



**Universiteit Leiden**

DEALING WITH POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS:  
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLICE ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK AND  
FRANCE

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## **Abbreviations**

ACPO – Association of Chief Police Officers

AFOs – Authorised Firearms Officer

CRS – Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité

HMIC – Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

IGPN – Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale

IPPC – Independent Police Complaints Commission

MPS – Metropolitan Police Service

PPE – Personal protective equipment

RBS – Royal Bank of Scotland

# Chapter 1 Introduction – Police Militarisation

## 1.1 Police Militarisation and Political Demonstrations

During the research and writing of this dissertation the conduct and use of excessive force by police officers and the police responses to political demonstrations has been centre fold in the world media and policy debate on policing in the USA. The death of George Floyd on May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2020 from the excessive use of force by officers of the Minneapolis police, has ignited intense riots, protests and global demonstrations.<sup>1</sup> The protests against his death and the Black Lives Matter movement, have spread globally from the cities in America to around the world. Many of the protests in the US have seen the deployment of the National Guard, a military reserve force and a strong response from the police, who have used rubber bullets, flash-bang grenades, sting-ball grenades and tear gas in controlling the protests<sup>2</sup>, further accentuating calls for the examination of police militarisation and police conduct. Even before these most recent events, questions of police conduct, excessive use of force and police militarisation have seen a renewed relevance in the general public, media and academia. The debate gain momentum after a number of highly publicised incidents in America, the most prominent being the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by police officer Darren Wilson on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri. This incident was followed by protests and riots the next day, which in turn were met by a strong response by police and SWAT in riot gear using armour vehicles, rubber bullets and tear gas.<sup>3</sup> The examination of police responses to political demonstrations in particular, has impacted the wider police militarisation debate and questioned the influence of military culture and values on police organisations.

## 1.2 Political Demonstrations: A Changing Narrative

Outside of the US, internationally media covered events like the G20 summit in London in 2009, the G20 summit in Toronto in 2010 and most recently the Yellow Vest movement in France in 2019 have seen increased media and public scrutiny on police conduct during

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<sup>1</sup> BBC News. (30 May 2020). 'George Floyd: What happened in the final moments of his life', *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726> (21/06/2020).

<sup>2</sup> Mimi Dwyer Reuters. (6 June 2020). 'Tear gas, pepper balls: Here's what U.S. police are shooting at George Floyd protesters', *Global News*, <https://globalnews.ca/news/7034964/what-us-police-are-shooting-george-floyd-protesters/> (21/06/2020).

<sup>3</sup> Jon Swaine. (28 Oct 2014). 'Ferguson police brace for new protests by spending thousands on riot gear', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/28/ferguson-police-spending-thousands-riot-gear-protests> (21/06/2020).

political demonstrations and police militarisation. Issues such as, the use of excessive force and officer conduct and behaviour have been focused on not just the actions of individual officers in confrontational situations with citizens but also on the wider institution of policing. Questions of racial profiling, excessive use of force against unarmed civilians, aimed particularly at those of marginalised communities, and the conduct of the police during political demonstrations have led to examinations of the entire police organisational structure. This has led to calls for large scale changes within police institutions. Some of these include defunding of the police<sup>4</sup>, holding officers who use excessive force more accountable<sup>5</sup> and for a shift in emphasis in police training<sup>6</sup>. This has led to a serious examination of police organisations and an intense scrutiny of the behaviour of their officers.

The focus on police conduct during political demonstrations is particularly relevant in light of the intense media coverage and public debate surrounding these events. Some of the demonstrations like those after the deaths of George Floyd and Michael Brown centre around police violence, while others protest a wide range of social issues, such as austerity measures, climate change, war, price increases (fuel, tax), social and economic inequalities. Many of these issues are representative of the prominent policy debate during that time. With the modern age of fast paced media content there has been a shift in the nature of the coverage of police conduct during political demonstrations. The rise in “citizen journalism”, which has seen a large amount of user-generated content (UGC) from the public being broadcasted about political demonstrations and police involvement<sup>7</sup> has started to question police and government policies. This has impacted the narrative surrounding police conduct during political demonstrations and even though a large majority of political demonstrations are taking place peacefully, cases of violence, extreme injuries or deaths during the demonstrations is further accentuating probing of police conduct and militarisation. Other factors like policies that threaten civil liberties and the marginalisation of underrepresented or minority communities, impacts greatly the social relationship between the public and the police and the trust that the public hold for their police. This breakdown in the trust between the police and the society which they are policing, has led to ever evolving problems for the police to continue to maintain order. This in turn will continue

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<sup>4</sup> Maya King. (17 June 2020). How ‘Defund the Police’ went from moonshot to mainstream’, *Politico*, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/17/defund-police-mainstream-324816> (23/06/2020).

<sup>5</sup> Antonio M. Ginatta. (30 September 2014). ‘A call for police accountability’, *The Hill*, <https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/219235-a-call-for-police-accountability> (23/06/2020).

<sup>6</sup> Rosa Brooks. (10 June 2020). ‘Stop Training Police Like They’re Joining the Military’, *The Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/police-academies-paramilitary/612859/> (23/06/2020).

<sup>7</sup> Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). ‘Adapting to Protest’, *Criminal Justice Inspectorates*, <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf>, p.24.

to impact how police organisations deal with future political demonstrations and perceived threats.

### 1.3 Literature Review: Police Militarisation

One of the most relevant aspects from the literature on police militarisation, in terms of the current debate, is the fact that this militarisation isn't a modern concept in itself. The emphasis on much of the literature is on a modern 'increased' militarisation of the police. Indeed Peter Kraska, one of the lead scholars on the militarisation of the police states; "police militarization, in all countries and across any time in history, must be conceived of as the degree or extent of militarization."<sup>8</sup> This emphasis on the increased militarisation of the police allows for a more focused definition of what is meant by militarisation in a modern context and why it is relevant for further scholarly research. Police militarisation has been defined by Kraska as, "...the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model"<sup>9</sup> and by Eliav Lieblich and Adam Shinar as "a process whereby police forces come to look and operate like military forces."<sup>10</sup>

This modern emphasis has seen the literature focus of a continued blurring of the lines between the police and military. The traditional views of external and internal threats are too becoming more difficult to separate. Threats such as terrorism have become more internalised and even groups involved in political demonstrations, such as Antifa and the Black Bloc, have been labelled as threats. This greatly influences the mentality of officers and the perception of the threat presented by political demonstrators. Eliav Lieblich and Adam Shinar discuss this by mentioning Carl Schmitt's "famous distinction that possibility of combat—which militarization implies—creates a friend/enemy distinction that constitutes (and delineates) the political collective."<sup>11</sup> This is also discussed by Bolduc in how the threat of terrorism is creating, in the US, the police into incorporating "a distinctively militarized tone to better face and eliminate the defined "enemy"."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Peter B. Kraska (2007). 'Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police' *Policing*, Vol.1(4), p. 503.

<sup>9</sup> Kraska (2007). 'Militarization and Policing', *Policing*, p.503.

<sup>10</sup> Eliav, Lieblich and Adam, Shinar. (2018). 'The Case Against Police Militarization.' *Michigan Journal of Race and Law*, Issue 1 Vol.23, Issues 1&2, p.107.

<sup>11</sup> Lieblich and Shinar. (2018). 'The Case Against Police Militarization', p.108.

<sup>12</sup> Nicholas S. Bolduc, (2016). 'Global Insecurity: How Risk Theory Gave Rise to Global Police Militarization', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Vol.23(1), p.271.

This increase of military culture and values in approaching domestic issues, is particularly evident in paramilitary police units, which has created what Kraska describes as a culture of militarism and hypermasculinity that is deeply embedded in these units.<sup>13</sup> These paramilitary police units are increasingly seen as a key component of the blurring of the lines between the police and military. Along with riot squads, they have been seen as the epitome of the transfer of military culture and values into the police force.<sup>14</sup> There have also been critiques of the modern police militarisation thesis focus on the blurring of lines concept, with Christopher McMichael claiming, “this concept is both historically and politically problematic.”<sup>15</sup> He puts forth the argument that, “that police and military distinctions in liberal democracies should be understood as part of a continuum of state power, in which domestic social control and international warfare build and secure capitalist order.”<sup>16</sup> This modern increase in the militarisation of the police has blurred the lines not only between the police and the military but with how militarisation effects how the police deal with threats of public disorder.

#### **1.4 Research Puzzle: Different Cultures and Police Militarisation**

The modern debate on police militarisation has centred around the US concept, derived from Richard Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ and the rise of the SWAT team created by Los Angeles police chief Daryl F. Gates in response to the Watts riots in LA in August 1965.<sup>17</sup> The American experience of the militarisation of its police has part of its basis in riot control and from military tactical units. But many other countries have their own distinct history of militarisation and created their own distinct cultures around their police force. This is pointed out by Nicholas Bolduc when he states that the militarisation of the police has been taking place in the Western world even before the US; “however, America is a late development in this trend; the majority of the Western world militarized themselves through the concept of ‘gendarmes’...”<sup>18</sup> The French National Gendarmerie can trace its origins back to the Middle

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<sup>13</sup> Peter B Kraska. (1996). ‘Enjoying Militarism: Political/Personal Dilemmas in Studying U.S. Police Paramilitary Units’, *Justice Quarterly*, Vol.13(3), p. 407.

<sup>14</sup> Radley Balko. (2013). ‘How did America’s Police become a Military Force on the Streets’, *ABA Journal*, Vol.99(7) (July 2013).

<sup>15</sup> Christopher McMichael. (2017). ‘Pacification and police: A critique of the police militarization thesis’, *Capital & Class*, Vol. 41(1), p.115.

<sup>16</sup> McMichael. (2017). ‘Pacification and police’, p.116.

<sup>17</sup> Radley Balko. (2013). ‘The Militarization of America’s Police Forces’, *Cato’s Letter A Quarterly Message on Liberty*, Fall 2013, Vol.11(4), p.3.

<sup>18</sup> Bolduc, (2016). ‘Global Insecurity’, p.267



Ages and the basis of the current organisation dates back to 1720.<sup>19</sup> This military force is one of the two national police forces in France and has both military and civic duties. The Italian Carabinieri was established in 1814 and although apart of the armed forces, takes part in combating organised crime and riot control.<sup>20</sup> The Spanish Guardia Civil was established in 1844 and although not formally part of the Spanish armed forces, has a distinct status of an armed institution of military nature.<sup>21</sup> These military institutions with civic duties, are one of the examples of the transition of military culture and values to the wider police organisation. Other examples such as the UK have experienced an increase in military culture in their police organisation, through a more gradual process. These traditions and histories have helped shape certain norms, values and identities within police organisations. These have influence ideas of security, freedom, rights and impact police policy and operations in dealing with political demonstrations. As well as early traditions between the police and the military, historical and modern experiences with threats and disorder can create, reinforce or alter the culture within police organisations. These threats can come in the form of external threats that become more internalised, such as terrorism or internal threats or disorder such as hooliganism, crime, drug trafficking or rioting that continue to push the police organisation to evolve to deal with them.

From examining European nations, similarities can be drawn, and patterns established, but a more focused analysis of the culture of other police forces, outside the US, can allow for a better understanding of how their traditions and experiences created certain norms, values and identities in their police organisations. These norms, values and identities impact not only how the police organisation deals with political demonstrations, but also the process of militarisation. The investigation into police organisational culture will help bridge the gap between past traditions and experiences and modern police operations on the ground during political demonstrations. This research will attempt to use a case study of the French and British police forces to examine how the differences in the cultures of police forces impact how they deal with political demonstrations.

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<sup>19</sup> FIEP International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status. (N.A.) 'French National Gendarmerie.' *FIEP*. <http://www.fiep.org/member-forces/french-national-gendarmerie/> (18/05/2020).

<sup>20</sup> Derek Lutterbeck. (2004). 'Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries.' *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.39(1) (March 2004), p.48.

<sup>21</sup> Lutterbeck. (2004). 'Between Police and Military', p.49.

## **1.5 Roadmap Through the Research**

Chapter 2 defines key concepts in the police militarisation debate in the context of this work and the different aspects of militarisation. It then uses a constructivist lens to highlight how the creation of norms, values and assumptions can come about in police organisations. Finally, it outlines two aspects of the organisational cultures of the police that are important for this research; the organisations themselves and their responses to threats and disorder. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for this research, by first providing justification for the case study selected, that of the British and French police forces. Then the chapter outlines the research design, the methods used, and the sources used. Chapter 4 and 5 are the case studies of the British and French police forces. The chapters first engage with the traditions and historical experience with threats of the two police forces. Then they look at the organisational culture of the two police forces, through an empirical study on political demonstrations in the UK and France. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the findings of the testing of the theories and the empirical study. Then it outlines the implications of the research and concludes the results.

## Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework – The Role of Culture in Police Militarisation

### 2.1 Defining military culture, militarisation, and militarism

In order for this research to provide conceptual clarity on the role of culture in police militarisation, a number of key concepts need to be defined. With many different interpretations of these concepts this chapter begins by defining them in the context of this work. Military culture represents an integral part of the police militarisation debate. The effect that this culture and its values has on the police organisation and how it impacts officer behaviour and conduct is a leading factor in how police organisations deal with political demonstrations. Culture itself is defined as “the values, norms, and assumptions that guide human action.”<sup>22</sup> Military culture represents the influence norms, values and assumptions, that are commonplace in the military, influence and integrate into police organisations. This military culture can be seen in more rigid police training, increased professionalism, an ethos of hyper-masculinity and a mentality of extreme or exceptional situation preparedness. Before examining how culture effects the police organisation in the UK and France, it is important to lay out how culture and its effects play a role in police militarisation.

The police militarisation process is commonly defined as when the police organisation adopts the operation mode of a military or embraces military values and culture<sup>23</sup> or when they “increasingly adhere to militarism.”<sup>24</sup> This can be done in the “process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict.”<sup>25</sup> The distinction is made between militarism and militarisation, with “militarisation denoting the capacity to wage war, and militarism the mental and cultural willingness to embark on it.”<sup>26</sup> The issue, stated by Wilson, of simply being linked to anything to do with military institutions and warfare in general, he describes the term militarism as “a highly problematic and ill-defined term”<sup>27</sup> This research examines militarism in the context of the affect it has on how the police solve problems, by shifting police mentality and their system of beliefs and values. This system

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<sup>22</sup> Peter H. Wilson. (2008). ‘Defining Military Culture’, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 72(1), January 2008, p.13.

<sup>23</sup> Lieblich and Shinar. (2018). ‘The Case Against Police Militarization’, p.109.

<sup>24</sup> Edward Eugene Lawson, Jr. (2019). ‘Causes and Consequences of Police Militarization’, (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from <https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5152>, p.6.

<sup>25</sup> Kraska (2007). ‘Militarization and Policing’, p.503.

<sup>26</sup> Wilson. (2008). ‘Defining Military Culture’, p.40.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p.39.

of beliefs and values “emphasize the use of force as an effective, acceptable, and desirable way to solve problems.”<sup>28</sup> This has a concrete impact on police mentality and organisation on the ground during political demonstrations but also represents the symbolic effect and cultural message<sup>29</sup> that police militarisation projects to the public.

## 2.2 Aspects of militarisation: Material, organizational, operational, cultural

As mentioned in the first chapter, police militarisation can be examined not as a new phenomenon but as a degree to which the police become militarised or as a modern increase in militarisation. The focus is then not on police militarisation itself but on the “extent to which a civilian police body is militarised.”<sup>30</sup> This has been developed by Kraska as four aspects of militarisation; material, cultural, organisational and operational<sup>31</sup> and the extent, ranging from low to high militarisation (see Appendix A), that they influence police militarisation. These aspects and the extent to which they are militarised can display how militarisation has the potential to penetrate multiple layers of the police organisation and thoroughly impact the actions of its officers.

The material aspect generally focuses on the types of weapons, equipment, technology and military attire that is used by the police. This translates in the context of political demonstrations in the use of riot gear, guns, batons, pepper spray and Tasers, while also encompassing things like armoured vehicles, water cannons and stun grenades. The impact this weaponry has on increasing the likelihood of serious injuries, particularly to any region of the head<sup>32</sup>, is one of the major concerns in police conduct during political demonstrations. The cultural aspect of militarisation examines the type of language, style, appearance, beliefs, and values of the police. This can be seen in the inclusion of war discourse in police activities, how police units in heavily militarised gear are perceived, and the shift of the psychological mentality of officers towards potentially more violent problem-solving tools. There is also a perception that by wearing attire that is increasingly resembling the military and presenting a

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<sup>28</sup> Lawson, Jr. (2019). ‘Causes and Consequences of Police Militarization’, p.6.

<sup>29</sup> Lieblich and Shinar. (2018). ‘The Case Against Police Militarization’, p.110.

<sup>30</sup> Kraska (2007). ‘Militarization and Policing’, p.503.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.503.

<sup>32</sup> One of the most recent incidents from the George Floyd protests. Paul Walsh. (16 June 2020). ‘Photographer amid Minneapolis unrest sues, says officers blinded her in eye with nonlethal shot’, *Star Tribune*, <https://www.startribune.com/photographer-sues-says-officers-blinded-her-in-eye-with-nonlethal-shot-during-mpls-unrest/571266322/> (22/06/2020).

more militarised appearance the police are creating an atmosphere to the public that extreme violence may be used.<sup>33</sup>

The organisational aspect focuses on the way police organise themselves. This is seen in terms of a rigid command-and-control hierarchy<sup>34</sup>, the communication of commands and orders, and special units, such as SWAT or riot control forces. These command structures and special unit operations patterned around the military model, change the traditional view of the police. As stated by Kraska “these units operate in patrolling high-crime areas (as opposed to the traditional officer on the beat).”<sup>35</sup> The operational aspect focuses on the activity of the police that is modelled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence (cameras, radar, sonar), supervision and handling high-risk situations.<sup>36</sup> A more militarised emphasis in police operations can lead to a normalisation of actions that were traditional reserved for more exceptional circumstances and heighten and influence the perception of threat to be encountered. Overall, how military language is used, the impact of military grade weapons or equipment and military influenced tactics and patterns of police action greatly affects how police deal with political demonstrations. Police militarisation is having a profound influence on police organisations and the degree to which the police are allowed to militarise greatly impacts their conduct and tactics during political demonstrations.

### **2.3 A Constructivist Approach: Norms, values and identity**

Traditions created in the early establishment of police organisation around its association with the military and the state, along with historical experiences of dealing with threats or situations of trouble or disorder have helped construct certain cultures in the police. This can be seen in norms, values and identities promoted by the state’s creation of their police forces and their experience with threats and disorder, such as terrorism, riot control and political demonstrations. In order to fully understand the influence these traditions and experiences have on the police organisation it is important to look at their origins and their impact on the police organisation. A constructivist theory framework can help examine the

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<sup>33</sup> Liebllich and Shinar. (2018). ‘The Case Against Police Militarization’, p.113.

<sup>34</sup> Norm Stamper. (2011). ‘Paramilitary Policing From Seattle to Occupy Wall Street’, *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/paramilitary-policing-seattle-occupy-wall-street/> (26/06/2020)

<sup>35</sup> Kraska (2007). ‘Militarization and Policing’, p.503.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p.503.

social construction and continued interaction of created norms, values and assumptions on police organisations.

Socially constructed norms, values and assumptions evolve from the traditional interaction of the police with the military and the state and how this is perceived by the people. This plays a large role in the creation of a certain identity associated with the police and the public perception of what a more militarised police would do to this identity. Social norms can be defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.”<sup>37</sup> This is important in the context of police militarisation as “states that conform to a certain identity are expected to comply with the norms that are associated with that identity.”<sup>38</sup> This ties into the constructivist emphasis that “norms not only constrain behaviour; they also constitute the identities of the actors.”<sup>39</sup> One of the major cases against police militarisation emphasises the impact of this by stating that “the real problem with police militarization is not that it brings about more violence or abuse of authority – though that may very well happen – but that it is based on a presumption of the citizen as a threat, while the liberal order is based on precisely the opposite presumption.”<sup>40</sup> The two identifiable norms are; regulatory norms that focus on the standards of appropriate behaviour and constitutive norms that aim at defining the identities of the actors.<sup>41</sup> These norms and identities can impact the social interaction between police and those involved in political demonstrations, as “some kinds of behaviour and action are more acceptable than others.”<sup>42</sup> This can influence what the public perceives are the police’s obligations during demonstrations and links to the certain identity in which the police are supposed to represent.

Certain values within the police organisations, such as strict adherence to rules and procedures and the following the directions of superiors, can create a dilemma for officers on the ground, as following procedures may conflict with the identity and the appropriate standard of behaviour expected of them. This dilemma links into the logic of appropriateness where

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<sup>37</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Columbia University Press, New York, p.5.

<sup>38</sup> Sarina Theys. (2018). ‘Constructivism’, in McGlinchey, Walters & Scheinpflug (ed.), *International Relations Theory*. E-International Relations Publishing, Bristol, England, p.38.

<sup>39</sup> K.M. Fierke. (2010). ‘Constructivism’, in Dunne, Kurki & Smith (ed.), *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity 2nd ed.* Oxford, New York, p.181.

<sup>40</sup> Lieblich and Shinar. (2018). ‘The Case Against Police Militarization’, p.105.

<sup>41</sup> Frank Foley. (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p.52.

<sup>42</sup> Theys. (2018). ‘Constructivism’, p.38.

“actions are seen as rule based.”<sup>43</sup> Police action during demonstrations is supposed to work in tandem with an identity or role that the police are trying to evoke and match their obligations to that identity or role to a specific situation.<sup>44</sup> This social relationship between the police and its citizens and the appropriate behaviour of officers when interacting with its citizens, can have an intersubjective understanding, where both have shared ideas and beliefs about their roles.<sup>45</sup> These roles are constantly being restructured by the police experiences with threats, ‘trouble’ or disorder. These experiences can be traditional external security threats, such as terrorism, that have become more and more internalised or internal threats such as crime, drug trafficking and violent disorder. This role concept can also be very important when discussing the lawfulness of protests, the rights of the protesters and the obligations of the police to facilitate the protest. A more militarised police force can enhance the security dilemma where the worst-case assumptions are made by both sides about the other.<sup>46</sup> Whether the structure of this social relationship, presented by Wendt, is changed or reinforced is down to the social interaction between the police and the citizens. A constructivist analysis will allow this research to theorise how norms, values and identities constructed through police traditions with the military and their experiences with threats, impact how the police organisation deals with political demonstrations.

## 2.4 Organisational culture: Organisation and responses

In order to investigate how the created norms, values and identities within the police impact how they deal with political demonstrations, the organisational culture of the police needs to be examined. Matthew Giblin’s work on *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations* provides the basis for outlining the organisational structure of the police. He states; “individuals working in an organization (patrol officers) operate within a larger context, influenced by their group assignments (the patrol unit) the organization as a whole (the police department), and everything outside of it (the environment).”<sup>47</sup> This influence on individuals

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<sup>43</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. (1998). ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.’ *International Organization*, Autumn, 1998, Vol.52(4), International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), p.951.

<sup>44</sup> March and Olsen. (1998). ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, p.951.

<sup>45</sup> Alexander Wendt. (1995). ‘Constructing International Politics’, *International Security*, Summer, 1995, Vol.20(1) (Summer, 1995), p.73.

<sup>46</sup> Wendt. (1995). ‘Constructing International Politics’, p.73.

<sup>47</sup> Matthew J. Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*. SAGE Publications, Inc. Thousand Oaks, p.6.

within the organisational culture of the police will be examined through two distinct features; the police organisation itself and the way in which the police organisation responds to threats and disorder.

### 2.4.1 Organisation

In order to understand how the police and its officers deal with political demonstrations, it is important to understand the police organisation itself, how they approach and achieve their goals, and how they solve potential problems they are confronted with when trying to maintain public order. As said by Giblin “we cannot truly understand policing in the United States and elsewhere without understanding police organizations and their influence on the individuals within them.”<sup>48</sup> Traditions and past experiences with both political demonstrations and internal threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking or hooliganism, shapes the culture within the police and they will confront new problems. Organisations themselves are “formed by and composed of people, either individually or in groups, who collectively try to achieve some common purpose.”<sup>49</sup> Achieving certain goals or a common purpose can provide extremely problematic for police organisations as they are constantly dealing with a changing social interaction with the public and conflicts of achieving their goals against the standards they are held to by that public. One of the central characteristics of an organisation is the creation of a stable and predictable environment that allows the organisation “to deal in a coordinated way with their environments.”<sup>50</sup> As mentioned by Giblin this bureaucratic form of organisation may be the most efficient in performing routine tasks in a predictable environment but if an unexpected situation occurs like political demonstrations “the organization may be ill equipped to adapt.”<sup>51</sup> This creates issues within police routines as officers tend follow procedures and rules that may create conflict with the overall goal of the activity or the expectations of society placed on the officers.<sup>52</sup> These routines also give the potential to understand changes taking place within the organisation. As routines can be stable and predictable then any move away from this will “provide a contrast required to detect novelty.”<sup>53</sup> These routines can exemplify how police

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<sup>48</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.1.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>50</sup> James March and Herbert Simon. (1993). *Organizations*. Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.23.

<sup>51</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.54.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p.55.

<sup>53</sup> Markus C. Becker. (2004). ‘Organizational routines: a review of the literature’, *Industrial and Corporate Change*, Vol.13(4), p.649.



behaviour and any changes in that behaviour can be explained in the context of political demonstrations.

### 2.4.2 Responses

How police respond to the challenges that mass demonstrations provide and how they respond to potential misconduct of officers or general complaints against police tactics is an important way to understand the culture within that police organisation. During political demonstrations the police attempt to balance the rights of the demonstrators, such as the right to freedom of assembly, while protecting and minimising the disruption to public or business life or the creation of unsafe environments, for example the blocking of roads or congregating in busy areas. Factors such as, how the demonstration is legally defined, the communication network between police and the organisers, and the general orders given to officers and orders in the event of disruption the police can influence the obligation placed on the police. Other factors such as, the media and police rhetoric towards the demonstrations can also shape the justification of the police response. For the police organisation and its officers, they must attempt to “balance crime control goals against the need to police populations and communities fairly (bias free) while observing individual rights.”<sup>54</sup> In the aftermath of the demonstrations many of the issues with the police response can be highlight. This can be in the rhetoric of the police and media on the events or the public outrage and legal ramifications of inappropriate police conduct and behaviour. Other aspects such as investigations into police tactics and the passing of legislation or amendments to previous legislation on demonstrations and police operations, can highlight police response. These responses within the police organisation can impact and be impacted by the organisational cultures of the police and its relationship with the legal system and the political system of that country.

As the police organisation adopts more military culture and values, they penetrates into the ethos of the organisation and impact the common beliefs and standard practices of the organisation.<sup>55</sup> Police organisations adhering to a more military model can be characterised by the strict hierarchical command structure, subordination to commanders, strict professionalism and discipline. It can also influence how orders are received and followed and how the police and its officers problem solve. As mentioned, when defining the concept of militarism, by

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<sup>54</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.9.

<sup>55</sup> March and Simon. (1993). *Organizations.*, p.2.

relying on the use of force and the threat of violence as standard effective and appropriate problem-solving tools, the police come in conflict with role and identity they are held to by the general public. The organisational structure of the police organisation, the policies and procedures they use to achieve their goals and how they deal with problem-solving, reflects not their actual efficiency and effectiveness but the expectations of the broader environment or put simply, what the organisation should do.<sup>56</sup> By using organisational theory, to examine the police organisation, their routines, patterns and their responses to threats or disorder (in this instance political demonstrations) we can “understand why organizations look the way they do or engage in certain activities.”<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.72.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p.2.

## **Chapter 3 Methodology – Case Study: The British and French police organisations**

### **3.1 Case Study: The UK and France**

This research is a case study of the British and French police organisations and how they deal with political demonstrations. The case study method used in this research is one as defined by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett as not creating a distinction between a comparative method, of using comparisons over a small number of cases and a case study method, of using the examination of a single case but instead using a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons.<sup>58</sup> Both the British and France police organisations and the empirical study of how they deal with political demonstrations can be examined within their own case and as a comparison between the two. From a constructivist and organisational theory perspective observable implications can be made of the culture in the police organisations and the extent to which military culture and values have impacted them. The definition of a case presented by George and Bennett is one of a class of events that are studied with the aim of “developing theory regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events.”<sup>59</sup> The similarities and differences around how the British and French police deal with political demonstrations can be examined in this context, while examining how this also represents the militarisation taking place within these police organisations.

### **3.2 Case selection: Justification for the case study**

The justification for choosing the British and French police forces for this research was based on a number of reasons. The case selection began from trying to find states broadly comparable to the USA and Canada. This was down to the large amount of literature on the US and to a lesser degree Canada and the impact they have on the police militarisation debate. This case study was an attempt to analysis how different countries of comparable characteristics can have different responses to dealing with political demonstrations. The UK and France both

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<sup>58</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.24.

<sup>59</sup> George and Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, p.24.

share the status of being Western liberal democracies and have at times shared similar security concerns and goals with that of the US. But by using a comparable example outside of the US and Canada, this research hoped to expand the knowledge on police militarisation and bridge the gap in how militarisation occurs and develops in other states.

Britain and France were chosen as the two states based partly on both these countries having “broadly comparable police, intelligence and military resources at their disposal.”<sup>60</sup> Along with being Western European liberal democracies that espouse these values, these two factors give an overall general comparable case study to examine. Further comparisons can be drawn with the threats that confronted these two states (historical and modern confrontation with terrorism and public disorder) and the political demonstrations that their police organisations have had to deal with (global movements like the G20 protests, occupy protests, anti-capitalist/globalisation protests and domestic issues like, tax and fuel protests). The countries have seen these political demonstrations encompass a comparable range of causes such as; social and economic inequality, climate change, anti-war, and police violence. Protests against police violence have on many occasions come after some of these larger scaled protests and these have been focused on how the police conducted themselves during the protests.

While exhibiting overall similarities, in terms of specific characteristics both the UK and France exhibit largely different cultures. Both have fostered different traditions around their police force and its relationship with the military in different historical circumstances. In more recent times they have both dealt with, at times, similar and different threats from terrorism and responded in different ways.<sup>61</sup> Other factors such as, their history with riot control, hooliganism, and crime have taken different paths and played a part in different organisational cultures within their police organisations. Finally, the relationship between the police, the legal system and the political apparatus of these states display contrasting interactions which have shaped how they deal with and respond to political demonstrations. An examination of these countries through their own historical circumstances, and not just through the American militarisation lens, will give a better understanding to how traditions, norms and assumptions can impact police organisation and police militarisation.

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<sup>60</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.1.

<sup>61</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.4.

### 3.3 Research design

As has been laid out in the previous chapter, this research encompasses a process by which the traditions that have been created in the UK and France, through the traditional relationship of the police with the military and the historical experiences with threat management has created certain norms, values and assumptions in their police organisations. By using a constructivist approach the social construction of certain cultures within the police can be tested by examining the creation of a certain identity around the police, the social norms of behaviour expected of the police and its officers, the roles and perceptions that have been created through the social relationship between the police and public and the assumptions about the appropriate behaviour and obligations expected of the police.

After testing how these traditions have impacted the norms, values and assumptions of the police and impacted the institution of policing, an examination of the police organisations through their organisation and responses can shed light on how military culture actually impacts the police structure, its units, and its individual officers. This can be seen in the organisational structure of the police (communication, hierarchy, discipline measures) the role concepts within the police organisation (or simply in dealing with the public), their organisational routines, and how they respond to threats (in this case political demonstrations). This can also be seen in how the police deal with other institutions or their own agencies (judiciary, special units).

By using these two theoretical structures an empirical study into political demonstrations in the UK and France can be examined. By looking at first what norms, values and assumptions around military culture in the police organisations are present and potentially how they are being challenged. Then an attempt to examine police organisation and response to political demonstrations through the tactics and equipment they use (how they are viewed, what is the response of the public/media to these tactics and equipment) and the discourse that surrounds the police conduct during the political demonstrations. The focus is not just what happens during the demonstrations but also what happens after the demonstrations – inquiries into police conduct, disciplining, policy change and legislation passed.

### 3.4 Method

By choosing a case study this work attempts to achieve high levels of conceptual validity or to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the constructivist and organisational theory concepts of this research.<sup>62</sup> This can help measure the impact of military culture has on the police organisation and how it effects how police deal with political demonstrations. Due to the difficulty of defining what variables lead to a more militarised police force, measuring the integration of more military culture or values can be difficult to examine. By placing the examples of the British and French police forces in a contextual comparison of the wider police militarisation debate, this work can attempt to address the issues of equivalence. The case study will allow comparisons to made within the cases in the UK and France and between the two countries. This allows for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a small number of cases.<sup>63</sup> This is done by identifying relevant variables, focusing on deviant cases and further refining concepts.

The study attempted to use identities and experiences from the past to help explain complex causal relations such as equifinality and complex interaction effects<sup>64</sup> in modern political demonstrations. These identities and norms created around the establishment of the modern police organisations in the UK and France and the evolution of certain values from historical experiences with threats and disorder provide a basis for police organisation and response to modern political demonstrations. These were measured through the principles and standards that have been established for policing and the impact these historical experiences had on policies, legislation and the creation of certain rhetoric around threats. This also impact how the use of weaponry, equipment and tactics during political demonstrations is perceived by the general public. These norms, identities and values can help explain certain variables such as, the issues of goal conflict during political demonstrations and the social interaction between officers and demonstrators.

In order for this study to complete the operationalisation of relevant variables it is important to clarify the elements of political demonstrations and police organisational culture that will be examined. As this research is based around police conduct during political

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<sup>62</sup> George and Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, p.26.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p.26.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p.29.

demonstrations, the term political demonstration is used here to emphasis mass demonstrations of people championing a political cause or protesting for a certain cause or against a matter for concern. This is to discern it from individual protests or public expressions of disapproval on a smaller scale. The case study focused on deviant cases in the shape of examining political demonstrations that saw large-scale criticism of police conduct or tactics, usually from the use of extreme force or violence. The research is by no means ignoring the large amount of political demonstrations that pass by peacefully or suggesting the police do not attempt to accommodate demonstrations at times. By looking at the causal mechanisms that lead to these outcomes the study can inductively observe unexpected aspects of the particular casual mechanisms or identify the conditions present that activate the causal mechanisms.<sup>65</sup> This can be from the challenges presented to the police in organising, how the police went about achieving their security goals and their behaviour and conduct in solving problems during political demonstrations. These challenges are balanced against the standards the officers are held to and their obligations in facilitating the rights of the demonstrators. By looking at the different cultures within the British and France police forces, this can help explain the different responses to political demonstrations in these cases.

The research further narrows the focus by examining large demonstrations in the urban areas of the UK and France that have a high amount of scrutiny and require a large amount of resources and manpower from the police. For this reason, the research examined the Metropolitan Police organisation in the UK and the two major national police forces in France, the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie Nationale. They were examined in the context in which they were established, the environment they evolved in and the socially constructed norms, values and assumptions that came from this. The focus on the Metropolitan Police model excludes the police forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland, as Scotland has a separate and distinct legal system<sup>66</sup> and Northern Ireland presents an entirely different case closer to a gendarmerie styled police. In France the Police Nationale are tasked with the policing of the urban cities and the Gendarmerie Nationale with the suburban and rural areas. Although the Gendarmerie Nationale are not tasked with urban policing they represent the militarised police force and along with the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), a branch of the Police Nationale, are routinely involved in dealing with demonstrations across the country.

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<sup>65</sup> George and Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, p.28.

<sup>66</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.70.

In order to tie into the modern debate on the increased police militarisation and political demonstrations, the multiple protests that took place around the 2009 G20 Summit in London in 2009 and the Yellow Vest demonstrations in 2018 and 2019 were selected. This allowed the research to encompass, the beginning of what is seen as an important rise in demonstrations in the UK since the early 2010s<sup>67</sup> (see Appendix B) and the culmination the media labelled ‘War on Protest’ in France.<sup>68</sup> There are a number of other large demonstrations that took place during this period, but these cases represented incidents where the police faced major difficulties in their organisation and response and received a large amount of criticism and inquiry into the behaviour of their officers. This modern emphasis was an attempt to use a historical base and a cultural narrative to examine current issues with police militarisation.

### 3.5 Sources

The context in which the modern police forces, the Metropolitan Police, the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie Nationale were established and the environment in which they evolved in, can be examined through the historical literature sources on their foundation. Police doctrine or legislation that was drawn up at their establishment can also provide a source to understanding the norms and identity the police forces that were created. Literature on the historical experiences of these police forces with threats and disorder and an examination of sources that emphasis policy changes can provide further evidence of norms and values created in these police organisations. In order to overcome the inability to comprehend French sources, comparative studies between the British and French police organisations and their histories with threats were used, as well as, some English written sources on French police and historical experiences.

The rich amount of data available on the G20 Summit in London in 2009, allowed a precise timeline of the events of the demonstrations over the two days of protests. A deep analysis of how the Metropolitan Police organised themselves and responded to the challenges in London was achieved through the full independent and government inquiries into the police organisation and detailed lists of the complaints against the police and extensive media

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<sup>67</sup> David J. Bailey. (3 January 2020). ‘Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it’s likely to continue’, *The Conversation*, <https://theconversation.com/decade-of-dissent-how-protest-is-shaking-the-uk-and-why-its-likely-to-continue-125843> (28/06/2020).

<sup>68</sup> Peter Matjasic. (12 July 2019). ‘France’s War on Protest’, *Open Society Foundations*, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/frances-war-on-protest> (28/06/2020).



coverage of police tactics and conduct. The Yellow Vest Movement in France in 2018 and 2019 provided a more difficult analysis with its recent timeframe and more limited English sources. The large amount of international and English-sourced French media attention and the growth of the movement to other countries allowed a more general analysis of the events and a sense of the public feeling in France. The recent nature of the events allowed for an analysis of the current state of protesting and the issues of policing.

## Chapter 4 Political Demonstrations in the UK: G20 London 2009

### 4.1 Traditions: The English Bobby!

Since the establishment of the Metropolitan Police force (known as the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) today) in 1829, British policing has attempted to create a model distant from its military counterpart and to foster an identity of its officers as non-military, unarmed, and non-political.<sup>69</sup> Although there are challenges and exceptions to these implications they have developed a social identity around the British policing model as non-military and its officers as unarmed and more cooperative with the people. This model became the centralised English police force after a number of police reforms looked to create uniformity in the police organisation and to centralise the independent power of the counties and boroughs to that of the Home Office. By the time of the Police Act of 1964 this had all but been achieved as the central government increasingly dealt directly with chief constables instead of the local governments and there was an increased uniformity in police service and training.<sup>70</sup>

From its foundation the Metropolitan Police have attempted to create an identity distant from the military. This can be seen in the adoption of blue uniforms over the red uniforms of the military and its initial move to arm its officers with batons or truncheons instead of firearms.<sup>71</sup> One of the core distinctions of British policing is the distinct identity of policing by consent. The first of these principals is “to prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment”<sup>72</sup> and expresses this distancing from the military. Sir Robert Peel, credited with beginning the reform, knew the decision to establish the force had been unpopular and therefore if it was to be successful “must rely on public co-operation and goodwill.”<sup>73</sup> Although his involvement is debated<sup>74</sup>, the principals, known as Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing championed such things as the restraint on the use of force, maintaining the respect of the public and securing the willing

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<sup>69</sup> Clive Emsley. (1996). *The English Police: A Political and Social History (2nd ed.)*. Pearson Education Limited. Essex, England, p.248.

<sup>70</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.250.

<sup>71</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.50.

<sup>72</sup> Home Office. (10 December 2012). ‘Definition of policing by consent’, *GOV.UK*,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent> (23/06/2020).

<sup>73</sup> T.A. Critchley. (1967). *A History of Police in England and Wales 900-1966*. Constable and Company Ltd. London, p.52.

<sup>74</sup> Stated there is no evidence of any link to Robert Peel. Home Office. (10 December 2012). ‘Definition of policing by consent’

cooperation of the public. These principles emphasize the need for a social relationship between the police and the public and the need for the police to maintain the trust of the general public.

The military nature of the police was still apparent within the police organisation, as it was still representative of a strict hierarchical institution, with strict discipline, an emphasis on a smart appearance and many commander officers being former soldiers or from colonial gendarmerie style police forces.<sup>75</sup> They also implemented certain military attributes such as, “military-style rank designations, coercive authority, and military-trained personnel (one of London’s first police commissioners was a retired colonel).”<sup>76</sup> Even with this, there was a fostering of suspicion of any military involvement in civic duties. This created a cultural identity around the British police of being distant from the military and dependent on the consent and cooperation of the public.

## **4.2 Historical experiences: Threats and disorder**

### **4.2.1 Maintaining Public Order**

After the experiences of Oliver Cromwell, the British nobility were very sceptical of standing armies and the central government tended to only use its troops in emergency situations and basically left local magistrates to their own policing.<sup>77</sup> This set a precedent of the military only being used in exceptional circumstances. Indeed the transfer of responsibility of maintaining public order from the police to the military signalled a desire, since the Peterloo massacre in 1819 that any suppression of ‘the mob’ should not be overtly bloody.<sup>78</sup> The historical environment in which the Metropolitan Police evolved in help facilitate this desire, as the early establishment of the English nation state led to the fostering of a belief in the ‘freeborn English’.<sup>79</sup> England escaping the revolutions of 19<sup>th</sup> century continental Europe, was also a source of pride for the English model and the Metropolitan Police.<sup>80</sup> Some of these norms and values were challenged by certain experiences with disorder such as, the race riots in the

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<sup>75</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.254.

<sup>76</sup> Giblin. (2017). *Leadership and Management in Police Organizations*, p.50.

<sup>77</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.253.

<sup>78</sup> P.A.J. Waddington. (1994). ‘Coercion and Accommodation: Policing Public Order after the Public Order Act’, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.45(3) (Sep., 1994), p.367.

<sup>79</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.253.

<sup>80</sup> Philip Rawlings. (2002). *Policing: A Short History*. Willan Publishing, Devon, p.162.

1950s, anti-Vietnam and student unrest in the 1960s and inner city riots in the 1980s.<sup>81</sup> These events led to the passing of the Public Order Act in 1986, which was seen as giving the police more statutory powers, and along with more advanced riot-control technology and training, “led many civil libertarians to fear for the health of democracy, especially freedom of speech and dissent.”<sup>82</sup> Although even more modern incidents of disorder continue to challenge these British norms and values, current incidents of maintaining public order most likely lie somewhere between, what Peter Waddington describes as the competing police roles of coercion and accommodation.<sup>83</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Threats: The IRA, Hungerford Massacre and AFOs

Although the principles created around the identity of the British police excluded military involvement and emphasised gaining the consent and cooperation of the public, police experiences with threats such as terrorism, riot control and maintaining public order challenged this. The identity of the non-military, unarmed, English policeman focused on the positive social interaction with the communities. Unlike Northern Ireland where police were routinely armed, the Metropolitan officers, with some few exceptions, rarely carried firearms. Even after World War II and the growing IRA terrorist threats from the 1970s to the 1990s, where firearms were more widely carried, the Home Office “remained very wary of arming the police.”<sup>84</sup> From the 1970s to the late 1990s, terrorist attacks, mostly incidents perpetrated by the IRA and the Lockerbie plane bombing in Scotland, led to 395 deaths from various acts of terrorism in mainland Britain.<sup>85</sup> Other incidents like the shooting of police officers and the Hungerford massacre of 1987, challenged the British police identity and led to some calls for arming the police.<sup>86</sup> There was also incidents of the shooting of civilians by officers, such as the case of Stephen Waldorf, who was shot by police in January 1983 after being mistaken for a known criminal, that led to calls against arming the police.<sup>87</sup> With these events a carefully selected unit of authorised firearms officers (AFOs) were trained in the use of a variety of weapons, although a largely negative response to questionnaires taken by police officers about the need for arms and with both politicians and senior officers determined to retain the unarmed ‘Bobby’,

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<sup>81</sup> A.T.H. Smith. (1987). *Offences Against Public Order: Including the Public Order Act 1986*. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, p.21.

<sup>82</sup> Waddington. (1994). ‘Coercion and Accommodation’, p.368.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, p.368.

<sup>84</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.256.

<sup>85</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.19.

<sup>86</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.256.

<sup>87</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.256.

firearms remained only for AFOs.<sup>88</sup> Although there was a slow evolution of more forceful weaponry in the police organisation, the use of lethal weapons or weapons that can cause serious injury remained, in most circumstances, largely unaccepted.

#### **4.2.2 Modern Threat: Islamist Threat**

The increase in the threat of Islamist terrorist attacks in the UK grew after the September 11 attacks in the US. Although Britain had become a focal point for terrorist network activities in the 1990s, there were no Islamist attacks in the UK from 1995 to 2001, and little evidence of any plots to that effect.<sup>89</sup> After 2001, the threat level from Islamist terrorists grew although the threat was now centred around ‘home-grown’ British radicals, who between 1999 and 2009 accounted for almost 70 per cent of offences committed.<sup>90</sup> Attempts from this time to alter British norms such as the standard judicial process and no imprisonment without trial were met with a large amount of resistance. During this time the government attempted to “circumvent the ordinary judicial system by introducing control orders and other administrative powers.”<sup>91</sup> This was faced with considerable opposition as there has always been an attempt to keep the judicial system independent from the police. This has created a system that has helped “to maintain checks and balances and the legitimacy of the justice system.”<sup>92</sup> The rise in home-grown terrorism and terrorist attacks in Britain since the early 2000s may have facilitated a normalisation around a more militarised police force, but traditions of the identity of the non-military, unarmed police officer persist.

### **4.3 G20 Summit London: Police Organisation and Response**

#### **4.3.1 Police Organisation: Operation Glencoe**

On April 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> 2009 six police forces, led by the MPS, took part in the £7.5 million G20 security plan in London. The security of the G20 Summit was given the title Operation Glencoe and the goal was to “deliver a safe and secure environment for the G20 summit”<sup>93</sup> at

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p.256.

<sup>89</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.28.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, p.29.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>93</sup> Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). ‘Adapting to Protest’, *Criminal Justice Inspectorates*, <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf>, p.3.

the ExCel Centre in London. The police had organised the command structure of the operation around the Gold (strategic) commander, the Silver (tactical) commander, and the Bronze (operational) commander.<sup>94</sup> The Gold commander was to set the tone for the operations and the strategy identified eleven objectives for Operation Glencoe (See Appendix D). These included “facilitating lawful protest”, “provide a safe environment for participants, public and staff” and “preserve public order and minimise opportunity to commit crime, and take proportionate steps to deal appropriately with offenders if crime is committed.”<sup>95</sup> While the security plan focused on the security of the world leaders meeting at the ExCel Centre, it also had to facilitate the ten protests taking place across seven different sites in London, while minimising the disruption to public and business life and any destruction to the city. These protests included the Financial Fools and Fossil Fools demonstrations, Climate Camp, the Stop the War march and rally, and the G20 Meltdown (also known as the Bank of England protest). The police successfully engaged with many of the groups but “engagement between police and some protest groups prior to the event was difficult.”<sup>96</sup> The Met organised the deployment of in excess of 5,500 officers on April 1<sup>st</sup> and 2,800 on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, under a terrorist threat level ‘Severe’ and as a response to three eventualities; security, notified protest and disorder.<sup>97</sup> The organisation, the achievement of their goals and the solving of potential problems deemed the operation a success through a number of factors. The preparation for the summit was done in three months (on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December 2008 the were MPS asked to plan for the summit), with the large number of protestors (35,000) there was minimum damage to the City, and “aside from a few highprofile incidents, the policing of the G20 Protests passed without drama.”<sup>98</sup> Although labelled as an operational success the number of ‘high-profiled’ incidents led to a massive inquiry and public debate into the conduct and tactics of the MPS.

### **4.3.2 The Inquiry into the Police Response**

The major high-profiled incident that created such an investigation into the police conduct during the G20 Summit was the death of Ian Tomlinson. Tomlinson, a street vendor walking home from work was struck by a baton and pushed to the ground by a police officer. After getting up and walking further down the street, Tomlinson collapsed and died. This death

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid, p.37.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, p.38.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p.9.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p.4.

<sup>98</sup> House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee. (2009). *Policing of the G20 Protests Eighth Report of Session 2008–09*. The Stationary Office Limited, London, p.2.

spearheaded inquiries into the events of the G20 Summit. After a City of London investigation initially attributing the death to natural causes, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) appointed its own independent investigators to launch a criminal investigation into his death. This was after media footage was released of the incident and also identified City of London officers near the officer who pushed Tomlinson.<sup>99</sup> The MPS then requested Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), a public authority susceptible to judicial review and responsible to the UK Parliament, to conduct an independent study into the events of the G20 Summit. This along with a report by the House of Commons, observations from a group of parliamentarians that attended the protest and the 80 individual filed Direct and Control (D&C) Complaints to the IPCC against the police provided a large body of observation on police conduct and tactics during the demonstrations. There were a number of other issues raised in the aftermath of the G20 demonstrations such as, the police and media relations, the identification of officers and the communication between demonstration organisers and the police. But the two major issues centred around the use of containment and excessive use of force by officers.

There was a large amount of allegations of excessive use of force by the MPS in dealing with the demonstrations surrounding the G20. There was allegations of excessive force by individual officers like the incident of Ian Tomlinson and another very public case of Nicola Fisher, who was slapped by the backhand of Sgt Delroy Smellie before being struck by an extendable metal baton.<sup>100</sup> There were also inquiries into the tactics used by the MPS, the containment method of 'kettling', dispersal techniques and distraction techniques (unarmed skills such as using, the fist, elbow, palm, or heel palm and the use of batons). These tactics were endorsed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) manual 'Keeping the Peace' but were seen as excessive by the public. The ACPO manual itself was cited by the HMIC as having "very limited attention to policing protests" and also stated "in instances where there is no notice or discussion with the police beforehand, no organised stewards controlling it and is disruptive, the police are left to arbitrate and deal with the consequences and impact on the general public as best they can."<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Vikram Dodd. (8 April 2009). 'Ian Tomlinson death: IPCC takes over inquiry from G20 protests police force', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/apr/08/ian-tomlinson-video-inquiry-ipcc> (26/06/2020).

<sup>100</sup> BBC News. (17 June 2010). 'IPCC clears G20 protest sergeant Delroy Smellie', *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/10340798> (26/06/2020).

<sup>101</sup> Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). 'Adapting to Protest', p.7.

### 4.3.3 Coercion vs Accommodation: Bank of England protest

Two of the HMIC major concerns with the police organisation and response to the demonstrations were; the tailoring of the tactic of containment at the Bank of England and at Bishopsgate and the dispersal of peaceful protesters and the proportionality of the force used by police officers.<sup>102</sup> Tactics such as the use of ‘kettling’, filter cordons and prolonged containment drew heavy criticism from the public and the media and was linked to rising the tension of the demonstrations, unnecessarily at times. Throughout the demonstrations that took place during the G20 Summit, the Metropolitan Police had to balance the rights of the protesters against the safety of the general public, the protection of property, and the prevention of disruption. The City of London protests, of which the Bank of England protests was part of, were one of the first concerns of the HMIC and were also the site of the death of Ian Tomlinson. This was where the containment at the Bank of England was the result of the contain. This was part of the protest saw that filter cordons (teams of police officers forming lines to block protesters routines) and prolonged containment protesters. The police had underestimated the amount of protesters at this demonstration, as 4,000-5,000 people were too much for the police resources there and for the barricaded area that had been set up.<sup>103</sup> As tension and violence increase, the police were forced to implement full containment to “prevent a breach of peace and to prevent groups from the 4,000 protesters at the Bank of England causing disruption or disorder across the City of London.”<sup>104</sup> A small number of protesters smashed the windows and entered the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) during the protesters.<sup>105</sup> Officers and mounted police wearing full personal protective equipment (PPE) move in to remove the protesters. It was stated that none of the mounted police came into contact with any protester.<sup>106</sup> This and further issues with hostile protesters, led to a number of arrests and lead to calls by the police for further containment of the City of London protesters.

### 4.3.4 Coercion vs Accommodation: Climate Camp demonstration

The other event that came under intense scrutiny was the dispersal of the Climate Camp demonstration (at Bishopsgate) and the unproportionate use of force by police. The

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p.7.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p.50.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p.51.

<sup>105</sup> Sam Jones, Jenny Percival and Paul Lewis. (1 April 2009). ‘G20 protests: riot police clash with demonstrators’, *the Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/01/g20-summit-protests> (26/06/2020).

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p.51.



demonstration had been relatively peaceful and during the day the police were seen in “clad in high-visibility vests rather than riot gear.”<sup>107</sup> After waiting for the end to the containment of the City of London protests (the police feared the violent protesters at this protest would hijack the Climate camp protests and create further violence if they were allowed to mix)<sup>108</sup>, the police moved in, late at night, to disperse the Climate Camp. After claims of repeated warnings from the police<sup>109</sup> the protesters were forcibly removed. Here the police tactic of ‘kettling’ was highlighted as creating an aggressive atmosphere around a near complete peaceful demonstration (a “hard-core” group of 200 protesters supposedly joined the Climate Camp and some missiles were thrown).<sup>110</sup> The Climate Camp although a mostly peaceful protest for the entire day was quickly cordoned off by riot police around 7pm in the evening, causing alarm among the protesters.<sup>111</sup> By the time the crowd was being dispersed at 11:30pm the police had failed in two important areas of the proper use of containment, communication and allowing people to filter out.<sup>112</sup> Instead the use of shield strikes and baton charges lead to claims of unproportionate or excessive use of force by the police as they cleared out the camp. After the demonstrations, the early containment of the Climate Camp was deemed unlawful by the courts, as protesters also challenged the legality of the use of shield strikes by the police.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Dominic Casciani. (1 April 2009). ‘Eyewitness: Climate Camp in the City’, *BBC News*, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/7977863.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7977863.stm) (29/06/2020).

<sup>108</sup> Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). ‘Adapting to Protest’, p.52.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, p.53.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid*, p.52.

<sup>111</sup> Bibi van der Zee. (2 April 2009). ‘G20 Climate Camp anger simmers in the kettle’, *the Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2009/apr/02/g20-climate-camp-protest-london-police-bishopsgate> (26/06/2020).

<sup>112</sup> House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee. (2009). *Policing of the G20 Protests Eighth Report of Session 2008–09*, p.16.

<sup>113</sup> BBC News. (14 April 2011). ‘London G20 demo: Met Police ‘kettling’ not justified’, *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-13077619> (28/06/2020).

## Chapter 5 Political Demonstrations in France (2009-2019)

### 5.1 Traditions: Gendarmerie Nationale, Police Nationale and French identity

The French Revolution in 1789 created a complete overhaul of the French police system. The Revolution's ideals of liberty and equality under the law created a lasting impression on French identity and its conflict with the French state. Indeed the French Revolution and its values have continued to impact the identity of demonstrations in France to this day. Although the ideals of the Revolution shifted the emphasis on the role of talent and merit over birth in certain careers, "patronage and who a man knew remained important in the Paris police."<sup>114</sup> In the aftermath of the Revolution and the establishment of the Sûreté Nationale in 1812, the police of Paris, who were directly responsible to the central government, dealt with day-to-day policing and maintaining order and were also "required to watch and repress political activists and critics."<sup>115</sup> This represented a re-establishment of the centralised system and with the Law of 28 Pluviose Year VIII (7 February 1800) established the Prefect of Police.<sup>116</sup> The traditions of liberté, égalité and fraternité (liberty, equality and fraternity) are deep rooted in French society and look to the state "as the representative of the general will and common good."<sup>117</sup> But with the large amount of upheaval in Paris and the potential for government overthrow the police of Paris were identified as a hand of the state, with the goal of suppressing any political dissent. With this "open acknowledgment that the police were state agents made the government and ministers directly responsible for police actions and behaviour."<sup>118</sup> This relationship of the police with the government, would continue to place the police of Paris highly on the political agenda.<sup>119</sup> There was also a distant relationship between the police of Paris and the municipal police, as the municipalities were reluctant to "yield their independence in policing matters to the state."<sup>120</sup> A national police in France was not founded until the creation of the Police Nationale under the Vichy government in 1941. The instability of the French political system and the police traditions dealing with this turmoil has created an aggressive tradition of policing public disorder.

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<sup>114</sup> Clive Emsley. (1987). 'Policing the Streets of Nineteenth-Century Paris', *French History*, Vol.1(2), p.262.

<sup>115</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.251.

<sup>116</sup> Emsley. (1987). 'Policing the Streets of Nineteenth-Century Paris', p.258.

<sup>117</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.57.

<sup>118</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.251.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, p.251.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p.251.

France's tradition of military police, as has been mentioned, goes back to the Middle Ages. The current military police the Gendarmerie Nationale can trace its origins back to the Maréchasussée, established in 1720 and was seen as "an instrument of sovereign power and national consolidation."<sup>121</sup> "As late as the 19<sup>th</sup> century notions of 'Frenchness' were lacking among large numbers of peasants who lived in France"<sup>122</sup>, the Maréchasussée and later the Gendarmerie Nationale were tasked with consolidating the French countryside under the centralised government. It was initially set up as a military organisation because "it followed an inclination for strict codification and regulation of all administrations."<sup>123</sup> The Maréchasussée became the Gendarmerie Nationale in 1791 and although it continued its territorial structure and its military status it lost the judicial prerogative that the previous institution had.<sup>124</sup> The Gendarmerie Nationale was tasked with the policing of the countryside and its primary duties were to aid the civil power and it "was responsible to the Minister of War"<sup>125</sup> (from the 1950s this shifted to the Minister of Defence). The Gendarmerie Nationale of today "ensures public safety on 95 % of the national territory for 50 % of the population."<sup>126</sup> Although the historical context focused on the rural areas of France, the modern context doesn't represent such a distinction between rural and urban policing. The expansion of French cities and the fact that few rural areas are still economically independent from the larger metropolitan areas, means the current Gendarmerie Nationale are now trained in fitting urban environments also.<sup>127</sup>

## 5.2 Historical experiences: Disorder and Riot Control Units

French history, particularly since the French Revolution has seen political turmoil and the continued overthrow of the state after a loss of confidence from the people. This environment of political instability has guided the social interaction between the state, the police and its people. As was mentioned, the political instability seen in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century created a nervousness around French regimes over the fragile nature of their power and impact of the number of revolutions and événements in the capital had on

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<sup>121</sup> J.L. Hovens and G.A.G. van Elk (Eds.). (2011). *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Koninklijke Marechaussee, p.30.

<sup>122</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.253.

<sup>123</sup> Hovens and van Elk (Eds.). (2011). *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.30.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, p.30.

<sup>125</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.252.

<sup>126</sup> FIEP International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status. (N.A.) 'French National Gendarmerie.' *FIEP*. <http://www.fiep.org/member-forces/french-national-gendarmerie/> (18/05/2020).

<sup>127</sup> Hovens and van Elk (Eds.). (2011). *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p.34.

their position, created a vigilance and repression of political dissent.<sup>128</sup> France during the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the devastation of two world wars and occupation, as well as many riots and violence between the police and the public. Events such as the Champagne riots in 1910-1911, the anti-parliamentarist right-wing demonstration of 1934, the student riots of 1968 and numerous riots in the 1980s and 1990s connected to police violence, saw extreme violence and led to the creation of a number of special riot control units. The mobile Gendarmerie was created in 1921 and represented a 11,300 strong general reserve at the disposal of the Government was “responsible for maintaining public order, it is also shaped to respond to a wide range of missions, from policing events to restoring order.”<sup>129</sup> The Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), a special mobile French police force was created in 1944 and became part of the Police Nationale in 1966. Making up 20 per cent of the Police Nationale, the CRS had units stationed in Paris and the major cities and suburbs, tasked with maintaining public order. The CRS is seen as a highly mobile unit and is “used mainly for riot control, maintenance of order during natural disasters, and assisting other branches of the Police Nationale as needed.”<sup>130</sup> These units were seen as a way for the French state to maintain public order and control popular dissent.

### 5.3 Historical experiences: Terrorism and Modern Disorder

In terms of severe terrorist threats France has experienced an accepted ‘security first’ norm.<sup>131</sup> Although there was this consensus, certain threats have caused political instability and an advancement in police weaponry and surveillance that has led to further police repression. From the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962, there was a rise in terrorist attacks both in Algeria and France. The political instability that surrounded this period, along with the attacks contributed to the fall of the Fourth Republic in 1958.<sup>132</sup> This period emphasised how these threats could threaten the fragile nature of the French state. Although this may have led to stability from this threat, “in the decades that followed, France was a target for a wide variety of militant organisations, from leftist terrorists to Corsican, Basque and Breton separatists, as well as a number of groups from North Africa and the

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<sup>128</sup> Emsley. (1996). *The English Police*, p.251.

<sup>129</sup> FIEP International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status. (N.A.) ‘French National Gendarmerie.’ *FIEP*. <http://www.fiep.org/member-forces/french-national-gendarmerie/> (18/05/2020).

<sup>130</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica. (N.A.) ‘Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité’, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Compagnies-Republicaines-de-Securite#ref1075650> (29/06/2020).

<sup>131</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.56.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.* p.60.

Middle East.”<sup>133</sup> These threats tended to be short-term campaigns and were described as “mostly short, sharp shocks to the French system.”<sup>134</sup>

After 1992, Algerian terrorist groups like Le Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), along with the more global Islamist terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIL/ISIS and other militant groups emerged as the main threat in France. Major terrorist attacks in France since then such as, 1995 Paris Métro and RER bombings, 2003 Nice bombing, and the more recent January 2015 Île-de-France attacks and November 2015 Paris attacks, led to targeting of the underrepresented and marginalised minority communities. The increase in incidents of excessive violence used by the police such as the 2005 Paris suburb riots, the death of Adama Traoré in police custody and 2017 assault of Théo Luhaka have alienated the police from these sections of the French population and set a modern precedence of police aggression and violence.

### 5.3 Mouvement des gilets jaunes (Yellow Vest Movement)

The Mouvement des gilets jaunes (known in English as the Yellow Vest Movement) began in October 2018 in response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s controversial fuel tax increase. Already losing the approval of the French public, Macron’s decision to increase fuel tax sparked a grassroots movement that expanded beyond this issue of tax, to issues such as the high cost of living, pension reform and the reintroduction of a solidarity tax on wealth that had been abolished by Macron. The movement seen two phases, one in 2018 centred around the fuel tax increase, was a leaderless movement where elements of the radical left and right attempted to infiltrate the group<sup>135</sup> and one in 2019 centred around pension reform, was led by the unions but also saw elements of the Black Bloc involved in the demonstrations. The scale of the movement was not initially anticipated by politicians and commentators who didn’t comprehend the deep rooted grievances behind the movement.<sup>136</sup> The movement received international attention, particularly in light of the extreme use of force by the French police and

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<sup>133</sup> Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*, p.16.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, p.18.

<sup>135</sup> Clement Le Goff. (27 Feb 2020). ‘Yellow vests, rising violence – what’s happening in France?’, *World Economic Forum*, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/france-protests-yellow-vests-today/> (29/06/2020).

<sup>136</sup> Didier Fassin and Anne-Claire Defossez. (2019). ‘The Yellow Vests Movement, an Unidentified Political Object’, *The Institute Letter Spring 2019*, <https://www.ias.edu/ideas/yellow-vests-movement> (28/06/2020).

the large scale violence of the demonstrations. The extreme use of force by the police received international condemnation, with it being addressed at the Human Rights Council in Geneva.<sup>137</sup>

#### 5.4 The Demonstrations and the Police Organisation

The Yellow Vest movement began with the planned blocking of 60 roads across France by French drivers over the rising fuel prices.<sup>138</sup> The demonstrations escalated into 71 consecutive weekends of protests in cities all across France, beginning with the first demonstration on the 17<sup>th</sup> of November 2018, which saw 282,000 people protest. The unanticipated scale of the demonstrations and the large amount of violence from the beginning, saw the rapid deployment of multiple riot control units to assist the police. The mobile Gendarmerie and the CRS were deployed, but also crime squad officers, who are normally tasked with drug or terrorism related raids<sup>139</sup> and soldiers, armed with automatic weapons<sup>140</sup> were used to attempt to prevent the outbreak of violence and quell the demonstrations. The police and these riot control units (the soldiers were not involved in direct confrontation with the demonstrators) used rubber ball launchers, dispersal grenades that sprayed out rubber pellets, tear gas and water cannons. The police organisations, already stretched by the threat of terrorism saw 50 of its 60 riot police companies nationwide “mobilized every weekend for more than two months.”<sup>141</sup> For the first weekends, there are large scale demonstrations with arrests and injuries (See Appendix E). The initial violence of the demonstrations set the tone for the demonstrations over the following year, with over 4,000 injuries to police and protesters lead to criticism of the French police and government’s public order policing.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> UN Human Rights. (2019). ‘High Commissioner Bachelet calls on States to take strong action against inequalities’, *40th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, 6 March 2019*, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24265&LangID=E> (29/06/2020).

<sup>138</sup> The Local (30 October, 2018). ‘Furious French drivers to block roads in fuel price protest, but are they right to?’, *The Local*, <https://www.thelocal.fr/20181030/french-drivers-plan-road-blocks-to-protest-fuel-prices-but-are-they-right-to> (29/06/2020).

<sup>139</sup> Peter Matjasic. (12 July, 2019). ‘France’s War on Protest’, *Open Society Foundations*, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/frances-war-on-protest> (28/06/2020).

<sup>140</sup> Aude Mazoue. (22 March, 2019). ‘Yellow Vest protests: Macron’s ‘risky’ plan to put army on streets’, *France 24*, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190322-france-macron-risky-plan-army-streets-yellow-vests-protests-sentinelle> (29/06/2020).

<sup>141</sup> Elian Peltier. (28 January, 2019) ‘Use of Force in France’s ‘Yellow Vest’ Protests Fuels Anger’, *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/world/europe/france-yellow-vests-police.html> (29/06/2020).

<sup>142</sup> John Lichfield. (9 June, 2020). ‘America Has a National Guard. France Has National Riot Police’, *Foreign Policy (FP)*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/09/france-riot-police-george-floyd-protests/> (29/06/2020).

## 5.4 The Government, Police and Demonstrators Response

The initial tension of the demonstrations centred around the blocking of roads across France and the dispersal and prevention of a crowd reaching the Élysée Palace, as 400 injuries and 1 death was reported on the first day.<sup>143</sup> As the demonstrations continue a large amount of criticism of the policing of the demonstrations focused on the use of excessive violence by the police, the weapons that were being used and the anti-protest legislation that the government proposed. With the roadblocks and growing social movement across France generally distancing themselves from violence, the demonstrations in Paris in particular saw an increased acceptance of violence. With the government attributing the violence of the demonstrations on the so-called casseurs<sup>144</sup> (rioter or hooligan), mostly represented by elements of the radical left and right, the police issued an aggressive tactics against the rioting and the demonstrations. The demonstrators in Paris increasingly accepted the violence of the rioting as part of the movement as frustration grew over the police response and the governments inaction.<sup>145</sup> Following the December riots in 2018, the diesel tax, that was seen as the reason for the movement, was scrapped. As well as this, a concession package to boost the income of France's poorest was announced and a 'national debate' was launched. By this time the movement had "already swelled into a broader movement protesting the president himself, his reforms and French elitism in general."<sup>146</sup>

The method of policing the demonstrations, particular the use of certain weapons and the anti-protest legislation, came under increasing scrutiny domestically and internationally. The police initially wanting to keep the demonstrators at a distance, using tear gas, rubber ball launchers, and rubber bullets as they tried to avoid injury to their officers. As the demonstrations increased in violence the police were forced into direct clashes with the demonstrators. By 2019, over 2,000 demonstrators had been injured (See Appendix F), many receiving serious injury to the head, others losing the use of an eye and others sustaining limb injuries. President Macron was even "forced to admit that he had been shocked by some of the injuries—including two dozen lost eyes—caused by controversial, nonlethal police

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<sup>143</sup> Kim Willsher. (17 Nov, 2018). 'One killed and hundreds injured in French anti-Macron protests', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/17/french-protester-killed-accident-anti-fuel-tax-blockade> (29/06/2020).

<sup>144</sup> Louise Nordstrom. (17 March 2019). 'Riots on Champs-Élysées: Why violence has become 'legitimate' for some Yellow Vests', *24 France*, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190317-france-paris-riot-champs-elysees-yellow-vest-fouquet-macron> (29/06/2020).

<sup>145</sup> Nordstrom. (17 March 2019). 'Riots on Champs-Élysées: Why violence has become 'legitimate' for some Yellow Vests'.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid

weapons.”<sup>147</sup> The police oversight body the Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN) had to investigate 212 cases of alleged police brutality brought against the police during the demonstrations.<sup>148</sup> The first member of the security forces to face trial was a CRS officer who was given a suspended two month jail term for throwing a piece of a paving stone at protesters.<sup>149</sup> The perceived inability of the police to respond effectively to the demonstrations and inaction which allowed rioting and vandalism of streets and landmarks in Paris<sup>150</sup>, led to Macron attempting to push anti-protest legislation. This legislation included two parts that were approved by the Constitutional Court, “giving the police the power to search demonstrators and ban them from covering their faces” and one part that was not approved, “the right to ban anyone pre-emptively identified as a troublemaker from demonstrating.”<sup>151</sup> These ‘anti-casseur’ laws were condemned by Amnesty International as an attack on the freedom to protest.<sup>152</sup> Overall the police response to the Yellow Demonstrations was seen as excessive, created more violence than it solved and ineffective.

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<sup>147</sup> John Lichfield. (9 June, 2020). ‘America Has a National Guard. France Has National Riot Police’, Foreign Policy (FP), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/09/france-riot-police-george-floyd-protests/> (29/06/2020).

<sup>148</sup> RFI. (21 November 2019). ‘First policeman goes on trial for brutality during Yellow Vest protests’, *RFI*, <http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20191121-first-policeman-trial-throwing-paving-stone-yellow-vest-protests-brutality-crs> (29/06/2020).

<sup>149</sup> RFI. (19 December 2019). ‘Police officer gets suspended sentence for violence at Yellow Vest protest’, *RFI*, <http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20191219-police-officer-suspended-jail-sentence-violence-throwing-stone-yellow-vest-protests> (29/06/2020).

<sup>150</sup> NEWS WIRES. (18 March, 2019). ‘French police response to ‘Yellow Vest’ violence in spotlight after latest unrest’, *France 24*, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190318-France-police-response-yellow-vest-violence> (29/06/2020).

<sup>151</sup> Sarah White. (4 April, 2019). ‘Setback for Macron as court vetoes key plank of anti-protest law’, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests-security/setback-for-macron-as-court-vetoes-key-plank-of-anti-protest-law-idUSKCN1RG2DK> (29/06/2020).

<sup>152</sup> Connexion journalist. (30 Jan, 2019). ‘Amnesty International condemns French anti-vandal law’, *The Connexion*, <https://www.connexionfrance.com/French-news/Amnesty-International-condemns-French-anti-smash-anti-casseur-gilets-jaunes-protest-law> (29/06/2020).



## **Chapter 6: Analysis and Conclusion**

### **6.1 Analysis**

#### **6.1.1 Traditions and identity**

This case study of the British and French police forces examined the different cultures of these two organisations and how these differences impact how they deal with political demonstrations. Both the British and French have created certain identities around their police forces, and these have been created by the environment of the time of their establishment. The British policing model has centred around this identity of the bobby policeman. The walk-the-beat police officer that symbolise a greater connection to the policed community. This identity has centred around norms and values that distance the police from its military counterparts. Certain norms like officers being unarmed and showing restraint over aggression embodies values of freedom of what it is to be 'English' and the principles of maintaining the respect and cooperation of the public. These norms and values are greatly helped by the long-standing institutions in the UK, the police institution being one of them. This provides a sense of stability and confidence in the accountability and strength of these institutions.

The French identity is more much fluid and based on a demanding population to the Revolutionary ideals. The extreme resentment against any suppression of the values of liberty and equality and the demand placed on the state to embodied them, creates a volatile environment in policing public order. The sudden and aggressive possibility of turmoil, along with the capricious nature of government created a norm of aggressive policing of public disorder. This is further accentuated by the fragmented relationship between Paris and the municipalities and the deep-rooted distrust for the authorities in Paris. The environment in which the French authorities and police have evolved in is one of constant conflict and threats both internally and externally. This has led to a more normalised tradition between the police, riot control units and the military.

#### **6.1.2 Threats and Disorder**

Elements of threats and disorder have challenged these identities, norms and values in both Britain and France. The British experience is slightly deceiving with such vastly

different experiences from Northern Ireland and the rest of mainland Britain. The British police identity and norms around the use of firearms, have prevented the rapid increase in non-lethal weapons or a military presence being commonly used in maintaining public order. This has translated to other equipment in public order policing, such as the rejection of the use of water cannons or any military style equipment in 2015.<sup>153</sup> The French experience of more short, sharp shocks to its system<sup>154</sup> and the volatile nature of change has seen a faster evolution of paramilitary styled units, advanced military weapons and aggressive police tactics. The more modern threat of terrorism since September 11<sup>th</sup> has certainly tested these norms and values of both countries. In Britain the challenges to the democratic values of liberal democracies and institutions like the judicial system have seen opposition from completing norms within its institutions. In France the consensus of security first norm and the lack of independence between its systems has seen more repressive measures been implement easier and faster.

### 6.1.3 The Demonstrations

The political demonstrations of the G20 Summit demonstrations in 2009 and the Yellow Vest Movement in 2018 and 2019 have exhibited these differences in the cultures of the UK and France. In the UK the large concern for the facilitating of lawful protest and the right to assembly was evident in the police organisation of the event. Whether the police actually achieved this is debatable, as even though it may have been an operational success, there was large scale criticism of police conduct and tactics. The large-scale inquiry into the behaviour of police officers and the investigations by an independent body into the high profiled incidents provides some checks and balances to police conduct, although the tactics of kettling and containment were used again with more criticism of them during the student protests in London in 2010.<sup>155</sup> In France, the initial disgruntled and simmering tension of the demonstrations was ignited by police aggression and violence. The unanticipated growth of the movement caught the French government and its police organisation by surprise. Even though the French have designed mobile riot response units, such as the mobile Gendarmerie

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<sup>153</sup> Vikram Dodd. (23 Jul 2015). 'Theresa May rejects use of water cannon in England and Wales', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/23/theresa-may-police-water-cannon-use-england-wales> (29/06/2020).

<sup>154</sup> Frank Foley, (2013). *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past*. Cambridge University Press, New York. p.18.

<sup>155</sup> Mark Townsend and Shiv Malik. (19 Dec 2010). 'Kettle tactics risk Hillsborough-style tragedy – doctor', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/19/police-kettle-risk-crush-hillsborough> (29/06/2020).

and the CRS they tend to be heavy handed once the demonstrations begin to escalate and only serve to further exasperate the violence.

In terms of the police response to the demonstrations, both the MPS and the different elements of the French police were criticised for their tactics and excessive use of force. The G20 demonstrations saw elements of violence, mainly at the City of London protests but generally for the large scale of the demonstrations remained peaceful. The police use of containment, cordon filters and kettling was seen as creating a tension in the demonstrations. The use of the tactics themselves were not completely criticised but the prolonged containment, lack of toilet and water facilities and the inappropriate use of kettling on the peaceful Climate Camp demonstration. The Yellow Vest demonstrations on the other hand were far more violent. This certainty owed a lot to the violent radical elements of the demonstrations but the demonstrations from early on were met with an excessive use of force by the French police. The use of tear gas, rubber bullet, flash grenades and the very controversial so-called Defence Ball Launchers (LBDs)<sup>156</sup> have escalated violence and caused serious life changing injuries to the demonstrators.

Maintaining public order, particularly when things turn violent may require a use of force on the part of the police, but how proportionate that use of force is and the impact it has on deescalating the violence is important. For the British police their response is seen as a balance between coercion and accommodation. The violent incidents like the excessive use of force that caused the death of Ian Tomlinson, the assault of Nicola Fisher and the dispersal of the Climate Camp was met with wide condemnation and investigation into police conduct. Having a body independent of the police, like the IPCC allows the UK to have more transparency and with a more independent judicial than that of France, allows for more accountability of its officers. The prosecution of a police officer doesn't come about easily, as seen with PC Simon Harwood, the man who pushed Ian Tomlinson, cleared of charges but sacked by the Metropolitan police for gross misconduct.<sup>157</sup> The French police during the Yellow Vest demonstrations were met with far more violence and uncertain than their

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<sup>156</sup> Aude Mazoue. (22 March,2019). 'Yellow Vest protests: Macron's 'risky' plan to put army on streets', *France 24*, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190322-france-macron-risky-plan-army-streets-yellow-vests-protests-sentinelle> (29/06/2020).

<sup>157</sup> BBC News. (17 September 2012). 'G20 death: PC Simon Harwood sacked for gross misconduct', *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19620627#:~:text=A%20police%20officer%20cleared%20of,a%20Metropolitan%20police%20disciplinary%20panel> (29/06/2020)

English counterparts. The lack of planning and national scale of the demonstrations show the difficulties the police organisation was put under. The violent nature of the protests led to a violent response by the police, which further accentuated the violence. The wider array of military grade weapons, the more aggressive nature of the officers and the anti-protest stance of the government led to an unproportionate response from the police.

## **6.2 Implications and Conclusion**

The attempt of this research was to create a number of links in the literature in understanding police militarisation in the context of political demonstrations. Modern political demonstrations are still influenced by the identities, norms and values that have been created through the traditions and the environment in which the police forces that deal with these demonstrations evolved in. The social construction of these identities, norms and values means the constant social interaction between the police, the public, and the governmental institutions continues to reshape how police deal with maintaining public order. The historical experiences of threats, disorder and protests continue to influence the police organisations and how they perceive and handle public display of frustration. The hope is that this research has begun to build a bridge between the traditions and historical experiences of threats and disorder with the more modern issues and interactions between the police and the public. As modern society is dealing with numerous social and economic inequalities, global transboundary issues and large-scale climate concern, political demonstrations are becoming more common and seeing more violence. The conduct and behaviour of police officers, the social interaction between the police and the policed community and the response of police when trying to maintain public order remains of critical importance.

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
Willsher, Kim. (17 Nov, 2018). 'One killed and hundreds injured in French anti-Macron protests', *The Guardian*. Retrieved 29/06/2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/17/french-protester-killed-accident-anti-fuel-tax-blockade>.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A




**Figure 1** Assessing Police Militarization Using Continuums\*

**Source:** Peter B. Kraska. (2007). ‘Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.’ *Policing*, Vol. 1(4), p. 504.

## Appendix B

Graph on the types of protest action from 2010 to 2019



**Source:** David J. Bailey. (3 January 2020). 'Decade of dissent: how protest is shaking the UK and why it's likely to continue', *The Conversation*, <https://theconversation.com/decade-of-dissent-how-protest-is-shaking-the-uk-and-why-its-likely-to-continue-125843> (28/06/2020).

## Appendix C

### Robert Peel's 9 Principles of Policing from the Home Office Website

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

**Source:** Home Office. (10 December 2012). 'Definition of policing by consent', *GOV.UK*, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent> (23/06/2020).

## Appendix D

List of the eleven strategic goals for Operation Glencoe


The eleven strategic objectives were:

- Facilitate lawful protest
- Provide a safe environment for participants, public and staff
- Minimise disruption to the life of the residential and business community
- Minimise disruption to air, rail, vehicular and pedestrian traffic
- Provide a co-ordinated response to incidents
- Preserve public order and minimise opportunity to commit crime, and take proportionate steps to deal appropriately with offenders if crime is committed
- Protect vulnerable and high profile premises
- Preserve the dignity of the diplomatic missions and buildings
- Enforce the Sessional Order of Parliament where appropriate
- Provide security commensurate to the threat level relating to this series of events
- Facilitate the arrival and departure of Principals and relevant support teams involved in the Mexican State Visit and the lead delegates involved with the Conference for Jobs and Growth.

**Source:** Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009). 'Adapting to Protest', *Criminal Justice Inspectorates*, <https://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf>, p.38.

## Appendix E

Figures showing the number of protesters, those put in police custody and those injured over the first four Saturdays of the protests



Source: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/france-protests-yellow-vests-today/>

## Appendix F

Figures released by the French government on the injuries



**Source:** Yusuf Ozcan. (5 March 2019). 'Yellow Vest protests: 368 injured in police violence', *Anadolu Agency*, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/yellow-vest-protests-368-injured-in-police-violence/1410047> (29/06/2020).