State Size as a Force for Peace?

Small States, Liberal Peace Theories, and War

Student name: Floris Benjamin Schaap

Student number: s2044277

Name first reader: Dr. W.P. Veenendaal

Name second reader: Prof. dr. I.C. van Biezen

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Introduction

Warfare is one of the oldest ways of conducting international relations. From the Peloponnesian wars to World War II, the act of warfare has shaped the world we know today. Many have sought to find underlying mechanisms due to which wars begin or can be avoided, but no clear answers to these issues have emerged. If such an answer were to be found, history might be explained better, but more importantly, future wars may be avoided. One of the factors that might prove useful for predicting state participation in interstate war is state size, as Rickli (2008), Toje (2010), Hey (2003) and East (1973) illustrate. There has, however, been little research that provides empiric support for a relation between state size and participation in interstate wars.

In my research I want to focus on the question whether there is a relation between state size and involvement in interstate wars, and if there is such an relation, what the theoretical explanation for this relation is. After this introduction, the thesis will begin with a literature review on small states and factors that might influence the likelihood of state participation in interstate war. After the literature review, I will state some problems with the current state of research on this topic. After this, my research question and hypotheses will be introduced. I shall then conceptualize and operationalize the concepts I will use in my research, and consequently discuss the research methods and research designs I will use. The thesis then continues with a statistical analysis, followed by a qualitative analysis into small states and participation in interstate war. The conclusion will state the main findings of the thesis and their implications, as well as recommendations for further research.

Literature review

One of the main theories that focusses on the factors that influence the likelihood of interstate war is the democratic peace theory. The democratic peace theory stems from the mind of philosopher Immanuel Kant, who thought that democratic governance would result in the reduction or elimination of interstate conflict; if there are only democracies, ''No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another'' (Kant, 1795, p. 113). This is the key principle of the democratic peace theory; democracies do not enter into wars with each other, and will resolve conflicts with each other without the use of force (Layne, 1994). This democratic peace thesis has become an important theory within the school of liberalism, as Baylis, Smith and Owens (2017) describe. The democratic peace theory enjoyed

a renaissance in the 1960s after the thoughts of Kant were reinforced with statistical models; Babst (1964), for example, states that empirically, there have been no wars between nations that have freely elected governments. The author thus concludes that freely elected governments improve the odds of maintaining peace. The correlation between democracy and the decrease of interstate conflicts between democracies is explained in multiple ways. Layne (1994) and Hayes (2012) summarize these different interpretations as institutional constraints (or structure) and norms. The institutional interpretation states that democracies fight less wars with each other because in democracies the system of checks and balances constrains the government (Layne, 1994). Government accountability towards the population is also said to decrease the amount of warfare between democracies (Layne, 1994; Hayes, 2012). The interpretation of norms states that certain norms make democracies more peaceful, because democratic culture and its norms are centered around the principle of non-violence; democracies consequently externalize these norms towards their international policies (Hayes, 2012). Layne (1994) also states that democracies' perception is that other democracies are pacifist, and hence they do not enter into wars with each other. The democratic peace theory has real-life implications, as it has been used as a reason to spread democracy (Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, 2020).

If there indeed is a causal relation between democracy and the reduction of involvement in war, this could lead to small states being less involved in interstate war; according to Veenendaal (2018), the political systems of small states are more democratic than those of larger states. From this would follow that because small states are democratic, and democracy promotes peace, small states will be less involved in interstate conflicts. The fact that small states are more democratic than large states makes small states a crucial test for the democratic peace theory; if it is found that the proposed relation between democracy and conflict-reduction is not found for the very democratic small states, this proposed relation is very unlikely to be correct.

Although statistically compelling, the democratic peace theory has faced considerable criticism. Layne (1994) and Rosato (2003) state that the abovementioned institutional and normative logics are not able to causally explain the correlation found between democracies and the decrease in interstate war. Bremer (1992) states that a lot of the statistical models used to demonstrate the democratic peace theory contain serious design faults[1]. One of the main

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[1] Bremer (1992) finds that the most serious design flaws are the limited spatial-temporal design of the studies, the questionable measures of war the studies use and that the studies focus on inappropriate units of analysis.

issues surrounding the democratic peace theory is the lack of consensus amongst scholars on how to define democracy. Chan (1997) notes that only with some definitions of democracy it is found that democracy promotes peace, and Layne (1994) even goes as far as to state no wars between democracies have been found because democratic peace theorists keep changing the definition of democracy.

The lack of certainty of the democratic peace theory has invited alternative explanations as to which factors decrease the chance of war. One of these alternative explanations is that not democracy, but capitalism is the driving force behind peace. The abovementioned thought that capitalism is the driving force behind peace is called the capitalist peace theory, and is mostly based on the interconnectedness of capitalist economies. This interconnectedness of economies closely resembles the liberalist idea of interdependence, which is described by Baylis et al. (2017). Statistically, Gartzke (2007) finds that capitalism is a better indicator of peace than democracy, while Bremer (1992) states that countries with more capitalist economies enter into conflict with each other less. There are also different theoretical explanations for the supposed relation between capitalism and peace. Gleditsch & Schneider (2010) state that the intensity of contracts between capitalist economies could make capitalist countries more peaceful. Gartzke (2007) finds that the capitalist peace might stem from the fact that capitalist countries have similar identities. This author also states that changes in the nature of production in capitalist economies cause peace; in capitalist states, inputs are easily acquired through trade, and thus there is no need to fight wars over the resources for these inputs. Gartzke (2007) and Mousseau (2010) find that the interconnectedness of capitalist economies is a restriction to warfare, as it is best for each state if states are as rich as possible and thus there is no impetus to conduct warfare, as this will decrease individual state welfare, and consequently collective welfare.

If the proposed relation between capitalism and the reduction of war is correct, this could lead to small states being less involved in warfare, as small states often have great trade openness (an important part of capitalism) according to Easterly & Kraay (2000). Long (2017) also states that small states greatly benefit from trade liberalization, another important part of capitalism. The logic would then be that because small states are often capitalist, and capitalism promotes peace, small states will be more peaceful. Small states are also a crucial case for the capitalist peace theory; if the proposed relation between capitalism and decrease of participation in interstate war is not found for the highly capitalist small states, it is highly

unlikely that the proposed relation between capitalism and decrease of participation in interstate war is correct.

The capitalist peace theory has also faced criticism: Choi (2011) describes how both the democratic- and the capitalist peace theory models contain considerable errors[2], and after correcting these errors the author finds that capitalism does not consistently decrease the likelihood of interstate war. Similarly, Goener (2004) finds that trade interdependence, an important aspect of capitalism, is not an adequate predictor of conflict.

Another factor that might predict state participation in warfare is the military capacity of states to actually conduct warfare. If small states are less involved in warfare, this might simply be because these states do not have the military capacities to fight wars. Vaicekauskaité (2017) states that small states have both smaller military and economic capacities, East (1973) describes how small states have relatively small amounts of resources available for devising and conducting foreign policy, Rickli (2008) finds that small states lack agenda-setting power because they lack necessary resources, and lastly, Long (2017) finds that the lack of material resources is often how small states are defined in the first place. This lack of military capability, however, might also increase the chances that small states are involved in interstate conflict, because their lack of military capability may lead to them being seen as easy targets.

Authors have also proposed a relation between state size and state participation in an interstate war. East (1973) states that the international behaviour of small states can be characterized by generally avoiding the use of force to coerce other states, Toje (2010) describes how small states generally do not use means of coercion in their strategic behaviour and aim to solve security challenges through non-military means, Rickli (2008) states that small states cannot afford to use offensive strategic policies, and Hey (2003) states that small states use diplomatic measures rather than military measures when conducting their foreign policy. East (1973), however, also mentions that small states can be more likely to exhibit high-risk behaviour, leading to involvement in conflict. From this, we can conclude that the literature on the foreign policy of small states finds that small states generally do not use acts of force when conducting their foreign policy, but that small states might still exhibit high-risk behaviour that might lead to them being involved in wars. There is thus no conclusive

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[2] Choi (2011) states that the errors in these models are observation omission, model misspecification and sample selection bias

answer as to whether we can expect small states to be less involved in interstate wars, but generally, it is expected that small states are less involved in interstate conflict.

Research question and hypotheses

From the literature review emerges that it is generally expected that small states are less involved in interstate war, and that there are three different theories that could explain the proposed relation between state size and participation in interstate wars. The lack of empiric evidence for the relation between state size and participation in interstate wars, as well as a lack of a clear theoretical explanation to why this would be the case, is the gap of knowledge that this research will attempt to fill. The research question that will guide the study is ''Is there a relation between state size and involvement in interstate conflict, and if so, what is the theoretical explanation for this relation?''.

The first hypothesis is based on the findings of Toje (2010), Rickli (2008), and Hey (2003), who expect that small states do not use military measures when conducting their foreign policy. The first hypothesis is that small states are less involved in interstate wars than large states.

The second hypothesis is based on the literature of the democratic peace theorists, who expect that democracies do not engage in warfare with other democracies. Because small states often have democratic regimes, according to Veenendaal (2018), these theorists would thus expect small states to be less engaged in interstate warfare. The second hypothesis constitutes that small states are less involved in interstate wars, because of their democratic regimes.

The third hypothesis is based on the capitalist peace theory, which states that capitalist countries do not engage in warfare with each other. Because small states often exhibit highly capitalist characteristics, as Easterly & Kraay (2000) and Long (2017) describe, small states are thus expected to participate less in interstate war. The third hypothesis is that small states are less involved in interstate wars because of their capitalist economies.

The last hypothesis is based on the lack of material power that small states often have, as Vaicekauskaité (2017) and East (1973) describe. Because small states lack the material power to actually engage in warfare, it is expected that small states are less involved in warfare. The fourth hypothesis thus constitutes that small states are less involved in wars, because of their lack of material power.

Conceptualisation & operationalisation

In my research, I conceptualize democracies as political systems that have elected officials, who are elected via free, fair and regular elections, in which every adult inhabitant of the state may vote, in which these adults have access to different, independent information sources and have freedom of association and freedom of expression. This conceptualisation of democracy stems from Dahl & Shapiro (2015). The concept of democracy will be operationalised through the Freedom House democracy index. This index determines to what extent states are democratic through assigning the states scores on different subjects, such as electoral processes, freedom of expression and association, rule of law and political pluralism (Freedom House, 2014). The Freedom House index closely resembles the definition that Dahl & Shapiro (2015) provide.

The notion of war will be conceptualized as militarized interstate disputes in my research. Militarized interstate disputes are

> ''united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war'' (Bremer, Jones, Singer, 1996, p. 163).

Militarized interstate disputes thus include interstate war, but also other forms of interstate aggression that might occur. Militarized interstate disputes are operationalized through the Correlates of War MID dataset, in which all cases of militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2010 have been recorded (Correlates of War, 2020). For my research, I have only included militarized interstate disputes in which force was actually used; these are categories 4 (use of force) and 5 (war).

Capitalism is conceptualized as an economic system in which markets and prices are used to coordinate and direct economic activity, and in which resources are privately owned (Brue, McConnell, Flynn, 2014). Capitalism will be operationalized via a proxy-variable, namely economic freedom. Economic freedom is a good proxy-variable of capitalism, because it measures freedom to access markets and the right to private ownership, which are both essential characteristics of capitalism (Brue, Flynn, McConnell, 2014). In order to find how much economic freedom individuals in a state have, I shall consult the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The variable of economic freedom in this dataset is based on

how open a state's markets are, the rule of law concerning economic freedom in the state, the government size of a state and lastly the regulatory efficiency of a state (Heritage Foundation, 2020).

Material power will be conceptualized via the notion of particular-intrinsic power of Long (2017). Particular-intrinsic power is based on factors as population, territory, GDP, and military strength. The notion of particular-intrinsic power will be operationalized as the national material capability of states in the National Material Capability dataset of Correlates of War. National material capability is measured through military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, steel production, coal production and total- and urban population (Correlates of War, 2020). These are the factors that best reflect the amount of resources a state can mobilize in conflicts, according to Correlates of War (2020).

There is a definitional debate surrounding the concept of small states, as Croward (2002) describes. For my research, the concept of a small state will constitute a state with less than 1.5 million inhabitants. This is also the definition that the World Bank (2020) uses. Only states that have been legitimized by their membership of the United Nations will be included in my research.

Research design

For my research, I will use a mixed-methods research design. The mixed-methods strategy that best resembles my research is the strategy of nested analysis, as described by Lieberman (2005). According to Lieberman (2005), a nested analysis constitutes the combination of a statistical analysis and more thorough research through case-studies. In my research, this means I will first use quantitative methods in order to find whether there is a relationship between state size and involvement in war, and if so, also determine which factor best predicts the likelihood of war for small states. Then, I will do two case-studies following my statistical analysis. If the statistical analysis yields consistent, significant results, these results are further tested through model-testing case-studies, in which the aim is to find whether the relation that is found in the statistical analysis is also found in the studied case (Lieberman, 2005). If the analysis does not yield consistent results, the consequent case-studies are meant to be inductive; the cases will be analysed in order to explore whether new predictors can be found for small states' involvement in interstate war (Lieberman, 2005).

Research methods

For the quantitative analysis, I will create my own dataset using SPSS. This dataset will contain information about the population size of a state, how democratic the state's regime was, how capitalist the state's economy was and how much national material capability the state had in the period from 2000-2005 for all UN-member states. This period has been chosen because it is especially interesting for my research; in this period, there were many militarized interstate disputes in the world, as illustrated by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the broader context of the ''War on Terror''. Aside from the above-mentioned variables, the analysis also includes region and GDP per capita in the analysis as controlling variables. Table 1 (p. 10) shows the variables used in my research, and how these variables are measured.

The statistical research will constitute a binary logistic regression. According to Field (2013), a binary logistic regression is used to predict in which category a certain case falls based on the information known about the case; in my research, this will mean that I attempt to predict whether a state was involved in conflict based on how democratic the state's regime was, how capitalist the state's economy was, the amount of national material capability the state had, or the population size of the state.

The relation between change in GDP per capita and involvement in conflict is measured per $1000, because a $1 change in GDP per capita is too small a unit to predict change in involvement in conflict. This also counts for population: because a population change of 1 is too small to predict change in involvement in conflict, population change is measured per 100.000 (lower units of change in population size led to non-interpretable results). National material capability is measured on a 1000-point scale. In this scale, a change of 1 in the analysis means a change of 0.1% in national material capability.

In the analysis, the world is divided into four regions, namely Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. Initially the analysis included Oceania as fifth region, but because of a small N of countries in Oceania and missing variables for these countries, including Oceania in the analysis led to non-interpretable results. Oceania is thus added to Asia, considering these are geographically most close to one another.

My qualitative analysis will mostly be based on qualitative content analysis and process-tracing. Halperin & Heath (2017) state that qualitative content analysis is a ''more interpretive form of analysis concerning with uncovering meanings, motives, and purposes in textual

content'' (p. 336). Through the analysis of texts, the case-studies will serve their goal of either model-testing of model-building. Process-tracing, according to Halperin & Heath (2017), is a method for linking variables to outcomes through examining the underlying causal mechanisms. In process-tracing, one seeks to find in which order events happened, in order to find how certain outcomes came to be. In my research, process-tracing can be used in order to find through which processes have contributed to the participation of small states in militarized interstate disputes.

Data-analysis

The variables that are tested in the binary logistic regression were first tested for multicollinearity; the multicollinearity tests yielded that the data had no multicollinearity issues (the tests are included in appendix 1A).

Table 1. Variables used in the analysis.

Variables	Measurement
Democracy	Ordinal variable, on a scale from 1-14 with 1 being least democratic and 14 being most democratic
Capitalism	Interval-ratio variable, on a scale from 0-100 with 0 being least capitalist, and 100 being most capitalist
National Material Capability	Interval-ratio variable, on a scale from 0-1000 in which 0 means a state has 0% of cumulative national material capability and 1000 means a state has 100% of cumulative national material capability
Militarized Interstate Dispute	Nominal variable, coded as binary, with 0 meaning that a state was not involved in interstate conflict and 1 means a state was involved in interstate conflict
Population	Interval-ratio variable, per 100.000
Population (Dummy)	Nominal variable, coded as binary, with 0 meaning a state has over 1.5 million inhabitants and 1 means a state has under 1.5 million inhabitants
Region	Nominal variable, coded as categorical variable, in which 0 means Europe, 1 means the Americas, 2 means Africa and 3 means Asia.

Table 2. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2000 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	0,402
Democracy	0,905
	[0,764; 1,072]
Capitalism	0,995
	[0,944; 1,050]
National Material Capability	1,088*
	[1,001; 1,183]
Population	1,000
	[0,999; 1,001]
Population (Dummy)	0,843
	[0,215; 3,310]
GDP per capita	0,990
	[0,925; 1,060]
Region	
Region (1)	2,838
	[0,627; 12,856]
Region (2)	1,380
	[0,286; 6,664]
Region (3)	1,655
	[0,351; 7,799]
-2LL	143,969
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,132
Nagelkerke R^2	0,202
N	156

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p <0,05

Table 3. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2001 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	0,121
Democracy	0,847
	[0,691; 1,039]
Capitalism	1,018
	[0,956; 1,083]
National Material Capability	1,149*
	[1,029; 1,282]
Population	0,999
	[0,999; 1,000]
Population (Dummy)	0,239
	[0,027; 2,154]
GDP per capita	1,030
	[0,958; 1,106]
Region	
Region (1)	1,169
	[0,176; 7,748]
Region (2)	1,729
	[0,251; 11,930]
Region (3)	2,489
	[0,412; 15,033]
-2LL	118,139
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,222
Nagelkerke R^2	0,344
N	151

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p <0,05

Table 4. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2002 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	0,013*
Democracy	0,853
	[0,687; 1,060]
Capitalism	1,091*
	[1,006; 1,182]
National Material Capability	1,071
	[0,967; 1,185]
Population	1,001
	[0,999; 1,002]
Population (Dummy)	0,000
	[0,000; -]
GDP per capita	0,898*
	[0,809; 0,996]
Region	
Region (1)	0,058*
	[0,005; 0,718]
Region (2)	0,409
	[0,080; 2,083]
Region (3)	0,482
	[0,091; 2,549]
-2LL	102,580
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,228
Nagelkerke R^2	0,374
N	150

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p <0,05

Table 5. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2003 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	0,036
Democracy	0,980
	[0,797; 1,205]
Capitalism	1,021
	[0,944; 1,105]
National Material Capability	1,024
	[0,898; 1,168]
Population	1,003*
	[1,000; 1,006]
Population (Dummy)	0,000
	[0,000; -]
GDP per capita	0,985
	[0,918; 1,057]
Region	
Region (1)	0,758
	[0,109; 5,292]
Region (2)	0,532
	[0,073; 3,865]
Region (3)	3,181
	[0,555; 18,222]
-2LL	101,491
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,326
Nagelkerke R^2	0,497
N	151

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** $p < 0,001$, **$p < 0,01$, *$p < 0,05$

Table 6. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2004 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	0,276
Democracy	0,847
	[0,682; 1,052]
Capitalism	0,986
	[0,913; 1,065]
National Material Capability	1,137
	[0,975; 1,327]
Population	1,001
	[0,998; 1,003]
Population (Dummy)	0,437
	[0,042; 4,545]
GDP per capita	1,011
	[0,946; 1,080]
Region	*
Region (1)	0,000
	[0,000; -]
Region (2)	2,397
	[0,208; 27,590]
Region (3)	11,295*
	[1,222; 104,425]
-2LL	85,301
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,363
Nagelkerke R^2	0,570
N	152

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p <0,05

Table 7. Logistic regression-analysis for the year 2005 (odds ratios).

	Model 1
(Constant)	1,106
Democracy	0,978
	[0,814; 1,175]
Capitalism	0,961
	[0,890; 1,039]
National Material Capability	1,017
	[0,963; 1,073]
Population	1,001
	[1,000; 1,003]
Population (Dummy)	0,000
	[0,000; -]
GDP per capita	1,009
	[0,958; 1,063]
Region	*
Region (1)	0,347
	[0,035; 3,449]
Region (2)	1,868
	[0,368; 9,482]
Region (3)	5,209*
	[1,060; 25,613]
-2LL	113,332
Cox and Snell's R^2	0,260
Nagelkerke R^2	0,400
N	152

Note: Odds ratios with 95% confidence interval between brackets

*** p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p <0,05

Figure 2 to 7 show the results of the binary logistic regression for the years 2000-2005. In this section, the interpretation of these results and their effect in light of the hypotheses and research question will be addressed. The output of the statistic analysis is included in appendix 2.

Population size

The central question of this research is whether there is a relation between state size and involvement in interstate conflict, and if so, what the theoretical explanation for this relation is. The relation between population size and involvement in interstate conflict was tested six times. Only in one test it was found that there was a statistically significant relation; in the year 2003, an increase of 100.000 in population size increased the odds of participation in interstate conflict by 1,003 (p = 0,034). Population size was also entered into the analysis as a binary variable. This variable was also tested six times, but none of the tests yielded statistically significant results. From these findings, we can conclude that there is no statistically significant relation between population size and involvement in interstate conflict. This finding means the first hypothesis, which constitutes that small states are less involved in interstate wars than large states, is rejected.

Democracy

The relation between democracy and involvement in interstate war was tested six times in the analysis. None of the six tests yielded a significant relation between democracy and involvement in interstate conflict. Because of the finding that there is no statistically significant relation between democracy and involvement in interstate conflict, the second hypothesis (small states are less involved in interstate wars because of their democratic regimes) is also rejected.

Capitalism

The relation between capitalism and involvement in interstate conflict was also tested six times in the analysis. Only one test, for the year 2002, yielded a significant relation between involvement in interstate war and how capitalist a state's economy was; in 2002, if how capitalist a state's economy was increased by 1 point on a 100-pointscale, the odds of conflict increased by 1,091 (p = 0,034). These findings are opposed to the third hypothesis, which constituted that small states are less involved in interstate wars because of their capitalist economies, and hence, the third hypothesis is rejected.

Material Power

The relation between material power (national material capability) and involvement in interstate conflict was tested six times. Out of the six tests, two tests yielded a significant relation between involvement in interstate war and national material capability. In 2001, the odds on participation in interstate conflict increased by 1,081 if the national material capability of a state increased by 0.10% (p = 0,049), and in 2002, the odds of participation in interstate conflict increased by 1,149 if the national material capability of a state increased by 0.10% (p = 0,013). Because only two of the six tests yield a significant relation between involvement in interstate war and national material capability, we can conclude that national material capability is a very weak predictor of involvement in interstate conflict. This leads to the rejection of the fourth hypothesis, which constituted that small states are less involved in interstate war because of their lack of material power.

Lastly, region was entered as a controlling variable, and was also tested six times. Out of the six tests, three tests yielded significant results. In 2002, countries in the Americas had significantly lower odds of being involved in interstate conflict than countries in Europe (p = 0,027). In 2004 and 2005, countries in Europe had significantly higher odds of being involved in conflict (p = 0,026 for 2004, p = 0,032 for 2005). Countries in Asia also had significantly higher odds of being involved in conflict in 2004 and 2005 when compared to Europe; (p = 0,033 for 2004, p = 0,042 for 2005). Region thus seems to have some predictive value concerning state participation in conflict.

From these findings it can be concluded that the research has not yielded a consistently significant predictor for participation in interstate conflict, and that the four previously mentioned hypotheses must all be rejected.

The fact that all four hypotheses must be rejected has significant implications for the literature on small states' behaviour in the international system, and liberal peace theories. Firstly, the fact that small states are not significantly less involved in interstate wars seems to refute the thought that small states do generally not use force when conducting foreign policy, which is a prevalent thought in the literature on small states' security behaviour, as illustrated by East (1973), Hey (2003), Toje (2010) and Rickli (2008). Secondly, the findings pose serious questions about the viability of the democratic peace theory. The fact that small states are not significantly less involved in interstate wars is the first factor that weakens the democratic peace theory, as small states are crucial cases for the democratic peace theory, as described

previously. The finding that how democratic a state's regime is has no predictive value on whether that state was involved in interstate conflict also weakens the democratic peace theory, although it can be argued that the democratic peace theory does not state democracy generally promotes peace, but only promotes peace between democracies. Thirdly, the findings of the statistical analysis also are opposed to the predictions of the capitalist peace theory. As described previously, small states are a crucial case for the capitalist peace theory, and the fact that small states are not significantly less involved in interstate conflict thus refutes the capitalist peace theory, as does the finding that how capitalist a state's economy is cannot be used in order to predict whether this state was involved in interstate war.

Case-study research: small states in militarized interstate disputes

The finding that a robust and statistically significant theory cannot be deducted from the statistical analysis means it must further be explored which factors might be adequate predictors for the relation between small states and involvement in interstate conflict, as Lieberman (2005) describes. Following the plan of Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis, the research will continue with two deliberately selected case-studies, in order to find whether a new model can be found for predicting the involvement of small states in interstate conflict. The first case-study will constitute a militarized interstate dispute between Bhutan and China in 2017, better known as the Doklam standoff, and the second case-study will explore the case of multiple militarized interstate disputes between Cyprus and Turkey.

The Doklam standoff

On June 16 2017, soldiers in the Royal Bhutanese Army noticed that Chinese forces had begun the construction of a road within the Doklam region, a disputed area between the borders of China and Bhutan (Joshi, 2017). The Bhutanese ministry of Foreign Affairs labelled this construction effort a direct violation of the agreed upon status-quo concerning the area dispute (Bhutanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). After noticing the violation, Bhutan turned to India, their close ally, for help, and Indian soldiers quickly arrived at the scene of the dispute to stop the construction of the road (Ganguly & Scobell, 2018; Myers, Barry, Fisher, 2017). Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a standoff, and the crisis on the Doklam plateau lasted two months before Indian and Chinese troops disengaged.

To understand how Bhutan became involved in this conflict, one must first look at the Bhutanese partnership with India. Bhutan and India have been close allies since the mid-20th century. Article 2 of the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese treaty, for example, reads that India will not interfere in domestic affairs of Bhutan, while Bhutan will be guided by India in their international affairs (Mansingh, 1994). The Indian military also trains Bhutanese troops, and India has given around $1 billion to Bhutan annually in the forms of military and economic support (Galay, 2004; Myers, Barry, Fisher, 2017). According to Galay (2004), India sees Bhutan as an important strategic buffer between themselves and China.

The conflict in the disputed border region of Bhutan and China can best be seen in the context of the Himalayan power struggle between India and China. Ganguly & Scobell (2018) describe how India and China have continuously engaged in a rivalry for power in Asia for more than 50 years, with the Himalaya as one of the most important strategic positions. This rivalry is mostly based on the respective size of the countries, their geographical proximity and the nationalist ideas of their respective leadership.

The abovementioned strategic importance of the Himalaya is aptly illustrated by the presence of the Siliguri corridor. The Siliguri corridor is a stretch of land in India, which is about 30 km broad, and connects the North-eastern states of India to the mainland of India (Myers, Barry, Fisher, 2017). This corridor is situated near the contested Doklam region. In a potential major conflict between China and India, China could separate the two parts of India by taking over the corridor, isolating 45 million Indians from the Indian mainland (Myers, Barry, Fisher, 2017). China's incursion into Bhutanese territory could not be allowed by India due to their strategic fears; if China takes over the Doklam plateau, they are one step closer to the Siliguri corridor. India thus had to prevent the Chinese take-over of the Doklam plateau, as Pillalamarri & Subanthore (2017), Myers, Barry & Fisher (2017) and Joshi (2017) describe.

The Chinese incursion can also be explained through more nationalist ideas; Mathou (2004) explains how China has claimed historical sovereignty over Bhutan in the past, as it has also done over Tibet, which China occupied in 1959. The incursion can thus also be seen as a continuation of these nationalist reunification-type politics.

The involvement of Bhutan in this militarized interstate dispute (through the violation of their territorial sovereignty) with China can thus best be attributed to its geopolitical location in the Himalayas, as the Doklam plateau is strategically important. Ganguly & Scobell (2018),

however, also state that Bhutan did not have the military capacity to counter the Chinese incursion (hence they called upon India for help).

Returning to the literature review, it was found that democracy, capitalism, population size and national material capability could predict conflict-reduction. Looking at the Doklam-crisis, it is clear how national material capability plays a role in this conflict; national material capability can be recognized in the lack of military power that Bhutan has, as described previously. The lack of national material capability of Bhutan makes them defenceless against the much stronger China. Here, it is visible how a lack of national material capability can increase the chances of small states being involved in conflict. The small population of Bhutan can be said to contribute to the conflict in the same way that the small national material capability of Bhutan does. It is, however, more difficult to distinguish how democracy and capitalism played a role in this conflict. One could argue that the conflict between Bhutan and China can be explained through the democratic peace theory and the capitalist peace theory. The explanation would be that because both Bhutan and China are not very democratic (both have a score of 3 on the Freedom House 14-pointscale) and not very capitalist (China averagely scores about 50 on the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom; Bhutan is noted as one of the least developed countries by the UN (2018)), the countries are involved in interstate conflict, but when one looks at the conflict more closely, it is hard to find how the lack of democratic institutions and a capitalist economy actually has contributed to the forming of the conflict.

New predictors, however, can also be found in the case of the Doklam-standoff; from the analysis of why Bhutan was involved in the Doklam-crisis emerged that this is mainly because of its geopolitical location in between regional great powers India and China. This new predictor of geopolitical location closely resembles the predictor region, which was found to be statistically significant for predicting whether countries were involved in interstate wars for the years 2002, 2004 and 2005. Geopolitical location, however, is a more specific predictor than the predictor region, as it adds a political-strategic layer to the concept (the predictor no longer only looks at a state's location, but also at the political consequences of this location). Another new idea that emerges from the analysis of the Doklam-crisis is that ideas and identities play a role in the forming of conflict; the Chinese idea that China has historical sovereignty over Bhutan can be interpreted as having contributed to their incursion into Bhutan.

Militarized interstate disputes between Cyprus and Turkey

In 2019, Turkish drill ships under escort of Turkish war ships began drilling for gas in the maritime territory of Cyprus, as Mumcuoglu & Syuleymanoglu (2019) describe. The Cypriot government called the actions of the Turkish ships a violation of Cypriot territorial sovereignty and customary international law, and a severe escalation in the relations between Cyprus and Turkey (Press and Information Office of the Cypriot Government, 2019). The Turkish violation of Cypriot territorial sovereignty was widely regarded as illegitimate, and Turkey was condemned for their actions by the United States and the European Union (Mumcuoglu & Syuleymanoglu, 2019).

The violation of Cypriot territorial sovereignty is one of the many militarized interstate disputes that have occurred between Cyprus and Turkey (Correlates of War, 2020). The source of these disputes can be found through examining the history of the island of Cyprus. Historically, Cyprus has two main population groups, namely the Greek Cypriots (78% of population) and the Turkish Cypriots (18% of population), according to Chan (2016). In 1960, Cyprus declared independence, which led to conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, as the Greek Cypriots wanted to form an union with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots wanted to divide the island between Turkey and Greece (Kaloudis, 1999). In 1974, when the Greek military junta exiled the president of Cyprus, Turkey thought that Cyprus would soon reunite with Greece, and launched a military invasion into Cyprus. Later, the Turkish-occupied northern regions of Cyprus declared themselves the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus; only Turkey recognizes this state (Chan, 2016). The uneasy divide between the sovereign state of Cyprus and its Turkish-occupied territory in the north of Cyprus, guarded by UN peacekeeping forces, is still ongoing today.

The reasons for the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and the following interstate disputes between Cyprus and Turkey can be approached from multiple ways. A first way is through looking at the strategic importance of Cyprus. Cyprus is strategically important regarding many of the security issues in the region of Cyprus, as illustrated by the Cypriot importance in NATO's Mediterranean operations, as well as its importance for potential military operations towards the Middle-East, as Stratfor (2012) and Inbar & Sander (2001) describe. Yilmaz (2020) further stresses the strategic importance of Cyprus with a focus on what the island means for Turkish security. The Turkish involvement on Cyprus might thus stem from the strategic potential that the location of the island offers.

A second way to approach the conflict is based on more economical reasons. The territorial waters of Cyprus hold a large gas field, which is valued at about $45 billion, as Bellut (2019) describes. Although Turkey laid claim to North Cyprus before the discovery of this field, it can be said that the discovery of this field has heightened the stakes over control of Cyprus, as Turkey finds that it has a sovereign right to exploit this field through the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (Bellut, 2019; Kambas, 2018). The discovery of the field has contributed directly to several militarized interstate disputes, such as the violation of Cypriot territorial sovereignty by Turkish drill ships and war ships, as mentioned earlier. The economic potential of the gas field might motivate Turkey to continue its occupation of North Cyprus and violations of Cypriot territorial sovereignty for economic gain.

A third way to view the militarized interstate disputes is in light of the Greco-Turkish rivalry. Kaloudis (1999) describes how Greece and Turkey have frequently engaged in wars with one another throughout history, and that the legacy of these wars is that there is no trust between Turkey and Greece. Turkey fears the Greek 'Megali' idea, which constitutes the will to reunify all territories that were once Greek under modern-day Greece; this would include Cyprus (Kaloudis, 1999). The Greco-Turkish rivalry is also reflected in the domestic politics of Cyprus; Kaloudis (1999) describes how both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are very nationalistic towards their respective 'motherland', thus complicating intergroup relations. The lack of trust between Greece and Turkey on the one hand, and thus Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, makes it difficult to negotiate on the future of Cyprus, and thus the militarized interstate disputes concerning Cyprus continue.

Lastly, the conflict can also be viewed as partly stemming from the Greek and Turkish domestic political situation. Kaloudis (1999) describes how issues concerning Cyprus are treated as national issues in both Greece and Turkey, and if there is domestic political struggle, both countries use the Cypriot issue as a way to muster support from the population, distracting from the political issues at hand. Baboulias (2019) also subscribes to this perspective; he states that the earlier-mentioned gas-related Turkish incursions into Cypriot territory must be seen in the Turkish domestic context. Because Erdogan was losing power in the domestic politics, he might have wanted to distract from the domestic political issues by intervening in Cyprus, in order to gain support from the population (Baboulias, 2019).

Combining these findings with the predictions from the literature review, it is once again seen how national material capability and small population size may play a role in the involvement of small states in interstate wars. For Cyprus, their relatively low national material capability

and population size means that they cannot withstand the military pressure and occupation by the much stronger state of Turkey. In these conflicts, however, it seems that there also is a role for democracy and capitalism, but not the role that was expected. From the analysis appeared that the militarized interstate disputes between Turkey and Cyprus might be motivated by economic incentives, that are put forth by the presence of the large gas field surrounding Cyprus. Turkish interest in economic gain through the selling of gas can be said to have contributed to recent militarized interstate disputes between the states. In this way, the capitalist will of maximizing profits may be seen as contributing to the forming of interstate conflict. The finding that recent militarized interstate disputes between Turkey and Cyprus may partly have been motivated by domestic political gain, shows how democracy may contribute to the forming of conflict; in both Turkey and Greece, tensions concerning Cyprus are often artificially heightened in time of domestic political issues in order to distract from these issues and to increase the government's popularity.

Other ideas of how interstate conflict may form also emerge from this case-study. The strategic location of Cyprus can be seen as contributing to their involvement in conflict, because it is important for Turkey to secure the island for their own security- and defence purposes. This, once again, points to the relevance of the concept of geopolitical position. The thought that ideas and identities may play a role in the forming of conflict is also found in the case-study of Cyprus and Turkey; because of the mistrust between Greece and Turkey, there is no viable political solution to the problem of Cyprus, and thus militarized interstate disputes over the region continue to occur. A new idea found in this case-study is that small states may be involved in interstate conflict because of domestic political issues of a larger state; in such cases, large states pick a state that is much weaker than them to consequently engage and use as a lightning rod to distract from their domestic political issues.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to find whether there is a relation between state size and involvement in interstate conflict. The research question for the thesis constituted ''Is there a relation between state size and involvement in interstate conflict, and if so, what is the theoretical explanation for this relation?''.

The thesis consequently posed four potential predictors for state involvement in interstate conflict, namely population size, how democratic the state's regime is, how capitalist the

state's economy is and how much material power the state has. The research found that there is no consistent significant relation between state involvement in interstate conflict on the one hand and population size, how democratic a state's regime is, how capitalist a state's economy is or how much material power the state has on the other hand. The answer to the research question is that there is no relation between state size and involvement in interstate war.

The thesis then went on to conduct qualitative research on a small number of case-studies of small states involved in interstate conflict to find other possible explanations as to why these states are involved in conflict. Through qualitative analyses of a militarized interstate dispute between Bhutan and China and militarized interstate disputes between Cyprus and Turkey, it was found that Bhutan and Cyprus are mostly involved in conflict because of their geopolitical location. Another explanation stems from a more constructivist understanding of International Relations, in which ideas and identities of states and populations can be seen as contributing to the involvement of small states in interstate conflict. A last explanation is that large states may engage in militarized interstate disputes with small states in order to distract from domestic political issues.

These findings pose major questions about the viability of both the democratic peace theory and the capitalist peace theory. As described previously, small states are crucial cases for both the democratic peace theory and the capitalist peace theory. The fact that small states were not found to be significantly less involved in interstate wars thus seems to refute the empirical robustness of the democratic peace theory and capitalist peace theory. Academics should further critically assess the viability of these theories, and policy-makers should take these findings into account before deciding to base their policy on either of these theories.

A shortcoming of the research is that only six years (namely 2000-2005) were analysed in the statistical analysis, and only two cases were analysed in the qualitative analysis. This means that the statistical research is generalizable to the 21st century world, but it is unclear whether the research can be generalized to longer periods of world history. In order to make the findings of the research more robust and generalizable, more years must be analysed in the statistical analysis, and more cases (differentiating in region and time) must be explored through qualitative analyses. Nevertheless, this research provides a good starting point for further analysis. Another problem the research faced is the lack of information available on the smallest states in the world, causing microstates to be underrepresented in the analysis.

This leads to my first recommendation for future research, namely that academics must conduct further studies into small states. Elman (1995) describes how small states are fundamentally underrepresented in research in International Relations; this is visible in the lack of data on some of the world's smallest states that impeded my research. In order to grow as a discipline, International Relations scholars must shift their view to also include these states, as small states and their actions have profound effects on our discipline. More data on small states would make research such as this thesis more robust and viable.

A second recommendation is to conduct further research into which factors may predict state involvement in interstate war. This may constitute broadening my research to include a longer time period in the statistical analysis, or conducting further qualitative analyses of state involvement in international conflict in order to find new predictors for such conflicts. This research can prove to be important for decreasing interstate conflict, and thus decreasing human suffering.

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Appendix

1A: Multicollinearity tests for 2000-2005

2000:

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	14,437	2,387		6,049	,000		
	Economic Freedom in 2000 (Heritage)	,714	,048	,756	14,839	,000	,505	1,981
	Democracy in 2000 (14 point-scale)	,260	,124	,098	2,108	,037	,604	1,657
	GDP per capita in 2000 : 1000	,149	,046	,154	3,210	,002	,573	1,746
	National Military Capabilities in 2000 x 100	-,075	,035	-,142	-2,137	,034	,295	3,392
	Population in 2000 (World Bank) : 100000	,001	,000	,194	2,958	,004	,305	3,282

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom in 2003 (Heritage)

2001:

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	11,772	1,911		6,159	,000		
	Economic Freedom in 2001 (Heritage)	,778	,039	,848	19,976	,000	,476	2,103
	Democracy in 2001 (14 point-scale)	,126	,104	,047	1,210	,228	,567	1,765
	Population in 2001 (World Bank) : 100000	,002	,000	,219	4,086	,000	,297	3,364
	GDP per capita in 2001 : 1000	,119	,038	,121	3,109	,002	,566	1,766
	National Military Capabilities in 2001 x 100	-,076	,028	-,148	-2,717	,007	,289	3,465

2002:

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	7,758	1,733		4,476	,000		
	Democracy in 2002 (14 point-scale)	,020	,089	,008	,228	,820	,556	1,798
	Economic Freedom in 2002 (Heritage)	,864	,035	,918	24,499	,000	,451	2,216
	Population in 2002 (World Bank) : 100000	,001	,000	,161	3,695	,000	,335	2,982
	GDP per capita in 2002 : 1000	,061	,031	,067	1,966	,051	,551	1,815
	National Military Capabilities in 2002 x 100	-,043	,023	-,083	-1,882	,062	,326	3,070

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom in 2003 (Heritage)

2003:

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,339	2,353		,144	,886		
	National Military Capabilities in 2003 x 100	,071	,029	,127	2,430	,016	,320	3,124
	Democracy in 2003 (14 point-scale)	,247	,111	,086	2,227	,028	,590	1,696
	Economic Freedom in 2003 (Heritage)	,950	,047	,871	20,372	,000	,481	2,079
	GDP per capita in 2003 : 1000	-,013	,034	-,016	-,397	,692	,555	1,801
	Population in 2003 (World Bank) : 100000	-,002	,000	-,200	-3,836	,000	,324	3,084

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom in 2001 (Heritage)

2004:

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,131	2,421		-,054	,957		
	GDP per capita in 2004 : 1000	-,009	,030	-,012	-,298	,766	,569	1,758
	National Military Capabilities in 2004 x 100	,018	,029	,033	,613	,541	,312	3,201
	Population in 2004 (World Bank) : 100000	,000	,000	-,026	-,490	,625	,316	3,169
	Economic Freedom in 2004 (Heritage)	,959	,048	,880	19,941	,000	,464	2,156
	Democracy in 2004 (14 point-scale)	,241	,110	,086	2,192	,030	,591	1,692

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom in 2001 (Heritage)

2005:

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1,288	3,176		,405	,686		
	Democracy in 2005 (14 point-scale)	,274	,138	,098	1,992	,048	,569	1,757
	Economic Freedom in 2005 (Heritage)	,930	,064	,824	14,423	,000	,418	2,390
	Population in 2005 (World Bank) : 100000	,000	,000	-,033	-,497	,620	,316	3,169
	GDP per capita in 2005 : 1000	,003	,034	,004	,081	,936	,566	1,768
	National Military Capabilities in 2005 x 100	,011	,036	,021	,319	,750	,313	3,199

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom in 2001 (Heritage)

2A: Binary logistic regression for the year 2000 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes

Output Created		06-MAY-2020 14:55:37
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2000
		/METHOD=ENTER DMC_2000 CAP_2000 NMC_2000x POP_2000x POP_2000DUMMY GDP_Capita2000x REGION
		/CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1)
		/CONTRAST (POP_2000DUMMY)=Indicator(1)
		/PRINT=CI(95)
		/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,02

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	156	80,8
	Missing Cases	37	19,2
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

		Frequency	Parameter coding		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	38	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	47	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	43	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP 2000	Large state	133	,000		
	Small state	23	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2000 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
		Observed	Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2000 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	121	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	35	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				77,6

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,240	,192	41,772	1	,000	,289

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2000	3,039	1	,081
		CAP_2000	,958	1	,328
		NMC_2000x	14,680	1	,000
		POP_2000x	10,450	1	,001
		POP_2000DUMMY(1)	1,368	1	,242
		GDP_Capita2000x	,132	1	,716
		REGION	4,279	3	,233
		REGION(1)	,738	1	,390
		REGION(2)	,418	1	,518
		REGION(3)	2,074	1	,150
	Overall Statistics		20,212	9	,017

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	22,131	9	,008
	Block	22,131	9	,008
	Model	22,131	9	,008

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	143,969[a]	,132	,202

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because

parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table^a

	Observed		Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2000 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2000 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	120	1	99,2
		Involved in conflict	30	5	14,3
	Overall Percentage				80,1

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1^a	DMC_2000	-,100	,086	1,331	1	,249	,905	,764	1,072
	CAP_2000	-,005	,027	,029	1	,864	,995	,944	1,050
	NMC_2000x	,084	,043	3,888	1	,049	1,088	1,001	1,183
	POP_2000x	,000	,000	,205	1	,651	1,000	,999	1,001
	POP_2000DUMMY(1)	-,171	,698	,060	1	,806	,843	,215	3,310
	GDP_Capita2000x	-,010	,035	,082	1	,775	,990	,925	1,060
	REGION			2,250	3	,522			
	REGION(1)	1,043	,771	1,832	1	,176	2,838	,627	12,856
	REGION(2)	,322	,804	,160	1	,689	1,380	,286	6,664
	REGION(3)	,504	,791	,406	1	,524	1,655	,351	7,799
	Constant	-,911	1,338	,464	1	,496	,402		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2000, CAP_2000, NMC_2000x, POP_2000x, POP_2000DUMMY, GDP_Capita2000x, REGION.

2B: Binary logistic regression for the year 2001 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes

Output Created		06-MAY-2020 14:57:00
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2001
		/METHOD=ENTER DMC_2001 CAP_2001 NMC_2001x POP_2001x POP_2001DUMMY GDP_Capita2001x REGION
		/CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1)
		/CONTRAST (POP_2001DUMMY)=Indicator(1)
		/PRINT=CI(95)
		/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	151	78,2
	Missing Cases	42	21,8
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

		Frequency	Parameter coding		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	38	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	42	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	43	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP2001	Large state	128	,000		
	Small state	23	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2001 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
		Observed	Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2001 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	119	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	32	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				78,8

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,313	,199	43,502	1	,000	,269

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2001	3,761	1	,052
		CAP_2001	,008	1	,928
		NMC_2001x	20,270	1	,000
		POP_2001x	11,935	1	,001
		POP_2001DUMMY(1)	4,610	1	,032
		GDP_Capita2001x	1,478	1	,224
		REGION	9,269	3	,026
		REGION(1)	,982	1	,322
		REGION(2)	1,662	1	,197
		REGION(3)	9,235	1	,002
	Overall Statistics		31,507	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	37,841	9	,000
	Block	37,841	9	,000
	Model	37,841	9	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	118,139a	,222	,344

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because
parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table[a]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2001 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
	Observed				
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2001 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	115	4	96,6
		Involved in conflict	22	10	31,3
	Overall Percentage				82,8

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1[a]	DMC_2001	-,166	,104	2,539	1	,111	,847	,691	1,039
	CAP_2001	,017	,032	,299	1	,585	1,018	,956	1,083
	NMC_2001x	,139	,056	6,131	1	,013	1,149	1,029	1,282
	POP_2001x	-,001	,000	1,317	1	,251	,999	,999	1,000
	POP_2001DUMMY(1)	-1,430	1,121	1,626	1	,202	,239	,027	2,154
	GDP_Capita2001x	,029	,037	,642	1	,423	1,030	,958	1,106
	REGION			1,406	3	,704			
	REGION(1)	,156	,965	,026	1	,872	1,169	,176	7,748
	REGION(2)	,548	,985	,309	1	,578	1,729	,251	11,930
	REGION(3)	,912	,917	,988	1	,320	2,489	,412	15,033
	Constant	-2,109	1,514	1,942	1	,163	,121		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2001, CAP_2001, NMC_2001x, POP_2001x, POP_2001DUMMY, GDP_Capita2001x, REGION.

2C: Binary logistic regression for the year 2002 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes		
Output Created		06-MAY-2020 14:58:41
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2002 /METHOD=ENTER DMC_2002 CAP_2002 NMC_2002x POP_2002x POP_2002DUMMY GDP_Capita2002x REGION /CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (POP_2002DUMMY)=Indicator(1) /PRINT=CI(95) /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	150	77,7
	Missing Cases	43	22,3
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

		Frequency	Parameter coding		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	38	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	43	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	41	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP2002	Large state	128	,000		
	Small state	22	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2002 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
	Observed				
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2002 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	123	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	27	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				82,0

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,516	,213	50,907	1	,000	,220

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2002	2,571	1	,109
		CAP_2002	,324	1	,569
		NMC_2002x	18,887	1	,000
		POP_2002x	16,476	1	,000
		POP_2002DUMMY(1)	5,659	1	,017
		GDP_Capita2002x	,984	1	,321
		REGION	5,975	3	,113
		REGION(1)	2,749	1	,097
		REGION(2)	,121	1	,728
		REGION(3)	4,854	1	,028
	Overall Statistics		30,728	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	38,838	9	,000
	Block	38,838	9	,000
	Model	38,838	9	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	102,580[a]	,228	,374

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because
maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be
found.

Classification Table[a]

	Observed		Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2002 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2002 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	121	2	98,4
		Involved in conflict	22	5	18,5
	Overall Percentage				84,0

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1[a]	DMC_2002	-,159	,111	2,059	1	,151	,853	,687	1,060
	CAP_2002	,087	,041	4,479	1	,034	1,091	1,006	1,182
	NMC_2002x	,068	,052	1,724	1	,189	1,071	,967	1,185
	POP_2002x	,001	,001	,692	1	,405	1,001	,999	1,002
	POP_2002DUMMY(1)	-19,151	7861,915	,000	1	,998	,000	,000	.
	GDP_Capita2002x	-,108	,053	4,132	1	,042	,898	,809	,996
	REGION			5,019	3	,170			
	REGION(1)	-2,853	1,287	4,918	1	,027	,058	,005	,718
	REGION(2)	-,895	,831	1,159	1	,282	,409	,080	2,083
	REGION(3)	-,730	,850	,738	1	,390	,482	,091	2,549
	Constant	-4,349	1,984	4,807	1	,028	,013		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2002, CAP_2002, NMC_2002x, POP_2002x, POP_2002DUMMY, GDP_Capita2002x, REGION.

2D: Binary logistic regression for the year 2003 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes

Output Created		06-MAY-2020 15:00:28
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2003 /METHOD=ENTER DMC_2003 CAP_2003 NMC_2003x POP_2003x POP_2003DUMMY GDP_Capita2003x REGION /CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (POP_2003DUMMY)=Indicator(1) /PRINT=CI(95) /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	151	78,2
	Missing Cases	42	21,8
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

			Parameter coding		
		Frequency	(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	38	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	44	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	41	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP2003	Large state	129	,000		
	Small state	22	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2003 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
	Observed				
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2003 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	117	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	34	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				77,5

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,236	,195	40,234	1	,000	,291

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2003	,992	1	,319
		CAP_2003	,004	1	,953
		NMC_2003x	23,118	1	,000
		POP_2003x	19,265	1	,000
		POP_2003DUMMY(1)	7,483	1	,006
		GDP_Capita2003x	,016	1	,899
		REGION	19,219	3	,000
		REGION(1)	,428	1	,513
		REGION(2)	6,415	1	,011
		REGION(3)	18,311	1	,000
	Overall Statistics		40,126	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	59,587	9	,000
	Block	59,587	9	,000
	Model	59,587	9	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	101,491[a]	,326	,497

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because

maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be

found.

Classification Table^a

	Observed		Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2003 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2003 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	114	3	97,4
		Involved in conflict	18	16	47,1
	Overall Percentage				86,1

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1^a	DMC_2003	-,020	,105	,037	1	,847	,980	,797	1,205
	CAP_2003	,021	,040	,275	1	,600	1,021	,944	1,105
	NMC_2003x	,024	,067	,129	1	,720	1,024	,898	1,168
	POP_2003x	,003	,001	4,470	1	,034	1,003	1,000	1,006
	POP_2003DUMMY(1)	-18,851	8260,308	,000	1	,998	,000	,000	.
	GDP_Capita2003x	-,015	,036	,179	1	,672	,985	,918	1,057
	REGION			6,742	3	,081			
	REGION(1)	-,277	,991	,078	1	,780	,758	,109	5,292
	REGION(2)	-,631	1,012	,389	1	,533	,532	,073	3,865
	REGION(3)	1,157	,891	1,688	1	,194	3,181	,555	18,222
	Constant	-3,323	1,952	2,899	1	,089	,036		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2003, CAP_2003, NMC_2003x, POP_2003x, POP_2003DUMMY, GDP_Capita2003x, REGION.

2E: Binary logistic regression for the year 2004 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes		
Output Created		06-MAY-2020 15:02:24
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2004 /METHOD=ENTER DMC_2004 CAP_2004 NMC_2004x POP_2004x POP_2004DUMMY GDP_Capita2004x REGION /CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (POP_2004DUMMY)=Indicator(1) /PRINT=CI(95) /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	152	78,8
	Missing Cases	41	21,2
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

		Frequency	Parameter coding		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	39	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	44	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	41	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP2004	Large state	130	,000		
	Small state	22	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2004 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
		Observed	Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2004 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	121	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	31	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				79,6

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,362	,201	45,765	1	,000	,256

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2004	13,559	1	,000
		CAP_2004	4,272	1	,039
		NMC_2004x	20,565	1	,000
		POP_2004x	16,611	1	,000
		POP_2004DUMMY(1)	3,980	1	,046
		GDP_Capita2004x	,241	1	,623
		REGION	38,910	3	,000
		REGION(1)	5,983	1	,014
		REGION(2)	3,111	1	,078
		REGION(3)	38,264	1	,000
	Overall Statistics		56,937	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	68,470	9	,000
	Block	68,470	9	,000
	Model	68,470	9	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	85,301a	,363	,570

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 13 because

parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Classification Table[a]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2004 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
	Observed		Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2004 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	116	5	95,9
		Involved in conflict	16	15	48,4
	Overall Percentage				86,2

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B) Lower	95% C.I.for EXP(B) Upper
Step 1[a]	DMC_2004	-,166	,111	2,251	1	,134	,847	,682	1,052
	CAP_2004	-,014	,039	,124	1	,724	,986	,913	1,065
	NMC_2004x	,129	,079	2,673	1	,102	1,137	,975	1,327
	POP_2004x	,001	,001	,363	1	,547	1,001	,998	1,003
	POP_2004DUMMY(1)	-,829	1,195	,481	1	,488	,437	,042	4,545
	GDP_Capita2004x	,011	,034	,097	1	,756	1,011	,946	1,080
	REGION			9,277	3	,026			
	REGION(1)	-9,117	40,825	,050	1	,823	,000	,000	6178743247688235000000000000000,000
	REGION(2)	,874	1,247	,492	1	,483	2,397	,208	27,590
	REGION(3)	2,424	1,135	4,565	1	,033	11,295	1,222	104,425
	Constant	-1,288	2,037	,400	1	,527	,276		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2004, CAP_2004, NMC_2004x, POP_2004x, POP_2004DUMMY, GDP_Capita2004x, REGION.

2F: Binary logistic regression for the year 2005 (SPSS Output)

Logistic Regression

Notes

Output Created		06-MAY-2020 15:03:41
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\Floris\Documents\SCRIPTIE\DATASET_SCRIPTIE4.0.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	193
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing
Syntax		LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES MID_2005
		/METHOD=ENTER DMC_2005 CAP_2005 NMC_2005x POP_2005x POP_2005DUMMY GDP_Capita2005x REGION
		/CONTRAST (REGION)=Indicator(1)
		/CONTRAST (POP_2005DUMMY)=Indicator(1)
		/PRINT=CI(95)
		/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases[a]		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	152	78,8
	Missing Cases	41	21,2
	Total	193	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		193	100,0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

Original Value	Internal Value
Not involved in conflict	0
Involved in conflict	1

Categorical Variables Codings

		Frequency	Parameter coding		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Geographic Region	Europe	39	,000	,000	,000
	Americas	28	1,000	,000	,000
	Africa	44	,000	1,000	,000
	Asia	41	,000	,000	1,000
Dummy POP_2005	Large state	131	,000		
	Small state	21	1,000		

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table[a,b]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2005 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
		Observed	Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
Step 0	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2005 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	119	0	100,0
		Involved in conflict	33	0	,0
	Overall Percentage				78,3

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-1,283	,197	42,502	1	,000	,277

Variables not in the Equation

			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	DMC_2005	7,561	1	,006
		CAP_2005	5,102	1	,024
		NMC_2005x	13,730	1	,000
		POP_2005x	14,454	1	,000
		POP_2005DUMMY(1)	6,757	1	,009
		GDP_Capita2005x	1,255	1	,263
		REGION	21,463	3	,000
		REGION(1)	4,285	1	,038
		REGION(2)	,454	1	,501
		REGION(3)	20,040	1	,000
	Overall Statistics		37,827	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	45,727	9	,000
	Block	45,727	9	,000
	Model	45,727	9	,000

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	113,332a	,260	,400

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because
maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be
found.

Classification Table[a]

			Predicted		
			Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2005 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)		
			Not involved in conflict	Involved in conflict	Percentage Correct
	Observed				
Step 1	Militarized Interstate Dispute in 2005 (Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes)	Not involved in conflict	113	6	95,0
		Involved in conflict	22	11	33,3
	Overall Percentage				81,6

a. The cut value is ,500

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B) Lower	Upper
Step 1[a]	DMC_2005	-,023	,094	,058	1	,810	,978	,814	1,175
	CAP_2005	-,039	,040	,986	1	,321	,961	,890	1,039
	NMC_2005x	,017	,028	,368	1	,544	1,017	,963	1,073
	POP_2005x	,001	,001	1,849	1	,174	1,001	1,000	1,003
	POP_2005DUMMY(1)	-19,320	8241,083	,000	1	,998	,000	,000	.
	GDP_Capita2005x	,009	,027	,115	1	,735	1,009	,958	1,063
	REGION			8,825	3	,032			
	REGION(1)	-1,058	1,171	,815	1	,367	,347	,035	3,449
	REGION(2)	,625	,829	,569	1	,451	1,868	,368	9,482
	REGION(3)	1,650	,813	4,125	1	,042	5,209	1,060	25,613
	Constant	,101	1,893	,003	1	,958	1,106		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DMC_2005, CAP_2005, NMC_2005x, POP_2005x, POP_2005DUMMY, GDP_Capita2005x, REGION.