

(A)Political Involvement of the World Bank in Post-Conflict Countries

The Case of its State and Peacebuilding Fund

Océane Delannoy

S2573075

o.c.n.delannoy@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Master Thesis in International Relations – Global Conflict in the Modern Era

1st June 2020

WORDS COUNT: 12.488 words

Supervisor: Dr. Nicolás Rodríguez Idarraga

Second Reader: Dr. Andrew Gawthorpe



**Universiteit
Leiden**

(A) Political Involvement of the World Bank in Post-Conflict Countries

The Case of its State and Peacebuilding Fund

Abstract

In 2008, the World Bank developed the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) to deal with post-conflict countries. The financial institution has been involved in post-conflict reconstruction since the late nineties. However, its adoption of the political concepts of state and peacebuilding seems to represent a shift towards a comprehensive position of the World Bank regarding post-conflict situations (World Bank, 1998, p. 4). The emphasis is put on the political aspects of state and peacebuilding as they imply the building of ‘institutional capacity and legitimacy’ and the management of ‘the internal and external stresses that increase vulnerability to conflict’ in ‘fragile and conflict-prone and -affected situations’ (World Bank, 2019a). At the same time, the World Bank has reminded the importance of not interfering in politics and the necessity to stick to its role of economic actor as stated in its Articles of Agreement. The organisation appears torn between a supposedly comprehensive approach concerning state and peacebuilding and its economic mandate. The evolution of the paradoxical discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction is therefore considered in this thesis by examining the power-knowledge and the associate regime of truth at stake in the production of its discourse. The method selected is a critical discourse analysis and the SPF is the case-study for this research. This thesis allows to unpack the problematic handling of state and peacebuilding by the World Bank.

Table of Contents

(A) Political Involvement of the World Bank in Post-Conflict Countries

The Case of its State and Peacebuilding Fund

Abstract	2
Table of Contents	2
Glossary	3
Introduction	4
1. Literature Review on State and Peacebuilding and the Discourse of the World Bank	8
A. From Peacebuilding to State-building	8
1. Peacebuilding	8
2. State-building	9
B. Discourse of the World Bank on Post-Conflict Reconstruction	10

1. Emergence of the Bank	10
2. Neoliberal Post-Conflict Reconstruction.....	11
3. Criticisms of the World Bank’s Approach and Early Evolutions	12
2. Design.....	14
A. Data Collection	14
1. Content for the Analysis.....	14
2. Case Study: SPF	14
B. Data Analysis.....	15
1. Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis	15
2. Genealogical Analysis	15
3. Analysis	16
A. First Sub-question: Evolution of the World Bank’s Discourse on Post-Conflict Reconstruction since the Late Nineties	17
1. First Evolutions of the Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction.....	17
2. Influence of Actors	19
3. Influence of Partners	21
4. Emerging Concepts	23
B. Second Sub-question: State and Peacebuilding by the SPF in Post-Conflict Countries .	25
1. Strategic Interests of the Address of State and Peacebuilding	26
2. Authority of Actors	26
3. Documents Related to the Emergence of the SPF.....	28
4. Intervention of the Bank in the State and Peacebuilding Process	29
Conclusion.....	31
References	34

Glossary

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CPRU	Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragile, Conflict and Violence
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IFI	International Financial Institution

IMF	International Monetary Fund
LICUS	Low-Income Countries Under Stress
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OP	Operational Policy
PCF	Post-Conflict Fund
PCU	Post-Conflict Unit
SPF	State and Peacebuilding Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
US	United States of America

Introduction

Living in a peaceful environment is one of the fundamental aspirations shared by most humans. It implies the absence of conflicts. However, conflicts have always arisen between people and countries. Therefore, the questions of how to achieve peace and resolve conflicts have been central to many academic fields, including the one of International Relations (Denskus, 2007, p. 657). One aspect of this debate concerns the establishment of a lasting peace after a conflict, also named ‘post-conflict reconstruction’, which has been incorporated into ‘state and peacebuilding’. A main actor involved in this process is the World Bank, often simply called ‘the Bank’ (World Bank, 2015). It is therefore important to focus on this institution as it can heavily affect the ability of a country to recover from a conflict.

Among all the actors involved in post-conflict countries, this thesis focuses on the World Bank because of its paradoxical discourse on post-conflict reconstruction. The latter appears to be contradictory as the Bank employs the inherently political concepts of state and peacebuilding while using its economic mandate to legitimise its interventions in post-conflict countries. State and peacebuilding are labelled as politicised because they evoke the carrying out of political actions by the actors in charge of their implementation. Indeed, according to the Bank’s definition, peacebuilding refers to the ‘reduction and management of the internal and external stresses that increase vulnerability to conflict and fragility’. State-building aims at improving ‘institutional capacity and legitimacy’, managing stresses and supporting ‘prevention and recovery from conflict and fragility’ (World Bank, 2019b). Nowadays, the World Bank even has a State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) (World Bank, 1998, 2008a). However, since its

creation, the financial institution has claimed to be an economic actor, tackling ‘development and reconstruction’ (World Bank, 2019b, 2020a). The World Bank has distanced itself from taking any political stance as stated in its Articles of Agreement (World Bank, 1998, p. 4). The establishment of the SPF therefore raises several questions: Is the World Bank overstepping its mandate by carrying out political actions? If so, is its discourse therefore paradoxical? Who is producing the World Bank’s discourse on post-conflict reconstruction? What type of knowledge shapes its position? Where does this knowledge come from? These interrogations led to the following research question:

‘Why has the discourse of the World Bank evolved from post-conflict reconstruction in the late nineties to state and peacebuilding nowadays?’

The question’s objective is to unpack the discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction. Its approach regarding post-conflict countries has been criticised, notably for not taking seriously local actors and not involving them in the reconstruction process (Goodhand, 2010). Another criticism targets the separation of the political sphere from the economic one (Bhatia, 2005). This is said to have triggered failed peacebuilding operations, like the one in Iraq where the neoliberal reforms prioritising of the reconstruction of the economy and the empowerment of the individuals accelerated the collapse of the state (Dodge, 2011, p. 1286). Consequently, the World Bank seems to have reacted by developing a politically oriented way of dealing with post-conflict reconstruction by addressing state and peacebuilding. Therefore, this thesis investigates the reasons for the adoption of a comprehensive approach by the Bank while claiming to be apolitical and to focus ‘only on economic considerations’ (Nelson, 1995, pp. 113–114; Seatzu, 2019, p. 219).

In order to answer the research question, the literature review elaborates on the notions of state and peacebuilding. It also looks at the discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction since the nineties. The section particularly focuses on the context of emergence of the Bank, its first interventions in post-conflict situations and the criticisms faced by the institution. The literature review is crucial to bring into light the Bank’s paradoxical discourse by showing how state and peacebuilding are political concepts while the World Bank is an actor informed by an economic knowledge and constrained by a strict mandate. Then, the design section briefly explains the choice of the State and Peacebuilding Fund of the World Bank as case study. It also highlights the data selected and the method of critical discourse analysis of this thesis, inspired by the genealogical approach of Michel Foucault. Throughout the thesis, attention is also paid to the power-knowledge relations at stake in the production of the

discourse informing the Bank. The notion is developed later in this introduction. Two sub-questions allow to further unpack the paradoxical discourse of the Bank.

1) How has the discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction evolved since the late nineties?

2) How does the SPF address state and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations since 2008?

The first sub-question aims at identifying the changes towards a comprehensive discourse of the World Bank. It highlights the influence of actors of post-conflict reconstruction and of the partners of the Bank on the financial institution. It examines the adoption of new concepts in the post-conflict related vocabulary such as the link between conflict and development. It culminates with the introduction of the State and Peacebuilding Fund embodying a possible paradoxical stance for the organisation. The second sub-question addresses the reasons for the emergence of the SPF and the use of state and peacebuilding by the World Bank. It looks at how it intervenes with its State and Peacebuilding Fund in post-conflict countries and if its actions are in line with the Bank's economic mandate.

By looking at the discourse adopted by the World Bank, this thesis aims at contributing to the literature on post-conflict reconstruction. It does so by analysing the emergence and understanding of state and peacebuilding by the Bank. The discourse of the World Bank has already been examined regarding specific subjects such as its definition of poverty or development (Cammack, 2004; Barbara, 2008; Peterson, 2014). The analysis of the evolution of the approach of the Bank regarding post-conflict reconstruction, and then state and peacebuilding, belongs to the same academic field of development studies. Indeed, as developed in this thesis, the notions of conflict, development and poverty are interlinked. These concepts are employed by the Bank to achieve its primary objective of poverty reduction (World Bank, 2004, p. 1). Besides, this research intends to add to the general academic debate around the establishment of a lasting peace and the challenged notion of 'liberal peace'. The criticisms faced by the concept of liberal peace and some of its limits are developed in a following section. Finally, another contribution to the academic debate regarding the relations of power-knowledge is realised by analysing the discourse informing the Bank's position on post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding.

The power-knowledge nexus has been popularised by Michel Foucault among others. It highlights the double interaction between power and knowledge (Herberg, 2011). On the one

hand, for instance, knowledge allows actors in power to justify their actions. An example in Foucault's book 'Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973-74' is the knowledge of the psychiatric field granting doctors a power legitimising defined practices. One of these is the control of subjects diagnosed with madness inside an asylum (Foucault, Burchell and Davidson, 2006, p. 7). Psychiatric knowledge enables doctors to assert their power over specific patients. On the other hand, power also reproduces a particular knowledge. This thesis aims at analysing how the actors collaborating with the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction support the production and adoption of a specific knowledge regarding state and peacebuilding. It also observes how the concepts of state and peacebuilding impact the practices associated with the interventions of the Bank in post-conflict countries. This thesis stresses the economic knowledge employed by the World Bank by highlighting the neoliberal regime of truth informing it which is developed in the next paragraph. A core assumption of the latter is the separation of the economy from other aspects of the society as developed in the literature review. This is key to understand the tensions at stake in the World Bank regarding post-conflict reconstruction. If informed by a neoliberal regime of truth, the Bank should only tackle economic considerations and not a comprehensive societal reconstruction of post-conflict countries.

Before developing the concepts of state and peacebuilding in the literature review, the meanings of two terms core to this thesis need to be explained. Both notions are borrowed from Michel Foucault. The first one is 'regime of truth' mentioned hereabove. A regime of truth constrains individuals to some acts of truth (Foucault, 2012). It is 'the type of discourse [a society] accepts and makes function a truth' (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). An important feature of the regime of truth is that it varies through time but also societies (Korsten, 1998). One example of a regime of truth prevalent in the eighteenth century was liberalism. The market was then seen as the instrument of truth and the government auto-limited by this principle (Foucault, 2004, p. 31). Identifying the regime of truth informing a discourse facilitates the understanding of the position of an actor on a given topic. In the case of this thesis, it facilitates the apprehension the World Bank's stance on post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding. The use of the 'neoliberal regime of truth' allows to understand how neoliberalism has been shaping the discourse of the World Bank since its creation.

Another concept central to the research question of this thesis is the notion of 'discourse'. According to the Foucauldian approach, discourses constitute 'bodies of statements that are regulated and systematically organized' (Stevenson and Cultcliffe, 2006, p. 716). However,

discourse is also said to be an ‘abstract form of knowledge’ (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, p. 185). It is acknowledged that defining this notion is not an easy task in Foucault’s philosophy (Garrity, 2010). Nonetheless, it is important to stress that discourse does not mean a text or a speech but the set of ideas behind the text which enables the author to produce it. Discourses are the ‘structural processes’ that allow someone to take up a particular ‘subject position’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 221 in Garrity, 2010). They are temporally located and evolve over time. The discourse of the World Bank has often been characterised as neoliberal (Harvey, 2005, p. 3; Pruitt, 2013, p. 59) as developed in the literature review.

1. Literature Review on State and Peacebuilding and the Discourse of the World Bank

The literature review first defines peacebuilding and state-building, core to the research question, and then introduces the notion of ‘liberal peacebuilding’. It highlights the political aspects of the concepts. The transition from the liberal to the neoliberal discourse informing the Bank’s position is also analysed by looking at the context of its emergence and at the neoliberal regime of truth. Its views on post-conflict reconstruction are then developed. These have however been criticised. Criticisms are eventually briefly summarised.

A. From Peacebuilding to State-building

1. Peacebuilding

The notion of peacebuilding is central to the research question of this thesis and to the establishment of a lasting peace in general. Nonetheless, peacebuilding is sometimes considered a vague concept and a catch-all term without proper definition. The first occurrence of ‘peacebuilding’ can be found in Johan Galtung’s work in 1976 (Wallenstein, 2015, p. 10). Primarily, the term has commonly been used by the United Nations (UN) (Denskus, 2007, p. 656; Goetze, 2017, p. 2). Peacebuilding aims at bringing war to an end by addressing the roots of the conflict (Neufeld, 2015, p. 1710). Its objectives are the recovery from the latter and the building of a sustainable peace (Barma, Levy and Piombo, 2017, p. 191).

An inherent dimension of peacebuilding advanced by the UN and the international community, in addition to settling the conflict, is the promotion of liberal democracy (Joshi and Wallenstein, 2018, p. 6). This represents the political feature of the concept. The necessity to reform the state has for instance been underlined by Madhav Joshi and Peter Wallenstein but also by the UN former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 11; Joshi and Wallenstein, 2018). The emphasis on the strengthening of states structures, the advocacy for liberal democratic governing institutions and for a market-oriented economy are characteristics of what is called the 'liberal peacebuilding'. It is also said to reflect western norms and ideas on what a society should be like (Mac Ginty, 2007, p. 457). Liberal peacebuilding started to be implemented in the early-mid nineties when liberalisation and democratisation were considered to be key components of the establishment of peace (Paris, 2010, p. 337).

However, this particular way of considering peacebuilding has been criticised for its lack of success. A case of failure of liberal peacebuilding is Sierra Leone where the focus of the international discourse and community on securitisation ignored the social and political construction of peace. The advancement of economic growth via the liberalisation of the market triggered divisions within the society which prevented the establishment of a lasting peace (Castañeda, 2009, p. 249). Therefore, peacebuilding and its associated practices are deeply political and sensitive. Tensions arise when priority is given to economic reconstruction. The political and economic aspects on post-conflict reconstruction are under stress in the liberal peacebuilding concept. Catherine Goetze emphasises the neoliberal features of peacebuilding such as the accent on individual freedom and private property. This neoliberal approach to post-conflict countries, which prioritizes the economy rather than other aspects, has been adopted by international actors such as the World Bank (Goetze, 2017, p. 193).

2. State-building

Later, at the end of the nineties and in the aftermath of the Cold War, the notion of 'state-building' emerged (Chandler, 2009; Barma, Levy and Piombo, 2017). State-building stands for the 'building or strengthening of governmental institutions' (Paris, 2010; Barma, Levy and Piombo, 2017, p. 192). It appeared parallel to a shift from the emphasis on the rights of the states to the rights of the individuals. This state-building process is mainly carried out by Western actors (Chandler, 2009, p. 19). Their discourse has preferred a vocabulary centred on the 'responsibility to protect' rather than 'state intervention'. Nowadays, the language of state-building favours terms such as 'shared responsibility' or 'new partnerships', also put forward by the World Bank.

Both state and peacebuilding induce a political approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The two concepts seem to be informed by international stakeholders, including the World Bank. However, their interventions have been criticised. Some of these criticisms concerning the World Bank are tackled in the following section.

B. Discourse of the World Bank on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

1. Emergence of the Bank

While the previous section developed the concepts of state and peacebuilding, which entail the carrying out of political practices, this one stresses the economic knowledge informing the World Bank. It looks at the context of its emergence and the regime of truth prominent at that time. The World Bank was created in 1944. It is one of the main International Financial Institution (IFI) that are organisations established by more than one country, subject to international law and aiming at addressing the Sustainable Development Goals (Goode, 2019). As an institution formed at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its main objective was to implement agreed ‘global economic rules which would prevent a replay of the Great Depression and its aftermath’ (Woods, 2018, p. 284).

The post-World War II period was characterised by the growing influence of the United States (US), the creation of the United Nations, the rise of globalisation and the spread of liberalism. Liberalism is, according to Foucault, a ‘particular type of “governmental reason”’ that emerged in the seventeenth century. It represents ‘a political reconstruction of the space in terms of which market exchanges could take place and in terms of which a domain of individual freedom could be secured’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 322 in Gane, 2008). However, although the Bank first developed in an environment described as ‘embedded liberalism’ and characterised by a control of social and political institutions of the market by the state, a change occurred in the nineties (Harvey, 2005, pp. 10–11).

In the aftermath of the breakdown of embedded liberalism and the Bretton Woods system, neoliberalism emerged as a solution to the problems faced by the capitalist model and as a response to the ‘crisis of liberalism’ (Bidet, 2007). Indeed, major debt and financial crises broke out in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. Challenges were also posed by the ‘transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economies’ (Woods, 2007, p. 3). Becoming central as regime of truth (Moore, 2000; Storey, 2000; Cammack, 2004; Ruckert, 2006; Ruckert, 2010), neoliberalism ‘generally refers to a system of global economics that assumes market-based solutions are preferable’ (Pruitt, 2013, p. 59). It entails the separation between the market and

the society and tends to not consider social or political factors (Moore, 2000). The accent is on the individual who is a competitive and responsible entrepreneur (Olssen, 2003; Foucault, 2004; Harvey, 2005, p. 2; Pruitt, 2013, p. 58). More than advocating for the separation of the state from the market, the regime of truth associated with neoliberalism legitimises a particular view of ruling the society. It also empowers specific actors and institutions such as the US or the World Bank (Harvey, 2005, pp. 29–31). The Bank has for instance been promoting neoliberalism by advocating for structural adjustment lending and policy conditionalities. These tools have been described as neoliberal instruments (Ruckert, 2006). Alongside the Inter-American Development Bank and the US government, the IMF and the World Bank have been sharing the same economic recommendations latter named ‘the Washington Consensus’. The term was originally coined by John Williamson in 1989 to describe the policy reforms proposed by these actors to develop emerging-market economics. They agreed on ten key principles representing the Washington Consensus (Engel, 2010; Babb, 2013). The latter embodied a neoliberal approach towards the economy and the society in general (Sheng, 2009, pp. 109–110). It therefore affected the discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction.

While the partnership between the IMF and the World Bank is central to post-conflict reconstruction (Cammack, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2015), this thesis concentrates on the Bank. This is explained by the support of economic and social reforms by the World Bank. The Bank’s main function is to assist countries in their development process (Woods, 2018) while the IMF concentrates on macroeconomic stability and promotes international monetary cooperation (International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 2001; Woods, 2018, p. 290). Besides, no ‘peacebuilding’ organism has been encountered in the IMF structure. Contrary to the IMF, the World Bank created a State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) which is the case selected for this thesis. The introduction of the idea of building a stable peace and state capacity clearly seems more political. It represents a move away from purely economic considerations by the Bank.

2. Neoliberal Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The reconstruction of countries affected by conflicts is essential to establish lasting peace (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011, p. 224; Hall, 2017, p. 13; Wozniak, 2017, p. 808). At the end of the nineties, the World Bank started to refer to ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ as one of its areas of intervention (Woodward, 2013, p. 140). However, reconstruction can be encountered in the organisation since its establishment as the Bank was set up ‘to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of

capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war [and] the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs’ as explained in its first section of its first Article of Agreement (World Bank, 2020b). In the World Bank’s view, post-conflict reconstruction ‘supports the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society’ (World Bank, 1998, p. 14). An early example of reconstruction by the Bank is its programme ‘to rehabilitate the economy and society following decades of warfare’ in Uganda with the help of the civilian Uganda Veterans Association Board in 1992 (World Bank, 1998, pp. 34). The justification for the World Bank’s involvement in the peace process is based on an economic argument, given its initial mandate to assist economies. The World Bank itself has reminded the importance for the organisation to focus on the economy and not on politics. It is stated in its Article 4 section 10 that ‘the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I’ (World Bank, 1998, 2001; Woodward, 2013, p. 140).

This fits the description of the World Bank as a neoliberal organisation focusing on the economy and leaving politics aside. Neoliberalism has been pointed out as a prominent ‘regime of truth’ guiding the World Bank’s views, including its position on post-conflict reconstruction (Cammack, 2004; Ruckert, 2006, 2010). As a result, its discourse has generally been labelled ‘neoliberalist’ (Naim, 2000; van Houten, 2007; Mahon, 2010). This in line with Jess Wozniak’s argument that a commonly used model for post-conflict reconstruction is the neoliberal approach used by the World Bank (Wozniak, 2017, p. 807). It consists of fostering economic growth in order to strengthen post-conflict reconstruction (Barbara, 2008, p. 315). It does not tackle the political aspects of such process. However, in the year 2000, David Moore raised the question of a possible evolution of the World Bank’s discourse away from a neoliberal approach (Moore, 2000, p. 6). But before tackling it in-depth in the first sub-question, the next section tackles the criticisms faced by the World Bank and its approach to post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Criticisms of the World Bank’s Approach and Early Evolutions

The approach of the World Bank, and other IFIs, regarding post-conflict reconstruction has been widely criticised, especially for its neoliberal stance and its absence of political awareness. Actually, some authors identify the separation between the political and economic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, characteristic of the neoliberal approach, as problematic for a

successful implementation (O'Donnell and Boyce, 2007, pp. 2; 295). Leigh Binford uses the example of El Salvador where the neoliberal peacebuilding supported by the Bank created social tensions, individual resistance to aid programmes and sentiments of fear and abandonment (Binford, 2010, p. 551). 'James K. Boyce and Manuel Pastor note that "economy and efficiency" can seldom be wholly divorced from political considerations' (Stevenson, 2008, p. 57). Others have argued that the Bank does not pay attention to the local specificities of the countries while drafting the programmes of reconstruction (Bretton Woods Project, 2004; Pugh, 2011; Woodward, 2013). One example pointed out by Jesse Wozniak is the disregard of the material deprivation faced by the Iraqi police in the post-conflict reconstruction process after 2003 which led to the rise of the Islamic State (Wozniak, 2017). Some critics also denounce the measures of the World Bank in the post-conflict process as having been imposed on countries (Guimond, 2007, p. 4; Seatzu, 2019, p. 212). The ignorance of the local communities regarding their economic future in the neoliberal peacebuilding process has been underlined in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008, p. 6). Other criticisms not addressed here reflect another side of the debate arguing that the World Bank should remain focus only on economic considerations and that other approaches are none of its business. Partly in reaction to the criticisms explained in this section, the Bank has developed another approach towards post-conflict reconstruction that has been said to be comprehensive.

While the role of the World Bank in post-conflict reconstruction has increased over time to transform it into a key actor (Guimond, 2007; Stevenson, 2008; Stubbs and Kentikelenis, 2017), its way of intervening has also evolved. Important steps have occurred regarding the official involvement of the Bank in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The first one was the administration of a 'multi-donor Trust Fund for the West Bank and Gaza' in 1994 (Collier and Sambanis, 2005, p. ix). A second turning point was the management of the Bosnia-Herzegovina programme in 1995 in collaboration with the European Union (EU) (Woods, 2018, p. 289). Both steps have been described as embodying a break from the traditional handling of conflicts by the World Bank. These two evolutions have been said to form 'the basis for a new post-conflict framework' in the Bank (Collier and Sambanis, 2005, p. ix) developed in the first sub-question of the analysis.

The literature review has stressed key elements in order to understand and unpack the paradoxical discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding. The latter derives from the fact that state and peacebuilding are political

concepts adopted by the Bank even though the IFI only has an economic mandate. Before analysing this more in-depth, the design is elaborated in the next section.

2. Design

The first part tackles the selection of the case study and data set employed in the sub-questions. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis adopts a Foucauldian perspective in order to critically analyse the discourse of the World Bank. The method of genealogical analysis is thus explained in a following paragraph.

A. Data Collection

1. Content for the Analysis

Given that the method selected is discourse analysis, most of the data are documents explaining the statuses of different units of the World Bank but also Operational Policies or Working Papers. Internal or external reports concerning post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding are used too. Vice-versa, because of the type of data available regarding the Bank's position on post-conflict reconstruction, the method of discourse analysis was chosen consequently. The data set covers the entire period of official involvement of the Bank in post-conflict countries, starting in the late nineties. Thus, the selection aims at giving an as complete as possible overview of the evolution of the discourse of the World Bank from post-conflict reconstruction to state and peacebuilding nowadays with its SPF.

2. Case Study: SPF

The paradoxical discourse of the World Bank regarding post-conflict reconstruction, contradictory to its economic mandate, is apparent in its State and Peacebuilding Fund. The SPF is the case study of this thesis. Its name is made up of two political concepts, as highlighted in the literature review. As stated in the introduction, the Fund has as objective to improve 'institutional capacity and legitimacy'. It also aims at managing 'the internal and external stresses that increase vulnerability to conflict' in 'fragile and conflict-prone and -affected situations' (World Bank, 2019a). Established in 2008, the Fund provides 'advisory and analytical services, knowledge generation and dissemination, technical assistance, capacity building, service delivery, and preparation and supervision of recipient executed grants' (World Bank, 2019b). The SPF was chosen as case study because one objective of this thesis is to critically examine the notions of peacebuilding and state-building. It focuses on the conditions of emergence and practices of state and peacebuilding of the World Bank.

B. Data Analysis

1. Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis

For this research, the method chosen is discourse analysis. Given the existence of different variants, the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method has been selected. It presents the advantage of considering language as reproductive of the relations of power (Gillian and George, 1983, p. 39). CDA allows the deconstruction of the power-knowledge relations, important for this thesis (Baker, 2012). Besides, it enables to grasp the particular regime of truth informing a specific position. In the case of this thesis, it facilitates the analysis of the World Bank's position on state and peacebuilding. However, there are different types of CDA (Van Dijk, 1997, 2014). The one chosen for this thesis is based on the genealogical method, inspired by a Foucauldian perspective.

2. Genealogical Analysis

The origin of the method genealogical analysis is attributed to Friedrich Nietzsche (Garland, 2014). The term genealogy refers to the process of 'historicising social items' (Vucetic, 2011, p. 1296). It is driven by a 'critical concern to understand the present' by looking at the past (Garland, 2014, p. 373). Indeed, such a procedure aims at investigating 'how certain taken-for-granted truths are historical constructs that have their roots in specific social and political agendas' (Saukko, 2011, p. 18). For Foucault, genealogy concentrates on the motivations of individuals and institutions that enable them to hold a particular stance (Saukko, 2011). An example that could be explained by a genealogical analysis is the neoliberal regime of truth informing the Bank's position. The 'genealogical approach' developed by Foucault focuses on the question of power (Olivier, 1988). It looks at the power-knowledge relations (Garrity, 2010) upon which a discourse is based. It provides a critical understanding of the reality and stresses how it could have been different. In the case of this thesis, it could underline that other ways to reconstruct societies could have been supported by the World Bank. It does so by showing under which specific conditions its discourse and views on post-conflict reconstruction have emerged.

However, criticisms of the method are recognised. The critical discourse analysis according to Foucault is described as a 'set of methodology rather than a theoretical approach' or a 'non-defined method' (Stevenson and Cultcliffe, 2006, p. 714; Frederiksen, Lomborg and Beedholm, 2015, p. 208). Nonetheless, the genealogical variant of CDA has been applied to the field of International Relations by several authors (Bartelson, 1995; Biebricher, 2008; Wedderburn, 2018). Moreover, it has been described as a research tool that allows an analysis of 'the

power/knowledge nexus' key to this research (Vucetic, 2011, p. 1312). The genealogical CDA is therefore considered as relevant to answer questions dealing with the 'how' or 'why' or 'how did Y become possible?' (Vucetic, 2011, p. 1303) of similar construction as the research question of this thesis. This approach allows to understand why the World Bank has started to deal with state and peacebuilding and how it tackles it.

As a result, the method of this thesis is a critical discourse analysis inspired by a genealogical perspective. It is operationalised through different questions. It looks at the actors exerting power over the production of the knowledge. It also examines what type of knowledge informs the actions of the actors having authority over post-conflict reconstruction.

- What documents define the position of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction?
- Have new concepts emerged in the discourse of the World Bank linked to post-conflict reconstruction?
- Have some of these concepts become prominent?

Other questions tackle the influence of the partners and the network of the World Bank. They concentrate on the actors producing the knowledge on state and peacebuilding.

- What actors are speaking on post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding?
- What are their statuses?
- What institutions legitimise their positions?
- How do the partners of the World Bank such as the UN view the post-conflict reconstruction process?
- What approach do they favour? Has it contributed to the adoption of a comprehensive stance by the World Bank?

These questions are answered through the two sub-questions organised in different categories highlighting either the influence of the knowledge or the effects of power on the World Bank's discourse.

3. Analysis

The first part of the analysis focuses on the identification of the paradoxical discourse of the World Bank by describing its evolution from post-conflict reconstruction to state and peacebuilding. It highlights the adoption of a more comprehensive approach by actors involved

in the process and partners of the Bank and its influence on the IFI. Emerging notions such as the concept of ‘fragile states’ and the nexus linking poverty to development and conflict are also underlined. The second part concentrates on the extent of the paradoxical discourse and looks at the SPF. It examines the conditions of its emergence and in what way the Bank has been intervening in post-conflict countries with its Fund.

A. First Sub-question: Evolution of the World Bank’s Discourse on Post-Conflict Reconstruction since the Late Nineties

In order to answer the first sub-question ‘How has the discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction evolved since the late nineties?’, this section starts by tackling the early evolutions of the World Bank’s discourse away from a neoliberal one. Then, important documents stressing the gradual changes towards a comprehensive approach of the Bank to post-conflict reconstruction are highlighted. The actors informing the Bank’s discourse and its partners are also looked at. Finally, some emergent concepts indicating a more inclusive and political approach of the IFI towards post-conflict reconstruction are analysed.

1. First Evolutions of the Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

As mentioned earlier, the World Bank has been guided by the neoliberal regime of truth since the aftermath of the crisis of the eighties. This was reflected by the appointment of ‘Alden Winship Clausen, a former commercial banker’ as President. The number of economists hired as staff was also representative of the adoption of the Washington Consensus by the Bank (Weaver, 2007; Engel, 2010; Mahon, 2010, p. 174). However, change has occurred (Naim, 2000). It has partially been triggered by a series of reports that criticised some aspects of the approach of the World Bank to post-conflict countries. The following analysis highlights most of the essential documents advocating for a comprehensive intervention. It is extensive but not exhaustive. Other documents, such as statuses of other internal bodies to the Bank and additional operational policies, might also have played a role in the evolution of its discourse regarding post-conflict reconstruction. They were however not identified as key to the process and are therefore not mentioned.

Post-Conflict Unit and Fund

Under the presidency of James Wolfensohn, the Bank started to look differently at the prohibition of carrying out political activities mentioned in its Articles of Agreement (Nay, 2014). Until the end of the twentieth century, the World Bank had addressed the post-conflict countries’ needs ‘on an ad hoc basis’ (Kreimer *et al.*, 1998, p. 12). However, in 1997, the Bank

published a guide in order to assist post-conflict countries in their economic reconstruction (Stevenson, 2008, p. 61). The same year, a Post-Conflict Unit, then renamed Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU), was established by the World Bank. Its aim was to ‘provide support and advice to design and implement watching briefs and facilitate cross-regional learning’ (World Bank, 1998, p. 43; Collier and Sambanis, 2005). One of its objectives was to ensure economic recovery but also to reduce poverty and analyse the impact of the reforms of the Bank on social development (Kelly and Jordan, 2004; World Bank, 2007b). The creation of the Post-Conflict Unit and the recognition of the necessity to pay attention to the consequence of the Bank’s interventions in post-conflict countries were a first step in the evolution of the World Bank’s discourse.

Publications Advocating for a Comprehensive Approach

A primary important report is the study on the causes of conflicts carried out by the World Bank in the late nineties. The link between conflict, poverty and development has been identified as triggering conflicts. The necessity to foster the latter to avoid the outbreak of conflicts has been stressed (Collier *et al.*, 2003; Collier and Sambanis, 2005; Flores and Nooruddin, 2009). Therefore, attention needs to be paid to the political aspects of the conflict and the state in order to prevent tensions from reoccurring. Prior to these publications, an Operations Evaluation Department report was published in 1998. The main recommendation emerging from the document was that the Bank should develop a clear Operational Policy (OP) on post-conflict reconstruction assistance and better define its role in the process (Kreimer *et al.*, 1998, p. vii). This advice was respected and translated in the Bank’s Operational Policy 2.3 ‘Development Cooperation and Conflict’ released in 2001 (World Bank, 2001; A Hassan *et al.*, 2004). The OP defines the role of the Bank in post-conflict countries. It also stresses the importance of tackling development issues. The document must be read in parallel with the Operational Policies of the Bank 8.5¹ and 8.00². These policies addressed ‘the specific needs of fragile and conflict-affected countries’ before the establishment of the SPF (World Bank, 2008a, p. 2). In 2015, the OP 2.3 was revised to take into account updated recommendations of the Bank (World Bank, 2020a). It embodies the changes occurring in the World Bank’s discourse towards an inclusive view on conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction (Addison and Mansoob Murshed,

¹ OP 8.5 ‘Emergency Recovery Assistance’ published in 1995 (World Bank, 1995) and tackling natural disasters but ignoring the political problems arising in post-conflict situations.

² OP 8.00 ‘Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies’ should be read in parallel to OP 2.3 (World Bank, 2007a).

2005). However, the policy also clearly recalls the economic, and not political, intervention of the World Bank in post-conflict countries.

In 2001, the Brahimi report was produced by the UN, a key partner of the Bank regarding post-conflict reconstruction (Atwood *et al.*, 2000). The document calls for a deeper involvement of the World Bank in peacebuilding. It describes the institution as ‘best placed to take the lead in implementing peacebuilding activities’ in collaboration with UN agencies and programmes (Atwood *et al.*, 2000, p. 8). In 2004, a report, released by the Operation Evaluations Department, specifically tackled the Post-Conflict Unit and the Post-Conflict Fund in order to assess the results of the World Bank regarding its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction (Bahnson and Cutura, 2004). It stresses the need to deepen the Bank’s collaboration with its partners such as the UN and other stakeholders including NGOs. It also took into account the newly established Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) group (Bahnson and Cutura, 2004, p. 28). Its programme was created in 2002 by James Wolfensohn. It aims at helping countries suffering from weak institutional structures, internal conflicts and/or difficult socio-economic conditions. In post-conflict situations, the LICUS initiative cooperates with the CPRU (World Bank, 2003, p. 3). The project also embodies an evolution towards a comprehensive approach of the Bank as it started to tackle state and peacebuilding objectives (World Bank, 2007d).

This section has emphasised the production of more comprehensive information by different authors regarding post-conflict reconstruction that has influenced the World Bank. It can contribute to explain the use of the political concepts of state and peacebuilding by the IFI. Thus, it is also relevant to look at the actors influencing the production of such knowledge and enacting the changes in discourse.

2. Influence of Actors

While an exhaustive analysis of the producers of each document was not possible, which constitutes a limit of this thesis, the following paragraphs address the main actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. Their evolving views on state and peacebuilding is examined. Indeed, their significance in the process of framing the discourse of the World Bank regarding post-conflict reconstruction needs to be investigated. Stakeholders to potentially analyse in further research include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank but also regional Multilateral Development Banks, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Relief collaborating with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN development

Programme or the UN Children's Fund (Naraghi, And and El-Bushra, 2004, p. 52). However, this section is limited and only focuses on the influence of the Bank's Presidents and the main donors regarding post-conflict reconstruction activities carried out by the IFI.

Presidents of the World Bank

A first major stakeholder in the production of the general discourse of the World Bank is its President. He is able to alter how the institution is perceived (Weaver, 2007), and therefore its associated discourse. Only two of them are mentioned here below because of their significant involvements in post-conflict reconstruction.

A clear evolution towards a comprehensive approach to development and post-conflict reconstruction was noticeable with the appointment of James Wolfensohn as Head of the World Bank in 1995 (Engel, 2010). He took over the management after the presidency of Lewis Preston and a previously neoliberal oriented staff under President Clausen (Weaver, 2007). During Wolfensohn's presidency, the Bank published the report 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank'. The document was described by the President as a start and a trigger to open dialogue (World Bank, 1998). While reminding the apolitical intervention of the institution, Wolfensohn also underlined the obligation for the World Bank to not aggravate 'existing inequalities in fragile situations'. He therefore asked the IFI to consider 'the conditions that may lead to conflict through redistributive policies' (World Bank, 1998, p. v). This implies taking into account the political context. In 2005, he re-emphasised the need for more cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction (Wolfensohn, 2005). In a speech in front of the UN, Wolfensohn has also favoured a 'comprehensive approach' which 'encompasses both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic and economic considerations' to be applied to all countries, including the post-conflict ones (Wolfensohn, 2005, p. 2). This clearly is a stepping-stone towards the address of state and peacebuilding in the SPF since 2008.

Another President that has influenced the discourse of the Bank on state and peacebuilding is Robert Zoellick. In office from June 2007 to July 2012, he 'urged a new approach by the international community in dealing with post-conflict countries'. Zoellick also called for 'bringing security and development together' (Wroughton, 2009). He identified six strategic themes for his presidency including one addressing 'the special problems of states coming out of conflict or seeking to avoid the breakdown of the state' (World Bank, 2020c). This emphasises the political aspects of post-conflict reconstruction.

Donors

Other key stakeholders influencing the view and discourse of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction are major financial contributors. Even though there are external donors among them, it is important to underline that most of the funding for post-conflict reconstruction is internal to the World Bank. For example, ‘the PCF receives funds from the World Bank Development Grant Facility’ (World Bank, 2007b, p. 1). Given the nature of trust fund of the PCF and that the latter has a governance structure separate from the one of the Bank, the influence of its donors is disproportionate (World Bank, 2020e). The contributions of the governments of Belgium, Brazil, Norway, the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation exemplify the importance of external donors financing the Post-Conflict Fund. This was the list of countries for the year 2007 but the observation is also valid for 2008 (World Bank, 2008b). Therefore, it is interesting to look at the position of these countries regarding post-conflict reconstruction. Attention needs to be paid to their views and influence on a comprehensive approach of the World Bank towards state and peacebuilding. Focusing on the case of Belgium in 2020, the funding of peacebuilding activities is a top priority. The country has upheld the ‘Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’, the ‘Sustainable Development Goals for 2030’ and the report on ‘Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace’ of the UN (Kingdom of Belgium, 2020). Similarly, Norway has been favouring a comprehensive engagement of the Bank as well as a stronger role in peacebuilding along with the UN (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, pp. 14, 40). In addition to states, other significant contributions to the PCF come from UN bodies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The importance of non-state partners of the Bank like the UN regarding post-conflict reconstruction is highlighted in the next section.

3. Influence of Partners

As mentioned earlier, a multitude of stakeholders are involved in post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, the promotion of the cooperation with other agencies has been reminded several times in the World Bank’s documents (Kreimer *et al.*, 1998; A Hassan *et al.*, 2004). This thesis only addresses the approach and influence of the UN as it is the main partner of the Bank in post-conflict countries (World Bank, 2008a). This limit is acknowledged. Other partnerships such as the one with the civil society, NGOs or the EU (Bahnsen and Cutura, 2004) should be analysed in further research.

United Nations

The collaboration with the UN is key for the Bank. It actually considers the organisation as the main actor of peacebuilding (World Bank, 2008a). Before highlighting the strength of the relationship between both institutions, it is important to stress the change in language that occurred inside the UN in the late nineties. At the end of the twentieth century, the United Nations started to focus on human rights (Gaggioli and Kolb, 2010; Walling, 2013). This allowed new practices and more intervention of the UN inside states based on human rights considerations. Human rights for instance justified UN interference in the building of state capability in Iraq (Walling, 2013). The discourse on human rights by the UN would be interesting to analyse in future studies to highlight its possible limits and instrumentalizations. An example of such work is the book on the ‘Human Rights Paradox’ by Scott Strauss and Steve Stern (Strauss and Stern, 2014). Still, it is important to keep in mind that this new accent on human rights has impacted the production of the UN general knowledge, and therefore its views on post-conflict reconstruction.

Consequently, it has influenced the discourse of the World Bank on peacebuilding. Besides, the need for a strong World Bank-UN partnership has been underlined in many documents (United Nations, World Bank and European Union, 2008; World Bank, 2015; United Nations and World Bank, 2017; United Nations, 2020a). In 1998, the President of the Bank, James Wolfensohn, emphasised the need to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN branches such as the UN Children’s Fund (World Bank, 1998). Later in 2005, he supported the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission by the UN. He applauded the opportunity to collaborate with the UN Security Council (Wolfensohn, 2005). The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Security Council, 2005; United Nations, 2005) has contributed to shape the discourse of the Bank on post-conflict reconstruction and state and peacebuilding. It proposed ‘integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery’ (United Nations, 2020b). As a result, the approach adopted by the UN, which is more comprehensive than the one of the Bank, has impacted the World Bank’s discourse (World Bank, 2007d, p. 26). Thanks to the cooperation with its partner, the World Bank has favoured a more political and holistic reconstruction of post-conflict countries which constitutes a move away from the neoliberal discourse characterising the IFI.

The network constituted of the UN and other actors involved in post-conflict countries have been sharing a ‘transnational discourse’. The latter has been informing the views of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction, state and peacebuilding (Mahon, 2010). Evolutions

favouring a more inclusive approach regarding post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding among the discourse of the international community have raised questions about the relevance and efficiency of the strictly economic-oriented PCF to tackle the needs of post-conflict countries (Bahnson and Cutura, 2004). It constitutes one of the conditions explaining the changes in the Bank's discourse and the establishment of the SPF. The relations of power with international stakeholders have impacted the Bank alongside the knowledge and specific ideas informing their positions. The discourse of the World Bank's partners is defined by some concepts influencing their views on post-conflict reconstruction. Two of them are the notions of fragile states and the poverty, development and post-conflict reconstruction nexus that are developed in the next section.

4. Emerging Concepts

Several concepts can be identified in the emergence of a more comprehensive discourse of the stakeholders involved in post-conflict reconstruction or state and peacebuilding. While the World Bank has developed some in-house notions, the IFI has also borrowed concepts from external actors and partners. Since the nineties, numerous concepts have become prominent and influenced the views of the actors of post-conflict reconstruction such as the economic and social stability or human security (Bahnson and Cutura, 2004). The following paragraphs develop the link between conflict, development and poverty and the notion of 'fragile states'.

Poverty, Development and Conflict Nexus

Poverty alleviation has been described as the main objective of the World Bank. This paragraph shows how post-conflict reconstruction has increasingly been entangled with this central goal of the IFI. An important document in the identification of poverty as a core concept of the World Bank is the Operational Policy 1.00 published in 2004. It states that 'the Bank's mission is sustainable poverty reduction' (World Bank, 2004, p. 1). Since the seventies, its focus has been on poverty, even though it was less central to the Bank's purpose under Clausen's presidency. Under the presidency of Robert McNamara which started in April 1968, 'the Bank began to express its core objectives in terms of redistribution with growth and basic human needs' (Woods, 2018, p. 284).

Before highlighting the link between conflict and poverty, it is important to stress the meaning of poverty for the World Bank. Different significations of the term and of its evaluation have been acknowledged (Ravallion, 2010). Among those having a radical position on the question, some argue that the defence of poverty by the World Bank is a way to advance its neoliberal agenda by intervening in developing countries in order to transform the societies and promote

capitalist accumulation and economic competition (Cammack, 2004, p. 190). The understanding of poverty by the IFI has been widely debated in the literature (Bahnsen and Cutura, 2004; Barbara, 2008; Peterson, 2014). It constitutes a sub-field of the debate on peace and can only be briefly mentioned in this thesis.

The link between poverty, development and conflict has been identified and recognised by the World Bank in the late nineties. Research, funded by the PCF, identified failures of development and high levels of poverty as important triggers of conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Bahnsen and Cutura, 2004). As a result, development assistance has been promoted by the World Bank in order to minimise potential outbreaks of conflicts (Mansoor Murshed, 2002; Addison and Mansoor Murshed, 2005). The nexus poverty, development and post-conflict reconstruction became a key means for the IFI to deal with threats to its mission of ‘sustainable poverty alleviation’ (Bahnsen and Cutura, 2004, p. 1). Poverty is however not the unique cause of conflicts. Another important driver is the idea of ‘fragile states’ (Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2003).

Fragile States and the Fragile, Conflict, Violence Group (FCV)

The concept of ‘fragile states’ was central to the creation of the SPF. This is explained by the recognition by the Bank that ‘preventing fragility, conflict and violence is central to reducing poverty’ (United Nations and World Bank, 2018, p. xi), which is the general mission of the World Bank. This section elaborates on the emergence of ‘fragile state’ in the World Bank’s vocabulary, its link to post-conflict reconstruction and its related ‘Fragile, Conflict and Violence’ (FCV) Group.

Countries formerly called ‘Low-Countries Under Stress’ by the World Bank were renamed ‘fragile states’ in 2010. They are now designated as ‘fragile and conflict-affected situations’ because conflicts sometimes occur within a state or a territory not yet recognised as such (Carvalho, 2006; State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2012; World Bank, 2018). There have been several attempts to better define the notion but there is currently no agreed definition (World Bank, 2007c, 2019a). States are often categorised as fragile when a lack of political will is identified in their structures or their capacities to fulfil the basic needs of their population regarding poverty reduction or the provision of security (World Bank, 2019a). In parallel to the notion of ‘fragile states’, the Fragile, Conflict and Violence concept was developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Bank adopted it in January 2006 to harmonise its discourse on post-conflict reconstruction with other donors (World Bank, 2005; Carvalho, 2006; World Bank, 2007c). Therefore, FCV lays at the heart of the Bank’s

state and peacebuilding discourse. Actually, the SPF is ‘the World Bank’s largest global Trust Fund for FCV’. Its objective is ‘to address the drivers and impacts of FCV’ (World Bank, 2019a).

Nonetheless, the concept of fragile states has also been criticised, partly because of the emotional and political connotations of the term ‘fragility’ which implies a weak local community unable to take actions or improve its situation (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014). Another criticism concerns the ability of the donors to select the beneficiaries of the aid in an easier way when relying on the concept of ‘fragile states’. Fragile states are stuck in the following vicious circle from which they cannot escape. Indeed, the lack of efficient structures, which defines the countries as ‘fragile states’, is used to refuse them the allocations of grants. The argument is that they will not be able to use them efficiently (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014, p. 200). However, these countries need the money in order to construct functioning structures. This discourse of ‘aid selectivity’ has been informed by the neoliberal regime of truth given that it allocates resources according to the most efficient way. Nonetheless, the concept of ‘fragile states’ aiming at building effective political structures still materialises the evolution of the Bank’s discourse towards ‘a greater emphasis on state and peacebuilding’ (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014, p. 200; Nay, 2014). The integration of the concept of state and peacebuilding in the SPF are ‘an important signal of the Bank’s intent to address the challenges of fragility and conflict in an integrated way’ (World Bank, 2008, p. 12). It appears problematic for the financial institution to tackle such political concepts. The second sub-question deals with the extent of this paradox by analysing the SPF more in depth.

B. Second Sub-question: State and Peacebuilding by the SPF in Post-Conflict Countries

The second sub-question ‘How does the SPF address state and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations since 2008?’ is first answered by stressing the practical reasons explaining the emergence of the SPF. Then, the actors having authority over the Fund are highlighted. This allows to emphasise the power relations at stake behind the SPF and the Bank’s discourse. Before elaborating on how the World Bank intervenes in the state and peacebuilding process, the thesis looks at the documents related to the creation of the Fund.

1. Strategic Interests of the Address of State and Peacebuilding

A key reason for the establishment of the SPF, stated in its founding document, is the need for more integration regarding the tackling of post-conflict situations by the World Bank (World Bank, 2008a). Until 2008, the Fragile States Unit and the CPRU, the two units dealing with post-conflict reconstruction in the Bank, did not collaborate efficiently. They were ‘located within different parts of the Bank’s organization’ (van Houten, 2007, p. 653). The creation of the Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group therefore represented a stepping-stone towards the emergence of the SPF. It resulted from the merger of the CPRU (World Bank, 2007b) and the Fragile States Unit in June 2007 (World Bank, 2008a). This organisational restructuring has precluded the establishment of the State and Peacebuilding Fund. Indeed, it was a first experiment of unifying two trust funds together under the same framework (World Bank, 2007b).


Similarly, the State and Peacebuilding Fund was the result of the fusion between the PCF and the Low-Income Countries Under Stress Implementation Trust Fund (LICUS TF) (World Bank, 2008a). It is the outcome of strategic concerns of the stakeholders. They aimed at empowering the practices of the two units in a more efficient way. It also ensued from the strengthening of the link between fragility and conflict. In its 2008 PFC and LICUS annual report, the World Bank stated that the replacement of two interrelated trust funds with a ‘single, conceptually, integrated fund’ reflected ‘the Bank’s belief that conflict and fragility cannot be seen through separate lenses’ (World Bank, 2008b, p. 2). In conclusion, the SPF was established in reaction to a decision to better address state and peace building. The rising prominence of the connection between fragility and conflict also contributed to its creation.

2. Authority of Actors

As the importance of the stakeholders involved in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding has been underlined, this section focuses on those having authority over the SPF. This part is key in understanding how their power has impacted the production of state and peacebuilding and its enforcement by the World Bank.

A major person in charge of the annual SPF report, and therefore post-conflict reconstruction, is the Director of the FCV Group. He influences the SPF given that the latter is under the authority of the FCV Group, as illustrated in the following graph. The chart was created with different documents including annual reports and statuses of related programmes (World Bank, 2007b; State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2010, 2013).

Organisational Chart



The founding document of the SPF is also useful to identify the actors having authority over the Fund (World Bank, 2008a). The SPF Committee is made up of some of the senior staff of the Bank. Since 2011, its chairman is also the Director of the FCV (World Bank, 2018). He is

appointed by the Operational Policy and Countries Services Vice President (World Bank, 2008a; State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2013, 2014). From a more top down perspective illustrated in the chart above, the SPF depends on one of the main branches of the World Bank: the IDA, also called the IBRD depending on the terms at which the countries borrow or receive grants (World Bank, 2020b). These units are under the direct leadership of the President of the World Bank whose influence has already been mentioned.

Regarding the individuals in charge of the SPF, in most reports of the Fund, the SPF Council and Technical Committee and the SPF Secretariat are thanked for their help (State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2017; Ahsan *et al.*, 2018). It is interesting to note that staff members come from different departments, fields and areas of expertise (Andersson *et al.*, 2015; State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2016; World Bank, 2020d). While this appears as positive for bringing in diverse views on post-conflict reconstruction, the general Anglo-Saxon tendency of the World Bank has to be underlined given that the location of its headquarters is in Washington and the predominant use of English as language of business (Mahon, 2010, p. 176; Woods, 2018). Nonetheless, this has to be carefully taken into consideration as the prominent influence of the donors who include Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom must be stressed given the trust fund nature of the SPF and its particular separate governance structure from the World Bank (State and Peacebuilding, 2019, p.45; World Bank, 2020e).

3. Documents Related to the Emergence of the SPF

As the conceptual and strategic factors and actors influencing the SPF have been highlighted, this section concentrates on the documents related to the creation of the Fund. Publications produced in parallel to the establishment of the SPF allow to better grasp the adoption of the concepts state and peacebuilding by the World Bank. They also help to emphasise the sole economic considerations addressed by the IFI and nuance its paradoxical use of state and peacebuilding.

A first key document, ‘Towards a New Framework for Rapid Bank Responses to Crises and Emergencies’, was published by the World Bank one year before the creation of the SPF. It summarises ‘the applicable legal and policy considerations, which apply to the Bank’s activities involving peace-building, security and relief’ (World Bank, 2007d, p. 29). It points out the overemphasis on physical reconstruction and the absence of guidelines regarding ‘the Bank’s role in facilitating peacebuilding when providing emergency assistance to post-conflict (or conflict-affected) countries’ (World Bank, 2007d, p. 8). The publication also recognises that the providers of aid such as the World Bank ‘should be sensitive to peace-building’ (World

Bank, 2007d, p. 23). This accent on the necessity to tackle peacebuilding could appear paradoxical for an IFI justifying its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction with an economic mandate.

Thus, the Annex of this publication is especially relevant to understand the position of the Bank. It states that the World Bank ‘may support an integrated emergency recovery program that facilitates peace-building objectives’ as long as it is ‘consistent with the legal parameters set out in the Articles’ of the IFI (World Bank, 2007d, pp. 37–38). This stipulation is of crucial importance given that the Article I of the IDA status prohibits political intervention in domestic politics. It constitutes a key factor in determining the nature of the intervention of the World Bank in post-conflict countries. The document stresses that ‘only economic considerations are relevant’ and limits the nature and scope of the Bank’s activities (World Bank, 2007d, p. 39).

Consequently, a tension seems to arise regarding the Bank’s position. The evolution of its discourse with its State and Peacebuilding Fund is undeniable. Actually, one of the reasons for the establishment of the SPF, recognised in its status, was the alignment of the discourse of the World Bank with the one of the international community. It was realised by including the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in the name of the Fund (World Bank, 2008a). Nevertheless, the obligation to respect the Bank’s Articles of Agreement and its economic mandate is strongly emphasised. Therefore, the following section analyses how the Bank deals with this paradox and intervenes in state and peacebuilding with its SPF.

4. Intervention of the Bank in the State and Peacebuilding Process

Since the late nineties, interventions of the World Bank in post-conflict countries have seemed flexible and comprehensive. This has been highlighted in the first sub-question of this thesis and has been embodied by the creation of the SPF. However, taking a close look at the actual working of the SPF and the nature of its operations in post-conflict situations is needed. It allows to understand what type of discourse informed the Fund and how it has evolved. The following paragraphs look at the practices supported by the Bank to reconstruct states after conflicts.

Contrary to what is suggested by the name of the SPF, which is made up of two political concepts as developed in a previous section, the World Bank does not appear to be politically involved in the building of state capacity. Nonetheless, at first, the objective of the SPF looks highly political. The document establishing the Fund states that ‘the SPF’s overarching goal would be to address the needs of state and local governance and peace-building in fragile and

conflict-prone and -affected situations' (World Bank, 2008, p. 7). With its different branches such as 'Crisis Response' or 'Prevention & Recovery', the SPF searches to 'identify and address critical state and peacebuilding issues' (World Bank, 2019a). This embodies a move towards a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. However, the document also highlights that the 'SPF would operate in accordance with the Bank's Articles of Agreement' (World Bank, 2008, p. 7). As reminder, the latter demand that the Bank abstains from intervening in the politics of countries. The IFI's mandate emphasises its economic and apolitical character.

A concrete example of the SPF work is the 'Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments'. The SPF uses them to finance strategies 'for recovery and development in post-conflict settings' in collaboration with the FCV Group (World Bank, 2015). If the name 'Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments' evokes a political and comprehensive approach, it remains an economic method of evaluation of the needs and costs of the impacts of the conflict. It examines the recovery priorities to be financed. While the term peacebuilding induces political actions, the instrument is limited to drafting plans to advise governments in need and to provide financial aid if required. There seems therefore to be no interference in domestic politics. Besides, means deployed by the Fund in order to address state and peacebuilding are economic tools. The priority of the financial aspect is visible in the last annual report of the SPF. The Fund contributes to state and peacebuilding objectives by allocating grants (World Bank, 2019a) as illustrated in the chart 'SPF at one glance' of the same publication (Ahsan *et al.*, 2018, p. 8). Its inputs to state and peacebuilding consists of evaluating costs, giving advices and allocating grants (State and Peacebuilding Fund, 2018).

As a result, when looking at the work of the SPF, it appears that the Fund solely aims at financing 'innovative approaches to state and peacebuilding' (World Bank, 2019a). According to the analysis, it does not seem involved in the carrying out of political actions as implied by the adoption of state and peacebuilding in the SPF. The SPF recognises in its annual reports, founding document and website the need for a comprehensive approach taking into account the political specificities of each post-conflict situations. Nevertheless, its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction, state and peacebuilding are realised through economic and financial contributions. To conclude, this section has highlighted that the World Bank, while having created a SPF, does not appear to overcome its mandate. The inclusion of state and peacebuilding in the name of the Fund has implied a move away of the World Bank from its traditional neoliberal rhetoric. However, the working of the SPF and its practices are informed

by the neoliberal regime of truth and economic-oriented as defined in its status (World Bank, 2008a).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the aim of this thesis has been to understand why the discourse of the World Bank has evolved from post-conflict reconstruction to state and peacebuilding, as embodied by the SPF. It has sought to unpack the paradoxical discourse of the World Bank on state and peacebuilding, given its economic mandate. Tensions around a possible political involvement of the Bank in post-conflict countries were reflected in this thesis. Therefore, regime of truth and power-knowledge relations at stake in the production of the discourse of the World Bank on state and peacebuilding have been analysed. This was realised through the carrying out of a critical discourse analysis inspired by the genealogical approach inspired by Michel Foucault.

The first part of the analysis has highlighted how some actors, concepts and partners have influenced the view of the World Bank on post-conflict reconstruction. Alongside the criticisms faced by the IFI, they have contributed to the adoption of a comprehensive approach by the Bank. The latter is visible in the name of the SPF. The answer to the research question therefore appears to be partially explained by the power-knowledge relations in which the World Bank is involved. By adopting the concepts ‘state and peacebuilding’, the Bank sought to unify its discourse with the transnational discourse of its network. The SPF established by the World Bank in order to intervene in post-conflict countries adopted two political concepts, broadly used in its web of collaborators. This has been shown as paradoxical given the economic mandate of the IFI used to justify its involvement and practices in post-conflict reconstruction.

The second sub-question has allowed an in-depth analysis of the discourse of the World Bank on state and peacebuilding by examining its State and Peacebuilding Fund. It has highlighted that the IFI seems to have respected its Articles of Agreement. It has also underlined reasons other than the influence of powerful stakeholders explaining the creation of the SPF. Indeed, strategic concerns regarding the efficiency of dealing with post-conflict reconstruction have been accentuated. Moreover, the knowledge informing the SPF has appeared to have remained economic and not political, as is implied by its name. This has been underlined by stressing the economic nature of the actors in power in the Fund. Then, the analysis of the SPF suggests that the Fund only addresses the economic aspects of state and peacebuilding. Its tasks are limited in its status to providing financial and economic advice. Therefore, the neoliberal regime of

truth is still guiding the Bank's involvement in post-conflict countries, despite the political concepts evoked in the name of the SPF.

These two sub-questions have answered the research question regarding the evolution of the discourse of the World Bank from post-conflict reconstruction to state and peacebuilding. They have demonstrated that the use of the concepts of state and peacebuilding by the World Bank can be explained by the influence of other actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. Another explanatory factor is the release of comprehensive publications and ideas. However, the discourse of the Bank has also been motivated by strategic concerns and economic actors and knowledge.

The interrogation concerning a paradoxical discourse of the World Bank and the tensions regarding its potential political involvement in post-conflict reconstruction have also been unpacked. On the one hand, the Bank has adopted a comprehensive and political approach to post-conflict reconstruction. It has included the concepts of state and peacebuilding in the name of the SPF. On the other hand, the practices of the Bank regarding post-conflict countries are economic and informed by a neoliberal regime of truth. Therefore, from the data analysed, the Bank appears to only address the economic aspects of the reconstruction in post-conflict countries. The intervention of the IFI with its SPF has continued to be neoliberally informed and economic. According to the analysis of this thesis, the Bank's actions have remained distinct from political involvement. Its language has evolved and adopted the political concepts of state and peacebuilding, but its practices have persisted in being economic and financial. However, these conclusions are drawn from the limited amount of data examined. It would be interesting to further research to analyse the nature of the activities funded and supported by the SPF in order to better characterise its involvement in post-conflict countries.

According to the results of the analysis, even though the World Bank acknowledges the need to take political and local specificities into account, it leaves the handling of these aspects to its partners and only deals with the economic ones. As pointed out by Francesco Scazzu, the financial institutions addressing state and peacebuilding, like the World Bank and its SPF, seem to have no other choice than adopting the (neo)liberal peacebuilding (Scazzu, 2019, p. 196). While recognising the necessity for a comprehensive approach, their practices continue to be informed by a neoliberal regime of truth. These findings can hopefully help to better understand in what ways the World Bank has contributed to the establishment of peace. The neoliberal regime of truth remains the one informing the practices of the Bank regarding state and peacebuilding. Some criticisms denouncing the latter as problematic are therefore still

unaddressed. Given that this approach to peacebuilding has been heavily criticised and that the IFI is a major actor of post-conflict reconstruction, it has implications for the reconstruction of societies after conflicts. Indeed, it impacts the building of a sustainable peace and the avoidance of potential new conflicts.

Finally, several limits of this thesis need to be underlined. First, the analysis carried out is not exhaustive. Other factors influencing the discourse of the Bank could be identified. For instance, it would be interesting to look at the larger network in which the IFI is involved and how these other partners, such as NGOs, influence its view on state and peacebuilding. Another research question could be to change the level of analysis. A possibility would be to look at the intervention of the SPF in a specific country. Taking the recent intervention of the Fund in Iraq (World Bank, 2019a) would be particularly relevant. It would allow a comparison with the current intervention of the SPF in the country and its previous one, prior to the existence of the Fund, which has been heavily criticised, especially for its neoliberal aspects (Pugh, 2011; Walling, 2013; Wozniak, 2017). This would permit to analyse if its practices are more comprehensive or have remained informed by a neoliberal regime of truth.

References

- Addison, T. and Mansoob Murshed, S. (2005) 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Some Analytical Issues', in Kwasi Fosu, A. and Collier, P. (eds) *Post-Conflict Economies in Africa*. Palgrave MacMillan. New York, pp. 3–17.
- Ahsan, A. *et al.* (2018) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2018*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Andersson, D. *et al.* (2015) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2015*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Atwood, M. J. B. *et al.* (2000) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A/55/305-S/2000/809. The United Nations. New York.
- Babb, S. (2013) 'The Washington Consensus as Transnational Policy Paradigm: Its Origins, Trajectory and Likely Successor', *Review of International Political Economy*, 20(2), pp. 268–297.
- Bahnsen, C. and Cutura, J. (2004) *The Post Conflict Fund Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs Case Study*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Baker, P. (2012) 'Acceptable Bias? Using Corpus Linguistics Methods with Critical Discourse Analysis', *Critical Discourse Studies*, 9(3), pp. 247–256.
- Barbara, J. (2008) 'Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building: Building Post-Conflict Development States', *Development in Practice*, 18(3), pp. 307–318.
- Barma, N. H., Levy, N. and Piombo, J. (2017) 'Disentangling Aid Dynamics in State-building and Peacebuilding: a Causal Framework', *International Peacekeeping*. Routledge, 24(2), pp. 187–211.
- Bartelson, J. (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
- Bhatia, M. (2005) 'Post-conflict Profit: The Political Economy of Intervention', *Global Governance*, 11(2), pp. 205–224.
- Bidet, J. (2007) 'Foucault and Liberalism: Rationality, Revolution, Resistance', *Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory*, 8(1), pp. 78–95.

- Biebricher, T. (2008) 'Genealogy and Governmentality', *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 2(3), pp. 363–396.
- Binford, L. (2010) 'A Perfect Storm of Neglect and Failure: Post-war Capitalist Restoration in Northern Morazán, El Salvador', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(3), pp. 531–557.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*. The United Nations. New York.
- BrettonWoods Project (2004) *World Bank, IMF and Armed Conflicts*. Available at: <https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2004/02/art-35157/>. (Accessed: 22 October 2019).
- Cammack, P. (2004) 'What the World Bank Means by Poverty Reduction and Why it Matters', *New Political Economy*, 9(2), pp. 189–211.
- Carvalho, S. (2006) *Engaging with Fragile States*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Castañeda, C. (2009) 'How Liberal Peacebuilding May Be Failing in Sierra Leone', *Review of African Political Economy*, 36(120), pp. 235–251.
- Chandler, D. (2009) 'Great Power Responsibility and "Failed States": Strengthening Sovereignty?', in Sutter, P. and Raue, J. (eds) *Facets and Practices of State-building*. Martinus Nijhoff. Leiden, pp. 15–30.
- Collier, P. *et al.* (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap Civil War and Development Policy*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Collier, P. and Hoefflert, A. (1998) *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, *Oxford Economic Papers*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
- Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (2005) *Understanding Civil War - Evidence and Analysis*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (2003) '*Mind the Gap*': *The World Bank, Humanitarian Action and Development*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Denskus, T. (2007) 'Peacebuilding Does Not Build Peace', *Development in Practice*, 17(4–5), pp. 656–662.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1997) 'What is Political Discourse Analysis?', *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, 11, pp. 11–52.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2014) *Discourse and Knowledge: A Sociocognitive Approach*. Cambridge

University Press. Cambridge.

Dodge, T. (2011) 'The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo-liberalism to Iraq', *International Affairs*, 86(6), pp.1269-1286.

Engel, S. (2010) *The World Bank and the Post-Washington Consensus in Vietnam and Indonesia: Inheritance of Loss*. Routledge. London.

Flores, T. E. and Nooruddin, I. (2009) 'Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs', *Review of International Organizations*. Springer New York, 4(1), pp. 1–27.

Foucault, M. (1980) *Power/Knowledge*. Edinburgh Gate. Harlow.

Foucault, M. (2004) *Naissance de la Biopolitique*. Gallimard. Paris.

Foucault, M. (2012) *Du Gouvernement des Vivants*. Gallimard. Paris.

Foucault, M., Burchell, G. and Davidson, A. I. (2006) *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974*. Palgrave MacMillan. London.

Frederiksen, K., Lomborg, K. and Beedholm, K. (2015) 'Foucault's Notion of Problematization: A Methodological Discussion of the Application of Foucault's Later Work to Nursing Research', *Nursing Inquiry*, 22(3), pp. 202–209.

Gaggioli, G. and Kolb, R. (2010) 'Le Conseil de Sécurité face à la Protection des Civils dans les Conflits Armés', in *International Law, Conflict and Development: The Emergence of a Holistic Approach in International Affairs*. Martinus Nijhoff. Leiden.

Gane, M. (2008) 'Foucault on Governmentality and Liberalism: The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 25(8), pp. 353–363.

Garland, D. (2014) 'What is a "History of the Present"? On Foucault's Genealogies and their Critical Preconditions', *Punishment and Society*, 16(4), pp. 365–384.

Garrity, Z. (2010) 'Discourse Analysis, Foucault and Social Work Research: Identifying some Methodological Complexities', *Journal of Social Work*, 10(2), pp. 193–210.

Gillian, B. and George, Y. (1983) *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge University. Cambridge.

Goetze, C. (2017) *The Distinction of Peace*. University Michigan. Michigan.

- Goode, W. (2019) 'I', in *Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, pp. 219–251.
- Goodhand, J. (2010) 'Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction, and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan', *Disaster*, 34(S1), pp. 78–102.
- Grimm, S., Lemay-Hébert, N. and Nay, O. (2014) "'Fragile States": Introducing a Political Concept', *Third World Quarterly*. Routledge, pp. 197–209.
- Guimond, M.-F. (2007) *Structural Adjustment and Peacebuilding Road to Conflict or Peace?*. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa.
- Hall, D. (2017) *Making Peace Pay: Post-Conflict Economic and Infrastructure Development in Kosovo and Iraq*. School of Advanced Military Studies.
- Hassan, F. M. *et al.* (2004) *Lessons Learned from World Bank Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University. Oxford.
- Herberg, M. (2011) 'Global Governance and Conflict of Laws from a Foucauldian Perspective: The Power/Knowledge Nexus Revisited', *Transnational Legal Theory*, 2(2), pp. 243–269.
- Hidalgo Tenorio, E. (2011) 'Critical Discourse Analysis: An Overview', *Nordic Journal of English Studies*, 10(1), pp. 183-210.
- van Houten, P. (2007) 'The World Bank's (Post-)Conflict Agenda: The Challenge of Integrating Development and Security', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20(4), pp. 639–657.
- International Monetary Fund (2015) *IMF Engagement with Countries in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations*. International Monetary Fund. Washington.
- International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (2001) *Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries and the HIPC Framework*. International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Washington.
- Joshi, M. and Wallenstein, P. (2018) *Understanding Quality Peace*. Routledge. London.
- Kelly, L. and Jordan, J. (2004) *The Prototype Carbon Fund. Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global*

- Programs, Case Study*. The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. Washington.
- Kingdom of Belgium, F. A. (2020) *Peacebuilding Grants, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs*. Available at: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/conflict_prevention_and_peacebuilding (Accessed: 24 January 2020).
- Korsten, F.-W. (1998) 'Foucault's Rhetorical Consciousness and the Possibilities of Acting upon a Regime of Truth', *Arcadia*, 33(1), pp. 64–71.
- Kreimer, A. *et al.* (1998) *The World Bank's Experience with Post Conflict Reconstruction*. The World Bank. Washington.
- Mahon, R. (2010) 'After Neo-Liberalism? The OECD, the World Bank and the Child', *Global Social Policy*, 10(2), pp. 172–192.
- Mansoob Murshed, S. (2002) 'Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment', *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(4), pp. 387–393.
- Moore, D. (2000) 'Levelling the Playing Fields and Embedding Illusions: "Post-Conflict" Discourse and Neo-Liberal "Development" in War-Torn Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27(83), pp. 11–28.
- Naim, M. (2000) 'Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?', *Third World Quarterly*, 21(3), pp. 505–528.
- Naraghi, S., And, A. and El-Bushra, J. (2004) 'Post Conflict Reconstruction', in *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*. International Alert. London.
- Nay, O. (2014) 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD Helped Invent the Fragile State Concept', *Third World Quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 210–231.
- Nelson, P. (1995) *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations*. MacMillan Press. London.
- Neufeld, M. (2015) 'From Peacemaking to Peacebuilding: The Multiple Endings of England's Long Civil Wars', *The American Historical Review*, 120(5), pp. 1709–1723.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) *Peacebuilding-a Development Perspective*. Available at: <http://odin.dep.no/ud>. (Accessed: 9 May 2020)

- O'Donnell, M. and Boyce, J. (2007) *Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding*. Lynne Rienner. London.
- Olivier, L. (1988) 'La Question du Pouvoir chez Foucault: Espace, Stratégie et Dispositif', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 21(1), pp. 83–98.
- Olssen, M. (2003) 'Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, Neo-Liberalism: Assessing Foucault's Legacy', *Journal of Education Policy*, 18(2), pp. 189–202.
- Paris, R. (2010) 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', *Review of International Studies*, 36, pp. 337–365.
- Peterson, J. H. (2014) *Building a Peace Economy?: Liberal Peacebuilding and the Development-Security Industry*. Manchester University. Manchester.
- Pruitt, L. (2013) 'Fixing the Girls: Neoliberal Discourse and Girls' Participation in Peacebuilding', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 15(1), pp. 58–76.
- Pugh, M. (2011) 'Local Agency and Political Economies of Peacebuilding', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 11(2), pp. 308–320.
- Pugh, M, Cooper, N. and Turner, M. (2008) *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. Edited by Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2011) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Polity Press. Cambridge.
- Ruckert, A. (2006) 'Towards an Inclusive-Neoliberal Regime of Development: From the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus', *Capital and Society*, 39(1).
- Ruckert, A. (2010) 'The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of Honduras and the Transformations of Neoliberalism', *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 35(70), pp. 113–139.
- Saukko, P. (2011) *Doing Research in Cultural Studies*. SAGE Publications. New York.
- Seatzu, F. (2019) 'Speculating on the World Bank's Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations and Activities', *International Organizations Law Review*. Brill Nijhoff, 16(1), pp. 192–228.
- Security Council (2005) *Resolution 1645*. S/RES/1645. The United Nations. Washington.

Sheng, A. (2009) 'Washington Consensus and the IMF', in *From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator's View of Unfettered Finance in the 1990s and 2000s*. Cambridge University. Cambridge, pp. 109–125.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2010) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2010*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2012) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2012*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2013) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2013*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2014) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2014*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2016) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2016*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2017) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2017*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2018) *SPF Funding: Eligibility and Guidelines for Proposals*. The World Bank. Washington.

State and Peacebuilding Fund (2019) *State and Peacebuilding Fund Annual Report 2019*. The World Bank. Washington.

Stevenson, C. and Cultcliffe, J. (2006) 'Problematizing Special Observation in Psychiatry: Foucault, Archaeology, Genealogy, Discourse and Power/Knowledge', *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing*, 13, pp. 713–721.

Stevenson, J. (2008) 'IFIs and peacebuilding', *The Adelphi Papers*, 40(336), pp. 51–69.

Storey, A. (2000) 'The World Bank, Neo-Liberalism, and Power: Discourse Analysis and Implications for Campaigners', *Development in Practice*, 10(3–4), pp. 361–370.

Strauss, S. and Stern, S. (2014) *The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents*. University of Wisconsin Press. Wisconsin.

Stubbs, T. and Kentikelenis, A. (2017) 'International Financial Institutions and Human Rights: Implications for Public Health', *Public Health Reviews*, 38(27).

United Nations (2005) *60/180. The Peacebuilding Commission. A/RES/60/180*. The United Nations. Washington.

United Nations (2020a) *The United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/policy-issues-and-partnerships/partnerships/un-worldbank-partnership> (Accessed: 25 January 2020).

United Nations (2020b) *United Nations Peacebuilding*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/> (Accessed: 10 February 2020).

United Nations and World Bank (2008) *United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations*. The United Nations and the World Bank. Washington.

United Nations and World Bank (2017) *Joint Statement of the Peacebuilding Commission and the World Bank*. The United Nations and the World Bank. New York.

United Nations and World Bank (2018) *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. The United Nations and the World Bank. Washington.

United Nations, World Bank and European Union (2008) *Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning A Common Platform for Action*. The United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union. Brussels.

Vucetic, S. (2011) 'Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 37(3), pp. 1295–1312.

Wallensteen, P. (2015) *Quality Peace*. Oxford University. Oxford.

Walling, C. (2013) *All Necessary Measures: the United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention*. Pennsylvania Press. Pennsylvania.

Weaver, C. (2007) 'The World's Bank and the Bank's World', *Global Governance*, 13, pp. 493–512.

Wedderburn, A. (2018) 'Tragedy, Genealogy and Theories of International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 24(1), pp. 177–197.

Wolfensohn, J. D. (2005) *Remarks on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. The World Bank. New York.

Woods, N. (2007) *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers*. Cornell University. Cornell.

- Woods, N. (2018) 'Bretton Woods Institutions', in Daws, S. and Weiss, T. G. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations*. Oxford University. Oxford.
- Woodward, S. (2013) 'The IFIs and Post-Conflict Political Economy', in Berdal, M. and Zaum, D. (eds) *Political Economy of Statebuilding*. Routledge. Oxon.
- World Bank (1995) *OP 8.50 - Emergency Recovery Assistance*. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/webarchives/archive?url=httpzxxweb.worldbank.org/archive/website01541/WEB/0__C-726.HTM (Accessed: 31 January 2020).
- World Bank (1998) *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2001) *Operational Policy 2.30 Development Cooperation and Conflict*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2003) *Low-Income Countries Under Stress Implementation Overview*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2004) *OP 1.00 - Poverty Reduction*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2005) *Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2007a) *OP 8.00-Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies Staff Connections*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2007b) *Post-Conflict Fund and LICUS Trust Fund Annual Report*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2007c) *Strengthening World Bank's Rapid Response and Long Term Engagement in Fragile States*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2007d) *Toward A New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2008a) *Establishment of a State and Peacebuilding Fund*. The World Bank. Washington.
- World Bank (2008b) *Post-Conflict Fund and LICUS Trust Fund Annual Report*. The World Bank. Washington.

World Bank (2015) *Working with UN in fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. The World Bank. Washington.

World Bank (2018) *Information Note: The World Bank Group's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations*. The World Bank. Washington.

World Bank (2019a) *Overview - State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/state-and-peace-building-fund> (Accessed: 24 January 2020).

World Bank (2019b) *State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF)*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/state-and-peace-building-fund> (Accessed: 29 November 2019).

World Bank (2019c) *What We Do*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do> (Accessed: 9 December 2019).

World Bank (2020a) *OP 2.30 - Development Cooperation and Conflict, Policies and Procedures*. The World Bank. Washington.

World Bank (2020b) *Organizational Chart of the World Bank*. The World Bank. Washington.

World Bank (2020c) *Robert Bruce Zoellick, 11th President of the World Bank, 2007-2020*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/robert-bruce-zoellick> (Accessed: 24 January 2020).

World Bank (2020d) *Who are We*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are> (Accessed: 6 February 2020).

World Bank (2020e) *2018-2019 Trust Fund Annual Reports*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/trust-fund-annual-report-2019> (Accessed: 26 May 2020).

Wozniak, J. S. G. (2017) 'Iraq and the Material Basis of Post-Conflict Police Reconstruction', *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(6), pp. 806–818.

Wroughton, L. (2009) 'Zoellick Urges Rethink on Post-Conflict Rebuilding', *Reuters*, 9 January. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/worldbank-security-zoellick-idUSN0853680420090109> (Accessed: 24 January 2020).