutch were made to eat crow

The Second Police Action - 'Operation Crow' - had according to Spoor the following directive: "that the power of the current Republic is destroyed. This implies therefore that the first operation goal can only be the chosen central point and also the symbol of the Republic: Djokjakarta" (= Yogya).¹⁹⁸ Van Mook had explained the outlines of Operation Crow to the Dutch government on October 19, 1948. According to P.M.H. Groen, his interpretation of the operation marks a turning point in his thinking on a federal Indonesia. Just like Spoor, he argued that the main target was Yogya, but "the [Police] Action should be continued until the whole of Indonesia is united under one authority."¹⁹⁹

The Second Police Action from 19 until 31 December 1948 was a fatal mistake, according to Ricklefs.²⁰⁰ Following the siege of Yogya and the arrests of the National leaders Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir, the BFO demanded their immediate release. A statement to show their solidarity with the Republic and to distance the BFO from the Netherlands.²⁰¹ The East-Indonesia cabinet resigned in protest to the Police Action.²⁰² By letting themselves get captured Sukarno and the other nationalist leaders became martyrs, which led to serious criticism of the Dutch military operation from the international press and the United Nations Security Council.²⁰³ Besides a political fiasco, the military operation also proved a failure in the end. Whereas the siege and capture of the Republican capital was seen as a military victory, the long-lasting guerrilla fight between the Dutch military forces and TNI cadres that came afterwards, proved the failure of Spoor's strategy. The Dutch army command was assuming that once the capital was taken and Sukarno captured, the remaining forces would be leaderless and easier to combat. Yet, despite a counterinsurgency campaign by Dutch troops, the TNI forces survived and prolonged the war long enough for the matter to become further entangled in the anti-communist campaign of the United States.²⁰⁴

On March 23 1949 Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States, told Stikker that the US was against giving the Netherlands Marshall Aid, for "the Indonesian question is not well on its way to a solution."²⁰⁵ He pointed out that he regretted the actions of the Dutch, because they endangered the future of the Atlantic Pact – now known as the North Atlantic Treaty.²⁰⁶ The

¹⁹⁸ P.M.H. Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen: Het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in Indonesië 1945-1950* (The Hague 1991) 145.

¹⁹⁹ Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen*, 146.

²⁰⁰ M.C., Ricklefs, *A history of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (Hampshire 2001)282.

²⁰¹ Gde Agung, 214.

²⁰² Gde Agung, 213.

²⁰³ Ricklefs, *A History of*, 282.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 282.

²⁰⁵ Minister of Foreign Affairs (Stikker) to Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Belgium (Spaak), Luxembourg (Bech), France (Schuman) and England (Bevin), 1 April 1949 in *NIB*, XVIII, 318.

²⁰⁶ Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 318.

Netherlands were in desperate need of the Marshall Aid for the economic recovery after the Second World War, but the US feared their financial aid could also finance the war against the Republic. The Indonesian guerrilla and the international pressure eventually brought the Dutch to their knees. On 7 May 1949 the Dutch agreed to release the Nationalist leaders who on their terms would initiate a ceasefire.²⁰⁷ Additionally, the Republic was accepted as a negotiation partner at the Round Table Conference that would be held in the summer of 1949.²⁰⁸

A document, obtained by the Central Military Intelligence Service of the Dutch Indies, captures the Republic's strategy toward the Dutch and their associates in a nutshell. It describes the work of the *Gabungan Persiapan Sulawesi*, a Republican organisation with the task of infiltrating Celebes, part of East-Indonesia and claiming it for a future unitary Republic. They claim that Java and Sumatra have been deliberately blocked by the Dutch 'because they do not want the formation of our unitary state'. To attain unity, 'breaching the blockade is not enough, what is most important is to shake the enemy occupation, the parties and groups that are not desired by us, until they are no longer able to prevent the recognition of the de facto and de jure of our Republic in overseas territories. This is possible via economic, political and military infiltration.'²⁰⁹ In short, all forces that would not conform to the wishes of the Republic must sooner or later side with the Republic, be physically forced to do so or otherwise eliminated. With the Dutch out of the picture due to the Second Police Action, *Anak Agung* must have contemplated these options. This document contains a striking caption provided by a Dutch administrator: 'Anak Agung could also learn something from this'. Most likely, the Dutch administrator hoped *Anak Agung* would devise some sort of counterstrategy being the head of the East-Indonesian state, yet in his case he must have read the information as a warning: side with the Republic or in the end your life remains uncertain.

Thus, not only was the Second Police Action a military failure, the Dutch were forced to politically admit their mistake in order to save their political viability and economy – they were made to eat crow. The Republic, by tackling Indonesian communism and the martyrdom of its nationalist leaders who were captured by their former Dutch colonial masters, rose in prestige with the Americans and could claim the upper hand in the conflict. Meanwhile the political viability of the BFO members could only be saved, if they formed a united front with the Republicans, because they were now the only ones capable of protecting them from possible acts of violence.

²⁰⁷ Ricklefs, *A History of*, 283.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 283.

²⁰⁹ CMI document-containing texts from the Hatta archive about the task and working method of the *Gabungan Persiapan Sulawesi* aiming infiltrations and subversive activities on Celebes (1947) March 1949. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2703.

The Inter-Indonesian Conference

This united front would gain momentum with the establishment of an Inter-Indonesian Conference (12-22 July 1949), that took place prior to the Round Table Conference. The Inter-Indonesian Conference was both an idea of the BFO and the Republic – Anak Agung suggested it on behalf of the BFO, whereas reports also speak of the Republic contemplating an invitation for the BFO to an Indonesian conference, as soon as the leaders were back in Yogyakarta.²¹⁰ The BFO contributed to this Inter-Indonesian conference by sending a working paper containing their newly formed image for future Indonesia. This working paper prescribed the United States of Indonesia government as a president with ministers, comprising a core cabinet and other ministers, and a bicameral parliament with a senate and house of representatives. The president had far-reaching powers: ‘the president is the constitutional head of state’, ‘to the government or the council of a negara or any other independent political unit the president, in special cases at his discretion, the Senate heard, can be allowed to replace a member of government by someone else’, ‘the government has the authority over the federal forces [...]; officers are appointed, promoted and fired by the government’. With regard to the negara’s the federal government: ‘[...] can [...] declare martial law, to the extent and for as long as it deems this necessary to ensure internal security’. ‘The Negara’s do not have their own military forces. In special cases for the sake of order, peace and security, the government of the United States of Indonesia can provide federal forces to the Negara which remain under the command of the Federal government’. Furthermore, federal law prescribed amongst other things: ‘in order to prevent uncertainty among the different areas of Indonesia it seems necessary to acknowledge negara’s by federal law’. Lastly, concerning the right for self-determination, this ‘is based on the idea that the right of self-determination can normally only be exercised once.’²¹¹

This contribution of the BFO to the Inter-Indonesian conference shows a clear lack for federal checks and balances. The superposition given to a central power with the monopoly on legal force in fact already concealed an impending change. The fact that both martial law and the providence of military troops to negara’s could be declared on vague terms, shows that the Republic could make administrative preparations to make the next step.

²¹⁰ Note from Koets (Director of the Cabinet of the H.V.K.) concerning “A conversation with Darmasetiawan on 11 June 1949 in *NIB*, XIX, 39-40; Van Goudoever (Head of the Political Information Department of the Government Information Service) to Van Velsen (Head of the Cultural Contact Department of the Ministry of Overseas Territories), July 1949 in *NIB*, XIX, 279.

²¹¹ Working papers of the B.F.O. with regards to the provisional state arrangements of the United States of Indonesia composed for the Inter-Indonesian Conference. Stencil 1949 May-July, The Hague, Collection Documentation Office collection for Sea Law 1894-1963. Entry number 2.20.61 Inventory number 10.

The BFO chairman, Sultan Hamid the Second, would formally invite the Republic in the person of Sukarno for this conference, because “it is imperative that at the time of transfer of sovereignty not only a state regulation of the United States of Indonesia is present – though it would only be of a provisional nature – but it is also desirable to have state bodies that can accept and exercise the government at that time.”²¹² Additionally, he would argue that the “Indonesians question” must be solved among Indonesians and that the conference could best take place in Jakarta.²¹³

The first series of meetings of the Inter-Indonesian Conference commenced on 22 July 1949. Both sides, BFO and Republic, agreed that the new federation of Indonesia would be named ‘the United States of Indonesia’. The rights of minorities would be protected by the constitutions of each individual state and a clear answer was given to those people that become Indonesians citizens: All Indonesians, Chinese, Arabs and Europeans, who formerly were ‘Nederlands onderdaan’ – Dutch subject – can become Indonesian State citizens. The subject of the Union between Dutch and Indonesia was postponed until the meetings in Jakarta.²¹⁴

Mohammed Hatta, chairman for the Republic, said the Inter-Indonesian conference is a “symbol of the unity of Indonesia” and Sultan Hamid the Second, chairman for the BFO, on his behalf spoke of a “dividing gap that has been bridged.”²¹⁵ However, a clear attention to detail shows important differences of approach. Hatta states the following: “It is not important whether one or two delegations are present at The Hague, more important is the mutual understanding. It is impossible to solve all problems in a week; the Inter-Indonesian talk will also be the subject in The Hague [...]. Most important is that we work together to receive the sovereignty.”²¹⁶ Sultan Hamid would emphasize that the activity of the BFO from its very first day was fixed on obtaining the freedom of the fatherland, the freedom of each state that comprises this fatherland and the unity in which the freedom of the whole and each individual part, is guaranteed.²¹⁷ Additionally, he would claim that the Indonesian flag is the symbol of respect of freedom and peace, not a power factor. The difference in wording shows that both parties wanted to honour nationalist feelings, yet Hamid’s emphasize of freedom of ‘different parts of the fatherland’ shows that he wanted federal guarantees. Finally, Sukarno took the floor and stated that “We [BFO and Republic] have the same

²¹² Letter from Chairman BFO to Sukarno in regards to Inter-Indonesian Conference, 6 July 1949. NL-HaNa, General Secretary Dut-Ind. Government, 2.10.14, inv.nr 2318; ‘Inter-Indonesische conferentie’ in Het Dagblad (Batavia 12 July 1949).

²¹³ Letter From Chairman BFO.

²¹⁴ Gde Agung, *From the formation of the state of East Indonesia towards the establishment of the United States of Indonesia* (Jakarta 1996) 596-599.

²¹⁵ ‘Inter-Indonesisch gesprek is symbool van de eenheid’ in Het Dagblad (Batavia 21 July 1949).

²¹⁶ ‘Inter-Indonesisch gesprek’.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

goal, namely the freedom of whole Indonesia under one flag: the red and white flag. Let us not get into trouble by paying too much attention to details.”²¹⁸ He quoted Douwes Dekker: ‘aan geen berg stoot zich de voet, het is de kiezel die struikelen doet’²¹⁹ – a Dutch saying meaning in this context, that interpretation of the details are more likely to cause difficulties than the realization of the actual goal: independence.

In the second series of meetings held in the Republican capital on 2 August 1949, there is no longer spoken of a United States of Indonesia, but a ‘United Republic of Indonesia’ – the more neutral name has clearly been replaced with a more nationalistic counterpart. It was no secret that Sukarno would become the first president, and he would become the Commander in Chief of the United States of Indonesia Armed Forces. The BFO agreed to these demands, knowing that conditions about Dutch Indies Royal Army soldiers and Dutch soldiers were still to be determined.²²⁰

The results of the Inter-Indonesian Conference show that both the Republic and BFO were positive about each other’s cooperation. And the BFO made crucial concessions, especially handing over military power to nationalists. Prior to the Round Table conference, the Republic had placed the BFO in a position where it could serve as an associate of the Republic in case the Netherlands and the Republic disagreed about something. The internal agenda of Indonesia had already been determined in favour of the Republic during the Inter-Indonesian Conference.

The Round Table Conference

On the August 23, 1949 started the Round Table Conference at The Hague. Though the BFO and the Republic both presented itself as separate Indonesian delegations, the Inter-Indonesian Conference had made sure that this was merely a separation on paper. The United Nations Commission was present to fulfil its final task as arbiter in the Dutch-Indonesian Conflict. Although the Republic and the BFO had to make some concessions -a financial debt of two billion had to be accepted and the status of New Guinea was to yet be determined - the result of the conference was almost everything they had hoped for. The idea of the Dutch-Indonesian union, deemed irrelevant at every Inter-Indonesian conference, was to be finally discussed at the insistence of the Dutch. The BFO and the Republic still criticized those aspects that were deemed a violation of self-government. The result was a so-called ‘Light Union’: Queen Juliana became the head of the Dutch-Indonesian Union with a federal basis and from time to time Dutch Commissioners of the Crown were to be instated.²²¹ It were critics of this Union plan, like the Dutch politician Schouten of the Anti-Revolutionary party,

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Gde Agung, *From the Formation*, 599-600, 609.

²²¹ L. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (part 12, Leiden 1988) 1006-1007.

who had given it the name Light Union. On paper the Dutch queen was the head of the union, but the Dutch had no means to enforce this.²²² Military and police forces remained in the hands of Sukarno and the Dutch power turned out an illusion. Besides New Guinea, the minority-question also remained a difficulty. Anak Agung once again sided during the Round Table Conference with the Republic and supported the claim, that states or minorities who wanted independence from the newly independent Indonesian state should be unable to do so. It shows that as a BFO member he too now stressed the Republican view of an indivisible Indonesia.²²³ Only a political entity like the central Indonesian government or the United Nations could give the states independence, he would argue. The transfer of independence was continued in Indonesia with the formation of a cabinet. Sukarno and Hatta, became the official president and vice-president while ministry posts were granted to Anak Agung and Sultan Hamid the Second.²²⁴

The results of the Inter-Indonesian Conference together with those of the Round Table Conference showed a major disbalance in powers between those favouring nationalism and unity and those in favour of federalism. The fact that the nationalists had the monopoly on the military and the most important position of Head of State was given to a nationalist, who also was the sole commander of the military, meant the survival of federalism hung by a thread. It would all come down on whether the nationalists would keep their word to their federal counterparts.

The Makassar uprising, the arrest of Sultan Hamid and the Moluccan uprising

During the Inter-Indonesian Conference and the Round Table Conference it had already been decided that each minority – Indonesian, Arab, Chinese or European – could claim their place in the new Indonesian state. Although this seemed like a break with the early policy of the Republic, the positioning of the TNI showed more continuation than difference in means of operation. On 19 September 1949 Dutch Commander at Sea, Pinke, explains the situation of the TNI in comparison to the Royal Dutch Indies Army, the KNIL. According to Pinke, soldiers of the KNIL are scared to go back to their negara, because the war is settled in favour of the Republic. “ The KNIL is highly uncertain about its future and fear abnegation to the Republic. They are the people who have fought the Republic and they cannot secure themselves like the government of the N.I.T., the judiciary and the police.” Pinke added that they hope the Dutch Queen will be their “saviour”, the saviour of Minahasa and Ambon where the KNIL was most strongly represented.²²⁵

²²² De Jong, 1006.

²²³ Ibid, 1007

²²⁴ Ibid, 1009.

²²⁵ Naval Commander (Pinke) to High Representative of the Crown (Lovink), 15 September 1949 in *NIB*, XIX, 769-770.

The decolonisation war had reached its end, but had now revealed more plainly the other layer of the Indonesian struggle: the civil war was still ongoing and reached a climax in April 1950. On the 5th of April captain Abdul Aziz, a captain of the KNIL army, had proclaimed he and other former KNIL soldiers had taken up arms to defend the State of East Indonesia.²²⁶ The reason for this upsurge was a planned arrival of TNI soldiers – now named federal soldiers – sent by the Central Government, which Aziz and his sympathizers deemed as illegal – it was not a question of sending in federal troops to restore order, but sending in an occupation force.²²⁷

This episode would mark the beginning of the end of East Indonesia. Aziz would claim his upsurge was for the benefit of the federation, thus he sympathised with the federal principles as declared during the Round Table Conference. His upsurge paved the way for several protests both pro- and anti-federalist.²²⁸ Dutch troops still at large in Indonesia were ordered not to take part in any of the demonstrations or other military rallies and thus tried to remain as neutral as possible. The central Indonesian government sent troops under the leadership of military commander Suharto to fend off the uprisers. The consequences for the East Indonesian parliament were severe. Sympathizers with the KNIL or federalists were mistrusted, which led to a majority of Republican sympathizers. With the KNIL sympathizers and other remnants of federalism sparking chaos, these Republican legislators were given an excuse to dissolve the East Indonesian state into the nationalist Republic of Indonesia.²²⁹

A similar fate was reserved for former KNIL commander and BFO member Sultan Hamid. On the 23 of January 1950, former Special Forces commander Raymond Westerling had gathered some forces left of the KNIL and instigated a coup with the intention of eliminating the nationalist leaders of the Republic.²³⁰ He succeeded in capturing Bandung and his success made many people believe an insider had come to his aid. After the arrest of Westerling's conspirators and after interrogations, it became clear that Sultan Hamid was involved.²³¹ He was stripped from his function as minister and arrested. Westerling's coup together with Hamid's betrayal became another excuse for the Republic to fully dissolve another state: the Pasundan. In an afterword, Anak Agung is resolute about the performance of the Republic: 'Juridically the Republic of Indonesia had every right to choose their preferred form of governance and state, because this was an internal affair.'²³²

²²⁶ 'Makassar door opstandige militairen bezet' in *Algemeen Handelsblad* (5 april 1950).

²²⁷ 'Makassar door opstandige militairen'.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ricklefs, *A History of*, 285.

²³⁰ Ibid, 285.

²³¹ 'Sultan Hamid II Gearresteerd' in *Algemeen Handelsblad* (5 april 1950).

²³² Gde Agung, *Renville*, 355.

Conclusion

The Republic anticipated the divide and rule strategy behind federalism. In accordance with Tilly's theory on war-making and its relation to state-making, the TNI army became the primary vehicle for Republican state-formation. Using a people's defence strategy to keep Dutch control at a minimum and make those protected by the Dutch feeling insecure. This insecure environment, according to Kalyvas, provided the possibility for Indonesians in the outer islands to either defect to Republican side or be coerced into non-collaboration. The BFO members were integrated in this strategy through the goodwill mission, which had several consequences. The division between Republican graduates and BFO collaborators, necessary as stated by Robinson to keep up Dutch indirect rule, was largely lifted and would be fully lifted during the Inter-Indonesian conference. BFO members, like Anak Agung, now turned a blind eye to more Republican infiltration in East-Indonesia, which made the lives of East-Indonesian population and aristocrats loyal to the Dutch unsafe. As a result, the internal state-formation process necessary - according to Tilly - to uphold the Dutch status quo in East-Indonesia and raise defences against Republican influence, suffered massive damage. The U.S. intervention raised new obstacles to the Dutch divide and rule strategy. The Dutch military operation to uphold colonial rule had become increasingly dependent upon finances and troops from the metropole, which according to Darwin had weakened its chances of survival in the long run. Without Marshall Aid the Dutch would lose the means of extraction, according to Tilly necessary to continue their warfare in Indonesia. The fact that the Dutch were refused to continue their military operation, severely lowered their credibility towards the Indonesian population and their collaborators. The suppression of the Madiun Uprising made the Republic a credible power for control which led to expectations of them being the better safekeeper of order to the population in the future, following Kalyvas' relation of violence, credibility and expectations. Kalyvas would further argue that the culmination of violence following the Second Police action provided Anak Agung with 'no alternative' other than full compliance with the Republic from now on. The BFO's contribution to the Inter-Indonesian conference comprised weak checks and balances to allow the Republican army to dismantle East-Indonesia. As evidenced by the way former KNIL soldiers and leaders, including BFO members, were treated, the pact of non-collaboration against the colonizer proved to be short-lived. Ironically, nationalist efforts to uphold the status quo in the early post-colonial period by military force shows how this new Indonesian administration was the mirror image of the Dutch colonial administration.

Research conclusion

The aim of this research is the answer how the federalists of the BFO positioned themselves between the Dutch and Republican powerbrokers during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict 1945-1950, while also safeguarding their own interests. Based on an analysis of their story, it can now be determined that their positioning vis-à-vis the Dutch and the Republic depended on a number of factors.

The political culture of the Dutch-Indies was characterised by increased anti-colonial sentiment, largely the result of a conflicting ethical policy of unredeemed promises of equality. The personal development of Van Mook, Sukarno and Anak Agung shows how their pre-war grievances effected their thoughts on the future pathways of decolonization. In case of Sukarno's and Anak Agung's education a federal formation for future Indonesia seemed unnatural at first glance. Pre-existing interests, like one's noble position, was initially a reason during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict to side with the Dutch. This is a much-heard argument in the historiography since the work of Kahin. Some doubts over Kahin's argument were already expressed, using the example of Anak Agung's insecurity while confronted with the pemuda. Facing a revolution, he and other aristocrats initially sided with the Dutch, but the development of the armed Dutch-Indonesian conflict provided clues on whether they collaborated because of the revolution or the revolutionary violence that emanated from it.

For the Dutch, these aristocrats provided an alternative system of collaboration to the failed collaboration with Sutan Sjahrir. Collaboration along with coercion was at the core of the Dutch divide and rule strategy masked as federalism. The difficult relationship between The Hague and Van Mook's colonial administration obstructed the execution of this strategy, in particular the increased dependence on The Hague weakened colonial rule. Van Mook took the lead in organizing the federal states, exerting his influence also behind the scenes in the East-Indonesian government and in the East-Indonesian parliament. Van Mook did not perceive the BFO members and members of East-Indonesian government as federalists, but as his traditionalists, helping to restore colonial relations.

Unfortunately for Van Mook, the BFO members also wanted to safeguard their own interests. These were conflicting interests. The BFO was presented as a united assembly, but their members were assembled from all over the outer islands. These individuals had mostly lived separate lives from one another. As shown by the case of East-Indonesia, they had a shared rivalry amongst themselves. Their contact with the Republic exposed an important weakness of Dutch indirect rule, namely the difficulty of separating the BFO and the Republic, and also made the BFO members painfully aware of Van Mook's intentions. Following Robinson's imagery of the colonial administrator as a dealer of cards, Anak Agung played the role of the hoped trump card in Van Mook's federal

playing field. But Anak Agung's position would reshuffle the deck to Van Mook's disadvantage. Being one of the few heavy weight collaborators in Van Mook's game of cards, Anak Agung became in fact the sole keeper of the East-Indonesian state. The Republic via the parliamentary path as well as the path of violence gained more control over the East-Indonesian government, which made Anak Agung a liability to Dutch colonial rule in due time. Anak Agung had seen pemuda violence up close and the pemuda continued to keep East-Indonesian society unsafe, which made his work as the prime-minister of East-Indonesia also life-threatening. Anak Agung's fear for Republican retaliation made him careful not to oppose them much during his reign over East-Indonesia. This resulted in Republican sympathizers silencing aristocrats who were openly loyal Dutch like the Bugis Sultan, who could therefore not play the role of official nationalists.

The threat of retaliation by Republican forces was an orchestrated strategy by the Republican army to counter the anticipated Dutch divide and rule strategy. The Republic, besides playing the games of politics and diplomacy, mainly relied on their army to forge the future state of a unitary Indonesia. Their guerrilla was built on Nasution's philosophy, emphasizing minimization of Dutch military control and threatening people under their protection. This provided possibilities for defection to the Republic or instilled fear to coerce the population in non-collaboration. The BFO would be integrated in this strategy via a goodwill mission that made more Republican infiltration possible. This development largely lifted the division between the BFO and the Republic, necessary to uphold Dutch colonial rule. Additionally, the influx of more Republican insurgents threatened the internal state structure of East-Indonesia. While the BFO had raised obstacles to Dutch colonial rule, the U.S. intervention made Dutch prolongation of colonial rule even more difficult. By threatening to revoke promised Marshall Aid and a pressured cease-fire demand, it took away Dutch means of extraction to continue warfare. The dependence on the Dutch treasury – in line with Darwin's argument – also exposed the major imbalance in power between the colonial administration and the metropole, the former becoming completely dependent on the latter around the end of the conflict. After the suppression of a communist uprising by the Republic the credibility of the Dutch towards the Indonesian population and the U.S. diminished and expectations seemed to indicate a Republican victory. The Second Police Action was a desperate attempt to regain Dutch control and credibility. The violence that resulted from this operation led to a 'heat of the moment' in which Anak Agung saw no alternative other than compliance with Republican wishes. The result, an involuntary coalition of non-collaboration that did away with Van Mook's federalism and ended the moment the Dutch had left the Indonesian premises. The violent acts of the early post-colonial Indonesian administration to abolish federal structures mirrored the colonial administrations' way of maintaining order through violence.

The continuous factor that explains the collaboration of BFO-members with either the Dutch and the Republic is violence and fear of retaliation. Pre-war interests like keeping aristocratic privileges were important during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, but this was not the leading factor in their reasoning to side with one party or the other. Nor must their switch of sides be seen as mere opportunism. Contrary to Kahin's argument.

Fear for retaliation, as Kalyvas teaches, lay at the heart of their reasoning and could make them comply, as described by Tilly. They complied to become the involuntary collaborators necessary for the Republic to end colonial rule, which shows that Robinson's system of collaboration on which colonial states were built, was the main reason for the rise and fall of the Dutch colonial rule.

The conditions to uphold this collaboration, or official nationalism, mentioned by Anderson and Amoroso were also mostly absent. The federal project was unsuccessfully implemented, due the common idea of central rule, the inability to propagate official nationalism because of Republican obstruction and the impossibility to crush the Republican adversary with military force.

The political culture of Indonesia during the conflict was mostly guided by violence, which in turn meant that federalism also meant little as a political identity. The identity of the BFO was mostly shaped by violence and it was only after the Second Police action that the identity of the BFO forged by violence temporary crystallised into involuntary nationalism. As a result, in the early post-colonial period they were at the mercy of Republican goodwill.

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