Norm Entrepreneurs or Client States?: Explaining Small State Behaviour in the International Whaling Regime

An analysis of Pacific and Caribbean small island states in the International Whaling Commission

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Abstract

This study will focus on small state behaviour in international politics by looking closely at the whaling policies of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states. The literature on small states offers different explanations for the behaviour of small states in international organisations. The international patron-client model proposes that small states function as client-states of larger states in international organisations (e.g. Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984; Carney, 1989; Sutton & Payne, 1993; Stringer, 2006; Veenendaal, 2017). In contrast, the constructivist approach poses that small states often act as norm entrepreneurs in international organisations (e.g. Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Ingebritsen, 2006; Corbett, Xu & Weller, 2019). Research into small states in the International Whaling Commission is limited to how these states receive material incentives in return for their support and does not look at strong relationships with other states or normative motivations behind their whaling policies. It is therefore the aim of this study to see which explanation of small state behaviour fits the Pacific and Caribbean small island states in the whaling regime. This will be done by three within-case analyses of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Palau and the Kingdom of Tonga in which through process-tracing an explanation will be sought for their position on the issue of whaling and decision on joining the International Whaling Commission. The analysis shows that the official whaling position of Pacific and Caribbean small island states is the product of their local culture and experience with the whaling industry, which best fits within the constructivist approach. Remarkably, their whaling position is not always reflected in their participation within the International Whaling Commission. The cases show instead that Pacific and Caribbean small island states can behave both as client states and as norm entrepreneurs in the International Whaling Commission. This study suggests that different theories on state behaviour do not necessarily contradict, but can also complement each other.

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1 Introduction

The beginning of 2020 brings good news from the seas surrounding Antarctica. An expedition has found that many species of endangered whales have returned to the southern seas, which is a welcome development for our planet since the carbon-storing function of these whales can be of tremendous help to slow down climate change (Good News Network, 2020). This outcome would not be possible without the cooperation of the international community. The moratorium put on commercial whaling in 1982 and the establishment of the 1994 Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) have given these whale populations the chance to re-establish themselves. This shows that whereas whaling was still a widely accepted practice in the first half of the twentieth century, the international community has been successful in restricting this ecologically destructive industry. Crucial actors within the whaling regime are states that can initiate and decide on proposals in the IWC. If one wants to convince the international community to enact a certain policy on the issue of whaling, it is therefore important to win as many states, both large and small, in the IWC to one's side. This research will focus in more detail on the smaller states in the whaling regime to find out how best to explain small state behaviour on the issue of whaling.

To start the analysis, this thesis will review literature on patron-client relationships in international politics and discuss constructivist views on small state behaviour. Seeing that these theories provide different views on the role of small states in international organisations and that a thorough examination of small states in the whaling regime does not yet exist, the second half aims to identify the motivations behind the whaling position and (non) IWC membership of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, the Republic of Palau and the Kingdom of Tonga. The results of this qualitative analysis show that the whaling policy of these states is driven by their local culture and experience with the whaling industry, supporting constructivist theories. However, their whaling policy is not always reflected in the decision on joining the IWC. Instead, it appears that both the patron-client model and the constructivist approach can be used to explain IWC participation of Pacific and Caribbean small island states. The analysis thus suggests that the theories on small states as norm entrepreneurs and as client states do not contradict, but rather strengthen each other when explaining small state behaviour.

2 Theoretical Framework

The international relations literature deals extensively with state behaviour in international politics. The behaviour of small states in particular has received increased attention from scholars as a result of their proliferation in international organisations (Archer & Nugent, 2002, p. 5; Panke, 2012, p. 313; Corbett & Connell, 2015, p. 436; Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017, p. 1; Corbett, Xu & Weller, 2019, p. 2). Different theories exist on small states in international organisations. This section will discuss two such theories dealing with small states in international organisations that can be of help for explaining small state behaviour: the international patron-client model and the constructivist approach. After laying out these two theories, more specific literature on small states in the whaling regime will be considered.

2.1 International Patron-Client Model

One explanation of small state behaviour in international organisations is provided by the international patron-client model. Small states have often been portrayed as weak and vulnerable actors in international politics with little military and economic strength compared to other states, and are therefore inherently disadvantaged in the international playing field (Sutton & Payne, 1993; Corbett & Connell, 2015). In order to survive or even adequately function within the international community, it is therefore common for small states to seek the help of larger states. One of the strategies small states employ is trying to bargain for assistance from larger states in return for political support in the international arena (Sutton & Payne, 1993; Panke, 2012; Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017). Such an arrangement benefits both parties as the smaller state gets additional resources whereas the larger state gets political support.

Scholarship focussing on such a reciprocal arrangement between smaller and larger states in the international arena describes this situation as a patron-client relationship (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984; Carney, 1989; Sutton & Payne, 1993; Stringer, 2006; Veenendaal, 2017). In a patron-client relationship, there exists a long-term exchange in which a larger patron state gives (often material) benefits to a smaller and less resourceful client state in return for its political support. Examples of benefits that a client state can receive in this arrangement are military support, official development aid (ODA), preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) and help with projects. Four crucial characteristics have been ascribed to patron-client relationships: reciprocity, asymmetry, compliance and affectivity (Carney, 1989, p. 45-46; Veenendaal, 2017, p. 565). Reciprocity points to a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement in

which the smaller state gets something in return for its support. The patron-client relationships are asymmetric as one state has significantly more resources and capabilities than the other. Additionally, compliance refers to the adherence of the client state to the policies of the patron state and affectivity includes that the client state speaks positively of the views and policies of the patron state. Patron-client relationships have thus been observed as a pattern of behaviour between smaller and larger states in international politics.

As the number of potential patron states has increased since the cold war, smaller states have a growing interest to participate in international organisations (Stringer, 2006; Panke, 2012; Veenendaal, 2017). A vote in international organisations gives small states the means to support a potential patron state, in return for which it can attract benefits. The patron-client model thus suggests that small state behaviour in international organisations is determined by their relationship with larger states.

2.2 Constructivism

The previous section has discussed the international patron-client model for making sense of small state behaviour in international organisations. Constructivist theories ascribe a very different role to small states in international organisations. The core principle of the constructivist approach to international relations is the rejection of one objective social reality. This implies that the social order in international politics is subject to change and construed from people's view on the world. For small states, the centrality of this perceptive element enables them to play an active role in international politics. Small states have indeed used perceptions in international politics to their advantage (Hey, 2003; Browning, 2006; Fox, 2006; Ingebritsen, 2006). In doing so, these states were able to create a social reality which benefitted them, such as being no threat or being a reliable partner in international affairs. Following the constructivist approach, perception thus determines the social reality of international politics.

One specific way in which small states can gain influence through perceptions is by promoting norms in international politics. Because small states often appear neutral and non-threatening, they are in a strong position to advocate and even create certain norms in international politics by emphasizing their vulnerability. Small states have therefore often been referred to as norm entrepreneurs in international organisations, successful in changing the view of the international community on certain issues (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Ingebritsen, 2006; Corbett, Xu & Weller, 2019). Examples of norms that have strongly been promoted by smaller states and as a result were adopted by the international community are environmental

issues, peaceful resolution of conflict, good governance and differentiated development of poorer states (Ingebritsen, 2006; Corbett, Xu & Weller, 2019). Small states are thus seen to strategically use norms in international organisations.

In short, constructivism suggests that small state behaviour is determined by their promotion of certain norms and ideals that fit within their preferred social reality.

2.3 Small States and the Whaling Regime

The patron-client model and the constructivist approach provide different perspectives on the role of small states in international organisations. One specific issue in international politics that many different states are involved with is the management of the whaling industry. Since 1946, various measures have been taken to regulate the whaling industry within the framework of the IWC (Morgera, 2004; International Whaling Commission, 2020).

The most prominent whaling states (Iceland, Japan, Norway) have formed a voting bloc in the IWC aiming at to overturn the commercial whaling ban and to avoid more restrictions on the whaling industry. Prominent pro-whaling (and anti-whaling) states use political pressure and side payments to strengthen their voting bloc in the IWC (Hurd, 2012, p. 106). Japan in particular has been accused many times of 'buying votes' from the Pacific and Caribbean small island states (The Guardian, 2001; Stringer, 2006; Greenpeace, 2007; Hurd, 2012; Strand & Tuman, 2012). This shows that these small states are relevant actors within the whaling regime, but also gives a limited view of Pacific and Caribbean small island states as being nothing more than votes to be bought. No constructivist literature exists on the subject.

This niche in the literature is problematic in the context of whaling in particular because of the successful anti-whaling discourse that has appeared (Morgera, 2004; Epstein, 2008; Hurd, 2012) and the perceived influence of indigenous cultures on the whaling policy of Japan, New Zealand and the South-eastern Caribbean (Creason, 2004; Romero & Creswell, 2005). This makes the IWC a most likely case for the relevance of constructivist approaches to small state behaviour. The aim of this thesis is therefore to find out which theory best explains small state behaviour in the IWC: the patron-client model focussing on the relationship between small and larger states or the constructivist approach looking at norms. Because no previous scholarship has looked specifically at small state behaviour within the IWC, this thesis will be exploratory and open for alternative explanations. The question to be answered is the following: why have Pacific and Caribbean small island states become a member of the International Whaling Commission and how can their position on whaling be explained?

3 Preliminary Expectations

In this thesis, an explanation will thus be sought for the whaling position and IWC participation and of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states to shed a light on the behaviour of small states in the whaling regime and in international organisations in general. The literature offers no insights into small states in the whaling regime, but scholarship on small state behaviour in international organisations offers two different expectations on how the research question can be answered.

A first expectation is that IWC participation and the whaling position of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states is driven by their relationship with a larger state and that these small states thus act as client states in the IWC. This idea is based on the notion of patron-client relationships (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984; Sutton & Payne, 1993; Stringer, 2006; Veenendaal, 2017) that have also been perceived within the IWC as Japan appears to be using material incentives to persuade these small island states to vote in support of their position on proposals (Stringer, 2006; Hurd, 2012; Strand & Tuman, 2012). Within the patron-client model, it is thus the relationships the Pacific and Caribbean small island states have with larger states that is expected to influence their whaling policies.

A second expectation is that IWC participation and the whaling position of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states can be explained through the constructivist approach in which IWC participation and the whaling policies of these small states can be understood through their role as norm entrepreneurs of either the pro-whaling or the anti-whaling norm. This idea is based on the literature pointing to small states as active promotors of norms in international organisations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Ingebritsen, 2006; Corbett, Xu & Weller, 2019), the identification of an anti-whaling discourse in contemporary international politics (Morgera, 2004; Epstein, 2008; Hurd, 2012) and the perceived influence of indigenous cultures on the whaling policy of larger states (Creason, 2004; Romero & Creswell, 2005). The constructivist approach thus offers a feasible explanation as well for the whaling policies of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states.

Following the discussed literature, there are two predicted explanations for the whaling policies of Pacific and Caribbean small island states: either their relationships with larger states, in which case the small state acts as a client state in the IWC, or their support for a certain norm on the issue of whaling, in which case the state acts as a norm entrepreneur in the IWC.

4 Conceptualization and Operationalization

Several concepts that will be used in this thesis require more clarification. One of these is the notion of small states. The literature proposes multiple ways to conceptualize small states (Hey, 2003). In this thesis, a state will be considered small when it has a population lower than 200.000, a limited geographical area (as islands) and a poor economy which can be seen in their label of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (UNESCO, 2017). The identification of a state as a SIDS by the United Nations will be taken as the operationalization of a small state.

The idea of a patron-client relationship has already been discussed in the literature review. What is still missing is a way to operationalize a patron-client relationship. This will be done on the basis of the four characteristics ascribed to this relationship. This analysis will recognise a patron-client relationship when one state is significantly larger in capabilities (e.g. in GDP or population) than the other state (asymmetry), representatives of the small state speak highly of the larger state's policy (affectivity), states have very similar voting patterns in the IWC (compliance) in return for which they receive obvious benefits, such as ODA or other forms of assistance (reciprocracy).

For the conceptualization of norms, the definition of Katzenstein (1996) will be used, being "social standards for the proper behaviour of actors of a stipulated identity" (p. 5). This points to what is generally considered to be acceptable behaviour. Within the context of whaling, whales are increasingly viewed to be in need of protection (Epstein, 2008, p. 19; Hurd, 2012, p. 108). Both the 'pro-whaling' and the 'anti-whaling' norm can be identified in the discourse surrounding the issue of whaling: do people mention the need to protect whales and is the practice of whaling frowned upon, or is whaling simply spoken of as a lucrative industry not that different from tuna or salmon fishing? Norms are thus operationalized as the views that are found in the discourse (speeches, news coverage, policy documents) surrounding the practice of whaling, which either accept or oppose whaling on strong moral grounds.

A last concept that needs to be specified is that of the position of states. This concept is closely related to the concept of norms. But whereas norms determine what is considered to be generally acceptable behaviour, this last concept merely shows whether a state presents itself as a whaling or an anti-whaling state. The position of states is expressed in statements made by official representatives of a state either supporting or opposing whaling, and whether a state ensures protection for whales or whether it allows for or even participates in whale hunting in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Data for this can be found in the IWC database on total catches and in national fishing legislation.

5 Case Selection

So far it has been laid out that this thesis intents to find an explanation for the IWC participation and whaling position of Pacific and Caribbean small island states. This will be done by a qualitative and in-depth analysis of specific cases. A selection of cases must thus be made that adequately represents the population of Pacific and Caribbean small island states. This can be done by finding diverse cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 297, 300-301) that exemplify all values of the two dependent variables 'membership' and 'whaling position': IWC member, non-IWC member, pro-whaling position, anti-whaling position. Table 1 gives an overview of the cases to be considered and the outcomes they exemplify.

Table 1. Selection of diverse cases from Pacific and Caribbean small island states.

	Whaling Position	IWC member
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Caribbean)	Pro-whaling	Yes
Republic of Palau (Pacific)	Anti-whaling	Yes
Kingdom of Tonga (Pacific)	Anti-whaling	No

The first case is Saint Vincent and The Grenadines. This Caribbean small island developing state (UNESCO, 2017) joined the IWC in 1981 and has supported whaling up until the twenty-first century, being the only small island developing state to still hunt whales itself (Roads & Kingdoms, 2017; International Whaling Commission, 2020).

Palau is another IWC member. This Pacific small island developing state (UNESCO, 2017) joined the IWC in 2002 and turned its back on the pro-whaling states in 2010 by making its EEZ a sanctuary for marine life such as whales, sharks and dolphins (Environment News Service, 2010; The Sydney Morning Herald, 2010). Nowadays, it is considered a global leader in the protection of marine ecosystems (Jakarta Globe, 2012; Island Times, 2019).

The Kingdom of Tonga is not a member of the IWC. Yet, this Pacific small island developing state (UNESCO, 2017) can be viewed as a dedicated anti-whaling state as well. It has shown its commitment to protecting whales since 1978 by declaring its EEZ a sanctuary for whales (Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 2017; Ministry of Fisheries Tonga, 2017*)*.

This research will thus focus on three diverse cases to ensure sufficient variation on the dependent variables. As a result of this, any findings deriving from these cases will likely be representative for the wider population of cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 297, 301), which are the Pacific and Caribbean small island states. However, whether these results would also extend towards small states outside the context of whaling strongly depends on the nature of that organisation since the IWC is characterised by a normative framework.

6 Methodology

The remainder of this thesis will look for an explanation of the position of the Pacific and Caribbean small island states on the issue of whaling and their (non) participation in the IWC through three within-case analyses of Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Palau and Tonga. In these cases, the causal inferences will be searched for that have led to these outcomes. This will be done through the method of process-tracing (Collier, 2011) and looking for patron-client relationships with larger states in the whaling regime with the help of quantitative data on foreign aid, government publications, IWC publications and statements by official representatives.

The analysis will speak of a patron-client relationship when it falls under criteria that are based on three of the four characteristics ascribed to this relationship. The characteristic 'asymmetry' will not be considered since all three cases are labelled as SIDS, which already implies a structural shortage of resources. Pointing to a gap in resources between the small state and a larger one would therefore add nothing new to the discussion. Table 2 shows the criteria to be used for identifying a patron-client relationship within the IWC.

Table 2. Criteria for a patron-client relationship in the whaling regime.

1 small state has a similar position on whaling as larger state	(compliance)
2 small state has similar IWC voting patterns as larger state	(compliance)
3 representatives both states speak highly of each other's whaling policy	(affectivity)
4 small state receives benefits from larger state	(reciprocity)

It must be noted that the criteria 'similar voting patterns' is of course only applicable to the cases of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Palau (the IWC members). It will be looked at whether these states gave their support for the pro-whaling or the anti-whaling voting bloc. The pro-whaling voting bloc will be considered those countries voting in the IWC with Iceland, Japan and Norway that are the whaling states with currently the most catches (International Whaling Commission, 2020). The anti-whaling voting bloc will be considered those countries voting the IWC with Australia, Brazil, France and New Zealand. These are the countries that have proposed whaling sanctuaries in the IWC (Morgera, 2004). Because earlier voting records are not always available, only voting behaviour in the twentieth-first century will be considered, which means covering the years 2000-2018 for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 2002-2018 for Palau. Of these years, the odd years (2001, 2003, 2005, etc.) will be left out to keep

within the scope of this research. Covering all years will not be necessary because the analysis looks for patterns of voting and not at specific years.

With the help of the criteria laid out in Table 2, it will be determined whether one can speak of a patron-client relationship between the small state and a larger state within the IWC. If so, the analysis will consider whether this relationship does logically lead to the state's whaling position and decision on IWC membership.

In addition to seeking for patron-client relationships, it will be looked at within the three cases what appears to be the accepted whaling norm and whether these norms can account for their current whaling position and IWC membership. These norms can be found in statements made by official government representatives, IWC publications and government publications.

Ultimately, this analysis aims to establish the causal inferences leading to the whaling position and decision on IWC membership that can be applied to all Pacific and Caribbean small island states. Image 1 presents a model for the representation of such a causal inference, including the expected independent variables that have been discussed earlier.

Image 1. Model causal inference for a state's position on the issue of whaling and decision to become a member of the IWC, including expected independent variables.



7 Analysis

In the sections that follow, the small island states Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Palau and the Kingdom of Tonga will be discussed with the objective of finding the underlying reason for their (non) IWC membership and position on whaling. Following the literature, these are expected to be understood either in the context of their relationship with a larger patron-state or as an extension of their behaviour as a norm entrepreneur in international politics. However, the possibility must be left open for other explanations given the exploratory nature of this thesis.

7.1 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is the most prominent pro-whaling state among the small island developing states. Located in the Caribbean, it is the only small island developing state that is still hunting whales, although on small scale and for local use only. This sort of whaling is still allowed by the IWC in some places in the world and is referred to as aboriginal subsistence whaling (ASW) (Saint Lucia The Star, 2019; International Whaling Commission, 2020). The practice of whaling was introduced to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the nineteenth century and has since then been an important part of the local culture and economy (Romero & Creswell, 2010; Roads & Kingdoms, 2017). After becoming independent from the United Kingdom in 1979, it became a member of the IWC in 1981. Was this decision taken by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to promote the pro-whaling norm, or did it do so as a result of their relationship with one of the larger states within the IWC?

7.1.1 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Japan

A first step to answer this question is to have a close look to its major aid donors. An overview of the ODA in 2017-2018 to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines can be seen in Appendix I. A cross-examination of these main donors and the countries providing PTAs (WTO, 2020), shows that Japan and Australia are the only two IWC members that are actively involved in the development of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Nevertheless, the contribution of Japan (6,8%) and Australia (5,8%) falls into the shadow of that of multilateral donors such as EU institutions (25,3%), the Climate Investment Fund (19,9%) and Caribbean Development Bank (14,6%). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does thus not seem to be strongly dependent for its

foreign aid upon another IWC-member. Nor does it appear that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines receives more ODA from Japan as a result of being a pro-whaling member in the IWC. A close look at the data of Japanese ODA in the area (Appendix II) shows that Japanese foreign aid is not biased in favour of IWC members. This suggests that becoming a member of the IWC is not a prerequisite for receiving Japanese foreign aid.

Looking beyond ODA, however, it can be perceived that Japan has invested in the development of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines by providing grant aid ad hoc. In 2016, for example, Japan provided Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with a grant aid for the provision of disaster reduction equipment (Agency for Public Information, n.d.). Similarly, another Japanese grant aid was provided in 2019 for the provision of equipment and enterprise development (Agency for Public Information, 2019). This shows that Japan has indeed contributed to the development of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, suggesting that ODA is a limited indicator for establishing aid relationships. This financial aid might be an indication of reciprocity in the Japan - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines relationship. In order to establish whether the Japanese aid is linked to the whaling position and IWC membership, a closer look is needed into the behaviour of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the IWC.

7.1.2 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the International Whaling Commission

Can we speak of compliance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines towards Japan in the IWC? Both countries support the practice of whaling, but this does not immediately point to compliance. The voting records of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines can be of more help. Table 3 presents the voting record of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines since 2000 and shows two important things. Firstly, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has frequently voted in support of the pro-whaling voting bloc (P). The only exception to this is in 2014, when Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not get to vote after failing to fulfil its financial contribution. This could be an indication of compliance towards Japan, but can also simply be an expression of its pro-whaling position. Secondly, it can be seen that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on occasion abstained from voting (N) instead of supporting the pro-whaling countries. In 2012, for example, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines abstained from voting on the question of establishing a South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary (first vote), whereas Iceland, Japan and Norway voted against. These voting records do thus not illustrate full compliance towards Japan.

Table 3. IWC Voting Record Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2000-2018.

Year	Supported Which Voting Bloc SVG
2000	P P P P P P P P
2002	P P P P P N P P P P P P P P N N P X N
2004	P N P P P P P N N P
2006	P P P P P P
2008	P
2010	X
2012	N X P N
2014	VOTINGRIGHSSUSPENDED
2016	N P P P X
2018	N X P P

P= voted in support of pro-whaling countries (Iceland, Japan, Norway); A= voted in support of anti-whaling countries (Australia, Brazil, France, New Zealand); N= not voted (abstained); X= vote does not reflect allegiance (e.g. question on extra fund for money for countries with little resources).

In line with these observations, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines makes no reference to Japan and its commercial whaling policy in its 1981 IWC opening statement (full opening statement can be seen in Appendix III). Instead, it proclaims its intention to contribute to "developing a regime for the regulation of subsistence whaling", particularly with "colleagues in Denmark and Canada" (ASW countries), to "ensure the survival of the whales" (International Whaling Commission, 1981, p. 122). By presenting its country's policy to become an advocate of ASW in the IWC, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not show strong solidarity and support for Japan's policy of wanting to resume commercial whaling on a large scale. So neither its voting nor its non-voting behaviour illustrate distinct compliance from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines towards Japan.

The discussion so far does not strongly support the theory that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' whaling policy and IWC participation would be the result of Japanese influence and that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines functions as a client-state within the IWC.

7.1.3 Promoting Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling

If not being pushed by Japan to become a member, how can its IWC participation and pro-whaling position be explained? The 1981 opening statement (Appendix III) already gives a clue about how to answer that question: towards the end of the statement, it is once again stressed that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines aims to "defend the rights of the local people to gain subsistence from whales" (International Whaling Commission, 1981, p. 122). With this

statement, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines presents itself as a promotor of ASW in the IWC. To further support this position, the practise of whaling is framed as a prestigious industry in which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is particularly specialized in: it describes how whales are hunted from an open boat with one captain and one harpooner, hand throwing a harpoon, and that their fishermen are very proud because the whale hunt is very dangerous (International Whaling Commission, 1981, p. 121). By presenting ASW as an industry to be respected instead of a morally wrong practice that needs to be prohibited, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines acts as a norm entrepreneur for the whaling practices of indigenous cultures. And indeed, the annual meeting reports reveal that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines frequently advocates ASW and the rights of indigenous cultures, during which they are supported by other ASW countries (Denmark, Russia and the United States) and Caribbean small island states Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Kitts & Nevis (e.g. International Whaling Commission, 2002, pp. 66, 68, 70; 2010, pp. 19-20; 2018, pp. 7-8). This shows that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines uses its IWC membership to convince the international community that ASW is an acceptable form of behaviour, suggesting that their desire to promote ASW to protect its local whaling culture and industry has led Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to join to IWC, in which it thus acts as a norm entrepreneur rather than a client-state.

Similarly, it is its history of whaling that has made Saint Vincent and the Grenadines a pro-whaling state. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' whaling position is best illustrated with the Need Statement they submitted in 2002 to the Scientific Committee of the IWC (Appendix IV) in which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines once again declares its pro-whaling position: "on Bequia, people consider whales to be a resource that should be used" (International Whaling Commission, 2012, p. 91). The full statement defends its pro-whaling position as whaling being a part of their traditional culture and a source of nutrition and income for their people. This suggests that its position is determined by of a history of whaling, as a result of which ASW became part of their local culture and economy.

The case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines shows that its whaling position is the product of its experience with the practice of whaling and its indigenous culture. In line with this, IWC participation appears to be driven by a desire to protect this local culture and industry from harmful IWC regulation. Within the IWC, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines clearly acts as a norm entrepreneur of ASW. These results show that the constructivist approach is able to explain small state behaviour, since the whaling policy of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines can

be understood through its view on the matter and its role as norm entrepreneur in the IWC. The process leading to its pro-whaling position and IWC membership is represented in image 2.

Image 2. Causal inference for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' whaling position and decision to join IWC.



7.2 Republic of Palau

The Pacific small island developing state Palau became fully sovereign in 1994, but it was not until 2002 that it decided to join the IWC. But whereas Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has acted as a norm entrepreneur for ASW, Palau has built a reputation for advocating an entirely different norm in international politics: whales as endangered animals that should not be hunted. This section will discuss Palau as a renowned promotor of environmental protection and whether this role in international politics can account for its IWC participation.

7.2.1 Promoting Environmental Protection

When Palauan President Tommy Remengesau Jr. first came into office in 2001, he stated that environmental protection would be one of his major policy goals (Saipan Tribune, 2001). He kept his word: Palau led the regional Micronesia Challenge in 2005 calling attention to the conservation of marine resources in the Pacific waters. Eventually, national legislation was introduced to prohibit harmful activities in its EEZ with the 2009 Shark Sanctuary and the 2010 National Marine Sanctuary, focussing on whale and dolphin populations. These policies brought Palau the reputation of a global leader of environmental protection (Jakarta Globe, 2012; Island Times, 2019), as illustrated by President Tommy Remengesau Jr. being awarded the 2014 UNEP Champion of the Earth Award for his national policies protecting biodiversity. In his acceptance speech, he asked other countries to "stand together to take action now to protect our oceans and our Mother Earth for our generation and future children" (SPREP, 2014). These words are in line with Palau's official government policy, which is "to be widely recognized in promoting, exploring, exploiting, developing, protecting, and managing the natural resources of the Republic, in areas of marine and fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture, forests, mineral and other land-based and ocean-based resources as well as tourism" (Republic of Palau National Government, 2020). By enacting policies to protect its environment and calling upon others to do the same, Palau acts as a norm entrepreneur for environmental protection in international politics and positions itself against the practice of whaling.

In his 2009 speech proclaiming Palau's EEZ as a Shark Sanctuary (Appendix V), Palauan President Toribiong gave away some clues for Palau's motivation for this position: Palauan people have long lived "in symbiosis with the sea", with the sea being their "source of sustenance". Protectionist measures would be necessary because "human abuses of the resources" have resulted in "the rapid loss of critical ecosystem" and "economic difficulty"

(Appendix V). His words suggest that Palau's whaling position rests on two elements.

Firstly, that Palauan people have a traditional connection with the sea and what it provides. Pacific island people, among which Palau, indeed seem to have a traditional culture with stories and traditions about marine life, such as legends about whales (Creason, 2004, p. 7; Department of Conservation, 2007, p. 5). The will to be protective of the sea and marine life is thus part of the traditional Pacific culture.

Secondly, the speech suggests that Palau's position can be understood in the context of its experience with whaling practices. From the late eighteenth century onwards, foreign vessels have come to the Pacific waters to hunt whales, bringing whale populations in the Pacific to the brink of extinction in the twentieth century (Department of Conservation, 2007, pp. 5, 30-31). Seeing its natural resources on which its local population depends endangered as a result of whaling practices explains why Palau would want restrictions on whaling. Eventually, it was economic hardship resulting from the 1997 Asian financial crisis that forced Palau to adopt this new model of governance in 2001 that actively promotes environmental protection (Island Times, 2020).

Palau has since 2001 thus acted as a norm entrepreneur for environmental protection, including the protection of whales in the Pacific. These policies can be traced back to the traditional Pacific culture and its experience with whaling practices.

7.2.2 Palau in the International Whaling Commission

So far it has been discussed that Palau acts as a norm entrepreneur for environmental protection, as a result of which it has positioned itself against whaling practices. Can this leading role account for Palau's adherence to the IWC in 2002? To answer this question, a closer look is needed into Palau's IWC behaviour.

Table 4 shows the IWC voting record of Palau. Considering Palau's environmental policies, these results are remarkable. Palau has persistently given its support not to the anti-whaling voting bloc (A), which would be in line with its own environmental policies, but to the pro-whaling countries (P). This did not change after Palau's 2010 proclamation of its National Marine Sanctuary, although it must be noted that since 2016 Palau's voting rights have been suspended as a result of falling behind on its financial obligations to the IWC. This support for the pro-whaling voting bloc does not suggest that Palau joined the IWC as norm entrepreneur for environmental protection to oppose the practice of whaling.

Table 4. IWC Voting Record Republic of Palau 2002-2018.

YEAR	Supported Which Voting Bloc Palau
2002	P P X P P P P P P P P P P P P X
2004	P P P P P P P P P P
2006	P P P P P P
2008	P
2010	X
2012	P X P X
2014	NOTATTENDING
2016	VOTINGRIGHTSSUSPENDED
2018	VOTINGRIGHTSSUSPENDED

P= voted in support of pro-whaling countries (Norway, Iceland, Japan); A= voted in support of anti-whaling countries (Australia, Brazil, France, New Zealand); N= not voted (abstained); X= vote does not reflect allegiance (eg. question on extra fund for money for countries with little resource).

Something similar can be seen in Palau's non-voting behaviour in the IWC. Palau is not a very prominent member in IWC discussions. The only moment in which Palau refers to the need for protective measures is in its IWC opening statement (Appendix II) when it pledges its commitment to "sustainable management and the rational utilization of the world's marine resources" (International Whaling Commission, 2002, p. 7). Aside from its opening statement, Palau does not bring up the restriction of whaling practices. Instead, Palau's name only appears in the annual meeting reports of the IWC as one of the countries supporting a statement or a proposal made by Japan (e.g. International Whaling Commission, 2002, pp. 21, 28; 2012, p. 23; 2018, p. 34).

Palau's behaviour within the IWC supports in no way the theory that it would have joined the IWC as a norm entrepreneur for environmental protection. Instead, it appears that Palau strengthens Japan's hold of the IWC by having similar voting patterns and supporting statements and proposals by Japan. This may point to compliance within a patron-client relationship between the two states. So can Palau's IWC membership be understood through its relationship with Japan?

7.2.3 Palau and Japan

The next step will be to see whether Japan has given Palau distinct incentives to show compliance within the IWC in order to determine whether one can speak of reciprocity in the Japan-Palau relationship. Japan and the United States are Palau's major aid donors (Appendix

I; Island Times, 2020; WTO, 2020). In the period 2017-2018, the United States accounted for 65,1% and Japan for 26,1% of Palau's total ODA (Appendix I). Although Japan provides a substantial portion of Palau's ODA, Palau is not strongly dependent upon the Japanese contribution because of the massive contribution from the United States. Looking in turn to Japan's total ODA to the Pacific region (Appendix II), it does not seem that Japan has given priority to IWC members for its ODA. The data on ODA to Palau does thus not point to financial incentives to persuade Palau to join the IWC.

However, the 2020 State of Republic Address (Appendix VI) given by Tommy Remengesau Jr., in which he looks back at the last 2020 years of Palau's development, does point to the crucial role Japan has had in Palau's development: Japan funded the reconstruction of the Koror-Babeldaob Bridge that was completed in 2002 and christened as the Japan-Palau Friendship Bridge. More recently, Japan has also contributed financially to its National Marine Sanctuary and New Airport Terminal Building showing that, although Japan's ODA does not clearly indicate reciprocity, Japan has largely contributed to Palau's development through which reciprocity can be perceived for Palau's compliance within the IWC.

The 2020 State of Republic Address also refers to the strong relationship that Palau has made with Japan and even speaks of "our Japanese partners" in trying to strengthen its tourism sector. Similarly, First Lady Remengesau stressed in her recent visit to Japan that Palau and Japan are "partners in the challenges of today" and admires Japan's support for these challenges and Palau (Office of the President, Republic of Palau, 2019). These statements illustrate affectivity from Palau towards Japan and its role in international affairs.

Observing reciprocity and affectivity in Palau's relationship with Japan in combination with the apparent compliance within the IWC, it can be concluded that a patron-client relationship exists between Palau and Japan and that Palau's relationship with Japan offers an explanation for its decision to join the IWC as a client state in 2002.

The case of Palau shows that national whaling policy does not always reflect IWC behaviour. Just as with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Palau's position towards whaling is the result of its traditional culture and experience with the practice of whaling, fitting within constructivist theories. On the other hand, the perceived compliance towards Japan within the IWC and the reciprocity and affectivity in the Palau-Japan relationship suggest that it is its good relationship with Japan that has driven Palau to become a member of the IWC rather than its role as a norm entrepreneur for environmental protection, and that Palau thus functions as a client state in the

IWC. Palau's behaviour within the IWC can thus be understood through the patron-client model rather than the constructivist approach and surprisingly does not reflect its own whaling position. Image 3 gives an overview of the process leading to Palau's anti-whaling position and its decision to join the IWC.

Image 3. Causal inference for Palau's whaling position and decision to join the IWC.



7.3 Kingdom of Tonga

Until now two cases have been discussed to shed a light on the motivations behind the whaling policy and IWC membership of states. What is still missing is why Pacific and Caribbean small island states would not become a member of the IWC. For this reason, the last case to be presented is the Kingdom of Tonga. Its official whaling policy is similar to that of Palau, but unlike Palau, Tonga never decided to join the IWC. This last section will look at Tonga as a state working to protect whales in its own and the Pacific waters outside the IWC.

7.3.1 Protecting Whales

Whale hunting has been prohibited in Tongan waters by a 1978 royal decree. As a result of this whaling ban, whale populations have recovered in Tongan waters and subsequently the whale-watching tourism industry has grown, bringing Tonga increasing income (Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 2017; Ministry of Fisheries Tonga, 2017; SPREP, 2017). Tonga has been involved in a number of regional initiatives to promote the protection of whales, such as joining the Secretariat of Pacific Regional Environmental Protection (SPREP) in 1995 and hosting the Whales in a Changing Ocean conference in 2017. Tonga has thus positioned itself against whaling practices by promoting protective measures towards whaling species and can therefore be seen as a norm entrepreneur for the protection of whales.

During the 2017 reaffirmation of their whaling ban during the Whaling in a Changing Ocean conference, Prime Minister Hon Siaosi Sovaleni provided some insight into the motivation of Tonga's devotion to anti-whaling policies. The direct cause of the royal whaling ban was the realization that whales were close to extinction in Tongan waters. Other factors that have contributed to the whaling ban are the importance of these species in Pacific and Tongan cultures and the fast growing whale-watching industry that is bringing strong profits to the Tongan economy. Adequately capturing these drivers behind the Tongan whaling policy, Prime Minister Hon Siaosi Sovaleni summarized this as whales being "ecologically, culturally and economically important for Tonga" (SPREP, 2017).

Just as in the cases of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Palau, the whaling position that Tonga has adopted can thus be traced back to a cultural connection with whaling species and their experience with whaling practices, in particular the perceived economic benefits from a growing whale-watching industry (see also Department of Conservation, 2007, pp. 5, 8-9).

7.3.2 Tonga in the Whaling Regime

However, its whaling policies have not led Tonga to become a member of the IWC. Instead, Tonga has been working for the protection of whales with regional partners SPREP and the Pacific Community (Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 2017; SPREP, 2017). By already participating in regional organisations that allow them to find and gain support for their whaling policies, it makes sense that Tonga would not spend its already limited resources on IWC membership if their voice on whaling is already heard. The voting records of Saint Vincent and Palau already show that it is a challenge for small island developing states to keep up with their financial obligations to the IWC. Nevertheless, other Pacific small island states involved in the SPREP and the Pacific Community have become a member of the IWC. The earlier discussion on Palau suggested that this choice can be understood through the patron-client model. Can Tonga's non IWC membership also be explained through the patron-client model?

Tonga's main aid donors are Australia, Japan and New Zealand (Appendix I; WTO, 2019). Appendix I shows that in the period 2017-2018, Australia has accounted for 26,6% of its total ODA. Next to providing ODA, Australia has contributed to Tonga's development by providing scholarships and skills development to Tongans and economic reforms (OECD, 2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Aid, 2020). Similarly, Japan (20% of total ODA) has contributed to Tonga's development with its economic assistance (Appendix I; Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 2019), as has New Zealand (17,1% of total ODA) with its strong trade relations with Tonga and development cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020). Tonga has thus created good relations especially with the larger states Australia, Japan and New Zealand, who provide Tonga with both ODA and other forms of aid. The contribution of these three larger states, who also happen to be prominent IWC members, are potential indicators of reciprocity.

Can compliance be perceived as well? Australia and New Zealand are prominent anti-whaling countries and share Tonga's official position on whaling. Not only have they proposed whale sanctuaries in the IWC on several occasions (e.g. South Pacific Whale Sanctuary), but they have also led regional initiatives to protect ocean ecosystems such as the SPREP (SPREP, 2020). Tonga's regional orientation for promoting the protection of whales can therefore not only be seen as a means to cut back on their expenses, but also to bring their policy closer to that of two of their main donors. Tonga's fishing policy, for example, builds on that of Australia and New Zealand. In the policy document laying out Tonga's national fishing policy, the fishing policies of New Zealand and Australia are thoroughly discussed and what Tonga can learn from

these (Ministry of Fisheries Tonga, 2018, pp. 28-31). This illustrates the close connection between Tonga's fishing policy and that of its two main donors.

In this same document, Tonga expresses its appreciation for New Zealand's policies: it starts by expressing its gratitude for New Zealand's support in Tonga's fishing policies (Ministry of Fisheries Tonga, 2018, p. 2) and even says New Zealand has the "most mature fishery management system in the world" (Ministry of Fisheries Tonga, 2018, p. 28). This shows affectivity from Tonga towards New Zealand.

It can concluded that rather than joining the IWC as a norm entrepreneur for promoting the protection of whales, Tonga has supported the regional policies of Australia and New Zealand (who have also contributed to its development). This suggests that being a norm entrepreneur is not a sufficient motivation for joining the IWC and that instead the relations a small state has with larger states guide its policy.

The case of Tonga shows that it is working to protect whales within regional organisations rather than within the IWC. This anti-whaling position is the product of its traditional culture and experience with whaling. Its regional orientation can be explained by its strong relationship with Australia and New Zealand, supporting the patron-client model for explaining small state behaviour. Image 4 gives an overview of the process leading to Tonga's anti-whaling position and decision not to join the IWC.

Image 4. Causal inference for Tonga's whaling position and decision not to join the IWC



8 Conclusion

This thesis has looked at the whaling policy of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Palau and the Kingdom of Tonga in order to answer the following research question: why have Pacific and Caribbean small island states become a member of the IWC and how can their position on whaling be explained? Existing literature disagrees on whether the patron-client model or the constructivist approach can best be used for this. The discussed cases show that the official whaling position of states stems from their experience with whaling and local culture. This strengthens constructivist theories of state behaviour, since worldview determines whaling position, and supports earlier observations on the role of indigenous cultures on the whaling policies of larger states (Creason, 2004; Romero & Creswell, 2005).

However, the decision on joining the IWC does not always reflect official whaling position. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' behaviour within the IWC suggests that it chose to be an IWC-member in order to advocate ASW. Palau and Tonga, on the other hand, seem to have made their decision on IWC membership in the context of their relationship with other larger states: Palau as a client-state of Japan and Tonga in its relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Both the constructivist approach and the patron-client model can thus be used for explaining IWC participation of Pacific and Caribbean small island states. As promised, these findings can be fit within a model of causal inference as seen in image 5.

Image 5. Causal inference for a state's position on the issue of whaling and decision to become a member of the IWC.



These results can be used to support the constructivist literature on small states as norm entrepreneurs in international organisations. The behaviour of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the IWC in particular shows that international organisations are a suitable platform for small states to advocate norms. In contrast, the IWC behaviour of Palau and Tonga's decision not to

join the IWC are more in line with the patron-client model since it was their relation with larger states rather than their will to promote protective measures against whaling that made them (not) join the IWC. The notion of small states as norm entrepreneurs and as client states appear therefore not to contradict, but rather complement each other. This suggests that different theories on state behaviour can co-exist.

Because the analysis has looked at diverse cases, this observed behaviour can be viewed as representative of all Pacific and Caribbean small island states, although the actual distribution of IWC membership and whaling position among them might differ (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 301). These states, and even small island states elsewhere provided they fall into the SIDS category to ensure their relative weakness, have thus the ability to act as norm entrepreneurs as well as client-states in international politics. However, the factors driving a state's whaling policy cannot so easily be transferred to other policy areas since whaling is such a strong normative issue. The results of this analysis can therefore best be applied to policy areas with a strong normative dimension, such as climate change and human rights.

This analysis suggests that there is a geographical divide in the whaling position between the Pacific and the Caribbean. A quick look at their whaling policies shows that Pacific states are generally against the practice of whaling, whereas Caribbean states support it. Future research might find it interesting to take a broader look into the whaling policies of Pacific and Caribbean small island states and figure out how, if there is indeed such a divide, this can be explained. Another puzzle yet to be solved is when exactly a small state chooses to act as a norm entrepreneur or a client-state, as this thesis shows that states can do both. Could this be a cultural choice, a matter of distance (Palau is far closer to Japan than Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) or a result of their relevance to larger states? If Saint Vincent and the Grenadines already supports the whaling industry in the IWC, why then would Japan invest in cajoling it for support? More research can be done into when exactly a small state shows which behaviour.

Lastly, these findings are of relevance to those interested in a better understanding of small state behaviour and should draw the attention to what larger states can gain from their continuing involvement in the development of smaller states.

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Appendix I

Overview of contributions main donors of Official Development Aid to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Republic of Palau and Kingdom of Tonga in the period 2017-2018 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2019).

Top 10 Donors of Gross ODA for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2017-2018, USD million.

Donor	ODA provided to SVG	% of total ODA provided to SVG
EU institutions	4,700	25,3%
Climate Investment Fund	3,696	19,9%
Caribbean Development Bank	2,725	14,6%
United Arab Emirates	1,698	9,1%
Kuwait	1,354	7,3%
Japan	1,267	6,8%
Australia	1,080	5,8%
International Development Association	1,049	5,6%
Canada	0,349	1,9%
Global Environmental Facility	0,294	1,6%
	Total: 18,600,000	

Top 10 Donors of Gross ODA for Republic of Palau 2017-2018, USD million.

Donor	ODA provided to Palau	% of total ODA provided to Palau
United States	34,66	65,1%
Japan	13,90	26,1%
Asian Development Bank	2,08	3,9%
Australia	1,34	2,5%
Korea	0,31	0,6%
United Arab Emirates	0,25	0,5%
New Zealand	0,22	0,4%
Italy	0,10	0,2%
Belgium	0,08	0,2%
EU institutions	0,07	0,1%
	Total: 53,250,000	

Top 10 Donors of Gross ODA for Kingdom of Tonga 2017-2018, USD million.

Donor	ODA provided to Tonga	% of total ODA provided to Tonga
Australia	24,25	26,6%
Japan	18,23	20%
New Zealand	15,51	17,1%
Asian Development Bank	9,64	10,6%
International Development Association	9,48	10,4%
Climate Investment Fund	5,24	5,8%
EU institutions	4,39	4,8%
United States	1,58	1,7%
Germany	0,92	1%
International Fund for Agricultural Development	0,80	0,9%
	Total: 90,950,000	

Appendix II

Japanese foreign aid through Japanese International Cooperation Agency in 2010 to Central America and the Caribbean and the Pacific (Japanese International Cooperation Agency, 2011, pp. 62, 70).

Part of Aid Received from the total 2010 JICA program in Central America and the Caribbean.

Antigua and Barbuda	0,2%	*Haïti*	5,9%
Barbados	0,2%	*Honduras*	3,0%
Belize	0,5%	Jamaica	5,3%
Costa Rica	16,7%	Mexico	3,3%
Cuba	1,5%	Nicaragua	5,1%
Dominica	0,2%	Panama	39,1%
Dominican Republic	3,1%	Saint Lucia	0,6%
El Salvador	4,2%	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0,3%
Grenada	0,0%	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0,3%
Guatemala	9,0%	Suriname	0,0%
Guyana	1,6%	*Trinidad and Tobago*	0,0%

IWC member *non IWC member*

Part of Aid Received from the total 2010 JICA program in the Pacific.

Cook Islands	0,1%	Palau	3,4%
Fiji	7,9%	*Papua New Guinea*	23,7%
Kiribati	0,7%	*Samoa*	9,6%
Nauru	0,1%	Solomon Islands	29,0%
Niue	0,0%	*Tonga*	7,3%
Marshall Islands	1,8%	Tuvalu	11,1%
Micronesia	2,0%	*Vanuatu*	3,0%

IWC member *non IWC member*

Appendix III

IWC Opening Statements of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1981) and Palau (2002) (International Whaling Commission, 1981, pp. 121-122; 2002, p. 7-8).

St. Vincent

Thank you Mr. Chairman. In the Chairman's report of the 32nd Whaling Commission meeting on page 20 the Commission is stated to have agreed to communicate with the People's Republic of China, Bequia, Indonesia, Portugal and Tonga to provide information about the work of the Commission and

St. Vincent

procedures for adhering to the Convention and also to request catch and biological data. As many of you know Bequia is a part of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and it is one of the two places in St. Vincent and the Grenadines where whaling takes place.

I must aplogize that my country was not able to take part in the proceedings of this meeting until Friday. This wasn't our wish, the instrument of adhesion to the International Whaling Commission was successively lost in mails and between various offices.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines has been a whaling nation for at least 80 years, that is the whole of this century. There are two centres of subsistence operations of which the larger is out at Bequia in the Grenadines, and is mostly for humpback whales. The species is hunted from one open boat with a hand thrown harpoon and there is one captain and one harpooner. No whales have been caught in the last 12 months but 3 were landed in 1980 and 5 in 1979. Over the last decade there has been a large decline in sightings of humpback whales in Bequia although this has not been documented scientifically. From Barrouallie, on the main island of St. Vincent, there are about 6,maybe 7, open boats which operate also with hand thrown harpoons, the main target species for this village is the pilot whale, of which about 20 have been caught so far this year. In 1980 about 40 pilot whales were caught and also a baby sperm whale. Our fishermen were very proud of this sperm whale because they considered it highly dangerous to try and take a calf in the presence of the mother although the vessels and equipment are much too small to attempt to kill an adult sperm whale.

Both in Bequia and St. Vincent the meat of the whales is consumed locally, some of the oil is extracted in vats and exported to Trinidad where it is used in the manufacture of a particularly hideous perfume.

If the whales recover, as a result of conservation actions by the International Whaling Commission, and by protective measures taken by states within their zones of national jurisdiction, we hope that the whales will be useful to us again. We would like to see the development in our beautiful islands of a small industry based on whale watching similar to that carried out in the USA, Canada and Argentina, and perhaps a research station.

For the time being our subsistence industry is going to continue. We would, however, like to be sure that if it does it is kept to a scale such that the survival of the whales is not threatened. We know that this Commission is actively engaged in developing a regime for the regulation of subsistence whaling and we would like to contribute to that effort. We are particularly anxious to contribute with colleagues in Denmark and Canada where the North West Atlantic humpbacks are being caught for subsistence or by accident in fishing nets. We regret that Canada has chosen to leave the Commission at the same time as we have joined it, nevertheless we hope that co-operation will

be possible at least on a scientific level.

Mr. Chairman, in recent years St. Vincent and the Grenadines has benefitted from the interests of scientists in several countries in studying the whales in our waters and recording for the future the characteristics of our small whaling operation. We hope that by joining the Commission we shall further encourage international interest in the whales in our waters. IUCN and the World Wildlife Fund have identified study projects of interest and we hope that such co-operation can grow.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines hopes in the future to play an active role in the Commission although our contribution will necessarily be small. We most particularly wish to defend the rights of local people to gain subsistence from whales whether as a source of food or in the more modern way as a source of tourist or scientific interest. We hope that by our combined efforts whales which have been subject in the North Atlantic to intense and less well regulated whaling, than any where else, will in future be given the best possible opportunity to recover.

May I close by wishing the Commission success for the remainder of this current meeting and in the future assure you Mr. Chairman of our spirit of full co-operation.

REPUBLIC OF PALAU

The Republic of Palau noted the dependence of its people on marine resources for daily sustenance and livelihood and therefore its commitment to the principle of sustainable management and the rational utilisation of the world's marine resources. It also noted the polarisation within the Commission on whaling issues, but considered that when implementing the Convention, it is important that members take account of the best scientific information available and keep in mind the ultimate objective of the Convention. It recognised that it needed to build additional capacity so that it could participate effectively in the Commission's work, and indicated that it would be grateful to receive any technical support, assistance and guidance from the organisation or from any of its members.

Appendix IV

Need Statement on behalf of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (first introduced in 2002 to the Scientific Committee IWC (p. 15), text published later in 2012 annual report (pp. 91-92)).

SUMMARY OF NEED STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Background

St. Vincent and The Grenadines is an island nation in the eastern Caribbean Sea made up of the eponymous main island of St. Vincent and a number of smaller islands collectively called The Grenadines. The largest of The Grenadines is Bequia, which lies only a few miles from St. Vincent. The population as of 2010 in St. Vincent and The Grenadines was 97,064, of which about 91,064 live on St. Vincent and about 6,000 live in the northern Grenadines. The main occupations on Bequia are tourism and fishing, and services. The average per capita income from full and part-time employment is about $2,700EC (Eastern Caribbean dollars or $900US).

From early times, even before the Europeans arrived, what is now St. Vincent and The Grenadines, akin to other island states in the eastern Caribbean, used the smaller cetaceans as a source of meat for food. Later, in the late 18th and early 19th century whale oil became the important commodity and item of trade and was much in demand to light homes and buildings in the Americas and Europe. American and European whaling ships passed through the islands using them as transshipment points for whale oil, and also to hire seamen to work on board. These men learnt how to hunt the great whales, and passed the methods on to the islanders of the eastern Caribbean.

Aboriginal whaling in Bequia

The Bequian whaleboat is made of wood and locally built to a design almost unchanged since the early 19th century. At present there are two boats operating. The boats are about 8.2m long by 2.1m wide and 1m deep. They do not have engines. They have a mast, sails and oars. Each carries a crew of six men: four oarsmen, a harpooner and the captain.

When there is wind the boats use their sails while searching for whales and to pursue them. When the boat gets close to the whale the harpooner throws a harpoon. Once the whale is struck the harpooner throws a second and third harpoon if he can, and the bow oarsman lowers the sail and mast. The boat is then hauled close and the whale is killed with a lance, or a bomb lance if needed. The whale is towed ashore to the station on Semple Cay and flensed. The meat, blubber and bone are shared out to the crew. An old darting gun is currently being used and efforts are currently being made to improve the technology to reduce the time to death of each whale harvested.

Establishing need

There are three aspects to the exercise of establishing 'Need' for whales by Bequia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines (see overleaf).

(1) Social and cultural

On Bequia people consider whales to be a resource that should be used as long as the use is sustainable. The whalers are honoured because whaling in Bequia is an old tradition that requires skill and bravery on the part of the whalers. The islanders take pride in their success and welcome the contribution of meat and fat to the island diet. Whalers and whale songs are part of the folk-art of Bequia. Hisashi (2001)[1] has witnessed the blessing of the whaleboats that takes place before the whaling season begins each year. He noted that the Anglican priest blesses the boats, prays for the safety of the crews, and for a successful hunt before the boats are launched.

When a whale is landed it is a major event in St. Vincent, and people come from the other islands to try to get some fresh whale meat. The fresh meat and blubber are shared out to the crew and owners of the boats, and they give some to friends and relatives, and sell some to the other Bequians.

(2) Nutrition

Meat from whales taken in the Bequia hunt substitute for imported animal protein. Some of the produce is sent to St. Vincent and The Grenadines, so this estimate of percent substitution is biased.

In 2002 and 2007, the whales are estimated to substitute for 12% of the animal protein need. The 2012 population of Bequia remained relatively constant, and four whales continues to substitute for about 12% of the annual animal protein need.

[1]H. Hisashi. 2001. Bequia whaling revisited. *Sonada Journal (Japan)* 36: 41-57.

(3) Economics

The third aspect to be considered in evaluating the need in Bequia for whale meat is economic. In 2002, the meat from two whales substituted for 7% of the value of the imports in terms of foreign exchange savings. Foreign exchange savings from food produced locally are extremely important to island economies that are not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. By 2007, the foreign exchange savings generated by the distribution of the products of Bequian whaling are calculated to remain relatively constant.

Conclusions

The cultural and nutritional need for whale products by Bequia was established by, and accepted by, the IWC in 2007. There appears to have been no quantitative estimation process used, and instead the level was established to be the level currently taken on average, namely two whales. It should be noted that the take of four whales in 2007 only satisfied 12% of the nutritional need, and 7% of the foreign exchange savings from substituting whale meat for imported meat and poultry. St. Vincent and The Grenadines was allowed a take of four to greater address need.

Since that date the need continues given that the population remains fairly constant on the island. In order to satisfy an equivalent 12% in terms of 2012 population size, a quota of four humpback whales is needed. The relation between need and population size may not be sustainable in the long term, but should not be of concern here where the resource clearly is capable of meeting the need with a sustainable harvest.

Appendix V

2009 Speech given by President Toribiong declaring its EEZ a shark sanctuary in the United Nations General Assembly (Shark Sanctuary, 2009).

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am speaking here for the first time as a Head of State. However, in 1977, I appeared with my country's delegation before the Trusteeship Council seeking independence. In 1994, the Trusteeship ended and we took our place as a member of the United Nations. Our independence is testament to the success of the International Trusteeship System, for which we are grateful. The legacy of our experience is a Constitution which incorporates the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- freedom, democracy, equal protection, rule of law.

Mr. President,

Palauans have lived throughout history in symbiosis with the sea. We are seeing now though that the sea, which has long been the source of our sustenance, is both rising in rage to destroy us and becoming barren. This fury was caused by the abuses of humankind and we therefore need to take every action necessary to allow the oceans to heal themselves.

In days gone by, the traditional chiefs of Palau would declare a "bul" – a moratorium to protect a resource which had become scarce. This traditional concept, now popularly known as conservation, shows the way for us to move forward. As Mahatma Gandhi said, "Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. " This is why the world must declare a bul on destructive fishing practices like deep sea bottom trawling, unsustainable harvesting of shark for their fins and overexploitation of tuna stocks.

Mr. President,

The odious fishing practice of bottom trawling, where a weighted net is dragged along the sea floor crushing nearly everything in its path, is contributing to the rapid loss of a critical ecosystem, our coral reefs. We have outlawed deep sea bottom trawling in Palau, but no matter what we do in our own waters, there must be an international solution.

For several years, we have advocated, along with our Pacific neighbors, a moratorium on this practice. The Sustainable Fisheries resolution adopted by the UN in 2007, urged nations and regional fisheries management organizations to stop trawling in sensitive areas by 2009. We have waited for compliance, which has not come, and now renew our call for a worldwide moratorium on this practice.

Mr. President,

An equally destructive fishing practice is shark-finning. We have banned it in Palau and call upon the world to address this issue in order to save the sharks from extinction.

The strength and beauty of sharks are a natural barometer for the health of our oceans. Therefore, I declare today that Palau will become the world's first national shark sanctuary, ending all commercial shark fishing in our

waters and giving a sanctuary for sharks to live and reproduce unmolested in our 237,000 square miles of ocean. We call upon all nations to join us.

Mr. President,

It is anomalous that Palau is experiencing economic difficulty while it sits in the middle of the richest waters in the world. We can no longer stand by while foreign vessels illicitly come to our waters to take our greatest resource, our tuna stocks, without regard to their conservation and without regard for adequate compensation to the island states which rely on this resource.

Palau believes that the best model for a regional effort to conserve our tuna resources and maximize the benefits to us is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). I therefore will work for the establishment of OTEC, the Organization of Tuna Exporting Countries, and I now call upon our friends in OPEC to come forward and help us to understand and obtain fair value from our threatened resource and to make tuna fishing sustainable.

Mr. President,

I come now to the economic crisis which my country is facing. As a developing nation, we are grateful for the grants provided by our allies and partners to advance our development. They have been helpful. But, we must acknowledge that outright grants do not always create meaningful employment. Jobs created are illusory and temporary.

Without a strong local economy, our children, our most valuable resource, are leaving our shores for opportunities elsewhere. As they leave it creates a continuing downward cycle which we must stop.

Our allies and partners can help us stop this cycle by promoting the development of private enterprise in our country. We need capital, and entrepreneurial expertise. I implore our allies and partners to consider providing incentives to their nationals to encourage them to come to our islands and launch partnerships with our talented people to create a viable economy. Let us once and for all put aside the fiction that we need handouts. What we need are partners to help advance our economy and put an end to the out-migration of our people.

Mr. President,

We note with satisfaction the decision by the People's Republic of China to invite Taiwan to attend the World Health Assembly. The health and safety of the world's people is at the heart of the ideals of the UN. In order to further promote these, we recommend that Taiwan be invited to participate meaningfully in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other international organizations.

Mr. President,

We have heard the voices of world leaders from countries small and large, powerful and vulnerable. We have heard the voice of science. Let us heed these voices, fulfill our obligations to our people, and work for a strong economy and a healthy planet.

Thank you.

Appendix VI

President Tommy Remengesau Jr.'s 2020 State of Republic Address (Island Times, 2020).

My fellow Palauans, it is important to remember where we came from just 20 years ago to comprehend the vibrancy of our nation and of our people. When I gave my first Inauguration Speech in 2001, I warned that we were entering a 'non-payday weekend'. I said that Palau would need to run on 'E'. Not 'E' for Empty, but 'E' for Efficiency, 'E' for Effectiveness and 'E' for Excellence. This was because in the 90's we were riding high and spending more than we brought in. We had depleted our cash reserves, and it was necessary to establish a new model of government and governance in Palau – a model of careful planning, a model of fiscal prudence, a model of institution building, and a model of self-reliance – all to ensure a brighter future for our children.

At the beginning of the New Millennium in Palau, it was evident that we could no longer continue to spend more than what we brought in. From 1995 to 2000, we had the luxury of a number of Compact and other revenue resources that allowed us to increase local expenditures for operations by 20%. These funding resources included upfront Compact payments such as the Energy Production, the Capital Account, the KB Bridge Settlement, and the UMDA stock sale proceeds. By 2000, these funding resources were either fully expended or committed and it was apparent that the high expenditure rate after the implementation of the Compact could no longer be sustained. In order to ensure that government services continued to be responsive to the needs of our people, it was imperative that we started living within our means.

Faced with this stark economic reality from day one, it was not easy to follow through on my commitment to "Preserve the Best; and Improve the Rest." But I believe that, twenty years later, we will leave this government much stronger than we found it. We have preserved much that is dear to us, and while we have done much, work continues to improve the rest.

We responded to our fiscal deficiencies by setting in place a planning regime that ensured that we could assess the problem and follow through on the solution. We adopted the Management Action Plan with six simple Guiding Principles to stabilize our country.

1. To Improve the quality of life of the People of Palau; 2. To focus on quality Services while aiming to Reduce Costs; 3. To Ensure Accountability of Representatives and Staff; 4. To Create a Viable Organizational Structure; 5. To Ensure Fair and Considerate Management of Employee Impacts; and 6. To foster a strong sense of Community While Ensuring ongoing communication during the process of change –

With these simple standards, we rolled up our sleeves and went to work to stabilize our economy and to establish the strong foundations for our future. In 2002, I suggested that Palau was at a crossroads. In 2004, I stated that there were dynamic new signs of growth. In 2005 I declared that our economy was emerging, in 2006, I indicated that our future was promising and in 2007, I affirmed that we were back on track.

In these early years, we focused on establishing strong governmental institutions that would withstand the test of time. We began our journey looking first to strengthen our Public Financial Management framework. We gained passage of the Budget Reform Act and introduced performance budgeting to Palau. We streamlined government structures aimed at improving services and upgraded our financial management system to improve accounting of our revenues and expenditures. We then implemented a Cost Reduction Plan to help contain the cost of government. We outsourced government services and implemented policies to help strengthen the private sector. We also eventually gained the passage of a Statistics Act so that we could evaluate the effectiveness of policy actions in progressing our development objectives. And in order to involve all sectors of our society in our development planning process, we encouraged and organized collaboration and cooperation with traditional, community, and state leadership as exemplified by the National/State Leadership Symposium.

The result of all of our efforts was a viable government structure with enhanced fiscal management and infrastructure planning capacity, and a strengthened private sector. These results were so evident that, by the end of our first eight years in office, in 2008, Stephen McGann, the head of the U.S. group entering into negotiations on the Compact of Free Association Review stated that, "Australia and New Zealand aside, Palau is the best run country in the Pacific."

When we came back into office in 2013, we once again found ourselves with a huge budget deficit and limited financing resources. We therefore focused our efforts again on instituting prudent management and budget policies to right the ship. In this context, by prioritizing our expenditures and enhancing revenue opportunities, we were once again able, in 2016, to balance our budget. We created the General Fund Reserve, devoting 2% of our unrestricted revenues and all unspent appropriations to the fund. From these resources we have been able to build a reserve, in just four years, of approximately $26 million. It is out of this fund that we recently authorized $10 million for the COVID-19 pandemic emergency.

Because we were running on empty when we came into office, with absolutely no funding from infrastructure development, we were required to be creative in our efforts to identify new funding sources and to expand the resources previously made available by our development partners. Due to the strong relationships that we have made with Japan, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, we have been able to support capital projects totaling over $400 million. We were also able to manage this onslaught of projects through the creation of the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP), which identified and prioritized current and future projects.

In our early years, we oversaw the completion of the Compact Road, funded by the United States, which has so changed our lives and allowed many of us to move back to our families' home states. We also witnessed the completion of the National Capital, aided by low interest loans from Taiwan. This was a critical step to our long-term plan of moving our population north. When the KB Bridge collapsed, Japan stepped in and provided no cost funding for its replacement through the construction of the Japan-Palau Friendship Bridge.

Along with our Compact Road and KB Bridge projects, we also undertook to connect our island and our people with better and new roads, including the Metropolitan Road Project and the Compact Connecting Road Projects (including the Airport-Ngerikiil Connection Road and Compact-Kokusai connection Road), along with road paving projects throughout our many states and villages in Palau. To make sure that this extensive road system survives into the future, we established a Road Maintenance Fund and earmarked the Road Use Tax to fund future road maintenance costs, as well as providing matching funds for Compact-funded infrastructure projects such as the Compact Road.

Less sexy, but just as necessary for our development, were projects for the development of the Malakal Sewage Treatment Plant; the capping of the Malakal landfill, and the development of a new landfill in Aimeliik; the Koror Airai Sewer Project; and the Koror-Airai Water Supply System Improvements.

We have also greatly strengthened our tourism sector through the construction of the New Airport Terminal Building, funded by Japan, and the current expansion of the facility with our Japanese partners in our country's first 'Public Private Partnership'. With U.S. funding, we improved our Airport runway and constructed the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Building and Airport Loading Bridges, along with fencing around the Airport.

In the energy sector, we purchased two new large generators to provide an additional 10 megawatts worth of more efficient and reliable energy. To help reduce our carbon footprint over the long term, we also undertook to increase our renewable energy sources by expanding solar energy applications in both the public and private sectors, including our hospital, schools, sports facilities, parks, roads, and large commercial buildings. In fact, the energy needs of Kayangel State are now 100 percent solar powered. We have secured an additional $3 million grant for the NDBP's Energy Efficiency Program that will help reduce the costs of power for our homes and businesses. We have also secured concessionary financing for the PPUC for capital investments in their power generation and distribution systems.

This week, PPUC announced the preferred bidders for a Solar Power generation facility that will meet our Nationally Determined Contribution to greenhouse gas reduction by achieving 45% renewable energy by 2025. This project will be the culmination of over a decade of work, from the 2010 National Energy Policy and the establishment of the Palau Energy Administration to the capacity-building work we have undertaken in these recent years. It will reduce power bills throughout the Republic, and help stabilize the finances of PPUC. I look forward to working together, as one Palauan team, to ensure the success of this critical project.

In support of our National Marine Sanctuary, we received a grant of approximately $100 million from Japan that provided a new Japanese 40meter Surveillance Vessel and companion smaller reef surveillance vessels; a New Marine Security Administration Building; and an enhanced PMDC Clam Hatchery Facility and wharf. In addition, Australia will soon be providing us with a brand-new Surveillance Vessel to further augment our fleet.

In order to enhance our telecommunications, we accessed financing from the Asian Development Bank to install our first fiberoptic submarine cable, which is now providing us with high speed internet. In the near future, we will enhance this greatly improved internet system with a second cable, which will not only expand our capacity and enhance speed, but will also provide redundancy, meaning that if one of the cables is cut, service to our people will continue uninterrupted. The Belau Submarine Cable Corporation has taken the first step by securing Palau's place on a new cable from California to Indonesia, with the full support of our national leadership.

We have also enhanced our governmental and our cultural infrastructure by constructing and supporting the Cultural and Performing Arts Center, the Belau National Museum, the National Gymnasium, and the Weather Service Station. We are also currently constructing a new Corrections Facility and the One-Stop-Shop Building.

It is our plan to accelerate and expand our infrastructure investments to increase construction activities during this crisis to help raise revenues to support our economy and our people.

Ladies and Gentlemen, when I came into office in 2001, I said that 'Our Environment is our Economy'. That is because we felt it necessary to preserve and protect our goose that lays the golden egg, the natural environment that brings tourists to our shores in the first place. It was therefore necessary to put into place a comprehensive Sustainable Development Framework, which recognized the balancing act required to expand economic opportunities for all Palauans in a sustainable manner that will preserve the same opportunities for our children far into the future.

To begin this process, we created the Office of Environmental Response and Coordination, known to you as OERC. Through this Office we were able to increase funding for and coordinate our efforts to respond to the international and regional issues of Climate Change and Biodiversity, as well as the many other international environmental issues. Our active participation and frequent international leadership in these international environmental treaties have resulted in sustained support for our domestic initiatives. We also created the National Environmental Protection Council to identify Palau's most pressing environmental issues and help plan for our national response.

Our efforts to respond to climate change and related impacts to our pristine coral reefs were greatly assisted through the creation and the work of the Palau International Coral Reef Center, which has become locally and internationally relevant, and has contributed to better informed decisions regarding the management and conservation of the region's and the world's marine resources.

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With these planning processes and institutions in place, we were able to lead the effort to adopt the Micronesia Challenge in Palau, the FSM, the RMI, Guam, and the CNMI, whereby we agreed, as a region, to "effectively conserve at least 30% of near shore marine and 20% of the forest resources across Micronesia by 2020." To raise funding for this initiative, we amended the Protected Area Network Legislation and set aside traveler fees to not only fund protective measures but to also fund environmentally friendly development projects. We also gained membership in the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force and co-chaired, with Japan, the International Coral Reef Initiative, hosting meetings of both. Through these many efforts, of all of the jurisdictions involved in the Micronesia Challenge, only Palau has met its fundraising goal to achieve the Challenge's mandates.

In our second administration, we progressed these efforts forward by establishing one of the largest marine sanctuaries in the world, the 'Palau National Marine Sanctuary'. We also led the world community in establishing an 'Ocean's' Sustainable Development Goal that focuses international efforts to establish the international rules and regulations to save our degraded Oceans for our children.

We also: Passed legislation banning Deep Sea Bottom Trawling; Passed a successful Recycling Law and companion regulations; Put in place a comprehensive oil exploration regime and framework with the grant assistance of the World Bank, which led to the creation of a Task Force on the issue and the eventual passage of a Petroleum Law; Established the PNMS Endowment Fund to implement the Sanctuary; and Became the 2nd Country in the world to ratify the PARIS Climate Agreement.

God willing, we are also scheduled to host the Oceans 2020 Conference this year in December, where we will highlight the importance of Oceans to all Island People and, through this conference, expand and enhance Ocean Initiatives worldwide. As a companion component to this Conference, we will also hold a Pacific Ecological Security Conference for Pacific jurisdictions and partners throughout the Pacific to foster and finance more active and better financed efforts to prevent and eradicate the invasion of foreign marine and terrestrial species in our region.