



**Universiteit
Leiden**
The Netherlands

**Between Promise and Practice:
Problematizing the Contradictory Role of Peacekeeping
in Canadian Strategic Culture, 1991-2017**

Thesis for the Partial Fulfillment of the
Master of Arts, International Relations, Specialization in Culture and Politics

August 20, 2020

Rachel Tung

2608499

r.s.tung@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Dr. John-Harmen Valk

Word Count: 14,986

Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Valk, for providing feedback and guidance on my thesis during these tumultuous times. Most importantly, love and gratitude go to my parents, Suzie and Kim, who have always indulged my whims and passions, even when they take me to the other side of the world.

Abstract

Peacekeeping has become one of the most enduring traditions, symbols, and narratives that constitutes Canadian national identity and strategic culture since Lester B. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for creating the first peacekeeping force. However, upon closer inspection of Canada's record on peacekeeping, contradictions emerge between the promise and practice of this national tradition. Why does peacekeeping persist as a tenet of Canadian identity and strategic culture when it no longer plays a prominent international role in peacekeeping? While perplexing, the theories of strategic cultural change and competing strategic subcultures provide the framework for addressing this question. This thesis finds that contradictions persist in the promise and practice of peacekeeping because while the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture that grew out of Canada's peacekeeping achievements is no longer a dominant worldview, it endures as a potent vestigial influence that continues to strike at the heart of what it means to be Canadian and helps contextualize the efficaciousness of the new Robust Western Ally hegemonic subculture's policy preferences. Through employing a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to reveal the mechanisms of power employed by the competing subcultures in academic, media, and political discourses, this thesis sheds light on how norms, narratives, and cultural factors that have clandestinely and conflictingly influenced strategic preferences on peacekeeping in Canada from 1991 to 2017.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 2

Abstract 3

Table of Contents 4

Abbreviations 5

Chapter 1. Introduction 6

Chapter 2. Literature Review 11

 2.1 Theories of Strategic Culture and Change 11

 2.2 Strategic Subcultures in Canada..... 15

Chapter 3. Methodology 18

 3.1 Research Design and Methods 18

 3.2 Limitations of Research 22

Chapter 4. Case Study: Peacekeeping and Change in Canada’s Strategic Culture..... 23

 4.1 Policy Crisis 23

 4.2 Policy Innovation and Policy Diffusion 26

 4.3 Policy Selection and Policy Persistence..... 32

Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion..... 41

Bibliography 44

Abbreviations

FDA	Foucauldian Discourse Analysis
G7	Group of Seven
MP	Member of Parliament
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	New Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States of America

Chapter 1. Introduction

“As the poet Yeats said, ‘In dreams begins responsibility.’ It is easy to dream; it is much harder to act.”

– Lloyd Axworthy (UNGA 1996, 17)

Peacekeeping is arguably the most enduring tradition, symbol, and narrative that constitutes not only the character of Canada’s foreign policy, but also its national identity. When Canadians are asked about their nation’s role in the world, they proudly and consistently acknowledge their legacy of being a leading peacekeeping nation who is always there when the world needs it. National identity is constructed around an altruistic promise and desire to be a steady voice in a chaotic world, and peacekeeping is a tradition that strikes at the heart of this promise of what it means to be Canadian. When Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for creating the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, the chairman of the Nobel Committee described him as “the man who did more than anyone else to save the world” (Jahn 1957). Since then, Canada has enjoyed a “golden age of diplomacy” and the country has been saturated with stories, monuments, heritage films, national holidays, and discourses that emphasize the importance of what peacekeeping means to Canada and the world (Chapnick 2009, 206; Dorn 2005, 7).

However, cracks emerge in this source of national pride when considering how many Canadian peacekeeping operations have gone awry. To name a few: in 1964, key states were convinced by Canada to join the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that would extend for almost 30 years, making many question whether peacekeeping perpetuated rather than helped solve conflicts (Dorn 2005, 11). The 1990s particularly saw Canada struggle in peace operations. In Somalia in 1993, United Task Force (UNITAF) soldiers “ill-equipped for peacekeeping” committed atrocities and were convicted of torturing and murdering a Somali teenager who broke into their camp (Dorn 2005, 13; McCullough 2016, 46). In the former Yugoslavia, 2,500 Canadian UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers wondered “how can we practice peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep” as they were helpless to stop ethnic cleansing from taking place while the UN Security Council ineffectually passed resolutions they had no way of enforcing

(Dorn 2005, 14). In Bosnia, peacekeepers were also held hostage and used as human shields against air strikes (Dorn 2004, 14; McCullough 2016, 45). And perhaps most famously in Rwanda in April to July of 1994, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Force Commander Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian General, was left impotent by the UN and international community to prevent the slaughter of over 800,000 people in just 100 days (Dorn 2005, 8). General Dallaire's resulting post-traumatic stress disorder and attempted suicide were well documented in Canadian media, leaving scars on the national psyche and political culture around peacekeeping. As well, Canadian peacekeepers have abused their power while abroad as recently since 2011, with allegations of sexual abuse during the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (Gurney, 2019).

Outside of just UN peace operations, Canada's record deteriorates further. In 2013, peacekeeping was removed from Canada's citizenship guide and the country's peacekeeping centres were defunded and closed (McCullough 2016, 3). Although Canada continues to be one of the top financial contributors to peacekeeping missions, its commitments to uniformed peacekeeping personnel have drastically declined in the post-Cold War period, with over 3300 deployed in the early 1990s to an historic low of just 34 in June 2020, or one percent of its peak contributions (UN Peacekeeping 2020; Dorn 2020). Figure 1 and Figure 2 below show the negative decline in Canada's peacekeeping commitments, particularly and markedly since the end of the Cold War. As such, in problematizing Canada's honoured tradition on peacekeeping since it began diverging from its espoused commitment in the 1990s, a puzzle emerges as to why peacekeeping persists in the country's national identity and foreign policy when its material record has not lived up to its reification for quite some time. Any number of these events could have undermined the country's peacekeeping reputation, yet it remains in the fabric of the national political culture as a preferred and time-tested narrative.




Figure 1. Canadian contributions of uniformed peacekeeping personnel from 1950 to 2019 (Dorn 2020).



Figure 2. Canada's international rank in contributions to uniformed peacekeeping personnel at the UN, 1991 to 2020 (Dorn 2020).

The notion of strategic culture affords insight on this matter; hence this thesis explores, specifically, how the peacekeeping narrative persists in Canada's strategic culture. Enduring historical forces, symbols, narratives, and doctrines that influence states' strategic preferences comprise an overarching strategic culture. Existing within the larger strategic culture are distinct Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures whose worldviews compete for hegemony over foreign policy preferences and decision-making. In times of policy crisis, the strategic subcultures fight to become the new dominant lens through which decisions are made, producing diverging discourses and preferences to redefine the country's view of itself and its role in the world. In exploring the competing subcultures that have created Canada's peacekeeping tradition and policy peculiarities, it becomes possible to understand why the country's national identity and strategic culture can be at odds with its strategic behaviour.

In turn, the research question becomes: despite the fact that Canada no longer maintains a prominent peacekeeping presence in the world, why does the narrative of the country as a peacekeeping nation persist in its strategic culture? Secondary questions include: what are the competing subcultures in Canada's strategic culture? How have they undergone change since the end of the Cold War? Why has this process of strategic cultural change produced the observed contradictions between the promise and practice of peacekeeping? This thesis will find that although the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture that gave rise to the peacekeeping tradition is no longer the hegemonic worldview in Canada's strategic culture, it remains a potent vestigial force that continues to strike at the heart of what it means to be Canadian and helps contextualize the efficaciousness of the new Robust Western Ally hegemonic subculture's policy preferences. While the country's strategic culture has shifted towards domestic and alliance interests since 1991, the aura of peacekeeping persists as an intrinsic promise to Canadians for foreign policy success and prestige, allowing the new hegemonic subculture to appropriate the symbolism of these operations to justify and advance its own political practices going forward. Canada's peacekeeping legacy and its history of altruism, sacrifice, and international distinction endure as an enculturating force from the golden age of diplomacy, and in turn, a powerful discursive tool in constructing and reconstructing how Canadians view themselves and their role in the world.

In cultivating answers to these questions, this research will provide new insights on the discursive and historical power dynamics that give rise to strategic preferences around peacekeeping in Canada. There is a research gap in analyzing how the country's competing subcultures may have produced the contradictions currently observed. Consequently, this research will shed light on how competing subcultures have contributed to the gap between the promise and practice of peacekeeping. Outside of classical theories or material explanations, it is important to understand cultural forces that constitute decision-makers and institutions, especially with their resulting contradictory relationship between rhetoric and record on peacekeeping. As a result, this thesis will also contribute to the growing scholarship displaying the importance of cultural variables in explaining strategic behaviour and phenomena in international relations.

The ensuing chapters of this thesis will set out to answer the research question. This introduction, Chapter 1, has introduced the peculiarities in Canada's peacekeeping tradition, and why it is an important scholarly contribution to explore the dynamics that drive the endurance and divergence of strategic preferences on peacekeeping. Chapter 2 will introduce the literature on strategic culture, and provide a model for strategic cultural change that accounts for how Canada's competing subcultures can cause contradictions between preferences and behaviour. Next, Chapter 3 will introduce the methods, longitudinal case study, sources, and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis that will examine the competition between Canada's strategic subcultures from 1991 to 2017, the period in which the promise and practice of peacekeeping have diverged. Chapter 4 then presents the case study on how Canada's strategic culture has undergone change since the end of the Cold War, breaking down the process into phases of policy crisis, innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence to detail the competing and contradictory forces at each stage. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the case study, concluding that the peacekeeping narrative persists due to its enduring nature in national identity and strategic culture, and the symbolic potency of the peacekeeping narrative in framing the preferences of the new hegemonic subculture. In all, strategic culture is a persistent set of beliefs that makes peacekeeping resonate above any other foreign policy or tradition. Although the needs of the contemporary global order have rendered peacekeeping less efficacious, it continues to carry the promise of what it means to be Canadian in a chaotic world. Or at least, what people dream of what it means to be Canadian.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

There are theoretical and historical forces that help explain why peacekeeping persists in Canada's strategic culture. Rather than viewing the country's record and rhetoric as paradoxical, strategic culture theory explains how a nation's unique cultural experience can produce contradictory lenses through which strategic decisions are made, especially during times of turmoil. Moreover, these distinct lenses exist in Canada's strategic culture, where the country's experiences after World War II and the Suez Crisis have fostered two separate conceptions of Canada's role in the world. In situating the Canadian peacekeeping tradition within strategic culture theory, this chapter provides the context for the selection of the research question, methodology, and case study on how strategic cultural changes since 1991 have produced today's contradictions.

2.1 Theories of Strategic Culture and Change

Culture permeates layers of society in which community values are discovered, human thought is recorded, and the meaning of life is created through ordinary behaviour (Williams 2006, 32). Fields such as political culture and cultural politics have studied the impact of culture on social relations. Where cultural politics analyzes processes in which power is exercised through ideas, and daily activities, political culture identifies the distinctive clusters of attitudes embodied by individuals and institutions over time (Glick Schiller 1997, 2; Jackman and Ross 1996, 636; Putnam 1971, 652). The cultural turn in international relations saw the field begin to consider these dynamics. Arising as a critique of classical theories, strategic culture bridges the divide between cultural politics' focus on the power behind norms and political culture's conception of how those in power perpetuate those norms. Subsequently, strategic culture emerged over four generations as a framework for analyzing how decision-makers and institutions may be socialized towards distinct strategic preferences due to their surrounding political culture and cultural politics. More specifically, taken together, the four generations shed light on the enduring and distinct cultural forces that can influence strategic contradictions during times of change.

The first generation of strategic culture focuses on the context underpinning political decisions, beginning with the Cold War. Jack Snyder (1977, v) posited that divergences arose from American and Soviet nuclear strategists acting from their unique historical preconceptions that “achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of culture rather than mere policy”. They made decisions from fundamentally distinct political cultures, where the former had strong democratic, capitalist, and legal traditions and the latter was built upon imperial, autocratic, and bureaucratic ways (Ermarth 1978, 138-155). Colin Gray further developed the first generation, writing that strategic culture is the context that both shapes behaviour and is constituted by the behaviour of a political community. He defines strategic culture as the “persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray 1999, 51). It is fostered over time by history, politics, geography, national symbols, international conventions, military technology, and a strategic community’s perception of itself in relation to the world (Libben 2017, 326). Gray’s scholarship has been critiqued for being tautological and unfalsifiable in its all-encompassing definition of strategic culture that views everything as cultural and deterministic of strategic behaviour (Johnston 1999, 520-523; Poore 2003, 281). On the other hand, Gray (1999, 58-59) maintains that it is necessary to make this assumption, as the theoretical integrity of strategic culture will be undermined if it is just one conflicting explanation of strategic choice rather than the context which “surrounds” and “weaves together” habits of behaviour.

Building upon the first generation of strategic culture, the second generation critically views strategic culture as a tool of political hegemony. Bradley Klein (1988, 136-138) writes that strategic culture is created and exercised by hegemonic classes at the domestic and global levels to justify military action, and creates a self-serving dichotomy between their operational policies and rhetoric. During the Cold War, American strategists justified their nuclear deterrence strategies and created a strategic culture through declaratory and operational modes. Second generation scholars shed light on the uneven power dynamics through which strategic preferences can be produced. Yet critics question whether hegemonic classes can transcend the bounds of their strategic culture or whether they are constrained within the cultural modes of behaviour they

fostered (Johnston 1995, 40). This generation assigns more conscious agency to the hegemonic classes who shape strategic culture in their own interests, unlike the first generation, which perceives it as organically forged by the collective experience of a nation. Second generation scholars have been unable to prove this claim, and thus it is the least developed of the four generations.

The third generation of strategic culture is characterized by its positivist approach, spearheaded by Alastair Iain Johnston. By statistically analyzing close to 300 case studies, he aims to quantify tendencies towards certain strategic behaviours. He defines strategic culture as:

An integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. (Johnston 1995, 46)

He critiques previous generations' tautological shortcomings of using patterns of strategic behaviour as the independent variable and in turn conflating it with the same phenomenon of strategic culture they sought to measure as the dependent variable (Uz Zaman 2009, 80). Importantly, Gray (1999, 51) supports making strategic culture more methodologically rigorous, but he questions Johnston's attempt to delineate culture as one of several variables influencing strategy. Gray (1999, 59) insists that for strategic culture to work, they must acknowledge "the methodologically appalling truth that [...] all strategic behaviour is effected by human beings who cannot help but be cultural agents" and in turn, all variables cannot help but be cultural variables.

Furthermore, critiques across the previous three generations include their homogenous and static conceptions of strategic culture. The fourth generation of strategic culture takes up this debate, arguing that a strategic culture consists of subcultures that compete for hegemonic influence. The most influential subculture determines the status quo, normative profile, and political preferences of the security community (Howlett and Glenn 2005, 127). Each subculture has a unique identity constructed by the worldview of its elite group. Elites are members of epistemic communities, characterized by their privileged access to the public sphere by virtue of their profession and competence on public matters (Libel 2016, 140). Moreover, they act on causes they perceive as important to wider society in order to validate and grow their legitimacy (Cross

2013, 142). The fourth generation introduces the missing notion that one strategic culture can be comprised of differing lenses through which states make strategic decisions, allowing for an appreciation of why behaviour may differ from dominant preferences if there are several lenses available to decision-makers (Libben 2017, 327). More importantly, the fourth generation explores how strategic culture is not static but can actually undergo change in times of crisis, thereby setting a more rigorous approach for understanding how ideological struggle between subcultures can cause shifts in the dominant strategic culture (Karásek 2016, 114).




Figure 3. Fourth generation framework for change in strategic culture (Libel 2016, 141).

Figure 3 displays Tamir Libel's (2016, 142) model for change in strategic culture. Actors include the hegemonic subculture, whose views hold a common sense status in political culture, and marginalized subcultures, whose views strive for influence on the margins. Change is triggered by an event of strategic shock that causes the hegemonic subculture's collapse, spurring the marginalized subcultures to compete for control over the policy-making process. Epistemic communities then revitalize and bundle together their expert opinions on strategy ("policy innovation"), in turn widely lobbying their ideas to decision-makers through public debates that assign urgency and efficacy to the emerging worldviews ("policy diffusion") (Libel 2016, 142). This ideological competition in expert and public discourses ensues over time as leaders weigh the slate of strategic preferences against the new political climate ("policy selection"), until one

subculture succeeds in having their worldview consistently selected and executed in policy documents (“policy persistence”), thus becoming the new hegemonic subculture (Karásek 2016, 113; Libel 2016, 142). This framework solves previous critiques of homogeneity and over-determination by identifying a casual mechanism for change in the event of strategic shock, delineating between dependent and independent variables, and detailing rival strategic worldviews underpinning a heterogeneous strategic culture.

Drawing on the four generations of scholarship, four assumptions must be made clear. First, humans and institutions cannot help being encultured and so everything must be viewed as cultural. Second, a strategic culture is comprised of subcultures with distinct worldviews of the country’s history, politics, and capabilities. Third, strategic culture is an enduring but not static force that sees change and contradictions over time due to the shifting balance of power between subcultures. Fourth, members of epistemic communities comprise the subcultures, giving them elite access to the social transmission of their worldview among the public and policy makers. These assumptions regarding strategic culture will be applied as it recognizes the encompassing, persistent, yet dynamic social forces underpinning strategic culture. It goes beyond the material factors of classical theories to account for how culture shapes what is desirable and possible in strategy. Moreover, it allows for a strategic culture to possess heterogeneous worldviews whose struggle for influence explain why policies may contradict paradigmatic norms.

2.2 Strategic Subcultures in Canada

Canada’s military and foreign policy history has fostered three distinct subcultures, two of which provide insights on country’s current contradictory promise and practice of peacekeeping. As a result of the high costs of Canadian involvement in World War I, the country developed an Isolationist strategic culture that preferred a more reserved position involving low levels of cooperation with countries other than the United States, and avoiding the use of force domestically or internationally (Bloomfield and Nossal 2007, 298; Massie 2008, 25). However, it soon lost eminence following the strategic shock of Canada’s role in World War II, the Suez Crisis, and subsequent internationalist turn in its foreign policy. External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson led Canada to its preeminent peacekeeping moment by recommending to the UN that an

“international peace and police force” be created to de-escalate the conflict in Egypt (Dorn 2005, 9). Pearson’s recommendation would become what has been recognized as the first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), and he was consequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.

Through Pearson’s accomplishments, Canada redefined itself as a visionary of global peace and security. The country responded with overwhelming pride in Pearson’s achievements, celebrating him as the “father of peacekeeping,” Canadian forces as “the first peacekeepers,” and Pearson’s award as “a Nobel Prize for Canada” (Carroll 2016, 170). Moreover, it set into motion what has been called Canada’s “golden age of diplomacy” (Chapnick 2009, 206) and a process of strategic cultural change. Peacekeeping was highlighted across public discourses and policy documents, making society saturated with narratives of its accomplishments. As Canada participated in every peace operations between 1948 and 1988, contributing ten percent of all Blue Helmets during that time, the nation was recognized as a “natural peacekeeper, an objective helpful fixer, seeking to do what is morally right on the international stage in the cause of peace” (Massie and Vucetic 2020, 38; Carroll 2016, 168). Across the country, international peacekeeper training centres, heritage films, national holidays, and monuments were created that entrenched peacekeeping within the fabric of the national identity (Dorn 2005, 7). Just as the new ten-dollar bill was released with a peacekeeper emblazoned on its back, a national poll announced that peacekeeping ranked among the top symbols for the country (McCullough 2016, 5). To date, peacekeeping invokes sentiments of global service, sacrifice, and courage among citizens of all backgrounds. As a result of this saturation of narratives around Canada’s new place in the world, the country gained two new subcultures, further diminishing the role of the former Isolationist worldview.

Canada as a Pearsonian Internationalist and as a Robust Western Ally are the subcultures that persist in the strategic landscape to this day, and are the two subcultures relevant to this thesis in explaining the country’s contradictory promise and practice on peacekeeping. Foremost, the new hegemonic subculture after World War II and the Suez Crisis was Pearsonian Internationalism and was centred on altruistic, liberal, middle-power internationalism (Libben 2017, 332). This subculture prioritizes promoting values within international institutions and only using force in the

interest of international stability, particularly in peacekeeping operations (Libben 2017, 333). Canadians had accrued a deep sense of national pride as a middle power state who created modern day peacekeeping, making it a common-sense strategic disposition for Canada. Peacekeeping embodied the promise of being a helpful, objective fixer in Canadian identity and helped the country gain international esteem while leading within the bounds of the global rules-based order. It also served Canada's desire to be distinct from their American ally's more assertive, hard power-centric style of foreign affairs. The second subculture arising from this period that unsuccessfully competed for hegemony viewed Canada as a Robust Western Ally. Canada's role in the Allied efforts in World War II and the first peacekeeping force constituted the country's ability to contribute above its middle power weight to western security (Libben 2017, 333). It supported protecting the values of Canada and its allies ahead of the global community, which is viewed as an ineffective forum of consensus that requires states to compromise on national goals. The subculture further supports fostering strong military capabilities to secure a seat at high-level forums like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Group of 7 (G7), and will use force in its own interests with less consideration of international authorization. With its focus on allies rather than the international community, this subculture did not take hold during a period when Canada was viewed as a global peacekeeper.

While Libben explores Canada's strategic subcultures vis-à-vis how their dispositions towards military capabilities align with peacekeeping, no scholars have undertaken work to see how these competing worldviews have changed over time and perpetuated, or challenged, the narrative around the country's peacekeeping tradition. As well, there remains a gap in the literature on cultural explanations, rather than just material or economic explanations, for why peacekeeping has such thick ties to both strategic culture and national identity in Canada. Section 2.1 displayed that competing worldviews exist and can change in hegemonic status over time, and now this chapter has outlined the existence of influential subcultures in Canada whose differing views pull national strategic preferences in contradictory directions. In turn, the remainder of this thesis will explore how Pearsonian Internationalism and Robust Western Ally worldviews compete amongst themselves in creating today's peacekeeping contradictions.

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design and Methods

Libel's model for change in strategic culture provides the interpretive and inductive building blocks for answering the research question of why peacekeeping continues to be a dominant narrative in Canada's strategic culture despite the country no longer playing a prominent peacekeeping role. A longitudinal case study will be used to understand the process of change in strategic culture through policy crisis, innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence. As strategic culture comprises enduring but not permanent worldviews, longitudinal research helps analyze the shifts between subcultures over time. Moreover, this research design supports the analysis of the dynamic forces among the competing subcultures that slowly give rise to the contradictions between the promise and practice of peacekeeping. The power dynamics since the end of Cold War between Canada's two main strategic subcultures are analyzed, as identified by Joshua Libben (2017, 332): Pearsonian Internationalism and Robust Western Ally. These two subcultures arose from an event of strategic shock that gave rise to the peacekeeping tradition, and it is fitting for a longitudinal study to explore how their competition for strategic dominance have produced today's peacekeeping dynamics.

In addition, Libel's (2016, 141) framework identifies the types of primary sources from which data was collected to analyze the competition between subcultures. The elites in the epistemic communities comprising the subcultures act from positions of power in order to assert their worldview as the dominant strategic lens, and these assertions are reflected in key documents and statements that created Canada's peacekeeping worldview. First, statements of expert networks within academic studies reflect the policy innovation stage initiated by epistemic communities repositioning their worldviews. Second, press debates in the national mass media shed light on the policy diffusion stage where epistemic communities strive for influence in mainstream discourses and debates. Third, policy documents such as defence white papers, foreign policy statements, and political speeches illuminate the policy selection and policy persistence phases where decision-makers select from the newly proposed worldviews and display preference for that lens in subsequent discussions and decisions. The time horizon of the selected data is from

1991 to 2017, as this period coincides with when the contradiction between strategic culture and strategic behaviour emerged. Importantly, the selection of this data according to Libel's framework represents the passage of time and cross-sections of the country where ideas, traditions, and attitudes are socially transmitted and entrenched by epistemic communities among ordinary Canadians as well as decision-makers.

Furthermore, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) methodology is applied to analyze the discursive practices employed by competing subcultures to construct, frame, and entrench their worldviews as hegemonic strategic preferences. Michel Foucault (1967, 8) writes that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality". In essence, he is concerned with how games of truth were conducted in public domains, or how procedures of power are utilized to legitimize or delegitimize particular results or behaviours. In turn, Foucault's approach to discourse aligns with Libel's framework. The former's concern with the genealogy of historical knowledge production, or how the (re)construction of an event in history can alter one's perception of the present (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2008, 6), supports how subcultures innovate, diffuse, and compete for the selection of their distinct worldview based on shared histories. FDA's understanding of mechanisms and functioning of power show how ideas diffused in expert, media, and political discourses create people and institutions as subjects within a subculture's construction of reality, negating divisions between ideas and actions of the subculture and necessarily encultured subject (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2008, 4; Wickham and Kendall 1999, 139). Furthermore, FDA helps problematize subcultures' uses technologies of power, the assemblages of human knowledge that act upon human conduct to produce desirable behaviour and avert undesirable actions, as well as technologies of the self, the acts of subjection that indicate how one can effect their own meaning and transform themselves to achieve happiness within a moral order (Rose 1999, 52; Foucault 1988, 18). Subcultures leverage technologies of power and self to frame their worldviews as paradigmatic in order to shape and control national strategic preferences, and undermine the worldviews of other competing subcultures. Moreover, FDA sheds light on the

positionality of those influencing change in strategic culture, and how through their socially recognized purviews of power, they constitute themselves and their surroundings in the process.

Based on the aforementioned FDA principles, a corpus of statements was selected from the according to their:

- Reflection of the worldviews of the Pearsonian Internationalist or Robust Western Ally subcultures;
- Constitution of peacekeepers, decision-makers, and the public as discursive objects of the subculture;
- Formation of the conditions of possibility for the discursive objects according to the subculture's worldview; and,
- Historical variability in the discussion or representation of discursive objects and their range of possibilities.

To shed light on how the two subcultures compete in academic papers, news articles, and policy statements, these principles guide the collection of data most insightful to evaluating and analyzing shifts in Canada's strategic culture over the time horizon. The shaping of power and knowledge structures around peacekeeping, and Canadians' relation to them, happens over time by diverging subculture forces, and these principles help focus the data collection on the discourses that best show how they are appropriated to advance or subvert worldviews.

The corpus of statements is also evaluated in its production and reproduction of the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures using the following criteria and questions:

- Problematizations. What has made this kind of strategic thought possible? How are strategic preferences rendered problematic and who is permitting the circulation of these moral judgements on peacekeeping? What subcultures do these statements serve in being visible and impactful? In problematizing statements otherwise taken at face value, FDA traces how discursive objects around peacekeeping are governed and constituted by the competing subcultures.
- Technologies of power and self. How is the subculture leveraging knowledge, institutions, symbols, or spaces to act upon norms and preferences around

peacekeeping? How is the subculture leveraging knowledge, institutions, symbols, or spaces to act upon individuals and decision-makers in relation to peacekeeping? Technologies of power and self constitute the truth games played by competing subcultures to govern conduct around peacekeeping from a distance through socially recognized avenues of knowledge production.

- Subject positions. What moral standing or privilege is possessed by the source of the statement to endow the discourse and subculture with significance? What forces gave rise to the moral standing or privilege of the source of the strategic statement? How does this affect the version of reality held by the source of the statement or subculture? This facet of FDA exposes the repertoire of cultural discourses available to speakers, showing how their claims of truth regarding peacekeeping become more persuasive depending on their location within the Canadian social order.
- Subjectification. How are the peacekeepers, decision-makers, and public constituted as subjects of the strategic subculture? Are the subjects imbued with an ethical goal or imperative on peacekeeping within the subculture? How are these subjects made to self-regulate themselves within the moral order of the subculture? Such questions show how the public and decision-makers are encultured towards certain strategic preferences on peacekeeping, depending on the efficaciousness of that subculture's moral order in relation to their perception of themselves and their role in the world.

FDA supports the theoretical underpinnings of this research that the discourses and practices around peacekeeping in Canada are organized in an enculturated, regular, and systemic manner arising from competing strategic subcultures. Power over the dominant worldview on peacekeeping circulates throughout society, and this methodology permits the analysis of political documents and statements from a historical cross-section of the socially-constructed strategic environment. Moreover, FDA deconstructs the strategic cultural systems of meaning-making to understand why certain tenets of worldviews were adopted as truths while others were marginalized. Consequently, this methodology provides the most relevant tools for answering the research question.

3.2 Limitations of Research

Limitations arise from the use of strategic culture theory and FDA methodology. Recalling Johnston's critique of over-determination, both the theory and methodology for this research hold that everything is cultural and constitutive of power-knowledge relationships. As such, there is risk in making inferences from where there is an immeasurable and culturally-subjective relationship between strategic culture and strategic outcomes. These challenges are mitigated through evaluating findings against related scholarship and prioritizing the pursuit of clear relationships in the data that show how perspectives are shaped and how subculture discourses frame the way in which Canadians view the world.

Chapter 4. Case Study: Peacekeeping and Change in Canada's Strategic Culture

The contradictions in Canada's peacekeeping tradition can be analyzed and explained through Libel's model of strategic cultural change in phases of policy crisis, innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence. Throughout each phase, FDA sheds light on how the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures compete to attain hegemony through problematizations, technologies, subject positions, and subjectification that construct, reconstruct, and entrench their perception of peacekeeping and Canada's role in the world as the predominant worldview, with contradictory effects at times.

4.1 Policy Crisis

The events of the Cold War not only led to the collapse of the bipolar world order but it also precipitated the strategic shock that would redefine Canada's hegemonic strategic culture. The early years of the Cold War coincided with the country's golden age of diplomacy. Canada's strategy of middle power diplomacy thrived as it was a founding member of the UN and NATO, the leading peacekeeping nation, and enjoyed international positions of esteem due to its reputation as a mediator and promoter of global order. However, in the tumult that led to the fall of the Soviet Union, cracks would emerge in the dominant Pearsonian Internationalist strategic culture. Opening new possibilities for the Robust Western Ally subculture, it was untenable for Canada to remain impartial during the Cold War due to its political, economic, and geographic proximity to the United States. Brian Mulroney's Conservative government came to power in 1984 with the aim of refurbishing its relations with America and focusing on continental defence (Brglez 2014, 35). Mulroney declared that "good relations, super relations, with the US will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy" and worked towards the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Barton 1990, 38). By the time the Soviet Union fell from power and the United States became the sole global hegemon in December 1991, Mulroney had laid the socio-political groundwork for the strategic shock to trigger change in the dominant strategic culture.

The collapse of the old world order that had given rise to Canada's golden age of diplomacy, and the emergence of a new world order led by its closest geopolitical ally, made Canada fundamentally reconsider its strategic priorities and capabilities. During his Stanford University centennial convocation speech in September 1991, Mulroney told attendees that after a conflict on par with a third world war, both Canada and the United States must lead together in charting "the course of peace" since "there is no map to the future, no instruction book to the new world order – we have only our values and the hard-earned lessons of the past to go on" (Mulroney 1991). In drawing parallels between the last global upheaval that transformed Canada's strategic culture, Mulroney problematizes the Cold War as it necessitates the production of new knowledge and norms around international peace and security, and more specifically, Canada's role in upholding it. The symbol of a third world war acts as a technology of power in necessitating a new era of strategy for Canada's place in the world, as well as a technology of the self in telling audiences that the strength of their values will help forge a new world order. As Prime Minister, Mulroney saw Canada through a significant portion of the Cold War, endowing him with a privileged subject position to speak on how cumulative events of the past will influence the country's strategic preferences going forward. Moreover, as a leader who fostered closer ties to the United States throughout the Cold War, the country that would eventually become the sole hegemon, he constitutes Americans and Canadians as essential subjects in building the new world order and strategic culture. Mulroney acknowledges the strong values and lessons in their shared histories, and imbues both countries with the ethical goal of leveraging these norms to chart the course of peace for the international community. His discourse creates a version of reality wherein Canada acts as the right hand of the new hegemon in regulating global order and norms. In announcing Canada's place alongside the United States in a unipolar world, Mulroney's words mark a shift away from the "global boy scout" image fostered by the Pearsonian Internationalism subculture and opens the country to competition from the Robust Western Ally discourse.

The uncertainty surrounding Canada's strategic direction was not just limited to Mulroney's public statements, but also spread to the Members of Parliament (MPs) who represent the interests of Canadians and shape federal policy. In November 1991, John Brewin, New Democratic Party (NDP) MP for Victoria, asked the House of Commons, "What is the threat to

Canada? [...] There is no country, other than the United States of America, that could successfully invade Canada [...] The hard question for Canadians is to what extent do we contribute militarily to security in other areas of the world. The clear answer, in which all Canadians agree, is that we participate in UN peacekeeping” (Canada 1991a). The next month, Beryl Gaffney, the Liberal MP for Nepean, added, “As we face new challenges we can again be a voice in this birth of international co-operation, openness and compassion which will seek to free all people. [...] Of late, however, there have been many examples in which the actions have not lived up to the rhetoric (Canada 1991b). Both MPs acknowledge the paradigmatic shifts in the global landscape that require it to re-envision its strategic priorities. On one hand, Brewin’s statement introduces an intriguing discursive power game between tenets of the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures. In accordance with the former subculture, peacekeeping continues to be a paradigmatic strategic preference with which to continue in the post-Cold War era. Yet in alignment with the latter subculture, America is framed as a benevolent presence to the south who has the power to be a threat but rather chooses to be an ally. With the new unipolar world order, there is the inherent call to value their close and privileged relationship with the United States, but there is also the entrenched identity for Canada to continue answering the call to participate in peacekeeping and global stability. These strategic statements speak to the contrasting factions that now make up Canada’s post-Cold War strategic landscape, but problematize where the ultimate moral order lays for the country’s next steps. Moreover, Gaffney makes the observation that there have been recent examples in which Canada’s rhetoric has contradicted its actions. Not fulfilling its international obligation to maintaining global peace and security contravenes the subjectification of the country’s reputation and ethical imperative within the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture, and sheds light on the cracks within its hegemonic status. While Gaffney’s statement aligns with the tenets of Pearsonian Internationalism, her recognition of its vulnerability problematizes its entrenchment within national identity and strategic preferences. It undermines the version of reality created by the hegemonic subculture to make the audience question its veracity in the new world order.

As such, with statements coming from political leadership and across party lines and geographies, the Cold War introduced the strategic shock that undermined the hegemonic

Pearsonian Internationalist subculture to open the door for competition for the Robust Western Ally subculture. With a new security landscape and emerging conflicts for which Canada needed new strategic worldviews to solve, the country was made to explore new possibilities for its role in the world and vis-a-vis its allies as it embarked on a process of change in its strategic culture.

4.2 Policy Innovation and Policy Diffusion

After the strategic shock of the end of the Cold War, Canada's subcultures began a competition in expert and mass media discourses to revitalize and lobby their innovative worldview as the hegemonic strategic lens. The 1990s saw developments that fuelled the competition, including a proliferation of peacekeeping missions to younger, fragile states that resulted in Canada once again leading the world in uniformed peacekeeping personnel. The country also fostered deeper ties to multilateral alliances with the UN, NATO, and G7. Amidst these developments, expert narratives from academia fuelled debates in the media, shaping the perceptions and discussions of Canada's future abroad. Specifically, three trends emerged that characterized the competition and ensuing strategic contradictions between the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures.

First, there was a dichotomy between Canada's tradition of internationalism and its new opportunity in multilateralism. Articles increasingly questioned the relevance internationalism and peacekeeping in the new world order, compared to articles defending peace operations. One defender of internationalism was Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Jean Chrétien's Liberal government, who wrote in the *International Journal* that the country can continue to innovate its peacekeeping tradition following the Cold War: "with this proprietary interest in peacekeeping, it was natural for Canada to take a leadership role in assessing how the United Nations might expand its activities to protect populations from intrastate conflict. [...] The concept of peacekeeping evolved out of Canadian experiences on the ground, and it will continue to be refined in the same way" (Axworthy 1997, 185-186). In alignment with the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture, Axworthy leverages technologies of power in Canada's legacy and national identity as a peacekeeper to position it as the "natural" leader for peace operations within the new world order. Speaking from a position of political power over a file for which he is directly

responsible, Axworthy's statement carries weight as he asserts the continued need for peacekeeping and Canada's role in reforming it for contemporary conflicts. As the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture held a hegemonic status not too long ago, his statement is endowed with an aura of common sense. Although the world has changed, the continuation of Canada's peacekeeping tradition is rendered as the obvious path. Axworthy was an outspoken figure in the 1990s championing Canada's soft power through its expertise in middle power public diplomacy, and so he continued to foster a reality in which the country would continue, and even innovate, its peacekeeping tradition to solve the intrastate conflicts of the post-Cold War era (Chapnick 2000, 203).

Yet articles advocating for a more multilateral approach to foreign policy were more prevalent, especially in relation to the country's American counterparts. Some wrote that "Canadian interests would be better served by a more considered approach to world order in Washington, one that recognized both the urgency of continued American commitment and the need to work co-operatively to meet the demands of a changing international setting" (Sarty 1993, 774) while others argued that "with its connections and credibility - first in North America, then in the Group of Seven industrialized nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [...] - Canada will be drawn automatically into the centre of multilateral renovation efforts" (Gordon and Wood 1992, 502). Internationalist worldviews are rendered problematic in the new world order where it is argued that Canadian interests are better advanced through closer collaboration with America and multilateral alliances. This suggested that as new states join the international community, Canada's voice at the UN may get lost in the growing melee of global interests. In order to preserve Canada's privileged position, the articles push for the country to stake its place beside the United States and within multilateral coalitions. This technology of power draws on the character of Canadian foreign policy and its need to be distinct. Canadian identity, and particularly the Robust Western Ally subculture, thrives upon garnering seats at decision-making tables above and beyond what usually befits a middle power. In turn this academic discourse promotes shifting from internationalist agendas like peacekeeping when the country can better advocate for itself through multilateralism and continentalism.

The shifting narratives on internationalism and multilateralism in turn transitioned from the academic sphere to mass media. Axworthy and members of the academic community sparred in competing newspaper articles, where critics called his statements a “foreign policy for wimps” that “generated a rhetoric of egoism” and did not fit Canada’s role in the new world order (Nossal 1998, A19; Chapnick 2000, 204). As the competition between the subcultures intensified on whether internationalism or multilateralism should be the primary tenet of the country’s foreign policy, a former policy analyst in Axworthy’s Department of Foreign Affairs declared in an article that “the day of Pearson internationalism is past” and wrote:

Canada is no longer a global player with global interests. The future of our foreign policy lies not all over the map but in the Americas, where our most vital economic and security interests actually complement our international idealism.

[...] The sad truth is that at the very moment Canada’s foreign policy needs to break out of its Cold War mold, it’s become ensnared by the institutional memories of the Liberal Party and a prime minister hankering for international attention. The current government needs to wake up to the fact that conventional peacekeeping is an anachronism in a world where states are primarily concerned with protecting their economic power.

[...] Yet Mr. Axworthy is beholden to a party that has beatified Pearsonian internationalism and created a culture at Foreign Affairs where common-sense bilateralism is treated as heresy. (Griffiths 1997, D3)

The author occupies a unique subject position as a former employee who directly observed the flaws he is critiquing, assigning him increased legitimacy in his statements. He problematizes the country’s internationalist foreign policy and preference for peacekeeping in a world whose conflicts have outgrown the bounds of what Canada is equipping itself to do. He uses technologies of power and self to frame the country’s Cold War foreign policy as an outdated mindset and urges the subject reading the article to look beyond the traditions of the past towards the opportunity of bilateralism and the Americas. The article further imbues the subject with the new ethical goal of promoting peace and commerce through alliances and bilateral relations, as internationalism of the country’s golden age of diplomacy has become futile. Such sentiments upend the entrenched version of reality in the minds of the security community in which internationalism and peacekeeping were paradigmatic worldviews. In actuality, that perception has become a beatified notion from an idealistic government that is chasing a bygone era of foreign policy, letting present

day multilateral opportunities pass them by. Media critiques of Canada's internationalism pervaded the 1990s, and this article displays the growing tensions and contradictions between the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures.

The second development that emerged during the policy innovation and diffusion phase was the perceived peace dividend from the conclusion of the Cold War. Canada felt it did not need to invest as heavily in defence spending since it was no longer at war, and could reallocate funds to paying down the deficit. After he was elected in 1993, Chrétien began to cut hundreds of millions from the defence budget. Although support for peacekeeping remained popular among the public and policymakers who continued to contribute peacekeepers to UN and NATO-led missions, academics wrote that "it was already 'open season' on the defence budget" and wondered "how it would be possible to justify the cost of purchasing and maintaining costly military hardware in the absence of obvious security justifications" (Martin and Fortmann 1995, 388-396). Such statements from the expert community influenced the position of both competing subcultures. On one hand, underpinning the academic discourse was the assumption that since there were fewer threats abroad Canada could make cuts to its defence spending to focus on continental security, as per the Robust Western Ally subculture. It leverages the post-war climate to negate the importance of international threats and emphasizes domestic interests. On the other hand, these defence cuts, masked by the Chrétien government's rhetoric around being a strong peacekeeping nation, undermined the country's capabilities to live up to its internationalist aspirations. This game of truth between the government's stated intentions versus its underlying actions was a sign of the increasing divide between the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures. While peacekeeping remained an effective technology of power and self to gain support for a policy and ease the blow of the defence budget cuts, these cuts harmed the standing of the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture by eliminating the military foundations that went into its peacekeeping operations. The country could not continue to live up to its peacekeeping rhetoric if it did not have the capabilities in place.

Sentiments on the future of defence spending spread through the media landscape and diffused into the public and strategic community. Newspapers reported on changes in public attitudes on whether the country in fact needed a military, the results of which affirmed the need

for armed forces but only with a focus on territorial defence, peacekeeping, and alliances (Healey 1995, A13). Defence experts analyzed Canada's diminished capabilities, with one saying, "there was always a broad consensus that we had a role in Europe, we had a role in peacekeeping and we had responsibilities in North America. But now, given the radical change in the security environment and the financial environment, that consensus is in the process of quite extensive disintegration" (York 1993, A6). The media discourse reflects the shifting problematization within Canada's strategic culture on what conflicts were considered their purview. Although peacekeeping was still a tenet of defence policy, with new attitudes towards global security the focus became more selective and favoured strategies in alignment with the Robust Western Ally subculture. No longer did the media frame discourses around Canada as a global peacekeeper, per the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture, but it turned towards the Robust Western Ally subculture in arguing that Canada still had a role to play abroad, but through a more financially-responsible manner with a focus on domestic security and alliances. In turn, the reality previously constructed by the internationalist subculture began to fade as stringent criteria were established before committing to the previously automatic peacekeeping commitments, such as sufficient financing and the overriding of consent if operations were undertaken in the interests of NATO allies (Canada 1994, 5).

The third and final trend of the ensuing policy innovation and diffusion phase saw a shift in perceptions due to the increased complexity of peacekeeping conflicts. There was a rising demand for skilled peacekeepers involving ethnic, intrastate conflicts rather than the ideological, interstate dilemma that had characterized the Cold War. Contrasting with Canada's golden age of diplomacy that involved UN-sanctioned forces deployed as *peacekeepers* upon a ceasefire agreement, these emerging conflicts often required countries to send forces to be *peacemakers* in active fighting zones (Whitworth 1995, 431; Dorn 2005, 12). Such a situation tested Pearsonian Internationalism's low casualty tolerance and penchant for more peaceful modes of achieving cooperation, and strengthened the Robust Western Ally's willingness to engage in higher-risk conflicts if it is in its strategic interests. Consequently, in order to ensure human security in the complex post-Cold War era, academic experts argued that Canada should be drawn into more combat operations rather than peacekeeping. The US-led Gulf War "served as a reminder that,

well before the development of the Pearsonian idea of peacekeeping in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis, collective security had been the UN model for international stability” and that “what the international community is now doing... is to feel its way through to implementing the UN’s basic preventative enforcement functions... If successful this would render peacekeeping unnecessary” (Gammer 2001, 69). These statements from the academic community display a distinct policy innovation and diffusion of the Robust Western Ally subculture. The entrenched technology of power of peacekeeping is leveraged and criticized alongside the subculture’s new strategic preference of peacemaking. It problematizes peacekeeping as it was previously conceived, and speaking with the authority of where the international community is now headed, it elevates peacemaking operations as the new strategic model. It also problematizes the core of the country’s peacekeeping tradition that Pearson’s Nobel-winning idea was the mode of conflict resolution par excellence. In fact, peacekeeping is constituted as an ineffective strategy in the new world order, while interventionist, coalition-led peacemaking operations are imbued as the new standard. These media discourses advance a new reality wherein Canadians can no longer claim peacekeeping as their global comparative advantage, but can once again attain prestige through finding a niche in multilateral affairs, a notion that strikes at the core of the Robust Western Ally subculture.

Furthering the diffusion of the need for greater intervention powers in peace operations were the responses to Canada’s experiences in peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. Reeling from its failures in Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, media narratives fuelled the shifting nature of Canada’s international participation in peacekeeping, with one article stating:

Five years ago, with the theory and practice of peacekeeping in a full-blown crisis, journalist David Rieff wrote that UN peace operations needed a “period of reflection and redefinition.”

Since then, a lively intellectual industry has churned out millions of words about how peace must no longer be kept, but rather must be made, enforced, built, observed, monitored, nurtured or cultivated, depending on the circumstances. And there is no shortage of case studies. (Knox 1999, A19)

Peacekeeping, once Canada’s proud tradition, is now problematized and framed as a crisis, showing the diminishing power of the old hegemonic subculture. The author not only uses their journalistic privilege to endow their argument with legitimacy, but also draws on the “millions of words” written by experts on how a more interventionist form of peacemaking is needed following

the deterioration of the country's peacekeeping legacy, a proposition that supports the Robust Western Ally subculture. Their positions of power lend importance to changing the ethical goal of peace operations and how they should be conducted. Instead of continuing to be subjects to the ineffective Pearsonian subculture, readers are influenced to buy into this new reality of peacemaking to build upon their mistakes and cultivate a better future. The country's aspiration to be an advocate for global peace and security is not called into question as it is a core tenet of overarching Canadian identity and strategic culture, but merely the means through which the country pursues this goal. Moreover, UNITAF, UNPROFOR, and UNAMIR are not just historical missions, but "case studies", implying an empirical detachment from the narrative that equips the article with an expert purview rather than punditry. It legitimizes the worldview of the Robust Western Ally subculture as it appears rooted in scientific research as a way of dimming the aura of Canada's golden age of diplomacy that persists in public narratives, even despite its failures.

4.3 Policy Selection and Policy Persistence

The success of the subcultures' innovation and diffusion of worldviews on peacekeeping is reflected in their selection and persistence in Canadian policy documents and political statements. Since the end of the Cold War, four defence white papers and foreign policy statements have been published, reflecting the country's shifting attitudes towards international peace and security. The latency of these policies is further perpetuated in the material actions and statements of the political leaders charged with implementing those policies. Due to the competing worldviews of the Pearsonian Internationalist and Robust Western Ally subcultures as well as shifting political landscapes, the policy papers do not always align with public discourses. As such, the contradictions between Canada's promise and practice of peacekeeping become more pronounced as subcultures' worldviews are selected and implemented in the strategic landscape.

Foremost in December 1994, the Chrétien government released its modestly named *White Paper on Defence* that was grounded in domestic determinants instead of international demands. Emerging from the shadows of its recent peacekeeping failures, disappointment in the UN community to help prevent those failures, and the need to pay down the deficit accrued in part

from those failures, the white paper sets a clear scope for its defence planning amidst the shifting global landscape and budget constraints. It states:

The Cold War is over. [...] At present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada, and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores. However, Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces.

We must maintain a prudent level of military force to:

- Deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime;
- Generate larger forces if needed; and
- Participate effectively in multilateral peace and stability operations and, if and when required, in the defence of North America and our allies in Europe, and in response to aggression elsewhere.

We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel.

This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combat capable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities. (Canada 1994, 3)

In contrast to the internationalist policies of previous white papers, and in alignment with the Robust Western Ally subculture, contemporary conflicts are framed as “far from Canada's shores” and so the national interest becomes retaining armed forces to protect Canada and its allies first, and the rest of the international community second. The conclusion of the Cold War is leveraged as a technology of power to assert that there are no direct threats that require a large military presence abroad, in turn removing Canada as a global citizen and constituting it as a strong ally within its continental community. The white paper argues that the reality contrived from Canada's golden age of diplomacy and peacekeeping is gone due to the increasingly complex conflicts they are forced to address. In alignment with the Robust Western Ally subculture, peacekeepers are no longer the subjects embodying Canada's strategic culture and operations, but rather “multi-purpose combat capable forces” who will protect the interests of Canada and its allies. No longer is the moral order of Canada's foreign policy endowed with significance in its relationship to the global community, but more narrowly by domestic and Western interests. As the policy paints the new reality as peaceful, there remains little need to maintain a robust peacekeeping presence abroad when there are more pressing concerns at home.

However, during the public consultations preceding the 1994 white paper, peacekeeping was the only defence policy clearly supported by Canadians and so the government was pressured into retaining a clear operational commitment towards peace operations in order to preserve popular support and funding for its new mandate during Chrétien's austerity (Martin and Fortmann 1995, 388). In turn, the Chrétien government was characterized by espousing internationalist and peacekeeping platitudes such as, "We are always there, like the Boy Scouts" (Pearlstein 1999, A24), but in reality, paring back the defence capabilities that enabled them. Both Chrétien and Axworthy gave speeches at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) affirming Canada's commitment to internationalism while cutting military spending back home. In 1996, Axworthy told the UNGA:

Canadians take special pride in peacekeeping because the concept was developed in part by their Foreign Minister, Lester B. Pearson, who received the Nobel Prize for his efforts.

[...] In our time, different as it may be, the spirit of internationalism, of commitment to cooperation, calls to us once again. In a new and changing global environment internationalism is ever more important for all nations, large or small, weak or powerful.

[...] We in 1996 must show ourselves capable of restoring the spirit of 1956 when, in the deepest freeze of the cold-war climate, the United Nations gave birth to peacekeeping and changed international relations forever. (UNGA 1996, 12-17)

Axworthy is playing truth games in proclaiming Canada's internationalist intentions in front of global leaders, while ignoring the reality of how his government is defunding its defence capabilities away from their gazes. It is politically advantageous for him to maintain the Pearsonian Internationalist worldview and leverage Pearson's Nobel Prize as a technology of power among his international audience in order to project Canadian soft power. Adopting the Robust Western Ally worldview on continental defence would not resonate with the UNGA audience, and so Axworthy projects an alternate reality in which Canada continues to be a shining example of peacekeeping in international relations, drawing on historical narratives and symbols to ensure his statement aligns with the version of Canada that he wants the world to see, rather than what it has become. As the Foreign Affairs Minister with the privilege of speaking at the UNGA, Axworthy's subject position endows his statement with strategic significance, as his peacekeeping proclamations bely the military and budgetary reality that he knows to be true at home. It is a clear display of the competition between the subcultures in the early period of policy selection. Policy

makers like Axworthy are put in difficult positions of navigating a strategic landscape that has shifted from old worldviews, resulting in strategic behaviour that is at odds with strategic culture.

The next foreign policy statement would not come until after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Under both the Chrétien and Paul Martin governments in the period following 9/11, the country reevaluated its foreign and defence policy to determine how it could support its closest ally and the global hegemon in the fight against terror. The resulting subculture competition would see Canada's strategic preferences grow closer to the Robust Western Ally worldview and drift further from the Pearsonian Internationalist ideology. Just two months after 9/11, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley addressed the UNGA in New York and stated:

In Canada, the campaign against terrorism, including the obligations we have undertaken here at the United Nations, is our highest priority. Our country, which shares with the United States the longest unmilitarized border in the world and the closest, most extensive and most profitable bilateral relationship anywhere, has been deeply affected by this crisis. Canadians, like Americans and citizens of many other nations, are concerned about their security, but also about what kind of a country and what kind of a world they are to live in after 11 September. The interlinked goals of protecting our citizens, providing assurance to our partners and allies and preserving the character of our free, democratic and diverse society have guided the actions and decisions of Prime Minister Chrétien and the Canadian Government throughout this crisis. (UNGA 2001, 32)

No longer is Canada framed as a citizen of the world, but rather as a partner and ally of the United States. Especially in a post-conflict setting like New York after 9/11, it only serves Canada's esteem and power to focus its foreign policy on support and concern for the United States. Whereas Canada's highest priority used to be promoting international peace and security among vulnerable communities, the discourse has now shifted to problematizing the war on terror and protecting North American security. Whereas global citizens used to be the subjects of Canada's foreign policy, it has now narrowed to Canadian and American citizens at risk from another terrorist attack. Importantly, 9/11 accelerated the adoption of the Robust Western Ally worldview, though not yet to a hegemonic level. Canada was the first NATO ally to invoke Article 5, the collective defence clause, in October 2001, consequently sending troops to Afghanistan and embarking on a mission that would involve Canadian soldiers for the next fourteen years (Boucher and Nossal 2017, 15; Massie and Vucetic 2020, 39). However, Canada did not participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to the lack of UN authorization (Vucetic 2004, 133). In other words, collective defence

of Canada's allies became a primary purpose of its armed forces and as the required means of defeating terrorism. While this development elevated the Robust Western Ally worldview, the Pearsonian Internationalist strategic preference persisted as Canada continued to abide by UN and NATO regulations. In turn, tension remained between the competing subcultures, but it became increasingly clear that Canada could no longer promote peace, freedom, and democracy abroad if it was under siege at its own borders, spurring the country to consider continental rather than internationalist defence policies.

Such attitudes were made clear in *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* released by the Martin government in 2005. With successive Liberal prime ministers and thereby similar political platforms, there were no fundamental changes in the white paper other than a clearer focus on domestic and continental defence and greater funding for the military in support of the war on terror. Whereas the 1994 white paper believed the greatest threats were far from its borders, the 2005 policy statement situated conflict on the country's doorstep:

The attacks of September 11, and their aftermath, have recast Canada's national security agenda in significant ways. The potential for another terrorist strike in North America remains high, leaving Canadians with a vulnerability that is likely to persist well into the future, particularly as global terrorist networks explore new way of harming innocents. While some Canadians may feel relatively immune to dangers, in truth we are not. [...] A major terrorist incident within one of our continental partners could have direct and potentially devastating consequences for the movement of people and commerce within the North American space.

[...] To that end, the February 2005 Budget provided the Canadian Forces with almost \$13 billion over the next five years, the largest increase in defence spending in two decades. (Canada 2005, 19-26)

The Canadian Armed Forces used to go abroad to protect innocent communities from threats to global peace and security, per the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture; but now, in alignment with the emerging Robust Western Ally subculture, the policy statement flips that worldview and makes Canada the site of conflict and Canadian citizens the subjects in need of protection. Although peacekeeping remains a subject of the document, it is centrally focused on domestic security and the protection of North American interests. 9/11 is used as a technology of power to minimize the importance of internationalism. Instead of keeping peace abroad, a new reality is

constructed in which Canada and its allies are facing the “potentially devastating consequences” of another terrorist attack within its own borders. In turn, the document endows the country with the ethical goal of investing resources to keep the peace at home before it can think of doing so abroad once again. In a show of power for how seriously they are taking this domestic threat, the policy promises to undertake unprecedented defence spending to protect its own citizens and allies, above and beyond what it previously afforded its internationalist and peacekeeping obligations. While technically a foreign affairs document, its focus is unapologetically on Canadian and continental security, showing selection and persistence of the Robust Western Ally worldview.

When Stephen Harper’s Conservative government came to power in 2006, the country’s rhetorical and material commitment to internationalism saw a sharp decline and the Robust Western Ally subculture was further entrenched as the new hegemonic subculture. The security landscape had shifted following 9/11 and Canada saw its armed forces primarily committed to US-led coalitions in Afghanistan. Although the country’s commitments to peacekeeping had been sharply diminishing since the Chrétien era, Harper’s defence policy took a stauncher position in support of Canadian rather than international security. The 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* rested on the pillars of “delivering excellence at home,” being “a strong and reliable partner,” and “projecting leadership abroad” (Canada 2008, 8-9). Peacekeeping was not mentioned once in the white paper, and the country’s commitment abroad was premised through hard power capabilities that could support international objectives consistent with national interests. The strategy read:

Today we live in an uncertain world, and the security challenges facing Canada are real. Globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the safety and interests of Canadians at home. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and those carried out since, demonstrate how instability and state failure in distant lands can directly affect our own security and that of our allies.

[...] This 20-year plan to rebuild the Forces, supported by an unprecedented long-term, predictable funding framework, will ensure that Canadians can depend on a military capable of delivering excellence at home, meeting its commitments as a reliable partner in the defence of North America, and projecting leadership abroad in support of international security. (Canada 2008, 7-22)

Globalization and the dangerous state of the world are problematized within Harper’s defence policy, attacking the internationalist foundations that underpin the Pearsonian subculture. Once

again using 9/11 as a technology of power, the policy works to normalize turning away from the problems of the world Canada used to concern itself with in order to defend against threats to the country and its allies. States in turmoil on the other side of the world are no longer subjects of Canada's benevolent peacekeeping tradition, but rather the malevolent source of global conflict against which they must now defend. Gone is the version of reality in which Canada could and would interest itself in protecting vulnerable states. Now Canada is the one that is vulnerable, and the policy statement assures citizens that they can depend on the government to invest the requisite funds to ensure their domestic security. In the reality crafted under this policy, power and security are achieved through domestic and continental excellence, and only when the country's own interests are secure will the country project itself into the international realm. Under this policy, peacekeeping and internationalism have been discarded in favour of a country who puts the security of itself and its allies ahead of global affairs, and will not concern itself with ineffective international consensus-building when continental security can be expeditiously achieved through like-minded coalitions.

This sentiment is a recurring theme over the nine years that Harper was in power. In an interview in May 2011, Harper argued that they had to create a foreign policy to address the "dangerous world" characterized by its "struggle between good and bad" and went on to claim, "I'm not dismissing peacekeeping [...] but the real defining moments for the country and for the world are those big conflicts where everything's at stake and where you take a side and show you can contribute to the right side" (Whyte 2011). He also stated at a Conservative Party convention that he would take "strong, principled positions in our dealings with other nations" and that the purpose of their foreign policy was not simply "just to go along to go along and get along with everyone else's agenda. It is no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations" (Harper 2011; Nossal 2013, 22). Such rhetoric shows the clear selection and persistence of the Robust Western Ally worldview in government discourse and policy. Little belief in peacekeeping and Pearsonian Internationalism remain, and now Canadian foreign affairs is characterized as a dichotomy between the good and bad, or between Canada's allies and its enemies. The phrase "dangerous world" was commonly used by Harper during his tenure, exemplifying the protectionism held by the dominant strategic worldview after the events of the

Cold War, Somalia, Rwanda, and 9/11. He problematizes the Chrétien-Axworthy era defined by peacekeeping and soft power in saying that Canada's foreign policy should not pander to dictators and global consensus at the UN, but instead should stand by its values and allies in fighting for the right side. Harper reduces the peacekeeping technology of power by not only implying it does not define Canada, but it also no longer represents the side on which they should be fighting. In turn, Harper creates a dichotomized reality in support of the Robust Western Ally subculture where Canadians must choose to put themselves first over the now dangerous internationalist tradition. Harper's use of the dichotomy is an impactful technology of self in making it easy for Canadians to understand which side they must be on, and more importantly, which side they must be against.

In the course of four prime ministers and twenty years, the hegemonic strategic culture has become the Robust Western Ally worldview, pushing the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture to the periphery and the annals of a bygone golden era of diplomacy. Peacekeeping saw a sharp decline under the Harper government. While Canada had maintained a presence of at least 200 uniformed personnel since Pearson created peacekeeping, in March 2006 Canadian forces were withdrawn from the Golan Heights and the country marked an historic low of only 120 peacekeeping personnel abroad (Dorn 2020; Dorn and Libben 2018, 258). Instead, Canada committed to American and coalition-led operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq that required military rather than peacekeeping forces. Although platitudes were used to commemorate National Peacekeeping Day every August, Harper's government preferred to ignore Canada's legacy at the UN and focused on becoming a "courageous warrior" who was capable of contributing to large global conflicts alongside its allies (Carroll 2016, 168).

While the Robust Western Ally subculture has become the hegemonic worldview, it continues to be challenged by the Pearsonian Internationalist subculture in expert, media, and political discourses. Most recently in 2015, Justin Trudeau was elected as Prime Minister and proclaimed to the world: "Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35 million Canadians, we're back" (Gillies 2015). Trudeau's internationalist sentiment is reflected in his government's *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* released in 2017. Emblazoned with pictures of peacekeepers, it reaffirms Canada's goals of not only being

“strong at home” or “secure in North America” but more importantly “engaged in the world, with the Canadian Armed Forces doing its part in Canada’s contributions to a more stable and peaceful world, including peace support operations and peacekeeping” (Canada 2017, 14). In enshrining in policy that “Canada cannot be strong at home without being engaged in the world” (Canada 2017, 61), the document marks a discursive contradiction to the hegemonic status attained by the Robust Western Ally subculture.

Trudeau won on a platform problematizing the shortcomings of Harper’s nine years in government, including its deterioration of the country’s peacekeeping tradition and global reputation. As a result, the policy leverages technologies of power and self in striving to reconstitute Canada and Canadians as global citizens who will not just do right by their domestic interests, but also by the needs of the international community. Whereas the Harper government attempted to foster a reality in which Canada could not ensure its domestic security if it was subject to the whims of the dangerous world, the 2017 defence policy asserts Canada can only protect its domestic security if it also works to protect international security. Moreover, it works to restore peacekeeping through key statements and repeated visual symbols as a powerful pillar of Canada’s contribution to global peace and security, and in turn, a pillar of domestic peace and security. Trudeau throws the support of all 35 million Canadians behind his statement that “Canada is back”, consequently making every citizen a subject of the renewed internationalist worldview and moral order he attempts to foster with his statements. While Trudeau has reinvigorated the Pearsonian Internationalist worldview in Canada’s foreign policy discourses, with the enduring nature of strategic cultures, it remains to be seen whether his government’s promises will reconcile with the actual practice of the country’s peacekeeping tradition once again.

Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion

“No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none.”

– Henry Kissinger (1973)

This thesis shows that although Canada’s strategic culture has undergone change since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping persists as a dominant narrative due to its thick ties to national identity and how Canadians have forged their middle power niche in the world. While the Robust Western Ally subculture has become the hegemonic worldview, peacekeeping and Pearsonian Internationalism retain a vestigial influence that continually re-emerges due to their potent connections to the unparalleled golden era of Canadian foreign policy in which the country was awash in pride and new strategic possibilities. Reflecting upon the case study, conclusions can be drawn that shed light on the continuity of peacekeeping in the Canadian strategic landscape.

First, the Pearsonian Internationalist worldview supporting peacekeeping is an enduring force that retains an intrinsic influence in political culture despite falling from hegemonic status. The ideas, narratives, symbols, and doctrines around peacekeeping perpetuated through expert, media, and political discourses have held a prominent position in not only Canadian strategic culture for close to five decades, but in the very definition of what it means to be Canadian. National identity is thickly constructed around the ideals of being an objective and altruistic fixer who does the right thing on the global stage, especially in relation to how it differentiates Canada from its more aggressive American neighbours. While being a Robust Western Ally fits the strategic needs of the day, peacekeeping continues to be seen as an independent and uniquely Canadian tradition that stands apart from those forged by its multilateral relations. As such, peacekeeping has become part of the country’s “genetic code as a nation” (Off 2000, 2) since it strikes at the heart of what it means to be Canadian. Since the promise of peacekeeping is a pillar of both a previously hegemonic subculture as well as the national identity, it lingers as a point of national pride and non-hegemonic preference regardless of whether the strategic landscape has eroded its relevance to contemporary affairs. It will take a longer period, more civilizational events of Canadian success within the Robust Western Ally subculture, or policy crises further

undercutting Pearsonian Internationalism for the new hegemonic subculture to become an enculturating force on par with national identity. With the aura of peacekeeping and Pearsonian Internationalism remaining as a competing, non-hegemonic yet efficacious worldview, decision-makers and institutions will continue to hold the remnants of Canada's golden age of diplomacy.

In turn, even as the changing world has required greater military action in defence of Canada and its allies, the Robust Western Ally subculture has followed through on these commitments contextualized within the country's strong principles of global sacrifice and altruism. Canada's international mandate, even if it has changed with the competing subcultures, is most strikingly built upon the connotations from its legacy of peacekeeping and doing good in the world. The country's golden age of diplomacy has made possible and meaningful a new range of strategic capabilities, and so regardless of the hegemonic subculture of the day, epistemic communities are inclined to frame a foreign policy through the discursive power structures around the country's historic contributions to global security and peacekeeping. Before Canada was a "strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America" (Canada 2008, 2), it was a strong and reliable partner in the defence of the world. Discourses since the Cold War, particularly those arising from the Robust Western Ally subculture, have always tied Canada's foreign and defence policies back to Canada's imperative and distinct role abroad. That original role abroad was peacekeeping and supporting the rules-based international order, and new discourses have framed policies around innovating the capabilities and influence accrued from its peacekeeping tradition that originally catalyzed Canada to its current international prestige. Even with the rise of the Robust Western Ally subculture, these Pearsonian attitudes on peacekeeping survive and continue to hold salient signifying power.

Recalling Foucault's focus on the genealogy of historical knowledge production and how the (re)construction of a past event can alter one's relationship to the present, the Robust Western Ally subculture sustains itself through continually reconstructing the power inherent in Canada's promise and practice of peacekeeping. Given that peacekeeping has remained a tenet of national identity despite the country's failures in the 1990s, it becomes clear that the narrative around peacekeeping is a more powerful discursive tool than the country's record in peace operations. In turn, by appropriating the narratives around peacekeeping and the legacy of country's golden age

of diplomacy, the Robust Western Ally subculture is empowered to change the country's perception of their role abroad. Peace operations go from the eminent strategic choice to one of historical significance that gives rise to Canada's abilities to incomparably advance its domestic and alliance interests in the international realm. Through the power and knowledge inherent in the country's peacekeeping narrative, and the obfuscation of promise and practice to validate the Robust Western Ally worldview over Pearsonian Internationalism, Canada's strategic culture has cultivated the contradictions between its rhetoric and record on peacekeeping.

In all, this thesis contributes new insights on why peacekeeping persists in Canadian strategic culture and how subculture competition produces efficacious yet contradictory lenses through which strategic preferences around peacekeeping are constructed. Building upon these findings, future research can explore whether a previously hegemonic subculture can compete to become the dominant lens once again, as is reflected in the rhetoric if not the actions of the current Trudeau government. Until then, the promise and practice of peacekeeping in Canada will continue to diverge so long as peacekeeping remains a more powerful rhetorical than material tool in the country's strategic culture.

Bibliography

- Arribas-Ayllon, Michael and Valerie Walkerdine. 2008. "Foucauldian Discourse Analysis." In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology*, edited by Carla Willig and Wendy Stainton-Rogers: 91-108 (PDF pagination pp. 1-24 differs from book). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781848607927.
- Axworthy, Lloyd. 1997. "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership." *International Journal* 52, no. 2: 183-196. doi:10.2307/40203196.
- Barton, Richard L. 1990. *Ties That Blind in Canadian/American Relations: Politics of News Discourse*. New York: Routledge.
- Blanchfield, Mike. 2020. "Canada's Peacekeeping Contribution at Lowest Level in More Than 60 Years." *Globe and Mail*, May 22. Accessed August 10, 2020. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canadas-peacekeeping-contribution-at-lowest-level-in-more-than-6/>.
- Bloomfield, Alan and Kim Richard Nossal. 2007. "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada." *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 2: 286–307. doi:10.1080/13523260701489859.
- Boucher, Jean-Christophe and Kim Richard Nossal. 2017. *The Politics of War: Canada's Afghanistan Mission, 2001-14*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Brglez, Karen. 2014. "Canada at the End of the Cold War: The Influence of a Transatlantic 'Middle Power' on German Unification." Master's Thesis, University of Manitoba. <http://hdl.handle.net/1993/30210>.
- Canada. 1991a. *Parliamentary Debates*. House of Commons, November 5. (John Brewin, Member of Parliament for Victoria). <https://www.lipad.ca/full/permalink/3884738/>.
- Canada. 1991b. *Parliamentary Debates*. House of Commons, December 10. (Beryl Gaffney, Member of Parliament for Nepean). <https://www.lipad.ca/full/permalink/3891042/>.
- Canada. 1994. Department of National Defence. *White Paper on Defence*. Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. Accessed August 8, 2020. https://www.walterdorn.net/pdf/DefenceWhitePaper-1994_Canada.pdf.

- Canada. 2005. Department of National Defence. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.
- Canada. 2008. Department of National Defence. *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.
- Canada. 2017. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.
- Carroll, Michael K. 2016. "Peacekeeping: Canada's Past, But Not Its Present or Future?" *International Journal* 71, no. 1: 167-176. doi: 10.1177/0020702015619857.
- Chapnick, Adam. 2000. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55, no. 2: 188-206.
- Chapnick, Adam. 2009. "The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox." *International Journal* 64, no.1: 205-221.
- Cross, David. 2013. "Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later." *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 1: 137-160.
- Dorn, A. Walter. 2005. "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12, no. 2: 7-32. doi: 10.1080/11926422.2005.9673396.
- Dorn, A. Walter. 2017. "Canada: The Once and Future Peacekeeper." In *The United Nations and Canada: What Canada Has Done and Should Be Doing for UN Peace Operations*, edited by John E. Trent, 12-13. Canada: World Federalist Movement.
- Dorn, A. Walter. 2020. "Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping." WalterDorn.net. Accessed July 23, 2020. <https://www.walterdorn.net/256>.
- Dorn, A. Walter and Joshua Libben. 2018. "Preparing for Peace: Myths and Realities of Canadian Peacekeeping Training." *International Journal* 73, no. 2: 257-281. doi: 10.1177/0020702018788552.
- Ermarth, Fritz W. "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought." *International Security* 3, no. 2 (1978): 138-55.
- Farrell, Theo. 2005. *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Foucault, Michel. 1967. "Orders of Discourse." *Social Science Information* 10, no. 2: 7-30.
- Foucault, Michel. 1988. "Technologies of the Self." In *Technologies of the Self*, edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, 16-49. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Gammer, Nicholas. 2001. *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis*. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Gillies, Rob. 2015. "'We're Back': Justin Trudeau's Liberals Head to Ottawa with a Majority." *Global News*, October 20. Accessed August 9, 2020.
<https://globalnews.ca/news/2288872/canada-returns-its-liberal-roots-under-trudeau-after-a-decade-of-conservative-rule/>.
- Glick Schiller, Nina. 1997. "Cultural Politics and the Politics of Culture." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 4, no. 1: 1-7. doi: 10.1080/1070289X.1997.9962580.
- Gordon, Nancy and Bernard Wood. 1992. "Canada and the Reshaping of the United Nations." *International Journal* 47, no. 3: 479-503.
- Gray, Colin S. 1999. "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1: 29-69.
- Griffiths, Rudyard. 1997. "The Day of Pearson Internationalism is Past." *Globe and Mail*, April 12.
- Gurney, Matt. 2019. "A Report on Abuse by Canadian Peacekeepers in Haiti Reveals a National Disgrace." *National Post*, September 17. Accessed July 23, 2020.
<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-a-report-on-abuse-by-canadian-peacekeepers-in-haiti-reveals-a-national-disgrace>.
- Harper, Stephen. 2011. "Stephen Harper Keynote Address: 2011 Conservative Convention." Ottawa, June 10. <https://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/cpac-special/episodes/17115049/#>.
- Healey, Ed. 1995. "Who Needs New Defence Equipment? Canada Does." *Globe and Mail*, August 4.
- Howlett, Darryl and John Glenn, 2005. "Epilogue: Nordic Strategic Culture." *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 1: 121-140.

- Jackman, Robert W. and Ross A. Miller. 1996. "A Renaissance of Political Culture?" *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3: 632-659.
- Jahn, Gunnar. 1957. "Award Ceremony Speech for the Nobel Peace Prize 1957." Oslo, December 10. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1957/ceremony-speech/>.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. "Thinking About Strategic Culture." *International Security* 19, no. 4: 32-64.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1999. "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1: 519-523.
- Karásek, Tomáš. 2016. "Tracking Shifts in Strategic Culture: Analyzing Counterinsurgency as a Rise of a Strategic Subculture." *Obrana a Strategie* 16, no. 1: 109-1128. doi: 10.3849/1802-7199.16.2016.1.109-128.
- Kendall, Gavin and Gary Wickham. 1999. *Using Foucault's Methods*. London: Sage Publications.
- Kissinger, Henry. 1973. "Speech at the 71st Annual Convention of the International Platform Association." Washington, August 2. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/03/archives/kissinger-urges-bipartisan-policy-asks-that-watergate-not-cut-unity.html>.
- Klein, Bradley S. 1988. "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics." *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 2: 133-148.
- Knox, Paul. 1999. "Prospects for UN-Led Peace Missions Darken." *Globe and Mail*, January 23.
- Libben, Joshua. 2017. "Am I My Brother's Peacekeeper? Strategic Cultures and Change Among Major Troop Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23, no. 3: 324-339. doi: 10.1080/11926422.2017.1352005.
- Libel, Tamir. 2016. "Explaining the Security Paradigm Shift: Strategic Culture, Epistemic Communities, and Israel's Changing National Security Policy." *Defence Studies* 16, no. 2: 137-156. doi: 10.1080/14702436.2016.1165595.
- Martin, Pierre, & Michel Fortmann. 1995. "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World." *International Journal* 50, no. 2: 370-400.

- Massie, Justin. 2008. "Regional Strategic Subcultures: Canadians and the Use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 14, no. 2: 19–48.
- Massie, Justin and Srdjan Vucetic. 2020. "Canadian Strategic Cultures: From Confederation to Trump." In *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Juneau, Philip Lagassé and Srdjan Vucetic, 29-44. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
- McCullough, Colin. 2016. *Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Mulroney, Brian. 1991. "Stanford University Centennial Anniversary Convocation Speech." Stanford, California, September 29. <https://news.stanford.edu/pr/91/910929Arc1160.html>.
- Nossal, Kim Richard. 1998. "Foreign Policy for Wimps." *Ottawa Citizen*, April 23.
- Nossal, Kim Richard. 2013. "The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era." In *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Contemporary Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, 21-35. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Off, Carol. 2000. *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda*. Toronto: Random House.
- Pearlstein, Steven. 1999. "Peacekeepers: Military Budget Put Constraint on Canadians." *Washington Post*, September 26.
- Poore, Stuart. 2004. "Strategic Culture." In *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture*, edited by John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, Stuart Poore and Darryl A. Howlett. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1971. "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'." *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3: 651-681.
- Rose, Nicolas. 1999. *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarty, Leigh. 1993. "Sunset Boulevard Revisited? Canadian Internationalism After the Cold War." *International Journal* 48, no. 4: 749-777.
- Snyder, Jack. 1977. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

- United Nations General Assembly. 1996. 51st Sess., 7th Plen. Mtg, UN Document A/51/PV.7, September 24: 1-29. <https://undocs.org/en/A/51/PV.7>.
- United Nations General Assembly. 2001. 56th Sess., 45th Plen. Mtg, UN Document A/56/PV.45, November 10: 1-39. <https://undocs.org/en/A/56/PV.45>.
- United Nations General Assembly. 2017. 72nd Sess., 12th Plen. Mtg, UN Document A/72/PV.12, September 21: 1-33. <https://undocs.org/en/A/72/PV.12>.
- United Nations Peacekeeping. 2020. "How We Are Funded." Accessed August 12, 2020. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>.
- Uz Zaman, Rashed. 2009. "Strategic Culture: A Cultural Understanding of War." *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 1: 68-88. doi: 10.1080/01495930802679785.
- Vucetic, Srdjan. 2006. "Why Did Canada Sit Out of the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 13, no. 1: 133-153. doi: 10.1080/11926422.2006.9673423.
- Whyte, Kenneth. 2011. "In Conversation: Stephen Harper." *Maclean's*, July 5. Accessed August 9, 2020. <https://www.macleans.ca/general/how-he-sees-canadas-role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/>.
- Williams, Raymond. 2006. "The Analysis of Culture." In *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by John Storey, 32-40. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- York, Geoffrey. 1993. "Consensus on Cutbacks for Defence Astounds Critic." *Globe and Mail*, October 13.