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MA THESIS

*Migration in International  
Relations: The Evolution and  
Implementation of Indonesia's  
Migration Diplomacy (1979-2019)*

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# 1. Introduction

Migration has always been a significant issue in world politics, with the latest development in the so-called 'Global Migration Crisis' in 2015 increasing its salience.<sup>1</sup> In 2016, the formulation of Jordan Compact and the European Union (EU)-Turkey Deal made way for the emergence of a new category of diplomacy, the "Migration Diplomacy".<sup>2</sup> Even though the term is considered a recent one, international actors (especially states) have practised it from time to time in previous periods. For example, the establishment of Bracero Program that regulated Mexican migrant worker movement to the United States in 1942, or the enactment of "Operation Solomon" in which the Ethiopian Government gave permission to the Israeli Government to evacuate 14,000 Ethiopian Jews from Ethiopian territory, in exchange for arms and financial aid of \$36 million from Israel.<sup>3</sup>

While there are already several studies done on Migration Diplomacy in America, Europe, and Africa,<sup>4</sup> there are not yet extensive empirical studies regarding Migration Diplomacy in Asia, especially not in the Southeast Asia region. This thesis aims to provide an empirical example of Migration Diplomacy, through the perspective of recent developments in Indonesia since the 1970s. It looked into the change over time regarding the implementation of Migration Diplomacy and the factors that influenced it.

## 1.1. Purpose and Research Question

The thesis aims to analyse how and why Indonesia conducted its Migration Diplomacy through three different periods. The first period was 1979-1998 when Indonesia's Diplomacy was mainly focused on accumulating international presence and acknowledgement after its independence in 1945. One way to elevate its international presence was done through Migration Diplomacy by transforming one of Indonesia's Islands in the Riau Province (Galang Island) into a refugee processing centre during the Indochina Refugee Crisis in the 1970s. In 1979, the Indonesian Government published the first Presidential Decree related to International Migration, specifically designed to resolve the Vietnam Refugee issue in Indonesia. This Decree considered as Indonesia's first significant effort in the field of Migration

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<sup>1</sup> Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation*, (Amsterdam University Press 2010) 8.

<sup>2</sup> Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in World Politics', *International Studies Perspectives* 20, (2019) 113-128.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 120

<sup>4</sup> Helene Thiollet, *Migration as Diplomacy: Labor Migrants, Refugees, and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil Rich Countries*, (Cambridge 2011); Hideaki Kami, *Diplomacy meets Migration: U.S. relations with Cuba during the Cold War*, (Cambridge 2018); Peter Seeberg, *Citizenship and Migration Diplomacy: Turkey and the EU*, (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018).

Diplomacy. In the period 1979-2001, Indonesia also saw a five hundred per cent increase of migrant workers who went abroad (compared to the previous five years period of 1969-1974)<sup>5</sup>, so it is interesting to see whether this surge has a connection to Migration Diplomacy. The fall of Soeharto's Regime in 1998 marked the end of this first period.

The second-period span from 2001-2015, that was marked by the terrorist attack in New York on 9/11 that intensify the securitisation of migration issues in several immigration countries that linked cross border mobility with terrorism,<sup>6</sup> including Australia as one of Indonesia's closest neighbouring countries. The event of 9/11 has transformed the way the Australian government perceives the Muslim population, from an ethnic/religious minority in a multicultural society, to a potential source of religiously inspired extremist violence.<sup>7</sup> As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, this turn of events might have also affected Indonesia's stance on its migration policy. Hence it is intriguing to see how Indonesia adjusted its Migration Diplomacy accordingly. During this period, the reformation into a full-fledged democratic country also brought some changes in Indonesia's Foreign Policy that are interesting to be further analysed. Since the country was profoundly affected by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, Indonesia's Foreign Policy focus was directed towards rebuilding the economy and stabilising domestic security.<sup>8</sup> Hence Indonesia adopted a more inward-looking foreign policy that may also affect how Migration Diplomacy was implemented.

The last period analysed is 2015-present, based on two main reasons. First, the newly elected President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, emphasised domestic politics and human development throughout his policy. This shift away from international politics might have consequences to the implementation of Migration Diplomacy and Diplomacy in general. Second, the so-called 'Global Migration Crisis' readjusted the attitudes of many International actors towards migration issues, hence influencing the dynamics between actors in their Migration Diplomacy, including Indonesia. The term "Migration Crisis" was used here instead of "Refugee Crisis" to include various type of migrations involved in the crisis aside from purely the refugee migration. Many migrants and asylum seekers have multiple reasons for mobility. Hence it is impossible to separate economic from human rights motivation completely.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ana Sabhana Azmy, *Negara dan Buruh Migran Perempuan: Menelaah Kebijakan Perlindungan Masa Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 2004-2010*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor 2012) 47

<sup>6</sup> Fiona B. Adamson, *Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security*, (Cambridge: MIT Press 2006) 165

<sup>7</sup> Michael Humphrey, 'Securitization of Migration: and Australian case study of global trends', *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad* Vol. 6 (2014) 83-98

<sup>8</sup> Imas Ananta Efendi, *Kebijakan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Era Reformasi*, (Yogyakarta: Muhammadiyah University 2019) 4

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Castles, 'Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation', *Sociology* Vol. 77 (2003) 13-34

Based on these three periods, the main research question for this thesis is “How did Indonesia Migration Diplomacy change from 1979 until 2019, and why?” To further elaborate on the topic and analysing the development, the thesis also compares the three periods utilising these following sub-questions:

- a. What kind of Migration Diplomacy was emphasised by Indonesia in each period?
- b. What were the main national interests influencing these kinds of Indonesia’s Migration Diplomacy in each period?

The answer to these questions shall highlight the comparison of Indonesia’s Migration Diplomacy differ in each period, and what drive those changes.

## 1.2. Theory

In 2018, political scientists Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas theorised Migration Diplomacy as a distinct concept that is different from other forms of migration-related research such as citizenship, integration, or diasporas.<sup>10</sup> They argue that migration is an important area where states develop bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations, just like war and peace, trade, economics, culture, the environment, and human rights.<sup>11</sup> Since Migration Diplomacy, the main topic of this thesis combined two of the most contested terms in international politics; it is best to first define the definition, scope, and categories of this concept.

In this thesis, migration is strictly perceived as international migration that was described by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) as the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not citizens.<sup>12</sup> Hence, this thesis did not include internal migration that took place inside a national country border. It is important to note that since the definition did not specify the condition of the people moving, this thesis included the return migration of human remains as a part of Migration Diplomacy. Regarding that matter, this thesis discussed the repatriation of Japanese soldier’s remains that was negotiated by the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Japan from 1993-2019.

The next term, Diplomacy, was more complicated with no single agreeable definition since attempts to define it objectively will exclude, marginalise, or suppress other uses of the term as well as alternative practices and cultures of diplomacy.<sup>13</sup> In order to limit this extensive definition of Diplomacy, this thesis refers to the definition coined by Ernest Satow, a British

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<sup>10</sup> Adamson and Tsourapas, ‘Migration Diplomacy in World Politics’, 115

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>. (accessed April 19, 2020)

<sup>13</sup> Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, Paul Sharp, *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, (London: SAGE 2016) 20

Ambassador. In his book, 'Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice', he defined diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the government of independent states, or more briefly still, the interaction between states by peaceful means.<sup>14</sup>

Adamson and Tsourapas then interpreted both terms and came up with their own conceptualisation of Migration Diplomacy as States' use of diplomatic tools, process, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility.<sup>15</sup> While in this framework, migration policy was seen as an end result of a diplomatic process, Adamson and Tsourapas acknowledged that Migration Diplomacy also refers to the process of using migration policy for diplomatic ends.<sup>16</sup> Based on these understandings, Migration Diplomacy as a concept refers to migration and its related policy both as a result of diplomatic processes as well as a negotiation instrument used by states in their official diplomatic relations worldwide.

Adamson and Tsourapas also categorised Migration Diplomacy into three different categories based on states' position in the web of global migration flows. In this context, states derive their interest and bargaining position in respect to whether they are migration receiving (Immigration Diplomacy), migration sending (Emigration Diplomacy), or transit states (Transit Diplomacy).<sup>17</sup> However, it is essential to understand that a state is not exclusively conducting a single type of Migration Diplomacy. States may simultaneously hold the position of the migration-receiving state in their bilateral relationships with some countries while holding the position of sending or transit states in the others.<sup>18</sup> To provide a clear distinction between these three types, the next part will give a concrete example of each respective category.

As a 'classical country of immigration',<sup>19</sup> the United States of America (U.S.) emphasise Immigration Diplomacy in their interstate relations. However, the Immigration Diplomacy conducted by the U.S has profoundly changed over time. For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies saw refugees as 'diamonds' that were valuable to them.<sup>20</sup> The mobilisation and resettlement of USSR dissidents into the U.S. territory was a strategic move concerning the U.S. interest. First, the refugees from the USSR tended to consist of the most enterprising, skilled, and well-educated of the persecuted group,<sup>21</sup> that could be later utilised as a part of U.S. human resource development (then known as the term 'brain gain').

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<sup>14</sup> Sir Ernest Satow, *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, (London: Longman 1979) 3

<sup>15</sup> Adamson & Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in World Politics', 116

<sup>16</sup> Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relation in the Cold War*, (New York: Cornell University Press 2015) 4

<sup>17</sup> Adamson & Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in World Politics', 118

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, (London: Palgrave 2014) 14

<sup>20</sup> Monica Duffy Toft, 'The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Vol. 24 (2007) 139-157

<sup>21</sup> Toft, 'The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy', 143

The second reason was the intelligence these refugees might possess regarding the economic, technological, and social conditions within the USSR,<sup>22</sup> that proved to be invaluable during the bipolar power relation during the Cold War. Third, these refugees also provided stories and narratives of USSR persecution and repression, turned into propaganda by the U.S. in their public diplomacy agenda. This example shows how the mobility of people was managed to achieve more significant objectives rather than merely protecting the people from persecution. Just as other types of diplomacy, the 'form' of Migration Diplomacy will differ depending on the interest of the involved State. In the case of the U.S., the 'open border' policy during the Cold War diminished along with the dissolution of USSR and its perceived threat. Without any needs to invite high skilled migrants or to create propaganda, the U.S. turned to a stricter border control policy with security interest as its primary foundation as we see it today. Even with this measure, the US still hosts the highest number of the immigrant population in the world with approximately 44 million immigrant population<sup>23</sup>, in contrast to 9 million overseas American.<sup>24</sup>

If the U.S. Migration Diplomacy was emphasising immigration, Egypt has a multi-tiered emigration policy that was carefully determined by its foreign policy objectives. Egypt was considered a migration-sending country that constituted the largest supplier of migrant labour in the Middle East, with 3.7 million emigrant populations worldwide.<sup>25</sup> These populations are widely dispersed across the globe, and Egypt exhibits wide variation in its treatment of emigrant groups depending on their host country.<sup>26</sup> The government cater to the needs of emigrants living in Europe and North America, while it was allegedly 'abandoning' its citizens who emigrated to Arab countries. One of the main reasons was that the Government utilised these emigrants to become 'agents' that will foster good relations with the Western World, as Egypt tried to liberalise its economy in 1970, moving away from USSR influence.<sup>27</sup> The mass media which was supported by the government in Egypt then published communications (via telegrams) between Egyptian migrants in the U.S. and the government as part of Egypt's public diplomacy, to portray itself as a developed liberal country to the outside world. More recently, Egypt's Emigration Diplomacy has focused on bilateral collaboration through the

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends#source>. (accessed June 8, 2020)

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.aetnainternational.com/en/about-us/explore/living-abroad/culture-lifestyle/where-are-Americans-emigrating-to-and-why.html>. (accessed June 8, 2020)

<sup>25</sup> Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Why Do States Develop Multi-tier Emigrant Policies? Evidence from Egypt', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2015) 2192-2214

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 2201

dispatching of skilled Egyptian labour to oil-producing Arab states, aiming for close bilateral relations with the economically powerful gulf states.<sup>28</sup>

The EU-Turkey Deal in 2016 serves as an excellent example of Transit Diplomacy. For most refugees and migrants from Syria, Turkey is the main transit country to reach Europe.<sup>29</sup> Hosting 2,7 million Syrian refugees in 2016,<sup>30</sup> Turkey acquired a critical bargaining chip to exchange with the EU that tried to minimise the number of refugees entering its border. After a series of meetings and negotiations, EU agreed to 'revive' Turkey's accession process into EU, accelerating the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen Zone, and provides an initial €3 billion aid for improving the refugee condition in Turkey.<sup>31</sup> All these in exchange for Turkey's effort to stop refugees in their jurisdiction from coming into Europe. This exchange is the main characteristic of Transit Diplomacy, that can be utilised by states that possess geopolitical location as a part of the migrant route.<sup>32</sup>

Based on the two examples above, a small portion of how countries went about their respective Migration Diplomacies became clear, capitalising on their position in the global migration network. These examples also display the various objectives of this diplomacy, from the tangible (financial aid) up to the intangible ones (international perception). In a broad overview, Migration Diplomacy can be used for various objectives including maintaining national security, obtaining economic gains, fostering development, shaping international perception, signalling positive or negative bilateral relations, adjusting regional relations, also promoting and maintaining relations with emigrant communities.<sup>33</sup>

This thesis argues that Migration Diplomacy possesses an absolute gain characteristic in which parties involved in the process aiming for a win-win solution based on international cooperation.<sup>34</sup> This was made possible because parties in Migration Diplomacy usually aimed for different goals. For example, in the EU-Turkey Deal, Turkey aimed for economic gain, while the EU's objective is stopping the flow of incoming refugees. During Operation Solomon, Israel objective is the evacuation of Jewish People, while Ethiopian Government goals are to obtain weapons and financial aids to combat the rebel forces. Based on the two examples above, Developed Countries tend to use Migration Diplomacy in managing people mobilisation, while

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<sup>28</sup> Adamson & Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in World Politics', 119

<sup>29</sup> Laura Batalla Adam, 'The EU-Turkey Deal One Year: A Delicate Balancing Act', *The International Spectator* Vol. 52 (2017) 44-58.

<sup>30</sup> Amnesty International, *Syria's Refugee Crisis in Numbers*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/>, (accessed April 20 2020)

<sup>31</sup> Adam, 'The EU-Turkey Deal One Year: A Delicate Balancing Act', 45

<sup>32</sup> Adamson & Tsourapas, 'Migration Diplomacy in World Politics', 119

<sup>33</sup> Filip Ahlborn, *The Role of Migration Diplomacy*, (Uppsala Universiteit 2019) 14.

<sup>34</sup> Robert Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 85 (1991) 1303-1320.



developing countries engage in Migration Diplomacy for economic gain. The graph below shall provide a visual framework on the conceptual process of Migration Diplomacy and its varying objectives.




FIGURE 1: FRAMEWORK OF MIGRATION DIPLOMACY

The above theoretical framework is used in this thesis to determine Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy in each period. By applying this framework as a foundation, this thesis hopes to explain whether migration is seen as an instrument or an end goal, what category of Migration Diplomacy the Indonesian government conducted, and what the differing objectives of the Migration Diplomacy in each period were (if any), and what caused those objectives to change. This thesis based on the hypothesis that the Indonesian Government implemented Transit and Emigration Diplomacy during the 1979-2019 timeframe, in which these Migration Diplomacy types served both as a diplomatic tool and diplomatic end. I also assume that economic gain and public perception were the key objectives that drove Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy until the present days, even though there are internal and external factors that changed how the Migration diplomacy was implemented to realise these objectives.

### 1.3. Historiography: The Unnoticed Migration Diplomacy by Indonesia

There are three factors that made Migration Diplomacy went unnoticed in Indonesia context. First, most migration research has taken situations in northern destination countries (countries in Europe and Northern America) as its starting point, neglecting the perspective of origin and transit countries.<sup>35</sup> Closely related to the first factor, the second factor stems from the fact that Indonesia (and Southeast Asian countries in general) was not a significant origin or destination country to Europe or America (see Table 1 &2).




TABLE 1: U.S IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY WORLD REGION OF BIRTH (Source: Migration Policy Institute)

	Country of origin	Number of migrants
1.	Turkey	1,983,240
2.	Morocco	1,384,935
3.	China (incl. Hong Kong)	724,428
4.	India	650,710
5.	Ukraine	634,851
6.	Russia	589,634
7.	Albania	464,149
8.	Serbia	408,491
9.	Pakistan	407,133
10.	United States	406,266

Source: Eurostat (2014a)

TABLE 2: TOP-10 COUNTRIES OF NATIONALITY OF NON-EU MIGRANTS RESIDING IN EUROPEAN UNION, 2012

Hence, early migration studies with its Eurocentric characteristic tend to put Indonesia 'under the radar'. The last factor was related to the field of migration studies that have traditionally focused on the factors driving migrant flows at the individual, national and global levels, the making of immigration policy, and the determinants of immigrant outcomes.<sup>36</sup> It is not surprising that literature on Migration Diplomacy is not as extensive as Migrant Incorporation, Migrant Agency, or other 'traditional' themes in Migration Studies.

The combination of these three factors resulted in almost non-existent literature on Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy. This thesis will add to the growing literature of Migration Diplomacy through the perspective of Indonesia as Developing Countries, also as a major actor in the Asia region.

Previous studies in migration fields that put Indonesia on the spotlight mainly talks about its position as a transit country for refugees and asylum seekers, the management of its

<sup>35</sup> Stephen Castle, 'Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 36 (2010) 1565-1586.

<sup>36</sup> Marcel Paret & Shannon Gleeson, 'Precarity and Agency Through a Migration Lens', *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 20 (2016) 277-294.

migrant domestic workers, or its colonial-related migration.<sup>37</sup> This section discusses two aspects of Migration in Indonesia that became a recurring theme in the three periods of this Thesis analysis, the Transit Migration and migrant workers program.

### Transit Migration in Indonesia

Several studies have analysed Indonesia's status as a transit country for asylum seekers and refugees on their journey to their ultimate country of destination. The migration of people who cross several countries before they arrive at their destination has become known as 'transit migration' since the early 1990s.<sup>38</sup> The status of a transit country considered as an externalisation of border imposed by destination countries to prevent incoming migrants from reaching their border. This externalisation process stems from an exchange where destination countries offer aid and development incentives in exchange for enhanced border control and policing of migrants.<sup>39</sup> In the context of transit migration, Indonesia has taken up two different roles in two different time-frame. During the Indochina Refugee Crisis in the 1970s and the Global Migration Crisis in 2015, Indonesia served as a processing centre for refugee and asylum seekers before they were resettled to respective destination countries. However, while there was no global crisis happening, Indonesia was considered only as an extension of the destination countries restrictive policy, in which it was willing to adjust their migration policy in exchange for economic gain.<sup>40</sup>

Indonesia's willingness to 'facilitate' the transit process of these refugees was considered as a losing deal that stood in opposition with its own interest.<sup>41</sup> First, even though Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this process has shifted the burden of refugee processing and protection onto Indonesia.<sup>42</sup> Second, the transit period is for many migrations not necessarily temporarily, ranging from a few months up to ten years and more, considered as an indefinite and potentially permanent state of precariousness.<sup>43</sup> Hence, for the Indonesian Government, the burden (financial and sociological) for being a transit country was expected to be prolonged to an indefinite time period. The third reason, due to that

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<sup>37</sup> For example: Antje Missbach, *Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS 2015); Hugo Graeme, 'International Labour Migration and Migration Policies in Southeast Asia', *Asian Journal of Social Science* 40 (2012); Ulbe Bosma, 'Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit', *International Migration Review* Vol. 41, No. 2 (2007) 1815-1940

<sup>38</sup> Franck Duvell, 'Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicised Concept', *Population, Space and Place* Vol. 18, Issue 4 (2012) 415-427.

<sup>39</sup> Robyn S. Sampson, Sandra M. Gifford & Savitri Taylor, 'The Myth of Transit: The Making of life by Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 42, No. 7 (2016) 1135-1152.

<sup>40</sup> Sally Clark, "Australia's Extraterritorial Asylum Policies and the Making of Transit Sites", in *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty First Century* (Bristol: E-IR Publishing 2018) 143-161.

<sup>41</sup> Clark, "Australia's Extraterritorial Asylum Policies and the Making of Transit Sites", 151

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 152

<sup>43</sup> Sampson, Gifford & Taylor, *The Myth of Transit*, 1135

precarious condition, migrants in transit are predominantly seen as a victim.<sup>44</sup> Coverage on their conditions and uncertainty then becomes a focus for media coverage or NGO's agendas, putting further pressure on Indonesia as a host country. While previous studies focused on these aspects, this thesis provides a different perspective behind Indonesia's willingness to maintain its status as a transit country through the lens of Migration Diplomacy.

## Importance of Migrant Workers for Indonesia

The emigration of migrant workers is another sector related to Indonesia's International Migration that has been widely discussed in several studies. Indonesia has become one of Southeast Asia's major emigration nations and one of the world's largest senders of overseas workers.<sup>45</sup> The studies regarding this topic are mostly dealing with the impact of these migrant workers (mainly as domestic servants) in several connections to their home country, for example, the significance of remittances they sent, the impact on development, or the precariousness faced by migrant workers.<sup>46</sup>

Hugo Graeme emphasises the high number of irregular migrations by Indonesian migrant workers to avoid time consuming and expensive bureaucratic process. This high level of undocumented migrant workers led to a higher number of problems and violation faced by Indonesia Migrant workers abroad, especially in the Middle Eastern countries.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, Mary Austin, a SOAS scholar who researched the campaign for a domestic law for Indonesian workers, also emphasised the national legal framework to protect Indonesian migrant workers.<sup>48</sup> She outlined this framework and gender norms that underpinned the Indonesia/Malaysia trade in domestic workers, and also examined the interplay between the press, newspaper readers, and the government regarding the dispute with Malaysia concerning these migrant workers<sup>49</sup> By analysing Indonesia diplomatic negotiations with the receiving countries (especially Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries), this thesis might be able to present a more precise picture related to Indonesia's policy on its migrant workers. Throughout three different time periods, the thesis shows whether Indonesia main interest was

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 1143

<sup>45</sup> Graeme Hugo, 'Effects of International Migration on the Family in Indonesia', *Asia Pacific Migration Journal* Vol.1, No. 1 (2002) 13-46

<sup>46</sup> For further reading see: Ethel Tungohan, *Global Care Chains and the spectral histories of care migration*, (Policy Press 2009); Mary Austin, *Defending Indonesia's Migrant Domestic Workers*, (Brill 2017); Nicola Piper, Stuart Rosewarne, and Matt Withers, *Migrant Precarity in Asia: 'Networks of Labour Activism' for a Rights-based Governance of Migration*, (Institute of Social Studies 2017)

<sup>47</sup> Hugo, 'Effects of International Migration on the Family in Indonesia', 15.

<sup>48</sup> Mary Austin, "Defending Indonesia's Migrant Domestic Workers", in *Citizenship and Democratization n Southeast Asia* (Leiden: Brill 2017) 265-288.

<sup>49</sup> Austin, "Defending Indonesia's Migrant Domestic Workers", 266.

to protect the rights of the migrant workers or maximised the development incentives such as remittances and employment that were produced by these migrant workers. Relating to the research question, this thesis argues that the protection of migrant workers is one of the main interests of Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy. Not only because the protection of its citizens is the priority of Indonesia's Foreign Policy,<sup>50</sup> but also to maintain the economic gain from the continuity of the migrant workers' program.

#### 1.4. Sources and Methods

To analyse and describe Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy, this thesis mainly utilised the Government's documents and publications. For example, every year since 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds the Annual Foreign Minister Press Statement. These statements contain Indonesia foreign policies' goal and priorities for the upcoming year. These publications will serve as the primary guide to determine Indonesia's foreign policy objectives and its national interest. For the periods before those statements published, other resources will be referred, including Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Bilateral Agreements between Indonesia as a sending country and the receiving countries, Presidential Decree, and other official documents that indicate the dynamic in Indonesia's migration policies in relation to the national interest.

Even though Official Documents possess reliability and relevance to the topic, they have their own setbacks as a primary source. First, since it was written and published by the Indonesian Government, these documents have normative characteristics that may not reflect the real intention of the policy or cooperation. For example, the information campaigns done by migrant-receiving countries such as Australia, the U.S., and Western European countries on the danger of irregular migration might be framed as a humanitarian attempt to prevent more deaths at sea. However, it might also mean to deter or discourage potential migrants in the policy target countries from coming.<sup>51</sup> Hence, aside from the explicit information presented in the document, it is important to further analyse the implicit meaning behind it. Second, most of the documents were intended for government institutions as a legal basis in their operation, so these sources did not directly explain what happened at that specific period, rather what the government. For example, the 2016 Presidential Decree stated that 'Government Institution cooperate with IOM and UNHCR to manage refugee'. However, to see the concrete form of that cooperation (police training, joint operation, etc.), other supporting documents such as news coverage or academic paper must be consulted. Hence a further observation is

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<sup>50</sup> As stated in the Constitution of 1945, that has become the guiding principle of Indonesia's Foreign Policy

<sup>51</sup> D. Schans & C. Optekamp, *Combatting Irregular Migration Through Information Campaigns*, (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justice 2016) 7

needed to interpret these officials document. Third, these sources did not present the possible policy gap that happened after the documents were published, nor did they include an evaluation of the previous policy. To make up for it, I utilised other sources such as local and international media coverage (*Kompas, Jakarta Post, CNN, Al Jazeera*) or publications of International organisations (IOM, UNHCR) that provide a different perspective on those governmental documents.

To maximise the utility of these primary sources with limitations mentioned above, these documents must be analysed in conjunction with other evidence to determine whether they present information that is exceptional or conforms to the research questions.<sup>52</sup> It is important to underline that not all Government’s documents in the migration sector are related to Migration Diplomacy since it might be subsumed under the banner of migration policy that does not involve interstate negotiations. In this case, the government sources serve as a starting point to analyse the condition, intention, or historical events that resulted in related Migration Diplomacy. By looking at the provisions in the government documents, it is possible to determine whether they are providing a legal framework in migration policy aimed to fulfil Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives, or they are the results of a series of the diplomatic process in the migration-related sector (visa requirement, population transfer, migrant workers agreement, free movement, etc.). Included in the term diplomatic process are Official State Visit, Ministerial Meetings, Bilateral Meetings, International Conference, even Cultural Exchange as a form of Public Diplomacy. On the other hand, non-Government sources provided a more concrete context regarding the results from the policy mentioned in these documents. The sources analysed in this thesis is listed as follows:

Table 3. List of Sources

No.	Original Source	Unofficial Translation
<b>Government Documents</b>		
1	Agreement to Normalise Relations between The Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia (1966)	-
2	Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees (1966)	-
3	<i>Keputusan Presiden Nomor 38 Tahun 1979 Tentang Koordinasi Penyelesaian Masalah Pengungsi Vietnam di Indonesia</i>	Presidential Decree No. 38 the Year 1979 on the Coordination for Vietnamese Refugee Settlement in Indonesia

<sup>52</sup> <https://www.lib.uts.edu.au/guides/primary-sources/primary-sources/strengthsweakness>. (accessed April 19, 2020).

4	<i>Memorandum Persetujuan Mengenai Penyediaan Tenaga Kerja antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Kerajaan Malaysia (1993)</i>	Memorandum of Agreement on Manpower Procurement between The Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of Malaysia
5	<i>Peraturan Menteri Tenaga Kerja Republik Indonesia Nomor: PER-02/MEN/1994 Tentang Penempatan Tenaga Kerja di Dalam dan ke Luar Negeri</i>	Ministerial Regulations on the Placement of Domestic and Overseas Workforce
6	<i>Memorandum Persetujuan antara Pemerintah Jepang dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Tentang Pembangunan Monumen Perang Dunia II</i>	Memorandum of Agreement Between The Government of Japan and The Government of The Republic of Indonesia Concerning The Building of A World War II Monument
7	<i>Nota Kesepahaman antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia tentang Rekrutmen dan Penempatan Pekerja Domestik Indonesia (2006)</i>	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia on the Recruitment and Placement of Indonesian Domestic Worker
8	<i>Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (2009-2019)</i>	Annual Press Statement of The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
9	<i>Protokol Perubahan Terhadap Nota Kesepahaman Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Mengenai Perekrutan dan Penempatan Pekerja Domestik Indonesia Yang Ditandatangani di Bali, Indonesia Pada 13 Mei 2006</i>	Amendment Protocol on the Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia Regarding the Placement and Recruitment of Indonesian Domestic Workers Signed in Bali on 13 <sup>th</sup> May 2006
10	<i>Keputusan Menteri Ketenagakerjaan Republik Indonesia Nomor 260 tahun 2015 tentang Penghentian dan Pelarangan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia pada Pengguna Perseorangan di Negara-Negara Kawasan Timur Tengah</i>	Ministerial Decision on the Termination and Prohibition of Indonesian Worker Placement for Private Employer in Middle Eastern Countries
11	<i>Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 125 Tahun 2016 Tentang Penanganan Pengungsi dari Luar Negeri</i>	Presidential Decree No. 125 the Year 2016 on the Management of Refugee from Abroad
12	<i>Keputusan Menteri Ketenagakerjaan Republik Indonesia Nomor 291 Tahun 2018 Tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan dan Pelindungan</i>	Ministerial Decision on the Guideline for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Kingdom of Saudi

	<i>Pekerja Migran Indonesia di Kerajaan Arab Saudi Melalui Sistem Penempatan Satu Kanal</i>	Arabia Through Single Channel Placement System
13	Perjanjian Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Jepang Dalam Ekskavasi, Pengumpulan dan Repatriasi Kerangka Tentara Jepang yang Gugur dalam Perang Dunia Kedua di Provinsi Papua dan Provinsi Papua Barat, Republik Indonesia	Agreement between The Government of The Republic of Indonesia and The Government of Japan on Excavation, Collection and Repatriation of the Remains of Japanese Soldier Who Died in The Second World War in The Province of Papua and The Province of West Papua, The Republic of Indonesia
Other Sources		
1	Laporan Tahunan Organisasi Internasional untuk Migrasi di Indonesia Tahun 2009	IOM Indonesia Annual Report 2009
2	IOM Annual Report for 2018	
3	Publikasi Amnesty Internasional: Perjalanan Mematikan: Krisis Pengungsi dan Perdagangan Manusia di Asia Tenggara (2015)	Deadly Voyage: Refugee Crisis and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia
4	Amnesty International Publication: Tackling The Global Refugee Crisis: From Shirking to Sharing Responsibility (2016)	-
5	UNHCR Indonesia Fact Sheets 2014-2016	-

In order to thoroughly analyse the list of sources above, this thesis first delves into the construction of the terms Migration Diplomacy itself, unravelling the factors that constitute Migration Diplomacy. It will then explore various states practices in conducting its own Migration Diplomacy, as migration-sending (emigration), migration-receiving (immigration), or transit migration states. Finally, this thesis further explores the practice of Migration Diplomacy in Indonesia chronologically that possess the unique characteristic of being immigration, emigration, and transit countries. By analysing the three different periods I sketched above, each having different international and domestic conditions, I could compare the implementation of Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy through time, whether there was a change in its focus and objectives, or a single interest guided it throughout the whole period.



## 2. Early Migration Diplomacy: The Thrive for Recognition (1979-2001)

During the early post-independence period, Indonesia's diplomacy was focused on the search for international recognition. With its independence on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1945 still not officially acknowledged by the Kingdom of Netherlands and faced with deteriorating economic condition, Soekarno as the first President of Indonesia was set to implement his '*Politik Mercusuar*' (Lighthouse Policy). The policy was described as a Lighthouse because it designed to make Indonesia a 'beacon' for other emerging, developing countries at that time, which are mainly Asian-African Countries.<sup>53</sup> Even though domestic audience heavily criticised this policy because it was deemed neglecting the poverty faced by Indonesian citizen,<sup>54</sup> Soekarno insisted that it was a necessary move. In one of the interviews for his Biography, Soekarno said that "I want Indonesia to be known as a great Country, no longer the foolish Nation manipulated by the Coloniser".<sup>55</sup> With this objective as a baseline, Soekarno engaged in his Lighthouse Policy by building the monument and extravagant structure and organising world-class events, such as the Asia-Africa Conference taking place in Bandung in 1955, the Asian Games IV in 1962, and the Games of New Emerging Forces (GANEF) in 1963.<sup>56</sup>

These efforts of attention-seeking took a drastic turn after the failed coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965, that gave way to the new Regime of President Soeharto, which was called the New Order period.<sup>57</sup> While Soekarno's Lighthouse Policy was branded as a struggle to topple the domination of Imperialist Western Countries, Soeharto's priority in the early years of his regime was focused on economic development by cooperating with those Western powers. In 1967, the government published Foreign Investment Bills that eased up access for foreign direct investment in Indonesia.<sup>58</sup> During this period, Indonesia also rebuilt its relation with the Western World by re-joining International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank (WB).<sup>59</sup>

Indonesia then gained the opportunity to boost its international presence further when the Indochina Refugee Crisis took place in 1975 in the last days of the Vietnam War. This crisis saw a massive flow of permanent refugees on a scale the world has not experienced

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<sup>53</sup> J.R. Angel, *The New Emerging Forces in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (Canberra: Australian National University 1970) 630.

<sup>54</sup> <https://tirto.id/asian-games-1962-dan-politik-mercusuar-bung-karno-cS69>. (accessed April 13, 2020).

<sup>55</sup> Cindy Adams, *Soekarno, Penjambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung 1966) 7.

<sup>56</sup> Neti Suzana, *Pelaksanaan Politik Mercusuar di Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin Tahun 1959-1965*, (Lampung University 2016) 9.

<sup>57</sup> Karen Brooks, 'The Rustle of Ghost: Bung Karno in The New Order', *Indonesia* Vol. 60 (1995) 61-100

<sup>58</sup> Wahyu Budi Nugroho, *Konstelasi Ekonomi, Sosial dan Politik di Era Orde Baru*, (Denpasar: Udayana University 2017) 3.

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.indonesia-investments.com/id/budaya/ekonomi/keajaiban-or>.(accessed May 6, 2020).

since World War II.<sup>60</sup> When the crisis became a focus of international politics at that time, Indonesia took the initiative to engage actively as part of the migratory process for the refugee.

One of the other aims of the Lighthouse Policy was to combat poverty and unemployment in the domestic realm. Indonesia started to facilitate its citizens to migrate abroad as migrant workers. In 1979, the Indonesian Government started to send migrant workers abroad in an unprecedented number.<sup>61</sup>

This chapter delves further into how Indonesia implemented its early migration diplomacy in this period, both through the Transit Migration Diplomacy in the Indochina Refugee Crisis, and Emigration Diplomacy through the Migrant Worker Scheme with Malaysia. The explanation in this chapter provides concrete examples of the Migration Diplomacy framework presented in the first chapter.

## 2.1. Establishment of Galang Refugee Camp

Following the end of the Vietnam War in 30<sup>th</sup> April 1975, waves of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fleeing deteriorating conditions started to arrive in neighbouring Southeast Asia countries.<sup>62</sup> This major influx of refugees became one of the first significant issues not long after the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) was established in 1968. Aside from Brunei, almost all members of ASEAN were significantly affected by this turn of events including Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Cambodia. In the first three years after 1975, around 35.000 refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar arrived in several ASEAN countries (Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia).

After mid-1978, however, this situation was aggravated by a mass refugee outflow from Vietnam (over 400.000 people), in a process that became the focus of worldwide attention and concern.<sup>63</sup> A majority among these refugees were known as “boat people”, because they had crossed the dangerous South China Sea in inadequate and overcrowded boats to reach the neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Indonesia.<sup>64</sup> As many as half of these boat people did not reach their destination due to death from drowning, starvation, thirst, illness, storms, shipwrecks, even violent pirate attacks,<sup>65</sup> making it a significant humanitarian issue.

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<sup>60</sup> Barry Wain, ‘The Indochina Refugee Crisis’, *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 1 (1979) 160

<sup>61</sup> Ida Fauziyah, *Geliat Perempuan Pasca Reformasi*, (Yogyakarta 2015) 351

<sup>62</sup> Wain, ‘The Indochina Refugee Crisis’, 162

<sup>63</sup> Frank Frost, “Vietnam, ASEAN and the Indochina Refugee Crisis”, in *Turning Points and Transitions: Selections from Southeast Asian Affairs 1974-2018*, (Singapore: Yushof Ishak Institute 2018) 738-761.

<sup>64</sup> Quan Tue Tran, ‘Remembering the Boat People Exodus: A Tale of Two Memorials’, *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* Vol. 7, Issue 3 (2012) 80-121.

<sup>65</sup> Tran, ‘Remembering the Boat People Exodus: A Tale of Two Memorials’, 80.

The international community responded differently to this refugee flow. While initially supportive, ASEAN member states took a stricter response after Vietnam signed a cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union that unleashed much vaster refugee flows than before.<sup>66</sup> For instance, Thailand pushed back 42,000 refugees from its border, despite the fact that some of those refugees had been accepted for resettlement in third countries.<sup>67</sup> Malaysia and Singapore also expressed its objection in receiving Indochina refugees, claiming that they aroused anti-China sentiment in their countries.<sup>68</sup>

While the neighbouring ASEAN countries that served as temporary transit states had expressed its objection, the developed countries determined not to get stuck with the refugee permanently.<sup>69</sup> The United States took the lead as resettlement destination, while Japan (as the wealthiest nation in Asia) and other resettlement destination countries imposing only a small number of refugee quotas.<sup>70</sup>

In Indonesia, aside from the financial and administrative strain, the sudden influx of refugees also created socio-economic problems. For example, more than 33,000 Vietnamese who had taken refuge in the Anambas Islands have provoked racial tensions from the local community.<sup>71</sup> In order to deal with these negative consequences, Indonesia engaged in its first Migration Diplomacy in 1979. Utilising its position as the host of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting that was held in Bali on 28-30 June 1979, Indonesia emphasised the handling of Vietnamese refugees on the Meeting's Opening Address. President of the Republic of Indonesia at that time, H.E. General Soeharto, stated that ASEAN Countries had exerted great efforts in tackling the problems in providing temporary accommodation based on Humanitarian considerations.

However, due to the increased influx of refugees, ASEAN countries are forced to 'reconsider' further assistance, for the sake of preserving peace and stability of the region.<sup>72</sup> By highlighting the issue in a regional forum, Indonesia managed to shift the focus from a domestic scope into a regional one. The ASEAN framework provided justification for Indonesia to halt the incoming refugees. Furthermore, it demanded Vietnam to become actively involved in the matter if they wanted to maintain harmonious relations with the other ASEAN Member States.

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<sup>66</sup> Wain, 'The Indochina Refugee Crisis', 167.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 168.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 169.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Wain, *The Indochina Refugee Crisis*, 168

<sup>72</sup> Joint Communique of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 28-30 June 1979, [https://asean.org/?static\\_post=joint-communique-of-the-twelfth-asean-ministerial-meeting-bali-28-30-june-1979](https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twelfth-asean-ministerial-meeting-bali-28-30-june-1979). (accessed April 10, 2020)

While Migration Diplomacy on a regional level was directed to ease the domestic socio-economic strain, on an international level, Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy objective was to shape international public perception. In the same year as the ASEAN Joint Ministerial Meeting, the government published Presidential Decree No. 38 the Year 1979 on Coordination for Vietnamese Refugee Settlement in Indonesia. The Decree stated that Minister of Foreign Affairs was responsible for cooperating with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, receiving countries, potential receiving countries, and other international stakeholders, to accelerate the settlement of Vietnamese refugees in Indonesia.<sup>73</sup> The Decree also instructed the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Provincial Government to facilitate the construction of infrastructure for sheltering these refugees and preventing any friction with local communities.

This Decree reinforced the decision by the Indonesian Government to establish the Galang Refugee Processing Camp in Riau Archipelago, with assistance from UNHCR. After a series of meetings among ASEAN member states and Western Resettlement countries in early 1979, only the Government of Indonesia and the Philippines offered to allocate their territory as shelter and refugee processing centre.<sup>74</sup> Indonesia chose Galang Island, an 8,700 square kilometres island with a population of only two hundred people (to minimise contact with and disturbance of the local population), complemented by its relatively easy access by air and sea.<sup>75</sup> Another important consideration was that the majority of Galang Island population consisted of migrant workers from Java Island. Hence, there was no objection or protest from the Island population, considering they shared migratory background, and they did not have a sense of belonging to the island. Despite these advantages, it is interesting to see why Indonesia propose to facilitate these refugees despite the possible socio-economic strain that has been mentioned above.

One possible explanation has its connection with the Lighthouse Policy implemented by the previous Soekarno regime. In 1979, none of the ASEAN Member States was a signatory to the 1961 Refugee Convention; hence they have no obligation to receive and provide shelter to these refugees. However, Indonesia chose to do so on the basis of humanitarian assistance, as stated in its official statement.<sup>76</sup> Even without having ratified the Convention, Indonesia was able to provide shelter, protection, and fundamental human right's

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<sup>73</sup> Presidential Decree No. 38 Year 1979 on Coordination for Vietnamese Refugee Settlement in Indonesia. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/70150/keppres-no-38-tahun-1979#:~:text=KEPPRES%20No.%2038%20Tahun%201979,Di%20Indonesia%20%5BJDIH%20BPK%20RI%5D>. (accessed April 13, 2020)

<sup>74</sup> Antje Missbach, *Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS 2015) 32

<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> Indonesia Department of Information, *Galang Island for Processing Centre of Vietnamese Refugees*, (Jakarta: Proyek Pusat Publikasi Pemerintah 1979) 2

needs for the refugees. Indonesian Government tried to position itself 'above' other states who are signatory parties to the Refugee Convention yet feel reluctant to receive these refugees due to the economic burden they created. Indonesia used this narrative up until the present days in addressing the management of refugee in their transit phase, that will be explained later in the next chapter.

This effort to shape the international perception was successful, based on the remarks made by foreign representatives and international media. Bernard Kouchner, then Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, acknowledged Indonesia's success in managing the refugees in Galang Island.<sup>77</sup> Asahi News that covered the closure of the refugee processing centre on the island in 1996 praised the condition of the island. They stated that the facilities in Galang Island are better than other processing centres in the region such as Hong Kong and Thailand.<sup>78</sup>

In addition to its projection as a country that held humanitarian aspect in high regard, Indonesia's willingness to establish the processing centre was also an effort to improve the relations with Western countries, especially the United States. During Soekarno's regime, Indonesia relations were heavily aligned with the Soviet Union and socialist countries.<sup>79</sup> Indonesia's role in the Indochina Refugee Crisis then can be seen as a support to the anti-communist movement led by the United States, realigned their position to the Western bloc.

Another gain from the establishment of the Refugee Processing Centre in Galang Island is the construction of buildings and infrastructures that would not have happened without international assistance. Using the fund provided by UNHCR and donor countries, the Indonesian Government built shelter, health facilities, and lodging for the refugees, that still stand until today. In the latest development, the abandoned Galang Island was revitalised as an emergency medical compound for the latest COVID-19 outbreak. This plan was made possible because of the legacy of the buildings and infrastructure made during the Indochina refugee crisis.

In a general overview, in its earliest Migration Diplomacy, Indonesia trade off a small portion of its territorial sovereignty, in exchange of development and international recognition. Through transit migration diplomacy, Indonesia managed to obtain international aid to develop a less developed region, while also projected a positive image as a nation that upheld human rights in high regard.

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<sup>77</sup> Asvi Warman Adam, *Pulau Galang Wajah Humanisme Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture 2012) 13

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ragna Boden, *The Gestapu Events of 1965 in Indonesia: New Evidence from Russian and German Archives*, (Leiden: KITLV 2007) 510

## 2.2. Promoting Migrant Workers

Starting in 1979, the Indonesian government officially integrated the sending of migrant workers abroad as one of its priority government programs. Before this period, the placement of migrant workers has not involved the government, but it was instead an individual arrangement based on existing migrant networks, mainly in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.<sup>80</sup> This change was reflected in the third 'Five Years Development Plan' (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun/REPELITA III*), after being absent in the first two plans. This plan was a signature program of the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soeharto, to highlight strategies and objectives in each of his five years terms. One of the recurring themes in those plans was related to the solution against unemployment. While REPELITA I (1969-1971) and REPELITA II (1974-1979) were focusing on the equal distribution of the workforce across the region in Indonesia, REPELITA III (1979-1984) for the first time mentioned the plan to send migrant workers abroad as an effort to reduce unemployment.<sup>81</sup> This scheme included encouragement, facilitation, and protection of the rights of migrant workers. The plan also mentioned that the migrant workers sent abroad should come from sectors that were less needed in Indonesia's development program.

Table 4. The Number of Migrant Workers Sent Abroad (1969-1999)<sup>82</sup>

Development Plan	Migrant Workers Abroad	Government targets
REPELITA I (1969-1974)	5,624	
REPELITA II (1974-1979)	17,042	
REPELITA III (1979-1984)	96,410	100,000
REPELITA IV (1984-1989)	292,262	225,000
REPELITA V (1989-1994)	652,272	500,000
REPELITA VI (1994-1999)	1,461,236	1,250,000

Table 3 above shows the sudden rise of migrant workers that were sent abroad during the 1979-1984 period, before increasing at a steady rate in the following years until the present day. Since then, migrant workers became an essential part of Indonesia's economy and exporting them become one of the government's priority program.<sup>83</sup> This phenomenon has

<sup>80</sup> The National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. <http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/profil-sejarah>. (accessed April 21, 2020).

<sup>81</sup> Presidential Decree No. 7 Year 1979 on Five Years Development Plan III (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Ketiga*), <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/70083/keppres-no-7-tahun-1979>. (accessed April 13, 2020)

<sup>82</sup> Source: Department of Labour and Transmigration of the Republic of Indonesia, 2000

<sup>83</sup> Amarjit Kaur, 'Labour Migration in Southeast Asia: Migration Policies, Labour Exploitation and Regulation', *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2010) 6-19.

slowly transformed Indonesia not only into a transit country but also as a major emigration country in Southeast Asia, having all the characteristics of a quintessential labour export country.<sup>84</sup>

Malaysia has always ranked first as a destination country for Indonesian migrant workers up to this day.<sup>85</sup> One of the determining factors was the long-standing and robust social networks linking Indonesia and Malaysia since colonial times across the strait of Malakka.<sup>86</sup> Historical linkage and cultural homogeneity have played an essential role in facilitating population movement from Indonesia to Malaysia. However, this flow of people subsided during Soekarno's regime due to the confrontation between the two countries in 1963.<sup>87</sup>

On 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1963, Soekarno declared the "Crush Malaysia" movement due to Indonesia's refusal of the establishment of Malaysia Federation.<sup>88</sup> Malaysia then responded by the termination of diplomatic relations with Indonesia on 17<sup>th</sup> September 1963. This confrontation period only ended after the regime change from Soekarno to Soeharto, formally marked by the Agreement to Normalise Relations that was signed on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1966.<sup>89</sup> The Agreement included the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and the creation of a conducive climate for cooperation.<sup>90</sup> Based on this Agreement, Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy regarding the migrant workers that started in 1979 was directed to ensure the continuation of migrant workers program with Malaysia.

Based on the Migration Diplomacy framework in the previous section, the cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia stems from an absolute gain perspective that benefits both countries. In the early 1970s, Malaysia experienced shortages of labour in the plantation, agricultural, and construction sectors.<sup>91</sup> This demand for low-skill labour matched with Indonesian program to send migrant workers in low priority sector and reduce domestic unemployment.<sup>92</sup> Soeharto's regime perceived the export of migrant workers to be the most effective way to decrease the unemployment rate and disperse population growth, as well as to increase foreign exchange reserves.

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<sup>84</sup> Hugo Graeme, 'Labour Export from Indonesia', *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* Vol. 12, No. 2 (1995) 275-298

<sup>85</sup> Data from Bank of Indonesia and The National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI), [https://www.bi.go.id/seki/tabel/TABEL5\\_30.pdf](https://www.bi.go.id/seki/tabel/TABEL5_30.pdf). (accessed April 15, 2020)

<sup>86</sup> Hugo Graeme, 'Indonesian Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications', *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* Vol 21, No. 1 (1993) 36-70

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, 39.

<sup>88</sup> <https://historia.id/politik/articles/percikan-awal-sebuah-konfrontasi-v27Ya>. (accessed May 7, 2020)

<sup>89</sup> Agreement to Normalise Relations between The Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/agreement-to-normalise-relations-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-malaysia/8DF6B8D86A9B26EAEAF48022CA330156>. (accessed May 8, 2020).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, Article 2.

<sup>91</sup> Graeme, 'Indonesia Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications', 39.

<sup>92</sup> REPELITA III, 1979-1984

Even though the government has started to get involved in the process, the management of migrant worker was still mainly operated by private institutions, from the recruitment, placement, to the return of migrant workers.<sup>93</sup> In this period, the Emigration Diplomacy emphasised on how to maximise the number of migrant workers sent abroad, while neglecting the protection aspect of those same migrant workers.<sup>94</sup> Indeed, the protection aspect of Indonesian citizen only mentioned generally in the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries that were signed in 1970. In article 2 of the Treaty, it was stated that Indonesian and Malaysian nationals should be free from restriction and inconvenience when residing in both countries.

This Emigration Diplomacy continues during the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam to Indonesia in 1982 for negotiations regarding “Supply of Workers Agreement”.<sup>95</sup> Soon after the visit, in 1984, Indonesia and Malaysia signed the Medan Agreement (*Kesepakatan Medan*). This Agreement stipulates that the acquisition of Indonesian labour by employers in Malaysia must be made through official channels,<sup>96</sup> to reduce illegal migration into Malaysia.

Indonesia’s effort in Emigration Diplomacy in this period concluded by the creation of Memorandum of Agreement on the Procurement of Labour between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of Malaysia (*Memorandum Persetujuan Mengenai Penyediaan Tenaga Kerja Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Kerajaan Malaysia*) that was signed on 15<sup>th</sup> December 1993. The Memorandum stated that Indonesia would provide labour based on Malaysia’s request after a process of negotiation between the two parties from time to time when the demand arises.<sup>97</sup> Even though the protection aspect was not a priority in this treaty, several provisions in the document have laid a foundation for future improvement. For example, the Memorandum mentioned the importance of contract between employer and employee, the ability of the Indonesian Government to extract its workers at any time, and the responsibility of Indonesian Embassy to protect the workers.

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<sup>93</sup> Moch. Faisal Karim, ‘Institutional Dynamic of Regulatory Actors in the Recruitment of Migrant Workers’, *Asian Journal of Social Science* 45 (2017) 440-464

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, 448.

<sup>95</sup> Graeme, ‘Indonesian Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications’, 39.

<sup>96</sup> Azizah Kassim, ‘The Unwelcome Guest: Indonesian Immigrants and Malaysian Public Responses’, *Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 25, No. 2 (1987) 265-278.

<sup>97</sup> *Memorandum Persetujuan Mengenai Penyediaan Tenaga Kerja Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Kerajaan Malaysia*. 1993, [http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/mou-between-government-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-the-government-of-malaysia-on-the-recruitment-and-placement-of-indonesian-domestic-workers/at\\_download/file1](http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/mou-between-government-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-the-government-of-malaysia-on-the-recruitment-and-placement-of-indonesian-domestic-workers/at_download/file1). (accessed April 7, 2020)



### 2.3. Conclusion

Reflecting back at the Migration Diplomacy framework in the previous chapter, we can conclude that in this period, Indonesia implemented both Transit Diplomacy and Emigration Diplomacy. In their Transit Diplomacy, the migration aspect was utilised as an instrument to achieve Indonesian national interest in global prestige, mainly in shaping public perception and fostering bilateral relations. The establishment of the Galang Refugee Processing Center became a symbol of Indonesia's commitment to humanitarian issues. At the same time, it showed Indonesia's support toward the Western Bloc in the framework of the Cold War, especially the United States, for sheltering refugees that try to escape the Communist regime. In addition, the establishment of the Refugee Processing Centre also had economic benefits for a less developed region in Indonesia outside Java. It left its legacy in terms of infrastructures that still stand up to this day.

On the other hand, Indonesia's Emigration Diplomacy took a different route, in which the Government used diplomatic channels to promote and maintain the export of migrant workers, especially to Malaysia. This effort was needed after the deteriorating bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia during Soekarno's regime. The continuation of migrant workers scheme was an essential part of Indonesia's economic development, even though the protection of the migrant workers remained neglected to a large extent.

### 3. Power Relations During the Securitisation of Migration (2001-2015)

This chapter analyses Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy after two major events that influenced its approach towards migration policy in general. First, the Asian Financial Crisis that happened in 1998 was followed soon by the fall of Soeharto's regime in 1998. The transformation from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government, combined with the financial crisis surely affected many aspects in the governmental process, migration diplomacy being one of them. The second event was the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the U.S., that accelerated the securitisation of migration issues worldwide, especially for Immigration countries.<sup>98</sup> The securitisation affected Indonesia in its capacity as a transit state, with the refugees and asylum seekers denied entry to their destination countries, resulted in their indefinite period of waiting in Indonesian territory. This chapter re-examined Indonesia's Transit and Emigration Diplomacy as a continuation from the previous chapter, to analyse whether global events influenced the way Indonesia implemented its Migration Diplomacy.

#### 3.1. Indonesia-Australia Transit Management

The transit country characteristic of Indonesia has changed in this period into a more complex pattern. Previously, during the Indochina Refugee Crisis in the 1979-2001 period, Indonesian Government hosted refugees and asylum seekers that were originated from Southeast Asian countries (mostly Vietnamese, with several Cambodian and Laotian in the mix). They were also localised on one island, that provided for relatively easy control and surveillance. The most important feature of this crisis was international cooperation regarding the process of repatriation of these refugees in the form of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The CPA became a framework for resettlement and repatriation of the refugees, that managed to ultimately mobilise all Vietnam Refugees from Indonesia to their destination countries.<sup>99</sup>

During this 2001-2015 period, however, Indonesia served as a transit country for asylum seekers and refugees of diverse origins. Based on data provided by the Directorate General of Immigration, more than half of asylum seekers and refugees residing in Indonesia came from Afghanistan, followed by smaller numbers of people from Myanmar and Pakistan. Even smaller numbers of asylum seekers were from Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,

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<sup>98</sup> Michael Humphrey, 'Securitisation of Migration: an Australian Case Study of Global Trends', 84

<sup>99</sup> W. Courtland Robinson, 'The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck', *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 17, Issue 3 (2004) 319-333.

Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea.<sup>100</sup> These asylum seekers and refugees also scattered across various provinces in Indonesia, depending on their point of entry. Regardless of formally applying for asylum or getting caught by the authorities while trying to cross the border to Australia illegally, these irregular migrants became the responsibility of the Immigration Office in the place where they were found. The last differential aspect is the uncertainty of the transit period for these asylum seekers and refugees, due to lack of an international framework of burden-sharing (like the one found in the CPA) and the strict border control imposed by destination countries after the 9/11 attack. For asylum seekers and refugees transiting in Indonesia, Australia's Migration Diplomacy played a significant role in their prolonged resettlement process.<sup>101</sup> Hence the relations between Indonesia and Australia in managing this transit migration became the main focus in the following section.

Under the new circumstances mentioned above, Indonesia's approach towards refugees and asylum seekers had changed compared to Vietnamese Refugees in the previous period. While the Vietnamese Refugees were considered people in need facing precarity in their origin country, the 'new' refugees and asylum seekers were considered illegal migrants whose entry into Indonesia was a breach of national law.<sup>102</sup> This approach then created frequent tensions with Australia that held a similar view on the matter post 9/11.

Following the steps taken by other Western Immigration states after the 9/11, Australia pursued aggressive border security policies designed to prevent migrants from entering its territory.<sup>103</sup> In 2001, Australian Government introduced the 'Pacific Solution', the policy in which asylum seekers (who were on board of unauthorised vessels) were intercepted and transferred to offshore processing centres in Papua New Guinea and Nauru.<sup>104</sup> The creation of the Pacific Solution itself was an example of Australia's Migration Diplomacy directed towards several Countries in the Pacific, such as Tuvalu, Tonga, Kiribati, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Fiji, and Palau.<sup>105</sup> After a series of negotiations and lobbying, Australia managed to agree on a deal with Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Both countries agreed to establish refugee processing centres in exchange for international aid and financial support.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Based on the data provided by several Immigration Offices up to 2015 in various provinces in Indonesia. These refugee and asylum seekers were located in Immigration Detention Centre in respective province, waiting for further process of resettlement by UNHCR.

<sup>101</sup> Sampson, Gifford, and Taylor, *The Myth of Transit: the making of a life by asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia*, 1136

<sup>102</sup> For a more detailed explanation of this changing approach, see Antony Lee, *Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitisation: Making Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media*, (Jakarta: Bina Nusantara University 2017) 75-101

<sup>103</sup> Clark, 'Asylum Policies and the Making of Transit Sites', 143

<sup>104</sup> Janet Phillips, *The 'Pacific Solution' revisited: a Statistical guide to the Asylum Seeker caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island*, (Canberra: Parliament of Australia 2012) 2

<sup>105</sup> [https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/Senate/Former\\_Committees/maritimeincident/report/c10](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/maritimeincident/report/c10). (accessed May 8, 2020).

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

How then Indonesia used its position as a transit migration country in response to Australia's Migration Diplomacy?

Due to the relatively successful scheme in the Pacific Solution, since the late 1990s, Australia has negotiated with Indonesia to engage in a similar readmission agreement with Indonesia.<sup>107</sup> Australia hoped Indonesia willing to resettle asylum seekers and refugees who were proven to have records of transiting through Indonesian territory and integrate them into the Indonesian population. However, as mentioned above, during this period, Indonesia took a stricter stance towards refugee and asylum seekers, that made a direct deal with Australia impossible. Several factors influenced this approach. First, the coverage of national print media in Indonesia framed refugee and asylum seekers as a threat to the local population 'socio-economic stability.'<sup>108</sup> Second, these refugees and asylum seekers did not attract as much global attention as the Indochina Refugees had attracted, hence it would not be quite useful if it was to be utilised as an instrument to shape the International perception of Indonesia. In other words, in this period, asylum seekers and refugee issues did not contain high political salience.<sup>109</sup> Third, bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia experienced a decline during this period because of issues related to refugees. One of the main issues was the MV Tampa Incident on 12 September 2001, when the Norwegian freighter, MV Tampa rescued 438 people from a sinking Indonesian vessel on its way to Australia.<sup>110</sup> A combination of these factors resulted in Indonesia's refusal to establish a refugee-processing centre in its territory, unlike their previous experiences with Galang Island. Even so, Indonesia still implemented its Transit Diplomacy through other means that will be explained in the following part.

In its effort to combat irregular migration, Indonesian authorities (in this case Directorate General of Immigration and the National Police) have always faced recurring problems that it can't resolve on its own. First, the long Indonesian coastline provides many points of entry and departure for irregular migrants, making patrol and surveillance an arduous process in combatting irregular migration. Second, the lack of human resources in each provincial authority, the lack of infrastructure (Boats, watchtower, CCTV), topped by no designated budget for regular surveillance have made an effort practically impossible.<sup>111</sup> To make up for these aspects, Indonesia engaged in Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA)

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<sup>107</sup> Clark, 'Asylum Policies and the Making of Transit Sites', 151.

<sup>108</sup> Lee, *Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitisation: Making Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media*, 75-101

<sup>109</sup> Samuel Tyrer, 'An Australia-Indonesia Arrangement on Refugee: Exploring the Structural, Legal and Diplomatic Dimensions', *Adelaide Law Review* 113 (2017) 113-147

<sup>110</sup> Missbach, *Troubled Transit*, 182

<sup>111</sup> Based on author past Interviews with Provincial Immigration and Police authorities in Medan, Bali, Manado, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Yogyakarta, and Semarang in 2016-2017.

with Australia and IOM since 2000 to address irregular migration, people smuggling, and trafficking.<sup>112</sup>

Within this RCA framework, the IOM is responsible for covering and improving the quality of care for asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia, for instance, the renovation and refurbishment of detention centres in Tanjungpinang, Batam, Balikpapan, and Semarang.<sup>113</sup> The IOM also provides training and capacity building for Indonesian authorities in dealing with irregular migration issues.<sup>114</sup> Australia provided the funding for these projects: up to US\$ 50,000,000 in 2001 alone.<sup>115</sup> In exchange for financial aid and capacity building programs, Indonesia provided 'temporary protection' for asylum seekers and refugees in their territory while UNHCR processed their asylum claim and resettlement.<sup>116</sup>

Indonesia's willingness to cooperate with the IOM was not only based on the wish to prevent irregular migration to Australia but also related to Indonesia's effort to combat people smuggling and trafficking from Indonesia that will be analysed in the next section. In terms of Transit Diplomacy, there was a noticeable change of objectives compared to the 1979-2001 period. While in the management of the Vietnamese Refugees, the political gain was emphasised, the policies in the framework of Transit Migration during this period were revolving around economic gain and developmental aspects. Another interesting point was that the diplomatic process was mainly done through interaction with non-state actors (IOM and UNHCR) instead of state actors.

### 3.2. Protection of Migrant Workers

Continuing from the previous period, migrant workers still played an essential part in Indonesia's economy. In 2001, the recorded remittances from migrant workers were US\$ 2 billion (not including the unrecorded amount from illegal migrant workers), only surpassed by remittance from agriculture (US\$ 3,5 billion) and mining (US\$ 5,6 billion).<sup>117</sup> The main difference with the previous periods, however, was the public attention on the protection aspects of these migrant workers. After the authoritarian regime by Soeharto, the new era of

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<sup>112</sup> Amy Nethery, Brynna Rafferty-Brown & Savitri Taylor, 'Exporting Detention: Australia-funded Immigration Detention in Indonesia', *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol.26, Issue 1 (2012) 88-109

<sup>113</sup> International Organization for Migration, *IOM Annual Report 2009*, (Jakarta 2010)

<sup>114</sup> International Organization for Migration, *Offering New Beginnings and Promoting Development: Australia and IOM*, (IOM 2015) 17

<sup>115</sup> Diah Ajeng Ariestya Putri, 'Kerjasama IOM dan Pemerintah Indonesia dalam Menangani Perdagangan dan Perbudakan Manusia di Industri Perikanan PT. Pusaka Benjina Resource tahun 2015', *Journal of International Relations* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2019) 998- 1006.

<sup>116</sup> Tyrer, 'An Australia-Indonesia Arrangement on Refugee: Exploring the Structural, Legal and Diplomatic Dimensions', 123.

<sup>117</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Help Wanted: Abuses against Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Indonesia and Malaysia*, (HRW 2004) 9.

reformation brought along with it press freedom and the creation of various human rights institutions in Indonesia. Both of these actors (the press and human rights institution) then emphasise the Governments lack of effort in protecting its Migrant Workers, mainly the female labourers worked as domestic servants in Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries.<sup>118</sup> This section analysed some Government's diplomatic efforts to address the issues.

Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia faced various issues, from the risk of arrest and deportation (due to the high number of illegal workers), long working hours, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual abuse, and unpaid wages.<sup>119</sup> However, it was not until 2004 that the Indonesian Government decided to seriously address this issue after the case of Nirmala Bonat attracted wide public attention and media coverage.<sup>120</sup> Nirmala Bonat was an Indonesian Domestic worker who experienced domestic abuse by her employer, and the case was deemed the worst example of migrant workers protection in 2004.<sup>121</sup> As a response to this case, the Indonesian Government started its Emigration Diplomacy by renewing its Memorandum on Migrant Workers that was signed with Malaysia in 1993. After a series of negotiations in 2004 and 2005, both countries agreed to create a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to address the issue of migrant workers' protection specifically. This intention was expressed during the visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to Indonesia in 12<sup>th</sup> January 2006.<sup>122</sup> The final product of this diplomatic process was the Memorandum of Understanding between Indonesia and Malaysia on Recruitment and Placement of Indonesian Domestic Servants, that was signed on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2006.

The MoU was a giant leap from its 1993 predecessor in many aspects. First, from the document title, we can see that the 2006 MoU was specifically designed to manage Domestic Servants, instead of migrant workers in general. It was mentioned in the preface of the document that recruitment and placement of Indonesian domestic workers are a beneficial area of cooperation for both countries.<sup>123</sup> Second, the MoU also mentioned the responsibility of Malaysia to treat Indonesian Domestic Servants in accordance with Malaysian law, a provision that was absent in the previous MoU. The appendix of the MoU also laid out a detailed description of the responsibilities of the Malaysian Government and Malaysian Employers regarding the rights of Indonesian Domestic Servants. Unfortunately, this MoU was

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<sup>118</sup> Austin, 'Defending Indonesia's Migrant Domestic Workers', 271.

<sup>119</sup> Human Rights Watch, 'Help Wanted: Abuses against Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Indonesia and Malaysia', *Human Rights Watch* Vol. 16, No. 9 (2004).

<sup>120</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Help Wanted*, 3

<sup>121</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-43044843>. (accessed May 9, 2020).

<sup>122</sup> Zainuddin Jafar, 'Hubungan Indonesia-Malaysia: Memerlukan Perspektif Kebijakan Baru?', *Indonesian Journal of International Law* Vol. 3 (2006) 356-377

<sup>123</sup> Memorandum of Understanding antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia tentang Rekrutmen dan Penempatan Pekerja Domestik Indonesia, 2006. [www.treaty.kemlu.go.id](http://www.treaty.kemlu.go.id). (accessed May 2, 2020)

insufficient in optimising protection towards Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia. The Indonesian government considered Malaysian authority was not taking their role as stated in the MoU sincerely.

In order to improve their negotiation position, Indonesia imposed a moratorium<sup>124</sup> in June 2009, stopping all recruitment and placement of Indonesian domestic servants to Malaysia. This move aimed to put pressure on Malaysia to revisit its commitment towards protecting Indonesian migrant workers under their jurisdiction. The moratorium can be deemed successful since the ban was lifted in 2011 after both countries signed an amendment protocol to the 2006 MoU. In the amendment protocol, specific provisions regarding the protection and safety of migrant workers were introduced. For instance, it added 'Escape' as a legal term in the documents, allowing the migrant workers to flee their workplace to avoid life-threatening situations.<sup>125</sup> This amendment also commands the creation of a Joint Task Force that consists of both countries representatives. This task force was responsible for overseeing and settle any dispute regarding Indonesian migrant workers and their employer.<sup>126</sup> Another meaningful change was the rights of migrant workers to keep their passport, in which the 2006 MoU stated that the employer was responsible for keeping it. This was one major turning point that raises the leverage of migrant workers in relation to their employer.

During this period, the Indonesian government also implemented a similar negotiation to adjust the Migrant Worker scheme with the Middle Eastern countries. As major destination countries for Indonesian workers, Middle Eastern countries pose their own issues regarding migrant workers management. First, local authorities in those countries did not have a legal framework that set up a rule for domestic servants, except for Jordan that possesses an MoU with Indonesia and a King's Decree on the protection of foreign workers.<sup>127</sup> Second, the management of migrant workers was given to the private sector based on the Kafala System.<sup>128</sup> The third reason, relating to the fact that these countries did not fulfil their obligation for Mandatory Consular Notification to Indonesian Embassy in respective countries, that

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<sup>124</sup> In this context, moratorium refer to the suspension of activity, meaning that Indonesian Government stopped sending Migrant Workers to the moratorium bound country until further notice.

<sup>125</sup> Protokol Perubahan Terhadap Nota Kesepahaman Antara Pemerintah Republik Indonesia dan Pemerintah Malaysia Mengenai Perekrutan dan Penempatan Pekerja Domestik Indonesia Yang Ditandatangani di Bali, Indonesia pada 13 Mei 2006. [http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/mou-between-government-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-the-government-of-malaysia-on-the-recruitment-and-placement-of-indonesian-domestic-workers/at\\_download/file2](http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/mou-between-government-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-the-government-of-malaysia-on-the-recruitment-and-placement-of-indonesian-domestic-workers/at_download/file2). ( accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, *Penguatan Peranan Tugas dan Fungsi Kementerian Luar Negeri dalam Rangka Meningkatkan Penempatan dan Perlindungan TKI di Luar Negeri*, (MoFA 2012).

<sup>128</sup> For detailed explanation of Kafala system, see: Hanan N. Malaeb, 'The Kafala System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision', *Arab Law Quarterly* 29 (2015) 307-342.

resulted in imbalanced legal procedures and biased court decision<sup>129</sup> These aspects gave way to a high number of cases involving Indonesian migrant workers in Middle Eastern Countries, especially who worked as domestic servants.

As a part of its Emigration Diplomacy, Indonesia also imposed an indefinite moratorium of migrant workers to these countries around the same time the moratorium to Malaysia began. The moratorium to Kuwait was implemented in September 2009, while the moratorium to Jordan was imposed since July 2010. In Saudi Arabia, the moratorium entered into force since August 2011, and the moratorium to Syria was enforced in August 2011.<sup>130</sup>

During the moratorium period, various diplomatic meetings took place to discuss the improvement of migrant workers' protection in each country. For example, the Joint Working Group between Indonesia and Jordan on 15-16 May 2011 to evaluate the existing MoU between both parties. Indonesia also created a Joint Working Group with Saudi Arabia that specifically discuss the Migrant Worker Issue on 10-13 July 2011. Unfortunately, these series of negotiations have not been able to facilitate both parties' interests, and various violations of rights kept occurring during these periods. Finally, in 2015, the Indonesian government published a Minister of Workforce Decision no. 260 the Year 2015 on the Termination and Forbidding of Placement for Indonesian Migrant Workers in Middle Eastern Countries.<sup>131</sup> In this period, Indonesia emphasised the protection aspect of the migrant workers more than the potential economic gain of promoting their recruitment. This priority was reflected in Indonesia's Foreign Policy guideline that will be analysed in the next section.

### 3.3. Defining Foreign Policy Priority

Since 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds the annual Foreign Minister Press Statement in January, as a recap of the achievements of last year's foreign policy, and the projection of the running years' foreign policy priority. This annual statement could serve as a solid basis to determine Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy since the statement included the objectives and cornerstones of Indonesia's Diplomacy.

In the statement of 2009, the bilateral relations with Malaysia were mentioned in a specific section, emphasising the cooperation between the two countries to resolve the imminent problem in border and migrant worker issues. It was also mentioned that both parties

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<sup>129</sup> MoFA, *Penguatan Peranan Tugas dan Fungsi Kementerian Luar Negeri dalam Rangka Meningkatkan Penempatan dan Perlindungan TKI di Luar Negeri*, 2012

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> This Minister Decision affected all migrant workers who are working for individual employers in nineteen Middle East Countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritius, Egypt, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirate, Yaman, and Jordan



agreed to create *Eminent Person Group* ((EPG) to increase cooperation and understanding of Indonesia Migrant Workers in Malaysia.<sup>132</sup> In the 2011 Statement, the concluding paragraph contained Indonesia's commitment to reinforce the protection of Indonesian citizens abroad. It was stated that the protection aspect had become the primary principle for all Indonesian diplomats. One of the main instruments of this protection effort was the negotiation and Agreement with respecting destination countries in the migrant worker sectors.<sup>133</sup>

The commitment to protect Indonesian Migrant Workers was repeated in the 2012 Statement, whereas the Indonesian Government had reviewed the various legal framework for migrant worker schemes in destination countries, to ensure the availability of protection for Indonesian workers. The result of this review shall determine the comprehensive policy directed towards the management of recruitment and placement for Indonesian migrant workers.<sup>134</sup> The protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers then gained high political salience when it was determined as one of the nine Priorities of Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy since 2013.<sup>135</sup>

### 3.4. Conclusion

Through the course of the 2001-2015 period, Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy took quite a turn from the 1979-2001 period in terms of implementation. Even though Transit and Emigration Diplomacy remained the main characteristic, the approach and objectives had shifted compared to the New Order that lasted until 1998. In terms of Transit Diplomacy, Indonesia was affected by the securitisation of migration issues following the 9/11 terrorist attack, that changed Indonesia's perception of asylum seekers and refugees. Considered as a threat to socio-economic stability of the local population, Indonesia implemented an unwelcoming approach for these asylum seekers and refugees.

In addition to those factors, the lack of international attention toward these migrant groups had made the Indonesian Government put aside its Transit Diplomacy objectives during the 1979-2001 period, which was to shape International perception. The Asia Financial

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<sup>132</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2009, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/736/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2009>. (accessed April 15, 2020).

<sup>133</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2011, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/737/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2011>. (accessed April 15, 2020).

<sup>134</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2012, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/738/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2012>. (accessed April 15, 2020).

<sup>135</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2013, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/745/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2013>. (accessed April 15, 2020).

Crisis in 1998 shifted Indonesia's priority towards a tangible goal in terms of economic development to revitalise its domestic condition. Indonesia contained the flow of refugees in its territory and served as an extraterritorial border for the destination country (in this case Australia) in exchange for economic gain and development aid. One aspect that was consistent from the previous period was the optimisation of the multilateral approach by Indonesia in implementing its Transit Diplomacy. While in the Vietnam Refugee Crisis, Indonesia moved through the framework of ASEAN and Geneva Convention, during this period, Indonesia engaged in multilateral cooperation between IOM, UNHCR, and Australia to manage the asylum seekers and refugees. Indonesia also emphasised the importance of regional cooperation through the creation of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking, and Related Transnational Crimes to further cooperate in a multilateral framework. This regional institution that consists of forty-nine members serves as a forum for policy dialogue, information sharing, and practical cooperation to address specific irregular migration issues in the region.<sup>136</sup>

In the context of Emigration Diplomacy, the implication of the Asia Financial Crisis prevented Indonesia to pursue an economic gain through promoting the recruitment and placement of its migrant workers like in the previous period. Instead, the transformation into a democratic country has created great public attention and political salience regarding the protection aspect of Indonesian migrant workers. After witnessing the surge of outward movement of migrant workers during the New Order Period, the Indonesian government implemented coercive emigration diplomacy<sup>137</sup> towards several destination countries in which there are high cases of violation of rights of Indonesian migrant workers. This coercive move, mainly by imposing a moratorium of recruitment and placement of migrant workers was used as a threat or bargaining chip to affect migration flows as a form of punishment until the target state acquiesces to an articulated political or economic demand.<sup>138</sup>

The shift of priority in Emigration Diplomacy from the economic aspect to the protection aspect also reflected the priority of Indonesia's Foreign Policy. The theme of migrant workers protection became a recurring theme in the Annual Ministerial statement alongside other strategic goals of Indonesia's Foreign Policies, and later it became one of the main objectives for Indonesia Diplomacy until the next period.

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<sup>136</sup> <https://www.baliprocess.net/>. (accessed June 8, 2020).

<sup>137</sup> Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Migration diplomacy in the Global South: cooperation, coercion and issue linkage in Gaddafi's Libya', *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 38, No. 10 (2017) 2367-2385.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, 2371.

## 4. Migration Diplomacy for Development (2015-2019)

In this chapter, I analyse the last and relatively short time period, in which the recent developments of Indonesian Migration Diplomacy, as a result of the Global Migration Crisis in 2015, and the election of President Joko Widodo in 2014, played a prominent role. Aside from the recurring Transit and Emigration Diplomacy, in this period, Indonesia also started to initiate its Immigration Diplomacy towards African and West Asian countries. This chapter takes a look at whether the approach and priority of Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy were consistent with the preceding period, or has it shifted again following the change of regime and significant international phenomena as has been shown in the analysis of the previous period. This chapter has a different structure than the two previous analytical chapters. I start with describing the priorities of Indonesia's Foreign Policy in this period. Then I devote a room to various recent implementations of Migration Diplomacy to see whether those diplomatic endeavours were reflecting the objectives set out by the Government.

### 4.1. A New Direction for Foreign Policy

Shortly after being elected as Indonesia's 7<sup>th</sup> President, Joko Widodo announced the *Nawacita* that served as the focus for the government of his first term. Derived from the Sankrit language *Nawa* (nine) and *Cita* (hope), this program contains nine priority areas for a five-year agenda. The first priority was related to foreign policy and diplomacy, which stated Jokowi's plan to return the state to its fundamental task of protecting all Indonesian citizens and providing a safe environment.<sup>139</sup>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then produced four priorities of foreign policy for the next five years that consisted of maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens and legal entities, and intensifying economic diplomacy.<sup>140</sup> As we can see, the protection aspect of Indonesian citizen abroad (which heavily emphasised the protection of migrant workers) reappeared as a foreign policy priority, this time for five years. Aside from these three priorities, Indonesia also reaffirmed its commitment to be engaged in an independent and active foreign policy in safeguarding world peace and policy, as mandated by its constitution.<sup>141</sup> In the area of migration, the Indonesian Government reiterated its intention to actively address the issue of irregular migration through regional cooperation

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<sup>139</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Converging Development Agendas: Nawa Cita, RJPMN, and SDGs*, (Jakarta: UNDP 2015) 8.

<sup>140</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2015, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/755/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2015>. (accessed April 20, 2020)

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

mechanism. It emphasised the importance of cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination.

Another essential aspect to note that has a connection with this chapter was Indonesia's acknowledgement of the expectation of the international community that Indonesia is in favour of the promotion and protection of human rights. This was due to Indonesia's re-election as a member of the UN Human Rights Council 2015-2017.<sup>142</sup> And the last point was Indonesia bid for election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the term 2019-2020.<sup>143</sup> These foreign policy priorities and highlights that were mentioned during the first Annual Minister of Foreign Affairs Press Statement of Jokowi's term will be the base for the next section that analysed the implementation of Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy.

## 4.2. The Returning Human Rights Dimension in Transit Diplomacy

The Global Migration Crisis in 2015 received high political salience when the UNHCR indicated that 65.3 million displaced persons were the highest number since the Second World War.<sup>144</sup> Across the globe, various policies and approaches of states towards migration issues became the main discussion in the media and public spheres. With this returning attention from the international society, Indonesia also returned to its softer approach toward refugee and asylum seekers that was implemented during the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis.

Indonesia itself was not profoundly affected by the Crisis since there was no extreme surge of asylum seekers and refugee that enter its territory during the Crisis.

Table 5. Number of Asylum Seekers and Refuge in Indonesia 2014-2016

Country	2014		2015		2016	
	Refugees	Asylum Seeker	Refugees	Asylum Seekers	Refugees	Asylum Seekers
<b>Afghanistan</b>	1,515	3,004	1,176	4,256	3,056	3,859
<b>Myanmar</b>	888	69	749	50	795	244
<b>Somalia</b>	334	310	320	463	459	762
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	329	247	288	170	319	294
<b>Iran</b>	294	625	279	569	312	331
<b>Palestine</b>	243	128	271	260	375	157
<b>Pakistan</b>	184	286	227	252	348	140
<b>Iraq</b>	148	283	194	471	223	689

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Joseph Besigye Bazirake, 'The Contemporary Global Refugee Crisis', *A Journal of Social Justice* Vol. 29, Issue 1 (2017) 61-67

<b>Others</b>	196	498	274	580	382	1,084
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,131</b>	<b>5,450</b>	<b>4,318</b>	<b>7,071</b>	<b>6,269</b>	<b>7,560</b>
	<b>9,581</b>		<b>11,389</b>		<b>13,919</b>	

Source: UNHCR Fact Sheet, from which website

From the above table, it is visible that the dynamic of asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia tend to be relatively stable compared to what happened in Europe. The number of refugees and migrants is also relatively small in comparison to Indonesia's population. The variation of the country of origin was also not affected by the Crisis since the composition remains the same.

However, even though the existing conditions did not experience significant changes, Indonesia's government took yet a different approach compared to the last period's strict treatment against refugee and asylum seekers. In 2016, the Government published Presidential Decree no.125 on the Management of Foreign Refugees. This decree regulates the management of refugees and asylum seekers from the search and rescue phase up until the resettlement or voluntary repatriation. Asylum seekers and refugees are no longer seen as external threats whose entry into Indonesian territory is a breach against national law but as a group of people who need humanitarian assistance. This approach was reflected in the first twelve provisions of the Decree that emphasise on the search and rescue aspect of asylum seekers and refugees, determining the process and responsible institutions for it.<sup>145</sup> The decree also regulates the responsibility of Provincial Government to provide temporary shelter in case the Directorate General of Immigration did not have any existing facilities in the said province where the asylum seekers arrived, which is a new step in the management of refugees and asylum seeker.

This humanitarian approach was also mentioned in the 2016's Annual Foreign Minister statement that stated how Indonesia had set up an example of humanitarian response in migration issues. It did not only emphasise Indonesia's acceptance of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, but it also mentioned Indonesia active participation in the United Nations' High-Level Event on migration and refugees during the UN General Assembly. Marathon diplomacy with origin countries (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Afghanistan), and its success as a host for Jakarta Declaration Roundtable Meeting on Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Movement of Persons in November 2015.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 125 tahun 2016 tentang Penanganan Pengungsi dari Luar Negeri, <http://ditjenpp.kemerkumham.go.id/arsip/ln/2016/ps125-2016.pdf>. (accessed March 20, 2020).

<sup>146</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2016, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/756/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2016>. (accessed March 13, 2020)

To further express its commitment on human rights and conflict resolution related to migration issues, Indonesia engaged in various diplomatic endeavours with Afghanistan and Myanmar as these were the countries of origin with the highest number of asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia. For example, in November 2017, Indonesia Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi visited Kabul, Afghanistan, that became the first bilateral visit in 50 years. This was continued by the visit of Joko Widodo to Afghanistan in January 2018 and followed by Trilateral Ulema Conference inviting High Peace Council of Afghanistan.<sup>147</sup> For the case of Rohingya Refugees, Indonesian Government directly held a dialogue with Myanmar authorities. It also formed a particular group called the Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance Myanmar (AKMI) that delivered various humanitarian assistance for Rakhine State and Cox's Bazaar that have a high concentration of refugees.<sup>148</sup> Indonesian representatives also engaged in a mediation involving Myanmar State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyii; Leader of Rakhine Advisory Commission Kofi Annan; also Bangladesh Foreign and Prime Minister.<sup>149</sup> Indonesian Government has also built a hospital in Rakhine State and coordinated other humanitarian aid through ASEAN Humanitarian Centre.<sup>150</sup>

These actions were not only aimed to reduce conflict in the important areas that hopefully resulted in the decreasing number of incoming refugees and asylum seekers, but they were also intended to restore Indonesia's reputation in international society. During this period, Indonesia was preparing its candidacy campaign as United Nations Security Council Non-Permanent Member 2019-2020 and United Nations Human Rights Council 2020-2022. If the Indonesian government still implemented the same approach as it did in the previous period, it could hinder its image as "True Partner for World Peace" which was Indonesia's motto for its candidacy.<sup>151</sup> However, it is important to note that the cooperation with Australia (through IOM) was still maintained in this period. IOM still funded the management of asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia, alongside its capacity building program given to Indonesian officials. Hence, in this period, Indonesia's Transit Diplomacy emphasised on

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<sup>147</sup> Retno L.P. Marsudi, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/03/05/toward-long-lasting-peace-and-stability-in-afghanistan.html>. (accessed May 17, 2020).

<sup>148</sup> Asep Setiawan, *Role of Indonesian Humanitarian Diplomacy toward Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar*, (Jakarta: UMJ 2020) 10

<sup>149</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia tahun 2017, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/757/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2017>. (accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>150</sup> Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia Tahun 2018, <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/758/pidato/pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2018>. (accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>151</sup> Campaign Brochure of Indonesia for Non-Permanent Membership of The United Nations Security Council 2019-2020. 2017

'repairing' its image from the previous period while still maintaining economic and developmental gain.

### 4.3. Expansion of Migrant Workers Protection

The emphasise on the protection of migrant workers still became the highlighted purpose of Indonesian migration diplomacy during this period. In the 2001-2015 timeframe, the focus was given to the bilateral exchange between Indonesia and Malaysia that lead up to the amendment of MoU agreed by both countries. For this period, Indonesia's Emigration Diplomacy was shifted towards Middle Eastern states that become the primary receiver for its migrant workers.

With the 2015 Moratorium on domestic workers still enforced, Indonesian government received pressure from both the Middle Eastern countries and the labour back home. Indonesia is one of the major suppliers for low-skilled migrant workers to the Middle East; hence, the sudden halt to its supply put a constraint in the receiving countries' economy, especially the domestic sector. On the other hand, Indonesian workers also protested the moratorium, since it was viewed as ineffective and discriminative.<sup>152</sup> Executive Director of Migrant Care, Anis Hidayah, stated that the Government should focus on improving the legal framework for migrant workers employment, instead of forbidding the employment of specific sectors to specific countries.<sup>153</sup>

The initial negotiation for this new framework was discussed during the meeting between Indonesia Minister of Labour and Saudi Arabia Minister of Labour and Social Development on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2017 in Jeddah.<sup>154</sup> This negotiation resulted in the creation of a new system specifically designed to accommodate Indonesian Migrant Workers employment in Saudi Arabia, without lifting the moratorium that is still enforced to the other Middle Eastern countries.

In 18<sup>th</sup> December 2018, Indonesian Government published Minister of Manpower Decision Number 291 the Year 2018 on the Guidelines of Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Through the One Channel Placement System.<sup>155</sup> The document stated that Indonesia decision to reopen employment

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<sup>152</sup> <https://www.dw.com/id/indonesia-hentikan-pengiriman-tki-ke-timur-tengah/a-18431515>. (accessed May 29, 2020).

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> <https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr-01287686/indonesia-arab-saudi-sepakati-sistem-baru-tki-411698>. (accessed May 29, 2020)

<sup>155</sup> Keputusan Menteri Ketenagakerjaan Republik Indonesia Nomor 291 Tahun 2018 Tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia di Kerajaan Arab Saudi Melalui Sistem Penempatan Satu Kanal, <https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/katalog-1584-Keputusan%20Menteri.html>. (accessed May 27, 2020)

opportunities to Saudi Arabia was based on the consideration that the Saudi Arabia Government must have reformed the policy and social guarantee for foreign migrant workers.<sup>156</sup> Through this Agreement, the employment and placement of Indonesian migrant workers were no longer based on the Kafala System, but under a new framework called *Syarikah* System.

As mentioned above, the *Syarikah* System is a bilateral arrangement between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia; hence it does not affect the other Middle Eastern countries who still enforce the Kafalah System. As a pilot project, the *Syarikah* System is not implemented countrywide, and it only applied to employment of Indonesian migrant workers in six cities in Saudi Arabia namely Riyadh, Jeddah, Madinah, Dammam, Dahrhan, and Khobar.<sup>157</sup> In a brief overview, under the *Syarikah* System, Indonesian Government shall be responsible for the dissemination of information, registration, recruitment, selection, protection, and return of migrant workers. On the other hand, the placement of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia shall be managed by a single private Institution (*Syarikah*) appointed by the Saudi Arabian Government. The Agreement also established a joint online database of Indonesian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia to support the protection and monitoring process.<sup>158</sup>

Even though the establishment of the *Syarikah* System was aimed to provide protection for Indonesian migrant workers, it also served another long term purpose. President Joko Widodo has stated that Indonesia was planning to stop sending migrant workers as domestic servants abroad entirely. Joko Widodo felt that Indonesia had been too long associated with domestic servants, and it tainted the Nation's pride and self-esteem.<sup>159</sup> Hence, he instructed the Minister of Labour to establish a roadmap that will gradually put a stop to the sending of Indonesian domestic servants abroad. He expected that in the future, Indonesia would only send highly skilled migrant workers. In this context, Indonesia managed the mobilisation of migrant workers not only to emphasise protection but also to shape international public perception, just like the objectives of its Transit Diplomacy discussed in the first chapter

Based on the establishment of *Syarikah* System in Saudi Arabia, it is expected that a similar scheme will be pursued with the rest of the Middle Eastern countries that are still on the Moratorium list. That way, the Indonesian government will have more significant control over the recruitment and protection effort of migrant workers. They can also determine the type of profession that will be sent to these countries, which is entirely in line with the

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.


<sup>159</sup> <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2015/02/14/03274001/Jokowi.akan.Stop.Pengiriman.TKI>. (accessed May 29, 2020)



President's plan to stop sending migrant workers that work as domestic servants entirely. Interestingly enough, while the term Domestic Servants (*Penata Laksana Rumah Tangga/PLRT*) was abolished in this Agreement (the term was still used in the bilateral Agreement with Malaysia), the Syarikah system allowed six types of profession to be sent to Saudi Arabia, namely housekeeper, babysitter, family cook, elderly caretaker, family driver, and child care worker.<sup>160</sup> These professions can be considered a division of the job description that used to fall under the general term of domestic servants. It can be assumed that this was the result of Saudi Arabia's Migration Diplomacy that still need a stable supply of migrant workers in domestic sectors. By altering the term, Indonesia can fulfil its objective of stopping the export of domestic servants. At the same time, Saudi Arabia can maintain the supply of low skilled workers with a more specific task and responsibilities.

#### 4.4. Towards Immigration Diplomacy

One phenomenon that distinguished this time period with its predecessor was the emergence of Indonesia's Immigration Diplomacy. Indonesia is not an immigration country, and this was shown by the relatively low number of immigrants staying in Indonesia.



Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific<sup>161</sup>

<sup>160</sup> Keputusan Menteri Ketenagakerjaan Republik Indonesia Nomor 291 Tahun 2018 Tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia di Kerajaan Arab Saudi Melalui Sistem Penempatan Satu Kanal. <https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/katalog-1584-Keputusan%20Menteri.html>. (accessed May 27, 2020)

<sup>161</sup> <https://lokadata.beritagar.id/chart/preview/jumlah-imigran-di-indonesia-2005-2017-1553249497>. (accessed June 1, 2020).

Based on the above graph, the immigrant population in Indonesia consistently made up around 0,1% of the country's population. Hence, Immigration Diplomacy had not been Indonesia's force due to its relatively low bargaining power. In terms of Immigration, Indonesia can be considered an open country that does not put complicated requirements for foreign nationals to enter its territory. In 2016, Indonesia even published a visa exemption for 169 nationalities to boost the tourism sector.<sup>162</sup> An exception has been made for several countries based on political reasons, such as Israel, Taiwan, and Kosovo. Aside from these three countries, Indonesia also has a particular immigration policy directed to countries that pose 'potential threat' to the nation's security, called the 'Calling Visa'<sup>163</sup> policy that will be the main focus of this section.

Countries that are put into Calling Visa list are countries that possess a particular threat in terms of ideology, politic, economy, social, culture, defence, and immigration.<sup>164</sup> This categorisation covers a wide range of issues, from drugs, fraud, communism, terrorism, radicalism, diseases, and bogus refugee. In 2012, countries that were considered Calling Visa Countries were Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Guinea, Cameroon, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. For citizens of these countries, a special visa procedure is applied with a rigorous requirement. For instance, visa applicant from Calling Visa Countries are required to have a local sponsor in Indonesia, whether personal or a private company. They also have to attend an interview with Indonesian Embassy personnel in their respective country. Indonesia also formed a special investigative team, consisted of several government institutions, that is responsible for evaluating and determining whether the visa application is to be approved or not.<sup>165</sup>

For Indonesia, this policy serves as a pre-emptive action towards potential breaches to national security, however for the countries on the Calling Visa list, the categorisation imposed negative stigma towards those countries' image. Similar cases can be seen on the travel restriction imposed by the United States to Nigeria, Eritrea, Sudan, Tanzania, and Kyrgyzstan, in the basis of terrorism.<sup>166</sup> Another example was the launch of 'Passport Index' in 2016 that puts strong images and words to the perception that the easier for a passport

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<sup>162</sup> <https://setkab.go.id/tidak-untuk-jurnalistik-wisatawan-dari-169-negara-ini-bebas-visa-kunjungan-ke-indonesia/>. (accessed June 1, 2020).

<sup>163</sup> Peraturan Menteri Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Republik Indonesia Nomorm.Hh-01.Gr.01.06 Tahun 2012 Tentang Tata Cara Penetapan Negara Calling Visa Dan Pemberian Visa Bagi Warga Negara Dari Negara Calling Visa, <http://ditjenpp.kemkumham.go.id/arsip/bn/2012/bn301-2012.pdf>. (accessed May 31, 2020).

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.


<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html>. (accessed June 1, 2020)

holder to enter various countries, the more powerful his or her country is.<sup>167</sup> Hence, being on the Calling Visa List means that a country is considered unsafe, and ranked below the receiving country in terms of international hierarchy and prestige. It is understandable then why the agenda regarding visa liberalisation, which means in more comfortable access for various nationalities to enter a country, has been brought up in several bilateral negotiations.<sup>168</sup>

In the case of Indonesia, the negotiations took place between the Indonesian Government with several Countries in the Calling Visa list. In 1995, the list consisted of thirty-eight countries. This number had gradually decreased following the improvement of the domestic condition of the respected countries<sup>169</sup>, down to thirteen countries in 2013.<sup>170</sup> From this moment onwards, the decision of which country shall be put into the list was more influenced by political consideration rather than security.

For example, in terms of immigration violation in 2017, among the top 10 countries with the highest immigration violation, only three Calling Visa countries were listed (Afghanistan,



Source: Directorate of Diplomatic Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia

Nigeria, and Somalia. On the other hand, China, who clearly count for more than half of the violations, was granted a visa-free facility for a tourist visit to Indonesia. The same thing applied to Iraq and Syria, which were exempted from the Calling Visa list while posing a terrorism threat at the same time.<sup>171</sup> Based on these instances, we may assume that there are other factors taken into consideration when determining the Calling Visa list, aside from the security aspect.

In 2017, Pakistan was taken out from the Calling Visa list of Indonesia after more than fifteen years. Even though Pakistan still considered posing a considerable threat in terms of conflict and radical Islamic views, the decision to take out Pakistan was mainly based on bilateral relations and economic interest.<sup>172</sup> First, through several bilateral meetings and international platforms (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), the Pakistani Government

<sup>167</sup> Nora El Qadim, 'The Symbolic Meaning of International Mobility: EU-Morocco negotiations on Visa Facilitation', *Migration Studies* Vol. 6, Issue 2 (2018) 279-305.

<sup>168</sup> Lena Laube, 'The Relational Dimension of Externalising Border Control: Selective Visa Policies in Migration and Border Diplomacy', *Comparative Migration Studies* 7 (2019) 1-22.

<sup>169</sup> Junior Perdana Sande, 'Selective Policy Imigrasi Indonesia terhadap Orang Asing dari Negara Calling Visa', *Indonesian Perspective* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2020) 92-111.

<sup>170</sup> Keputusan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Nomor M.HH-02.GR.01.06 Tahun 2013.

<sup>171</sup> Sande, 'Selective Policy Imigrasi Indonesia terhadap Orang Asing dari Negara Calling Visa', 104

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

persistently requested to be exempted from the list.<sup>173</sup> The second reason related to the high number of Pakistani tourist arriving in Indonesia in 2016 despite the lengthy procedure of Calling Visa.<sup>174</sup> The Indonesian Government hoped to give easier entry access for Pakistani citizens would boost tourism visit even further. Both Pakistan and Indonesia engaged in their own Migration Diplomacy with different objectives. For Pakistan, it was for the sake of international perception, and for Indonesia, another economic gain in the tourism sector.

Following Pakistan's removal from the Calling Visa list, Indonesia then set its sight towards the next region, Africa. During his first term, President Joko Widodo had instructed the Indonesian Ambassador and Diplomat to intensify Economic Diplomacy to untapped market countries in Eastern Europe and Africa. In a Group of Twenty (G-20) meeting in Hamburg back in 2017, Joko Widodo stated that Indonesia and African Countries had a long-standing connection since the Asian African Conference in 1955. This connection must be cemented into a concrete economic and trade partnership.<sup>175</sup> Indonesia's ambition to seriously improve economic relations with African countries then implemented through organising the first Indonesia-Africa Forum on 10-11 April 2018 in Bali.<sup>176</sup> One crucial aspect of the economic partnership is the connectivity between countries, and Calling Visa policy could hamper that connectivity.

As a follow-up measure, Indonesia started to cater to African countries request to be taken out from the Calling Visa list. On 16<sup>th</sup> October 2017, Niger President, Mahamadou Issoufou conducted a state visit to Indonesia. Aside from several economic deals (housing, fisheries, agriculture, small enterprises), health, and education, both countries agreed to initiate a visa exemption for service and diplomatic passport holders.<sup>177</sup> Following the meeting, the Indonesian Government published a Ministerial Decision that amends the Calling Visa list, exempting Niger.<sup>178</sup> In the Ministerial Decision, it was stated that Niger was exempted as a follow up to the meeting between the Heads of State of both countries. This was also done to intensify bilateral cooperation which would benefit both parties.<sup>179</sup> Another take out of this Agreement was the renovation project of Niger's Presidential Palace with a project value of \$40 million, that was given to Indonesian construction company in 2019.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> <http://ksp.go.id/forum-indonesia-afrika-2018/>. (accessed June 2, 2020)

<sup>176</sup> <https://iaf.kemlu.go.id/>. (accessed June 3, 2020).

<sup>177</sup> <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/16/13415101/kunjungan-presiden-issoufou-indonesia-sepakat-bantu-pembangunan-perumahan-di>. (accessed June 3, 2020).

<sup>178</sup> *Keputusan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia (Kepmenkumham) no. M.HH-02.GR.01.06 tahun 2018*

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> <https://kumparan.com/kumparanbisnis/wika-raih-kontrak-rp-600-miliar-untuk-renovasi-istana-presiden-niger-1ryJ71L690h/full>. (accessed June 8, 2020).

This Immigration Diplomacy pattern with Niger then set up an example for another effort with another African country which is Cameroon. Due to its geographical location and port infrastructure, Cameroon was considered as a country that can serve as a hub for Indonesia's economic diplomacy in West and Central Africa.<sup>181</sup> In order to implement effective diplomacy, since 2019 Indonesian government announced its plan to open an embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon's capital. Relating to that matter, there have been ongoing negotiations to lift off Cameroon's Calling Visa status to accelerate and ease the Embassy set up process.

These examples above have displayed how Indonesia's Immigration Diplomacy looked like. Even though Indonesia is not a major immigration country, it can still engage in an Immigration Diplomacy exchange to some extent. In this case, the diplomacy did not causally relate to the movement of people, but rather the permission to do. This was another example of how Migration Diplomacy does not always lead to the movement of people instantly, but Migration Diplomacy can also be done to alter or create certain policies that regulate those movements.

#### 4.5. Migration Diplomacy of the Deceased

Aside from various types of Migration Diplomacy mentioned above, states can also engage in Migration Diplomacy in order to expel, deport, or transfer individuals or group, as occurred in historical cases of population transfer.<sup>182</sup> A distinguished case for Indonesia would be its Migration Diplomacy with Japan, in the repatriation of the World War II Japanese Soldier remains in the province of Papua and West Papua. This lengthy negotiation process started in 1993 and had just concluded in 2019. As mentioned in the introduction, the definition of migrants based on IOM did not specify whether the people moving are alive or not. Several cultures and religions also considered the cycle of migration as uncompleted until the peoples remains return to their country of origin. For example, the Moslem-Pakistani migrant community in the US that is struggling to send the remains of their friends or family back to Pakistan.<sup>183</sup> Hence, I included these remains mobilisation as a part of Migration Diplomacy since it contained the necessary elements to be subsumed under that category.

For example, in 1973, the US and Vietnam signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam following by the cease-fire throughout the whole country of Vietnam, which was soon to be reunited. The US agreed to withdraw all of its troops and dismantled all US bases, in exchange for the release of the US and others prisoner of war.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> <https://iaid.kemlu.go.id/medio/press-releases>. (accessed June 3, 2020).

<sup>182</sup> Adamson & Tsourapas, *Migration Diplomacy in World Politics*, 120.

<sup>183</sup> <https://thedi diplomat.com/2018/05/the-struggle-to-send-home-pakistans-dead/>. (accessed May 17, 2020).

<sup>184</sup> <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/paris-peace-accords-signed>. (accessed May 17, 2020).

This Agreement includes the responsibility for each party to return captured persons during the Vietnam War without any delay, even though the said person has been prosecuted or sentenced.<sup>185</sup> They were also responsible for exchanging information regarding the location of the grave of military personnel and foreign civilians, for exhumation and repatriation of the remains.<sup>186</sup>

Another example was shown by Russia, who in the late 1980s began a campaign to improve relations with the Russian diaspora (another Migration Diplomacy objective as mentioned in the theory section), by bringing back the bodies of renowned cultural figures buried abroad.<sup>187</sup> Romanians also retrieved from Paris their esteemed interwar diplomat Nicolae Titulescu, and Rome, eighteenth-century bishop Inochentie Micu.<sup>188</sup> Thus, still, a plethora of examples exist, but the main point is, even the remains of people still possess a diplomatic value that their mobilisation or migration is worth the trouble of negotiating and entering into diplomatic acts with another country. Japan is another example of a country that engaged in such effort regarding their World War II soldiers remains.

Even though it has been seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, Japan still has unfinished business concerning that period, especially in the social and cultural sphere.<sup>189</sup> This effort was aimed to provide closure for the soldiers' relatives<sup>190</sup> and create a sense of reconciliation and coming to terms with Japan's past.<sup>191</sup> The Government appointed the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare as the responsible institution for the matter, that was later complemented with the creation of Association for Recovery and Repatriation of War Casualties in 2017. Among the many locations of the soldiers' remains was Indonesia, especially in the province of Papua and West Papua. Japan's effort to initiate the repatriation can be traced back in 1993, during the signing of Memorandum of Agreement Between The Government of Japan and The Government of The Republic of Indonesia concerning The Building of a World War II Monument.<sup>192</sup> An article of the Memorandum stated that the

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<sup>185</sup> Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/12/656ccc0d-31ef-42a6-a3e9-ce5ee7d4fc80/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/12/656ccc0d-31ef-42a6-a3e9-ce5ee7d4fc80/publishable_en.pdf). (accessed May 17, 2020).

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post colonialist Change*, (New York: Columbia University Press) 13.

<sup>188</sup> Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 13.

<sup>189</sup> Beatrice Trefalt, 'Collecting Bones: Japanese Missions for the Repatriation of War Remains and the Unfinished Business of the Asia-Pacific War', *Australia Humanities Review* 61( 2017) 145-159.

<sup>190</sup> <https://eu.freep.com/story/news/local/2019/07/15/organization-works-find-repatriate-remains-wwii-japanese-soldiers-world-war-ii/1731771001/>. (accessed May 17, 2020)

<sup>191</sup> Trefalt, 'Collecting Bones: Japanese Missions for the Repatriation of War Remains and the Unfinished Business of the Asia-Pacific War', 146

<sup>192</sup> Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Building of a World War II Monument. 1993. [www.treaty.kemlu.go.id](http://www.treaty.kemlu.go.id). (accessed May 8, 2020)

Japanese Government should build a mortuary where the skeletons of the Japanese who were killed during World War II shall be kept before they are brought back to Japan for their final burial.<sup>193</sup> However, it was not until 2019 that both parties agreed on the terms regarding the repatriation of these remains, after a long process of negotiations.

The repatriation process was a race against the clock for Japan, since the family and relatives of the deceased soldier were getting older and anxious, whether they will have a chance to give their deceased a proper and respectful burial in their homeland. However, the Indonesian Government did not have an interest in those remains, giving them the upper hand on the negotiation. In order to elevate the stakes, Indonesian Government also stated that objects that have been buried for more than fifty years are considered Cultural Heritage (human remains included), and due to National Law, were prohibited from being transported outside of Indonesian Territory.<sup>194</sup> In 2013 the Indonesian Government finally gave initial access for the Japanese Government to begin excavating and collecting the remains. This access was granted through the signing of *Memorandum of Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Japan on Provision of Access for and Conduct of Collection and Repatriation of the Remains of Japanese Soldiers of World War II in the Province of Papua* in November 2013.<sup>195</sup> However, it was not until 2019 that the details and specifics of the repatriation were given, after both parties signed the “Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of Indonesia and The Government of Japan on Excavation, Collection and Repatriation of the Remains of Japanese Soldiers Who Died in The Second World War in The Province of Papua and the Province of West Papua, The Republic of Indonesia’ on 25 June 2019.

Through the provisions of the Agreement, it was clear how Indonesia utilised trade off access for mobilisation with economic gains. The preface of the Agreement stated that this cooperation was made by taking into account the interest of Japanese Government in collecting and repatriating the soldiers’ remains while bearing in mind the importance of economic and social development of local people in Indonesia.<sup>196</sup> Article III of the Agreement stated that the activities of excavation and collection should respect the environment and historical nature and economic benefits of the site.<sup>197</sup> The process of excavation, collection,

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2010 Tentang Cagar Budaya, <http://www.bpkp.go.id/uu/filedownload/2/2/77.bpkp>. (accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>195</sup> <https://www.kemdikbud.go.id/main/blog/2019/06/indonesia-dan-jepang-sepakati-repatiasi-kerangka-tentara-jepang-di-papua>. (accessed May 27, 2020).

<sup>196</sup> Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of Indonesia and The Government of Japan on Excavation, Collection and Repatriation of the Remains of Japanese Soldiers Who Died in The Second World War in The Province of Papua and the Province of West Papua, The Republic of Indonesia, [www.treaty.kemlu.go.id](http://www.treaty.kemlu.go.id). (accessed May 20, 2020).

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

and repatriation shall be conducted by a Joint Technical Team that include members from both parties, hence encouraged the transfer of knowledge for the Indonesian officials. In addition, this Joint Technical Team may also request the participation of local people, promoting job opportunities for the residents of Papua and West Papua. The Japanese Government also agreed to bear all expenses incurred in the implementation of the Agreement. In addition to all of the above provisions, the Japanese Government shall submit a proposal of activities that will contribute to the economic and social benefit of the local people in Papua and West Papua.<sup>198</sup> The mentioned activities ranged from sister province cooperation; grant of ambulances or other medical supplies; museum renovation, capacity building in the field of agriculture, tourism, fisheries, and other sectors; also establishment of clean water facilities in the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

The repatriation of human remains and historical artefacts has proven to be another form of Emigration Diplomacy to some extent, with its own unique characteristics that distinguish it from the general Emigration Diplomacy. Due to its historical and political value, States are willing to negotiate and fulfil demands of the country of origin in order to retrieve those remains and artefacts. On the other hand, those human remains only possess limited symbolic value for the Host Country (though it may be different for the case of artefacts) that the permission for its repatriation can be utilised as an effective bargaining chip in a negotiation.

#### 4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has captured the dynamic of Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy, especially in terms of its objectives. While Indonesia's Emigration Diplomacy still emphasised the protection aspect from the 2001-2015 period, the Transit Diplomacy objectives return to its 1979-2001 objectives of shaping international perception. This dynamic showed that migration is part of a broader foreign policy frame, that can be adjusted as the national interest dictates. This period also witnessed the early stage of Indonesia's Immigration Diplomacy. Despite its relatively low immigration rate, Indonesia still able to implement its own Immigration Diplomacy towards individual states. The next chapter incorporated all findings from the three periods, to conclude how Indonesia implemented its Migration Diplomacy throughout three different periods.

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<sup>198</sup> Ibid.



## 5. Conclusion

The main research question of this thesis was ‘How did Indonesian Migration Diplomacy change from 1979 until 2019 and why?’. To answer these questions, we have divided Indonesia’s Migration Diplomacy into three different periods to be analysed and compared. These distinct periods characterised by internal and external factors that made it distinguishable from each other. Not only Indonesia was governed by different regimes in the three periods, but there were also international events in each period that influenced how Indonesia implemented its Migration Diplomacy.

To get a better perspective of the change over time in Indonesia Migration Diplomacy, the table below will highlight each period’s main features. This table describes what types of Migration Diplomacy were implemented in each period, and what interest drove it. Both aspects are based on the theoretical framework mentioned in the theory section.

<b>Time Period</b>	<b>Type of Migration Diplomacy</b>	<b>Objectives</b>
<b>1979-2001</b>	Transit Diplomacy	Public perception
		Bilateral relations
		Economic gain
	Emigration Diplomacy	Economic gain
<b>2001-2015</b>	Transit Diplomacy	Economic gain
		Development
	Emigration Diplomacy	Public perception
<b>2015-2019</b>	Transit Diplomacy	Public perception
		Development
	Emigration Diplomacy	Economic gain
		Development
		Public perception
	Immigration Diplomacy	Economic gain
Bilateral relations		

During the first period in 1979-2001, the Indonesian Government was orientating on building economic power following its independence. Both Transit and Emigration Diplomacy aimed to maximise economic gain. The government set up plans to send as many migrant workers abroad as possible in terms of Emigration Diplomacy. Indonesia engaged in negotiations with destination countries to establish a legal framework for the migrant worker

scheme. This policy mainly aimed to reduce the high unemployment rate in Indonesia, also to increase remittances, that migrant workers sent back to their families. Remittances have a significant role in Indonesia's economy. On the Transit Diplomacy category, the Indochina Refugee Crisis in the 1970s served as an initiator that gave way to Indonesia's Transit Diplomacy. Indonesia hosted the Vietnamese Refugees to project its humanitarian effort to international society. It was also aimed to foster relations with Western countries during the Cold War, to boost economic cooperation with those countries further.

Moving on to the 2001-2015 period, even though the type of Migration Diplomacy implemented by Indonesia still revolved around the Transit and Emigration sphere, the objectives changed. Affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack, Indonesia took a sharp turn in its approach towards asylum seeker and refugee. Indonesia's Transit Diplomacy no longer aimed to emphasise its humanitarian endeavour but directed towards economic gains and the development of its human resources. Similar to the power relation between EU and Turkey in the 2016 deal, Indonesia willing to prevent asylum seekers and refugees from entering a country's territory (mainly Australia) in exchange for financial support and human capacity development. The Emigration Diplomacy in this period was then directed to recipient countries of Indonesian migrant workers, to promote a better system and legal framework that emphasise the protection aspects. This shift of objectives was caused by the growing attention of the domestic audience following the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998. Press freedom and easier access to information have raised awareness regarding the lack of protection aspects of the migrant worker scheme that was neglected during the 1979-2001 period.

The most recent period of 2015-2019 saw an exciting development in the context of Migration Diplomacy. Indonesia managed to implement all three types of Migration Diplomacy at the same time. During this period, the Indonesian Government started to implement its Immigration Diplomacy that was absent in the first two periods, even though it was still in its initial stage with a limited scope. Similar to its Transit and Emigration Diplomacy, Indonesia's Immigration Diplomacy also carries with it an emphasis on the economic gain as the underlining interest in Indonesia's Migration Diplomacy. Immigration Diplomacy is usually used by developed countries in the Global North; hence it was an interesting finding to see that a South country also engaged in this Migration Diplomacy category.

Just like the Indochina Refugee Crisis in the 1970s, the Global Migration Crisis in 2015 brought back humanitarian aspects as the primary objective in Indonesia's Transit Diplomacy during the 2015-2019 period. The high political salience of migration in international politics was utilised by Indonesia to put itself in the spotlight and attract public attention. This attention was aimed to support Indonesia's effort in securing a high profile position in the realm of global politics, such as being elected as a Non-Permanent Member of the United Nations Security

Council, and the United Nations Human Rights Council. In terms of Emigration Diplomacy, Indonesia still emphasised the protection aspect of its Migrant Workers by limiting their mobilisation, to put pressure on receiving countries. Indonesia was also planning to gradually stop sending migrant workers who work as domestic servants to maintain national pride and self-esteem. A rather particular part of Emigration Diplomacy was the negotiation between Indonesia and Japan in the repatriation of the Japanese Soldier's remains, that became an interesting example of a unique Migration Diplomacy. This pattern of negotiation regarding the mobilisation of inanimate objects can be applied in analysing other countries effort to retrieve their legacy. For example, the US and Australia that tried to repatriate their soldier remains and wreckages in the Pacific Region.

To draw a holistic conclusion based on Migration Diplomacy in three different periods, we can conclude that Indonesia implemented Transit and Emigration Diplomacy as its primary focus. Even though the objectives of these Migration Diplomacy change from time to time, economic gain and public perception were recurring themes in each period. The difference in objectives was influenced by both internal (unemployment rate, regime change, etc.) and external factors (international events, bilateral relations, etc.). It can be assumed that Indonesia's focus in economic gain and international public perception was related to its position as an emerging power in the Global South, that required both economic power and international support to rise in the global politics rank.

On a more general conclusion regarding Migration Diplomacy, the example of Indonesia has shown two exciting findings. First, a country can implement three types of Migration Diplomacy at the same time. While it has been agreed that a country is not limited to just a single type of Migration Diplomacy, there has been no example of a country that engages in all types simultaneously. Second, Indonesia has reinforced the pattern that countries from the Global South tend to engage in Migration Diplomacy for economic benefit. It can also be assumed that these countries mainly involved in Emigration and Transit Diplomacy as opposed to Developed Countries with an emphasis on Immigration Diplomacy. These two aspects have revealed a new example of how a country utilised its position in a global migration network to achieve its various interest. Hopefully, these findings can pique interest in further research to explore Migration Diplomacy implemented by countries outside of America and Europe. Results of these researches shall enumerate the example of Migration Diplomacy practices from countries with different interest and power, that will later enrich the field of Migration Diplomacy.

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