Internalising' Development:

The impact of the Korean-inspired Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) project in Uganda on 'local' village identities and sense of community belonging

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Abstract

The Saemaul Undong (translated as the New Village Movement), was first introduced in South Korea in the 1970s. It not only contributed to the country's rural economic development, but also contributed to an enhanced national consciousness and a stronger collective identity through the internalisation of external support and incentives. The recent implementation of this specific rural development model under the name of the Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) project in seven model villages in Uganda, raises the question on how it may impact the existing collective identities in the country that continues to portray institutionalised ethnicity in modern politics. This research, therefore, aims to study how the Korea-inspired Saemaul Undong Model Villages socially influences the existing 'local' village identities in Uganda as well as how it contributes to the national identity.

Fieldwork was conducted in three of out of the seven model villages in Uganda between August 2019 and January 2020, to collect data using formal in-depth and informal interviews, as well as participant observation. The triangulated data was used to explore the process of

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[1] The Saeumaul Undong (Translated as the New Village Movement) was first introduced in Uganda in 2009 by the Korea Saemaul Undong Center, a private sector organisation; however, in this research, I will solely focus on the first phase of the movement that was implemented by the South Korean government organisation, KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) from 2015 to 2018.

internalisation of the external support from the Korean and Ugandan governments by the grassroots actors, and how this impacted their sense of belonging to the community. Social dynamics were analysed using the actor-oriented approach introduced by Norman Long (2001) and Herbert Kelman's social influence theory (1958, 1961, 1979, 2006, 2017). In addition, Benedict Anderson's imagined communities ([1983] 2016) was referred to discuss the concept of national identity and how it was impacted by the intervention program.

The ultimate purpose of this research was not to measure peoples' sense of patriotism nor nationalism, but to rather understand how the ESMV project contributed to the understanding of collective identities in these regions. Thus, it focused on the social changes witnessed in the villages in relation to the reproduction and adaptation of ideas and practices associated with national identity at the local level. It then concludes that the formation of collective identities in these villages by the rural development project was both the means and the ends for the national economic development.

Key words:

Saemaul Undong (SMU) – ESMV project – Collective identities – National Identity – Internalisation

Introduction

Uganda is not only home to over 42.7 million Ugandans (World Bank 2019) from more than 65 diverse ethnic backgrounds, but also to many foreigners.[2] As a South Korean, I grew up in the country from 1997 until 2013. When my family and I moved to Uganda in 1997, we were considered one of the pioneers as there weren't many Koreans at that time. Thus, identity was always an unresolved concept that I continuously pondered over, since I was never *local* enough for my Ugandan friends nor fully Korean for my Korean friends who mostly came to settle after mid-2000. Over the years, this subconsciously enhanced my desire to seek for an overarching collective identity that would fully include me as a member of society and tend to my needs of belonging to a social group. "Overseas Korean" was an option for my primary identity, nevertheless it eventually became a choice, especially when I was frequently asked whether I was a Chinese, Japanese or a North Korean.[3] Given the fact that we all do look quite alike and also the fact that these countries had more vibrant bilateral relationships in terms of trade and support in both political and economic dimensions, this wasn't a surprise. In this process, I aspired for South Korea to also join such a level of identification and recognition through heightened diplomatic interactions with Ugandans.

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[2] Though there are multiple definitions for ethnicity, throughout this paper, I will refer to the definition of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics whereby, ethnicity is "the state of belonging to a social group with common culture, tradition and language" (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017) and during the interview sessions, it was used interchangeably with 'tribe' for the participants to understand better.

[3] Referring to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (1948), in the Act on the immigration and legal status of overseas Koreans, overseas Korean is defined as

a person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs:
1. A national of the Republic of Korea who obtains the right of permanent residence in a foreign country or is residing in a foreign country with a view to living permanently there (hereinafter referred to as a "Korean national residing abroad"); and
2. A person prescribed by the Presidential Decree of those who have held the nationality of the Republic of Korea or of their lineal descendants, who obtains the nationality of a foreign country

In May 2011, the South Korean embassy in Uganda, which had closed in 1994 mainly due to economic constraints, reopened and soon arrangements were being made to officially implement a rural development program. This project was a South Korean model using the Saemaul Undong, also known as The New Village Movement (hereafter SMU) that was to be implemented in Mpigi District under the name of the Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) development project. SMU, which will be further explained in the later chapters, had contributed to the establishment of a stronger collective identity in the form of national identity in South Korea in the 1970s. To familiarise these relatively new ideas and practices, government officials from both countries emphasised on building similar connections between the two, especially using *Bulungi bwansi*, a local traditional custom of the Buganda Kingdom (located in central Uganda) that encouraged community service and self-help.

Bulungi bwansi (translated as 'for the good of the country/nation') was first introduced by the *Kabaka* (King of Buganda) centuries ago, and involved any collective action carried out to support the community. [4] Some of these actions included building and maintaining roads and drainage systems, cultivating land optimal for farming, and generally going around the neighbourhood helping those in need. This nature of working together stems from the common traditional African conception that an individual only achieves *full personhood* through the *incorporation* of the community and thus emphasising the essence of engaging in social community activities (Menkiti 1984). It is based on kinship links and a conception that Buganda is no exception too, as the Baganda people primarily identify themselves to which clan and lineage

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[4] The exact date of origin is not recorded in any official documents, however based on the Buganda official website, it can be stated that it has been practised for many centuries. See Buganda Kingdom. 2014. "Community Cleaning Service Programme Launched." *Buganda Kingdom.*

they belong during the first encounter and hold the social customs and collective actions of great importance.

Similar community actions were also found in other various ethnic groups, including *burungibwensi* in Ankole (located in south-western Uganda) and *Akimor* ('sharing') in Karamoja (a region located in north-eastern Uganda) (Mugabi 2012, 5), but it did not get the widespread recognition (both national and international) as the Baganda *Bulungi bwansi*. This was because of the political autonomy and dominant role that Buganda had during colonialism, unlike the other ethnic groups. However, this also meant that as Buganda began to lose its administrative power under the Buganda Agreement of 1900 (further explained in the upcoming chapter), management of social norms began to be difficult and it slowly became obsolete (Kasozi 1994, 238; Ssali 2017, 151).

In fact, during an encounter with some Baganda youths from Kampala, they confirmed that they had heard of *Bulungi bwansi* as a traditional cultural norm that was valid in the past but is no longer practised. Although some said that it could be practised in rural areas, at least in many societies, it can be assumed as a *dead* practice. One interviewee attributed these changes to modernisation in which the construction of fences and walls in their compounds also began to act as a wall for interpersonal relations.[5] This could be partially true since modernisation can and does impact traditional values and even cultural convergence depending on societies (Inglehart and Baker 2000, 20).

Therefore, this process of rejuvenating an old traditional norm using a foreign South Korean model has led me to the following research question:

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[5] Raymond Musisi interview, 2020. Interviewed a member of Buganda ethnic group, but not from one of the model villages about the Buganda culture in general by author. Kampala (September 9, 2019).

How did the establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) development project in Uganda socially influence existing 'local' village identities as well as contribute to the national identity?

With the latter, I refer to a sense of belonging to an *imagined community*. To answer this question, I will explore two sub-questions:

- What is the role of the local leaders (both grassroots actors and the national government) and their Korean counterparts in achieving the ESMV objectives?

- How are existing *local* ideas and practices used as well as being transformed and scaled up through the national development interventions?

The focus of the research will, therefore, be on how the village leaders engage fellow villagers for economic, social and mental/attitudinal development and how such efforts impact the reproduction and adaptation of ideas and practices associated with *national identity* at the local level. The research will analyse the collected data from the field to study the challenges the village members had before the intervention program and how their perceptions of collective activity have also changed and its impact. Through this research, I hope to contribute to the scholarly debate on how grassroots actors play a vital role in rural development programs and how they in effect influence or reshape national identity via social, everyday practices.

This thesis consists of seven chapters, whereby the first chapter discusses the conceptual frameworks and the theoretical debates. It focuses on what internalisation is, its relevance and aim, as well as the unintended consequences with regards to the (re)construction of an *imagined community*. The chapter on methodology and positionality will then follow and unfold how the research fieldwork was conducted in Uganda. The third chapter introduces the political history of

national and local identities in Uganda, by exploring the politics of ethnicity and communal identities in the country. Hence, it explores the colonial impact on the rise of Buganda and the regimes of Milton Obote, Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni. Chapter four then studies the origin of SMU by focusing on how the former president Park Chung-hee introduced and enforced SMU in Korea. The chapter aims to evaluate SMU's contribution to the rise of communal and perhaps national identity in the rural areas through a heightened sense of belonging in South Korea in the 70s. This chapter also aims to evaluate the applicability and demand for SMU in other countries.

Chapter Five, which is the first empirical chapter, focuses on the transplantation of SMU in Uganda to analyse the administrative input in the implementation of the project and consequently, the chapter is followed by the second empirical chapter that focuses on the internalisation process and the role of the grassroots actors. The objective of this chapter is to elaborate on how internalisation becomes a socio-political process of extending one's belongingness to a nation and emphasise the importance of the village leaders as the crucial drivers in this process. The last chapter then concludes by answering how the internalising process of the Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) project by the village leaders in Uganda impacts the reproduction and adaptation of ideas and practices associated with national identity at the local level.

Chapter One:

The Theoretical Framework

Postcolonial African states have struggled long with issues of national cohesion and identity. The scramble for Africa that began in the mid-1880s officially enforced new borders for (colonial) political entities. With time, these divisions led to the development of nation-states "that are peculiar to Africa, and the subject of substantial debate" (Gewald, Leliveld, and Peša 2012, 5). However, at the time of decolonisation in the 1960s, the failure or disinterest to conceptualise nation and nationalism in an overarching collective identity had its political consequences, also in Uganda. Not only were the presidents ousted from power but the various military confrontations involved in coups and legitimisation of power also took the lives of many innocent civilians. Although different regimes in Uganda have rhetorically stressed to pursue nationalist agendas, the fundamental question of what this concept entails has not been answered. This chapter therefore, aims to explore the different theories and concepts to understand what national identity is in the context of different actors and their capability of becoming the social drivers in cultivating a collective identity in developing countries, specifically in Uganda.

Thus, the literature on nationalism, internalisation processes and identities, and the role of grassroots actors will be discussed in this chapter. The first section of the chapter studies the concept of *Imagined Communities.* This is to build an understanding of how despite the various ethnicities that are deeply intertwined in regional, political and social dimensions in a country can still impact the formation of national identity. Henceforth, it looks at the different factors that can create *imagined linkages* to understand the origins. It will then be followed by the *Actor-Oriented*

Approach to elaborate on the significance of grassroots actors in national development projects. Finally, *Internalisation and Identities* will be explored to focus on how new interventions are recognised and practised by individuals and the possible outcomes from this internalised process.

1.1. Imagined Communities – Primordial or Constructed?

The definition of nationalism from a primordial context claimed by scholars such as Clifford Geertz (1973) and Anthony D. Smith (1991), using the ethnocultural approach of a common origin, language and kinship do not do justice in defining nationalism in multi-cultural countries like Uganda that is home to over 65 ethnic groups. However, neither does sole reliance on the *civic* approach of defining the nation as an outcome of a collective goal driven by loyal members to arrange a political community of governance achieve it. Thus the concept of nationalism should not be fixated to the dichotomy of the ethnic nor civic approach but must be understood as a social construction to fully represent all the members (Seymour 2000, 230).

In Benedict Anderson's well-known *Imagined Communities,* a nation is defined as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" ([1983] 2016, 6). According to Anderson, the nation is *imagined*, *limited* and *sovereign* because no matter how big or small the population is, there is a *finite* number that defines that population as members. Furthermore, an individual member will never get to meet and know every other member in the community and yet they believe to have a bond that unites them all under the same governance and protection (Ibid.). Thus, the usage of the term *imagined community* combines both socio-cultural and political dimensions that can also be used to define many other nations even in Africa.

One factor that Anderson states to have contributed to creating the awareness of the *imagined community* is the *homogeneous empty time* notion. It begins with the recognition of a common apprehension or collective activities that is a representation of a past and the present by individuals who happen to come across it at that specific moment (Ibid., 24). This could be a cultural norm or event that takes place at a given time, which implies a specific meaning, recognisable to only a specific group of people. Thus, with the conceptualisation of the *simultaneity-along-time* aspect, individuals in a community are affirmed with the position that although they are all different individuals (who they most probably will never get to know), living different lives in their respective territorial spaces, they are all connected by the *same steady apprehension of time* (Ibid., 26).

To further elaborate on this aspect of the *imagined linkage*, Anderson refers to the print capitalism that "prefigure[s] the inbuilt obsolescence of modern durables … [which] creates this extraordinary mass ceremony" for a specific period of time using a specific language (Ibid., 35). He elaborates that print capitalism is a modern tool to *re-present* the image of a community with a character of its own at a precise time, which creates the linkage between individuals to share a unique temporary moment of the represented information that will be replaced with another news the next day/week at the same usual time for distribution. (Ibid.). As for the language used in these prints, he stated that they enhance one's national consciousness by "creat[ing] unified fields of exchange and communication," as well as contribute to the formation of "image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation" (Ibid, 44). Thus, according to Anderson, the standard print-language provides a uniting factor for individuals, which enhances national consciousness but also acts as an identifying factor of others that do not associate with the news. Hence, he claims

how the *homogeneous empty time* can construct *imagined linkages* between complete strangers while excluding others (Ibid, 97).

The other factor that Anderson states to be necessary for constructing an *imagined community* is the community's selective memory. Using the previously mentioned aspects, the standard language and the *simultaneous continuity along time*, he claims that the community is put collectively under a narrative to remember certain things while *obliged already to have forgotten* others, that helps to understand where and how a nation is formed (Ibid, 200). One of the examples that he gives to support this claim is the American education on the civil war that reminds people to remember it not as an inter-state war, but as a war between *brothers* (Ibid, 201). To give an example from the Ugandan context, President Museveni frequently refers to himself simply as "the old man who has saved the country" from the tyrants, while at the same time, overshadowing his despotic rule and the corruption in the country because of the ruling government (BBC 2016; Rumanzi 2016). Under such common historical knowledge, it helps to imagine how the nation came into being and sustained, which eventually enhances the national consciousness and a sense of belonging to a particular nation (Ibid, 205).

Consequently, Anderson's conceptualisation of nations and nationalism enables a better understanding of the cultivation of national identities in Uganda. Nonetheless, this does not imply that Anderson's *imagined community* can fully explain the origins of nationalism in Uganda. This is because Anderson's argument using *print capitalism* and *creole pioneers* as factors that contribute to the formation of nationalism is inapplicable in the case of Uganda. According to the latest data obtained by Afrobarometer, many Ugandans (52 per cent of the surveyed population), stated that they rely on radios to get access to everyday news, while only 3 per cent got news from the newspapers, which is possibly due to the high level of illiteracy in the rural areas amongst the

older generation (2018). As for the claim using the *creole pioneers*, the pilgrimages for administrative and educational purposes did not directly boost the formation of a collective nationalism in Uganda. Not only is there a lack of substantial evidence that can support Anderson's claim, but it is noted that leaders, whether they got education or experience from the neighbouring countries or were simply locally nurtured, seemed to prioritise their ethnic groups, which will be further described in chapter three. Instead, in post-independent Uganda, the notion of nationalism was more of a tool introduced and utilised by the political leaders to consolidate power.

But this does not imply that nationalism, by all means, is a by-product of modernism, contradicting the claims made by some scholars such as Ernest Gellner (1964; [1983] 2006). Gellner theorised that human societies undergo three stages, the pre-agrarian, agrarian, and the industrial. He states that before industrialism, the societies are either stateless or in lack of a common culture between the elites and the mass. Industrialisation, on the other hand, may either lead to the formation of nationalism through the creation of a unified and structured society from standardised education system or to nationalism stemmed from secessionist desires due to unequal distribution of economic development ([1983] 2006). Nevertheless, it would be fallacious to claim that nationalism cannot exist before industrialism.

Industrialisation in the case of Uganda, began to actively take place after independence, in 1966 as part of the Second Five-year Plan (Shinyekwa et al. 2016, 194). However, scholars like Semakula M. Kiwanuka (1970) have claimed that Buganda had a well-established nationalism of its own in the form of Kiganda nationalism before the national independence. The Baganda people had their common origin, culture, language, and territories under the sovereign rule of the *Kabaka* with a functioning administrative and judicial system (Ibid, 232). Therefore, although Anderson's *Imagined Communities* lacks an in-depth exploration on the quality of nationalism, in terms of its

strength and durability (Breuilly et al. 2016, 646), its exploration on the origins, by emphasising the importance of both ethnocultural and political aspects allows room to discuss how the grassroots actors in a rural development project in Uganda can re-construct their understanding of a collective identity, which therefore, may impact their national identities. Hence, in the upcoming chapters, I explore how national consciousness and identity can develop without the direct effect of print capitalism nor industrialisation, but through the training centre that act as the state apparatus, interaction with foreigners and simply an identifying title, the *model village.*

1.2. The Actor-Oriented Approach – 'Mere' Grassroots Actors?

The fields of anthropology and sociology, although, intensively explored ethnographic case-studies during colonialism, social changes and development theories were generally limited to either modernisation perspective under the liberal frameworks or the radical approach using the neo-Marxist perspectives (Long 2001, 11). Scholars such as David Booth (1992) have thus pointed out that the two different ideological perspectives provide a limited scope to truly understand the process of social change and development in different parts of the world, other than the West. In support for this "non-linear process resulting in the creation of social heterogeneity," Norman Long introduces the actor-oriented approach that focuses much more on the social actors than the structure of the larger political units (Hebinck, Ouden, and Verschoor 2001, 4).

Long in his work argues for the shift of the approach in which these social actors are not "passive recipients of intervention, but as active participants who process information and strategise in their dealings with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel" (Long 2001, 13). The actor-oriented approach studies how the identified social actors

react to the external factors introduced in their societies based on their ethnographic backgrounds. Long uses *agency* as a key concept to accentuate the *knowledgeability* and *capability* of social actors that are derived from their social norms, customs and experiences, which enables them to navigate against or cooperate with the new interventions and fellow actors within their socially constructed realities (Ibid, 16). Thus, the collective social actions are not limited to the simple human interactions, but also incorporation with the non-human materials (Callon and Law 1995; Latour 2005; Long 2001, 2015).

To further conceptualise these aspects of the development interventions and their assimilation into individuals' lifeworlds,[6] Long uses the notion of the social interface to emphasise how each individuals' different values and interests often clash and hence leads to constant engagement in the "processes of negotiation, adaptation and transformation of meaning" in their communities (Long 2001, 72). He defined social interface as "a critical point of intersection …. where *social discontinuities,* based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power, are most likely to be located" (Ibid, 243). This interface negates the presumed structuralist interpretations of development but strongly emphasises the constant reconstruction of understanding entailed from both the cultural and political dynamics of the agencies (Ibid, 51). In doing so, it does not fix the focus on one actor's rational choice but on the *points of intersection* between the lifeworlds of various social actors. Thus, the actor-oriented interface approach provides an insight of the grassroots actors with some authority that they use to "manipulate and subvert outside authority in their struggles to defend and promote their own interests and projects" (Ibid, 84).

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[6] In Norman Long's *Development Sociology – Actor perspectives*, Long defines lifeworlds as the social world of an individual produced through "individual's own constant self-assembling and re-evaluating of relationships and experiences. Lifeworlds embrace actions, interactions and meanings, and are identified with specific socio-geographical spaces and life histories" (2001, 241)

However, the actor-oriented approach comes short in analysing the different stages of the internalisation. Long and others (Landini et al. 2014) have also claimed that the field of development still lacks studies on community psychology, especially concerning rural development. For this aspect, the next section will discuss the concepts of identity and internalisation to elaborate further on the process of how political internalisation occurs.

1.3. Social Influence on Individuals – The Internalisation Process

The use of psychological theories seem crucial to elaborate on how and why subject individuals react in a certain way to rural development projects (Landini et al. 2014). Hence, this section aims to elaborate on the framework of an individual in the social system using the social influence theory of Herbert Kelman that was first introduced in 1958 and continues to be applied in various studies, such as in field of education (Estrada et al. 2011; Hwang 2010), business administration (Wang, Meister, and Gray 2013), and even studies related to social media (Ifinedo 2016). Kelman's tripartite integration model of social influence (TIMSI) provides a theoretical framework of why and how an individual accepts change based on their *interests, relationships* and *identities* (Estrada et al. 2011; Kelman 1961, 2006). Thus, despite being quite old, it continues to be applied and practised by modern "social psychologists … [who study] about the links between personal and national identity, between intragroup and intergroup processes, and between individual behavior and the functioning of social systems" (Eagly, Baron, and Hamilton 2004).

In the extensive studies on social influence and attitude change conducted by Herbert Kelman, he defines attitude change as the outcome of negotiations based on either or both instrumental and self-maintenance concerns and can be categorised in three different processes:

compliance, identification and internalisation (1958, 1961, 1979, 2006, 2017). Compliance is claimed to take place when the social influence of another individual or organisation is accepted by one, who hopes "to attain a favorable reaction from the other—either to gain a specific reward or avoid a specific punishment controlled by the other, or to gain approval or avoid disapproval from the other" (2006, 3). Hence, the individual abides by the rules and regulations outlined by the social system to secure their personal interests (Ibid, 14). Furthermore, in regards to the membership and participation in the social duties, they are more inclined to be passive with minimal input so long as their interests are secured. This eventually leads to detailed monitoring by the intervening actors to efficiently manage the means control (Ibid, 4). Therefore, Kelman concludes that for "individuals who are primarily rule oriented, relationship to the national group represents … a conferred or nominal identity element in their personal identities" (Kelman 1997, 175).

As for identification, which is also known as role orientation, occurs when an individual either aims "to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to the other" as a form of *reciprocal-role expectations* or for a *classical identification*, in the hopes to become more like the other person initiating the change (Kelman 2006, 4). This influence takes place when the subject individual is attracted to the self-defining characteristics and thus surveillance is not necessary as compared to the attitudinal changed occurred through compliance (Ibid, 6). Since the acceptance of the social influence is based on the role itself, these people are more likely to be active supporters in enacting the policies introduced, instead of upholding the values and beliefs (Ibid, 16). Consequently, it is similar to compliance in the sense that change does not occur from the *intrinsically satisfying* aspect of the intervention, and thus, the individuals accepting the influence continue to be reliant on the external supports that are to be provided (Ibid, 64-65).

The final process is internalisation, which is assumed to have taken place due to *value congruence,* "where the induced behavior is perceived as conducive to the maximization of the person's own values, or the form of affective appropriateness, where the induced behavior is perceived as continuous with the person's self-concept" (Kelman 2006, 4). In this case, an individual sees the credibility of the intervention agents in terms of *expertness* and *trustworthiness* (Ibid, 5). Therefore, Kelman states that these individuals are "more responsive to issues of group survival, because they are not merely concerned with the physical survival of the group but with the values for which it stands" (Kelman 1997, 176). However, internalisation does not necessarily imply that the intervention is fully integrated without any modification. Instead, Kelman claims that at times, some adjustments are made so that it fits one's values better, thus making their loyalty to the group or organisation *conditional* (Kelman 1961, 65). Hence, those that have accepted the social influence based on the value orientation are more likely take an active part in "formulating, evaluating, and questioning policies" of the social system than those of rule or role orientation (Kelman 2006, 16).

In the socialisation process of developing national identity, it is important to understand what this process entails. Nation, according to Kelman, "provides individuals with a larger arena in which to develop themselves," and so it is a means to satisfy their needs of *self-protection* and *self-transcendence* (1997, 179). Thus, the analysis helps distinguish the processes taken in "(a) the adoption of the specific elements of the national identity, i.e., of the beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations that make up the national identity as a collective product; and (b) the development of an orientation to the nation itself (Kelman 2006, 10).

In *Nationalism, patriotism, and national identity* (1997)*,* Kelman notes *sentimental* and *instrumental* attachments as two sources of attachment one develops to a group. The former is

driven by the "perception of that group as representative of their personal identity – as somehow reflecting, extending, or confirming their identity" (Ibid, 173). For the latter, it "refers to people's attachment to a group based on perception of that group as meeting their personal needs and interests and those of the other members of the social category encompassed by the group" (Ibid.). The two sources occasionally produce a synergy effect in which it is possible that when one's material needs and desires are satisfied, it may enhance one's affiliation with the group and thus, strengthening their concept of the communal identity. Likewise, those who were attracted by the sentimental aspect may also look forward to the protection of interests and support from the associated group (Ibid.). So within these attachments, the formerly mentioned orientations and the processes of attitudinal change develop in a non-mutually exclusive manner, depending on the social situation in which the primary interests of the individuals are adhered to (Kelman 2006, 14-15).

Table 1: Summary of the distinctions between the three processes

	Compliance	Identification	Internalization
Antecedents			
1. Basis for the importance of the induction	Concern with social effect of behavior	Concern with social anchorage of behavior	Concern with value congruence of behavior
2. Source of power of the influencing agent	Means control	Attractiveness	Credibility
3. Manner of achieving prepotency of the induced response	Limitation of choice behavior	Delineation of role requirements	Reorganization of means-ends framework
Consequents			
1. Conditions of performance of induced response	Surveillance by influencing agent	Salience of relationship to agent	Relevance of values to issue
2. Conditions of change and extinction of induced response	Changed perception of conditions for social rewards	Changed perception of conditions for satisfying self-defining relationships	Changed perception of conditions for value maximization
3. Type of behavior system in which induced response is embedded	External demands of a specific setting	Expectations defining a specific role	Person's value system

Source: Kelman, Herbert C. 1961. "Processes of Opinion Change." Public Opinion Quarterly *25(1):67*

1.4. Conclusion

With the rise of globalisation and transnationalism in the modern world, some scholars such as Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, in the work *After the Nation-state: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder* (1994) have argued for the obsolescence of nationalism. But this does not seem to be the case with the rise of nationalist parties in many parts of the world, and studies have shown that less democratic countries are more likely to rely on nationalism for legitimisation (Bieber 2018, 537). In Uganda that is ethnically diverse and with an authoritarian

leader, who himself has continuously urged for stronger nationalism and patriotism, the above-mentioned concepts provide the theoretical framework to explore further.

To briefly summarise the concepts, national identity is a distinct collective identity, based on socio-cultural norms, but with also the aspects of continuity over time and territorial boundaries that further highlight the inclusive and exclusive nature. Integrating the two other concepts of grassroots actors and internalisation, it leads to the assumption that nationalism or national identities can be reinforced by grassroots actors. These actors internalise the support and incentives given by the external forces, which eventually leads to the (re)construction of their collective identities and their conception of an imagined community on the local level. Therefore, the grassroots actors such as the village leaders can be instrumental in social intervention programs and thus, having the ability to impact the definition and adoption of communal identities in the form of national identities.

Applying this framework to study the impact of Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) project on the notion of collective identities, it provides better insight to how each individual's interpretation of the intervention affects the reconstruction of the initial concept of collective identities. Through this approach, it reinforces the idea that depending on the social realities, for example, the given raw materials, the relationship between village members, and many other characteristics of the model villages, actors would have to (re)define their identities to secure their interests. According to the project evaluation report constructed by KOICA, each village had a different approach to the intervention, which resulted in varying outcomes of the project. Hence, the social interface analysis provides a framework to unfold how the SMU intervention *discontinued* the habits and attitudes an individual had prior to it. It then provides the framework to explore the *transformed* meanings of communal identity and the notion of working

together into the local context instead of simply *transferring* the Korean model. It enables flexibility through *multi-layered* meanings instead of the *unitary* and *systematised* knowledge system that is still widespread in many development intervention programs (Long 2001, 176).

As for the purpose of using Kelman's model of the three processes of attitude change, it is not to measure the extent of change in villagers' opinion towards the intervention policies. Instead, the objective of using this model is to provide a theoretical explanation that helps identify the changes that occurred in the village and infer possible motivational forces in accepting the different changes. Kelman's theory also allows to utilise the actor-oriented approach as it focuses on one individual at a time and their relationship with the associated group. Additionally, it also provides a framework to explore how knowledge and values of an organisation can be transformed and assimilated to a smaller group of people who then become the social engineers in expanding the influence to a wider public. In conclusion, the above-mentioned works of Anderson, Long and Kelman affirm the position that the village leaders can be more than mere recipients of aid, by becoming active "implementers, consciously transforming broad guidelines into specific forms of practice" (Long 2015, 79).

Chapter Two:

Methodology and Positionality

For this qualitative research project using the actor-oriented analysis, a mixed-method approach was used to collect data from the fieldwork. With the assistance from my driver who was also my translator, a total of 20 visits were made to three villages and 63 interviews (both individual and group interviews) sessions with 57 both village leaders and village members were conducted.[7] Most of these interviews were conducted in Luganda and it touched upon issues concerning personal identities, the relationships and interactions within the villages, as well as with the local government officials and KOICA representatives, in the hope to understand their perceptions of collective identity better. To further elaborate on these issues, the upcoming sections of the chapter discuss why the focus area was chosen and how focus groups, interviews and participant observation were used to engage with the research participants. In the final sections of the chapter, the issues related to positionality and reflections of researching about identities in the field will be discussed.

Before embarking on five-month fieldwork (August 2019 – January 2020) to Uganda, a short meeting with the Country Director of KOICA of Uganda was successfully arranged. Upon arrival, we met and he shared his general opinions about SMU and how this project is not only applicable but truly needed in Uganda.[8] The director showed strong belief in the need for an attitudinal change for both individual and national developments, just like South Korea

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[7] In this research, village leaders were identified and labelled as so but for the non-village leaders, they were simply identified as village members.
[8] Country Director, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (August 29, 2019).

experienced. Throughout the interview, he was positive towards the changes being made in the model villages and attributed it to the integration of the three values of SMU (diligence, self-help and cooperation) into the everyday lives of the villagers. Although the interview session was relatively short, it was good enough to portray the determination KOICA had for the project, and their willingness to support academic scholars. They provided all the necessary information before going into the field, including the locations of the villages and the contact information of the village leaders. They also provided contact information of the KOICA interns in Mpigi District who were directly involved in the village projects. Therefore, the KOICA representatives were active mediators at the initial stage of this research who helped build a connection with the village members.

2.1. Focus Areas

The fieldwork was conducted in three model villages of the ESMV project. Although it would have been best to research all the seven villages, only three were chosen for better efficiency and management purposes during the limited time frame. These villages were Kiwumu A, Kkumbya, and Lukonge, which were located in Kammengo sub-county, Buwama sub-county and Nkozi sub-county respectively (see Figure 1). The three were chosen based on their performance ranking from both mid-term (2017) and final evaluation reports (2018) published by KOICA, which assessed the inclusivity of the village projects, the efficiency of the projects in terms of time and financial management, achievements and impacts of the projects, and finally the sustainability of the project outputs. So according to these assessments, Kiwumu A ranked first, Kkumbya came in third and Lukonge was the sixth (see Table 2, highlighted in red). However, it is important to note

that the three villages were not chosen for comparative purposes, but instead to balance the data despite being limited and provide a rather reasonable overview of the project in general.

Figure 1: Map of Mpigi District

Source: KOICA. 2018. Project for Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages in Uganda - Final Project Report (2015-2018): 2

Table 2: Score ranking based on village performance

#	VILLAGE	SCORE			RANK		
		2017	2016	Change	2017	2016	Change
1	Kiwumu A	84.62%	65.85%	▲18.77%	1	2	▲1
2	Lwaweeba	76.75%	58.03%	▲18.72%	2	5	▲3
3	Kkumbya	74.56%	68.98%	▲5.58%	3	1	▼2
4	Kololo	70.51%	59.95%	▲10.56%	4	4	■
5	Tiribogo	68.70%	50.01%	▲18.69%	5	7	▲2
6	Nsamu	62.71%	62.93%	▼0.22%	6	3	▼3
7	Lukonge	57.65%	52.80%	▲4.85%	7	6	▼1

Source: KOICA. 2018. Project for Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages in Uganda - Final Project Report (2015-2018): 50

Kiwumu A

To briefly describe Kiwumu A village, it was relatively a small village compared to the other six model villages, with a population of 441 people.[9] The village was around a two-hour drive from central Kampala and rather quite far from the main road. The roads from the high way to the centre of the village were all murram, but it was very well levelled and wide, so despite it being a rainy season, the roads were not very difficult to travel. At the centre of the village, many shops selling different kinds of agricultural goods, clothes, telecommunication services and even shops with automobile spare parts were found. Other than the SMU logos painted in many buildings, these vibrant economic activities in the middle of the village clearly distinguished it from other neighbouring villages and even the other two model villages, Kkumbya and Lukonge (see Images 1 and 2).

Kiwumu A gave an overall impression of being very systematic in terms of mobilisation and arrangement despite being self-reliant and independent individuals. Thus, there was not much difficulty in scheduling and conducting the interviews with the participants. Although the issue of leadership will be explicitly dealt with in chapter six, to briefly mention, the leaders in this village seemed to play an outstanding job in interacting with other members in the village, arranging plans to expand their social networks, managing time and also delegating roles and responsibilities for the division of labour and to maximise productivity. In general, Kiwumu A's high performance in KOICA's evaluation reports was quite self-explanatory and the reasons behind this will be

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[9] According to the mid-term (2017) and final (2018) evaluation reports published by KOICA, the village is claimed to have 441 people. However the Secretary for the local government system (Local Council 1) in the village identified the village population as 1037 people. This information discrepancy could be caused by the lack of updated information on the national population consensus. Based on Uganda Bureau of Statistics, the most latest Area Specific Profiles on the national population and housing consensus, is of 2014 published in 2017.

discussed further in the sections about the interviews, participant observation and reflection and also in the upcoming chapters.

(Image 1: The way to the centre of Kiwumu A village)

(Image 2: Different shops selling everyday commodities, farming equipment, some automobile spares and telecommunication services in Kiwumu A village)

Kkumbya

Kkumbya was located further away from Kampala than Kiwumu A, and also with steeper and narrower murram roads. Usually, it took around a two-hour and half drive from central Kampala but varied greatly depending on the weather and traffic. The village was situated quite far from the main road and the steep murram roads during the rainy season made travelling much more difficult. The meeting point for the villagers in Kkumbya was the building where the coffee huller machine donated by KOICA was kept (See Image 3 and 4). This building was constructed through the village savings to enhance the value-addition process of the harvested coffee beans and thus, it was considered as one of the biggest accomplishments and the centre for the village.

In Kkumbya, according to the chairperson and other committee leaders, the main source of income was through coffee farming. They stated that almost every homestead had a coffee farm and thus, it was the reason to why the village economic development plan under the ESMV project was to produce coffee using the brand name *Kkumbya Equator Coffee* (See Image 5). Although the details of cooperation with KOICA will be further elaborated in chapter five, to briefly explain the value addition process, the villagers bring their coffee beans to the machine to be hulled and then they are sent to Makerere University Agricultural Research Institute to be roasted. The roasted coffee beans are then packaged by the villagers for sale. The revenues earned from the sales are then returned to the coffee farmers depending on their contribution, thus explaining the strong inter-connectedness witnessed in the village.

Such strong collectivism was also noticed during the interviews where they always came in groups and expressed their desires to improve their individual living standards through another village business: a village catering service like Lukonge.[10] Most of the discussions with the village

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[10] Kkumbya group interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

members during the interviews and even simple casual conversations during the participant observations were about the village as a whole, rather than the individual, which gave a strong family-oriented atmosphere. The family-oriented style was also noticed when I introduced myself using a local name (Namubiru, a name that indicates belongingness to the Mmamba clan of Buganda) to interact with people in the field. Many villagers treated me more like a family member and would call me 'sister' from time to time, which quite contrasted with the reactions noticed in the other two villages.

In general, these tendencies of working together and aspiring for collective projects for both individual and group satisfaction therefore, portrayed strong interdependency in Kkumbya. In the case of Kiwumu A, the villagers were already quite independent and more self-reliant and thus, their survival was not directly tied to the inter-dependence of all village members. While as in Kkumbya, their approach to collectivism seemed to primarily focus on encouraging individuals to first come together and then work together to achieve the collective goal. Therefore, in Kkumbya, strong collective action seemed more significant in maintaining one's economic goals which would then possibly lead to self-reliance in the future.

(Image 3: Sign post of the road to the centre of Kkumbya; Image 4: The building for coffee machines)

(Image 5: Kkumbya Equator Coffee brochure)

Lukonge

Lukonge was the furthest village from Kampala to visit in this research. It was located nearer to the Equator and was around a three-hour drive from central Kampala. The village was not too far away from the main road and thus, not too difficult to find like the other two villages. The

chairperson of Lukonge was a man in his 30s who was considered relatively young compared to the chairpersons in the other model villages, who were in their 40s and above.[11]

In the case for Lukonge, out of the many supports provided by KOICA, including the maize milling machines and livestock, the biggest source of economic income for the village members was from the village catering service. Although this topic will also be further explained in the upcoming chapters, to briefly describe the village project, Lukonge received tents, chairs and saucepans that can host up to 500 people from KOICA (see Image 6 and 7). Lukonge rented out these products and earned a faster and higher income than the other model villages, and thus the village members seemed very satisfied.[12]

However, mobilisation in the village seemed slightly more difficult than the other two villages. Arranging and maintaining the schedules with the chairperson was not problematic but with the members including both leaders and non-leaders was slightly difficult. Besides, cooperation amongst the villagers did not seem to be as efficient as Kiwumu A and Kkumbya due to issues related to communication and individual values. During the interviews, it was stated that around 20 per cent of the village members were not cooperating with the changes being made, no were these people willing to even listen.[13] Furthermore, some of the respondents showed reluctance to convince these people to join, because it was considered to be a loss of their own time and energy when they can simply remove these uncooperative people from the list of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, all the respondents claimed that the intervention programs have

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[11] Usually in the villages that are farther away from town, they are more likely to elect a chairperson (the Local Council 1) who are considered elders in the villages, whereas in town, younger people with higher educational backgrounds aim to climb up the political ladder. Thus, the relatively young age of the chairperson was quite striking.

[12] Lukonge group interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 29, 2019).

[13] Lukonge group interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 29, 2019).

improved their living standards, and thus, they were willing to continue working with KOICA even in the future.

(Image 6: Group interview session with Lukonge People; Image 7: Catering service chairs in Lukonge)

2.2. Focus Groups

Focus groups were used in this research as a stepping stone into the community and find potential research participants. During the first meetings with each village representatives, I informed them of my desire to have an open discussion with any village members (roughly around 10 to 15 members) about the ESMV project, their communities and everyday social issues. All the three chairpersons were very supportive and accepted the request to arrange a platform for the open group session.

The very first meeting with a village representative was the meeting with Mr Michael Lutalo, the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer (from Local Council 3) of Buwama sub-county. A semi-structured interview was conducted on September 17, 2019, and various issues regarding

the implementation and the monitoring process of the ESMV project was discussed. Through Mr Lutalo, a meeting with the Kkumbya village people was arranged. On September 19, 2019, the first group session took place in which 10 people gathered (see Appendix 1 for the anonymous list of all research participants). With the assistance from the administrative officer of Local Council (LC) 3 who translated Luganda to English and vice versa for me, I was able to introduce myself to the community and also conduct a short survey (see Appendix 2).

The survey prepared had questions about the general information of the respondent, for example, the number of household members, head of the household, the highest level of education and a few others. It also included some simple questions requiring not more than a tick or circle regarding their opinions towards the ESMV project. Initially, the survey was prepared in hopes to ease the process of identifying potential research participants and when these people were chosen, they would be interviewed and throughout the fieldwork, they would be given three additional questionnaires. These questionnaires were to produce follow-up questions for the interviews and also gradually engage the participants to unfold their various social interfaces and layers of identities.

However, in the actual field, this was not feasible. For the first group session with people from Kkumbya, 15 survey copies were prepared in English hoping that the participants who can read and write English would complete the form during the session. Whereas for those who cannot, they would take it to their homes and complete it with the help of either their children or another family member who knows English.[14] But after discussing with the village participants and the LC3 representative, it was decided that it would be too troublesome and complicated, and thus, it

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[14] English is one of the official languages in Uganda, and according to the Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports, for the schools in rural areas, from primary 1 to primary 4, the local language is to be used as a medium of instruction, but from onwards, English is no longer a second language subject and thus being used as the medium of instruction (2004, 20).

reached a conclusion that it would be best to do it all together. The LC3 representative translated the survey to Luganda and everyone filled in the form together, which led to the same or very similar answers in their responses to the ESMV project-related questions.

Kiwumu A also had a similar issue. The first meeting with a person from Kiwumu A took place on October 10, 2019, and was with the vice-chairperson due to the absence of the chairperson on that particular day. A semi-structured interview was conducted and with the assistance from my translator, I was able to introduce myself, the research objectives and fieldwork plan. The vice-chairperson gave a general overview of the ESMV project and the impact SMU had brought in the village. After the interview, a request was made to the vice-chairperson whether 10 to 15 people or even more could gather to share their experiences with the ESMV project in the next visit. Also in hopes to save time, 15 copies of the survey, was given to the vice-chairperson to be distributed amongst random villagers who will fill and bring it to the next session. In the first group meeting, a total of 15 people arrived (although two had to leave earlier), but because the vice-chairperson forgot to distribute the questionnaire, none were filled before the meeting. Eventually, it was filled in altogether as a group (see Image 9), like Kkumbya, and it took away the opportunity to be completely free from peer pressure.

Nevertheless, it was a useful opportunity to solidify my image as an independent researcher with no affiliation with KOICA. The semi-casual interactions during the two sessions led to discussions related to the 'mind-set change' and other communal activities that the ESMV project (re)introduced to the villages. These topics provided insight into the topics that were to be discussed in-depth in the upcoming sessions. Towards the end of the first group sessions in both villages, it became easier to identify potential research participants for an in-depth interview. With

the help of the chairpersons, individual interviews with 10 villagers were scheduled, including my

participation in the next *Bulungi bwansi* for the two villages.

In the case of Lukonge, it was slightly different compared to the above-mentioned villages.

The first meeting with the chairperson took place on October 22, 2019. The chairman gave an

overview of the benefits received from KOICA and the information regarding communal activities

(Image 8: First group session in Kkumbya)

in the village. When the tour around the village and the semi-structured interview came to an end,

the same survey copies were left with the chairperson in hopes to be filled by the focus group

before the next meeting. In the next meeting, 10 people gathered with the survey all filled and a

very causal discussion took place about ESMV project and various social issues in the village,

including the free-riders in the village projects. It was a very constructive session, which vividly

exposed the various social interfaces that both leaders and non-leaders go through ever since the

implementation of the project. Thus, in the case for Lukonge, all the participants who attended the

first group session were asked to join an individual interview in the upcoming sessions, to which they all agreed.

Therefore, in the process of identifying potential interview participants from the focus groups, there was not much leverage to demand for respondents according to a specific list of criteria such as age group, gender, or even the level of education, as planned in advance. A request was also made to meet some uncooperative village members, but this too got derailed. Hence, some considerations were made based on age and gender within the given pool of gathered members during the first session. However, to compensate for this loss in the direct involvement of creating a focus group, during the participant observation, where more interaction took place with a wider group, recruitment of some participants was possible and thus created some balance.

(Image 9: First group session in Kiwumu A - completing the survey together)

Interviews

In this research, all kinds of interviews, including the open, life story, and the active interview were used to avoid any "bias, error, misunderstanding, or misdirection" from various discussions with the participants (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, 3). A total of 67 people, including both villagers from the model villages, the SMU training leader from the National Farmers' Leadership Centre (NFLC), the Korean counterparts (the Korean ambassador, country director, project manager and the interns of KOICA) and also some Buganda people who were not from the model villages were interviewed. Although not all sessions were recorded, those that were recorded were done so with the consent of the interviewees and later on transcribed for reference.

The interviews with the non-villagers were all conducted once individually, but when any questions arose during the data management process, a follow-up was made either through emails or short text messages. The interviews with these participants were primarily centred around the

(Image 10: First group session in Lukonge)

implementation process of the ESMV project, their opinions on the bilateral relationship between Korea and Uganda, challenges and also their expectations of the project, and also about the socio-cultural norms, to discuss the issue of national identity. The setting of the interviews, with the exception of the SMU training leader from NFLC, were all conducted from the workplaces of the participants. Before the interviews, all the interviewees were notified of the purpose of this

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research and were also informed that any information that they wish not to be used would be completely off the record. In addition, in respect to the Korean anti-graft law (also known as the Kim Young-ran Act),[15] no act of any material compensation was carried, other than a very sincere gratitude text messages via phone and emails.

In contrast, interviews with the village members were conducted quite differently. Three interview sessions with each research participants were arranged (although not everyone could attend all the three sessions) and each session had a different broad theme, whereby one focused on their personal identity and their immediate political unit. The other session then concentrated on one's identity in relation to KOICA and thus aimed to discuss their challenges and their distinct village characteristics. Finally, the last session was to elaborate on one's personal identity in relation to a broader political unit, the nation. This was the session that focused much more on one's concept of a collective identity in the form of a national identity and their everyday challenges in the construction of this identity (see Appendix 3 for the prepared interview questions for each session).

Each individual interview session took an average of 30 to 40 minutes since translation was required in most cases. For the group interviews, if it was less than three people, it took around an hour, whereas for a larger group, it was more discursive and hence, approximately two hours. The flexibility for each interview duration enhanced the engagement in various and also in-depth conservations of any related topic or issue. The preparation of water, bread and some sweets for each session also helped to lighten up the atmosphere and indulge the participants in a more open discussion, even when discussing political issues. But to avoid any distortion from very subjective

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[15] This is a Korean law that came into effect in September 28, 2016. According to this law, any *improper solicitation and graft act* is prohibited and it includes food and drinks services that goes beyond 30000 Korean won, gifts that are more than 50000 Korean won and flowers and wreaths for either congratulating or consoling purposes above 100,000 Korean won in value are all prohibited (Ahn 2016).

and emotional perception of the interviewees, some techniques such as the *retrospective inspection* and *mutational questions* that allowed a direct reference to a specific event, situation, or even people were asked to obtain more credible information from the interviewees' whole range of experiences (Beuving and De Vries 2015, 95).

Participant Observation

Despite the above-mentioned measures taken into consideration, it is always easier said than done (for both me the researcher and the respondents) and thus, there was a need to develop more familiarity and intimacy to observe and witness the various social interfaces experienced by the participants (Goffman 1989, 126). Hence, in this research that focuses on how the grassroots actors adhere and make meaning of the external support and act as a group, participant observation was one of the key methods to understand the social dynamics occurring in the villages better.

For this purpose, participation in various *Bulungi bwansi* (term locally used in the villages to refer to any village cleaning and collective activities) for each village was requested to the chairpersons. In total, three active participations in village cleaning (gardening and road maintenance) and two farming activities (harvesting coffee beans and green vegetables) were undertaken for this research. Usually, village leaders would gather to decide and plan for the next communal activities and notify the village members a week in advance. All the activities began in the morning and would go on until one or two o'clock in the afternoon depending on the weather and how fast people gathered and completed the activities.

In the model villages, one of the most common *Bulungi bwansi* as mentioned by the village members was to gather and help the community elders build cleaner toilets and stronger drying

racks for kitchen utensils, or even help them clean around their farms and houses. However during the fieldwork period, it was rainy season in Uganda and so, it would rain almost every day which made the road maintenance of a higher priority. Therefore, in all the *Bulungi bwansi* that I attended, greater time was spent in cleaning and levelling the roads that were impacted by the continuous rain, which was later followed by a short period of group gardening activities, such as weeding and selective picking of the coffee beans, in the farms owned by a group of villagers and also near the communal areas. But by personally participating in these activities, observation on different attitudes of the village members engaging in *Bulungi bwansi* was noticed.

For example, in the case of Kkumbya, starting from nine o'clock, when drumming began, people slowly gathered at the communal coffee building. They would begin by weeding the surroundings and slowly move up to the roads that would be dug and levelled to maintain the width of the roads. The grass next to it would also be cut and well maintained, and any rubbish found would be collected for proper disposal. As for the farming activities, coffee beans were harvested through selective picking at the farm that was owned by some group of villagers, located close by the building. The villagers brought a small basket to hold the coffee beans and were later collected in a bigger basket that was used to transport it to their homes where they would dry it. In these communal activities, women and men from different age groups, including some young children came to participate in the village activities. They all brought their own gardening tools for the job and casually engaged in social conversations. However, it was noted that there were not many male youths who participated in the village activities. It was through the small talks where some people informed me that the younger men preferred to become *boda-boda* (motorcycle used as a taxi) men and thus wished to be closer to the main roads that led to the centre of the sub-county.

In the case of Lukonge, it was also similar to Kkumbya. *Bulungi bwansi* took place almost every Wednesday and public announcement of it would be made beforehand. On the day for the cleaning, drums were used to remind the people to participate. Building and reconstructing the roads damaged by the rain was of a high priority in Lukonge as well due to the wet season. People gathered in the morning with their hoes to widen and level the roads that have been affected by the rain. It was then proceeded by cutting the grass and weeds that were on the roadsides and together with the collected rubbish, they were all taken to the communal disposal area which was later burnt. During this session, some village members who could speak English informed me that they would drum again when only a small group of people arrived, but in general because, these people have witnessed the benefits of collaborating with KOICA (receiving livestock and different types of agricultural machines), there was enough motivation to continue taking part in the collective activities and hence, almost no need for a second reminder.

The same aforementioned activities were carried out for *Bulungi bwansi* in Kiwumu A as well. The only difference was how Kiwumu A seemed slightly more systematic in the way they monitored and enforced the collectively agreed-upon rules of the village to reduce the number of free-riders, especially the youth. *Bulungi bwansi* began at around seven o'clock in the morning, usually on Wednesdays, and drumming was also used to call everyone (or at least one person from each household) to join. When people arrived, the secretaries of Kiwumu A, just like the secretaries from the other two villages, went around creating a list of all the participants so that they can use it as a record.

However, in Kiwumu A, the leaders took a step further in the monitoring and enforcing process by checking on those that missed the session without prior notification. The leaders informed me that they visited these people and took them to the site where the activity was

performed. From the site, they tried to emphasise how each individual contribution is important in building communal welfare. But, when such behaviour persisted, then the chairperson also confronted the defiant and later warned them that if they continued to deviate from the formerly agreed village norms, they will have to be excluded from the beneficiary list for the public goods. In the worst-case scenario, during a conversation with one of the leaders, he claimed that there were some rumours that the local government wanted to put a law to enforce active participation of *Bulungi bwansi*. Thus the leaders could use this possibility of police supervision as a method to instigate fear, which then may enhance active participation.[16] Nevertheless, there wasn't a specific punishment for not participating in the village activities and instead it was simply sustained by the goodwill of the villagers or simply by individuals who wished to maintain their relationship with various individuals in their respective social groups.

In general, the participant observation was a very constructive method in collecting data from the field. Despite the lack of (or at times very limited) understanding in the conversations between the village members due to the language barrier, observation on how each participant constructed their realities and their social networks were still possible. In fact, the language barrier helped me to be more attentive to their behaviours, by inferring and analysing the changes the villagers mentioned during the interview sessions and also the practice of the SMU values: *diligence*, *self-help* and *cooperation*. But again, the observation was also made while I practised the activities mentioned by the villagers. This, therefore, marked my presence as an outsider but also as a fellow community member who is trying to understand their social norms and contributing to the communal welfare of the villages. Eventually, these efforts paid off since I was able to earn the trust of the village members, which was quite essential for the discussion on the

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[16] KA (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

social interfaces regarding both social and political issues of the community, but especially concerning the president.

(Image 11: People slowly gathering for Bulungi bwansi in Kkumbya)

(Image 12: Kiwumu A secretary showing the records he has made over the years)

(Image 13: Harvesting coffee beans)

2.3. Positionality and Reflections

In this research on the (re)construction of collective identities in the villages where South Korean intervention is taking place, my identity as a young Korean researcher in the field was of a big advantage. Besides, my former experience in the country allowed me to identify and connect with the key informants, such as the translator, the KOICA representatives that provided all the data and social networks regarding this project. These factors also eased the connection with the other Buganda people that were not affiliated with the model villages but could provide other related background knowledge for both confirmation and comparison purposes. My presence was, therefore, not perceived as a threat to both Koreans that treated me simply as a young graduate

student and the local villagers who either saw me as a young student or as a mediator in between their relationship with KOICA.

To elaborate on the relationship with the KOICA representatives, my national identity, my educational background in political studies in Korea and my former experience of living in Uganda allowed me to present myself as a partial insider. Using these narratives, I was able to reaffirm my image as a young scholar, trying to fully understand the intervention process of a South Korean model of rural development in Uganda. "I did sometimes emphasize a certain junior, learning and affirming role," especially when I aimed to discuss the national gains for South Korea for conducting this particular project and also the bilateral relationship with Uganda in both socio-political and economic dimensions (Sung-mi Kim 2019, 63). In this regard, some Korean respondents seemed to be more empathetic and genuinely interested in my academic progress. They engaged in some conversations about their conflicted realities in which their initial plans and expectations of the Uganda government were not entirely in accordance with the actual results. They were also not hesitant to offer some advice based on their personal fieldwork experiences or provide contacts of other affiliated people that may be helpful to me. As a form to express my gratitude, as mentioned in the earlier section, although no material compensation was involved, emails and text messages were exchanged to express my appreciation for their time and effort and also to inform them of the accessibility of my research work when completed.

In regards to the social dynamics with the village research participants, depending on the individual, I seemed to either be perceived as a young independent researcher or as a mediator who could link them better to the Korean organisations: KOICA and the Korean embassy. During some interview sessions with the individuals who saw me and treated me as a young scholar, I experienced "a manifest goodwill by the interviewee towards the interviewer's research subject,"

which could have been due to my gender and thus also known as the *paternalism effect* (Abels and Behrens 2009, 145). Such effect was more evident during interviews with older male leaders, who engaged in a detailed but also lively discussions like an older relative, about how their villages were, what it is now, and how they plan to overcome other challenges in the villages. Unconsciously, I might have acted in such a manner, in which I depicted myself as a younger community member, but there was mutual respect for both parties throughout the sessions and no uncomfortable moments were experienced due to gender nor age factors.

As for the village participants who regarded me as a mediator between their relationships with the Korean counterparts, the ambience was quite similar in the sense that the interviewees engaged actively in the conversations. However, the difference was on the way some would continuously divert from the initial topic of the conversation into what they currently need – the capital. Their emphasis on the financial constraints and requests to make it better, which included personal donations or from my friends, made these particular sessions quite uncomfortable as a researcher following the non-monetary compensation approach. In response, I reminded these people of my position as a young independent scholar and as an alternative, I promised to relay their needs and concerns to the Korean organisations, although I would not be able to guarantee the results. Thankfully, both the villagers and the Korean representatives understood my position and there was no difficulty in completing the fieldwork. Thus, after the last individual interview sessions, a litre of cooking oil for all participant was prepared as a token of appreciation. In addition, each interviewee was again reminded that any material, which they did not wish to disclose will be respected and also the availability for contact at any time.

Overall, my national identity, academic background and interest in the subject, particularly in their villages were good enough qualification for the participants to support me in my data

collection process. Much efforts were made to position myself with a neutral attitude towards all the policies implemented by the Koreans, the local government and also within the villages. There were, however, some moments where I felt that the Koreans participants perceived me as a *potential supporter* for this rural development aid policies that are yet to be confirmed as a truly successful new framework in development studies (Sung-mi Kim 2019, 60). It was during these moments where I would try to divert the attention back to the interviewee and focus more on their opinions, which was of not much difficulty. In general, the navigation using the three layers of identity was an efficient tool to position myself as a harmless researcher to all participants and have access to all required information for the research in the limited time frame.

2.4. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter on methodology and the operationalisation process, triangulation of data through document analysis, interviews and participant observations was a process to verify the credibility of each resource (Creswell and Creswell 2018, 209), although, the five-month period was relatively short to fully explore the internalisation of external factors and the formation of collective identities. For the other drawbacks, the inability to live in these villages or at least live in a closer area, limited the number of interview sessions and participant observations for better credibility. In addition, the biggest limitation of this research was for not having the opportunity to meet those outliers in the villages that rejected KOICA intervention, due to the lack of connections. However, despite the limited interviews and participant observation, it was very clear that the majority of the villagers truly wanted development and showed the willingness to accept the Korean intervention (and transform if necessary) for their best advantage. All the obtained data

(ESMV related documents, field notes, recordings and transcriptions) were organised according to the correspondents' affiliation and was always referred to, to build follow-up questions and identify the common similarities and differences in the conception of a common identity of all the research participants, which is further analysed in chapters five, six and seven.

Chapter Three:

The Politics of Ethnicity in Uganda

During colonialism in Africa, the poor infrastructures and the lack of European personnel for each region made administrative work difficult for the Western colonisers and thus, enhanced the need for native actors to do this job (Mamdani [1996] 2018, 72-108). As a result, Britain like the other colonisers in the continent, institutionalised ethnicity to make the task of governing the area more practical through the small colonial officialdom that could be posted there. In doing so, the British colonisers applied the technique of indirect rule that relied on customary rulers for providing a veneer of legitimacy to colonial overrule; this then gave rise to the ethnic kingdoms of modern Uganda, including the centrally important kingdom of Buganda in its modern form.

As a result, there arose in the land groups that built up vested interests in this ethnic politics, and groups that wanted to transcend it and create national unity to legitimise and consolidate power. That defines the problem of Uganda's national unity. Thus, the chapter focuses on the specific programmes and policies through which successive Ugandan rulers tried to promote national unity, to what extent they succeeded and failed. It then leads to the analysis of the underlying dynamics explaining their success and failure until the current leadership. This chapter aims to provide the underlying context in which Museveni warmed up to the South Korean development project and in return created room for grassroots agency to mobilise and re-introduce the concept of national identity for the upcoming chapters.

3.1. Colonial creation of ethnic politics

British rule and the rise of Buganda

To briefly discuss the history of colonial rule and its impact on the rise of Buganda, in 1890, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) began to officially mandate Uganda.[17] The British colonial administrators claimed Buganda as the most eligible native candidate for the indirect rule due to their level of socio-cultural and political advancement that was witnessed through their functioning judicial, financial and administrative bodies (Speke 1863; Stanley 1878, cited in Kiwanuka 1970, 232; Mamdani [1996] 2018, 78). This led to the signing of the treaty of protection between Mwanga II, the *Kabaka* (meaning King) and Frederick Lugard, the British colonial administrator, in the same year. But not before long, the British government took over the colonial administration when IBEAC lacked capital for general administration. Hence Buganda was officially declared as the British Protectorate in 1894. Soon, it led to the signing of the Buganda Agreement of 1900, which gave it some self-autonomy and legitimacy to take administrative control over other kingdoms, including Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro (Commonwealth of Nations). The legitimate administrative control was of great importance because this led to the formation of the Mailo land tenure system.

According to the new tenure system, approximately 19,600 square miles of land covering the Buganda region was distributed amongst the Baganda ruling class that included the *Kabaka*, chiefs and other individuals that were loyal to the kingdom, for perpetual ownership (Mulindwa 2019). As for the majority of the lower social class that didn't own land but were living on those

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[17] The Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty was conducted on July 1, 1890, between Germany and Britain to recognise each countries' spheres of influence in eastern Africa. Due to the signing of this treaty, this meant that the treaty of protection of Buganda that was originally signed by Carl Peters, the German explorer and Mwanga II, the *Kabaka* (king) of Buganda in 1889 was nullified and transferred to the British administration (Kokole et al. 2020).

transformed lands, the *Kibanja* holders, began to pay rent to the landowners, quite similar to a feudal system. The system provided some legal protection from eviction for the *Kibanja* holders, which continues to be appreciated in the present-day. Furthermore, on the economic advantages, these lands were permitted to grow cash crops such as cotton, coffee and tea, which were restricted in other regions like in the northern part of the country.[18] This political and economic dominance that Buganda had, vividly exposed how the colonial practice of *divide and rule* and *indirect rule* impacted the ethnic fragmentation and bitter rivalry in the country, and how it continued to impact the modern politics of Uganda.

Therefore, during colonialism, the preferential treatment for Buganda was evident all across the country. The Kiganda way of life had widespread representation and could openly encourage and cultivate strong ethnic affiliations.[19] Besides, it was a well-known fact that Buganda sought separatism, and hence presented itself "as a self-governing nation within a nation" (Nyombi and Kaddu 2015, 7). As a consequence, it was not long before it exacerbated hatred, distrust and competition towards Buganda in the form of an *anti-Kiganda nationalism*, but also amongst the various ethnic groups that wanted to challenge the authority (Kiwanuka 1970, 235). However, neither pro-Kiganda nor anti-Kiganda nationalist sentiments were strong enough to develop a cohesive overarching identity for the whole country that was primarily invested heavily on their ethnic group identities – and still is in the form of *self-determination* – as a consequence of colonialism (Mamdani [1996] 2018, xvii).

To elaborate, the political crisis of Buganda (1953-1955) that led to the deportation of *Kabaka* Mutesa II showed how national unity was difficult to begin with. Sir Andrew Cohen, who

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[18] These two factors continues to be well appreciated by the modern Baganda farmers, and thus explaining the long-lasting loyalty for the *Kabaka.*

[19] Kiganda is the adjective form of Buganda that can be used to describe all types of socio-cultural norms related to the ethnic group.

was appointed as the new governor for Uganda in 1952, aimed to develop stronger unity in the country by revising the policies for better equality and representation to reduce ethnic fragmentation (Nyombi and Kaddu 2015, 8-9; Ward 1998, 412). The governor also aimed to create stronger solidarity amongst Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania through the formation of the East African Federation but both objectives fell short of his ambitions as it conflicted with Buganda's goals. These objectives were quite obviously a direct disincentive to Buganda's secessionist desires and their semi-autonomous political identity but then again, many Ugandans, in general, were also wary of the likeliness of increased colonial settlers and their dominance as it was the case in Kenya, if the federation was to be established.

The *Kabaka* confronted the governor on these issues and strongly demanded a separate independent identity from Uganda, which resulted in the dethronement and deportation to England in November 1953. Baganda leaders in response organised delegates to represent and support the *Kabaka* in England and also to bring him back to Uganda. In Uganda, *Lukiiko* (parliament of Buganda) which was composed of different political parties, mainly concerning religious groups (i.e. Protestant, Catholic and Muslim groups) came together to arouse anti-colonial sentiments and hinder the governor's plans (Ward 1998, 412). Upon the *Kabaka*'s return in Oct 1955, a new Buganda Agreement was signed and a constitutional monarchy was to be recognised, which in a way gave more political power to the *Kabaka* (Ibid. 433).

The Buganda crisis in effect proved to be an opportunity for Buganda to emphasise its hierarchical position in the country and also for the *Kabaka* to identify his political allies and foes even within the same ethnic group, proving how the roots of fragmentation were deeply embedded. The conflicting political interests of various political groups within Buganda kingdom and also

against other ethnic affiliated political parties was indeed a strong obstacle for the formation of a strong national unity and thus leading to direct confrontation in the later years.

Milton Obote

Policy reforms that took place in Uganda in the late 40s and onwards enabled the formation of new political interest groups including trade unions. These conditions alongside with Sir Andrew Cohen's failure of achieving the previously mentioned objectives to create national and regional unity changed the political landscape, and paved the way for new political parties to form in the late 50s. The newly formed parties were organised by members that prioritised ethnicity and religious values, as a result of the colonial legacy, and thus continued to leave the country highly fragmented, even in post-independent Uganda (Mamdani 1999).

To give a brief overview of the history, the two main political parties in the 50s were the Uganda National Congress (UNC) and the Democratic Party (DP). The former was established in 1952 as the first political party in Uganda and was mainly geared to consolidate Buganda's influence and the interests of the Protestant community. On the other hand, the DP focused on promoting Catholic administration in Buganda and thus positioned itself as the political rival of UNC. But because both parties had such narrow political interests, they were not able to bring the country together as a whole. To tackle this issue of underrepresentation, in 1958, the Uganda People's Union (UPU) was formed. It drew support mainly from the western regions as the party spearheaded against Buganda's preferential status. Two years after, in 1960, it had regrouped with members from UNC that had support from the northern region and formed the Uganda People's Congress (UPC).

The leader of UPC was Apollo Milton Obote, a Lango (person from Langi ethnic group, located mainly in the northern region of the country), who had initially participated in the anti-colonial movements in Kenya early 50s. He promised to focus on minimising the ethnic cleavages that were hindering nation-building projects and national unity. The main focus of UPC was, therefore, to oppose Buganda and their *Kabaka* by mobilising and uniting the country under strong leadership. These kinds of fast political transitions were considered as an imminent threat for many Baganda leaders, so in the following year (1961), the *Kabaka Yekka* (KY, meaning King Only) party was formed to protect the leadership system of the *Kabaka* and maintain the somewhat *independent* status of Buganda (Otunnu 1990, 18).

However, having realised how DP's political support was big enough to guarantee a candidate for the position of the prime minister, KY felt their secession desires and their independent status threatened more than ever. This led to the formation of a political coalition between KY and UPC in 1961, right before the Uganda Constitutional Conference that led to the independence of Uganda. This alliance system enabled KY to win against DP and become the Buganda representative for the upcoming general election. In the general election of April 1962, the alliance system initially seemed to be successful for *Kabaka* Mutesa II, since he became the president and Milton Obote the prime minister. Even so, it was not long before the personal interests began to break the two parties and the country apart.

The alliance began to fall apart when both parties continued to represent themselves with specific ethnic backgrounds and aimed to achieve absolute power at the expense of the other. With regards to the contestation of power, one of the most conflicting issues for the two parties was on the subject of land. Under British protectorate, some Bunyoro's territories that were annexed based on the Buganda Agreement of 1900 were to be returned to Bunyoro. A referendum took place in

1964, but this triggered great disapproval within the coalition members and ultimately accentuated ethnic animosity in the country (Okuku 2002, 16). Further efforts were arranged to outmanoeuvre each other and in February 1966, the Secretary-General of KY urged for the formation of a committee at the parliament to investigate the prime minister and his close parliamentary members for embezzlement and their plans to overthrow the constitution.

Obote who continued to gain political support from many parts of the country, especially from the northern region for breaking the Buganda privilege, declared the suspension of the constitution in reaction the KY claims. He then deposed *Kabaka* Mutesa II, and appointed himself as the president. He later introduced a new constitution that purposely limited political power of the traditional kingdoms and explicitly expanded the presidential power. The Buganda kingdom addressed these events in May by declaring its independence from the country, and demanding the central government to be relocated away from Kampala, to a non-Buganda region. Obote at this point declared a state of emergency and was determined to use military force to destroy the kingdom. He ordered Idi Amin, the then Deputy Army Commander, to seize the *Kabaka's Lubiri* (King's palace) which took the lives of over a hundred people and led to the exile of Mutesa II, which was continued even after Mutesa's death (Bouckaert 1999). These events therefore, officially ended Buganda's dominance and marked the beginning of the power shift from the south (Buganda) to the north (Acholi and Langi).

In the process of consolidating power but also in the hope to bring national unity under a strong government, Obote introduced the "move to the left" policy. This enforced a single-party state and also tried to implement nationalisation in the economic sector, threatening multinational companies. Upon these events, Obote's regime had divided the country into two, the North and the South, instead of uniting it. Hence the military became a necessity for Obote to control the

country amidst the power transition. In addition, Obote's military was highly factional on its own too, due to his preference of selecting soldiers from the north with either Acholi or Langi ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, although Obote had criticised the marginalisation in the country based on ethnicity, he too contributed significantly to sectarianism and hindered the formation of national unity. In retrospect, Obote's regime foreshadowed how different leaders were willing to instrumentalise ethnicity for the consolidation of power just like the colonial administrations and use it to create a false sense of unity that will be elaborated more in the upcoming sections.

3.2. The Troubled Times

Idi Amin's Regime

The concept of collective identity during Amin's regime was quite similar to the previous regimes mentioned above. But what differentiated Amin's rule compared to the two was that as much as they were manifested to ethnic identities, in the course of the rule, there was indeed a period whereby Amin fostered stronger pro-nationalist sentiments in the country through a much more active anti-colonial and Pan-African movements compared to his predecessors.

Amin, just like the colonial administrative officials and Obote, instrumentalised ethnicity in his favour to rise and consolidate his political status. When Amin was still under the command of Obote, Amin was alienated since Obote persisted to prioritise personal and ethnic connections for military positions. Amin reacted to this by building his group in the army with those from his home region, the West Nile (located in north-western Uganda) and contributed to the rivalry. The tension between the two leaders finally blew up in January 1971, when Amin launched a coup and successfully took over the presidency, while Obote was in Singapore attending the Commonwealth

Heads of Government Meeting. Amin was enthusiastically welcomed by many national actors that were discontent mostly with Obote's continuation of the colonial practice of politicising ethnicity. From the international actors' perspective, Amin's accession to presidency was welcoming news to the West, especially because he promised to uphold democracy (Okuku 2002, 21). Also due to Obote's socialist claims and actions, for example, the "move to the left" policy that alerted the possibility of nationalisation occurring for foreign companies, which were predominantly British, was a factor of concern that Amin eliminated for the West (Dowden 2005).

As Amin took over the presidency, he highlighted the issues of "corruption, detention without trial, the activities of the secret police, economic mismanagement, divisive and sectional policies" caused by Obote's regime, to legitimise himself (Glentworth and Hancock 1973, 250). Additionally, in efforts to bridge the ethnic cleavages, Amin permitted Mutesa's body to be returned to Buganda for the traditional funeral and also released over 1,500 political prisoners, who were mainly from Buganda. He also tried to eliminate the socio-cultural barrier between the president and the public, by speaking fluent local languages of the region and also attending many local events, which was something that was never initiated in the previous regimes of the *Kabaka* nor Obote (Kasozi 1994, 105).

In August 1972, Amin took a bolder step to create national unity and gain wider political support by announcing the expulsion of Asians from the country for economic prosperity. He nationalised all the foreign-owned enterprises as a form of affirmative action for Ugandans against the Asians, who he claimed to be hindering national economy and contributing to corruption (Nyombi and Kaddu 2015, 19; Patel 1972, 17). Based on one of the prominent newspaper companies at that time *Uganda Argus*, the local response to the incident seemed positive and supportive of Amin during this initial stage (Mamdani 2011, 19). Furthermore, Amin's refusal to

withdraw the policy despite the international pressure, especially from Britain, helped portray him as an anti-imperialist hero, leading the country in a "political crusade against imperialism worldwide" to many Ugandans and even other Africans (Mazrui 1980, 54).

However, the euphoria was short-lived, as the repercussions for the expulsion left a significant impact on Uganda's economy. The commercial and industrial sectors of the economy collapsed and the tax burden was shifted to the rural agricultural sector that was already burdened by the continued government misconduct. Over the years, Amin's popularity declined enormously and voices of discontent were raised, which again threatened national unity. Amin reacted to this by simply increasing military presence in all aspects of society to maintain his power. It was simply a turn to a reign of terror as Amin's army attacked and raided any community in the country, and also took advantage of the privilege granted through mutual ethnic identity to confiscate personal belongings of civilians and sexually abuse women (Leonard Boyle 2017).

By the late 70s, Amin was perceived by both local actors, such as the supporters of the *Kabaka* and Obote, and international actors, such as Britain and Tanzania, as a common enemy that needed to be overthrown (Otunnu 1990, 35-36). This led to the collaboration of anti-Amin actors to instigate the Liberation War (also known as the Uganda-Tanzania War) that was going to tear the country completely apart (to be discussed in the next section). Therefore, although in the early days of the regime, Amin seemed to balance out the ethnic disparities and also use some aspects of anti-imperialist sentiments to cultivate national unity, favouritism and persecution based on ethnicity (including race) originally introduced and systematised during colonialism never ceased. It only proved how the politics of ethnicity was further institutionalised for a modern patronage system, which in general made the construction of collective identity not likely, also during Amin's regime.

Post-Amin regime – Milton Obote's second regime

When the successful coup enabled Amin's rise to the presidency in 1971, Obote fled to Tanzania where his old friend Julius Nyerere was the president. Nyerere shared similar socialist views with Obote and had thus refused to acknowledge Amin's regime and instead, supported Obote and his supporters to overthrow Amin. This resulted in a conflict near the national borders of the two countries in September 1972. The hostility between the two leaders continued and Amin saw the attack on the anti-Amin rebels in Tanzania as an opportunity to divert the national attention away from the economic and political instability in the country (Roberts 2014, 693). As a result, Ugandan political interest groups with the help from Tanzanian troops formed a political coalition known as Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) to overthrow Amin in 1979.

However, the political coalition was not a strong factor to unite the country as a whole since the war itself also victimised certain social groups in the country, especially the West Nile people and many Muslims in southern Uganda, mainly from Ankole and Masaka region (Kasozi 1994, 127). Furthermore, in the process of gathering soldiers to fight against Amin's dictatorial regime, ethnicity continued to play a vital role in the mobilisation process. For example, the pro-Obote political group, *Kikoosi Maluum* (special unit) that was led by Obote's commander, Oyite Ojok, only accepted new members mainly from the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups, when they entered Kampala. In the case for the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), a political rebel group formed in 1972 and led by Yoweri Museveni, recruited new soldiers mainly from Ankole (Weinstein 2006, 68). As portrayed by the two examples, ethnic factionalism never ceased to influence political action and hence, simply contributed to stronger ethnic affiliations rather than collective national identities.

From 1979 to 1986, the country was far more unstable than ever. During this short period, five different governments were in power. None of these governments was chosen by the mass public and thus they had to rely not only on the armed forces but also the international actors, such as Tanzania, the Commonwealth team, and the international financial institutions, for political support and legitimacy (Kasozi 1994, 128). During each political transition, violence was intensified and bloodshed was unavoidable due to the presence of armed forces from different political groups. When Obote re-positioned himself in power in 1980, he became far more oppressive compared to his previous tenure. Ethnicity became a vital aspect for one to join his army and the "political education for the troops consisted largely in identifying the Baganda in particular and other Bantu speakers, in general as the enemy" (Ibid., 150). Even then, within his administration, ethnic hostility ensued between the Acholi and the Langi, due to the growing suspicion of Obote favouring members from his ethnic group, the Langi. Eventually, all these aspects led to the outbreak of a civil war (also known as the Ugandan Bush War) in October 1980 that resulted in mass killings of innocent civilians. Therefore, although Obote claimed himself to be a "national leader whose concern was to build national consciousness and eliminate compet[ition] for local and primordial loyalties, … his second administration political participation was conducted through ethnic (or tribal) units" (Kasozi 1994, 176).

In general, it should be noted that the post-independent Uganda was close to a state of anarchy due to the colonial policies that divided the nation into various coalitions of interest groups (mostly ethnic groups) that enforced the patronage system and clientelism. Land was indeed one of the most contested factors amongst different ethnic groups, since many relied on agriculture for a living. The direct access to national budgets from taxes and international support (from either sharing similar political ideologies regarding the Cold War or for supporting a country of their

international recognition for sovereignty like Israel) was also one of the motivating factors for different individuals to be extremely loyal solely to their political groups (Otunnu 1990, 35).

Furthermore, the absence of White settlers unlike in other African countries "eliminated the perception of a 'common enemy' which could have been a rallying point … that could arouse mass nationalism" (Otunnu 1990, 14). In other African countries, for example Kenya, the presence of White settlers enabled the growth of anti-imperialist sentiments that enforced nationalism due to the formation of the white minority rule, which occurred at the expense of the native local people (Ibid.). Therefore, in post-colonial Uganda, until 1986, anti-imperial sentiments that formed unity and nationalism were quite hard to find, and personal political ambitions were of a better source of motivation for individuals compared to collective actions based on collective national identities.

3.3. The New Hero

Yoweri Museveni's rise to power

When Obote took over the presidency in 1980, Yoweri Museveni formed the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the National Resistance Army (NRA) for the military group with the former president Yusuf Lule (was president from April 1979 to June 1979, only for 68 days), in 1981 to fight and overthrow Obote. Museveni mobilised the masses for the guerrilla warfare by recruiting members for NRA mainly from the Buganda region where intense anti-Obote sentiments were present. He initiated the Resistance Council (RC) "in which the people elected their leaders and at the same time passed information to NRA on the movement of government troops" (Okuku 2002, 23). Such actions contributed to the positive image of Museveni as a leader committed to unite and democratise the country (Baraka 2019).

During the early years of Museveni's presidency, ethnic consciousness was still at its peak. The unequal distribution of power and wealth amongst ethnic groups from the previous regimes continued its legacy even during Museveni's. Besides, the weak state institutions for legislative and judicial systems continued to pose a threat to the stability and unity of the country. To tackle these issues, he first imposed the one-party state policy. This was because, in the past years, the political parties present were based on ethnic and religious affiliations that continued to intensify sectarianism in the country. To emphasise the inclusiveness of the regime, the NRM included individual members from previously active political parties, but only under the condition that they were not representatives of their former organisations. Such changes seemed to contradict with the previous regimes, and thus, had the effect of legitimising his power and also endorsing national unity.

Museveni also implemented a decentralising policy as a solution to Uganda's problems, which also seemed to be rather successful in rebuilding the nation. In 1986, the RC system that was only found around NRA's military bases in the early 1980s was expanded throughout the country. These committees delegated the responsibility to administer their villages, which meant that they had limited and informal justice systems to settle local disagreements and crimes. They also had the authority to maintain and regulate social infrastructures such as roads that were to be shared by the villages (Kasfir, 2005 as cited in Green 2008, 429). In the following year, it was "institutionalised … which set up a five-tier structure of local governance. The RCs were numbered one through five, with RCI representing the village, RCII the parish, RCIII the sub-county, RCIV the county and RCV the district" (Green 2008, 430). Direct popular elections took place every two years and the RC system was later renamed as the Local Council (LC) system in 1995, which seem to prove how it was well accepted as a success by the majority of the people.

These systems overall seemed to have an impact on empowering government institutions, the non-preferential system and above all, Museveni's promise to promote democracy and national unity.

In terms of the economy, Museveni stepped into office when the economy was devastated. Though the agriculture sector did not suffer a lot due to the high number of subsistence farmers, the transportation, manufacturing and commercial sectors were close to collapsing completely (Warnock and Conway 1999, 4-5). Infrastructures were nearly all destroyed and thus, Museveni implemented economic reforms through liberalisation and privatisation for development and stabilisation. These reforms took place in the main sectors that were heavily subsidised but not producing much profit such as banks, insurance companies, and telecommunications. In addition, Uganda received USD 310 million in the form of aid from international donors like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund from 1987 to 1988. In the same period, it also got to reschedule the amount and date of payments for its foreign debt which alleviated the burden off the government (Ibid, 17).

Though these initial political and economic liberalisation methods seemed to bring presidential legitimacy in both national and international arenas (Dicklitch 2002; Tangri and Mwenda 2001), it was not long before it retreated back to the old habits of the preferential system based on ethnicity and clientelism. Decentralisation using the LC system centralised the powers to LCV (the district Local Council), and thus the competition for the position increased. This made some candidates rely on their ethnic backgrounds for better political advantage. In some extreme cases, the LCV elections led to the outbreak of violence.

For example, during the preparation for the 2002 LCV elections in Kabaale district and Kiboga district, candidates were accused of bringing and bribing more people of their ethnic groups from other regions to gain higher votes. In the case of the Kabaale district, it even escalated

into a case where some xenophobic members from the Banyoro ethnic group killed some from the Bakiga ethnic group (Green 2008, 435). Another incident of malpractice was noticed when the NRM deliberately supported NRM members as LC representatives, and the election in 1989 for the national parliament was conducted in a queuing system instead of a secret ballot. Hence Museveni's promises to work towards democracy and ethnic reconciliation at the beginning of the presidency became much more vague and ambiguous. Instead, it became rather obvious that the main concern of the NRM was also to legitimise and consolidate its power (Okuku 2002, 26).

This issue also trickled down to the economic sector as well. Criticisms for the lack of transparency and constant irregularities in the transaction process became more widespread. NRM's political opponents raised the issue of public enterprises being sold to Museveni's close patrons, especially the ethnically related political allies, and some of these enterprises included the Uganda Grain Milling Corporation, Entebbe Handling Services Ltd., Uganda Commercial Bank and Kampala Sheraton (Tangri and Mwenda 2001, 127). In the above mentioned cases, the president's brother Salim Saleh as well as Sam Kutesa, Museveni's brother-in-law, but also the then Minister of State for Investment and Planning and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, were greatly involved, proving how state resources continued to be mismanaged for private gains instead of the wellbeing for all. Though some institutions for anti-corruption were eventually established to fight against corruption, studies have shown that many institutions continued to be made up of members that had the same ethnic background or shared similar political interests with Museveni (Ibid. 127-129).

Three decades in power

Museveni won his fifth term in office in 2016 general elections, making it his 30th year in power. However, before the Election Day, Museveni's long term political opponent Kizza Besigye was arrested and this led to the outbreak of violence in the streets of Kampala. Many opposition supporters criticised the incumbent government for the failure to tackle corruption, unemployment and the faulty democracy (The Guardian 2016). With regard to these issues, during Museveni's interview with Al Jazeera in 2017, he vaguely addressed them by claiming that Uganda is one of the most democratic countries in the world, which is also why he was legitimately voted into power. He denied any claims of clientelism or nepotism and showed strong affirmation to how he abides by the Ugandan constitution that was constructed under democracy.

However, following up on these claims, Uganda has long been notorious for its endemic "abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International 2019), and in terms of the transparency rate, it ranked 149th out of 180 countries (2018). The mismanagement by highly corrupt government officials has made rent-seeking, insider trading, money laundering and off-book accounts an everyday practice in all economic sectors. Furthermore, the inefficient government regulations and political repression have hindered public projects that led to poor infrastructures in the country, which has widened the gap between the rich and poor. In a country where ethnic identities are of huge significance, economic and political dissatisfaction continues to be a big threat that may lead to ethnic tensions and conflicts as it did in the past.

Ethnicity continues to hinder unity and a strong collective identity in the country. Many believe that the westerners (Banyankole, Bakiga, Banyoro and Batoro) have taken the majority of the key political and economic positions in the country (Jones 2009; Lindemann 2011; Platas 2011). And it was only until recently that the northern part of the country began to stabilise. The northern

part was known to be the base area for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). LRA was a rebel group formed in 1987 that mainly consisted of Acholi ethnic members that felt victimised by Museveni's NRA and people from his ethnic group. It threatened the national and regional stability of the neighbouring countries with an estimated 54,000 to 75,000 individuals abducted from the period of 1986 to 2006 (Pham, Vinck, and Stover 2008, 404). Although the northern region of Uganda is now said to be politically stable, with the last LRA attacks in 2006, the leader of the group, Joseph Kony, is yet to be captured. Thus it may be too rash to completely disregard the possibility of another threat in the region.

Of a more recent issue with ethnic tensions, the demand for the abolishment of the Mailo land tenure system (the land given to Buganda during colonialism under the Buganda Agreement of 1900) has been brought up in the parliament several times and was strongly opposed by many Buganda people (E. Kasozi and Namyalo 2018). For another example regarding the issue of land, tensions between the government and the Rwenzururu kingdom (from Bakonjo and Baamba ethnic groups) that is located in western Uganda, near the borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo can be noted. The tension has always been high due to the secessionist desire of the kingdom that came from the perception of being neglected (whether from access to land or economic opportunities) in the highly patronage political system of the country (Reus and Titeca 2016). With this history, in November 2016, the Ugandan army attacked Rwenzururu kingdom under murder charges for having militias to guard *Omusinga* (meaning king), which is against the law. This led to the death of 46 royal guards, the arrest of 139 royal guards and *Omusinga* Charles Mumbere (Ibid.). Many, including the Human Rights Watch (2019) have asserted that it was the government's intention to suppress any support for the opposition party; nevertheless, it doesn't change the fact that these ethnic minorities were and continued to be abused.

Furthermore, the conflict due to the scarcity of resources is not only restricted to land but also includes the recently found oil reserves in the region. Some scholars have pointed out the possibility of ethnic tensions arising with regards to the redistribution of oil revenue amongst the national government, districts and ethnic kingdoms (Vokes 2012, 313). Though the production of oil is yet to take place, it has been reported that Museveni has centralised his authority in the oil production field and also enhanced the military in the oil refinery region, raising the issue of transparency and corruption (Patey 2015, 24). Increased military and slow economic growth in these regions have only increased the frustration of the people that feel marginalised because of the patronage system based on ethnicity (Ibid.). Therefore, this shows that even in modern politics, ethnicity continues to be intertwined in the national politics, which may threaten national stability. Hence national unity of some form may become crucial for both Museveni and any other future leader that takes over the presidency.

Museveni is currently preparing for his sixth term in office, and so far, his government has constantly been putting in efforts to remind the public of *his contribution towards economic and political stability in the country*. From the 1990s to mid-2000, Museveni was considered as the *darling of the West*, for promoting democracy, encouraging regional stability by deploying peacekeeping troops to Somalia and even supporting former US president Bush's fight against HIV/AIDS through the ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, use Condoms) campaign (BBC 2016; Dicklitch 2002; Perkins 2009). But since then, on numerous occasions Museveni has openly resorted to anti-imperialistic remarks to shift the blame to the West for economic stagnation and even moral decadence in the country, which has created some solidarity in the country.

One of the most controversial issues that arose with the anti-imperialistic remark was on the issue of the anti-homosexuality bill in 2009. According to the bill, those engaged in *aggravated*

homosexual acts were to be punished by death.[20] Though the bill did not pass, it was re-introduced in February 2014 after editing the death penalty to life imprisonment and this time round, it was successfully enacted into law. Although the law was nullified shortly (in August 2014), the two introductions did garner worldwide attention and in many parts of Africa, Museveni was considered a hero for fighting against *neo-imperialism*. Museveni on many occasions around this time retorted to the West that homosexuality was not traditional and morally wrong. This incident got wide media coverage, and in many interviews, it was shown that most Ugandans approved of Museveni's strong determination and were willing to re-elect him for president in the upcoming elections (Biryabarema 2014). Thus, the signing of the bill did unite the country under conservative *traditional* values and also *anti-social imperialism*, regardless of one's ethnic affiliation and effectively legitimised Museveni's role as a true nationalist leader.[21]

In response to the anti-homosexuality law, many Western donor countries including the US, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands withheld aid or loans to Uganda (Croome 2014). China, on the other hand, continued with their *non-intervention policy* and emphasised the so-called *no-strings-attached* development assistance towards Uganda. China was certainly the alternative donor that Uganda could turn to for economic assistance, which would keep the country stable and perhaps even united through development projects. Such assumptions can be drawn

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[20] Aggravated homosexuals were defined as those that conduct same-sex act on a minor, disabled or someone who is not in the position to think rationally due to the influence of drugs or alcohol, and even HIV positive people that engages in same-sex acts or is in a position with more authority than the other (BBC News 2009).

[21] Many African leaders, including President Museveni has argued that homosexuality is not part of their tradition and has shown strong homophobic reactions. However, many historical and anthropological research works have stated that it was the influence of Christianity and British colonialism that restructured some traditional values such as marriage and identity, which then began to criminalise homosexuality. They claim that this colonial legacy has continued to prosper, by using the marriage and family laws, cultivating *sexual citizenship*, which meant anyone who did not fall into this concept were to be stigmatised as "unproductive and unpatriotic" in their societies (Rodriguez 2017, 397). Thus, with such widespread, deeply embedded belief, President Museveni was portrayed as a leader standing for their traditional and national values.

from Museveni's speech at the 2018 Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation, where he promoted investment opportunities in the country that acts as the *confluence points* for different ethnic groups and also emphasised the anti-colonial struggles that both countries have in common against the Western powers (The State House of Uganda 2018a). Also during the celebration in Uganda marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of China, Museveni claimed China to be more supportive of the country by not interfering in their domestic policies, unlike the West that keeps telling them what to do. He further credited Chinese foreign policy for helping build a more reliable bilateral relationship against Western colonialism (Draku 2019). Based on these anti-colonial statements repeated on various occasions for both national and international audiences, it can be understood that Museveni recognises it to be having a positive impact in creating solidarity.

3.4. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, colonialism had an impact by institutionalising national boundaries and ethnic identities in Africa, including in Uganda. Ethnic factionalism and indirect rule that also took place in Uganda initially positioned Buganda as a superior group. This contributed to stronger ethnic fragmentation and rivalry, which enabled Milton Obote to take over the presidency. But Obote's hostile relationship with other ethnic groups and later even with the international actors, paved the way for Idi Amin to take advantage and consolidate power to himself. Similar to Obote, Amin walked the path of creating tensions between ethnic groups, which made him too reliant on military power. When the political exiles returned with international support, Amin was ousted and replaced by other weak regimes that all failed to achieve collective understandings with

different political coalitions (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2016, 605). This eventually enabled Yoweri Museveni to take over the presidency.

Though Museveni's policies to decentralise, using the LC system, the one-party state, attracting foreign investments and also arousing anti-imperialist sentiments did seem to minimise ethnic factionalism and encourage the construction of national collective identity, the effects seem to be very temporary. The country still shows strong ethnic affiliations and even feelings of marginalisation based on ethnicity (Lindemann 2011). However, this is not to say that the problem of division in Uganda is ethnicity in itself, but rather to emphasise that it was manipulated to create an unequal distribution of power and wealth. In fact, when interacting with the common people on a daily basis, it is difficult to come across discrimination and exclusion based on one's ethnicity (further discussed in the next chapters). Additionally, the brief exploration of the politics of ethnicity in Uganda proved that it is beyond one's control to manage how their identities are to be perceived and judged by the others (Sen 2006, 31). Therefore, in the next chapters, it aims to explore how the South Korean development project can contribute to solidarity in such an ethnically fragmented country, as well as focus on how the grassroots actors can be the social drivers in this process.

Chapter Four:

Park in the Rural Areas

Recently, President Museveni has been noted for actively emphasising the need for stronger nationalism and patriotism in Uganda. For example, when Museveni was addressing the local leaders of the country on 1 December 2014, he publicly spoke out about how the ruling party, National Resistance Movement (NRM) was built on nationalism and patriotism as means to fight against "sectarianism, chauvinism, and marginalisation" (Daily Monitor 2014). Even during international events, for example, the 2018 National Liberation Council Meeting, where he attended as a Mediator in the South Sudan Peace Process, he pointed out that, "although society is vertically separated, the future belongs to nationalism and Pan-Africanism" (The State House of Uganda 2018b). With such clear emphasis on the need for nationalism, it becomes unavoidable to ask why and how a South Korean model of rural development was first accepted and implemented in Uganda.

This chapter, therefore, aims to briefly study why and how Saemaul Undong (SMU) was introduced in South Korea. The chapter focuses to understand how SMU contributed to the rise of communal and perhaps national identity in rural areas through a heightened sense of belonging. The key actors involved in the implementation and enforcement measurements in Korea are studied and then the chapter introduces the debates regarding the evaluation of the project. In the third section of the chapter, it discusses about the globalisation of SMU to other parts of the world to postulate what this could mean for Uganda that is discussed in the later chapters.

4.1. Introduction of Saemaul Undong (SMU) aka the New Village Movement

The May 16 coup d'état in South Korea enabled General Park Chung-hee to take over the government in 1961. He then proceeded with numerous policy reforms to legitimise and consolidate his presidential power. In this process, industrialisation was highly prioritised over agricultural investments and eventually led to increased rural-urban migration and rural-urban income disparities (Doucette and Müller 2016, 33; S.-M. Han 2004, 73; S. Park 2009, 115). During the 1967 and 1971 presidential elections, Park noticed his falling popularity in the rural areas, which led him to implement a new action plan to better respond to the needs and demands of the rural population (S.-M. Han 2004, 73).

In April 1970, Saemaul Undong (SMU) aka the New Village Movement was proclaimed. President Park, who was greatly inspired by the rapid industrialisation of Japan (S. M. Park 2010, 77), ordered the distribution of overproduced cement from industries to 33,267 villages, so that the villagers can improve the common needs such as basic housings and infrastructures (Korea Saemaul Undong Center 2005, 3). In 1972, SMU training institutions were established to nurture SMU leaders for not only economic development, but also social and spiritual (mental/attitudinal) development by adopting the three principles – *diligence, self-help* and *cooperation* (K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 4). Thus the movement aimed to achieve enhanced living standards in the rural areas and also to indoctrinate the *'I can do it'* spirit (Korea Saemaul Undong Center 2005, 5)

To mention a few of the encouraged activities for these developments, it included road construction and maintenance, stream/river maintenance, increased livestock farming, organising village funds and savings, and also organising village festivals for higher sales and income (Ibid., 9–10). These were led by committee leaders, who were usually elected by the villagers amongst

relatively young people and served the villages voluntarily (K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 7; Korea Saemaul Undong Center 2005, 11; Nauta and Lee 2017, 198; S. Park 2009, 123). To maximise the productivity of the village members, the government implemented the incentive system whereby, additional resources and support, such as more cement and steel rods were given to highly performed villages. The village performances were evaluated based on the communal developments achieved and were categorised as either *basic (underdeveloped)* village, *self-help (developing)* village or *self-reliant (developed)* village (Korea Saemaul Undong Center 1980, 12). Such top-down approach, therefore, created the competitive structure, which further encouraged the participation of the village members (S. Park 2009, 128).

4.2. The Role of the Key Actors

Like any other community development project, individuals' high-level participation and commitment were crucial in determining the success of the movement (D.-H. Han, Song, and Park 2013, 94). SMU was a top-down rural development that was highly centralised, but also arguable as a bottom-up movement, for there was a limit to what the central government could do for the grassroots actors on a daily basis (E. Lee and Lee 2014, 249; Sonn and Gimm 2013, 27). Therefore, SMU was also of no exception in requiring active participation and commitment of all the social actors involved, and thus, this section of the chapter aims to elaborate on how the two main groups of social actors, the president on behalf of the central government and the village members at the grassroots level, were the social engineers navigating the movement.

The president

President Park was also known as the *development hero,* and as the title suggests, his involvement in the movement was exceptionally high in Korea (Nauta and Lee 2017, 197). The implementation process was initiated by Park, who openly stated that "the development of the mind was the key element to overcome poverty and laziness" (Presidential Secretariat 1972). This high priority stemmed from the belief that if the villagers whole-heartedly practised the three core principles mentioned above, they would become more responsible actors in their communities, with better ability to identify and address their specific needs, and thus naturally strive for positive changes in their environments voluntarily and collectively (S. Park 2009, 122).

Although the overall evaluation of SMU continues to be debated (which will be further discussed in the next section), the pro-mobilising effect SMU had on various communities during the 70s was undeniably contributed by the efforts of President Park (Sonn and Gimm 2013, 27). His involvement in the monitoring process using the Monthly Economic Trend Briefings at the presidential office and residence, the Blue House, as well as his personal visits to some SMU villages highly motivated the villagers to participate actively. This was also because, during the briefings and personal visits, outstanding village members were invited to share their success stories, which were then given nationwide recognition as well as presidential awards and medals (D.-H. Han 2012, 44; D.-H. Han, Song, and Park 2013, 98; K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 7; S. Park 2009, 128; Sonn and Gimm 2013, 28).

In addition, the central government also made use of the collectivistic orientation of the Korean culture to further develop a communal identity – specifically, national identity (K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 5–7; S. M. Park 2010, 75). The state intervened into the everyday life practices of individuals, by emphasising social hygiene, mandatory village meetings and also organising anti-

communist and corruption rallies with pro-nationalist agendas which all encouraged greater communal relationships (S. M. Park 2010, 79; J. Seo and Kim 2015, 60; Sonn and Gimm 2013, 24).[22] Such Foucauldian (1997) guidance provided by the state on how to become moral and nationalist citizens in order to achieve development, cultivated the grassroots actors, especially the SMU leaders to become the social engineers in driving the movement, but this enhanced sense of responsibility also made them become loyal supporters of Park (Sonn and Gimm 2013, 24–25). With these courses of events and policies, in defining rural development projects in Korea and specifically SMU, Park *inseparably* became part of the core identity (Douglass 2014, 23).

The grassroots actors

The rural-urban economic imbalance was evident as mentioned above, and the cause to this problem was said to be *defeatism*, *fatalism* and *lethargy* that was widespread in the rural areas (Chung 2013, 658). Thus, as mentioned previously about the presidential speech on the *Saemaul Income Promotion Contest*, it was firmly believed that through attitudinal change, poverty would be eradicated and will lead to economic development (Presidential Secretariat 1972). Hence, there was a widespread belief that SMU was an apolitical movement, simply aimed to improve the living standards and communal wellbeing (Doucette and Müller 2016, 35). In this process, the grassroots actors certainly became the core social actors, since their engagement and performance determined

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[22] Some of the activities related to the social hygiene included disciplining citizens on moral grounds and thus the police and law enforcers would encourage cleanliness and sanitation, as well as abstinence from drunkenness, gambling and prostitution, regulations on physical appearance related to attires such as skirts and even hair length. As for the village meetings, traditionally, in the village areas, *durae* (cooperative units of farmers to help each other) and *hyangyak* (moral principles used a code of conduct) were used to ensure cooperation (J.-D. Park 2019, 237), but during Park's regime, *bansanghoe* system (a monthly neighbourhood meeting) was enforced (J. Seo and Kim 2015).

the success of the national movement (D.-H. Han, Song, and Park 2013, 100; K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 11).

Some of the incentives that motivated the grassroots actors to take part in SMU despite the absence of the direct monetary rewards included: the introduction of new agricultural technologies, collectively constructed social infrastructures, increased household incomes and the opportunities to better market access (S. Park 2009, 135). Any individual that showed outstanding achievements were given the opportunity to have better access to the above mentioned incentives. This made the movement inclusive of all members of the society, including women who were generally discriminated in leadership roles, confined to housekeeping and exempted from formal economic activities.

To further elaborate on this aspect, women, according to the SMU values, were required to join Saemaul Mother's club while men joined Saemaul Farmers' Club. These clubs provided training to elect a male and a female leader in each village, and prepared the women to also take formal and independent part in discussion meetings and economic activities that enabled them to have better socio-economic status and role (Chung 2013, 670; Nauta and Lee 2017, 198). Such recognition of formerly discriminated people in society promoted better solidarity and became a good motivational source to practise the three spirits of SMU (Chung 2013, 695; Sonn and Gimm 2013, 27). Furthermore, using the five general sub-committees (village development; the youth; women's affairs; safety and protection; auditing board) in the villages also helped to efficiently assign roles and enhance efficiency (J.-K. Kim and Kim 2013, 61).

These trainings were organised by the SMU instructors who reiterated the two most fundamental qualifications – self-sacrificing attitude and patriotism, to the leaders so that they would be motivated to engage in various communal activities to overcome poverty for themselves,

their villages, as well as the nation (Choi and Park 2013, 426–28). Hence, the instructors focused on building national consciousness and "devotion to the development of [the] local community and the nation" through the everyday application of SMU principles (Ibid., 441). The training required all the leaders to stay at the training centre for a period of 5 nights and 6 days, and throughout the session, they had to wake up at 05:30 in the morning, conduct roll calls, pay respect to the national flag, sing the national anthem (until the final verse), recite the SMU guidelines and engage in simple exercises (Ibid., 462).

During the day, the leaders would attend various lectures related to morality, mind-set change and civic duty, as well as hear or present successful case stories involving village businesses (D.-H. Han 2012, 22). Hence, all these collective actions constantly reminded their duties as a member of a community and stimulated their patriotism. The leaders were then encouraged to take these values and practices to their respective villages and encourage the implementation of it as part of a daily routine for all villagers (Choi and Park 2013, 450). Additionally, the leaders along with the other village members would also make collective project goals, rules and method of punishment for efficient propagation of the SMU principles.[23]

Therefore, the legal framework, guidance and material support from the central government, guided these grassroots actors to extend their loyalties and identities from their families to the larger political units, the nation (S. M. Park 2010, 76). Such modernising process indeed was appreciated by the majority of the rural population and this contributed to the strong loyalty towards the SMU ideology and the identification with the Korean way of development (Douglass 2014, 11). In general, SMU's categorisation of the rural population with a specific national identity was a case that can be explained as the formation of a *classificatory unity* amongst

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[23] Usually persuasion through peer pressure would take place but at times levying fines and even some violent confrontation were used to achieve the collectively agreed goals (Sonn and Gimm 2013, 30–31).

the rural population leading to solidarity (Sen 2006, 27). Using this solidarity, better inculcation of SMU's principles was achieved, despite villagers having multiple identities and loyalties to either their family lineage, villages or even district provinces. Although the medium for dissemination was not fixated to print-capitalism per se, as it was used to explain the emergence of nationalism as in Anderson's *Imagined Communities,* the SMU programs nevertheless "created unified fields of exchange and communication" in a more inclusive manner that connected all individuals in the nation to participate and engage in the national development activity simultaneously ([1983] 2016, 44).

4.3. Boon or Bane?

As mentioned above, SMU became *inseparable* from President Park (Douglass 2014, 23). But with the assassination of Park in 1979, as well as the crop failure of high-yielding varieties introduced through the Green Revolution, SMU lost its momentum. In 1980, it was re-established as a private sector organisation under the name Korea Saemaul Undong Center, to continue the SMU spirit and eradicate poverty. However, even to this day, the final evaluation of SMU and its impact during Park's era, as well as the global exportation of the principles continue to be debated amongst scholars.

For example, some scholars such as Suh Sang-Mok (1981) indicated that it had an outstanding nationwide impact in various aspects, including a decrease in the absolute rural poverty rate from 27.1 per cent in 1970 to 10.8 per cent in 1978 (1981, 24). In addition, scholars like Mike Douglass claimed that the Green Revolution introduced during SMU "substantially completed the transformation from peasant to small-scale commercial farmer in Korea," which,

then led to rural modernisation that substantially reduced extreme poverty (2014, 16–17).[24] On a similar note, the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a government-funded research institute, provided numerous publications indicating that the encouragement of diligence, self-reliance, and cooperation through SMU contributed to Korea's development. This argument was supported by the claim that people from various socio-economic backgrounds and identities had to engage in multiple interactions within their communities to perform well and get better support from the government that would eventually lead to economic development (D.-H. Han, Song, and Park 2013; J.-K. Kim and Kim 2013). Other than this kind of human resource development, in the *2012 Modularization of Korea's Development Experience*, various scholars also presented how SMU positively contributed to the growth in "industrialization, … , government administration, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), agricultural development, land development, and environment" sectors of the country (2013, 4).

In contrast to such positive analysis, the most commonly mentioned criticisms of SMU evaluation were on the credibility of the statistical data, the sustainability of the movement and also the oppressive nature of the authoritarian regime and its development strategies. Some scholars, like Sonn Jung Won and Gimm Dong-Wan (2013) have stated that the actual income level growths were overrated in the official statements (2013: 26). They state that this income growth in itself was simply a process resulting from the government's ultimate goal to nurture *half-civilian, half bureaucratic agents* that allows the government to better control its citizens (Ibid., 34). In other studies, previously mentioned Mike Douglass and scholars like Park Sooyoung have both claimed that the high rural-urban migration, as well as the political censorship, may have

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[24] The Green Revolution was more concentrated to the rice production. The government enforced the use of high-yielding varieties of grain and provided subsidies for pesticides and machineries, such as tractors, transplanters, sprayers, that would increase productivity (Douglass 2014, 10–11).

also impacted the publication of some data and thus raising the issue of credibility (Moore 1984, cited in Douglass 2014; S. Park 2009).

Moreover, they also analysed that although there was some success initially in alleviating poverty through reaching higher income levels, this growth was not sustained, especially when the government could no longer subsidise the rice prices (Ibid.). With regards to the violation of freedom and labour rights, Jeong Hyeseon criticised the authoritarian regime and its oppressive policies (2017). Jeong claimed that SMU in the 70s was a rare moment in which the villagers' desire for economic prosperity was in accordance with the state policies, and thus proves why the villagers abided by the new changes despite the oppressive nature (Ibid., 162). However, even then, Jeong stressed how the disparities between the rural-urban populations continued to grow, as well as for the rural household debts due to multiple reasons including Green Revolution (Ibid., 161).

In conclusion, as shown from these examples, although the definition of success may differ according to scholars, they all seem to agree on the pro-mobilising effect SMU had in South Korea during the 1970s. In addition, all the above-mentioned scholars agreed on the reduction of extreme poverty in the rural areas, as well as the significant role president Park played in determining the overall results of SMU and achieving rural modernisation. Thus, in the next section of the chapter, it will explore the selling points of SMU and the possible precautions required for the importing countries.

4.4. The Exportation of SMU

After the establishment of the Korea Saemaul Center, their performances were minimal compared to the heydays under Park Chung-hee's administration. However, in the 1990s, it slowly began to

regain its spotlight by globalising the movement, especially after engaging in the economic cooperation program for North Korea and also carrying out some small-scale development projects in Asian countries, which were led by self-proclaimed leaders who were either Christian missionaries or individual philanthropists (Jeong 2017, 165). It was only after 2010, whereby SMU began to be exported as part of the official development assistance (ODA) program, but even then, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) did not actively promote it, and so was only initiated when requested by the recipient countries (Ibid., 166). It was starting from Park Geun-hye's administration (2013 – 2017) that began to actively export the movement as a distinct Korean development program (Doucette and Müller 2016, 29; Jeong 2017, 165; E. Lee and Lee 2014, 240).

When President Park Geun-hye was in office, she had shown strong determination to continue her father, the former authoritarian president Park Chung-hee's SMU legacy, by re-introducing it in the national policies and exporting it to the international development aid arena. SMU was and continues to be promoted as the new distinct Korean model for inclusive and sustainable growth through its partnership with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as a community-driven development (CDD) program, acknowledged by the World Bank (The World Bank 2016). It's promoted to have improved the village infrastructures and also increased rural household incomes and thus contributing to Korea's national economic development (Asian Development Bank 2012; Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea Saemaul Undong Center, and KDI School of Public Policy and Management 2013). In the process of promoting SMU, President Park Geun-hye took the initiative to personally visit some African countries including Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, in which she supported and encouraged the idea to enhance agricultural skills through rural development projects (The State House of Uganda 2016).

SMU and all its related projects have strongly been projected as a distinct Korean ODA model using both *intellectual leadership* and the *ethical leadership* discourses (Sung-Mi 2016, 78). According to these initiatives, it shares not only the experience and knowledge of rural development but also opportunities for better trade and investments (Ibid., 84). This newly promoted SMU continues to emphasise the adoption of the three principles, diligence, self-help and cooperation to achieve a new mind-set that will evntually lead to economic development. Indeed many leaders of the recipient countries have retorted to the lack of strong determination or attitude in their countries for the limited economic development and persistent poverty in the rural areas (E. Lee and Lee 2014, 244). For example, during the 8th CGECI Academy (Confédération Générale des Entreprises de Côte d'Ivoire) president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame addressed that one should stop being lazy and trying to earn themselves the capacity to do better, instead of relying on others (Kagame 2019).

However, with regards to the globalisation of SMU, some scholars have raised precautions for the direct implementation of the movement in various developing countries. Many of these scholars claim SMU to be of a unique case, specific to Korea, whereas for the countries that are importing this movement lack the intensive government scrutiny, subsidies and support, in addition to the land reforms which was one of the biggest contributor to the success in Korea (Douglass 2014, 26; S. Park 2009, 138; Reed 2010, 9–11). Besides, some scholars have also voiced concerns about reiterating the rural population as lazy and hedonistic, as well as embellishing the coercion that was common during the dictatorial regime (Doucette and Müller 2016; S.-M. Han 2004; Jeong 2017).

4.5. Conclusion

SMU that was introduced in Korea in 1970 by President Park Chung-hee, aimed first to achieve mental development by tackling the widespread *fatalism and defeatism* in the rural areas (Chung 2013, 658). Training institutes were established to nurture leaders that would instil the three principles of SMU, *diligence*, *self-help* and *cooperation* into individuals' every aspect of life. In general, many villagers willingly accepted such moral suasion not only because they solely believed it as so, but also because of their strong desires for economic development, participation in a national development project, as well as to protect themselves and the nation from the communist threat (Doucette and Müller 2016, 35; Douglass 2014, 22; S.-M. Han 2004, 78; Jeong 2017, 163; S. M. Park 2010, 72; J. Seo and Kim 2015, 60; Sonn and Gimm 2013, 24). To conclude, what "started off as a "rural" development project … came to impact every aspect of life as a general social mobilization mechanism" (S.-M. Han 2004, 70). In this process, SMU in Korea contributed to the rise of communal and national identity in rural areas through a heightened sense of belonging.

Chapter Five:

Transplantation of SMU in Uganda, aka the ESMV Project

So far, the political history of ethnicity in Uganda with regards to collective identity, also in the form of national identity, has been discussed along with the introduction of SMU in Korea in the 70s. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the implementation of SMU in Uganda through KOICA. To achieve this objective, this chapter discusses how the Korean model of rural development was transformed and modified to fit best into the Ugandan rural context. In the first section, it explores the bilateral relationship between the two countries to see how they both promoted themselves to achieve a win-win strategic goal. It then looks into how the SMU principles were localised to better fit the norms and the needs of the Ugandan rural population better. In the final section of the chapter, it goes back to the discussion on what the initial expectations were of the two states with regards to the project and compares it with the actual evaluation of the first phase of the project.

5.1. South Korea – Uganda Relations

In the recent years, President Yoweri Museveni has shown great interest in building a pro-nationalist attitude for further development of the country and urged the leaders of the country to take note of the Asian countries and their methods of achieving change (The State House of Uganda 2012). Shortly after this event, Korea-Uganda summits, led directly by the two presidents, Park Geun-hye and Museveni, was arranged to enhance the bilateral economic cooperation and it

took place in May 2013 and May 2016 in Korea and Uganda respectively. Both summits focused on the field areas of industrial investments, energy and natural resources, as well as development, in which SMU was the key project (J. Lee 2013).

On both occasions, Museveni emphasised the need for "investments, trade access, tourism and human resource development" in the country that is abundant with natural resources, including the newly discovered oil reserves (The State House of Uganda 2016). Studies have shown that this new oil industry has the potential of making Uganda a mid-level African producer, and the third-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan region in the near future (Patey 2017, 2). Thus, this discovery made it not only an attractive economic investment opportunity for international countries like South Korea but was also a pivotal moment for Uganda.

2016 was indeed a big year for Uganda. Museveni had just won his fifth presidential term amid the controversies and thus needed to prove his irreplaceability in the country that "has just started bearing fruits" (Rumanzi 2016). During his inaugural speech in May 2016, he explicitly outlined his plans to turn Uganda into a middle-income country through better trade and industrialisation, especially in the agricultural sector (Museveni 2016). The emphasis he made on the lack of technology and infrastructure to increase commercial farming instead of the subsistence nature that was widespread among the farmers (Ibid.), was a preview of what to expect in the upcoming years of his presidency and also in terms of the bilateral relationship with South Korea. With this economic and political outlook of 2016, SMU as a rural development project was seen as one of the best options for Museveni. The memorandums of understandings signed at the previously mentioned summits were going to grant Museveni the means to new agricultural technologies, funds for infrastructures, and also probably more bargaining power for the oil industry.

From the Korean government's perspective, economic cooperation with African countries was an opportunity to enhance access to natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, platinum and uranium, as well as an opportunity to obtain access to an expanding market (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). Geopolitically, Park's administration aimed "to strengthen Korea's network with other middle powers to become a global leader that contributes to global peace and improvement of human rights," as a form of *middle power diplomacy* (Kang et al. 2014, 3). Moreover, there has been growing public support and interest over the years, to give more aid to developing countries to tackle poverty due to enhanced awareness and sense of responsibility for the international community (H. Kim 2017, 350).

Therefore, with these national interests as the underlying factors, Korea and Uganda signed the Country Partnership Strategy. Through the partnership, Korea was to support Uganda implement its National Development Vision (Vision 2040), which aimed for, "a transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years" (Uganda National Planning Authority 2020). It planned to achieve this goal by "improving agricultural extension, productivity, and value chain for comprehensive rural development; supporting technical and vocational education and basic education; and promoting health services and a local health system with a focus on mothers, children, and girls" (The Government of the Rep. of Korea 2017, 4). Under this development cooperation, SMU was implemented to achieve the first objective that focused on agricultural capacity and regional development.

5.2. The localisation of SMU – Implementation of ESMV

The SMU project conducted by KOICA in Uganda was implemented under the name of 'Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages' (ESMV) project in seven model villages found in Mpigi District from 2015 to 2018 for the first phase with a budget of USD 3 million (USD 2.5 million from Korean government and USD 0.5 million from Ugandan government). According to the Korean embassy, prior to the implementation of the ESMV project, the National Farmers' Leadership Centre (NFLC) located in Kampiringisa, Mpigi District was already scheduled to officially open. The NFLC was a training centre jointly established by the government of Uganda and Korea, as a state apparatus, intending to achieve rural development through new agricultural technological insights, mind-set change and leadership skills driven by the SMU principles (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries 2020). Thus, it only seemed appropriate to choose the seven model villages from nearby sub-counties to maximise efficiency (J.-D. Park 2019, 323). Each sub-county leaders were then asked to evaluate the villages based on village cooperativeness (within the villages and also with neighbouring villages), economic performance and also willingness to accept change, concerning new actors and new ideas.[25] Thus, the chosen villages:

1. Kiwumu A in Kammengo Sub country

2. Kkumbya village in Buwama Sub County

3. Lukonge village in Nkozi Sub County

4. Lwaweeba village in Kituntu Sub County

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[25] Michael Lutalo (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interview with the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer aka Town council for Buwama Sub County by author. Kampala (September 17, 2019).
During this interview, he stated that the village agricultural output at the end of the year as well as interviews with the village leaders were used for the evaluation.

5. Tiribogo village in Muduuma Sub County

6. Kololo village in Kiringente Sub County, and

7. Nsamu village in Mpigi Town Council

were to be called the *model villages* with the purpose "to demonstrate Saemaul Undong as a new rural development paradigm and model for inclusive and sustainable communities" (Bwanika, Kasolo and Mubende, 2017:1). The project covered 1078 households (a total of 4765 people) and aimed to increase "social capital, household incomes and agricultural productivity, improved living conditions and improved governance among target villages" (KOICA 2018c, 1–2).[26] Hence, to localise SMU more efficiently, the systematic use of NFLC was conducted as well as the reliance on the socio-cultural similarities between the two countries to appeal to pathos.

The National Farmers' Leadership Centre (NFLC)

To achieve the objectives mentioned above, a similar approach to that of the SMU in Korea during the 70s were taken into account in Mpigi. Each model village elected leaders for five sub-committees (Agriculture and livestock; Housing and sanitation; Finance and micro-credit; Infrastructure; Women affairs), which were similar to those formed in SMU Korea, for better delegation of work and to integrate more village members into the project (KOICA 2018c, 3). However, there were no specific criteria for one to be chosen as a leader because most of these leaders had been elected as the LC 1 leaders in early 2000, but now simply rebranded as a committee leader for SMU committee.[27] Nevertheless, these chosen leaders with a few other

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[26] Social Capital according to KOICA was to be defined
> "…as the total stock of social relationships that an individual possesses. Some of the indicators measured under this section include: target population voluntarily participating in Saemaul activities, belongingness to groups, frequency of community meetings among the target villages, a level of trust in target villages, and divorce rate" (KOICA 2016b, 26)

[27] Project Manager of KOICA, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 6, 2019).

village members were then taken to NFLC to be informed and trained with regards to agricultural productivity, leadership and most importantly the SMU principles for *mind-set change*. According to KOICA reports, 63 SMU leaders participated in the five-day training and as it was conducted in Korea in the 70s, NFLC training required participants to wake up at 05:00 in the morning, sing the national anthem, and recite the prayers and the pioneering slogans such as,

- *We can do it ourselves*

- *Do not eat to eat, but eat to work. If you don't like to work, do not eat. Work at least four hours for each meal*

- *I work first, I serve first, I sacrifice first,*

to both encourage and empower the participants who would then disseminate these teachings to their fellow village members (KOICA 2016a).

The training session began with the historical background of SMU in Korea and how it was used to modernise the rural areas, which eventually contributed to the national economic development. The lecturers emphasised the contribution made by diligent, self-reliant nationalist villagers to transform the poor, war-torn country to that of a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee using pictures and films.[28] Additionally, there was a separate lecture on *Patriotism for Community and National Development*, conducted by the then Colonel and now Brigadier David Kasura Kyomukama, who presented the qualities of a good leader and how the love and work by the leaders for their communities with the right ideology leads to development. The lecture was then well connected to the other lectures on mind-set change and leadership, which largely demonstrated time management skills, self-sacrificing attitude, engaging with others and bringing them to take part in collective actions.

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[28] SK (NFLC representative) interview, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 16, 2019).

To further motivate the participants to take part in the project, lectures on agricultural technology was also prepared. Although the participants did not receive high-yielding varieties like in Korea in the 70s, the participants were introduced to mushroom productions, horticulture and farm management (such as soil fertility, farm planning and cash flow management), which were new to many. New insights for poultry and piggery was also shared, such as litter and pullet management, market trends for eggs and meat, artificial insemination for pigs and cows, as well as the application of indigenous micro-organisms (IMO) for organic farming (KOICA 2016a).

Other lectures that also seemed very practical for daily use was the micro-credit and village savings, which aimed to improve cash flows in the villages. The village members were taught how they can manage their finances better and also learn how to do simple accountings to encourage entrepreneurship. Because the villages are usually in remote areas with little or no infrastructure, many villagers had trouble finding access to markets or banks, which also contributed to their low income levels. However, this intervention program aimed to minimise such burden on the village members, and help them to be more cooperative as a group, through small but rather immediate cash. Furthermore, this particular lecture, along with the lecture on gender mainstreaming, both contributed to women empowerment in the villages as it gave better opportunities to take on more official social positions (further discussed in the next chapter).

Moreover, during these training sessions, the participants were informed about the need to construct detailed and inclusive action plans if they were to receive support and incentives from KOICA (J.-D. Park 2019, 330). For some friendly competition, field trips were organised once in a while to different model villages, which provided some insight to how others were implementing the new resources as well as working together to achieve the four objectives (improved social capital, household incomes and agricultural productivity, living conditions and governance among

target villages) of the ESMV project. In addition, the leaders were to go back to their villages, share the acquired knowledge, conduct division of labour, organise the list of beneficiaries to receive livestock from KOICA, construct and improve common village goods such as wells or roads, and create a safer and better environment for all. Therefore, these factors determined the level of assistance each village were to receive from KOICA, and although, there was no direct coercion as in the case of Korea in the 70s that was thoroughly planned and managed by the central government, the Ugandan government could indirectly achieve their target goals through the incentive system managed by KOICA.

Socio-cultural connections

The use of NFLC to transplant the SMU principles was indeed closer to the logical appeal however, it was noted that the Korean government representatives also appealed to emotions using the socio-cultural factors. When SMU was being implemented in Korea, the Korean farmers were not lazy or hedonistic per se (S.-M. Han 2004, 74–75), yet the same narrative was also applied to the rural population in Uganda, where they were portrayed as to lack diligence, self-reliance and cooperation. The Ugandan villagers were thus, *trained* to improve the above mentioned aspects. In addition, the Korean government, when introducing SMU, mentioned how Korea was also heavily dependent on foreign aid and this led to aid dependency and laxity in the past, but, with the change of attitude and mind-set through the SMU principles, they were able to come together to work and improve the community living standards (J.-D. Park 2019, 229).

The common historical legacy was also used by the Korean representatives including President Park Geun-hye as well as the Korean ambassadors to Uganda to further motivate the participants to understand and appreciate the model better. Studies have shown that colonial

history often generates "a strong sense of humiliation and an imposition of perceived inferiority" (Sen 2006, 85), thus sharing such common sufferings could have facilitated the implementation process of SMU in the country. To give an example, during Park's visit to Uganda in May 2016, she gave a speech about the bilateral relationship of the two countries that have both experienced colonialism and civil war. She also emphasised the geopolitical significance of both countries in their respective regions for economic prosperity and peace, and thus, emphasising how Uganda's national development leads to mutual benefits (2016). As for the ambassadors, it was noted that both former ambassador Park Jong-dae, who was the Head of Mission since the reopening of the embassy in 2011 until 2018, and the current ambassador Ha Byung-kyoo, who came in 2019, both made similar comments about Korea's "first-hand experience in recovering from extreme poverty and ruins of war" can work best to achieve Uganda's National Development Plan and the Vision 2040 (Ha 2019).

As for the cultural commonality, during informal interviews with the KOICA interns, they mentioned how they used the cultural similarities to bridge the gap between them and their local counterparts. One of it was the strong collectivist culture since kinship and familialism were of core importance in the two countries, and thus, by using the local clan names, they could attain membership in the local groups. However, the biggest cultural factor that was used during the familiarising process of SMU was indeed the previously mentioned *Bulungi bwansi*. Though this aspect is further explained using the data collected during the interviews in the next chapter, the use of the word *Bulungi bwansi* interchangeably with collective actions or community service by both the Koreans involved and the local village members, seemed to have heightened the localising effect and thus, making the latter group to take better ownership of the village projects.

5.3. Expectations and Outcomes

The first phase of the ESMV project officially ended on November 29, 2018, and was considered successful. To briefly summarise the final evaluation of the ESMV project, all objectives were said to have been accomplished. In the final evaluation report, it was stated that the level of trust, belongingness and number of community meetings showed a significant increase, which all determined the success rate of achieving enhanced social capital. As for the household income level, according to KOICA, it was stated that the population in the model villages living below USD1.25 per day has reduced from 20.1 per cent in 2016 to 10.9 per cent by the end of the project (KOICA 2018a, 6–7). This increase was mostly derived from the various agricultural starter inputs, such as day-old chicks, piglets, simple animal disease diagnosis tools and drug supplies, coffee hullers and maize mill to name a few. Applying the knowledge gained from NFLC into action enabled the village members to come work together and to maximise productivity as outlined by the EMSV project.

The third objective to improve living conditions and infrastructure was also considered to have reached its target goal through *Bulungi bwansi*. Villagers gathered to improve their community by working on roads, wells and even trenches for water tunnels during the rainy season. The lectures on health and hygiene also improved the overall sanitation in the villages and thus many villagers seemed to have access to cleaner toilets and kitchens. For the final objective on governance, leadership was taken quite seriously since the outstanding members were invited at NFLC or at some district events to share their success stories and on rare occasions, taken abroad

for training.[29] Over 90 per cent of the target population was said to have new insights and different perceptions as well as mind-set change (Ibid., 40). Therefore, the report concluded that,

> "The ESMV project was highly relevant, tapping into real needs of communities and contributing to achievement of national, sectoral and international development objectives. The project used less resources given the magnitude of achievements realised. Impacts range from reduced poverty and improved living conditions. The project promoted human rights, and incorporated mechanisms to sustain attained benefits for instance collection of user-fees, and instituting caretakers" (Ibid., 7).

When interviewing one of the project manager, Mr Bae during the fieldwork, he also agreed to the positive outcome achieved. Although he mentioned that there was some limit in the complete accomplishments of the village action plans by the corresponding villages, the fact that the beneficiaries have now, to some extent, adopted the three principles of SMU as a daily practice, in itself was considered to be a success. To achieve this objective, he stated that his team frequently reminded the village members about the end date of the project and thus strongly emphasised the importance of the leaders on all levels. During the session, he also mentioned that the role of KOICA was to simply provide the appropriate materials and incentive for the villages to voluntarily aim and work towards development. In this process, the role of NFLC was to help localise the foreign ideas, persuade the local villagers that the intervention will be beneficial to them and finally guide them so that they can identify their own problems and solutions. As for the local villagers, their role was to apply the newly acquired knowledge as their new way of life and try engaging more village members to also adopt the same principles.[30] Hence, looking at these

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[29] "KOICA Rural Development Project Workshop between Rwanda and Uganda" was conducted in September 2018, for a period of four days in Rwanda. 21 village leaders with some sub-county and district officials also attended the event and shared information regarding their village action plans and cooperation (KOICA 2018b).

[30] Project Manager of KOICA, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 6, 2019).

expectations and the outcomes, it can generally be concluded that the ESMV project was rather successful.

5.4. Conclusion

The SMU projects in the two countries were very similar in the way they both tried to achieve economic development through attitudinal change. In this process, the role of the Korean representatives was to simply introduce the new concept, provide the external resources and incentives that would support the Ugandan government in implementing its national development plans. Thus the NFLC centre which was led by the local instructors, provided lectures and training similar to that of Korea in the 70s, and seemed to focus more on the mind-set change, nurturing leadership skills and patriotism. Based on these observations it was seen that the training centres in both countries aimed to "induce changes in the attitudes and values of Saemaul leaders by infusing the Saemaul spirit, rather than imparting of technical information regarding agriculture" (K.-D. Kim and Lee 1976, 5). For the village members that participated in this training, they were expected to internalise the SMU principles and carry them out as a daily routine. They were encouraged to become self-confident and take initiative to think of new plans for development, diligently carry them out as a team and also reach out to those members who were reluctant to change. Therefore, observing what the initial expectations were of the various actors involved, the ESMV project in Uganda seemed to be an appropriate solution to achieve national development and induce a strong sense of belongingness in the target villages.

Chapter Six:

The Social Engineers

The dynamics of the world have changed and many rural populations are seen to be actively "proposing to carve out sustainable livelihoods *on their own terms*" rather than simply abiding by the dictated social policies (Hebinck, Ouden, and Verschoor 2001, 13). Such trends are also witnessed in the model villages of the ESMV project, whereby active village participation and also the practice of the three SMU principles in everyday lives were required to obtain the necessary raw materials and support for economic development. In addition, these changes are now highly appreciated and desired by almost all participants who wished for higher income levels as mentioned in the previous chapter. The leaders in these villages hence showed how they became the social engineers by "actively transforming so-called 'traditional' societies through the injection of capital, technology, and forms of bureaucratic organisation" (Long 2001, 52).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the villages that participated in this first phase of the project were *model villages* chosen by the sub-county leaders. According to the interview with the assistant chief administrative officer of Buwama sub-county, he stated that the criteria to become a model village were village cooperativeness and economic performance that was visible through their yearly agricultural productivity and interviews with the village chairpersons. Also attitude towards change for both new actors and new ideas was another criteria that was evaluated during the interviews with the sub-county leaders.[31] With this background, it meant that the villages to

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[31] Michael Lutalo (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interview with the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer aka Town council for Buwama Sub County by author. Kampala (September 17, 2019).

some extent already had some knowledge and capabilities to work towards development but simply lacked the resources to enhance their economic productivity. By being given the leadership position and label as a *model village* in the intervention program with demanded resources and infrastructures, it may have triggered a new sense of commitment, resulting into attitude change (Kelman 1979, 188).

This chapter, therefore, focuses on the sub-questions of the research and discusses the role of the local leaders in achieving the ESMV project and on how the transformation of *local* ideas and practices occurs. I discuss the development of social realities of the village actors and the various interfaces, in which the members of the three villages interpret their community before and after the intervention program. The chapter explores how KOICA and its intervention program was first perceived and then how this first impression was later transformed via their own interpretations. It will analyse how the village members became the social engineers in this rural development project and study the concept of *mind-set change*. In this section, referring to Kelman' theory mentioned in chapter one, the processes on why and how they showed their acceptance of the external social influence based on *compliance, identification* and *internalisation* will be discussed, using their interviews and also notes from participant observations. This chapter aims to provide the discursive material for the final chapter to understand what implication the different processes would have on the villagers' conception of a collective identity.

6.1. The Social Realities

Under the ESMV project, the model villages were introduced to a new system of local governance that led to the appointment of leaders, formation of committees, division of labour, active

participation in village activities, and also enhanced interest in collective wellbeing to receive the resources from KOICA. With these influx of new knowledge and establishing interactions (not only with people within their villages but also with people outside the villages, such as the other villagers and the trainers they met at the NFLC training centre as well as the KOICA representatives), the village members were positioned in new *social interfaces* to either enhance or transform their understanding of *diligence, self-help* and *cooperation* for their best interests.

Primarily, these interfaces were encountered by the leaders chosen to participate in the training sessions planned at the NFLC. Using their newly acquired knowledge on sanitation, health, farming, entrepreneurship, and collective identity, they were to become better leaders of development in their communities. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the leaders in the model villages were the sole drivers in this intervention, however, it was a given fact that they partook the role of the *multiple interface manager* to create the linkages for the villages with the external actors. They also had to take the responsibility to monitor and enforce the new ideas and policies that could not be carried out by the higher levels of management (the local governments and KOICA's representatives) on a daily basis. Thus, they were the key social drivers in this project with the autonomy to devise their own plans that would improve unity and living standards in their respective villages.

The next interface experienced by the leaders was again during the initial phase of implementation, whereby they were challenged to convince the large number of village members, who were sceptical of the true intentions of the foreign actors and the government. "Leaders had to persuade villagers that the experiments would succeed for them and that the benefit generated by the experiments would be large enough to recover the cost of giving up their old ways" (Sonn and Gimm 2013, 32). But as mentioned in the previous chapters, land was a highly contested

resource in the country for decades. Hence, there was distrust and fear amongst almost all the village members and also from the neighbouring villages that the ESMV project was one of the schemes to take away their lands.

However, all research participants commented that this fear and distrust did not last long, because members who participated in the training sessions at NFLC were shown video clips and pictures that showed the process of economic development in South Korea. In addition, KOICA began to build infrastructures needed in the villages almost as soon as the project began, which further reaffirmed their position as *friends* instead of *neo-colonialists*. According to one village member, he stated that:

> *"Some were scared, the elders, because ... they remember about colonialism, they thought that people have come back to colonise them. At first, I wasn't happy myself because I didn't know the interest of KOICA. I thought they came to buy our land near the Equator and also many other people thought so, but after receiving the training, I learnt that they came to help like friends so I am okay, I am happy with it."*[32]

When the same question about the first impression of KOICA was asked to a group of leaders from the same village, one responded that:

> *"There is no way you can understand someone before talking to him or her, you don't know until you talk to people, so that doubt... but when KOICA came, the first impression, because we were given training and we saw that in those years, back in those years, South Korea was in a very bad condition but they developed at a very high speed. So I became interested in what they had come with. So I was happy."*[33]

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[32] KS (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).
[33] NR and KR (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).

The same question was also asked in Kiwumu A, where one village leader stated:

"At first I was fearing, I didn't know what was coming but through the teachings. After the teachings and trainings I believed them... 'The more I sweat, the more I get,' they [KOICA] opened our minds. They showed us that Korea was very poor before. It developed. They showed that you can do everything. Everything is possible if you put in much effort... I now believe in myself ... Before I was working but not as when KOICA came. Because when it came, it taught me how to be hardworking, to fulfil my goals in life. And I was told that a family man, a man in the family should work so hard to help his family, and also community."[34]

With reference to these interviews, it can be assumed that the leaders took on the role as mediators and transformers of the external intervention to mobilise the village members and familiarise them with the new information and resources. They were the ones who were to share what they have seen, learnt and experienced from the training centre to the village members who could not attend the trainings. After this localisation, leaders were to distribute the given resources and responsibilities amongst the village members to achieve their desired collective goals, such as their village businesses or sustaining their traditional customs and norms. All village research participants claimed that the leaders were responsible and initiative of these positive changes in the villages. During the individual interview sessions, where they were asked to list done the most hardworking members in the village, some would also name themselves, but regardless of these self-acknowledgements, the names of different leaders always appeared. As for their overall opinion of ESMV project, all the research participants gave similar responses to the outcomes mentioned in KOICA's evaluation reports of the project, which showed that it was rather successful in achieving their objectives.

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[34] KA (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project, relationship with KOICA and challenges by author. Kampala (November 7, 2019).

To support this claim, they talked about the marginalised people such as women and elderly, who in the past, did not have a stable income. After the intervention program, they were now claimed to be better off. One of the most memorable comments on these new social realities were by some widows and single mothers who talked about the limited job opportunities they faced but how this situation improved after the ESMV project. These mothers shared about their struggles of having to take on the traditional responsibilities of both the father, being the bread winner and the household head, and also of the mother, managing the household chores and raising children. They claimed that their sources of income were mostly from their gardens or if not, by working in others' farms, which were always insufficient. However, through the material support given to them by KOICA, they were given better opportunities in their *lifeworlds*.[35]

To give an example, during one interview with a widow from Lukonge village, she said:

> *"Because I don't have a job, I just dig [others' farms] to get like some money to pay school fees for the kids…But I am not as badly off as before because I am now having a cow from KOICA, it delivered, now I can sell milk and pay school fees for the kids."*[36]

However, other than these material support such as livestock, many respondents also claimed that the village savings account helped improve their cash flows significantly. Prior to the ESMV project, there were some savings system known as the *cash-round*. This was a system similar to the Rotating Credit and Savings Association (ROSCA), whereby women used to make groups, collect some money, give it to one individual, then in the next round, they collect money

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[35] *Lifeworlds* is defined "as the product of an individual's own constant self-assembling and re-evaluating of relationships and experiences. Lifeworlds embrace actions, interactions and meanings, and are identified with specific socio-geographical spaces and life histories" in Norman Long's, *Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives* (2001, 241).
[36] NF (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).

and give it to another.[37] But this was always a very small amount due to the limited members and also because of the widespread condescending attitude in the villages. When the people received training on savings from the NFLC, they now had a different perception that with the little they have, they can still save and get some interest from those who borrow money. The women who used to be belittled for saving the *small-small money* were now trusted with bigger responsibilities of organising and managing the village savings account which has improved financial management for many, and also used to provide communal welfare.

To quote the village treasurer of Kiwumu A, she said:

> *"…the problem first was men. Men used to say it was for ladies, these small-small money for ladies, so as KOICA came, we got trainings so they have become sensitised…they are now also concerned…they trust females [more] than males, the females keep their money very well, we fear huge amounts of money, but for male, they don't fear money…This group will help us to accumulate a big sum of money, which we can someday use to buy big land for the community."*[38]

The dynamics in these villages also changed their social groups in which most cases showed expansion in the number of members. The villagers discussed about neighbouring villages coming to join their collective action programs and their keen interest in wanting to share the benefits that the model villages received from KOICA. For example, during the participant observation, it was noticed how people from neighbouring villages also came to clean these model villages and in the case of Kiwumu A, people came to collect water from the boreholes constructed

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[37] Rotating Credit and Savings Association (ROSCA) "is made up of a group of individuals acting as an informal financial institution in the form of an alternative financial vehicle. A ROSCA happens via set contributions and withdrawals to and from a common fund" (Chen 2019).

[38] BR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about their village and the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

by KOICA. The increased interaction of the village members was also observed when treasurers of each village mentioned that people from neighbouring villages also joined their village savings account.

In general, the KOICA intervention through the donation of raw materials to the villages changed the *social domains* of the individuals, whose transformed ideas and practices were "through actors' shared experiences and struggles" (Long 2001, 242). The project empowered the villagers and gave them more leverage in negotiating processes. Also in terms of their *social capital*, the villagers interviewed mentioned how they were given new platforms either through their village meetings or *Bulungi bwansi*, to work with more people in their villages and also interact with the neighbouring villages that showed interest in their achievements. In these processes of accepting the new social realities, the villagers proved themselves to be the social engineers in the implementation and continuation process of the development project.

6.2. 'Mind-set Change'

In these changing dynamics, *situations of resocialisation* can be stated to have occurred, whereby individuals have taken "new roles with their accompanying beliefs and values" through the significant involvement of behavioural reforms from the *international exchange* that took place in the villages (Kelman 2006, 8). To support this claim, in both written documents and interviews with the Korean representatives and also with the village members, they all attributed the ESMV project's success to *mind-set change*. When using the definition of mind-set as "a person's way of thinking and their opinions," a change in this would mean a change in one's beliefs, values and also their behavioural actions (Cambridge English Dictionary 2020).

Consequently, a project with the aim to change one's mind-set by encouraging *diligence, self-help* and *cooperation*, could have had an adverse effect of portraying the Ugandan rural population with the image of being lazy and heavily dependent, which then could have offended the local participants. However, according to both representatives from KOICA (a Korean) and the NFLC (a Ugandan), this was not necessarily the case. During an interview with the ESMV project manager, he stated that indeed it could have been offensive and if in any way the Ugandan counterparts expressed this issue, they would have looked for alternative methods of promoting this project. However, he confirmed that during numerous encounters with both Ugandan politicians and civilians, they would be the first to claim as so.[39] In fact, President Museveni on many occasions addressed indolence of the public workers and the citizens as the cause for the poverty and limited economic development in the country, hence urged for the dire need to change this attitude (Laing 2018; F. Mugabi 2011; Otwii 2019; The State House of Uganda 2020).

In addition, according to the interview session with the NFLC representative on mind-set change, he first defined mind-set to be "a way of life, like culture that people are used to thinking and behaving." He then asserted that in Uganda, there are two most common habits which are dependency and lack of punctuality. He stated that there is a profound belief that if people wait patiently, the government officials will one day come and do the village maintenance for them. He then added that this dependency is also found when interacting with any international organisation. He said that many take it for granted, since the foreigners are here to help, it is only natural that they give some money. Based on these reasons, he said that the aim of the SMU training was always to bring positive impact to the villages so that the villagers realise that they must take the initiative to help themselves first, instead of waiting for help to come. To quote him, he said:

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[39] Project Manager of KOICA, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 6, 2019).

"…most people, they have a mind-set that everything must be done by the government. That is the mind-set. The government has to clean our water well, the government has to maintain our roads because we pay taxes … the government must do everything for us that is a mind-set … No self-help, everything must be done for us, so to receive, only to receive, that mind-set receiving from someone, from government, the Europeans, the organisations, that mind-set, when SMU came, they were trying to fight that mind-set, 'no you have to do it for yourself now, you have to do self-help, not to wait for someone to give you,' … We are changing the mind-set of the people that not everything can be done by the government. Some things, we can do by ourselves because the government might not do everything for you."[40]

Similarly, when village respondents were asked general questions on how their lives have changed as an individual and as a village, their answers were either *mind-set change* or a description of an activity that was a result of a change in perception. Although the provocative words such as *lazy* and *dependency* were not mentioned, some of the words used to describe their changes in lifestyles were *hardworking*, *diligent*, *clean*, *healthy*, *unity*, *positive*, *confidence*, *I can do it*, to just mention a few. These activities related to express the changes were not a result from grandiose ideas, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, they were ideas that were easy to understand and practised by anyone. To mention a few of these activities, these included, being punctual, managing food portions to avoid wasting, recycling animal manure and coffee husks to make fertilisers, cleaning public village goods such as the roads, water tanks and communal buildings, and also organising group activities to help the marginalised people in community.

For example, during one interview with one village leader, he said:

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[40] SK (NFLC representative) interview, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 16, 2019).

"At Kampiringisa [where NFLC is located], it trained us that everything is possible, it trained us that we can solve problems by ourselves... such things. It taught us also to be determined in whatever we are doing ... Before it [tensions, arguments, and conflicts] was there, but when KOICA came, it changed our mind-sets, it taught us how to be cooperative, how to behave so then everything changed ... Another thing, we have one heart, working together, before we were not like now, we were not digging like now, this road, so we are working together to see that. Like how we are cleaning our roads."[41]

During another interview with a village member, she said:

"The coming of KOICA helped us so much, we didn't know what we should do, and also cooperate, so it helped us a lot. It empowered us in Bulungi Bwansi, though before [in the past] we were doing it but not like now, because at least we are doing it more [frequently and with a larger group of people] than before."[42]

Nevertheless, the degree to which these changes were accepted varied depending on the individual. To better identify and analyse these differences, Kelman's theory on social influence was used. It helped identify whether an individual was in the process of complying with the social policies or was trying to maintain an accepted identity for certain relationship or in the process of internalising simply because the individual's values were now in accordance with those of the ESMV project (1958, 1961, 1979, 2006, 2017). To measure the attitudinal change due to *compliance* and *identification* was relatively easy to observe. It was rather straightforward as defined by the characteristics of prioritising either rewards or avoiding punishments for the former, while for the latter, self-defining identity and their respective relationships were the key factors.

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[41] KP (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 10, 2019).
[42] NM (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 10, 2019).

Hence to analyse the observations better, the process of *internalisation* was to be evaluated using the four criteria:

- Punctuality (keeping promises and time)

- Cleanliness (cleaning up themselves and their place) during and after interview sessions

- Engagement (number of social groups the participant is associated with)

- Responsibility (based on their economic productivity – not necessarily how prosperous their businesses were doing, but focusing on their work attitude)

Only when all these four criteria were observed, then the complete *internalisation* process was assumed to have taken by the individual.

The chart below shows the observation results of the process of accepting social influence with 57 village members in the three villages. Primary colours – red, yellow and blue – were used to represent the three processes – *compliance*, *identification* and *internalisation* – respectively. With reference to Kelman's claims that these processes and roles are *not mutually exclusive* of each other, it was indeed noticed that some participants were seen to be bordering on two difference processes (Ibid.). For these participants, the secondary colours – orange and green – were used to represent either the process of *compliance & identification* or those bordering in the process *of identification & internalisation* respectively. For the people who were only met once (usually during the group sessions) and did not contribute much to the discussions, they were marked as *not applicable* to avoid any confusion in the final analysing process.

(Chart 1: Process of Social Influence in Kiwumu A, Kkumbya and Lukonge)

Compliance

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, according to Kelman's social influence theory, *compliance* is said to occur when an individual's goal achievement is directly dependent on the means control by the *influencing agent* (1958, 1961, 1979, 2006, 2017). "In accepting influence via this process, members assure themselves of continued access to rewards and approval (and avoidance of penalties and disapproval) contingent on adherence to system rules" (Kelman 2006, 11). It is important to note that this change of behaviour is not because the individual "believes in its content, but because it is instrumental in the production of a social effect" and thus requiring strict monitoring system (Kelman 1961, 62-63).

In the research fieldwork conducted, none of the research participants portrayed such traits. The most fundamental reason that contributed to this observation was because these villages were the *model villages* in their respective sub-counties as well as the timing of the fieldwork, which

was conducted after the end of the first phase. It was somewhat confirmed that the majority of the people in these villages were diligent and productive, and had already undergone the implementation procedure. Thus, it was not easy to identify many village members that would only adhere to the new rules and policies for rewards and/or to avoid punishments (if there were any). Furthermore, despite the request made to meet these people who were unwilling to adapt the new policies to each village leader during the first encounters, no feedback was attained. Based on this, it was made explicit that the village leaders were definitely the "social gatekeepers or function[ed] as facilitators who decide what is good for both groups of people" (Long 2001, 88). Because they had the authority to mobilise the people, they also got to manage the flow of information, and thus it was possible that they may not have wanted their village image to be tarnished by exposing these uncooperative members to an outsider.

However, during the interviews, all the participants in the three villages mentioned the youth as the least cooperative members. It was said that unless these youth were to see the immediate reward, they would rarely participate in the village activities for *Bulungi bwansi*, morning drills nor in the village meetings. The participants claimed that most of the male youth were not interested in farming, and so, although it is not easy to make ends meet, they preferred to be *boda-boda* men (drivers of motorcycles used as a taxi). With regards to this issue, some members have said,

> *"The youth are the ones who doesn't want to work so hard. For the youth, they say, 'ah, that is for the elders, let them work.' For us we just work, thinking that the youth will also see us, the way we are working cooperatively so that they come and join us, to see how good it is."*[43]

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[43] NJ (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 10, 2019).

With another interviewee, he responded,

> *"yeah, they [not hardworking members] are [there] but not very many, like at this time, they are near the lake, they go for their work for fishing and they don't come engaging in the work [village community work]. They spend the whole day there. Before [the ESMV project] people usually went for fishing and almost spend a full month without coming home. So, the chairman talked to them, talked to them that they could come and work for their family, they should engage in coming, engage in activities which can help them to grow, to change their lives, but now [they] have become boda-boda men...Koreans taught us that if we want to eat, we first have to work, but for them, they first eat before they work."*[44]

In summary, none of the interviewees portrayed to be currently engaged in the project solely to gain something or to avoid disadvantages from the local government or KOICA (compliant attitude). Instead, many mentioned that the most uncooperative and indolent members to be the youth, who only would engage if they saw direct incentives or stronger enforcing mechanisms like police patrol.[45] However, the leaders in all the three villages seemed confident that with time, these outliers would eventually cooperate with them, especially when they notice the significant changes in the living standards of those who have cooperated and indulged in reproducing the knowledge acquired from the training centre.[46]

Identification

For the process of *identification*, it is said to have occurred when "members are meeting the expectations of their system roles, thus maintaining their desired relationship to the system and

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[44] KY (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 29, 2019).

[45] ME (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

[46] NR and KR (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).

their self-concept as fully embedded in these roles" (Kelman 2006, 11). *Identification* in one way is comparable to the process of *compliance,* for attitude change does not occur "because it's content per se is intrinsically satisfying" but at the same, it is different because the "individual believes in the opinions and actions that he adopts" (Kelman 1961, 64). Furthermore, Kelman theorised that individuals who have taken the *role orientation* play an "active part in carrying out policies," which makes them great *supporters* rather than *evaluators* due to their fundamental concern on the *personal status* that attracts the individual to become more like the influencing agent (2006, 16).

In this process, *self-definition* becomes an explicit priority for the members, which seems to explain why it was the predominantly observed process and orientation in the villages that were already identified as the *model villages.* During the fieldwork, out of the 37 participants whose source of attitude change was observable as they engaged in the in-depth interviews, 21 participants (1 from Kiwumu A, 13 from Kkumbya, 7 from Lukonge) showed traits of the *identification* process. They seemed to accept the social influence primarily due to the importance of *role orientation.* This number of observation included those who were bordering on the process of *compliance* and *identification* as well as those showing some traits of the *internalisation* process.

The two participants who seemed to be bordering on the process of *compliance* & *identification* were marked as orange to depict the mixture of *compliance* (red colour in key of the graph) and *identification* (yellow colour). These two participants throughout the interviews showed greater interest in the discussion of what KOICA and other external organisations could do for their village and the members, and concerns to maintain this relationship. The two mainly requested to be supported with some electric sewing machines numerous times during the interview sessions. To quote a section from one of the interview session, the interviewee said,

"I am in the group of that sewing machine, now I am asking if there is any hope of helping us, like to give us more sewing machine and to help us like in providing more materials because what we have is not enough."[47]

In addition, some other requested items not only from the two participants but from Kkumbya village as a whole during both group and individual interviews were tents, chairs and saucepans that would enable them to start a catering service business. During the third group interview session in Kkumbya village, where 10 people attended, the conversations were centrally focused on this issue. One person during this session said:

"We are thanking KOICA for everything it has done for us, but we have a very big challenge and some problems, like we don't have chairs, tents, we need these things, tents and saucepans…we put our request to the community development officer [LC3 representative], but now it's like two years and nothing we got from it. So we see you as B's [KOICA representative] friend, you are the person that we can appeal to… So if like you who can help us to get for those chairs, saucepans, tents, it can help us."[48]

The same request for these items were also made during the last individual interview sessions that took place on October 31, 2019. Out of the 9 people interviewed, 8 people asked about the future plans of KOICA and the possible relationship status between them and their village. Out of these 8 people, 5 asked for the way they could obtain tents, chairs and saucepans needed for their village catering service. Thus, many participants observed in Kkumbya seemed to have changed and continued to maintain the preferred behavioural qualities introduced by the influencing agent, KOICA, for both rewards and the maintenance of a favourable relationship.

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[47] NCY (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).
[48] Kkumbya group interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

As of the case for only the *identification* process marked in yellow, 7 people (6 from Kkumbya and 1 from Lukonge) were observed to fall under this category. Overall, these participants showed enthusiasm in their role as an ESMV project committee leader or as a member of these committees. They appreciated the changes that KOICA brought into the village. Throughout the different interview sessions, some requests for certain goods from KOICA were made, but this was based from an underlying expectation of some reciprocity for maintaining the relationship with KOICA.[49] These included the desire for more infrastructures in the villages, such as the extension of electricity power and water supplies, but also those that may support their current village businesses.[50] To these people, KOICA's presence in the villages was of utmost importance and thus was frequently asked about during the interview sessions.

In addition, the subject matter for these participants during the interviews were focused to what roles they have taken during the project. For this issue, there were some members who would identify themselves as the most hardworking member in their communities.[51] Such aspects showed that these participants were better *supporters* than *critical evaluators* of the ESMV project in their respective villages (Kelman 2006, 16). During one interview session, one participant claimed the achievement of the leaders were limited. He referred the leadership role to that of a priest in church, whereby even if the priest preaches, some may pick up the gospel whereas others may not do so, and thus, implying that the positive results wanted is quite beyond one's control.[52]

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[49] CK (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 10, 2019).

[50] DR (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

[51] NR and KR (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).

[52] MM (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 5, 2019).

If these 7 participants were to have fully *internalised* the principles of SMU, there could have been more active engagement to encourage *diligence*, *self-help* and *cooperation* in the village, instead of the passive attitude, "we cannot change who they are and so we leave them behind".[53] Likewise, there could have been some traits of the four criteria (punctuality, cleanliness, engagement, responsibility) mentioned at the beginning of the chapter to observe some process of the *internalisation* process as it was for the 12 participants (1 from Kiwumu A, 5 from Kkumbya, and 6 from Lukonge) marked in colour green in the chart. These participants showed more activeness and commitment in practising and sharing their knowledge with the other village members, especially corresponding to the engagement and responsibility factor to fulfil their expected roles as a leading member of a model village. For example, when interacting with village members that are reluctant to adopt the new policies introduced by the ESMV project, some leaders have expressed that they have introduced the village meetings as a platform, where any village member can come, suggest and even debate about what the village should do to improve.[54]

However, although these 12 village participants showed eagerness in engaging the community and showing diligence in their personal economic activities, they did not portray the same level of commitment for punctuality and cleanliness, which were also highly promoted at NFLC. With most of these members, despite the initial agreement on the time for the interview sessions, it was noticed that some either forgot completely about the appointment – even when reminding messages were sent a day before, or they would come at a completely different time making schedule arrangements quite difficult. Also during all the interviews and participant

[53] Lukonge group interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project by author. Kampala (October 29, 2019).

[54] SN (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019)

observations it was noticed that only a few participants would clean up the empty water bottles and plastic bags of the breads consumed.

Therefore, as for these respondents, it was difficult to observe much traits that would show that they were actively carrying out the leadership roles or simply their duties as a member of the community due to the high integration of their personal values and attitude with the training received from NFLC. This lack of high level of commitment in practising the activities promoted to lead to mind-set change by the NFLC representatives led to the decision that 21 participants were to be labelled as either *compliance & identification* (orange colour), only *identification* (yellow colour) or *identification & internalisation* (green colour), in their socialisation process to the ESMV project.

Internalisation

Influence in the form of internalisation according to Kelman, was described to occur when "members live up to the implications of these shared values [with the influencing agent], thus maintaining the integrity of their personal value framework" (Kelman 2006, 11). Therefore, these individuals either accepted change based on "cognitive consistency, where the induced behavior is perceived as conducive to the maximization of the person's own values, or the form of affective appropriateness, where the induced behavior is perceived as continuous with the person's self-concept" (Ibid. 4). The influencing agent, KOICA, had to show *credibility* to the villagers in Mpigi district, in order to achieve behavioural change through the *internalisation* process, whereas in the processes mentioned above it was simply through *means control* for the *compliance* or *attractiveness* for the identification process (Kelman 1961, 65). Another aspect that differentiates this process of social influence from the rest, is the individual's *rational grounds* that play a role

in the decision making process, hence as previously mentioned, they were *evaluators* in the intervention programs (Kelman 2006, 16).

Amongst the 57 research participants interviewed and observed, 16 people corresponded with the above-mentioned traits. In addition, throughout the interview sessions and the participant observation, high levels of punctuality, responsibility, engagement, and also cleanliness as advocated by the ESMV project were noted. They were always at the place where they were needed, which included the interview sessions, community activities and also with their daily schedules that were discussed during the informal conversations. Importantly, these participants would always clean after the sessions and leave the place as they found, which was very different from the rest of the participants. It was quite surprising that many of these people were from Kiwumu A, where 10 participants out of the 11 that were interviewed in depth, showed diligence, punctuality, cleanliness, responsibility and high engaging attitudes.

For example, in the case of Kiwumu A, many youth that were not engaging in village cooperation was because of their interests in fishing, and hence leaving behind their families and work in the village unattended for weeks. The chairman of the village who was further motivated in creating village development through enhanced cooperation, diligence and a self-help attitude, decided to talk to the leader of the fishermen's association so that not everyone could be in the lake. Together, the leaders implemented some regulations on safety and environmental concerns that gave the youth no other choice but to go back to their homes, take on their responsibilities as a communal member and make a proper living. To quote this interviewee:

> *"…they told them that everyone should have a boat for his own, something which is not easy, as a way of controlling them to go there, so it is not easy to own a big boat, so since they saw that it is very difficult to own it, some have decided to come back … when some refused and went back, then they said you must have a life jacket, and they don't have the*

money to buy, and there is no way they can go for fishing, so you have to come to agriculture to at least you plant some cassava you do and you sell, to go on possessing life jacket. You can't be allowed to get on the water without a life jacket."[55]

Another event that demonstrated the process of social influence through internalisation in Kiwumu A was when an interviewee was asked about any other activities that the village members engaged collectively. He then shared the story of when the chairman organised a village meeting to discuss about village sanitation. In this meeting, the chairman suggested that since *Bulungi bwansi* cannot be conducted every day, using the village saving, they could hire some people to do this job. Through this session, it was collectively agreed to hire two people who would work as village sanitation workers and clean the village, such as the main roads on a daily basis, except for the days when *Bulungi bwansi* was carried out.[56] This was something that was not instructed by the NFLC instructors nor KOICA representatives. Such systematic transformation based on the negotiation by the village members, showed the effort put in by the leaders to encourage active participation of every member in the community, which showed a high level of commitment regardless of the influencing agents' direct involvement or monitoring.

To elaborate more on this issue some questions were asked during the interview sessions to stimulate a zero-sum thinking, with regards to the material support to observe the reactions of the participants. The general question asked regarding this issue was whether the participants wanted more villages to join this project. All the respondents agreed that they thought that the project was very beneficial for them and worth having more individuals to also receive the

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[55] TJ (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 16, 2019).

[56] ME (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (November 7, 2019).

trainings. Based on this answer, the follow-up question was *"would it be okay even if KOICA would not be able to provide the current model villages with the material support?"* With this question, the answers varied into three different reactions.

To briefly summarise the answers given, some participants showed denial, and stated that KOICA would or should be able to manage because they still needed KOICA's support. Others suggested a trickle-down effect, so that KOICA doesn't necessarily have to help the other new villages directly, but through the model villages. This implied that if KOICA trains their villages (the model villages) more and also support their businesses to grow bigger, they can be better empowered to reach out to their neighbouring villages. The last category of reaction observed was where some participants said it was understandable that KOICA would help other villages instead of theirs, because now that they have received training on mind-set change and also some livestock as well as machines, they were capable of developing by themselves, although it may not be as easy.

This last category of reaction was visible in the 16 participants (10 from Kiwumu A, 4 from Kkumbya and 2 from Lukonge) marked as blue indicating *internalisation* of the social influence. They showed confidence and determination that as long as each individual does their part in the community, diligently and whole-heartedly, they can always be self-reliant. To quote some sections of interview sessions, one participant from Kiwumu A said:

> *"Yeah, because for us we changed, since KOICA came we changed, we increased in most of the things, economically, socially, now I would like other villages to copy us and change also. I think it will be going on and on until the whole country can do it…We may not get as much as we got but I think like coming for fieldwork from those villages, when they are teaching, I think they will be coming to this village… and because we have different ideas,*

so we are just going to gain that, like if they come, we will be getting more ideas from those people too."[57]

Another participant from Kkumbya responded:

"Yeah, competition for resources but also in this element of how do you call it, maximising resources, yeah, there are quite a number of modern practices of using the limited resources that you have to benefit the maximum people. So competition is good by that way... because it drives us to work more."[58]

Lastly, to quote someone from Lukonge supporting KOICA to expand their project, he said:

"I would like the KOICA project to spread all over the nation even with the training. I would like everyone in the nation to be trained, then within 10 years, there will be a big change in the lives of the people ... Poverty has reduced in this village, we are happy because there is some income in the village, if there is like income where someone can get money, even it reduces crime in the village, and leads to development. It brings togetherness and development [for all]."[59]

The high number of participants that have accepted mind-set change through the internalisation process from one village was surely not expected. This was because, as stated by Norman Long, everyone has different *lifeworlds* that are products of constant reconstructions of their social *relations* and *experiences* (Long 2001, 241). Besides, a complete *internalisation* process would mean a continuous negotiation of all social actors involved to identify their own problems and find corresponding solutions despite the financial challenges that were evident in these rural areas.

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[57] NJ (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 22, 2019).

[58] MJ (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

[59] KW (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 14, 2019).

6.3. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, with reference to Kelman's theory of social influence, awareness of being part of a larger political unit may have also contributed to the acceptance of change for an individual to move from compliance to the next level of accepting the new values and hence leading to attitude change (Kelman 1979, 189). The individuals from the respective seven villages were introduced to each other during different training sessions and even other formal events arranged by KOICA, which may have created awareness that they were part of a larger community.

In addition, the social pressure coming from the possibility of receiving greater assistance, depending on their success could have further encouraged the village members to practice the newly introduced principles to achieve their collective goals. These changes were noted during the interviews, where quite a large number of people stated that initially they were sceptical of the intentions of KOICA in their areas, but with time they realised that KOICA did not have any desires to take their land or property but only to give them new information and support economic development. Hence, the aspiration for economic prosperity, which has always been a great priority for the members seemed more attainable through collective actions as encouraged by the ESMV project. Thus, the change of value to be more initiative, diligent and cooperative was seen to be instrumental for the participants who wished for higher income levels and living standards.

However, it was evident that not all the model villages fully integrated the values of SMU promoted by NFLC. Based on the data collected from the field, out of the 57 participants, 2 were seen to be bordering on *compliance & identification* (marked in orange). As for the change of attitude based on *identification* (marked in yellow) 7 were found in the three villages, but mainly

from Kkumbya village. As for those who accepted change based on *identification &*
internalisation (marked in green)*,* 12 out of 57 participants were observed. Finally, those who have

shown *internalisation* process (marked in blue) were 16 participants, whereby 10 were from

Kiwumu A village. Although there was no intention to categorise the participants based on their

villages, somehow there seemed to be clear village characteristics, especially in the way they

organised themselves and reproduced the external factors.

For example, all the village members interviewed from Kkumbya and Lukonge were more

reliant on KOICA and the Korean embassy for continuous external support despite having received

the basic raw materials and knowledge to improve their economic production. During the

interviews (all the three interview sessions for Kkumbya and the first two interview sessions with

Lukonge), they continued to ask for connections to KOICA so that they can get the funding, and

also emphasised how they needed KOICA. Alternatively, the members interviewed in Kiwumu A

showed a more self-reliant attitude towards improving their economic status. The Kiwumu A

people were more confident that they learnt a lot from the intervention and could help themselves

out, even if KOICA cannot be there to support them. To quote one village committee leader from

Kiwumu A, when he was asked how his village can support itself despite the lack of capital, he

replied:

> *"Everyone does his or her own but still it needs money, but it is not from KOICA [we do*
> *it ourselves]. For example, the elder people who don't have money to build like good*
> *toilets … we can help only those who cannot manage to make the good one … we can do*
> *that as Bulungi Bwansi, we can say, let's go together there, help this one to build the kitchen,*
> *together."*[60]

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[60] MR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship
with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 16, 2019).

In general, regardless of the villagers' orientation, whether rule, role or values, to the group and the newly introduced rural development project, there was a heightened sense of belonging to their respective communities and also responsibilities that had to be fulfilled, if they were to receive the incentives provided by KOICA. Therefore, using these observations made, in the next chapter, I explore what these processes in general affected their understanding of collective identities on both village and national levels.

Chapter Seven:

Collective Identity

In terms of belongingness to the village groups and the love for their communities, KOICA concluded that the two have both increased in all the model villages. Furthermore, during the formal interviews and also the informal conversations with the village participants about the ESMV project, constant use of words such as *mind-set change, unity, togetherness, hardworking, proud, cooperation, community,* and *collective action* occurred to describe their villages. These responses certainly seemed to correspond to the analysis of the respondents for both the role-orientation (based on the identification with the group) and the value-orientation (based on the internalisation of the group values) that was made in the previous chapter.

The role oriented respondents indeed mentioned how they were involved in the projects because it contributed to their *self-definition* in respect to their relationships in the groups, whereas for the value oriented individuals, they were involved because of their commitment to uphold the *congruent values* of the groups (cf. Kelman 1997, 175–76, 2006, 4). But nevertheless as mentioned in the previous chapter, all the participants in general had shown internalisation of the ESMV project to some extent, due to their changed perceptions and values that collective action is more likely to bring economic development in their communities.

Therefore, this final chapter aims to analyse how the ESMV project impacted the villagers' understanding of collective identities and thus, also contributed to their conception of national identities regardless of their orientations toward the groups. To achieve this objective, the socio-cultural factors and the economic factors that influence collective identities are discussed. In the

first section, I discuss these factors and the corresponding collective identities at the village level. In the next section that looks into the national context, I explore how the ESMV project enhanced national consciousness and impacted the (re)construction of a national identity amongst the project participants.

7.1. The *Local* Village Identities

As mentioned in the previous chapters, three interview sessions were conducted in each village (Kiwumu A, Kkumbya and Lukonge). The third interview sessions were more dedicated to discuss the collective identities. When the village respondents were asked to reflect on some of their cultural norms, various practices were explained. Some referred to the responsibilities based on gender and age, others shared information about the marriage customs, and funeral rites, but the most frequently mentioned custom that currently impacted their lives much more than others was *Bulungi bwansi*. According to the village respondents, this cultural patterns played a significant role in the reconstruction of their social networks and, sense of belongingness, and also contributed to a unique village identity as well.

For example, in Kkumbya, many participants (7 out of 9 participants) mentioned the practice of *Bulungi bwansi* or the good sanitation as one of the biggest factors that were specifically unique to their village compared to the neighbouring villages, and which also was contributing to unity. According to one village member, *Bulungi bwansi* was definitely part of her socio-cultural identity that played a significant role in uniting various groups within her village, but also with people outside her village such as the Korean representatives and the local governments:

"As a Muganda, I am so proud of my tribe. Like Kabaka appeals to us to do Bulungi Bwansi so I am proud of that… There is unity in this village, especially when KOICA came, we can do Bulungi Bwansi together, and we can do communal work together, everything together… We are totally different from other villages, if you move around you will know … We welcome those who can come because those people can bring new ideas. I welcome even those ones from different countries because, for example, like you [South Korean], as you come, you change our minds … The truth, since KOICA came, everything changed, for example some of us didn't have toilets but at least now we all have, some people they were only minding about their lives but at least it [collective action and identity] has improved."[61]

One village leader in Kkumbya said,

"That spirit of cooperation, the self-help, the communal work aspect, the Bulungi Bwansi, we call it the Bulungi Bwansi. We want it promoted and expanded, taken to other villages, yes, across the country… Yes and in fact, even sub-county level we are trying to promote it by ensuring that in every parish, there is a parish development committee which can spearhead it, this process of expanding the good things that are found in Kkumbya to other villages."[62]

Similar responses were also noticed in other villages where both leaders and other members shared how their cultural norms became a symbol of collective identity. During an individual interview session in Kiwumu A, where a question about a particular ethnic norm that the participant really loves and would want to share to other people in the country, the participant responded as:

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[61] NP (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

[62] BL (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

"The Kabaka is like a father, he wishes all Baganda people well. The Kabaka asks people to carry out Bulungi bwansi, he asks people to carry out immunisation, taking kids for immunisation, he is asking people to grow crops and coffee ... Bulungi bwansi, encouraged by the Kabaka is like carrying out brotherhood, unity... very cooperative...[it's] important for development"[63]

In Kiwumu A, there was also a participant who was not a Muganda, but from Ankole (located in the western region of the country), and she still highly valued the practice of *Bulungi bwansi*. She claimed that it was a factor that differentiated their village from other neighbouring villages, and worth spreading further across the country. During one of the interviews, she said:

"...mind-set trainings like Bulungi bwansi from KOICA made us strong, cooperative ... KOICA taught us that, the more time we spend inefficiently, the more money we lose ... in this village people all have different political parties they support, but as Koreans came and we received training, they told us you don't only belong to a certain political party, but with development, we all become one. We fight for development, it is not a political party, and we all belong to development. It doesn't discriminate ... Since KOICA was here, though it didn't take long to stay in the place, but at least it trained us a lot. Now for us who were trained, we became teachers we keep teaching others...People want this village, they admire it... [we have a] strong sense of belonging ... we are together."[64]

Similar answers were also given from the village participants from Lukonge. They confirmed that the Kabaka is so influential to them and people around their villages because he is the figure that encourages social development on both personal and communal levels:

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[63] MR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 12, 2019).

[64] BR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and collective identity by author. Kampala (November 7, 2019).

"The Kabaka is our leader who encourages people to immunise their children, carry out Bulungi bwansi, carry out farming, good farming...With these cultural factors with development initiatives from KOICA it makes our village unique...the government together with KOICA made this project possible and for our village, we benefit a lot, we are happy."[65]

Another respondent from Lukonge responded to the same question as:

"I love the Kabaka so much, even the village loves him so much because he encourages us to do Bulungi bwansi. He also sometimes provide us with coffee seeds and also generally helps with farming... Our culture with training from KOICA, we were taught to love our country by being united in one group, carrying out farming..., if it is possible, you can unite with like two or three people and if it is a big land, you carry out farming with partnership together and sell the crops and you get money from these products together to save money."[66]

All the respondents showed great love for their ethnic culture and even those who were not Baganda people, also agreed that the cultural aspects with the trainings from the ESMV project made their villages unique. Although these responses by the participants could have partly been the result to provide socially desirable answers to a foreigner who could impact their relationship with KOICA, their donor, I assume these chances were rather low. This is because, throughout the three different interview sessions conducted, there were moments where the participants would also criticise some government officials for their poor management and even take a critical stand

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[65] DR and NT (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 14, 2019).

[66] NF (Lukonge individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 14, 2019).

on ways to improve. During their comments, some even differentiated between the government and the country and thus indicating that the respondents were quite honest with their opinion regarding the love for their community. As for KOICA, although there were no direct criticisms, some participants did suggest ways in which KOICA could do better.

Hence, based on the interviews in general, it was observed that the socio-cultural factor – *Bulungi bwansi* – was intertwined with the socio-development factors which (re)constructed their image from a common village to that of a *model village*. The *Bulungi bwansi,* the practice assumed to be *dead*, was rejuvenated by the importation of SMU and thus transformed and portrayed with a much more inclusive nature that could mobilise anyone and everyone across the country who aspired for economic development. Referring to Anderson's work*,* it is arguable that *Bulungi bwansi* became an *extraordinary mass ceremony* in the model villages, "being replicated simultaneously" and "incessantly repeated" by many, which portrayed a "vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community" ([1983] 2016, 35).

Regarding this issue of a collective identity through *imagined linkages* by the socio-cultural norms and the economic factors, the respondents were then asked about their opinions towards having new settlers in their villages with diverse backgrounds, including ethnicity. All respondents were positive that new settlers would bring new ideas for development and would also contribute to building better infrastructures either by themselves or through increased governmental aid.[67] When asked about the increased competition regarding the scarcity of resources, they mentioned that they had been trained at the NLFC to maximise efficiency even with the little that they have, and hence it wouldn't be too troublesome.

For example, one participant said:

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[67] During the interviews, it was observed that there was some underlying expectation that if the population in the villages were to grow, there would also be an increase in government assistance to support them.

"It is likely that some people come with developmental ideas ... When we were in Kampiringisa for training, we were taught how to use the small land that we have. Also because it is not good to have the big land when you don't have something to do with it, so when someone comes, these people can do something on it, and develop it, so it is better to welcome them and put it [the resources] in use."[68]

Another participant from Kiwumu A mentioned that,

"...there's no problem if more people come to the village ... they will just provide more market for our products. For example, if you like grow your acre of cassava, and if it can't be all consumed in this village, it may need to go to other places but if they get other people to settle around, the cassava can at least be taken to more schools and hotels [to accommodate the bigger population], ... so you can increase profit, but if you don't have a market and a full acre of cassava, you will have nowhere to take [in the village]."[69]

A participant from Lukonge stated,

"When more people come, yes prices might increase but that also means development too. Also we've learnt how to use everything we have more wisely, like someone is having a large portion of land not in use, new people can come use it and it can lead to development."[70]

Based on these interviews that represented the overall reactions from their respective villages, it was observed that all the participants showed confidence that the three SMU principles introduced through EMSV truly changed their communities and the way of thinking. As mentioned

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[68] SA (Kkumbya individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

[69] TJ (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project, relationship with KOICA and challenges by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

[70] TJ (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project, relationship with KOICA and challenges by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

in the previous chapter, either through the role or value orientation, or even both orientations, of the villagers, they have come to believe that the collective willingness and action can lead to the communal development, no matter how minimal, and showed some internalised aspects of the SMU principles. Overall, such responses seemed to be in accordance with their claims that, despite the ethnic or any other background differences, cooperation can lead to better outcomes, in terms of development. The participants all answered that it was this newly adapted attitude that they were all so proud of, that indeed made them *the model village* and a "leading example for all Ugandans to follow".

7.2. The *Imagined Communities* and National Identity

To further elaborate on the issue of ethnic differences, the village respondents and also the non-village local respondents positively affirmed that they do not discriminate others based on ethnic affiliation. However, some claimed that there are certain ethnic groups that are discriminated against on a national level. The ethnic groups that they believed to be discriminated included the Acholi, Langi and West Nile people from the north, and the Basoga from the east. Some respondents also claimed that the Baganda were deliberately left behind by the government; however, there were also others who were certain that there was no discrimination based on ethnicity. These respondents claimed that the fact that groups that were not achieving much was simply because they were not diligent in the first place. Despite such varying perceptions, one statement that all participants agreed upon was that whether intended or not, the western people, usually the Banyankole people, secured the top socio-economic and political status in the country.

Regarding this issue, following comments were recorded by three random participants from each village:

> *"The Baganda are left behind. For example our children, even if they study hard, it is hard to get a job, but in these big offices, there are people from only one tribe [Ankole]. Also in politics, you see how governments are from this one tribe only"[71]*

> *"…In these positions, especially in politics, you only find the western people and I am not sure whether this is truly based on merits and qualifications"[72]*

> *"There are no tribes left behind, but there is one that is striving… Those that are left behind are not very hardworking people because if they were hardworking, they wouldn't be left behind. But in the big national offices, there is only one tribe [Ankole]".[73]*

To further elaborate on this issue and how it impacts one's sense of belonging to the country, the question about their love and loyalty for their ethnic groups and the country was asked during the last interview sessions. Out of the 25 participants who attended the last session, everyone agreed that both their ethnic and national identity mutually existed without conflict, except for one participant, whose greatest dissatisfaction for the nation came from the poor infrastructures and faulty democracy.

To quote, he said:

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[71] NC (Kkumbya individual interview) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (October 31, 2019).

[72] MR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 12, 2019).

[73] DR and NT (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 14, 2019).

"The Kabaka cannot do much because of the limited resources but even with the little, they try to do their best... So I love my tribe, but not the same way I love my country. Because for example, there is no way you can get proper health services here in Uganda... You have to fly to India or another country for treatment, but if you live in the villages and you are poor, you just die. The market regulation is also so bad because for the fishers for example, they buy these nets from the markets but now the government is saying those nets cannot be used for fishing. They should have not allowed to import those products in the first place but the Uganda National Bureau of Standards is not doing its job well and it is only for the common people like us to suffer".[74]

Although others expressed similar frustration regarding the poor democracy and infrastructures in the country, many Ugandans in general, including those in the cities, showed a flexible understanding in which both subnational and national identities can mutually exist (J.-D. Park 2019, 68). When the research participants were asked why and how this was possible, most claimed that since their ethnic group is located in Uganda, it is only natural to be fond of the country that has allowed them to keep their traditions for all these years. They mentioned that because the nation-state has provided the basic conditions such as safety and protection, it contributed to the preservation of their history and culture.

To elaborate further on the common perception of safety and protection in the country, many appreciated President Museveni for keeping the country peacefully united and bringing in donors and investors such as KOICA for economic development. Additionally, president Museveni was also known as the 'national hero' for some of the respondents, who blamed the local government for not supporting the president and the national goals, but instead misusing their power and corrupting the country. Indeed, due to strong media censorship in the country, there

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[74] MR (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about collective identity by author. Kampala (November 12, 2019).

was limited exposure of negative news, such as presidential malpractices, that may cause division in the country, especially in the rural areas. Furthermore, all the respondents seemed oblivious about the ethnic factor significantly involved in the civil wars, in addition to Museveni's contribution to this sectarianism in the past that continues to the current times (as mentioned in chapter three).

Concerning this issue, two participants remarked,

> *"President Museveni wants unity in the country. He is doing a lot for the country to be together and to develop, but you see these leaders, these leaders at sub-county level, district level, these ministers, they don't want unity. They keep fighting for power only for themselves, and not putting proper effort in helping President Museveni".[75]*

> *"The government is like family, so the president is like our father. It is only right that we follow the head of the family…People blame the government too much and can't appreciate what it has done for us so far. They should understand that the government cannot fulfil all the interests of everyone and it is why we must learn how to do it on our own. In Kampiringisa, they taught us this, and everyone should also go there".[76]*

Other than the use of mass media to construct such selective memories and remembering of the nation, it has also been used to promote the common aspirations and create awareness of the civic duty. For example, the success story of the ESMV project was not only on the newspapers but also broadcasted across the country numerous times to encourage more people to be diligent, take ownership of their communities and work together to improve their socio-economic standards

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[75] KJ (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project and relationship with KOICA by author. Kampala (October 29, 2019).
[76] NO (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about collective identity by author. Kampala (November 12, 2019).

just like how the model villages achieved it.[77] In these various platforms, the community-driven nature of the enterprise was strongly emphasised as well as patriotism, which can be demonstrated through the hardworking spirit to increase communal welfare, "because without love for the country, one cannot achieve development," as claimed by the interviewed NFLC representative.

During the interview sessions with the village participants, it was also noted that such promotion of the ESMV project through mass media also affected their national consciousness and national identities. As indicated earlier, all the interview respondents answered yes to the increased pride for themselves, their villages and also their country, from all the national and international attention that they were getting for successfully implementing and completing the first phase of the project. All the participants mentioned how their villages were more *organised, diligent* and *cooperative*, which as mentioned earlier made their villages unique. For the participants of Kiwumu A, they all mentioned how their village got to represent the country because of their outstanding internalisation of the SMU principles, and hence were given the opportunity to present in front of the presidents of Uganda and Korea in 2016 and also host the Korean Ambassador in their village. They mentioned that although the training from NFLC had contributed to better acceptance of change to achieve national development and also the national values as a member of the community, having hosted such a big international event in their village had greatly enhanced their sense of belonging to the nation, as well as their responsibility to do better as a citizen.

To quote some memorable interview sessions on the related issue, one participant said:

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[77] SK (NFLC representative) interview, 2020. Interviewed by author. Kampala (December 16, 2019).

"In Kampiringisa, they taught us we should self-help ourselves, eat to work and also not lose hope. They told us with that good heart, the diligence and unity, we can support our family, neighbours and even Uganda when we produce more for the market...I am so proud to be part of this village, but before KOICA there wasn't much unity. Now it changed, everyone who comes to our village are surprised at how clean and developed this place is. Even when the Korean Ambassador came to our village, we felt so proud...Now we can teach more Ugandans how we did this and how we can all be better". [78]

7.3. Conclusion

The internalisation of the training from NFLC, as fuelled by the continuous practice of the newly introduced principles and knowledge by the village members led by the various committee leaders, in a way became a political process, whereby they began to have a better understanding of how they were connected to larger political units expanding from their families, to relatives, neighbours, villages and eventually the nation. One research participant commented about the changed perception of national identity and patriotism as,

"Before we were waiting, even a hole around your courtyard that, that is the responsibility of the government but at least for being patriotic, we can now work without being forced or waiting for the government... [Such training] was good and necessary, we learnt that we shouldn't be too reliant and have the heart to make our fatherland better". [79]

These attitudinal change was one of the many outcomes of the training from NFLC and the continuous interaction with the Korean counterparts who were able to transform the SMU

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[78] KP (Kiwumu A individual) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the ESMV project, relationship with KOICA and challenges by author. Kampala (November 7, 2019).

[79] DR and NT (Lukonge group) interview, 2020. Interviewed about the collective identity by author. Kampala (November 14, 2019).

principles into the local context using *Bulungi bwansi.* This localisation had a significant impact on one's identity: it was directly related to ethnic identity and hence, many perceived "this role as a way of expressing their personal identity and promoting their personal values," referring to Kelman's social influence theory (Kelman 1997, 176). The revival of *Bulungi bwansi*, a culture that was not practiced for a long time in these villages, helped re-construct a distinct village identity and solidified their images as the *model villages.*

Additionally, although *Bulungi bwansi* was not conducted on a fixed day in all the seven model villages, it was nevertheless, conducted once in every week in all of them, with the collective aim to improve their individual and the communal welfare. Hence the model village members, demonstrated the *simultaneity-along-time* aspect mentioned in Anderson's *Imagined Communities* ([1983] 2016)*,* which also contributed to the formation of *an imagined community.* Despite the lack of direct interactions amongst every individual in these model villages, they came to perceive themselves "as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history," (Ibid., 26) of their national development plan. It has therefore, enhanced their sense of belongingness to their respective communities, which included the nation as well.

The mass media also contributed to the reinforcing of this collective unity that extended to the nation. For long, media censorship in Uganda was used to create selective memories of the nation-state, but along with the promotion of the ESMV project it acted as an agent to better disseminate national goals (economic prosperity) and values (diligence, self-help and cooperativeness), which impacted the mass public as well as the model village members themselves. The use of the media to promote the success of the ESMV project and the NFLC in both national and international news made the model village members to become more self-cautious of their position as representatives of Uganda's rural population.

Furthermore, being in the national spotlight increased the chances to interact with more people, both Ugandans and other foreigners such as their Korean counterparts, and thus also contributed to their enhanced national consciousness. All the research participants portrayed their confidence and love for their communities as trained under the guidance from the NFLC and showed strong desires to live up to their title, the *model villages* for the other villages in the country to follow. Therefore, the ESMV project in general, although did not contribute to nationalism per se, did cultivate a stronger national consciousness which led to a more inclusive collective identity, in the form of a nation identity, than there was before the intervention program.

Summary and Conclusion

The colonial legacy is still present in Uganda, and it explains, as many have pointed out, why the elites in the country are all from the same ethnic regions while others such as those from the northern or central Uganda feel marginalised (Jones 2009; Lindemann 2011; Platas 2011). Based on these issues at hand, it was worth asking why a South Korean model of rural development project was implemented specifically in central Uganda, the Buganda region. SMU, a rural development program that was first introduced by President Park Chung-hee in the 70s in South Korea, led to socio-political changes in which people in the rural areas became more involved and took more initiative in constructing their own communal welfares. In Korea, the project had a unifying effect in the program villages, which helped enhance nationalism and political support for Park (Sonn and Gimm 2013). Though the movement lost momentum after the assassination of Park, during his daughter Park Geun-hye's presidential term (from 2013 to 2017), it was re-introduced in the country as a new model for the Korean ODA program.

The new ODA framework was important for Korea as it would reinforce its international reputation as a donor country and also find new potential economic partners (Doucette and Müller 2016; H. Kim 2017; Soyeun Kim and Gray 2016). This need coincided with the needs of Uganda, where agriculture continues to account for the main source of income, and also with President Museveni's stated desire to promote national unity. An economic summit of the two countries that took place in 2013 officially confirmed the exportation of South Korea's rural development program SMU to Uganda. In 2015, the ESMV project was implemented in seven model villages in Mpigi District. The first phase of the project was to take place from 2015 until 2018 with the objectives to increase social capital, household incomes, living standards, agricultural productivity

and also to improve governance (KOICA 2018c). Training took place at the National Farmers'
Leadership Centre (NFLC) to bring attitudinal and lifestyle change that would help internalise the
three spirits of SMU (diligence, self-help and cooperation) and achieve these objectives.

According to the final evaluation of the project conducted by KOICA (2018), it was
considered successful. Social capital in these villages increased as leaders who were trained at
NFLC took full responsibility to share their knowledge and engage with fellow village members.
For enhancing household incomes and agricultural production, KOICA provided the first batch of
beneficiaries with some hens, pigs and cows which were expected to be shared with the next batch
of beneficiaries. Also, machines and appropriate training were provided for value-addition of the
harvested agricultural products. In addition, Village Savings and Loans Association (VSLA) were
created to act like a microfinance bank, to improve the cash flow of the village. As for the living
conditions, *Bulungi bwansi,* the traditional model of mutual help and cooperation, was resuscitated
and reintroduced in the villages, to improve the basic infrastructures and hence the living
conditions for all. For the final objective of the project, governance and leadership showed positive
results too, as the villages learnt how to make action plans and democratically monitor these
projects.

These results show that for the successful outcome of the project, the role of grassroots
actors and their active participation were of great significance. It is also the reason to why KOICA
emphasised the direct interaction with the lower levels of government, from the town council
(Local Council 3) to the village leaders (the Local Council 1) instead of interacting through the
district level government officials (Local Council 5). Based on personal interviews and participant
observation conducted in the field, it was noticed that in the early phases of the project the village
members were quite sceptical. The villagers had to be convinced that only through active

participation and a good understanding of these trainings, they would be able to receive both material and technical support from KOICA to execute their action plans. The Korean Embassy then arranged competition cups amongst these model villages to increase motivation and internalisation of the SMU values. The widespread media coverage also contributed to the internalisation of the project since the model villages were given both national and international recognition.

With reference to Herbert Kelman's theory on the process of internalisation (1958, 1979, 1997, 2006) that may look dated but continues to be applied in modern social influence experiments, the model villages seem to have proceeded from mere compliance to get access to the material support (such as hens, pigs, cows) towards identification to maintain the relationship with both KOICA and the state. Furthermore, some leaders and members in the villages have shown to have fully integrated the SMU spirit as their own values in life by actively partaking in the communal activities, even though receiving no direct benefits from doing so, such as the secretary of Kiwumu A village who bought a digital camera at his own personal expense to use it for the committee. Also, some respondents appreciated what KOICA did for them so far and showed selfless support to KOICA to expand to other parts of the country, even if they were not to be included as beneficiaries anymore.

Similar to the outcome of SMU in Korea, the ESMV project in Uganda also impacted on the local understandings of collective identities. According to the interviews, the members stated that before KOICA, everyone was more individualistic with almost no collective action. Thus, there wasn't much opportunity or need to be conscious of a collective identity. However, through the ESMV project, they received training that made them more self-aware of themselves as a community member and were encouraged to play an active role to achieve economic development.

Additionally, the external materials received were another vivid aspect that made their villages different compared to the non-ESMV participants, which all contributed to a new brand image for their village identity.

Furthermore, when submitting project proposals to KOICA, they were required to elaborate on how the project would benefit the whole community. Hence, from smaller political units of family and neighbours, the ESMV project expanded these political boundaries from that of the village to neighbouring villages, districts and now nationwide. The village members' interaction with foreigners, both international partners and their fellow Ugandans from different villages, ethnic groups and even government officials also truly contributed to an enhanced national consciousness. Many village members showed aspiration for the growth of the national economy and for better political reputation in the international arena, thus proving how ideas and practices associated with national identity were reproduced and adapted. However, SMU as an ODA framework is relatively new, especially on the African continent and thus underexplored, and if implemented must probably be tailored to the specific local conditions in any country.

To conclude, this research was conducted to provide a critical analysis of the social impact SMU had on grassroots actors and their communities, in the hopes to contribute to future studies on how international rural development programs may affect national political events, including general elections and political survival of the African leaders.

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Anonymous List of all participants with colour identification for the level of acceptance of new intervention

	Kkumbya	Kiwumu	Lukonge	KOICA	Korean Embassy	Ugandans not from the model villages
Name of participant	BL	BR	DR	Taeyoung Kim	Byung Kyoo Ha	Ronald Bugembe (Translator)
	KI	BE	HK	Joon Cheol Bae (Project Manager)		Raymond Musisi
	KS	CK	KW	SK (NFLC representative)		Anthony Mulo
	KP	GK	KS	Sol Kim		Nabylah Saku
	MJ	KA	KR	Jin Moo Park		
	MN	KP	MM			
	ML	KJ	NT			
	MA	KF	NR			
	MG	LS	NA			
	NM	MB	NG			
	NJ	ME	NF			
	NP	M	NV			
	NC	MR				
	NCY	NO				
	NJE	NJ				
	NSR	NI				
	NTM	NK				
	NTR	SI				
	NUR	TJ				
	NCR	WBA				
	NPK					
	ON					
	SA					
	SN					
	WP					
No. of participants interviewed	25	20	12	5	1	4
Total no. of participants	67					

KEY	
COLOR	MEANING
(red)	Compliance
(orange)	Compliance and Indentification
(yellow)	Identification
(green)	Identification and Internalisation
(blue)	Internalisation
(grey)	Not Applicable

Leiden University MA Research Fieldwork –

Rural Development Project Implementation via Grassroots Actors in Uganda

Hello, my name is Ka Hyoun Moon, a research MA student from Leiden University in the Netherlands. I am currently majoring in African Studies and for my MA thesis, I am conducting a research on the topic, "Rural Development Project Implementation via Grassroots Actors in Uganda," with the research question, "How do the committee leaders of the Establishment of Saemaul Model Villages (ESMV) project in Uganda navigate the social construction of collective identity?" Therefore, the aim of my research is to see if and how grassroots actors in development projects contribute to the 'internalisation' of the support and incentives given by external forces such as states and international organisations.

This survey includes 15 questions that I believe are relevant to the study and the responses obtained will be used to prepare follow-up interviews. This will take no longer than 30 minutes. The names of the respondents will not be disclosed and will later be indicated with a marking that only I can follow-up for confidentiality. The thesis will be published upon graduation and all documents and files related will be processed according to the regulations of Leiden University policy.

Please be informed that all participation for the surveys and interviews are to be voluntary, hence the participant has the right to withdraw from it without any adverse consequences. Feel free to ask any questions for further clarifications at any time.

By signing the consent statement below, it will be regarded that the respondent has fully understood the purpose of this study and has approved to take part in it.

Thank you,

Truly,

Ka Hyoun Moon

I, _____ (name), has read and understood the above information and give consent to take part of the study.

Date: _____   Signature: _____

General information

Sub-County: _____   Village: _____

Name: _____   Age: _____

Gender: _____   Mobile number:_____

Questions

1. How many members are in the household?

_____

2. Who is the head of the household? (tick)

| Grandfather	Grandmother	Father	Mother
Oldest male child	Oldest female child	Other:_____ (specify)	

3. What is the highest level of education obtained by the household head? (tick)

Primary	Secondary O-Level	Secondary A-level	Bachelor's degree
No formal education	Other: _____ _____ (specify)		

4. What is the major economic activity of the household?

Crop farming	Livestock farming	Business	Wage/Salary
Other: _____ (specify)			

5. How was your experience working in the ESMV project? (tick/circle)

Excellent   Good   Average/Not Bad   Bad   Terrible

6. How would you rate the cooperation you had with fellow village members during the project?

Excellent   Good   Average/Not Bad   Bad   Terrible

7. Did this rate change after the end of the first phase of ESMV? Specify.

_____

8. How would you rate the performance of the committee leaders and the sub-committee leaders?

Excellent   Good   Average/Not Bad   Bad   Terrible

9. If the second phase of the project is to take place, would you want to be one of the committee or sub-committee leaders? Give a reason for your answer.

_____

10. Whether good or bad, are there noticeable changes in your lifestyle behaviour after the project? Specify.

_____

11. Do you belong to a social group that consists of at least 3 people? (yes or no answer) If the answer is yes, specify the number of the social groups you belong to.

_____

12. What social activity taken in the village do you appreciate or enjoy the most? (for example, collecting water, sweeping the common grounds, cleaning around the water areas, etc)

_____

13. What social activity taken in the village do you least appreciate or do not like the most?

_____

14. Do you wish to participate in the next phase of the EMSV project?

_____

15. Would you want other villages to also participate in the ESMV project?

_____

The End – Thank you!

Appendix 3: Interview questions

First interview session for the village members

1. Could you tell me more about yourself? Age, highest level of education and how long you have been living in the village

2. Could you also tell me about the position you have in the village (are you a committee leader or sub-committee leader)

3. How about your role in the family?

4. If you are the head of your family, do you make decisions for other family members?

5. Similar to this, during the village meetings, do you also get to say more, especially since you are considered as an elderly?

6. Do you feel that your age and/or gender has affected your position in the household and the village?

7. Do you think you would have been treated differently if you were of a different gender or age?

8. Including yourself, can you name the most hardworking members in the village

9. Including yourself, can you name the least hardworking members in the village

10. In terms of village cooperation, why did you rate it as good? Is everyone punctual and willing to contribute?

11. Is there any type of self or group assessment where you rate the effectiveness of committee members?

12. Have you witnessed any violent confrontation during village meetings or Bulungi Bwansi?

13. Has this reduced after the introduction of SMU project?

14. As a member of the model village, to what extremes have you gone to, to persuade the village members to participate?

15. I am aware that as a committee leader you are required to attend leadership training, so with regards to this, did you learn how to deal with uncooperative behaviours and members during the leadership training?

16. Could you tell me more about the training that you received?

17. Do you enjoy any leisure activities? For example, going to play sports, watching sports, coffee time, drinking alcohol etc

18. What do you gain from the social groups that you are part of?

19. What is your dream or goal in life?

20. Does the social groups help you achieve your goal?

21. What do you want to achieve through village cooperation?

22. Do you believe that a collective identity is possible?

23. How would you define a collective identity?

24. Do you want to have a collective identity?

25. Are the neighbouring villages also part of the collective group? Why?

26. What about the competition with other members in the villages or against other villages?

Second interview session for the village members (their relationship with KOICA and different challenges in the villages)

1. What was your first impression of KOICA? Was there anyone in the village that were against having foreigners and foreign approaches in the village? How was this case handled?

2. Are there some people that are still resisting the change? What are their reasons for doing so?

3. Do you think KOICA had some challenges when starting the ESMV projects? If yes, what do you think would have challenged them?

4. In general how was working with KOICA? Do you feel your life has changed? In what ways has it changed?

5. Do you think you are now capable of sharing your knowledge from the ESMV trainings to the neighbouring villages? Could you tell me a rough plan of how you plan to share your knowledge with them?

6. If there was something that KOICA could do to improve the project, what would you suggest?

7. At the moment, what do you think are the critical social, cultural, political and economic factors hindering development in Kiwumu?

8. Do you think the ESMV project has contributed to the worsening of these issues or has it improved the situation?

9. In your opinion, was the ESMV an inclusive development that empowered all individuals in the village or were there some that were left behind? Who are these people that you think were left behind?

10. Do you think many people in this village share a strong sense of belonging – being part of the community? Why do you think so? Is it because of the traditional culture?

11. Other than Bulungi Bwansi, is there another traditional norm in your culture that encourages working together and being mutually supportive? Is this still practised up to date?

12. Do you have a religion? Does everyone that you are close with in the village share the same religious values with you?

13. In a year, around how many village functions are there?

14. Can you tell me some stories of memorable events that happened in the village? (This could be weddings, birthdays, Christmas parties and even funerals) Why was this very memorable to you?

15. Can you tell the difference between a **(Kiwumu A/Kkumbya/Lukonge)** person and someone from other neighbouring villages?

16. Is there something that is particularly unique of this village compared to the other villages? This could include special greeting, food, language, relationship with people, group activities including dances, or historical products

17. Would you want this particular aspect to be spread across the nation so that others also follow it?

18. Would you mind if more people from other districts came to settle in your village? How about people from other countries?

Third interview session for the village members (related to collective identity)

1. Is there a particular tribal norm that you really love and would want many to know and practise it?

2. What does Kabaka mean to you? Does Kabaka influence your life a lot? How about the village?

3. I think by becoming a model village, people in this village seem to be able to approach the government officials more easily, could you tell me some positive things done by the government, including the sub-county leaders

4. Do you feel that these leaders truly represent your values, needs and interests, or do you think there is still some room for improvement?

5. I heard that during the ESMV project, alongside the issue of sensitizing health and sanitation, safety and security, nationalism and patriotism has also been emphasized. Could you tell me how these trainings were conducted?

6. Do you think this training was necessary? How has the training affected your life?

7. During an emergency with relation to health and safety hazards, how effective was the police and local government? Were they of great assistance? At the moment, do you feel that you are well protected? During these emergencies, whose help do seek first? Is this the most trusted person?

8. If the number of people in the village increased, do you think that the government assistance will increase or decrease?

9. Do you feel that there are some ethnic groups that are being left behind?

10. Do you think if they received the same trainings as you did, they can be as successful as you are?

11. Is your love and loyalty for your ethnic group the same for Uganda as a country? (if yes, has this always been the case?)

12. Do you think many people around you share this feeling with you? Why is it so?

13. How engaged are you in the national politics? Do you think they affect your life a lot?

14. Have you ever felt uncomfortable by the government? Is there a place or person you can seek help?

15. What do you think the current government can do to better represent the interests for many Ugandans?

Interview questions for NFLC representative

1. How did you first get introduced to SMU and what convinced you that this project needs to be expanded in Uganda?

2. What does mind-set change mean to you? Do you think this is truly necessary in Uganda? If yes, is there no underlying connotation that the three spirits; diligence, self-reliance and cooperation is lacking in Uganda?

3. Can you tell me more about your role in the NFLC training centre and what kind of lectures you give

4. How important is the role of a committee leader in each village and how are these leaders trained?

5. Do the leaders receive any trainings to deal with negligence and confrontation in the villages?

6. How do you personally persuade people to take part in SMU, especially those who do not want change?

7. Have you witnessed any violent confrontation so far?

8. What does collective identity mean to you and are there any lectures related to this topic at the training centre?

9. Is there a reason why patriotism and nationalism is emphasized at the training centre? Do you think Ugandans are not patriotic enough? Why do you think patriotism is necessary?

10. What is the role of the local government, KOICA, civil society organizations and the village members in SMU? Which actor do you think greatly determines the success of SMU?

11. The SMU project in Uganda seems very dependent on Korea yet it is supposed to be a sustainable model for development. When do you think the SMU projects in Uganda can truly be self-reliant and sustainable?

12. Do you think SMU projects in Uganda will in any way affect the general elections in 2021? Or will the general elections affect the SMU projects?

Interview questions for KOICA representative

1. I believe SMU under the Korean ODA framework hasn't been long. Could you tell me more about why and how it started being implemented as one? And what does Korea gain from exporting these principles abroad?

2. Based on the three spirits of SMU; diligence, self-reliance and cooperation, can one assume that there is an underlying connotation that these three are lacking in the countries that implement SMU principles? Do the people on the receiving end not get offended by this assumption?

3. Why did Korea decide to export SMU to Uganda as well, where there isn't a strong central government support that you can see in countries like Rwanda? Are there strong drawbacks for not having a supportive government? Or were there any specific demands from the central government when implementing SMU in Uganda?

4. Based on the trips to the model villages, the villagers seem more reliant on KOICA rather than the local government. Do you think this would affect the sustainability of the project in the long-run? Or are there plans to make the Ugandan government to take more action/

5. With regards to the issue of sustainability, these model villages were already well-performing villages in the district. In reference to this, what does it say about

development when these grassroots actors are already better off than the others and how would this influence the long term survival of the project?

6. Also, it seems that some of the committees established were simply rebranded from the existing committees in the villages, perpetuating the gender inequality. So the current pool of leaders, mainly consisting of males, were already leaders in the past 10-20 years. In details could you tell me more about how SMU distinctively empowered women and tackled the gender issues?

7. SMU in Korea was one of the factors that also contributed to the enhanced nationalism, do you think this would also take place in Uganda? Who is then to play this role to enhance nationalism?

8. What is the role of the civil society organization mentioned in the mid-term evaluation report and who are the members of these organizations? Are these people completely independent from the government and the market?

9. To what extent will the general elections in the next year impact the SMU projects or vice versa?

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