

The Complexity of Alliance Formation: Variations in State Responses in the Middle East to the First Gulf War

Andrea, A. Visser

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Abstract

Despite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on alliance formation in the Middle East. This thesis highlights the limits of Western-centric theories when applied on non-Western regions. In doing so, this thesis focuses on one crucial non-Western region, the Middle East, and asks if the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of-threat, balance-of-power and ideological solidarity) can explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, if so to what extent, and if not what an alternative could be. It researches this question through the systematic exploration of one topical moment of Middle East contemporary history, which caused major regional realignment in the region: The First Gulf War in 1990.

The findings of the case study, show that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance the external threat (of Iraq threatening the status quo after invading Kuwait) as well as internal threats (of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region). Therefore, this thesis will argue that the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories cannot explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as these theories only take external threats into account. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats may it explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The 'regime security' approach of Ryan is, therefore, considered to be a suitable alternative approach, as it examines ruling regimes and their insecurities, considering external as well as internal threats. Nevertheless, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the external influence coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies have on state behaviour of other states. Every state was externally influenced through these strategies, leading them to join the U.N. coalition or declare neutrality with large repercussions. This has not been discussed in alliance formation literature before. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well as the definitions do not hold up in a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East where states have large differences in military capabilities.

Introduction

The international relations of the Middle East have often caused confusion and led to assumptions that, of all the world's regions, this region must be an exception to the norms of global politics.¹ International crises in the Middle East have often led to shifts in existing patterns of regional alliances and alignments. Even in times of relative calm, regional alignments have long been characterized by fluidity and frequent change. Nowhere are these dynamics more prevalent than in inter-Arab politics. Allies become enemies, and enemies become allies, often with great frequency.²

These assumptions are the basis of scholars' attempts to apply Western-centric theories on alliance formation in the Middle East, despite the fact that Middle Eastern states rather tend to form looser and informal alignments with other states, instead of formal alliances the West is known for. Only when the very concept of alliances is considered more broadly, can the Middle East be researched while applying theories from the West.³ This thesis highlights the limits of Western-centric theories when applied on non-Western regions. In doing so, this thesis focuses on one non-Western region, the Middle East, and asks the following question: "Can the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of threat, balance-of-power and ideological solidarity) explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, and if so to what extent?" It explores this question through the use of a case study of one topical moment of Middle East contemporary history, which caused major regional realignment in the region: The First Gulf War in 1990.⁴

Few observers were able to provide useful insights on the direction of realignment for these Arab states.⁵ By focussing on this period of realignment and the inter-Arab politics that led to them, this thesis will explore one of the least developed areas of research in the international relations of the Middle East. Numerous studies have examined the Middle East during the Cold War, but literature is lacking on the First Gulf War specifically. Additionally, few scholars have examined the world of inter-Arab relations in any depth. Many of the most highly regarded studies cover only the earliest

¹ Ryan. *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 204. Anderson, "Policy-Making and Theory-Building," 52-80.

² Ryan. *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 3, 204.

³ *Ibid*, 3-4, 204-207.

⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

⁵ *Ibid*.

period of state formation in the 1940s, 1950s, or the 1960s at the latest. Therefore, there remain few academic works on inter-Arab politics on this period.⁶

In order to define my research, I have chosen to conduct a case study of the First Gulf War, analysing the foreign policy decisions of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates) and Yemen. These Middle Eastern states have actively chosen a side in the First Gulf War, and therefore aligned or realigned, or had large repercussions by declaring neutrality. Iraq and Kuwait are not considered relevant in this case study, since they were the instigator and victim of the war and, therefore, did not align, realign or declared neutrality.

By comparing multiple states, instead of one, the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold will be able to be determined better and, therefore, the common and differentiating factors that occur in different cases of alliance formation will be established. In doing so, new or omitted variables and hypothesis can be identified and causal relations can be uncovered. Therefore, the comparison between states may itself suggest concepts that are relevant to revising the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories and, therefore, improve theory building.⁷ In this thesis the foreign policy decisions of the ruling regimes of the states considered in the case study will be analysed, through identifying several strategies that reveal drivers and patterns of state behaviour and can lead to alliance formation or can externally influence other states considering alliance formation. This will be researched through desk research, using qualitative sources.

The findings of the case study will show that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance both internal and external threats at the advent of the First Gulf War. Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen had to take into account internal threats of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region, as well as the major external threat of Iraq on the status quo after invading Kuwait. As the Western-centric alliance formation theories only take external threats into account, I will conclude that that neither the balance-of-power and ideological solidarity theory nor the balance-of-threat theory can explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form. Only if the balance-of-

⁶ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 3-4, 6. Korany, *The Changing Middle East*, 8.

⁷ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 74. Bennett, "Case Study Methods," 19, 34-35.

threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats can it attempt to explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The 'regime security' approach of Ryan is, therefore, considered to be a suitable alternative approach, as it "examines the foreign policies of the ruling regimes, incorporating explicit links to external threats, internal political economy, and domestic politics in understanding alignment formation in the Middle East."⁸ Nevertheless, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the external influence coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies have on state behaviour of other states. Every state was externally influenced through these strategies, leading them to join the U.N. coalition or declare neutrality with large repercussions. This has not been discussed in alliance formation literature before. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well as the definitions do not hold up in a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East where states have large differences in military capabilities.

The first chapter of this thesis, will give a theoretical overview of the leading Western-centric theories of alliance formation, balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theory, and highlight the limits of the existing literature, concluding with which theoretical framework will be used in this thesis. Chapter 2 will discuss the empirical findings of the case study, detailing the historical background of the First Gulf War; the internal and external threats identified to have influenced the foreign policy decisions of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates) and Yemen; the influence of coercive diplomacy on these foreign policy decisions; and the differences in foreign policy decisions between the states that joined the U.N. coalition and Jordan and Yemen who remained neutral. In chapter 3, the findings of the case study will be analysed. Through a comparison of the drivers of alignment formation with the strategies of the theoretical framework, patterns of alignment formation will be identified, after which the research question can be answered if and to what extent the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain alignment formation in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. This will be followed by a final conclusion.

⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 11-14, 204-205.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Background and Framework

In order to understand alignment formation in the Middle East during the First Gulf War and discuss if and to what extent the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain it, the development alliance formation literature underwent needs to be understood. Therefore, this chapter will first give an overview of what is understood to be the leading Western-centric theories of alliance formation: balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theory. Part two of this chapter will highlight the current constraints of the existing literature in general and will address the limits of the literature, already acknowledged by several scholars, when researching alignments in the Middle East specifically, which will be expanded upon in chapter 3. In the third and final part of this chapter, the theoretical framework used in this thesis will be discussed.

1.1. Existing theories of alliance formation

For decennia states have regularly formed and broken alliances. Alliance formation constitutes a major component of a state's foreign policy, since alliances are typically used as the primary tool for advancing a state's interests and enhancing a state's security against external and internal threats. This is generally rationalized by the observation that in international politics, states will ally with other states when facing an external threat, in order to amass sufficient power to counter or deter an attack, as there exists no supreme authority to protect states from each other. Alliances will endure, as long as the conditions that it originated from remain in place. Should those conditions change, the alliance may break, as it lost the reasons that held it together. States can freely form alliances. However, in practice, states do not form alliances lightly, since it has potential costs as well as benefits. One of those costs may be the loss of independence. Therefore, in order to understand the dynamics of alliance formation, one must research what drives states to form alliances.⁹

The most prominent explanations of alliance formation focus on external influences. According to the realist school of International Relations, "states form alliances in order to combine their military capabilities and thereby improve their

⁹ Duffield, Michota and Miller, "Alliances," 291-292, 295. Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 224-225. Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 4. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 6-7.

security positions.”¹⁰ Their most well-known explanation of alliance formation is the balance-of-power theory, “where states with lesser capabilities are presumed to ally against stronger states, especially when they are unable to balance power through their individual efforts or when the costs of such internal balancing exceed those of alliance membership.”¹¹ According to this view, alliances formation is driven by states not wanting other states to achieve a dominant position in the region. This would eventually result in strong states provoking other states to ally against them, since their superior military capabilities threaten weaker states.¹²

However, scholars have also noted that the perception of external threats is not solely comprised of aggregate power. As a refinement of the balance-of-power theory, the balance-of-threat theory argues that states form alliances in order to balance against external threats.¹³ In addition to aggregate power, states will perceive other states as threatening, based on “geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.”¹⁴ In a status quo, “states that are nearby are more dangerous than those that are far away; states that possess offensive military forces pose a greater threat than those with purely defensive capabilities; and states with aggressive intentions will be viewed as more worrisome than states that seek only to preserve the status quo.”¹⁵ However, it is not always obvious how and if states will perceive other states as threatening. While these two theories are based on the existence of external threats, threat perception may be influenced by internal threats as much, if not more.¹⁶ This will be expanded on in the next part of this chapter, when discussing the limits of the existing literature.

A third explanation views alliances as the product of ideological solidarity. According to this theory, alliance formation occurs between states with similar domestic systems or political values, when in a status quo.¹⁷ Scholars have argued that this

¹⁰ Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 296.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 295-296. Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 224-225. Walt, “Alliances in theory and practice,” 4. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 6-7. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 117-123. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 17.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Walt, “Alliances in theory and practice,” 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 295-296. Walt, “Alliances in theory and practice,” 4. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 6-7. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 117-123. Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 225, 230. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 17.

¹⁷ Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 297. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 34-35. Walt, “Alliances in theory and practice,” 5.

phenomenon can be explained through the generation of “similar values by the common interests and common interpretations of what constitutes a threat.”¹⁸ Furthermore, alliances between like-minded states may boost the domestic legitimacy of a weaker state, raised from the suggestion that the alliance is part of a broader movement.¹⁹

1.2. Constraints of the existing literature

These explanations of alliance formation have, however, rarely been examined outside of the Western setting from which they were derived, rather, it has been concerned with alliances in European and Western historical experience. Scholars have mainly focused on great powers politics and interpretations of specific alliances, resulting in a lack of research on alliance formation in non-Western regions, such as the Middle East. Furthermore, few scholars have researched inter-Arab relations in any depth and many studies cover only the earliest period of state formation in the Middle East. Therefore, there remain few academic works on inter-Arab politics since the 1960s.²⁰

Several scholars have tried to remedy this. Walt has written a book on the regional alignments in the Middle East, from the 1950s till the 1970s, where he paid particular attention to superpower-client relations in the region.²¹ Though, while Walt moved beyond Western cases in his analysis, inter-Arab politics remained largely unaddressed. As Ryan points out, there are limitations to Walt’s theoretical framework as well, as his examination of Middle Eastern alignments largely ignored domestic politics, dismissing the roles of both ideology and political economy. In doing so, Walt drew on the theories of Waltz, whose work is commonly seen as a cornerstone of the Neorealist paradigm.²² Furthermore, Walt assumed in his book that all alignments made in the Middle East must be subject to the same motivations as Western security pacts. However, this assumption is not based on empirical evidence. Most inter-Arab alignments do not correspond to the definition of formal alliances.²³

¹⁸ Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 297.

¹⁹ Ibid. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 34-35.

²⁰ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 6. Exceptions of this are the works of: Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*. Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf.” Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*. Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*. Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*.

There are also several excellent studies of specific bilateral relationships in inter-Arab politics. See in particular: Gause, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*. and Kienle, *Ba’th v Ba’th*.

²¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 7. See: Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

²² Ibid. See: Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

²³ Ibid.

There is no consensus on how formal alliances should be defined. Several leading definitions of alliances have been overly broad,²⁴ whereas others have been overly specific, making distinctions between defensive and offensive alliances, and non-aggression, neutrality and consultation agreements.²⁵ In this thesis, formal alliances will be seen according to Wolfer's definition as "promises between two or more states, involving clear declarations of future intentions regarding mutual assistance in security and defence matters, in which members' military capabilities and/or other resources are combined in a way that furthers their respective interests".²⁶ They can be bilateral or multilateral security arrangements, that may involve formal defence pacts. However, alliances are generally seen as the formal subset of alignments.²⁷ These conceptual distinctions are important, because, as mentioned before, most of the existing literature has drawn on Western experience, and hence has tended to focus on alliances as formal security pacts between states, rather than on less formal, more basic alignments. Yet, such formal alliances are rare in non-Western regions, one is more likely to find looser linkages between states in the form of fluid alignments. Inter-Arab politics, specifically, are characterized more by shifting informal alignments than formal alliances, and, therefore, studies that focus solely on alliances can capture only a fraction of the dynamics of inter-Arab relations.²⁸

Drawing on the work of Snyder, in this thesis alignments are defined as "informal relationships between two or more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that may include, but is not restricted to, security affairs."²⁹ Formal declarations of military support are, therefore, not a necessary condition for alignment, although they are central components of an alliance. In formal alliances existing alignments are strengthened, or new alignments are created. The phenomenon of alignment occurs when states bring their foreign policies together and cooperate in order to achieve mutual security goals.³⁰

²⁴ Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 225. Walt, "Alliances in theory and practice," 4. Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," 68. Wolfer, "Alliances," 268.

²⁵ Duffield, Michota and Miller, "Alliances," 295-296. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, 17. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 157. Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 225. Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," 68.

²⁶ Wolfer, "Alliances," 268.

²⁷ Snyder, "Alliance Theory," 105. Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 225.

²⁸ Ibid. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 5-6.

²⁹ Snyder, "Alliance Theory," 105.

³⁰ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 5-6.

These distinctions underscore the difficulty of applying the Western-centric alliance formation theories to non-Western cases. There are significant differences between Western states and post-colonial states in the Middle East, regarding even the most basic concepts in these theories. Notions such as 'state' and 'security' have far more complex and multi-faceted meanings for Middle Eastern states. In traditional realist International Relations theory, the security dilemma refers to "the dynamic of states attempting to enhance their security largely through arms, but unwittingly provoking fears among their neighbours who also re-arm, yielding a less secure situation despite the bolstered defences."³¹ According to Ryan, Middle Eastern states "confront not only this traditional version of the security dilemma, but also find themselves wedged between both internal and external security dilemmas, in which shoring up security at one level often triggers insecurity at another, as the specific interest of these states is in their own regime's security and survival."³²

These ruling regimes need to constantly assess their regional and regime security. They do this through forming alignments. However, in doing so, these regimes often find themselves further removed from their own societies. Ryan observes that this may partly be caused by the phenomenon that it is easier for ruling regimes to switch alliance partners than it is to carry out significant domestic reform. "The internal security dilemma too often undermines hopes for greater liberalization or democratization, as states hunker down against domestic opposition rather than risk the more open approach of domestic reform."³³ Yet legitimacy in domestic as well as regional politics remains crucial for regime security. Therefore, ruling regimes continue to bolster their domestic and regional legitimacy and security. State security is, therefore, only achieved by countering threats to the continued tenure of the ruling regime, whether those threats are based internally or externally. This is especially true for post-colonial societies, like in the Middle East, where internal security and political survival are more immediate and pressing issues than is the case for the developed post-industrial states of the West.³⁴

Therefore, for two reasons the realist focus on traditional security and threat considerations would be too narrow when researching alliance formation in the Middle

³¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 13-14, 206-207.

³² *Ibid*, 13-14, 206-207.

³³ *Ibid*, 206-207.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 9, 13-14, 207.

East. Firstly, when focusing on traditional realist theories of alliance formation, the importance of non-military factors would be overlooked. Secondly, they tend to see security threats as mainly external, overlooking the internal threats that can endanger the security of the ruling regime.³⁵ Several Liberalist scholars have recognized the limited usefulness of the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories. David argues that, “rather than solely external, the real balancing act is of an internal as well as an external nature, where states attempt to ‘omni-balance’ between internal and external threats.”³⁶ While I agree with that observation, the focus of his work is still lacking. Like that of Walt, his work is primarily concerned with the asymmetrical alignments between weaker post-colonial states and their superpower patrons. The Cold War looms large in the works of both scholars, who justify their focus on the basis of the importance of the Third World to Western strategy. So much justification is offered, in fact, that it obscures the fact that regions such as the Middle East have dynamics of their own.³⁷ Harknett and Vandenberg expand on David’s ideas by noting that “internal and external threats can also be inter-related.”³⁸

Barnett and Levy shift their focus toward economic factors. They argue that “international alignments, and especially those of post-colonial states, are more accurately explained as decisions made on the basis of economic needs and how these needs affect the stability of a regime over time.”³⁹ Similarly, Brand argues, in contrast to most Neorealist approaches, that “the domestic economy is the key element behind foreign policy choices, including alliances and alignments, called ‘budget security’.”⁴⁰ However, if the Neorealist emphasis on an external balance of threats tends to neglect domestic politics and political economy, too close an emphasis on budget security may leave out the importance of external threats and the military dimension of security. Economic factors are indeed key variables, but they must be examined in a broader context that takes into account the multi-dimensional influences on alliance and alignment in the Middle East.⁴¹

³⁵ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 9.

³⁶ David, “Explaining Third World Alignments,” 233–56.

³⁷ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 9–10.

³⁸ Harknett and Vandenberg, “*Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats*.”

³⁹ Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments.”

⁴⁰ Brand, “Economics and Shifting Alliances,” 394.

⁴¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 10.

Lynch, as a Constructivist scholar, challenges, in his study on Jordanian behaviour in regional politics, both the balance-of-threats theory and budget security approaches as too uni-causal. He argues that “if interests drive policy, then these must be understood not as externally-generated and fixed, but rather as internally-generated and variable. In order to adequately analyse the changing nature of state policies and interests, one must examine changes in domestic politics.”⁴²

As the above discussion indicates, despite the differences in approaches between Realists, Liberalists and Constructivists, the growth of theoretical literature on non-Western alliances and alignments has extended beyond their traditional and limited Western confines. However, this risks a trend in which one feels a need to explain alliances and alignments as driven by internal motivations excluding insights of earlier approaches. Ryan recognised this danger and contributed his so-called ‘regime security approach,’ which draws on the insights of scholars from Realist as well as Liberalist and Constructivist approaches, “incorporating explicit links to external threats, internal political economy, and domestic politics in understanding the politics of inter-Arab alliances and alignments, through looking at the foreign policies of the ruling regime.”⁴³ His approach offers an alternative for the balance-of-threat theory.

1.3. The balance-of-threat theory revised

This thesis will revise the balance-of-threat theory by building and expanding on the ‘regime security’ approach of Ryan. In doing so, the foreign policy decisions of the ruling regimes of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates) and Yemen will be analysed, through identifying several strategies that reveal patterns of state behaviour and can lead to alliance formation or can externally influence other states considering alliance formation. This way I aim to highlight the limits of the Western-centric theories balance-of-threat, balance-of-power and ideological solidarity, when researching alignment formation in the Middle East.

⁴² Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 11. See: Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 9-11, 204-205.

The strategies used in this thesis are balancing, bandwagoning, hiding, transcending, chain-ganging, buck-passing and coercion. See table 1.

Strategies									
Leads to alliance formation				Reveals state behaviour				Influences state behaviour	
Balancing		Bandwagoning		Hiding	Transcending	Chain-ganging	Buck-passing	Coercion	
Internal	External	Defensive	Offensive					Compellence	Deterrence

Table 1

The two strategies that can lead to alliance formation are balancing and bandwagoning. States may balance or bandwagon in order to counter a perceived threat. The strategy balancing is defined as “allying with others against the prevailing threat.”⁴⁴ States can balance in multiple ways, however, it is presumed that when states balance, states with lesser capabilities ally against a stronger state, in order to balance out the dominion of the stronger state. Waltz makes a distinction between two kinds of balancing. States either counter threats with their own resources, which is called internal balancing, or ally with other states that share their perception of the threat, which is called external balancing.⁴⁵ Scholars have noted that in some cases states may also choose to ally with the strongest or most threatening state. This is called bandwagoning. States can bandwagon in order to gain protection and payoffs, because weaker states are perceived to be more dangerous, or because of ideological solidarity.⁴⁶ Walt differentiated two kinds of bandwagoning: offensive and defensive. According to him, “offensive bandwagoning is alignment with a dominant state in order to share in the spoils of victory. Defensive bandwagoning is a ‘form of appeasement’, where a state aligns with an aggressive state in order to avoid being attacked.”⁴⁷

Besides balancing and bandwagoning, there are also four strategies that reveal patterns of state behaviour and can externally influence other states considering alliance formation: hiding, transcending, chain-ganging and buck-passing. One strategy that reveals state behaviour is when states hide from threats. Hiding can take multiple forms: states can declare neutrality; ignore the perceived threat; form a purely defensive position; withdraw into isolation; or give diplomatic services or non-military support in exchange for protection from other states, without allying with those states or

⁴⁴ Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226.

⁴⁵ Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 296. Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” 143. Vasquez, *Realism and The Balancing of Power*, 79.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226. See: Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21.

promising military support.⁴⁸ According to Schroeder, the strategy transcending occurs when states try to “deal with the dangers of both concentrations of power as well as concrete threats, by taking the problem to a higher level, establishing norms of a legal, religious, moral, or procedural nature to govern international practice, with these norms to be somehow maintained and enforced by the international community or by a particular segment by it.”⁴⁹

The strategy chain-ganging occurs when alliance commitments interlock, resulting in states pulling each other into conflicts they might have avoided otherwise. According to Christensen and Snyder, “this dynamic is most likely to occur when states perceive that offense has the advantage over defence, since states must then lend quick and decisive support to their allies.”⁵⁰ In this case, all members of an alliance would then have to follow the foreign policies of the least restrained state in the alliance, which could result in unrestrained war caused by ‘hyperactive balancing’.⁵¹ Lastly, the strategy buck-passing occurs when a state “refuses to balance against a rising state, hoping that another threatened state will expend the necessary blood and treasure. A mutual buck-pass could result in none of the threatened states balancing, with the consequence that the rising state could achieve hegemony.”⁵² It is argued that this dynamic is most likely to occur when defence is perceived to have the advantage over offense.⁵³

Besides these strategies there is another strategy used by states in order to influence the behaviour of another state. This strategy is called coercion. Coercion is not considered as a strategy in the existing literature on alliance formation. However, since coercion is used multiple times in this case study and can influence alliance formation of other states greatly, I will argue in this thesis that it needs to be added to the theoretical framework. Since the Cold War, coercion in all its aspects has been widely studied and questioned on its use in the 20th and 21st century.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, coercion is generally

⁴⁸ Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” 143.

⁴⁹ Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” 143. See also: Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226. Vasquez and Elman. *Realism and The Balancing of Power*, 119.

⁵⁰ Christensen and Snyder, “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances,” 73.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Christensen and Snyder, “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances,” 73. Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 226-227.

⁵⁴ For more information see: Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. Borghard, and Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace.” Lindsay and Gartzke. *Cross-domain Deterrence*. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence.” Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz, *Complex Deterrence*.

understood as “the use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behaviour.”⁵⁵ The limited use of actual force can enhance the credibility of the threat or demonstrate the costs of continued defiance. However, the use of force will always be limited, since the threatened state must remain able to choose not to exercise its capacity for organized violence. Besides the threat or limited use of force, other tools that are used for coercion are economic sanctions, inducements or political pressure. Coercion is generally divided in compellence and deterrence. Compellence is understood to “attempt to reverse an action that already has occurred or to otherwise overturn the status quo,” whereas deterrence “attempts to prevent an as yet unmaterialized action from occurring.”⁵⁶

By examining the known policy considerations of the Middle Eastern states considered in the case study, and comparing them to these strategies, it will become clear what drove these states to (re)align or declare neutrality. This will lead to a better understanding of the policy considerations themselves, which is needed in order to determine if any of the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain them.

This chapter gave a theoretical overview of the leading Western-centric theories of alliance formation, balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theory, and highlighted the limits of the existing literature. Chapter 2 will discuss the empirical findings of the case study, detailing the historical background of the First Gulf War; the internal and external threats identified to have influenced the foreign policy decisions of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates) and Yemen; the influence of coercive diplomacy on these foreign policy decisions; and the differences in foreign policy decisions between the states that joined the U.N. coalition and Jordan and Yemen who remained neutral. In chapter 3, the findings of the case study will be analysed. Through a comparison of the drivers of alignment formation with the strategies of the theoretical framework, explained in this chapter, patterns of alignment formation will be identified, after which the research question can be answered if and to what extent the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain alignment formation in the Middle East during the First Gulf War.

⁵⁵ Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 1-4.

Chapter 2: Alignment formation during the First Gulf War

To gain an understanding of the drivers of alignment formation during the First Gulf War, this chapter will discuss the major foreign policy considerations of the Middle Eastern states that actively chose to join the U.N. coalition or had large repercussions by staying neutral. The Middle Eastern states considered in this case study are Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States and Yemen. In the first part of this chapter, an overview of the historical background of the First Gulf War will be given. Part two of this chapter will discuss the internal and external threats identified to have influenced the foreign policy decisions of the states considered in this case study. In the third part of this chapter, the influence of coercive diplomacy on these foreign policy decisions will be explained. In the fourth and final part of this chapter, the differences in foreign policy decisions between the states that joined the U.N. coalition and Jordan and Yemen who remained neutral will be discussed.

2.1. Historical Background of the First Gulf War

While it has become conventional to date the onset of the First Gulf War to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, in reality the regional crisis had been underway for several months, only coming to a head with the invasion. Indeed, the invasion itself signalled the end of the earlier crisis, that between Iraq and Kuwait, and marked the beginning of a new crisis well beyond the Gulf region alone.⁵⁷

The earlier, more localized, crisis had emerged in the wake of Iraq's eight-year war with Iran. In the period between the cessation of hostilities in 1988 and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Iraqi regime had concentrated on rebuilding its war-torn country and had also actively asserted its regional leadership and status, largely in an effort to gain much-needed aid from the Gulf states to finance post-war reconstruction.⁵⁸ The war had reduced Iraq's economic strength severely and Iraq emerged from it economically dependent on the West and its regional allies. By 1990, debt to Europe had reached over 40 billion dollars, 10 billion dollars more than in 1988, while the annual interest on the debt was 6 to 7 billion dollars. Both had to be repaid to restore Iraq's creditworthiness. The inability of Iraq to restore oil exports immediately and the multiple demands on its

⁵⁷ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127-128.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

resources, including an expensive weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.) program, made its post-war oil income inadequate. When oil prices dropped in 1990, Iraq was vulnerable.⁵⁹

Since Iraq is bordered not only by two large non-Arab states, Turkey and Iran, but by four Arab neighbours as well, of which Syria and Saudi Arabia are major players in the region, being vulnerable was unacceptable for Iraq. Its sense of vulnerability has been enhanced by its dependence on these neighbours for much of the export of its major resource, being oil. Pipelines running through the territory of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have often been cut off in times of trouble, which has emphasized Iraq's geographic vulnerability as an almost landlocked power. A similar situation exists with respect to Iraq's water resources. The headwaters of both the Tigris and Euphrates, as well as the tributaries of the former, lie in Turkey and Iran, whereas the middle reaches of the Euphrates flow through Syria on the way to Iraq. Some 48 percent of Iraq's arable land is dependent on Tigris and Euphrates irrigation. The Tigris irrigates about 2.2 million hectares; the Euphrates, one million. Iraq is vulnerable to water interdiction from all three neighbours, and water problems have been a contentious issue with both Syria and Turkey. Iraq's desire for independence and freedom from foreign interference has, therefore, always been strong.⁶⁰

Saddam recognized that in order to achieve his ambitions he needed a stable base and a country rich enough to arm itself. Oil could give him the necessary wealth, but if the oil revenues were not to be mortgaged for years to come, setting back his more grandiose programmes, the debts of the eight war years had to be written off. Iraq had steadily increased its demands for aid and also for concessions in oil pricing policies within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), culminating in a series of diatribes by Iraqi officials against both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, with the Iraqis army still mobilized and no peace treaty between the antagonists, so that Iraq's control of the Gulf was still threatened by Iran, Saudi Arabia had willingly agreed to Iraqi's demands that the huge loans made between 1980 and 1988 should be turned into outright grants. Saudi Arabia could afford it, and the reward was a treaty of non-aggression from Iraq.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 185, 196. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 12, 17, 86-87.

⁶⁰ Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 185-186, 196.

⁶¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127-128. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 21. To view the treaty, see the ATOP database: "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944."

However, the end of the war with Iran brought little immediate benefit to the people of Iraq. Saddam was aware that discontent was simmering not far below the surface. Demobilized soldiers were unable to find jobs, and often reacted violently against Egyptian immigrants who had taken their places or turned to armed robbery. There was a crime-wave and the security services reported more open criticism than ever before. Iraq needed a new rallying point and Kuwait fitted the bill perfectly. Kuwait was seen as being 'used' by the United States and the West to prevent Iraq's economic revival, through such methods as overproduction of its OPEC oil quota, refusal to cancel Iraq's debts, and its unwillingness to provide substantial sums of money for post-war reconstruction.⁶²

Furthermore, Kuwait may have been chosen, because it attempted to restore its relations with Iran, which had so deteriorated during the war that the Iranians had branded Kuwait at one time as a 'co-belligerent with Iraq.' Iran and Kuwait quickly agreed to restore diplomatic relations after the Iraq-Iran war, and on July 11th, three weeks before the invasion of Kuwait, the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, called in at Kuwait on his way home from acrimonious talks with his Iraqi counterpart in Geneva. It was a bad portent for Iraq, which feared that Kuwait might be seeking Iranian protection in the face of the spate of demands on it from Baghdad.⁶³

The decision to invade must also be set against a background of long frustration over lack of direct access to the Gulf and the desire to eliminate Kuwaiti control over the Khor 'Abd Allah estuary. Iraq's borders, drawn up by foreign powers and for the most part imposed on Iraq, are still not completely settled or accepted by the population. Border issues have been a constant irritant with most of Iraq's neighbours, especially at the head of the Gulf, where Iraq's boundaries leave it with only about twenty-six miles directly on the Gulf. Its main port, Basra, lies seventy miles up the Shatt al-'Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, a river it must share with Iran. This riverine boundary has been contested for decades. A second port, Umm Qasr, is situated on the Khor 'Abd Allah channel, a second Gulf estuary, which Iraq shares with Kuwait. Two Kuwaiti islands, Warba and Bubayan, control the entrance to this channel. A strong

⁶² Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 206. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 13, 21-22, 87, 99-100.

⁶³ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 100.

desire to modify these borders, which limit Iraq's access to the Gulf, must have been a powerful motive for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.⁶⁴

In the days immediately before the invasion, the Kuwaitis felt under pressure not only from Iraq, but also Saudi Arabia. Soon after Saudi Arabia and Iraq had concluded their non-aggression treaty, the Saudis had brought up their own demand for part of Kuwaiti territory, the small island of Qaruh in the southern part of Kuwait, long claimed by the Saudis and once briefly occupied. Now threatened in the north by Iraq, and aware of the pact between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Kuwait was suddenly faced with an ultimatum from Saudi Arabia for settlement of the undefined maritime border between the two states, important because of the possibility of more off-shore oil finds. This demand by Saudi Arabia was seen as an opportunistic move as Iraq put the pressure on through its mobilization at the time of the OPEC meeting. For Iraq the sudden resurrection by Saudi Arabia of its demands on Kuwait, was a signal that there would be little trouble if it acted.⁶⁵

Without mincing any words, Iraq accused Kuwait of 'stealing' 2.4 billion dollars of oil by drilling into the Rumaileh field, which according to the Iraqis belonged to them. Iraq also accused Kuwait of aggression against Baghdad. The grounds were that, without notice or consultation, Kuwait had moved the border and customs posts north from their previous positions. The Kuwaitis pointed out that both were still in Kuwaiti territory, and said if they had been moved, then it was for administrative and practical reasons, to expedite the flow of traffic. Kuwait also accused Iraq of resorting to intimidation to try to force it and other creditor countries into writing off Iraq's huge debts, something which the Kuwaitis strongly implied that they had no intention of doing. Two days later Iraq claimed Kuwait was preparing the ground for foreign intervention in the Gulf, and that it had renounced the Arab option in setting the dispute, a possibility that had not been mentioned until then. This was the signal for diplomats from a number of Arab countries to move in, and the Saudis, the Egyptians and Arab League officials all became involved.⁶⁶

The Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis escalated with the deployment of additional Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border in mid-July 1990. While some observers may have believed the

⁶⁴ Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 185-186, 206. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 122.

⁶⁵ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 160-161.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 100-101.

crisis to have been quickly defused following this show of force, all such perceptions were quickly dashed by the sudden invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd. The surprise invasion, in turn, triggered a new crisis, far more global in scope than the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute itself. Within 24 hours, Iraq infantry and armoured units had crushed Kuwaiti opposition and consolidated control over the small country.⁶⁷

Although the crisis began as the most severe of inter-Arab conflicts, Kuwait's geo-strategic importance to the major industrial powers of the world ensured that it quickly became a global concern.⁶⁸ At the advent of the invasion, Resolution 660 was approved by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, condemning Iraqi aggression and calling for its immediate withdrawal of Kuwait. Responding to appeals from the Kuwaitis for international assistance, President Bush ordered additional US warships to the Gulf and Moscow halted the flow of Soviet weapons to Iraq. The main banking centres put a freeze on Kuwaiti assets, thereby depriving Saddam of his booty and, within a day, the Russians and the Americans had condemned the invasion in a joint statement issued in Moscow by the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the visiting American secretary of state, James Baker. Within twenty-four hours a collective international response, which Saddam had discounted, was already emerging. On August 6th, the Security Council stepped up the pressure by passing Resolution 661, imposing mandatory trade sanctions which included a ban on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, a measure which had already been adopted by the West.⁶⁹

Saddam's response the following day was to proclaim the annexation of Kuwait. This turned international opinion against him. The international political confrontation that followed the invasion was succeeded, in turn, by a major regional war as an international coalition of forces was formed, acting under U.N. authority, and led by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The U.N. coalition inflicted a devastating defeat on the Iraqis between January and March 1991.⁷⁰ The defeat of Saddam's armed forces resulted in Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and hence in the political liberation of that Gulf emirate.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 128. "Kuwait - The Persian Gulf War and Its Aftermath."

For a detailed account of the invasion and the resulting war see: Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 102-117. Musallam, *The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait*.

⁶⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 128.

⁶⁹ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 108.

⁷⁰ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 128. "Kuwait - The Persian Gulf War and Its Aftermath." Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 110

⁷¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 128. "Kuwait - The Persian Gulf War and Its Aftermath."

After Kuwait was freed, Iraq was not only defeated in the war, which destroyed its military, but an international sanctions regime was implemented on Iraq as well. This led to the Iraqi loss of control over its oil exports and saw drastic erosion of its domestic economy. Two no-fly zones ended Iraq's sovereignty over much of its air space. In the Gulf, the U.N. coalition drew down their forces after the war but left a robust naval and air armada to enforce these restrictions. An intrusive international weapons inspection regime began dismantling Iraq's nuclear program and had reduced much of the remainder of its W.M.D. program by the time it was withdrawn in December 1998.⁷²

Meanwhile, withdrawal of Iraqi troops from a large swath of territory in the north, running roughly south and east from Zakho to Kalar and Kifri, left much of the Kurdish region under real Kurdish control for the first time in Iraq's modern history. This spontaneous uprising put temporarily fourteen out of Iraq's eighteen provinces in rebel hands. The regime had never been closer to being overthrown.⁷³ Moreover, practically all Western countries and most regional powers broke diplomatic relations with Iraq. By the end of the decade, Iraq's situation had been eased, but the country was still considered a pariah state by the most important global powers. The First Gulf War resulted in massive inflation, disinvestment by the population, deaths from malnutrition estimated at 4500 a month in the mid-1990s, and a serious depletion of the educated middle class as Iraqis left the country by the thousands.⁷⁴

2.2. Balancing internal as well as external threats during the First Gulf War

When looking at the historical background and the state behaviour leading up to the First Gulf War of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iran, the Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates) and Yemen, it can be seen that most foreign policy decision of these states had taken into account both internal as well as external threats. In the case of Egypt, as one of the long-time allies of Iraq throughout the Iraq-Iran war, it tried to negotiate with Iraq before the invasion in 1990. President Hosni Mubarak had proposed a high-level meeting in Saudi Arabia between Iraq and Kuwait. However, when this failed, Egypt was one of the first states to support the U.N. coalition actively, realigning against Iraq with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Iran, Turkey, Syria and the West. At Saudi request, and pursuant to the Arab Collective Security Pact,

⁷² Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 197. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127.

⁷³ Ibid, 196-197. Ibid.

⁷⁴ Marr, "Iraqi Foreign Policy," 197.

Egypt deployed some 25,000 Egyptian troops to the kingdom to participate in the U.N. coalition that liberated Kuwait.⁷⁵

This realignment is argued to be based largely on balancing Egypt's internal threats of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of its leadership position in the region. Despite previously good relations, upon the Egyptians return from the Iraq after the Iraq-Iran war tales ran rampant about their bad treatment, which soured their relations. Furthermore, the peace which President Mubarak's predecessor, Anwar Sadat, had made with Israel had brought no real political dividends and few economic rewards. Mubarak had managed to strengthen its Arab alignments, but had not re-established its country's leadership position, nor had he made the economic breakthrough needed. Therefore, because of its need to balance its internal threats of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of its leadership position in the region, and its external threat of Iraq, Egypt made its decision to realign and join the U.N. coalition.⁷⁶

In the case of Iran, due to the exhaustion of its physical and emotional resources by the Iraq-Iran war, Iran's decision to align with the U.N. coalition was also as much fuelled by external as internal threats. It was ready to repair the war damage and revive their economy. Khomeini's death in 1989 removed a powerful, domineering presence, and allowed his lieutenants more flexibility in domestic and foreign policy. Rafsanjani, the new president, focussed on economic development, launched what he described as the 'era of reconstruction', and set about repairing Iran's foreign relations. The First Gulf War created opportunities for this.⁷⁷

Even though feelings of encirclement persisted. After the Iraq-Iran war, which ended in 1988, and Khomeini's death a year later, the Islamic Republic came to attach primary importance to stability along its own borders and good relations with neighbouring states. Its borders with Afghanistan, the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Iraq remained a constant source of instability for Iran. American military presence in the Persian Gulf was another source of concern, because of past hostilities and their uncertain intentions. Military cooperation between Israel and Turkey, and the possibility that Arab-Israeli peace might lead to an Israeli

⁷⁵ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 13, 158-159. Doran, "Egypt," 116.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Bakhash, "Iran," 252-253, 255-256.

diplomatic, commercial, and perhaps military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, reinforced Iran's perpetual fear of encirclement. However, aligning with the Arab states and the West would balance out part of these perceived external threats. Due to Iran's commitment to the U.N. coalition, relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Jordan could be re-established, which gave much needed diplomatic relief. It also opened up more economic venues with Japan, China, Russia and several European states, which relieved economic pressure on Iranian resources.⁷⁸ Therefore, Iran's decision to align with the U.N. coalition addressed both its internal as well as external threats.

In the case of Syria, President Assad used the First Gulf War to change the fortunes of his desperately poor country overnight. His army was occupied in the civil war in Lebanon; he lacked the support of the Soviet Union, due to the fall of the wall in 1988, and Iran, due to being physically exhausted from the Iraq-Iran war, which left Syria exposed and its economy in near-terminal condition. Syria was in no position to achieve the central objective of President Assad's long-term strategy, to regain the Golan Heights, which had been seized by Israel in 1967. Assad had begun to improve his relations with Egypt and Jordan, and so, he hoped, with the West; he voted at the Arab League for action against Iraq; and sent 15,000 Syrian troops to Saudi Arabia as part of the Arab contingent.⁷⁹

Even before the advent of the First Gulf War, relations between Syria and Iraq were not cordial. There existed a political rivalry between Syria and Iraq, due to both being Baath parties. Furthermore, Syria had sided with Iran, instead of Iraq, during the Iraq-Iran war, which exacerbated the external threat of Iraq even more. Due to the poor state of its economy and its army's occupation in Lebanon, it was imperative that Syria looked elsewhere for aid.⁸⁰ During the First Gulf War, the Syrians, therefore, felt a powerful need for friends, which this conflict created the perfect opportunity for. Joining the U.N. coalition solved both Syria's external threat of Iraq, as well as its internal threat of its near-terminal economy, as will be expanded upon later in this chapter.

Just like with Syria and Iran, the First Gulf War gave Turkey the opportunity to strengthen its ties with the members of the U.N. coalition, mostly with its patron the

⁷⁸ Bakhash, "Iran," 252-253, 255-256.

⁷⁹ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 149, 155.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 148-149, 155.

United States, and gain a new strategic position in the world. By joining the U.N. coalition, Turkey balanced its internal threats of dwindling resources and eroding American support, through receiving an increase of American support and American interference in the region, which resulted in getting an additional 3 billion dollars in aid from the Gulf States. Furthermore, there was widespread agreement in Turkey that its regime should follow the United Nations decisions. However, due to its close geographical proximity to Iraq, as neighbours, and sharing the border issue of the Kurds, going against Iraq by joining the U.N. coalition would also increase the external threat Iraq posed. President Ozal balanced this external threat by not taking part in the actual fighting, but in conformity with U.N. resolutions, it only assisted those countries that were enforcing them, such as shutting off the oil pipeline from Iraq, and allowing American planes to operate from Incirlik.⁸¹

Even in the cases of Jordan and Yemen, who did not align with the U.N. coalition, these states can be seen balancing their internal and external threats. Yemen had recently been freed of a civil war. National sentiments and public opinion, therefore, influenced their foreign policies greatly. Following a united course of action was imperative in rebuilding their country. However, public opinion was divided on whether to support Iraq or the U.N. coalition. The south was inclined to support Iraq, due to them sharing the Soviet Union as a patron in the past, and a perpetual fear of American influences in the region, which would increase with the presence of the U.N. coalition. Whereas the north was more pragmatic and feared repercussions of Saudi Arabia, who had harassed their borders in the past. The external threat perceived by the Yemini government was, therefore, not only the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's increase of power and influence in the region, but possible repercussions from Saudi Arabia and the United States as well. For that reason, the Yemini government decided on a more moderate course of action, to not align with either side of the war, but remain neutral.⁸²

In the case of Jordan, its options were constrained by their close geographical proximity to Iraq and their social, political, and economic links with the various participants in the ever-widening crisis, mainly Iraq itself. By 1989 Jordan was economically dependent on Iraq, due to Iraq being the main source of Jordanian imports

⁸¹ Harris, "Turkey's Foreign Policy: Independent or Reactive?" 270-272. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 153-154.

⁸² Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 135, 159. Brown, "The Other Middle Eastern States," 289.

and exports and their almost exclusive source of petroleum. Moreover, all of Jordan's policy decisions were taken with domestic political ramifications in mind. Since Jordan began a process of political liberalization in 1989, maintaining domestic stability became a priority for its regime's survival. Furthermore, the Jordanian government believed that internationalizing the crisis, with the U.N. coalition, would escalate the crisis and perhaps create a broader conflict with the potential to engulf the entire region. This could lead to Jordan becoming a battleground in an Israeli-Iraqi confrontation.⁸³ By declaring neutrality, Jordan, therefore, tried to appease both domestic and external audiences and balance both its large external as well as internal threats.

All in all, these examples show that these states all had to balance both their internal as well as external threats during this conflict. The case of Saudi Arabia is slightly different from the previous cases. At the advent of the First Gulf War, Saudi Arabia experienced almost minimal known internal threats. Public opinion was rallied behind the kingdom and economic resources were more than sufficient. Considering how Saudi Arabia was aligned with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war, had signed a non-aggression pact in 1989,⁸⁴ and had always been opposed to the West, it is remarkable that they realigned themselves during the First Gulf War against Iraq and with the West in the U.N. coalition. However, its close geographical proximity to Iraq, the trend in Iraq's aggressive foreign policy decisions, and their large offensive capabilities played a large part in its decision to realign against Iraq. Since Saudi Arabia's military capabilities were not large enough to withstand a possible Iraqi attack on the kingdom, King Fahd had to find a way to balance the scales.⁸⁵ His decision to join the U.N. coalition was therefore largely determined by its external threats, instead of its internal threats like with the previous states.

However, one could also argue that domestic politics influenced King Fahd's decision to join the U.N. coalition. Since neither Saudi Arabia's indigenous military forces nor those of the Gulf Cooperation Council had the capability to withstand a possible Iraqi attack on the kingdom, King Fahd, albeit reluctantly, agreed to an American proposal that invited American forces on their soil, in order to deter the Iraqi threat and

⁸³ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 131-132, 135-138, 140-141. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 142, 147-148, 150-155.

⁸⁴ To view the treaty, see the ATOP database: "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944."

⁸⁵ Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 222, 224-226, 230, 237-238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 167-169.

eventually to liberate Kuwait. Sensitive to the misgivings of his Wahhabi subjects to having non-Muslim military in the holy land of Islam, the king prudently obtained a *fatwa* from the late Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the mufti of Saudi Arabia, legitimizing the presence of such troops in defence of Islamic territories. The American troops, it was stipulated from the outset, would leave the kingdom once the Iraqi threat was removed. Furthermore, the presence of the Egyptian troops, and later those of Syria, Morocco, and other Islamic states, eased King Fahd's domestic problem in countering misgivings among rigidly conservative elements of the Saudi public for having invited large numbers of foreign, non-Muslim troops into the 'holy land of Islam'.⁸⁶ Therefore, since Saudi Arabia also balanced against this internal instability, it can be argued that its decision to align with the U.N. coalition was based on both internal and external threats.

For the Gulf States, in comparison, no internal threats before or after the conflict are known. Most of the statelets of the Gulf reacted in the same way as their senior partner, Saudi Arabia. They wanted the guarantee of protection as soon as possible. The United Arab Emirates, in particular, realized the threat that Iraq posed. When American and British envoys arrived to ask for the support of these small states for the embargo, they were putting in place, they were met with promises that everything possible would be done, and with permission for the West to arrange a physical presence in their territory. The United Arab Emirates told Britain that RAF planes could use their airports, and British instructors and equipment would train their small forces to deal with a possible chemical attack. Qatar, the state most ideologically and temperamentally akin to Saudi Arabia, requested and was given American air force units for its defence.⁸⁷

Oddly enough, it was Oman, the country generally regarded as still somewhat of a British protectorate, which took the most independent line of the Gulf States. Oman had British seconded and contract officers in all its military services, and it had allowed America to position stores on Marisah island and at Thamrait on the edge of the Empty Quarter and welcomed British and American aircrafts. Yet Oman still took a softer line than most other Gulf states. Just as it had maintained links with Iran throughout the Iraq-Iran war while also drawing closer to Egypt, Iraq's close ally in that time, so now

⁸⁶ Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 224, 230, 238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 167-169.

⁸⁷ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 135.

Oman tried to steer between the most extreme positions of its allies and neighbours, keeping in contact with its neighbour Yemen.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, the Gulf States realized themselves well, that Kuwait, as one of the Gulf States, got invaded in less than a day. Without having sufficient military capabilities to defend against an Iraqi attack, the Gulf States had to look abroad for help. With their close geographical proximity to Iraq as well, the Gulf States needed a guarantee of protection as soon as possible.⁸⁹

2.3. The use of Coercive Diplomacy

The Gulf States procured this guarantee of protection through the use of coercive diplomacy. In exchange for their allegiance to the U.N. coalition, the Gulf States offered monetary inducements to Egypt and Turkey. They acquitted Egypt a debt of 6,7 billion dollars. The United States similarly promised to write off 7 billion dollars which Egypt owed the U.S. for arms.⁹⁰ After the First Gulf War, the United States also provided the promised monetary and military inducements to Turkey at the start of the war. It provided 3,5 billion dollars in excess military equipment and raised textile quotas at least 100 percent across the board. With the United States running interference, Turkey also got 3 billion dollars in aid from the Gulf states. Even the European Union raised its textile quotas by a third and the F-16 joint production program was put into high gear.⁹¹ These inducements were, therefore, a means of influencing Egypt's and Turkey's foreign policies in joining the U.N. coalition and preventing them to support Iraq.

Furthermore, as punishment for staying neutral in the conflict, the Gulf States also halted aid and export to Yemen and Jordan. This was further supported by Saudi Arabia and the United States. In the case of Yemen, American aid was reduced to a pittance. Saudi Arabia withdrew many of the privileges the 1.5 million Yemenis living in the kingdom had enjoyed, forcing thousands of them to go home; reducing the remittances sent to Yemen; and putting a severe strain on services there. At the same time the Saudis again distributed money and arms to the tribes on the Saudi side of the

⁸⁸ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 135.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Doran. "Egypt," 116.

⁹¹ Harris, "Turkey's Foreign Policy: Independent or Reactive?" 272.

border with Yemen, encouraging them to resume their traditional sport of harassing Yemeni government troops and installations, and seizing what booty they could find.⁹²

In the case of Jordan, exports to and from Arab states rapidly declined and aid from the Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States was abruptly halted. Port revenues and goods entering Jordan sharply declined too as the port of Aqaba was eventually all but shut off to commercial traffic. Furthermore, as tensions rose in the region due to the conflict, tourism dwindled until the Jordanian tourism income effectively evaporated. Lastly, several hundred thousand Jordanians and Palestinians were expelled first from Saudi Arabia and later from liberated Kuwait. In addition to eliminating Jordan's critical source of labour remittances from the oil states, these repercussions also added a severe strain on housing and services in the kingdom, as half a million laborers and their families abruptly arrived back home.⁹³ In both cases, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and the United States, therefore, used coercion to try to disrupt the status quo in Yemen and Jordan, as a punishment for failing to join the U.N. coalition.

2.4. Declaring neutrality vs. joining the U.N. coalition

As already briefly has been touched upon, Jordan and Yemen chose to remain neutral in the conflict, instead of joining the U.N. coalition. Both states were in a difficult position at the advent of the First Gulf War. Only a few months before the conflict, the long-divided northern and southern parts of Yemen had been united, with ministers from the Marxist south now serving in the government beside the more pragmatic and nationalist men from the north. The southerners, with their seafaring tradition and alliance with Moscow, were more inclined to side with Iraq in the dispute. They also feared the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula. The northerners, closer to Saudi Arabia and more aware of the damage that kingdom could inflict, took a more cautious line. The result was that the government in Sanaa allowed Iraqi planes to continue to fly into the Yemen, sent some food and other goods to Baghdad, and resisted pressure to align itself with Saudi Arabia, without going against the U.N. resolutions.⁹⁴

To the surprise and chagrin of its Western allies, Jordan's historically conservative and pro-Western regime did not follow conventional expectations in supporting the U.N. coalition against Iraq, but stayed neutral as well. It maintained its

⁹² Brown, "The Other Middle East," 289. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 135, 159.

⁹³ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 140.

⁹⁴ Brown, "The Other Middle Eastern States," 289. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 135, 159.

alignment with Iraq while simultaneously attempting to appease all sides of the crisis. That made Jordan's decision to remain neutral one of the most contested during the First Gulf War. Within hours of the news of the initial invasion, the Jordanian position began to form, and was repeated consistently in the months that followed, right up to the outbreak of the war in January 1991. King Hussein immediately attempted to take on the role of mediator in the crisis and began a lengthy set of shuttle diplomacy missions to various capitals.⁹⁵

Jordan rejected the admissibility of the acquisition of territory through conquest, but it also rejected Western military intervention. It called for Iraqi withdrawal; continued to recognize the al-Sabah government of Kuwait; and rejected Iraq's claim to have annexed Kuwait. However, it also refused to abandon Iraq entirely. While many individual Jordanians signed up as volunteers to defend Iraq, the Jordanian armed forces were strictly neutral. It sent none of its armed forces to assist either the U.N. coalition or Saddam Hussein's army, while also remaining noticeably lax in its enforcement of the embargo against Iraq. Contrary to Western and Gulf views of the Jordanian stance, Jordanian policymakers saw themselves as having picked neither side in the looming conflict. Just as importantly, they saw themselves as among the very few, along with their colleagues in Yemen, who were attempting to find a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the crisis.⁹⁶

Jordanian policy makers believed that their options were constrained by their vulnerable geographical position and their social, political, and economic links with the various participants in the ever-widening crisis, particularly their links with fellow Arab states.⁹⁷ The regime's first goal was 'containment.' King Hussein and his government warned the other Arab states of the dangers of internationalizing the crisis: it could only mean foreign intervention, thereby escalating the crisis and perhaps creating a broader conflict with the potential to engulf the entire region. If the crisis could not be handled within the Arab camp, the prescription was certain to involve war, and many Jordanians believed that such a war would inevitably bring in Israel, making Jordan a battleground in an Israeli-Iraqi confrontation.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127-129.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 129, 134.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 131-132. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 142, 150.

⁹⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 131-132. For more information about Israel's foreign policy decisions during the First Gulf War, see: Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 155-157.

This fear was not ungrounded. Only months before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had threatened chemical weapons attacks on Israel. The Jordanian government feared being dragged into an unnecessary war by one's own ally. Not only were Jordanian officials convinced that their own military forces were no match for the Israelis, but they were also deeply aware that they, and not Iraq, shared the longest border with Israel. It was Jordan that would bear the brunt of any Israeli offensive, not Iraq. Furthermore, Israel had also announced after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, that if any Iraqi troops moved into Jordan that would be a *casus belli* for Israel. Therefore, Iraqi belligerency, while popular with the Jordanian public, was also the source of considerable uneasiness for regime officials.⁹⁹

Jordan's policy decisions were also taken with economic ramifications in mind. In 1979, Jordan had shifted its main Arab alignment from Syria to Iraq. These ties had increased throughout the 1980s to the point that by 1989, Iraq was the main source of Jordanian imports (17.3 percent) as well as the main destination of Jordanian exports (23.2 percent). In addition, most of its oil supply came from Iraq, an arrangement that had developed in return for Jordan's support of the Iraqi war effort against Iran. Furthermore, these oil shipments came at no charge to Jordan, but rather were deducted from Iraq's wartime debt it owed to Jordan. Jordan's dependence on Iraqi oil had become so great, in fact, that it no longer imported oil from most other Arab Gulf states, relying on Iraq for anywhere from 70 to 100 percent of its oil imports, depending on the particular year. Given this level of economic ties to Iraq, and indeed this level of dependency, the Jordanian government felt that Western intervention against Iraq could only result in economic and political disaster for the region and certainly for Jordan's largest trading partner and its almost exclusive source of petroleum.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, all of Jordan's policy decisions were taken with domestic political ramifications in mind. Jordan began in 1989 a process of political liberalization. With the coincidental timing of the liberalization effort and the Gulf crisis, many political elements in Jordan had only recently found their voices. Though they made ample use of them in street demonstrations; in parliament; and in newly established newspapers and magazines. The majority of the Jordanian population supported Saddam Hussein and saw the conflict in terms of an Arab nationalist leader standing up to the West.

⁹⁹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 132. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 155-156.

¹⁰⁰ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 140-141. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 150-152, 155.

Spontaneous demonstrations erupted across Jordan in favour of Saddam and against Western intervention. For some Jordanian policymakers, the intensity of domestic politicization during the crisis operated as a powerful constraint on decision making, possibly preventing any major shift from the initial Jordanian stand. The public and parliament, in short, seemed to be running far out in front of the king and the cabinet, and the latter attempted to keep pace, mixing occasional fiery rhetoric with constant pleas for restraint and reconciliation, as the regime attempted to appease both domestic and external audiences. Despite the severe economic costs and the dangers of regional war, Jordanians across the political spectrum were proud of their regime's stance. Maintaining that stance, then, meant maintaining domestic stability.¹⁰¹ By declaring neutrality, Jordan therefore tried to appease both domestic and external audiences and balance both its large external as well as internal threats.

The drivers of alignment formation identified in this chapter, will be compared, in chapter 3, with the strategies of the theoretical framework, explained in the chapter 1. In this way, patterns of alliance formation can be identified, after which the research question can be answered if and to what extent the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain alignment formation in the Middle East during the First Gulf War.

¹⁰¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 135-138. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 151-152, 155.

Chapter 3: Alliance formation theory revised

In order to answer the research question if and to what extent the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories can explain alignment formation in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, the drivers of alignment formation identified in the previous chapter, will be compared to the strategies of the theoretical framework, explained in the chapter 1. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, the findings of the case study will be compared to the strategies balancing and bandwagoning. Part two of this chapter will address the influence of coercive diplomacy on the foreign policy decisions made. In the third part of this chapter, the findings of the case study will be compared to the strategies hiding, transcending, chain-ganging and buck-passing. In the fourth and final part of this chapter, the findings of the case study will be compared to the three leading Western-centric alliance formation theories.

3.1. Balancing or Bandwagoning in a coalition

The theoretical framework also allowed to compare the findings of the case study to alliance formation strategies, in order to understand the occurrence of alliance formation. See table 1.

Strategies									
Leads to alliance formation				Reveals state behaviour				Influences state behaviour	
Balancing		Bandwagoning		Hiding	Transcending	Chain-ganging	Buck-passing	Coercion	
Internal	External	Defensive	Offensive					Compellence	Deterrence

Table 1

As explained in chapter 1, in Western alliance formation theories, the strategy balancing is defined as “allying with others against the prevailing threat”,¹⁰² where states can balance internally, by using their own resources, or balance externally, by seeking out other states that share their perception of the threat and ally with them. However, in both cases it is presumed that when states balance, states with lesser military capabilities ally against a stronger state.¹⁰³

As discussed in the previous chapter, during the First Gulf War a U.N. sanctioned coalition was formed. According to Snyder, alliances are often formed in peace time, but

¹⁰² Duffield, Michota and Miller, “Alliances,” 296.
¹⁰³ Ibid. Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 225-226. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” 143. Vasquez and Elman, *Realism and The Balancing of Power*, 79.

in war time they can also take a different form, named coalitions.¹⁰⁴ Fedder defined a coalition as “a set of members acting in concert at ‘x’ time regarding one to ‘n’ issues.”¹⁰⁵ By joining the U.N. coalition, there were Middle Eastern states that aligned with states that had lesser, similar or more military capabilities than themselves. Is this then still considered balancing or is this considered bandwagoning, where states align with the strongest state or the most threatening one?

States are known to bandwagon for several reasons, which could be gaining protection; gaining payoffs; for ideological reasons; to avoid being attacked; or because the weaker state is perceived as more dangerous.¹⁰⁶ As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States did not have the military capabilities to withstand an Iraqi attack, and had to look elsewhere for aid. They joined the U.N. coalition, and therefore several stronger states, in order to be protected from an attack from Iraq.¹⁰⁷ In the case of Syria, its army was occupied in the civil war in Lebanon and its economy was in near-terminal condition, which led to Syria needing to depend on outsiders as well. Furthermore, Syria had bad relations with Iraq for decennia, and was, as a neighbouring state, in danger of being attacked by Iraq in the future. Since Syria could not internally defend against this, it sought protection as well. However, as explained, it needed help to restore its economy as well due to the lack of support from the Soviet Union and Iran.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, it can also be argued that Syria joined the U.N. coalition in order to gain payoffs from the Gulf States and the United States to help revive its economy. As discussed in the previous chapter, Iran, Egypt and Turkey underwent economic difficulties as well,¹⁰⁹ which led to a similar situation with Syria, where the First Gulf War was used as an opportunity to gain payoffs, like promised aid, reduced debts and better economic relations, in order to revive their economies as well. It can, therefore, be argued that the states that joined the U.N. coalition chose the strategy bandwagoning, where they align themselves with the strongest states, against their external threat of Iraq.

¹⁰⁴ Snyder, “Alliance Theory,” 106.

¹⁰⁵ Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” 80.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Eilts, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy,” 224, 238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 135, 139, 167-169.

¹⁰⁸ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 149, 155.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 159. Doran. “Egypt,” 116. Bakhsh, “Iran,” 252-253, 255-256. Harris, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Independent or Reactive?” 271-272.

However, this line of thinking goes against Walt's theory of offensive and defensive bandwagoning, where offensive bandwagoning is argued to be motivated by sharing in the spoils of victory by the aggressor, and defensive bandwagoning is argued to be motivated by avoiding to be attacked by the aggressor. In this theory, the strongest state is argued to be the aggressor,¹¹⁰ which is in this case study Iraq. However, since most states considered joining the U.N. coalition, which was comprised of states with lesser, similar, or even more military capabilities from each other, the entirety of states joining the coalition would, therefore, be stronger than the aggressor itself. For that reason, I argue that Walt's theory cannot be applied in a situation where a coalition is formed.

In the literature, it is argued that Jordan chose the strategy bandwagoning as well, by not going against the aggressor, Iraq. In declaring neutrality, it would have avoided being attacked by Iraq, and even shared in the economical surge Iraq would have gained from invading Kuwait, since economic relations between Iraq and Jordan continued after the invasion.¹¹¹ This reasoning is in line with Walt's theory. However, as Jordan declared neutrality and did not choose any side in the conflict, I argue that it did not use the strategies balancing or bandwagoning at all. Since these two strategies lead to (re)alignment, and Jordan did not align with either the U.N. coalition or Iraq, Jordan could not have used one of these strategies. Since Yemen declared neutrality too, this holds true for Yemen as well.

All in all, it can be concluded that if balancing is defined as aligning against the prevailing threat and bandwagoning is defined as aligning with the prevailing threat, as argued in Walt's theory, one could argue that the states that joined the U.N. coalition used the strategy external balancing. Since in this case the prevailing threat is Iraq. However, if balancing is defined as aligning with states with lesser capabilities to balance the dominating position of the strongest state and bandwagoning is defined as aligning with the strongest state, one can argue that the states that joined the U.N. coalition used the strategy bandwagoning, since together, especially with Western support, they can be perceived as the strongest state. Therefore, I argue that the theories surrounding the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised when

¹¹⁰ Duffield, Michota and Miller, "Alliances," 296. Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 225-226. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," 143. Vasquez and Elman, *Realism and The Balancing of Power*, 79.

¹¹¹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 133-134. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 140.

dealing with a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East, where states have large differences in military capabilities.

3.2. Coercive Diplomacy influencing alignment formation

Another strategy that needs to be discussed is coercion. As explained in chapter 1, coercion is defined as the “use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behaviour.”¹¹² However, besides the threat or limited use of force, other tools of coercion can be used as well, such as economic sanctions, inducements or political pressure.¹¹³ The use of coercion is not considered in alliance formation theory, while it does actively influence state behaviour and, therefore, influences alliance formation. Furthermore, as has been identified in this case study, all three of the tools of coercion, economic sanctions, inducements and political pressure, have been applied by as well as on the states considered in this case study.

Coercion is typically divided in compellence and deterrence, where compellence “attempts to reverse an action that already has occurred or to otherwise overturn the status quo,” and deterrence “attempts to prevent an as yet unmaterialized action from occurring.”¹¹⁴ Therefore, depending on the timeline and type of behaviour one wants to influence, the tools of coercion will take a different shape. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, due to a lack of military capabilities, the Gulf States needed a guarantee of protection in order to balance against the threat Iraq posed. Therefore, in exchange for their allegiance to the U.N. coalition, the Gulf States offered monetary inducements to Egypt and Turkey.¹¹⁵ In this way the Gulf States influenced Egypt’s and Turkey’s foreign policies in joining the U.N. coalition and prevented them from supporting Iraq.

Furthermore, as punishment for staying neutral in the conflict, the Gulf States also halted aid and export to Yemen and Jordan. Saudi Arabia supported the Gulf States in this by applying political and economic pressure on Yemen and Jordan, by expelling Jordanians and Palestinians from its kingdom; withdrawing privileges and straining services of Yemenis living in the kingdom; and supporting hostile tribes to harass the

¹¹² Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 1.

¹¹³ Ibid, 1-3.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 1-4.

¹¹⁵ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 159. Doran. “Egypt,” 116.

Yemini border. Jordan’s tourism income and exports to and from Arab states rapidly declined too and port revenues and goods entering Jordan sharply declined as the port of Aqaba was eventually all but shut off to commercial traffic.¹¹⁶ In both cases, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and the United States, therefore, used political pressure and economic sanctions to try to disrupt the status quo in Yemen and Jordan, as a punishment for failing to join the U.N. coalition. These examples are a classic example of coercion, where if deterrence fails, compellence is used to disrupt the status quo in a state.

Since the use of coercion is not considered in alliance formation theory, but is clearly visible in this case study, I argue that the influence of coercion on alliance formation needs to be researched further and ultimately added to the theoretical framework. If strategies like buck-passing and chain-ganging, that can identify patterns of external influences on alliance formation, are considered in the broader spectrum of alliance formation theory, the strategy coercion should be considered too, as it actively influences state behaviour of other states by being offered inducements or being put under economic or political pressure, as was seen in the case study.

3.3. The use of Multiple Strategies

Besides the strategies balancing and bandwagoning that identify alliance formation, and the strategy coercion that influences state behaviour, there are four strategies that can reveal state behaviour and identify patterns. See table 1.

Strategies									
Leads to alliance formation				Reveals state behaviour				Influences state behaviour	
Balancing		Bandwagoning		Hiding	Transcending	Chain-ganging	Buck-passing	Coercion	
Internal	External	Defensive	Offensive					Compellence	Deterrence

Table 1

These strategies were of importance in order to identify patterns of external influences and explain the behaviour of Yemen and Jordan, who did not join the U.N. coalition and, therefore, deviated from the behaviour of the other six states, but, compared to other states in the region, had large repercussions for their decision to remain neutral.

The case study showed that, both Yemen and Jordan used the strategy hiding by deciding to remain neutral. Hiding can take multiple forms: states can declare neutrality;

¹¹⁶ Brown, “The Other Middle East,” 289. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 135, 159. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 140.

ignore the perceived threat; form a purely defensive position; withdraw into isolation; or give diplomatic services or non-military support in exchange for protection from other states, without allying with those states or promising military support.¹¹⁷ As discussed in the previous chapter, Yemen and Jordan declared neutrality and supported both sides of the conflict.

Besides using the strategy hiding, Jordan also attempted to forge a role for itself as a neutral mediator between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti regimes, and in a broader sense, between Iraq and the rest of the Arab world.¹¹⁸ By rejecting both the admissibility of Iraq's acquisition of Kuwaiti territory through conquest, and the Western military intervention, and mediating with both parties, Jordan took the problem to a higher level. Therefore, Jordan used not only the strategy hiding, but also the strategy transcending, which occurs when states try to deal with both sides of the conflict, by taking the problem to a higher level, establishing norms of a legal, religious, moral, or procedural nature.¹¹⁹ While Jordan called for Iraqi withdrawal and continued to recognize the al-Sabah government of Kuwait, it also sent none of its armed forces to assist either the U.N. coalition or Saddam Hussein's army, and remained noticeably lax in its enforcement of the embargo against Iraq. Their focus was on attempting to find a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the crisis.¹²⁰ This shows that multiple strategies that do not lead to alliance formation, but do influence state behaviour, can be used by the same state.

A similar phenomenon was also seen in the foreign policy decisions of Saudi Arabia. By allowing non-Muslim military in the holy land of Islam, the decision to align with the U.N. coalition brought internal instability to Saudi Arabia. As explained in the previous chapter, since Saudi Arabia did not have the military capability to withstand a possible Iraqi attack on the kingdom, King Fahd agreed to an American proposal that invited American forces on their soil. In order to legitimize the presence of these troops and mitigate the misgivings of his Wahhabi subjects for having non-Muslim military in the holy land of Islam, the king prudently obtained a fatwa from the late Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the mufti of Saudi Arabia.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 226-227. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," 143.

¹¹⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127-129.

¹¹⁹ Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 226-227. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," 143. Vasquez and Elman. *Realism and The Balancing of Power*, 119.

¹²⁰ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 129, 134.

¹²¹ Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 224, 230, 238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 167-169.

The king also ignored Saddam Hussein's assurances that he had no intention of moving into Saudi Arabia, or his careful distinction between Iraq's historic claim to Kuwait and its friendly relations with the kingdom, and welcomed Egyptian President Mubarak's success in persuading ten members of the Arab League to condemn the Iraqi aggression. Furthermore, the presence of the Egyptian troops, and later those of Syria, Morocco, and other Islamic states, eased King Fahd's domestic problem in countering misgivings among the rigidly conservative elements of the Saudi public for having invited large numbers of foreign, non-Muslim troops into the 'holy land of Islam'.¹²² By obtaining a fatwa, condemning Iraqi actions in the Arab League, and allowing the presence of troops of other Islamic states, Saudi Arabia took this internal struggle to a higher level, which demonstrates that strategies that do not lead to alliance formation can be used besides strategies that do lead to alliance formation.

As with the strategy coercion, the strategies buck-passing and chain-ganging can identify patterns of external influences on alliance formation. The strategy buck-passing was not visible in this case study, since it occurs only "when a state refuses to balance against a rising state,"¹²³ and all states considered in the case study either used the strategy balancing or bandwagoning by joining the U.N. coalition or the strategy hiding in remaining neutral. The strategy chain-ganging is considered to occur when alliance commitments interlock, which results in states pulling each other into wars that they might have avoided otherwise.¹²⁴ Turkey was (and still is) allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the First Gulf War.¹²⁵ Since the United States was allied with Turkey through NATO and was also a member of the U.N. coalition, can it be argued that Turkey was chain-ganged into joining the U.N. coalition?

At the advent of the First Gulf War, both Turkish-Iraqi relations and Turkish-American relations had deteriorated. Iraq had run roughshod over Turkish interests during the Iraq-Iran war. During president Ozal's trip in Tehran in 1988, Saddam's forces had continued to bomb the city and Iraq had opened fire on Turkish tankers during the war. The Iraqis had also refused to renew the agreement that expired in 1988, which allowed Turkish troops to conduct operations in northern Iraq near the Turkish border. Furthermore, Iraq was constantly raising the Euphrates water problem,

¹²² Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 230, 238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 168.

¹²³ Christensen and Snyder, "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances," 73.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ "Turkey - Foreign Affairs Since 1950."

insisting that relations could not be correct as long as water issues were unresolved.¹²⁶ This could have made it easier for Turkey to decide to join the U.N. coalition against Iraq.

However, at the same time, the Iraqi-Turkish relationship did also bring benefits. Ankara and Baghdad had long shared common policies toward Kurdish dissidence, which always had been a thorn in Turkey's side. Moreover, American aims in the Gulf War did not include ousting Saddam Hussein, hence there was no assurance that Iraq would have new leadership at the end of this conflict, which could backfire against Turkey if it would decide to join the U.N. coalition. Therefore, president Ozal had to confront substantial foreign policy arguments suggesting that Turkey did not actively take part in the war.¹²⁷

Furthermore, there were also reasons why Turkey might not have been expected to cooperate closely with the United States during the First Gulf War. American support for the Turkish military had been eroding. In 1990, the U.S. Air Force opposed upgrading F-16s for Turkey. Allied American military forces also had unilaterally withdrawn from Erhac and Eskisehir air bases. Moreover, negotiations to extend the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which was to expire at the end of 1990, were progressing slow, as the Turkish side was insisting on more assistance than the United States felt it could give. Finally, renewed political pressures in the U.S. Congress over Cyprus were also disturbing the relationship between Turkey and the United States.¹²⁸

Considering there were obvious pros and cons about joining the United States in the U.N. coalition against Iraq, President Ozal made sure not to antagonize Iraq too much, by not taking part in the actual fighting. In conformity with U.N. resolutions, it assisted those countries that were enforcing them, such as shutting off the oil pipeline from Iraq, and allowing U.S. planes to operate from Incirlik.¹²⁹ Since Turkey made the conscious decision to balance the possible repercussions of both camps this way, I argue that Turkey did not use the strategy chain-ganging, where it would have been pulled in the U.N. coalition by its ally the United States, which it might have avoided otherwise.

In the case of Syria, as explained in the previous chapter, it needed aid to restore its near-terminal economy and gain protection from Iraq. Therefore, besides joining the U.N. coalition, it resurrected the Triangle Alliance. This originally was an alignment

¹²⁶ Harris, "Turkey's Foreign Policy: Independent or Reactive?" 271.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 270. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 153-154.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to balance the threat posed by Turkey and Israel. A strategic bond had developed between Turkey and Israel, which in part was based on a mutual distrust of Syria. Since both the Turks and the Israelis enjoyed very strong ties with the United States, the Syrians found it expedient to balance the power of their enemies by turning to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. When the Triangle Alliance re-emerged in 1990, it had been in response to the threat posed by Iraq. However, it continued to function throughout the 1990s.¹³⁰

During the First Gulf War, the Syrians, in particular, felt a powerful need for friends, because the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iran in the Iraq-Iran war had left them exposed. However, the Egyptians also found in the renewed Triangle Alliance a sphere of interest that made the Americans respect them as their primary interlocutor in Arab affairs.¹³¹ Saudi Arabia for that matter, found a new way of insurance against Iraq and the newly created Arab Cooperation Council in 1989, embracing Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen. Despite giving generous financial aid to Iraq during the protracted Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s and free access to Saudi ports for food and materials and substantial quantities of Saudi oil after the war, in order to forge a bilateral tie with Iraq, this new organization raised Saudi fears that Iraq might support vestigial Yemeni irredentist claims to its territories. Accordingly, King Fahd joined the renewed Triangle Alliance and signed a nonaggression pact with Iraq.¹³²

The kingdom's attempt to forge a special bilateral tie with Iraq and to mitigate Iraqi-Kuwaiti tensions, through friendly mediation and a generous offer of a monetary contribution to an Iraqi financial demand of Kuwait, proved ephemeral, however, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and appeared threateningly astride the kingdom's north-eastern border.¹³³ Similar mediation attempts proved fruitless for Egypt as well. As one of the long-time allies of Iraq throughout the Iraq-Iran war, Egypt tried to negotiate with Iraq before the invasion in 1990.¹³⁴ For the last three decades, relations between Egypt and Iraq had been strong. As early as the 1970s Egyptian farmers had been moved to southern Iraq, where their experience of farming in the Nile Delta enabled them to show their Iraqi neighbours how to get the maximum returns from the wetlands north of

¹³⁰ Doran, "Egypt," 117-118.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 225-226, 237-238. To view the treaty, see the ATOP database: "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944."

¹³³ Ibid, 226, 238.

¹³⁴ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 13.

Basra. Then during the Iraq-Iran war, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians went to Iraq to replace men serving in the armed services, to supply the middle management in Iraq's emerging service industries, or to use their skills in Iraq's rapidly expanded arms factories. Eventually, there were more than two million Egyptians in Iraq.¹³⁵

Upon the Egyptians return, however, tales ran rampant about their bad treatment. These tales told of forceful conscription in the army; cheating; being sent to Basra to repair the canals during artillery bombardment; and being attacked by Iraqis returning from the war, who resented Egyptians in their old jobs. At one point, the Iraqis even stopped Egyptian workers sending remittances home because of the desperate state of the Iraqi economy. There was also an incident where the Iraqi government tried to hide from the Egyptian government that hundreds of Egyptians were killed by returning Iraqi soldiers. For all the support given by Hosni Mubarak to Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war and for all the profits made, there was no love lost between Egypt and Iraq by the time of the invasion of Kuwait.¹³⁶

Therefore, the re-emergence of the Triangle Alliance provided all three states with extra opportunities to balance against the threat Iraq had become. However, it did not pull these states into a war they had rather avoided, as the strategy chain-ganging states, as they were in need of an alliance which the First Gulf War provided them with. The conflict gave them the opportunity to strengthen their ties with each other and improve their internal security and economic prospects.

In the case of Jordan, some have argued (falsely) that Jordan remained an ally of Iraq during the First Gulf War,¹³⁷ and, therefore, could be seen to have used the strategy chain-ganging. However, as explained, Jordan did not align with anyone in this conflict, it remained neutral and used the strategies hiding and transcending. Instead of being pulled into a war by Iraq or Egypt, that Jordan would have wanted to avoid according to the chain-ganging strategy, Jordan's main Arab alliance, the Arab Cooperation Council, became instantly deadlocked as its two most powerful members, Iraq and Egypt, shifted overnight from alignment partners to military adversaries.¹³⁸ Instead of being pulled into a war by either ally, Jordan declared neutrality and transcended by taking the

¹³⁵ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 158-159.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 129, 134. Brand, "In Search of Budget Security," 142, 150-152, 155.

¹³⁸ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 127.

problem to a higher level.¹³⁹ Jordan's actions are, therefore, in clear contrast to the chain-ganging strategy. All in all, these examples showed that no state considered in this case study used the strategies buck-passing or chain-ganging.

All in all, as has been shown in this case study, states are capable of using multiple strategies in the same conflict. The Gulf States balanced or bandwagoned by joining the U.N. coalition, while coercing Egypt and Turkey to do the same and punishing Yemen and Jordan for refusing to do so. Saudi Arabia balanced or bandwagoned as well, while also using the strategy transcending by taking its internal struggles to a higher level, and the strategy coercion by supporting the Gulf States and the United States in punishing Yemen and Jordan. Lastly, Jordan used the strategy hiding by declaring neutrality, while using the strategy transcending by attempting to forge a role for itself as a neutral mediator between Iraq and Kuwait, and in a broader sense, between Iraq and the rest of the Arab world, and while being coerced by the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia for declaring neutrality.

This use of multiple strategies in the same conflict has not been discussed before in the existing literature. Therefore, as with the strategy coercion, I argue that the use of multiple strategies in the same conflict needs to be researched further and ultimately added to the theoretical framework.

3.4. Balance-of-threat theory vs. Balance-of-power and Ideological Solidarity theory

As explained in the first chapter, the leading Western-centric theories that explain alliance formation in the West are the balance-of-threat, balance-of-power and ideological solidarity theories. According to these theories, when a state would choose (re)alignment, it would base its decision of which side to support, either on the need to balance itself against a state with higher military capabilities (balance-of-power theory); the need to balance itself against external threats (balance-of-threat theory); or the preference to side with a state which has similar political orientations (ideological solidarity theory).¹⁴⁰ See table 2:

¹³⁹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 128-132.

¹⁴⁰ Duffield, Michota and Miller, "Alliances," 295-297. Walt, "Alliances in theory and practice," 4. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 6-7. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 117-123. Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 225, 230. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 34-35.

Theories for alliance formation		
<i>Balance-of-power</i>	<i>Balance-of-threat</i>	<i>Ideological solidarity</i>

Table 2

How threatening states appear to be is a matter of perception. When considering external threats, other states can be perceived as threatening or not, based on their geographical proximity, their offensive capabilities, their perceived intentions and their internal characteristics. In a status quo, “states that are nearby are more dangerous than those that are far away; states that possess offensive military forces pose a greater threat than those with purely defensive capabilities; and states with aggressive intentions will be viewed as more worrisome than states that seek only to preserve the status quo.”¹⁴¹ However, as previously argued in chapter 1, these theories acknowledge only the presence of external threats. They do not take into account the presence of internal threats and the influence these threats can have on alliance formation. When researching inter-Arab politics, the concept of alliances must be considered more broadly in order to be made relevant. If one focuses only on formal alliances then one will barely find them in contemporary Middle Eastern history. Yet looser alignments between Arab states, committed to political and economic support but not necessarily including formal military commitments, are a regular phenomenon in inter-Arab politics.¹⁴²

In inter-Arab politics, alliances and alignments are best seen as transnational support coalitions between ruling regimes, rather than as combinations of states allying together as unitary rational actors. The latter conceptualization, so common in the Neorealist discourse on alliance formation and international relations, neglects the dynamics of domestic politics and internal insecurity that are often essential to understanding inter-Arab alignment formation, as the case study pointed out. As Ryan and Brand argue, “the governance of a state is comprised of a body of elites, who will align and realign according to their relatively narrow interests of regime security. Their key interest is not the ‘national interest’, but their specific interest in their own security and survival. The security of the state is here achieved by thwarting threats to the continued tenure of the ruling regime, whether those threats are based internally or externally. Alignments are in this sense one set of foreign policy choices, deemed to

¹⁴¹ Walt, "Alliances in theory and practice," 4.

¹⁴² Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 204.

enhance the security of the state-as-regime, which in turn equates its own security with that of the state-as-country.”¹⁴³ The security of the ruling regime is, therefore, influenced by both internal as well as external threats, which in turn influences how the ruling regime forms alignments with other states.

This was visible in the case study, discussed in the previous chapter, as six of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance both internal as well as external threats at the advent of the First Gulf War. Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Yemen had to take into account internal threats of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region, as well as the major external threat of Iraq threatening the status quo after invading Kuwait. Especially in Syria and Iran economic considerations led their decision to join the U.N. coalition, as Syria’s economy was in near-terminal condition, due to the lack of support from the Soviet Union and Iran and its army being occupied in the civil war in Lebanon, and Iran was physically exhausted from the Iraq-Iran war.¹⁴⁴ While economic considerations played a large role in Jordan and Yemen too, domestic political ramifications were equally important in their decision to remain neutral in the conflict, since Jordan had just begun a process of political liberalization, and Yemen had recently been freed of a civil war.¹⁴⁵ For Turkey and Egypt joining the U.N. coalition brought them the opportunity to increase their leadership position in the region, besides opportunities to boost their economy and mitigate possible public unrest.¹⁴⁶

Even for Saudi Arabia it can be argued that it had to take into account both external and internal threats. While Saudi Arabia experienced almost minimal known internal threats, at the advent of the First Gulf War, and its close geographical proximity to Iraq, the trend in Iraq’s aggressive foreign policy decisions, and Iraq’s large offensive capabilities were all external threats that played a large part in Saudi Arabia’s decision to realign against Iraq, allowing non-Muslim military in the holy land of Islam led to

¹⁴³ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 13-14, 204. See also: Brand, “In Search of Budget Security,” 140-141.

¹⁴⁴ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 149, 155. Bakhash, “Iran,” 252-253, 255-256.

¹⁴⁵ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 131-132, 135-138, 140-141. Brand, “In Search of Budget Security,” 142, 147-148, 150-155. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 135, 159. Brown, “The Other Middle Eastern States,” 289.

¹⁴⁶ Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam’s War*, 13, 153-154, 158-159. Doran, “Egypt,” 116. Harris, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 270-272.

misgivings of the Wahhabi subjects in the kingdom, which could have led to public unrest and had to be balanced against.¹⁴⁷

Only for the Gulf States no internal threats before or after the conflict are known. One could argue that the balance-of-power theory can therefore explain the Gulf States joining the U.N. coalition, as only when internal threats were relatively non-existent could the balance-of-power theory explain the formation of alignments. However, since seven of the eight cases were known to balance against both internal and external threats, this would rather be a case of lack of data than proof of the application of a theory. Therefore, I argue that the balance-of-power theory cannot explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War.

The third theory, ideological solidarity cannot explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War either. According to this theory, states form alliances with nations whose domestic systems or political values resemble their own. The general argument is that, "other things being equal, states will tend to ally with states whose political orientations are similar to their own."¹⁴⁸ As has just been discussed, in this case study every state experienced either external or internal threats or in most cases both. Therefore, none of these states were in the position to choose its allies based on their preferred political orientations alone. However, this does not exclude that some foreign policy decisions could have been made where political preferences were parallel to the best choices for states to make in order to balance against their perceived external or internal threats. Nevertheless, this possibility does not proof the application of the ideological solidarity theory on the Middle East during the First Gulf War.

Therefore, based on the findings in this case study, the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories cannot explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance both internal as well as external threats. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats can it attempt to explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The 'regime security' approach of Ryan is, therefore, a good alternative for the

¹⁴⁷ Eilts, "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy," 222, 224-226, 230, 237-238. Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 167-169.

¹⁴⁸ Duffield, Michota and Miller, "Alliances," 322. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 34-35.

balance-of-threat theory, as it examines ruling regimes and their insecurities at the nexus of domestic and international politics, considering external as well as internal threats.¹⁴⁹ However, as this chapter has shown, this approach needs to be expanded too, in order to include the influence of coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies on state behaviour of other states. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well, when dealing with a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East, where states have large differences in military capabilities.

¹⁴⁹ Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances*, 204.

Conclusion

The research question of this thesis was: “Can the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of-threat, balance-of-power and ideological solidarity) explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, and if so to what extent?” The findings of the case study showed that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance both internal and external threats at the advent of the First Gulf War. Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen had to take into account internal threats of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region, as well as the major external threat of Iraq on the status quo after invading Kuwait.

Especially in Syria and Iran economic considerations led their decision to join the U.N. coalition, as their economy was exhausted, due to Syria’s efforts in the civil war in Lebanon and its lack of support from the Soviet Union and Iran, and Iran being physically exhausted from the Iraq-Iran war. In Jordan and Yemen, economic considerations were equally important as domestic political ramifications in their decision to remain neutral in the conflict, since Jordan had just begun a process of political liberalization, and Yemen had recently been freed of a civil war. For Turkey and Egypt joining the U.N. coalition brought them the opportunity to increase their leadership position in the region, besides opportunities to boost their economy and mitigate possible public unrest. Saudi Arabia experienced mostly external threats, due to its close geographical proximity to Iraq, but allowing non-Muslim military in its borders led to misgivings of its Wahhabi subjects, and could possibly lead to public unrest, which had to be balanced against as well. Only for the Gulf States no internal threats before or after the conflict are known. Nevertheless, since seven of the eight cases were known to balance against both internal and external threats, this would rather be a case of lack of data than proof of the application of a theory.

Therefore, I conclude that neither the balance-of-power and ideological solidarity theory nor the balance-of-threat theory can explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as these theories only take external threats into account. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats can it attempt to explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The ‘regime security’ approach of Ryan is, therefore, a good

alternative for the balance-of-threat theory, as it examines the foreign policies of the ruling regimes, incorporating explicit links to external threats, internal political economy, and domestic politics in understanding alignment formation in the Middle East.

However, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the influence of coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies on state behaviour of other states. As has been shown throughout this case study, states are capable of using multiple strategies in the same conflict. The Gulf States balanced or bandwagoned by joining the U.N. coalition, while coercing Egypt and Turkey to do the same and punishing Yemen and Jordan for refusing to do so. Saudi Arabia balanced or bandwagoned as well, while also using the strategy transcending by taking its internal struggles to a higher level, and the strategy coercion by supporting the Gulf States and the United States in punishing Yemen and Jordan. Lastly, Jordan used the strategy hiding by declaring neutrality, while using the strategy transcending by attempting to forge a role for itself as a neutral mediator between the Iraq and Kuwait, and in a broader sense, between Iraq and the rest of the Arab world, and while being coerced by the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia for declaring neutrality. This demonstrates that strategies that do not lead to alliance formation can be used together with strategies that do lead to alliance formation; and multiple strategies that do not lead to alliance formation, but do influence behaviour of other states, can be used at the same time by one state. Furthermore, the case study demonstrated that coercive diplomacy actively influences state behaviour of other states by offering inducements or putting other states under economic or political pressure. Since the use of coercion and the use of multiple strategies are not considered in alliance formation theory, but are clearly visible in this case study, they need to be researched further and ultimately added to the broader spectrum of alliance formation theories.

Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well, when dealing with a coalition, as they are not clearly defined. During the First Gulf War, by joining the U.N. coalition, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States aligned with states that had lesser, similar or more military capabilities than themselves. Therefore, if balancing is defined as aligning against the prevailing threat and bandwagoning is defined as aligning with the prevailing threat, as argued in Walt's theory, the states that joined the U.N. coalition used the strategy external balancing, as

Iraq was the prevailing threat in this case study. However, if balancing is defined as aligning with states with lesser capabilities to balance the dominating position of the strongest state and bandwagoning is defined as aligning with the strongest state, the states that joined the U.N. coalition used the strategy bandwagoning, since together they could be perceived as the strongest state. As these strategies, and the outcomes they predict, are not clearly defined when dealing with coalitions they need to be revised, especially regarding the Middle East, where states have large differences in military capabilities.

This thesis has been written on the assumption that the Western-centric alliance formation theories could be applied on the Middle East to certain extent, despite the Middle East having looser alignments between states, committed to political and economic support but not necessarily including formal military commitments, instead of formal alliances the West is known for. Furthermore, in the Middle East the security of the state is not achieved by balancing only external threats, as argued in Realist alliance literature, but by thwarting threats to the continued tenure of the ruling regime. The security of the ruling regime is, therefore, influenced by both internal as well as external threats, which in turn influences how the ruling regime forms alignments with other states. Therefore, as I have argued, in order to research the Middle East while applying theories derived from the West, the very concept of alliances must be considered more broadly, making it imperative that the theories include the looser variants of alignments.

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