How did British trade unions approach the European Question in the run-up to the UK Parliament's historic vote on EEC membership in 1971? Evidence from the debating floor of the Trades Union Congress.

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will look at how British trade unions responded to the suddenly realistic prospect of British membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) following De Gaulle's resignation of the French Presidency in 1969. I hope to shed light on how trade unions responded to the European Question in the run-up to what was the 'original moment of decision'[1] for the United Kingdom (UK), when the House of Commons took the historic vote to join the EEC on 28th October 1971, which has received less academic attention than the role trade unions played in subsequent national referendum on British membership held in June 1975[2]. Through an analysis of the debates on British entry to the EEC that took place at the British Trades Union Congresses of 1970 and 1971, I will use verbatim historical exchanges between trade union delegates to investigate the following. Firstly, and most simply, I hope to demonstrate the range of opinions held by various trade unionists from both those in favour and against British entry, in the face of the tendency to view organised labour as generally united in its views. Secondly, I will consider whether or not, in arriving at their views on the European Question, trade union representatives privileged economic arguments relating to the future living standards of their members and ideas relating to how industrial relations would operate in the EEC – the types of arguments one would traditionally expect from the trade union movement – or whether broader political considerations, which have been traditionally left to the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), actually proved more prominent. Finally, I will explore whether any link existed between a union's stance on entry and whether it represented white-collar or blue-collar British workers or whether the fact that their members worked in domestically-focused sectors or export-oriented industries was more important.

In terms of the wider relevance of this study, European integration is an interesting context in which to study divisions within organised labour movements, which are often mischaracterised as monolithic. This is in contrast to how employers are usually conceptualised as in competition with one another (though this may itself be overstated – employer organisations, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, etc). The first reason European integration provides a hopefully fruitful context in this regard is the way questions that address a political or identity theme have more potential to sow division between trade unions than those that relate to

[1] N Piers Ludlow, "Safeguarding British Identity or Betraying It? The Role of British 'Tradition' in the Parliamentary Great Debate on EC Membership, October 1971." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53, no. 1 (2015): 18

[2] See, for example, Philip B. Whyman. "British trade unions, the 1975 European Referendum and its legacy." *Labor History* 49, no. 1 (2008): 23-45

the narrower field of economics and industrial relations (though disagreements are no doubt also common on these issues). Secondly, European integration itself has intensified the process of globalisation, giving rise to transnational production which by its very nature (and indeed as part of the economic logic that drives it) pits groups of workers against one another. From my reading of the comparative studies on trade unions' attitudes towards European integration, differences in approach are abundant (see next section). That is not to deny that there are similarities between unions and labour movements around Europe, not least the Marxist/neo-Gramscian idea that different union institutions and behaviours (the superstructure) nevertheless arise from fundamental production and class processes (the base)[3].

The UK is a particularly good location to study differences within organised labour movements because the Trades Union Congress (TUC) consists of a huge variety of some hundred or so overlapping craft, general and industrial unions[4]. It also publishes the verbatim proceeds of its annual conference (similar to Hansard transcripts of UK parliamentary debates), meaning that primary resources on which to base this study were readily available. Furthermore, as history has shown, with "Brexit" the latest episode, there is perhaps nowhere the identity question of nation-state versus European integration is more hotly contested than in Britain. The debates from 1970 and 1971 have been selected as this was arguably the first period during which British membership of the EEC became a realistic prospect following the resignation and death of President De Gaulle, who had previously vetoed Britain's entry in 1963 and 1967. The disappearance of the main obstacle to British membership injected a degree of urgency into a longstanding debate. Furthermore, these particular debates took place before the TUC voted in 1972 to oppose EEC membership in principle[5] and before the UK Parliament had voted in favour of membership in October 1971, allowing ample opportunity for vigorous debate between delegates given that all was still to play for. What is more, the 1970s probably represent the peak of trade union power in British history[6], which perhaps increases the potency of this

[3]Though this theory is tangential to this particular study, for a discussion of how the Neo-Gramscian approach relates to trade unions and European integration see Andreas Bieler, "Globalization, Swedish Trade Unions and European Integration: From Europhobia to Conditional Support." *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 1 (1999): 21–46

[4] Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, "Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union." In *West European Politics* 19, no. 2 (1996): 259

[5] Gerard Strange, "From 'Embedded Liberalism' to 'Negotiated Openness': British Trade Unions and the European Union from the 1960s—A World-Order Approach." *Capital & Class* 31, no. 3 (2007): 239

[6] Paul Teague and John Grahl, *Industrial Relations and European Integration* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1992): 203

research. It was also around this period that academics began to talk of “white-collar unionism” as the public and financial sectors in Britain expanded in the post-war period[7], a development that is integral to this study as I seek to explain differences in trade union opinions. I chose not to consider the further TUC debates in the run up to the 1975 to include British entry itself in January 1973 (at the third attempt), Harold Wilson’s subsequent renegotiation of Britain’s membership terms, and the following referendum in June 1975 for these episodes have already received much academic attention.

[7] George Sayers Bain, “The Growth of White-Collar Unionism in the Great Britain.” *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 4 (1966): 304-335

LITERATURE REVIEW

The academic literature on trade unions and European integration is, generally speaking, relatively underdeveloped given the importance of these actors in the integration process. Nevertheless, there have been a number of studies that I have been able to draw from that show how trade union attitudes towards the process of European integration have varied over time and by geography (that is to say nationality). Furthermore, contemporaneous individual trade unions, despite sharing a national context, can nevertheless disagree on the European Question. Thus, this literature review sets out each of the various ways trade unions have responded to the process of European integration.

Trade union attitudes to European integration change over time

First, I wish to set out briefly an example of how trade union attitudes towards European integration can evolve over time. The stance of the organised labour movement in the UK, for example, has changed over time, sometimes rapidly. Consider the table reproduced here, showing the evolution of the TUC's European policy[8]:

Year	European policy of the TUC	
1950	Opposition	Opposition to the Schuman Plan
1955	Support	Conditional support for European Integration
1962	Neutral	'Wait and see' approach, relating to the terms of entry
1971	Opposition	Opposition to Membership of EU on the terms negotiated by the Conservative government
1972	Opposition	Opposition to membership in principle
1974	Renegotiation	Renegotiation of the terms of UK membership of the EU
1975	Opposition; Reform	Campaigned for 'No' vote in the referendum; thereafter, accepted membership if accompanied by fundamental reform of the EU
1980	Withdrawal	Withdrawal from the EU – approved by Congress; the TUC leadership preferred conditional support based on reform of the EU
1988	Conditional Support	Support for European integration conditional upon the creation of a social dimension, following the Delors speech to the TUC Congress
1990	Support	Supported ERM entry (albeit at a lower central rate)
1992	Support	Support for the Maastricht Treaty (EMU) without referendum
1995	Conditional support	Support for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty (EMU)
1996	Conditional support	Support for an employment chapter to counter-balance EMU; supported EMU in principle
2000	Support	Support for enlargement of EU

Figure 1: Reproduction of Philip Whyman's table showing the chronology of British trade union policy towards European integration

[8] Reproduced from Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 24

As evidenced above, the TUC's official position on the European question has oscillated significantly, including five times between 1970 and 1980. This has given rise to a debate in the literature about whether the "default setting" of British trade unions is pro-Europe[9] or anti-Europe[10]. These shifts in stance depended typically on whether at that particular moment power within the movement was enjoyed by the "Left", which was generally anti-Europe with the notable exception of the National and Local Government Officers' Association (NALGO)[11] which has been consistent pro-European voice, or by the "Right" which was generally pro-Europe[12].

The TUC was opposed in principle to the idea of supranationalism in the early 1950s, believing that 'Whitehall was best placed to plan the economy, achieve full employment and improve living standards'[13]. Given the first sectors where continental integration was considered were coal and steel, both seen as indispensable to the British economy and with the steel industry being protected by high tariffs[14], it is perhaps little wonder that the TUC took this general approach and rejected the idea of British participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Neither did other potential areas of cooperation appeal, for example agriculture where little trade was done with the continent; links with the Commonwealth and what remained of the British Empire were more important. However, in the course of the decade, the TUC 'grew convinced that Britain could ill afford completely to detach itself from the arrangements being established by the Six [founding members of the EEC]'[15]. Division between trade unionists on the degree of cooperation with the Six – ranging from wanting Britain to join them to wanting absolutely nothing to do with the process – led to TUC backing for the "halfway house" of a European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)[16].

Naturally, not all British trade unions have always "sung from the same hymn sheet". Teague identifies three competing traditions within British trade unionism prior to the UK's eventual accession to the EEC: Pro-European, Anti-European and Pragmatist[17]. Briefly put, the Pro-Europeans sought unambiguously to promote

[9] See for example Strange, "From 'embedded Liberalism'"; Gerald A Dorfman, "From the Inside Looking Out: The Trade Union Congress in the EEC." In Journal of Common Market Studies 15, no. 4 (1976) 248-271
[10] See, for example, Teague and Grahl, *Industrial Relations*
[11] Now part of Unison, the UK's biggest trade union, representing a variety of public sector workers.
[12] Strange, *From 'embedded Liberalism'*, 234
[13] Matthew Broad, "Negotiating 'Outer Europe': The Trades Union Congress (TUC), Transnational Trade Unionism and European Integration in the 1950s." *History of European Ideas* 46, no. 1 (2019): 63
[14] Ibid., 63
[15] Ibid., 64
[16] Ibid., 65
[17] Paul Teague, "The British TUC and the European Community." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 18, no. 1 (1989): 30

the case for Europe within the labour movement, usually for the economic growth they believed this would herald, whilst Anti-Europeans were opposed on principle to the Community for an array of different reasons. These ranged from rejection of the Community as a capitalist institution to concerns over the erosion of British sovereignty and a drift towards a federal Europe. The Pragmatists, meanwhile, were concerned chiefly with the terms and conditions of British entry; they were happy to entertain the idea of either entering or remaining outside the Community but sought the optimal course of action with reference to available evidence.

Whyman's work looking at the proceedings of the annual TUC conferences in the 1970s corroborates this idea of division within the British trade union movement on the European Question at this time. Although he does not attribute opinions to individual delegates in a systematic manner, Whyman provides a useful list of the arguments made by trade unionists in their speeches during the TUC congress debates between 1970 and 1975[18]. Whyman records that entering or remaining inside the Community would: establish a larger 'home' market, created via the European Single Internal Market; stimulate British trade, which would in turn create jobs; raise the British standard of living; allow for a degree of control over multinational capital; and not preclude the British Government from pursuing an interventionist economic policy. Meanwhile, remaining outside or leaving the Community would: mean a loss of British influence in the realm of foreign policy; be isolationist and betray internationalism; and leave Britain chasing the impossible dream of "Socialism in One Country".

Among the many more reasons given to oppose British membership, Whyman identifies that entering the Community - or indeed remaining inside, depending on the time frame - would: result in higher food prices in Britain as a consequence of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which in turn would cause inflation; worsen the UK's balance of trade; undermine parliamentary democracy; prohibit interventionist economic policy, limiting the policy options of a Labour Government; threaten jobs; threaten British public services; weaken organised labour and collective bargaining whilst favouring capital; create a barrier to creating socialism; and result in slower economic growth.

It is clear that plenty of political considerations beyond trade unions' traditional remit of economics and industrial relations came to the fore in these wide-ranging debates on this emotive issue. Although there is

[18] Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 25

typically a reciprocal relationship of support between the economic and political wings of the British labour movement (i.e. British trade unions and the PLP), there nevertheless exists a traditional (if somewhat blurred in practice) separation between the two. This 'strict demarcation' between politics and industrial relations is often 'jealously asserted on both sides of the divide'[19]. However, what is clear here is that, alongside the economic considerations that fall within or near to the trade unions' traditional areas of concern, such as the potential impact on living standards and economic growth, delegates also spoke out about purely political considerations, for example concerns over the impact on foreign policy and parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, this episode sheds light on a broader area of academic and trade unionist debate – namely the degree to which trade unions are willing to, or should, act in or engage with areas beyond the traditional spheres of industrial relations and the narrow economic wellbeing of their members. The trade unionist, and General Secretary of the TUC from 1960 to 1968, George Woodcock, is an example of an individual whose vision was to expand the role of the trade union movement[20]. It would seem that the European Question is an example of when a labour movement 'cannot altogether neglect the broader social and political context of market relations'[21].

Throughout the 1970s, the Anti-European attitude appeared to dominate trade union thinking, aside from a brief willingness to allow the then Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson the opportunity to try to renegotiate the terms of British membership negotiated by his predecessor, the Conservative Ted Heath[22]. This culminated with the TUC's campaign for "Leave" in the 1975 referendum, concluding that the EEC was 'an undemocratic, bureaucratic extension of the interests of big business, designed to benefit multinational capital at the expense of citizens and workers'[23]. The majority of arguments made at the preceding TUC conference were in line with the wider Eurosceptic campaign in the run-up to the referendum, which focused

[19] Richard Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism* (London: SAGE Publications, 2001): 3
[20] See Robert Taylor, "What are we here for? George Woodcock and Trade Union Reform" in *The Post-War Compromise: British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, 1945–64,* edited by Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2007)
[21] Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism*, 4
[22] Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 28
[23] Ibid., 26

on the possibility of price rises, particularly more expensive food, the threat to jobs (primarily through a worsening of the trade balance) and the undermining of parliamentary democracy[24].

Of course, this did not prevent some trade unions, notably the white-collar Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX[25]) donating office space and staff to the "Remain" campaign[26]. Of course, nor did the TUC's stance prevent the ultimate victory of the "Remain" campaign and confirmation of Britain's membership of the EEC, though union members were slightly less likely to have voted for Remain than the rest of the population[27].In the referendum, the more secure one's personal socioeconomic circumstances, the more likely one was to support continued membership. Of those in the white-collar social grades AB and C1, 85% and 75% voted to remain respectively. For the blue-collar social grades C2 and DE this fell to 64% and 62% respectively[28]. The majority trade union stance subsequently albeit briefly, 'grudgingly acquiesced to the [new] reality'[29], perhaps unsurprisingly given the swell of white-collar members among their ranks.

This brief change of stance was soon overturned by arrival of Margaret Thatcher in Downing Street, who one should note was in fact a strong pro-European at this time (though this position is best understood as a result of her fervent anti-Communism rather than any lofty ideals around shared European identity[30]). The election of the Conservatives in 1979, and the monetarist or neoliberal policies Thatcher pursued, had the short-term effect of radicalising both the parliamentary and trade union wings of the labour movement and the TUC subsequently advocated British withdrawal from the EEC. The longer-term effect though, especially given the continued electoral success of "Thatcherism", was a sustained shift towards pro-Europeanism among British trade unionists, Figure 1 showing that the TUC has now backed the European project consistently (though sometimes conditionally) since 1988. This change was prompted by the way in which, during the

[24] Ibid., 26
[25] The new name of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU) from 1972, a union that features prominently in this study.
[26] Philip B. Whyman "The Heritage of the 1975 European Referendum for the British Trade Union Movement." Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 5, no. 4 (2010): 141
[27] Ben Clements, "The 1975 EEC Referendum." Published 31 July 2017. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/07/31/the-referendums-of-1975-and-2016-illustrate-the-continuity-and-change-in-british-euroscepticism/
[28] Ibid.
[29] Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 31
[30] Young, Hugo. *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (London: Papermac, 1999): 309

1980s, the unions felt "frozen out" of Margaret Thatcher's government but were attracted by Jacques Delors vision of a "social Europe"[31] and the way French and Italian state intervention in their economies did not appear to have been curtailed by their EEC membership[32]. In a country such as Britain, which has had a succession of neoliberal governments of all colours ever since, where trade union rights have been weakened over time and their role in public policy diminished, and with multinational employers stretching across an increasingly "borderless" world, the EEC/EU might be considered as having become, the 'only card game in town'[33] whether the trade unions have liked it or not. This shift in attitude is best summed up thus; 'where British trade unions once tended to regard the EEC as a free-market challenge to social democracy, the EU now appears as social democracy's potential saviour in an era of neoliberal globalisation'[34]. Furthermore, the ascendancy of the Right of the British labour movement during the 1990s, under the moniker "New Labour" and ultimately personified by Tony Blair, did even more to mute trade unionists from the Left of the movement, who had traditionally opposed European integration which they saw as a fundamentally capitalist project[35].

The extent of the shift within the British trade union movement from a majority anti-European stance to a majority pro-European viewpoint is arguably best reflected in British trade unions' support for UK participation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) around the turn of the century. Although some public sector unions opposed this move due to worries about public sector pay restraint to meet convergence criteria, many unions with members in manufacturing, for example the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), argued for the adoption of the Euro fearing that failure to adopt the common currency would curtail exports to the continent[36] . Leading trade unionists indicated their personal support for EMU despite the hostility of the wider electorate, as reflected in opinion poll data from the time[37]. More recently, the TUC has

[31] Strange, *From 'embedded Liberalism'*, 248
[32] Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 31
[33] Strange, *From 'embedded Liberalism'*, 250
[34] Strange, *From 'embedded Liberalism'*, 236
[35] Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*, 33
[36] Mark Hall, "UK trade unions and the euro." Published 27 May 1999. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/1999/uk-trade-unions-and-the-euro
[37] Philip B. Whyman, "British Trade Unions and Economic and Monetary Union." *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society* 41, no. 3 (2002): 467

continued to be a consistent pro-European voice, campaigning for Remain during 2016 referendum[38]. Only a few small trade unions campaigned for Brexit, notably the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT)[39]. Even more recently, the TUC has been campaigning against a "No Deal Brexit"[40].

Trade union attitudes towards European integration differ across Europe

As well as changes that occur over time, it is clear that trade union attitudes towards European integration also differ across the continent, where labour movements operate in very different national contexts. There is a vast degree of difference between trade union movements across Europe. A nation-state's historical experience has severe consequences for the structure of its organised labour movements and given the diversity of national trajectories through history across the European continent, 'the study of union movements is a study of historically rooted variation'[41]. For example, the way in which the German peak organisation the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) was purposefully recreated along seventeen clearly demarcated industrial lines following the Second World War contrasts sharply with the long, voluntarist history of British trade unionism that has borne the overlapping, sprawling, evolving mosaic of fiercely autonomous unions that is the TUC. Austria, meanwhile, has a very centralised trade union structure with its seven unions each considered mere subsidiaries of a central confederation[42]. Meanwhile, in other European countries there are still competing union movements along ideological lines, for example the rival Christian and Socialist movements in Switzerland[43]. Meanwhile, there are separate union confederations for manual, routine white-collar and professional employees in the Nordic countries[44]. These differences, and antagonisms over the pace and scope of European integration, are perhaps unsurprising given how unions are 'autonomous institutions with their own nationally-conceived and culturally-defined views, objectives and agendas' facing up

[38] See Michael Ford, *Workers' rights from Europe: the impact of Brexit* (London: TUC, 2016). https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/workers-rights-europe-impact-brexit
[39] See Richard Hyman "British Trade Unions and the ETUC", in *National Trade Unions and the ETUC*, edited by Andrea Ciampani and Pierre Tilly (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2017)
[40] See Trades Union Congress, *Consequences of No Deal* (London: TUC, 2019). https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/consequences-no-deal
[41] Marks and McAdam, *Social Movements*, 259-260
[42] Bernaciak, Magadalena, Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman. *European Trade Unionism: From Crisis to Renewal?* (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2014): 29
[43] Ibid., 28
[44] Ibid., 28

to a European project that is 'bound to elicit fierce debate given that it touched on vital issues for union members'[45].

For example, whilst British trade unions, at least since the 1980s, have seen the possibility of a "European Social Model" as a vehicle to further their domestic aims in the face of an unsympathetic national government (as described above), many Swedish trade unions in the 1990s, when debating their own accession to the European Union, were concerned that European integration would actually undermine their own superior Nordic Social Model[46]. Denmark is another country whose trade unions have *generally* opposed further European integration for similar reasons, with the trade union consensus being that European regulation was not necessary and could even turn out to be detrimental to domestic arrangements in Denmark including industrial relations, though this scepticism has waned in recent years as the EU has become more flexible in its approach to economic convergence adopted some ideas that have long prospered in the Danish labour market, such as "flexicurity"[47].

Nevertheless, the Eurosceptic line of thinking in Denmark and Sweden does, to some extent, echo the sentiment of some of those British trade unionists who opposed British entry to the EEC back in the 1970s on the basis that it was a "capitalist institution" which would be an obstacle to a future Labour Government seeking to realise socialism. On the other hand then, despite differences in national contexts, one prevalent attitude among trade unionists across Europe that seems to appear time and time again in the literature is trade unions' strong commitment to their own national welfare arrangements and their reluctance to support their replacement with a new and more homogenous scheme at a European level[48].

Furthermore, trade unions in the former Communist member states of eastern Europe that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 also operate in a very different national context that determines how they weigh

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[45] Broad, *Negotiating 'Outer Europe'*, 75
[46] See Bieler, *Globalization*; Andreas Bieler "Swedish Trade Unions and Economic and Monetary Union." *Cooperation and Conflict* 38, no. 4 (2003): 385–407.
[47] Herman Knudsen and Jens Lind, "Is the Danish Model Still a Sacred Cow? Danish Trade Unions and European Integration." *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 18, no. 4 (2012): 393
[48] Richard Hyman cited in Maarten Keune, "Trade Unions, European Integration and Democracy: Conference on 'Organised Labour – An Agent of European Democracy? Trade Union Strategies and the EU Integration Process, Dublin, 30 October 2004." *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 10, no. 4 (2004): 668

up European integration. It could be said that enlargement has opened up a new divide between trade unions with very different views on the European Question, for whilst French or German unions might fear the loss of manufacturing jobs to the newest member states – where unions are weaker, wage bills and taxes are lower, and regulations less onerous – attracting foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe and the jobs this investment brings is a clear priority of trade unions there[49]. Thus, the way in which European countries 'exhibit a range of different employment models' with national variants of the European social model[50] can explain some of the differences in opinion across the continent's trade union movements on the process of European integration.

In other cases, the differences in trade union attitudes towards the European Question would seem to stem from differences in labour movements' fundamental approaches to the economy pre-dating the integration process. For example, following British accessions, the TUC clashed with its German equivalent, the DGB; the former wanted Keynesian EEC policies that sought to achieve full employment whilst the latter prioritised the control of inflation above all else[51], a long held concern of all sections of German society, including trade unions, given the hyperinflation of the 1920s and its terrible consequences. This same division also reared its head in the 1990s when EMU was being debated, with some British trade unions opposed to the requirement for wage restraint contrasted with their German (and Irish and Dutch) equivalents being generally more prepared to accept this as the price to pay for the prize of EMU[52]. This tallies with Broad's observation that 'scholars have tended to attach words such as "fragmentation", "conflict" and "division" to Western Europe's trade unions'[53]. He points to the difficult relationship between the TUC and its French equivalent the Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO) in the 1950s, though shows the TUC had a better relationship with its Nordic equivalents as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was established, perhaps due to wider links between British and Nordic social democratic movements at the time[54].

[49] Guglielmo Meardi cited in ibid., 669
[50] Jeremy Waddington, "Editorial: Trade Unions and the European Integration Project." *Industrial Relations Journal* 40, no. 6 (2009): 469
[51] Strange, *From 'embedded Liberalism'*, 242-243
[52] Whyman, *Economic and Monetary Union*, 472
[53] Broad, *Negotiating 'Outer Europe'*, 75
[54] See Matthew Broad, *Harold Wilson, Denmark and the Making of Labour European Policy 1958–72* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2017)

Overall, we can see that member states' different national contexts – the different histories, traditions and political-economies – have resulted in big differences in trade union attitudes towards European integration.

Trade union attitudes to European integration differ within national contexts

This literature review so far reflects the tendency for academics when writing about trade unions and European integration to focus on "peak" or "aggregate-level" organisations, like the TUC or DGB, and compare differing national contexts. However, individual trade unions, despite sharing a national historical and geographical context, nevertheless do disagree with one another on many issues. The sheer scope for disagreement between those in organised labour movements is demonstrated by how, for example, in England alone there are currently three different unions[55] competing for the loyalties of classroom teachers. The vexed European Question appears to have sown much dispute within national labour movements in countries around Europe, to which the ground covered so far has already alluded.

For example, Bieler shows how Swedish trade union views when the Swedish Social Democratic Party announced its intention to join the EEC in 1990 were far from unanimous. Trade unionists in industrial sectors with transnational production structures, who typically worked for multinational companies in export-oriented sectors were in favour of Swedish entry, seeing it as a way to regain some control over transnational capital and international financial markets. For example, the Metal Workers' Union and Paper Workers' Union backed Swedish membership, the paper sector exporting 80% of its products at the time), as did the Swedish Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry and the Union of Financial Sector Employees, which organised white-collar workers in industry and finance respectively, two sectors dominated by "transnational social forces"[56].

Meanwhile, many unions with members in domestic-focussed sectors, including the public sector (for example the Municipal Workers' Union and Swedish Teachers' Union) opposed membership of the EEC because, as described in the previous section, they were concerned this could undermine the superior Swedish

[55] These are the National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT), The National Education Union (NEU) - formed by the recent merger of two further previously independent teaching unions, and Voice.
[56] Bieler, *Globalization*, 35-38

"social model" of generous welfare provision, near full employment, the high rate of labour market participation by women and a large and well-resourced public sector. These unions believed that the retention of 'as many national policy tools as possible would offer a better chance for the preservation of the Swedish model' despite globalisation[57].

Other unions that had members working in both transnational and domestic sectors were split. For example, the Industrial Workers' Union board was divided between representatives from transnational sectors like textiles and chemicals in favour of membership and those representing workers in domestic industries, like the country's sugar refining sector which had no markets outside Sweden, against. Meanwhile, the Union of Service and Communication Employees' members included proponents, such as those working in the transnational telecommunications sector but also those against, for example postal workers fearing loss of the postal state monopoly and a subsequent loss of jobs[58].

As a result of lack of agreement among trade unions, two of the peak trade union organisations in Sweden, the blue-collar LO and the white-collar professional TCO) ended up adopting a neutral position in the 1994 referendum. Danish trade unions were similarly divided ahead of Denmark's accession to the EEC alongside Britain in 1973. Those against emphasised 'increased immigration threatening the employment of Danish workers and endangering labour standards, and the autonomy of the Danish industrial relations system' and declared the EEC to represent "Capital's Europe"[59]. Supporters countered that political and social integration of the EEC would realistically never come to pass so fears about industrial relations and labour standards were misplaced whilst emphasising the expected economic benefits of EEC membership. Interestingly, only the leaders of the blue-collar peak trade union organisation the LO campaigned for Danish entry during the 1972 referendum, but many trade union leaders were opposed and opinion amongst the rank-and-file was also split.

[57] Ibid., 38
[58] Ibid., 37
[59] Knudsen and Lind, *Is the Danish model*, 386

As well as looking at debates around accession, another way to consider differences in attitude towards European integration between individual unions in a shared national context is to look at their approaches and strategies once *inside* the European project. Bieler, for example, found that dividing trade unions into transnational and domestic sector camps continued to explain individual trade union attitudes towards further integration, in this case their stance on EMU[60]. Similarly, Teague later embellished his three-pronged approach – outlined in the first section of this literature review – to explain differences in individual trade union strategy once the UK had joined the EEC, through his "Europeanisation", "Nationalistic" and "Opportunistic European" models; these seek to explain the subsequent behaviour of the three factions within the British trade union movement he had previously identified – Pro-European, Anti-European and Pragmatist[61]. Briefly put, the Europeanisation model characterises trade union responses to the European Community as a gradual reorientation away from the nation-state towards European institutions and was first suggested by the European integration theories of E. B. Haas in the 1950s[62]. This model envisages a transfer of trade union loyalties and expectations from the national to the European level, as European integration "spills over" into more and more economic sectors. Teague offers a more nuanced version of this model that allows that trade union loyalties and expectations be divided between nation-state and the European level[63]. Nevertheless, the central premise remains that trade unions will acquire a positive European perspective.

Drawing on prior studies, Teague distinguishes four key aspects of this Europeanisation process, each of which suggests why some unions might adopt a pro-European attitude, whilst others would be less likely to do so. First, in sectors where supranational decision-making dominates, for example agriculture, trade unions involve themselves more at the European level. Second, trade unions representing members working in highly international, exposed industries, particularly in sectors where transnational companies dominate, will develop a European perspective (note the conceptual overlap with Bieler's work on Swedish trade unions). International cooperation between trade unions – particularly within a formal international structure such as the EEC –

[60] Bieler, *Economic and Monetary Union*, 385
[61] Paul Teague, "Trade Unions and Extra-National Industrial Policies: A Case Study of the Response of the British NUM and ISTC to Membership of the European Coal and Steel Community." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 10, no. 2 (1989): 211
[62] Ibid., 214
[63] Ibid., 215

should appeal, or so the argument goes, to trade unions in international sectors as a way of insuring against a global race-to-the-bottom (to wherever labour costs are lowest or unions weakest). Third, trade union involvement in EEC affairs is prompted by disenchantment with national economic policy[64]. National economic policy may affect some sectors and unions more than others. Following Van der Maas, it is perhaps useful here to think in terms of both push and pull factors; on the one hand, unsatisfactory national economic policy encourages to trade unions to seek a European alternative, whilst on the other trade unions recognise the potential to achieve more at European level[65]. Fourth, individual trade union reorientation towards the European level might be voluntary, driven by internal factors like creative personalities at the helm. A trade union's pro-European attitude could have more to do with the predilections of its leadership than anything else.

Trade unionists who adhere to the nationalistic model on the other hand believe straightforwardly that trade unions are unable to represent their members' economic interests at the European level. The first reason why trade unions might confine action to the national level is due to pessimism as regards the effectiveness of international trade union action due to international variation of organised labour movements as outlined in the previous section. This international variation makes it difficult to obtain a coherent cross-border view in the first instance and presents logistical difficulties of conducting international action of substance[66]. It is also worth bearing in mind that 'even if unions were strong and united, there is no coherent European government that could engage them in supranational bargaining'[67].

The second reason why trade unions might confine action to the national level lies in the way that trade unions are historically wedded to their home nation state, as previously discussed. According to Teague, there are two elements to this union. Firstly, organised labour depends on national political and legal systems to mobilise its members, undertake collective bargaining, to take strike action and to mount boycotts; in short 'every union movement in Western Europe is embedded in a legal system that determines its ability to exercise economic muscle'[68]. As the nation-state became the pre-eminent scale for economic activity in the modern era, trade unions expanded to match the geographical reach of employers and became national in their

[64] See Dorfman, *From the Inside*
[65] Erin van der Maas, 'British Labour and the European Union: The Europeanisation of Trade Unions?' Paper presented at UACES/ESRC seminar on Europeanisation, Sheffield, 2004: 5
[66] Teague, *Trade Unions*, 217
[67] Marks and McAdam, *Social Movements*, 263
[68] Ibid., 260

organisation in an attempt to monopolise the supply of labour within the nation-state. Trade unions are consequently "institutionalised" at this scale. The relationship between the development of organised labour and that of nation-states (particularly modern welfare states) is not one way, however, which brings me to the second element. Trade unions were themselves 'key actors in creating the state by campaigning for political inclusion, welfare reform, and state intervention in the economy'[69]. Thus, organised labour's key reference points were the modern welfare states of Europe they had had a hand in creating, particularly in the post-war era. Thus, they came to identify themselves with the state-based political system and developed what has been termed a 'naive Keynesian economic policy vision' that 'regards the nation-state as the most appropriate level for economic policy-making'[70]. Thus, the nationalistic model goes beyond a simply pessimistic response to the potential of international trade unionism; it is much more deep-seated than that.

Considered together, these factors make it 'very difficult for unions in different countries to coalesce along international lines' despite the great cost of this failure[71]. The main cost is the drastic loss in bargaining power as employers, particularly flexible transnational corporations, have the potential to outflank organised labour within the regional bloc by easily establishing subsidiaries elsewhere in the single market or expand abroad through merger or acquisition whilst unions remain rooted nationally[72]. Nevertheless, this nationalistic approach 'has influenced the outlook of a good many trade union leaders' despite 'the growing centralisation of capital on a global basis'[73].

Meanwhile, the Opportunistic European Model interprets trade union action at the European level as 'simply the use of another institutional system' in the 'short-term pursuit of self-interest'; the model suggests that trade unions can undertake intermittent European-level initiatives to protect the interests of their members without a fundamental change in their orientation or behaviour, merely utilising "*le troisieme guichet"* as and when it suits them[74]. In comparison to the emotive, deep-rooted Nationalistic model and the ideology of the

[69] Marks and McAdam, *Social Movements*, 260
[70] Teague, *Trade Unions*, 217
[71] Marks and McAdam, *Social Movements*, 260
[72] Ibid., 261
[73] Teague, *Trade Unions*, 217
[74] Ibid., 216

Europeanisation model, European Opportunism is soberly pragmatic by comparison, most likely focussed around a cost-benefit analysis on the question on membership and seizing any opportunity to advance their members' cause whether it presents itself at the domestic or European level. According to Teague, this model best captures the behaviour, or at least the intentions, of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) to European Coal and Steel policy in the 1970s and 1980s[75]. Any union could ostensibly take such a pragmatic approach.

Thus, it is clear why divides on the European Question can open up between trade unions sharing a domestic context. A pro-European stance on the EEC (and Europeanisation strategy within the EEC) is expected to be more popular approach with those unions representing members working in globalised sectors producing for international markets. Of course, the opposite holds for trade unions representing members working in sectors with domestic, sheltered markets[76] or in the public sector. This is because membership of a regional economic bloc and the subsequent process market integration poses a threat to a status quo with which these unions are satisfied. These unions, therefore, are more likely to adopt an anti-European stance on the EEC and adhere to a Nationalistic strategy within the EEC. Other unions meanwhile will seek a "halfway house", perhaps due to internal divisions, by adopting a pragmatist attitude and following an Opportunistic strategy.

It is worth noting though that, according to Strange, even unions that have *agreed* on a European policy objective can articulate a range of political-economy perspectives. This can be seen, for example, in the 1990s and 2000s among those British unions in favour of EMU when the 'regional competitive corporatism' of the "General, Municipal, Boilermakers" union (GMB) and the AEEU as well as the TUC contrasted with the 'intergovernmental Keynesianism' of Unison[77] and the 'federal Keynesianism' of the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSF)[78].

[75] Ibid., 235
[76] Van der Maas, *British* Labour, 6
[77] Represents public service workers
[78] Strange, *From 'Embedded Liberalism'*, 250

Varieties of trade unionism in Britain

The potential for disagreement between specifically British trade unionists is heightened by the sheer diversity of trade unions in the UK. This diversity is chiefly a consequence of the gradual development of organised labour in a mainly non-repressive legal context since the nineteenth century[79], in combination with the British tradition of voluntarism. The early craft unions developed first, organised exclusively by skilled occupation. Later, industrial unions recruited the skilled workers across a particular industry. Later still, large general unions were established that recruited members, including unskilled workers, across many industries and occupations. However, the new ways in which workers came to organise themselves did not displace what came before them, giving British organised labour what Hyman has referred to as a 'sedimented character'[80]. That is to say each kind of union continued to co-exist (and indeed compete for members), and responded to political and economic developments quite differently, reflecting the differing interests of those they represented. Furthermore, this landscape never stands still. Frequent mergers occur between trade unions (across Europe, not just in Britain), a process which has been described as primarily defensive[81]. This is in part a response to technological changes that have blurred the divide between manual and white-collar jobs in manufacturing and privatisation programmes that have blurred the divide between public and private sectors, as well as an attempt to secure long term financial viability[82].

That unions of varying structure, focus and size continued to exist alongside one another is also reflected in the British tradition of voluntarism whereby industrial relations hinged on "free collective bargaining". That is, unions seek to strike compromises with employers without the involvement of the law courts and the state[83]. Thus, whilst unions elsewhere in Europe have pursued statutory regulation of industrial relations, their British counterparts would rather rely on their own organisational strength and avoid complicity with governments who they suspected had employers' interests at heart. This provided for a more varied

[79] Marks and McAdam, *Social Movements,* 259
[80] Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism*, 73
[81] Waddington, *Restructuring Representation: The Merger Process and Trade Union Structural Development in Ten Countries*. (Brussels: P.I.E.- Peter Lang, 2005): 375.
[82] Bernaciak, Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, *European Trade Unionism,* 33
[83] Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism*, 67

landscape of industrial relations than might have otherwise been the case. Furthermore, the twentieth century saw the unionisation of a large number of white-collar occupations, changing the character of a movement that had previously been the exclusive domain of the manual worker[84]. This was in part driven by the explosion in public sector jobs resulting from welfare state development and the shift towards high technology and chemical manufacturing from the relatively low-tech textile and footwear industry, for example[85]. This introduced a new breed (and often gender) of trade union member with different priorities. These office workers for the most part organised separately along occupational lines[86].

What is clear is that the TUC has always comprised not only representatives of a wide range of industries and occupations but also a range of organisational traditions and backgrounds too, despite each delegate belonging to the same "broad church" labour movement. What is more, some unions are not affiliated to the TUC, choosing instead to remain outside this umbrella organisation and completely independent. In spite of this, there has been an academic tendency to ignore these divisions and treat trade unions as a homogenous group. This is perhaps most evident in work that sees welfare state development through the prism of class conflict and that assumes that trade unions share an 'egalitarian agenda', in favour of government intervention in the labour market to redistribute wealth[87]. In this worldview, unions are pitched against employers, with the unions wanting the working class to retain a greater proportion of the wealth they create through their labour, at the expense of the employers (the middle and upper classes). Employers, so the argument goes, meanwhile want to keep wages down and retain more of the wealth as profits for themselves.

Whilst this conceptualisation might have held true in some scenarios, and perhaps in the romantic imagination, it vastly oversimplifies the situation, ignoring divisions on both the labour and capital sides[88]. Rather it is much more realistic to see trade unions, certainly British ones, as representing the interests of their actual, fee-paying members, rather than representing class interests more generally. Although it is true that

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[84] Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism*, 72
[85] See Bain, *The Growth of White-Collar Unionism*
[86] Dennie Oude Nijhuis, "Explaining British voluntarism." *Labor History* 52, no. 4 (2011): 376
[87] Ibid., 375
[88] Treating employers as a homogenous group does them a disservice too. For example, in a share-owning democracy, ownership of employers is (or should be) much more diffuse throughout society (i.e. the line between employees and employers is blurred). Alternatively, the employer may in fact be the state (and thus "owned by the people") – certainly in 1970s Britain this was more likely the case than present.

general unions representing unskilled workers may well lobby for wage compression, for example, this should not be confused with “class action” but instead be seen as a function of representing their members. Craft trade union opposition to the statutory extension of collective bargaining in the UK, as exists in other parts of Europe, represents the pursual of self-interest over the interests of non-unionised employees and the broader class interest.

Evidently, rather than expressing class conflict or labour unity, the ‘organisational logic’ of craft unions representing skilled manual labour or white-collar unions, whose members have likely undergone a significant period of education or apprenticeship, ‘serves to preserve the privileged position of their members’[89]. These unions mount the defence of this privileged position in three ways. Firstly, by representing the most productive workers or by having an effective monopoly on a “bottleneck” within the wider economy, these unions are able to seek higher wages at the expense of other, less-skilled workers as much as their employers, as they pursue the preservation or even increase of wage differentials. Secondly, these unions ‘defend the valuable market niche of those whose qualifications set them apart from labour in general […] by reinforcing the barriers against incursions by other members of the labour force’[90]. Thirdly, this accrued power can also be wielded in a softer way to influence the policies of the wider union movement[91]. Evidently, there is much potential in the UK for great diversity of opinion, and even antagonism, among trade unionists on almost any issue, not least a matter as hotly contested and emotive as British entry to the EEC.

[89] Ibid., 375
[90] Hyman, *Understanding European Trade Unionism*, 75
[91] Oude Nijhuis, *Explaining British Voluntarism,* 376

HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

Hypotheses

Following on from my reading of the literature, I decided to explore further how British trade unions responded to the suddenly realistic prospect of British membership of the EEC following De Gaulle's resignation of the French Presidency in 1969 until the 'original moment of decision' when the UK House of Commons took the historic vote to join the European Community on 28th October 1971, given that relatively little had been written on this period of British labour history; indeed, Ludlow describes this vote as 'the climax of over ten years of governmental and parliamentary debate, had a cathartic value that not even the 1975 referendum could match'[92]. I decided I would test the following hypotheses:

1. Although the focus of British trade unionists' arguments concerned economic matters and industrial relations, they also embraced wider aspects of European integration in coming to their view.

2. British trade unions were not unanimous in their attitude towards European integration at the beginning of the 1970s.

3. White-collar unions favoured British accession to the EEC whilst their blue-collar counterparts opposed it.

4. Unions whose members work in sectors with an export focus (with transnational companies for example) were more pro-European whilst those whose members work in areas with a domestic focus retained a nationalistic viewpoint.

Methodology

The primary sources used in this study are the Annual Reports from the Trades Union Congresses held in 1970 and 1971. Whyman has used these same sources though he focusses on the Reports directly preceding

[92] Ludlow, *Safeguarding British Identity*, 18

the 1975 referendum[93] and does not systematically present the attitudes of individual delegates[94] as required to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. The Reports include paragraphs outlining the TUC's Executive Committee's position on a wide range of economic and political issues, informed chiefly by meetings throughout the preceding year with the Government but also with international partners. The TUC (made up of delegates from each of the participating trade unions) has the opportunity to debate and vote on each section of the Executive Committee's report. Individual trade unions can also table motions to be debated and voted upon. These exchanges are recorded and transcribed, and form part of the Annual Report. This study focuses exclusively on those parts of the Report (and supplementary reports included in the publications) concerned with the "European Question", which usually appear under the heading "Britain and the EEC" or similar. This study pays close attention to the verbatim exchanges from the debating floor in order to evaluate the above hypotheses, as opposed to the TUC leadership's evolving position and the Executive Committee's reports (though these are summarised for the relevant years in the next section). A written summary of each union's participation to the debates, bringing together their contributions to debates on several motions, will be provided and their own stance on the European Question determined. At the same time, a series of tables will be constructed showing the range of points raised (under the categories Economic, Industrial Relations, Democracy and Geopolitics) and, of course, which delegates employed which arguments, in order to shed light on Hypothesis 1.

Given Hypotheses 3 and 4, it was also necessary, before embarking on the above, to look at which unions had delegates who spoke on the European issue at the TUC debates of 1970 and 1971, and classify them into white-collar and blue-collar categories and also into transnational and domestic sectors (see Tables 1 and 2 below). This will allow me to ascertain whether these factors can be said to have had a bearing on an individual union's attitude towards European integration, if indeed the union's reasoning is not explicitly spelled out on the debating floor.

[93] See Whyman, *The Heritage of the 1975 European Referendum*
[94] See Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*

Blue-Collar	White-Collar
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)	Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section	Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)
National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)	Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)
National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)	Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)	Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)
National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)	National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D)	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)
Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)	
Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)	
Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)	

Table 1: Blue-collar and white-collar unions represented in the TUC debates on Europe in 1970 and 1971

Transnational focus	Domestic focus	Mixed focus
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)	Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)	National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D)
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section	Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)	Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)
Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)	National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)
Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)	Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)	
Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)	Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)	
National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)		
National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)		
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)		
National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)		

Table 2: Unions in transnational, domestic-oriented and mixed sectors represented in the TUC debates on Europe in 1970 and 1971

It should be made clear that classifying these unions into the above categories is not as simple as it might seem at first, given how there are a number of competing definitions of who counts as a white-collar worker. Considering the heritage of this vague phrase, in both the English language and German literature, Bain and Price concluded that, although difficult to pin down an exact theoretical definition of "white-collar", the division between white-collar and blue-collar work does nevertheless exist in the popular consciousness and seems to be associated with perceived functional proximity to authority, due to the non-manual nature of the labour in common with employers, as well environmental proximity to authority, given similar dress codes and places of work (i.e. an office) to the employers[95].

Despite the trend in British industrial relations towards craft unions rather than industrial unions, some unions did nevertheless represent both blue-collar and white-collar workers in this sense, as evidenced by Bain's list of 'partially white-collar unions' at the time[96]. Examples include the National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA), an industrial union which contained both manual and white-collar workers across paper, printing and publishing industry and the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) which had a separate white-collar section called the National Association of Clerical and Supervisory Staffs[97]. Indeed, Bain estimates that at the time approximately twenty percent of white-collar union trade union members were in fact in manual (or blue-collar) unions[98]. However, for the purposes of this study, only the unions that Bain identifies as 'purely white-collar unions'[99] have been counted as white-collar unions.

In terms of deciding whether these unions operated in a transnational or domestic context (following Bieler's work[100], as summarised previously), I first consulted data visualisations from *The Observatory of Economic Complexity* to ascertain Britain's export categories in 1970 and 1971[101]. I have employed a broad interpretation of 'transnational production" following Bieler's study of Swedish trade union attitudes to

[95] George Sayers Bain and Robert Price, "Who is a White-Collar Employee?" *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 10, no. 3 (1972): 336-337
[96] Bain, *The Growth of White-Collar Unionism*, 334
[97] Ibid., 325
[98] Ibid., 318
[99] Ibid., 332-333
[100] See Bieler, *Globalization*; Bieler, *Economic and Monetary Union*
[101] Observatory of Economic Complexity. "What does United Kingdom export? (1970)". Accessed 30 May 2020. https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/gbr/all/show/1970/

European integration. In the end, I chose to include all the unions covering workers in private sector manufacturing, including the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU) where many members worked in the office functions of industry[102] or, like some members of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), worked in finance sector in the City of London, a global financial centre. Furthermore, I have chosen to classify the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW) as operating in a transnational context due to the prospect of greater trade in food if the UK were to become an EEC member, in spite of the UK's history as a net importer of food, and that agricultural exports represented a small percentage of both total agricultural sector output and total UK exports at the time. Other unions proved even more difficult to categorise because they had some members that clearly worked in export-oriented firms and others that perform similar roles for domestic-oriented organisations. Some unions, as evidenced by the long names, had formed through mergers and were in effect federations of previously independent unions. For example, the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D) combined sheet metal workers (where factories typically export at least some of their output) and domestic engineers (by definition focused on the national sphere). In the end, I decided to place this union in a separate "Mixed" category, along with the transport unions, some of whose members worked in the shipping industry, for example dockers in the TGWU, whose jobs are clearly linked to international trade whereas the likes of bus drivers and railway clerks were working in a clearly domestic context.

As demonstrated, the decisions in classifying trade unions for the purposes of studies such as these is not typically straightforward and, what is more, the way in which the trade union landscape is constantly shifting in the UK makes this task even more difficult. The boundaries between different types of trade unions, although they need to be drawn somewhere for the sake of a study such as this, should be regarded as somewhat fuzzy. For example, if we look at the history of British trade union development more generally, small craft unions have often changed their membership policies or have merged with other similar unions to increase their memberships. On the other hand, large, diverse general and industrial unions also sometimes have different sections of membership to cater for different categories of worker (which sometimes subsequently break away to form their own union). An example from the timeframe of this study is the way the

[102] Bain, *The Growth of White-Collar Unionism*, 322

Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Alliance (DATA) in fact became the supervisory section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) in 1970 (and for that matter subsequently broke away again in 1985). Nevertheless, it is hoped here that the attempt to distinguish here between white-collar and blue-collar unions on the one hand, and between those operating in a transnational context (mainly private sector) and those working in a domestic context (mainly public sector) will allow me to see if any patterns emerge in terms of individual trade unions' attitudes towards British membership of the EEC.

My analysis will require a further classification of the unions as I consider their respective delegates' contributions to the debates in question and decide the extent to which they support or oppose British membership of the EEC. Although much of Teague's theoretical work relates to the behaviour of trade unions once inside the EEC[103], as previously outlined, I will nevertheless employ his terminology of "Pro-European", "Anti-European" and "Pragmatist" to classify the outlooks of the various unions represented. I suspect the "Pragmatist" category will be necessary for those unions withholding judgement, not least as this perhaps best describes the TUC leadership's view on the matter, at least in 1970 (see next section).

[103] See Teague, *The British TUC*; Teague, *Trade Unions*

THE APPROACH OF THE TUC LEADERSHIP

Before presenting my findings as regards the positions of individual British trade unions on European in integration in the years 1970 to 1971, it is first important to set out in detail the position of the TUC leadership on this matter. After all, this was to a large degree the substance of what was being debated at the annual conference so an excavation of the General Council's reports and the General Secretary's remarks at the opening of debates on "Britain and the EEC" is indispensable in terms of providing the necessary context.

On Thursday 10th September 1970 at the Brighton Dome, the General Secretary of the TUC, Victor "Vic" Feather, opened the debate on Britain and the EEC, seeking Congress's approval of paragraphs 441-446 of the General Council's Report and the Supplementary Report on Britain and the EEC. An exposition of his speech is a good way to introduce the immediate historical and political context that frames the subsequent debates. By way of introduction, Paragraph 441 of the General Council's Report in question neatly sums up the change in circumstances that thrust the prospect of British membership of the EEC back to the fore of UK politics:

> *'Following the resignation of President de Gaulle in August 1969 and the election of President Pompidou there was a noticeable change in the French Government's attitude towards British membership of the E.E.C. As a result, Britain's application, which had been on the table since the French veto in December 1967, became a live issue once more. Thus, in December 1969, the six member countries of the European Communities decided at a summit meeting to open negotiations with Britain and the other applicant countries – Denmark, Ireland and Norway – by the summer of 1970'*

There were four key themes running through Feather's summary speech in support of the Report. First, he clearly privileged economic arguments above the political, unlike some delegates (see next section). Second, he sought to treat fairly the economic arguments on both sides of the debate over Britain's potential membership of the EEC. Third, he suggested ways in which the Government's strategy in the negotiations might seek to assuage the concerns of both sides. Finally, he advocated a cautious "wait and see" approach and sought the Congress' approval of this policy.

Firstly then, Feather focused on the economic arguments as outlined in the Supplementary Report and relegates political concerns to a walk-on role in his speech. Political arguments only made a brief appearance towards the end of his contribution, although he admitted that he knew 'some people would put the political considerations first'[104]. He curtly dismissed talk of being "ruled from Brussels" as an exaggeration and went on to state that 'in any case, what really matters is that the policies are right and democratically reached'[105]. He was also optimistic about the influence either Britain or British unions (it is not clear to which he is referring) would wield over the policies and institutional development of a wider Europe. The implication was that political arguments should be something of a secondary consideration for the TUC, even if he spoke of drawing up 'a balance sheet which assesses all the benefits and costs – economic, social and political – of joining or not joining' once the outcome of negations was known[106]. That the chief permanent officer of the umbrella organisation for British trade unions would focus on economics over-and-above politics is not surprising, given British unions' traditional focus on industrial relations, on the most part leaving politics to the PLP. The Supplementary Report (and Feather's subsequent speech) 'concentrat[ed] particularly on what effects entry would have on economic growth'[107]. Feather justified this approach with the statement, 'it is the rate of economic growth that determines the speed – or lack of speed – of our advance in economic and social welfare'[108].

Secondly, in his summary of the economic arguments, Feather sought to be, and indeed stated how he intended to be, 'scrupulously fair to the arguments which are advanced on both sides'. Accusations that the Report is anti-Common Market, that it is pro-Market, or that is alternatively a simple fence-sitting exercise all fell 'wide of the mark', he claimed[109]. Feather told the assembled that the principal economic factors at play were the "dynamic effect" and the "balance of payments effect"; proponents of British accession would usually invoke the former while the latter seems to be the main concern of the Anti-Marketeers. Feather summarised the former argument as follows; 'if British industry is to be internationally competitive, it must have a home market which is at least comparable in size with those of its major rivals'[110]. Furthermore, he highlighted that

[104] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970* (Brighton: TUC, 1970): 679
[105] Ibid., 679
[106] Ibid., 679
[107] Ibid., 676
[108] Ibid., 676
[109] Ibid., 676
[110] Ibid., 676

industrial concerns could increase in size without becoming monopolistic, increasing economic efficiency and productive potential and bringing with it a higher rate of economic growth. The counter arguments he summarised are that European integration might bring with it a reduction in access to Britain's Commonwealth market and that having a large "home market" may be of less importance in the context of decreasing import tariffs around the world.

Feather devoted rather more time to summarising the "balance of payment effect". He informed delegates that the first balance of payments problem presented by British accession concerned the way in which the Community would be financed. As things stood, he said, Britain would contribute 31 per cent of the revenue of an enlarged Community – a 'much bigger [contribution] than our national income would warrant' – whilst only receiving 6 per cent back[111]. 'No Government could contemplate joining in such a circumstance' he posited, suggesting that a contribution of between 6 per cent and 10 per cent of any enlarged EEC Budget would in fact be more appropriate[112]. He explained that the problem with the "rules of the club", as constituted at the time, were that they were 'really only fair for countries which grow similar proportions of their own food'[113]. This brought Feather to his subsequent point on the balance of payments problem, namely the compounding effect of 'extra balance of payments costs that would arise from dearer food imports'[114]. He reminded his audience that a recent Government White Paper had predicted increases in food prices of between 18 and 26 per cent should Britain join the EEC, resulting in an increase in the British cost of living of between 4 and 5 per cent. He also mentioned, although did not expand upon, the effect of changes in the patterns of trade and capital movements. An issue to which Feather did devote a considerable degree of attention, however, was the potential impact of entry on the low paid in the UK. In particular, he made reference to the TUC's opposition to the introduction of any value added tax (a condition of membership), which, if it were to replace direct taxation, would be a regressive fiscal measure and would 'hit the lower income groups the hardest'[115]. Furthermore, if such a tax were to be introduced, the trade unions 'would insist on full compensating increases

[111] Ibid., 677
[112] Ibid., 677
[113] Ibid., 677
[114] Ibid., 677
[115] Ibid., 677

in the incomes of every group likely to be affected [including] wage increases for those at work, better social benefits for those who are retired or others drawing social security payments, and also much improved family allowances which, incidentally, are much higher in the EEC countries than they are in Britain'[116].

At this time Feather perhaps seemed to lend slightly more weight to Eurosceptic arguments in this address (though he would later campaign for "Yes" in the referendum of 1975 as a leader of the Trade Union Alliance for Europe[117]). Although he was very careful to preface the "dynamic effect" arguments of the Pro-Market camp with phrases like 'the conclusion of that particular argument'[118] as he gave his summaries, he seemed to make less effort to distance himself from the more sceptical "balance of payments" arguments, which he addressed at greater length. Indeed, he described the way in which the Community was financed and the subsequent deleterious impact on Britain's balance of payments as 'the absolute kernel of the problem, the crux of the matter'[119]. That said, he swiftly repudiated the objections on sovereignty grounds to European integration. As General Secretary, Feather had a tight rope to walk in order to maintain the confidence of a wide range of delegates, some with strongly held and wildly divergent views on the European question. Consequently, the balance of his speech might reflect this difficult task, seeking to reflect the mood whilst keeping everyone "within the tent" as opposed to revealing his personal convictions on the matter.

Indeed, he advanced arguments that might be seen as an attempt to bring the two sides closer together, to rally around a pragmatic, centrist consensus, even highlighting the possibility of probably fanciful compromise measures to satisfy both sides. For example, he cited the UK Government's intention to negotiate a long transitional period for 'accepting the difficult and costly obligations of the agricultural policy' in contrast to a short transitional period for 'lowering industrial tariffs on both sides', which would allow the UK to reap the benefits of membership whilst reducing the immediate costs[120]. He even went so far as to mention the rather hopeful suggestion that the UK government could purchase entry "on tick", meaning that what the British would

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[116] Ibid., 677
[117] David Gowland and Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*: *Britain and European Integration 1945-1998* (London: Routledge, 2000): 205
[118] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 676
[119] Ibid., 676
[120] Ibid., 677

not pay into the ECC budget at first but rather accumulate a debt that would only be paid once the UK had reaped the benefits of membership, but admitting to not 'know[ing] what the reactions of the Six might be to this proposal'[121].

Ultimately, Feather advocated a cautious "wait and see" approach to the question of British entry. He cautioned that it was 'extremely difficult' to know the extent of any boost that dynamic effects would provide following entry, but that this was not a good reason to dismiss the effect altogether. Equally, however, he suggested that it would be a mistake to pretend that dynamic benefits would be achievable no matter the cost in terms of the balance of payments. Thus, he revealed a clear misgiving about basing any decision to enter on the grounds of economic models. He was also reluctant to make any recommendation before the TUC General Council had examined the question of entry from all angles. Summing up, he stated:

> *'So far, the General Council have examined the E.E.C. policies which have a bearing on industrial structure and on the free movement of labour. We will be examining in detail the effects on the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. We will also be looking at the institutions of the Community, at the ways in which the Community is run, and how our trade union Movement, together with the Movements in the other countries could influence its decisions'* [122]

Clearly, then, Feather did not think that the TUC had by September 1970 considered enough evidence to make a firm recommendation at this point. Furthermore, he pointed to further factors, 'the question of economic and monetary union; and the Community's social, regional, taxation, transport and energy policies', all of which he considered 'very important in forming a considered view on whether Britain should join the Community'[123]. Finally, and most importantly, Feather recommended that the TUC await the outcome of the Government's negotiations before passing judgment on whether the UK should enter the EEC or not; only then, he stated, would it be 'possible to draw up a balance sheet which assesses all the benefits and costs - economic, social and political - of joining or not joining'[124]. Depending on one's point of view, this was either a sincerely held view or a way of kicking an issue that will almost certainly split in the trade union movement into the long grass.

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[121] Ibid., 677
[122] Ibid., 677-678
[123] Ibid., 678
[124] Ibid., 679

Either way, following Teague's terminology, Feather here is best described as a Pragmatist. Following the ensuing debate, the TUC voted for the adoption of the General Council's Report paragraphs 441 to 446 and the supplementary report, with 6,073,000 votes to 1,361,000 (each delegate's vote being weighted according to the number of members of his union).

By the time that the TUC met again at the Opera House in Blackpool in September 1971, however, the General Council had determined a position against British entry on the terms negotiated by Edward Heath's Conservative Government of the time. In his speech opening the debate on British entry, Feather made clear that he believed the Government's negotiations had failed to deliver on two fronts – the terms of entry and the impact of entry on the cost of living. The General Council report adopted by the TUC in the previous year had stated that one of the main aims of the negotiations should be to limit Britain's contribution to the Community Budget to between six and ten per cent, given that only six percent of that Budget would be spent in Britain. However, Feather stated that the Government's inability to negotiate a permanent mechanism to cap Britain's contribution of the Community Budget would leave Britain paying over twenty per cent of the Community once the transitional period would end[125]. What is more, he did not see Britain being able to negotiate changes to the financial arrangements once inside the EEC, due to the UK Government's acceptance that decisions by the Council of Ministers should be made unanimously where national interests are at stake. This would effectively allow France a veto to prevent change to how the Community would be financed.

Thus, Feather was especially critical of the Government's negotiating strategy. Britain had had, he stated, 'a golden opportunity to negotiate a change in the agricultural finance regulations', which he assessed to have been designed in the French national interest, but 'we [had thr[own] away our hand'; 'no wonder President Pompidou smiles' he concluded[126]. Furthermore, Feather was also critical of the Government White Paper itself on entry, deriding it as 'one of the most inadequate documents' he had ever seen on 'any important policy issue, let alone on one of the historical importance of this one'. Indeed, he even went as far as to state that the White Paper is an embarrassment to 'even those who favour entry at any price'[127]. Thus, Feather concluded that the Government had failed the task set by the previous year's General Council report to

[125] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971* (Blackpool: TUC, 1971): 468
[126] Ibid., 468
[127] Ibid., 468

negotiate acceptable terms of entry. That said, it is not at all surprising that a Conservative Government received such a negative review from the TUC leadership.

FINDINGS

In this section, I present my findings of how each of the unions whose delegates spoke in the 1970 and 1971 debates approached the question of Britain and the EEC. Firstly, I have identified the sub-themes that trade unionists raised during these debates and categorised these under my chosen over-arching themes of Economy, Industrial Relations, Democracy and Geopolitics. Note the overlap with the trade unionist arguments identified by Whyman as outlined previously.

Economy	Industrial Relations	Democracy	Geopolitics
Economic growth and investment	Role of trade unions in the EEC institutions	Democratic deficit in the EEC	Britain's position in the world post-Empire, with particular reference to the Commonwealth
Realising socialism	Working class internationalism	Effect on national sovereignty	Response to globalisation and transnational corporations
Regional development		Immigration	Britain's relationship with Warsaw Pact countries
Terms of entry (particularly the budget contribution and value-added tax)		The Government's mandate to take the UK into the EEC	The EEC as a counter to US economic dominance
Trade and the balance of payments			
Wages and the cost of living (particularly the impact of the CAP on food prices)			

Table 3: The main sub-themes raised in the debates, classified by my chosen overarching themes.

This table in itself suggests Hypothesis 1 to be true, as it can be immediately seen that delegates employed a number of arguments concerning democracy and geopolitics in regard to the European Question, stepping beyond the usual realm of the economy and industrial relations. Next though I will summarise the contributions and attitude of each individual union in order to shed light on Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.

The blue-collar unions

Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)

During the 1970 debate, Dan McGarvey of the ASBSB-SW moved the following motion, which summarised his union's position, and asked fellow delegates to support it as 'a service to the citizens of this country'[128]:

> *This Congress is firmly opposed to British membership of the European Economic Community, believing that the Treaty of Rome will impose injurious social, economic and political effects on present and future generations of British citizens.*
>
> *Congress believes this would remove control and planning of Britain's economy from the elected Government, react against the trade union movement, strengthen the great international companies and, by committing Britain to a political power bloc, perpetuate the division of Europe and increase world tension.*
>
> *Congress instructs the incoming General Council to utilise the full resources of the T.U.C. to inform affiliates of the effect of Common Market membership and vigorously to oppose Britain's entry.*

With regard to the question of entry, McGarvey employed the analogy of being on a train without knowing the destination[129], both in terms of the economics and the politics. For example he complained that "experts" had first said that joining the EEC was beneficial to the economy but came at a political price, but were now saying that it was a political step forward that comes with an economic price, which he felt the working classes would end up paying[130]. He certainly wasn't convinced that economic growth and increases in the standard of living would be automatically forthcoming. Rather, he was particularly concerned about the predicted rise in food costs, describing the CAP in 1971 as an 'economic monstrosity' which had 'established a rigged market with

[128] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 682
[129] Ibid., 681
[130] Ibid., 681

artificially high prices in order to keep out cheaper food from efficient producers'[131]. He even suggested that Belgian and Dutch housewives were currently getting on ferries to England to do their food shopping, given how high prices were there[132]. In any case, McGarvey made it quite clear that, although he considered himself an internationalist, he would be putting the needs of his members above the interests of French farmers[133]. Joining the EEC, and becoming part of the CAP in particular, would have a dire effect on the nation's balance of payments, he added during both debates[134].

McGarvey was especially worried that joining the EEC would limit the UK government's room for manoeuvre as regards intervention in the economy. Given the interests of his membership, he was particularly concerned about the future of shipbuilding in Britain without subsidies if exposed to even more competition from abroad[135]. In his reply to other delegates, particularly the pro-European Tom Bradley MP of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA), he also suggested that the railway industry would not be viable without subsidies from the national government, at least not at current wage levels[136]. He was also worried that joining the EEC would necessitate the removal of the then regional employment premium (used to incentivise investment in areas of high unemployment) which would leave the likes of Scotland, Wales and the North of England 'in the doldrums'[137]. This would be compounded by the flow of investment to the south east of England to be close to the continental market, he suggested[138]. Indeed, the following year, McGarvey stated that the view of the "Upper Clyde Shipbuilders" (i.e. his members) was that 'capital should not be left to itself to maximise the returns of private owners, to disregard social costs and to leave derelict whole sections of industry'[139]. According to McGarvey, once inside the EEC the only way to combat the large multinational

[131] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971*, 474
[132] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 681
[133] Ibid., 681
[134] Ibid., 681; Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 473-474
[135] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 682
[136] Ibid., 687
[137] Ibid., 687
[138] Ibid., 682
[139] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 474

employers would be 'to strengthen the already over-powerful and over-centralised bureaucracy of the Common Market itself'[140].

Thus, McGarvey also rejected the 'political integration' of the UK into what he saw as an undemocratic organisation, forcefully describing it as 'giving up […] the franchise of children yet unborn in this country to decide their own destinies'[141]. McGarvey was also particularly concerned that a consensus to join amongst the political class had emerged from 'cosy chats amongst the politicians at the top'[142] and railed against their condescension, stating that 'when people tell me that something is too complicated for me to understand I have often found that it is something they do not want me to understand in the first place'[143]. Along similar lines, he complained that 'when somebody tells me that something I do not much like is in my own best interests, because it often turns out that it is in his best interests'[144]. He was also sceptical that Britain's problems with the Treaty of Rome would be solved through the negotiation of better terms of entry, no matter whether these were led by a Labour or Conservative Government, describing the negotiations as a matter of "dotting the Is and Ts" whilst the words were clear to see[145]. Nor would there be a solution following entry, as other delegates had suggested, stating in 1971 that 'you cannot join an organisation in the belief that you can change the whole basis on which it exists'[146]. Rather, McGarvey thought Britain would be better served in geopolitical terms by staying out of the EEC, avoiding pacts with the continental powers and instead 'keeping the balance' in the world[147]. The UK should instead continue to ally itself with the Commonwealth nations, who had 'stood beside [Britain] in two world wars'[148].

[140] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 682
[141] Ibid., 687
[142] Ibid., 682
[143] Ibid., 681
[144] Ibid., 681
[145] Ibid., 682; TUC, *Annual Report 1971*, 474
[146] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 474
[147] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 688
[148] Ibid., 688

Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section (AUEW-ES)

Mr R. Wright of the Engineering Section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) contributed to the 1971 debate and, like each of the delegates representing craft unions, was clearly against British entry. He stated that each of the sections of the AUEW was opposed to Britain joining the EEC. He was particularly concerned about the UK being exposed to imported goods from Europe that were manufactured domestically and imported labour from the likes of southern Italy[149]. Somewhat implausibly, Wright even accused the Government of intentionally dampening the UK economy to make entry to the EEC seem more attractive.

Wright also believed that the question of entry could not be 'isolated from the political implications', believing that the UK's national independence was at stake and even going so far as to describe the Treaty of Rome as a 'constitutional attack' on the nation state[150]. Wright also had concerns about a democratic deficit at the EEC level, complaining of appointments rather than elections to the EEC Commission and describing it as an 'autocracy which this Movement should not tolerate'[151]. Interestingly in terms of the geopolitics at stake, Wright suggested that the UK should instead be seeking to do more trade with eastern Europe and China, as opposed the EEC which he saw as 'inward-looking'[152]; perhaps the socialist regimes in power in these parts of the world were more in keeping with his politics.

National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)

In 1970, Mr W. Daley of the NSMM was likewise opposed Britain joining the EEC. He believed that there were 'certain facts that cannot be assailed' by those who were making the case for British entry[153]. Daley believed that it would be even more difficult to realise a democratic socialist system across a whole continent which the UK labour movement had been unable to bring about 'even on this small island', suggesting that the Treaty of Rome contained neither provisions for regulating monopolies and preventing cartels nor the nationalisation of

[149] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 482
[150] Ibid., 482
[151] Ibid., 482
[152] Ibid., 483
[153] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 686

industry[154]. Useful levers of government to intervene in the economy, particularly regarding the balance of payments, such as import controls and export subsidies, would also be outlawed by the Treaty. Like other delegates, he drew attention to the potential for rising food costs but interestingly he implied that the main problem associated with this would be a round of wage rises that could make British industry uncompetitive[155].

Furthermore, pointing to the potential erosion of national sovereignty, Daley decried that 'the end-product is political unity'[156]. This would be the price to be paid for a geopolitical benefit that Daley felt to be over-egged; he believed that EEC could not become an independent 'third world force' given the domination of American companies in Europe, giving the examples of the French computer, rubber, telecommunications and petrol distribution industries[157]. Evidently, he felt that joining the EEC would not be a sufficient response to the challenge of globalisation and the increasing power of transnational companies. Tellingly, he felt that there was more potential in negotiating to enter the 'fantastic markets in the Communist bloc countries'[158].

National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)

Mr R. Briginshaw of NATSOPA contributed to the 1971 debate and could not have been clearer in his opposition to British entry. He believed that the question of whether or not Britain was to continue as a nation was 'the central issue', imploring colleagues to 'reject the national defeatism of our rulers'[159]. He also rejected some colleagues' suggestion that entering the EEC would be an act of internationalism. Rather he thought joining would be an act of 'gross cosmopolitanism which has nothing in common with working class internationalism' and that 'there can be no real internationalism without independent nations'[160].

In terms of economics, he made clear his surprise that any trade unionist might accept terms of entry which he described as an 'obvious Tory hoax'; he presumably believed these terms would benefit capital at the expense of the working classes. In terms of the geopolitics of entering the EEC, he accused the

[154] Ibid., 686
[155] Ibid., 686.
[156] Ibid., 686
[157] Ibid., 686
[158] Ibid., 686.
[159] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 479
[160] Ibid., 479

Conservative Government of charting this course to 'widen the basic division between the East and the West of Europe' which would threaten peace on the Continent[161].

National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&DE)

In 1970, Mr W. Warman of the NUSMWCH&DE was also against British entry to the EEC. First and foremost, he believed the argument to wait-and-see as regards the negotiations to be 'wearing very thin': he could not see in any case that an acceptable deal could be arrived at[162]. He was primarily concerned that joining the EEC would create a barrier to realising socialism in Britain. He stated that the EEC Commission had prevented Italy from nationalising an industry, for example, and worried how this would sit with the TUC's then aims of the state ownership of industry, the elimination of profit as a motive in society, and the establishment of a socialist system of society'[163]. Warman also pointed out that it was already a struggle to encourage investment in the peripheral regions of the UK, and that making state intervention in the economy more difficult would be to the detriment of these areas[164]. Furthermore, Warman quoted the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home who had reportedly said that "capitalism required unity" in Western Europe in order to overcome the socialist threat emanating from the East. Warman, however, would rather see 'unity with [international] workers' rather than the establishment of a united Europe in [employers'] interests'[165].

What is more, Warman also stated that through entering the EEC 'we shall without a doubt sacrifice our democratic rights'[166], pointing out the shortcomings of the EEC Parliamentary Assembly which could not adequately hold the Commission to account nor make laws, which had resulted in a democratic deficit at the heart of the EEC.

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[161] Ibid., 479
[162] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 684
[163] Ibid., 685
[164] Ibid., 685
[165] Ibid., 685
[166] Ibid., 684

Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)

During the 1971 debate, Mr B. Stanley of the POEU echoed other delegates' concerns about the economic impacts of entry. He stated that 'the National Institute of Economic and Social Research had "found no evidence that there would be automatically an improvement in the economic growth of Britain if we entered the Six"'[167]. He stated that wage growth in the Six had started from a low base and reiterated the suggestion that economic growth had slowed in the Six since the EEC was formed. Furthermore, any increase in British wages following entry would not necessarily outweigh higher food costs and the introduction of a value-added tax; thus entry 'may be very disadvantageous, particularly to many trade unionists and to many of the lower-paid sections of our community'[168]. He was aggrieved that much of the £500 million per annum price tag in budget contributions would be mainly used to prop up 'inefficient French agriculture'[169]. He also added his voice to concerns about the impact on the UK's balance of payments.

However, what exercised Stanley most was the way the Government did not have a democratic mandate to take Britain into the EEC, as he saw the situation. He stated that the question of entry had not been an issue at the last General Election and therefore the British people had the opportunity to express an opinion on the matter. The Conservative Party's election manifesto, he reported, had only committed 'to negotiate - no more and no less'[170]. Stanley believed that 'to force a decision through Parliament on a three-line whip would be a constitutional outrage' not to mention 'a deplorable beginning to our membership of the Community' should that happen[171]. He stated that a General Election should take place first, or even that an unprecedented referendum on the issue should be held - anything less and 'we cannot […] continue to call ourselves a democracy', he stated[172].

[167] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 481
[168] Ibid., 481
[169] Ibid., 481
[170] Ibid., 481
[171] Ibid., 481-482
[172] Ibid., 482

National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)

Reg Bottini of the NUAAW expressed firm opposition to British entry to the EEC during the debate in 1970, being particularly concerned about the plight of British agriculture, an issue of the direct importance to his members, and what he perceived to be a loss of national sovereignty.

Regarding agriculture, Bottini believed the UK would be required to 'permanently subsidise inefficient European agriculture'[173]. He was concerned that 'The most efficient [system of] agriculture in Europe is to have its financial structure torn apart'[174]. He was referring here to the 1947 Agriculture Act, introduced by a Labour Government. He believed that British entry would greatly increase the price of food in the UK, particularly as a result of agricultural surpluses at 'artificially inflated prices dictated […] by political and not economic considerations'[175]. In contrast to many other speakers in the debate, Bottini directly referenced his members, who he described as 'the descendants of the Tolpuddle Martyrs'[176]. He stated that 'agricultural industry and its workers are at the very centre […] of all the manoeuvrings in the present negotiations'[177]. Other more general points Bottini made as regard economic factors included concerns over the impact on the UK's balance of payments and the necessary introduction of a value added tax that would 'shift the burden of taxation from the wealthy to the low paid'[178]. According to him, all this 'would dramatically increase the cost of living without any guarantee of improvements in the standard of living'[179]. He was also averse to handing over a proportion of the UK's customs duties to the EEC bureaucracy.

Furthermore, Bottini went on to describe the General Council's 1970 Report as reaching 'the wrong non-conclusions' for its failure to mention the loss of national sovereignty[180]. He went on pose the following question to delegates: 'if this trade union Movement has demonstrated this week that it is totally opposed to

[173] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 683
[174] Ibid., 683
[175] Ibid., 683
[176] Ibid., 683
[177] Ibid., 683
[178] Ibid., 683
[179] Ibid., 683
[180] Ibid., 683

the loss domestically of trade union rights, how much more opposed should this Congress be to the transfer of whole sections of British law being subordinated to the Brussels Commission?'[181].

Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)

The UPOW's representative, Norman Stagg, intervened in the 1971 debate to argue against British entry to the EEC. His main argument concerned economics, principally the negative effect of entry on the UK's balance of payments and 'the disastrous effects that are bound to flow from that situation', which he said had been 'the most inhibiting factor to growth over the past decade'[182]. He was particularly concerned about the impact of having to pay more for imported food and the loss of preferential trading agreements with the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries. He said pro-Marketeers were wrong therefore to pin their hopes on economic growth meeting the costs of entry within a few years.

Stagg also expressed strong concerns about the role trade unions in the European set up. Like Jones of TGWU and Mills of the NUBE he was concerned about the relative strength of trade unions on the Continent in comparison to the UK. As he put it, of course trade unionists in the Six would want the UK in as 'they would welcome ten million allies on their side'[183] to help increase their unsatisfactory powers of negotiation. However, Stagg emphasised the 'differences of language and legalistic systems' between the UK and the Continent[184]. He also suggested that the trade union movement in Europe was split ideologically, which could be a reference to either the divide between the social democratic movement and Euro-communism, or even a reference to Protestant-Catholic divisions. In sum, he believed that there was 'not one [trade union] question that we need to enter the Six to deal with' […] that we cannot deal with more effectively through our international trade secretariats'[185]. Stagg was also concerned that the Government of the time did not have the mandate to take

[181] Ibid., 683
[182] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 483
[183] Ibid., 483
[184] Ibid., 483
[185] Ibid., 483

such an 'irrevocable' decision and rather insisted that the issue should be decided by 'the voice of our people, through a General Election'[186].

National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)

Sir Frederick Hayday of the NUGMW contributed to the 1971 debate, arguing in favour of British entry and focusing exclusively on economic issues. He argued that just 'a half per cent increase in our national productivity would mean […] the whole of the General Council document is demolished'[187]. He admitted that it was difficult to put an exact price on British entry but, like Roy Grantham of CAWU, pointed to recent experiences on the continent, which had put paid to the concerns which were voiced by concerned trade unionists in those countries ahead of the founding of the EEC. He stated that the general experience was that 'the lowering of the tariff barriers between the separate countries has meant a stimulus and impetus to industrial growth [and] an increase in general living standards'[188].

More specifically, he pointed out that German trade unionists had feared that the 'could not bear the cost of propping up the French agricultural policy' but that Germany was subsequently 'embarrassed by the strength of her economic position'[189]. He also pointed to the Italian experience. He stated that the Italians had been afraid to lower their tariff barriers (the highest among the Six), which they had erected to protect nascent post-war advanced manufacturing in areas like car and refrigerator production. However, rather than being swamped by German products, the Italian manufacturers had maintained market share in a greatly increased market[190]. Hayday claimed that the same positive outcome would be conferred upon Britain should she join the EEC[191]; the Common Market was a 'proven thing'[192].

[186] Ibid., 483
[187] Ibid., 478
[188] Ibid., 478-479
[189] Ibid., 479
[190] Ibid., 479
[191] Ibid., 478
[192] Ibid., 479

Furthermore, he also suggested that the cost of research and development in an industry such as civil aviation could not be sustained by the likes of Britain alone and that developing a Europe-wide industry would be preferable to 'buy[ing] American off the shelf'[193]. He clearly saw an enlarged EEC as a potential counterweight to the USA's post-war economic dominance.

Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)

Jack Jones of the TGWU also took part in the 1971 debate, though on the opposing side to the NUGMW, arguing forcefully against British entry to the EEC. In 1971, he moved the following motion:

> *This congress opposes the present proposal for Britain to join the Common Market on the terms now known, and believes that a General Election should be held before any decision on entry is taken by Parliament.*
>
> *Congress therefore calls upon the General Council to launch a public campaign in support of this policy.*

Jones gave wide-ranging reasons for his union's opposition and, again, the majority of his observations concerned economics. First, the claimed that the Six's rate of economic growth had in fact slowed down since they formed the EEC[194]. He also suggested that Italy continued to suffer from grave economic and social problems, which had led to recent renewed electoral support for Fascists[195]. In terms of the impact of entry on trade, Jones suggested that entry would result in the return of the UK's balance of payments weakness, which had in recent years been offset 'at great cost to ordinary families'[196].

As regards wages, he stated that some members of his union were working in Europe and were paid £9 to £10 extra per week to cover the higher cost of living, whilst the pro-Marketeers were advertising the fact that British workers would be £7 better off each week should the UK join the EEC; he therefore concluded that

[193] Ibid., 479
[194] Ibid., 472
[195] Ibid., 485
[196] Ibid., 473

any wage increase would not cover the increase in the cost of living[197]. He also doubted that any increase in wages, or holidays and other benefits, would materialise for British workers due to the increase in competition from European firms[198]. He also predicted that food prices would rise by 50% and believed strongly that the TUC should not adopt a policy of 'prosperity for the French farmers and increased poverty for the British workers'[199]. In addition, Jones described the value-added tax that would be introduced on entry to the EEC as 'a vicious indirect tax that would make the poor poorer'[200].

Jones also stated that Britain joining the EEC would be detrimental to "the regions", that is to say the areas beyond the south-east of England. Firstly, Britain would be 'on the fringe' whilst investment would flow to the centre[201]. Second, the British Government would be unable to employ a regional policy to direct investment towards those areas where unemployment was highest; in fact, he claimed that Belgium had been hauled in front of the Common Market Court as its system of regional aid contravened the principle of free movement of capital[202]. Taken together, there was a clear risk of Britain 'becoming something like the Northern Ireland of Europe', Northern Ireland being the poorest and most isolated constituent nation of the United Kingdom[203]. Jones seemed to suggest that joining the EEC would be a reckless gamble, stating that 'this is not a bet for the one o'clock race; it is the future of our entire people which is at stake'[204].

Jones also made arguments against joining the EEC with reference to democracy. He made reference to what he saw as a democratic deficit at the heart of the EEC, suggesting that 'joining the Common Market would mean handing over control of our own affairs to an excessively centralised, bureaucratic structure, not susceptible to popular control'[205]. Furthermore, as outlined in his motion, he also expressed doubts that current Members of Parliament, who had been 'elected in a General Election that hardly mentioned the Common Market', had a democratic mandate to take Britain into the EEC. He stated that not to be allowing the people

[197] Ibid., 472
[198] Ibid., 472
[199] Ibid., 485
[200] Ibid., 472
[201] Ibid., 473
[202] Ibid., 485
[203] Ibid., 473
[204] Ibid., 485
[205] Ibid., 473

themselves to have their say on the issue was an act of 'absolute arrogance' on the part of politicians[206]. He even went as far to suggest that Labour pro-market organisations 'would rather have Britain in the Common Market with a Tory Government than have Britain outside the Common Market with a Labour Government'[207].

Jones also had concerns about the state of trade unionism in Common Market, saying that he had spoken to colleagues in European trade unions who had told him that 'they are absolutely beaten by the bureaucrats of Brussels'[208], in stark contrast remarks made by Sir Frederick Hayday, the NUGMW delegate (another general, blue collar union). As regards working class internationalism, he did not consider joining the EEC as a question of internationalism, implying that the TUC had a duty to colleagues 'all over the world', not just in Europe[209].

Summarising the views of the ten blue-collar unions

The table below provides a summary of the main arguments advanced by each of the ten blue-collar unions that took part in the 1970 and 1971 debates on British entry. For this table, and each of the subsequent iterations, red represents Anti-European, green denotes pro-European and orange indicates Pragmatist views respectively. The numbers in brackets show how many delegates employed these themes in their contributions.

[206] Ibid., 472
[207] Ibid., 485
[208] Ibid., 485
[209] Ibid., 485

Economy (10)	Industrial Relations (3)	Democracy (9)	Geopolitics (5)
Wages and the cost of living (particularly the impact of the CAP on food prices) **(7)** ASBSBSW NSMM NUAAW POEU TGWU UPOW NUGMW	Role of trade unions in the EEC institutions **(2)** TGWU UPOW	Effect on national sovereignty **(5)** ASBSBSW AUEW-ES NSMM NATSOPA NUAAW	Britain's position in the world post-Empire, with particular reference to the Commonwealth **(2)** ASBSBSW UPOW
Trade and the balance of payments **(7)** ASBSBSW AUEW-ES NSMM NUAAW TGWU UPOW NUGMW	Working class internationalism **(2)** NATSOPA TGWU	The Government's mandate to take the UK into the EEC **(3)** POEU TGWU UPOW	Britain's relationship with Warsaw Pact countries **(2)** NSMM NUSMWCH&DE
Economic growth and investment **(5)** ASBSBSW POEU TGWU UPOW NUGMW		Democratic deficit in the EEC **(2)** NUSMWCH&DE TGWU	The EEC as a counter to US economic dominance **(2)** NSMM NUGMW
Terms of entry (particularly the budget contribution and value-added tax) **(5)** NATSOPA NUAAW NUSMWCH&DE POEU TGWU			Response to globalisation and transnational corporations **(1)** NSMM
Realising socialism **(3)** ASBSBSW NSMM NUSMWCH&DE			
Regional development **(3)** ASBSBSW NUSMWCH&DE TGWU			

Table 4: Summary of attitudes of and arguments made by blue-collar unions in the debates.

As can be seen, although different craft unions chose to emphasise different facets of the debate, there was a clear consensus amongst blue-collar unions as all but one – Hayday's NUGMW – opposed British entry to the EEC. The arguments most frequently advanced by this type of union were the detrimental effect of entry on standards of living for British workers and the country's balance of trade, but note how concerns around democracy also featured regularly, particularly the worry about the erosion of British national sovereignty.

The white-collar unions

Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)

Mr C. Jenkins of the ASTMS also opposed Britain joining the EEC during the 1970 debate. His main objection concerned what he considered to be the democratic deficit in the European institutions. He described the EEC as so 'anti-democratic' it was deserving of the 'most ferocious attack from people in democratic states'[210]. He complained of the concentration of power in the Council of Ministers which he described as having the combined powers of executive, cabinet and parliament despite the members of which being unknown to the man in the street[211]. In a similar vein, Jenkins bemoaned that joining the EEC would undermine the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility 'where you question the man you elect'[212]. Continuing the theme of imperilled democracy, Jenkins alleged that a German nominee for the Council of Ministers had subsequently been found to be a former member of the Nazi Party[213]. On a separate but related note, Jenkins pointed out that only two of the current members of the Council of European Communities had any link to the trade union movement, which he felt called into question the presumption that trade unions had adequately influence in Brussels[214].

In terms of geopolitics, Jenkins had a particular view on Britain's position in the world following the unravelling of the British Empire. He believed that it betrayed 'great Anglo-Saxon arrogance' to believe that the UK could mould the EEC to suit its national interest, listing the societal and economic problems in each of the Six[215]. Instead he thought that the UK should focus on fostering a 'prosperous, outward-looking Commonwealth' rather than pursuing membership of a continental trade bloc[216]. He was especially concerned that Britain being part of the CAP would greatly damage Britain's trading relationship with the Commonwealth, particularly New Zealand, due to the import tariffs on foodstuffs this would entail. Although Jenkins was more concerned about the politics rather than the arithmetic, as he put it, he did express concerns about the cost

[210] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 682
[211] Ibid., 682
[212] Ibid., 683
[213] Ibid., 683
[214] Ibid., 683
[215] Ibid., 682
[216] Ibid., 683

and rationale of the CAP. He stated that 'supporting an ancient, medieval, family-based system of peasant tenant farming ought not to be entertained here' and expressed his disgust that the system had produced a 'mountain of rotting foodstuffs equivalent to the combined weight of the entire population of Austria' in a world where hunger and malnutrition remained widespread[217]. On these grounds, he called into question the morality of the European project, let alone the politics and economics.

Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)

Bill Kendall of the CPSA only contributed to the debate in 1970, when he struck a decidedly pragmatic tone. He seconded the motion proposed by the pro-European Roy Grantham of the CAWU (see below), though made it clear that he did not consider the motion to necessarily represent a pro-Market position[218]. In fact, as regards economics, Kendall actually remarked that 'the economic objections are now much clearer'[219]. Furthermore, as regards issues of democracy, he expressed that he believed many of the Common Market institutions to be unrepresentative. However, a key criticism he had of the anti-Common Market arguments was that 'the discussion of long-term alternatives [to joining the EEC] is the least satisfactory part [of their case]'[220].

Kendall went on to state that there was no consensus on British entry within the trade union movement. In light of this, his recommendation was to 'sit on the fence', believing that 'short-term procrastination on an issue of this kind is not at all dishonourable and is a sensible and proper policy for this Congress'; he believed that for Congress to determine an attitude in 1970 on a slender majority (most likely calling for flat-out opposition to entry) would 'serve no useful purpose'[221]. Rather, it would be better to wait and see if negotiations are fruitful. In this manner, Kendall demonstrates that he is essentially an opportunist as regards British entry and is neither ideologically for nor against.

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[217] Ibid., 682
[218] Ibid., 680
[219] Ibid., 680
[220] Ibid., 680
[221] Ibid., 680

Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)

Roy Grantham of CAWU was without doubt the loudest and most loquacious pro-European voice attending congress in 1970 and 1971, proposing motions and advancing far-ranging arguments addressing almost all of the aforementioned themes. His general position is perhaps best summarised by his statements 'the cost of doing nothing is economic and political stagnation'[222] and 'the most important negotiations will take place when we have the advantage of sitting in council as a member, not when we were an applicant in the ante-chamber'[223]. The motion that Grantham moved in 1970 was as follows:

> "*Congress, concerned at the lack of awareness on the part of the public of the full implications for this country's negotiations for entry to the E.E.C., calls on the General Council to organise as a matter of urgency a programme of action to inform trade unionists.*
>
> *"Congress is aware that negotiations are in progress with the European Economic Community to see whether entry can be achieved on acceptable terms. An assessment should be made of the real costs and benefits, particularly the effects on prices and the implications of a Value Added Tax.*
>
> *"The decision on entry to the Common Market should be based on an assessment of the political implications of membership, the arrangements agreed in relation to the share of Community finance to be borne by the United Kingdom, the extent to which the Community agricultural community can be restructured, the amount of protection that can be secured for the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A interests, and the effect on trade unionists both as producers and consumers.*
>
> *"A further important consideration to be taken into account must be the political and economic consequences to Britain of not joining the Common Market".*

In 1971, Grantham moved the following motion:

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[222] Ibid., 680
[223] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 477

> "*Congress accepts the outcome of the negotiations initiated by the Labour Government to join the Common Market. By giving Britain unrestricted access to our fastest growing market, and by providing our expanding industries with a broader base, British membership will improve the standard of living of our workers as it has done in the Six.*
>
> "*Failure to sign the Treaty of Accession would have serious repercussions on our workers by its adverse impact on employment and investment in this country".*

On economic growth and investment, Grantham stated that the way in which going the EEC would grow the home market to 300 million people would have two benefits. Firstly, there would be an end to "stop-go" in British industry as a British Chancellor would be able to restrict demand in the UK only, 'leaving the rest of the market of 250 million customers unaffected'[224]. Secondly, industry would be able to invest more, particularly in the areas of computers, electronics, atomic energy and aircraft engines which require large home markets to be sustained, he claimed. European funding for research and development worth to the UK 'at least £100 million per year by 1980' would also be forthcoming[225]. Abolishing tariff barriers between the UK and Europe would mean that UK-based companies would expand production in Britain to serve the European market, rather than establish factories on the continent[226]. This was met with cries of no from the floor, with others, including Mr McGarvy of the ASBSBSW, taking the view that such an action would further encourage investment to flow away from Britain to the European core. He suggested that failure to join the EEC after ten years of it being under consideration would lead to a 'total loss of business confidence', speculating that rates of investment would halve, leading to higher unemployment and lower growth[227]. By contrast, he suggested that if by going into the Common Market, the UK could increase growth rate up by only 1 per cent per a year, all of the visible costs of entry, including the agricultural policy, would be met by 1980[228].

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[224] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 679
[225] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 477
[226] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 687
[227] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 486
[228] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 679

As regards wages, Grantham contrasted the situation in the UK and the members of the EEC, pointing out that in 1958 income per employed person in the Six was 14% below that in the UK but in 1968 was 25% above. Furthermore, he predicted that the trend would continue, with wages 40-50% higher in the Six by 1980, meaning 'we shall be the poor people of Europe'[229]. Grantham also compares the situation regarding trade. He states that 'exports between the Six trebled between 1960 and 1970 [whilst] our exports to the Six grew at half that rate'; he claimed that had the UK been a member, UK exports to the Six would have been 'at least £650 million higher last year'[230]. He also made the argument that 'the TUC Report makes the worst possible balance-of-payments assumptions'[231]. Furthermore, on international trade, he states that the Six's trade with other countries 'has grown more rapidly than any other', which refutes the view that the EEC is an inward-looking, protectionist organisation[232].

As regards food prices and the CAP, in 1970 Grantham identified this as the main obstacle to overcome in the negotiations on entry to the EEC. He suggested that it was 'fundamental that we insist on a reduction of guaranteed prices within the Common Market and on a realistic and acceptable contribution by the UK to the agricultural fund'[233]. However, he was confident that a 'mutually advantageous solution'[234] could be struck on this issue, especially once the UK was a member of the EEC, perhaps resulting in European contributions to British regional policy in recompense. In any case, the cost of the CAP would reduce over time as fewer and fewer Europeans worked in agriculture. He predicted this would fall from 15% in 1970 to 6% by 1980, and he looked forward to a time when together 'we can work towards a new common agricultural policy based on their having, like us, a small, efficient farming community instead of their existing large, peasant-like and expensively subsidised farming society'[235]. In 1971, when it was clear that the Government wouldn't be able to negotiate lower guaranteed CAP prices, Grantham stated that the British trade union movement needed to 'have the vision not to judge this vital issue on the price of butter, not to be content that Britain should slowly

[229] Ibid., 679
[230] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 476
[231] Ibid., 477
[232] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 679
[233] Ibid., 679
[234] Ibid., 679
[235] Ibid., 679

decline in terms of economic power in the world, but to recognise that we need to rid our country of the economic shackles which bind it'[236]. He reiterated that living standards in Europe were higher despite higher food costs[237]. This led Victor Feather, the then TUC General Secretary, to accuse Grantham of having thrown away his yardstick whilst the General Council had used theirs, and come to the conclusion that the TUC should oppose UK entry on the terms negotiated by the Conservative government, with rises in food prices prominent in their Report's reasoning.

Grantham also sang the praises of UK entry to the EEC as regards entry's impact on regional development in Britain. Countering the anti-marketeer view that investment will be sucked from the peripheries of Europe towards the core, he highlighted the start the EEC had made on regional policy, pointing to the 'steel plants, car plants and chemical plants' being built in Southern Italy with EEC support; he stated that similarly industrial development in the UK will become a number one EEC priority once the UK joins and that 'going into Europe will be the best thing that has ever happened to our Development Areas'[238]. Furthermore, he claimed that the UK would be able 'to negotiate hundreds of millions of pounds from the [EEC] Social Fund for the training and re-employment of the people', half of which was now earmarked for solving structural and long-term unemployment ("and where is there more of it than in this country?")[239]. Finally, as regards economic arguments, he counters the view that the EEC is a barrier to the realisation of socialism in the UK, pointing out that there are many more nationalised industries in the Six than in Britain[240].

Grantham's was the only pro-European voice in the debates of 1970 and 1971 in terms of democracy. In 1970, addressing concerns about the possible erosion of British national sovereignty, he went on the offensive, declaring that 'the needs of our children and our grandchildren call for new social and political forms, not the outworn system of the nation state which we inherited'[241]. Also in his 1970 speech he quoted fellow trade unionist Frank Cousin's contribution to a 1961 TUC debate on British entry: 'there are many things which

[236] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 478
[237] Ibid., 486
[238] Ibid., 477
[239] Ibid., 477
[240] Ibid., 477
[241] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 678

I would be prepared to say about reducing the sovereignty of a state, even if it were a socialist state, and certainly I would be prepared to talk about reducing the sovereignty of a state which was not a socialist one[242]'. In response to fears that the EEC was not sufficiently democratic - understandable as direct elections to the nascent European Parliament did not take place until 1979 - Grantham called for 'a parliament that can control the EEC Commission with representatives from all the national political countries'[243]. Regarding the debate around whether the Conservative government had the necessary mandate to take the UK into the EEC, Grantham rejected calls for a fresh General Election on the issue, making clear his belief that you could not isolate the issue in such a vote as, for example, his members 'would vote against the Tories whether they were for going into the Market or not'[244].

Grantham also advanced a number of geopolitical arguments in making his case for UK entry to the EEC. First, he suggested that joining an economic bloc made sense in a globalised world, 'in which the jet engine has annihilated distance'[245] and [American and European international companies] already operate above the apparatus of the existing nation states'[246]. The thrust of his argument here is that nation states are incapable of regulating international capitalism. He pointed to other moves towards common markets elsewhere in the world, in Africa, South America, Asia, Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and suggested that 'if they are acceptable to underdeveloped and developed countries, to Communist and to capitalist countries, they must meet a basic need'[247]. He also warned that Britain needed to find itself a new role on the world stage. As he put it in 1970, 'the Empire of Queen Victoria has disappeared'[248]. The following year, Grantham put it in even starker terms, making reference to other European nations - namely Spain, Portugal and Greece - who had also enjoyed great imperial pasts, but at the time were ruled by nationalist dictatorships: 'Living in the past is the surest way to kill the future' he proclaimed[249]. Although 'the days of […] imperial

[242] Ibid., 687
[243] Ibid., 687
[244] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 486
[245] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 678
[246] Ibid., 687
[247] Ibid., 678
[248] Ibid., 678
[249] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 476

greatness' had passed, true greatness could be found by freely accepting equality with the UK's European neighbours[250].

Another geopolitical argument that Grantham made concerned the influence that Britain would have over the direction of Europe once she became a member of the EEC. He declared that as well as having the power of a veto, the UK would enjoy the influence that came with footing approximately 30% of the budget. Putting a positive spin on the large budget contribution Britain would be expected to make, he pointed out that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'[251]. He even suggested that due to this influence, 'just as the first ten years of the EEC will be known as the French Decade, the second ten years will be known as the British Decade'[252]. However, he warned that 'joining the Market is like catching a moving train,' in that each year the UK remained outside the club saw new policies being adopted, over which the UK had no influence, whilst living standards, as previously mentioned, would continue to surge ahead[253]. In Grantham's view, the UK needed to join as soon as possible so as to have a say over the EEC's future direction.

In terms of industrial relations, Grantham did not have much to say, other than to state that '[European trade unionists] have to decide whether we are going to run Europe for the people or have Heath and Pompidou run it for the rich'[254]. Furthermore, he contended that 'an anti-EEC vote in our Movement [would only] give Heath and Pompidou an unjustified claim to be the founding fathers of the Europe of the Ten and cause dismay to our trade union and socialist colleagues in Europe'[255]. Finally, he makes reference to international worker solidarity, proclaiming that '…inward-looking attitudes should have no place in the minds of trade unionists'[256] and also that 'if we cannot unite with those who share a common heritage with us, we deny the principles upon which our Movement is founded'[257]. He even suggests that through both the EEC and the Commonwealth, Britain can further inter-dependence in other regions of the world and help heal the divisions between poor

[250] Ibid., 486
[251] Ibid., 477
[252] Ibid., 477
[253] Ibid., 478
[254] Ibid., 486
[255] Ibid., 478
[256] Ibid., 478
[257] Ibid., 486

and rich, black and white, East and West' and thus 'with our friends in Europe we can start on the road to world unity'[258].

Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)

Mr K. Gill of the DATA took part in the 1971 debate and was against Britain joining the EEC. He saw signing the Treaty of Rome to be too great a price to pay as it would erode both the UK's control over its own economy and Britons' democratic rights[259]. As regards the economy, Gill was particularly fearful that joining the EEC would mean the end of British regional policy. As he put it, there would be 'no support for those workers on the Clydeside if we were in the Common Market' and quoted the Confederation of Business Industry who he said had admitted that entry 'would accentuate the drift [of investment] to the South-East [of England]'[260]. He suggested that any union with members in the regions, which would be practically all of them, would in fact be 'jeopardising their future' by supporting entry[261]. He was opposed to the freedom of movement of capital, describing the Treaty of Rome as 'the businessman's Cook's Tour[262] to paradise' but, addressing Roy Grantham of CAWU, 'not a paradise for clerical workers', for whom such a freedom was meaningless[263].

A freedom of movement that may concern workers though was the freedom of movement of labour. However, Gill had a very negative outlook on this, stating that the British worker 'will be free to wander over Europe like a gypsy, looking for work' whilst as would 'any European worker from the pools of unemployment created by unrestricted capitalism be free to seek work in Britain'[264]. As regards issues of democracy, Gill referred to a 'self-perpetuating Brussels bureaucracy' and, in with regard to industrial relations, suggested that influencing such a body would be even more difficult than negotiating with a Government that is elected every five years[265]. Furthermore, he suggested that should the UK enter the EEC, it would be a 'waste of time talking to our Government' such would be the transfer of power from Westminster to Brussels[266].

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[258] Ibid., 478
[259] Ibid., 481
[260] Ibid., 479-480
[261] Ibid., 480
[262] This is a reference to Thomas Cook, a dominant British travel agent in mass tourism to the continent
[263] Ibid., 479-480
[264] Ibid., 480
[265] Ibid., 480-481
[266] Ibid., 480

Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)

Like Bill Kendall of the CPSA, Mr F. D. Swift of the IRSF only contributed to the debate in 1970. Despite striking a more pragmatic tone than the craft unions, his contribution was laced with more scepticism than those of his white-collar colleagues. His initial concern appeared to be that, given that the government would continue negotiations on entry whether the trade union movement liked it or not, the TUC should seek to influence those talks 'to secure whatever safeguards are necessary to protect the interests of the working people of Britain'[267]. He then added that personally he did not believe those guarantees could be secured.

His primary concern, however, regarded the introduction of a value-added tax that would be a requirement should the UK join the EEC. This appears to have been a professional interest, and his uneasiness seem to have been derived from a general concern for Britons on lower incomes rather than necessarily just his own members working for the Inland Revenue. Swift stated that 'it is one thing for the well-to-do to forgo buying a new Rolls every year or a luxury yacht, and quite another for the working-class wage-earner not to clothe and feed and keep his children warm in order to avoid paying tax'[268]. He went on to report that a recent delegation his union had sent to West Germany and the Netherlands to learn more about this tax had reported that their counterparts in these countries had 'conceded that value added tax had worsened the living conditions of the poorer section of the community'[269].

National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)

NUBE did not take part in the debate in 1970, but in 1971 Mr L. A. Mills moved the following motion:

> *"In view of Great Britain's possible entry into the European Economic Community, Congress resolves to take all steps to unify action with free trade unions in member nations, so that a*

[267] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 684
[268] Ibid., 684
[269] Ibid., 684

common front can be stablished to protect and advance the conditions of service of all workpeople in EEC countries".

NUBE appeared to be ambivalent about whether or not Britain joined the EEC. Rather, Mills took the stance that, whether Britain stayed outside or joined the EEC, and whether any decision turned out to be in the national interest or not, 'the need for effective trade union action [would be] of course paramount'[270]. For example, he stated his belief that if entry resulted in greater economic growth in the UK, this would not necessarily translate into greater living standards for trade union members. However, he also believed that if the anti-Marketeers were right and entry resulted in 'economic stagnation and regional poverty', trade union action 'would be more important than ever'[271] In this sense he revealed himself as a pragmatist as regards the European question.

In fact, Mills points out that the main challenge facing trade unions was multinational companies, and that that challenge would remain in or out of the EEC[272]. The way banks were becoming more international, reflecting the increasingly international nature of production, was a particular challenge to his union. In fact, NUBE had already responded to this challenge by associating with a European banking union, which had agreed to pursue a 35-hour working week across European jurisdictions, for example[273].

As regards the economics of the issue of entry, Mills did point out that 'US investment in the Community 10 years ago was substantially lower than US investment in Britain […] but since then the position has been completely reversed'[274]. He also stated that 'It is no secret that the banks in this country generally favour entry […because] they hope that the City of London will stand the best chance of becoming the financial centre of the Community'[275]. Reading between the lines, it would appear that Mills is in favour of entry, given the opportunity it represents for employment growth in his sector and his personal experience of working with European unions which appeared to have been encouraging. Mills states that 'If we are to enter the Community

[270] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 476
[271] Ibid., 475
[272] Ibid., 475
[273] Ibid., 475
[274] Ibid., 475
[275] Ibid., 475

we naturally hope that we shall not only become involved in the European Confederation and the International Trade Secretariats of that Confederation, but of course also involved in the various Community organisations, like the standing Committee on Employment and the Economic and Social Committee'[276].

However, one point he does make regarding industrial relations is the relative lack of union organisation in the Netherlands, Germany and France compared to the UK, meaning that only 38% of the workforce in unionised in the Six[277]. The insinuation is that this could be a challenge for the trade union movement if it is to effectively influence the European project in future (coming from the voluntarist tradition, he perhaps did not appreciate the nature of the statutory extension of collective wage bargaining in Western Europe, which is a key factor in explaining lower union memberships in these countries).

Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)

The TSSA was represented by Tom Bradley MP (the union's President) in the 1970 debate and Percy Coldrick (the union's General Secretary) in the 1971 debate. Interestingly, Bradley took a pro-entry stance whilst a year later Coldrick was much more sceptical. Bradley considered it strange for trade unionists to take a firm position before the outcome of negotiations were known to be good or bad and dismissed the 'hysterical outpourings' of the anti-Marketeers in the 1970 debate[278]. As he put it, 'that is not the way we face our difficulties in industry, and it ought not to be our approach to wider responsibilities'[279]. Although adamant that he would not support 'going into Europe on distinctly disadvantageous terms', Bradley considered that failure to join would lead to raft of negative consequences[280]. These included the diversion of industrial investment to the Continent meaning potential new jobs would not be realised in the UK and, like the NUGMW, Bradley also insisted that to allow competition with America in the realm of technology, the UK needed to be part of pan-European efforts and not limited to a small home market. Furthermore, Bradley introduced a geopolitical consideration, namely that the UK would find itself in a world where international trade, and international trade rules for that matter,

[276] Ibid., 476
[277] Ibid., 476
[278] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1970,* 685
[279] Ibid., 685
[280] Ibid., 685

would be 'increasingly dominated by giant groupings, to none of which [Britain] will belong'[281]. He stated that 'friends in the trade unions on the Continent and in the Social Democratic parties […] all want us in' and implored colleagues not to let their internationalism 'stop short at the Sussex coast'[282].

As regards trade, staying outside the EEC would subject the likes of the car and textile industries to continued high tariffs. Furthermore, Bradley claimed that progress in increasing trade with the Commonwealth had been 'painfully slow', increasing by just 12% in the past decade, compared with the 250% increase between the Six and the British Commonwealth in the same period[283]. He pointed to that fact that, during the same period, the UK had increased trade with the Six by 150% but that trade between the Six had increased by over 300%. The insinuation here was that Commonwealth trade and economic cooperation belonged to the past, whilst Britain's future was with its European neighbours, echoing Roy Grantham of CAWU. He also pointed to 'car workers in Cologne getting three times as much money as their counterparts in Dagenham'[284] and implied that wages would rise by more than any increase in the cost of living. In sum, Bradley stated that 'in the most pessimistic view [the economic costs of entry identified by the anti-Marketeers] will affect us for only a few years, whereas the economic cost of not joining will remain with us a dead weight for the rest of this century'[285]. A decision taken by the TUC in 1970 to stand aside would be premature, Bradley having 'faith in the possible benefits of British membership'[286].

According to Percy Coldrick on the other hand, by 1971 his organisation was 'fairly evenly divided but with a bias against joining the EEC'[287]. This assessment, 'an incredibly difficult judgment to make', followed his consideration of the terms negotiated by the then Conservative government, which he described as 'not satisfactory'. Although he believed that 'given the right conditions' the UK could enter the EEC, he stated that his union had 'never believed that membership would be beneficial to the people of this country whatever the

[281] Ibid., 685
[282] Ibid., 685
[283] Ibid., 685
[284] Ibid., 685
[285] Ibid., 685
[286] Ibid., 685
[287] Trades Union Congress, *Annual Report 1971,* 484

outcome of the negotiations'[288]. In terms of the economics, Coldrick was particularly concerned about entry leading to 'a deterioration in the balance of payments of at least £500 million' and the deleterious effect this would have on the UK's economic performance[289]. He dismissed those who simply asserted that extra economic growth would automatically follow on from entry.

Coldrick also voiced his belief that the EEC would eventually become a political union and seemed uneasy at this prospect; this was not simply a case of being invited to join 'a Sunday school outing'[290]. Furthermore, he rejected the geopolitical argument that Britain needed to be part of a trade bloc, seeing 'no reason why Britain should not develop her potential to the full outside the EEC'[291]. Finally, he derided the 'critical lack of detail' in the Government's white paper on entry, published in July of that year, which was nothing more than a 'whitewash paper' in Coldrick's eyes[292]. More information had been considered as the basis for deciding the location of London's third airport, he said, and the Government had not made a rigorous enough case for entry.

Summarising the views of the seven white-collar unions

The table below provides a summary of the main arguments advanced by the seven white-collar unions that took part in the 1970 and 1971 debates on British entry to the EEC.

[288] Ibid., 484
[289] Ibid., 484
[290] Ibid., 484
[291] Ibid., 484
[292] Ibid., 484

Economy (7)	Industrial Relations (5)	Democracy (5)	Geopolitics (4)
Economic growth and investment **(5)** CPSA CAWU DATA NUBE TSSA	Role of trade unions in the EEC institutions **(4)** ASTMS CAWU DATA NUBE	Democratic deficit in the EEC **(4)** ASTMS CPSA CAWU DATA	Britain's position in the world post-Empire, with particular reference to the Commonwealth **(3)** ASTMS CAWU TSSA
Terms of entry (particularly the budget contribution and value-added tax) **(4)** CPSA CAWU IRSF TSSA	Working class internationalism **(2)** CAWU TSSA	Effect on national sovereignty **(3)** CAWU TSSA DATA	Response to globalisation and transnational corporations **(2)** CAWU NUBE TSSA
Wages and the cost of living (particularly the impact of the CAP on food prices) **(3)** ASTMS CAWU TSSA		The Government's mandate to take the UK into the EEC **(2)** CAWU TSSA	Britain's relationship with Warsaw Pact countries **(1)** CAWU
Regional development **(2)** CAWU DATA		Immigration **(1)** DATA	The EEC as a counter to US economic dominance **(1)** TSSA
Trade and the balance of payments **(2)** CAWU TSSA			
Realising socialism **(1)** CAWU			

Table 5: Summary of attitudes of and arguments made by white-collar unions in the debates.

What is clear is that the white-collar unions as a group were at least more open to the idea of the UK joining the EEC than their blue-collar colleagues. Further to Roy Grantham of CAWU's fervent support, other delegates representing white-collar unions were pragmatic as regards the issue of British entry. Some of the arguments voiced against entry related to specific professional concerns of those union members, for example F. D. Swift of the IRSF, representing tax collectors, had concerns about the imposition of a value-added tax, whilst Bill Kendall of the CPSA, representing civil servants, worried about the democratic accountability of the Brussels institutions. That said, other white-collar unions, particularly those involved in manufacturing and industry – DATA and the ASTMS – were united in opposition along with the vast majority (as we have seen) of the blue-collar unions.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Hypothesis 1

My first hypothesis was as follows: although the focus of British trade unionists' arguments concerned economic matters and industrial relations, they also embraced wider aspects of European integration in coming to their view. The following table shows the arguments made by each of the seventeen individual trade unions that made contributions over the course of the two debates on British entry to the EEC that took place in Brighton in 1970 and in Blackpool the following year (though note it does not show whether they were arguing for or against British accession). As before, the numbers in brackets show the number of trade unions mentioning these themes, out of a maximum of 17.

Economy (17)	Industrial Relations (8)	Democracy (14)	Geopolitics (9)
Economic growth and investment **(10)** ASBSBSW CAWU CPSA DATA NUBE NUGMW POEU TGWU TSSA UPOW	Role of trade unions in the EEC institutions **(6)** ASTMS CAWU DATA NUBE TGWU UPOW	Effect on national sovereignty **(8)** ASBSBSW AUEW-ES CAWU DATA NATSOPA NSMM NUAAW TSSA	Britain's position in the world post-Empire, with particular reference to the Commonwealth **(5)** ASBSBSW ASTMS CAWU TSSA UPOW
Wages and the cost of living (particularly the impact of the CAP on food prices) **(10)** ASBSBSW ASTMS CAWU NSMM NUAAW NUGMW POEU TGWU TSSA UPOW	Working class internationalism **(4)** CAWU NATSOPA TGWU TSSA	Democratic deficit in the EEC **(6)** ASTMS CAWU CPSA DATA NUSMWCH&DE TGWU	Response to globalisation and transnational corporations **(4)** CAWU NSMM NUBE TSSA
Terms of entry (particularly the budget contribution and value-added tax) **(9)** CAWU CPSA IRSF NATSOPA NUAAW NUSMWCH&DE POEU TGWU TSSA		The Government's mandate to take the UK into the EEC **(5)** CAWU POEU TGWU TSSA UPOW	Britain's relationship with Warsaw Pact countries **(3)** CAWU NSMM NUSMWCH&DE
Trade and the balance of payments **(9)** ASBSBSW AUEW-ES CAWU NSMM NUAAW NUGMW TGWU TSSA UPOW		Immigration **(1)** DATA	The EEC as a counter to US economic dominance **(3)** NSMM NUGMW TSSA
Regional development **(5)** ASBSBSW CAWU DATA NUSMWCH&DE TGWU			
Realising socialism **(4)** ASBSBSW CAWU NSMM NUSMWCH&DE			

Table 6: Summary of points raised made by all delegates in the debates.

Table 6 clearly shows that the arguments made by trade unionists in these debates were far from limited to the realms of economics and industrial relations, with over four fifths of delegates raising issues relating to democracy and over half mentioning geopolitics. The willingness of trade unionists on both sides of the debate to employ political and geopolitical arguments, not just economic ones, should not be understated. This tallies

with Whyman's findings from his work on trade unions' role in the 1975 referendum[293]; economic arguments were employed most often, though trade unionists were not afraid to raise topics relating to democracy and geopolitics. For some unions, the political arguments for not joining the EEC were given greater prominence than the economic. For example, for C. Jenkins of the ASTMS, the politics of the question far outweighed the economic considerations. This is unusual in that the political arguments had traditionally been left to the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) to deal with, but with the PLP, like the Conservatives, split on the issue of British entry at the time perhaps the delegates felt they had free reign to focus on the politics rather than the economics of the matter.

That said, to be clear, no delegate in 1970 or 1971 failed to mention the economic aspects of possible British accession; this was the most popular theme embraced by speakers. By contrast though, and somewhat surprisingly, arguments made relating to industrial relations – one of the key remits of the TUC – were relatively few and far between. Fewer than half of delegates contributing to these debates felt the need to comment on how British membership of the EEC would affect industrial relations. Perhaps even more surprisingly, throughout the debate there were relatively few explicit mentions of specific impacts of joining or not joining the EEC on the speakers' own members. In summary then, although this study suggests the second part of Hypothesis 1 is true, it would appear that the first part is not due to the lack of attention paid by speakers to issues around industrial relations.

Furthermore, looking back at and comparing Tables 4 and 5, it would appear that white-collar and blue-collar unions had slightly different *emphases* (that is to say their view of what were the important issues at stake) even before any comparison of the *stances* they take. Interestingly, white-collar unions were more likely to raise issues around how being the EEC would affect industrial relations (71% of the white-collar unions raised this as opposed to just 30% of the blue-collar unions). In terms of the sub-themes covered, blue-collar unions appear to have been more ready to raise wages and cost of living issues than their white-collar colleagues, which could possibly be a result of their members having generally lower wages.

[293] See Whyman, *The 1975 European Referendum and its legacy*; Whyman, *The Heritage of the 1975 European Referendum*

Hypothesis 2

My second hypothesis was as follows: British trade unions were not unanimous in their attitude towards European integration at the beginning of the 1970s. The table below shows the stances each union took on the European question during the TUC debates of 1970 and 1971:

Pro-European	Anti-European	Pragmatist
Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)	Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)	Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)
National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)	Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section (AUEW-ES)	National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)
	Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)
	Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)	
	Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)	
	National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)	
	National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)	
	National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)	
	National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D)	
	Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)	
	Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)	
	Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)	

Table 7: Summary of individual unions' stance on the European Question in the TUC debates of 1970 and 1971.

The table clearly shows that the delegates were not unanimous in their assessment of Britain's prospects within the EEC, with two pro-European unions, three Pragmatist unions and twelve nationalistic unions. That said, it is clearly the case that most speakers were opposed to British entry. This foreshadows the future vote at the TUC in 1972 to oppose British membership of the EEC in principle. The remaining hypotheses aim to establish *reasons* why some unions opposed membership whilst others were in favour or deferred taking a stance.

Hypothesis 3

My third hypothesis for the TUC debates of 1970 and 1971 was as follows: white-collar unions favoured British accession to the EEC whilst their blue-collar counterparts opposed it. To consider whether representing a white-collar union or a blue-collar union had a bearing on a delegate's stance on entry it is possible to draw up the following table based on my findings, whereby, as before, green signifies a pro-European stance, orange a pragmatic stance and red an anti-European stance in line with the schema Teague outlined in his studies of British trade unions[294]:

Blue-Collar	White-Collar
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)	Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section (AUEW-ES)	Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)
Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)	Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)
National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)	Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)
National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)	National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)
National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)	
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D)	
Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)	
Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)	
Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)	

Table 8: Blue-collar and white-collar unions' stances on the European Question during the 1970 and 1971 debates.

The above table shows how the blue-collar unions were almost unanimous in their opposition of British entry to the EEC, with only one exception, the NUGMW, whereas white-collar unions were much more open to the idea, as already stated. This suggests that this divide could indeed have some explanatory power in terms of individual unions' positions in the debates. An intuitive explanation might be that white-collar unions emphasised the general economic benefit that joining the EEC could bring (indeed the four white-collar unions which were either pro-European or Pragmatist mentioned this) because their members would likely stand to

[294] See Teague, *The British TUC*; Teague, *Trade Unions*

benefit. For example, in improved economic conditions, banks would be making more loans creating employment for clerical staff. Furthermore, it might be argued that members of white-collar unions, who were generally better paid and more educated than their blue-collar counterparts, were more likely to embrace a European identity and take advantage of the cultural, travel and business opportunities that came with it.

The blue-collar unions, on the other hand, perhaps had more to lose from increased competition in the sectors from which their members hailed, such as skilled manufacturing. The "raison d'être" of the craft unions within their ranks was the protection of their members' conditions and status amongst the working class, so this stance on the EEC sits comfortably with their typical preoccupation with maintaining wage differentials for their members[295]. It might be said that these unions were particularly self-interested and defensive and, with regard to economic integration, a certain stake in the status quo which afforded them a degree of protection from international competition, European or otherwise. That said, I found the degree of unanimity surprising. For example, it is puzzling as to why the NUAAW was so opposed to Britain joining the EEC at this juncture as one would suppose that its members would benefit from the stability brought about by increased state subsidies for the agricultural sector via the CAP. Explaining the NUAAW's approach to the question of entry could be a fruitful study in itself.

In terms of the original hypothesis, it would seem that support for European integration from white-collar unions was perhaps overstated due to the range of opinions expressed within this group. That said, the most vocal supporter of British membership in the debates was Roy Grantham of CAWU, a white-collar union. Although not absolutely unanimous, the blue-collar unions did oppose British entry as predicted.

Hypothesis 4

My fourth hypothesis was as follows: unions whose members work in sectors with an export focus (with transnational companies for example) were more pro-European whilst those whose members work in areas with a domestic focus retained a nationalistic viewpoint.

[295] See Oude Nijhuis, *Explaining British Voluntarism* for a discussion of this logic as applied to debates around minimum wages.

Transnational focus	Domestic focus	Mixed focus
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths & Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)	Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)	National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating & Domestic Engineers (NUSMWCH&D)
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - Engineering Section	Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF)	Transport & General Workers' Union (TGWU)
Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial Staffs (ASTMS)	National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW)	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA)
Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union (CAWU)	Post Office Engineering Union (POEU)	
Draughtsmen's & Allied Technicians' Association (DATA)	Union of Post Office Workers (UPOW)	
National Society of Metal Mechanics (NSMM)		
National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants (NATSOPA)		
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW)		
National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE)		

Table 9: Transnational and domestic unions' stances on the European Question during the 1970 and 1971 debates.

From the evidence presented in the table above, it would seem that the idea that operating in an export-oriented, transnational context would prompt support for European integration among trade unions as it has in other European countries at other times, for example Sweden in the 1990s[296], did not hold true. If anything, the opposite would appear more likely to be the case. One reason for this, beyond the vast differences between the various national contexts unions find themselves in, could be that, in the early 1970s, neoliberal globalisation was not yet the overarching global economic logic that it had arguably become by the time the likes of Swedish trade unions were weighing up entry in the 1990s to what had by then become the European Union. At this time, government intervention in economies was much greater (with public ownership, capital controls, etc), even in export-oriented industries and trade unionists appear to have been more fearful that the EEC would undermine the nation state (with free movement of capital for example). They saw the nation state

[296] See Bieler, *Globalization*; Bieler, *Economic and Monetary Union*

as the primary bulwark against international capital (to the extent that it existed at the time) and the vehicle that could, with the right people in power, deliver socialism. They were not receptive to the competing idea that in the future the EEC would be a more effective and appropriately sized bulwark against international capital. In summary, then, Hypothesis 4 was not found to hold true in these debates.

Evaluation

Ludlow describes the six-day parliamentary debates preceding the 1971 House of Commons vote as the 'most accessible instant at which to measure the aspirations and fears, hopes and misgivings with which the British opted to become members of the European Community'[297] and I hope returning to the contemporaneous trade union debates has provided a complementary snapshot. Given the relatively small number of union delegates taking part in these debates it is, on reflection, difficult to draw firm conclusions about whether these cleavages – blue-collar versus white-collar, transnational versus domestic – determined trade union attitudes in this particular time period in Britain. For example, some key British unions, such as the coal National Union of Miners and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation were conspicuous in their absence from the debates considered here, though their contrasting approaches to the European Question have been detailed elsewhere[298]. Furthermore, introducing a comparative element to the study, for example exploring how trade unions in Denmark, Ireland, and Norway responded to the European Question at the same time may have borne more fruit.

What is more, this study has not considered the possibility that the stance of union delegates reflects the majority view of their memberships in these debates, which given the hotly contested nature of this thorny issue that has long cut across political party lines seems unlikely or even unknowable. Further research into internal disputes within unions on the European issue through consultation of individual union archives would likely shed further light on British trade union attitudes to European integration. Perhaps the individual predispositions and personalities of the union leaders are more important than the views of their membership, regardless of whether they wear a white or blue collar.

[297] Ludlow, *Safeguarding British Identity*, 19
[298] See Teague, *Trade Unions*

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