Legitimising Repression and Negotiations: How Counterinsurgency Works in a Mixed Regime

A Critical Discourse Analysis on Seeking Counterinsurgency Legitimacy by Two Colombian Presidents and Insurgency Legitimacy by The Insurgents The FARC

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Table of contents

Chapter 1: Introduction and literature review

Introduction

On 17 June 2018 Iván Duque was elected president of Colombia. As a member of Centro Democrático he has a close relationship with ex-President and founder of Centro Democrático Álvaro Uribe Vélez (Gamboa, 2018). Duque's proponents are optimistic about Colombia's political future, whereas opponents fear a return to the 'iron fist' period under Uribe (Gamboa, 2018). Uribe implemented the 'democratic security policy' during his presidency, spanning 2002-2010, aiming to combat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC[1]) with a repressive, militarised counterinsurgency and attempting to end the civil conflict in general (Regilme, 2018). It is argued that this led to state repression, civil casualties and human rights abuses (Amnesty International, 2002). Despite criticism, he gained much popularity (Dugas, 2003) and was elected for a second term (Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas, 2006). His successor, Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), continued with some aspects of the militarised counterinsurgency, but contrary to his predecessor, Santos also engaged in peace negotiations with the FARC to find a durable solution for the conflict (Ince, 2013). In 2016, his government and the FARC reached a peace accord after four years of negotiations (Gamboa, 2018).

Counterinsurgency literature distinguishes between means used by democratic and authoritarian states with regards to counterinsurgency (Byman, 2016). Some authors argue that the distinction is not a sharp dichotomy, but rather a spectrum of means varying from purely autocratic to purely democratic (Ucko, 2016). This can be seen when democracies use violence, taking a more proportionate and targeted approach. This contrasts with autocratic trend to mass violence without popular consent. Besides, democracies are more likely to focus on political reforms to weaken the insurgent's appeal to the population and increase government legitimacy (Gurr, 2000). However, little attention is paid to how counterinsurgency works in a mixed regime type.

Considering Colombia, a certain contradiction appears. That means, formally being a democracy Colombia would be expected to not resort to large-scale violent confrontation with the insurgents and civilians. However, Uribe promised to attack the FARC with his new military strategy and violated human rights (Regilme, 2018), while at the same time he sought to legitimise his counterinsurgency. This study argues that Colombia can be perceived as a

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[1] In literature, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo) are used interchangeably, so this study uses them interchangeably, too.

mixed regime and it therefore raises the question of how counterinsurgency works in such a regime. A Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) examines how Uribe sought legitimacy for his militarised counterinsurgency within this context by analysing his discourse regarding his counterinsurgency and the FARC. Furthermore, as comparative studies over time are scarce in the Colombian context, this study researches how his discourse differed from that of Santos, who additionally pursued political actions and organised negotiations with the FARC. The study considers both sides in counterinsurgency, as it also investigates how the FARC sought legitimacy through discourse and how that changed over the course of Uribe's and Santos' presidency. The research question therefore is: How did President Uribe and President Santos on the one hand, and the FARC on the other hand, seek legitimacy amongst the Colombian population through discourse regarding their counterinsurgency and insurgency, respectively?

The answer to this question is relevant as it contributes in two ways to existing literature in International Relations and Security Studies. Firstly, it shows how the spectrum of democratic and autocratic means in counterinsurgency should be reconsidered. Thus, this study demonstrates how counterinsurgency works in a mixed regime, something that has not yet received sufficient attention in counterinsurgency literature. It illustrates that, besides autocratic features, these regimes do seek legitimacy for their counterinsurgencies. The study shows how strategies may differ according to their place on the spectrum of counterinsurgency and how differences in discourse by counterinsurgents over time could explain corresponding discontinuity in insurgents' discourse. Therefore, the study supplements literature on insurgents' legitimacy.

Secondly, by identifying how mixed regimes seek legitimacy for repressive actions, these strategies can be detected at an earlier stage in similar cases, to prevent them from engaging in state repression and human rights abuses. This newly acquired knowledge can be applied to Duque to examine whether he is implementing a security policy of the same nature as Uribe, since this could have negative consequences for the incidence of state-based violence and human rights abuses in Colombia. Furthermore, it could lead to negative effects regarding the peace accord between the government and the FARC. Centro Democrático and its leader Uribe are strong opponents of the accord and Duque has announced to modify the accord (Gamboa, 2018). A weakening of the accord could lead to increasing tensions and violence in Colombia.

Since the civil conflict is characterised by various actors involved, such as left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and drug trafficking groups, attention should be paid to its complexity and long-lasting nature. However, due to scope limitations, this study focuses on

the counterinsurgency of the Colombian government under first Uribe and later Santos aimed at ending the conflict with the FARC.

This study proceeds as follows. The current chapter outlines the conflict's history, followed by literature on counterinsurgency, the Colombian context and counterinsurgents' and insurgents' legitimacy. Chapter 2 explains the study's research design. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 deal with discourse by Uribe, Santos and the FARC. Chapter 6 is assigned to compare the findings with each other. In Chapter 7 the conclusion is presented, in which results are interpreted in light of the discussed literature and theory. The conclusions examine implications for the wider debate on insurgency, counterinsurgency and legitimacy, while limitations are considered.

Literature review

History Colombian conflict

The Colombian conflict is rooted in La Violencia (1948-1958), a civil war of 10 years between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, vying for agricultural lands. In 1958, the National Front was established, a power-sharing system in which the two parties alternated power. The majority of the liberal guerrillas handed in their weapons, but some continued fighting, resulting in the establishment of the FARC in 1966. Various other guerrilla movements were formed, amongst others the ELN, EPL and M19, mostly fighting for agrarian reform and backed by rural populations (Livingstone, 2003).

By 1974 the National Front fell, the new government repressed opposition and guerrilla warfare strengthened in reaction. The late 1970s witnessed a boom in coca- and marijuana cultivation, generating large revenues. The guerrillas became involved in the drug business too, taxing the trade to finance their armed struggle (Livingstone, 2003). Consequently, right-wing private militia arose in the 1980s to protect big businesses and natural resources. Allegedly, they often worked together with the army and government in their counterinsurgency. The paramilitaries are perpetrators of various massacres and human rights abuses. Besides, drug cartels became affiliated with the military and paramilitaries to fight the guerrillas (Dube & Naidu, 2015).

By the end of the 1980s, drug cartels had become increasingly powerful, threatening the government and civilians with urban terrorism. In 2000, President Pastrana signed 'Plan Colombia', a policy by the US and Colombia to combat drugs with military means. This decreased the guerrilla's willingness to engage in peace talks, as they accused the government of using the 'war on drugs' as a façade for US-backed counterinsurgency against leftist groups.

While the US was previously supportive of peace talks, this changed after September 11th 2001, when they became eager to promote the fight against the FARC as part of the 'war on terror'. FARC attacks intensified in turn, conducting numerous kidnappings for ransom and putting pressure on the government (Livingstone, 2003).

In 2002 Uribe was elected president. Popularity for his hard-line approach is evidence of a war-weary population. He soon implemented the militarised counterinsurgency, a welcome solution to restore order for many people, but he also faced criticism for his links with paramilitaries. Human rights organisations and the United Nations expressed their concern about human rights, the army's power and the installation of an informant force. This force was to cooperate with the armed forces and besides, 20.000 civilian soldiers were recruited. These part-time peasants were to assist in the counterinsurgency, but critics were concerned about this civilian involvement in the conflict and the expansion of paramilitary groups (Livingstone, 2003).

After Uribe's first term, levels of violence had declined (Arjona, 2015), explaining his election for a second term. However, as time went on, various scandals were brought to light, such as arbitrary detentions and attacks on civilians and dissidents. The best known scandal is that of 'false positives'. According to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (2012), armed forces killed civilians, pretending they were guerrillas, because of pressure by the democratic security policy to show success illustrating that guerrillas were being defeated. Armed forces were promised promotion based on result rates.

In 2010 Santos was elected president. Despite being a former supporter of Uribe's approach, he changed course and opposed the hard-line attitude, organising peace talks with the FARC. He pursued a comprehensive counterinsurgency, in which military action was supplemented by political strategies (Ince, 2013). In November 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC ratified the peace agreement, which signifies an end to the conflict (Gamboa, 2018). It has to be noted, however, that the sustainability of the agreement can be questioned, because parts of the population are sceptical about FARC-rebels getting away without being punished and moreover, President Duque has pronounced his lack of support for the agreement (Gamboa, 2018). However, the question whether the peace agreement will last and whether it is morally justifiable with regards to the victims, is not addressed in this study for scope limitation reasons. Nevertheless, this remains an essential topic to be explored by future research.

Democracies, autocracies and counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency in this study is defined as ''the combination of measures undertaken by a government … to defeat an insurgency'' (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. X). Counterinsurgency literature often distinguishes between democratic and authoritarian counterinsurgencies. This subsection discusses these forms and shows that the reality is more complicated, arguing that counterinsurgencies can consist of a mix of democratic and authoritarian strategies and that literature should focus more on counterinsurgencies in mixed regimes than has been done so far.

Authoritarian counterinsurgencies are often perceived to be characterised by politicizing the military, silencing dissidents, killing civilians and large-scale repression to defeat the rebels. On the other hand, democracies are more likely to 'win the hearts and minds of the population', limit the use of force and increase government legitimacy (Byman, 2016). In a similar vein, Merom (2003) asserts that democracies lose small wars more often because they refuse to use cruel violence, fearing to lose their legitimacy, in contrast to autocracies. Gurr (2000) upholds that democracies are more often involved in formal negotiations.

Despite this distinction between democratic and authoritarian counterinsurgencies, not all scholars focus on a sharp dichotomy, rather implying a spectrum ranging from means characteristic for autocracies and means characteristic for democracies. In between, mixed means exist, for example a democracy using violence 'proportionately' while at the same time pursuing negotiations. Ucko (2016) elaborates on this spectrum, explaining that the focus on regime type undermines the analysis of each case's context. Many countries do not fit within either one of these two types, being '''anocracies''' or '''democratic authoritarian' regimes'' (p. 33). Lyall (2010) disputes a focus on regime type too, by showing that democracies do not lose insurgencies more often because of their regime type, but because of different means of fighting, for example being engaged in counterinsurgencies abroad. Ucko (2016) asserts that autocracies do not only resort to mass violence, but seek to win popular support too, although their means differ from democracies. He stresses that authoritarian rulers portray the insurgents as a threat to the country and frame the country as a superpower, to evoke support amongst the population and justify repressive means. They use language polarising the insurgents from the population, depicting the former as destabilising for the country. These overlapping characteristics rather than a strict division between democracies and autocracies could explain Uribe's level of repression as well as Santos' mixed strategy.

Contrary to Ucko (2016) and Lyall (2010), who claim that analysing regime type is not helpful in accounting for counterinsurgency approaches, this study does put emphasis on

Colombia's regime type. However, not in the traditional sense of it being a democracy or autocracy, but by showing that the country is a mixed regime. In this light, Asal, Deloughery and Sin (2016) contest Lyall's (2010) study, denoting that democracies with high levels of political inclusion and political competition are more likely to fail in counterinsurgencies, because they do not want to repress. On the contrary, autocracies will use more repression because they are already discriminating and excluding a share of the population, and are thus more likely to do so with regards to insurgents. While this study does not particularly focus on the outcome of the counterinsurgency against the FARC, Asal's et al. (2016) argument indicates that regime type does matter in counterinsurgency and that low political inclusion in a formal democracy can cause higher levels of repression in counterinsurgency. So, mixed regimes should be investigated more and Colombia's history of political instability should be taken into account in explaining how counterinsurgency is implemented. Therefore, the next subsection examines Colombia's regime type.

Colombia's context

The previous subsection shows how various academics challenge the differentiation between democratic and autocratic counterinsurgencies and how others defend the dichotomy. In this light, Colombia is an interesting case, because it has been viewed as a mixed regime. Dominant counterinsurgency theory has neglected to explore how counterinsurgency works in a mixed regime. This subsection investigates Colombia's regime and therefore allows for examination of counterinsurgency in a mixed regime. So, this study is able to test if Byman (2016) or Ucko (2016) is right about whether differences between autocratic and democratic counterinsurgencies should be considered as a dichotomy or a spectrum. By explicitly researching the way counterinsurgency and legitimation works in Colombia's mixed regime, this study sheds new light on existing literature.

      The fact that Colombia can be viewed a mixed regime, makes it more likely to use violence than if it would be a full democracy. The weakness of the state and the rule of law are features of this mixed regime in which democracy has been undermined due to subordination by the military and lacking civil liberties (Bejarano and Pizarro Leongómez, 2002). Colombia's 'partially free' status in the years previously to Uribe assuming office, could explain his willingness to use repressive strategies, as set out by Asal et al. (2016). Additionally, due to Colombia's 'culture of violence', repression might be implicitly accepted (Waldmann, 2007). This high level of repressive violence is accounted for by Regan and Henderson (2002), stressing that the level of political repression is not only dependent on

regime type, but also on the level of threat faced by a state, such as guerrilla warfare. Since mixed regimes are most likely to deal with threats, they are thus also most likely to employ state repression (Regan & Henderson, 2002).

Thus, Colombia as a mixed regime is expected to use repression, both in its counterinsurgency against the FARC and towards civilians. Besides these autocratic features, it is expected to use democratic means as well, like seeking legitimacy amongst the population. This subsection has shown that Colombia's mixed regime accounts for mixed counterinsurgency strategies and the following subsection explains how counterinsurgents seek to legitimise their actions, thereby helping to investigate how this works in a mixed regime.

Counterinsurgents' legitimacy

Previous subsections reveal that Colombia, as a mixed regime, shows features of repression, while simultaneously legitimacy is sought. However, it does not explain *how* legitimacy was sought. This subsection identifies how counterinsurgents seek legitimacy and builds a framework that can be used in the CDA to investigate how legitimacy is sought in mixed regimes, such as Colombia. It is argued that not only democracies use 'winning the hearts and minds of the population', as Western counterinsurgency literature claims, but that mixed regimes engage in this strategy too.

This study defines legitimacy in a descriptive manner (Duyvesteyn, 2017): ''Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it believe that it is appropriate, proper and just.'' (Tyler, 2006, p. 375).

Mixed regimes are likely to seek legitimacy by using both autocratic and democratic legitimation means. Democracy, good governance and social order are generally important for states to build their legitimacy upon (Duyvesteyn, 2017). Where Byman (2016) claims that autocratic counterinsurgents rule by coercion instead of consent and legitimacy, Ucko (2016) indicates that autocracies do seek legitimacy, ''through nationalism, ideology, or a cult of personality.'' (p. 39) and by portraying insurgents as a threat to the country. Mampilly (2011) maintains that counterinsurgents portray insurgents as irrational terrorists, thereby undermining their legitimacy and justifying the use of force, ''as it is presumed that the only language that such actors understand is force.'' (p. 244). This shows that counterinsurgency should be considered a competition of legitimacies of both parties, since legitimacy is fundamental for both the state and the insurgent (Gawthorpe, 2017).

Popular support for repressive counterinsurgencies, such as in Colombia, could be explained by societal dynamics that are recognised as legitimate by the population. Colombia's 'culture of violence' (Waldmann, 2007) is important in this regard, as the population was accustomed to high levels of violence. Kitzen (2017) therefore advocates a so-called cultural legitimation that counterinsurgents should use, underlining that the form of legitimation is dependent on the society in which the legitimation seeking actor is operating. It points to the fact that even though counterinsurgents might be repressive, they do aim to legitimise their actions. Moreover, since Colombia is perceived a mixed regime, it is worth considering how legitimacy is sought in this context, as this is often overlooked in counterinsurgency literature, and to examine how strategies changed between Uribe and Santos. Figure 1 depicts sources on which legitimacy is often built as identified by the literature and is used in the CDA to examine whether they hold true for Colombia's mixed regime too.


Figure 1. Sources on which counterinsurgents build their legitimacy, as identified by the literature

Insurgents' legitimacy

Since counterinsurgency is a competition of legitimacy between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent (Gawthorpe, 2017), this subsection investigates how insurgents seek legitimacy.

Insurgency is defined here as ''the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.'' (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. IX). Scholars use the concepts insurgents, rebels and non-state armed groups interchangeably, so this study uses them interchangeably too.

Regardless of their motivation, insurgents require legitimacy, as ''they need material and moral support from communities both inside and outside the conflict region. Without minimal legitimacy, an armed group is bound to fail . . .'' (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 410). Legitimacy can be derived from different factors. Social position within society might influence how legitimacy is regarded, together with differences between geographical regions (Duyvesteyn, 2017). Moreover, legitimacy might derive from social contract, as rebels can obtain legitimacy by providing the population with public services such as health and security, acting as an alternative to the state (Mampilly, 2011). Podder (2017) points to the role of international actors and on this note, Steele and Shapiro (2017) studied Colombia, indicating that international (US) involvement to defeat guerrillas had counterproductive outcomes and undermined the strength of the Colombian state. This could possibly reinforce the armed group's legitimacy.

Rebels' legitimacy can decrease, for example in response to the counterinsurgent's actions. The fact that the FARC declined in number of combatants between 2002 and 2012, at the height of the military counterinsurgency, and that they did not have much support amongst the people at this time (Wickham-Crowley, 2015), could be explained by Wickham-Crowley's (2015) contention that rebels' legitimacy can decrease when a military crackdown turns out to be effective or when they breach norms that are binding to governing actors. Arjona (2015) argues that resistance to insurgents amongst civilians is dependent on the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions already in place and on the rebels' intention to intervene completely in the community or not.

Although above-mentioned factors are all relevant in understanding how insurgents' legitimacy is perceived and enacted or not, they do not demonstrate how these groups seek legitimacy through narratives. This is why this study is useful, as it investigates how the FARC seek legitimacy through discourse, with comparisons over time.

Rebels can refer in their discourse to symbolic claims to seek legitimacy (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015), for example claims based on ''communal myth-symbol complexes and … popular belief systems, traditions and cultures'' (p. 417). Also, claims regarding ''socio-economic and political aspirations of a local community'' (p. 417) are used by insurgents and ''are often tied to encompassing ideologies or world views such as social-

revolutionary, ethno-nationalist or religious ideas of political order'' (p. 417). Lastly, insurgents may refer to ''outside threats and established enemy images'' (p. 417) to justify actions. Although Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) look at the importance of insurgents' discourse, few studies have considered discourses of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, like this study does.

Figure 2 illustrates sources of legitimacy often used by insurgents, stemming from the literature. This is used to examine in the CDA whether this accounts for the FARC too.

Figure 2. Sources on which insurgents build their legitimacy, as identified by the literature

Conclusion

As mentioned previously, counterinsurgency theory mostly focuses on democracies and autocracies, whereas mixed regimes have been neglected. Therefore, the sometimes perceived binary distinction of how counterinsurgency is done should be perceived as a spectrum. Counterinsurgency in Colombia's mixed regime is an interesting case in this regard, so this study focuses on how counterinsurgency works in such a mixed regime and how legitimacy is sought through discourse.

Various scholars have conducted research on counterinsurgency and legitimacy in Colombia (Arjona, 2015; Dube & Naidu, 2015; Ince, 2013), but studies focusing on discourse are scarce. What is more, no comparisons over time have been made yet, namely between Uribe's and Santos' discourse. Besides, few studies have researched legitimacy in discourse

of both parties in counterinsurgency. In this respect this study is interesting, as it examines how the FARC sought to justify its battle too, characterised by high levels of violence.

Chapter 2: Research design and methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis

This study's goal is to investigate how Uribe and Santos, respectively, sought to legitimise their counterinsurgencies and how the FARC sought to legitimise their insurgency, through discourse.

According to the literature, attention should be paid to societal factors in which the insurgency took place and the counterinsurgency was implemented. In this regard, the conflict's history, the threat posed by the FARC, the long-lasting nature and the resulting demand for a solution, serve as a framework from which the research question is approached and the CDA is conducted.

In the subsequent three chapters, a CDA is carried out to investigate Uribe's discourse regarding the FARC during his presidency (2002-2010), Santos' discourse regarding the FARC during his presidency (2010-2018) and the FARC's discourse regarding their insurgency and Uribe's and Santos' counterinsurgencies, respectively.

Discourse is often understood as creating truths and knowledge. Besides, discourse is about power relations, as certain persons have a greater capability to influence discourse, and thus common knowledge and belief, because of their position in society (Schneider, 2013). CDA is a type of discourse analysis that investigates how power relations are socially constructed and how power abuse is legitimised (Van Dijk, 1993). Van Dijk (1993) argues that powerful actors can use discourse to influence the population's beliefs and attitudes. Machin and Mayr (2012) explain how the ''process of legitimation is generally expressed through language'' (p. 24). Studies of Sarfo and Krampa (2012) and Achugar (2007) show that CDA is an appropriate instrument to analyse discourse in International Relations of political or military actors in their justification of measures to counter threats to the state. Therefore, this study uses CDA to reveal how Uribe and Santos used discourse to justify their policies. Moreover, CDA reveals how the FARC used discourse to justify their demands. Since taking socio-cultural structures of society into account is important while conducting CDA (Machin and Mayr, 2012), the Colombian society and its history are borne in mind in the analysis process.

Sources[2]

To examine how Uribe and Santos sought legitimacy for their counterinsurgencies, primary sources such as public speeches, interviews and policy documents are analysed. FARC's public announcements and interviews with FARC combatants are evaluated to reveal how they sought legitimacy. Secondary sources are used in this study to draw a picture of the social, historical, political and cultural aspects of the Colombian conflict and the FARC's role. By including both primary and secondary sources and shifting attention between them in the analysis process, the context in which the sources are produced is considered, aiming to minimise bias and validate facts.

Data-analysis

A qualitative method is used in conducting the CDA. Machin and Mayr's (2012) work is used as a manual to systematically analyse the sources. Discursive statements are analysed with attention for micro features of the text and macro features of the context in which the texts are produced. Strands referring to state measures aiming to either negotiate with, or fight against the FARC are sought within these. Similarly, FARC documents are scrutinised in aspects referring to their insurgency and the state's response. Subsequently, it is examined whether the sources of legitimacy in Figure 1 and Figure 2, derived from the literature, are found in the discourses, while there is room left for identifying other sources of legitimacy. Ultimately, strands are compared to find out how they relate to each other and they are interpreted in light of the literature.

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[2] Many of the primary sources of Uribe, Santos and the FARC, used for the CDA, were originally written in Spanish. For the purpose of writing this study, they were translated into English. The original texts in Spanish can be made available by the study's author.

Chapter 3: Critical Discourse Analysis Uribe

Based on the discussed literature on counterinsurgency and legitimacy, various features are identified that can be used in discourse to seek legitimacy. Given that Uribe served in a mixed regime (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002), democratic and autocratic features are expected to be found. This chapter shows that Uribe indeed, despite his repressive means (Gamboa, 2018), attempts to legitimise his counterinsurgency, by portraying the insurgents as a threat to the country and as terrorists (Ucko, 2016; Mampilly, 2011). Furthermore, he refers to the 'democratic' (Duyvesteyn, 2017) aspect of his security policy to legitimise his actions. Going beyond the literature, this chapter indicates that counterinsurgents such as Uribe build legitimacy on the country's and conflict's history to win the support of the population. Figure 3 depicts these sources of legitimacy in Uribe's discourse, as found by the CDA. The sources in green are derived from the literature and found in Uribe's discourse accordingly, whereas the source in blue was not discussed in existing literature but was found in Uribe's discourse. The following subsections discuss these sources, being 'democratic security policy', 'the FARC as illegitimate and a threat to the population' and 'Colombia's history'.


Figure 3. Sources on which Uribe aims to build his counterinsurgency's legitimacy

Democratic security policy

Critical analysis of Uribe's discourse indicates that his presidency's main pillar is his democratic security policy. Central to this policy is the idea that security should be

democratic, in the sense that it should be for everyone. Besides, with 'democratic' Uribe refers to the citizens' active role in the counterinsurgency, by means of the civilian informant force, discussed in Chapter 1 (Livingstone, 2003). Human rights organisations and scholars reveal that this informant force was contentious, because civilians became even more exposed to violence and the conflict's perpetual nature was enhanced (Livingstone, 2003; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002). This subsection uncovers through structural opposition and pronoun analysis that Uribe seeks legitimacy for his counterinsurgency by claiming that it is democratic.

The manifesto for Uribe's presidential campaign dedicates 15 points to the means and ends of the democratic security policy. In contrast, only one point is dedicated to possible peace negotiations, indicating that Uribe attaches more value to fostering security than to engaging in peaceful negotiations with the FARC and that he aims to base his legitimacy on security for all Colombians.

On his personal website, Uribe refers to democracy to justify his policies directed against the FARC. The following quotes reveal, by pronoun analysis, that he emphasises the inclusiveness of his policies by using 'we', giving the population a sense of participation.

- ''*We* [emphasis added] defend security as a democratic value in itself, as a fundamental requirement for the real validity of liberties and rights, as a source of resources and as a human right to which all citizens must have access and equality of conditions.'' (Uribe, 2014)

- ''*We* [emphasis added] are going to build a nation in harmony, prosperous and just.'' (Uribe, 2006)

Also, Uribe contrasts Colombia's democracy with various autocracies throughout Latin America in past decades. Using structural oppositions causes the opposing concepts to be immediately evaluated, indicating which one is good and which one is bad (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 39). Here, Uribe uses this strategy to legitimise why attacks against democracies should be combatted.

- ''Why do we call the Colombian guerrillas terrorists? Because while Latin America witnessed insurgencies against dictatorships, we have been witnessing armed groups

against a democracy . . . ; while the others fought for democratic liberties, the Colombian guerrilla has been attacking democratic liberties.'' (Uribe, 2014)

However, his arguments contradict with the evidence of human rights institutions and scholars. Chambers (2013) contends that dissidents were penalised under Uribe, accusing them of supporting terrorists, and Human Rights Watch (2008) expressed concern about attacks against human rights defenders. The ICC (2012) reported about attacks systematically directed against civilians, particularly in the context of the 'false positives' scandal, described in Chapter 1. These assertions are not in line with what a democracy should be like. However, given that Colombia is regarded a mixed regime (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002), such contradictions are to be expected in the country.

What is more, Uribe uses pronouns, for example in an interview conducted by Stangler (2010), to sketch a contrast between the insurgents and the population and to align the population alongside values, such as democracy. He makes clear that the insurgents are against *our* (i.e. the population's) shared values (democracy) and legitimises the battle against them.

- ''*We* [emphasis added] have criminal attempts from terrorist groups against *our* [emphasis added] democracy.'' (Stangler, 2010)

The FARC as illegitimate and a threat to the population

A way to legitimise counterinsurgency, is to delegitimise the insurgent (Mampilly, 2011). This subsection exposes that Uribe uses structural opposition and metonymies to criminalise the FARC and to obscure realities of the conflict, in order to seek legitimacy for his own crackdown against them.

Structural opposition analysis exposes that in Uribe's presidential manifesto, there is a continuous distinction made between civilians and violent guerrillas. For example:

- ''The legitimate authority of the state protects the citizens and stops the violent ones.'' (Uribe, 2002b)

In this way the insurgents are being polarised from the population, to frame the insurgents as a threat to the country and to take away their legitimacy (Ucko, 2016). Furthermore, it implies that the country is a kind of superpower taking care of the population. Graham,

Keenan and Dowd (2004) concur with Ucko (2016), clarifying that politicians show similar features in conflict, such as ''the creation of an evil enemy . . . [and] an appeal to unity behind a greater power source'' to legitimise their actions (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 176).

In speeches and interviews, Uribe emphasises viewing the counterinsurgency as directed against terrorists, instead of guerrillas. In this way, he justifies extraordinary means, as it is commonly believed that terrorists are a threat to all people and should be defeated, regardless of the means (Mampilly, 2011). While guerrillas might have legitimacy, terrorists certainly do not and hereby Uribe aims to take away all possible legitimacy for the insurgents. Contrarily, he seeks legitimacy for his own counterinsurgency by making it part of the international 'war on terror', creating a sense of urgency to legitimately overthrow the FARC as it is framed as a force threatening international stability.

- ''Terrorism does not have ethical limits, neither border limits. Its contempt for the State is total, so it poses the same threat today against the democratic State of Colombia and tomorrow against the democratic State of whichever other country.'' (Uribe, 2014)

- ''The challenge of democracies around the world nowadays is the defeat of the enemy of society, which is terrorism and organised crime, whatever its ideological disguise is.'' (Uribe, 2014)

Moreover, Uribe refers to the insurgents as drug traffickers and criminals. Podder (2014) explains that counterinsurgents often portray insurgents as 'bandits' to take away their legitimacy based on revolutionary ideas to change the present state. By linking the FARC to Colombia's drug trade, Uribe seeks legitimation to combat them, as drugs is regarded as a destabilizing factor in the country because of high incidences of violence that come along with the drug trade (Dube & Naidu, 2015). The following quotes illustrate, the second one being a quote of Uribe as highlighted in his biography by De Zárate (2016) and the third one a quote of Uribe derived from an interview by Samper and Vargas (2002).

- ''While insurgent organisations of other latitudes financed themselves with donations, the Colombian guerrilla has been financing itself with drug trafficking, extortions and kidnappings.'' (Uribe, 2014)

- ''A bunch of bandits'' (De Zárate, 2016)

- ''A condition for negotiating with the armed groups is its dissociation from drugs. If they do not abandon drugs, the international community will lose its interest for a negotiation process.'' (Samper & Vargas, 2002)

In the latter, Uribe uses the metonymy 'international community' to avoid being specific about the exact agent. It suggests that the international community consists of one voice with the same opinion about this conflict, instead of leaving space for diverse, nuanced perspectives (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 171). Such a sense of common interest engenders that people feel the earnestness of the situation and might view attacking the guerrillas as legitimate.

Although the term 'terrorist' implies a political goal (Legal Information Institute, 2019), Uribe systematically ignores the FARC's original goal on which their insurgency is based. Whenever he refers to them as terrorists, he never pays attention to what exactly they pursue. Livingstone (2003) points out that the FARC are linked to the Communist party, prioritising agrarianism and anti-imperialism. A majority of the FARC members wanted to advance the political and socio-economic situation of the people in their municipality instead of pursuing political goals nationally or globally (Livingstone, 2003). During the FARC's first years, they received strong backing from Colombians, especially from rural populations. The movement consolidated their power in areas with a lack of government presence. They provided landowners with protection in exchange for tax and provided populations with education, courts and health systems (Bergquist, Peñarando, & Sánchez, 2001). However, when the armed struggle intensified due to the involvement of drugs and right-wing paramilitaries, many inhabitants wanted the conflict to end and to re-establish a stable living environment (Livingstone, 2003).

The CDA reveals that Uribe does not reflect on the FARC's real initial intentions, perhaps because he does not want to risk a revival of support for them and enhance his own legitimacy in turn. In other words, by portraying them as terrorists, drug traffickers or criminals, he conceals possible legitimate factors of the FARC, as their manifesto demands are ''a mixed economy, wealth redistribution and defence of civil rights'' (Livingstone, 2003, p. 90), aspects to which a large share of the population can relate. In contrast, not many people would recognise themselves as being terrorists.

Colombia's history

Apart from referring to democracy and framing the FARC as illegitimate enemies to legitimise the use of force, there must also be looked at Colombia's societal context (Kitzen, 2017). This subsection considers the macro-level structures of society that influence the way discourse is interpreted, arguing that Uribe uses Colombia's violent history to legitimise his militarised policies. Besides, presupposition analysis reveals how he aims to win the people's hearts and minds.

By the time Uribe assumed office, the country had witnessed forty years of war and many victims. In 2000, for example, 26.540 homicides were reported in Colombia (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2001). The FARC lost some legitimacy when they expanded their battle towards more central areas of the country (Gonzalez, 2006). Gonzalez (2006) adds to this the failed peace process by Uribe's predecessor Pastrana as an important factor explaining the decrease in popular confidence in formal negotiations. As a result, the population preferred a military solution, believing that extreme measures were now required (Livingstone, 2003). Uribe said in an interview with Orozco (2002) that he was only willing to negotiate from a strong military position, implying that he prioritises attacking the FARC over talking with them.

- ''I propose authority as a dissuasive element for violence that ultimately facilitates negotiation.'' (Orozco, 2002)

The following quotes reflect Uribe's call upon Colombia's long and complex conflict, in an attempt to legitimise the measures taken.

- ''A conflict of magnitude like ours needs atypical solutions.'' (Uribe, 2002b)

- ''Today, the only road that is left is rescue by the military and police from the kidnappings.'' (De Zárate, 2016)

By using presuppositions in discourse to win popular support, the speaker does not have to be explicit about what he or she really means, as the public will understand what is referred to (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 153). The next quotes illustrate, as the word 'recover(y)' presupposes that human rights were not secured under former presidencies. Uribe does not

openly attack his predecessors, but he makes the public believe that they were not protecting them and that this will be rectified under his presidency, aiming for legitimacy.

- "We will proceed with firmness, with serenity, with an absolute respect for democracy, to recover our human rights." (Uribe, 2002c)

- ''. . . the recovery of human rights.'' (Uribe, 2002a)

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Colombia has a 'culture of violence' (Waldmann, 2007) and ''In 1991 murder became the main cause of unnatural death.'' (Livingstone, 2003, p. 31). Civilians had been witnessing that criminals were not being brought to trial, causing little faith in the rule of law. Paramilitary groups surfaced to guarantee self-defence. Furthermore, the drugs business worsened the crisis, as state officials were corruptly profiting from the drug trade and the violent drug cartels became part of the governing system. All these factors led the population to perceive government institutions as ineffective and illegitimate, diminishing perspective for peace negotiations (Livingstone, 2003).

Besides, Colombia was only 'partially free', regarding civil liberties and political rights, in the years leading towards Uribe's presidency (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002). As a result, the population could have verged more easily towards the implicit acceptance of the use of violence to re-establish order (Asal et al., 2016). This history could also account for Uribe's promises to strengthen the military and his willingness to use repression in this context of a mixed regime (Regan & Henderson, 2002). In the following quotes, the second one derived from a BBC article, Uribe refers to Colombia's history of violence and insecurity, to legitimise the final solution to crackdown on the guerrillas.

- '' . . . to retake the unifying bond of the law, the democratic authority, freedom and social justice lost in moments of turmoil in history.'' (Uribe, 2002d)

- ''A whole nation is crying out for respite and security. . . . I understand the grief of the mother, the orphan and the displaced.'' (BBC, 2002)

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the grounds on which Uribe aims to build legitimacy for his counterinsurgency. Using various discourse strategies, he makes references to democracy

(Duyvesteyn, 2017) to legitimise his security policy, stating that security is meant for all Colombians and that they play an active role in establishing a secure Colombia and defeating the FARC. Besides, Ucko's (2016) and Mampilly's (2011) assertions that counterinsurgents portray insurgents as illegitimate and a threat to the population to gain legitimacy, are confirmed by this CDA on Uribe's discourse.

Apart from these grounds of legitimacy that were identified by the literature, another ground is found in Uribe's discourse that was not discussed in existing literature. That is, he points oftentimes to Colombia's violent history to convince the people that the only solution is to crackdown on the FARC, thereby seeking legitimacy for his militarised counterinsurgency.

So, this chapter shows that Uribe, acting in a mixed regime, engages in a repressive counterinsurgency for which he does seek popular legitimacy, rather than only resorting to illegitimate mass repression. The CDA therefore reveals power structures in the Colombian society and the way they are manipulated. Uribe would never say that the country is a mixed regime, instead he refers to democracy and aims to strengthen his legitimacy on this basis, while at the same time he aims to take away the FARC's legitimacy and power by accusing them of attacking the democracy.

Chapter 4: Critical Discourse Analysis Santos

Since Santos was president of the mixed regime of Colombia, democratic and autocratic features are expected to be found in his counterinsurgency too. Although Santos was engaged in repressive measures against the FARC when he was Minister of Defence under Uribe's administration, he did not proceed with this hard-line strategy as president. While not completely ceasing military operations against the FARC, he did not underline the security approach as much as Uribe (Ince, 2013). In line with Byman's (2016) arguments, Santos attempted to win the people's hearts and minds by organising negotiations rather than emphasising military measures. This is characteristic for democracies (Gurr, 2000). The CDA shows that democracy is indeed one of the grounds that Santos bases his legitimacy on (Duyvesteyn, 2017), by referring to the democratic process of popular participation in the peace process. Figure 4 illustrates that 'democratic participation of the population', 'peaceful future' and 'the FARC as human beings, worthy of holding a dialogue with' are the sources of legitimacy that Santos refers to in his discourse. The source in green was found in both the discussed literature and Santos' discourse, whereas the sources in blue add to existing literature, as they were not discussed in literature previously but found in Santos' discourse by the CDA. Each following subsection elaborates on one of these sources.


Figure 4. Sources on which Santos aims to build his counterinsurgency's legitimacy

Democratic participation of the population

Santos sets out his political vision, regarding the conflict, in political statements and interviews, emphasising the democratic element of popular participation in the peace process to seek legitimacy. This subsection demonstrates how Santos reaffirms the population's role and attaches value to democracy, to legitimise his approach. He does this by using aggregation amongst others. Furthermore, it is exhibited how grammatical positioning of actions shifts attention away from his means that may have been less democratic.

Firstly, Santos declared in his inauguration speech, discussed in a BBC article, his willingness to engage in dialogue with the FARC to seek a solution:

- ''To the armed illegal groups, who invoke political reasons and now talk of dialogue and negotiation, I say my government is open to any kind of conversation which seeks to eradicate violence and build a more prosperous, equal and just society.'' (BBC, 2010)

Moreover, on the website of Santos' Party of National Unity, he describes the party's main principles. The following quote exemplifies that he incorporates democracy to show the people that they are taken into account and that the party should therefore be perceived as legitimate.

- ''A political party with ideology, discipline, debate and democracy is a powerful element in the construction of a country. The party – as a political organ – allows to include the aspiration of millions of Colombians who give voice and strength to the desires of the Colombians.'' (Santos, 2019)

By using 'millions of Colombians' Santos applies the discourse strategy aggregation. Aggregation takes place when actors are represented as statistics, conveying the idea that scientific research is behind it, whereas in reality the reader is not provided with specific numbers and is thus ideologically manipulated (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 83).

Santos does this again in the speech for his Nobel Prize, that he received for his efforts to bring the conflict to an end:

- ''Today, we have a new agreement for ending the armed conflict with the FARC, which incorporates the majority of the proposals we received. This new agreement

was signed two weeks ago, and it was endorsed last week by our Congress, by an overwhelming majority. . .'' (Santos, 2016a)

'Majority of the proposals' and 'overwhelming majority' give the impression that almost all perspectives were included in the agreement and that there was no doubt of rejecting it. So Santos uses aggregation in this speech to seek legitimacy for the agreement.

Although it is true that the new agreement was a revision of the initial agreement and that this new one was adopted with a majority of Congress, this process was not without problems. After four years of negotiations, Santos' government and the FARC came to an agreement which was to be ratified by a referendum. Despite the fact that Santos expected popular support for the deal, it was rejected by 50,2% (Wallenfeldt & Ray, 2018). This meant an enormous challenge for Santos to put even more effort to seek legitimacy for the deal, his counterinsurgency's major pillar. In this regard, he once again emphasised the democratic means by which he tried to come to an agreement, namely consulting the population and strengthening his government's and the peace deal's legitimacy by including their ideas:

- ''I devoted myself to listening to the concerns and recommendations of those who had voted ''No'', of those who had voted ''Yes'', and of the majority who did not vote at all – with the aim of achieving a new and improved agreement, an agreement that all of Colombia could stand behind.'' (Santos, 2016a)

- ''I went out and recognised the result, which is what any president and any citizen should do. . . I said I accept immediately the results but I ask both the yes and no people to unite, because all of you want peace, I have heard you for many months, many years.'' (Santos, 2016b)

This call upon democracy as a source for legitimacy was also used by Santos in the period before the rejected deal. The following quotes illustrate, as he mentions democratic processes such as a plebiscite and his promise to let the population decide whether or not to adopt the deal.

- ''What I can say is that whatever the result of this plebiscite is, will be submitted to the Colombian people, so it is the people who decide whether to accept the agreement or not, so we are guaranteeing that the process is democratic.'' (Santos, 2014a)

27

Santos' discourse shows that he recognises the FARC's objectives and the fact that they still enjoy some popular support amongst Colombians. Therefore, he addresses a wider audience than only the ones wanting to defeat the FARC. The statements below clarify that he uses democracy to gain legitimacy for the peace process and its outcomes, namely the fact that the FARC will be able to participate in politics and represent their supporters' objectives.

- ''They can continue their struggle through political means, and that's what a peace process is all about.'' (Santos, 2015a)

- ''Politics with no violence, that's the whole idea.'' (Santos, 2015a)

- ''We are trying to get rid of this conflict, trying to convince the guerrillas to change their bullets for votes, to change their arms for arguments and to continue their struggle, but through democratic means . . . If we achieve this peace then the other objectives will be much easier to realise, to obtain.'' (Santos, 2013)

As mentioned previously, Santos had not always been advocating formal negotiations as a solution to the conflict. As Minister of Defence under President Uribe, he implemented a militarised counterinsurgency, repressing both the FARC and the population. Having changed his approach when he became president, he cannot avoid talking about these actions in the past and justifies them by arguing that they were necessary to arrive at this moment that allows for democratic negotiations:

- ''. . . because as the process matures and circumstances change, you also have to change your position.'' (Santos, 2015b)

In the next quote, Santos composes his sentences carefully, so that the actions are grammatically positioned in a way that obscures the agent.

- ''First you need to do everything possible to convince the other side that it is in their interest to negotiate and that's why the military offensive was very hard, very strong and very effective. And then the offer of a peace agreement. And that's where we are right now.'' (Santos, 2013)

''Grammatical positioning of actions'' (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 114) is a strategy to put certain actions at the foreground and others in the background. Here, Santos places 'that's why the military offensive was very hard, very strong and very effective' later in the sentence, giving it a subordinate position. Therefore, less importance is attached to this part of the sentence and the action is downplayed, whereas 'First you need to do everything possible to convince the other side that it is in their interest to negotiate' is put at the core of the sentence and thus regarded the most important. It takes away his agency in the former military actions, while placing emphasis on his role in the current democratic actions of negotiating an agreement, that he seeks to legitimise.

So, this subsection shows that Santos uses inclusive dialogue and democracy in his discourse to legitimise his counterinsurgency approach.

Peaceful future

Given that the peace process is the main pillar of Santos' counterinsurgency, he continuously highlights Colombia's future. By reiterating what the country in peace will look like, he aims to legitimise peace talks with the FARC. Many Colombians were sceptical about negotiations, because the FARC caused so much damage to the country and the population (Livingstone, 2003). Therefore, Santos has to convince the people that a negotiated end to the conflict is better for the country than a continuation of the violence. This subsection indicates that Santos refers to the Colombian society, using pronouns and structural opposition, to make a brighter future clear and pursue legitimacy for it.

As mentioned, Santos received much criticism during his negotiation efforts, because many people were afraid that the FARC-leaders and –members would get away with impunity (Wallenfeldt & Ray, 2018). To assure the population that he is doing the right thing, he calls upon Colombia's future to unite the population in favour of a common goal. Using the pronoun 'we' conveys the idea that the population is an active part of this process leading to more prosperity:

- ''I firmly believe that Colombia today has to set a goal for itself that *we* [emphasis added] can all commit to. And what's that goal, to become by 2025 a country in total peace. . .'' (Santos, 2014b)

- ''I am convinced that what *we* [emphasis added] are doing is right and good for Colombia. My generation hasn't known a single day of peace. So I tell my compatriots, close your eyes and imagine Colombia had peace. Imagine leaving our children with a country at peace. That's something spectacular, something marvellous that I believe *we* [emphasis added] will achieve.'' (Santos, 2014a)

In the last quote, Santos mentions 'my generation' and plays this against the generation of 'our children'. By implicitly contrasting these two generations with each other, he demonstrates the disparity between Colombia's past and present hostility against the possibility of a peaceful future, making clear that this future will undoubtedly be better than the past and the present (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 69). Although, under the condition that the peace process is being finalised. So, by structurally opposing these two periods and by taking the Colombian society into account (Kitzen, 2017), he legitimises the continuation of the process.

In a similar vein, Santos uses structural opposition on his political party's website, to seek legitimacy for it and thereby for his counterinsurgency strategy, being a main principle of the party. The following quote points out that he keeps repeating his commitment to a better future and that he defines this future by contrasting it with the horrors that lie in the past.

- ''The party that I visualise is a party that thinks about the future, that does not remain stagnant in the past, in the conflict, in the war and in the hatreds; that it is the party of the post-conflict, of the future, the one that is going to modernise Colombia.'' (Santos, 2019)

The FARC as human beings, worthy of holding a dialogue with
As noticed previously, Santos acknowledges the FARC's objectives, rather than denouncing them as merely criminals. Since many Colombians were suspicious about the FARC's intentions and their commitment to peace (Wallenfeldt & Ray, 2018), Santos sought legitimacy for his talks with the guerrilla group. This subsection illustrates how Santos, using impersonalisation and individualisation, calls upon ideas of universal humanity to legitimise his approach.

In his Nobel Prize speech, Santos explains why he has chosen dialogue and political participation as opposed to only military operations. Hereby, he refers to the foolishness to make war and the human nature of all people, including armed forces such as the FARC. He

portrays himself as someone who respects the dignity of all, to let people consider his approach legitimate. The following quotes illuminate:

- ''. . . it is now irrational to have this type of conflict to my country.'' (Santos, 2012)

- ''This agreement . . . marks the beginning of the dismantling of an army – this time, an irregular army – and its conversion into a legal political movement.'' (Santos, 2016a)

- ''Dialogue…based on respect for the dignity of all. That was our recourse in Colombia. And that is why I have the honour to be here today, sharing what we have learned through our hard-won experience. Our first and most vital step was to cease thinking of the guerrillas as our bitter enemies, and to see them instead simply as adversaries.'' (Santos, 2016a)

In the next quote, Santos uses so-called impersonalisation, causing greater emphasis to be given to the remark (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 79). That means, referring to 'the human spirit' implies that not just some persons or a particular group will be defeated if the state only resorts to force, but that all human beings will suffer from this defeat. Thus, Santos aims to create a sense of solidarity that all civilians will suffer from military solutions and that negotiation is the key.

- ''A final victory through force, when nonviolent alternatives exist, is none other than the defeat of the human spirit.'' (Santos, 2016a)

On the other hand, Santos uses individualisation as a strategy to provoke empathy amongst the public (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 80).

- ''Seeking victory through force alone, pursuing the utter destruction of the enemy, waging war to the last breath, means failing to recognize your opponent as a human being like yourself, someone with whom you can hold a dialogue with.'' (Santos, 2016a)

By portraying FARC members as 'a human being like yourself', they are being individualised, bringing them closer to the public. With this strategy, Santos aims to humanise

the FARC in an attempt to legitimise the negotiations with them, based on equality of all humans.

Conclusion

This chapter has shed light on the sources of legitimacy that Santos refers to in his discourse. Acting in a mixed regime, though using military means to a lesser extent than Uribe, Santos aims to legitimise his counterinsurgency by often referring to democratic participation of the population. Since his counterinsurgency mainly consists of peace talks with the FARC, he aims to gain legitimacy amongst the population by making clear to them that they have a voice in this process. Furthermore, he seeks to legitimise the peace talks amongst FARC supporters by telling that the objectives of the guerrilla group and their followers are being heard. These references to democracy in order to seek legitimacy are in line with Duyvesteyn's (2017) argument.

Besides, the CDA unveils that Santos uses two other sources, not identified previously in literature, of legitimacy. That is to say, he mentions the Colombian society, as is important according to Kitzen (2017), in the quest for legitimacy. In particular, he refers to a bright future for Colombia that should be perceived legitimate, and convinces the people that this is what the country needs, to legitimise and secure a continuation of the peace process, leading to the peace agreement.

Finally, Santos makes an appeal for perceiving the FARC as human beings, worthy of holding a dialogue with, thereby evoking empathy amongst the public to persuade them that his approach respects human dignity and that that is the only way to end the conflict.

Chapter 5: Critical Discourse Analysis FARC

Following from existing literature, three sources can be identified on which insurgents aim to base their legitimacy in discourse (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015). This chapter examines the FARC's discourse during Uribe's and Santos' presidency regarding their insurgency and the presidents' counterinsurgencies, and demonstrates where they base their legitimacy on. Figure 5 illustrates the sources of legitimacy, in green, as identified by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) that are found in the FARC's discourse, plus an additional source of legitimacy, in blue, derived from the CDA and adding to literature. So, this chapter shows how the FARC attempt to gain legitimacy by referring to 'the state as illegitimate and an enemy of the population', 'revolutionary socio-economic and political objectives' and 'destructive international involvement'. Ultimately, a subsection elaborates on the differences in the FARC's discourse during Uribe's and Santos' presidency.

*Figure 5*. Sources on which the FARC aim to build their insurgency's legitimacy

The state as illegitimate and an enemy of the population

The FARC regularly published public statements, aiming to seek support for their objectives. In these statements they also attack the Colombian government, denouncing it as illegitimate. This subsection demonstrates how they portray the state as an enemy of the population to seek

legitimacy for their insurgency, by linking the government to paramilitaries, terrorists, drug traffickers and engaging in 'condemning the condemners'.

Especially during Uribe's presidency, the FARC criticised his policies and blamed him for having close links with paramilitaries. Vieira (2008), drawing on a United Nations report, contends that paramilitaries are responsible for 80% of all killings in the conflict, many massacres of civilians and lootings. Uribe informally legalised the paramilitaries (Norman, 2018) and it is suggested that paramilitary groups came into existence to carry out the dirty work of the state's counterinsurgency, thereby absolving the state itself of international law violations (Vieira, 2008).

The framing of the government as harmful to the population because of its links with paramilitaries is in line with insurgents' claims that Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) identified. They explain how insurgents seek justification for their actions by constructing threats and enemies. By portraying the state, its leaders and their paramilitary 'partners' as merciless and cruel, the FARC aim for their own military actions to appear inevitable to protect the population, creating legitimacy for their battle.

The first quote that follows displays this creation of the population's enemy, whereas the second quote displays the Colombian army as a ruthless enemy of its own soldiers. In the third quote the state is framed as being explicitly against the people, undermining the state's legitimacy and legitimising the FARC's insurgency.

- ''We can no longer tolerate this narco-paramilitary mafia of large landowners and ranchers, drug traffickers and businessmen who . . . turned Colombia into a hell of war, massacres, mass detentions of citizens, disappearances, misery and looting, and all the outrages of State terrorism.'' (FARC-EP, 2007)

- ''The Glorious National Army does not mind risking the lives of its own soldiers.'' (FARC-EP, 2014)

- ''This paramilitary Government of Uribe, takes advantage of the anguish of the people of the nation . . . and improve their [paramilitary gangs] military training in techniques of dirty war against the people and their revolutionary and popular organisations, in the excessive increase of the total war without dialogues against the armed insurgency.'' (FARC-EP, 2003)

Interestingly, the FARC do not only link the government to paramilitaries, but also to the drug trafficking. What is more, they call the government terrorists, thereby countering accusations made by the government that portrays the FARC themselves as terrorists. So, the FARC apply ''The condemnation of the condemners'' (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668) to remove their own faults by focusing attention on the state and blaming it for criminal behaviour.

- '' . . . in order to impose State Terror on the civilian population to make them accept their impositions. . . '' (FARC-EP, 2002)

- ''This confirms the Terrorist nature of the Colombian governing regime which, in spite of such state barbarity, is protected by impunity.'' (FARC-EP, 2002)

Thus, by depicting the government as atrocious, the FARC aim to undermine the government's legitimacy and justify their own actions.

Revolutionary socio-economic and political objectives of the population
This subsection discusses how the FARC call upon socio-economic and political objectives of the population. They state to fight for these objectives, such as the guarantee of common good, social justice and democracy, which allows the pursuit of legitimacy by the people. Specifically, they refer to their revolutionary Bolivarian spirit, which drives them to continue their insurgency to establish a better Colombia for the people. Below, it is exhibited that the FARC use structural opposition and metaphors to clarify and legitimise their revolutionary ideas.

The FARC portray themselves as serving a higher purpose by fighting in the name of not only Colombians, but all South Americans. They make references to 'The Liberator', referring to Simón Bolívar, and contrast him with dictators that have ruled South American countries. Bolívar was a freedom fighter and guided the liberation of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Panama and Bolivia from the Spaniards (Brown, 2006). Given that he is perceived as a hero throughout South America (Brown, 2006), the FARC link themselves to this positive image.

Two groups can be contrasted to imply that one group is better than the other and legitimise the first group (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 39; Van Dijk, 1998, p. 69). Below, the FARC refer to revolutionary guerrilla movements as opposed to dictatorships and to their goal

of a new state as fundamentally opposed to the state in place. They associate their proposed state with love, Bolivarianism and justice, and the present state with fascism, repression and neoliberalism. The third quote is derived from a communiqué after the killing of FARC leader Raúl Reyes by the Colombian army and shows his revolutionary commitment.

- ''The Governing Caste headed by Uribe Velez . . . consists of wiping the guerrilla movement from the political map in order to remove a major obstacle to the imposition of the kind of dictatorial policies which remain a bitter memory for the countries of the Southern Cone and Central America. . . '' (FARC-EP, 2002)

- ''The objective is the creation of an alternative . . . to save Colombia from the abyss, to recover the dignity dishonoured by the outlawed government of narco-paramilitary fascists blessed by Washington . . . that outlaws the repressive and plundering Democratic Security of the empire and the neoliberal policy, that rescues the sovereignty of the people, restructures the State with the goal of guaranteeing the common good and conform a Bolivarian Army guided by the love of the people, social justice and the defence of the country.'' (FARC-EP, 2007)

- ''We will always remember Raúl . . . and his effectiveness to make the international community recognise the FARC's reality as a Revolutionary Army and his strength to revitalise the Bolivarian strategy of continental unity.'' (FARC-EP, 2008)

These quotes demonstrate how insurgents base their legitimacy on political or socio-economic objectives of the population (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015), as the FARC refer to their goal of freeing them from repression and guaranteeing a better socio-economic and political situation. This sense of revolution that they aim to invoke is built on Bolívar, who also liberated the people from repression, to strengthen legitimacy.

Moreover, they express the idea of progress and revolution by metaphors. Rhetoric can obscure how outcomes are pursued by the text producer and as a matter of fact, nobody can be held accountable (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 167). Often, actors with a political agenda use metaphors that portray the ongoing political struggle as a path of progression leading to the end goal (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 74). The FARC apply this strategy too. The following quotes, the first one derived from a manifesto and the second one from a BBC article that quotes former FARC leader Iván Márquez, illustrate:

- ''We have no alternative but to seek united the road to leave the dark night guided by the glimpse of justice and the new dawn of Great Colombia.'' (FARC-EP, 2007)

- '' . . . an important step in the right direction to end the conflict and to achieve a real democracy in Colombia.'' (BBC, 2013)

Mentioning a new, bright 'Great Colombia' and democracy conveys the idea that the insurgency establishes a process leading to preferred outcomes. However, these metaphors do not state clearly hów this goal is to be attained. Consequently, they do not have to elaborate on, nor take responsibility for their means, which consists mainly of armed combat. Thus, the FARC's use of metaphors regarding socio-economic and political objectives allows them to mobilise the population and seek legitimacy without being specific about their tactics.

Destructive international involvement
The CDA discloses that the FARC aim to seek legitimacy on more grounds than identified by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015). Although Podder (2017) and Steele and Shapiro (2017) considered links between international actors and insurgents' legitimacy, they did not investigate how this interplay can be exploited in discourse. This subsection shows how the FARC blame the Colombian state for strengthening US interference in Colombia. By pointing to the destructive effects hereof, they seek legitimacy for their insurgency against the state that is supported by the US. Below, it is demonstrated how 'overlexicalisation' is used to portray US involvement as a threat to the people and thus as necessary to fight against.

Overlexicalisation is the use of many words with the same meaning that portray actors in a particular way, to persuade the audience on a contentious issue (Teo, 2000, p. 20). Here, it means that the FARC choose words associated with negative intentions to describe the US. The quotes below illustrate this, but first it is clarified how US interference might influence the FARC's quest for legitimacy.

Chapter 1 indicates that Podder (2017) attributes insurgents' legitimacy partly to the role of international actors and Steele and Shapiro (2017) examined Colombia in this regard. Their assertion that US involvement in Colombia is likely to be counterproductive in strengthening state legitimacy is not investigated in this analysis, however, it is discerned that US involvement does play a role in the FARC's discourse in order to undermine the state's legitimacy and to increase their own legitimacy. That means, the FARC are provided with

another source to create a 'common enemy' and mobilise the population against it. They accuse the state of its close bonds with the US government and being a puppet of this government, condemning it for impairing Colombia's sovereignty and exposing the country to neo-colonialism.

- ''Colombia is being further violated by the policy of Democratic Security designed by Washington . . . as a strategy of the dominance of the empire over the people of Our America. In essence, this policy . . . seeks, within the framework of neoliberal recolonization, to ensure the investment and plundering of the transnationals through the application of severe laws and force, to suppress and annihilate the resistance of the peoples and social nonconformity.'' (FARC-EP, 2007)

- ''These sectors of society are condemned to suffer the deplorable effects of the unfettered application of neoliberal policies prescribed from Washington by the IMF and the World Bank.'' (FARC-EP, 2002)

These quotes elucidate how the enemy, the US, is being overlexicalised by using strands as 'dominance of the empire', 'neoliberal recolonization', 'plundering of the transnationals', 'severe laws and force', 'suppress and annihilate', 'condemned to suffer the deplorable effects', 'neoliberal policies'. By applying this strategy, the FARC evoke a negative sense attached to the US to convince the audience of the US's evilness and to enhance their own legitimacy to fight against this.

Differences in the FARC's attitude towards Uribe and Santos and issues of agency
Various differences between the FARC's discourse during Uribe's and Santos' presidency can be distinguished. This subsection looks at the quantity of public statements and their content as a general feature and at the use of transitivity as a micro feature.

Firstly, it is evident that the FARC published public statements more frequently during Uribe's presidency in comparison with Santos' presidency. During Uribe's leadership, they issued many communiqués to clarify their objectives and overtly attack the state, its counterinsurgency and Uribe in particular. During Santos' administration, however, there are less of such official communiqués published. The FARC mainly communicated their statements through interviews in videos and newspapers and therein they do talk about the state and its failures, but less aggressively and with less emphasis on reaffirming their fighting

and more on their desire for peace. The following quotes, the second one derived from an interview with the FARC by journalist Brodzinsky, illustrate the difference:

- ''A new type of guerrilla force is emerging out of the gunpowder and the fierceness of the fighting, fuelled by enemy manoeuvres and the clash with the new technologies of the counterinsurgency operability, a guerrilla that is really capable of political and military fire at the service of the popular cause. . . . Uribe is not the man for peace in Colombia. . . . Only a new patriotic and democratic government, sovereign, can achieve negotiated peace . . .'' (FARC-EP, 2007)

- ''This unilateral ceasefire, which we hope will be prolonged in time, will only end if it is determined that our guerrilla structures have been the object of an attack by the military.'' (Brodzinsky, 2014)

Furthermore, agency is depicted differently in the FARC's discourse during both presidencies. Transitivity means analysing the way in which actors and their actions are portrayed and are used to promote ideas and ideologies (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 104). The FARC usually represent the Colombian people with less agency during Uribe's administration, whereas they are represented as more active agents during Santos' administration. The following quotes exemplify how they portray the population as a passive victim of Uribe's powerful and cruel government by using verbs as 'impose' for the government and 'make them accept' for the population, while they give the population more power during Santos' administration by using a form of 'building' associated with the population. These contrasting uses of transitivity show that the FARC aim to undermine Uribe's legitimacy by giving the population a sense of suffering due to his policies, whereas they give the population a sense of strength and agency to work for a better Colombia during Santos' leadership. Since the FARC fight in the name of the people, they are hereby implicitly seeking legitimacy for their combat.

- ''In the name of total war, the government decreed a State of National Emergency . . . in order to impose State Terror on the civilian population to make them accept their impositions . . . '' (FARC-EP, 2002)

- ''We believe that power is built from the bottom.'' (FARC-EP, 2016)

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the FARC attempt to gain popular support by building their legitimacy on various sources, applying several discourse strategies to meticulously compose texts. Of the three symbolic claims as proposed by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), the FARC apply the second and third one in their discourse to delegitimise the Colombian state and seek legitimacy for themselves, being claims of ''socio-economic and political aspirations of a local community'' (p. 417) and claims of ''outside threats and established enemy images'' (p. 417). The first claim of ''communal myth-symbol complexes and … popular belief systems, traditions and cultures'' (p. 417) as described by the authors is not referred to by the FARC in their quest for legitimacy.

Nevertheless, they do build legitimacy on another source that is not explained in previous literature, being 'destructive international involvement'. They use references to the US to emphasise the negative consequences of their interference in Colombia and thereby legitimise their insurgency against the state that is backed by the US.

Finally, comparisons between the FARC's discourse during Uribe's and Santos' government reveal that they change their approach to being less openly aggressive and that they use agency in different ways to seek legitimacy during the two periods.

Chapter 6: Comparison

Figure 3, 4 and 5 identify the main grounds on which Uribe, Santos and the FARC, respectively, build their legitimacy in discourse. Comparison of the three models discerns similarities and differences. Given that Uribe and Santos both acted in a mixed regime, they show autocratic and democratic features, although to different extents. While they both conducted military operations, Uribe as his main policy and Santos to a lesser extent because he focused on negotiations, they also seek legitimacy for their actions, rather than acting repressively without consent. However, they do this in distinct ways. This chapter argues that their divergent attitudes towards the FARC and their different ways of seeking legitimacy amongst the population caused a different approach of the FARC towards the state in turn, which can be observed in their discourse.


Figure 3. Sources on which Uribe aims to build his counterinsurgency's legitimacy

Figure 4. Sources on which Santos aims to build his counterinsurgency's legitimacy

Figure 5. Sources on which the FARC aim to build
their insurgency's legitimacy

Comparing Uribe and Santos

Comparing the models of Uribe and Santos, it stands out that they both use democracy
(Duyvesteyn, 2017) as a source for legitimacy, both referring to democratic elements of their
counterinsurgencies to gain legitimacy. However, this study shows that there are distinct ways
for mixed regimes to refer to democracy as a source for legitimacy, adding nuance to existing
literature.

On the one hand, Uribe repeatedly mentions the democratic element of his security
policy, his counterinsurgency's main pillar. He refers to his security policy as being
'democratic' to illustrate that security should be for everyone and that the population is
democratically involved in establishing a secure environment, by means of participating in a
civilian informant force. In this way he seeks to legitimise his counterinsurgency that in
reality shows repressive features. On the other hand, Santos often mentions democracy, but
for him it has the meaning of referring to the democratic process as consulting the population
about their opinion on the peace deal. His counterinsurgency's main pillar is the peace process
with the FARC and he aims to legitimise this by showing the population that they have a
voice in this democratic process. So while both presidents do not show only democratic
means, they do legitimise their counterinsurgencies in this mixed regime by calling upon
democracy, however in different ways.

Besides, Uribe and Santos portray the FARC differently. Uribe frames the FARC as
criminals, terrorists and drug traffickers, to undermine their legitimacy and strengthen
legitimacy for his counterinsurgency against them. Contrarily, Santos presents the FARC as

an 'irregular army' and adversaries instead of enemies. He does not reduce them to illegitimate criminals, but acknowledges their political objectives and demonstrates his willingness to offer them the opportunity to negotiate these politically rather than by armed struggle. So, whereas Uribe delegitimises the FARC, Santos addresses them as humane counterparts, though engaged in violent combat. He does not aim to delegitimise them but instead seeks to strengthen his counterinsurgency's legitimacy by convincing the population that peaceful negotiations, based on equality, are the only way to genuinely end the conflict.

Additionally, Uribe and Santos diverge regarding their references to the Colombian society. Uribe frequently mentions Colombia's violent and insecure history, pointing to all the damage caused by the FARC, whereas Santos regularly hints at how Colombia's future could be like if the peace process continues. Although Kitzen (2017) contends that societal structures are important for the way legitimacy is sought, he does not elaborate on how society is used in discourse. This study shows how Uribe seeks legitimacy in discourse by persuading the population that military means are the only option to end all the suffering in *history*, as violence has always been omnipresent in Colombia, while Santos seeks legitimacy by convincing the population that peace talks are the only way to establish a peaceful *future* for Colombia, as he portrays violence as irrational because Colombians deserve peace. So, counterinsurgents of mixed regimes can use references to society in different ways in their quest for legitimacy.

Comparing the presidents' discourses with the FARC's discourse
Although the FARC's discourse shows different sources of legitimacy than Uribe's and Santos' discourse, similarities can be found too. This subsection shows how counterinsurgency, in a mixed regime too, is a battle for legitimacy.

For example, both Uribe and the FARC portray their opponent, the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, respectively, as an illegitimate enemy of the population. They portray each other as terrorists, drug criminals and dangerous to the population, to undermine the other party's legitimacy, as populations' enemies are usually perceived as threatening and illegitimate. Here, the fact that counterinsurgency is a battle for legitimacy between insurgents and counterinsurgents (Gawthorpe, 2017), can thus be observed very clearly. By taking away the opponent's legitimacy, they aim to seek support for their own insurgency or counterinsurgency. So, Ucko's (2016) and Mampilly's (2011) contention that counterinsurgents portray insurgents as a threat to justify forceful means, seems to be applicable to insurgents as well. Likewise, Schlichte and Schneckener's (2015) argument that

insurgents justify their means by creating enemies, seems to hold true for counterinsurgents too.

Lastly, both Uribe and the FARC refer to US involvement in the Colombian conflict to gain legitimacy for their approaches, although in different ways. Uribe does not use this involvement as a major ground to build legitimacy on, but rather to strengthen the idea that the FARC is perceived by international actors beyond Colombia as a security threat. Framing his counterinsurgency as part of the international 'war on terror', he justifies repressive military actions against the FARC, because terrorists are commonly regarded as illegitimate, allowing for consent to attack them. On the contrary, US involvement is one of the three main grounds on which the FARC build legitimacy, as they repeatedly underline the catastrophic effects of US support to the Colombian state. By asserting that this involvement undermines Colombia's sovereignty, they aim to win popular support to fight this foreign threat that backs the Colombian state against which the insurgency is directed.

Explaining changes in the FARC's discourse over time

The previous subsections demonstrate how Uribe and Santos seek legitimacy for their counterinsurgencies differently. Although this study focuses on discourse and not on the actual level of legitimacy, it is possible to draw some conclusions about how the FARC changed discourse and actions in reaction to the different attitude of Santos, compared to Uribe. This subsection explains that the FARC changed both discourse and actions as a consequence of Santos' new attitude, showing that the extent to which a mixed regime acts repressively might influence the insurgent's attitude in turn.

Chapter 5 illustrates that the FARC published less statements to directly attack the state and its counterinsurgency during Santos' presidency than during Uribe's presidency. This change seems to be in line with the shift in discourse from Uribe being aggressive towards Santos being more open for equal dialogue. That means, in response to Santos' new approach, the FARC changed their discourse about the state and their counterinsurgency in turn. And these changes are not only visible in discourse, but also in actions. Under Uribe there were no attempts for peace negotiations, whereas under Santos the FARC felt probably more open for negotiations due to a less aggressive discourse against them and therefore decided to engage in such negotiations.

This process is closely linked to the quest for legitimacy, as Uribe mainly sought legitimacy amongst the people by portraying the FARC as illegitimate enemies, meanwhile Uribe emphasised the importance of dialogue and approached the FARC as normal human

beings. This shift accounts for the changed attitude of the FARC correspondingly. They adjusted their discourse from expressing the idea of suffering due to Uribe's policies towards the population to giving them the idea of agency to work together on a brighter future during Santos' administration, in order to seek legitimacy, and they simultaneously engaged in peace talks with this latter president. So while both presidents acted in a mixed regime type, Uribe implemented more repressive means and Santos more democratic ones, influencing the FARC's strategies in turn.

Conclusion

Given that Uribe's counterinsurgency was mainly focused on military defeat, repressing both the FARC and civilians, it could be argued that he acted as an authoritarian counterinsurgent. However, contrary to what would be expected from dominant counterinsurgency theory, he did not only rule by illegitimate mass violence, but instead aimed to gain legitimacy for his actions. Therefore, his counterinsurgency can be perceived as a mixed type. Analysis of his discourse shows how he exploits his power position by ignoring that he uses repression and concealing the mixed features of the regime, thereby deceiving the population about how the state really operates. He instead focuses attention on the 'democratic' element of his security policy, Colombia's history and the illegitimacy of the FARC to legitimise his counterinsurgency. Santos, on the other hand, did not focus on military defeat alone and did not repress civilians under the guise of his counterinsurgency. The main focus of his counterinsurgency was to agree upon a negotiated peace deal and his strategies therefore fit more in a democratic counterinsurgency. However, his strategies are mixed as well as he showed some autocratic features by not completely ruling out military operations. He does, though, seek legitimacy for his actions too, by referring to democratic participation, Colombia's future and the FARC as human beings, causing the FARC to adapt their discourse in turn. Thus, this study exposes how counterinsurgents in mixed regimes seek legitimacy and how differences in discourse by counterinsurgents over time might explain discontinuity in the insurgent's discourse.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study shows how counterinsurgency and legitimacy work in mixed regimes, shedding new light on dominant counterinsurgency theory that distinguishes between democratic and autocratic counterinsurgents. It shows how mixed regimes employ a mix of democratic and autocratic features in counterinsurgency, strengthening the view that the distinction between democracies and autocracies should be perceived as a spectrum, rather than a sharp dichotomy. This in turn means that, although mixed regimes enforce repressive strategies, they do seek to legitimise the counterinsurgency, instead of ruling without consent. This study's CDA demonstrates how legitimacy is sought in discourse in different ways by two Colombian presidents and explains how diverging counterinsurgents' discourses can influence insurgents' discourse on legitimacy.

The study discovered sources used by mixed regimes in discourse to legitimise their counterinsurgency. Figure 1 illustrates counterinsurgents' sources of legitimacy, as identified by the literature. Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the sources of legitimacy used by Uribe and Santos. Comparing the models, it becomes visible that Figure 1 does not account for everything. To clarify, Duyvesteyn's (2017) 'democracy' is found in the CDA, however, more attention should be paid to the different ways democracy can be used to build legitimacy on, as the different uses of Uribe and Santos show. Where Uribe referred to democracy with regards to his security policy, meant to be for every Colombian and including a civilian informant force, Santos referred to democracy by underlining democratic popular consultation regarding the peace agreement. Furthermore, undermining insurgents' legitimacy by portraying them as 'terrorists' (Mampilly, 2011) or a 'threat to the country' (Ucko, 2016) is used by Uribe, but not by Santos. This shows that the place of a mixed regime on the spectrum of counterinsurgency does not only account for diverging means, but also for the different ways of legitimising the counterinsurgency in discourse. 'Good governance and social order' (Duyvesteyn, 2017) and 'nationalism, ideology and cult of personality' (Ucko, 2016) are not found in the CDA. Instead, additional sources used by the presidents are found, indicating that counterinsurgents in similar cases might refer to their country's 'history', 'future' and 'the insurgents as human beings' to seek popular consent.

That being said, the idea of democracies winning the population's hearts and minds on the one hand and autocracies repressing without consent on the other hand (Byman, 2016; Merom, 2003; Gurr, 2000), should be reconsidered. Ucko's (2016) assertion that autocracies do aim for legitimacy and that the distinction should be perceived as a spectrum, is therefore more helpful in examining counterinsurgency. Yet, while he argues that focusing on regime

type is not useful due to these forms in between, this study shows that it is relevant to focus on regime type, since counterinsurgency works differently in mixed regimes. Given that 56,3%[3] of the countries in the world are flawed democracies or hybrid regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019), and can thus be considered mixed regimes, it is important to examine how counterinsurgency and legitimacy work in this context. So, this study concurs with Asal et al. (2016) that regime type should be taken into account in investigating how counterinsurgency works. The fact that Colombia was only partially free when Uribe became president and that civil liberties were not guaranteed throughout his presidency, expose their claim that such regimes are more likely to repress. Uribe's popularity despite his level of repression could be explained by the fact that counterinsurgents' legitimacy depends on societal dynamics (Kitzen, 2017). This study builds on Kitzen's (2017) observation that cultural legitimation is important in counterinsurgency, but while he does not elaborate on how this is exploited in discourse, this study does. This means that counterinsurgents in mixed regimes such as Uribe might refer to a violent history to legitimise military means. These societal dynamics, in this case Colombia's violent culture, might account for what is perceived legitimate (Waldmann, 2007). Besides, the statement that mixed regimes are most likely to repress because they face more threats than democracies and autocracies (Regan & Henderson, 2002), is observed in Colombia. Uribe viewed the FARC as dangerous to the state and engaged them with military repression. By 2012, during Santos' presidency, the number of FARC combatants had declined considerably, posing a smaller threat (Wickham-Crowley, 2015). Indeed, Santos' focus was less on military repression and more on negotiations, strengthening this contention and placing Santos more, although not completely, towards the democratic end of the counterinsurgency spectrum.

This leads us to consider the reason that insurgents engage in negotiations and specifically, why the FARC engaged in negotiations under Santos, as opposed to the years under Uribe. Chapter 5 exhibits that the FARC changed their discourse when Santos assumed office and portrayed them in another way than Uribe, implying that the FARC adjusted discourse in reaction to new discourse and counterinsurgency strategies. They changed their actions accordingly as they committed to negotiations and ultimately gave up on their armed struggle. Hence, this study adds to existing literature by analysing how insurgents adapt their legitimation strategies and actions in response to varying strategies of counterinsurgents. However, since this study does not examine either the FARC's actual thoughts about the

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[3] This number is derived from a study including 167 countries. Given that it only left out microstates, it does not differ much from the world population.

presidents, or the extent to which they still perceived the insurgency as successful, it cannot draw significant conclusions about these dynamics influencing the FARC's changed strategies. It is suggested for future research to scrutinise this relationship, for example by interviews.

Similarly to Figure 1, Figure 2 has been revised too, illustrating sources on which insurgents base their legitimacy in discourse, as can be observed in Figure 5. Apart from referring to 'socio-economic and political objectives' and the creation of 'illegitimate enemies' (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015), they can also refer to the 'destructive effects of international involvement'. Additionally, it shows that building legitimacy on 'symbols, traditions and cultures' (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015) does not hold true for all insurgents.

So, answering the research question shows that both Uribe and Santos sought legitimacy through discourse for their counterinsurgencies, even though their counterinsurgencies varied from more autocratic to more democratic, both showing mixed features. Uribe built legitimacy on his 'democratic security policy', portraying 'the FARC as an illegitimate threat' and on 'Colombia's history', whereas Santos built legitimacy on 'democratic participation of the population', 'a peaceful future', and 'the FARC as human beings worthy of holding a dialogue with'. The FARC built their legitimacy on 'socio-economic and political objectives of the population', 'the state as an illegitimate enemy' and 'destructive international involvement', but they lessened their focus on enemies when Santos assumed office.

Now that the research question has been answered and contributions to literature on counterinsurgency and legitimacy have been mentioned, it is important to note that this study has implications for the specific Colombian context too. If Duque follows Uribe's line, both in his discourse and actual actions, this could have repercussions for the FARC's discourse and actions in turn, possibly leading to escalation and a weakening of the peace accord. Therefore, it is recommended to analyse Duque's discourse regarding the FARC.

To conclude, this study has exposed that counterinsurgents in mixed regimes use repression to different extents, seeking legitimacy for the strategies meanwhile, and has discovered sources on which counterinsurgents and insurgents build their legitimacy in discourse. To investigate how these legitimation processes influence the actual level of legitimacy amongst the population regarding both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent and to identify successful counterinsurgency strategies, future research should focus on the people's perception regarding both parties in mixed regimes, by conducting surveys and interviews and analysing public opinion polls.

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