

**Trafficking through the Northern Route:
International Organisation's Response to Drug
Trafficking in Tajikistan.**



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Contents

Introduction	3
Chapter One – Literature Review	6
Chapter Two – UNODC	18
Chapter Three – BOMCA	26
Chapter Four – SCO	32
Chapter Five – OSCE	38
Chapter Six – CSTO	45
Conclusion	53
Bibliography	58

Research Question:

Which international organisation plays the most effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan?

Introduction:

Drug trafficking in Tajikistan has been a huge problem since its independence in the 1990's. This is mainly due to Tajikistan's neighbour Afghanistan consistently being the biggest producer of opium in the world (UNODC World Drug Report 2019, 11). The 1,344km border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan mostly follows the Panj River. In the west the border areas are flat with decent road infrastructure, but in the east the border area is extremely mountainous and official border crossing points are limited (UNODC Afghan Opiate Trafficking along the Northern Route 2018, 71). Tajikistan's civil war in the 1990's and the ongoing war in neighbouring Afghanistan since 2001, has only contributed to the worsening of the situation as some people in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have used drug trafficking to fund their terrorist activities and military and political ambitions.

Narcotics from Afghanistan are trafficked through all their neighbouring countries. The trafficking route to Russia that passes through Tajikistan is called the Northern route. In Afghanistan between 2011 and 2017 there was an increase in opium production (Ibid XI) however in 2018 cultivation of opium decreased due to a drought in Afghanistan (UNODC World Drug Report 2019, 11). Despite the drought Tajikistan's Drug Control Agency (DCA) seized 716 kg of drugs in 2018 (UNODC ROCA 2018, 22). Due to Tajikistan's weak state capacity and the continuing security threat from Afghanistan Tajikistan has had to rely on external actors and donors to help stop the trafficking of narcotics. Russian border troops continued to patrol the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan even after Tajikistan became independent. However a vacuum was created in 2005 when Russia pulled its border troops out of Tajikistan, leaving international donors and organisations to fill in the gaps (Gavriliis 2012, 22).

The most prolific international organisations in Tajikistan are the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). This thesis will spend a chapter on each of these organisations work in Tajikistan. When looking at the aid implemented by these organisations I will be mainly looking at what they have done in the past five years 2015 was a significant year in Tajikistan as there was a failed coup by what the government called 'extremists' and 'terrorists'. This coup has led Tajikistan to securitise the state and their borders even further, to protect themselves from both internal and external threats including drug trafficking. However if there is something of real significance that an organisation did before 2015 then it will also be included.

In order to answer which international organisation plays the most effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan I will take a holistic approach to see what tactics have been taken by a wide range of international organisations. I will be using content analysis of primary sources including speeches, reports and press releases from each organisation to see whether they have implemented the basic tactics used to combat drug trafficking. I will also be analysing new and unique tactics which show organisations have gone beyond the basic tactics of aid. I define these basic tactics of aid as training, cooperation, donating equipment and building and refurbishing infrastructure. Training organised by international organisations can be practical or theoretical. Cooperation can come in the form of information sharing, border security or training. Cooperation can take place at a national level between Tajik agencies, at a regional level between Central Asian states and Tajikistan's neighbours, and cooperation can also happen between the international organisations themselves. I will be looking into the similarities and the differences in approaches towards combating drug trafficking, as well as what each of them is missing in their approach. It is also important to be taking into account the policies and relationship between the main donors of each organisation and drug trafficking and Tajikistan as this strongly effects what kind of role organisations play.

Drug trafficking in Central Asia is an extremely important topic to look at as it poses a serious threat to the stability of the region and has a negative impact on the regional

power, Russia. It is important to look at Tajikistan in particular as they share a long border with opiate producer and conflict ridden Afghanistan. Thanks to Tajikistan's weak state building, mostly due to the civil war in the 1990's, Tajikistan has proved to be the ideal country for traffickers to transit drugs from Afghanistan and northwards towards Russia. Due to its geographical location Tajikistan has come under the influence of not only Russia but also the US, who have troops stationed in Afghanistan, and Tajikistan's very powerful neighbour, China. Very little research has been done on the topic of drug trafficking in Central Asia in contrast to drug trafficking in Central America and no previous research has included these five international organisations and applied them to their work combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan.

The way that these organisations combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan depends mostly on who their biggest donors are. The UNODC and BOMCA are mostly funded by the US and European countries, the OSCE is funded by a mixture of the previously mentioned countries and Russia, the SCO's biggest donors are Russia and China and the CSTO is made up of former Soviet Union countries and is dominated by Russia. I have chosen to write about these five as their major donors have the biggest political and economic influence in Tajikistan, it is also important to have a mix of organisations dominated by western powers such as the UNODC and BOMCA, eastern powers such as the SCO and CSTO, as well as a mixture of both, for example the OSCE. I have chosen to exclude NATO as since 2014 they have provided little to no assistance in the field of combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan due to the breakdown in relations between NATO and Tajikistan's biggest foreign influence, Russia. All these international organisations have made effective contributions towards combating drug trafficking in their own way despite having to deal with a weak state, corruption, organised crime, the narco-terror nexus and a lack of political will from the Tajik government to fight a war on drugs. These factors have hampered international organisations work in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan.

Chapter One

Literature Review:

In this literature review I will be focusing on academic literature written about the policies of Russia, the EU, China and the US towards drug trafficking in Tajikistan. I have chosen these four as they are the largest donors of international organisations working in Tajikistan and they also have the greatest political influence in the Central Asian region and neighbouring Afghanistan, where the narcotics trafficked through Tajikistan originate. Understanding EU, Russia, China and US policies towards drug trafficking in Tajikistan helps explain why, depending on who the main donor of the organisation is, some organisations only focus on certain aspects of combating drug trafficking. In this literature review I will also be looking at the problems faced by international organisations in Tajikistan as these difficulties highlight where international organisations need to engage in or change their technique to maximise their assistance to Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking.

1.1 Russian policy

Russian donors see drug trafficking in Tajikistan as a security issue and so they push this rhetoric in the organisations which they are a member of. Securitisation is described as the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or above politics” (Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde 1998, 23). They argue from a discourse perspective that securitisation is conceptualised as a result of specific grammar constructions of threat and vulnerabilities as existential threats. Successful securitisation has to show three different characteristics “identification of existential threats, emergency actions and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules” (Ibid1998, 26). Lemmon believes securitisation as only being successful “when an actor frames an issue as an existential threat and the audience accepts it as such” (Lemmon 2018, 2). Grayson states that “national security paradigms can dominate and co-opt human security vulnerabilities to further state interests” (Grayson 2003, 338). This applies to Russia’s

case as their securitisation discourse first appeared after 9/11 when the war on terror “expanded the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse further from national and regional to international” due to the boom in terror activities and drug production in Afghanistan in 2001 (Crick 2012, 411-412).

For Russia the influx of drugs coming from Central Asia is not an immediate threat but a potential risk, which makes Russia vulnerable. Grayson believes that securitisation decisions should take ethical approaches and that “militarized responses must be seen as a failure of security policy” (Grayson 2003, 340-341). However Johan Engvall argues that the “drug trade is therefore a threat due to its function as a source of finance and/or the main purpose of violent groups” (Engvall 2006, 834). According to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) there are five areas where the state can be threatened; the economy, environment, military, political and in the society. The drug trade affects all of these areas in Tajikistan except the environment (Ibid 2006, 830). Russia’s turn towards securitisation in their drugs policy could be seen on September 4th 2002 when Putin made a speech calling drugs a security problem (Marshall 2014). In response to this ‘threat’ the Russian government opened the FKS (Federal Drug Control Service) in 2003 and the GAK (State Anti-Narcotic Committee). Mark Galeotti argues that framed as a security threat the Kremlin views the influx of heroin from Afghanistan at “best as a western failure and at worst as a malign attempt to damage Russia” (Galeotti 2016, 1).

Russia’s regional security problem is drug smuggling at the Tajik-Afghan border. In the 1990’s after the Civil War in Tajikistan Russia’s main priority was to protect Tajikistan’s borders and so Russian troops were deployed on the strategic borderline of the former Soviet Union. Even after the Civil War Russia kept military troops in Tajikistan, as they knew Tajikistan’s military was not effective enough to successfully control their own borders, especially the volatile border with Afghanistan (Jonson 1998). The security threat of the Tajik-Afghan border also exists because it was “conditioned by Soviet involvement in Afghanistan” (Jackson 2003, 146) and this “Russian perception of the vulnerability of the Tajik-Afghan border was enhanced by Tajik opposition hiding in Afghanistan” (Ibid 2003, 142).

To defend Russia's borders against Islamist extremism they reinforce their neighbour's regime security to counter any foreign influences in Central Asia – Western, Chinese or Islamist. Makarenko believes that Russia is justifying keeping the 201st Motor Rifle Division along the Afghan-Tajik border by increasing trafficking rates (Makarenko 2001). Cornell and Swanstrom argue, "Eurasia's security can no longer be understood in separation from the drug trade" (Cornell & Swanstrom 2006, 10). Tajikistan continues to be a consistent, active and disciplined CSTO member (Sayidzoda 2015) but some Central Asian states think Russia over exaggerates the threat from radical Islam in order to work closer with Russia in military matters (Hedenskog, Holmquist & Norberg 2019, 39). However in 2006 the Russian army withdrew from the Tajik-Afghan border.

Despite Burnashev's belief that Russia sees Central Asia as a zone of indifference (Burnashev 2015), the presence of the 201st ground base in Tajikistan with 9,000 military personnel cannot be underestimated. In 2004 a 10-year lease was signed for Russia to have exclusive use of three military bases and shared use of an air base for free. In return Russia wrote off \$242m in Tajik debt. Disagreements over Russian presence in Tajikistan have arisen. Tajikistan wants Russia to pay to use military bases however Russia has refused arguing that they subsidise the Tajik economy by letting in Tajik migrants to Russia, who make up 50% of Tajikistan's GDP. Tajikistan's counter argument is that they can't fairly price inherited army infrastructure and that Tajik migrants are essential for the Russian economy. Tajikistan's desperate need for money has led them to grant Russia rent-free rights to military bases until 2042 (Matveeva 2013, 484). This shows Russia has the upper hand when it comes to relations with Tajikistan. Another example of Russia's strong influence in Central Asia can be seen when Russia pressured Kyrgyzstan into cancelling the lease for a US transit base in Manas. During Putin's time as president Russia has been successful only at expelling western powers; securing its sphere all over Central Asia has proved to be a more difficult task than first thought (Zhunisbek 2019). However more recently the bi-lateral links between Russia and Central Asia have become concentrated in the spheres of security and energy (Ibid 2009, 160).

The historic relationship between Russia and Tajikistan has played a huge part in the rise of the drug trade throughout the region. For one, personal connections throughout

the former Soviet Union aided the development of organised criminal syndicates and their international penetration. Russia does have a general interest in helping counter the narcotics trade in Tajikistan. Moscow has been using increasing trafficking rates to justify the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan. By 2000 the 201st division of the Russian army had captured 3,129 kilograms of narcotics – this number accounted for approximately half of all seizures made in Tajikistan that year. However impressive this number may be the Russian 201st division has been involved in trafficking drugs themselves. Russian military helicopters have been reported to transport illicit narcotics from the Tajik-Afghan border to destinations in Russia (Makarenko 2001). This shows Russia may have reasons other than securitisation to keep a military presence in Tajikistan to fight drug trafficking.

1.2 EU Policy

For many years the Central Asian region did not draw any attention from the EU. In 2005 the office of the EU special representative in Central Asia was underfunded and understaffed (Kavalski 2007, 843) and in 2014 the office was even temporarily abolished (Boonstra & Tsertsvadze 2016, 5). The EU published its strategy for Central Asia in 2007. The EU hopes to secure and stabilise the region, access hydrocarbons, promote democracy and human rights and also aims for each Central Asian state to meet internationally agreed development criteria (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 15). Individual EU member states also have interest in the region. Germany is the only EU state with formal embassies in each Central Asian country and France has access to a small part of Dushanbe airport. France does not pay formal rent but instead paid for a new terminal for Tajikistan's 20th anniversary (Cooley 2012, 167). The EU sees Central Asia as an extension of their neighbourhood policy and as a separate entity from Afghanistan. In Tajikistan EU member states focus on border control, police reform and judicial reform as well as providing them with training (Boonstra & Laruelle 2013, 2). "One of the main cooperation directions between Tajikistan and the EU is ensuring security at the border and illegal drug traffic control" (Zarifi 2009, 31). The EU programme BOMCA helps Tajikistan to protect their borders from the flow of drugs. BOMCA is a sound model for border control assistance (Boonstra 2011, 14) and is known as the EU's "jewel in the crown" (Melvin 2012, 3). From 2007-2010 the EU gifted €66 million to Tajikistan. Despite

Central Asia not being a vital part of EU policy it is still argued that it could overtake the US as the 3rd most important player after Russia and China (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 5). In order for BOMCA to be fully effective at the Tajik-Afghan border the authors believe it should be turned into a common security and defence policy (Ibid 17) and should become a partner of the OSCE College (Boonstra 2011, 14).

Most authors have been critical of EU assistance in Central Asia. Emilian Kavalski argues the EU is avoiding positions of leadership and responsibility (Kavalski 2007, 842) and Jos Boonstra believes EU policy in Central Asia is over stretched and has had limited or no impact at all (Boonstra 2011,5). The EU has tried to hold high level security dialogues but at a meeting in March 2015 only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan sent representatives and the second meeting had to be cancelled due to lack of interest (Boonstra & Tsertsvadze 2016, 5). This shows that Central Asian countries are careful not to collaborate too much with the west in case they are punished for it by Russia or China. It has been recommended that the EU should work together more often with the US, Russia and China in Central Asia. The EU has the most potential to work more with the US. Currently the main faces of the US and the EU in Central Asia only meet twice a year and there is even less interaction at lower levels (Boonstra & Laruelle 2013, 1). It is suggested that the EU and US should divide the Tajik-Afghan border between them and should establish a joint working group on border control support (Ibid 3). It is also vital for the EU to work with China in the region to combine “Chinese funding with EU know how” (Boonstra & Tsertsvadze 2016, 6) however it is more likely that the EU would cooperate on security issues with Russia than they would with China (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 20). Neil Melvin criticises the EU for being too focused on interacting with Central Asian regimes rather than with citizens and civil society and he believes this interaction has reinforced authoritarian regimes (Melvin 2012, 3). In Tajikistan it is important that the EU needs to give tough conditions with aid and check on its implementation (Boonstra & Tsertsvadze 2016, 7). This shows that the EU has been hesitant to push any real policy to tackle drug trafficking in Tajikistan due to lack of collaboration with other actors involved in the region and the corrupt nature of Tajikistan’s government elites.

1.3 US Policy

The US first became seriously involved in Central Asia after 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan. US policy links Central Asia closely to the war in Afghanistan and sees Central Asia as a broader set of geopolitical calculations. The US focuses on hard security, short term training assistance and aid (Boonstra & Laruelle 2013, 2). For the US, Central Asian countries have been indispensable for providing military bases, transit routes for fuel and supplies and border cooperation for operation Enduring Freedom (Cooley 2012, 6). In order to keep these military bases, the US has provided aid for combating smuggling, terrorism and border security (Jie 2019, 76). However the US's position in Central Asia was threatened when they supported colour revolutions in 2005. In the same year the SCO, which includes Russia and China, demanded the withdrawal of US troops from the Central Asian region (Ibid 78). This shows that Russia and China are afraid of US influence. In 2006 Frederick Starr recommended the US government not to promote democracy in the region and instead focus on building trade relations in the area (Ibid 81). US trade with Tajikistan had gone from \$1.2m in 2002 to \$241m in 2005 (Azarkan 2009, 5). This shows the US has learnt its lesson and is trying to keep the military bases in Central Asia through increasing trade rather than pushing democracy and social development.

Attempts by the US to promote democracy in authoritarian Central Asian states has led to political elites becoming suspicious of US intentions (Bohr 2010, 116). Some leaders even believe that US bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan are part of a larger plan for the US to gain a foothold in the area in order to attack Iran (Ibid 115). During Obama's administration the US no longer pushed for regime change (Jie 2019, 83). Sticking to their word, in 2011 they introduced the infrastructure heavy New Silk Road strategy (Kim & Indeo 2013, 275). This was probably due to the gradual withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and therefore less of a need for strategic military bases in Central Asia. During Trumps administration the US has increased its military presence in Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown 2017, 1) and so the priority in Central Asia is now combating terrorism and not letting the region be dominated by Russia and China (Jie 2019, 86). However this year's Taliban-US agreement states that all military troops will leave by the end of 2020 (State Gov 2020, 2); this move would need to be met with a complete overhaul of US policy towards Central Asia.

Central Asian countries know that when the US does leave Afghanistan it will be a serious blow to them both in terms of security and the economy.

In Tajikistan the US has been providing aid to combat drug trafficking and remains Tajikistan's top individual donor of humanitarian aid (Bohr 2010, 117). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) projects in Tajikistan are mainly funded by the US (De Danieli 2011, 134) and the regional Border Guard Training Centre in Khorog near the Afghan border has received funding from the US (Nicol 2014, 28). In 2011 the US launched a counter-narcotic initiative worth \$4.2 million to provide training and equipment to set up anti-narcotic task forces in every Central Asian country (Ibid 63). The US and Tajikistan have signed 24 documents together including on drug trafficking and military issues (Zarifi 2009, 37). Before 2014 the US and Russia had worked together on creating a curriculum for a training centre in Dushanbe however since the war in Ukraine the US and Russia have been unable to coordinate counter narcotics and border security in Tajikistan (Gavrilis 2012, 22-23). The US also refuses to work with the Russian dominated CSTO (Cooley 2012, 160). Cooley suggests that US policymakers need to remain flexible with regional partnerships in Central Asia and avoid being locked into the 'anybody but Russia' rhetoric (Ibid 176). It is clear that combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan is important to US policy as Tajikistan receives \$26.89 million in aid from the US, second only to Kyrgyzstan (Nicol 2014, 76).

1.4 Chinese Policy

China also has interest in Central Asia. Some of their interests there include stopping Central Asia becoming a base for anti-Chinese Uyghur groups, stop destabilisation in the region so China will not have to intervene in security issues outside their border, control hydrocarbons and raw materials from the area and integrate Central Asia into the Chinese market (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 11). China mainly focuses on financial aid to the region providing electronics, cars and textiles but no military equipment (Ibid 12). Even as early as 2004 China completed highways connecting Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe with Chinese cities to increase trade (Ramani 2016). Central Asia has historically been a weak geopolitical area for China however the Chinese have tried to rectify this by joining regional multilateral initiatives such as the

SCO (Kim & Indeo 2013, 276). China formally established a strategic partnership with Tajikistan in 2013 but China has also signed solidarity agreements with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia to stop transnational drug crime in Central Asia (Ramani 2016). Through the SCO China has tried to help Tajikistan fight its drug smuggling problem. On June 23rd 2016 Xi Jinping met with Tajik president Rahmon during an SCO summit. Xi pledged to increase security cooperation between China and Tajikistan and he emphasised the need to combat the drug trade. Beijing wants to get involved as they are concerned that unrest in Tajikistan would lead to an influx of drugs coming into China (Ramani 2016). Chinese soldiers have been patrolling part of the Tajik-Afghan border and in 2016 China agreed to finance and build border guard posts and a training centre along Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. China has also completed joint narcotics operations with Tajikistan (Hedenskog, Holmquist & Norberg 2019, 43). China has been particularly focused on investing and has given Tajikistan a \$600m loan to building two hydroelectric power stations (Azarkan 2009, 8). Chinese investment has encouraged the Tajik government to crack down on corruption amongst officials involved in the drug trade (Ramani 2016).

1.5 Problems Faced by International Organisations Fighting Drug Trafficking in Tajikistan

Filippo De Danieli argues, "Counter-narcotics policies and interventions promoted by Western governments in Tajikistan have had a very limited impact mainly because of this emphasis on the narco-terror nexus" (De Danieli 2011, 130). The focus of securitising an issue such as drug trafficking has led to political, economic and social dimensions of drug trafficking being ignored by international donors. It is also extremely difficult for donors to track the impact of their projects as the projects are usually under the direct control of the Tajik military and security forces who are unwilling to have their activities monitored by international donors and organisations (Ibid, 130). Many donors believe there is a link between terrorism and drug trafficking in Tajikistan so they have focused their efforts on creating border posts but have neglected to improve the economies of the towns and villages along the border (Peyrouse 2013, 249). Omelicheva and Markowitz argue that the ideological and operating differences between terrorists and drug traffickers prevents them from

working together (Omelicheva & Markowitz 2019, 1022). Aris also argues that Central Asian countries frequently paint themselves as the victim of drug trafficking to divert attention away from their own role in drug trafficking and due to the emphasis on the narco-terror axis Central Asian countries use it as an excuse to use brute force against local Islamists who likely have no connection to the drug trade (Peyrouse 2013, 249).

George Gavrilis points out many Central Asian governments have failed to implement donor's wishes by neglecting the refurbishment of border crossings and the implementation of security strategies. The Tajik's have also failed to use expensive equipment that has been gifted to them stop drug trafficking. He argues that programmes in countries such a Tajikistan should be cut if it is likely that the government has no intention of implementing them. However Tajikistan sees their proximity to Afghanistan and the narco-terror nexus as an excuse to continue receiving aid without meeting any conditions (Gavrilis 2012, 9). Donors do have a right to be concerned where their money goes as on the 20th anniversary of their independence Tajikistan built the world's largest flagpole, a new presidential palace and a nine-story library devoid of books. These incidents have led donors to include maintenance plans for buildings in Tajikistan (Gavrilis 2012, 35). International donors should use local NGO's and civil society to gauge how successful Tajikistan has been at stopping drug trafficking with foreign aid. Despite new infrastructure built in Tajikistan, development in community is low as there is still no electricity in remote areas near the borders (Ibid 39).

Gavrilis believes that 80% of problems with border control in Tajikistan can be solved through political will (Ibid 42). He also highlights that embassies and organisations representing donors should take their frustration about the Tajik governments lack of aid implementation public in order to pressure them into keeping their promises (Ibid 42). Peyrouse argues that for Central Asian states "The fight against drug trafficking is an easy element for promoting cooperation with international donors and regional organisations and therefore is seen above all as a PR tool by the majority of the regions political authorities" (Peyrouse 2013, 252). This shows there is no political will to solve the problem of drug trafficking in Tajikistan because the state receives foreign aid to fix the drug trafficking problem which the state already benefits from.

During the Civil War in the 1990's warlords were involved in drug trafficking in order to raise money to buy weapons but when the Civil War ended the warlords branched out into legal sectors of the economy and became businessmen. These businessmen are now some of the wealthiest people in Tajikistan and are either part of the government or have close ties to power (De Danieli 2011, 132). There have been many scandals, which have uncovered the connection between politics and drug trafficking in Tajikistan. In 2000 the Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan was arrested for carrying 62kg of heroin in the ambassador's car and in 2005 a commander and two senior officials of the State Border Protection Committee were arrested for drug trafficking in the Shurobos district close to the Afghan border (Ibid, 133). There are even rumours that the President's family are involved in drug trafficking as the President's son Rustami Emomali Rahmon was appointed the head of the department for the prevention of smuggling in customs service. This means the President's son has control over judicial procedures connected with trafficking (Peyrouse 2013, 248). This rumour appeared more likely after an incident in 2008 when after civil unrest occurred in the Kulyab district, the president's home town, two gang leaders were arrested (De Danieli 2011, 138). This shows that in the rare case that a major gang leader connected to drug trafficking is arrested it is to save the president from losing his grip on power.

The border force authorities in Tajikistan continue to be corrupt, unreformed and resistant to change (Gavrilis 2012, 7). It is estimated that 85% of law enforcement in Tajikistan is involved in the sale and supply of heroin. Law enforcement officers take previously seized drugs, supply them to dealers, provide them with protection and arrest the buyers (Latypov 2011, 13). Latypov argues that the police do this to meet quotas and that in order to tackle drug smuggling, the focus needs to be on exposing the link between government officials and drug trafficking (Ibid, 15&19). Peyrouse agrees stating that Tajikistan needs to openly address senior officials protecting drug traffickers (Peyrouse 2013, 251). Many members of law enforcement and border guards are drawn into corrupt activities such as drug smuggling because they are underpaid. Some border troops don't even have access to basic equipment and resources such as vehicles, gas and winter clothes (De Danieli 2011, 132-33). Even more worrying is the high rate of suicide at border posts (Gavrilis 2012, 33). Gavrilis

admits it will be difficult for Tajik elites to address their corrupt activities related to drug trafficking as the money made from it contributes to the Tajik economy. Drug trafficking allows government officials access to revenue which they use to boost their own fortune, maintain political power or cover the public sector where there are shortcomings (Gavrilis 2012, 38). In a cruel twist, infrastructure such as roads built with money from donors, which is intended for fostering economic cooperation and socio economic development, is instead used by drug traffickers to more effectively move their product (Stepanova 2013, 30). This shows that international donors have to focus on exposing corruption and the link between crime and politics in Tajikistan in order to fight against drug trafficking.

Johan Engvall (2006) believes that drug trafficking has hugely affected Tajikistan and is difficult for foreign donors to solve due to its weak state. Ohlson and Söderberg argue that a weak state is characterised by a lack of consensus on how state power should be contested and executed, little capacity of state institutions to provide everybody with the basic needs of health and security, vulnerability of the state to external political or economic forces and lack of legitimacy of the people in power (Ohlson & Söderberg 2002, 6-7). Engvall has highlighted that due to Tajikistan's low state capacity the government has been unable to collect taxes, which has led to unpaid civil servants, health workers and border guards (Engvall 2006, 833). The high number of heroin addicts in Tajikistan, due partly to the amount of drugs being trafficked through the country, has led to a looming HIV crisis, which Tajikistan is not prepared for. In order to treat a person with HIV an estimated \$10,000 is needed. Tajikistan's health budget is \$13 per person. This means for the majority of Tajik's, HIV is a life sentence (Ibid 843). Due to border guards being severely under paid the 1,206km border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan goes largely unguarded or the border guards take part in the smuggling of drugs themselves (Ibid 2006, 846). Drug smuggling is a major source of income for Tajikistan. 30-50% of the country's economic activity is linked to drug trafficking (Ibid 2006, 844). Narcotics money has provided regime survival and has also financed terrorist training (Konarovsky 2007, 14). This shows Tajikistan's weak state has exacerbated the drug trafficking problem in the country.

1.6 Conclusion

From this literature review it is clear most academics agree that Russia has the greatest political influence in Tajikistan. Russia's hard security policy towards drug trafficking is reflected in the mainly Russian funded CSTO. A hard security policy involves using the military to solve a conflict. As the CSTO has no Chinese or western donors, nothing stops them from fully pursuing their hard security goals. China's influence in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan has mainly been through economic aid, they do not pursue much hard security as they do not want to do anything that will upset Russia. Due to the distrust between Russia and China, the SCO is mostly used as a platform for the two major powers to have an open dialogue on the Central Asian region. The US is also a major player in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan due to their troop presence in neighbouring Afghanistan and their large contributions to the UNODC and OSCE. The EU plays a significant role in Tajikistan and could overtake the US's influence if they withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

BOMCA, due to being funded by the EU, follows a soft security policy towards combating trafficking. A soft security policy does not involve the military and instead uses development to deal with a complex security issue such as drug trafficking. From the literature review we can see that the main difficulties that all international organisations face in Tajikistan in the fight to eradicate drug trafficking is a lack of political will, corruption, the narco-terror nexus, organised crime and Tajikistan's weak state. These difficulties combined with the ongoing tensions between organisations hard and soft approaches to security will be the basis of the framework used to analyse what aid has been implemented by each organisation and answer which one has carried out the most effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan.

Chapter Two

UNODC:

In this chapter I will be looking at the work done by the UNODC to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan. I will firstly outline who the UNODC donors are and what frameworks and strategies they use. I will then go on to talk about the basic aid the UNODC provides such as infrastructure, training and cooperation and I will finish with the new and unique tactics of aid the UNODC uses.

2.1 Donors and Strategies

The UNODC has played a very effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan. The UNODC receives most of its funding from non-Russian donors; its two biggest donors are the US and the EU who contributed \$73 and \$54 million respectively, which is 22.2% and 16.7% of the total budget of the special purpose fund in 2018. In comparison Russia contributed \$2.1 million, which is less than 1% of donations received (UNODC Annual Report 2018, 143). Therefore due to the UNODC's biggest donors it follows an approach that appeases both EU and US that includes focusing strongly on development, building infrastructure and training to combat drug trafficking. The UNODC began working in Central Asia in 1993. In Tajikistan the UNODC operates the Programme for Central Asia and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries.

The Programme for Central Asia (2015-2019) is the strategic framework used by the UNODC to provide assistance to each Central Asian state and is coordinated from the Regional Office of Central Asia (ROCA). The programme aims to enhance capacity at national level and also encourage regional cooperation between Central Asian states. It is structured into four sub-programmes. Sub-programme one is the most relevant for countering drug trafficking. Out of a total budget of \$70 million, sub-programme one receives the most funding at \$30.4 million (UNODC 2015, 12&13). In this programme the UNODC aims to increase cooperation between law enforcement agencies in Central Asia and further strengthen the Central Asian

Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC). The UNODC also aims to continue initiatives such as Border Liaison Offices, Drug Liaison Officers and the Container Control Programme (UNODC 2015, 23). It is also a long term target of sub-Programme one for each Central Asian country to have a pool of master trainers who can train their new law enforcement officers on drug control and organised crime (Ibid 48). This shows the UNODC is seriously committed to playing an effective role in Tajikistan by laying out long term plans.

2.2 Infrastructure

The UNODC describes a Border Liaison Office as a coordinating office for national law enforcement, usually located near a border crossing, which acts as a central hub for information received from the surrounding area, where upon joint actions can be taken and coordinated. BLO counterparts meet regularly to exchange information on new trafficking techniques and routes (UNODC 2015, 11). There have been ten BLO's built on the Tajik borders to date including two at the Tajik-Afghan border (UNODC 2020). The two BLO's at the Tajik-Afghan border, Ishkashim in the east and Nizhny Pyanj in the west, are geographically the most important BLO's for stopping narcotics being trafficked from their origin in Afghanistan to Central Asia. Limited water and electricity supply and poor communication infrastructure has hampered staff efforts at remote BLO's. This lack of development is due to Tajikistan's weak state which cannot afford to provide such amenities in remote areas. Staff at BLO's stated that their biggest problem was high staff turnover and suggested that frequent trainings would be needed for new recruits. Gavrilis argues donors want to give border outposts all the modern comforts so officers can focus on the job at hand rather than only thinking about how to survive in such harsh conditions (Gavrilis 2012, 35). BLO's on the Tajik-Afghan border can be seen as a success as in 2018 joint operations at the border resulted in the seizure of 120kg of narcotics (UNODC 2018). This shows the UNODC has played an effective role in combating drug trafficking through the creation of BLO's.

So far in Tajikistan the UNODC has helped construct and rehabilitate ten border posts. The first border post Bakhorak was built in 2007 with financial assistance from the US and the most recently built border post Payvand is located on the Tajik-

Afghan border, which was opened on the 12th of December 2019 (UNODC 2019). All of the border posts built by the UNODC are located in western Tajikistan neglecting the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan. While international assistance is effective to capture small time drug traffickers they fail to catch the major mafia groups. Levi-Sanchez argues Tajik border guards only target small dealers and traffickers to satisfy international donors such as the UNODC and legitimise the efforts made by the DCA (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 112).

The government's lack of control in Gorno-Badakhshan could be seen in 2012 when the central government had to send in 3000 security personnel to shut down what they called a violent criminal group. It is believed that the government acted in this heavy handed way to either stop a coup, to insert officials loyal to President Rahmon in Gorno-Badakhshan or for the government to take control of drug smuggling routes in the province (Nicol 2014, 27-8). This shows that drug trafficking is so entrenched in Tajikistan that when there is violence in the country, including what took place in 2012 in Gorno-Badakhshan, is usually related to struggles amongst elites and security forces over resources including drug smuggling routes (Omelicheva & Markowitz 2019, 134).

One common misconception which international donors make when developing border crossings is that development will decrease drug trafficking as they assume local institutions will be empowered by the new facilities and equipment to help them do their job (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 16). However customs handbooks given to border guards are “convoluted, and the customs guard told me they were unable to decipher all of them” (Ibid 111). For every formal rule there is in Badakhshan there is also an unwritten rule, when the two rules clash the informal rule trumps the legal rule (Ibid 121). This shows a lack of political will among local law enforcement to change their corrupt habits and that central Tajik government and international donors are viewed with suspicion.

2.3 Training

The UNODC also organises training for Tajik border guards as part of their aim to strengthen the capacity of the Tajik-Afghan border. Training in intelligence analysis

is the most common training undertaken by the UNODC; they have conducted 10 courses over the last 10 years. The most recent training took place in March in cooperation with the DCA to advance data analysis (UNODC 2020). During these training sessions, officers learned skills from basic computing to geo-information systems to criminal intelligence and software training. The UNODC believes that knowledge of these computer systems and software will help law enforcement and border guards to map out and analysis drug seizures and prices in order to effectively fight against drug trafficking. Unfortunately, on occasion, the technology that officers have been trained to use has been abandoned due to a lack of electricity in remote border crossings (Gavrilis 2012, 39). Other types of trainings have been undertaken by the UNODC. In November 2018, 26 Tajik officers completed a five day training course where they learned how to profile a drug trafficker and effectively search a vehicle for narcotics (UNODC 2018). This sort of training would be counter-intuitive to corrupt law enforcement as it would teach them how not to get caught or raise suspicion from other officers while they were engaged in trafficking narcotics (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 122). However the range of subjects related to combating drug trafficking that the UNODC teaches in training sessions shows that the organisation does indeed play an effective role.

2.4 Cooperation

Cooperation on Information between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

In order to more effectively fight drug trafficking in Tajikistan the UNODC has been encouraging regional cooperation between Central Asian states and has itself been cooperating with other international organisations. UNODC has been actively encouraging Tajikistan and its neighbour Kyrgyzstan to cooperate. In November 2017 the UNODC facilitated a meeting between the Ministry of the Interior of Kyrgyzstan and the DCA of Tajikistan where a protocol of cooperation was signed. The countries stated they wished to cooperate on combating organised criminal drug groups and exchange information about them. The meeting to combat drug trafficking between the two countries was timely as the poppy harvest in 2017 in Afghanistan was a decade record of 9,000 tons (UNODC 2017). A year after this meeting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to exchange information on countering the trafficking of narcotics and their precursors, to share experiences and legislative acts,

to conduct capacity building and professional development, to assist in expert analysis and study on the topic and to conduct joint research activities together (UNODC 2018). This shows the UNODC is playing an effective role in helping Tajikistan cooperate by sharing information with Kyrgyzstan to combat drug trafficking.

Information Cooperation between Neighbours

The Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries or RP, which is part of the UNODC is “a platform that seeks to bring together nations, fostering dialogue, exploring common ground and proposing joint solutions to counter the effects of narcotics” (UNODC RP Report 2015, viii). The most relevant initiative for fighting drug trafficking in Tajikistan is the Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (AKT) Initiative, founded in 2012. This initiative develops greater legal cooperation and closer ties between the Drug Control Agencies, Financial Investigative Units and General Prosecutors from each country (Ibid Xii). It is important to include Kyrgyzstan as the Fergana Valley is a sensitive area in which Tajik and Kyrgyz authorities need to cooperate on. This valley intersects with the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The borders in this area are highly disputed and some villages are even split between the three countries. This has led to unchecked migration, which coupled with strong clan and tribal traditions, creates an ideal environment for drug trafficking (Ibid 79). Therefore it is imperative that the UNODC encourages security cooperation between Tajikistan and its neighbours.

CARICC – Mechanism for Regional Information Cooperation

The UNODC project that has facilitated the most cooperation between Central Asian states to fight drug trafficking is the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC). CARICC was created “to facilitate information exchange and analysis, and to assist in the coordination of operational activities of the various law enforcement agencies in the region and thereby improve effectiveness in countering drug trafficking” (CARICC History¹). The CARICC agreement was ratified by all Central Asian countries in 2009 (UNODC 2009) and by Russia in September of the same year (UNODC 2009). In 2018 the CARICC operation ‘substitute’ was successful in countering the illegal trafficking of precursor chemicals

¹ <https://caricc.org/index.php/en/caricc/about-caricc/history>

(UNODC 2018). The UNODC has also collaborated with CARICC to develop and publish a catalogue on methods of concealment of narcotics identified in CARICC member states during the period 2014-2016. CARICC also facilitated the exchange of information between its members and the counter narcotics police of Afghanistan (UNODC Annual Report 2018, 21). This shows that CARICC is another successful project by the UNODC, which has helped play an effective role in eradicating drug trafficking from Tajikistan through information sharing between Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

Attempted Border Security Cooperation with CIS & SCO

In February 2019 the UNODC and the Border Guard Forces of the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan co-hosted a conference on the importance of the CIS Council of Border Troops cooperation with other regional and international organisations to combat threats and challenges to border security including drug trafficking. The meeting was also attended by border guard commanders from Central Asian, Russia and Afghanistan as well as representatives from the SCO and CARICC (UNODC 2019). The UNODC has also held meetings with the SCO, which is funded by China and Russia. During a meeting held in March 2017 the SCO discussed eliminating drug production by eradicating illicit opium plants and the processing facilities for them (UNODC 2017). This method of eradication is a policy pushed by Russia. In contrast the US, who donates millions to the UNODC, believe that eradication is wrong as it will leave many Afghan farmers penniless and worsen the UN's image in the eyes of the Afghan people. The US funded NATO wants to focus on targeting warehouses where the narcotics are stored to directly tackle the criminals rather than farmers just trying to make a living (Peyrouse 2013, 249). Therefore while there are US troops in Afghanistan, Russian backed organisations such as the SCO and CSTO will be unable to fulfil their method of fighting against narcotic trafficking.

2.5 Other Unique Projects

One of the earliest successes of the UNODC in Tajikistan was the help they gave to launch the Drug Control Agency (DCA) in 1999. The DCA has signed 43 national and international agreements since its inception to increase cooperation in the fight

against drug trafficking and between 2000 and 2018 17,902kg of narcotics have been seized by the DCA (UNODC 2019). The success of the DCA shows that the UNODC has played a huge role in Tajikistan from the beginning. The DCA was created by the UNODC to help Tajikistan rebuild and develop after the civil war and for Tajikistan to have its own independent body dedicated to eradicating the drug trafficking trade. The UNODC hopes in the future that the DCA will no longer be reliant on them for support.

During an expert group meeting in November 2018 a memorandum of understanding on the placement of Drug Liaison Officers (DLO's) was signed by representatives of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (UNODC 2018). These DLO's are a unique feature intended to help cooperation between the three countries in order to combat drug trafficking. The Container Control Programme (CCP) is a joint UNODC- World Customs Organisation (WCO) initiative which aims to help governments establish sustainable law enforcement bodies to fight drug trafficking in dry and sea ports. In total Tajik officials have taken part in nine CCP training activities since they joined the programme in March 2014 (UNODC 2016). The CCP has built four port control units in Tajikistan. In 2016 the dry ports of Dushanbe-2 and Nizhny Pyanj were opened with the addition of computers, secure communication tools, search and detection equipment as well as chemical detectors (UNODC 2016). Two additional port control units were built in Tajikistan in April 2019 in Khujand, in the Sughd region and in Khorog, Gorno-Badakhshan. The new port control units were equipped and the staff had received training before beginning work (UNODC 2019). In 2019 five Tajik custom officials even made an international visit to Dover and Gatwick in the UK under the CCP (UNODC 2019). This shows that the UNODC have recently made an effort to help establish unique tactics to combat drug trafficking around the whole country including Gorno-Badakhshan.

2.6 Conclusion and Recommendations

The UNODC have played a huge role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan. The biggest success the UNODC has made in Tajikistan is helping them create a dedicated law enforcement agency to fighting drug trafficking, the DCA. The UNODC have also helped Tajikistan by building new border posts and border liaison offices, these

have been useful in the fight against drug trafficking but will only work to their full potential if they are staffed by non corrupt officers. The UNODC have also created the successful information exchange programme CARICC. The UNODC has implemented other successful projects such as the container control programme; they have built port control units, conducted training programmes for law enforcement and have helped foster cooperation between Central Asian states. There have also been some attempts to cooperate on border security with other organisations such as the SCO and the CIS, funded by Russia, that do not follow the same policy in the fight against narcotics as the UNODC. However there have been limited practical outcomes in these meetings as non-Russian donors have pushed their soft security policy onto the UNODC's actions in fighting drug trafficking in Tajikistan. The UNODC's work reveals that they are not comfortable with addressing the government on issues such as corruption and that are afraid of implementing anti-drug trafficking aid in areas associated with violence and organised crime such as Gorno-Badakhshan.

The UNODC has covered the most common types of aid used to combat drug trafficking and have also contributed their own unique projects such as CARICC, the DCA, the container control programme, port control units, building BLO's and establishing DLO's. For the UNODC to be more effective in Tajikistan it needs to invest in building border posts in Gorno-Badakhshan in order for Tajikistan to be covered against the threat of drug trafficking across their whole border with Afghanistan and because it is a known area for drug trafficking and organised crime. If the UNODC wants to play an effective role it should also expose the ties that Tajik elites have to drug trafficking. Finally the UNODC needs to encourage and facilitate more information cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan especially through CARICC in order for Tajik analysts to know in advance when possible traffickers are heading towards the Tajik border.

Chapter Three

BOMCA:

In this chapter I will be exploring the effective work implemented by BOMCA in Tajikistan to combat the trafficking of drugs. I will firstly be looking into the trainings BOMCA offer on anti-corruption and their plans for a new unique training system. The equipment donated and their success in cooperation which has further enhanced Tajikistan's capabilities to deal with the problem of drug trafficking will also be discussed.

3.1 Background of BOMCA

The EU funded programme Border Management Programme of Central Asia (BOMCA) was created in 2003 to focus on “capacity building and institutional development, developing trade corridors, improving border management systems and eliminating drug trafficking across the Central Asia region” (BOMCA Overview²). BOMCA helps Central Asian countries in the fight against drug trafficking through training, technical assistance, joint practical exercises, training of the trainers, study visits and online learning (BOMCA What We Do³). Since 2015 BOMCA has been in its 9th phase. While the UNODC concentrates most of its donor money in combating drug trafficking in western Tajikistan, BOMCA focuses its efforts in the eastern part of the country (De Danieli 2011, 135). Before the 9th phase BOMCA donated 80% equipment and 20% training however now it is the opposite (Gavrilis 2012, 19).

3.2 Training

During this 9th phase, BOMCA has been focusing on providing workshops and trainings for Tajik border officials. From 2015 until now Tajikistan has participated in 19 trainings and workshops organised by BOMCA. These trainings and workshops have focused on topics such as border demarcation and joint border crossings. These

² <https://www.bomca-eu.org/en/programme/overview>

³ <https://www.bomca-eu.org/en/programme/what-we-do>

sorts of issues are extremely important for Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley where the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan meet. However it is important that these border disputes, which contribute to the trafficking of narcotics through Tajikistan and beyond, are dealt with at local level (Gavrilis 2009, 3). In 2016 experts from Europe held meetings with Tajik officials to help them increase the efficiency of green border surveillance and develop risk analysis (BOMCA 2016). In Central Asia drug trafficking is split into three colours; red is drug trafficking organised by senior officials, black is trafficking by organised criminal groups and green is trafficking organised by clandestine Islamic movements (Peyrouse 2013, 249). Due to the securitisation of drug trafficking the green channel receives the most attention from international donors. The black channel does not receive nearly as much attention as it should because international organisations are scared to face up to corrupt Central Asian regimes and jeopardise their ability to work in the country.

BOMCA has also organised practical exercises in Tajikistan to help fight drug trafficking. In October 2017 in the northern Tajik city of Khujand close to the Kyrgyz border 20 officers from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan took part in a practical exercise focusing on the tactics and techniques needed to detect illegal goods and vehicles. The activity was carried out in order to build the capacity of border and customs officers in the prevention and detection of smuggling illegal drugs (BOMCA 2017). Tajik officials have participated in two study work trips abroad to Europe with BOMCA, one in 2016 and in 2017. BOMCA highlights the importance of teaching border officials from European experiences, whether it is Central Asian officials visiting the EU's eastern border or EU experts visiting Central Asia, however BOMCA also aims for Central Asian border officials to be self reliant.

BOMCA tries to create this self-reliance through their training of the trainers programme; this programme was first introduced in 2011. In June 2016 Tajikistan took part in the training of the trainers' session where the Chief of Examination Service of the State Border Guard of Latvia conducted workshops on document security, this event was co-organised by BOMCA and the OSCE (BOMCA 2016). It is hoped that these officers will pass on the information to new recruits. In February 2017 Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed to exchange trainers from their customs training institutes. From May 29th to June 1st 15 Tajik teachers and

instructors were trained by their Kyrgyz and Uzbek contemporaries (BOMCA 2017). BOMCA hopes that the training of trainers will make Tajik law enforcement agencies more self-sufficient to fight drug trafficking in the long run so they will not have to always rely on international donors for support. The fact that the BOMCA train the trainers programme has been ongoing for nine years now shows that BOMCA is dedicated to playing an effective long-term role in training Tajik officials to combat drug trafficking in their country.

Most aid given to Tajikistan by BOMCA comes with the risk that the aid will be used for the wrong purposes due to the corrupt border officials. BOMCA has recognised this risk and has taken some action to educate Tajik officials about the dangers of corruption. In April 2017 European experts came to Dushanbe to give workshops on law enforcement ethics and the fight against corruption. The experts and Tajik officials looked into how to install a culture of integrity, how to detect and deter unethical behaviour and how to simplify administration as well as how to take action through the law, anti-corruption agencies and whistle blowing (BOMCA 2017). An identical workshop on corruption took place in February 2019 (BOMCA 2019). Gavrilis believes that Tajikistan needs an incentive to fight corruption in law enforcement and customs. If Tajikistan implements BOMCA recommendations on corruption it should be rewarded with more EU development aid, infrastructure and investments in border regions (Gavrilis 2009, 5).

3.3 Donation of Equipment

Technical assistance to Central Asian states through donating equipment is certainly not as common as it used to be, due to BOMCA now embracing a more sustainable approach to delivering aid in the region, however Tajikistan still receives tens of thousands of Euros worth of equipment every year. In August 2018, 70 sets of surveillance video systems worth €48,000 were given to the border troops of Tajikistan (BOMCA 2018). 2019 was the year in which the most equipment was handed over to Tajikistan. In June an English class in the new military gymnasium was equipped with furniture, computers with the relevant software installed, books and a projector. This equipment was donated in order to modernise the training of border guards in Tajikistan so they meet international standards (BOMCA 2019). In

September BOMCA donated a printer to the Higher Border Institute of the Border Troops of Tajikistan and the customs service was also given a printer along with computers worth €10,000 (BOMCA 2019). Finally in October video equipment was handed over to the border troops of Tajikistan worth €38,000 (BOMCA 2019). This shows that BOMCA is keen to play an effective role in developing Tajikistan's facilities in order for them to be better equipped for combating drug trafficking.

Before phase 9 of BOMCA, when 80% of aid was equipment, Tajikistan received binoculars, infrared goggles, thermal cameras and even fridges. BOMCA also constructed bridges, border guard housing and customs facilities along the Tajik-Afghan border to make it more comfortable for border troops to stay in remote posts for longer (Gavrilis 2009, 4). Unfortunately though night vision goggles, donated by EU donors, which were supposed to be used by border guards to catch drug traffickers was instead used by the Tajik government against the political opposition (Cooley 2012, 159). Instances like these show that the Tajik government has little political will to combat drug trafficking and instead is focused on trying to use international aid to assert their political position and eradicate any opposition to Rahmon's regime. BOMCA's attitude towards donating large amounts of equipment to Tajikistan has changed due to the realisation that it has been used by the wrong people against innocent Tajik's.

3.4 Cooperation

Interagency and Regional Cooperation on Training

BOMCA are extremely keen to enhance interagency cooperation in border and customs control between the Central Asian nations. In October 2019 a regional workshop for border guards and customs training institutions was attended by all five Central Asian states. They talked about the cooperation of training institutions to develop a unique, harmonised and efficient training system for border guards and custom officials in Central Asia. BOMCA plans to create this joint platform for training in the 10th phase beginning in 2020 (BOMCA 2019). The fact that this has been planned for eight years shows that the EU is perusing a steady as she goes approach by simply extending existing policies from previous phases (Melvin 2012, 1).

Cooperation on Border Security

In July 2018 a conference on regional cooperation in the field of border security took place, which was attended by the heads and senior officials of the border agencies of all five Central Asian states as well as Afghanistan and Iran. The participants of the meeting agreed to continue joint efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking, promote joint risk analysis and threat assessment and exchange information to be able to predict potential threats (BOMCA 2018). This shows that although the EU is correct to encourage security cooperation in the area, they are unlikely to make any changes as they are not a powerful enough influence in the region like Russia or China. Therefore BOMCA will not be able to engage in hard security approaches (Melvin 2012, 5). Despite not being able to get involved in hard security aid BOMCA have still played an effective role in combating drug trafficking through softer tactics such as training, cooperation and donating technical equipment.

3.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

BOMCA, in its 9th phase since 2015, has made some progress in the fight against drug trafficking in Tajikistan, mostly through training. BOMCA's initiative train the trainers should be expanded as it allows those who join the border troops to be educated by an experienced Tajik rather than a foreigner who they cannot relate to. BOMCA also needs to continually push workshops on corruption and should facilitate information and border security cooperation between Tajikistan with other Central Asian states and Afghanistan. It would also be helpful if BOMCA led more practical missions in Tajikistan to do with identification, profiling and searching people and vehicles for narcotics. More emphasis should also be put on tackling red smuggling, drug trafficking organised by corrupt senior officials rather than smuggling by terrorists. BOMCA should continue to donate equipment to the border troops of Tajikistan but there must be conditions that officials should either write a report on how the donations have helped fight drug trafficking or there should be random checks by donors to judge whether the equipment donated is being used properly and not being abused by corrupt officials. If aid is being misused then donors should feel comfortable enough to discuss the issue with senior officials. When it comes to cooperation in security against trafficking it is imperative that the EU and US work

together. A combination of hard security policy of US troops on the ground in Afghanistan and the soft security policy of EU funded border posts in Tajikistan should make inroads into eradicating drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Overall BOMCA has made effective contributions to combating drug trafficking by not only implementing all the common tactics of aid such as training, donation of equipment and cooperation but also through study trips abroad, online learning, anti-corruption classes and the future introduction of a unique training system for Tajik border troops.

Chapter Four

SCO:

This chapter on the SCO will firstly look at the aims and strategies the SCO wish to use in Tajikistan, how the SCO deals with cooperation between its own members and with other organisations. The new unique ideas by the SCO to stop drug trafficking in Tajikistan will also be discussed which include anti-narcotic exercises and tackling trafficking on the dark web.

4.1 Aims and Strategies of the SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was created in 2001 as a political, security and economic alliance between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. India and Pakistan became full members in 2017 and Belarus, Iran, Mongolia and Afghanistan are observer states. Afghanistan's ascension as an observer state of the SCO shows that China and Russia are serious about eradicating the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan to Russia via Central Asia. "One should not forget that the SCO emerged as a response to immediate threats of terrorism and drug trafficking, which came from Afghanistan in the late 1990s. The SCO idea was born from a collective demand for a regional coalition to combat them" (Da Silva Reis & Simionato 2013, 146) The SCO main goals include strengthening trust and cooperation between members; make joint efforts to keep peace, security and stability in the region and proceed towards the establishment of a democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order. What is unique to the SCO compared to western backed international organisations is the Shanghai Spirit. The SCO members do not cooperate based on democratic values but instead they highlight the importance of non-interference in each member states internal affairs (Reeves 2014, 7). This Shanghai spirit has made it difficult for the SCO to make any effective inroads in fighting drug trafficking in Tajikistan as they have refused to acknowledge the rampant corruption, organised crime and lack of political will displayed by the Tajik government.

On the 10th of July 2015 a framework was laid out for an agreement on cooperation and interaction of the member states of the SCO on border issues. Article three of the framework stresses the need to strengthen the capacity of the border authorities of SCO members and coordinate their efforts in detection, prevention and suppression of illegal activity at international borders (SCO 2015, 2). Whilst article four states that member states need to plan and implement coordinated border activities, exchange information and train border guard officials. Article five emphasises the need for members to exchange experience and legislation and hold regular work meetings (Ibid 3).

The development strategy of the SCO until 2025 emphasises the need for joint operations on trafficking, training of law enforcement and financial and technical assistance. By 2025 the SCO hopes to develop a special project to promote research and exchange in techniques and technologies of monitoring and the elimination of illicit cultivation of narcotic plants in Afghanistan (SCO Development Strategy 2015, 6). This elimination of the poppy plant is in line with Russia's hard security strategy to win the war on drugs in Afghanistan, however while US troops are stationed in Afghanistan the SCO will not be able to do anything.

The SCO's anti drug strategy for 2018-2023 includes tactics to fight drug trafficking in Tajikistan by blocking channels of precursors arriving in Central Asia, suppressing money that flows into the drug trade and cooperation with the UNODC and CARICC (UN 2019, 41). The chemical precursor acetic anhydride is an extremely important part of Tajik's drug trafficking problem as it is needed for the transformation of Afghan opium into heroin (Peyrouse 2013, 240). This shows that the SCO hopes to play an effective role in combating drug trafficking through cooperation, developing training and information sharing as well as stopping illegal financial flows from trafficking and stopping precursors from entering the country. If the SCO does implement their strategies then they will be successful in combating the trafficking of narcotics.

4.2 Cooperation

Attempted Cooperation with Western Backed Organisations

The SCO signed a cooperation agreement with CARICC in 2010 and with the UNODC in 2011 (Peyrouse 2013, 245). However there has been little practical cooperation in

combating drug trafficking because of the completely different policy views of Russia and China and the EU and US on narcotics. This conflict of ideas could be seen recently in March of this year during a speech given by the Secretary General of the SCO, Vladimir Norov, at the 63rd session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs where he emphasised the narco-terror nexus "the phenomenon of narcoterrorism when proceeds from illegal narcotic drugs trafficking finance terrorist activities is particularly alarming." (SCO 2020). This is in complete contrast to the UNODC who see no evidence that any terrorist group is benefitting from the drug trade (Stepanova 2013, 38). The SCO fixation on the narco-terror nexus makes their job in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan harder as they completely ignore the more important connection between trafficking and local organised crime and corruption taking place in Tajikistan.

Lack of Cooperation Due to Differences between Members

The SCO is seen by some as a mechanism of cooperation between countries with a long history of enmity whereas others see the SCO as an anti-western alliance (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013, 32). The two main SCO members China and Russia do not have much in common as have very different priorities for the organisation; Russia wants to use the SCO to increase its political influence in the region whereas China wants to use the SCO to increase their trade with Central Asia. Marcel De Haas argues that the SCO's "wide ranging agenda and diverse membership clearly weakens its potential capabilities" (De Haas 2017, 11). Jeffrey Reeves disagrees stating that the inclusivity of member and observer states is the SCO's greatest strength and that the SCO has provided institutional linkages between states and governments that were not there before due to the hostility between Russia and China. With the SCO, Russia and China balance each other out and do not aim to undermine regional stability (Reeves 2014, 6). For Central Asian states such as Tajikistan they can be enriched by China economically and also receive training and security from Russia to counter the drug trafficking trade. However due to the Shanghai spirit, the SCO will never get to the root of the problems causing drug trafficking in Tajikistan and so will not play a very effective role in combating drug trafficking.

Stephen Aris believes China and Russia still don't trust each other and due to this mistrust SCO can never become a military organisation. Instead of military cooperation

the SCO holds 'peace missions' (Aris 2013, 196). It will be impossible for the SCO to ever become a military organisation because Russia and China will never disclose sensitive military and technology information to each other. Laruelle and Peyrouse argue the SCO's "obsession for consensus and for maintaining the status quo has hampered the SCO effectiveness" (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013, 33). The SCO has not defined any long term goals, refuses to discuss divergences in its member's priorities, lacks coordination, suffers from a lack of financial resources and has weak bureaucratic structures (Ibid 33). Due to Russia's mistrust of China, they prefer to engage with Central Asian states on security issues such as drug trafficking through the CSTO and economic issues through the Eurasian Economic Union. Reeves argues Russia sees the SCO as an organisation for managing relations with the Chinese in Central Asia (Reeves 2014, 9). This proves due to sphere of influence that Russia has over Central Asia, China has to be wary of how they cooperate with Russia through the SCO. Due to some narcotics from Afghanistan making their way into China via Tajikistan, both of the SCO's main donors do care about stopping the flow of drugs into their country. SCO members hold regular meetings between the heads of their counter-narcotic agencies to try and fight the problem of drug trafficking (Konarovskiy 2011, 182). However it is argued that the SCO has failed to coordinate joint activities against drug trafficking (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 12).

4.3 Trafficking on the Dark Web & Anti-Narcotic Exercises

At the 63rd session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs the SCO brought up a new technique of targeting the dark web to fight drug trafficking in SCO member states. The SCO Secretary General Vladimir Norov claimed that drug trafficking accounts for 60% of transactions on the dark web. Norov explained during his speech that as part of anti-drug operation Spider Web, the SCO were planning to train people to block the delivery channels of narcotics including online resources and the virtual payment systems (SCO 2020). This shows that the SCO are keeping up and evolving with new modern techniques criminals are using to traffic narcotics. CARICC estimates that in Tajikistan 70-75% of opiates are transported by road in trucks and cars and 8-10% is trafficked by plane (Stepanova 2013, 28). This leaves a significant percentage of narcotics in Tajikistan that could possibly be trafficked over the Internet on the dark web. Out of the five organisations discussed the SCO has taken the threat of trafficking

through the dark web the most seriously. This shows that the SCO can make a unique, soft security policy contribution towards fighting drug trafficking.

In July 2019 the anti-drug operation Spider Web took place as part of the SCO's Anti-Drug Strategy Programme for 2018-2023. The SCO worked in cooperation with CARICC. The aim of the operation was to cut off channels used to sell and distribute narcotics. Officers of SCO law enforcement agencies and representatives of the SCO secretariat carried out coordinated and statistical work as part of the operation to fight drug trafficking in the region. The operation also involved representatives from Afghanistan, CSTO and UNODC. 6,422kg of narcotics were seized during the operation and 32 people were arrested for drug trafficking (SCO 2019). Operation Spider Web's success could be an indication that more anti-narcotic operations will take place in the future allowing the SCO to play a more effective role in the fight against drug trafficking. Unfortunately, the SCO does not publish statistics from each individual member state so it is impossible to see the impact the operation made in Tajikistan. Operation Spider Web is an exception for the SCO as they usually don't indulge in practical programmes and instead limit themselves to summits and meetings (Aris 2013, 206). What the SCO does excel at, which helps Tajikistan fight drug trafficking in their country, is to provide a "forum for dialogue and coordination of national approaches" (Ibid 204). This allows for Tajikistan to learn from more powerful nations such as Russia and China on which tactics and techniques to use to fight against drug trafficking.

4.4 Conclusion and Recommendations

Out of all the organisations discussed in this thesis the SCO has played the least effective role in helping Tajikistan fight drug trafficking. This is probably due to the ongoing struggle between China and Russia to trust each other enough to work on meaningful projects to fight drug trafficking in the region. The only basic facet of aid they have implemented is cooperation. However operation Spider Web has shown that the member states can work effectively together as long as no classified information is exchanged. This operation needs to be replicated in the future with results from each member state published so the SCO knows which country it needs to focus its attention on most. Targeting drug trafficking on the dark web shows that the SCO are capable of

forming new and unique policies. However it is clear that the SCO are stopped from working to their full potential in Tajikistan due to the lack of political will to work with the SCO in fear that it will either hamper their relations with Russia or the west for working too closely with China. An area that the SCO does excel in is cooperation, due to the breadth of members. For the SCO to be more effective at fighting drug trafficking in Tajikistan it needs to promote Afghanistan, where almost all the narcotics originate from, to full member status. This would allow deeper cooperation between Afghan anti-narcotic and law enforcement agencies and their contemporaries, who are also members of the SCO, such as Tajikistan. If Afghanistan became a member of the SCO it would also give Russia the chance to influence Afghanistan and allow them to carry out their hard security driven anti-narcotic policy of destroying the illicit opium plant.

Chapter Five

OSCE:

In this chapter I will be looking at the work done by the OSCE in training the Border Troops of Tajikistan through the College in Dushanbe, in remote locations, at the airport and in Moscow, as well as their train the trainer's course. The OSCE has carried out other basic aid work by refurbishing training centres. They are also starting to tackle trafficking online; they have introduced anti-corruption courses and have tried a new tactic of trying to persuade the Tajik government to implement New Border Strategies (NBS).

5.1 Background

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest security orientated organisation in the world. It has 57 member states which include countries from Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the US and Canada. The biggest donors to the OSCE in 2018 were the US and Germany who contributed 12.9% and 10.9% respectively of the total donations received. Russia also contributed a fair amount to the OSCE; its donation was 4% of the total budget (OSCE Annual Report 2018, 99). Therefore the OSCE is an organisation with a mix of Russian and non-Russian donors. In 2018 the OSCE office in Dushanbe had the highest budget out of all five Central Asian offices (Ibid 2018, 98). This shows that the OSCE sees Tajikistan, who joined the OSCE in 1992, as a priority for security orientated aid. For the OSCE drug trafficking is a transnational threat and in Tajikistan the OSCE's major project to fight trafficking in the country is their Border Management Staff College.

5.2 Training

The OSCE's college was founded in 2009 and offers over 100 specialised training courses for 2,200 officials from the border guards, police, customs and the DCA. The college offers both an intense one month course and also a yearlong course. Since 2014 a women only course has been taught once a year (OSCE Border Management

Staff College Factsheet 2015, 1). The courses at the college focus on the global impact of transnational crime, management, operational planning, organisational modernisation and cooperation with other agencies. Courses include study visits to nearby borders including the Tajik-Afghan border. Outreach events organised by the college focus on topics such as border management strategies, delimitation and demarcation, false travel documents and anti-corruption. Although the college does not receive donations from Russia, it still receives the Russian seal of approval, as the CIS border troops are affiliated with the College (Ibid 2). The OSCE College concluded its 25th border management staff course on the 1st of November 2019, this averages at 2-3 courses being taught every year (OSCE 2019). Gavrilis argues that the OSCE border college has failed as they have not been able to attract enrolment from other Central Asian republics. This is probably due to the competition posed by the presence of two other border guard training institutions in Tajikistan. The Higher Border College was set up by BOMCA in 2007 and receives support from the US, this college offers cadets four year courses and the curriculum is set by the Tajik government. The Russian funded Border Guard Training Centre provides junior officers with 3-4 months advanced specialist training and 100 officers graduate every year (Gavrilis 2012, 24). The creation of a training college for Tajik officials still shows that the OSCE is determined to play an effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan.

Training, organised and funded by the OSCE to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan, not only takes place in Dushanbe, where the college is located, but takes place all over the country in order to reach those in remote locations. They teach practical skills as well as theory. Six training courses, taught by Tajik instructors, who had been trained themselves by the OSCE, took place in regional Border Troops training centres in Khatlon, Sughd and Gorno-Badakhshan region (OSCE 2019). Learning these practical skills to use at border posts to find and capture drug traffickers will be more useful in the long term for Border Troops compared to donating equipment, which could be abandoned due to officials not knowing how to work it. Graduates of the 2017 OSCE train the trainer course led mobile training courses for 129 border troop officials across Tajikistan in August 2018. One aspect of the course was learning about the importance of the local population's involvement in border protection (OSCE 2018). This shows that the OSCE is aware of the importance of the train the trainers course

and its effectiveness in teaching local border troops in more remote regions near the Tajik-Afghan border where drug trafficking is a known problem.

The OSCE have also used training as a way to tackle drug trafficking at airports. In September 2017, 24 Tajik Border Troops took part in a week long workshop on the usage of technical equipment for the authenticity and verification of documents. The border troops were also taught on sight at passport control in Dushanbe Airport (OSCE 2017). The OSCE and Russia co-organised a border security and management workshop study trip for 15 Tajik Border Troops to visit Vnukovo and Domodedovo Moscow airports in December 2017 (OSCE 2017). This shows that Russia is very capable of working on OSCE projects and it also shows the OSCE's capabilities of helping Tajikistan tackle drug trafficking by giving them the unique opportunity to go aboard and learn from their Russian counterparts.

5.3 Infrastructure

On the 1st of January 2020 the OSCE launched the €3.3 million project 'Stabilisation of Tajikistan's southern border region with Afghanistan'. This project is due to last 18 months and is funded by the EU, with the aim to strengthen the Tajik and Afghan border services and to deal with illicit activities including drug trafficking taking place at the Tajik-Afghan border. Both Tajik and Afghan border troops will receive training on operational planning and sustaining field operations. In addition the training facilities of the Tajik Border Troops in Khalkayor and Langar will be refurbished and the training centre in Karatag will be renovated and put into service (OSCE 2020). This shows the OSCE is making a renewed effort to help combat drug trafficking at the Tajik-Afghan border. This effort could be due to the future security threat of when the US leaves Afghanistan. Khalkayor and Langar are both located in the western province of Khatlon whereas Karatag is located close to the Uzbek border. This shows that the OSCE, just like the UNODC, concentrates its efforts only in the west of Tajikistan avoiding the province of Gorno-Badakhshan, which has proven to be troubled by organised crime and drug trafficking.

5.4 Cooperation

Regional Cooperation in Training

Another major project recently launched in Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking by the OSCE is the 'Patrol Field Capacity Building of the Tajik Border Troops through Promotion of Regional Cooperation'. This programme was launched in November 2018 in Khalkayor and is supported by Germany. This project is to last five years and aims to train 1,500 Tajik Border Troops (OSCE 2018). A project of five years shows the OSCE is committed long term to combating drug trafficking. Long term commitments send a message to Rahmon's government that there is no quick fix to solve drug trafficking. During her time in Tajikistan, Levi-Sanchez talked with OSCE trainers from the US and UK who admitted that it could take decades or even a hundred years for the training implemented by the OSCE to change the culture of corruption and unwritten rules among border guards and law enforcement (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 136).

Inter-Agency Security Cooperation

The OSCE knows that in order for Tajikistan to better combat drug trafficking in their country they need to improve interagency cooperation and cooperate more with their neighbours. In September 2017 the OSCE supported the inauguration of Tajikistan's Inter-Agency Secretariat for Border Management and Security. The Inter-Agency Secretariat is a coordination body of 16 agencies working under the framework of Tajikistan's National Border Management Strategy. The OSCE is supporting Tajikistan in their new project so that all border related agencies in the country can strike a multi-agency response to transnational threats such a drug trafficking. The OSCE also provided 15 computers and laptops to the new Inter-Agency Secretariat (OSCE 2017).

Regional Cooperation on Information Sharing

Information sharing between Tajikistan and other Central Asian nations is encouraged by the OSCE. In October 2019 border officials from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took part in a one week workshop organised by the OSCE on analytical research and information sharing between border protection agencies. The workshop was taught by experts from Hungary and Russia (OSCE 2019). In July 2018 the OSCE organised a regional meeting of the heads of law enforcement departments of Central Asia to encourage cooperation, the UNODC was also present (OSCE 2018).

The OSCE has also included Afghanistan in coordinated meetings, exercises and workshops with the aim to foster information sharing (OSCE 2018). This shows that the OSCE plays an effective role in tackling drug trafficking in Tajikistan by encouraging Central Asian states to cooperate on the problem.

5.5 Trafficking Online & Anti-Corruption

The OSCE have recently begun to follow in the footsteps of the SCO in Tajikistan by tackling drug trafficking online. In November 2019 22 Tajik officials from the DCA and other Tajik law enforcement agencies took part in a three day training course on the methods used to investigate drug trafficking crimes on the internet. This training course, supported by the OSCE, was taught by Russian experts (OSCE 2019). This shows that Russia can take successful strategies, which they created in the SCO to fight drug trafficking, over to another international organisation which they donate to.

One of the main difficulties faced by international organisations in Tajikistan while trying to combat drug trafficking is corruption. The OSCE has acknowledged this problem and have taken steps to educate Tajik authorities about corruption within society and its negative effects on it. In March 2020 the OSCE organised an anti-corruption roundtable in Dushanbe. At this meeting the OSCE stressed the importance of better coordination between relevant actors in society to defeat corruption and highlighted the new National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which is to be adopted by the Tajik government by the end of 2020 (OSCE 2020). In 2018 and 2019 there were four workshops organised by the OSCE that focused on corruption. However nobody that attended the workshops were members of law enforcement, who would benefit most as they are in the front line against trafficking. Instead these workshops were attended by members of civil society and civil servants and were taught either by Europeans or Russians. Although most Tajik officials are interested in their training, others just view the trainings as a formality for international donors and the Tajik government (Levi-Sanchez 2017, 125). In 2017 the OSCE organised three train the trainer's programmes which resulted in the qualification of 55 Tajik Border Troops. These sessions were mostly run by local experts (OSCE 2017). The more local trainers that are trained, then the more effective OSCE sponsored anti-corruption workshops will

be. This shows the OSCE needs to refocus who it teaches its anti-corruption lessons to in order to play an effective role in combating drug trafficking.

5.6 Unique Tactics for Helping Combat Drug Trafficking

A unique facet of OSCE training lessons is that they include sessions on human rights and gender mainstreaming. Human rights and gender mainstreaming are not taken into consideration by the SCO and CSTO. This is due to the undemocratic nature of the regimes of Russia and China. Both of them are more worried about securitising borders to stop the flow of narcotics and keeping a political or economic influence over the Tajik government rather than the well being of ordinary Tajik men and women. The Shanghai spirit of the SCO would argue that the OSCE policy of stressing human rights and gender mainstreaming interferes with Tajik internal affairs however it is natural for the OSCE, who's main donors are the US and Germany, to promote democratic values they are known for. Promoting human rights and gender mainstreaming in the training of Tajik border guards and officials shows the OSCE is willing to introduce new innovative methods to stop drug trafficking.

The OSCE has tried to directly play a role in the Tajik government by developing a National Border Strategy (NBS). The OSCE envisions a radical revision of border laws in Tajikistan and wants to change border guards from army recruits to paid professional soldiers. However the Tajik government continues to follow old laws from Soviet military directives and has ignored the OSCE's advice of adopting new NBS (Gavrilis 2012, 23). NBS will never be passed as the current laws allow the Tajik elite to continue profiting from drug trafficking, which they depend upon to keep themselves in power. Therefore the OSCE should use Russia to influence the Tajik government to adopt these new rules, which could help the country more effectively deal with their drug trafficking problem.

5.7 Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite being funded by Russia, the US and EU, the OSCE continues to follow a soft security policy towards combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan. This is mainly because EU countries are the biggest contributors to the organisation. Due to the EU's

focus on development and soft security, Russia does not see the OSCE as being a serious security forum and implementer (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 17). Therefore Russia is unlikely to increase their donation to the OSCE in Tajikistan. Just like the UNODC, the OSCE needs to invest more of their time in implementing aid in Gorno-Badakhshan. In their College in Dushanbe the OSCE needs to focus more on attracting foreigners to study there. The OSCE have been trying to influence the Tajik government to adapting security reforms such as the NBS. The OSCE's failure to implement NBS shows a lack of political will from the Tajik government. In order to effectively combat drug trafficking the OSCE must continue to implement long term initiatives including train the trainers which would allow for new Tajik border guards and law enforcement to be taught completely by locals instead of foreign experts. The OSCE also needs to focus its corruption training on border guards and law enforcement, as they work closest to where drug trafficking takes place, instead of the current OSCE focus on teaching civil servants about corruption. If it were a local leading the anti-corruption workshops then certain Tajik border or law enforcement officials would see that combating corruption is not only for the benefit of foreigners, but also for the benefit of their local community. In order for the OSCE to be more effective in Tajikistan, Russia should be encouraged to contribute more to the OSCE. An OSCE with equal funding from the EU and Russia would allow them to combine the EU's soft security-development approach with Russia's strong political influence and hard security policy in Tajikistan. Although the OSCE pushes cooperation for information sharing between Central Asian states and Tajik agencies, it should also encourage more cooperation by organising joint practical exercises. Overall the OSCE plays a strong role in combating drug trafficking by implementing all the common aspects of aid and also introducing anti-corruption lessons, fighting trafficking on the internet and pressuring the government to adapt NBS.

Chapter Six

CSTO:

The CSTO's work in Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking is mainly focused on the basics of aid such as enhancing coordination and cooperation between the heads of member states anti-narcotics agencies and with other international organisations. The OSCE has also played an effective role in stopping the trafficking of narcotics through the presence of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force and military and anti-narcotic exercises. The CSTO's most unique tactic to combat the threat of drug trafficking, peacekeeping operations will also be discussed.

6.1 Overview

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance, which became an organisation of post-Soviet states in 2002. Currently the CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. From a military power perspective Russia is the CSTO hegemon (Haas 2017, 13). Since 2013 Afghanistan has been an observer, this shows that the CSTO is aware of the need to collaborate with Afghanistan as many security problems that affect CSTO members originate from there. Tajikistan is the only member of the CSTO that shares a border with Afghanistan so they are the most strategic country for the CSTO in terms of combating drug trafficking. The CSTO has been combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan for the past 18 years through the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), technical military assistance, practical training exercises, the Coordinating Council for Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking (CCBCD) and cooperating with other international organisations.

6.2 Coordination/ Cooperation

Cooperation between Members on Training and Information

Due to drug trafficking outweighing "all other security concerns that Russia has about the situation in Afghanistan including those related to terrorism," (Stepanova 2013, 10) the CSTO created a special organ dedicated to combating drug trafficking. The

Coordination Council of the Heads of Competent Authorities to Combat Drug Trafficking was founded in 2005 in coordination with the CSTO Collective Security Council. This coordination council improves and harmonises legislation on drug trafficking in CSTO member states, coordinates with the CIS and SCO, promotes the exchange of experience, information and joint research between CSTO states and considers issues such as training and staff development for the competent authorities and educational institutions (Purpose and Function of the CCBCD⁴). During the 20th meeting of the CCBCD in June 2018, the coordination council outlined their achievements and goals. Comprehensive operational-search measures had taken place to identify and suppress channels of drug trafficking through the territories of CSTO member states. The CSTO were also involved in the searching of vehicles, luggage and transported goods crossing borders (CCBCD 2018). One of the greatest achievements of the CCBCD was the creation of a joint database on the circulation of drugs. This database, created in 2007, allows all CSTO members to accumulate and analyse information about people active in trafficking drugs in every CSTO state (Ivanov 2015, 8). Coordination between member states is difficult because the CSTO lacks political will from non-Russian members (Aris 2013, 200). This lack of interest in the CSTO from its members was apparent in 2012 when Uzbekistan withdrew from the organisation. Since Uzbekistan's exit Russia has been trying hard to make the CSTO a priority and a more attractive military alliance for strategically valuable members such as Tajikistan.

Attempted Cooperation with other International Organisations

Despite Russia having the biggest political influence over Tajikistan, it is not the only country that has influence there. The Tajik government has struck a balancing act of not showing too much dedication to Russia and the CSTO in order to still receive military and economic assistance from the EU, US and China. The CSTO not only promotes coordination for combating drug trafficking between member states but also wants to coordinate with other international organisations. The UNODC affiliated CARICC acts as the main regional cooperative framework for Russia and the US (Stepanova 2013, 31). Although the UN and the CSTO started to work together in

⁴ <https://ksopn.odkb-csto.org/en/>

2016 there have been no specific mechanisms to enhance their collaboration (Fedko 2019, 1179).

6.3 Training

Since 2013 CSTO member states have provided free military technical assistance to the Border Troops of Tajikistan (CSTO Sessions 2013) and the Siberian Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation was given accreditation to teach specialists in the field of drug control from CSTO member states (CCBCD presentation 2019, 17). Tajikistan also receives aid for gathering intelligence information and offers training for Tajik Border Troops with the FSB (Peyrouse, Boonstra & Laruelle 2012, 9). It would be expected that by playing such an effective role in the fight against drug trafficking, by providing training and military assistance, that the CSTO would be an attractive partner for Tajikistan, however at a CSTO summit in December 2012 President Rahmon complained that although many documents had been signed there had been little to no practical results (Nicol 2014, 20). Remarks such as these suggest that President Rahmon is unhappy with the CSTO but at the same time it is unlikely that Tajikistan will leave as they depend on the CSTO and Russia too much for military protection against security risks from Afghanistan such as drug trafficking.

6.4 Military Support

Despite the CSTO's low focus on using development to combat drug trafficking, Tajikistan still sees the CSTO as an attractive organisation for combating drug trafficking in their country due to the military support they receive. The CSTO created the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) in 2009. The CRRF is made up of peace keeping forces, aviation forces, air defence, a crisis response centre and a partnership institute. Out of the 16,000 military troops in the CSTO, Tajikistan provides 1,000 of them (Aris 2013, 198). CRRF aims to respond to conventional warfare, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics, anti-terrorism and disaster relief (Haas 2017, 12). The Russian Army base in Tajikistan is a component of the CSTO's Collective Rapid Deployment Forces and in times of crisis it will give support to the Tajik military. However despite the ongoing bouts of violence that have taken place in

Tajikistan, the CSTO's rapid deployment forces have not been used. In April 2015 Russia planned to increase the number of troops stationed in Tajikistan to 9,000 in the next five years and they promised to provide \$1.36 million in military and technical assistance to Tajikistan. In October 2015 Russia deployed attack and military transport helicopters in Tajikistan to protect against any threats coming from northern Afghanistan including drug trafficking. However by February 2016 Russia had turned its back on increasing its troop numbers in Tajikistan (Haas 2017, 6). This was probably due to Russia's military being overstretched by operations in Ukraine and in Syria.

By turning their back on the promise of more troops, efforts to combat drug trafficking will be hampered. For Tajikistan, less Russian troops on their territory may come as a relief to them. "The military driving force and the political instigator of the CSTO is Russia and as a result many of the other members are reluctant to allow the development of a permanent CSTO military force for fear it will grant Moscow excessive influence over their military and security affairs" (Aris 2013, 199-200). The lack of trust and unity between CSTO members is likely what deters the CSTO from conducting military missions abroad (Haas 2017, 13). Despite this the CSTO is still playing an effective role in Tajikistan by providing military troops to the country, which can protect Tajikistan from threats such as armed drug traffickers.

6.5 Anti-Narcotic Operations

The CSTO has organised many practical operations in order to effectively combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan. Operation 'Brotherhood', 'Channel' and 'Thunder' are the most relevant CSTO operations which have contributed to combating drug trafficking. The international counter-narcotics operation 'Channel' first took place in 2009 and in the previous three years the operation has taken place twice a year. 'Channel' has facilitated information exchange and the training of security services, customs, border patrol and the army (CCBCD presentation 2019, 7, 8 &9). Operation 'Channel' is designed to destroy the economic basis of the drug industry and reduce demand and supply associated with narcotics (Fedko 2019, 1177). In May 2014 operation 'Channel –Southern Trap', took place in Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan. During the operation Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan practiced combat coordination in

mountainous conditions, conducted search and ambush measures to block the smuggling of drugs, organised communications and set up check points (Ivanov 2015, 8). The CSTO were correct to host the operation in Gorno-Badakhshan as it is an area that has received little aid or coverage by western backed organisations. During the operation five drug laboratories were destroyed and more than 300kg of opiates and eight tons of precursor were seized (TAG News 2014). ‘Channel’ was observed by the UNODC, the OSCE, CARICC, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and China (UNODC RP 2018). This shows that the CSTO is playing an effective role in combating drug trafficking through organising annual anti-narcotics operations in strategic areas where drug trafficking is a huge problem. It is even argued that the ‘Channel’ is the most effective operation to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan (Fedko 2019, 1176).

Anti-drug training operation ‘Thunder’ has also been a success for Tajikistan and the CSTO. The first ‘Thunder’ took place in 2012, in Russia, with the participation of the special forces of the anti-narcotic departments and services of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. ‘Thunder’ in 2013 took place in the Fergana Valley, a strategic area for Tajikistan to fight drug trafficking, as a large paramilitary drug group was present there and in 2015 operation ‘Thunder’ was held at the Fakhrabad training ground in Tajikistan (Ibid 1176). During this round of ‘Thunder’ participants improved their practical skills of carrying out search and ambush operations, blocking channels of drug trafficking, seizing illegal narcotics, arms, ammunition and explosives (Haas 2016, 400). The operation also took place in 2017 and 2019 so it is expected that ‘Thunder’ will continue to be a regular counter narcotic exercise attended by Tajik military, Border Troops and law enforcement in order to continuously enhance their skills. These practical anti-narcotic exercises are some of the most effective tools to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan due to the number of narcotics seized, however due to Tajikistan’s weak state they would never be able to conduct the exercises on their own without the Russian backed CSTO troops. This shows that one of Russia’s top priorities in the CSTO is to keep military troops in Tajikistan in order to continue to have influence over the country by acting as its protector.

6.6 Military Exercises

Over the past few years Tajikistan has taken part in many military training exercises. In 2017 the final stage of ‘Combat Brotherhood’ took place in Tajikistan with the participation of the collective forces of the CSTO under the command of the Russian Colonel-General Vladimir Zarudnitsky. The appointment of a Russian as the leader of the exercise proves Russia’s dominance in the CSTO. The aim of the war game ‘Combat Brotherhood’ was to destroy a group of ISIS militants, who with the cooperation of local criminal groups crossed the Afghan border to Tajikistan to destabilise the internal political and social situation in Tajikistan. As drug trafficking is seen as part of the narco-terror nexus the local criminal groups that the CSTO refer to could easily be a heavily armed drug trafficking group. The military units of the CRRF organised air reconnaissance of border areas where they blocked and destroyed the illegal group crossing the border. The integrated use of electronic warfare, radiation, chemical and biological defence units, engineering troops and communication led to the success of the war game. More than 5,000 soldiers, 60 aeroplanes and helicopters as well as over 1,500 units of military specialist equipment were used for the duration of ‘Combat Brotherhood’ (CSTO 2017). This war game has allowed the Tajik military to learn the skills needed to destroy any illegal armed groups at the border. This could become a serious threat to Tajikistan in the near future when the US and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. Therefore the CSTO is playing an effective role in preparing Tajikistan for a worst case scenario, where drug trafficking increases and becomes more deadly due to a power vacuum in Afghanistan.

6.7 Unique Peacekeeping Exercise

The second stage of ‘Indestructible Brotherhood’ was a peacekeeping mission that took place 20km from the Tajik-Afghan border at Harb-Maidon training ground. This stage was carried out by the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the CSTO. The peacekeeping forces practiced withdrawing heavy equipment and artillery from a zone of conflict and setting up a safe area. During the exercise this safe area, controlled by the peacekeeping forces, was patrolled, checkpoints were constructed and serviced, convoys of humanitarian aid were escorted through the area, settlements were blocked and counter-rioting tasks were practiced (CSTO 2019). These peacekeeping exercises show that the CSTO does take into account the importance of

protecting civilians during armed conflict. Despite the CSTO being a military organisation it has failed to intervene when there has been armed criminal groups and Islamist causing violence in the country. For example in 2010 over two dozen people escaped from prison in Tajikistan, those escapees then went on to launch many violent attacks. In September 2010 a suicide bombing killed more than two dozen civilians and in the same month in the Rasht Valley a military convoy was attacked (Nicol 2014, 26). There was also no intervention by the CSTO against armed insurgents with links to drug trafficking during the unrest in Gorno- Badakhshan in 2012 or the coup attempt in 2015 (Omelicheva & Markowitz 2019, 132). It is hoped that these recent military exercises organised by the CSTO will help Tajikistan's military deal with any future threats from terrorists or armed drug traffickers.

6.8 Conclusion and Recommendations

The CSTO has played an effective role in helping Tajikistan combat drug trafficking through providing all the basic aid such as training at its college in Russia, encouraging cooperation between members and with the SCO as well as donating military equipment. The CSTO has also played an effective role in Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking through organising anti-narcotic operations such as 'Channel' and 'Thunder'. These operations have taught the relevant Tajik authorities the necessary skills to stop drug trafficking and they have taken place in areas considered hot spots for drug trafficking including Gorno-Badakhshan and the Fergana Valley. The CSTO has also created its own joint database, which allows all members of the CSTO to be aware of drug trafficker's movements before they reach the country's border.

The CSTO clearly pushes Russia's hard security policy and narco-terror nexus upon its members. Its military exercises such as 'Brotherhood', which although are mainly geared towards training Tajik military and police to deal with terrorist incidents, are also relevant for fighting heavily armed drug traffickers. As the CSTO believes in the strong connection between terrorists and drug traffickers, military exercises are seen by the CSTO as helping train Tajik authorities to successfully combat drug trafficking. The peacekeeping missions should continue as they are a unique method of training Tajikistan on how protect the civilian population against drug traffickers

and how to deal with the aftermath of violence caused by terrorism or drug mafia groups. Since it has been six years since a 'Channel' operation last took place in Tajikistan; it is time now for them to host the operation again. However the CSTO should focus more on developing the Tajik military and law enforcement to allow Tajikistan to be self sufficient instead of adding more Russian troops. The CSTO should also increase its role in combating drug trafficking by implementing written agreements with the UNODC, BOMCA, the SCO and the OSCE in order to blend the CSTO hard security with the other organisations knowledge, training and infrastructure projects.

Conclusion:

All five international organisations have contributed in helping Tajikistan combat the drug trafficking issue in their country. The SCO has done the least effective work to help Tajikistan as they are hampered by the ongoing distrust between the two main donors, China and Russia, which has led the SCO to be used mainly as a platform for cooperation between members on their actions in Central Asia. The UNODC, BOMCA, the OSCE and the CSTO have played a more effective role in combating drug trafficking in Tajikistan. The UNODC, BOMCA and the OSCE base their activities on soft security policies through cooperation, training, building infrastructure and donating equipment and the CSTO focuses its aid in line with a hard security policy involving a military presence to fight drug trafficking. Other unique forms of combating drug trafficking have been introduced by international organisations.

Cooperation between agencies in Tajikistan, between Central Asian countries and between the international organisations themselves in the realms of information, training, security and joint operations plays an effective role in combating drug trafficking. The UNODC has encouraged cooperation between Tajik law enforcement agencies and has also encouraged information sharing between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan through the AKT initiative. The UNODC has also tried to cooperate with the SCO and the CSTO on border security. BOMCA has been focusing on encouraging cooperation on training between Tajik agencies and also among the five Central Asian states. They have also been trying to cooperate on border security with Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. The SCO has tried to cooperate with the UNODC and CARICC but have failed to cooperate beyond meetings and during operation Spider Web the SCO collaborated with Afghanistan and the CSTO. The SCO has failed to initiate cooperation among Central Asian states despite four out of the five Central Asian states being members. Even with its own members the SCO can cooperate at meetings and agree strategies but they struggle to coordinate joint exercises, Operation Spider Web is the exception. The OSCE has encouraged interagency security cooperation in Tajikistan, training and information cooperation between Central Asian states and Afghanistan, and has also worked with the UNODC. The CSTO has fostered information and training cooperation between

member states and the CSTO has also cooperated with CARICC on information sharing. This shows that the UNODC continue to adopt the most effective cooperation to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan by focusing on border security and information cooperation and also by encouraging cooperation at an inter-agency, regional and organisation to organisation level.

Training in both a theoretical and practical setting to combat drug trafficking has been an approach taken by all organisations. The UNODC has trained Tajik law enforcement officials in class settings, in the field, abroad and also runs the train the trainers programme. BOMCA has also done similar trainings as the UNODC with added online learning and classes bringing awareness to the danger of corruption in hampering efforts to combat drug trafficking. The SCO trains Tajik officials through anti-narcotic operations; these exercises do not involve the military but instead use law enforcement, customs officials and analysts to carry out the operation successfully. The OSCE has its own college to teach Border Troops and also organises its own train the trainers, anti-corruption classes, organises training in remote areas, at the airport and abroad. The organisations talked about so far have followed a soft policy in carrying out their training by focusing on using development for training instead of the military. The CSTO uses its hard security policy to focus on training Tajik troops through practical anti-narcotic exercises and military exercises designed to teach the Tajik military how to deal with extremists and violent drug traffickers. The CSTO also offers training at a college in Siberia and gives the opportunity for Tajik Border Troops to train with the FSB. For theoretical training the OSCE does the most and for practical training the CSTO has, by far, done the most effective work to combat the trafficking of narcotics.

Donating equipment and building infrastructure are also important facets of aid that follow a soft security policy and helps international organisations play an effective role in combating drug trafficking. The UNODC has built numerous border posts and BLO's. BOMCA has donated non military equipment to be used to combat drug traffickers and has helped build and refurbish border posts and training centres. The OSCE has helped refurbish training centres while the CSTO follows its hard security policy by donating military equipment including helicopters and artillery as well as providing troops to Tajikistan. The SCO has not donated any equipment or built

infrastructure in Tajikistan as China and Russia donate to Tajikistan bilaterally or through another organisation. Therefore the UNODC is the most consistent and effective organisation for building infrastructure and BOMCA has provided the most equipment for Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking in their country.

The international organisations working in Tajikistan have also come up with more new and unique ideas to effectively combat drug trafficking. The UNODC has founded projects such as the DCA, which is a Tajik organisation designed solely to fight drug trafficking and CARICC, which is used by Central Asian states to coordinate, analyse and share information on drug trafficking. The Container Control Programme, which helps to improve the capacity of customs to search for illegal goods in containers and other vehicles, was also co-founded by the UNODC. The implementation of Drug Liaison Officers near borders is yet another unique project by the UNODC designed to help Tajikistan combat drug trafficking. BOMCA hopes in the 10th phase of its work it will introduce a unique training system for Tajik officers. The SCO is taking the approach of blocking precursors and money from narcotics entering Tajikistan, as well as undertaking anti-narcotic exercises such as Spider Web. The SCO has also begun combating drug trafficking through the dark web. The OSCE has introduced a unique development aspect to their lessons by emphasising human rights and gender mainstreaming when training officials on how to combat drug trafficking. Lastly the CSTO has introduced peacekeeping exercises to combat drug trafficking in order to teach Tajik officials how to deal with the aftermath of an armed conflict.

As seen above there has been a lot of overlap in tactics to combat drug trafficking in Tajikistan but international organisations continue to miss out on opportunities to help Tajikistan combat drug trafficking. The UNODC needs to build its border posts across the whole of Tajikistan; it needs to introduce anti-corruption training and should carry out more practical anti-narcotic exercises. BOMCA should invest more money into building border infrastructure and cooperate more with Tajik authorities and other donors and organisations working in the country. The SCO has the biggest potential to help Tajikistan fight drug trafficking out of all of the organisations as China's resources and Russia's influence combined would be a winning solution if the two countries trusted each other to cooperate more. The OSCE would be a stronger force

in Tajikistan if Russia contributed and donated more to the organisation. This would allow the OSCE to equally combine Russian influence with EU and US experience. In order for the CSTO to be more successful in combating drug trafficking they need to focus more on developing the relevant authorities of Tajikistan so they do not always have to depend on the CSTO for protection against threats coming from Afghanistan.

The UNODC has clearly played the most effective role in Tajikistan to help them combat drug trafficking. The UNODC has implemented all the basic facets of aid to fight drug trafficking and has done the most out of all the other organisations when it comes to cooperation and building infrastructure. Most importantly they have been responsible for founding effective and unique projects including the DCA, CARICC, DLO's and the CCP. The UNODC's presence in Tajikistan since the 1990's and its focus on long term projects shows their commitment to helping Tajikistan will not stop anytime soon, and will probably have to increase their work when foreign troops eventually leave Afghanistan, exposing Tajikistan to an even greater threat. It is only in the areas of staff training and donation of equipment that the UNODC is outshined by other organisations.

Overall international organisations should do more to help Tajikistan by tackling the root of the drug trafficking problem. Although trafficking will never be fully eradicated as long as opiates are produced in Afghanistan, it is still important to remember that the Tajik people will only become involved in drug trafficking if it benefits them financially and the risk is low, or they have no other choice for a source of income. Many of the difficulties faced by international organisations in Tajikistan including its weak state, corruption, organised crime, the government's fixation on the narco-terror nexus and lack of political will can be fixed by international organisations if they increase Tajikistan's state capacity, invest in education and industry and encourage the government to clamp down on corruption in law enforcement. International organisations should specifically focus more on developing areas near the Tajik border or in remote places where drug trafficking is a problem, in order to detract law enforcement or local civilians from getting involved in trafficking. If the Tajik state is strong and has little corruption then it will be easier for organisations to help the government with the problem of drug trafficking. Unless

these problems are tackled head on then the Tajik government will continue to have no political will to combat drug trafficking, even with international assistance.

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