

(De)-Colonial Continuities From Kenya and Malaya to the Cyprus Emergency



Maria Pinelopi Chatzicharalampous



ResMA Thesis

ResMA Program: Colonial and Global History

M.P. Chatzicharalampous, s2115131

mpchatz95@gmail.com

Supervisor: Dr. C.M. Stolte

Second Reader: Dr. W.M. Schmidli

Universiteit Leiden, June 2020

*To my Mother
In memory,*

And,

*To my Father for always
Being there for me,*

Table of Contents

<u>List of Abbreviations</u>	<u>p.2</u>
<u>Acknowledgements</u>	<u>p.3</u>
<u>Introduction</u>	<u>p.4</u>
Chapter 1	
<u>Under a State of Emergency: Exception or Norm?</u>	<u>p.7</u>
Chapter 2	
<u>Creating a depository of knowledge. The Malayan and Kenya Emergencies</u>	<u>p.19</u>
Chapter 3	
<u>(De)-Colonial Cyprus</u>	<u>p.35</u>
Chapter 4	
<u>“If we are going to sin we must sin quietly.” State of emergency and Human Rights</u>	<u>p.53</u>
<u>Conclusions</u>	<u>p.65</u>
<u>Bibliography</u>	<u>p.67</u>
<u>Appendix I: The Proclamation of the Cyprus State of emergency</u>	<u>p.74</u>

List of Abbreviations

AKEL	Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party for the Working people)
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CO	Colonial Office
DORA	Defence of the Realm Act
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GOC	General Officer Commanding
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MCF	Movement for Colonial Freedom
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MP	Member of Parliament
OXEN	Orthodoxi Christianiki Enosi Neon (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth)
PEON	Pancyprios Ethniki Organosis Neon(Pancyprian National Youth Organisation)
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
WO	War Office

Acknowledgements

My wholehearted gratitude goes to Carolien Stolte. Without her feedback, guidance and our productive discussions this thesis would have never been completed.

I want to thank also the former EOKA fighters Thasos Sofokleous and Mimis Vasileiou who opened their hearts to me and shared their memories of the decolonisation war in Cyprus.

Special thanks to *Sofoklis Achilopoulos Foundation* which funded my postgraduate studies at Leiden University.

I would like to express my appreciation both to my family and friends in Greece but also to my second family in The Netherlands. Stefania, Ioanna, Despoina and Anna thank you for making this journey easier and memorable.

Last but not least, gratitude goes to this special person in my life who endured numerous long discussions on my thesis, and happily proofread the whole paper. Thank you.

Introduction

The end of the Second World War, created a paradigm shift when it came to the relations among the European imperial powers and their dependencies. The colonies fought on the side of the imperial powers in the name of liberty and against the tyranny of the Fascist and Nazist regimes. The end of the Second World War was a celebration of peace, freedom and human rights. The post-1945 era honoured the rights of the man, with the declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The destruction and horror of the Nazi concentration and extinguishment camps was destined to remain as a bad memory.

Similarly, in the spirit of liberty and human rights, many colonies started demanding their independence from the imperial powers. It is the moment when the “Empire Strikes Back”. Great Britain faced a domino-effect of worldwide decolonization which threatened the economical and geo-strategical interests of the country. Great Britain had to keep up with a dual role, firstly as an imperial power which wished to retain its colonies and secondly as a self-proclaimed ambassador of Human Rights.

The purpose of the current research paper is precisely to look into the stance that Great Britain took against a series of decolonisation wars, in Malaya (today Malaysia), Kenya and Cyprus. At first glance these three colonies seem completely different. However, what this paper will show is that the use of the state of emergency as a tool in colonial counterinsurgency is an element which created a colonial continuity among these three colonies. The lessons that were learned in Malaya, were also implemented in Kenya and in Cyprus. In other words, the paper wishes to show the connections across these colonies, primarily through the implementation of the same methods of counterinsurgency and secondly through the actual colonial officials who transferred their knowledge from one colony to another. The ultimate aim of this comparative research is to shed light on the colonial dimension of Cyprus, an under-studied aspect of Cypriot history.

The case of Cyprus has been analyzed through an international angle particularly in Greek historiography. The majority of existing literature covers the negotiations between Archbishop Makarios and Governor Sir John Harding, or the involvement of Greece and the appeal to the UN. Adding to the international angle, Greek historiography has also extensively covered the national struggle and the actions of the Greek-Cypriot organisation EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston/National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). British historiography, recently represented by the book of David French, *Fighting EOKA. The British*

Counterinsurgency Campaign on Cyprus, presents a novel view on the Cyprus case, which is the British response. Besides the peculiarities of the Cyprus case, the colonial aspect is severely neglected. During the Cyprus Emergency, the British fought as they had in previous colonial wars. The positioning of Sir John Harding, a professional and experienced military man, showed that the British had no intention of surrender.

The research behind this paper is mainly based on information extracted from the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Migrated Archives. This collection of archives consists of information from Britain's colonial governments, which were transferred in the UK in 1994 and were located in Her Majesty's premises at Hanslope Park. In that location the archive, which numbered over 1.2 million files, remained hidden and the documents were not handed over to The National Archives for classification and public access. The files dated back to the 1840s and also consisted of information on the decolonisation wars of Britain. The existence of this hidden archive came to light in 2011 after pressure from professor David Anderson who alleged the systematic withholding of information by the government. In April 2011, the government admitted to the withholding of files that contained information from 37 ex-colonies including Kenya and Cyprus. A first batch of the archives was eventually transferred to the National Archives in 2012.¹ The 21st century Hanslope Archive incident mirrors an organised cover up, with aim to safeguard the British colonial past. This incident represents the persistence of the colonial mindset in our times. The UK government, by breaking the 30 year Public Records Act, attempted to hide sensitive information that could lead to the rewriting of Britain's colonial history.

In addition to the National Archives documents, I have obtained information on General Erskine in the archives of the Imperial War Museum in London. I have also done fieldwork in Cyprus. Therefore, aside from the British documentation, this research is based on information from the Cyprus State Archives in Nicosia, and interviews with EOKA fighters who shed light on the details of the insurgency on the island.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter aims to theorize the state of emergency and apply it to the anticolonial insurgencies of the postwar period. The chapter analyses the theoretical interpretations of the state of emergency by jurists like Carl Schmitt, and political philosophers like Giorgio Agamben. These theoretical interpretation which cover mainly a western point of view set within the wider colonial framework.

¹ The Times, '50 years later: Britain's Kenya cover up revealed' (April 05, 2011), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

The second chapter covers the application of the state of emergency in Malaya and Kenya. It aims to show how these two colonial cases created a depository of knowledge of lessons learned from the Emergencies in Malaya and Kenya. This chapter is mainly based on the information from the “Operational Research Unit Report No. 1/57. A Comparative Study of The Emergencies in Malaya and Kenya”, which can be found in the National Archives in London. This report is a perfect example of lessons learned from the emergencies and how that knowledge would later be exported to other colonial emergencies.

The third chapter turns the attention exclusively to Cyprus as a colonial case. It explains the characteristics of the Cyprus Emergency and shows how the state of emergency and the knowledge that the British officials acquired from the previous emergencies were also applied to Cyprus. It focuses specifically on the personality of Sir John Harding who was assigned as Governor in Cyprus after leading successful counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and Kenya.

Finally, the fourth chapter views the Cyprus Emergency within the dual identity that Britain had as an imperial power and an ambassador of human rights. The state of emergency as a colonial tool in counterinsurgency is viewed from within the reality of the Human Rights regime.

1. Under a State of Emergency: Exception or Norm?

“Emergency doctrine, that mixture of history, politics and emotion.”²

“Sovereign is he who decides the exception.”³ That is the introductory phrase in Carl Schmitt’s *Political Theology*, a book published in 1922, which represents the jurist’s engagement with the concept of sovereignty. For Schmitt, exception and sovereignty are interconnected. Exception is the term in Schmitt’s works and fundamentally represents the state of emergency. The concept of the state of emergency is complicated as it intersects with questions of sovereignty, governmentality and legitimacy. Schmitt was one of the first who approached the state of emergency from the standpoint of sovereignty. For the jurist, the power to decide the exception that is the state of emergency, is what defines the dominant. It could be stated that the state of exception creates a new status quo, through the application of a combination of rules, norms and institutions which are produced under the emergency powers. Schmitt’s approach provoked a considerable debate on the question of legality. In other words, how legitimate is a state of emergency and in return the power that declares it?⁴ A second point of concern is, under which circumstances are emergency powers put into practice?

Victor V. Ramraj examines the exercise of emergency powers between two constitutional contexts; firstly, when states seek to establish legality, and secondly, in need of the preservation of legality.⁵ The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, following Schmitt, traces the state of exception from the Roman Law and the Weimar Republic, to the Nazi doctrine and Guantanamo prisons. For Agamben, the state of exception becomes the rule.⁶ The state of exception creates a “legal state” in which the law exists but has no power.⁷ The state of exception is a lawless area

² J.B. Kelly and G.A. Pelletier, ‘Theories of Emergency Government’, *South Dakota Law Review* 11:42 (1966).

³ C. Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.5.

⁴ V. V. Ramraj, K. Thiruvengadam, *Emergency Powers in Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.22.

⁶ G. Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.69.

where the power of law is at stake.⁸ During the state of exception a new “legal order” is created which appears to be illegal but in reality is not.⁹ A thin line between legality and illegality is created. This is what Ramraj, in his study of the emergency powers in Asia, defines as the “emergency powers paradox.”¹⁰ The paradox lies in the fact that the state in its attempt to preserve legality, takes measures that under different circumstances would be considered illegitimate.¹¹ This is also what Agamben defines as the “paradox of the sovereign”, the sovereign having the power to amend the existing legislation sets himself outside of the legal framework.¹² The concept of the state of exception makes more sense if seen through the actual structure of the state of emergency. In other words, the state of emergency is situated between two very important concepts “norm and exception.” Exception has to be seen in juxtaposition with norm, as the state of emergency is derived from the rule of law, the established norm.¹³

Both Agamben and Schmitt tackle issues of sovereignty, and emergency. The main theoretical gap in this case however, is that these theorists apply their work mainly to the western European perspective, leaving colonialism excluded. Violence, rule of law and politics of exception are especially apparent in colonial contexts. It is interesting therefore to apply Schmitt’s and Agamben’s theories to the colonial world. The detention camps, the power politics and the states of emergency were part of the decolonisation wars. As the philosopher Achille Mbembe notes: “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of power outside the law.”¹⁴ So both exception and norm are dominant within the colonial context.

The previous theories already gave a brief analysis of the exception. How is the norm defined then? One argument is that emergency powers are an integral part of the normal mode of

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p.51.

¹⁰ Ramraj and Thiruvengadam, *Emergency Powers in Asia*, p.22.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998), p.37- 38.

¹³ N. Hussain, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency Colonialism and the Rule of Law* (University of Michigan Press, 2003), p.20.

¹⁴ Achille Mbembe mentioned in: M. Svirsky and S. Bignall (eds), *Agamben and Colonialism* (Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p.4.

governing, which in turn does not make them exceptional.¹⁵ Neocleous presents how historically emergency powers have become part of the normal political rule.¹⁶

Norm actively intersects with legitimacy. According to David Beetham: “Legitimacy concerns the normative dimension of power relations and the ideas and practices that give those in power their moral authority and credibility”.¹⁷ In other words, a series of actions which creates the norm also bears the aspect of legitimacy. On the contrary, actions which do not follow society's norms are often defined as illegitimate. One simple general definition of the term “norm” would be: “an empirical regularity in the natural world or in society”.¹⁸ In public law the norm is represented through the constitution which must be equally respected by everyone. The emergency powers are defined as the derogation from the norm which has to be justified.¹⁹ This is connected to Beetham’s schema of legitimacy. Beetham identifies three criteria which can provide legitimacy: a) conformity to the rules, b) justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs and c) legitimation through expressed consent.²⁰ Therefore, legitimacy is acquired if it accords with the “rules of power”²¹ as Beetham defines, either unwritten, as informal conventions or written in legal codes; compliance provides legitimacy.²² In reverse, breach of the rules leads to illegitimacy. However, the justification of the rules are also an important factor for legitimacy. Beetham underlines that to be justified, “power has to be derived from a valid source of authority [...] power must be seen to serve the general interest”.²³ Finally, the third level consists of the consent from the part of the subordinate.²⁴ Therefore, some criteria which lead to the legitimation of actions create also the norm.

It is interesting to analyse the state of emergency from the spectre of Beetham’s definition of legitimacy. As shown above the state of emergency or state of exception creates a

¹⁵ M. Neocleous, "The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to ‘permanent Emergency’ ”, *Alternatives* 31:2 (2006), p.208.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.207.

¹⁷ D. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.x.

¹⁸J. Ferejohn and P. Pasquino, ‘The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers’, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2:2 (2004), p.221.

¹⁹ Beetham, *The legitimation of power*, p.223.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.15, 20.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.16.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

new legal space, a set of new laws which applies to the first criterion on legitimacy, that is conformity to the rules. In the case of a state of emergency a peculiar new norm is being created. There is no fear of conformity to the rules as, during a state of emergency, the existing law system is actually being paralysed. A new reality is being created which creates a cloak of legality. The second criterion is also something that accompanies every declaration of a state of an emergency, which is the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs. The states of emergency create a precarious reality which is often accompanied by discourses on extreme peril and public safety. These discourses create in turn the reasons on which the state's extreme measures will be based. However, one weak point that will also be shown through the following case studies is Beetham's third criterion; legitimation through expressed consent. If the question is considered in society, to what extent can we argue that the emergency laws enjoyed public consent? An answer to this question is provided when the analysis turns to the colonial propaganda and discourses.

Although Schmitt's and Agamben's theorisations of the emergency are rooted in a western perspective, the colonial space is a fruitful ground for researching the theories on emergency, governmentality and legitimacy. The state of emergency as a process has attracted analysis, but from the perspective of the modern state. Processes of inclusion, exclusion and sovereignty are apparent in colonial frameworks. The concept of the state of emergency becomes even more complicated when it is applied to the colonial world. The main argument here is that the state of emergency as a concept and as a method has not only been apparent, but also developed during the era of European colonisation. The "coloniality" that this concept encapsulates however, is often overlooked by theorists and researchers.²⁵

Therefore, the focus of this chapter specifically and the thesis in general will be the use of the state of emergency by the British Empire during its postwar decolonisation wars. By the end of the Second World War, Great Britain faced a series of "insurgencies", in Colonial Office terminology, which demanded the end of colonial rule and independence. Although these insurgencies spread in a wide colonial space all bear one important common element and that is the declaration of a state of emergency.

Cornelius Cotter points out how the 20th century British governments achieved "constitutionalising" prerogative emergency powers.²⁶ Before the imminent threat of the First

²⁵ J. Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.11.

²⁶ C. P. Cotter, 'Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience' *Stanford Law Review* 5:3 (1953), p.382.

World War and under the need for “protection of the realm”, the British government went on with the activation of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which was an advanced method modelled after martial law.²⁷ Through the DORA the government created the capacity for the use of actions for safeguarding the country. As Cotter highlights: “The Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act 1914 marked the first attempt on the part of the government to rationalise and systematise its war powers”.²⁸ The institutionalisation of the Emergency Powers was created through the DORA. The DORA represented the response of the government to the First World War and for that reason were in use during that specific period of time. The DORA was mirroring an already known pattern of emergency powers which had been used in India and Ireland.²⁹ DORA created the constitutional conditions which gave the military special powers and safeguarded them from the possibility of legal prosecution.

The regularisation of the emergency powers themselves became clearly apparent in the postwar era. Uncertainty, however, from the government led in 1920 to the introduction of the Emergency Powers Bill which could be used in peacetime.³⁰ The emergency powers were to be set in action under three basic provisions, if the community was threatened from deprivation of the essentials for living. The government with an Order in Council could proceed to the proclamation of an emergency which, within fourteen days, had to be accepted with a resolution by parliament.³¹ The First World War experience already created a depository of knowledge concerning the reactions of the government to dangerous situations. Furthermore, the knowledge was applied again to the colonies. In 1915 an analogous emergency code was set in action in colonial India, allowing in that way the use of actions for public safety.³² At the same time the 1921 Restoration of Order in Ireland was also being applied to that country.³³

This experience was reflected in the Second World War and the activation of the Emergency Powers Defence Acts (1939).³⁴ The government with an Order in Council had the

²⁷ Ibid., p.384.

²⁸ Ibid., p.385.

²⁹ Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law*, p.90-91.

³⁰ Cotter, ‘Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience’, p.396.

³¹ Ibid., p.396.

³² Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law*, p.90-91.

³³ Brian Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights. Activism and Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), p.19.

³⁴ Cotter, ‘Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience’, p.403.

right to activate regulations “for securing public safety, the defence of the Realm and maintenance of public order”.³⁵ This description actually fits to a general definition that could be given to the state of emergency. As Stephen Morton, notes:

“countries are considered to be in a 'state of emergency' when executive power is used to suspend the normal rule of law, and power is transferred to the police or military. Emergency legislation is often associated with totalitarian governments or so called terrorist states, but liberal democracies have also made use of emergency in times of social and political crisis.”³⁶

In the colonial world the state of emergency was a recurrent phenomenon during the British decolonisation wars.

As Hussain Nasser points out: “the colonies were not passive recipients but rather productive forces in the conceptualisation and delineation of Western ideas and practices”³⁷ The state of emergency can therefore be defined as a colonial tool of counterinsurgency. This also illustrates one of the main arguments that the analysis of the colonial case studies wish to show. As it was pointed out, the western application of the state of emergency already carried a colonial pedigree which was used in the First World War and Second World War. During that time it acquired an even more advanced form and then was implemented again in the colonies. In the colonial space the state of emergency was used as a method of counterinsurgency which at the same time created a series of inclusions and exclusions. The main purpose of the state of emergency was to preserve the legality of the violent actions that would take place during the counterinsurgency missions and safeguard any possible prosecutions against Her Majesty’s Forces.³⁸ The state of emergency therefore was more of a specific method of governance rather than a spontaneous response to a crisis. Nasser, with his focus on colonial India, noted when it came to colonial law:

“It was to be the form of a civilized despotism, for it would both declare to subjects that their identity, their offenses, their grievances, all began and ended in the authority of the law, and would reflect the morality of publicity and process lacking in the

³⁵ Ibid., p.404.

³⁶ S. Morton, *States of Emergency. Colonialism, Literature and Law* (Liverpool University Press, 2013), p.1.

³⁷ Nasser, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency Colonialism and the Rule of Law*, p.6.

³⁸ Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law*, p.13.

authority of a native despotism. Procedure was not substance but spirit, and in its exactitude it covered all law, English or Indian, statutory or customary, insisting that no authority preceded law, or more specifically, the workings of law, and that these workings created and reflected their own authority.”³⁹

The state of emergency creates a space in which the sovereign’s control over life and death is absolute. Sovereignty however works in two ways. On the one hand is control over life but also over mortality. This is what Achille Mbembe from his part defined as “necropolitics.”⁴⁰ The right to kill and the permission to live defines the ultimate level of sovereignty.⁴¹ “The state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill. Power continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to produce that same exception, emergency and fictionalized enemy.”⁴² Mbembe’s remarks on the power of the state of exception and the framing of the enemy are also apparent in colonial spaces. All of the colonial cases which will be analysed include methods of inclusion, exclusion, and practice of sovereign power over the society. Mbembe when it comes to the colonial space emphasizes:

“Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity. Instead colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real. [...] All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to re-emerge in the colonies.”⁴³

The “reality” that the state of emergency creates becomes even more interesting when it is seen under the umbrella of the declaration of human rights. The disastrous inhumane effects of the Second World War assisted in the understanding of human life which led in return to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Britain’s postwar colonial governance is highly connected to the Human Rights concept as at that moment Britain stood between two choices: “a)the continuation of an imperial notion of acting b) towards a contemporary notion of equal

³⁹ Nasser, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency Colonialism and the Rule of Law*, p.65.

⁴⁰ Achille Mbembé, ‘Necropolitics’, *Public Culture* 15:1 (2003), p.11-40.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.11-12.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.16.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.25.

respect and abandonment of the long-lasting imperial project by granting independence to the colonies and respecting their rights”.⁴⁴

The recent work of Kate Kennedy discusses three phases of British Colonial governance. More specifically she distinguishes British governance between a soft phase from 1938-1945 which was accompanied by the rhetoric of welfare and benevolence and the postwar period in which Britain was an active supporter of the promotion of Universal Human Rights. What is interesting, however, is the fact that during the postwar era the switch to hard governance is noticed during the colonial insurrections with the declaration of a state of emergency.⁴⁵ This double role that Britain acquired after the Second World War led to complicated and unclear reactions when it came to the insurrections. On the one hand, Britain wished to retain its colonies, but on the other hand could not follow a clear strategy under the light of being a Human Rights ambassador.

It is interesting, however, to point out that although Britain was part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafting procedure, the circulation into the colonies followed a specific plan. The UDHR was published on the one hand in the official Gazettes of the colonies but no further circulation was allowed. UDHR was not taught in schools under the reasons that: “(a) it was not easily understandable and thus it was likely that pupils might regard it ‘merely as a form of lay catechism’, and (b) it could be used by ‘politically-inclined school-teachers’ to ‘confuse’ the minds of their pupils on political matters”.⁴⁶ Already from the beginning it is clear how Britain swings between its imperial character and the need for the preservation of the status quo, and by supporting on the other hand the new postwar reality. With the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the enforcement of the European Convention of Human Rights on 3 September 1953 for Britain the imminent danger for the colonial regime became again apparent. Griffiths, the colonial secretary, was writing in the 1950s: “This Convention, if applied to the Colonies, cannot be other than an embarrassment to Colonial governments and if it were possible for the UK to decline to accept it so that the question of its application to the Colonies would not arise. The CO would be very glad”.⁴⁷ However, one year later Griffiths himself was

⁴⁴ Kate Kennedy, *Britain and the End of Empire. A study of Colonial Governance in Cyprus, Kenya and Nyasaland against the backdrop of the internationalisation of empire and the evolution of supranational human rights culture and jurisprudence 1938-1965* (University of Oxford, Worcester College, 2015), p.11.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.2-3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.80.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.89.

arguing how a possible failure of the extension of the UDHR into the colonies would actually provoke criticism both domestically and abroad.⁴⁸

The United Kingdom was trying to balance between the glorified imperial past and the demanding postwar present. An analysis of the state of emergency in that context can provide an important focal point on the postwar decolonisation wars that Britain faced. The use of the state of emergency as a colonial tool of counterinsurgency also served to create a cloak of legality before the postwar reality of the Human Rights system. The 1939 Emergency Powers Order in Council was the legal tool that colonial governors utilised in order to confront the insurgencies and legitimise their actions. Under the 1939 Emergency Powers Order in Council, the governors gained the jurisdiction to amend, suspend and modify any law. Furthermore, the governors had the power to make regulations which on their account were considered necessary for the preservation of public safety.⁴⁹ Martin Shipway characterises the emergencies as a “robust” means of political control of the late colonial state.⁵⁰

The emergencies also served to support the British discourse. For them the emergencies provided a “moral legitimacy,” and in that way they presented that their actions were according to the “rule of law”.⁵¹ As Reynolds underlines: “the concept of emergency served as a medium through which Britain’s colonial authorities sought to reconcile the unfettered sovereign power of imperial conquest with genuine concerns over the lawfulness of their actions and policies vis a vis the natives”.⁵² The myth of winning “hearts and minds” and the use of “minimum force” was dominant for many years. However, our theoretical analysis of the state of emergency actually shows how that colonial tool successfully created an alternative reality. Law in that case was being turned into a weapon of war.⁵³

Brian Drohan, underlines how Britain was categorising colonial insurrections as internal rebellions and in that way it could be argued that international law would not apply in these cases.⁵⁴ Perhaps the use of the term “emergency” for the colonial insurgencies was used in order

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.90.

⁴⁹ D. French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford University Press, 2015), p.95.

⁵⁰ Martin Shipway referenced in Kennedy, *Britain and the End of Empire*, p.100.

⁵¹ Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights*, p.3-4.

⁵² Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law*, p.69.

⁵³ Ibid., p.11.

⁵⁴ Drohan, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights*, p.12.

to serve that argument. It could be argued that the use of the term “emergency” creates a sense of an internal localised issue and not an international conflict. The British argued that colonial insurgencies were actually internal matters and therefore Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on humane treatment of non combatants and prisoners could not fit in the colonial space.⁵⁵

The concept of the state of emergency was applied to the colonial insurrections. The first postwar example comes from the Malayan Emergency in 1948. The British declared a state of emergency in 1948 to deal with the “communist led insurgency”.⁵⁶ The Malayan Emergency is the best example that shows colonial warfare within the context of the Cold War. The postwar reality finds the western powers in a struggle against the powerful Soviet Union. For the US, the postwar decolonisation domino created on the one hand the chance for the expansion of US ideas, but on the other hand the western powers had to prevail over the “Soviet danger”.⁵⁷ For the US and the colonial powers the insurrections entailed the fear that if the colonies were to be liberated then they would be turned towards communism ideologically.

As shown below, the Malayan Emergency created the blueprint for the colonial emergencies that would follow. In 1952, the British would deal with the Mau Mau uprising, or as the colonial documents described it, the Kenya Emergency. The state of emergency in Kenya has one more element, as Reynolds shows, which is the concept of the “racialised emergency”.⁵⁸ It is actually an approach of viewing the emergency from below. How “racial prejudices” were incorporated into the emergency regime. In this case the emergency powers are not just seen as reactive measures but “as the performance of calculated pre-emptive measures infused into ongoing governance and designed to preserve sovereign power [...] the specific ways in which law has imagined, anticipated and responded is through the construction of emergency structures that exploit and reify racial difference”.⁵⁹ In the Kenya emergency this characteristic is really apparent as it will be shown.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.12.

⁵⁶ The National Archives (London), FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957 [September 1957]”, in *Brigadier Baker's Report on Cyprus Emergency. Comparative Research to Malaya*, p.2-3.

⁵⁷ O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.26-27.

⁵⁸ Reynolds, *Empire, Emergency and International Law*, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

In 1955, the British had to deal with one more colonial emergency and that was from Cyprus. The Cyprus case is interesting to look into as geographically, the small island in the Mediterranean was easier monitored from Europe than Kenya and Malaya. However, this did not restrict the colonial authorities from also declaring a state of emergency in November 1955. As will be analysed in the next chapters, the state of emergency would follow the blueprint, however as in every colonial case, it was adapted in such a way so that it suited each colonial reality. The state of emergency however is the key which provides a colonial continuity. In this continuity, there is also a place for the Cyprus Emergency which so far was considered a European problem. Despite the international character, Cyprus was also one more colonial problem to the eyes of the British government.

The term “blueprint” of the emergencies came up in the previous paragraphs. What does that mean exactly? No matter the spatial or racial differences among the colonies, the state of emergency as a concept is the key which creates a common ground among all these colonies. Beginning with the Malayan Emergency, the British demanded from the officials of the colony to conduct a report which analysed the aspects of the guerrilla warfare and of the emergency for the colony. The director of operations in Malaya conducted a report which presented the campaign, the emergency measures and most importantly, the lessons learned from the emergency.⁶⁰ The chapter on the lessons was crucial for the British authorities as there was a possibility that this knowledge could be applied in similar situations. As the report on the Emergency in Malaya describes: “The lessons drawn below have been chosen as those most likely to apply to similar situations which may arise in the future, in which an established government, backed by loyal armed forces and police is threatened by a communist-organised revolt”.⁶¹ Similarly a report was also conducted for the Emergency in Kenya. Both cases were also used in a comparative report.⁶² Accordingly Brigadier G.H Baker was asked to prepare a report on the Cyprus Emergency. An analysis of the warfare, the legislation and the state of the society is offered. Furthermore, a comparison is also drawn with the Malayan Emergency.⁶³ As was underlined in the colonial report:

⁶⁰ TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957”.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.25.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

“The emergencies in Malaya and Kenya represent an important but limited sample of the experience of this type of campaign. From the military angle, operations were largely confined to a battlefield of jungle and forest, and experience of the many problems of operating in built up areas normally a common feature of such campaigns has been limited. It is suggested that before a firm doctrine is evolved for fighting future campaigns of this type similar studies should be done of Cyprus and if possible with French cooperation of Indochina and North Africa”.⁶⁴

All those bulk of information, created a corpus of knowledge on the conduct of the emergency, which makes the concept of the state of emergency not a spontaneous reaction but a well-planned tool in counterinsurgency. Finally, the presence of the Cyprus case in these reports actually confirms the “coloniality” of the island which is often overlooked by researchers because of the focus in the diplomatic aspect.

As shown above, the concept of the state of emergency is complex and has been theorized in different ways. The theorisations, however, ignore the colonial perspective. There is a debate among theorists whether the state of emergency consisted of an exception or actually created a new norm. Practically, the state of emergency, was a colonial tool in counterinsurgency. The state of emergency when applied into the colonial space created a new norm, with actions on sovereignty and power over the colonial bodies becoming even more evident. The British Empire incorporated it into its techniques at a period when the empire was under the threat of destruction and new ideas started prevailing. Britain was between its imperial past and its new postwar present as an ambassador of human rights.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

2. Creating a depository of knowledge: The Malayan and Kenya Emergencies

The end of the Second World War found Great Britain in a defensive position against colonial insurgencies. With the withdrawal from India in 1947, often seen as the beginning of the end of the Empire, Britain for the next half decade faced a series of movements for independence. The postwar colonial insurgencies, however, were not only ominous to the British imperial system, but were also seen as an ideological threat. In the postwar reality the US and Soviet Union saw themselves as successors of European modernity. The colonial insurgencies, thus, were welcomed on the one hand by the US, however on the other hand for the US all these areas were actively under the threat of Communism.⁶⁵ Within the atmosphere that the Cold War created, Great Britain had to deal with a large decolonisation domino over its territories. John Darwin in his work on Britain and decolonisation refers to the concept of decolonisation:

“decolonisation was a subtle, intricate and deceptive process [...] decolonisation must refer to wider changes in the relations between developed and less developed states even if it is in the territorial possessions of the colonial powers that these changes can usually be seen most distinctly. Decolonisation is best understood as a partial retraction redeployment and redistribution of British and European influences in the regions of the extra-European world whose economic political and cultural life had previously seemed destined to flow into Western moulds.”⁶⁶

Decolonisation in other words was a process which actually affected the well known power relations. The once strong imperial powers like Great Britain were being threatened by their colonial states. For Great Britain, the new ominous reality imperilled the economic and strategic status of the country. Decolonisation was not just the handing over of sovereignty to a once dependent territory. Decolonisation in reality had multiple aspects; ideological, cultural, economic and strategic.⁶⁷ The shift in the relations between metropolis and colony affected the cultural and intellectual influence that may have existed. Furthermore, sovereignty and the creation of new states led to a shift in the economic reality and mainly the economic profits which Great Britain achieved through a system of open economy that existed with its dependent

⁶⁵ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p.3.

⁶⁶ J. Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World. The Making of the 20th Century* (Macmillan, 1988), p.7.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.16.

territories.⁶⁸ London, therefore, after the Second World War was found in a defending position against the new reality which was created with the outbreak of all the national movements. London officials understood on the one hand the need of retreat, however this retreat in most of the colonies did not happen without a fight. Strategic and ideological necessities did not allow Britain to leave most of the colonies easily. As Martin Thomas argues in his comparative book *Fight or Flight Britain and France and their roads from Empire*, the wars of decolonisation were chosen.⁶⁹

The retreat from India raised an alarming question among the colonial officials. If one of the most important colonies became independent, what did that mean for the rest of the dependencies and the empire's capacity to retain its dependencies?⁷⁰ After India a domino of uprisings against the commonwealth was triggered. Britain faced the Malayan Emergency, as it was labelled in 1948. For the British, the campaign from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1948 was described as a "Soviet inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas in South East Asia".⁷¹ According to the previous theory on decolonisation, Malaya was a highly ideological war. Losing Malaya would cost losing influence in the wider area of South East Asia. After the Second World War the British had a plan for economic modernisation, the creation of a pro-western administration and paving the way in the end to self-government.⁷² The Malayan Emergency was indeed a serious threat to the British plans. The British response to the Malayan emergency showed no inclination for *flight* but rather an inclination to *fight*. As it was mentioned, Malaya had both a strategic importance and an economic asset through its production of rubber and tin.

A similar desire for fight was shown throughout the Emergency in Kenya (1952-1960). The reasons behind the violence were mainly because of the grievances of the Kikuyu who were expelled off their lands in favour of the European settlers.⁷³ The unequal political representation compared to the European settlers also increased the anti-European sentiment. The

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ M. Thomas, *Fight or Flight : Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire* (Oxford University Press, 2014), p.3.

⁷⁰ Thomas, Moore, Butler, Moore, Bob, and Butler, L.J, *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975* (Hodder Education, 2008), p.53.

⁷¹ TNA, FCO 141/4233, "Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.", p.3.

⁷² Thomas, Moore, *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975*, p.60.

⁷³ H. Bennet, *Fighting the Mau Mau. The British Army and Counter- Insurgency in Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.8.

disappointment on European presence was represented through the Mau Mau movement. The Mau Mau which mainly derived from the Kikuyu tribe led to an anti-colonial struggle. Both of the anti-colonial movements were a threat to the British imperial regime, but also within the Cold War framework it consisted of an ideological threat. More specifically a report from April 9th 1951, from the Moscow Home Service sheds light to the tensions of the era. The report referred to the British colonial exploitation in Africa and condemned it. As they wrote in the report: “The British Imperialists keep the great native population in their colonies in a state of slavery without any right”.⁷⁴ After criticising the state in Africa and the economic exploitation the report concludes in a really interesting way saying that: “[Power] and freedom are indivisible in the minds of the people of Africa. They know that they will achieve both only through union with the democratic, progressive, forces of the whole world, headed by the great Soviet Union, the true defender of all the oppressed peoples”.⁷⁵ In other words, in both colonial cases the British had to deal with colonial insurgencies, which if lost would have a wider impact on the geostrategical interests.

In both cases the British declared a state of emergency, an effective tool from many different aspects as it will be shown, which dealt with their colonial insurrections. The state of emergency “legalised” a series of extended actions against the insurgents, and was constructed through the creation of a clear distinction between the “Self” (British Empire) and the “Others” (insurgents). Colonialism was mainly based on a constant definition and redefinition of the Self and the Other. When it comes to Britain, their presence to the colonies was “legitimised” as a “civilising mission”, as the “White Man’s Burden”. Britain’s superiority was based on the construction of other nation’s inferiority.⁷⁶ As will be analysed the state of emergency and the framing were interconnected processes. The colonial discourse created a “criminal community” against which the countermeasures were legalised. The main argument that this chapter wishes to show is that through these colonial insurrections a depository of knowledge was created which was amended to fit the special characteristics of each colony and then was utilised as a blueprint of knowledge. An empire like Great Britain would not be successful if it also weren’t for a strong bureaucratic character. The experiences in every colonial war did not remain in the hands of the storytellers. In the post-emergency periods, the British administration hired

⁷⁴ Daily Report. Foreign Radio Broadcasts (FBIS-FRB-51-075), “British Ruthlessly exploit Africans”, Moscow Soviet Home Service, Apr.9, 1951.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ P. Gleijeses, ‘Decolonization and the Cold War’, *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire* (eds. Martin Thomas, Andrew S. Thompson), p.1.

experienced personnel who conducted official reports on the emergencies. The reports included all the important information that any British official had to know, especially in the case of a new insurrection. Therefore, for both Malaya and Kenya there were reports conducted on the emergencies which described the campaigns, the position of the society, the army actions, what was successful and what was not. This chapter will be based both on the separate reports of Malaya and Kenya, but also on a comparative report. It will be shown how important it was to create a depository of knowledge which would be used for future insurgencies.

In 1957 the Director of Operations in Malaya prepared a review of the Emergency in the colony that covered the period from June 1948 to August 1957.⁷⁷ In Malaya the insurgents were defined as "Communist Terrorists".⁷⁸ In 1948, the colonial office informed the Defence department that: "the criminal elements engaged in acts of violence in Malaya should be referred to as *bandits*. On no account should the term *insurgents*, which might suggest a genuine popular uprising, be used. I should be grateful if you could bring this to the notice of your dept."⁷⁹ The definition shows the ideological character of the Malayan emergency whereas the use of the word "terrorists" is part of the wider definition that was given to the fighters during all the colonial insurrections. Both in Kenya and later in Cyprus the fighters were framed as "terrorists". That particular framing had a wider aim within the reality of the state of emergency. If the fighters were recognised as soldiers this in turn would mean political recognition, which would offer them legal protections and if arrested they would enjoy the rights of political prisoners. This was not the case with the colonial insurrections.⁸⁰ Drawing also from the theory on the Algerian decolonization war Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, in the chapter of her book on colonialism and terrorism, associates the colonial tactics of representation to the state violence. The state establishes a "climate of terror" with the representation of the nationalist violence as terrorism. In effect, this "legalises" state terrorism as counterterrorism.⁸¹ As a result the use of extreme measures for the suppression of the insurgency was legalised as "internal social

⁷⁷ TNA, FCO 141/4233, "Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957."

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁷⁹ P. Deery, 'The terminology of terrorism. Malaya 1948-1952', *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies*, 34:2 (2003), p.236.

⁸⁰ M. Thomas, G. Curless (eds), *Decolonisation and Conflict. Colonial Comparisons and Legacies* (Bloomsbury, 2018), p.2-3.

⁸¹ V. Erlenbusch- Anderson, *Genealogies of Terrorism. Revolution, State Violence, Empire* (Columbia University Press, 2018), p.93.

defence”.⁸² She defines the current concept as “polemic terrorism”.⁸³ In this way the colonial war was framed as a tool of social defence.⁸⁴ As Martin Thomas also clearly underlines:

“Insurgents operated in a legal limbo likely to face rigorous punishment under martial law but also subject to criminal penalties as ‘bandits’ ‘seditionists’ ‘terrorists’ or plain killers. Such criminalisation offered imperial governments a means to deny insurgents political validation and it enabled colonial authorities to enable the strictures of international law regarding the treatment of enemy personnel. Economically too admitting the existence of a decolonisation war as opposed to more limited troubles might be disastrous sapping the confidence of domestic publics colonial settlers corporations insurers and investors that imperial supremacy would be restored. [...] Cyprus, Aden, Kenya and Malaya were all defined as emergencies.”⁸⁵

In other words, the declaration of state of emergency assisted the empire in multiple sides. The colonial rebellions were not defined as decolonisation wars, as this would create setbacks for the metropolis, while at the same time within the state of emergency the empire had “the right” to deny any political recognition to the insurgents which in turn allowed wider actions against them. The term “terrorist” acquires multiple definitions. It must be noted that the defined colonial terms terrorism/terrorists cannot be set side by side to the future acts of terrorism like 9/11. Especially after 9/11 the term terrorism attracted further analysis and multiple definitions.⁸⁶

According to the report on the Malayan Emergency, 1951 was the year when violence reached its peak with that leading in February 1952 to the positioning of general Sir Gerald Templer as High Commissioner and Director of Operations.⁸⁷ The state of emergency was already declared since June 1948, “legalising” the organisation of an extended campaign against the Malayan insurgents or as the report would describe, the “communist terrorists”.⁸⁸ The unique element of the Malayan emergency was the fact that the British forces had to deal with a jungle type of war. At the peak of the Emergency, in the federation there were 67.000 police, 300.000

⁸² Ibid., p,94.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Thomas, Curless (eds), *Decolonisation and Conflict. Colonial Comparisons and Legacies*, p.2-3.

⁸⁶ Deery, ‘The terminology of terrorism’, p.246.

⁸⁷ TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.”,p.8.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Home Guard and 23 Battalions, a vast number of British forces.⁸⁹ Local support was vital for the insurgents as it was the source where they could find food, water and ammunition. In order to break that link, the British proceeded to the villagisation policy beginning in 1951 where they moved the squatters into protected villages in order to separate them from the insurgents in the jungle.⁹⁰ As squatters were defined the Chinese migrants living in Malaya. Between 1914 and 1945, Malaya was the place which received a considerable amount of Chinese migration for work at the tin mines. With the Japanese occupation during the Second World War, the Chinese were relocated close to the jungles and rivers in need for survival. This relocation created small communities which occupied land and practiced agricultural work.⁹¹

During the Malayan insurgency these communities supported the insurgents. From the period of August 1951- July 1954 nearly half a million of locals were resettled to new villages.⁹² The new villages were required to be both defensible and eligible for agriculture. In most of the cases there was no prior warning when it came to the resettlement. The soldiers secured the area at dawn and afterwards gathered the people and moved them. The new “villages” resembled more to concentration camps surrounded with barbed wire and lights and guarded by the Malayan Police and Chinese Home Guard which consisted mainly of local recruitments.⁹³ In 1949, “Kampong” Guards were formed in Malay villages and armed with shotguns to enable them to defend their villages. The Chinese Home Guard was raised in September 1950 to enable the Chinese to do the same especially in the resettled areas. The Home Guard had been a local part-time force which provided the principal means of identifying the people with the anti-terrorist campaign.⁹⁴

The villagisation policy was a technique which was also followed in the Kenya Emergency. The British acknowledged that the armed revolt was the outcome of the dissatisfaction of the population and for them it was extremely vital that the population was

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.9.

⁹¹ R.D. Renick Jnr, ‘The Emergency Regulations of Malaya Causes and Effect’, *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6:2 (1965), p.1-3.

⁹² TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.” p.8.

⁹³ Ibid, p.17.

⁹⁴ R.D. Renick Jnr, ‘The emergency regulations of Malaya causes and Effect’, p.10.

under control and turned in favour of the government.⁹⁵ Both Malaya and Kenya were cases in which the armed struggles did not have any external support, thus winning over the population was the key for the prevailing of either side. Therefore, in order to cut any possible support to the guerrillas, the topography of Malaya and Kenya assisted in the implementation of the villagisation policy. In Kenya, the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru tribes were also relocated and separated from the rest of the population. The British official documents justified these as “a method of protection from the terrorists”.⁹⁶ The villagisation policy turned out to be one of the most effective policies in the suppression of the emergency. Entire parts of the population were forced to abandon their properties. At first it was only implemented in Rift Valley where the settlers requested the eviction of the Kikuyu for their personal safety. The targeted groups were mainly women, children and elders. Besides, the majority of men were already in detention camps. As far as the women were concerned, the British were surprised to find out that some of them were active in the Mau Mau movement. Therefore, the villagisation policy targeted these women while at the same time detention camps were also formed for women.⁹⁷ Life in these barbed-wire villages was not peaceful. Forced labor was imposed whereas at the same time torturing and violence were part of the “civilising” measures. Many women were beaten and raped while many others were executed publicly. There was no constraint whatsoever concerning the actions of the British army.⁹⁸

The “civilised” western forces apart from these actions were also addressing the Africans as “savages”, and “uncivilised”. This is an apparent example on how those in power were able to define and redefine those under their jurisdiction. The colonial space was the best place where it can be analysed how power relations were formed and changed depending on the circumstances. The Kikuyu population was segregated into “punitive” and “rewarding” villages. In the rewarding loyal villages the population enjoyed social and economic reforms, whereas the punitive villages were places under “decay”. No sanitation measures were taken while at the same time some did not have enough food supplies. The conditions under which numerous people lived reached inhumane levels. The villagisation policy was by then a known and successful part of the British counter-insurgency measures. After Operation Anvil, the policy

⁹⁵ TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.”, p.33-35.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ C. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (Holt, 2005), p.233-243.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.247.

was expanded and almost 259 villages were created and inhabited by Africans from the Central Province or close to the forests. The goal of the current policy was to reduce the use of the military in policing the population and instead focusing on operations in the forests against the Mau Mau.⁹⁹ It is estimated that about 1,050,899 Kikuyu were relocated.¹⁰⁰ A 23 KAR officer remembered that: “people were “pretty peeved” at being removed from homes they had lived in for many years. The villages were far more concentrated than traditional habitations in Kenya.”¹⁰¹ Rehabilitation actions were also taken in these villages as the ultimate aim was to “cure” the Kikuyu and follow the example of the Loyalists in the “model” villages.

The Malayan and Kenyan state of emergencies did not consist only of the villagisation policy. A series of emergency regulations were put into effect. The emergency legislation could also be described as a method on “how to deal with insurgencies”. The emergency legislation was an important tool in counterinsurgency. It was put in practice in Malaya, Kenya with the rest of the colonies following the same example, including the Cyprus emergency as the next chapters will show.

The emergency legislation vested the British officials with unlimited powers when it came to the application of laws. In Malaya, the High Commissioner was authorised to apply whichever regulations felt necessary for the successful suppression of the insurgency. The emergency laws had a clear effect on the society and the relations with the British officials. Agamben’s theory of exception is evident in that context. The special powers which were vested to the officials created a new power paradigm which was outside of the norm and created a new status quo.

One of the main and most imminent effects of the state of emergency was the power of detention without trial. A person could be detained for a period of two years without the need for a trial. Under the emergency regulation dealing with detention a provision was also made for the deportation of undesirable persons, but only with their own consent.¹⁰² The regulation also allowed the collective detention which permitted the security forces to inspect areas and arrest people who had been considered to have assisted the insurgents. A large number of people were

⁹⁹ S.Scheipers, ‘The Use of Camps in Colonial Warfare’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43:4 (2015), p.687-688.

¹⁰⁰ Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, p.235.

¹⁰¹ H. Bennet, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency*, p.224-225.

¹⁰² TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.”, p.17.

detained most of the time without any specific reasons but rather as a method of precaution. Those framed to have taken part in “terrorist” activities were transferred to Rehabilitation Centers. In these areas they received specific training which prepared them for re-integration into the society.¹⁰³ The emergency regulations vested legality for the re-classification of people. This in turn created a system of assessment of behaviour in the detention camps. The people were enlisted in different categories of detention according to their behaviour and obedience to the detention rules.¹⁰⁴ People became “bare lives” to borrow the concept from Giorgio Agamben.¹⁰⁵ No political representation was vested, with this resulting in the use and most of the time abuse of the people’s lives in favour of the colonial system.

Another side of the emergency regime was the application of collective punishments. In response to guerrilla actions the British authorities proceeded to instate curfews and collective fines. In Tanjong Malim Perak for example, General Templer imposed a 22 hour curfew for the reason that the inhabitants of the city failed to adequately inform the security forces on any guerrilla actions.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the city’s inhabitants were requested to fill out a form which would provide any valuable information on the guerrillas. As is already easily understood, the emergency granted powers of control over the population but also over space. Emergency regulations allowed the creation of restricted areas in which all the everyday actions were under supervision by an officer.¹⁰⁷

The Malayan emergency created a blueprint of lessons learned. For the British officials the most important flaw was the inability to prevent and foresee the revolt. As the report concludes strictly: “the best means of preventing or restricting the scope of such a revolt are a permanent intelligence system (Special Branch) of adequate size and quality covering the whole country”.¹⁰⁸ Equally important was a well equipped and well integrated police force. The police force in Malaya was small in numbers, unequipped and alienated from the society. Furthermore, for the British officials conducting the report, it was also vital that a successful supervision of the educational program was taking place. The control of education was unquestionable, as it

¹⁰³ R.D Renick Jnr, ‘The Emergency regulations of Malaya causes and effect’, p.24.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.25.

¹⁰⁵ G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, (Stanford University Press, 1998).

¹⁰⁶ R.D Renick Jnr, ‘The Emergency regulations of Malaya causes and effect’, p.27.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.28.

¹⁰⁸ TNA, FCO 141/4233, “Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.”, p.25-26.

was one of the first steps which would lead to pro-British population. The successful conduct of the guerrilla counter attack required from the security forces to have an established support and connection to the population. It was well known that winning a struggle clearly depended on winning over the population.

Efficient propaganda services were required for the control of the population. In Malaya propaganda was conveyed through leaflets, newspapers, word of mouth and by airplanes flying over the continent and broadcasting to the public. The psychological warfare, as it was described by the officials, was of high importance. In 1956, Voice Aircraft flew 2.246 sorties and 100.157.000 strategic and tactical leaflets.¹⁰⁹ News was also spread through the radio whereas surrendered communists were also used as propaganda means.¹¹⁰ However in the case of the British counterinsurgencies, the counter measures mainly alienated the population. Besides the problems, the Malayan emergency was a successful counter-insurgency. The Kenyan policy was highly affected by the actions undertaken in Malaya. As was already shown, the villagisation policy was an effective measure taken also against the Kikuyu. Sir Gerald Templer, was one of the links between the two insurgencies. He provided governor Baring with the blueprint of the Malayan emergency regulations.¹¹¹ All of the legal work done for the Malayan emergency and empowering the emergency legislation was also exported in Kenya. The emergency measures undertaken in Kenya resembled the successful example of Malaya.

The colonial resemblance in the counterinsurgency measures and the state of emergency application between Malaya and Kenya does not mean that the two colonies were identical. From the military side operations took place in an area of jungle and forest with operations also taking place in built up areas. The federation of Malaya was larger than the colony of Kenya, in terms of population, however, the numbers between the two colonies were similar.¹¹² Both countries were multi-racial, in Malaya the three races had comparable standards of living, whereas in Kenya this was not the case with the three main races having different standards of living. Furthermore, Kenya was differentiated from Malaya because of the presence of the European settlers, an element that did not exist in Malaya.¹¹³ Differences existed also in terms of

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.8, p.16.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, p.101.

¹¹² TNA, FCO 141/4233, "Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.", p.9.

¹¹³ Ibid.

the type of guerrillas that the British forces came up against. The MCP was defined by the British as the "Malayan Branch of international communism" with the aim to overthrow the government and establish a communist controlled "People's Republic", whereas the Mau Mau movement was a secret religious society derived mainly from the Kikuyu tribe with main goal to drive out of the country the Europeans and later the Asians.¹¹⁴ The distinct elements that exist among Malaya and Kenya in specific and the rest of the colonies in general verifies the hybrid character of the state of emergency. The state of emergency created a link between different colonial realities. As the Chief of Staff Colonel Rimbault underlined in his memorandum in August 1953:

"Experience has so far shown that the tactical doctrine for operations against Mau-Mau in Kenya can be based to a large extent on lessons learnt from operations against the communists in Malaya as well as from operations in Kenya in the last seven months. There are of course major differences between the two, particularly in climate, terrain and in the characteristics of the enemy. Those do not however form a reason for not profiting by experience in Malaya, and there are many similarities between the two campaigns."¹¹⁵

This colonial continuity between the emergencies was created in two ways. Firstly, the application of the same systems, in this case the state of emergency but more importantly through the people on the ground. The individuals were those who applied the state of emergency and created the realities under which the system would be implemented. Sir Gerald Templer, as was already mentioned, passed on to governor Baring the blueprint on the emergency regulations. Templer however was not the only one. Thomas Askwith was one of Kenya's colonial officials who travelled to Malaya to be personally taught by Templer on the methods of counterinsurgency and especially the rehabilitation method which was successfully used in both emergencies. Askwith monitored the detention camps, rehabilitation camps, emergency villages and the effect of the emergency regulations in Malaya.¹¹⁶ As Caroline Elkins notes in her book on the Kenya Emergency, the observations that Askwith made during his stay in Malaya would result in similar policies in Kenya as well.¹¹⁷ Askwith's tour report in 1953

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p.10.

¹¹⁵ "GHQ East Africa, Training Instruction Number 7 Operations against the Mau Mau" in H. Bennet and D.French (eds.), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine* (Army Records Society, 2013), p.53.

¹¹⁶ Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, p.103.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

underlined about the detention camps: “the detention camps in Malaya were regarded not as punitive institutions but as opportunities to alter the attitude of the communist sympathisers and reinstall confidence in the British colonial government”.¹¹⁸ The colonial mindset on counter-insurgency was being formed and re-applied to new cases.

In June 1953, a confidential letter from the Secretary of State for War stated that General Erskine would be appointed Commander in Chief East Africa and “[...] is required to restore law and order in Kenya. For this purpose he will exercise full command over all Colonial, Auxiliary, Police and Security Forces in Kenya”.¹¹⁹ The governor retained authority over the administration of the Colony. However it was stated in the letter that priority should be given to any security and military measures that General Erskine considered necessary for the “restoration of law and order”.¹²⁰ Erskine was also an important link that shows the continuity between the emergencies. General Erskine, was born on 23 August 1899 and following his father’s footsteps he went into the army with his first commission being in 1918 into the King’s Royal Rifle Corps. From 1919-1922 Erskine served in Ireland where he took part in counterinsurgency operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA).¹²¹ After graduating from Staff College, Erskine served in India from 1931-1934. In 1941 he was appointed as Brigadier commanding the 69th Infantry Brigade. His first counterinsurgency command experience came when Erskine was appointed as General Officer Commanding (GOC) for the British troops in Egypt. General Erskine remained in Egypt until 1952 where he was in charge of conducting operations in villages in the Suez Canal Zone. The Egypt experience showed how Erskine could follow more strict methods of dealing with armed insurgents and that made him the perfect man for the posting in Kenya against the Mau Mau.¹²² From June 1953 General Erskine assumed full control from General Hinde of all the operations in Kenya. With the army following his orders the main goal was the defeat of all the “terrorist gangs” as the Mau Mau were defined.¹²³

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ “Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War to C in C in East Africa. May 1953.” in Imperial War Museum (IWM), London, Box 75-134-1.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ IWM, Box 75-134-1, p.1.

¹²² H. Bennet and D.French (eds.), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine*, p.2- 4.

¹²³ IWM, Box 75-134-4, *The Kenya Picture*, issued by G.H.Q East Africa, 1954, p.9.



Image 1: British Forces Identification Card: General Sir George Erskine¹²⁴

The positioning of General Erskine as director of operations was a decision which was taken unanimously by important members of the colonial office and military staff. One of the people who also agreed that a more robust approach was necessary in the Kenya Emergency, was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Harding. Sir John Harding during the Kenya Emergency became one of the personal advisors of Erskine concerning matters of the Emergency. Erskine on a BBC broadcast upon his arrival stated:

“my first task is to explain to the people of Kenya why I am here. From bitter personal experience you must know much more about Mau Mau than I do- I only know that this Evil Creed has led to crimes of the greatest savagery and violence and the respect for law and order must be restored without delay.”¹²⁵

Erskine was determined to shutter the “evil creed” and safeguard the colonial status quo. Harding was one of the main associates for the achievement of the goal. In June 14th 1953, General Erskine sent a letter to Field Marshal Sir John Harding with his first impressions concerning the situation in Kenya. In his letter Erskine stated how he thought that among the communities there was goodwill towards the British. Nonetheless, he pointed out the problem of the Mau Mau and more specifically how the military forces were inadequate and unprepared in certain areas in Kenya.¹²⁶ Following that, he informed Harding of his plans concerning the use of the army and the operations that were to be taken against the Mau Mau. Erskine’s and Harding’s contact may have not been day to day, however Erskine kept Harding informed on the matters of concern and any problems that may have existed. Closing his letter Erskine wrote to Harding: “I

¹²⁴ IWM Box 75-134-1.

¹²⁵ “Broadcast by C in C about 24hrs after arrival in evening at about 9 p.m. after BBC news”, in H. Bennet, D. French (eds.), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine*, p.30.

¹²⁶ “General sir George Erskine to Field Marshal Sir John Harding, 14 June 1953”, in *ibid.*, p.31.

will let you know if operations do not pan out as I hope- otherwise I hope that you will see a steady improvement".¹²⁷

The communication between General Sir George Erskine and Field Marshal Sir John Harding was mainly monthly. With Harding being Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Erskine was obliged to keep him updated on the course of the Kenya Emergency. Therefore, the letters to Harding contained details on the positions of the army and the police, the discipline and the effect that the operations had on the political and social life in Kenya.¹²⁸



Image 2: Sir John Harding¹²⁹

Sir John Harding was a highly experienced officer. Harding was born on 10 February 1896 in South Petherton. Although Harding did not come from a military family, with his decisiveness he succeeded in becoming in May 1914 second lieutenant in the 1st battalion 11th London Regiment. Harding's military experiences begin with the Dardanelles campaign in 1915, Egypt (1917) and India (1919-1927).¹³⁰ In 1939 he took command of the 1st battalion in India. After the end of the Second World War Harding got a posting in Malaya as Commander in Chief. Harding's contribution to the "Malayan Emergency" was significant with the Special Commissioner Malcolm Macdonald paying explicit salute to Harding's input. From 1952-1955

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ "General Sir George Erskine to Field Marshal Sir John Harding, 9 July 1953" in H. Bennet and D. French (eds), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine*, p.44-45.

¹²⁹ [Google images](#).

¹³⁰ D. Hunt, 'Harding, John [Allan Francis], first Baron Harding of Petherton (1896–1989), army officer' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (23 Sep. 2004), Accessed 13 Jan. 2020.

his position as Chief of the Imperial General Staff provided him with influence and also an active part in the Kenya Emergency.¹³¹

Sir John Harding could be described as a living link between the colonial emergencies. The Malayan experience was the first one which formed Harding's and the other general's counter-insurgency methods. In 1955, Brigadier M.C.A. Henniker wrote a book on the Malayan Emergency. The fact that the author was a British military man could already be seen by the title of the book: "Red Shadow Over Malaya"¹³² The title of the book showed the political tone that the Malayan Emergency embraced. Furthermore, in this book the colonial framing is apparent as the Malayan fighters were described as "bandits" and "terrorists".¹³³ Henniker explains the advantage of the state of emergency counter to martial law. On his account martial law would increase support among the insurgents for the reason that martial law would provoke as he stated "miscarriages of justice".¹³⁴ On the contrary, the State of emergency was considered as the best option as: "a State of emergency can bring in new Regulations that give summary powers to Civil, Police and Military Authorities. [...] It gives the Government all the advantages of the Martial Law without the bother of setting up new machinery".¹³⁵ Harding forwarding the book wrote: "I commend this book to all readers as a story of which not only Brigadier Henniker and his gallant troops but the whole British people can justly be proud".¹³⁶ The Malayan Emergency enclosed a wisdom in which the British officials would look back at and utilise.

Harding's experiences in Malaya were utilised in his role as advisor in the Kenya Emergency. At the end of February 1954, both Harding and the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton visited Erskine in Kenya to observe the situation. In March 1954, Erskine wrote: "The visit of the Secretary of State and CIGS has been most useful and we have done some useful business."¹³⁷ The course of the Kenya Emergency was not abandoned in the hands of inexperienced people. On the contrary, qualified military men with previous experiences took care of the next emergency. Both the Malayan and Kenya emergencies created a depository of

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² M.C.A. Henniker, *Red Shadow Over Malaya* (William Blackwood & Sons LTD. Edinburgh and London, 1955).

¹³³ Ibid., p.43.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.155.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.xiv.

¹³⁷ "General Sir George Erskine to Robert Erskine 12 March 1954", in H. Bennet and D.French (eds), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine*, p.165.

knowledge ready to be used in the next emergency. Sir John Harding, with the Malayan and Kenya emergencies in his military saga, was later appointed governor during the Cyprus Emergency. Cyprus was a distinct colony from many points of view. Nonetheless, two really important remarks can classify it as another colonial emergency, that is the state of emergency and secondly the people on the ground, in this case sir John Harding. With these two characteristics Cyprus became one more colonial war that had to be fought within the Imperial Commonwealth.

3. (De-)Colonial Cyprus

On April 1st, 1955, bombs exploded in different parts of Nicosia. This marked the beginning of what the British called the Cyprus Emergency. The small island in the Eastern Mediterranean, came under British jurisdiction in 1878 representing the need of the Imperial power to safeguard their way to India. In 1914, Turkey's alliance with Germany led Britain to the annexation of the island. The geographical position of the island ensured naval dominance for the British both in the Eastern Mediterranean and strong presence also over the Middle East. In July 1923, with the Treaty of Lausanne, Cyprus became a Crown Colony.¹³⁸ The island was administered by the Governor. The Governor besides the autonomy, was liable to the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Secretary was liable to the British Government. The island was divided into districts with the District Commissioner in charge and answerable to the Governor. Cyprus as other British dependencies worked under the philosophy that the colonies have to "pay their own way." This did not allow the positioning of many British officials in administering positions. The connection between the 617 villages of Cyprus and the colonial administration was created through the local "Mukhtar." This was the representative of the village to the administration. This position was mostly covered by a Turkish-Cypriot and this in turn created lack of trust from the Greek-Cypriot society. The Greek-Cypriots often considered them as traitors or spies in favour of the colonial government. As a result by 1957 many of them were murdered or quit their rank.¹³⁹

Cyprus as a colonial case has two main characteristics. Firstly, Cyprus consisted of two communities, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. Both communities felt a special relationship with Greece and Turkey accordingly. With the beginning of the decolonisation war against Britain, a deep division between the two communities was generated, or even fabricated. As it will be shown later, the British forces used the Turkish Cypriot community in the police forces, and this gradually led to the creation of hatred among the two communities. Secondly, the Greek-Cypriots did not request independence as it happened in other colonies, but Enosis (Union) to another country. This in result involved Greece and Turkey into the Cyprus case. The peculiarity also made the British officials question as to what kind of problem they were dealing

¹³⁸ X. A. Ρίχτερ, *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, τόμος πρώτος (1878-1949), (μτφ. Κώστας Σαρρόπουλος), (Βιβλιοπωλείον της Εστίας, Αθήνα, 2007), p. 33-36.

¹³⁹ F. Crouzet, *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946-1959*, vol.A, (μτφ. Αριστοτέλης Φρυδάς), (Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, Αθήνα 2011), p.46, 49-50.

with. Was Cyprus an international problem, was it a political problem or was it a colonial problem?¹⁴⁰

One final element that existed in the Cyprus case was the strong position of the Greek-Orthodox Church. Before it was mentioned that sir John Harding was in negotiations with Archbishop Makarios. In Cyprus the position of the Ethnarchy was occupied by a member of the clergy. In that case the Church had direct access and interference into politics. For the British administration the power of the Church was really threatening for the future of the British in the island. The British administration was discussing the proscription and exclusion of the clergy from the legislature as “it provides the background in which EOKA terrorism is able to flourish”¹⁴¹ In the 1950’s, the Church’s power was represented through the powerful figure of Archbishop Makarios the Third. Makarios was both a religious figure but also a political figure with a strong presence in the political affairs of the island. David French in his book presents the description of Makarios done by a journalist:

“Every Sunday in the early 1950s he preached in a different village church. ‘The peasants come in their hundreds—men, women and children. [...] In the middle of the congregation stands a flag-bearer with a large Greek flag which accompanies the Archbishop everywhere. The Archbishop himself, a handsome man of imposing stature, looks splendid in his rich gowns of golden and silver brocades and silks. A golden crown rests firmly on his abundant wavy black hair. His black beard is neatly trimmed. His voice is soft and musical and he speaks without oratorical tricks. His message on these occasions is always the same. ‘Cyprus has known many conquerors in the past. Now it is face-to-face with the last of its conquerors. Your Church has preserved the flame of religion and nationalism through all these centuries. It will lead you get to liberty and deliver you from foreign rule.’¹⁴²

Makarios was committed to fighting on all fronts for the achievement of Enosis (Union). His position as an Archbishop and the strong religious feeling that existed among the Greek-Cypriots allowed Makarios to use it as a political persuasive weapon. Makarios controlled the

¹⁴⁰ TNA, FO 371/1176675, *Cyprus question and Enosis*, p.25.

¹⁴¹ TNA, FCO 141/4227, *Measures to control the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church*.

¹⁴² D. French, *Fighting EOKA. The British Counterinsurgency Campaign on Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.40.

political aspect of the struggle whereas George Grivas was the leader of the military campaign. Harding described Archbishop Makarios as a man of “great ambition.”¹⁴³

“He was a skilful negotiator with all the tradition in political intrigue of the Greek Orthodox Church behind him. He was evasive in arguments and discussions but he had considerable charm and was a man of character and determination though completely ruthless and unscrupulous. That impression was of course built up during my first few meetings with him. My impression was that he fulfilled in every degree the description that he was sly, scheming medieval prelate. I went into my discussions with him not prejudiced one way or another. I found him very stubborn and very evasive but always ready to try and leave a door open to keep the thing going or to try and get his own way.”¹⁴⁴

Makarios’s strong political maturity influenced and led the EOKA struggle in multiple aspects. Makarios also acknowledged the strong power that the youth would give to the struggle. Therefore, under his blessings, PEON (Pancyprian National Youth Organisation) was established in 1951. The young students, members of PEON were actively taking part in anti-British riots and thus gradually creating a polemic climate which in 1955 would lead to EOKA and the anti-colonial struggle.¹⁴⁵ In 1953, PEON was banished after the organisation of riots in the island against the coronation of Queen Elisabeth II.¹⁴⁶ The once members of PEON switched to the pre-existing Christian organisation O.X.E.N (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth). O.X.E.N was founded in November 1939 with the manifesto to oppose communism and any other irreligious organisations. By 1955, the organisation was estimated to number 3.000 members. According to a police report of July 1955: “O.X.E.N’s religious character had not prevented it from mixing in politics and it was taking an active part in politics as many of its members had become fanatic Enosis agitators and in some O.X.E.N clubs religion is only used as a cover for inculcating subversive beliefs.”¹⁴⁷ According to Grivas’s diaries held by the British intelligence, O.X.E.N was one of the main sources where EOKA members were recruited. And other references connect O.X.E.N to arm smuggling as well for the purposes of the struggle.¹⁴⁸ The use of

¹⁴³ TNA, FCO 141/4458, *Official Government Review of the Emergency in Cyprus*.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA. The British Counterinsurgency Campaign on Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.40.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ TNA, FCO 141/4227 *Measures to control the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church*.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

religion as a political tool led to the church's supremacy over the Greek-Cypriot society and created a strong and united Enosis movement. In the Greek-Cypriot mindset the Enosis request was not just a political request but it encapsulated a divine character. The powerful position of the Church was also represented through the referendum in favour of the Enosis that was organised in the 1950's. The striking result of 94.6% in favour of the Enosis showed the influence of the Church and it established the Church as representative of the movement at a moment when the Left represented by A.K.E.L gained power.¹⁴⁹ The British administration was not oblivious on the strong influence of the Church and its organisations. However the proscription of the organisation was not an easy decision and concealed risks which could affect the image of the British administration towards the society. On the discussion whether O.X.E.N should be considered an illegal organisation it was stated that: "to take action against the child (O.X.E.N) whilst leaving the mother (the Church) free would serve no purpose."¹⁵⁰

These characteristics applied to the unique character of the Greek-Cypriot struggle against the British. The Enosis movement was an unexpected challenge for the British forces and threatening for the future of the British Empire.

Already from 1878, the Greek-Cypriot desire for Enosis (Union) with Greece, was apparent. The Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos when he welcomed General Wesley in Larnaca in July 22, 1878 stated how they accepted the new reality with the British presence and how they felt that Great Britain would assist to the achievement of the long desired Union of Cyprus with the mother land Greece.¹⁵¹ The aspiration of Union had long been desired by the Greek-Cypriots. At first, the British presence renewed the hope for the Union with Greece. In the long run it was to be proven that the island acquired a strategic importance for the British to abandon it. The discussions among the British officials reveal the true opinion concerning Cyprus:

"From some of the speeches which are made in various assemblies, one would think that it was merely a question of the British government being in the position of an ageing parent with a growing child. The boy is of age give him his freedom and be done with it. If that was all it was it would be very simple and indeed it would be so simple that it would no have worried this particular administration because I have no doubt it would have been done long ago. [...] On the question of sovereignty our

¹⁴⁹ R. Holland, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας 1954-1959* (μτφ. Βίλλυ Φωτοπούλου), (Ποταμός, 2001), p.44.

¹⁵⁰ TNA, FCO 141/4227 *Measures to control the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church*.

¹⁵¹ Α. Βαρνάβας, *Ιστορία του απελευθερωτικού αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ (1955-1959)*, (Σειρά ΑΔ: Πηγές και βοηθήματα για τον αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ, αρ.5, Ίδρυμα απελευθερωτικού αγώνα ΕΟΚΑ 1955-1959, Λευκωσία, 2002), p.9.

position is clear. We do not see quite plainly conditions likely to arise in the Eastern Mediterranean in the near future or I would go further and say in any foreseeable future where Cyprus could be firmly annexed to Greece without devastating results both upon the friendship of the Greek and Turkish people and the general security system upon which all the free countries of Europe and indeed the World depend.”¹⁵²

The small island in the Eastern Mediterranean acquired a significant position for the British geostrategic interests. The desire for Enosis, however, was apparent throughout the years. 1955, was the year when the struggle against the British began and a few months later a state of emergency was declared. Nevertheless, indications of the polemic climate that would follow appeared throughout the years with the most noticeable the riots of October 1931. The 1931 riots against Storrs and his legislation indicated that the Enosis movement was gaining momentum. The British administration which consisted of a really weak and unequipped police force was unprepared for that attack which resulted in the burn down of the Governor’s house.¹⁵³ The 1931 riots was one strong indicator of the troubles that would follow. It was considered one of the most humiliating hits against the British administration. The British reaction led to what remained in public memory as “Palmerokratia” (1933-1939).¹⁵⁴ Six years of a strict administration with illiberal laws which mirrored the need of the British to gain back the dominance over the island. However at the same time the 1931 riots explain why the British were unable to foresee the beginning of the EOKA struggle. In their minds the Enosis movement would continue to be expressed only through riots and not in a form of an organised struggle. For the British the Cypriot people were seen as peaceful, docile and unable to organise something which could threaten the status quo.¹⁵⁵ According to general Baker:

“The whole attitude of the Government towards the threat of violence was conditioned by the experience of 1931. There was general awareness that violence might break out at any time. But it was generally assumed that it would follow the pattern of the ill organised and more or less spontaneous disturbances in 1931 that it would be of short duration though disagreeable by a show of force as had happened in previous affairs. The belief was widely held that Greek Cypriots were not capable of sustained

¹⁵² TNA, FO 371/1176675 *Cyprus question and Enosis*.

¹⁵³ Holland, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας 1954-1959*, p. 15-18.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.22.

¹⁵⁵ D. French, ‘British intelligence and the Origins of the EOKA Insurgency’, *British Journal of Military History*, 1:2 (2015), p.89-91.

terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The government was not alone in that no one in Cyprus including greek Cypriots themselves believed that were capable of a full scale emergency.”¹⁵⁶

The threat that the EOKA struggle created to the British interests led the administration to the application of a known and successful colonial tool in counterinsurgency, the state of emergency. With the actions against the British on the rise with most memorable the burning down of the British Institute in 17 September 1955 it was high time that a stronger approach was taken. Governor Armitage however was considered incapable of the responsibility of a state of emergency and this led to the positioning of general sir John Harding.¹⁵⁷ With the Malayan and Kenyan emergencies in his military saga, it was time for one last mission, Cyprus.

The replacement of Armitage with sir John Harding, represents the need of the colonial state to gain back the lost control and ensure its interests in the area. The approach to the Cyprus problem ceased to be diplomatic and became a military issue. An experienced military man was called in a position usually held by diplomats. Harding was in office from 3 October 1955 to October 1957. Only one month after he declared the State of emergency to “restore law and order.” Harding became the head of all police and military operations. Before the emergency the command and control structure consisted of the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, Commander of the Cyprus district, senior RAF officer, Attorney General, Resident Naval Officer, Commissioner of Nicosia and Commissioner of Police.¹⁵⁸ After Harding’s arrival, the whole control of the internal security was assumed by him. He abolished the appointment of Director of Security and instead established a chief of staff to be responsible directly to him for the detailed conduct of the Internal Security campaign.¹⁵⁹ Already from his arrival Harding noticed that the Cyprus police force was small and unequipped. One of the first actions for Harding was to expand and equip the police force whereas at the same time he requested from the Colonial office the use of the military in urban security. The military with the Royal Order gained the same rights as the police force.¹⁶⁰ Harding was determined to bring the EOKA insurgency to an

¹⁵⁶ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*.

¹⁵⁷ Α. Κάρυος, ‘Η εμπλοκή του Sir John Harding στο Κυπριακό 1955-1956: Η πολιτική διάσταση’, *Εθνική Φρουρά και Ιστορία*, 37(2016), p.80.

¹⁵⁸ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.14.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ A. R. Novo, ‘Friend or foe ? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency’, *Small Wars and insurgencies*, 23:3 (2012), p.419-420,427.

end as successfully happened in Malaya and Kenya. Charles Foley, journalist and director of the Times of Cyprus described the new governor as a smart and strict man with a notable military career.¹⁶¹

The geo-strategical interests both in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean which surrounded the island of Cyprus, led to actions for the introduction of liberal constitution which would at the same time safeguard the British dominance and interests in the island. That was one of the Governor's first tasks when he arrived in Cyprus. Harding began immediately with the negotiations with Archbishop Makarios for a solution which would create conditions suitable for the introduction of a liberal constitution and the development of self-government.¹⁶² For sir John Harding however, the negotiations could flourish only if "men could speak without fear."¹⁶³ For Harding, success would arrive through military dominance.¹⁶⁴ Military success in Harding's mind could be achieved through the declaration of the State of emergency which came into effect in November 1955. As Harding believed it was important to retain military control over the main cities of Cyprus and connection to the population. At the same time what was being done was to develop an organisation similar to that built up in Malaya and Kenya for the running Security Operations on tripartite or three member team basis both certainly in each of the districts and to provide any other organisation to enable control from there.¹⁶⁵ On December 1, 1955 AKEL published an article in the newspaper *Neos Demokratias* concerning the emergency. On the newspaper the article was critical on the measures that Harding imposed on the island, that were considered similar to the illiberal period of *Palmerocracy*. At the same time clear lines were drawn between fascist regimes and Harding's administration. According to the article:

"Ten years after the great anti-fascist war during which abundant blood was shed for freedom; ten years after that titanic battle against the forces of darkness, subjugation and violence a battle to which the people of Cyprus contributed to the utmost of their power our people are today the target of an all-sided attack and are threatened with the most oppressive measures because they vindicate their inalienable right to live free. This is an irony in view of the vociferous declaration of our British rulers. The present British attitude points to the inconsistency of the so called free world. The inconsistency of

¹⁶¹ C. Foley, *Island in Revolt* (Longmans,1962), p.44.

¹⁶² TNA, FCO 141/4458, *Official Government Review of the Emergency in Cyprus*, p.13.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ TNA, FCO 141/4458, *Official Government Review of the Emergency in Cyprus*.

those who voted against the inscription of the Cyprus question on U.N.O agenda; it is a blow on everything which is sacred and inviolable in the world; it shows once more that behind big words, promises and declarations on principles, imperialism and its interests are hidden.”¹⁶⁶

AKEL’s statement echoes the feeling that the greek-Cypriots had over the new illiberal regime that Harding’s state of emergency represented. This consisted of the main argument that appeared in all of the propaganda discourse. The British actions became equivalent to the Nazi actions during the Second World War. The State of emergency came in contradiction with the Human Rights context in which Great Britain also vigorously supported after the end of the Second World War. The Emergency however for the British colonial system was the way into sovereignty and success.

Sir John Harding from his part in an interview to Woodrow Wyatt explains the geo-strategic importance of Cyprus and how the occupation of military bases was not enough.

“Well if Cyprus was only concerned as far as we are concerned with Greece -with NATO- well that would be - that would be all right. But for us Cyprus is directly concerned with all our military effort in the Middle East. It is the nerve centre of our whole Middle East military organisations; it houses a large part of the Middle- British Middle East land and air garrison and it contains certain installations which serve British forces throughout the Middle East. Also reinforcements are needed anywhere in the Middle East for British military requirements, they go through Cyprus or assemble there.”¹⁶⁷

For the British sovereignty only through the bases was not adequate. Their military interests in the Middle East and Israel could come in contradiction with Greece and its active influence in Cyprus. Therefore, Union was out of the question. Cyprus had to remain within the British influence.¹⁶⁸

For sir John Harding, the empowerment of the police force was in the priority list. The police force was small, unequipped and with low morale and low wages. With the beginning of the struggle many, especially the Greek-cypriots quit their ranks.¹⁶⁹ The condition of the police


¹⁶⁶ TNA, FO 371/1176675, *Cyprus question and Enosis*, p.151.

¹⁶⁷ TNA, FO 371/123869: *Cyprus and Enosis*, p.148.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ A. R. Novo, ‘Friend or foe ? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency’, p.419.

force is connected to the condition of the intelligence services. In Cyprus there was not an intelligence organisation which could foresee the outbreak of “terrorism” as the British officials wrote.¹⁷⁰ The peacetime machinery of the island was certainly unprepared for the scale and the type of the struggle. The expenditure on the police force was inadequate. “Millions of pounds were spent on an emergency which an efficient police force provided with a good intelligence service might well have nipped in the bud.”¹⁷¹ This was what general Baker highlighted in his report on the Cyprus emergency. Data drawn from the work of Andrew R. Novo show that in 1953, only 376.000 pounds were invested for the police force. In 1955 with the beginning of the emergency there was an increase to 1,004.000 pounds. The amount of pounds for the police force was gradually increasing since 1955 with 1958 reaching the amount of 3,177.000 pounds.¹⁷²



*Chart 1*¹⁷³

The financial support showed that London was not oblivious to the importance of Cyprus. Coming out of a costly Second World War, they did invest on the emergency. It is also worth noticing that during the Suez Crisis and the financial catastrophe that this meant for Britain, the government kept increasing the funding for the purposes of the emergency. With the financial support, the British aimed in expanding the police force. By 1959, the number of the Cyprus Police Force expanded from 1.397 to 2.278 including the special regiment from the UK.

¹⁷⁰ FCO 141/4459 The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker, p.9.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.




Chart 2¹⁷⁴

At the same time as it can also be shown from the second chart in the years 1954- 1956 a transition on the consistency of the Cyprus Police force can be shown. In 1954 the Cyprus Police Force consisted of a percentage of 62.6 % of greek Cypriots whereas in 1956 the Greek Cypriots represented a percentage of 28% and the Turkish Cypriots 47%. In 1957 the Turkish Cypriots reached the peak of 51%.¹⁷⁵ From 1955 two new police regiments were created, the Auxiliary Police which was assisting the Cyprus Police Force, and consisted mainly of Turkish Cypriots with no previous training. The Mobile Reserve slightly more professional also consisted of Turkish Cypriots. The social division which became even more apparent in the next years was being formulated during the struggle years with the Turkish Cypriots fighting in the Police against the Greek-Cypriots. The main reason behind this change in the consistency of the Police Force was firstly the death threats from EOKA against those who would support the British in any way. On a second level, most of the resignations happened because of the feeling of support to the cause that existed among the Greek-Cypriots.

The emergency legislation was described as necessary because of the “weakness in the normal laws to maintain law and order.”¹⁷⁶ The emergency legislation covered a wide range of laws that dealt with restriction of movement, curfews, freedom of speech, control of media, restriction of assembly of more than five people, arrests without warrant, detention, collective

¹⁷⁴ D. M. Anderson, ‘Policing and communal conflict: The Cyprus emergency 1954-1960’, in R. Holland, *Emergencies and Disorders in the European Empires after 1945* (Routledge, 2012),p.190.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ TNA, FCO 141/4459, The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker, p.30.

measures of control and punishment, exile of unwanted people, propaganda, control of ports and movement.¹⁷⁷ What Lawrence Durrell, who served at the intelligence service for two years, underlined was that the “political freedom of the citizen came as a secondary issue if safety on the street could not be guaranteed.”¹⁷⁸

“The Detention of Persons, Regulation 18B” of 1955 without trial law drew a lot of criticism to the administration, especially concerning human rights. However, from the point of view of the British administration, it was considered necessary for “the breakup of the terrorist organisation.”¹⁷⁹ There was a categorisation of how dangerous a person was considered. If the person was low on the list then restriction orders were issued against him. For those labelled as dangerous the administration went on with the detention of the person without the need of a trial. Detention camps were established following the successful example of Kenya and Malaya. As Baker notes in his report: “[...] in the camp good work was done by the Government welfare staff in conditioning men and youths to a return to normal life.”¹⁸⁰

Following the “Detention of Persons” law, the collective measures for control and punishment were also considered illiberal. The aim of the collective punishments had a dual final purpose; first against the EOKA organisation and secondly as a deterrent toward the society. The measures included collective fines, curfews, closure of places, eviction from buildings, restriction of movement. The British considered the collective punishments vital in order to: “bring home to the ordinary people the hard fact that the results of terrorism include hardship to themselves and so to create conditions predisposing people in favour of a political settlement.”¹⁸¹ Both the army and police had the right to stop any individual on the street for inspection, people were stripped off their clothes anywhere. The security forces had also the right to break into every public or private space for inspection at any time.¹⁸² Collective fines were imposed on whole villages when active EOKA action existed close by and the villagers were not willing to share any information.¹⁸³ The collective fines, although successful at first,

¹⁷⁷ Public Information Office Library, *Legislation of the year 1955. vol. II. Subsidiary Legislation*, Nicosia, p.715.

¹⁷⁸ Λ. Ντάρρελ, *Πικρολέμνα*, (μτφ. Αιμίλιος Χουρμούζιος), (Εκδόσεις Γρηγόρη, Αθήναι, 1959), p.236.

¹⁷⁹ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.36.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.37.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.38.

¹⁸² Public Information Office Library, p.725-730.

¹⁸³ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.38.

were revoked in March 1957 after already having lost effect as EOKA was refunding the suffering villages.¹⁸⁴

According to the emergency legislation, the ownership of guns and ammunition was forbidden. In the case of breach of the law or also creation of a bomb, the person could be charged with death penalty. The introduction of the death penalty within the context of the state of emergency was also a known technique. Robert Holland, underlines how the introduction of the death penalty shows the thin line that existed for a person being considered innocent or guilty.¹⁸⁵ However, because of the position of Cyprus and the easier outreach to Europe the death penalty was not applied as extensively as in the other colonies. During the course of the emergency people were sentenced to death but in the end 9 people were killed. The hanging of these 9 EOKA fighters broadened the gap between the colonial administration and the society.¹⁸⁶ In the eyes of the people the hanged turned into heroes, into martyrs for the cause. Furthermore, as it will also be extensively analysed in the next chapter, the death penalty law was severely criticised by the Cyprus Bar Council and Greece, and was reported to the UN. It actively contradicted Britain's role as an ambassador of Human Rights and an Imperial power in defence. In general the majority of the accused were sentenced to prison to life. In 1958, 12 people who were sentenced to death were pardoned of the accusation. The example of the death penalty law shows how although the state of emergency was a colonial tool in counterinsurgency, some laws were adapted to the reality of the colony.

The curfews were also widely used during the emergency. The curfews were of two types: operational and preventive. The operational curfew was imposed for a few hours or days in order to assist the actions of the Security Forces. The preventive curfew was used both as a means of avoiding riotous assemblies and also of restricting EOKA's freedom of movement.¹⁸⁷ A remarking example is the curfew that was imposed in Nicosia for 72 hrs after murderous offences on Ledra street. The chief of the police Martin Clement after imposing the curfew stated that now it was the time for everyone to give to the police the information needed. In every household there was given an envelope in which everyone could write any information on EOKA. The result was unexpected for the authorities as they only received back blank

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Holland, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας 1954-1959*, p.272.

¹⁸⁶ F. Crouzet, *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946-1959*, p.574-575.

¹⁸⁷ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.38.

envelopes.¹⁸⁸ This on the one hand showed the support that the Greek-Cypriot community gave to EOKA and also the fact that the emergency measures were ineffective and actually alienated the society from the administration. These emergency legislations could also be described as technologies of fear and exclusion. The people were deprived from their political rights, the bodies of the people became objects of political dominance. The control of the person in specific and the whole of the society became critical for the government.¹⁸⁹

An active part which supported the struggle in multiple ways was the youth. The British took specific measures which concerned the control of the education, schools and the involvement of the students in riots. Students were charged for participation in riots, offences to security forces, throwing of home-made bombs and distribution of EOKA leaflets. The juveniles were charged with fines which were paid by their parents or sentenced to imprisonment in the Central prison. In November 1955, for the young offenders under 18, whipping was introduced.¹⁹⁰ In Cyprus the elementary school education was British controlled, however the syllabus, discipline and regulations of the secondary schools was Greek oriented. The books and the pensions of the Greek-Cypriot teachers were provided by the Greek Ministry of Education. Harding in order to deal with the riotous students in the schools went on with the closing down of schools. At the same time he proceeded with the exile of many secondary school teachers of Greek nationality. For Harding they were considered as “known troublemakers.”¹⁹¹ By March 1956, 38 secondary schools with an estimated 16.410 students were closed.¹⁹² Brigadier G.H Baker stated that the factor that assisted most in the flourishing of the EOKA movement was the inability of the British administration to control secondary education.¹⁹³ The student riots contributed actively to the EOKA struggle. At first students were organising riots on national celebration days later riots were organised as an answer to government decisions and state of emergency laws. As Robert Holland accurately notices: “the security forces in the island were occupied with chasing schoolboys.”¹⁹⁴ In 1955, 21 secondary schools participated in riots. For Grivas, the secondary

¹⁸⁸ Foley, *Island in Revolt*, p.68.

¹⁸⁹ Δ. Μακρυνιώτη (επίμ.), *Τα όρια του σώματος. Διεπιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις*, (μτφ. Κώστας Αθανασίου, Κική Καψαμπέλη, Μαριάννα Κονδύλη, Θόδωρος Παρασκευόπουλος), (Νήσος, Αθήνα, 2004), p.16, 29.

¹⁹⁰ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.42.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.53.

¹⁹² Crouzet, *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946-1959*, p.569.

¹⁹³ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*.

¹⁹⁴ Holland, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας 1954-1959*, 167-173.

schools consisted of the source for the future EOKA fighters. A memorable event which depicts the power of the students in the Cyprus struggle was the “battle of the flags” as it remained in public memory. After a law that did not allow courses being held under a foreign flag, the students would put down the British flags and raise Greek flags. This resulted in the closing of the school and British regiments going to schools put down the greek flags.

The counterinsurgency measures created one aspect of the emergency. The second aspect of the emergency was the British propaganda which was utilised in order to assist the image of the British administration. As Charalambos Alexandrou describes in his article as “bloodless war of propaganda and anti-propaganda.”¹⁹⁵ Already with the emergency regulations control and censorship existed over the press and the radio.¹⁹⁶ As a result these means were used for the conduct of colonial propaganda. Propaganda was also actively spread through leaflets. Alexandrou describes it as “a war” for the reason that leaflets were created both from the Colonial administration and the EOKA organisation. The leaflets could either be small texts or just images. The content of the texts was written in simple language that could be understood by everyone. Furthermore, in many cases leaflets were created as an answer to previous leaflets from the other side. From the part of EOKA leaflets were created by the organisation itself whereas the British created their own leaflets and sometimes copied and presented their leaflets as EOKA leaflets. For both sides, the main target of the propaganda was society. Society is the key element when it comes to contesting sides as support or no support defines the success of an organisation or an administration.¹⁹⁷

Britain’s legitimization of its colonial war came through the construction of a criminal community. Through the propaganda leaflets a clear distinction was made between the “Self” and the “Other.” As “Self” was defined the British colonial administration whereas as “Other” the EOKA fighters who were defined as terrorists. The British proceeded with the creation of leaflets which consisted of sketches descriptive to the point that the text was redundant. In the leaflets the British portrayed the EOKA fighters in a threatening for the society framework.

¹⁹⁵ C. Alexandrou , ‘Enlightenment, Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Cyprus, 1955–1959’, in M. Tsianikas, N. Maadad, G. Couvalis, and M. Palaktoglou (eds.), (Flinders University Department of Language Studies-Modern Greek: Adelaide, June 2011), p.129.

¹⁹⁶ TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*, p.44-45.

¹⁹⁷ Alexandrou, ‘Enlightenment, Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Cyprus, 1955–1959’, p.129.



British Propaganda Leaflet 1: "What does Grivas have to offer?"

On the first image for example, George Grivas, and Grigoris Afxentiou second in ranking in the organisation are shown into a dark cave. The cave has the form of a restaurant with Grivas holding a plate with a skull whereas Afxentiou is at the bar creating the bombs. On the table there is the menu with the words: "Violence", "Hatred", "Fear". The menu is the answer to the question underneath: "What does Grivas have to offer?" It was clearly portrayed that EOKA is an organisation which leads to death and "precarious life."¹⁹⁸



British Propaganda Leaflet 2: "EOKA the only obstacle"

¹⁹⁸ State Archives Cyprus, *Προπαγάνδα-Αντιπροπαγάνδα. Απελευθερωτικός Αγώνας 1955-1959* (Nicosia 2014), p.41.

The same concept of “precarious life” can also be seen in the second leaflet. In this case the image is even stronger.¹⁹⁹ An EOKA fighter is depicted as an obstacle to the road to peace and prosperity. To his left there is a pile of skulls whereas to his right a small river of blood. The figure itself has an extreme masculinity, whereas the fighter wears a mask, and holds a gun on his right hand and a bomb on his left hand. In this case, the creation of the criminal Other is evident, and more specifically the creation of a terrorist Other. The colonial Other is portrayed as a figure of fear and death, with raw characteristics and no signs of mercy. The EOKA fighters were excluded from the body of the society as terrorists, dangerous for the well being and progress.

With the definition of the terrorist Other, the British were self-represented as the protectors of the society. As a result the self portrait of the “good guys” allowed the use of extreme measures for “protection”. In this way, propaganda assisted also in the “legitimization” of the state of emergency. During a state of emergency, the limits of legality are extended and actions that in every other case were considered illegal, were framed within a “lawful” environment. Giorgio Agamben's theory on “Bare Life” can also be seen in the propaganda techniques. With the representation of the EOKA fighters as terrorists and criminals, on the one hand, they are given an identity, but the specific identity turns them into “bare lives”, with result any measures against them being legalised.²⁰⁰ The criminalisation of the Other, the withdrawal of any rights. As Kahn underlines: “Criminals have no right of self defence against the police [...] There is a corresponding depoliticalization of the violence of crime: it is not political threat but personal pathology. Law enforcement aims to prevent the violence of the criminal from becoming a source of collective self-expression.”²⁰¹ The distinction between the enemy and the criminal applies to the new way of irregular warfare. The decolonization wars did not consist of armies but irregular forces which were hiding in remote areas and were attacking suddenly against specific targets and people who were considered a threat.

To a second level, the leaflets should be analysed with regards to the society that they referred to. It could possibly be argued that the fear that these leaflets wished to provoke could be connected to the notion of “precarious life.” As Judith Butler underlines in her work: “Precarious life” [...] is based upon on how easily human life is annuled.” The concept itself refers to the fear


¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.52.

²⁰⁰ G.Agamben, *Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998).

²⁰¹ P. Kahn, ‘Criminal and Enemy in the Political Imagination’, *Yale Review* 99:1 (January 2011),p.149.

and anxiety of loss which in turn deters from violent actions. In the case of Cyprus, the concept of precarious life can perhaps be seen from the part of society. The Other, in this case the EOKA fighters are the ones responsible for the precarious life of the citizens. If reversed, the citizens are in this stage of fear which assists in viewing the Self (the British) as the solution out of this anxiety and fear of loss. In that way again the British could legitimise and frame their actions within this specific notion.

The formation and description of the identity of the EOKA fighters, must also be analysed within the framework of the Cold War. The decolonization war of the 1950's is part of the wider Cold War notions and fears of the communist threat.



British Propaganda Leaflet 3: Depiction of the leader George Grivas

The third leaflet is an illustration of the leader of the EOKA organisation, George Grivas.²⁰² The leader is portrayed as an evil menace towards the innocent young schoolchildren. The current leaflet has an actual reference to the participation of many schoolchildren into the struggle. In general, the EOKA struggle was favoured by the Greek-Cypriot society. Many teenagers were participating in riots and caused many problems to the police with all sorts of actions. The most interesting element of the leaflet is the figure of George Grivas himself. Similar to the previous leaflets, the figure has far more raw characteristics, with a military outfit and in an attacking position. However if a more careful look is taken the facial characteristics of the figure are not similar to Grivas's characteristics. The illustration is closer to the figure of Joseph Stalin than

²⁰² Ibid., p.39.

George Grivas. It is rather common knowledge that within the Cold War framework all the decolonization movements were considered communist led. Similarly, the Cyprus insurgency was being paralleled to the communist threat. With the depiction of Grivas as Stalin, the British led the discussion to the fight against communism. The interesting part is that the communist threat is applied to a leader who was a well known anti-communist. George Grivas a few years earlier was in Greece as the leader of the secret organization “X” which fought against the communists. The “Global Cold War”²⁰³ as Westad defines, colonialism constantly intersects and affects one another. The Cold War is a continuation of colonial interventions in different dialogue.

The fear of losing Cyprus led the British to the application of a well known and successful tool in counterinsurgency, the state of emergency. A cloak of legality was created around military and restrictive actions against the society. The state of emergency consisted of laws that legitimised the British actions whereas propaganda methods were used also to backup the legislation. The blueprint however was in many cases adapted to the reality of the colony like the application of the death penalty for example. The Cyprus Emergency was a serious colonial problem for the British because of the strategic importance that the island acquired. At the same time the proximity of the island to European monitoring complicated the case for the British as their state of emergency received lots of criticism on Human Rights.

²⁰³ Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our times*.

4. “If we are going to sin we must sin quietly.”²⁰⁴ State of emergency and Human Rights

The course of the Cyprus Emergency demanded from the British decisive and strict actions. The way was known from the previous insurgencies, however Cyprus was not as isolated from European monitoring as Kenya and Malaya were. That is the reason behind Eric Griffith Jones’s phrase to sir John Harding, “if we are going to sin we must sin quietly”.²⁰⁵ By the end of the Second World War, Britain was found on a crossroad with one path demanding the maintenance of the Empire and the other path advocating in favour of human rights. The tremendous effects of the Second World War led institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to endorse the Declaration of the Universal Human Rights (UDHR) in December 1948, which would safeguard the freedom of the individual.

The follow up of the UDHR was the declaration of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was set into action in September 1953. The European Convention on Human Rights was the landmark that showed the postwar shift that nations wanted to make. Fabian Klose in his comparative research on the wars of independence in Kenya and Algeria, describes the postwar reality as a “divided world”.²⁰⁶ Precisely, Britain and France, as it is shown on Klose’s research, advocated on the one hand in favour of human rights, but at the same time the colonial powers tried to keep the declaration of the Universal Human rights disconnected from the colonial territories. Britain wished to restrain the circulation of the UDHR in the colonies as much as possible. As Kate Kennedy mentions in her work concerning Cyprus, Kenya and Nyasaland, the UDHR was published in the official gazettes in Cyprus and Nyasaland but not in Kenya.²⁰⁷ This precisely shows the divided politics which surrounded Great Britain. The Colonial Office advised that the UDHR should not be circulated in schools in the colonial territories as according to their supporting argument: “it was not easily understandable and thus it was likely that pupils might regard it ‘merely as a form of lay catechism’, and it could be used by ‘politically-inclined school-teachers’ to ‘confuse’ the minds

²⁰⁴ Eric Griffith-Jones, Kenya attorney general to governor Sir John Harding (1957), in French, *Fighting EOKA. The British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.307-308.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ F. Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. The wars of independence in Kenya and Algeria*, (translated by Dona Geyer), (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p.5.

²⁰⁷ Kennedy, *Britain and the end of Empire*, p.80.

of their pupils on political matters.”²⁰⁸ The confusion that the Colonial Office feared was, in reality, the unwanted possibility of colonial territories to raise demands that would affect the interests of the Empire. Jurgen Osterhammel, who was cited in Klose’s work, binds the reluctance of universalising human rights to the nature of colonial rule itself.²⁰⁹ Colonialism was “legitimised” through the construction of the inferior “otherness” and the “noble” colonial duty to share the civilisation with the “inferior” races. As it was shown in the previous chapters the racial element was really strong both in Kenya and in Malaya. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights represented the equality among humanity, a factor which contradicted the whole idea of colonialism.²¹⁰ The colonial emergency embodied a strong racial character. So the “white man’s burden” that framed the colonial actions in Africa and the idea of the “hybrid and mongrelized race”²¹¹ that existed for the Greek-Cypriots became weaker through the Human Rights regime.

Similarly, the ECHR created anxiety for the Colonial Office. Griffiths wrote in the 1950’s: “The Convention if applied to the Colonies, cannot be other than embarrassment to Colonial governments and if it were possible for the UK to decline to accept it so that the question of its application to the Colonies would not arise. The Colonial Office would be very glad.”²¹² However, by February 1952, the ECHR was extended to colonial territories including Cyprus and Kenya.²¹³ The articles of the ECHR safeguarded the right to life. As article 2 declares: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”.²¹⁴ Article 3 clearly prohibited any form of torture: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.²¹⁵ Article 6 safeguarded the right to a fair trial. Collectively all of the Human Rights articles were intended to create a safe environment mainly for the “Wretched of the Earth” to borrow the phrase from Frantz Fanon’s famous book.²¹⁶ For the colonial empires

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Jurgen Osterhammel cited in: Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*, p.48.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Drohan, *Brutality in the age of Human Rights*, p.13-14.

²¹² Kennedy, *Britain and the end of Empire*, p.90.

²¹³ Ibid, p.90-91.

²¹⁴ European Court of Human Rights, *European Convention on Human Rights*, Council of Europe, p.6.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Fanon, Sartre, Bhabha, Sartre, Jean-Paul, and Bhabha, Homi K. *The Wretched of the Earth*. (Grove Press, 2004).

however the declaration on human rights had an ominous aspect with regards to their freedom of actions.

The decolonization wars that Britain faced mainly violated the humanitarian standards of international law. Nevertheless, the British discourse was that of “minimum force” and winning “hearts and minds”.²¹⁷ All British officials vigorously advocated that violence was used only when it was absolutely necessary and only with the minimum amount of force. That, however, was nothing more than a well structured way of framing the politics which covered Britain’s dirty wars and was legitimised through the state of emergency. As Klose accurately describes the colonial emergency as “a legal vacuum”.²¹⁸

Going beyond “minimum force”

The emergency regime which was imposed in Cyprus created the “legal vacuum” for the quiet sin that Eric Griffith Jones hoped for. In the previous insurgencies, and especially in Malaya, the “legal vacuum” proved a successful tool for fighting against the insurgencies. The Cyprus Emergency, nevertheless, attracted lots of publicity concerning the British military actions. Reports from the island alleged the use of torture as techniques of interrogation. As Jean-Paul Sartre underlined in his work on Algeria, torture was not mainly an issue of totalitarian systems like Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. Torture appears as a method also in the progressive democratic west: “Today it’s Cyprus and it is Algeria; all in all Hitler was just a forerunner”.²¹⁹ For the colonial powers torture was one large part of their counter-insurgency methods which aimed to the extraction of information. Besides, in the eyes of the empire the colonised had no rights. Human rights abuses were accused for both Kenya and Cyprus. The collective punishments, the detention camps and random executions were going beyond the propaganda of “minimum force.” The great challenge in the postwar framework was to successfully cover these actions and show that everything was done according to the law.

The “minimum force” concept may have been projected as the leading rule of the British forces, however it was not followed. Secretary of State for War Christopher Soames mentioned how every soldier in Cyprus knew of the concept without though fearing of admitting that it was not always followed. According to him: “we must never forget that the role of the security forces

²¹⁷ Drohan, *Brutality in the age of Human Rights*, p.2.

²¹⁸ Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*, p.94.

²¹⁹ J.P. Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism* (Routledge, 2001), p.35.

is to conquer terrorism, and there will be many incidents when the minimum force necessary will be quite a lot of force”.²²⁰

The EOKA campaign consisted of armed groups that fought in the mountain of Troodos and the Kyreneia range. In addition to the guerrilla actions, EOKA had strong connections in the cities and villages of Cyprus. The actions in these areas consisted of bomb positioning on British targets but also assassination of targets that collaborated with the British, no matter if those were also Greek-Cypriots. A British report mentions various targeted assassinations against Greek-Cypriots: “on the 15th January at 5p.m a Greek-Cypriot, Kypri Menicou, aged 20 years was in a coffee shop at Psomolophou Village, Nicosia when three masked men dressed in priests clothing, entered the coffee shop and shot him dead”.²²¹ There was no mercy for whoever attempted to go against the EOKA movement. A strong element of the EOKA campaign was also the youth who assisted in the struggle with riots and other missions. The women of Cyprus were those who provided the resources to the fighters or hid fighters when needed. In some targeted assassinations, women were used, as they were above suspicion. The former EOKA fighter Mimis Vasileiou recalls the important contribution of women to the struggle:

“the women were amazing, women assisted in the actions. [...] If I had a mission to go and assassinate an Englishman, I would not carry the gun with me, it was not easy because there were inspections everywhere. The women undertook this mission. They hid the gun in their clothes, they proceeded to the assigned area, left the gun there, the fighter took the gun, proceeded with the assassination, he put the gun back to the assigned spot and then the woman returned, took again the gun and left.”²²²

Although women were not part of the active participation in the mountain range, they assisted the fighters in every other possible way. The struggle, therefore, was a collective action of the Greek-Cypriots. Every part of the society assisted in its own way in the course of the anti-colonial movement.

The British therefore had to undertake actions not only to defeat the armed groups in the mountains, but also to control the parts of the society that were pro-EOKA. Raising the discussion question at this point whether Britain actually conducted a “dirty war” in Cyprus.

²²⁰ C. Soames referenced in D.French, ‘Nasty not nice. British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice 1945-1967’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 23:4-5 (October-December 2012), p.749.

²²¹ TNA, CO 936/485, *Appeal by Greece to Commission against deportation of Makarios and others under Emergency powers Acts 1956 of Cyprus*, p.62.

²²² Eftimios (Mimis) Vasileiou, Interviewed by Maria Pinelopi Chatzicharalampous, Nicosia, 7 December 2019.

During the course of the emergency a series of allegations of ill-treatment began spreading against the British security forces. The approach towards this issue requires precise attention. On the one hand, the allegations were part of a large propaganda war initiated by EOKA and received official appeal through the greek government. On the other hand, credible allegations of torture have come to light.

A former EOKA fighter testifies that torture was used as an interrogation method. Thasos Sofokleous was one of the EOKA fighters who underwent torture. Thasos Sofokleous during the years before the beginning of the struggle was a university student in Athens where, with other Cypriot students, he took part in marches in support of the Enosis cause. It was not long till they decided to go to Cyprus and fight for the cause. Their first stop was the island of Creta where they were trained and prepared for irregular warfare. At the beginning of the EOKA struggle they went to Cyprus and were ready to be under the orders of George Grivas. Sofokleous was positioned in the area of Pentadaktylos for six months along with the famous EOKA fighter Grigoris Afxentiou. When Afxentiou was positioned in a different area, Sofokleous became leader of the armed group. On August 4 1956, Sofokleous and his team were discovered and got arrested. According to Thasos Sofokleous, the whole group was tortured with him undergoing a higher level of torture for being the leader.²²³

Sofokleous distinguished two kinds of torture, psychological and torture of the body. The aim of both was to extract information on the secrets of the organisation and the struggle. Sofokleous was tortured for seventeen days. There was a torture act which remained solid in his memory and also made him paint a painting of it.



Painting by Thasos Sofokleous

²²³ At. Sofokleous, *Χρόνια Οδύνης. Το χρονικό ενός ισοβίτη αγωνιστή της EOKA στις φυλακές της Αγγλίας* (Κώνος, 2015), p.25.

“They bound me on a chair, [...] I was only with my short pants, they bound my feet across on a pillar, my hands [were also] bound. They put on my face a piece of blanket and they wore me a silver bucket on top and they hit me; Under my bare feet [...] on the knees, at the back and on the head with hammers.”²²⁴

The torture included whipping and various other methods. Ultimate aim of the torture was for the prisoner to confess. According to Sofokleous, when the person under torture eventually fainted then they would throw a bucket of water and if he would wake up then the procedure would continue, if not then they would shoot him in the back and then say that he attempted to escape and they killed him. Sofokleous endured torture for seventeen days without revealing any secrets of the organisation and the struggle.

His experience with the British did not end at the prisons of Larnaca. Sofokleous and other fighters were transferred to prisons in the UK as they were considered too dangerous to remain in Cyprus. In 1957, therefore, along with eight more co-fighters, Socrates Loizides, Fotis Christofi, Epifanis Papantoniou, Andreas Mappis, Grigoris Louka Grigoras, Vias Leivadas, Nicolas Loizou and Evangelos Panagiotou were transferred to Wormwood Scrubs.²²⁵ The prisoners did not stay inactive but forwarded to the Colonial Office allegations of ill-treatment that occurred during their time in Cyprus.²²⁶

The Greek-Cypriots mainly represented by EOKA, Makarios and in the end the Greek-government created a strong propaganda discourse which accused the British security forces of excessive violence. The former EOKA fighter Mimis Vasileiou, in the post-independence years, dedicated part of his life to the writing of a volume on the concealed torturing that took place during the struggle. The book is a concise work which includes testimonies, newspaper articles and British archives. As a historian it's worth mentioning that some of the testimonies included in that work without losing however our critical character. The work has collected fourteen cases of death which according to the Greek-Cypriots, occurred because of torturing. One example of the structure of these arguments is the case of the EOKA fighter Georgios Nikolaou. Nikolaou

²²⁴ Athanasios (Thasos) Sofokleous, Interviewed by Maria Pinelopi Chatzicharalampous, Nicosia, 6 December 2019.

²²⁵ Sofokleous, *Χρόνια Οδύνης. Το χρονικό ενός ισοβίτη αγωνιστή της EOKA στις φυλακές της Αγγλίας*, p.54-55.

²²⁶ French, *Fighting EOKA The British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.199.

was responsible for the EOKA actions in the area of Pyrgos. When he was arrested in 1956, he was transferred to the camps of Leukas-Xerou, where according to his brother, he was severely tortured. Nikolaou was reported dead some days before his scheduled court case. According to the official report, he was shot by a guard as he tried to escape. During the identification progress his brother noticed the bullet but also noticed marks of torture, whereas his legs were broken. From the Greek-Cypriot side therefore, the allegation was that the death was the result of the torture, and that the story of escaping was a cover-up.²²⁷ This example represents the discourse that took place along the course of the struggle. The torture allegations against the British took dimensions that mirrored the recent Second World War memory. The actions of the security forces were compared to those of the German SS. One of the accusations towards the Harding administration is that the British forces were committing genocide.²²⁸ However, it is important to point out and go along with David French in the argument that the extermination of million Jews, the famine death of thousands of Greeks in Athens during 1941-1942 and the burn down of villages cannot be entirely compared to the Cypriot struggle.²²⁹

In 1957, in an attempt to capture George Grivas, the security forces executed a curfew at Milikouri village which lasted for 54 days, with the residents not being allowed to leave their houses between 7 p.m and 7a.m. The emergency regime allowed for the creation of circumstances like that, with the soldiers also being allowed to search everything and everyone.²³⁰ These kinds of curfews along with the detention of thousands of Greek-Cypriots in the detention camps of Kokkinotrimithia, Polemi, Kyreneia Castle, Pyla and Pergamos strengthened the allegations against the British government.²³¹ The use of curfews and detention camps were well known methods that were implemented in both Malaya and Kenya. Life behind barbed wire became a “normality” for those who were fighting British colonialism.

²²⁷ Ef. Vasileiou, *Βασανιστήρια και οι 14 Ηρωομάρτυρες της ΕΟΚΑ που πέθαναν στα ανακριτήρια των Βρετανών 1955-1959* (Συμβούλιο Ιστορικής Μνήμης ΕΟΚΑ 1955-1959, Λευκωσία 2017), p.144-145.

²²⁸ French, *Fighting EOKA The British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.217.

²²⁹ Ibid, p.218.

²³⁰ Holland, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας*, p.333.

²³¹ TNA, FCO 141/3639, *Cyprus Camp P: Detention camps at Pyla and Pergamos*.

From Cyprus to Strasbourg

The Bar Council of Cyprus, which came into being in 1948 as an unofficial body and was officially constituted by law in 1955, also fought for the rights of the Cypriots.²³² The Council consisted of representatives of the Bar committees of the five districts, with the Turkish barristers however not having secured an election. The Bar Council of Cyprus also took a stance on the emergency regulations. The two main issues of concern were the emergency regulations which imposed death penalty as the sole punishment for the offences of discharging carrying or possessing firearms or throwing bombs with intend to kill or injure. The second point of concern was the composition of the special court with a single judge empowered to try capital cases.²³³

It was not long till the allegations of ill-treatment reached the European shores. A powerful speech from Archbishop Makarios in Athens on June 16 1956, showed the polemic climate that existed against the British administration on Cyprus. “We shall not succumb to force and tyranny. [...] Let the dynast go on trying through base methods to bend our convictions and resistance. His efforts shall be in vain. Our soul shall continue to be free.”²³⁴ The allegations of torture that had begun from some prisoners took an official form under the umbrella of the Greek government. The Greek government became the representative of the Greek- Cypriots before the European Commission of Human Rights.

In May 1956, Greece appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights for the violation of the international agreement for the Rights of Man with the emergency regime in the island of Cyprus.²³⁵ In general, the Greek government proceeded to submit two applications. The first one was application 176/55 which initially contained many charges. All of them were disposed but for two which related to the state of emergency and the imposition of curfew. More specifically, objection was raised by the Greek government to regulations 52, 52A, 53, 53B of the emergency powers (public and safety order) regulations relating to possession and carriage of arms. According to the argument, the sentence of death for a crime such as possession of carriage of arms implied that the man being convicted and sentenced for a much more serious

²³² TNA, FCO 141/4360: *Cyprus representations by Cyprus Bar Council against emergency regulations and their application*, p.69.

²³³ Ibid, p.42.

²³⁴ TNA, CO 936/485 *Appeal by Greece to Commission against deportation of Makarios and others under Emergency powers Acts 1956 of Cyprus, Appendix I*, p.2.

²³⁵ TNA, FO 286/1438 *Application by greek government to European commission for Human Rights alleging contravention of Human Rights by Cyprus government under emergency regulations part 1*, p.17.

crime such as murder or the use of violence against the police and contravened the principle of the presumption of innocence under article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights.

MP Kenneth Robinson, in the parliamentary debate of December 1956, was highly critical of the colonial governance in Cyprus and the emergency regime. In his speech at the House of Commons, he asked whether the denial of civil liberties will continue to exist in Cyprus.

“The greater part of the Emergency Regulations in Cyprus remain in force, and I should like hon. Members to reflect on what they mean in actual physical terms to the half-million people of this unhappy, torn island. I would like to tell the House a few of the things that happened in one month, the month of November. There were about 30 murders, an average of one a day. There were 10 Cypriots killed, including a child of seven years old, by the security forces. There were 80 explosions. There were 800 arrests, mainly for questioning. There were 18 Cypriots detained under Regulation 18B, and 20 Cypriots were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, most of them ranging between 15 and 5 years. Five youths were whipped. In 25 villages a curfew was imposed. A £35,000 collective fine was imposed on the people of Nicosia, and a £950 collective fine on the village of Panayia. The Larnaka Secondary School was permanently closed and its director was deported from the island.”²³⁶

The reality in Cyprus drew the attention of international monitoring, but also created debates among the political leadership in London. Athens continued on pursuing justice for the island of Cyprus. So after the first application, the Greek-government proceeded with a second application. The second is application 299/57 of July 17 1957, related to the allegations of ill-treatment. The Greek government initially submitted 49 cases in which ill treatment was alleged.²³⁷ On July 5th 1957, the Greek newspaper “Ethnos” published an article under the title: “The decision of the sub-committee of Human Rights is a slap on the face of London”.²³⁸ More specifically the sub-committee of Human Rights called upon the British Government to suspend the execution of death sentences under the emergency law.²³⁹ The Greek minister of foreign affairs M. Averoff spoke of a victory of Greece against powerful opponents: “to obtain a decision which, I hope will contribute considerably in the protections of the life, property and

²³⁶ Hansard, House of Commons, 21 December 1956.

²³⁷ TNA, FCO 141/4445: *Cyprus investigation of emergency measures applied in Cyprus by sub-commission of European Commission of Human Rights (application 176/56)*, p.98.

²³⁸ TNA, FO 286/1438: *Application by greek government to European commission for Human Rights alleging contravention of Human Rights by Cyprus government under emergency regulations (part 1)*, p.4.

²³⁹ Ibid.

dignity of our Cypriot brothers”.²⁴⁰ On October 14 1957, the Human Rights Commission of the council of Europe announced that the sub-commission will carry out an investigation for ascertaining the facts relating to: “the existence and present extent to which the meaning of article 15 of the ECHR of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation and the circumstances in which curfew regulations are applied”.²⁴¹ The decision for an investigation was nothing but ominous for Sir John Harding, as according to the governor it would create more violence from EOKA.²⁴² The decision on the investigation triggered a discussion in British parliament concerning foreign policy.²⁴³ MP James Callaghan, following the source of allegations which came both from Wormwood Scrubs and Cyprus, insisted on the need for an investigation.²⁴⁴ The active debate within London represented the divided politics that existed at that period, especially when it came to foreign policy. The colonial office insisted that the allegations were false counting on Harding’s feedback.

Before the accusations of torture, an amendment of the emergency laws was considered necessary in need of protection of the system. Therefore, in 1957, there was an amendment concerning the restriction of publications and censorship. It was forbidden to publish a report or a newspaper with any form of accusation against the security forces and their actions.²⁴⁵ The amended regulation on press gave Harding the power to shut down a newspaper without the need of a prior notice. Furthermore, it was forbidden to prosecute in courts officers of Her Majesty’s forces. The laws of the state of emergency were once more used to create a protective wall against criticism, accusations, in order to liberate the security forces from legal constraints. The colonial government, in a publication concerning the allegations of brutality, denied the misbehaviour of its security forces. It was argued that the security forces had an “innate respect of humanity”.²⁴⁶ According to the colonial government, the members of the United Kingdom Police forces were bound to a culture of restraint and humanity.²⁴⁷ It was one of the primary

²⁴⁰ TNA, CO 936/485: *Appeal by Greece to Commission against deportation of Makarios and other under Emergency powers Acts 1956 of Cyprus*, p.88.

²⁴¹ TNA, FO 286/ 1439: *Application by greek government to European commission for Human Rights alleging contravention of Human Rights by Cyprus government under emergency regulations (part 2)*, p.9.

²⁴² Kennedy, *Britain and the end of Empire*, p.133.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid. p134.

²⁴⁵ TNA, FCO 141/3497: *Cyprus publicity on Emergency regulations*, p.25.

²⁴⁶ Kennedy, *Britain and the end of Empire*, p.132.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

goals of the British administration not only to convince the people of Cyprus of the nobility of the system, but also the international community. It was mainly since the Greek applications in Strasbourg, that the cloak of the state of emergency became vulnerable. The legal framework of the regime in Cyprus was not enough to protect the Colonial government from the allegations on the violation of basic Human Rights.

The anti-colonial feeling that existed in the UK was represented also by the Movement for Colonial Freedom which was established by Labour MP Fenner Brockway in 1954. It was the Labour Party's attempt to show support to all independence movements. The Movement for Colonial Freedom also had the active support of MPs like Barbara Castle who travelled both to Kenya and Cyprus in order to reveal the allegations of ill-treatment that occurred within the emergency regime. In 1955, in its first annual conference, the MCF declared its first principle:

“The right of all peoples to full independence (including self-determination and freedom from external political, economic and military domination) and to the enjoyment of all the rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.”²⁴⁸

The inclusion of Cyprus in the agenda of MCF, is more evidence which showed the strong primarily colonial character that encapsulated the island. The allegations of mistreatment were coordinated actions from Makarios, the EOKA fighters and Athens representatives, but also with the strong support from Labour MP's like Fenner Brockway. The Labour MP told the Greek Cypriots in London that: “[...] I have championed the Cypriot cause. I have been called a traitor by my compatriots. [...] While denouncing (British) Government policy, friends of Cyprus are shocked, shattered and shamed by recent events.”²⁴⁹ MP Fenner Brockway's fight for the rights of the colonies can also be traced through the House of Commons debates. Brockway was always in the forefront when it concerned injustices against the colonies. Cyprus was also part of the agenda as another colonial case. In a parliamentary debate at the House of Commons on July 4 1957, Brockway set into the discussion, the cases of the Cypriot prisoners in Wormwood Scrubs. He appealed for the urgency of a visit by a doctor to examine the prisoners for signs of injuries and bruises.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p.149.

²⁴⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA The British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus 1955-1959*, p.294.

²⁵⁰ Hansard, House of Commons, 04 July 1957.

The anti-colonial sentiment and the support for those under colonial rule was strong in London. This movement represents the dual character that the British Empire acquired after the Second World War. The important values of liberty and human rights contradicted the colonial tradition of Great Britain. It was time things changed, and the voices came both from outside and inside of the Empire. The emergency regime assisted in trying to conceal the actions of the security forces in the colonies. It was not long enough, however, until voices both from London and the colonies attempted to reveal the “dirty wars.” In 2011, Kenya survivors pursued legal action against the UK on allegations of Human Right abuses. In 2013, the UK paid 19.9 million pounds to more than 5.228 Kenyans.²⁵¹ The Greek-Cypriots following the example of the Kenyans, similarly got compensated for the allegations of torture with 1 million pounds.²⁵²

Undeniably, the Cyprus Emergency, which lasted from 1955-1959 and led to the independence of the island in 1959 with the London-Zurich Agreement, except for its European side also enclosed a strong colonial character. The Colonial Office put in place experienced generals, like Sir John Harding, with the hope that the insurgency would be “nipped in the bud” successfully, as happened in other colonies. The colonial handbook of dealing with insurgencies was also used on the small island in the Mediterranean. A state of emergency was imposed in order to create a new legal norm which would facilitate the actions of the security forces. However, the postwar double character that Great Britain had to follow restricted the freedom of action that the Colonial Office wished to have. Nonetheless, “nasty”²⁵³ and not “nice”²⁵⁴ counterinsurgency methods were used which led to another “dirty war” in Cyprus. Finally the divide and rule methods planted the seed of hatred among the two communities, which in the next years led to inter communal conflicts, the creation of the green line in 1964 which divided the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and in the end resulted in the partition of the island in 1974 with the Turkish invasion.

²⁵¹ The Guardian, "Mau Mau Rebellion victims claim parliament was misled over torture" (23 May 2016), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

²⁵² BBC News, "UK pays £1m to Cyprus 'torture victims' " (24 January 2019), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

²⁵³ French, 'Nasty not nice: British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice, 1945–1967', p.744-761.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

Conclusions

The state of emergency creates a new power paradigm when it comes to decolonisation wars. This thesis shows the strong presence that the state of emergency has within the colonial frameworks. The case studies of Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus show how the concept can be defined as a colonial tool for counterinsurgency. A blueprint on how to deal with insurgencies was created. The state of exception, which was defined by Agamben in case of the colonies, managed to become more of a norm. A new colonial reality was created to serve the preservation of the Empire.

It was within the colonial context where the power politics and geo-strategical interests led to methods for power dominance. The colonised people who demanded their freedom were framed and represented as criminal communities. The criminalisation and tagging of the fighters as “terrorists” led to measures which violated human rights. The society as a whole became “bare lives” as men, women and children were put behind barbed wire, house searches became a normality and in the eyes of the colonial officials everyone was guilty unless proven otherwise. Within the postwar new reality, Britain’s colonial wars proved a threat for the Empire but also for the image of Britain as ambassador of human rights. That was precisely the role of the state of emergency. It created a legal framework around actions like detention without trial, curfews and restriction measures. The security forces in reality had freedom of action. One of the most spectacular examples of the protective character of the emergency regime was the law which was implemented in Cyprus that forbade any prosecution of a member of the security forces by a civilian.

Through the state of emergency concept it was also possible to see the overlooked colonial character of Cyprus. It was the goal of this research to include Cyprus into the colonial histories or histories of decolonisation. With the diplomatic aspect of the struggle being over-researched, the state of emergency allows us to look into the actual decolonisation struggle. The continuity is apparent both through the methods, but also through the people. Sir John Harding, and other British colonial officials, after having built a depository of knowledge from the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya, applied the knowledge to the Cyprus Emergency. Local amendments existed, and this proves that the hybrid character of the state of emergency was useful for the officials regardless of the divergent characteristics and realities of each colony.

The strong strategic importance that Cyprus acquired, especially after the Suez Crisis, did not permit the British to think of the possibility of responding to the wishes of the citizens

for Enosis (union) with Greece. A dirty war was fought in Cyprus as well, with the application of the state of emergency for the empowerment of the security forces and the protection of the colonial system. However, it was not long until allegations of torture and mis-treatment of prisoners came to the forefront. EOKA prisoners, some of whom also got transferred to the prisons in Wormwood Scrubs, revealed severe mistreatment by the security forces. For sir John Harding the method was the same. Only with strong actions against the “terrorists” the British forces would prevail.

The goal of this thesis was to create the framework for the state of emergency and apply it within the British decolonization wars. The aim was to connect colonies that rarely are seen in comparison. This offers a new approach to viewing decolonization wars in an integrated perspective. Especially when it comes to Cypriot history, this research offers a start for the beginning for the writing of a colonial history of Cyprus, for Cyprus under emergency.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

The National Archives, Kew London

TNA, FCO 141/4233, *Director of operations Malaya: Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957* [September 1957].

TNA, FO 371/1176675, *Cyprus question and Enosis*.

TNA, FCO 141/4227, *Measures to control the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church*.

TNA, FCO 141/4458, *Official Government Review of the Emergency in Cyprus*.

TNA, FCO 141/4459, *The Cyprus Emergency by Brigadier Baker*.

TNA, FO 371/123869: *Cyprus and Enosis*.

TNA, CO 936/485, *Appeal by Greece to Commission against deportation of Makarios and others under Emergency powers Acts 1956 of Cyprus*.

TNA, FCO 141/3639, *Cyprus Camp P: Detention camps at Pyla and Pergamos*.

TNA, FCO 141/4360: *Cyprus representations by Cyprus Bar Council against emergency regulations and their application*.

TNA, CO 936/485 *Appeal by Greece to Commission against deportation of Makarios and others under Emergency powers Acts 1956 of Cyprus, Appendix I*.

TNA, FO 286/1438 *Application by greek government to European commission for Human Rights alleging contravention of Human Rights by Cyprus government under emergency regulations (part 1)*.

TNA, FO 286/ 1439: *Application by greek government to European commission for Human Rights alleging contravention of Human Rights by Cyprus government under emergency regulations (part 2).*

TNA, FCO 141/4445: *Cyprus investigation of emergency measures applied in Cyprus by sub-commission of European Commission of Human Rights (application 176/56).*

TNA, FCO 141/3497: *Cyprus publicity on Emergency regulations.*

TNA, FCO 141/3645.

Imperial War Museum, London

IWM, Box 75-134-1.

IWM, Box 75-134-4, *The Kenya Picture* , issued by G.H.Q East Africa, 1954.

State Archives Cyprus, Nicosia

Public Information Office Library, *Legislation of the year 1955. vol. II. Subsidiary Legislation*, Nicosia.

State Archives Cyprus, *Προπαγάνδα-Αντιπροπαγάνδα. Απελευθερωτικός Αγώνας 1955-1959*, Nicosia 2014.

European Council Publications

European Court of Human Rights, *European Convention on Human Rights*, Council of Europe.

Hansard Parliamentary Debates

Hansard, House of Commons, 04 July 1957.

Hansard, House of Commons, 21 December 1956.

Interviews

Sofokleous, Athanasios (Thasos), interviewed by Maria Pinelopi Chatzicharalampous, Nicosia, 6 December 2019

Vasileiou, Efthimios (Mimis), interviewed by Maria Pinelopi Chatzicharalampous, Nicosia, 7 December 2019.

Foreign Radio Broadcasts

Daily Report. Foreign Radio Broadcasts (FBIS-FRB-51-075), "British Ruthlessly exploit Africans", Moscow Soviet Home Service, Apr.9, 1951.

Newspaper Articles

The Guardian, "Mau Mau Rebellion victims claim parliament was misled over torture" (23 May 2016), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

BBC News, "UK pays £1m to Cyprus 'torture victims' "(24 January 2019), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

The Times, '50 years later: Britain's Kenya cover up revealed' (April 05, 2011), Accessed on 12 June 2020.

Secondary Sources

Alexandrou, Charalambos, 'Enlightenment, Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Cyprus, 1955–1959', in M. Tsianikas, N. Maadad, G. Couvalis, and M. Palaktsoglou (eds.) (Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University, June 2011).

Anderson, David M., 'Policing and communal conflict: The Cyprus emergency 1954-1960', in Robert Holland, *Emergencies and Disorders in the European Empires after 1945* (Routledge, 2012).

Agamben, Giorgio, *State of Exception* (University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Agamben, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998).

Βαρνάβας, Ανδρέας, *Ιστορία του απελευθερωτικού αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ (1955-1959)* (Σειρά ΑΔ: Πηγές και βοηθήματα για τον αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ, no.5, Ίδρυμα απελευθερωτικού αγώνα ΕΟΚΑ 1955-1959, Λευκωσία, 2002).

Beetham, David, *The Legitimation of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Bennet, Huw, French David (eds.), *The Kenya Papers of General Sir George Erskine* (Army Records Society, vol.33, 2013).

Bennet, Huw, *Fighting the Mau Mau. The British Army and Counter- Insurgency in Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Cotter, P. Cornelius, 'Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience', *Stanford Law Review* 5:3 (1953).

Crouzet, Francois, *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946-1959*, (μτφ. Αριστοτέλης Φρυδάς), (vol. Α, Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, Αθήνα 2011).

Darwin, John, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World. The Making of the 20th Century* (Macmillan, 1988).

Deery, Philip, 'The terminology of terrorism. Malaya 1948-1952', *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies* 34:2 (June 2003).

Dhu Renick Jnr, Rhoderick, 'The Emergency Regulations of Malaya Causes and Effect.', *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6:2 (1965).

Drohan, Brian, *Brutality in an Age of Human Rights Activism and Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire* (Cornell University Press, 2017).

Elkins, Caroline, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (Holt, 2005).

Erlenbusch- Anderson, Verena, *Genealogies of Terrorism. Revolution, State Violence, Empire* (Columbia University Press, 2018).

Fanon, Sartre, Bhabha, Sartre, Jean-Paul, and Bhabha, Homi K. *The Wretched of the Earth* (Grove Press, 2004).

Ferejohn, John, and Pasquino, Pasquale, 'The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers.' *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2: 2 (2004).

Foley, Charles, *Island in Revolt* (Longmans, 1962).

French, David, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

French, David, 'British intelligence and the Origins of the EOKA Insurgency', *British Journal of Military History* 11:2 (February 2015).

French, David, 'Nasty not nice. British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice 1945-1967', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 23:4-5 (October-December 2012).

Gleijeses, Piero, 'Decolonization and the Cold War', *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire* (eds. Martin Thomas, Andrew S. Thompson).

Henniker, M.C.A., *Red Shadow Over Malaya* (William Blackwood & Sons LTD. Edinburgh and London, 1955).

Holland, Robert, *Η Βρετανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας 1954-1959*, (μτφ. Βίλλυ Φωτοπούλου), (Ποταμός, 2001).

Hunt, David, 'Harding, John [Allan Francis], first Baron Harding of Petherton (1896–1989), army officer' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (23 Sep. 2004), Accessed 13 Jan. 2020.

Kahn, Paul, 'Criminal and Enemy in the Political Imagination' *Yale Review*, 99 (January 2011).

Κάρυος, Ανδρέας, 'Η εμπλοκή του Sir John Harding στο Κυπριακό 1955-1956: Η πολιτική διάσταση', *Εθνική Φρουρά και Ιστορία*, 37 (2016).

Kelly, Joseph B. and Pelletier, George A, 'Theories of Emergency Government', 11:42(1966).

Kennedy, Kate, *Britain and the End of Empire. A study of Colonial Governance in Cyprus, Kenya and Nyasaland against the backdrop of the internationalisation of empire and the evolution of supranational human rights culture and jurisprudence 1938-1965* (University of Oxford, Worcester College, 2015).

Klose, Fabian, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. The wars of independence in Kenya and Algeria*, (translated by Dona Geyer), (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

Μακρυνιώτη, Δήμητρα (επίμ.), *Τα όρια του σώματος. Διεπιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις*, (μτφ. Κώστας Αθανασίου, Κική Καψαμπέλη, Μαριάννα Κονδύλη, Θόδωρος Παρασκευόπουλος), (Νήσος, Αθήνα, 2004).

Mbembé, Achille, 'Necropolitics' *Public Culture* 15:1 (2003).

Morton, Stephen, *States of Emergency. Colonialism, Literature and Law* (Liverpool University Press, 2013).

Nasser, Hussain, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency Colonialism and the Rule of Law* (University of Michigan Press, 2003).

Neocleous, Mark, "The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to 'permanent Emergency'" *Alternatives* 31: 2 (2006).

Novo, R. Andrew, 'Friend or foe ? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency', *Small Wars and insurgencies* 23:3 (July 2012).

Ντάρρελ, Λώρενς, *Πικρολέμονα*, (μτφ. Αιμίλιος Χουρμούζιος),(Εκδόσεις Γρηγόρη), Αθήνα, 1959.

Ramraj, V, Victor K. Thiruvengadam. *Emergency Powers in Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Reynolds, John, *Empire, Emergency and International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Ρίχτερ, Χαϊντς Α., *Ιστορία της Κύπρου*, τόμος πρώτος (1878-1949),(μτφ. Κώστας Σαρρόπουλος), (Βιβλιοπωλείον της Εστίας, Αθήνα, 2007).

Sartre, Jean Paul, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism* (Routledge, New York, 2001).

Schmitt, Carl, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Scheipers, Sibylle, 'The Use of Camps in Colonial Warfare' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43: 4 (2015).

Sofokleous, Athanasios (Thasos), *Χρόνια Οδύνης. Το χρονικό ενός ισοβίτη αγωνιστή της ΕΟΚΑ στις φυλακές της Αγγλίας* (Κώνος 2015).

Svirsky, Marcelo, Bignall Simone (eds), *Agamben and Colonialism* (Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

Thomas, Martin, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire* (New York Oxford University Press, 2014).

Thomas, Moore, Butler, Moore, Bob, and Butler, L.J, *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975* (London: Hodder Education, 2008).

Thomas, Martin, Curless Gareth (eds), *Decolonisation and Conflict. Colonial Comparisons and Legacies* (Bloomsbury, 2018).

Vasileiou, Efthimios (Mimis), *Βασανιστήρια και οι 14 Ηρωομάρτυρες της ΕΟΚΑ που πέθαναν στα ανακριτήρια των Βρετανών 1955-1959* (Συμβούλιο Ιστορικής Μνήμης ΕΟΚΑ 1955-1959, Λευκωσία 2017).

Westad, Odd Arne, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Appendix I: Proclamation of the Cyprus Emergency²⁵⁵



BY THE GOVERNOR.

A PROCLAMATION.

John Harding

Governor.

Whereas on the 9th day of March, 1939, His late Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, was pleased to issue an Order in Council entitled The Emergency Powers Orders in Council, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Order"), for the making of provision for the security in time of emergency of the Colonies and Protectorates mentioned in Part I of the First Schedule to the principal Order and of the Mandated Territories mentioned in Part II of the said Schedule ;

And Whereas by the principal Order it was among other things provided that the provisions of Part II of the principal Order shall have effect in any of the said territories in which they shall from time to time, in case of any public emergency, be brought into operation by Proclamation made by the Governor ;

And Whereas Cyprus is one of the Colonies mentioned in Part I of the First Schedule to the principal Order ;

And Whereas on the 25th day of November, 1952, Her Majesty by and with the advice of Her Privy Council was pleased to issue a further Order in Council entitled the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Order in Council, 1952, whereby the principal Order was amended to empower the Governor of any of the said territories to make a Proclamation under the principal Order so as to apply only to such part of the territory as may be specified in the Proclamation (the principal Order and the said Emergency Powers (Amendment) Order in Council, 1952, hereinafter being referred to as "the said Orders") ;

And Whereas there exists in the Colony a state of emergency :

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in me in that behalf, I, John Harding, Field Marshal in the Army, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, upon whom has been conferred the Decoration of the Military Cross, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of Cyprus, do hereby proclaim that the provisions of Part II of the principal Order shall have effect in the Colony on and from the date hereof.

Given at Nicosia, this *26* day of *November*, 1955.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

Printed by the Government Printer, Nicosia, Cyprus.