

CHINA'S SURINAME

A CASE STUDY ON CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPING WORLD POLICY

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TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENT	1
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES	2
1. INTRODUCTION	3
2. CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY	7
2.1 Chinese OFDI	7
2.2 Belt and Road	8
2.3 Debt trap policy	10
2.4 China and the developing world	11
2.5 China and Latin America	14
2.6 Conclusion	15
3. CHINA IN SURINAME: HISTORY AND DEBATE	17
3.1 Historic relations: Suriname and China	17
3.2 Recent Chinese economic activities in Suriname	20
3.3 Concerns about Suriname's relation with China.	23
3.4 Conclusion	24
4. CHINESE LOANS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES	26
4.1 Chinese loans and creditworthiness	27
4.2 Terms & Conditions: Chinese loans to Suriname	30
4.3 Chinese loans and diplomatic consequences	35
4.4 Conclusion	40
5. CHINESE FDI IN SURINAME AND THE ROLE OF SURINAME'S ETHNIC CHINESE POPULATION	42
5.1 Chinese FDI in Suriname	42
5.2 Economic role ethnic Chinese population in Suriname	46
5.3 Trade relations Suriname – China	49
5.4 Conclusion	50
CONCLUSION	52
BIBLIOGRAPHY	55
APPENDIX 1: HISTORICAL GDP PER COUNTRY LATIN AMERICA	63
APPENDIX 2: APPLIED METHOD TO UNIFORMIZE LOAN AGREEMENTS.	64
APPENDIX 3: FOREIGN LOAN AGREEMENTS SURINAME, 2012-2019	66
APPENDIX 4: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS LABELED 'INTERVENTION'	73
APPENDIX 5: APPLIED METHODOLOGY COMPARISON CHINESE INDEBTEDNESS WITH RSVC	82
APPENDIX 6: UN SIMILAR VOTING TO CHINA RATE PER COUNTRY, SUBJECT AND YEAR.	85
APPENDIX 7: UN SIMILAR VOTING TO CHINA PER SUBJECT, RANKED HIGHEST CHINESE INDEBTEDNESS PER ANNUM.	88
APPENDIX 8: DETAILS INTERVIEWS CHINESE RETAILERS	91

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Migration into Suriname by country of origin; 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013	19
Figure 2: Chinese OFDI in Latin America, 2005-2014	43
Figure 3: Trade Relations Suriname - China, 2000-2018	49
Table 1: Chinese economic activities developing world & Suriname	5
Table 2: Total Chinese aid & loans to Latin America, 2000-2014	27
Table 3: Credit rating per Agency	28
Table 4: Chinese loans and credit rating researched countries	29
Table 5: Foreign suppliers of loans to Suriname, 2012-2019	31
Table 6: Foreign loans Suriname, arranged by maturity, 2012-2019	32
Table 7: Chinese loans to Suriname, 2012-2019	33
Table 8: RSVC and indebtedness to China, total of resolutions, 2000-2019	38
Table 9: RSVC and indebtedness to China, per category, 2000-2019	38
Table 10: RSVC and indebtedness to China, per country, 2000-2019	39

1. INTRODUCTION

As a result of years of economic growth and an increasing demand for resources China is ‘going out’. One of the main reasons for the Chinese to expand internationally is to secure future access to resources such as oil, gas, minerals and, to some extent, food. Within the western world observers look critically towards Chinese foreign practices. There is both a criticism of the less progressive extractive practices of Chinese companies, but there is also fear that the Chinese might be more successful in building ties with developing countries and, thus, cementing better access to their resources.

Whereas there is much written about Chinese activities in Africa, less is known about what role Chinese companies play in the economy and society of Suriname, which, until as recently as 1975, was part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, as a result of this, maintains strong (though complex) relations with the Netherlands.

Chinese involvement in Suriname is extensive. When Chinese president Xi Jinping met Surinamese President Desi Bouterse, just after Xi’s inauguration in 2013, he mentioned that Suriname hosts the most overseas Chinese in the Caribbean, and that the Chinese culture has become an important part of Suriname's society.¹ But Chinese involvement goes much further than the ethnic Chinese community in Suriname. Suriname is a developing country, having regularly found itself short of funds in recent years, and China has been an eager supplier of loans. Additionally, Chinese companies have been involved in road and house construction and the Chinese are increasingly visible in the Surinamese wood industry. Concerns about Suriname’s inability to repay its Chinese debts and, as a result, losing control of its own resources have been growing over the past ten years.² When these concerns are articulated, examples of rogue practices by Chinese companies in (primarily African) developing countries are often raised to emphasise the validity of the speaker’s apprehensions about Chinese control.

But what the debate about China’s economic presence in Suriname typifies is the lack of actual data to support the claims being made, and, therefore, addressing this discrepancy is the purpose of this thesis. Based on different data sets from primary sources, combined with information from Surinamese and Chinese media agencies, and empirical data collected during a trip to Suriname, this thesis will seek to answer the question:

‘How does the Chinese economic influence in Suriname in the period 2000-2019 compare with China’s international economic strategy elsewhere in the developing world, and how can the similarities and/or differences be explained?’

¹ Xinhua, ‘Xi Pledges Closer Co-Op with Suriname, Barbados’, *China Daily*, 3 June 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/2013-06/03/content_16558766.htm.

² Nina Jurna, ‘Suriname ruilt de oude Nederlandse kolonisator in voor suikeroom China’, NRC, 24 November 2019, .

One of the main points within the academic debate on China's economic activities in the developing world is whether China lures poor countries into 'debt traps' by supplying loans with harsh terms to countries with low creditability. The leverage that China holds over a country as a result of indebtedness would be used by China to gain resource access and diplomatic influence; whether this theory is applicable for the case of Suriname is the subject of this research. Suriname shall be the main subject of research, but, when necessary, the research scope will be expanded to countries in Latin America. In order to answer the research question the study is designed around the following sub questions:

- To what extent do data on Suriname and Latin America support claims that the terms and conditions of Chinese loans are tougher than that of other lenders and that there is a relation between Chinese loans, creditworthiness and support for China's diplomatic standpoints?
- What relations exist between the relatively large ethnic Chinese population in Suriname and Chinese foreign direct investment in Suriname?

By answering these questions, the research will contribute to current academic debates around the implications of the rise of China for the developing world. Various scholars believe the emergence of China as a major lender will be beneficial for developing countries, as it provides them with an alternative to the demanding loan programmes of the international development agencies. Besides, it would enable developing countries to pursue economic development on their own terms.³ According to others, however, China implements an exploitative, mercantilist strategy, which will create dependency on commodity exports and harm the long-term development of developing countries. Furthermore, they argue, China's provision of loans without conditionalities will weaken good governance in the developing world by removing the financial incentives for change.⁴

The purpose of the thesis is to understand where the case of Suriname fits within the academic debate on Chinese economic policy in developing countries. This following chapter will address this debate, with specific focus given to China's economic role in developing countries and its involvement in Latin America.

³ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* by Deborah Brautigam (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011); Stephen B. Kaplan, 'Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin America', *Review of International Political Economy* 23, no. 4 (3 July 2016): 643–76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1216005>.

⁴ Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, 'China's Overseas Lending', *NBER Working Paper Series* 26050 (1 July 2019), <https://doi.org/10.3386/w26050>; Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs, 'Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation', *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique* 48, no. 3 (2015): 988–1023, <https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12166>.

The third chapter tells the story of Suriname’s relations with China, starting in the 19th century and continuing until the recent Chinese economic influence and involvement in Suriname. The literature treated in chapters 2 and 3 will highlight a set of trends observed in both China’s general behaviour towards developing countries, and in the particular case of Suriname. These trends are summarized in table 1 below. A confrontation of the general trends on one side and those observed in the case of Suriname on the other form the research direction for chapters 4 and 5.

Table 1: Chinese economic activities developing world & Suriname

China’s economic activities developing world	China’s economic activities Suriname
Latecomer in investment in resource rich countries; forced to work with second-choice countries	China is after resources Suriname
Chinese investment not purely economic, also for diplomatic purpose	China invests in Suriname to increase diplomatic influence
China lures countries into dept-traps	China forces heavier terms on Suriname than traditional donors.
Chinese loans bad for industrialisation & governance	China’s loans have not helped Suriname’s economy
Invest to create new export markets	China uses Suriname as an entrance point in Latin America

As shown in table 1, the observed general trends observed in Chinese foreign investments and lending in developing countries are, in a broad sense, applicable to the case of Suriname. This qualifies Suriname a strong, indicative case study to test the accuracy of the defined trends of Chinese investments in and lending to developing countries.

In chapter 4 some of the defined trends listed in table 1 will be tested by a variety of sources: AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, credit ratings from Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, UN General Assembly voting data and a dataset with the details of the terms and conditions of all foreign loans Suriname has taken out since 2012.

At first the extent to which a correlation can be found between the creditworthiness of a country and its lending from China will be explored. It is an assumption that the lower a country’s creditworthiness is, the more difficult it is for a country to get regular loans. As China is less strict with its lending and needs developing world partners for resources, low-credit-rate countries are more drawn to lending from China. This hypothesis will be tested on the overall situation in Latin America rather than just in Suriname. Secondly, the notion of harsher terms from Chinese loans will be examined by in-depth analysis of Suriname’s national debt. By perusing and evaluating the details of all loans taken out by Suriname since 2012, the specifics of Chinese loans will be compared with those of non-Chinese lenders. In third instance, whether heavy Chinese financial involvement indeed leads to more favourable diplomatic decisions regarding China will be tested. This will be assessed using UN voting behaviours of Latin American countries, comparing the way countries with high Chinese debt vote with the voting patterns of countries that know little indebtedness to China.

The fifth chapter will be structured around the question of how the relatively large ethnic Chinese population in Suriname relates to Chinese direct investment in Suriname. To develop an opinion on this issue, information from different sources is used: news media,

academic literature and information collected through interviews I took in Suriname in January 2020. Also, will the recent development in the Sino-Surinamese trade balance be studied in this chapter. The effect that Chinese investments and loans have on Suriname's governance quality and economic development is more complex to investigate and lies mostly outside the scope of this thesis. The same counts for whether Chinese companies indeed see Suriname as a testing ground for a greater market in Latin America.

Based on the results of the above-mentioned studies it will be concluded whether Chinese activities in Suriname are exemplary of Chinese economic behaviour in developing countries or whether Suriname is a unique case.

By focusing on Latin America, and Suriname in particular, the research will address a significant gap in the relevant literature, which so far has concentrated mostly on China's activities in Africa. The case of Suriname is, in this case, particularly interesting for its relatively large ethnic Chinese population. Secondly, this research adds to the discussion on the relations between Suriname and the Netherlands. This relationship has politically and economically deteriorated since 2010 but remains emotionally strong due to the centuries of shared history and the fact that at least half of the original Surinamese population lives in the Netherlands. It is broadly felt that China now is taking over the special economic and diplomatic relationship with Suriname, which traditionally belonged to the Netherlands. The question for the Netherlands is whether it still sees a role for itself in Suriname's future and if it still can play this role if it stays idle.

2. CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

In order to understand the extent to which China's economic activities in Suriname compare to China's general economic activities in the third world, this chapter will investigate how China's foreign economic policy is illustrated within the academic world. Just as with most of its activities, China's activities in the Third World evoke many and passionate responses. This chapter will thus not give a singular academic vision, but rather highlight the main debates and the different arguments. The chapter starts with an introduction into Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) and China's position within this business field. The Belt and Road Initiative, China's all-encompassing foreign economic program will be treated next, followed by an examination of debt trap policy. The debates on China's economic relation with the third world in general, and Latin America specifically will finalise this chapter.

2.1 Chinese OFDI

It is assumed that investors will choose to invest in countries promising high returns. This consideration gains importance as investments once made are difficult to reverse and facilities for resource extraction tend to be immobile.⁵ FDI is generally seen as a positive attribution to a nation's economy as it provides capital, employment and often industrial advancement and growth of the local, skilled labour force. Potential host countries are thus eager to attract FDI and are in constant competition for this with other countries.

Looking on what countries attract most FDI, research shows that states with a democratic institutional design have in total received more FDI than those with other institutional designs.⁶ Scholars have been suggesting that the main reason for this is that the property rights are better protected in democracies as a result of to the judicial independence that stops governments from failing to honour completed deals.⁷ This stability is rewarded by investors, it seems, so it is fair to argue that investors are searching for reliability and predictability in a host country.

But it was only in 1999 that China ended the earlier ban on capital outflow and started encouraging OFDI. This made China a latecomer to international OFDI.⁸ Since 2000 China's OFDI has been constantly increasing and have been partly replacing OECD countries as sources of FDI. Interestingly though this is not the case when it comes to FDI in resource-rich

⁵ Nathan M. Jensen et al., *Politics and Foreign Direct Investment* (University of Michigan Press, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.3425019>.

⁶ Shima Elkomy, Hilary Ingham, and Robert Read, 'Economic and Political Determinants of the Effects of FDI on Growth in Transition and Developing Countries', *Thunderbird International Business Review* 58, no. 4 (2016): 347–62, <https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.21785>.

⁷ Mancur Olson, 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938736>.

⁸ Ilan Alon and Marc Fetscherin, *Chinese International Investments* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

countries.⁹ This has probably to do with the fact that facilities for resource extraction typically are immobile and related investments not easily un-done. It thus follows that China's latecomer status on the international resource market forces it to operate in less optimal business environments, not yet occupied by others. These less attractive business environments are associated with institutional designs ranking low in terms of institutional quality.

A deterrent factor for Chinese OFDI, however, is the fact that China is less sensitive to international pressure and embargoes. This allows Chinese firms to invest in countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, in which Western firms are discouraged to invest.

2.2 Belt and Road

Over the past years, Chinese OFDI have surged significantly and have continued to grow year on year. An accelerator for this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One Road, that was introduced in 2013 and is an attempt by China to revive the old Eurasian Silk Road and the maritime trading routes from China to Africa and Europe. Since the introduction, the inclusiveness of the BRI has been extended, however, and has become an inclusive term for all connectivity projects in which China is involved.

Although the name suggests a clear and well-defined initiative, there is still quite some confusion about what the exact means of the BRI project for the Chinese government are. At its inception what the initiative should encompass was fairly vague; the project seemed just a set of roads, railways and pipelines along what used to be the Silk Road. In March 2015 it became somewhat clearer when the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly published the Visions and Actions document on 'jointly building Silk Road economic belt and 21-st century maritime Silk Road.' In this document China's five main objectives for the initiative were presented: coordination of policy, facilitating connectivity, facilitating trade, deepening financial integration and increasing people-to-people exchanges between member states. In 2015 the Chinese government mentioned that the BRI project potentially would include 65 countries and almost 4,5 billion people.¹⁰

But as of October 2019, the BRI touches 138 countries, with the majority located in Asia, Africa and Europe, and in total accounting for 61 per cent of the world's population and amounting to 36 per cent of Gross World Product.¹¹ China's BRI is financed by Chinese state-owned banks, sovereign wealth funds, including the Silk Road Fund, and multilateral financial institutions, like the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is characterised by an array of hard infrastructure projects, such as the revitalisation of the deep-sea port of Gwadar

⁹ Shujie Yao and Pan Wang, 'Has China Displaced the Outward Investments of OECD Countries?', *China Economic Review* 28 (1 March 2014): 55–71, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2013.11.002>.

¹⁰ Gisela Grieger, 'One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's Regional Integration Initiative', Briefing (European Parliamentary Research Service, 7 July 2016), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2016\)586608](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586608).

¹¹ China Power Team, 'How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China's Interests?', *ChinaPower Project* (blog), 8 May 2017, <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

in Pakistan and the proposed Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje-Athens-Piraeus railroad line. The Chinese government is the biggest investor and has committed significant resources to the BRI. The BRI's grandiosity, but also its vague intentions, have captured global headlines and are subject of a contentious scholarly debate. One of the key issues at stake in this debate is whether the BRI is a market-enlarging endeavour or a critical geostrategic undertaking that is motivated by the Chinese Dream.

According to Tim Summers and several others, the BRI should be seen as a strategic attempt by China to secure new foreign markets for Chinese exports at a time when the end of the Chinese economic miracle comes in sight. For example, through enhanced access to Kazakhstan's emerging market as part of the China-Central Asia-West Economic Corridor, the BRI could be understood as a means for China to foster national economic prosperity. By drawing trading partners closer and helping them to strengthen their economies, China ultimately strengthens its own export opportunities.¹² This is the understanding of Sean Miner who believes the main purpose of the BRI to be helping state-owned enterprises (SOEs) increase their exports, and boost the internationalisation of the renminbi.¹³

William Callahan, and most Chinese language literature on the BRI, notes that the BRI is an expression of Chinese patriotic aspiration, with the aim to connect countries along the routes into a 'Sino-centric network of economic, political, cultural and security relations'.¹⁴ Zhou Weifeng adds that through an modern adaptation of the Silk Road, the long term plan of the Chinese government is to reduce the subdued frictions between itself and its neighbours, and, additionally, claim its role as the normative power in the region, effectively succeeding the United States.¹⁵ Interpreting the BRI just as an economic phenomenon runs the risk of missing the point that the economic elements of the BRI are motivated by China's geopolitical objectives. Its ultimate goal is the 'creation of an alternative world order,' says Nadège Rolland of the National Bureau of Asian Research.¹⁶

Since the initiation in 2013, the BRI has found itself under increasing criticism and not only from outside China. According to Yujun Feng, for example, a part of the Chinese population claims that the BRI is just a tool for the Chinese government to draw attention away

¹² Tim Summers, 'China's "New Silk Roads": Sub-National Regions and Networks of Global Political Economy', *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9 (1 September 2016): 1628–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415>.

¹³ Simeon Djankov and Sean Miner, eds., *China's Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and Challenges* (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2016).

¹⁴ William Callahan, 'China's "Asia Dream": The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional Order', *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1 (16 May 2016): 231, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891116647806>; William A. Callahan, 'China's Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order' (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), 2016), JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07951>.

¹⁵ Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban, 'Beyond Balancing: China's Approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative', *Journal of Contemporary China* 27, no. 112 (4 July 2018): 490, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1433476>.

¹⁶ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 'A China-Centric 21st Century', *Axios*, 2 May 2020, <https://www.axios.com/china-xi-jinping-world-power-ab889b35-b5de-4e9b-b6a4-95e1c0110773.html>.

from domestic concerns, like the lacking of an successful social safety net.¹⁷ Jacob Shapiro calls the BRI an ‘ill-defined mirage’ having, by 2017, produced more noise than results.¹⁸

2.3 Debt trap policy

The BRI and, with that, China’s foreign diplomatic and economic policy, has, furthermore, become central to debates on debt traps. The term ‘debt trap’ was introduced by the Indian publicist Brahma Chellaney, who used it to explain a form of diplomacy based on debts in a bilateral relationship between countries. In this relation, it is the intention of the lender to, in case that the borrower cannot repay its debts, reap economic and political benefits. A consequence of this motivation could be that the loans are designed in such a way, for example, through harsh terms and conditions, that the borrower will find problems repaying the debts. China has often been accused of practising debt trap diplomacy.¹⁹

The most well-known case of a Chinese debt trap is that of Sri Lanka. In preparation for his re-election campaign, Sri Lanka’s prime minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, asked China to expand the harbour of Hambantota. China granted this request and loaned Sri Lanka millions for the expansion works of the harbour (work executed by Chinese companies and labour). The harbour became active in 2010, but in 2018 the government of President Maithripala Sirisena, under Chinese pressure, was forced to hand over the harbour to a Chinese SOE, which received a lease for 99 years in exchange for Sri Lankan debt release.

Sri Lanka is the most commonly cited example of a Chinese debt trap, but Tajikistan also had to hand over 1158 square KM borderland in exchange for the release of an undisclosed debt. Montenegro received money, Chinese labour and construction material for the construction of a highway to Serbia, but halfway the construction has been halted as the debts could not be repaid. Also Pakistan was forced to halt ongoing Chinese projects due to lacking funds to repay the debts and have asked the IMF for a bailout. Angola has asked the IMF the same for a Chinese debt of \$23 billion.²⁰

These developments have made countries cautious over Chinese projects and Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal, for example, have recently cancelled or downsized planned investments funded by Chinese loans. According to the Centre for Global Development, next to Montenegro and Pakistan, the following countries will experience severe financial problems as they will be

¹⁷ Yujun Feng et al., ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing’, *Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy*, 4 August 2019, <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/04/08/belt-and-road-initiative-views-from-washington-moscow-and-beijing-pub-78774>.

¹⁸ Jacob L. Shapiro, ‘One Belt, One Road, No Dice’, *Geopolitical Futures* (blog), 12 January 2017, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/one-belt-one-road-no-dice/>.

¹⁹ ‘Is the BRI Debt Trap Real?’, *The ASEAN Post*, 12 November 2018, <https://theaseanpost.com/article/bri-debt-trap-real>.

²⁰ John Pomfret, ‘China’s Debt Traps around the World Are a Trademark of Its Imperialist Ambitions’, *Washington Post*, 27 August 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/27/chinas-debt-traps-around-the-world-are-a-trademark-of-its-imperialist-ambitions/>.

unable to repay their Chinese debts; Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia and Tajikistan.²¹

2.4 China and the developing world

Since the initiation of China's Going Out policy at the beginning of the millennium, China has been investing in its relationship with the Third World. The Going Out Policy has been regarded as a logical attempt by China to find new export markets, while at the same time attaining skills, advanced technologies and assets to assist its economy to move towards more advanced industry. At the same time, the policy was strongly linked to the country's industrialisation, as the demand for fuel, minerals and other primary materials skyrocketed. These materials were increasingly imported from commodity-rich but less-developed areas: Africa and Latin America.²² Between 2003 and 2006 China's OFDI increased from \$1.8 billion to \$16.1 billion, with half of these investments in natural resource industries.²³

In its relationship with Africa, China used its self-acclaimed title of 'the largest developing country in the world' and the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, founded in 2000, to get closer to Africa. Since then Chinese investments have spread across different regions in Africa and in all sectors, ranging from telecom to food processing. Next to the economic footprint on Africa, there is also a broad array of Chinese activities in Africa aimed at image-building. The fifty-four Confucius Institutes that the Chinese government has set up in Africa for the promotion of Chinese language is a good example of this cultural diplomacy. The fact that 40 out of Africa's 54 officially recognised countries signed up for the BRI underlines that China's soft power efforts in Africa bear fruit.

These investments have become central to an increasingly polarising complementarity-dependency debate in the popular press and in academic scholarship. The discussion is divided into two broad sides: one portraying China as a threat to the economic development and political stability of developing countries, the other as a benevolent development partner.²⁴

Those who see China's involvement in the developing world as a threat for the countries development generally focus themselves around three main arguments.

²¹ John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, 'Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective' (Center for Global Development, 3 April 2018), 11, <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-a-policy-perspective>.

²² Paola Bellabona and Francesca Spigarelli, 'Moving from Open Door to Go Global: China Goes on the World Stage', *International Journal of Chinese Culture and Management* 1, no. 1 (1 January 2007): 93–107, <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJCCM.2007.016170>.

²³ Raymond Lotta, 'China's Rise in the World Economy', *Economic and Political Weekly* 44, no. 8 (2009): 32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/40278526>.

²⁴ Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (Zed Books, 2012), 111.

At first they argue that Sino-African relations have become a win-lose situation, with China becoming a practitioner of neo-colonialism in Africa.²⁵ Moises Naim, for example, denounces China of offering non-democratic and non-transparent development aid to Africa which stifles real progress and hurt average citizens.²⁶ Criticism from this corner also includes the concern that China is luring African countries into a debt trap. A given example for this is the railway line connecting Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti. This project is financed through Chinese BRI loans, but already costed the Ethiopian government nearly a quarter of its budget for 2016 and continues to be a heavy financial burden on the country, even after it was renegotiated that parts of the project have come under (temporary) Chinese ownership.²⁷

Secondly, various scholars argue that China's growing economic ties with developing countries is reinforcing their dependency on the export of natural resources as a source of income, thereby preventing them from pursuing the economic diversification necessary to promote long-term sustainable development. Mark Langan, for instance, draws on experiences of Chinese investments in Zambia and Angola to show how China rapidly became the country's most important export location for their raw materials. China, in return, used the consequential dependence on their investments to boost export of a wide range from textiles to high tech products to African markets. As a result, cheap Chinese imports are displacing local products, undermining local African manufacturing industries.²⁸ According to Coxhead similar dynamics are visible in Southeast Asia, where, due to the combined effects of China's export boom and its demand for primary products, several countries are experiencing a reconfiguration of their economies favouring low-skill manufacturing and natural resource extraction to the detriment of high value-added production.²⁹

A third argument provided by critics of China's economic impact is that China's investment in developing countries' extractive industries has an indirect negative impact on good governance. Naim claims this to be a result of China providing aid without requiring any human rights or good governance policy reforms in return. By doing this, China is undermining the efforts of other development agencies to promote these values.³⁰ This argument is supported by Raphael Kaplinski, who bases his hypothesis on case studies on the results on governance

²⁵ 'Clinton Warns Africa of China's Economic Embrace', *Reuters*, 10 June 2011, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa-idUSTRE75962920110610>.

²⁶ Moises Naim, 'Rogue Aid', *Foreign Policy* (blog), 15 October 2009, 95, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/>.

²⁷ Wade Shepard, 'What China Is Really Up To In Africa', *Forbes*, 10 March 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/>.

²⁸ Mark Langan, *Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of 'Development' in Africa*, Contemporary African Political Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 90–94, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58571-0>.

²⁹ Ian Coxhead, 'A New Resource Curse? Impacts of China's Boom on Comparative Advantage and Resource Dependence in Southeast Asia', *World Development* 35, no. 7 (2007): 1099–1119, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.10.012>.

³⁰ Naim, 'Rogue Aid'.

of Chinese aid in Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe.³¹ Richard Manning, moreover, argues that non-conditional aid and loans could not only delay reforms, but also present the risk that current ‘poor standards of governance and accountability’ are strengthened.³² Gernot Pehnelt, a scholar who, overall, maintains a relatively sympathetic account of China’s behaviour in Africa, also accepts this criticism, though be it out of necessity for China. For where China is a latecomer to international commodity markets, it has fewer options for investments and, thus, cannot afford to discriminate amongst its potential clients on the basis of humanitarian concerns.³³

But next to the fierce academic criticism of Chinese activities in developing countries, many other scholars are on the side of current Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s who claims that Chinese investment helps Africa potentially more in its development than traditional Western aid does.³⁴ Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Lin maintain for instance, that China’s investments in rural infrastructure Africa will, in the long term, be vital for Africa’s further development and facilitate increased economic integration among African countries which shall stimulate the exchange of information, goods and services in the region.³⁵ Jeremy Kelley adds that Chinese investment in infrastructure and the modernising of African industry potentially will kick-start African economic growth and help African countries out of the ‘resource curse’ and into a phase of sustainable development.³⁶

Scholars on this side of the debate disagree with accounts that portray China as pursuing a network of Chinese manufacture-dependent countries in the Third World. For Deborah Brautigam, one of the leading experts on Sino-African relations, the economic pressure that results from China’s manufacturing exports to Africa is compensated by Chinese investment into local industries and the resulting employment for local workers.³⁷ Su, Wei and Tao base themselves on economic data of 135 developing countries covering the period 1995-2007 to

³¹ Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, ‘The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa’, *Institute of Development Studies*, ISD working papers, no. 291 (2007), <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/the-impact-of-china-on-sub-saharan-africa/>.

³² Richard Manning, ‘Will “Emerging Donors” Change the Face of International Co-Operation?’, *Development Policy Review* 24, no. 4 (2006): 381, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2006.00330.x>.

³³ Gernot Pehnelt, ‘The Political Economy of China’s Aid Policy in Africa’, *Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Jena Economic Research Papers*, 1 January 2007, 8, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1022868>.

³⁴ Paul Kagame, ‘Why Africa Welcomes the Chinese | Paul Kagame’, *The Guardian*, 2 November 2009, sec. Opinion, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west>.

³⁵ Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Yifu Lin, eds., *China-Africa and an Economic Transformation* (OUP Oxford, 2019), 160.

³⁶ Jeremy Kelley, ‘China in Africa: Curing the Resource Curse with Infrastructure and Modernization’, *Sustainable Development Law & Policy* 12, no. 3 (4 April 2013): 41, <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol12/iss3/8>.

³⁷ Brautigam, *The Dragon’s Gift*, 308.

conclude that there is no evidence of a link between an increase in China's economic presence and a decline in economic growth and manufacturing.³⁸

As for the criticism that China's unconditional loans have a negative impact on good governance, scholars at this end of the spectrum usually bring up that traditional 'Western' donors themselves neither have a very impressive record with their aid flows to Africa. Miwa Hirono and Shogo Suzuki, for example, cite the unsatisfactory results of Western aid programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. They show that despite an annual aid flow of approximately fifty billion dollars, the area still houses 27 of the 28 poorest countries in the world and that the poverty rate has hardly improved.³⁹ Ngaire Woods adds that China's rise as a major aid donor is partly fuelled by developing countries' disappointment with the complicated and counterproductive governance conditions Western donors attach to their aid. She adds that where the West regularly changes its development advice, programs and approach in Africa, China's aid is more welcome as China does not claim to know what developing countries must do to develop and leaves governance to local leaders.⁴⁰

2.5 China and Latin America

Whereas China's relationships with African countries are relatively intimate on a political level, it seems that its relationships with Latin American countries are more focussed on the economic and commercial levels. While China has been providing development assistance to Latin America since the 1960s, until recently it was relatively insignificant, limited to a few countries and ideologically driven.⁴¹ Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, financial and economic ties have expanded at considerable speed. China's economic boom has increased its demand for raw materials, such as oil, copper and soybeans, as well as for markets for its manufactured goods, both of which Latin America has been able to provide. Therefore, while there are various other dimensions to China's current relations with Latin America, for instance China's desire to increase its geopolitical influence and its ideological ties to countries such as Venezuela, their deepening relationship is driven mainly by economic

³⁸ Fubing Su, Guoxue Wei, and Ran Tao, 'China and Natural Resource Curse in Developing Countries: Empirical Evidence from a Cross-Country Study', *China & World Economy* 24, no. 1 (2016): 33, <https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12142>.

³⁹ Miwa Hirono and Shogo Suzuki, 'Why Do We Need "Myth-Busting" in the Study of Sino-African Relations?', *Journal of Contemporary China* 23 (17 December 2014): 460, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.843889>.

⁴⁰ Ngaire Woods, 'Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance', *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2008): 1217, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x>.

⁴¹ See Xiangming Chen and Ivan Su, 'A Different Global Power? Understanding China's Role in the Developing World |', *The European Financial Review*, 19 June 2014, <https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/a-different-global-power-understanding-chinas-role-in-the-developing-world/>; Jörn Dosch and David S. G. Goodman, 'China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalisation', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 41, no. 1 (1 March 2012): 3–19, <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100101>.

concerns.⁴² China's economic ties with the region consist mainly of trade, investment and loans.

The literature on China's economic relations with Latin America can be divided along the same lines as the literature on its relationship with the developing world in general, with China portrayed as either a development partner or an exploitative power.

Different scholars provide a negative account on China's economic activities in the continent by presenting China's strategy for the region as exploitative and mercantile, which will push Latin American countries into increased dependency and harm local economic development.⁴³ Rhys Jenkins notes that Sino – Latin American trade are highly asymmetrical and force the Latin American countries into the same periphery status that has undermined the region's development for centuries. Eric Farnsworth adds that China's mercantilist strategy in the region threatens the manufacturing sectors of countries like Mexico. Besides, he notes, are Chinese loans decreasing the potential of Western nations to promote principles as labour and environmental protection, human rights and the rule of law in Latin America.⁴⁴

Stephen Kaplan, instead, maintains that China's non-conditional lending allows Latin American governments to increase their policy flexibility as governments are no longer limited by the traditional budget constraints normally imposed by the IMF and global markets. Expanded fiscal autonomy would particularly benefit leftist governments, as with fiscal stimulus they would be able to provide greater employment, higher wages and social benefits for their citizens, which would profit their economies in the long-term.⁴⁵ Also Kevin Gallagher et al. argue that Chinese loans benefit Latin America's long-term economic development as these loans tend to focus on industrial investments and infrastructure projects and not the latest Western development trends.⁴⁶

2.6 Conclusion

China's relationship with the developing world has generated considerable academic debate. A generally accepted observation is that, when it comes to foreign investment, and especially with the purpose of accessing resources, China is a latecomer and consequently is forced to focus on second choice and dubious locations for its investments. For China, this is

⁴² Matt Ferchen, 'China's Latin American Interests', *Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy*, 4 June 2012, <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests-pub-47759>.

⁴³ Rhys Jenkins, 'Latin America and China—a New Dependency?', *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 7 (1 August 2012): 1337–58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.691834>.

⁴⁴ Eric Farnsworth, 'The New Mercantilism: China's Emerging Role in the Americas', *American Society - Council of the Americas*, 31 January 2011, <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/new-mercantilism-chinas-emerging-role-americas>.

⁴⁵ Kaplan, 'Banking Unconditionally', 2.

⁴⁶ Kevin P. Gallegher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, 'The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America' (Inter-American Dialogue, 2012), 1, <https://www.bu.edu/pardee/research/global-economic-governance-2/emerging-market-and-developing-countries/chinas-global-reach/chinas-global-reach-finance-and-investment/the-new-banks-in-town-chinese-finance-in-latin-america/>.

might be less problematic than for traditional ‘Western’ investors as China is less sensitive to international embargoes and considerations related to human rights.

The more heavily-debated characteristics of China’s economic relations with the developing world can be summarised by the following four claims: China’s investment in the developing world is not purely economic and also has a diplomatic purpose; China consciously lures countries into debt traps for its own economic and political benefits; Chinese loans have a bad influence on local industrialisation and governance; and, lastly, a considerable part of Chinese investments are aimed at developing new export markets for Chinese goods. Each of these four claims is intensely debated within the academic world and has its supporters and opponents.

The following chapter will track whether the same observations described here are discoverable in the literature on China’s economic activities in Suriname.

3. CHINA IN SURINAME: HISTORY AND DEBATE

In the previous chapter the academic debate on China's economic activities in the developing world has been discussed. This chapter will look into the debate regarding China's economic relations with Suriname, with the purpose of determining what similarities and difference there are between these and China's general economic activities in the developing world. The fact that Suriname has a long history with China and hosts a substantial ethnic Chinese population, might be of significance to the current Sino-Surinamese relationship. For this reason, this chapter will start with a historic overview of these relations, before the debate on Suriname's current economic relations with China is treated.

3.1 Historic relations: Suriname and China

Suriname is located on the north-eastern shore of the Latin American continent. Although the country is approximately five times the size of the Netherlands, the population is significantly smaller, with some 540.000 people living in Suriname. The sheer majority (about 90%) of the Surinamese people live in the northern coastal region of the country, with most of them in or around the capital, Paramaribo. Culturally, Suriname is considered a Caribbean country, with Dutch as its official language, but English is also often spoken, and many Surinamese citizens speak Sranan Tongo, an English-based Creole language. The people of Suriname have very diverse backgrounds, with multiple ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups.

The diversity and heterogeneity among citizens in Suriname has a long history. In the pre-colonial period, the country already accommodated multiple civilizations of Amerindian groups. The first European encounter with Suriname was in 1499 when Spain landed there, but it soon focussed its attention on other regions. From that time on European traders incidentally traded with the local peoples of Suriname, and, in 1651, England claimed dominion over Suriname. After the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667), the English exchanged Suriname for Nieuw-Nederland (today known as New York) with the Dutch and so, in 1667, Suriname became a colony of the Netherlands.⁴⁷

The Dutch established a plantation economy in Suriname, which depended on forced labour performed by African slaves. In the period 1680-1780, the number of plantations in Suriname grew from 200 to 591, and the slave population from 2,800 to 53,000 persons. From 1780 the number of slaves remained somewhat constant up to the early nineteenth century. When, on 1 July 1863, slavery was abolished in Suriname, about 35,000 persons of African

⁴⁷ Hans Buddingh', *De geschiedenis van Suriname*, [4e, herz. en geactualiseerde ed.] (Amsterdam]: Nieuw Amsterdam/NRC Boeken, 2012), 20.

descent were released from slavery. The exact total number of Africans that were forced to migrate to Suriname remains unknown.⁴⁸

After the abolition of slavery, there was a lack of workers on the plantations. The Dutch Government then started to import large numbers of Asian contract workers to replace slave labour on the plantations. Between 1863 and 1875, some 2,600 Chinese indentured labourers arrived in Suriname. As no return passage was included in Surinamese indenture contracts, only a mere 0.1 per cent were estimated to have made the passage back.

In addition to the Chinese the Dutch colonial government recruited large numbers of contract labourers in former British India and in its own colony of Java. Between 1863 and 1945 more than 34,000 British Indians and almost 33,000 Javanese arrived in Suriname, of which only a small number returned.⁴⁹

The Chinese were, according to some sources, not very suitable for working on plantations, as they were always in search for an opportunity to quit plantation work and start their own businesses, often as a shop-owner.⁵⁰ From 1883 the first Chinese voluntary migrants came to Suriname. Some of these were contract workers, but many others came to join the businesses of already established friends or family.⁵¹ It was thus, as a consequence of Dutch labour policy, that, from the second half of the 19th century, an ethnic Chinese population emerged in Surinamese society.

Between the end of World War II and 1992, which marked the end of Suriname's Interior War, migration figures were low compared to the preceding and following periods. Reasons for this were the uncertain socioeconomic and political outlook that surrounded Suriname's independence (1975) and the period of political instability that lasted from 1980 to 1992 and escalated into the Interior War (1986–1992), an armed conflict between Maroon guerrilla groups and the military government. After the re-establishment of democracy and peace in 1992, increasing numbers of migrants came to Suriname. Figure 1 shows that a notable percentage of these were Chinese, especially when considering that most of the immigrants from Guyana and Netherlands were returnees of Surinamese origin.⁵²

⁴⁸ Marieke Heemskerk and Celine Duijves, 'Suriname Migration Profile: A Study on Emigration from, and Immigration into Suriname' (International Organization for Migration, October 2014), 17, <https://publications.iom.int/books/suriname-migration-profile-study-emigration-and-immigration-suriname>.


⁴⁹ Heemskerk and Duijves, 19.

⁵⁰ G. C. Zijlmans and H. A. Enser, *De Chinezen in Suriname: een geschiedenis van immigratie en aanpassing, 1853-2000* (Barendrecht: Batavia Publishing, 2002), 48–49.

⁵¹ Zijlmans and Enser, 44.

⁵² Heemskerk and Duijves, 'Suriname Migration Profile: A Study on Emigration from, and Immigration into Suriname', 21.

Figure 1: Migration into Suriname by country of origin; 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013



(Source: Suriname Migration Profile (International Organization for Migration, October 2014))

Although Suriname’s informal relationship with China dates back to the nineteenth century, diplomatic relations between Suriname and China started in 1976, within a year of Suriname’s independence. In 1977 China opened an embassy in Paramaribo. In the first several years the relationship between both countries was rather inactive, but, from the 1990s onwards, this changed and various agreements were signed, and plans made. An important milestone was the visit of then Surinamese President Jules Wijdenbosch to China in 1998. Here he met China’s President Jiang Zemin and the two countries signed the first trade agreement, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation and a first framework agreement on China providing Suriname a preferential loan.⁵³ Since then the relations between both countries has become ever tighter, to the extent that Surinamese president Bouterse claimed in 2016 that China is Suriname’s most important development partner.⁵⁴

One of the developments that has enabled China to develop such an important role in Suriname is the deterioration of Suriname’s relationship with the Netherlands. Since the independence of Suriname, the country had maintained the strongest diplomatic relations with the Netherlands who, as Suriname’s former coloniser, also provided Suriname with aid and preferential loans. But the relation changed when, in 2010, the party of Desi Bouterse won the Surinamese elections and Bouterse succeeded Ronald Venetiaan as Surinamese president.

⁵³ P. B. Tjon Sie Fat, ‘Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname’, in *Migration in China and Asia: Experience and Policy*, ed. Jijiao Zhang and Howard Duncan, International Perspectives on Migration (Springer Netherlands, 2014), 198, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8759-8>.

⁵⁴ ‘Bouterse: China Is Onze Belangrijkste Ontwikkelingspartner’, *Starnieuws*, 9 April 2016, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/34676>.

Venitiaan had a lot of support in the Netherlands and maintained strong relations with Suriname's former coloniser. Bouterse, on the other hand, is controversial, as he had been sentenced (in absentia) to eleven years in prison in the Netherlands for drug trafficking and, besides, is the main suspect in the December murder trial. The presidency of Bouterse has chilled the relations with the Netherlands. The latter decided to end its financial streams to Suriname and not to pay the remaining €20 m of the treaty resources it owes to Suriname as agreed on Suriname's independence.⁵⁵ Since then the Surinamese government, led by Bouterse, has distanced itself from the Netherlands and focussed instead on relations with Latin American countries and organisations, and with China.⁵⁶

3.2 Recent Chinese economic activities in Suriname

Being a relatively unknown and small Latin American country, Suriname is not often the subject of international academic research, and, thus, are there just a few academic sources on the economic relations between China and Suriname.

In 2012, Evan Ellis claimed that the Chinese presence in Suriname followed a different path than that in African and other Latin American countries. This is because, on the one hand, as in few other countries the ethnic Chinese community plays such a significant a role in the local economy, participating as the 'local' partner in investment projects with Chinese companies. But, on the other hand, he claims that China's investments in Suriname's primary product sector and its sales of manufactured products to the country have been modest and Chinese investments in mineral fields are also comparably limited thus far. Moreover, Chinese loan-backed construction work has not advanced as rapidly as assumed by some.⁵⁷

In a 2015 article in the Guardian, Nicolas Bourcier describes how the 2015 withdrawal announcement of US aluminium giant Alcoa from Suriname happened at the same time as the Chinese turnkey homes and offices construction company Broad's investment in Suriname.⁵⁸ Bourcier insinuated that both developments are typical of the way the Surinamese economy is heading: a shift in focus from the American/ Western economy towards the Chinese. The fact that Suriname's President Desi Bouterse attended the official opening of Broad Homes he notes as significant, as well as the fact that President Xi Jinping has encouraged Chinese enterprises to invest in Suriname.⁵⁹ He further reinforces his argument by listing that the Chinese have set up hundreds of companies, casinos and restaurants, asphalted roads, and built social housing.

⁵⁵ Ivo Evers, 'Cynisme heerst over hulp Nederland aan Suriname', *Trouw*, 8 August 2011, sec. voorpagina, <https://www.trouw.nl/gs-b1aab6cb>.

⁵⁶ Nicolas Bourcier, 'China Finds an Eager South American Stablemate in Suriname', *The Guardian*, 23 June 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/23/suriname-china-business-influence>.

⁵⁷ R. Evan Ellis, 'Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration, and Less-Told Stories of Globalization', *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 2 (23 December 2012): 85–97, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2012.0026>.

⁵⁸ 'Alcoa to Curtail Remaining Suralco Refining Capacity', *Alcoa Online Newsroom* (blog), 14 September 2015, <https://news.alcoa.com/press-release/alcoa-curtail-remaining-suralco-refining-capacity>.

⁵⁹ Emma Gonzales, 'Broad Homes Opens Overseas Site with Production Base in Suriname', *China Daily*, 31 March 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2015-03/31/content_19957790.htm.

Moreover, he writes that Chinese nationals are estimated to control around 90% of the country's supermarkets, have a Mandarin tv channel and have opened two banks. He also mentioned that immigration of Chinese nationals to Suriname increased substantially since the late-1990s, with estimations of about 10,000 additions to the existing Chinese community. This noteworthy Chinese community would make Suriname an ideal testing ground for Chinese ambitions in Latin America.⁶⁰

But Chinese dominance within the Surinamese retail sector is not an exclusively recent development, but instead has a long and rich history. As shown above, Suriname has hosted a Chinese ethnic minority for over 160 years, and soon after their arrival to Suriname these ethnic Chinese started to play an important role in the retail sector. Due to the link between the retail, trade-based, ethnic-ownership economy and chain migration Chinese ethnicity remains a constant and visible presence in Suriname.

For many decades Chinese chain migration consisted of Chinese nationals from South East China. These immigrants mostly moved to Suriname to join a Surinamese business established by relatives. In Suriname they arrived in an ethnically Chinese society with cultural similarities to their home region. These group, which broadly includes the Chinese immigrants from the 19th century up until the 1980s, are known in Suriname as 'Old Chinese'. From the 1980s and especially since the 1990s, a new wave of Chinese immigration arose as a product of globalisation. These Chinese immigrants came from districts all throughout China and are seen as different from the already present Chinese in Suriname. These new migrants are referred to as 'New Chinese'.⁶¹

Paul Tjon Sie Fat, a scholar with expertise on the subject of Chinese migrants in Suriname, states that both the Old and the New Chinese immigrants took to Suriname in response to social pressure to leave their hometown to improve one's standard of living and increase the wealth and status of one's relatives back home. For both groups the migration strategy is based on chain migration linked to a Chinese ethnic-ownership economy based on retail trade. But whereas the Old Chinese successfully adapted to the Surinamese culture this is less the case for the New Chinese. Tjon Sie Fat writes that, partly due to the unwillingness to assimilate, the New Chinese Migrants in Suriname have become a symbol of the threat of Chinese global rise. This is the same case in other developing nations, especially when this migration happens synchronously to increased practices of local Chinese economic activities and resource extraction. But where Old Chinese are linked to Suriname and New Chinese to China and transnational entrepreneurship both have arranged themselves in similar social organisations in Suriname. New Chinese have copied the 'old' Chinese practice of Chinese formal organisation. Currently, there are several old and new Chinese organisations in

⁶⁰ Bourcier, 'China Finds an Eager South American Stablemate in Suriname'.

⁶¹ Ranu Abhelakh, Paul Tjon Sie Fat, and Edward Troon, *Beyond the Shopkeeper's Counter; Images of Chinese Life in Suriname* (Paramaribo: self-published, 2013), 15.

Suriname. Both old and new Chinese organisations were typically founded by successful businessman as a tool to promote their business interests politically, but, additionally, new Chinese organisations position themselves as a platform for diplomacy between the Surinamese state and representatives of the Chinese state. The most important aspect of Chinese organisations in Suriname is, however, the rotated savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) model⁶² that helps members of the organisation to gain credit for their business activities.⁶³

The relations between the Chinese embassy in Paramaribo and the Chinese of Suriname was limited after the opening of the embassy in 1975, as the embassy primarily focussed on keeping Suriname for its One China cause. This changed in the 1980s when overseas Chinese investments were promoted by the Chinese government and the Chinese embassy in Suriname had to connect with the ‘Chinese diaspora’ to promote and realise such Chinese OFDI. In the 1990s, the role of the Chinese embassy became more focussed on representing an emerging superpower with local geopolitical ambitions, whilst also increasingly positioning themselves as an alternative source of development aid. From this period on the Chinese embassy would start to actively demand support from the local, Chinese organisations. The Chinese state now dominates the image of China in Suriname. The Chinese embassy, as an example, donated funds and machinery to the privately-run Chinese newspapers and demanded editorial input in return. To extend the control of the image of China in Suriname a Confucius Institute was founded at the Anton de Kom University to promote Mandarin as a language and promote positive views on Chinese politics and history.⁶⁴ In 2018 Suriname signed a memorandum of understanding with China in which it expressed support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.⁶⁵

Recently the (predominantly Dutch) media has given more attention to Suriname’s economic relations with China. In an extensive report in the Dutch newspaper, *NRC*, journalist Nina Jurja writes how China has become Suriname’s closest political-economic ally, through loans, gifts and investments in Suriname. She further describes how the Chinese presence can be felt everywhere in Suriname. The local Surinamese retail trade hardly exists anymore, as 90% of all supermarkets are run by Chinese people. Besides, parts of Paramaribo’s centre are covered by advanced cameras, a gift from China to help Suriname fight crime in its capital.⁶⁶

⁶² ROSCAs are basically groups of people who periodically meet in order to organize informal micro-financing. ROSCAs are based on trust, and in their simplest form participants contribute a fixed sum of money at each session, to be collected by one member in a predetermined order at every meeting (hence ‘rotating’). Chinese ROSCAs in Suriname are informal (savings and borrowing are untaxed), but may involve substantial sums of foreign currency. The ROSCAs are organized as ‘bidding associations’, meaning that participants anonymously bid for the highest ‘interest’ they would pay on a loan from the ROSCA fund. Surinamese Chinese describe they ‘visit’ or contact a Chinese organization for specific reasons, and therefore would be more accurately described as clients than members (Tjon Sie Fat (2014)).

⁶³ Tjon Sie Fat, ‘Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname’, 192.

⁶⁴ Tjon Sie Fat, 199.

⁶⁵ ‘Suriname Ondersteunt OBOR-Initiatief China’, *Starnieuws*, 26 May 2018, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/47211>.

⁶⁶ Jurna, ‘Suriname ruilt de oude Nederlandse kolonisator in voor suikeroom China’.

3.3 Concerns about Suriname's relation with China.

Within the Surinamese and Dutch media, the increasing Chinese economic involvement in Suriname is met mostly with scepticism. The main concern of different observers is that Suriname will fall victim to a Chinese debt trap. Surinamese economist Winston Ramautarsing notes that halfway through 2019 almost 20% of Suriname's official debt consisted of Chinese loans and that Suriname does not demonstrate the economic growth necessary to repay these loans. When Suriname will, indeed, become unable to repay China, he fears that China would like to be compensated with something else, like Suriname's minerals or even parts of the forest.⁶⁷ Also Rob de Wijk and Arend Jan Boekestijn believe that China tries to make Suriname dependent on China through loans with conditions that make them difficult to pay off, which will entitle China to Suriname's riches, such as gold, minerals and wood. Besides, there are suggestions that Telesur, Suriname's telecom provider, has already been used as a guarantee for one of the Chinese loans to Suriname.⁶⁸

August Boldewijn, a Surinamese public administration expert, shares the fears of Suriname entering a Chinese debt trap, but is, further, afraid that the projects for which the Chinese loans are used will not benefit Suriname's economy. He notes that there have been many such Chinese projects in Suriname, like the Chinese asphaltting of hundreds of kilometres of Surinamese roads, to install broadband internet by Huawei, and the installation of 300 Chinese cameras for controlling Paramaribo. Boldewijn notes that much of the work of these projects is done by Chinese migration workers and that the only Surinamese contribution is money, which is borrowed from China.⁶⁹

Ramautarsing additionally mentions that, for China, small countries like Suriname are of interest as it is easy to influence them with limited funds, for instance to elicit support for a vote in the United Nations.⁷⁰ De Wijk and Boekestijn share this opinion and, moreover, claim that China also tries to establish its influence in Suriname through the retail sector in Suriname. They suggest that the fact that the majority of the supermarkets in Suriname are run by Chinese is a result of a conscious strategy from Beijing.

Not everyone shares this pessimism. Lloyd Pinas, a Surinamese specialist on China, believes, for example, that Suriname's prime interest to China is its favourable location. Because of this Suriname could act as the Chinese starting point for a grander regional market

⁶⁷ Original Dutch quote: „Voor China zijn kleine landen juist interessant. Er is makkelijk steun te vinden voor een stem in de Verenigde Naties en je kunt snel invloed uitoefenen. Er is ruimte, er zijn mogelijkheden en je kunt hier snel een belangrijke rol spelen”

⁶⁸ Arend Jan Boekestijn, Rob de Wijk, and Hugo Reitsma, 'De Nieuwe Kolonisatie van Suriname', Boekestijn En de Wijk, n.d., <https://www.bnr.nl/podcast/boekestijn-en-de-wijk/10383094/de-nieuwe-kolonisatie-van-suriname>.

⁶⁹ Jean Dohmen, 'Suriname Verdrinkt in Chinese Schuld', *Het Financieele Dagblad*, 18 December 2019, sec. Vooruitzicht.

⁷⁰ Original Dutch quote: „Voor China zijn kleine landen juist interessant. Er is makkelijk steun te vinden voor een stem in de Verenigde Naties en je kunt snel invloed uitoefenen. Er is ruimte, er zijn mogelijkheden en je kunt hier snel een belangrijke rol spelen”

outlet in Latin America. He feels that Suriname should not be worried about Chinese negative intentions if Suriname cannot repay its debt.¹

Current Chinese ambassador to Suriname, Liu Quan, is actively fighting the accusations that China is luring developing countries into a debt trap. In December 2019 he published an extensive article in the Surinamese newspaper *Times of Suriname* in which he explained that China is investing much in developing countries like Suriname for ‘.. the common bottlenecks of many underdeveloped countries are insufficient industrial production capacity, lack of independent development capacity, undeveloped infrastructure, and financing difficulties. China itself was once confronted with these same problems, therefore we understand the needs of these developing countries.’

He emphasises that China fully respects the wishes of the receiving countries and their people and does not attach political strings to their aid. He then mentions that financial support for infrastructure always happens upon the request of the receiving country and only happens after ‘rigorous feasibility studies and market research’ have insured that the investments will deliver the expected economic and social benefits. He then writes that, ‘It is irresponsible and futile that some biased people deliberately ignore these facts and fabricate so called "debt trap" with Chinese concessional loans to developing countries.’⁷¹

3.4 Conclusion

Chinese presence is clearly notable in Suriname, as the country homes a relatively large ethnic Chinese community and because of the hundreds of supermarkets, restaurants, asphalted roads, building projects and other economic and cultural activities run by ethnic Chinese. The increased Chinese activities in Suriname are in line with the observations from the previous chapter. These pointed out that China is forced to invest in alternative regions to secure resources, and that China indeed invests in these regions, either through loans or FDI, to gain both access to resources as diplomatic influence.

Most observers feel that China uses the supply of loans to draw Suriname into dependency. They mention that the Netherlands’ withdrawal of aid in 2010 left Suriname in dire need of money and consequently Suriname found China as a credit supplier but had to accept the harsh conditions attached to Chinese loans. They foresee difficulties for Suriname to repay the loans and fear other demands by China in lieu of default, resulting in Suriname having to forfeit resources or even land to China. In other words, a debt trap policy is feared, just like observers treated in the previous chapter do.

The increasing influence that China holds over Suriname due to the latter’s indebtedness to China is, according to some, created to encourage or compel voter support in the United Nations and diplomatic support for China’s causes. Also, some feel, Suriname, due

⁷¹ Quan Liu, ‘Building a Community of a Shared Future for Mankind and Creating a New Era of Chinese-Surinames Relations’, *Times of Suriname*, 12 March 2018, <http://sr.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgxyw/t1605657.htm>.

to its favourable location, could act as a starting point for a regional market outlet in Latin America for Chinese products. Chinese investments in Suriname, would thus have the purpose to create new export markets, a practice in line with one of the other main observations of the precious chapter.

As for developing countries generally, there are doubts about how the Surinamese economy will benefit from Chinese loans and investment. Some have posed a new observation by arguing that Chinese dominance in the Surinamese retail sector is a result of a deliberate strategy from Beijing to exercise influence in the country. But this is a minority and overall all observations on Chinese economic activities in Suriname are in line those of chapter 2, albeit safe for influence of the long established ethnic Chinese population in Suriname. To what extent these observations can be backed by data from primary sources will be the focus of the next two chapters.

4. CHINESE LOANS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

As illustrated in the previous chapters, one of the fiercest criticisms of Chinese foreign economic policy is that it lures developing countries into debt dependency by supplying them loans with terms and conditions that will make it challenging for borrowers to repay the loans by themselves. Poor countries are signing these loans as they often have few other choices due their low creditworthiness. Low credit scores are common in developing countries and make it impossible to borrow money from many regular sources. The resulting debt dependency could then be used by China in its pursuit of economic and diplomatic goals.

The goal of this chapter is to find out whether the above-noted claims can be supported by data analysis and primary sources on Suriname's lending from China. By using four datasets the aim is to answer: *To what extent does data on Suriname and Latin America support claims that the terms and conditions of Chinese loans are tougher than that of other lenders and that there is a relationship between Chinese loans, creditworthiness and support for China's diplomatic standpoints.*

Responding to the above question poses certain challenges, especially as suitable data on the subject is not for the easy taking. China has no tradition in transparency, and, unlike most Western countries, it does not report all of its foreign aid and lending to the IMF, Worldbank or the Bank of International Settlements. Suriname, on the other hand, is a small, developing country with few resources and relatively weak institutions. Statistics from Suriname are, therefore, scarcer than from other countries and less trustworthy. As different other Latin American countries experience comparable situations to Suriname, information from these is also not always readily available.

Fortunately, the research lab AidData has developed a database on Chinese foreign aid and grants and made this publicly available.⁷² By combining data from this source with datasets of United Nations General Assembly voting data and official credit rating data, it is, nonetheless, possible to formulate an answer on the chapter's central question, which is structured around the following three sub-questions;

1. Do Latin American countries with a lower creditworthiness have more Chinese debts relative to GDP than those with a higher creditworthiness?

⁷² Axel Dreher et al., 'Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46.' (AidData, 2017); This database is developed by AidData, a research lab at William & Mary's Global Research Institute, and is based on hundreds of primary sources to identify Chinese foreign loans and grants to 140 recipient countries between 2000 and 2014. Transactions only enter the final dataset after intensive crosschecking. AidData has been able to identify 1200 Chinese loans and more than 2300 grants amounting to a total of 280 billion USD in Chinese official commitments. AidData does not claim the Chinese Official Finance Database to be complete, but is likely the most comprehensive source on Chinese foreign official finance and used for several other academic research papers. See e.g.; Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 'China's Overseas Lending' For this reason it seems to be a suitable source for this research. .

2. Are the terms and conditions of Chinese loans to Suriname less favourable than those of loans from other countries and organisations to Suriname?
3. Are Latin American countries with higher Chinese debts relative to GDP more supportive of Chinese diplomatic stances than those with lower Chinese debts?

4.1 Chinese loans and creditworthiness

The theory suggests that countries with lower creditworthiness are more drawn to China for loans than countries with a higher credit rating. The logic behind this is that a lower creditworthiness gives countries fewer options for taking loans, as many lenders are not willing to take the risk to lend money to a country which is less likely to pay back the amount in full.⁷³ China would, on the contrary, have fewer problems with a debtor defaulting as, in this case, China would seize this opportunity to claim resources or other assets from the country in return. Whether a lower creditworthiness does indeed result in higher Chinese debts is tested in the following part by combining information about Chinese loans given to individual countries in Latin America⁷⁴ with the creditworthiness of these borrowers.

As described in the introduction of the chapter the details of the Chinese loans come from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset. A filtering of this dataset⁷⁵ gives the following overview:

Table 2: Total Chinese aid & loans to Latin America, 2004-2014

Total of Chinese Aid & Loans (* \$ million)											
Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina			\$ 114,0					\$ 1.500,0	\$ 261,0	\$ 85,0	\$ 2.400,0
Bahamas						\$ 7,3	\$ 58,6	\$ 2.480,3	\$ 39,5		
Barbados								\$ 1,7			\$ 0,0
Bolivia		\$ 30,0		\$ 36,8		\$ 292,1	\$ 613,1	\$ 63,6			\$ 344,3
Brazil		\$ 100,5		\$ 577,8	\$ 750,0	\$ 300,0	\$ 4.730,0				
Chile						\$ 200,0		\$ 150,0	\$ 900,0		
Colombia					\$ 75,0	\$ 3,9					
Costa Rica					\$ 1,5					\$ 396,0	
Cuba					\$ 70,0						
Dominica										\$ 70,0	
Ecuador						\$ 1.218,0	\$ 1.571,0	\$ 2.442,5	\$ 240,0	\$ 1.400,0	\$ 1.918,0
Guyana		\$ 3,8		\$ 39,0							
Jamaica							\$ 398,1			\$ 530,1	
Mexico								\$ 375,0			
Peru	\$ 1,0							\$ 180,0	\$ 3,2		\$ 50,0
Suriname	\$ 43,4			\$ 3,2	\$ 140,5				\$ 50,0	\$ 50,0	
Trinidad & Tobago										\$ 150,2	
Uruguay			\$ 27,6				\$ 10,0	\$ 6,2			\$ 30,0
Venezuela					\$ 582,0	\$ 300,0		\$ 4.000,0	\$ 691,0	\$ 4.581,0	\$ 127,0
Total	\$ 44,4	\$ 134,3	\$ 141,6	\$ 617,8	\$ 1.658,0	\$ 2.321,3	\$ 7.380,8	\$ 11.199,3	\$ 2.184,7	\$ 7.262,2	\$ 4.869,3

(Source: AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 2017)

⁷³ Christopher Alessi and Roya Wolverson, 'The Credit Rating Controversy - Council on Foreign Relations', 27 July 2013, <https://web.archive.org/web/20130727223220/http://www.cfr.org/united-states/credit-rating-controversy/p22328>.

⁷⁴ The countries listed in table 2 do not make up the whole of Latin-America, but is based on the countries being part of the 'Latin America' category in AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset.

⁷⁵ AidData uses three categories for Chinese financial streams to other countries, being: *Vague Official Finance*, *Official Development Assistance* (ODA) and *Other Official Flows* (OFF). As in this chapter the analyses are based on regular loans, the ODA loans are not taken into account. Thus after ruling out the ODA streams, ruling out the flows other than loans and selecting the Latin American countries this gave the above overview.

Creditworthiness

To provide insight on the historical creditworthiness of the different countries, the historical credit ratings of these given by Moody's, Fitch and Standard & Poor's will be used. These three companies, together known as the Big Three, provide investors with an analysis of the risk associated with different securities. The risk of investing in these is expressed in a credit rating, which expresses the likelihood that the debt issuer - be it a corporation, bank-created entity or sovereign nation - will fail to make timely interest payments on the debt. In 2013 the Big Three together held a global market share of approximately 95%.⁷⁶

All three agencies have their own way of calculating credit ratings and use standardised values. For this reason, I have chosen to use the Trading Economics (TE) value to translate all values into a single format. The different values are displayed in table 3, in which a credit rating of 100 expresses 'riskless' and a rate of 0 represents 'likely to default'.⁷⁷

Table 3: Credit rating per Agency

TE	S&P	Moody's	Fitch	Description
100	AAA	Aaa	AAA	Prime
95	AA+	Aa1	AA+	High Grade
90	AA	Aa2	AA	
85	AA-	Aa3	AA-	
80	A+	A1	A+	Upper medium grade
75	A	A2	A	
70	A-	A3	A-	
65	BBB+	Baa1	BBB+	Lower medium grade
60	BBB	Baa2	BBB	
55	BBB-	Baa3	BBB-	
50	BB+	Ba1	BB+	Non-investment grade speculative
45	BB	Ba2	BB	
40	BB-	Ba3	BB-	
35	B+	B1	B+	Highly speculative
30	B	B2	B	
25	B-	B3	B-	
20	CCC+	Caa1	CCC	Substantial risks
15	CCC	Caa2		Extremely speculative
10	CCC-	Caa3		In default with little prospect of recovery
5	CC	Ca		
5	C	C		
0	D	/	DDD	In default
		/	DD	
		/	D	

(Source: Trading Economics, 2020)

The link between the creditworthiness of a country and the percentage of the country's GDP consisting of Chinese loans⁷⁸ is shown in table 4. Here, per country, the average % of

⁷⁶ Alessi and Wolverson, 'The Credit Rating Controversy - Council on Foreign Relations'.

⁷⁷ 'Credit Rating - Countries - List', Trading Economics, accessed 3 May 2020, <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/rating>.

⁷⁸ To make for a fair comparison, one can not only consider the sheer amount of the loans of a country as is displayed in table 2. Different countries have different sized economies and whereas a loan of \$100 million is very substantial for the Bahamas, it normally counts for not even 0,01% of Brazil's Growth Domestic Product (GDP). To make a fair comparison on the impact of a loan on a country's economy are the loans divided by the GDP of the country in the year the loan was received. This gives a percentage, to show what part of the

GDP borrowed from China is shown to determine which country has borrowed relatively most money from China between 2000 and 2014.

This information is combined with the countries' average credit rating for the years in which a loan agreement with China was signed. The hypothesis researched in this part dictates that the lower this average credit rating is, the more likely a loan from China would be. So, if countries with the relative most Chinese debt show lower average credit ratings in table 4, this confirms the hypothesis.

Table 4: Chinese loans and credit rating researched countries

Country	A.v % Cn Loan of GDP	Av. Credit rate in years of signing Chinese Loan
Bahamas	1,6833%	65,0
Dominica	0,9400%	30,0
Ecuador	0,7280%	21,9
Suriname	0,5987%	34,7
Bolivia	0,4467%	30,6
Jamaica	0,3493%	22,5
Venezuela	0,1980%	32,8
Guyana	0,1353%	N/A
Argentina	0,0573%	29,0
Costa Rica	0,0533%	50,0
Trin. & To.	0,0367%	75,0
Chile	0,0347%	81,1
Brazil	0,0213%	49,3
Uruguay	0,0140%	45,8
Peru	0,0080%	62,5
Cuba	0,0080%	N/A
Colombia	0,0020%	50,0
Mexico	0,0020%	61,7

(Source: AidData, 2017; Trading Economics, 2020)

Table 4 gives the impression that countries with the relative most lending from China have indeed lower credit rates than countries with relatively less money lent by China. But if the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient⁷⁹ is applied to express the statistical correlation this, however, gives a value of $r_s = 0,4816$ which expresses just moderate correlation and would not firmly confirm the hypothesis.

country's GDP equals the amount of Chinese money lend that year. The historical GDP per country per year used for this calculation can be found in appendix 1.

⁷⁹ In order to determine the strength of the relation between a countries credit rate and its Chinese debt, the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient is used, which assesses the statistical dependence between the rankings of two variables and which is denoted by r_s . A Spearman coefficient is expressed in a value between '1' and '-1', whereas '1' or '-1' express that both assessed variables are ranked in the exact same way and are thus completely correlated. A coefficient of '0' means no correlation at all. When the r_s is expressed verbally this would give the following guide for the absolute value of r_s : .00-.19 'very weak'; .20-.39 'weak'; .40-.59 'moderate'; .60-.79 'strong'; .80-1.0 'very strong'.

Based on: Schober, Patrick, Christa Boer, and Lothar A. Schwarte. "Correlation Coefficients: Appropriate Use and Interpretation." *Anesthesia & Analgesia* 126, no. 5 (May 2018): 1763–1768.
<https://doi.org/10.1213/ANE.0000000000002864>.

This lower than expected correlation score is probably linked with the somewhat odd leading position of the Bahamas which has, in relative terms, significantly higher Chinese debts than the other countries in the list, but also the fifth best average credit score. The Chinese indebtedness of the Bahamas can be brought back to one loan, however, as the country signed a loan agreement of \$2,4 billion in 2011 with China for the development of Baha Mar resort, the biggest resort in the Caribbean. The Chinese involvement in this project developed after the initial investor got in financial trouble in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. To guarantee completion of the project the Chinese Export & Import Bank then stepped in and supplied the loan, which included the provision that Chinese state-owned enterprise China State Construction Engineering would be hired as the main contractor and that the company was allowed to import a Chinese labour force.⁸⁰

At the time of signing the loan agreement, the sum of the loan accounted for 24,3% (!) of the GDP of the Bahamas, a country with a population then of 350.000 people and an economy to which tourism contributed 51%. It is not clear whether there were other potential investors for the Baha Mar resort or why the country chose to borrow from China, but as the lead position of the Bahamas in the list is solely due to one loan agreement in a specific sector that in general knows a high dependency on FDI⁸¹ the case of the Bahamas can be excluded in answering this subchapter's hypothesis.

Excluding the Bahamas from the calculation, the values shown in table 4 give a correlation of $r_s = 0,7307$, which express a strong to very strong correlation between a countries credit rates and its Chinese debt a percentage of GDP. Table 4 shows that the lower the credit rating, the higher the Chinese debts, and these two observations combined thus confirm the hypothesis that Latin American countries with a lower creditworthiness have more Chinese debts relative to GDP than those with a higher creditworthiness. This is not to exclude the possibility that countries have reasons to borrow money from China other than limited options due to a low credit rating, but research into this lies outside of the scope of this study.

4.2 Terms & Conditions: Chinese loans to Suriname

As can be seen from table 4 Chinese lending comprised an average of 0,6% of Suriname's GDP over the years 2000-2014, which ranked it the 4th highest rate of the researched Latin American countries. Whereas the previous part gave an overview of the loans different countries received, it did not reveal anything about the terms and conditions of the Chinese loans, which, according the 'debt trap theory', are supposed to be harsher than the terms and conditions of loan agreements from other lenders. The following part will, therefore,

⁸⁰ Muhammad Cohen, 'How China Rescued -- Then Ruined -- The Caribbean's Largest Resort Project', *Forbes*, 14 December 2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/muhammadcohen/2016/12/14/how-china-rescued-then-ruined-the-caribbeans-largest-resort-project/>.

⁸¹ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2016* (United Nations, 2016), 60.

compare the terms and conditions of loan agreements signed by Suriname with China and those of loan agreements Suriname signed with other credit suppliers.

As *AidData*'s dataset does not contain any information on terms and conditions of loans, this analysis will draw on the details of all 90 foreign loans taken out by the Surinamese government between 1 January 2012 and 16 February 2020. This information was received from the Surinamese Bureau of National Debt.

The overview includes loans of different type of lenders: commercial, multilateral and bilateral. Of the total 90 foreign loans, six loans were of Chinese origin, equalling just 6,6%. However, in terms of actual money borrowed per creditor 21,4% of the total is of Chinese origin. This last statistic makes the collection a good source to analyse how Chinese loan terms and conditions compare with those of other lenders.

Table 5: Foreign suppliers of loans to Suriname, 2012-2019

Lender	Type	Number of loans	Total Amount
ABN-AMRO Bank N.V.	Commercial	2	\$ 44.684.815
Agence Française De Developpement	France (bil.)	2	\$ 19.976.793
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.	Commercial	2	\$ 47.453.923
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	8	\$ 167.256.850
China Dalian International Cooperation (Group) Holdings Ltd.	China (bil.)	1	\$ 5.797.000
Credit Suisse	Commercial	2	\$ 74.607.840
Export-Import Bank of China	China (bil.)	5	\$ 645.284.892
Export-Import Bank of India	India (bil.)	6	\$ 101.570.000
ING Bank N.V.	Commercial	2	\$ 45.512.785
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	26	\$ 669.200.000
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Multilateral	2	\$ 58.000.000
International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation	Multilateral	1	\$ 25.000.000
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	16	\$ 275.990.000
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	6	\$ 37.028.589
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development	Kuwait (bil.)	1	\$ 16.471.060
Oppenheimer & Co. INC	Commercial	3	\$ 682.500.000
Republic Bank Limited of Trinidad	Commercial	1	\$ 50.000.000
The OPEC Fund for International Development	Multilateral	4	\$ 72.300.000
Total		90	\$ 3.038.634.548

(Source: Surinamese Bureau of National Debt, 2020)

A challenging factor is that loan agreements differ from each other in maturity periods, currency and interest rate structures. To enable equal comparison, several actions were taken to make the loan agreements uniform. A description of these actions can be found in appendix 2. This resulted in an overview of all foreign loan agreements signed by Suriname in the period 2012-2020 which can be found in appendix 3.

The next step is to analyse how the terms and conditions of the loan agreements signed with a Chinese supplier compare with the other loans. Suriname has borrowed money from three Chinese lenders, which are all full Chinese state-owned enterprises, so these loans are regarded as bilateral loans.

As the terms and conditions of loan agreements are influenced by the maturity of the loan⁸², the loans were organised by maturity period and compared within these categories. In table 5 the scores are shown for the different groups in different categories. Here two sets of scores are shown; one calculated based on the number of agreements in that category⁸³ and one based on both the number of agreements and the amount of each loan agreement.⁸⁴ As the second way of calculating gives the most inclusive values, this method is applied to arrive at the average interest, maturity and grace of the Chinese and bilateral loans.

Table 6: Foreign loans Suriname, arranged by maturity, 2012-2019

	Lender	Total Amount	Average Maturity (months)	Average Grace (months)	Grace as % of total	Average Interest
0-2 years (0-24 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 278.297.000	13,20	0,00	0%	7,53%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 39.756.714*	10,57	0,00	0%	6,79%
	China	\$ 5.797.000	5	0,00	0%	4,40%
2-5 years (25-60 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 44.982.816	43,45	6,34	15%	5,33%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 7.497.136*	51,00	9,00	17%	4,15%
5-10 years (61-120 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 657.351.556	116,45	4,42	4%	8,20%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 93.907.365*	101,86	27,86	28%	3,62%
10-15 years (121-180 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 493.875.287	166,64	45,29	27%	3,20%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 23.517.871*	166,10	44,67	27%	2,90%
	Bilateral	\$ 264.623.718	175,86	52,14	31%	3,59%
	China	\$ 163.767.000	175,22	48,04	26%	3,70%
15-20 years (181-240 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 880.555.659	237,89	62,44	26%	2,00%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 33.867.525*	233,65	60,81	26%	1,97%
	Bilateral	\$ 497.986.809	240,00	59,60	24%	2,14%
	China	\$ 481.515.749	240,00	60,00	25%	2,11%
>20 years (>240 months)	All loans (calculated over total amount lend)	\$ 570.665.022	347,99	67,40	19%	2,57%
	All loans (calculated per loan agreement)	\$ 31.745.527*	328,68	66,26	21%	2,66%

(Source: Surinamese Bureau of National Debt, 2020)

Looking at table 6 it can be concluded that overall the loans taken by Suriname from China have terms and conditions somewhat less attractive than average. However, the difference with other lenders is very minimal and based on this data the terms and conditions of Chinese loans cannot be classified as especially unfavourable or harsh. This means that, based on the findings of this research, the claim that China lures developing countries into debt traps by supplying them loans that pose difficulties for repayment cannot be confirmed.

Other than the terms and conditions, what is found after studying the details of each of the Chinese loans to Suriname, is that all are signed for a specific project that were executed by appointed Chinese companies as will be explained now.

⁸² OECD, *Short-term interest rates* (OECD, 2020). doi: 10.1787/2cc37d77-en

⁸³ For example: Interest Rate (IR) is calculated as $(IR1 + IR2 + IR3) / 3 = \text{Average IR}$.

⁸⁴ For example: Interest Rate (IR) is calculated with Amount (A) taken into account as: $((IR1 * A1) + (IR2 * A2) + (IR3 * A3)) / (A1 + A2 + A3) = \text{Average IR}$

Table 7: Chinese loans to Suriname, 2012-2019

Lender	Date	Amount (* \$Mln)	Description	Maturity & Grace (months)	Interest
Export-Import Bank of China	2012	\$ 47,3	This agreement was signed on July, 27, 2012. For an amount of \$ 47,3 mln to finance the building of 1000 houses	240 60	2,00%
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited	2015	\$ 65,3	The general objective is the construction of 70 kilometer roads in Suriname.	168 30	4,55%
Export-Import Bank of China	2016	\$ 235,0	The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Suriname National Infrastructure Projects (Dalian IV)	240 60	2,14%
China Dalian International Cooperation (Group)	2016	\$ 5,8	This agreement was signed on March 30, 2016 for an amount of USD 5.797 million for the payment of 85% of the credit Insurance of the above-mentioned project which is finance with a loan signed in 2015 with China Industrial and Commercial Bank.	5	4,40%
Export-Import Bank of China	2016	\$ 98,5	The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Suriname National Broadband Network Project, which has been signed between Telesur and Huawei Technologies Co. LTD.	180 60	3,14%
Export-Import Bank of China	2019	\$ 199,2	The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "J.A. Pengel International Airport Expansion Project".	240 60	2,09%

(Source: Surinamese Bureau of National Debt, 2020)

All loan agreements Suriname signed with China between 2012 and 2019 are listed in table 7. When starting with the first loan agreement, signed to finance the building of 1000 houses, one can link this to the Surinamese investment of the Chinese company Broad Homes. In 2014 Broad Homes announced to invested \$20 million in a Surinamese factory to locally produce prefab houses. Although Broad Homes positions itself as an private company, a Chinese article noted that Broad Homes had an agreement with the Surinamese authorities which included that 65 percent of the precast houses produced by Broad Homes would be bought by the state of Suriname and that this deal was part of a \$50 million loan the Chinese Exim Bank had approved in 2012 to finance the construction of houses in Suriname.⁸⁵ The second, third and fourth loan agreements are all related to a long-term project to rehabilitate the asphalt road network in Suriname, which is executed by China Dalian International Cooperation (group) Holdings Ltd. The relations with this company started with a visit of then Surinamese president Jules Wijdenbosch to the Chinese city of Dalian, where an agreement was signed for the rehabilitation of 270km roads in Suriname. In 2004 a second agreement was signed (Dalian II) for the restoration of another 275km of infrastructure and in April 2008 Dalian III was signed for an additional 500km road to be rehabilitated. For each of the projects funding had come through loans from the Chinese government. Although it is unclear whether this was stipulated in the loan agreement, the majority of the work has been executed by

⁸⁵ ‘湖南：住宅产业化成经济增长新亮点 (Foreign Housing Industry Becomes a New Bright Spot in Economic Growth Hunan)’, *新浪财经 (Sina Financial News)*, 22 October 2015, <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20151022/104223544299.shtml>.

imported Chinese labour.⁸⁶ Dalian IV was signed in 2016 as shown in table 7. Dalian IV was supposed to be signed in 2013, but as this project had no timely start another 70km project by Dalian had already started in the meantime, for which a loan was signed in 2015.⁸⁷

As the description of the loan agreement already notes, the Export-Import Bank of China also supplied Suriname with a loan to invest in broadband internet. This was something for which Surinamese telecom company Telesur had wished for some time, and, on their initiative, the Chinese bank was found willing to supply the money, and Chinese technology company Huawei was co-opted to run the project.⁸⁸ From the start, this has been a controversial project though, as opponents claim that Telesur was given as collateral for the loan to the Chinese government.⁸⁹ With regard to the last loan agreement less information is available. Although it is clear that the loan was given for the planned expansion of the Johan Adolf Pengel International Airport of Suriname, construction seems not to have started as of March 2020.⁹⁰ Chinese SOE China Harbour International is, by several sources (e.g. previous Chinese ambassador Zhang to Suriname), claimed to be the contractor of the expansion.⁹¹ China Harbour International was, in the past, also the contractor of the expansion of Guyana's international airport and started in 2020 with the dredging of the Suriname River.⁹²

The details of the different loan agreements signed by Suriname in the period 2012-2020 do not confirm the claim that Chinese loans know harsher terms and conditions than those of other loans. Other than the standard terms, additional specifics of the loan agreements were not available for analysis, and so the possibility that Chinese loan agreements include terms unconventional for non-Chinese loan suppliers cannot completely ruled out yet. What was striking in more detailed examination of the Chinese loan agreements, is that all Chinese loans helped Chinese enterprises to be awarded projects in Suriname. As shall be shown in chapter 5, Surinamese projects for Chinese enterprises have normally also meant the import of Chinese labour to Suriname.

⁸⁶ P. B. Tjon Sie Fat, *Chinese New Migrants in Suriname : The Inevitability of Ethnic Performing* (AmsterdamVossiuspers UvA - Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 158–60, <https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=379a7235-1343-4d57-9c61-6c3ce0b54fb7>.

⁸⁷ 'Dalian IV: US\$ 235 Miljoen Gereed Om Te Tekenen', *Starnieuws*, 11 July 2016, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/38225>.

⁸⁸ René Gompers, 'Over 18 Maanden Heeft Heel Suriname Breedbandinternet', *Starnieuws*, 6 October 2017, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/41796>.

⁸⁹ 'Fiat DNA Nodig Voor US\$ 115 Miljoen Lening Telesur', *Starnieuws*, 27 November 2016, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/38554>.

⁹⁰ 'Lening US\$ 205 Miljoen Nodig Voor Groei Luchthaven', *Starnieuws*, 27 November 2018, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/50042>.

⁹¹ 'China Leent USD 200 Miljoen Voor Luchthaven JAP-Luchthaven', *Dagblad de West*, 8 December 2019, <https://dagbladdewest.com/2019/12/08/china-leent-usd-200-miljoen-voor-jap-luchthaven/>.

⁹² 'Internationale Luchthaven Guyana Wordt Uitgebreed', *Starnieuws*, 4 November 2012, <http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/13835>; 'Jogi Wil Weten Waarom China Harbour Surinamerivier Baggert', *Starnieuws*, 22 December 2019, <http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/56145>.

In his farewell interview, former Chinese ambassador to Suriname, Zhang Jinxiong, mentioned that the starting and completion of ‘projects’ was his main task as ambassador in Suriname. He adds being proud to have been able to develop new projects in Suriname based on Chinese grants and loans, without clarifying why this is such an achievement or how Suriname profited from the projects he summed up.⁹³ This statement gives the impression that Chinese ambassadors are driven by Beijing to create these projects. As project development is probably not what the average Western diplomat would consider his core task, it could be possible that Chinese diplomats in countries such as Suriname were given instructions from Beijing to expand Chinese influence through these ‘projects’. The creation of new markets for Chinese exports could possibly be a reason for Chinese ambassadors to stimulate projects. But China has also a long history of labour surplus. The Chinese government has been able to alleviate this through gigantic domestic infrastructural and construction projects.⁹⁴ But, as many of these came to completion throughout the 2010s, it is not unthinkable that projects abroad were becoming an interesting way to create employment for Chinese surplus labour, especially if receiving countries would pay for these projects through Chinese loans.

Furthermore, should one wonder to what extent Suriname benefitted from these projects. Although it seems logical that Suriname should invite a foreign specialist to create a broadband network, Suriname hosts local companies capable of asphaltting roads.⁹⁵ But as all Chinese projects have been executed by imported Chinese labour, it can be argued that, by borrowing money from China to pay Chinese workers to do work that could also have been done by Surinamese workers, Surinamese economic development is possibly frustrated by Chinese projects.

Studying all loan agreements Suriname signed with foreign lenders between 2012 and 2019 moreover exposes that the country finds itself in serious economic difficulty. One learns from the overview (appendix 3) that Suriname even lacks the funds to pay for rather basic services and is forced to sign loan agreements for projects as simple as a census, a feasibility study or for the maintenance for its three helicopters.

4.3 Chinese loans and diplomatic consequences

According to the findings in subchapter 4.1 Latin American countries with a lower credit rating are more likely to borrow from China. As lending money to less creditworthy debtors increase the lender’s risks of not seeing the loan fully repaid, it would not be unorthodox to see high interest rates in return. But based on the example of Suriname loan

⁹³ ‘Ambassadeur Zhang Focuste Zich Op Projectuitvoering’, *Starnieuws*, 22 July 2018, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/48142>.

⁹⁴ Nomaan Majid, ‘The Great Employment Transformation in China’ (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2015), 15.

⁹⁵ ‘Baitali Group of Companies - Wegenbouw Materialen’, accessed 20 June 2020, <https://www.baitaligroup.com/expertises/wegenbouw-materialen/>.

agreement the standard terms of Chinese loans do not show particularly high interest rates or grace periods, despite the low average credit rate of 34.7 (out of 100) of Suriname. However, other than a high loan yield, a glimpse was caught of how China profits from lending money to Suriname, namely by ensuring foreign projects for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese laborers. As discussed in chapter 3, there are also theories that China intentionally indebted Suriname to develop leverage over the country that China can use to rally Surinamese support within the United Nations. In less clear terms, but along the same lines, many of the academics discussed in chapter 2 insist that China's economic activities in the developing world have both economic and diplomatic goals. Whether China uses the supply of credit to assist its diplomatic goals will be considered in this subchapter.

One of the places in which China is actively working to increase its diplomatic influence is the United Nations (UN).⁹⁶ According to Courtney Fung China is striving to claim leadership in a new international order and a global organization like the UN offers the perfect stage for this. Here China can, for instance, exert power through a veto on important decisions. By delving into the data and qualitative sources, Fung concludes that China has taken a much more active role within the UN in recent years.⁹⁷

As the UN is of such importance to China, analysing what similarities there are between China's voting pattern in the UN General Assembly and that of countries strongly indebted to China, could be an effective way to learn whether China, indeed, uses loans to extend its diplomatic reach. In the following part this will be achieved by combining the information from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset with a database including UN voting information for the period 2000-2019. This database was created for this thesis and includes information of all 1.532 resolutions that were voted on in the UN General Assembly the period 2000-2019.⁹⁸

As the UN General Assembly votes on many different subjects, just evaluating similar voting rates, between China and its debtors, runs the risk of missing important trends or nuances. To mitigate this risk different analyses are made based on the voting subject categories: 'Middle East', 'Nuclear Weapons', 'Disarmament', 'Human Rights', 'Decolonisation' and 'Economic Development', which are often used by the UN watchers to categorise voting behaviour.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Tung Cheng-Chia and Alan H. Yang, 'How China Is Remaking the UN In Its Own Image', *The Diplomat*, 4 September 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/how-china-is-remaking-the-un-in-its-own-image/>.

⁹⁷ Courtney J. Fung, *China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status* (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 28.

⁹⁸ The source for this information is; United Nations, 'General Assembly of the United Nations - Voting Records' (United Nations), accessed 9 June 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp>.

⁹⁹ Michael Bailey and Erik Voeten, 'A Two-Dimensional Analysis of Seventy Years of United Nations Voting', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 17 April 2018), 24–25, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166115>.

Also, the category ‘Intervention’ was added as one of China’s main interests within the UN are intervention decisions, for which China consistently makes the case for host-state consent for intervention. China’s main concern with non-host-state consent intervention by the UN is that actions to promote regime change elsewhere could set a precedent for such actions against China. This concern formed the base for China’s seven U.N. vetoes related to the Syria conflict, as a Chinese diplomat was quoted ‘When we vote on Syria, we are thinking of China.’¹⁰⁰

Since the intervention subject is of such importance for China, one would expect that China would employ most of its leverage over other countries to push these to vote in line with Chinese interest. For this reason, the category ‘Intervention’ was created, consisting of 277 resolutions that have to do with non-host-state consent intervention proposals. The selected resolutions can be found in appendix 4.

To find whether there is a relation between a country’s Chinese debt as a percentage of its GDP and the Rate of Similar Voting to China (RSVC) different steps were taken, which are described in appendix 5. For the analysis the same Latin American countries are included as in subchapter 4.1, but also the voting behaviour of the ‘Western’ countries Germany, Japan, Netherlands and United States in comparison to China were added as reference points.

Another addition to the dataset of subchapter 4.1 is that a dynamic ranking is used that for each year put the country with relative most Chinese debts that year on top, instead of the country with the highest average debt on top of all years. This is to ensure that link between indebtedness to China and a country’s RSVC analyses is as clean and precise as possible.

Analysing all UN resolutions between 2000 and 2019 gives the overview shown in table 8, in which the scores in all columns but the last express the rate of resolutions in which a country votes similarly to China that year. Rank 1 is each time the country with the highest Chinese debt relative to GDP that year and rank 18 the country with the lowest relative Chinese debt. The last column shows the average debt to China over the years 2000-2019 for each rank.

¹⁰⁰ Fung, *China and Intervention at the UN Security Council*, 1.

Table 8: RSVC and indebtedness to China, total of resolutions, 2000-2019

Total																				Average	Av. CN Debt		
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019			
Rank	# UN resolutions	67	67	72	73	71	73	85	76	75	64	65	68	68	60	78	76	80	90	104	98		
1	78%	84%	87%	88%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	92%	83%	82%	85%	82%	73%	76%	80%	77%	81%	84%	11,84%	
2	70%	69%	71%	68%	90%	87%	89%	89%	90%	92%	85%	82%	87%	64%	81%	65%	72%	96%	75%	89%	81%	5,87%	
3	82%	79%	86%	84%	77%	89%	86%	86%	85%	88%	89%	82%	81%	90%	88%	80%	76%	81%	80%	79%	83%	3,73%	
4	79%	81%	85%	84%	76%	85%	88%	91%	88%	89%	89%	86%	85%	88%	87%	77%	73%	81%	79%	80%	83%	2,44%	
5	78%	81%	85%	84%	88%	85%	86%	86%	89%	92%	89%	86%	82%	85%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	82%	84%	2,04%	
6	78%	73%	83%	79%	86%	78%	86%	83%	81%	83%	87%	82%	81%	88%	87%	79%	78%	86%	82%	81%	82%	1,62%	
7	79%	82%	83%	82%	83%	87%	85%	85%	88%	92%	89%	89%	82%	87%	85%	76%	77%	81%	81%	83%	84%	0,93%	
8	75%	83%	81%	73%	78%	84%	88%	89%	81%	86%	91%	84%	78%	88%	87%	77%	74%	81%	76%	78%	81%	0,51%	
9	92%	94%	94%	99%	87%	88%	87%	83%	81%	88%	92%	90%	78%	83%	83%	78%	74%	81%	77%	79%	85%	0,33%	
10	61%	71%	79%	90%	78%	79%	82%	80%	76%	83%	83%	84%	81%	87%	79%	74%	70%	78%	74%	79%	78%	0,29%	
11	81%	83%	86%	87%	96%	93%	87%	89%	78%	83%	85%	81%	85%	85%	86%	75%	74%	80%	78%	75%	83%	0,19%	
12	84%	86%	88%	88%	89%	92%	95%	93%	87%	80%	77%	82%	74%	83%	83%	78%	74%	82%	76%	78%	83%	0,17%	
13	84%	88%	89%	86%	91%	86%	92%	89%	80%	83%	82%	85%	79%	88%	88%	80%	76%	82%	76%	61%	83%	0,10%	
14	72%	75%	77%	77%	90%	87%	91%	88%	82%	86%	82%	82%	72%	86%	84%	78%	73%	80%	78%	79%	81%	0,04%	
15	61%	80%	96%	87%	85%	82%	88%	91%	89%	86%	86%	78%	69%	80%	79%	73%	70%	76%	76%	76%	80%	0,04%	
16	71%	79%	84%	86%	88%	86%	84%	84%	86%	89%	69%	81%	76%	85%	86%	80%	78%	83%	83%	83%	82%	0,03%	
17	73%	75%	78%	76%	78%	81%	90%	91%	80%	83%	80%	88%	82%	82%	78%	71%	69%	66%	67%	70%	77%	0,01%	
18	84%	85%	87%	86%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	88%	88%	87%	82%	78%	79%	70%	67%	78%	73%	68%	82%	0,01%	
Germany	54%	49%	53%	47%	54%	56%	59%	61%	56%	51%	52%	53%	49%	49%	47%	41%	44%	56%	54%	45%	52%		
Japan	61%	60%	60%	56%	56%	64%	62%	64%	64%	55%	60%	57%	53%	55%	53%	51%	53%	58%	58%	53%	58%		
Netherlands	54%	49%	51%	52%	56%	58%	59%	62%	57%	51%	49%	52%	47%	50%	47%	41%	48%	56%	52%	47%	52%		
United States	15%	10%	11%	11%	8%	7%	9%	7%	9%	11%	11%	16%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	14%	11%	13%	12%		

(Source: AidData, 2017; UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

The penultimate column of table 8 shows the average RSVC of the countries ranked each year by Chinese debt relative to GDP. At first sign there seems no strong relation observable between the indebtedness to China and the RSVC. Application of the Spearman (see subchapter 4.1) formula gives a value of $r_s = 0,4365$, expressing there is just a weak to moderate relation between RSVC and indebtedness to China.

Whether the specific subject categories show a different trend is shown in table 9, which per rank gives the average RSVC over the years and for each of the subject categories.

Table 9: RSVC and indebtedness to China, per category, 2000-2019

Rank	Intervention	Middle East	Nuclear Weap.	Disarm-ment	Human Rights	Decolo-nisation	Eco. Devel.	Total	Average CN debt
1	80%	93%	67%	74%	81%	93%	93%	84%	11,84%
2	84%	91%	53%	61%	77%	95%	92%	81%	5,87%
3	83%	94%	67%	72%	80%	94%	94%	83%	3,73%
4	81%	95%	65%	70%	80%	94%	92%	83%	2,44%
5	84%	92%	70%	73%	79%	96%	96%	84%	2,04%
6	87%	98%	65%	70%	79%	95%	90%	82%	1,62%
7	86%	98%	67%	74%	83%	96%	89%	84%	0,93%
8	78%	93%	66%	73%	76%	94%	91%	81%	0,51%
9	83%	93%	69%	78%	80%	89%	95%	85%	0,33%
10	70%	89%	58%	65%	71%	90%	90%	78%	0,29%
11	80%	92%	68%	74%	78%	95%	92%	83%	0,19%
12	85%	94%	68%	73%	80%	94%	93%	83%	0,17%
13	80%	91%	69%	77%	74%	93%	95%	83%	0,10%
14	77%	89%	67%	73%	73%	90%	92%	81%	0,04%
15	72%	88%	62%	76%	73%	89%	95%	80%	0,04%
16	85%	97%	61%	69%	82%	94%	87%	82%	0,03%
17	72%	84%	64%	67%	68%	87%	89%	77%	0,01%
18	83%	89%	67%	73%	81%	92%	95%	82%	0,01%
Average	81%	92%	65%	72%	77%	93%	92%	82%	
Dif (max-min)	17%	15%	17%	18%	15%	9%	9%	7%	
Germany	61%	74%	37%	45%	35%	69%	66%	52%	
Japan	63%	77%	58%	54%	37%	74%	64%	58%	
Netherlands	61%	74%	38%	46%	35%	70%	67%	52%	
United States	1%	3%	12%	18%	6%	0%	8%	12%	
r_s	0,3085	0,4989	0,0196	-0,1455	0,2920	0,6016	0,0773	0,4365	

(Source: AidData, 2017; UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

Looking at the r_s values of the different subject categories shows that there are hardly any categories in which a strong relation between the RSVC and indebtedness to China is observable. The highest correlation is found in Decolonisation and the lowest in Economic Development. But in these categories the Latin American countries vote overwhelmingly like China and here is the smallest difference between the highest and lowest value discoverable (both 9%). This makes the differences and ranking in these two categories hardly significant. What is also striking is that there is only a weak correlation discoverable between the RSVC and indebtedness to China in the category ‘Intervention’, a category where a relatively strong relation was expected.

But although there might be no strong relation between RSVC and the relative indebtedness to China, another conclusion that can be drawn is that Latin American countries vote similar to China in about 80% of the cases, whereas for the United States this was just as little as in 12% of the cases. This not only shows that the United States and China thus vote extremely dissimilarly, but also that Latin American countries are much more likely to vote similarly to China than to the United States.

Table 10 gives an overview, based on the total of UN resolution voted on, ranked by country. Instead of by debt to China, the list is ranked based on the average RSVC.

Table 10: RSVC and indebtedness to China, per country, 2000-2019

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Average	Av. CN Debt
#UN resolutions	67	67	72	73	71	73	85	76	75	64	65	68	68	60	78	76	80	90	104	98		
Cuba	92%	94%	94%	99%	96%	93%	95%	93%	89%	92%	92%	82%	85%	86%	86%	80%	78%	83%	83%	83%	89%	0,06%
Venezuela	84%	85%	87%	86%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	92%	91%	82%	81%	87%	85%	76%	77%	81%	81%	83%	86%	0,95%
Guyana	84%	86%	88%	88%	90%	87%	88%	91%	90%	89%	89%	89%	82%	88%	87%	77%	74%	81%	76%	78%	85%	0,88%
Ecuador	81%	83%	86%	87%	91%	86%	91%	88%	86%	88%	89%	82%	87%	90%	88%	80%	76%	81%	80%	79%	85%	3,88%
Bolivia	79%	81%	85%	84%	86%	87%	89%	89%	85%	92%	92%	82%	85%	88%	87%	79%	78%	86%	82%	81%	85%	2,26%
Jamaica	78%	84%	87%	88%	90%	89%	88%	91%	88%	88%	89%	86%	82%	85%	87%	77%	73%	81%	79%	80%	85%	2,23%
Suriname	61%	80%	96%	87%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	85%	86%	81%	88%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	82%	84%	3,29%
Trinidad & Tobago	71%	79%	84%	86%	88%	86%	90%	91%	88%	88%	88%	87%	82%	87%	86%	75%	74%	80%	78%	75%	83%	0,18%
Bahamas	82%	79%	86%	84%	88%	87%	88%	89%	87%	86%	87%	83%	82%	85%	82%	73%	76%	80%	77%	81%	83%	10,66%
Brazil	78%	81%	85%	84%	83%	85%	86%	86%	81%	86%	89%	90%	81%	88%	88%	80%	76%	82%	76%	61%	82%	0,14%
Dominica	61%	71%	79%	90%	89%	92%	89%	89%	89%	89%	69%	88%	82%	64%	81%	65%	72%	96%	75%	89%	81%	4,75%
Chile	78%	73%	83%	79%	78%	84%	87%	83%	80%	83%	85%	84%	78%	85%	83%	78%	74%	82%	76%	78%	81%	0,21%
Uruguay	73%	75%	78%	76%	78%	81%	86%	86%	81%	83%	83%	85%	79%	85%	84%	78%	73%	80%	78%	79%	80%	0,07%
Costa Rica	75%	83%	81%	73%	78%	79%	87%	89%	82%	86%	86%	81%	76%	83%	79%	74%	70%	78%	74%	79%	80%	0,27%
Mexico	84%	88%	89%	86%	85%	82%	84%	84%	80%	83%	80%	82%	72%	82%	78%	71%	69%	66%	67%	70%	79%	0,01%
Argentina	70%	69%	71%	68%	76%	78%	86%	83%	81%	83%	82%	84%	78%	83%	83%	78%	74%	81%	77%	79%	78%	0,31%
Peru	72%	75%	77%	77%	77%	85%	85%	85%	78%	83%	82%	81%	74%	80%	79%	73%	70%	76%	76%	76%	78%	0,05%
Colombia	79%	82%	83%	82%	87%	88%	82%	80%	76%	80%	77%	78%	69%	78%	79%	70%	67%	78%	73%	68%	78%	0,01%
Japan	61%	60%	60%	56%	56%	64%	62%	64%	64%	55%	60%	57%	53%	55%	53%	51%	53%	58%	58%	53%	58%	
Netherlands	54%	49%	51%	52%	56%	58%	59%	62%	57%	51%	49%	52%	47%	50%	47%	41%	48%	56%	52%	47%	52%	
Germany	54%	49%	53%	47%	54%	56%	59%	61%	56%	51%	52%	53%	49%	49%	47%	41%	44%	56%	54%	45%	52%	
United States	15%	10%	11%	11%	8%	7%	9%	7%	9%	11%	11%	16%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	14%	11%	13%	12%	

(Source: AidData, 2017; UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

Here the r_s value, calculated over the average RSVC and average Chinese debt is 0,4798, slightly higher than that of the other total, as shown in table 8, but still just a moderate correlation. Just as was the case in subchapter 4.1, the specific case of the Bahamas has a strong impact on the whole analysis. When the Bahamas are excluded from the analysis, this gives a correlation of $r_s = 0,5098$, which expresses a somewhat stronger correlation, but still not significantly so.

In 2016, former Chinese ambassador Zhang to Suriname praised Suriname for supporting China in international organisations such as the United Nations.¹⁰¹ This subchapter has shown that this appraisal was fitting as Suriname indeed voted similar to China in 85% of the researched UN General Assembly resolutions. But it is also evident that Suriname is not unique in its support of China as the sheer majority of the researched Latin American countries voted similarly to China in >80% of all resolutions, a rate significantly higher than the RSVC of ‘Western’ countries Japan, Germany and Netherlands, and the complete opposite of the RSVC of the United States.

This difference in RSVC between the ‘Western’ and the Latin American countries has, according to the findings in this subchapter, little to do with the indebtedness of countries to China. When analysed per country and when analysed based on a dynamic ranking of Chinese indebtedness, there was only a moderate correlation between the indebtedness to China and the RSVC. Within the specific subject categories only a moderately-strong correlation is found for the category ‘Decolonisation’, and for other subjects nothing higher than a moderate correlation.

The difference in RSVC between the ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ countries needs to be explained another way. Although it is not the scope of this research, it is not unlikely that the high rate of similar voting to China for all researched Latin American countries simply has to do with ideology. Chapter 2 showed that China has been presenting itself to world as world’s biggest developing country and claims its worldview to be similar to that of the developing world on many points. This could explain the high RSVC rate amongst Latin American countries on matters related to ‘Decolonisation’, ‘Economic Development’ and ‘Middle East’. Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament, on the other hand, have the lowest average RSVC scores with the Latin American countries, but the highest average RSVC scores for the United States. This can be explained by the fact that China cannot possibly portray itself and act as a developing country in these subject categories, as possessor of one of world’s largest armies and nuclear arsenals.

These observations are based on quantitative research in which each vote was assigned the same weight. It has recently been argued that this could run a risk of conclusions that emerge differently when the same data is researched qualitatively.¹⁰² But, unfortunately, due to a limitation of time there is no possibility for such a qualitative analysis within this research.

4.4 Conclusion

Analysing four datasets with information on Latin American countries and Suriname specifically, this chapter has tested observations from chapter 2 and 3 by quering whether the

¹⁰¹ ‘Ambassadeur Zhang: Suriname Is Belangrijk Voor China’, *Starnieuws*, 29 May 2016, <http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/35594>.

¹⁰² Michael Bailey and Erik Voeten, ‘Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 August 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595700>.

terms and conditions of Chinese loans are tougher than those of other lenders and whether there is a relationship between Chinese loans, creditworthiness and support for China's diplomatic standpoints.

Whereas a strong correlation is found between the credit rating of a country and the Chinese loans, no such strong correlations are found between the indebtedness to China of these countries and their rate of voting sympathy with China. This is not even the case for UN resolutions regarding Intervention, which is supposed the most important topic for China within the UN and where one would most expect China to use its leverage over indebted countries to vote in China's interest. The observation that China uses the supply of loans to gain diplomatic support is thus not backed by the findings of this chapter.

Instead, it has become clear that Latin American countries are irrespective of Chinese indebtedness much more likely to vote similarly to China than to the United States and, to a lesser degree, to the other 'Western' countries researched. This has likely to do with the fact that most of Latin America are part of the developing world and China still behaves and acts as being part of the developing world on some topics.

Based on accessible details of the case of Suriname it has been shown that Chinese loans have no considerably tougher conditions than loans of non-Chinese origin and cannot validate a Chinese debt trap theory. Further investigation, however, showed that all loans proffered by the Chinese government to Suriname have created new business opportunities for Chinese enterprises and Chinese workers and so benefitted China in other ways.

The observations as noted here are predominantly based on quantitative research. A deeper and more qualitative research into the Chinese economic activities in Suriname and the relation to the theory of Chinese behaviour in the developing will be the subject of the following and last chapter.

5. CHINESE FDI IN SURINAME AND THE ROLE OF SURINAME'S ETHNIC CHINESE POPULATION

After paying a visit to Suriname, which I had the opportunity to do in January 2020, it was not difficult to understand why many observers feel that the Chinese influence in Suriname is increasing rapidly. Nine out of ten supermarkets have Chinese names and are run by ethnic Chinese. The same counts for DIY shops and many other types of retail companies. This situation is not exclusive to the urban parts of Suriname. As one moves deeper into the country Chinese shops are still found all around, with a significant number of wood-trading companies being Chinese named. Furthermore, within the capital, Paramaribo, and in the countryside, signs of (re)construction work executed by Chinese companies are frequently found. The Chinese economic influences in Suriname seem omnipresent.

As Suriname has a long history with Chinese immigrants and holds an influential ethnic Chinese population, the link between this group and Chinese investments in Suriname is often made. This chapter will investigate what the relationship is between the relatively big Chinese population in Suriname and Chinese FDI in Suriname, as well as with Sino-Surinamese trade.

5.1 Chinese FDI in Suriname

Suriname has maintained warm relations with China for many decades now and since Desi Bouterse took office as president of Suriname in 2010 the relationship with China has only grown more intense. During his presidency Bouterse took several steps to grow closer to China. For instance, he made Suriname the first country in the Southern Hemisphere to acknowledge Chinese New Year as an official holiday and facilitated the opening of a Confucius Institute in Suriname for the promotion of Chinese language and culture. Bouterse, moreover, mentioned several times that China is Suriname's most important development partner.¹⁰³ The Chinese embassy has, in return, emphasised the importance of Suriname for China. Then ambassador to Suriname, Zhang Jinxiong, mentioned in 2016 that despite being a relatively small country within Latin America, Suriname plays an important role and will act as a hub for Chinese companies to the whole of CARICOM and Latin America. He adds that there is much interest in the country amongst Chinese companies and that an increasing number of these have set up branches in Suriname over the past ten years.¹⁰⁴ Current Chinese ambassador to Suriname emphasised Zhang's statement in 2019 and added that Chinese-Surinamese continue to act as a bridge between China and Suriname and are the reason why the relationship between the two countries is so successful.¹⁰⁵


¹⁰³ 'Bouterse: China Is Onze Belangrijkste Ontwikkelingspartner'.

¹⁰⁴ 'Ambassadeur Zhang: Suriname Is Belangrijk Voor China'.

¹⁰⁵ René Gompers, 'Ambassadeur: Chinese Surinamers Blijven Brug Naar China', *Starnieuws*, 21 October 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/55156>.

Deriving from the above statements, it is surprising to find not a single case of Chinese OFDI in Suriname in China Global Investment Tracker from the American Enterprise Institute, currently the most renowned international database on Chinese OFDI. See figure 2.

Figure 2: Chinese OFDI in Latin America, 2005-2014



(Source: China Global Investment Tracker, the American Enterprise Institute, 2019)

But Chinese OFDI in Suriname could be missed by the China Global Investment Tracker, as this only includes investments starting from €100 million. Average investments in a small country like Suriname will likely be smaller. Other sources are thus necessary to find details on Chinese OFDI in Suriname.

For the period 1990s until 2008, Paul Tjon Sie Fat's dissertation gives a unique and very well-detailed overview. The first Chinese projects run in Suriname were based on gifts or loans from the Chinese government, as was encountered in the previous chapter. This consists of the building of a gymnasium in the 1980s, different social housing projects in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the road rehabilitation project by Dalian as described in the previous chapter. In addition to the fact that these projects were 'arranged' by the Chinese government, another defining characteristic is that for all these projects all labour was imported, and thus did not bring about much employment for Suriname. The Chinese argument to defend this practice was consequently that local labour was too expensive and not amply qualified.¹⁰⁶

Dalian has now been active for a long time in Suriname, as the current Dalian Road Rehabilitation Project IV has been launched. Already, in 2009, it was known that Dalian was

¹⁰⁶ Tjon Sie Fat, *Chinese New Migrants in Suriname*, 152–62.

not limiting itself to road projects, but had been diversifying into rock mining and forestry, both using imported labour from China.¹⁰⁷

With regard to private Chinese investments in Suriname, Tjon Sie Fat exemplifies that it is very difficult to draw an accurate picture of this, but that most of these took place in extractive industries, such as logging and palm oil production. Companies involved in logging were attracted by the huge market demand in China for wood and the abundance of wood and lack of good forest governance and administration in Suriname.¹⁰⁸ Moreover Chinese logging enterprises could often rely on Chinese transnational networks that linked Chinese businessmen with the government of China on the one hand and with individual ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Suriname on the other. Tjon Sie Fat describes the cases of the Chinese investors Tacoba Forestry Consultant N.V., Finestyle Investments (Suriname) N.V. and Suriname Ji Shen Forestry and Timber Industry N.V., who entered the Surinamese logging industry between 1995 and 2005 with absolutely no experience in logging. Instead, they were drawn into it by the prospect of undiscovered opportunities and the potential of quick profits. Although they ran concessions up to 30.000 ha, all projects were managed unprofessionally, stopped after a limited number of years and caused much damage to the forest and the reputation of Chinese companies and nationals in Suriname.¹⁰⁹

Another example is that of China Zhong Heng Tai, who in 2002 got a concession of 52.000 ha to set up a palm-oil production facility. As part of the deal Zhong Heng Tai had exclusive rights to clear the forest of its current trees and use the profits of this Surinamese wood to pay for its investment in palm production, a strange construction that benefits Suriname little. It quickly turned out that this company also had no experience in palm oil production, nor tropical forestry. But other than in the aforementioned cases, the Zhong Heng Tai project immediately met with critical responses from the Surinamese public.¹¹⁰ As of 2019 still no activities related to palm-oil production are employed by Zhong Heng Tai at the concession.¹¹¹

Although different Chinese ambassadors to Suriname praised Chinese investments in Suriname and the Surinamese government at times specifically asked the Chinese embassy for more private Chinese investments¹¹², most known cases of Chinese investment in Suriname come from state enterprises. Even an enumeration by the Association of Chinese Enterprises in Suriname of their members' activities in Suriname stuck with the already described cases of

¹⁰⁷ 'Bouterse Geeft Overzicht van Huizenbouwprojecten', *Starnieuws*, 9 June 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/53076>.

¹⁰⁸ In the mid-1990s only about 6% of the forests within the Surinamese Forestry Service's area of operation were considered to be 'managed' or 'partly managed'.

¹⁰⁹ Tjon Sie Fat, *Chinese New Migrants in Suriname*, 163–69.

¹¹⁰ Tjon Sie Fat, 178.

¹¹¹ 'Brunswijk Wil Intrekken Concessie China Zhong Heng Tai', *Starnieuws*, 7 June 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/53049>.

¹¹² 'Sapoen Wil Meer Chinese Investerings in Productiesector', *Starnieuws*, 2 April 2013, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/16347>.

road rehabilitation, bridge- and house construction, the building of a stadium and investments in the timber industry.¹¹³

In the Chinese media it was noted in 2014 that banking company China UnionPay was to launch its first official Latin American debit card in in Suriname to gain experience in a different culture, and as testing ground for expansion towards the whole of Latin America. In cooperation with De Surinaamsche Bank it announced the launch of the first UnionPay prepaid card in October 2014 and the first UnionPay credit cards by the second quarter of 2015.¹¹⁴ Around the same time it was announced in the Chinese press that Chinese credit rating agency Dagong would make its American debut in Suriname after the latter had appointed Dagong to give it a sovereign rating.¹¹⁵

The only actual Chinese standard OFDI case in Suriname in recent years is that of Broad Homes, a case which was also referenced in the previous chapter. Broad Homes announced in 2015 the opening of its first overseas factory in Suriname.¹¹⁶ The plan to set up a production base in Suriname was developed in 2012 when an official delegation from Suriname visited China and an agreement was signed on the development infrastructure and 18,000 homes in Suriname, for which the Chinese Exim Bank approved a \$50 million loan.¹¹⁷ Although Broad Homes is presented as a private company and supposedly invested \$20 million in its Surinamese factory, there was also an agreement between Broad Homes and the Surinamese authorities that 65 percent of the Broad Homes produced houses would be bought by the Surinamese government.¹¹⁸ It wouldn't be surprising if the 2012 'Concessional loan 1000 housing project' of \$47,3 million that Suriname signed with the Export-Import Bank of China includes a term that obliges Suriname to use the borrowed money for the purchase of houses from Broad Homes. This makes it debatable in what aspects Broad Homes is actually acting differently from a state-owned enterprise. During my trip to Suriname I visited the Surinamese Broad Homes plant, but the management never responded to my request for an interview on their Surinamese activities. I have thus not been able to examine the claim that hardly a prefab house came out of the factory since the opening in 2015, as several Surinamese told me.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ 'Chinese Bedrijven Gaan Grotere Bijdrage Leveren', *Starnieuws*, 20 December 2015, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/32896>.

¹¹⁴ Xuanqian Zhou, '苏里南银行发行拉美首张银联卡 (UnionPay Enters Suriname Testing Ground)', *上海金融报 (Shanghai Financial News)*, 31 October 2014, <https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJFLa4>.

¹¹⁵ '大公开拓拉美业务 评定苏里南国家信用等级 (Dagong Debuts in LatAm with Its Suriname Ratings)', *人民网财经频道 (People's Financial Channel)*, 22 July 2014, <http://finance.people.com.cn/stock/n/2014/0722/c67815-25319110.html>.

¹¹⁶ '留言反馈 - 远大住工国际有限公司', accessed 1 June 2020, <http://www.bhomeglobal.com/e-content/53.aspx>.

¹¹⁷ Gonzales, 'Broad Homes Opens Overseas Site with Production Base in Suriname'.

¹¹⁸ '湖南：住宅产业化成经济增长新亮点 (Foreign Housing Industry Becomes a New Bright Spot in Economic Growth Hunan)'.

¹¹⁹ See also; Bryan Boerleider, "'Betaalbare Woningen" Steeds Meer Een Mythe', *Starnieuws*, 13 March 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/51657>; Idris Naipal, 'Gaan We Nu Toffee

In a weird way Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd., also cannot longer be regarded as a private company. As state-controlled China Reform Holdings Corp. Ltd. took over 58% of the shares of Dagong, effectively turning it from a privately-owned company to a state-owned enterprise. The takeover was necessary after Dagong was banned from rating debt since August 2017 for irregularities in their business practice.¹²⁰

Apart from these traceable cases, there are also media reports of planned Chinese investments which have never materialised. The supposedly signed Memorandum of understanding between the Surinamese government and Chinese companies Cheng Dong International and China Harbour of 2010 is a good example. This agreement was supposed to represent a value of \$6 billion and would include a road and railroad from Paramaribo to Brazil, a deep sea harbour, a sea dam and a highway to Suriname's airport.¹²¹ Whereas China Harbour is a well-known enterprise in Latin America, i.e. as the constructor of the expansion of the Cheddi Jagan International Airport in Guyana and the 2020 dredging of the Suriname river¹²², there is virtually nothing to be found about Cheng Don International. This makes one wonder how this article came to be and, even more, why it was brought up by scholars as source material for Chinese activities in Suriname.¹²³

5.2 Economic role ethnic Chinese population in Suriname

As shown thus far Suriname, other than claimed by some Chinese diplomats and journalists, does not have an impressive record with FDI from large Chinese private corporations. The main source of private Chinese OFDI in Suriname inarguably comes from Chinese individuals and small-scale enterprises.

Chinese people have been living in Suriname for over 160 years and, as shown in chapter 2, it is common in Surinamese society to distinguish between Old and New Chinese migrants. Reliable data on Chinese migration to Suriname is lacking, but the ethnic Chinese population in Suriname has been estimated to be approximately 40.000 persons.¹²⁴ There are different reasons why Chinese people moved to Suriname, but the majority left their hometowns in search for a way to improve one's standard of living. Whereas some Chinese migrants came to Suriname on their own initiative, most (especially new) Chinese migrants

Maken in de Huizenfabriek?', *Starnieuws*, 28 February 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/51459>.

¹²⁰ Qinqin Peng, Yuzhe Zhang, and Timmy Shen, 'State Firm Takes Over Disgraced Credit Rating Agency Dagong - Caixin Global', 18 April 2019, <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-04-18/state-firm-takes-over-disgraced-credit-rating-agency-dagong-101406014.html>.

¹²¹ Mark McGowan, 'Suriname's Deep Sea Port, Road and Rail Link to Brazil Challenge Guyana's Bid to Become Brazilian Gateway', *Stabroek News*, 12 December 2010, <https://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/12/12/news/guyana/suriname%e2%80%99s-deep-sea-port-road-and-rail-link-to-brazil-challenge-guyana%e2%80%99s-bid-to-become-brazilian-gateway/>.

¹²² 'Jogi Wil Weten Waarom China Harbour Surinamerivier Baggert'.

¹²³ Ellis, 'Suriname and the Chinese', 90.

¹²⁴ Wilfred Leeuwijn, 'Vraagtekens Bij ABS-Census Cijfers Chinezen in Suriname', *Starnieuws*, 9 December 2013, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/19163>.

were asked by relatives to join their business in Suriname. This chain migration is mostly linked to the Chinese domination in the retail economy; relatives are brought in from China to be employed in a shop or supermarket in Suriname.¹²⁵ Also is there a group of Chinese migrants who came to Suriname as they were sent by a Chinese company or the Chinese government, often to work in construction projects.¹²⁶

As discussed in chapter 2, some claim that the New Chinese came to Suriname and got involved in the retail business at the direction of the Chinese government and to act in the interest of China from this position. This seems to be a somewhat far-fetched argument, likely born out of an unease with the behaviour of a majority of the New Chinese. Whereas the Old Chinese have assimilated, New Chinese do not generally take part in society, but instead commit themselves completely to the continuing and the survival of their own business. Workdays or opening hours of 18 hours are not uncommon. On my visit to Suriname, I was told that with Chinese New Year, the most important holiday for ethnic Chinese, all the enterprises in the country were closed, apart from the shops ran by Chinese. Ethnic Chinese compete non-Chinese companies out of the market with their work ethic and access to cheap Chinese goods. This, combined with the fact that New Chinese immigrants often hardly speak a local language raises xenophobic reactions towards ethnic Chinese with the Surinamese population.¹²⁷

A survey by the Shanghai Jiaotong University in 2013 showed that of all researched Latin American countries Suriname gave the lowest score when asked about the trustworthiness of Chinese (just 17% of the recipients saw Chinese as trustworthy).¹²⁸ Over the years there have been different cases of violence against New Chinese shop-owners, some including murder.¹²⁹ The Chinese organisations in Suriname have been asking the government for measurements to protect the Chinese society in Suriname and this has been a topic for discussions between the Chinese embassy and the Surinamese government.¹³⁰ News of violence to ethnic Chinese in Suriname have reached Chinese media as well¹³¹ and it is not

¹²⁵ Tjon Sie Fat, 'Old and New Chinese Organizations in Suriname', 190.

¹²⁶ J. Uitterlinden, 'De Constructie van Etnische Groeps grenzen van Nieuwe En Oude Chinese Migranten in Suriname' (Master Thesis, Tilburg University, 2014), 76.

¹²⁷ Uitterlinden, 3.

¹²⁸ Peng Jiang, '上海交大调查显示 中国模式在拉美受青睐 (China Seen Favorably in Latin America)', *文汇报 (Wenweipo Newspaper)*, 13 June 2013, <http://sh.eastday.com/m/20130613/u1a7451815.html>.

¹²⁹ 'Gewapende Criminelen Beroven Leden Chinese Vereniging', *Starnieuws*, 20 January 2014, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/21248>; 'Roofmoord op Chinese ondernemer; moeder en zoon gekneveld', *Suriname Herald* (blog), 29 March 2018, <https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2018/03/29/roofmoord-op-chinese-ondernemer-moeder-en-zoon-geknveld/>.

¹³⁰ 'Vraag Om Meer Veiligheid Bij Chinees Nieuwjaarsviering', *Starnieuws*, 28 January 2017, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/39615>.

¹³¹ Xinhua, '两家中资企业在南美国家苏里南遭抢劫 (Two Chinese-Owned Enterprises Robbed in Suriname)', *中国新闻网 (ChinaNews.Com)*, 6 October 2014, <http://www.chinanews.com/shipin/2014/06-10/news440876.shtml>.

unlikely that the donation of 300 security camera's from China to Suriname was a response to the reports of Surinamese violence against ethnic Chinese.

No evidence was found to any involvement of the Chinese government in Chinese migration to Suriname. Moreover, two empirical studies on the reasons for Chinese to move to Suriname both show that the sheer majority arrived as a result of chain migration.¹³² As I speak Mandarin, I was able to interview eight (New) Chinese retailers.¹³³ When asked for their motivation to come to Suriname they all answered that they knew somebody already living in Suriname. They believed that coming to Suriname could offer them an opportunity to start their own business in the future and grow their wealth, for which they saw no opportunities back home. What was striking, was that five of them had been in Suriname for less than two years. Besides, all of them knew other Chinese that had come to Suriname, failed to successfully run a shop and moved back to China within 12 months. One of the persons I interviewed was in Suriname for the second time, as his first attempt failed. He told me that it is normal practice for newly-arrived Chinese to rent a shop from a Chinese that has been in Suriname longer and built up his or her own business. The newly-arrived Chinese then pays rent to use the location, either right away or through becoming indebted to the owner, and is responsible for making a profit from running the shop. If this goes well the person who runs the shop will eventually invest in his own building and so expand the number of Chinese shops in Suriname. Those who are not successful will go back to China and the shop-owner will use his or her links in China to find someone new to come run the shop. Another of the other Chinese retailers I interviewed told me that he arrived in Suriname as a construction worker for one of the Dalian projects and then learned about the possibilities to open one's own business. He first had his wife come over from China to start working in one of the Chinese shops and when his contract with Dalian was finished he joined her. He mentioned that this was not uncommon and that more people have stayed in Suriname after they were sent there as a construction worker.

As Chinese immigrants dominate the Surinamese retail sector and outcompete Surinamese entrepreneurs with their unparalleled work ethic, one wonders why all these Chinese immigrants are allowed to stay and work in Suriname. Whether a deal was made between the Chinese and Surinamese government for this is unknown, but the Chinese embassy in Suriname has at times pressured the Surinamese government to award residence permits to Chinese in Suriname.¹³⁴ Chinese associations in Suriname also devote themselves to this cause, and in a country with weak institutions like Suriname this could easily bring effect. In 2009, for example, large-scale illegal sales of residence permits to Chinese was reported.¹³⁵ There are

¹³² Uitterlinden, 'De Constructie van Etnische Groepsgrenzen van Nieuwe En Oude Chinese Migranten in Suriname', 66–68, 77; Tjon Sie Fat, *Chinese New Migrants in Suriname*, 123–29.

¹³³ The interviews I took were non-structured and thus no transcriptions are available. In Appendix 8 a list is found with details about the interviews taken.

¹³⁴ 'China Vraagt Vlotte Afhandeling 400 Verblijfsvergunningen', *Starnieuws*, 14 November 2014, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/26109>.


¹³⁵ 'Surinaamse visa te koop aangeboden in China', *Waterkant*, 29 July 2009, <https://www.waterkant.net/suriname/2009/07/29/surinaamse-visa-te-koop-aangeboden-in-china/>.

also regular reports on large groups of illegal Chinese in Suriname¹³⁶ and it seems relatively easy for such persons to attain legal status.¹³⁷

5.3 Trade relations Suriname – China

This chapter has showed that next to a domination in the Surinamese retail sector, the ethnic Chinese community also plays an important role in attracting unofficial Chinese FDI to Suriname, especially within the timber industry. One of the observations regarding China’s economic policies towards developing countries implies that China invests in developing countries to gain access to their resources. To test accuracy of this observation with the case of Suriname, but to also test the observation that China invests in developing countries to develop new export markets for Chinese manufactures, this last subchapter will examine the Sino-Surinamese trade data of the period 2000 – 2018 as showed in figure 3.

Figure 3: Trade relations Suriname - China, 2000-2018



(Source: Export by China to Suriname, 2000–2018 & Export by Suriname to China 2000-2018, WITS, 2020)

When focussing on Surinamese exports to China, no clear signs of ‘resource extraction’ can be observed. Wood is Suriname’s most exported commodity to China, but according official statistics Suriname only listed 67 on the list of wood trade partners of China between

¹³⁶ See i.a.; ‘Onderzoek Illegaal Verkregen Surinaamse Identiteitsbewijzen’, *Starnieuws*, 17 July 2019, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/53663>; ‘155 Personen Het Land Uitgezet’, *Starnieuws*, 13 July 2017, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/42338>; ‘Haïtianen En Chinezen Toppen Lijst Legalisatie Vreemdelingen’, *Starnieuws*, 13 August 2018, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/48459>.

¹³⁷ ‘Bouterse: Verblijfsvergunning Illegale Chinezen Naar US\$ 2000’, *Starnieuws*, 16 February 2018, <https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/45726>.

2000 and 2018.¹³⁸ But interestingly enough does China possess the leading position of Suriname's wood export destinations, as 35% of all Surinamese wood was exported to China in the same period.¹³⁹ China, however, already had this position in 2001, just a year after the initiation of Chinese Going Out policy and before Chinese investment in Suriname, by means of loan agreements, started. Although the annual Surinamese wood exports to China six folded between 2001 and 2018, one cannot speak of Chinese resource extraction in this context as the total of Surinamese wood export grew thirteen times that same period.

A stronger trend is visible in the Chinese export figures to Suriname. As the value of Chinese exports to Suriname increased twentyfold between 2000 and 2018, which was twice the growth rate of Chinese global exports that same period, it seems that Chinese economic activities in Suriname have indeed resulted in new export markets for Chinese goods.¹⁴⁰

5.4 Conclusion

Although the China Global Investment Tracker does not record any Chinese OFDI in Suriname, it has been shown that there is certainly plenty of Chinese investment in Suriname, albeit primarily at the scale of private entrepreneurs. These investments are closely linked to the ethnic Chinese population in Suriname. This community makes for an easy entrance into the country, primarily in the retail sector, but also for Chinese companies who seem attracted to Suriname for its natural riches and the relative lack of regulations or enforcement of these.

Suriname has experience with Chinese companies active in resource extraction in the timber industry, but, different than what the literature on both Suriname as the developing world suggests, trade data gives no proof of Chinese resource-extraction in Suriname as a result of increased investments. Quite the opposite as China's share in Surinamese wood trade, Suriname's main reported export product to China, halved between 2001 and 2018.

The observation that China invests in developing countries to create new export markets is, by contrast, supported by this same trade data as is shown that Chinese exports to Suriname grew twice as much as Chinese total growth in export in the period 2000-2018. The role of the ethnic Chinese population in Suriname in this development is unclear, although it seems likely that this role was pivotal as through language and the hometown network they have improved access to Chinese exporters supplying products cheaper than available on Surinamese

¹³⁸ 'Import by China Wood in US\$ Thousand 2000 - 2018 | WITS | Data', accessed 27 June 2020, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/StartYear/2000/EndYear/2018/TradeFlow/Import/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/BY-COUNTRY/Product/44-49_Wood#.

¹³⁹ Worldbank, 'Export by Suriname Wood in US\$ Thousand 2000 - 2018 | WITS | Data', accessed 28 June 2020, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SUR/StartYear/2000/EndYear/2018/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/BY-COUNTRY/Product/44-49_Wood#.

¹⁴⁰ Worldbank, 'Export by China All Products in US\$ Thousand 2000 - 2018 | WITS | Data', accessed 28 June 2020, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/StartYear/2000/EndYear/2018/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/WLD/Product/Total>.

traditional markets. Additionally, can they employ these same assets to act as a Surinamese 'local' partner by Chinese FDI.

There is no evidence that the Chinese government in any way coordinates the migration of New Chinese to Suriname, but indirectly it influences this process through signing loan agreements that dictate the involvement of Chinese companies and sending large numbers of Chinese construction workers. The latter do not always return to China after their job is finished. Also, the Chinese embassy, at moments, uses its leverage over Suriname to push the Surinamese government for measures favourable to the Chinese community in Suriname.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study is to position Chinese economic activities in Suriname within China's general activities in the developing world. The literature study of the chapters 2 and 3 disclosed that a number of observations regarding China's economic relationship with the developing world apply to Suriname. Several of these observations have been tested with quantitative and/ or qualitative research and below the results of this will be listed, followed by general observations and implications of the results of this study

China is generally accepted to be a latecomer with foreign investments that aim at access to resources and, therefore, is forced to invest in second-choice regions. For China this would be not as problematic as for others, as China is less critical of the countries it invest in or lend to. This last observation is in line with findings in this study, as is shown that Latin American countries with a low credit rating, received more Chinese loans relative to their economy than countries with a better credit rating. China is, thus, willing to take more credit risks than traditional lenders. However, whereas China is often accused of taking these risks to gain access to resources, no proof of large-scale Chinese resource extraction is found in Suriname.

Just as no proof was found for resource extraction, also the claim that China's economic activities in the developing world, and Suriname specifically, are partly orchestrated to increase support for Chinese diplomatic causes cannot be backed by this study. Support for China's standpoint within the UN is found to be high amongst Latin American and Caribbean countries, but this is indiscriminately throughout all researched countries and just a weak correlation with indebtedness to China is found.

The observation that a considerable part of Chinese investments is aimed at developing new export markets for Chinese goods is, on the other hand, clearly confirmed by the results of this study, as the value of Chinese exports to Suriname increased twentyfold between 2000 and 2018, a rate twice as much as the growth of Chinese global exports. To the question as to whether Suriname acts as an entrance point for Chinese goods to a greater Latin-American market, this study does not pose any answers.

Research into the terms and conditions of Chinese loans granted to Suriname has brought interesting insights. In the first place Chinese loans are not found to have considerably harsher conditions than non-Chinese loans. This finding reduces the plausibility of the claim that China is consciously luring Suriname into a debt trap. Further investigation has, moreover, shown that all Chinese loans to Suriname have created business opportunities for Chinese enterprises and employment for Chinese workers. This gives the impression that the rationale behind official Chinese economic activities in Suriname is first and foremost to create new markets for Chinese business. And this in the widest definition of the word; not only is the export of Chinese manufactured goods stimulated, but also that of Chinese services and construction workers.

Chinese direct investments in Suriname happen primarily at the scale of small sized enterprises and are closely linked to the ethnic Chinese population of Suriname. Most Chinese entrepreneurs are active within the retail sector. This entrepreneurship is private, stimulated through an ethnic Chinese domination of the Surinamese retail sector and chain migration. Different to what some observers of Chinese activities in Suriname claim, there is no evidence that the Chinese government encourages the migration of Chinese to Suriname. But, whether conscious or unconscious, it influences this process by signing loan agreements with Suriname that stimulate Chinese construction workers to be employed in Suriname, of which some also end up as entrepreneurs in Surinamese retail.

Given the above it can be stated that the character of the Chinese economic influence in Suriname differs from China's international economic strategy elsewhere in the developing world when it comes to resource extraction and the expansion of diplomatic influence. But, at the same time, China's economic activities in Suriname are clearly focussed on developing new markets for Chinese business, something that is also part of the general image of China's economic policy towards developing countries. The results of this study do not pose a clear explanation for China's apparent focus on developing Suriname into an export market over resource extraction, but the easy access to the Surinamese market through the ethnic Chinese domination of Suriname's retail industry plays in all probability an important role here. Also does the study not leave the possibility out that Suriname is used as an entrance point for exports or activities in the wider Latin American market.

Perhaps the most important question is what effects Chinese loans have on the economic development of Suriname, which, within the academic debate on Chinese economic activities in the developing world, is likely the most fiercely debated topic. Based on this study, Chinese loans seem not to have a positive effect on the economic development of Suriname and one-sidedly benefit China. Suriname has signed loan agreements with China for very specific projects and, as showed, all these projects are carried out by Chinese companies and Chinese labourers. Some investments, like the installation of a broadband network, would indeed necessitate foreign technology, but most Chinese loans agreements were signed for infrastructural projects. The fact that these projects are also executed by Chinese companies and workers, while Suriname has its own local companies who could do this work, inarguably frustrates the development of the Surinamese economy. Surinamese companies will not get the opportunity to profit or learn from these projects. Besides, employment opportunities for Surinamese are reduced by importing Chinese labour and all earnings from these projects end up in China, while Suriname finds itself indebted to China.

Whether Chinese immigration to Suriname is as negative for Surinamese economy, is less clear. It is true that the retail sector is dominated by ethnic Chinese and that their work ethic makes it hard for other groups to compete with them. But the question is whether profits stay in Suriname or are being remitted to China. Most Chinese came to Suriname seeking ways

to increase their financial position and that of their relatives. This could mean that most of their profits would be sent back to China and that the immigrant eventually returns to China. But figures of remigration are lacking, whilst it is clear that a big group of ‘Old Chinese’ never returned to China and instead have integrated in the Surinamese society. Whether this will be the case for New Chinese remains to be seen, especially now that technology allows them to remain part of the community in their hometown and so much of the pressure to integrate in Surinamese society has been taken away.

As the Sino-Surinamese loan structure clearly benefits China more than Suriname, it should be wondered why Suriname has entered this relationship. Although a topic less treated in this research, it is not unthinkable that Chinese loans pose a threat to good governance in Suriname. Due to his controversial track-record Surinamese president Bouterse has not been able to maintain Suriname’s traditional economic and aid relation with the Netherlands. China was, alternatively, a very attractive partner for Bouterse as it did not ask questions about his past or governance. Bouterse, a populist leader, has often been accused of using investments from China to impress his supporters and secure re-election. That said, the first infrastructure loan with China was signed in 2004 and the first Chinese construction workers arrived in Suriname years before Bouterse became president in 2010. Whether China would have suggested certain projects to Suriname is unclear, but in the light of China’s surplus of construction workers and Chinese ambassador to Suriname Zhang’s remark that the completion of projects was one of his main tasks in Suriname, this possibility cannot be excluded.

Within the Western media Chinese foreign economic activities are often welcomed with much scepticism and China’s activities in Suriname are no exception to this. According to the findings in this study Chinese loans have no positive influence on the Surinamese economy, but no signs of a conscious debt trap policy towards Suriname are found either. Moreover, different observers do rightfully note that neither do Western aid and lending have a great track record. A look at the list of all loan agreements Suriname signed with foreign lenders between 2012 and 2019 makes one thing clear though. The country finds itself in an economic position such that it is even forced to enter loan agreements for projects as simple as a census, a feasibility study or service to three helicopters. Suriname is a small country with relatively weak institutions and, just as many developing countries, it faces serious challenges to actually develop. Chinese loans are not likely to play a positive role in this, and Suriname should hope the burden of these loans will not turn into Chinese debt traps still. Contrarily, what, should be hoped for the country is a normalization of its relations with the Netherlands. As over half of the Surinamese population lives in the Netherlands and both countries share centuries of shared history, Suriname would most likely benefit more from a redesign of the traditional close economic relation with the Netherlands, than from its current relation with China.

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APPENDIX 1: HISTORICAL GDP PER COUNTRY LATIN AMERICA

GDP by country															
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	284.204	268.697	97.724	127.587	164.658	198.737	232.557	287.531	361.558	332.976	423.627	530.163	545.982	552.025	526.320
Bahamas	8.076	8.318	8.881	8.870	9.055	9.836	10.167	10.618	10.526	9.982	10.096	10.070	10.721	10.563	10.913
Bolivia	8.398	8.142	7.905	8.082	8.773	9.549	11.452	13.120	16.674	17.340	19.650	23.963	27.084	30.659	32.996
Brazil	655.421	559.372	507.962	558.320	669.317	891.630	1.107.640	1.397.084	1.695.825	1.667.020	2.208.872	2.616.201	2.465.189	2.472.806	2.455.994
Chile	77.861	70.980	69.737	75.643	99.210	122.965	154.788	173.606	179.638	172.389	218.538	252.252	267.122	278.384	260.542
Colombia	99.887	98.212	97.963	94.641	117.082	145.181	161.190	205.707	241.711	232.494	286.104	334.454	370.574	381.867	381.112
Costa Rica	14.950	15.913	16.505	17.196	18.529	19.948	22.603	26.744	30.613	30.562	37.269	42.263	46.473	49.745	50.578
Cuba	30.565	31.682	33.591	35.901	38.203	42.644	52.743	58.604	60.806	62.080	64.328	68.990	73.141	77.148	80.656
Dominica	333	340	333	343	367	364	390	421	458	489	494	501	486	498	520
Ecuador	18.328	24.468	28.549	32.433	36.592	41.507	46.802	51.008	61.763	62.520	69.555	79.277	87.925	95.130	101.726
Guyana	713	712	726	743	788	825	1.458	1.740	1.917	2.061	2.273	2.576	2.862	2.988	3.078
Jamaica	8.985	9.178	9.694	9.399	10.151	11.204	11.902	12.828	13.680	12.067	13.221	14.445	14.807	14.263	13.898
Mexico	707.907	756.706	772.106	729.336	782.241	877.476	975.387	1.052.696	1.109.989	900.045	1.057.801	1.180.490	1.201.090	1.274.443	1.314.564
Peru	51.745	52.030	54.778	58.731	66.769	76.061	88.643	102.171	120.551	120.823	147.529	171.762	192.649	201.175	200.789
Suriname	948	834	1.094	1.274	1.484	1.793	2.626	2.937	3.533	3.875	4.368	4.422	4.980	5.146	5.241
Trinidad and Tob	8.154	8.825	9.008	11.305	13.280	15.982	18.369	21.642	27.872	19.172	22.158	25.433	25.763	27.268	27.616
Uruguay	22.823	20.899	13.606	12.046	13.686	17.363	19.579	23.411	30.366	31.661	40.284	47.962	51.264	57.531	57.236
Venezuela	117.141	122.904	92.894	83.621	112.453	145.510	183.478	230.364	315.953	329.788	393.192	316.482	381.286	371.005	482.359

(Source: World Bank. GDP is expressed in \$ million)

APPENDIX 2: APPLIED METHOD TO UNIFORMIZE LOAN AGREEMENTS.

The 90 foreign loan agreements signed by Suriname between 2012 and 2019 used for the comparison of terms and conditions of Chinese and non-Chinese loans in chapter 4 originally do not allow fair comparison as the loan agreements differ from each other in maturity periods, currency and interest rate structures. Besides do some loan agreements contain commitment fee structures that are calculated over the undisbursed credit of a loan. To enable equal comparing, several actions were taken to uniformize the loan agreements, these are described below.

Loans with interest rates based on variables.

Several loans were based on variable interest rates such as Libor and Euribor. As at the time of constructing the loan the actual height of these rates was known to the borrower, he or she made a conscious choice for a certain fixed or variable interest rate. When the variable rate of the date of signing thus is found, this reflects the rate chosen for by the borrower at time of signing and can thus be compared with fixed rates. The actual Libor / Euribor / US Swap Rates (plus optional defined margin) at the date of signing are now taken as the interest rate of loans with defined variable interest rates.

Uniform terminology

As many different additional terms were applied and different terminology was used, I have structured these into the following categories;

- ‘Fixed’ origination fees on aggregated amount. Under this category I have brought all ‘one-off’ costs (in opposite to annually calculated rates). Fees in this category are e.g. Front-end Fees, Appraisal Fees, Structuring Fees, Letter of Credit Issuance Fee and fixed management fees. Also was there a transaction fee noted as an exact amount once. This has been translated into a percentage as well and added to this category.
- Insurance Premiums; Some (commercial) lenders also calculated additional fees to insure them against default from Suriname. In some cases, insurance or risk mitigation fees were mentioned in amounts, these have been calculated into a percentage based on the aggregated loan amount.

Include fixed origination fees and insurance fee within interest rate structure

To calculate the fixed originated fees and insurance fees as part of the whole interest rate I have used the following method;

- Assuming all loans are signed on a linear base.
- Made a spreadsheet that calculates the actual amount of rent monthly paid based on lend amount, agreed interest and monthly instalments (initial loan/ maturity);

- Interest amount Month 1 = Initial Loan * (1+InterestRate / 12(months))
- Interest amount Month 2 = (Initial Loan – Instalment Month 1) * (1+InterestRate / 12(months))
- Interest amount Month 3 = (Initial Loan – Instalment Month 2) * (1+InterestRate / 12(months))
- Etc.
- Then made the same calculations, but with the Initial Loan * (1+FixedFee +InsuranceFee).
 - This gave slightly higher monthly interest amounts as the initial amount is higher.
 - By then dividing this slightly higher monthly interest amount by the Initial Amount of the same month. This gave a interest rate that includes the FixedFee and InsuranceFee).

Undisbursed fee rate

Undisbursed fees are the costs charged by the lender for undisbursed credit. The actual additional costs that these fees will give are not possible to calculate, as it is not known what the part of each loan is disbursed by Suriname and what part is not. Besides could this change over time as the Surinamese government can decide to make additional disbursements during the term of the loan. Fortunately does Suriname state the total of the undisbursed foreign loans in their annual financial statements. By combining this data with the total foreign debt of any given year an average percentage of the foreign debt that is undisbursed can be calculated (See table below).

- To include the Commitment fee rate into the Interest Rate the Commitment Fee rate was multiplied with the Average Undisbursed Loan Percentage. As the Commitment fee is standing interest rate (vs. a one-off rate) the resulting rate was simply added to the Interest Rate.

<i>Surinamese Foreign debt & undisbursed loans (*\$ 1M)</i>												
Description	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Total foreign debt	390,3	391,1	297,9	319,2	269	334,4	463	567,2	739,2	810,6	876,6	5458,5
Undisbursed foreign loans	100,8	107,1	120,8	305,3	357,2	295,9	222,5	229,7	233,3	267,8	331,8	2572,2
Foreign debt + undisbursed	<u>491,1</u>	<u>498,2</u>	<u>418,7</u>	<u>624,5</u>	<u>626,2</u>	<u>630,3</u>	<u>685,5</u>	<u>796,9</u>	<u>972,5</u>	<u>1078,4</u>	<u>1208,4</u>	8030,7
% Undisbursed	21%	21%	29%	49%	57%	47%	32%	29%	24%	25%	27%	32%

(Source: UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

Currencies

As different loans were given out in different currencies, all have been calculated back to dollars by making use of the historic exchange rate of the date of signing.

APPENDIX 3: FOREIGN LOAN AGREEMENTS SURINAME, 2012-2019

Lender		Year	Amount	Maturity (mths)	Grace (mths)	Interest
Export-Import Bank of China	China	2012	\$ 47.300.000	240	60	2,00%
This agreement was signed on July, 27 , 2012. For an amount of \$ 47,3 mln to finance the building of 1000 houses						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 15.000.000	240	60	1,22%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to support the Government of Suriname's efforts to enhance the effectiveness of spending on non-contributory social protection programs and improve efficiency of targeting of important social protection programs to promote poverty reduction and human capital development.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 5.000.000	240	60	1,22%
The general objective of the Project is to increase and facilitate the use of the basic demographic, social, economic, and cultural information of the Republic of Suriname. The specific objectives of the Project are: (i) to update the statistical data and improve its accuracy; (ii) to achieve greater accessibility to disseminated data; and (iii) to produce and disseminate data in a timely manner through the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the General Bureau of Statistics (GBS).						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 13.700.000	240	60	1,09%
The overall objective of the multi-phase program is to increase the learning outcomes of students in the education system of Suriname from pre-primary through junior secondary education nationally, and improve the internal efficiency and quality of the new basic education system.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 15.000.000	240	60	0,99%
The general objective of the Program is to increase the efficiency, transparency, sustainability and accountability of the power sector. The specific objectives are to develop an institutional and regulatory framework and to strengthen the corporate capabilities of the sector to supply electricity in an economic, efficient and sustainable manner.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 20.000.000	240	60	0,99%
The objective of this second operation of the programmatic series is to support the Government of Suriname reform efforts to enhance public expenditure management. The reforms combine policy initiatives and government actions in three areas (1) public investment management (2) public procurement (3) public financial management and audit.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2012	\$ 40.000.000	300	60	0,99%
The general objective of the Project is to improve access to important economic zones and facilitate tourism And regional integration of the country, through lower transport cost and improved road safety that will be attained by the rehabilitation and improvement of the Meerzorg-Albina corridor.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 50.000.000	240	72	1,17%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to aims to support the execution of a policy-based reform program consisting of improving the effectiveness of financial institutions and markets in providing credit and other financial services to firms and households, and reducing their vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks. The specific objectives of the program are the enhancement of the enabling environment in which the financial markets and institutions operate, both public and private, and the strengthening of the capabilities of the Central Bank of Suriname to execute its core responsibilities.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 50.000.000	240	72	1,17%
This agreement was signed on July, 09, 2013. For an amount of \$ 50 mln and is entered into pursuant to the Trust Fund agreement signed between the Bank and the People's Bank of China for the establishment of the China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean, on January 14, 2013. The general objective of the proposed Program is to aims to support the execution of a policy-based reform program consisting of improving the effectiveness of financial institutions and markets in providing credit and other financial services to firms and households, and reducing their vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks. The specific objectives of the program are the enhancement of the enabling environment in which the financial markets and institutions operate, both public and private, and the strengthening of the capabilities of the Central Bank of Suriname to execute its core responsibilities.						

Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 10.000.000	240	72	1,16%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to support the execution of a policy-based reform program to increase the efficiency, transparency, sustainability and accountability of the power sector. The specific objectives of the program are to develop an institutional and regulatory framework and to strengthen the corporate capabilities of the sector to supply electricity in an economic, efficient and sustainable manner.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 15.000.000	240	72	1,16%
The general objective of the operation is to contribute to the growth of the agricultural sector, through an increase of the sector's productivity. The specific objectives are to develop institutional and policy reforms to enhance farmers' access to improved public agricultural services.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 20.000.000	240	72	1,16%
The objectives of the program are to (i) strengthen the country's fiscal position over the medium and long term, through an increase in tax revenue; and (ii) improve efficiency in tax and customs administration.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2013	\$ 30.000.000	240	96	1,16%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to contribute to the sustainability of the power sector by strengthening EBS' operational procedures and corporate performance and by improving the sustainability of rural electricity supply. The specific objectives are to support the implementation of information technologies in business support tools for EBS, to provide financial support for upgrading critical infrastructure, and to contribute to expand electricity coverage by grid extension and renewable energy systems in the Hinterlands. The main components of the program are: (i) Improvement of EBS' operations; (ii) Sustainable Rural Electrification; and (iii) Critical Infrastructure.						
The OPEC Fund for International Development	Multilateral	2013	\$ 13.800.000	180	48	4,50%
The general objective of the proposed program is to support the economic growth of Suriname, through the rehabilitation and improvement of the 2-lane 140 km road linking the capital city of Paramaribo with the Eastern border of the French Guyana. The objectives of the Project will be achieved through the implementation of the following components.						
ING Bank N.V.	Commercial	2014	\$ 12.298.875	42	12	4,49%
The general objective of the proposed program is to build the bridge of Carolinakreek.						
ING Bank N.V.	Commercial	2014	\$ 33.213.910	138	12	4,49%
The general objective of the proposed program is to build the bridge of Carolinakreek.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 5.000.000	240	48	1,12%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to support the execution of a policy-based reform program consisting of increasing the value added of the private sector in the economy.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 15.000.000	240	72	1,12%
The general objective of the proposed Program is to support the execution of a policy-based reform program consisting of increasing the value added of the private sector in the economy.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 5.270.000	120	60	1,68%
The general objective of the proposed project is to: establish and equip training hubs, give support to project Management, support the establishment of a National Training Authority (NTA) and build institutional capacity within the country.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 50.000.000	144	60	1,88%
The general objective of the proposed project is to contribute to poverty alleviation through the achievement of the targets outlined in the Republic of Suriname National Health sector plan (2011-2018) which aim to ensure that all Surinamese citizens have equal access to basic health services. Specifically, the project aims to improve the quality and quantity of the healthcare services by upgrading the Academic Hospital of Paramaribo and five Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. In addition to providing standard specialized medical services for all the population of Suriname, the hospital will serve as a "Center of Excellence" for training and research.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 5.500.000	180	48	2,00%
The general objective of the proposed project is to: establish and equip training hubs, give support to project Management, support the establishment of a National Training Authority (NTA) and build institutional capacity within the country.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 5.000.000	180	36	1,50%

The general objective of the proposed project is to: establish and equip training hubs, give support to project Management, support the establishment of a National Training Authority (NTA) and build institutional capacity within the country.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2014	\$ 10.000.000	240	72	1,50%
The general objective of the proposed project is to contribute to poverty alleviation through the achievement of the targets outlined in the Republic of Suriname National Health sector plan (2011-2018) which aim to ensure that all Surinamese citizens have equal access to basic health services. Specifically, the project aims to improve the quality and quantity of the healthcare services by upgrading the Academic Hospital of Paramaribo and five Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. In addition to providing standard specialized medical services for all the population of Suriname, the hospital will serve as a "Center of Excellence" for training and research.						
The OPEC Fund for International Development	Multilateral	2014	\$ 26.500.000	252	60	4,50%
The general objective of the proposed project is to contribute to poverty alleviation through the achievement of the targets outlined in the Republic of Suriname National Health sector plan (2011-2018) which aim to ensure that all Surinamese citizens have equal access to basic health services. Specifically, the project aims to improve the quality and quantity of the healthcare services by upgrading the Academic Hospital of Paramaribo and five Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. In addition to providing standard specialized medical services for all the population of Suriname, the hospital will serve as a "Center of Excellence" for training and research.						
Agence Française De Développement	France	2015	\$ 14.286.718	180	66	2,22%
The general objective of the proposed project is to reinforce the water sector in Suriname.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2015	\$ 18.570.000	204	60	4,27%
The general objective of the proposed project is to assist the borrower in: establish and equip training hubs, give support to project Management, support the establishment of a National Training Authority (NTA) and build institutional capacity within the country.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2015	\$ 3.370.000	240	60	2,50%
The general objective of the proposed project is to assist the borrower in: establish and equip training hubs, give support to project Management, support the establishment of a National Training Authority (NTA) and build institutional capacity within the country.						
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited	China	2015	\$ 65.300.000	168	30	4,55%
The general objective is the construction of 70 kilometer roads in Suriname.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2015	\$ 33.000.000	300	66	1,39%
The general objective of the proposed project is to support the strengthening of EBS's institutional and operational processes by financing improvements in information technology management and contribute to the upgrade and retrofitting of the National Power System's critical infrastructure, with the aim of improving the reliability of the EPAR sub-system.						
Republic Bank Limited of Trinidad	Commercial	2015	\$ 50.000.000	12		7,41%
The general objective of the proposed loan agreement is exclusively to assist the borrower with capital budget expenditures.						
ABN-AMRO Bank N.V.	Commercial	2016	\$ 19.611.605	75	15	2,85%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the dike construction project at the Commewijne river.						
ABN-AMRO Bank N.V.	Commercial	2016	\$ 25.073.210	78	18	2,54%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the dike construction project at the district of Coronie.						
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.	Commercial	2016	\$ 27.096.946	120	30	3,29%
The general objective of the agreement is the implementation of phase 1 for the construction of Anton de Kom University, including laboratory, dorms and lecture halls.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 50.000.000	144	24	3,29%
The general objective of the agreement is to assist the Government of Suriname in financing the programme to support reforms in the energy sector.						
China Dalian International Cooperation (Group) Holdings Ltd.	China	2016	\$ 5.797.000	5		4,40%

This agreement was signed on March 30, 2016 for an amount of USD 5.797 million for the payment of 85% of the credit Insurance of the above mentioned project which is finance with a loan signed in 2015 with China Industrial and Commercial Bank.						
Export-Import Bank of China	China	2016	\$ 98.467.000	180	60	3,14%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Suriname National Broadband Network Project, which has been signed between Telesur and Huawei Technologies Co. LTD.						
Export-Import Bank of China	China	2016	\$ 235.000.000	240	60	2,14%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Suriname National Infrastructure Projects (Dalian IV)						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 20.000.000	300	66	2,09%
The general objective of the agreement is to contribute to the financing and execution of the Second Basic Education Improvement Program phase 2 that aims at increasing learning outcomes of all primary school students and improving the internal efficiency of the education system.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 70.000.000	306	66	2,09%
The general objective of the agreement is to support the execution of a policy based reform program to increase the efficiency, transparency, sustainability and accountability of the power sector.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 30.000.000	3		6,00%
The general objective of this project is that the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) shall purchase petroleum products to Suriname with the Energie Bedrijven Suriname (EBS) as the executing agency.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 20.000.000	36		7,00%
The general objective of this project is that the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector will from time to time sell commodities to the Republic of Suriname at a deferred price on spot delivery and deferred payments terms with the Staatsolie N.V. as the executing agency.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 19.170.000	162	42	2,21%
The general objective of the proposed project is to improve the access to secondary and technical education by constructing and equipping one modern secondary and technical campus with boarding facilities with a capacity of 1.140 students. And will enhance the quality of secondary and technical education by (i) providing trainings to pedagogic and administrative staff as well as learning and teaching materials and update the curricula, and (ii) providing institutional capacity building to the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 4.420.000	168	48	2,21%
The general objective of the proposed project is to improve the access to secondary and technical education by constructing and equipping one modern secondary and technical campus with boarding facilities with a capacity of 1.140 students. And will enhance the quality of secondary and technical education by (i) providing trainings to pedagogic and administrative staff as well as learning and teaching materials and update the curricula, and (ii) providing institutional capacity building to the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 7.210.000	186	54	2,21%
The general objective of the proposed project is to improve the access to secondary and technical education by constructing and equipping one modern secondary and technical campus with boarding facilities with a capacity of 1.140 students. And will enhance the quality of secondary and technical education by (i) providing trainings to pedagogic and administrative staff as well as learning and teaching materials and update the curricula, and (ii) providing institutional capacity building to the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2016	\$ 5.900.000	237	57	2,20%
The general objective of this project is to enhance the capacity of Suriname in rice production in order to maintain self-sufficiency and increase the export of high quality rice.						
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2016	\$ 4.781.814	60	12	3,24%
The general objective of the agreement is the implementation of phase 1 for the construction of Anton de Kom University, including laboratory, dorms and lecture halls.						
Oppenheimer & Co. INC	Commercial	2016	\$ 86.000.000	18		8,57%
The purpose for the issuance is to raise funds for the financial and monetary reform program of the government.						
Oppenheimer & Co. INC	Commercial	2016	\$ 550.000.000	120		9,25%
The purpose for the issuance is to raise funds for the financial and monetary reform program of the government.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 498.850	216	24	2,50%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "Feasibility Study to Upgrade Water Supply Facilities.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 32.500.000	540	60	2,50%

The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the “Power Project – Electricity System Upgrade and Expansion” from the EBS.						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2017	\$ 8.640.000	144	36	1,63%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the supply of three (3) nos. pumps with allied accessories and services for Wageningen pumping stations.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 20.000.000	300	66	2,33%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the Paramaribo Urban Rehabilitation Program.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 17.500.000	300	66	2,33%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the Agricultural Competitiveness Program.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 40.000.000	360	66	2,49%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the Fiscal Strengthening to Support Economic Growth Program.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 35.000.000	12		6,00%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the goods purchased from the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 25.000.000	180	6	3,27%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the Affordable Housing Project (LISP III).						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2017	\$ 10.000.000	300	84	1,50%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the Affordable Housing Project (LISP III).						
Oppenheimer & Co. INC	Commercial	2017	\$ 46.500.000	18		9,00%
This agreement was signed on December 27, 2017 for an amount up to USD 75.000.000,- . The actual issuance of US\$ 46.500.000,- took place on the 4th of January 2018.						
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.	Commercial	2018	\$ 20.356.977	120	30	2,59%
The general objective of the agreement is the implementation of phase 2 for the construction of the Anton de Kom University.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2018	\$ 14.818.000	156	36	4,12%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the replacement of approximately 40.324 high pressure sodium street lights with high efficiency light-emitting diode systems and the establishment of an advanced metering system, including the installation of 21.000 smart electricity meters in Suriname.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2018	\$ 15.000.000	156	36	3,04%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the replacement of approximately 40.324 high pressure sodium street lights with high efficiency light-emitting diode systems and the establishment of an advanced metering system, including the installation of 21.000 smart electricity meters in Suriname.						
Caribbean Development Bank	Multilateral	2018	\$ 32.500.000	468	60	3,62%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance and execute the “Power Project – Electricity System Upgrade and Expansion” from the EBS.						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2018	\$ 27.500.000	180	60	4,18%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the up-gradation of transmission network infrastructure.						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2018	\$ 3.500.000	180	60	4,18%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the servicing and maintenance of three (3) Chetak helicopters.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2018	\$ 20.000.000	288	78	3,52%
The general objective of the agreement is to contribute to the reduction of the burden of disease in Suriname by improving access to high quality, integrated primary care services and enhancing the effectiveness of the health sector to address priority epidemiological challenges.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2018	\$ 30.000.000	288	78	3,52%
The general objective of the Program is to increase agricultural productivity in the Republic of Suriname through investments in infrastructure and management of Irrigation and Drainage (I&D) systems and by improving the quality and availability of agriculture statistics.						
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2018	\$ 3.606.203	48	12	4,93%

The general objective of the agreement is the implementation of phase 2 for the construction of the Anton de Kom University.						
Agence Française De Développement	France	2019	\$ 5.690.075	243	63	2,08%
The general objective of the agreement is to finalize the construction of Albina Hospital and proceed to its operationalization						
Credit Suisse	Commercial	2019	\$ 9.942.818	80	42	3,13%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of a project for the implementation of an agro-industrial park in Suriname, which comprise a dairy farm, a vegetable farm and irrigated field crops.						
Credit Suisse	Commercial	2019	\$ 64.665.022	282	42	1,41%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of a project for the implementation of an agro-industrial park in Suriname, which comprise a dairy farm, a vegetable farm and irrigated field crops.						
Export-Import Bank of China	China	2019	\$ 199.215.749	240	60	2,09%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the “J.A. Pengel International Airport Expansion Project”.						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2019	\$ 15.000.000	144	36	4,50%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance activities in connection with the Design, Manufacture, supply, Supervision, installation and commissioning of 19 vertical axis pumps with electric motor, gear box, control panel, lubrication system, couplings and sets of special tools and commissioning spares in 10 locations namely Marienburg, Montresoir, Zorgvliet in Commewijne District, Djakartaweg, Henar, Rotterdam in Nickerie District, Bombay Kanaal, Jankie Kanaal, La Poule, Zondervan Kanaal in Saramacca District.						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2019	\$ 11.130.000	180	60	3,74%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Rehabilitation and Up gradation of De Melkcentrale N.V. Milk Processing Plant.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2019	\$ 30.000.000	300	66	4,02%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of a project for the alleviation of the impact that a serve or catastrophic natural disaster could have on the county’s finances, by increasing stability, and efficiency of contingent financing to address emergencies.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2019	\$ 45.000.000	300	60	3,17%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of the “Improving Transport Logistics and Competitiveness in Suriname” program						
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Multilateral	2019	\$ 23.000.000	353	71	3,53%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the “Competitiveness and Sector Diversification Project”.						
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Multilateral	2019	\$ 35.000.000	360	72	4,12%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance activities in regard with the reducing of flood risk for the people and assets in the Greater Paramaribo Area and improving the operation of the Saramacca Canal System.						
International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation	Multilateral	2019	\$ 25.000.000	6		6,12%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the purchase of Foodstuff, Medical Supplies, Agriculture Inputs, Fertilizers, Cement and Construction Materials.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2019	\$ 41.320.000	240	54	2,83%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Expansion of Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution System project of Suriname.						
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2019	\$ 1.830.469	60	12	2,64%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the construction of the Auditorium of Anton De Kom University (Phase 2B).						
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2019	\$ 2.465.455	60	6	2,58%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of a project for the initiation, development, implementation, support and operation of a computing project in Suriname’s health system including the development, supply and implementation of a computer infrastructure and the custom-made system in the Dutch language.						

Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2019	\$ 13.970.914	150	42	2,17%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the execution of a project for the initiation, development, implementation, support and operation of a computing project in Suriname's health system including the development, supply and implementation of a computer infrastructure and the custom-made system in the Dutch language.						
Israel Discount Bank Ltd.	Commercial	2019	\$ 10.372.655	152	32	1,99%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the construction of the Auditorium of Anton De Kom University (Phase 2B).						
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development	Kuwait	2019	\$ 16.471.060	240	48	3,16%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "Expansion of Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution Systems Project"						
The OPEC Fund for International Development	Multilateral	2019	\$ 26.000.000	216	48	4,60%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "Expansion of Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution Systems Project"						
The OPEC Fund for International Development	Multilateral	2019	\$ 6.000.000	216	48	4,60%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "Health Facilities Improvement Project"						
Export-Import Bank of India	India	2020	\$ 35.800.000	180	60	3,51%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the "Rural Electrification through Solar DG Hybrid PV systems in 50 remote villages in Suriname.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2020	\$ 10.000.000	300	66	2,99%
The general objective of the agreement is to promote Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and exports through the operationalization of InvestSur.						
Inter American Development Bank	Multilateral	2020	\$ 30.000.000	300	66	2,99%
The general objective of the agreement is improve rural economic development, by ensuring adequate and modern access to sustainable electricity to enhance the living conditions of the rural population while improving the rural business environment with better provision of electricity as a public service.						
Islamic Development Bank	Multilateral	2020	\$ 2.200.000	144	48	1,50%
The general objective of the agreement is to finance the Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design for New Hospital on The Premises of The Academic Hospital (AZP).						

(Source: Surinamese Bureau of National Debt, 2020)

APPENDIX 4: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS LABELED ‘INTERVENTION’

2000	
R/54/267	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/55/114	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
R/55/115	Human rights situation in Iraq
R/55/116	Situation of human rights in the Sudan
R/55/129	Emphasizes the need for strengthening the educational system in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967, including Jerusalem, and specifically the need for the establishment of the proposed university and Requests the Sec
R/55/130	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
R/55/132	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan
R/55/133	Israeli Practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem
R/55/134	Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions on the occupied Syrian Golan. Also calls upon Israel to desist from the establishment of settlements
R/55/180A	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/55/20	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba
R/55/209	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
R/55/50	Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular the so-called Basic Law
R/55/51	Declares that that the Israeli decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void and has no validity whatsoever, as confirmed by the Security Council in its resolution
R/55/55	Expresses its full support for the ongoing peace process which began in Madrid. Stresses the necessity for commitment to the principle of land for peace
R/55/87	The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
2001	
R/55/180B	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/56/142	The right of Palestinian people to self-determination
R/56/171	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
R/56/174	Situation of human rights in Iraq
R/56/175	Situation of human rights in the Sudan
R/56/204	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
R/56/214A	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/56/214B	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/56/31	Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular the so-called Basic Law
R/56/32	Declares that that the Israeli decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void and has no validity whatsoever, as confirmed by the Security Council in its resolution
R/56/36	Expresses its full support for the ongoing peace process which began in Madrid. Stresses the necessity for commitment to the principle of land for peace
R/56/58	Emphasizes the need for strengthening the educational system in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967, including Jerusalem, and specifically the need for the establishment of the proposed university and Requests the Sec
R/56/59	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
R/56/61	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan
R/56/62	Israeli Practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem

R/56/63	Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions on the occupied Syrian Golan. Also calls upon Israel to desist from the establishment of settlements
R/56/9	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba
2002	
R/57/11	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba
R/57/110	Expresses its full support for the ongoing peace process which began in Madrid. Stresses the necessity for commitment to the principle of land for peace
R/57/111	Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular the so-called Basic Law
R/57/112	Declares that that the Israeli decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void and has no validity whatsoever, as confirmed by the Security Council in its resolution
R/57/123	Emphasizes the need for strengthening the educational system in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967, including Jerusalem, and specifically the need for the establishment of the proposed university and Requests the Sec
R/57/124	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
R/57/126	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan
R/57/127	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem
R/57/128	Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions on the occupied Syrian Golan. Also calls upon Israel to desist from the establishment of settlements
R/57/198	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
R/57/228	Requests the Secretary-General to resume negotiations, without delay, to conclude an agreement with the Government of Cambodia, Recommends that the Extraordinary Chambers should have subject-matter jurisdiction consistent with that set forth in
R/57/230	Situation of human rights in the Sudan
R/57/232	Situation of human rights in Iraq
R/57/269	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
2003	
R/57/325	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
R/58/100	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/194	Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/195	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/196	Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/22	Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/229	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/23	The Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/98	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/58/99	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2004	
R/58/307	Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/123	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the Occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/124	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / submitted by the General Assembly
R/59/125	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/205	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/206	Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/59/207	Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/251	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/32	Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/59/33	The Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2005	
R/59/307	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/106	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/107	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/108	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/170	Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/171	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/172	Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/173	Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/174	Situation of human rights in Uzbekistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/183	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/60/41	Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2006	
R/60/278	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/11	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/116	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/117	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted
R/61/118	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/119	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/120	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/152	The right of the Palestine people to self-determination: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/174	Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/175	Situation of human rights in Belarus: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/176	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/184	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/22	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/23	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/232	Situation on human rights in Myanmar: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/24	Special information programme on question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/25	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/26	Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2007	
R/61/250B	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/61/250C	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/106	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/62/107	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted
R/62/108	Israeli settlements in the Occupies Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/110	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/167	Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/168	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/169	Situation of the human rights in Belarus : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/222	Situation of human rights in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/3	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/80	Committee on the Exercise of Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/81	Division for Palestine Rights of the Secretariat: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/82	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Departement of Public Information of the Secretariat: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/83	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/62/84	Jerusalem: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2008	
R/62/265	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/26	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/27	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/28	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Departement of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/29	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/3	Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/7	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/95	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israel Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/96	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1249, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / ad
R/63/97	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/63/98	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adoptef by the General Assembly
R/63/99	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2009	
R/64/16	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/17	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/175	Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/176	Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/18	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/19	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/238	Situation of human rights in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/6	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/91	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israel Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/64/92	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / ado
R/64/93	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/94	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/64/95	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2010	
R/65/102	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/65/104	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/65/106	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/65/14	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/65/16	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2011	
R/66/14	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/66/16	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/66/6	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/66/77	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adop
R/66/79	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/66/80	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/118	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/120	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/122	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/20	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/22	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/4	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/12	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/14	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2012	
R/67/118	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/119	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / ado
R/67/120	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/121	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/122	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/19	Status of Palestine in the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/20	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/21	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/67/22	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/23	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/67/4	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2013	
R/68/12	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/13	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/14	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/15	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/235	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/80	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/81	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/82	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/83	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/68/84	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2014	
R/68/292	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/189	Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/20	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/21	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/22	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/23	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/241	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/5	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/90	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/91	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/92	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/93	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/94	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/99	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2015	
R/69/286	Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/69/302	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/103	Dissemination of information on decolonization : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/12	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/13	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/70/14	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/15	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/225	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/234	Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/87	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/88	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/89	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/90	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/91	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2016	
R/70/265	Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/70/280	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/104	Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/121	Dissemination of information on decolonization : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/122	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/20	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/205	Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/21	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/22	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/23	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/95	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/96	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/97	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/98	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/99	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2017	
R/71/290	Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/71/307	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/11	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/110	Dissemination of information on decolonization : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/111	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/12	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/13	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/14	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/190	Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/72/248	Situation of human rights in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/84	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/85	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/86	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/87	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/88	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/ES-10/19	Status of Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2018	
R/72/280	Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/282	Complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/72/299	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/100	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/122	Dissemination of information on decolonization : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/123	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/18	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/182	Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/19	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/20	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/21	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/255	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/263	Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/264	Situation of human rights in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/8	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/88	The situation in Afghanistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/96	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/97	Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/98	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/73/99	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/ES-10/20	Protection of the Palestinian civilian population : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
2019	
R/73/298	Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/10	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/11	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/12	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/13	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Global Communications of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

R/74/168	Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/169	Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/243	Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/246	Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/7	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/87	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/88	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/89	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/9	The situation in Afghanistan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/90	The occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
R/74/95	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

(Source: UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

APPENDIX 5: APPLIED METHODOLOGY COMPARISON CHINESE INDEBTEDNESS WITH RSVC

To compare a country's UN voting behavior with its Chinese debts relative to GDP the same data and way of calculation is used as in subchapter 4.1. The difference with the analysis in subchapter 4.1 is however that in that subchapter the moment of the signing of a loan was important, whereas for the analysis of subchapter 4.3 the total of Chinese debts (as a percentage of GDP) that a country holds at any moment is the defining value. It is namely this indebtedness to China that determines the leverage that China holds over a country and can use to influence countries to vote in Chinese interest. Recalculating¹ the data from 3.1 to the needs for this analysis gave the following overview;

Table 5.1 The Chinese debt as percentage of GDP countries Latin America 2000-2014

Total of Chinese Aid & Loans (* \$ 1M)															
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,05%	0,04%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,30%	0,34%	0,36%	0,83%
Bahamas	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,58%	24,91%	23,77%	24,12%	23,35%
Bolivia	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,31%	0,26%	0,51%	0,40%	2,07%	4,95%	4,32%	3,82%	3,38%	4,18%
Brazil	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,01%	0,01%	0,05%	0,08%	0,10%	0,29%	0,25%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%
Chile	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,12%	0,09%	0,14%	0,47%	0,45%	0,48%
Colombia	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%
Costa Rica	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,80%	0,78%
Cuba	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,12%	0,11%	0,11%	0,10%	0,10%	0,09%	0,09%
Dominica	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	14,05%	13,46%
Ecuador	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	1,95%	4,01%	6,60%	6,22%	7,22%	8,64%
Guyana	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	2,03%	1,89%	1,71%	1,51%	1,36%	1,30%	1,27%
Jamaica	0,13%	0,13%	0,12%	0,13%	0,12%	0,11%	0,10%	0,09%	0,09%	0,10%	3,01%	2,76%	2,69%	4,89%	5,02%
Mexico	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%
Peru	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,11%	0,09%	0,09%	0,11%
Suriname	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	2,92%	2,42%	1,65%	1,59%	5,29%	4,83%	4,28%	4,23%	4,76%	5,58%	4,65%
Trinidad & Tobago	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,55%	0,54%
Uruguay	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,14%	0,12%	0,09%	0,09%	0,09%	0,08%	0,08%	0,07%	0,12%
Venezuela	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,18%	0,27%	0,22%	1,54%	1,46%	2,74%	2,13%

(Source: AidData, 2017)

The Chinese debt percentage of GDP as shown in table 5.1 is next combined with the percentage of resolutions in which a country voted similar to China. These rates have been categorized per year and per subject category. For Suriname this gave the overview as shown in table 5.2, in which 77% means that in Suriname voted similar to China in 77% of the resolutions in that respective category and year.

Table 5.2 Suriname's rate of similar voting to China per category, 2000-2019

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Suriname	0%	0%	0%	0%	2,9%	2,4%	1,7%	1,6%	5,3%	4,8%	4,3%	4,2%	4,8%	5,6%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%
Total	61%	80%	96%	87%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	85%	86%	81%	88%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	82%
Intervention	50%	63%	100%	78%	78%	60%	78%	80%	100%	83%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	80%	88%	88%	85%	81%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	60%	89%	90%	91%	91%
Nuclear Weapons	70%	-	-	78%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	76%	56%	53%	38%	58%	53%
Disarmament	64%	100%	100%	82%	88%	89%	91%	88%	83%	76%	81%	78%	63%	72%	81%	47%	50%	62%	57%	65%
Human Rights	64%	75%	100%	86%	89%	78%	81%	88%	83%	91%	75%	88%	81%	90%	86%	74%	77%	80%	70%	79%
Dcolonization	67%	100%	100%	89%	100%	90%	93%	100%	86%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	86%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	100%

(Source: AidData, 2017; UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

¹ For each year the indebtedness to China is per country calculated by adding up the total of all Chinese loans signed by the country in the previous 10 years and then dividing this by the country's GDP of that year. Although the majority of Chinese loans are often longer (see appendix 3) here the conservative assumption is made that the average length is 10 years for sake of equal calculations.

Table 5.4 RSCV & Chinese debt as percentage of GDP countries Latin America, annually ranked by height, 2000-2019

Total																					Aver.	Average
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	CN debt	
# UN resolutions	67	67	72	73	71	73	85	76	75	64	65	68	68	60	78	76	80	90	104	98		
	78%	84%	87%	88%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	92%	83%	82%	85%	82%	73%	76%	80%	77%	81%	84%	
	70%	69%	71%	68%	90%	87%	89%	89%	90%	92%	85%	82%	87%	64%	81%	65%	72%	96%	75%	89%	81%	
	82%	79%	86%	84%	77%	89%	86%	86%	85%	88%	89%	82%	81%	90%	88%	80%	76%	81%	80%	79%	83%	
	79%	81%	85%	84%	76%	85%	88%	91%	88%	89%	89%	86%	85%	88%	87%	77%	73%	81%	79%	80%	83%	
	78%	81%	85%	84%	88%	85%	86%	86%	89%	92%	89%	86%	82%	85%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	82%	84%	
	78%	73%	83%	79%	86%	78%	86%	83%	81%	83%	87%	82%	81%	88%	87%	79%	78%	86%	82%	81%	82%	
	79%	82%	83%	82%	83%	87%	85%	85%	88%	92%	89%	89%	82%	87%	85%	76%	77%	81%	81%	83%	84%	
	75%	83%	81%	73%	78%	84%	88%	89%	81%	86%	91%	84%	78%	88%	87%	77%	74%	81%	76%	78%	81%	
	92%	94%	94%	99%	87%	88%	87%	83%	81%	88%	92%	90%	78%	83%	83%	78%	74%	81%	77%	79%	85%	
	61%	71%	79%	90%	78%	79%	82%	80%	76%	83%	83%	84%	81%	87%	79%	74%	70%	78%	74%	79%	78%	
	81%	83%	86%	87%	96%	93%	87%	89%	78%	83%	85%	81%	85%	85%	86%	75%	74%	80%	78%	75%	83%	
	84%	86%	88%	88%	89%	92%	95%	93%	87%	80%	77%	82%	74%	83%	83%	78%	74%	82%	76%	78%	83%	
	84%	88%	89%	86%	91%	86%	92%	89%	80%	83%	82%	85%	79%	88%	88%	80%	76%	82%	76%	61%	83%	
	72%	75%	77%	77%	90%	87%	91%	88%	82%	86%	82%	82%	72%	86%	84%	78%	73%	80%	78%	79%	81%	
	61%	80%	96%	87%	85%	82%	88%	91%	89%	86%	86%	78%	69%	80%	79%	73%	70%	76%	76%	76%	80%	
	71%	79%	84%	86%	88%	86%	84%	84%	86%	89%	69%	81%	76%	85%	86%	80%	78%	83%	83%	83%	82%	
	73%	75%	78%	76%	78%	81%	90%	91%	80%	83%	80%	88%	82%	82%	78%	71%	69%	66%	67%	70%	77%	
	84%	85%	87%	86%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	88%	88%	87%	82%	78%	79%	70%	67%	78%	73%	68%	82%	
Germany	54%	49%	53%	47%	54%	56%	59%	61%	56%	51%	52%	53%	49%	49%	47%	41%	44%	56%	54%	45%	52%	
Japan	61%	60%	60%	56%	56%	64%	62%	64%	64%	55%	60%	57%	53%	55%	53%	51%	53%	58%	58%	53%	58%	
Netherlands	54%	49%	51%	52%	56%	58%	59%	62%	57%	51%	49%	52%	47%	50%	47%	41%	48%	56%	52%	47%	52%	
United States	15%	10%	11%	11%	8%	7%	9%	7%	9%	11%	11%	16%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	14%	11%	13%	12%	

(Source: AidData, 2017; UN General Assembly voting records, 2020)

APPENDIX 6: UN SIMILAR VOTING TO CHINA RATE PER COUNTRY, SUBJECT AND YEAR.

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Argentina	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,05%	0,04%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,30%	0,34%	0,36%	0,83%	0,83%	0,83%	0,83%	0,83%	0,83%
Total	70%	69%	71%	68%	76%	78%	86%	83%	81%	83%	82%	84%	78%	83%	83%	78%	74%	81%	77%	79%
Intervention	75%	76%	79%	70%	70%	55%	72%	69%	92%	69%	91%	91%	91%	91%	79%	87%	78%	68%	71%	63%
Middle East	86%	86%	85%	78%	94%	93%	94%	94%	94%	93%	94%	94%	94%	93%	85%	85%	86%	77%	81%	82%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	64%	60%	67%	64%	85%	75%	77%	77%	85%	67%	71%	58%	78%	55%	50%	53%	58%	53%
Disarmament	53%	53%	47%	42%	53%	68%	82%	82%	79%	76%	81%	78%	71%	82%	81%	58%	55%	73%	67%	65%
Human Rights	47%	45%	55%	55%	68%	58%	77%	67%	65%	73%	65%	75%	73%	81%	79%	79%	69%	76%	67%	76%
Dcolonization	85%	83%	82%	90%	89%	80%	87%	82%	80%	79%	85%	83%	85%	85%	85%	80%	83%	77%	77%	80%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Bahamas	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,58%	24,9%	23,8%	24,1%	23,3%	23,3%	23,3%	23,3%	23,3%	23,3%
Total	82%	79%	86%	84%	88%	87%	88%	89%	87%	86%	87%	83%	82%	85%	82%	73%	76%	80%	77%	81%
Intervention	79%	69%	79%	70%	80%	64%	71%	69%	83%	67%	90%	90%	82%	91%	85%	82%	88%	74%	76%	69%
Middle East	100%	93%	85%	89%	94%	93%	94%	94%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	93%	84%	86%	90%	86%	92%	89%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	82%	80%	82%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	75%	53%	50%	47%	58%	53%
Disarmament	73%	71%	82%	83%	88%	89%	91%	88%	83%	76%	81%	78%	65%	72%	76%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%
Human Rights	75%	69%	80%	82%	84%	72%	73%	81%	87%	78%	77%	75%	86%	81%	83%	82%	76%	79%	74%	79%
Dcolonization	92%	82%	82%	88%	88%	80%	87%	91%	87%	86%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Bolivia	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,31%	0,26%	0,51%	0,40%	2,1%	4,9%	4,3%	3,8%	3,4%	4,2%	4,2%	4,2%	4,2%	4,2%	4,2%
Total	79%	81%	85%	84%	86%	87%	89%	89%	85%	92%	92%	82%	85%	88%	87%	79%	78%	86%	82%	81%
Intervention	81%	82%	86%	70%	67%	50%	81%	80%	100%	85%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	93%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Nuclear Weapons	64%	60%	73%	70%	75%	73%	77%	83%	67%	75%	83%	67%	71%	55%	78%	50%	47%	47%	58%	47%
Disarmament	60%	60%	71%	67%	76%	89%	86%	94%	79%	81%	87%	72%	71%	65%	74%	47%	59%	67%	52%	63%
Human Rights	76%	80%	85%	82%	84%	72%	88%	79%	77%	91%	87%	88%	82%	100%	93%	93%	85%	94%	85%	92%
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Brazil	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	####	0,01%	0,05%	0,08%	0,10%	0,29%	0,25%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%	0,26%
Total	78%	81%	85%	84%	83%	85%	86%	86%	81%	86%	89%	90%	81%	88%	88%	80%	76%	82%	76%	61%
Intervention	75%	76%	79%	70%	80%	64%	78%	75%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	93%	89%	79%	76%	31%
Middle East	95%	95%	95%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	90%	86%	85%	45%
Nuclear Weapons	82%	90%	100%	100%	83%	64%	85%	100%	69%	77%	92%	75%	71%	67%	83%	55%	50%	40%	53%	47%
Disarmament	60%	73%	82%	83%	82%	70%	86%	88%	79%	76%	88%	83%	71%	78%	89%	53%	50%	67%	62%	60%
Human Rights	71%	70%	75%	64%	63%	58%	77%	63%	62%	70%	70%	71%	73%	76%	79%	69%	76%	67%	67%	41%
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	92%	50%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Chile	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,12%	0,09%	0,14%	0,47%	0,45%	0,48%	0,48%	0,48%	0,48%	0,48%	0,48%
Total	78%	73%	83%	79%	78%	84%	87%	83%	80%	83%	85%	78%	85%	88%	83%	78%	74%	82%	76%	78%
Intervention	81%	82%	86%	70%	70%	55%	78%	75%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	93%	89%	84%	86%	81%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	90%	91%	92%	91%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	82%	80%	75%	82%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	64%	78%	55%	50%	47%	56%	53%
Disarmament	73%	73%	82%	83%	76%	95%	91%	88%	79%	76%	81%	78%	65%	76%	78%	47%	50%	67%	55%	65%
Human Rights	65%	50%	75%	64%	63%	58%	77%	63%	62%	70%	70%	71%	73%	76%	79%	69%	76%	67%	67%	76%
Dcolonization	92%	83%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	91%	87%	93%	100%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Colombia	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%	0,02%
Total	79%	82%	83%	82%	87%	88%	82%	80%	76%	80%	77%	78%	69%	78%	79%	70%	67%	78%	73%	68%
Intervention	73%	83%	58%	30%	40%	20%	72%	69%	92%	69%	91%	91%	91%	91%	86%	80%	78%	74%	71%	75%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	89%	94%	100%	83%	82%	82%	80%	80%	82%	75%	80%	75%	75%	75%	73%	80%	59%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	70%	70%	75%	73%	75%	75%	67%	85%	65%	67%	64%	58%	75%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%
Disarmament	73%	73%	82%	83%	88%	95%	91%	94%	79%	82%	81%	78%	65%	72%	76%	42%	50%	67%	57%	65%
Human Rights	65%	75%	80%	86%	89%	79%	69%	63%	65%	65%	57%	63%	59%	67%	72%	75%	65%	74%	59%	59%
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	90%	100%	90%	87%	91%	80%	86%	85%	83%	85%	85%	92%	90%	92%	85%	92%	70%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Costa Rica	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,80%	0,78%	0,78%	0,78%	0,78%	0,78%	0,8%
Total	75%	83%	81%	73%	78%	79%	87%	89%	82%	86%	86%	81%	76%	83%	79%	74%	70%	78%	74%	79%
Intervention	73%	83%	58%	30%	40%	20%	72%	69%	92%	69%	91%	91%	91%	91%	86%	80%	78%	74%	71%	75%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	83%	50%	65%	64%	89%	94%	94%	93%	94%	94%	93%	85%	80%	80%	86%	88%	91%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	80%	80%	82%	82%	85%	83%	67%	85%	85%	67%	64%	58%	78%	55%	45%	47%	58%	53%
Disarmament	71%	71%	76%	83%	88%	95%	91%	94%	79%	82%	81%	78%	65%	72%	78%	47%	50%	67%	57%	68%
Human Rights	60%	78%	79%	64%	63%	58%	73%	78%	69%	74%	74%	71%	68%	76%	72%	71%	62%	71%	59%	72%
Dcolonization	90%	91%	80%	90%	89%	80%	87%	91%	87%	86%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	90%	92%	85%	92%	100%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Cuba	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,12%	0,11%	0,11%	0,10%	0,10%	0,09%	0,09%	0,09%	0			

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Dominica	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	14,0%	13,5%	13,5%	13,5%	13,5%	13,5%	13,5%
Total	61%	71%	79%	90%	89%	92%	92%	89%	89%	89%	69%	88%	82%	64%	81%	65%	72%	96%	75%	89%
Intervention	40%	67%	83%	60%	78%	71%	100%	63%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	67%	77%	100%	100%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	67%	86%	100%	80%
Nuclear Weapons	-	-	71%	-	82%	73%	85%	71%	67%	77%	-	-	64%	-	-	53%	56%	-	80%	100%
Disarmament	-	-	-	-	88%	89%	91%	88%	81%	76%	-	-	63%	-	100%	44%	55%	-	42%	100%
Human Rights	64%	77%	92%	89%	88%	89%	87%	89%	82%	87%	67%	87%	81%	69%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%
Dcolonization	100%	100%	50%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	75%	100%	50%	80%	67%	100%	89%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Ecuador	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1,9%	4,0%	6,6%	6,2%	7,2%	8,6%	8,6%	8,6%	8,6%	8,6%	8,6%
Total	81%	83%	86%	87%	91%	86%	91%	88%	86%	88%	89%	82%	87%	90%	88%	80%	76%	81%	80%	79%
Intervention	80%	82%	86%	67%	80%	55%	78%	75%	100%	85%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	84%	86%	75%
Middle East	100%	100%	95%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	91%	92%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	82%	80%	91%	82%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	79%	67%	72%	55%	50%	40%	58%	53%
Disarmament	73%	73%	82%	83%	88%	95%	91%	88%	79%	76%	81%	72%	76%	72%	74%	47%	50%	60%	52%	65%
Human Rights	76%	80%	85%	86%	89%	74%	85%	78%	81%	87%	85%	83%	77%	100%	83%	77%	79%	79%	70%	76%
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	80%	100%	88%	89%	71%	92%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Guyana	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2,0%	1,9%	1,7%	1,5%	1,4%	1,3%	1,3%	1,3%	1,3%	1,3%	1,3%	1,3%
Total	84%	86%	88%	88%	90%	87%	88%	91%	90%	89%	89%	89%	82%	88%	87%	77%	74%	81%	76%	78%
Intervention	87%	88%	86%	80%	80%	64%	78%	75%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	87%	83%	79%	
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	90%	91%	92%	
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	82%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	55%	72%	53%	47%	47%	53%	
Disarmament	73%	73%	82%	83%	88%	89%	91%	88%	83%	76%	81%	78%	65%	71%	78%	47%	50%	67%	57%	
Human Rights	82%	85%	85%	86%	89%	77%	85%	87%	82%	87%	82%	87%	85%	90%	90%	82%	73%	79%	74%	
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	100%	78%	100%	92%	86%	67%	91%	77%	

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Jamaica	0,13%	0,13%	0,12%	0,13%	0,12%	0,11%	0,10%	0,09%	0,09%	0,10%	3,0%	2,8%	2,7%	4,9%	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%	5,0%
Total	78%	84%	87%	88%	90%	89%	88%	91%	88%	88%	89%	86%	82%	85%	87%	77%	73%	81%	79%	
Intervention	69%	73%	79%	80%	80%	60%	78%	73%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	91%	93%	86%	78%	68%	74%	
Middle East	93%	95%	95%	89%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	90%	84%	86%	82%	
Nuclear Weapons	73%	75%	82%	80%	82%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	76%	55%	40%	47%	58%	
Disarmament	71%	73%	82%	83%	88%	89%	91%	88%	79%	76%	81%	78%	65%	72%	80%	47%	50%	67%	57%	
Human Rights	64%	75%	85%	86%	89%	79%	76%	85%	85%	83%	83%	83%	86%	81%	86%	79%	65%	76%	73%	
Dcolonization	85%	83%	80%	90%	100%	90%	100%	93%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	85%	92%	
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	80%	100%	100%	89%	100%	91%	100%	63%	81%	77%	

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Mexico	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%	0,03%
Total	84%	88%	89%	86%	85%	82%	84%	84%	80%	83%	80%	82%	72%	82%	78%	71%	69%	66%	67%	
Intervention	81%	82%	86%	70%	70%	55%	72%	69%	92%	69%	91%	91%	91%	86%	80%	72%	42%	48%	50%	
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	89%	88%	93%	89%	94%	94%	93%	94%	94%	94%	93%	85%	85%	81%	45%	54%	
Nuclear Weapons	73%	80%	91%	90%	92%	82%	83%	75%	69%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	78%	55%	50%	47%	58%	
Disarmament	80%	87%	94%	92%	88%	89%	91%	88%	74%	76%	88%	78%	65%	72%	78%	42%	50%	67%	65%	
Human Rights	76%	80%	85%	77%	79%	58%	73%	70%	65%	74%	57%	71%	64%	71%	72%	71%	58%	53%	44%	
Dcolonization	100%	100%	100%	90%	89%	80%	86%	91%	87%	86%	85%	83%	85%	85%	90%	92%	62%	69%	90%	
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	86%	92%	91%	80%	83%	100%	65%	100%	83%	86%	67%	87%	85%	

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Peru	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,11%	0,09%	0,09%	0,11%	0,11%	0,11%	0,11%	0,11%	0,11%
Total	72%	75%	77%	77%	77%	85%	85%	85%	78%	83%	82%	81%	74%	80%	79%	73%	70%	76%	76%	
Intervention	67%	71%	69%	50%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	73%	71%	73%	72%	68%	71%		
Middle East	86%	91%	74%	67%	71%	80%	83%	82%	81%	80%	80%	82%	81%	80%	75%	75%	76%	77%		
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	80%	80%	83%	92%	85%	63%	69%	85%	85%	67%	64%	58%	78%	55%	100%	47%		
Disarmament	73%	73%	83%	83%	88%	95%	91%	94%	79%	82%	81%	78%	65%	72%	78%	47%	50%	67%		
Human Rights	59%	65%	63%	64%	63%	58%	69%	65%	58%	65%	61%	67%	59%	67%	69%	75%	65%	71%		
Dcolonization	85%	83%	80%	90%	89%	80%	87%	91%	85%	86%	92%	92%	92%	92%	92%	90%	92%	85%		
Eco Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	81%	80%	100%	88%	78%	100%	92%	83%	100%	92%		

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Suriname	0%	0%	0%	0%	2,9%	2,4%	1,7%	1,6%	5,3%	4,8%	4,3%	4,2%	4,8%	5,6%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%	4,7%
Total	61%	80%	96%	87%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	85%	86%	81%	88%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	
Intervention	50%	63%	100%	78%	78%	60%	78%	80%	100%	83%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	80%	88%	88%		
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	60%	89%	90%		
Nuclear Weapons	70%	-	-	78%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	76%	56%	53%	38%		
Disarmament	64%	100%	100%	82%	88%	89%	91%	88%	83%	76%	81%	78%	63%	72%	81%	47%	50%	62%		
Human Rights	64%	75%	100%	86%	89%	78%	81%	88%	83%	91%	75%	88%	81%</							

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Uruguay	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,14%	0,12%	0,09%	0,09%	0,09%	0,08%	0,08%	0,07%	0,12%	0,12%	0,12%	0,12%	0,12%	0,12%
Total	73%	75%	78%	76%	78%	81%	86%	86%	81%	83%	83%	85%	79%	85%	84%	78%	73%	80%	78%	79%
Intervention	94%	94%	93%	80%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	94%	89%	86%	88%
Middle East	95%	91%	85%	78%	82%	86%	89%	88%	88%	87%	87%	94%	94%	93%	85%	85%	85%	86%	88%	86%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	82%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	76%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%
Disarmament	60%	60%	71%	67%	76%	84%	86%	88%	79%	76%	81%	78%	65%	72%	81%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%
Human Rights	65%	65%	70%	73%	68%	61%	73%	70%	65%	70%	65%	73%	77%	81%	79%	79%	69%	74%	67%	72%
Dcolonization	92%	83%	82%	88%	89%	80%	87%	91%	87%	86%	92%	92%	92%	92%	90%	92%	90%	92%	92%	90%
Eco. Development	67%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	100%	89%	100%	92%	100%	83%	91%	85%	93%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Venezuela	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0,18%	0,27%	0,22%	1,5%	1,5%	2,7%	2,1%	2,1%	2,1%	2,1%	2,1%	2,1%
Total	84%	85%	87%	86%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	92%	91%	82%	81%	87%	85%	76%	77%	81%	81%	83%
Intervention	94%	94%	93%	80%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	94%	89%	86%	88%
Middle East	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	80%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	75%	50%	50%	40%	58%	53%
Disarmament	73%	73%	81%	83%	88%	89%	95%	88%	79%	82%	88%	72%	59%	67%	72%	47%	59%	60%	52%	70%
Human Rights	88%	85%	90%	91%	100%	100%	92%	96%	92%	100%	91%	92%	82%	100%	93%	96%	81%	91%	85%	86%
Dcolonization	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Eco. Development	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	83%	75%	67%	71%	80%	71%	67%	91%	77%	86%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Germany																				
Total	54%	49%	53%	47%	54%	56%	59%	61%	56%	51%	52%	53%	49%	49%	47%	41%	44%	56%	54%	45%
Intervention	69%	65%	64%	50%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	64%	73%	64%	60%	61%	58%	52%	50%
Middle East	81%	77%	75%	67%	76%	80%	78%	82%	82%	80%	82%	82%	75%	80%	65%	60%	62%	68%	69%	68%
Nuclear Weapons	45%	40%	40%	30%	45%	45%	46%	42%	38%	46%	46%	33%	36%	31%	44%	35%	25%	33%	37%	32%
Disarmament	40%	40%	40%	33%	47%	63%	55%	59%	58%	47%	50%	50%	41%	39%	48%	26%	27%	53%	48%	40%
Human Rights	29%	25%	35%	27%	32%	32%	38%	37%	31%	26%	26%	29%	32%	25%	41%	43%	35%	47%	41%	45%
Dcolonization	54%	58%	55%	50%	56%	50%	80%	73%	73%	71%	69%	73%	77%	77%	77%	78%	83%	69%	69%	70%
Eco. Development	100%	50%	80%	80%	100%	78%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	67%	50%	82%	54%	64%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Japan																				
Total	61%	60%	60%	56%	56%	64%	62%	64%	64%	55%	60%	57%	53%	55%	53%	51%	53%	58%	58%	53%
Intervention	69%	71%	71%	60%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	73%	73%	64%	60%	61%	58%	52%	50%
Middle East	81%	82%	75%	72%	76%	80%	78%	82%	82%	80%	80%	82%	81%	80%	70%	65%	71%	73%	77%	73%
Nuclear Weapons	73%	70%	55%	50%	67%	55%	69%	58%	67%	62%	69%	50%	50%	33%	61%	60%	50%	53%	58%	53%
Disarmament	53%	53%	47%	42%	53%	63%	55%	59%	68%	59%	63%	61%	41%	50%	59%	47%	41%	67%	57%	45%
Human Rights	29%	30%	35%	41%	26%	32%	38%	41%	35%	26%	30%	29%	36%	29%	45%	43%	38%	47%	41%	45%
Dcolonization	69%	67%	64%	70%	67%	70%	80%	73%	80%	71%	77%	75%	77%	77%	77%	80%	83%	77%	77%	70%
Eco. Development	100%	50%	80%	60%	60%	67%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	57%	50%	82%	54%	71%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Netherlands																				
Total	54%	49%	51%	52%	56%	58%	59%	62%	57%	51%	49%	52%	47%	50%	47%	41%	48%	56%	52%	47%
Intervention	69%	65%	64%	60%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	64%	73%	64%	60%	61%	58%	52%	50%
Middle East	81%	77%	75%	72%	76%	80%	78%	82%	82%	80%	80%	82%	75%	80%	65%	60%	67%	68%	69%	68%
Nuclear Weapons	45%	40%	36%	30%	50%	36%	46%	50%	42%	46%	38%	33%	29%	17%	44%	35%	35%	33%	37%	37%
Disarmament	40%	40%	41%	33%	47%	58%	55%	65%	63%	47%	44%	50%	35%	39%	48%	26%	36%	53%	48%	45%
Human Rights	29%	25%	35%	36%	32%	32%	38%	37%	31%	26%	22%	26%	32%	29%	41%	43%	35%	47%	41%	45%
Dcolonization	54%	58%	45%	60%	67%	60%	80%	73%	73%	71%	69%	75%	77%	77%	77%	80%	83%	69%	69%	70%
Eco. Development	100%	50%	80%	100%	100%	78%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	57%	50%	82%	54%	64%

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
United States																				
Total	15%	10%	11%	11%	8%	7%	9%	7%	9%	11%	11%	16%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	14%	11%	13%
Intervention	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	6%
Middle East	5%	5%	5%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	5%	12%	9%
Nuclear Weapons	27%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	15%	25%	7%	8%	22%	25%	10%	20%	16%	11%
Disarmament	20%	20%	18%	17%	18%	11%	14%	6%	21%	18%	13%	28%	12%	22%	26%	21%	9%	27%	19%	20%
Human Rights	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	4%	7%	8%	4%	9%	4%	14%	5%	7%	7%	4%	15%	4%	10%
Dcolonization	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Eco. Development	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	20%	0%	13%	11%	29%	17%	14%	0%	9%	0%	7%

APPENDIX 7: UN SIMILAR VOTING TO CHINA PER SUBJECT, RANKED HIGHEST CHINESE INDEBTEDNESS PER ANNUM.

Total																					Aver.	Average	
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt	
# UN resolutions	67	67	72	73	71	73	85	76	75	64	65	68	68	60	78	76	80	90	104	98			
	78%	84%	87%	88%	90%	88%	89%	91%	87%	91%	92%	83%	82%	85%	82%	73%	76%	80%	77%	81%	84%	11,84%	
	70%	69%	71%	68%	90%	87%	89%	89%	90%	92%	85%	82%	87%	64%	81%	65%	72%	96%	75%	89%	81%	5,87%	
	82%	79%	86%	84%	77%	89%	86%	86%	85%	88%	89%	82%	81%	90%	88%	80%	76%	81%	80%	79%	83%	3,73%	
	79%	81%	85%	84%	76%	85%	88%	91%	88%	89%	89%	86%	85%	88%	87%	77%	73%	81%	79%	80%	83%	2,44%	
	78%	81%	85%	84%	88%	85%	86%	86%	89%	92%	89%	86%	82%	85%	87%	73%	76%	83%	79%	82%	84%	2,04%	
	78%	73%	83%	79%	86%	78%	86%	83%	81%	83%	87%	82%	81%	88%	87%	79%	78%	86%	82%	81%	82%	1,62%	
	79%	82%	83%	82%	83%	87%	85%	85%	88%	92%	89%	89%	82%	87%	85%	76%	77%	81%	81%	83%	84%	0,93%	
	75%	83%	81%	73%	78%	84%	88%	89%	81%	86%	91%	84%	78%	88%	87%	77%	74%	81%	76%	78%	81%	0,51%	
	92%	94%	94%	99%	87%	88%	87%	83%	81%	88%	92%	90%	78%	83%	83%	78%	74%	81%	77%	79%	85%	0,33%	
	61%	71%	79%	90%	78%	79%	82%	80%	76%	83%	83%	84%	81%	87%	79%	74%	70%	78%	74%	79%	78%	0,29%	
	81%	83%	86%	87%	96%	93%	87%	89%	78%	83%	85%	81%	85%	85%	86%	75%	74%	80%	78%	75%	83%	0,19%	
	84%	86%	88%	88%	89%	92%	95%	93%	87%	80%	77%	82%	74%	83%	83%	78%	74%	82%	76%	78%	83%	0,17%	
	84%	88%	89%	86%	91%	86%	92%	89%	80%	83%	82%	85%	79%	88%	88%	80%	76%	82%	76%	61%	83%	0,10%	
	72%	75%	77%	77%	90%	87%	91%	88%	82%	86%	82%	82%	72%	86%	84%	78%	73%	80%	78%	79%	81%	0,04%	
	61%	80%	96%	87%	85%	82%	88%	91%	89%	86%	86%	78%	69%	80%	79%	73%	70%	76%	76%	76%	80%	0,04%	
	71%	79%	84%	86%	88%	86%	84%	84%	86%	89%	69%	81%	76%	85%	86%	80%	78%	83%	83%	83%	82%	0,03%	
	73%	75%	78%	76%	78%	81%	90%	91%	80%	83%	80%	88%	82%	82%	78%	71%	69%	66%	67%	70%	77%	0,01%	
	84%	85%	87%	86%	93%	93%	93%	93%	88%	88%	88%	87%	82%	82%	78%	79%	70%	67%	78%	73%	68%	82%	0,01%
Germany	54%	49%	53%	47%	54%	56%	59%	61%	56%	51%	52%	53%	49%	49%	47%	41%	44%	56%	54%	45%	52%		
Japan	61%	60%	60%	56%	56%	64%	62%	64%	64%	55%	60%	57%	53%	55%	53%	51%	53%	58%	58%	53%	58%		
Netherlands	54%	49%	51%	52%	56%	58%	59%	62%	57%	51%	49%	52%	47%	50%	47%	41%	48%	56%	52%	47%	52%		
United States	15%	10%	11%	11%	8%	7%	9%	7%	9%	11%	11%	16%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	14%	11%	13%	12%		

Intervention																					Aver.	Average
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt
# UN resolutions	16	17	14	10	10	11	18	16	12	13	11	11	11	11	14	15	18	19	21	16		
	69%	73%	79%	80%	78%	60%	78%	80%	100%	83%	100%	90%	82%	91%	85%	82%	88%	74%	76%	69%	80%	11,84%
	75%	76%	79%	70%	80%	50%	81%	60%	100%	85%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	67%	77%	100%	100%	100%	84%	5,87%
	79%	69%	79%	70%	60%	60%	67%	63%	100%	85%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	84%	86%	75%	83%	3,73%
	81%	82%	86%	70%	70%	64%	78%	73%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	86%	78%	68%	74%	67%	81%	2,44%
	75%	76%	79%	70%	80%	55%	72%	75%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	92%	80%	88%	88%	85%	81%	84%	2,04%
	81%	82%	86%	70%	67%	55%	78%	69%	83%	77%	90%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	93%	87%	1,62%
	81%	82%	86%	80%	80%	64%	61%	56%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	94%	89%	86%	88%	86%	0,93%
	73%	83%	58%	30%	70%	55%	71%	69%	100%	77%	100%	91%	100%	100%	93%	87%	83%	79%	75%	73%	78%	0,51%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%	64%	78%	75%	92%	77%	100%	100%	91%	91%	79%	87%	78%	68%	71%	63%	83%	0,33%
	40%	67%	83%	60%	40%	20%	61%	56%	67%	62%	82%	100%	100%	100%	86%	80%	78%	74%	71%	75%	70%	0,29%
	80%	82%	86%	67%	100%	100%	72%	69%	67%	69%	100%	73%	100%	100%	93%	86%	83%	74%	80%	43%	80%	0,19%
	87%	88%	86%	80%	78%	71%	100%	100%	83%	54%	73%	100%	73%	91%	93%	93%	89%	84%	86%	81%	85%	0,17%
	81%	82%	86%	70%	80%	55%	100%	63%	100%	54%	91%	90%	91%	100%	93%	93%	89%	79%	76%	31%	80%	0,10%
	67%	71%	69%	50%	80%	64%	78%	75%	92%	67%	73%	91%	91%	100%	86%	87%	83%	74%	76%	69%	77%	0,04%
	50%	63%	100%	78%	70%	55%	78%	75%	100%	69%	91%	73%	64%	73%	71%	73%	72%	68%	71%	63%	72%	0,04%
	70%	79%	86%	80%	78%	50%	72%	69%	100%	77%	100%	91%	91%	91%	100%	93%	94%	94%	90%	93%	85%	0,03%
	75%	71%	71%	60%	60%	60%	78%	71%	92%	69%	91%	100%	100%	91%	86%	80%	72%	42%	48%	50%	72%	0,01%
	94%	94%	93%	80%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	77%	100%	100%	100%	73%	71%	73%	65%	63%	71%	44%	83%	0,01%
Germany	69%	65%	64%	50%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	64%	73%	64%	60%	61%	58%	52%	50%	61%	
Japan	69%	71%	71%	60%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	73%	73%	64%	60%	61%	63%	57%	50%	63%	
Netherlands	69%	65%	64%	60%	60%	55%	61%	56%	67%	54%	73%	73%	64%	73%	64%	60%	61%	58%	52%	50%	61%	
United States	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	6%	1%	

Middle East																					Aver.	Average	
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt	
# UN resolutions	21	22	20	18	17	15	18	17	17	15	15	17	16	15	20	20	21	22	26	22			
	93%	95%	95%	89%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	88%	93%	84%	86%	90%	86%	92%	89%	93%	11,84%	
	86%	86%	85%	78%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	67%	86%	100%	80%	100%	91%	5,87%	
	100%	93%	95%	89%	71%	100%	89%	88%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	91%	92%	86%	94%	3,73%	
	100%	100%	100%	94%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	84%	86%	82%	88%	86%	95%	2,44%	
	95%	95%	95%	94%	94%	80%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	93%	89%	60%	89%	90%	91%	91%	92%	2,04%	
	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	93%	100%	94%	88%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	1,62%	
	100%	100%	100%	89%	100%	93%	83%	82%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	0,93%	
	100%	100%	83%	50%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	90%	90%	91%	92%	90%	93%	0,51%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	93%	85%	85%	86%	77%	81%	82%	93%	0,33%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	65%	64%	83%	82%	82%	87%	87%	100%	100%	100%	85%	85%	80%	86%	88%	91%	89%	0,29%	
	100%	100%	95%	94%	100%	100%	89%	94%	81%	93%	100%	82%	100%	100%	90%	89%	90%	86%	92%	75%	92%	0,19%	
	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	80%	80%	100%	81%	93%	90%	90%	90%	91%	92%	91%	94%	0,17%	
	100%	100%	100%	89%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%	93%	94%	94%	100%	90%	90%	90%	86%	85%	45%	91%	0,10%		
	86%	91%	74%	67%	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	93%	80%	94%	94%	100%	85%	85%	85%	86%	88%	86%	89%	0,04%	
	100%	100%	100%	94%	88%	93%	100%	100%	100%	93%	93%	82%	75%	80%	75%	75%	76%	77%	81%	77%	88%	0,04%	
	90%	95%	95%	94%	100%	100%	89%	94%	100%	100%	100%	94%	94%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	97%	0,03%	
	95%	91%	85%	78%	82%	86%	100%	100%	94%	93%	93%	100%	100%	93%	85%	85%	81%	45%	54%	68%	84%	0,01%	
	100%	100%	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%	75%	75%	75%	73%	59%	89%	0,01%	
Germany	81%	77%	75%	67%	76%	80%	78%	82%	82%	80%	80%	82%	75%	80%	65%	60%	62%	68%	69%	68%	74%		

Nuclear Weapons																					Aver.	Average
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt
# UN resolutions	11	10	11	10	12	11	13	12	13	13	13	12	14	12	18	20	20	15	19	19		
73%	75%	82%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	83%	67%	64%	58%	75%	53%	50%	47%	58%	53%	67%	11,84%	
73%	70%	64%	60%	82%	73%	77%	83%	67%	75%	85%	67%	79%	-	-	53%	56%	-	57%	-	53%	5,87%	
73%	70%	82%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	67%	72%	55%	50%	40%	58%	53%	67%	3,73%	
64%	60%	73%	70%	67%	64%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	71%	58%	76%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%	65%	2,44%	
82%	90%	100%	100%	82%	82%	85%	75%	77%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	76%	56%	53%	38%	58%	53%	70%	2,04%	
73%	70%	82%	80%	75%	64%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	55%	78%	50%	47%	47%	58%	47%	65%	1,62%	
73%	70%	70%	70%	83%	73%	85%	83%	67%	85%	92%	67%	64%	58%	75%	50%	50%	40%	58%	53%	67%	0,93%	
73%	70%	80%	80%	75%	82%	85%	75%	69%	77%	85%	67%	64%	55%	72%	53%	47%	47%	53%	47%	66%	0,51%	
73%	70%	91%	90%	75%	73%	85%	75%	77%	77%	92%	75%	71%	58%	78%	55%	50%	53%	58%	53%	69%	0,33%	
-	-	71%	-	82%	82%	75%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	71%	58%	78%	55%	45%	47%	58%	53%	58%	0,29%	
73%	70%	82%	80%	92%	82%	85%	83%	69%	77%	85%	67%	71%	64%	76%	47%	47%	43%	58%	53%	68%	0,19%	
73%	70%	82%	80%	82%	73%	92%	75%	67%	85%	85%	75%	64%	58%	78%	55%	50%	47%	56%	53%	68%	0,17%	
73%	80%	91%	90%	91%	82%	85%	71%	67%	85%	85%	67%	64%	67%	83%	55%	50%	40%	53%	47%	69%	0,10%	
73%	70%	80%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	64%	76%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%	67%	0,04%	
70%	-	-	78%	92%	82%	85%	75%	67%	85%	85%	67%	64%	58%	78%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%	62%	0,04%	
64%	56%	73%	70%	73%	80%	83%	75%	67%	77%	-	67%	64%	58%	78%	50%	55%	40%	63%	47%	61%	0,03%	
73%	70%	82%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	69%	77%	85%	-	64%	58%	78%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%	64%	0,01%	
73%	70%	80%	80%	83%	73%	85%	75%	67%	77%	85%	67%	64%	58%	75%	55%	50%	47%	58%	53%	67%	0,01%	
Germany	45%	40%	40%	30%	45%	45%	46%	42%	38%	46%	46%	33%	36%	17%	44%	35%	25%	33%	37%	32%	37%	
Japan	73%	70%	55%	50%	67%	55%	69%	58%	67%	62%	69%	50%	50%	33%	61%	60%	50%	53%	58%	53%	58%	
Netherlands	45%	40%	36%	30%	50%	36%	46%	50%	42%	46%	38%	29%	17%	44%	35%	35%	33%	37%	37%	37%	38%	
United States	27%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	15%	25%	7%	8%	22%	25%	10%	20%	16%	11%	12%	
Disarmament																					Aver.	Average
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt
# UN resolutions	15	15	17	12	17	19	22	17	19	17	16	18	17	18	27	19	22	15	21	20		
71%	73%	82%	83%	88%	89%	91%	88%	83%	76%	87%	78%	65%	72%	76%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%	74%	11,84%	
53%	53%	47%	42%	88%	89%	86%	94%	83%	81%	81%	72%	76%	-	100%	44%	55%	-	42%	-	61%	5,87%	
73%	71%	82%	83%	88%	89%	86%	88%	79%	76%	81%	72%	63%	72%	74%	47%	50%	60%	52%	65%	72%	3,73%	
60%	60%	71%	67%	53%	79%	91%	88%	79%	76%	81%	78%	71%	72%	80%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%	70%	2,44%	
60%	73%	82%	83%	88%	95%	82%	88%	72%	82%	81%	78%	65%	72%	81%	47%	50%	62%	57%	65%	73%	2,04%	
73%	73%	82%	83%	76%	68%	86%	82%	79%	76%	81%	72%	59%	65%	74%	47%	59%	67%	52%	63%	70%	1,62%	
73%	73%	82%	83%	82%	89%	91%	94%	79%	75%	88%	78%	65%	67%	72%	47%	59%	60%	52%	70%	74%	0,93%	
71%	71%	76%	83%	76%	95%	91%	88%	79%	76%	88%	78%	65%	71%	78%	47%	50%	67%	57%	60%	73%	0,51%	
79%	77%	94%	100%	88%	95%	91%	88%	79%	76%	87%	83%	71%	72%	81%	58%	55%	73%	67%	65%	78%	0,33%	
-	-	71%	-	88%	95%	91%	94%	79%	76%	81%	78%	71%	72%	78%	47%	50%	67%	57%	68%	65%	0,29%	
73%	73%	82%	83%	94%	83%	91%	94%	79%	76%	81%	78%	65%	76%	77%	47%	50%	62%	57%	65%	74%	0,19%	
73%	73%	82%	83%	88%	89%	90%	81%	83%	82%	81%	65%	65%	72%	78%	47%	50%	67%	55%	65%	73%	0,17%	
80%	87%	94%	92%	88%	95%	91%	88%	79%	82%	81%	78%	65%	78%	89%	53%	50%	67%	62%	60%	77%	0,10%	
73%	73%	82%	83%	88%	89%	91%	88%	79%	76%	81%	78%	65%	59%	81%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%	73%	0,04%	
64%	100%	100%	82%	88%	89%	91%	88%	81%	82%	81%	78%	65%	72%	78%	47%	50%	67%	57%	65%	76%	0,04%	
67%	67%	76%	75%	82%	94%	91%	88%	79%	76%	-	78%	65%	72%	74%	47%	64%	53%	57%	65%	69%	0,03%	
60%	60%	71%	67%	76%	84%	91%	88%	74%	76%	88%	-	63%	72%	78%	42%	50%	67%	57%	65%	67%	0,01%	
73%	73%	81%	83%	88%	89%	95%	88%	79%	76%	81%	73%	65%	72%	76%	42%	50%	67%	57%	65%	73%	0,01%	
Germany	40%	40%	40%	33%	47%	63%	55%	59%	58%	47%	50%	41%	39%	48%	26%	27%	53%	48%	40%	45%		
Japan	53%	53%	47%	42%	53%	63%	55%	59%	68%	59%	63%	61%	41%	50%	59%	47%	41%	67%	57%	45%	54%	
Netherlands	40%	40%	41%	33%	47%	58%	55%	65%	63%	47%	44%	50%	35%	39%	48%	26%	36%	53%	48%	45%	46%	
United States	20%	20%	18%	17%	18%	11%	14%	6%	21%	18%	13%	28%	12%	22%	26%	21%	9%	27%	19%	20%	18%	
Human Rights																					Aver.	Average
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		CN debt
# UN resolutions	17	20	20	22	19	19	26	27	26	22	23	24	22	21	29	28	26	34	27	29		
64%	75%	85%	86%	89%	78%	81%	88%	83%	91%	87%	75%	86%	81%	83%	82%	76%	79%	74%	79%	81%	11,84%	
47%	45%	55%	55%	89%	72%	88%	79%	87%	91%	75%	88%	77%	69%	82%	78%	69%	92%	69%	100%	77%	5,87%	
75%	69%	80%	82%	63%	79%	73%	70%	77%	87%	83%	88%	81%	100%	93%	89%	77%	79%	70%	76%	80%	3,73%	
76%	80%	85%	82%	68%	74%	76%	85%	92%	87%	83%	88%	82%	90%	86%	79%	65%	76%	73%	76%	80%	2,44%	
71%	70%	75%	73%	84%	58%	77%	70%	92%	100%	82%	83%	86%	81%	86%	74%	77%	80%	70%	79%	79%	2,04%	
65%	50%	75%	64%	84%	58%	73%	67%	65%	70%	77%	92%	82%	100%	93%	93%	85%	94%	85%	92%	79%	1,62%	
65%	75%	80%	86%	68%	72%	69%	65%	85%	100%	78%	87%	86%	100%	93%	96%	81%	91%	85%	86%	83%	0,93%	
60%	78%	79%	64%	63%	58%	73%	81%	65%	78%	91%	75%	73%	90%	90%	82%	73%	79%	74%	76%	76%	0,51%	
100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	79%	77%	63%	65%	83%	91%	83%	73%	76%	79%	79%	69%	76%	67%	76%	80%	0,33%	
64%	77%	92%	89%	63%	58%	69%	63%	65%	70%	65%	71%	77%	86%	72%	71%	62%	71%	59%	72%	71%	0,29%	
76%	80%	85%	86%	100%	100%	73%	78%	58%	73%	70%	67%	86%	76%	86%	82%	73%	79%	74%	67%	78%	0,19%	
82%	85%	85%	86%	89%	87%	100%	96%	87%	65%	57%	92%	59%	81%	79%	79%	69%	76%	67%	76%	80%	0,17%	
76%	80%	85%	77%	89%	74%	89%	82%	62%	65%	65%	79%	77%	86%	83%	82%	73%	76%	59%	41%	74%	0,10%	
59%	65%	63%	64%	89%	78%	85%	78%	69%	78%	61%	71%	64%	100%	79%	79%	69%	74%	67%	72%	73%	0,04%	
64%	75%	100%	86%	79%	58%	77%	85%	87%	74%	74%	63%	59%	67%	69%	75%	65%	71%	63%	72%	73%	0,04%	
71%	79%	84%	86%	89%	74%	73%	70%	81%	87%	67%	71%	68%	81%	93%	100%	81%	94%	88%	93%	82%	0,03%	
65%	65%	70%	73%	68%	61%	85%	85%	65%	74%	57%	87%	81%	71%	72%	71%	58%	53%	44%	62%	68%	0,01%	
88%	85%	90%	91%	100%	100%	92%	96%	91%	83%	78%	83%	86%	67%	72%	75%	65%	74%	59%	59%	81%	0,01%	
29%	25%	35%	27%	32%	32%	38%	37%	31%	26%	26%	29%	32%	25%	41%	43%	35%	47%	41%	45%	35%		
Japan	29%	30%	35%	41%	26%	32%	38%	41%	35%	26%	30%	29%	36%	29%	45%	43%	38%	47%	41%	45%	37%	
Netherlands	29%	25%	35%	36%	32%	32%	38%	37%	31%	26%	22%	26%	32%	29%	41%	43%	35%	47%	41%	45%	35%	
United States	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	4%	7%	8%	4%	9%	4%	14%	5%	7%	7%	4%	15%	4%	10%	6%	

Decolonization																					Aver.	Average	
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		
# UN resolutions	13	12	11	10	9	10	15	11	15	14	13	12	13	13	13	10	12	13	13	10		CN debt	
	85%	83%	80%	90%	100%	90%	93%	100%	86%	93%	100%	92%	92%	92%	92%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	93%	11,84%	
	85%	83%	82%	90%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	5,87%	
	92%	82%	82%	88%	89%	90%	87%	91%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	94%	3,73%	
	92%	92%	91%	100%	89%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	92%	85%	92%	90%	94%	2,44%	
	92%	92%	91%	100%	88%	80%	87%	100%	100%	93%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	96%	2,04%	
	92%	83%	91%	100%	100%	80%	93%	82%	87%	93%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	1,62%	
	92%	92%	91%	90%	100%	80%	87%	91%	93%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	96%	0,93%	
	90%	91%	80%	90%	100%	90%	87%	91%	93%	93%	100%	83%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	0,51%	
	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	91%	80%	93%	100%	100%	85%	92%	85%	80%	83%	77%	77%	80%	89%	0,33%	
	100%	100%	50%	100%	89%	80%	87%	91%	80%	86%	92%	92%	100%	100%	100%	92%	90%	92%	85%	92%	100%	0,29%	
	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	100%	87%	91%	85%	79%	100%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	95%	0,19%	
	92%	92%	91%	90%	100%	90%	100%	100%	87%	86%	85%	100%	92%	85%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	94%	0,17%	
	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	90%	93%	100%	87%	86%	85%	92%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	92%	50%	93%	0,10%	
	85%	83%	80%	90%	100%	90%	93%	100%	87%	86%	92%	83%	85%	100%	92%	90%	92%	92%	92%	90%	90%	0,04%	
	67%	100%	100%	89%	89%	80%	93%	100%	93%	86%	92%	83%	85%	92%	92%	90%	92%	85%	92%	90%	89%	0,04%	
	67%	91%	91%	90%	100%	100%	86%	91%	93%	93%	100%	92%	92%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	94%	0,03%	
	92%	83%	82%	88%	89%	80%	93%	100%	87%	86%	85%	100%	100%	85%	85%	90%	92%	62%	69%	90%	87%	0,01%	
	92%	92%	91%	100%	100%	90%	93%	100%	93%	93%	100%	100%	100%	85%	92%	90%	82%	85%	92%	70%	92%	0,01%	
Germany	54%	58%	55%	50%	56%	50%	80%	73%	73%	71%	69%	75%	77%	77%	77%	78%	83%	69%	69%	70%	69%		
Japan	69%	67%	64%	70%	67%	70%	80%	73%	80%	71%	77%	75%	77%	77%	77%	80%	83%	77%	77%	70%	74%		
Netherlands	54%	58%	45%	60%	67%	60%	80%	73%	73%	71%	69%	75%	77%	77%	77%	80%	83%	69%	69%	70%	70%		
United States	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	

Economic Development																					Aver.	Average	
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019		
# UN resolutions	3	4	5	5	5	9	7	12	11	10	6	8	9	7	12	7	6	11	13	14		CN debt	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	100%	83%	86%	80%	88%	77%	92%	93%	11,84%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	88%	89%	100%	50%	80%	67%	100%	89%	100%	92%	5,87%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	80%	100%	88%	86%	71%	92%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	94%	3,73%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	100%	67%	100%	92%	100%	67%	91%	77%	92%	92%	2,44%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	90%	100%	100%	89%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	100%	96%	2,04%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	75%	67%	71%	82%	86%	83%	90%	85%	100%	90%	1,62%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	100%	78%	71%	80%	71%	67%	91%	77%	86%	89%	0,93%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	90%	83%	100%	78%	100%	92%	86%	67%	91%	77%	92%	91%	0,51%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	83%	100%	78%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	100%	95%	0,33%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	82%	90%	100%	100%	78%	100%	83%	86%	67%	91%	77%	93%	90%	0,29%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	88%	67%	100%	92%	86%	67%	91%	85%	92%	92%	0,19%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	78%	83%	75%	78%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	100%	93%	0,17%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	100%	89%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	79%	95%	0,10%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	90%	100%	100%	67%	71%	92%	100%	83%	91%	85%	93%	92%	0,04%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	100%	88%	67%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	100%	100%	95%	0,04%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	86%	92%	91%	90%	100%	88%	78%	100%	75%	71%	67%	82%	77%	86%	87%	0,03%	
	67%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	91%	80%	83%	100%	75%	100%	83%	86%	67%	82%	85%	86%	89%	0,01%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	89%	90%	100%	100%	89%	100%	92%	100%	83%	100%	92%	86%	86%	95%	0,01%	
Germany	100%	50%	80%	80%	100%	78%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	67%	50%	82%	54%	64%	66%		
Japan	100%	50%	80%	60%	60%	67%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	57%	50%	82%	54%	71%	64%		
Netherlands	100%	50%	80%	100%	100%	78%	71%	75%	73%	50%	50%	63%	56%	71%	50%	57%	50%	82%	54%	64%	67%		
United States	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	20%	0%	13%	11%	29%	17%	14%	0%	9%	0%	7%	8%		

APPENDIX 8: DETAILS INTERVIEWS CHINESE RETAILERS

Nr.	Date Interview	Location	Origin retailer	Time spend in Suriname	Remark
1.	19-01-2020	Paramaribo	Liaoning	> 5 years	Arrived in Suriname as construction worker, owns shop
2.	19-01-2020	Paramaribo	Zhejiang	< 1 year	
3.	20-01-2020	Paramaribo	Anhui	1,5 year	
4.	22-01-2020	Commewijne	Zhejiang	10 months	In Suriname for second time
5.	22-01-2020	Commewijne	Zhejiang	4 years	Owens shop
6.	03-02-2020	Brownsweg	Fujian	8 years	Owens shop
7.	05-02-2020	Atjoni	Ningxia	6 months	Thinking of going back to China
8.	08-02-2020	Paramaribo	Anhui	< 2 years	