



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

BUYING THE PERIPHERY PACT ?

*The policy of the United States towards the Periphery Pact arrangements between Iran,
Israel and Turkey during the Eisenhower Administration, 1953 - 61*

By Paul Landy

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Supervised by: Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon, Leiden University,

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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Tom & Marie, without whom it would never have been started.

The genesis of this thesis lies in a research project I undertook on a railway branch-line connecting the Ottoman Hejaz railway to the port of Haifa. At some time during this research, an opaque reference to cooperation between the intelligence agencies of Israel and Turkey during the 1950's caught my eye. When it came to writing my master thesis, that nugget of information was triggered and a new journey was initiated, the results of which lie before you. On the ensuing journey I had many fellow travelers whom I wish to thank.

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Abstract

During the summer of 1958 Iran, Israel and Turkey concluded a secret agreement to share intelligence data and information gathering techniques. This agreement, the Periphery Pact ('Pact'), was initiated by Israel who was anxious to establish relationships with countries on the periphery of the ring of hostile Arab countries that encircled it. The Pact signatories, engaged in a diplomatic marketing initiative to sell the Pact to their Cold War sponsor, the United States in the belief that US support for the Pact was beneficial. Existing research tells us little about how the United States reacted to this sales pitch or what US policy was towards the Pact. My research of the US diplomatic archives indicate that the US response to the Periphery Pact arrangements was decidedly lukewarm. This appears inconsistent with US regional policy which was to stimulate the creation of regional defense arrangements by its regional allies to counter Soviet threats to the region. I argue that the response of the United States to the Pact may not be a complete surprise if analyzed in the light of the US response to the Baghdad Pact, a contemporaneous defense arrangement in the region. I also investigate how the US intelligence services reacted to the Pact. This aspect of the US policy towards the Pact is under-researched. This is surprising given Israel's track record in clandestine diplomacy and its use of its regional intelligence gathering capabilities as an argument when marketing the Periphery Pact to US officials. My research indicates that the CIA displayed more interest in and provided resources to the intelligence sharing mechanism of the Periphery Pact. It may well be that the United States used clandestine diplomacy in parallel, rather than as a substitute, for normal diplomatic channels.

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Abbreviations

AIOC:	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AZCPA:	American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs
CENTO:	Central Treaty Organization
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
DNSA:	Digital National Security Archive
FRUS:	Foreign Relations of the United States (State department historical archives)
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
JCS:	Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee of the heads of each branch of the US military
MEDO:	Middle East Defense Organization
Mossad:	Israel's foreign intelligence service
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE:	National Intelligence Estimate
NSC:	National Security Council
OCB:	Operations Coordinating Board
OEEC:	Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
SAVAK:	Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security (Sazeman Etellat Va Amniyat-e Keshver).
SNIE:	Special National Intelligence Estimate
TNSS:	Turkey's National Security Service
UAR:	United Arab Republic
UN:	United Nations
US:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

This chapter introduces the topic of my research, the Periphery Pact. This was a Cold War secret agreement, concluded between Iran, Israel and Turkey (hereafter referred to as the ‘Periphery Pact countries’) in 1958, to share military and intelligence information. Existing literature on the Periphery Pact tends to discuss the rationale from the perspective of each Pact signatory. Each of the Periphery Pact countries actively promoted (their participation in) the Periphery Pact to the US government. With a few exceptions, current literature does not investigate how US policy makers viewed the Pact arrangements, so little is known about whether the United States wished to ‘buy’ the Periphery Pact arrangements of three US allies in the region.

In the next section, I explain briefly, what the Periphery Pact entailed and define ‘clandestine diplomacy’, a concept which was central to the development and implementation of the Periphery Pact. Thereafter, I briefly consider the deepening bilateral relationships between the Periphery Pact countries that helps explain these countries’ participation in the Periphery Pact arrangement. One explanation common to all three Periphery Pact countries was a shared desire for (regional) security protection, even if the Pact countries did not share the threat assessment that necessitated such security protection.¹ Each of the three countries had taken a broadly taken a pro-Western position in the Cold War and desired US participation in any such security protection. The objectives of my research project and accompanying research question are outlined in the following section. The penultimate section of the chapter outlines the research design and methodology choices underpinning my research. Here I outline the research approach taken to researching US government archives from 1953 to 1961 to understand US policy, during the Eisenhower administration, to the Periphery Pact Countries and the Pact itself. The final section of this chapter contains a reading guide outlining the structure of the thesis.

¹ Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty organization was directly exposed to a threat from the USSR. Iran was also threatened by the USSR, given its significant land-border with the USSR and its strategic position between Persian Gulf Oil resources and the USSR. Israel, on the other hand, felt threatened by the Arab States which surrounded it.

The primary objective for my research is to understand US policy towards the Periphery Pact countries and the Pact itself. My research findings demonstrate that US budgetary concerns, US regional security objectives to protect against Soviet expansion and the security Western oil interests were prominent factors in defining US policy towards the Periphery Pact and Pact countries. Furthermore, a US policy objective of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict dominated US policy making towards the region. My research indicates that actions taken by Periphery Pact countries to ‘sell’ the Pact to the Eisenhower administration was greeted by a lukewarm response from US diplomats. This appears strange given the US policy of encouraging indigenous security arrangements in the Middle East region to counter Soviet threats. The United States had supported the creation of the 1955 Baghdad Pact defense arrangement.² My research suggests that an understanding of the logic of the United States not supporting the Baghdad Pact may partially explain the muted attitude of the United States towards the Periphery Pact. My research indicates that the Periphery Pact received more support from the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”). The continued redaction of the relevant archival documents obscures the extent of US intelligence involvement in or views of the Periphery Pact. It appears that the United States may have engaged in a form of parallel secret diplomacy that allowed the CIA to take deal with the Periphery Pact arrangement.

[An Intelligence-sharing Relationship](#)

The Periphery Pact was an arrangement for sharing of intelligence and techniques between the intelligence services of Iran (SAVAK), Israel (Mossad) and Turkey (TSS). It is considered to have been a series of bilateral agreements of the Pact countries where these intelligence services took the lead in arranging multilateral meetings. These intelligence acquisition opportunities were the only manifestation of multilateral arrangements within the otherwise bilateral relationships between Pact countries.³ The tripartite intelligence-sharing arrangements

² The 1955 Baghdad Pact was a military alliance between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Its creation was supported by the US, but it did not participate in it

³ Yoel Guzansky, “Israel’s Periphery Doctrine 2.0: The Mediterranean Plus”, *Mediterranean Politics*, 19.1(2014), 102.

were initiated by Israel in 1958 and were short-lived due to the coup d'état in Turkey in 1960.⁴ Our knowledge of the Periphery Pact is limited by the secrecy that surrounded its nature and implementation. Turkey demanded secrecy and informality as a condition for engaging with Israel.⁵ Iran was anxious not to antagonize Arab opinion by openly doing business with Israel: by entrusting the management of Iran's diplomatic relationship with Israel to the intelligence services of both countries, discretion could be maintained as to the nature and extent of Iranian-Israeli relations.⁶ For Israel, such clandestine diplomacy had been a feature of its diplomatic history since it was created.⁷ During World War II, future Israeli leaders had learned how to exercise power and influence through establishing clandestine relationships with crucial actors in foreign governments, even when no formal relationships with those governments existed.⁸ A key assumption underlying diplomatic relations between two countries is the acknowledgement of each other's independence.⁹ As many (neighboring) states did not recognize the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, continuing clandestine diplomacy was necessary.

The centrality of clandestine diplomacy to my research warrants a definition of what it precisely means and how it fits with the broader notion of diplomacy. Watson emphasizes diplomacy as a process defining it as “a process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in

⁴ The 1960 coup d'état marked the end of the Menders government, that had concluded the Periphery Pact with Israel. The new military continued the relationship for some years but by the mid 1960's the relationship was fully terminated. Israel and Iran continued their clandestine liaison until the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

⁵ Noa Schonmann. “Back-Door Diplomacy: The Mistress Syndrome in Israel's Relations With Turkey 1957 - 60” in *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies*, eds Clive Jones, and Tore T. Petersen (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 88.

⁶ Sohrab Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 27.

⁷ Clive Jones and Tore T. Petersen, eds. *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 3-5.

⁸ Clive Jones. “Influence Without Power: Britain the Jewish Agency and Intelligence Collaboration, 1939-1944” in *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* eds., Clive Jones, and Tore T. Petersen, (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 52 - 53.

⁹ Adam Watson. *Diplomacy : The Dialogue between States*. (London: Eyre Methuen, 1982), 33.

a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war.”¹⁰ The institutional structures of a network of embassies and diplomats within which such dialogue and negotiation takes place and the diplomatic protocols that define how it takes place have been defined as “front-door diplomacy.”¹¹ Diplomatic discussions between countries normally take place in secret but the fact that such discussions are happening is not. This contrasts with the concept of “back-door diplomacy” where officially sanctioned relations “operate under conditions of secrecy as a matter of course.”¹² Such a back-door approach to diplomacy recognizes that the formal front-door diplomacy that precedes the development of substantive economic or security ties between countries is not always possible. In this situation back-door diplomacy, can allow such substantive ties to evolve, even where diplomacy occurs under conditions of secrecy. For my research, I use this definition of “back-door” diplomacy as the basis for defining clandestine diplomacy but recognize an additional element when defining clandestine diplomacy in terms of the Periphery Pact, namely the role of intelligence services in such diplomatic efforts.¹³ On the one hand, the Periphery Pact intelligence services were the institutions tasked with managing the diplomatic business between Iran, Israel and Turkey to ensure the secrecy required by Iran and Turkey. On the other hand, the activities of the same intelligence services is the basis for the cooperation envisaged by the Periphery Pact, what Schonmann refers to as the “substance” which diplomacy enables.¹⁴

Deepening Bilateral Relations and the Rationale for the Periphery Pact

Existing scholarship on the Periphery Pact, surveyed in chapter one, analyzes the Pact in terms of the broader relationships between Israel and, respectively Iran and Turkey, exploring a variety of reasons why each country signed up to the Periphery Pact. The genesis of the Periphery Pact lay in the Periphery Doctrine, an Israeli foreign policy doctrine championed by the country’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion (hereafter ‘Ben-Gurion’). That strategy

¹⁰ Watson, *Diplomacy*, 11.

¹¹ Schonmann, “Back-door diplomacy,” 87.

¹² Schonmann, “Back-door diplomacy,” 87.

¹³ The potential for involvement of intelligence agencies is implicit in Schonmann’s definition. I have chosen here to make it more explicit.

¹⁴ Schonmann, “Back-door diplomacy,” 87

assumed it would be impossible for Israel to make permanent peace with the neighboring Arab states that it had defeated in 1948. Instead, Israel needed to develop relationships with state and non-state actors at the periphery of the hostile Arab encirclement.¹⁵ For Israel, improving relationships with Iran and Turkey was central to the implementation of this Periphery Doctrine. Israel had two further reasons to develop a relationship with Iran. Firstly, the repatriation of Jewish diaspora was a central tenet of Israeli foreign policy and diplomatic relations with Iran were necessary to allow Iranian, and Iraqi Jews (smuggled through Iran) to repatriate to Israel. Secondly, Israel had an energy security objective of safeguarding the continuity of the covert supply of Iranian oil that had become vital to its economy, particularly in response to oil blockades by its Arab neighbors.¹⁶

Iran also benefited from the relationship with Israel. Economic cooperation between the two states involved Israel sharing its expertise in irrigation and agricultural techniques. This contributed to the Iranian objective of modernizing its economy through agriculture projects to provide stable economic growth in Iran.¹⁷ The relationship between Iran and Israel developed a security component as the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, (hereafter referred to as ‘the Shah’), was anxious to bolster his own position within Iran. He requested Israel to provide training and support for his fledgling intelligence service, the SAVAK. The Shah believed that the SAVAK would benefit from a comprehensive Middle East perspective that Mossad training officers could provide.¹⁸

In 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize the state of Israel and encouraged Turkish Jews to immigrate to Israel.¹⁹ In 1950, the newly-elected Menderes

¹⁵ For more detailed descriptions of the Periphery Doctrine, see for example: Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente* and Yossi Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

¹⁶ Uri Bialer, “Fuel Bridge across the Middle East - Israel, Iran, and the Eilat-Ashkelon Oil Pipeline,” *Israel Studies*, 12(3), (2007): 30.

¹⁷ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 6, 18-19.

¹⁸ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 28

¹⁹ Ercan Yilmaz, “Turkey-Israel Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Journal of Management and Economic Research) 6, no. 10 (2008), 162. Available at <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/yead/issue/21821> Last accessed on December 20, 2020.

government in Turkey wanted to improve relations with Israel as part of a strategy to align Turkey with US policy in the hope of gaining US security protection. Turkey secured this protection when it joined NATO in 1952 but continued to push for a regional security alliance that would protect its southeastern border.²⁰ This regional security alliance came to fruition as the Baghdad Pact in 1955.²¹ During the negotiations for the Baghdad Pact, Turkey gave priority to relationships with Arab countries, particularly Iraq, at the expense of its relationship with Israel.²² With the USSR anxious to deal with the Baghdad Pact alliance on its southern flank, Egypt became the focus of Soviet attention and arms deals were concluded with Egypt and Syria in 1955.²³ Turkey's regional security position changed in 1957 when Egypt and Syria together formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) resulting in a pro-Soviet regime on Turkey's Southern border.²⁴ This precarious security position, forced Menderes to accept Ben-Gurion's offer of talks on security cooperation between Israel and Turkey, even before the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 that saw Iraq withdraw from the Baghdad Pact.²⁵

Like Turkey, Iran and Israel were anxious for a regional security arrangement that had US backing. Turkey's NATO membership made it fall within the US security umbrella. Israel was keen to participate in the US security umbrella and sought to join the Baghdad Pact. Israel's overtures to join the Baghdad Pact were rejected and was excluded from participating in any security pacts, even as a candidate for participation.²⁶ By mid-1958, Israel again sought to

²⁰ Evaki Athanassopoulou, "Turkey's Approach Towards Israel in the 1950s: Not Merely Following US policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 6, 2017: 902.

²¹ The 1955 Baghdad Pact was a military alliance between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Its creation was supported by the US, but it did not participate in it.

²² Athanassopoulou, "Turkey's Approach Towards Israel", 903.

²³ Joshua Walker, "Turkey and Israel's Relationship in the Middle East," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (2006), 68.

²⁴ Athanassopoulou, "Turkey's Approach Towards Israel", 905-6.

²⁵ Athanassopoulou, "Turkey's Approach Towards Israel", 906-7

²⁶ Orna Almog and Ayşegül Sever. "Hide and Seek? Israeli-Turkish Relations and the Baghdad Pact." *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 4 (2017): 613.

demonstrate its strategic value to the US in the region, in need of security guarantees.²⁷ Iran believed that the lack of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact made it potentially ineffective against Soviet threats.²⁸ Iran, anxious to obtain US security protection, believed that Israel's special relationship with the US could be exploited to Iran's advantage in this respect.²⁹

The Research Problem

In the previous paragraph, we have seen that all three Periphery Pact countries had an interest in regional security arrangements backed by the United States. This was despite differences in the threat assessment warranting such arrangements: Israel wished to insulate itself from the threat posed by its Arab neighbors while the Soviet threat guided the search for a regional security alliance by Iran and Turkey. Israel sought to bridge this threat assessment gap by seeking to persuade Iran and Turkey that a pro Soviet UAR, led by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, (hereafter "Nasser") represented a threat to them. This desire for a regional security arrangement was a shared objective that helps explain the motivation of each of these countries to join the Periphery Pact. Each country sought to promote the Periphery Pact with the US government in the hope of persuading the United States to provide greater security support. The existing literature on the Periphery Pact is generally written from the perspective of individual countries and does not explore the US perspective of the Pact. Moreover, these accounts generally do not use US archival material to support their research conclusions.³⁰ Nor has US archival material been used to understand whether US intelligence services were involved in the Periphery Pact, which is a logical question given the involvement of Periphery Pact countries' intelligence services. Many questions flow from this gap, shaping the research problem at the core of my research: How did the United States view the Periphery Pact arrangement? What was the US policy towards Periphery Pact countries and their security arrangements? What role did the CIA have the Periphery Pact intelligence-sharing arrangements?

²⁷ Noa Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake: The Accidental Crisis in American - Israeli Relations, August 1958," *Israel Affairs* 23 no 4 (2017) : 631.

²⁸ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 20.

²⁹ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, xxii, 6.

³⁰ With the exception of Schonmann's articles that generally use US archival sources.

Objectives of my Research and Research Question

The objective of my research is threefold. The first objective is to understand the US policy on the relationship between Israel and respectively Iran and Turkey based on existing literature on the Periphery Pact. The second objective is to understand, based on US primary sources, how US policy towards the Periphery Pact and Periphery Pact countries was developed and implemented. Thirdly, my research aims to understand the role of the CIA with respect to the Periphery Pact. My research is based on the analysis of US policy. This necessitated gaining an understanding of how the National Security Council (NSC) operated in terms of policy creation and implementation during the Eisenhower administration.

These research objectives have been formulated in the following research questions which were used for my research: What factors determined the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Presidency (1953-61) towards the 1958 Periphery Pact arrangement between Iran, Israel and Turkey? The research question is supported by three sub questions: What was the regional and global foreign policy of the Eisenhower Presidency towards the Periphery Pact countries and international relations between them? What was US policy towards the 1958 Periphery Pact itself? What was the contribution of the State Department and the CIA in formulating these policies?

The following section outlines the research design and methodology employed in my research to answer these questions.

Research Design and Methodology

Research Design: a qualitative approach

Research design outlines the framework in which the research takes place. My research is qualitative research which has been defined as “an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world.”³¹ This approach has been chosen to support my research of the human activity involved in establishing and implementing foreign policy in a specific historical period.

³¹ John Van Maanen, “Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research: A Preface,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (1979), 520.

My research method involves the content analysis of policy documentation (the process of document selection is explained below) created during the Eisenhower administration. My research approach used content analysis as a qualitative approach rather than as a quantitative one in which it is sometimes employed. In this respect my research recognizes that content analysis, as a data analysis tool, is at “the base of all forms of qualitative data analysis.”³² I used content analysis to develop policy themes that informed the Eisenhower administration’s policy towards the Periphery Pact countries chosen as case studies for my research.

Research Design: Case Study selection

The case study selection was defined by the research objective which was limited to Periphery Pact countries within the geographic region of the Middle East. Sudan and Ethiopia, although part of the Periphery Doctrine of Israel, were not part of the intelligence-sharing arrangements with Iran and Turkey.

Research Methodology - Primary Sources

Due to Covid-19 travel restrictions, primary data sources were limited to those available online. Much of the US government archives have been digitized and are accessible remotely. The Office of the Historian, US State Department, maintains the most comprehensive online archive of US diplomatic history curated and collated as the *Foreign Relations of the United States Series* (hereafter “*FRUS*”). The *FRUS* archive is accessible online, searchable and legible. Documents are typed transcripts of the original documents. The curation process means incorporated cross references and lists of abbreviations and key people make it more accessible. The Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) contains digitized archival material from the US National Security Archive and is maintained by the George Washington University. The DNSA only contains documents that have been subject to a Freedom of Information Request. Therefore, if a document has not been requested under the FOI, it may not be included in the DNSA. The declassified intelligence digital archive was accessed through the CIA Electronic Reading Room website of the CIA. This website is useful for a document search, but it is not

³² Lindsay Prior, "Content analysis" in *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed Patricia Leavy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),362.

clear whether the underlying database being searched is comprehensive. My research is also based on documents from the online collection of the Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, maintained by Johns Hopkins University Press. This archive contains digitized and transcribed versions of documents contained in the Eisenhower Presidential Library. This archive is curated externally and includes mostly personal correspondence of President Eisenhower. Unfortunately, certain archival material that is available at the Presidential Library (for example oral interviews) are not included in the Johns Hopkins archive. I also used the database 'US Declassified Documents Online' maintained by Gale, a private enterprise that contains digital documents from US government archives in the original format, rather than transcripts. The primary sources described in this paragraph were chosen to provide a broad range of insights into the diplomatic history of the Eisenhower administration, given the restriction of needing remote access because of Covid-19 restrictions.

Strategy for selecting primary data source documents

With the most comprehensive document population, the *FRUS* was the starting point for selecting primary source documents. It was estimated that there were over 10,000 *FRUS* documents relating to all three Periphery Pact countries during the Eisenhower Presidency. The focus of my research has been narrowed using purposeful sampling to exclude *FRUS* documents relating to two significant events during the Eisenhower administration that were voluminous but unlikely to cover the Periphery Pact.³³ The content analysis performed on the remaining population of documents forms the basis for my research.

Research Methodology - Content Analysis

The research analysis was performed using a qualitative content analysis approach. This raised the question as to how to select and analyze the documents most relevant to the research question. As the research question was anchored in US policy analysis it is first necessary to understand how US policy was formulated during the Eisenhower Administration and the specific role of the NSC structure in policy formulation and implementation. The policy

³³ I excluded documentation relating to the Iran Coup of 1953 for Iran and documents related to the Sues Crisis in late 1956 for Israel from the integral document review. I performed document searches within this population of excluded documents to ensure that nothing relevant was overlooked.

statements issued by the United States with respect to each country were identified.³⁴ After establishing a complete list of relevant policy statements, it was possible to review background information documents as well as the policy itself. For example, the NSC planning board staff paper often provided useful background information to the policy decisions taken and alternatives considered; the minutes of the NSC meetings at which policy statements were approved were often insightful on the policy issue concerns or the institutional differences that needed to be resolved. This process allowed for a selection of the most relevant policy documents to be analyzed and from which broad policy themes emerged that provided the basis for answering the research questions.

Limitations

Carrying out this research during the Covid-19 pandemic has had two main consequences. Firstly, my research has been limited to archives that are accessible online. Such digital access has enabled remote access to these archives and provided a wealth of information. It remains the case that documents in such digital archives have been redacted or curated before being published on-line. This increases the risk that the resulting research becomes more of a classical Cold War history as such redaction/curation makes it more difficult to ‘read against the archive’. Secondly, the original intention had been to use oral history archives during the research fieldwork. These archives have largely not been remotely accessible so their potential to contribute to a more balanced and ‘rich’ assessment of the diplomatic archive has not been available.

Finally, my research has been limited to the policies of Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) for two reasons. Firstly, the Periphery Pact came into being during the Eisenhower administration. Secondly, the later periods of Periphery Pact diplomacy, specifically between Iran and Israel, has already been extensively researched.³⁵

³⁴ During the transition from the Eisenhower to Kennedy Presidency, the NSC official responsible for transition prepared a helpful list of all NSC policy pronouncements. This enabled me to establish the completeness of all policies issue.

³⁵ In later decades Periphery Pact diplomacy became entangled in a larger political scandal in the United States, the Iran-Contra affair.

Thesis Guide

This thesis contains six chapters. The *first* chapter contains a critical analysis of existing literature on the Periphery Pact and introduces the Foreign Policy Analysis framework that has guided my research. The *second* chapter is designed to provide a regional and domestic context to the US policy being investigated.. It provides a brief overview of policy towards the Middle East region during the Eisenhower presidency. Thereafter it surveys US domestic policies recognizing that events in the US domestic sphere, such as the anti-communist crusade of Senator Joseph McCarthy or the increasing prominence of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, influenced the creation of US foreign policy. The *third* chapter outlines the results of my research on US policy with respect to Israel. It outlines how the United States desired to achieve a policy of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to persuade Arab countries to maintain a pro-Western stance in the Cold War. This US desire for neutrality clashed with Israel's requests for a security guarantee and with the activities of the pro-Israel lobby within US domestic policies. The chapter discusses research findings indicating that US intelligence services had developed a close working relationship with their Israeli counterparts and did not appear to be restricted by any need to maintain neutrality. Rather the relationship between the intelligence agencies was based on mutual self-interest. The *fourth* chapter reports my research findings with respect to US policy towards Iran, specifically how the US responded to continual Iranian requests for economic and military aid. This chapter highlights the rationale for US non-adherence with the Baghdad Pact and the reluctance of the US military to supply arms to Iran without a chain of command. The *fifth* chapter looks at US policy with respect to Turkey and how this was dominated by Turkish requests for economic aid. Turkish requests for military aid received a more sympathetic hearing in Washington as the chain of command afforded by Turkish membership of NATO allowed US to retain some level of control over this military expenditure. The *sixth* chapter outlines the main conclusions arising from the current research project. My research findings indicate that communication of the Periphery Pact arrangements was met with a lukewarm reception by the diplomatic arm of the US government, an attitude may not be surprising if we consider it in the same way that the US looked at the Baghdad Pact. The conclusion considers that this diplomatic stance may indeed reflect a parallel clandestine diplomacy where US support for the Periphery Pact arrangement was funneled through CIA support for its operations.

Chapter 1 Literature Review

This chapter surveys the academic literature on US policies towards the Middle East in general and more specifically the Periphery Pact. It outlines the main themes emanating from this literature and the gap in academic research as it relates to the US perspective on the Periphery Pact. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the theory of Foreign Policy Analysis ('FPA') that guides my research.

US Policy Towards the Periphery Pact

There are few academic articles that deal specifically with the US view of the relationships between the Periphery Pact countries during the 1950's and the Periphery Pact itself. This requires a more generic consideration of the perspective of the Cold War superpowers and the Middle East. Nathan Citino's "*The Middle East and the Cold War*" provides a comprehensive and 'state of the art' historiographical review of the development of Cold War history with respect to the Middle East, a region that featured prominently in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the USSR because of its economic and strategic importance.³⁶ Citino argues that classical histories of the Cold War in the Middle East have tended to have a global focus to the exclusion of a regional one and are based on research of Western archives often due to with limited regional language skills. Such histories emphasize the role of individual states in the Middle East in the context of US-Soviet rivalries, the attempts of both superpowers to develop client states in the region and the desire to protect western interest in the region's oil resources.³⁷ Citino outlines a 'turn' in Cold War historiography that has arisen from the declassification of archival material, the availability of new archives, for example in Russia and Eastern Europe, following the end of the Cold War, the expansion of literature and sources in Arabic, Persian Hebrew and Turkish combined with improvements in regional language abilities of scholars. All of these factors have contributed to the development of more nuanced Cold War histories that dispelled the notion that the superpowers were the only relevant

³⁶ Nathan J. Citino, "The Middle East and the Cold War," *Cold War History* 19, no 3 (2019): 443-456.

³⁷ Citino, "The Middle East and the Cold War," 441.

international actors in the region during the Cold War.³⁸ One of the major themes emerging from these histories is the agency of the US and Soviet client states in the Middle East as actors in their own right.³⁹ The regimes governing client states used their position to manipulate the superpowers to their own benefit, the notion of the ‘tail wagging the dog.’⁴⁰ Many of the books and articles reviewed in this chapter have been written in this vein and analyze the Periphery Pact by ‘taking off the Cold War lens.’⁴¹ This recognizes that the Periphery Pact countries were happy to use the Cold War situation to their advantage bearing in mind that United States in the region as a ‘superpower by invitation’.⁴²

A second aspect concerning the US perspective on the Periphery Pact relates to the assumed strategic or special relationship between the United States and Israel. But was this special relationship real or imagined? We know also from the accounts analyzed below that the US was angered by Israel’s involvement in the Suez Crisis and that it rebuffed Israel’s attempt to join the Baghdad pact, refused to provide a specific security guarantee to Israel and did not provide Israel with the requested military support. Things began to change in 1958 after the Iraqi revolution. The US print media created a powerful narrative of the Egyptian leader Nasser as an expansionist dictator who was acting in a way similar to the Hitler and Mussolini had acted. This narrative was similar to that used by Israel when discussing Nasser. The Eisenhower Administration was acutely aware of the public hostility towards Nasser and resultant support for Israel.⁴³ We will also see, in chapter two, that the pro-Israel lobby in the United States during the 1950’s became a more organized and effective lobby organization. The notion of a special relationship between the United States and Israel is important in understanding how Turkey and Iran used the Periphery Pact to pursue their interests with the United States. As we

³⁸ Citino, “The Middle East and the Cold War,” 443-4.

³⁹ Citino, "The Middle East and the Cold War," 444.

⁴⁰ Citino, "The Middle East and the Cold War," 443.

⁴¹ Citino, "The Middle East and the Cold War," 445.

⁴² Eldad Ben Aharon. “Superpower by Invitation: Late Cold War Diplomacy and Leveraging Armenian Terrorism as a Means to Rapprochement in Israeli-Turkish relations,” *Cold War History* 19, no. 2 (2019): 275-293.

⁴³ Richard J. McAlexander, “Couscous Mussolini: US Perceptions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 1958 Intervention in Lebanon and the Origins of the US–Israeli Special Relationship,” *Cold War History* 11, no. 3 (2011): 378.

shall see below, Turkey and Iran saw Israel as a conduit to the center of power in the US, an ally that could pursue their interests in Washington.

Noa Schonmann's article on the diplomatic interactions between Israel and the US in the summer of 1958 is one of the few articles that specifically addresses the US perspective on the Periphery Pact.⁴⁴ When Ben-Gurion was requested by the US in July 1958 to facilitate a British military operation in Jordan, Ben-Gurion saw a window of opportunity to attach conditions to this facilitation. He requested that the US provide clearer security guarantees to Israel, review its prohibition on arms sales to Israel, provide support for the Periphery Pact and encourage Iran and Turkey to do the same.⁴⁵ US Secretary of State Dulles sent a letter to Ben-Gurion confirming the US agreement to these conditions. However, apparently due to a diplomatic error, Ben-Gurion did not receive the letter in time to act on it. Schonmann's article is highly relevant to my research for the detail it provides with respect to Ben-Gurion's attempt to get US approval for the Periphery Pact and the US response. It is also pertinent in that it exposes how US State department officials disagreed with the position taken by Dulles, were not enthusiastic about the Periphery Pact and arranged for a softening of the commitment provided by Dulles.⁴⁶

Schonmann's article does not reveal whether this lack of enthusiasm for the Periphery Pact was shared by the other US government institutions within the NSC 'policy factory', particularly the US intelligence community. Indeed the literature surveyed in this chapter does not address whether the US used similar clandestine diplomacy techniques employed by the Periphery Pact countries, although this could be inferred by US state department activity in Iran during the 1950's.⁴⁷ There are three reasons why it is pertinent for my research to consider whether the US intelligence community displayed more interest in the Periphery Pact than their State

⁴⁴ Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 626-649.

⁴⁵ Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 633

⁴⁶ Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 640-641

⁴⁷ See for example the activities of Gideon Hadary, an intelligence officer at the US embassy in Teheran and his role in pursuing recognition of Israel: Bialer, Uri Bialer, "The Power of the Weak: Israel's Secret Oil Diplomacy: 1948 - 57," in *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* eds Clive Jones, and Tore T. Petersen (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 75.

Department colleagues did. Firstly, a strong bond already existed between the Mossad and the CIA. The relationship between the US intelligence agency and their Israeli counterparts was managed by the longstanding CIA director of Counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton. He became the CIA executive liaison with the Israeli foreign intelligence service, the Mossad after having developed a special relationship with Reuven Shiloah in 1951.⁴⁸ Indeed, Angleton misled his own government colleagues in advance of Israel's attack on Egypt in 1956 by dismissing reports from the US embassy in Israel of an Israeli military build-up as being not accurate.⁴⁹ Secondly, the Periphery Pact arrangements were being managed by the intelligence agencies of the Pact countries; it would seem logical that contacts with the United States would follow similar institutional lines. Thirdly, the cooperation between Periphery Pact countries being managed related to intelligence information and gathering techniques. Again, liaison with US intelligence agencies was to be expected given the nature of the information being shared between the Periphery Pact signatories. For these reasons, my research seeks to investigate the role of the US intelligence community in defining US policy and action towards the Periphery Pact.

The Periphery Pact Countries perspective

Sohrab Sobhani's account of the relationship between Iran and Israel, *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli - Iranian Relations 1948 - 1988* seeks to explain why two states that were so dissimilar would actually form an alliance and investigates whether this willingness to collaborate was attributable to external factors or internal dynamics.⁵⁰ He concludes that the threats from the Arab core to Iranian and Israeli identities on the periphery, explains the logic of the alliance.⁵¹ In the first period of the alliance, between 1948 and 1954, the dominant justification for Israel's participation was its desire to repatriate the precarious Jewish diaspora in Iraq.⁵² Sobhani posits

⁴⁸ Jefferson Morley. *The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2017), 55

⁴⁹ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret War*. (Sea Cliff, New York: Levant Books, 2012), 43.

⁵⁰ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, xvii.

⁵¹ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, xviii - xix.

⁵² Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, xx.

that the surge of Pan-Arabism led by Nasser, aided by expanding Soviet influence propelled Iran and Israel to extend their cooperation, including giving the countries' intelligence services responsibility for managing and camouflaging the nature and extent of Iranian-Israeli relations.⁵³ Sobhani argues that Iran also perceived that Israel had a special relationship with the United States, a relationship Iran could exploit for its own benefit.⁵⁴ It may be sufficient for Sobhani to accept this Iranian perception as explaining Iran's benign position towards Israel. He does not establish whether this Iranian perception was justified, what the nature of Israel's influence in the United States and whether Israel "could serve as Iran's power broker in Washington."⁵⁵ My research, with the objective of illuminating the relationships with between the United States and the Periphery Pact countries during the Eisenhower Presidency, will seek to understand if the Iranian perception was justified.

Trita Parsi's *Treacherous alliance: the secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*⁵⁶ provides a comprehensive account of international relations between Iran, Israel and the US from the creation of the State of Israel through to cessation of relations between Iran and Israel in the 1980's. Parsi's central conclusion is that these relations, contrary to public perception and hostile rhetoric, were dictated by geopolitical necessities and not determined by ideological rivalry. Apparent differences between these states were accommodated because the shared threat was greater shared. In contrast to the other accounts discussed in this literature review, Parsi highlights the Shah's goal for Iran to become a regional hegemon. He suggests that this gave rise to an asymmetry as to how the relationship was viewed from both sides. The Israeli view of the relationship was one of strategic necessity to deal with the existential threat to Israel's survival. The Iranians viewed the relationship with Israel as a tactical step in its strategic goal of regional supremacy. Parsi argues that the extensive use of interviews from each country and the triangulation of the contents of these interviews form a good basis for these conclusions. Parsi's account of the relationship between Iran, Israel in the US during the

⁵³ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 27.

⁵⁴ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, xxii, 6.

⁵⁵ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 6.

⁵⁶ Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

1950's relies less on oral histories than in later periods. This is logical, as many of the actors are probably deceased.

Howard Patten's *Israel and the Cold War. Diplomacy Strategy and the Policy of the Periphery at the United Nations* outlines the ebb and flow of diplomatic relations between Israel and three countries associated with its Periphery Doctrine; Ethiopia, Iran and Turkey during the Cold War, based on an analysis of public diplomacy, as pursued by each of these countries at the United Nations (UN).⁵⁷ This work complements Sobhani and Parsi's contribution by providing insight into the Israeli-Turkish relationship. He traces the history of this relationship to the Ottoman-era encounters with early Zionists that resulted in an implied Ottoman consent to the Zionist project in Palestine.⁵⁸ He uses British diplomatic archives effectively to analyze the relationship between Turkey and Israel in the lead up to the Baghdad Pact and to explain how, after the 1958 Iraqi revolution, Turkey pivoted again towards Israel seeking "full coordination of mutual political actions."⁵⁹

Patten's contribution is useful in establishing a record of the formal diplomatic history of the Periphery Pact country relationships, as enacted at the UN. This is also a limiting aspect: he only treats those 'big ticket' items considered at UN level. The bilateral relationships between the countries in the periods between such major events, often developed in secretive ways outside the gaze of traditional diplomatic channels, is hardly considered. Neither does Patten deal extensively with the US perspective on the relationships with the Periphery Pact Countries although he concludes that Turkey perceived that a powerful Jewish lobby in the US and pro-Israel position in Congress could be beneficial in reducing the influence of Greek and Armenian lobbies in the US that were hostile to Turkish interests.⁶⁰ Patten's work that deals with Turkey is the most beneficial to my research project as it one of only a small number of essays that deals with the relationship between Israel and Turkey.

⁵⁷ Howard A. Patten, *Israel and the Cold War: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Policy of the Periphery at the United Nations* (London: IB Tauris, 2013).

⁵⁸ Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 14.

⁵⁹ Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 84.

⁶⁰ Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 22.

Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies is an edited collection of essays that documents and analyses case studies of the practice of clandestine diplomacy throughout Israel's diplomatic history.⁶¹ The case studies include examples of clandestine diplomacy prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and with both Iran and Turkey. The collection is beneficial to my research by dissecting the meanings attributed to clandestine/secret diplomacy, particularly as much 'regular' diplomatic activity takes place outside public gaze and on a confidential basis. The idea of secret diplomacy is linked to the role of intelligence agencies in the diplomatic process. In the case of Israel, intelligence agencies have played a prominent part in shaping Israeli diplomatic engagement since the foundation of the state of Israel.⁶²

In her contribution on the clandestine relationship between Israel and Turkey, *Back-Door Diplomacy: The Mistress Syndrome in Israel's Relations With Turkey 1957-60*, Noa Schonmann concludes that Israel's relationships with Turkey can be more accurately described as 'back door' diplomacy.⁶³ She notes that normal diplomatic practices have a formal element (e.g., appointing ambassador) and a substantive element (e.g., deepening economic relations), normally occurring in that order. Turkey made informality and secrecy a precondition for substance with a promise to formalize the relationship in the future.⁶⁴ The substance of the relationship between the countries prospered until the mid-1960's, with clandestine high-level meetings at ministerial and prime ministerial level, cooperation between the military of both countries and intelligence sharing activities the form of the Periphery Pact. Throughout the relationship Israel continued to press for its cherished formal recognition and Turkey continued to prevaricate and not live up to its promise.

Schonmann's work is based on detailed and extensive analysis of Israeli State and US archives, providing a comprehensive historical narrative of this part of the diplomatic history between

⁶¹ Jones and Petersen, *Clandestine Diplomacies*, 5-6.

⁶² Clive Jones. "Introduction: Themes and Issues," in *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies*, eds Clive Jones, and Tore T. Petersen, (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 3.

⁶³ Schonmann, "Back-Door Diplomacy, 87.

⁶⁴ Schonmann. "Back-Door Diplomacy," 88.

Israel and Turkey and the US.⁶⁵ For my research, Schonmann's work is particularly important as it one of the more comprehensive accounts of the Israeli-Turkish arm of the Periphery Pact.

Uri Bialer's chapter, "*The Power of the Weak: Israel's Secret Oil Diplomacy: 1948 - 57*" describes Israel's attempts to achieve diplomatic recognition from Iran, the (related) issue of assisting Iraqi Jews to emigrate to Israel through Iran and the economic ties that resulted in Iran becoming the main supplier of oil for the Israeli economy.⁶⁶ He notes that clandestine diplomacy can involve "risks ... in dealing with uncertain interlocuters, where avarice as much as sound statecraft determined the patterns and modes of diplomatic exchange."⁶⁷ He also highlights the extent to which Israel's energy security requirements dominated the early relationship: prior to 1958, Israel's interest in Iran was economic as the relationship provided access to oil.⁶⁸ Bialer's article contributes to my research, indirectly, by emphasizing that national and regional issues, and not only superpower interests, defined relationships in the Middle East during the Cold War.

Yossi Alpher's contribution, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* provides a rich account of the Periphery Doctrine as the author participated in the implementation of the Doctrine during his years working for Israeli intelligence services.⁶⁹ This historical narrative of the development and implementation of the Periphery Doctrine is written from an 'insider' perspective as it based on extensive interviews with former Mossad operatives and diplomats, involved in its implementation.⁷⁰ The relevance to my research lies in Alpher's analysis of how the Periphery Pact was promoted to the US by the Pact countries. Diplomatically, Israel 'marketed' the Periphery Pact to the US as an alliance that could assist in curtailing Soviet expansion and as a buffer against Arab radicalism.⁷¹ In doing so, Israel was trying to make

⁶⁵ Schonmann. "Back-Door Diplomacy," 100.

⁶⁶ Bialer, "The Power of the Weak," 67-83.

⁶⁷ Bialer, "The Power of the Weak," 78.

⁶⁸ Bialer, "The Power of the Weak," 83.

⁶⁹ Alpher, *Periphery*, xi - xiii

⁷⁰ Alpher, *Periphery*, 151-152.

⁷¹ Alpher, *Periphery*, 12.

itself relevant to the United States, thereby contributing to Israel's own strategic objective to become establish close security links to one of the superpowers.⁷² Iran and Turkey informed the United States of their participation in the Periphery Pact in the belief that this participation would encourage the United States to support efforts to counter Soviet subversion.⁷³ Alpher reveals a covert US interest and involvement in the Periphery Pact noting the CIA involvement in establishing the Periphery Pact information-sharing mechanism and a keen interest by the CIA in how this mechanism worked.⁷⁴ Indeed, contacts between the US and Israel related to the Periphery Pact took place at a clandestine, intelligence service level with little or no involvement of US ambassadors to Israel.⁷⁵ This contrasts with US diplomatic services which, at an operational level at least, appear to have been unaware of this clandestine interest. Alpher concludes that the United States and Israel did not always view the Periphery Pact in the same way and that the interest of the US and Israel with respect to the Pact did not always coincide.⁷⁶ Alpher's book does not deal with whether the US diplomatic and intelligence institutions viewed the Periphery Pact in this way: he writes mostly from an Israeli perspective, hardly uses any US archival sources and, in his own words, provides only a "brief and largely anecdotal discussion" of the US perspective on the Periphery Pact.⁷⁷ The objectives of my research is to address these gaps.

Jean-Loup Samaan's contribution, *Israel's Foreign Policy Beyond the Arab World: Engaging the Periphery* differs from other literature in the level attention paid to the intellectual history of the Periphery Doctrine.⁷⁸ Samaan argues that the history of Periphery Doctrine can be found in the views of Vladimir Jabotinsky the founder of revisionist Zionism, who argued that Israel's position within the Middle East state system would never be based on peace with its Arab

⁷² Alpher, *Periphery*, 65.

⁷³ Alpher, *Periphery*, 12.

⁷⁴ Alpher, *Periphery*, 12.

⁷⁵ Alpher, *Periphery*, 67.

⁷⁶ Alpher, *Periphery*, 69.

⁷⁷ Alpher, *Periphery*, 69.

⁷⁸ Jean Loup Samaan, *Israel's Foreign Policy Beyond the Arab World: Engaging the Periphery* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

neighbors. Samaan argues that such a pessimistic approach has instilled Israel's national security identity and Jabotinsky's ideas have been translated into a military strategy: in order to continue to exist and overcome its rivals, Israel needs to achieve military dominance in the region.⁷⁹ The resulting national security identity has caused the involvement of security institutions (military, intelligence) in Israeli foreign policy determination, created a bias (in favor of the military) in policy making resulting in secretive processes and a 'zero-sum game mindset.'⁸⁰ This also led to bureaucratic rivalries between the security establishment and those formally charged with foreign policy. One diplomat interviewed for Samaan's research concluded that the Periphery Doctrine "was doomed to fail because it was implemented by organizations that do not have the proper diplomatic know-how."⁸¹

Foreign Policy Analysis

My research has been guided by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach to understanding how foreign policy is determined and implemented. It emphasizes the actual foreign policy actions of states and the decision-making process that precedes these actions. This differs from an International Relations approach that considers the meanings of foreign policy in terms of the international system in which the state operates⁸² The choice for using an FPA approach for my research is guided by the advantage of a greater analytical power FPA provides. This emanates from FPA's emphasis on a closer examination of foreign policy actors and what motivates them, and on obtaining an understanding of how decisions on policy are reached and the context in which policy options are considered and acted on.⁸³ In addition certain features of the Middle East state system are such that an analysis that assumes that states act as rational actors less compelling. Such features include the view that states in the region do not necessarily act in a cohesive way, can be fragmented or dependent on other parties that may prioritize regime interest above national interest. Furthermore, within the regional state system,

⁷⁹ Samaan, *Israel's Foreign Policy*, 19.

⁸⁰ Samaan, *Israel's Foreign Policy*, 35.

⁸¹ Samaan, *Israel's Foreign Policy*, 32.

⁸² Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, Amnon, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 3.

⁸³ Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3.

foreign policy can be impacted by trans-state identities (e.g., Kurdish identity) or the global system in which states are fixed.⁸⁴ This means that an analysis of foreign policy within the Middle East should include FPA, an opening of the “black box of policymaking in which policies are drafted and decisions are made and implemented.”⁸⁵ A further reason for choosing an FPA approach for my research can be found in the modern approaches to FPA that seek to abandon narrowly-defined approaches to policy decision making in favor of an approach that recognizes the impact of the state and supra-state institutional contexts to the decisions made.⁸⁶ My research deals essentially deals with US foreign policy. Utilizing an FPA approach that incorporates such institutional contexts can only serve to enhance the resulting analysis. In the following chapter, I deal with the context in which US policy was developed during the Eisenhower Presidency, including the regional context in which policy was formulated, domestic politics and the state institutional contexts in which policy formulation was discussed and agreed, the National Security Council structure. The supra-state institutional context of foreign policy-making, particularly NATO, emerges in a later empirical chapter.

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⁸⁴ Raymond A. Hinnebusch. “Foreign Policy in the Middle East” in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* eds. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2014), 1-2

⁸⁵ Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” 28.

⁸⁶ Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 150.

Chapter 2 Regional and Domestic Policies of the Eisenhower Presidency

This chapter provides a US context for understanding the US policy toward the Periphery Pact. This first section chapter surveys Eisenhower policies towards the Middle East region and the Cold War context in which such policies were enacted. Key among these was US policy of containing expansion of Soviet influence in the region and at the same time denying the Soviet Union access to the region's oil resources. This resulted in the US Northern Tier strategy of encouraging Western orientated states - Turkey Iraq Iran and Pakistan – to develop a regional defense organization on the northern fringe of the Persian Gulf. A second theme for US policy makers was dealing with the rise of Arab nationalism in the region and the risk that (perceived) US support for Israel would antagonize Arab opinion and drive pan-Arab countries towards the Soviet Union. The second section of this chapter considers those US domestic politics that informed the Eisenhower administration's policy towards the Middle East region: the anti-Communist activities of Senator Joe McCarthy, the drive to balance US fiscal budgets and how pro-Israel groups in the United States became more effective in lobbying Congress. Thereafter, the changes made by the Eisenhower administration to streamline the policy making and implementation are considered. These changes were not specific to policy regarding the Middle East but important to understanding how National Security policy was formulated and implemented by the Eisenhower administration.

Regional US Policy Based on Strategy of Containment and Denial

In 1945 the victorious allies in war torn Europe, the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter 'USSR' or the 'Soviet Union'), took steps to distance themselves from each other, separated by the geographical extremities of their military success, a barrier that would become known as the Iron Curtain. The ensuing bi-polar world order pitched Western countries led by the United States against the communist or Soviet-bloc led by the USSR. Both superpowers sought to acquire allies on all continents in this Cold War that defined the course of international relations for the four subsequent decades. In the Middle East, the United States had two overarching strategic objectives with respect to the USSR: containment and denial. Firstly, the United States wished to restrict the expansive influence of the USSR by making containment central to its policy response: "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment

of Russian expansive tendencies.”⁸⁷ The implementation of this policy in the Middle East involved bolstering Turkey and Iran that buttressed Soviet expansion and undermining states that had fallen under Soviet influence such as Egypt, under Nasser, Syria and Iraq. The second policy objective of the United States was to protect Western access to the oil and gas reserves of the region and deny Soviet access to these resources.

The Northern Tier Strategy and Regional Defense Arrangements

The strategy of containment and denial with respect to the Middle East was premised on the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* to separate the USSR from the Persian Gulf and Western oil interests there. This was to be achieved by means of a defense arrangement between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, referred to as the ‘Northern Tier of nations’ by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.⁸⁸ The premise of this defense strategy was that those countries of the Northern Tier had the greatest exposure to a Soviet threat should form the core of any defense union.⁸⁹ The Turkish government argued that Turkey could play a strategic role in such a defense arrangement given its political and economic stability, a determined anti-Soviet stance and its military superiority.⁹⁰ The 1955 Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq was the initial agreement of the defense arrangement that became known as the Baghdad Pact.⁹¹ These countries were subsequently joined in the defense arrangement by the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the US was reluctant to overtly support the Baghdad Pact out of fear of alienating Egypt whom the US saw as a major actor in any future resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Periphery Pact

⁸⁷ “X” (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 1947. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct> , last accessed January 4, 2021.

⁸⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Superpowers and the Northern Tier,” *International Security* 4, no. 3 (1979), 6.

⁸⁹ Almog & Sever, “Hide and Seek,” 612.

⁹⁰ Almog & Sever, “Hide and Seek,” 612.

⁹¹ The Turk-Iraqi Pact, that would become formally known as the Baghdad Pact, was a mutual defense pact between Iraq and Turkey, signed on 24 February 1955. The UK joined the pact on 5 April 1955 and Pakistan on September 23, 1955 and Iran on 3 November. Ara Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.33, No.2 (April 1997), 258-260.

countries this non-adherence by the US to the Baghdad Pact had different consequences. Iran was disappointed that the US did not sign the Baghdad Pact and felt the Pact may become ineffective against Soviet threats.⁹² Turkey was concerned by the failure of the Baghdad Pact but already fell under the US security umbrella through its NATO membership. Israel had been excluded from the Baghdad Pact completely. Israel had indicated that it would be willing to join the Baghdad Pact if its security concerns about Iraq's participation were incorporated into the alliance's structure.⁹³ Fearing that Israeli participation in the Baghdad Pact might alienate the already precarious Arab participation, the US rejected Israel's overtures. Israel argued it was being excluded from joining any security pacts, even as an observer. Israel's attempt to persuade the US to enter a separate arrangement that would provide for its "mutual defense and security" was also rebuffed.⁹⁴

The Rise of Nasser and the End of the Baghdad Pact

The apparent regional stability that accompanied the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact did not last for long. Developments in Egypt, Syria and Iraq were to pose a threat to Turkey's position as a regional power. By the mid-1950's Egyptian President Nasser's charisma, oratorical skills, and propaganda machine had propelled him to a position as leader of the pan-Arab movement. Iraq, under Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, became the biggest threat to Egyptian supremacy in the region. The Arab world began to split along pro-Cairo and pro-Baghdad lines, the division being defined by support or opposition to the Baghdad Pact.⁹⁵ Nasser also marginalized Iraq for concluding the Baghdad Pact with Britain and some non-Arab neighbors.⁹⁶ His critique directed at Iraq was that its alliance with Turkey was tantamount to having an alliance with Israel as "Any alliance with Turkey, the friend of Israel, necessarily means an indirect alliance

⁹² Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 20

⁹³ Walker, "Turkey and Israel's Relationship," 65.

⁹⁴ Almog & Sever, "Hide and Seek," 613.

⁹⁵ Thomas Volk, "Turkey's Historical Involvement in Middle Eastern Alliances: Saadabad Pact, Baghdad Pact, and Phantom Pact," *L'Europe en Formation*, no. 1 (2013), 21.

⁹⁶ Roger Owen, *State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 72.

with Israel itself.”⁹⁷ Nasser’s contempt for Iraq and Turkey was not purely rhetorical. He established a closer relationship with the USSR to access economic and military aid that was not forthcoming from Western sources.⁹⁸ With the USSR anxious to deal with the establishment of a Western military alliance (Baghdad Pact) on its southern flank, Egypt became the focus of Soviet attention and arms deals were concluded with Egypt and Syria in 1955.⁹⁹ This Soviet attention to Syria raised the prospect of a Soviet satellite state on Turkey’s southern border.¹⁰⁰ Turkey became even more apprehensive when Egypt and Syria announced the formation of a political union, the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. The United States faced a conundrum in its policy towards Nasser and pan-Arabism. On the one hand it had no ideological qualm with Arab nationalism that had its roots in self-determination principles of Woodrow Wilson. The United States believed that Egyptian concurrence was necessary for any resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Nasser’s Arab nationalist rhetoric was increasingly directed towards US allies, Britain, France and Israel. Nasser’s apparent move towards the Soviet camp was an affront to US attempts to retain Egypt in the Western camp. Concerned with the increasing Soviet influence, the United States issued a new policy in 1957, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, under which a country could request US economic assistance and or US military aid if it was being threatened by “overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.”¹⁰¹ The United States tried to use this policy announcement to assuage the concerns of its allies in the region and sought to project the continued commitment of the United States to their security. The events of the summer 1958 would test the resolve of the United States to live up to these commitments. On July 14, 1958 the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy was replaced in a coup d’état that was framed as the furtherance of pan Arab nationalism: an Arab response to British

⁹⁷ Citation from an official radio of Egypt broadcast: Athanassopoulou, “Turkey’s approach towards Israel,” 902.

⁹⁸ Murat Kasapsaraçoğlu, “Harmonization of Turkey’s Political, Economic, and Military Interests in the 1950s: Reflections on Turkey’s Middle East Policy,” *Turkish Studies* 16, no. 3 (2015), 341. r

⁹⁹ Walker, “Turkey and Israel’s Relationship”, 68.

¹⁰⁰ Philip Anderson, “‘Summer Madness’ the Crisis in Syria, August-October 1957,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 1–2 (1995), 24. r

¹⁰¹ “The American Presidency project” accessed 1 April 2020.

<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-the-situation-the-middle-east>

imperialism that had kept the Hashemite elite *in situ* since 1921.¹⁰² Lebanon and Jordan made urgent requests of the United States and Britain for military assistance to bolster their regimes from any pan-Arab threats. The regime change in Baghdad left Turkey hemmed in by countries hostile to Ankara, save for Iran to its east. The coup d'état in Iraq rendered the Baghdad Pact no longer operational. After Iraq left the Baghdad Pact, the remaining members continued the defense arrangement as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The net effect of these events was to bring Turkey and Israel together in a bilateral relationships as it became clear that “combatting Nasser and his growing power in the region was one of the main priorities of both countries.”¹⁰³ Iran was equally perturbed with the developments in Iraq, particularly when the new regime laid claim to the Shatt-al-Arab waterway that divided the two countries and Iraqi troops prevented National Iranian Oil Company from using the waterway.¹⁰⁴ The procedures and protocols established for sharing security and intelligence information between Turkey, Israel and Iran is also known as the Trident Agreement.¹⁰⁵ For my research, these terms are used interchangeably.

US Domestic Politics

The theoretical framework of Foreign Policy Analysis recognizes the influence of domestic politics on the determination and implementation of foreign policy. In this view, foreign policy is never formulated in a vacuum and domestic political events need to be considered to gain a comprehensive understanding of a state’s foreign policies.¹⁰⁶ Three aspects of US domestic politics are relevant for my research. Firstly, the post-war US body politic and public opinion was consummated by an anti-communist narrative. Senator Joseph McCarthy was engaged in a public witch-hunt for alleged communists in US public institutions. He used his chairmanship of a senate committee to hold hearings and subpoena potential suspects. Eisenhower was publicly silent on McCarthy’s activities as he did not wish to afford McCarthy more publicity.

¹⁰² Michael Eppel, “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 2 (1998), 237.

¹⁰³ Almog & Sever, “Hide and Seek,” 620.

¹⁰⁴ Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 36

¹⁰⁵ Alpher, *Periphery*, 14.

¹⁰⁶ Alden and Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 63–4.

Ignoring the allegations of McCarthy, most of which were unfounded, the US domestic anti-communist narrative was prevalent and would have assisted garnering public support for foreign policies that were based on anti-communism rhetoric and containment of the Soviet Union. Secondly, Eisenhower had been elected on a policy platform of the elimination of the US federal budget deficit. The huge mobilization of US military might during World War II and expansive aid packages to rebuild war-torn Europe had been funded by US taxpayers. The fiscal cost of these projects and of the expanding military footprint during the early Cold War years interfered with a domestic political agenda that emphasized budget deficit or taxation reduction. Domestic supporters of balanced budgets acted as a constraint for US diplomats when dealing with regular requests from US allies for US financial or military aid, including requests from the Periphery Pact countries. Lastly during the 1950's, despite many internal differences, organizations representing Jewish citizens in the United States came together to form a "united front for Israel."¹⁰⁷ The capacity to mobilize US public opinion in a way supportive of Israel was exemplified by the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA) that started operations in 1954.¹⁰⁸ The effectiveness of such groups to influence US policy was observed by the State Department that recognized "the existence of heavy and effective Zionist pressure which has been brought to bear on both the Executive and Legislative branches of the American Government."¹⁰⁹ Secretary Dulles reported to the NSC in 1959 that Israel was organizing a campaign in the United States to constrain any rapprochement between the United States and Nasser.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Doug Rossinow, "The Edge of the Abyss: The Origins of the Israel Lobby, 1949 -1954." *Modern American History* 1, no. 1 (2018), 41.

¹⁰⁸ Rossinow, "The Edge of the Abyss", 23. The AZPCA would later become the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

¹⁰⁹ Department of State Position Paper: Arab-Israeli Relations, May 7, 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, The Near and Middle East, eds. Paul Claussen, Joan M Lee, Carel N. Raether (Washington, DC, 1986), document 609.

¹¹⁰ Discussion at the 395th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, January 29, 1959, Dwight D Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Box 11, 395th Meeting on MSC, 1/29/59. Available at US Declassified Documents Online. Last accessed on June 11,2020.

US Policy Formulation During the Eisenhower Presidency

The US National Security Council (NSC) was established under the Truman Administration's National Security Act of 1947 (hereafter 'the 1947 Act'). The primary purpose of the NSC is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."¹¹¹ This coordinating role of the NSC was underlined by the 1947 Act stipulating that the NSC membership should include specific members of cabinet responsible for matters of national security.¹¹² The 1947 Act mandated the participation in the NSC, as advisors, of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the Director of CIA to provide input from the US military and foreign intelligence services, respectively.¹¹³ In late 1953, Eisenhower's National Security Advisor, Robert Cutler, made recommendations to the President to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NSC policy making process.¹¹⁴ One key recommendation was the instigation of the NSC Planning Board, chaired by the National Security Advisor, that would become the 'principal body for the formulation and transmission of policy recommendations' to the NSC.¹¹⁵ The Operation Coordination Board (OCB) established in 1953 to ensure a coordinated approach to the implementation of NSC decisions and to reporting back to the NSC on the results of implementation and problems encountered.¹¹⁶ Cutler later referred to this enhanced NSC policy making structure as a "policy hill" with the NSC at its pinnacle and the departments and agencies tasked with national

¹¹¹ US National Archives, Section 101 Act of July 26, 1947 ("National Security Act"), Public Law 80-253, 61 STAT 495. Available at <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299856>. Accessed on 21 August 2020.

¹¹² According to law NSC membership should include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Director of Foreign Operations Administration (successor to Mutual Security Agency) and Director of Defence Mobilization.

¹¹³ George A. Wyeth Jr, "The National Security Council: Concept of Operation; Organization; Actual Operations." *Journal of International Affairs* (1954), 187.

¹¹⁴ Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler). *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume II, Part 1, National Security Affairs, eds Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen (Washington DC, 1984), document 50.

¹¹⁵ Wyeth, "The National Security Council,"189.

¹¹⁶ Wyeth, "The National Security Council,"195

security such as the State Department and Department of Defense (collectively ‘national security departments’) at the bottom of the hill. Policy recommendations were initiated by national security departments and rolled up the hill – through the NSC Planning Board - for ultimate approval by the NSC. The approved policies were then rolled down the hill - through the OCB mechanism - to the national security departments responsible for implementation. This policy formulation process improved the structured consideration of policy options and established a mechanism for monitoring policy implementation. The process brought institutional differences (generally between the State Department and the Department of Defense/JCS) to the fore and the basis for such disagreements are documented in NSC archives. Resolving such differences led to policy compromises or a policy written with sufficiently vague wording to allow each institution to maintain, sometimes, conflicting positions. We shall see how conflicting institutional differences on the policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact brought the formal policy into jeopardy.

Conclusion

This chapter has sets out the key policy aims of the Eisenhower administration towards the Middle East region. Chief amongst these aims was the containment of Soviet expansion in the region and the safeguarding of Western interest in the regions oil resources and denial of these to the USSR. The United States saw the development of an indigenous regional defense organizations as the means to achieve these policy goals. The emergence of pan-Aran nationalism, led by Nasser was a threat to regional stability. The Iraqi coup triggered US and British military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan respectively to stabilize the situation in these countries.

Developments within the US domestic political scene relevant to US foreign policy have been considered, reflecting the view that foreign policy cannot be considered in isolation from domestic political events. The activities of Senator Joe McCarthy, despised by Eisenhower for their unethical methods, set a clear anti-Communist narrative closely aligned to the US policy of containment. as the mirror of anti-Soviet containment policies. Other US domestic issues clashed with the foreign policy: the agenda of fiscal conservative in the US regime agenda kept in check the economic and military aid to US allies in the region; the increasing organization of pro-Israel groups lobbied for policy choices favorable to Israel, despite a State Department desire to develop a policy of neutrality towards Israel. Finally, the Eisenhower administration

streamlined the National Security policy-making process with augmented NSC policy development and implementation coordination process. These procedures provided for a structure to develop US policies that incorporated the views of many government agencies and provide for consistent policies across all levels of government. Despite these improvements, inter-institutional policy differences persisted.

These regional policies and policy related domestic issues provide the context to understanding how US policies towards the Periphery Pact countries evolved as explored in the following three empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 US Policy Towards Israel: Security by Who and for What Reason?

Introduction

This chapter discusses the development and implementation of US policy towards Israel between 1953 and 1961 and considers whether and how these policies had repercussions for the Periphery Pact.

The chapter discusses five themes that defined US policy in this period. Firstly, the (new) US policy objective of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli dispute was a recurring theme in the policy development. The United States was anxious to attract more support from Arab countries in the fight against global communism and wished to present a more neutral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Secondly, US policy makers sought to contain US treasury financial support to Israel. Thirdly, US policy towards Israel was influenced by discussions on demographics, the situations of Arab refugees located in the countries neighboring Israel and the migration of Jewish diaspora to Israel. The fourth theme related to how the US relationship with Israel influenced US efforts to establish a regional defense organization in the Middle East. The fifth policy issue relates to how the United States dealt with Israel's requests for the supply of armaments.

The chapter is structured chronologically with the first section sets the scene by briefly recalling the circumstances of the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Thereafter, I briefly consider the development of the Periphery Doctrine by Israeli policy makers. The following section outlines the broad objectives of Middle East policy inherited from the Truman administration and continued by Eisenhower. Thereafter the (implementation of) US policy during Eisenhower's first term of office (1953-56) is addressed. The third section covers Eisenhower's second term (1957-60) including the 1958 Middle East crisis and the manifestation of the Periphery Pact. The final section concludes with an assessment of how these US policy themes interacted with the Periphery Pact.

US Support for the Creation of the State of Israel

The involvement of the United States in the process that led to creation of the State of Israel is well documented. President Truman had declared himself to be sympathetic to the Jewish cause and supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, despite contrary advice by the State Department.¹¹⁷ The United States provided *de facto* recognition of the provisional government of the new state almost immediately after Israel's declaration of Independence May 14, 1948.¹¹⁸ The Arab armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq immediately invaded Israel in support of the Palestinian Arabs. The ensuing conflict, the first Arab-Israeli war, came to an end after armistice talks in 1949 defined demarcation line between the warring parties that became the *de facto* territorial borders of Israel, at least until the 1967 war. The hostilities surrounding the creation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli War resulted in the dislocation of a substantial number of Arab citizens of Palestine who were housed in Palestinian refugee camps in the countries bordering Israel. The fate of these Arab/Palestinian refugees and their descendants, who continued to reject the logic of their displacement and demanded the right to return to the original homes, became a recurring theme in the diplomatic relations between the US and Israel during the Eisenhower administration.

Israel's Periphery Doctrine

Despite its victory in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the security position of Israel remained precarious due to its geographic position encircled by Arab countries. This reality was the genesis of the foreign policy, known as the Periphery Doctrine, championed by Ben-Gurion. This doctrine posited that it would be impossible for Israel to make peace with its Arab neighbors. The Arab defeat in 1948, their ongoing hosting of Palestinian refugees and the rising pan-Arab sentiment that accompanied the 1952 ascent to power of Egyptian president Nasser mitigated against any attempts to secure a peace with Israel. To counteract this, Israel needed

¹¹⁷ US National Archives "US recognition of the State of Israel". Available online at <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/us-israel>. Last accessed on 20, December 2020.

¹¹⁸ The Secretary of State to Mr. Eliahu Epstein, at Washington, May 14, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948 Volume V Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, eds Herbert A. Fine and Paul Claussen (Washington, DC, 1976), document 271

to develop relationships with state and non-state actors beyond the hostile Arab encirclement: non-Arab Muslim states (Turkey, Iran), non-Muslim States (Ethiopia) or minorities within Arab states (Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Kurds in Iraq) and Arab States geographically distant from Israel (Morocco, Oman).¹¹⁹ The Periphery Doctrine, was the brainchild of Reuven Shiloah. The Jewish Agency was an organization that arranged many aspects of Jewish life during the Palestinian Mandate period. Shiloah was the head of intelligence and security affairs at the Jewish Agency.¹²⁰ During the Second World War, Shiloah established a working relationship with British intelligence services.¹²¹ When Ben-Gurion became Prime Minister of Israel, he appointed Shiloah as head of Israel's foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad. In this role, he became instrumental in implementing the Periphery Doctrine with Turkey and Iran. During the Eisenhower administration Shiloah was the second in charge at the Israeli embassy in Washington.

US Policy Towards Israel, a Constituent part of US Middle East policy

The policy of the Eisenhower Administration towards Israel was incorporated in the US policy towards the Middle East.¹²² The policy was revised five times during the Eisenhower administration, revisions occurring usually in response to changing circumstances.¹²³ Each of the policy iterations reconfirmed the Middle East region as important to US national security interests. The objectives set out in the 1953 US policy towards the Middle East were to curbing the expansion of Soviet influence; ensure access to the region's oil resources and to (potential) locations for Western military bases and the denial of these to the Soviet Union; support for viable stable, friendly governments; a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to secure regional peace and security; reversing the Anti-American sentiment within Arab public opinion; and;

¹¹⁹ Alpher, *Periphery*, 7.

¹²⁰ Jones, "Influence Without Power," 50.

¹²¹ Jones, "Influence Without Power," 49-66

¹²² This policy document covered policy towards Israel and other countries in the Middle East (mainly the Arab states). A revision to the document does not mean that policy with respect to Israel changed if the reason for the policy revision related to one of the other countries covered by the policy.

¹²³ For example, the events of the Middle East crisis in 1958 were of such significance that the policy revision approved in January 1958 (NSC 5801/1) was updated in November 1958 (NSC 5820/1).

recognition of the legitimate aspirations of countries in the region to be recognized as sovereign states.¹²⁴ These objectives remained largely unchanged in subsequent policy revisions.

US Policy Towards Israel, 1953 - 56

Compared to the national security policy objectives of the Truman administration (1948-52), the most notable change by the Eisenhower administration was an explicit policy objective recognition of the need to reverse anti-US sentiment amongst Arab states. Furthermore the new administration included a policy objective of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict as a precursor to obtaining regional stability.¹²⁵ The involvement of the United States in the creation of Israel was the main source of anti-US sentiment in the Arab world. A new policy of US impartiality/neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict was adopted to avoid the risk that Arab States would adopt a pro-USSR stance in the Cold War.¹²⁶ A progress report on the implementation of policy NSC 155/1 in July 1954 noted that one of the major accomplishments during the first year of policy had been the “implementation of the US policy of impartiality between the Arab States and Israel.”¹²⁷

The second theme engaging US diplomats was the precarious economic financial situation of Israeli and its reliance on US private and public donations to keep afloat. US policy was to reduce this financial dependence and encourage Israel to live within its means. Reducing US

¹²⁴ NSC 155/1, United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East, July 14, 1953. FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 145.

¹²⁵ NSC 155/1. FRUS, 1952-54, Volume IX, Part 1, document 145, paragraphs 8 and 9.

¹²⁶ ‘NSC ‘Staff Study on United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East’, Paragraph 23. This study, included as an appendix to NSC 155/1, provides background considerations for the policy choices. The close relationships of the United States to Great Britain and France was also a source of anti-western sentiment amongst the Arab populations, particularly in Egypt, which was trying to end Britain’s military presence along the Suez Canal. The Appendix is available on U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Gale.com. Accessed August 24, 2020.

¹²⁷ Progress Report on NSC 155/1 (NSC 155/1 (Now 5428) ‘U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East’, Paragraph 1. Available at

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003000120007-3> Accessed on August 23, 2020.

financial support was fiscally responsible and would contribute to achieving the US policy of impartiality.

The third theme that engaged US diplomats in this period relate to demographics. The issue of Palestinian refugees remained unresolved. US policy was to persuade Israel to work on resolving the financial plight of these refugees while allowing for some level of repatriation to Israel. A second demographic element of US policy was its ardent opposition to Israel's plans to repatriate Jewish diaspora. Israel viewed this migration as a fundamental part of its national policy: migration to Israel would resolve the precarious position of Jews remaining in Arab countries, while contributing to the development of a self-sustaining economy in Israel. The US took the view that the Israeli economy was insufficiently developed to absorb the costs of the migration. The United States contended that new immigration flows to Israel could provoke Arab neighbors, fearful of an Israeli territorial expansionist policy to accommodate its new population.¹²⁸

The fourth theme relates to regional security considerations. When the NSC revised its policy towards the Middle East in 1954, one of the most significant change to the new policy (NSC 5428) was to emphasize the need for the creation of an indigenous regional defense arrangement to improve the stability and strengthen the security of the area.¹²⁹ It was assessed that any proposal to include Israel in a regional defense mechanism would likely result in Arab refusal to participate in that regional defense mechanism.¹³⁰ The United States, pending resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would not support any request from Israel to join any Middle East Defense arrangements.¹³¹ At the time, the US continued to court Egypt to dissuade it from joining the Soviet Bloc, even considering the need to provide military assistance to

¹²⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 153d Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, July 9, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 144.

¹²⁹ NSC 5428 United States Objectives And Policies With Respect To The Near East, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 219, paragraph 13.

¹³⁰ NSC 5428, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 219, paragraph 6.

¹³¹ NSC 5428, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 219, paragraph 17(d).

Egypt in certain circumstances.¹³² During 1955 and 1956, it participated with the British in a covert diplomatic endeavor to arrange a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.¹³³ A peace arrangement remained elusive and deteriorating relations between Egypt and Israel contributed to Israel's attack on Egypt (with Britain and France) during the Suez Crisis of 1956. This action thwarted US attempts to court Nasser. When Israel refused to comply with UN resolutions and withdraw from Egypt, the United States threatened support UN 'further procedures' (sanctions against Israel).¹³⁴ Israel's involvement in the 1956 action against Egypt marked a low point in US Israeli relations.

US Policy Towards Israel 1957- 61

During the second half of 1957, the NSC initiated a revision of the policy towards the Middle East.¹³⁵ Despite the comprehensiveness of the update process, the actual policy changes were limited. There was a greater emphasis on economic development in the region and the need to build "indigenous strength - political, economic and military – upon which to build an effective resistance to communist resistance".¹³⁶ The intractability of the problems of the region were such that the NSC Planning Board was only able 'to recommend the *need* for a solution, and a *procedure* to follow, instead of a *substantive policy* guiding to a solution.'¹³⁷ NSC 5801/1 incorporated the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine into US policy giving a commitment to use armed

¹³² NSC 5428, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 219, paragraph 17(e).

¹³³ Michael B Oren, "Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 3 (1990): 366

¹³⁴ Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. February 3, 1957. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XVII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, ed Nina J. Noring (Washington D.C, 1990), document 54.

¹³⁵ This policy revision process culminated in the NSC approval of NSC 5801/1 on 22 January 1958. Briefing Note by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) - Appendix to Memorandum of Discussion at the 352d Meeting of the National Security Council, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Edward C. Keefer, (Washington D.C. 1993), document 4, paragraph 1.

¹³⁶ *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 4, paragraph 3 (a).

¹³⁷ *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 4, paragraph 8.

forces to “assist any nation ... against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.”¹³⁸

Egyptian President Nasser’s perceived victory in the Suez Crisis cemented his role as leader of a pan-Arab nation and “the *mystique* of Arab unity has become a basic element of Arab political thought.”¹³⁹ In February 1958, the United Arab Republic (UAR), a federation between Egypt and Syria, was created. The United States was concerned that the UAR would affect the orientation and stability of three pro-Western countries, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.¹⁴⁰ The July 1958 *coup d’état* in Iraq triggered a request from Lebanon for military support from the United States under the Eisenhower Doctrine. Jordan made a similar request to the UK.¹⁴¹

The Middle East crisis in July 1958, and Israel’s logistical support for the British action in Jordan, provided an opportunity for Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to reposition Israel as a key partner of the US.¹⁴² Ben-Gurion launched his Periphery Pact diplomatic initiative with his letter to Eisenhower on 24 July 1958 in which he proffered his analysis of the crisis: the desire of Nasser to dominate the Islamic World and how the Soviet Union would use Nasser to serve the Soviet agenda. Ben-Gurion outlined the risks to the stability other countries, including Iran, Sudan, and Ethiopia of Soviet-backed Egyptian domination. He then proceeds to announce that Israel has begun to strengthen their links with countries on the edge of the Middle East: Iran, Sudan, Ethiopia and Turkey to prepare a “dam against the Nasserite Soviet torrent.” He argued that immediate action is needed to establish effective internal

¹³⁸ NSC 5801/1: Statement by the National Security Council of Long Range Policy towards the Near East, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 5, paragraph 7.

¹³⁹ NSC 5801/1, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 5, paragraph 5.

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum on Egyptian-Syrian Union, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, eds Suzanne E. Coffman and Charles S. Sampson, (Washington D.C., 1992), document 187.

¹⁴¹ The joint UK and US military planning that followed from the Eisenhower doctrine, had preassigned this division of labor - United States to support Lebanon, Britain to support Jordan - in the event that military assistance was requested. See Lawrence Tal “Britain and the Jordan Crisis of 1958,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no. 1 (1995): 40.

¹⁴² Schonmann. “Fortitude at stake,” 642.

security to frustrate any attempted *coup d'état* in Iran, Sudan and Ethiopia. Israel's military and intelligence services were well placed to provide assistance in this regard, he argued. Ben-Gurion uses the opportunity to plead on Israel's own behalf urging that it is "essential to give Israel complete security as to the integrity of her borders, her sovereignty and her capacity for self-defense."¹⁴³

Commenting that the first stages of this new Israeli 'design' are already in the process of fulfilment, he urged US support - political, financial and moral for the Periphery Pact. He requested the United States to communicate its support for this approach to Iran, Turkey, Sudan and Ethiopia.¹⁴⁴ Eisenhower responded to Ben-Gurion on 25 July 1958 that "Israel could be confident US interest in the integrity and independence of Israel" and that Secretary Dulles would write to him in more detail.¹⁴⁵ Dulles' response on 1 August 1958 reminded Ben-Gurion of actions already taken to strengthen US relations with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan and increased security contributions to these countries' security needs. Dulles said that the US is happy to encourage Israel's efforts to stand on its own two feet. The following ten lines of text of Dulles' letter, presumably explaining what this means, are not declassified. As regards the Israeli request for security, Dulles asserted that that Israel should be able to deter any aggression by indigenous forces and undertook to examine the military implications with an open mind. Because of the continuing redaction, it is not possible to understand fully Dulles' position, during this conversation, on the Periphery Pact. Noa Schonmann concluded that State Department officials were not enthusiastic about supporting the Periphery Pact and moved, subsequently, to water-down Dulles' initial enthusiasm.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Text of a letter from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to the President of the United States of America in Dwight D Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, Box, 36, Mid East, July 1958 (4), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Accessed 17 July 2020.

¹⁴⁴ Letter from Ben-Gurion Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Files, July 1958, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Accessed 17 July 2020.

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, London, July 27, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 31, footnote 2.

¹⁴⁶ Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 640-641.

Because of Dulles' promise to keep an open mind, the issue of providing defensive arms to Israel became the dominant issue in the relationship between the United States and Israel for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, the fifth policy theme of the research.

The military strategic value of Israel to the US in the event of a war with the Soviet Union had been the subject of a 1951 study by the US military institutions. This military study concluded that Israel would be of limited value to the US as a base area, although its excellent airfields could be beneficial. However, Soviet control of the same airfields would seriously interfere with the operations of the Western allies. The study recommended that Israel should be retained as a Western-leaning state and steps should be taken to resolve Israel's conflict with her Arab neighbors.¹⁴⁷ This military assessment remained applicable throughout the Eisenhower Administration. This military assessment meant that any decision by the United States to provide arms to Israel was a question of political choice rather than US military necessity.

On 10 September 1958, Israel's ambassador to the United States Abba Eban reacted to what Dulles described as the "US arms concessions to Israel" by presenting a list of Israel's arms requirements. Eban thanked Dulles for US interest in Israel's proposals for strengthening non-Arab states in the area and improving the cooperation between them. Two lines of text relating to the topic also remain classified.¹⁴⁸ Diplomatic exchanges between the US and Israel for the remainder of 1958 related to the mechanics of implementing the US arms concessions, including some direct transfers of military equipment and other indirect transfers (through UK) but financed by the US.¹⁴⁹ Israel border tension with Syria, an Egyptian military build-up in the Sinai Peninsula and continuing anti-Israel rhetoric by Nasser to push the US towards a positive consideration of various arms requests.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Kenneth W Condit. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, vol. 2, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, (Washington DC, 1996), 55-56.

¹⁴⁸ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 38.

¹⁴⁹ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 17, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 42.

¹⁵⁰ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel February 27, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 128.

On March 10, 1960, during a visit to the United States, Ben-Gurion presented an analysis of Israel's military deficiencies compared to the UAR to Eisenhower in support of Israel's most recent request for military supplies from the US.¹⁵¹ The President in his remarks urged Israel to consider looking to its Western European allies for some of its arms requests to get around US policy not to become an arms supplier to the region.¹⁵² Despite Ben-Gurion's intervention in 1960, the US rejected Israel's arms request (Hawk missiles) in August 1960.

Ben-Gurion used his 1960 White House visit to promote the Periphery Pact in a meeting with Eisenhower. Two records of their conversation exist, one prepared by the White House Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty and one prepared by G Lewis Jones of the State Department.¹⁵³ One significant difference between the two versions of the conversation relates to Ben-Gurion's discussion of Israeli-Iranian relationships. Hagerty's version records Ben-Gurion talking, in broad terms about the good relations with Iran. Jones' account of Ben-Gurion's comments on the Iranian relationship is more extensive. Ben-Gurion had talked of expanding political and economic relationship with Iran. There had been another meeting of the intelligence services of Israel, Turkey and Iran, in Teheran, he told Eisenhower. Eisenhower in his reply even referred to an upcoming meeting between Ben-Gurion and CIA Director Allen Dulles on "some other matters."¹⁵⁴ It is not clear why Hagerty omitted these details. It is remarkable that the State Department, when publishing the *FRUS* series, chose the account of Hagerty (a White House employee) and not that of Jones (a State Department participant in the meeting). The intriguing question is whether the US was trying to hide some aspect of its

¹⁵¹ Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 10, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume XII, document 131.

¹⁵² Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 10, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume XII, document 131.

¹⁵³ Hagerty's memorandum is included as Documents 131 referred to previously. Jones' version 'Memorandum of Conversation: Conversation between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel and the President has been obtained from the 'US Declassified Documents Online, Gale.com, last accessed August 28, 2020.

¹⁵⁴ Dwight D Eisenhower Library. 'Summary of a White House meeting between President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, and other U.S. and Israeli government officials, 10 March 1960'. Pages 5, 9. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Gale.com, last accessed August, 28 2020.

rection to the Periphery Pact. This incident, together with continuing redactions mentioned previously, leave this question unresolved.

The US Intelligence Community and the Periphery Pact

One of the main objectives of my research project to understand US intelligence services view of the Periphery Pact. The US intelligence community participated in the NSC policy update process. Regular NSC policy updates generally incorporated the recommendations of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) prepared by the CIA on specific aspects of the policy.¹⁵⁵ Allen Dulles was the Director of the CIA for the duration of the Eisenhower Administration, was an advisor to the NSC. In principle, the US policy statements discussed until now encompass a view from the US intelligence community. Why then do we need additional research into a potential CIA involvement? My argument is that if Israel and the other Periphery Pact countries desired US support in an arrangement that included a significant intelligence-sharing component and was being managed by the intelligence agencies of Pact countries it is entirely plausible to inform or involve the CIA. This is particularly the case from an Israeli perspective given the close relationship between the CIA and the Mossad. A close working relationship between these two organizations had been established by Reuven Shiloah, head of the Mossad and the CIA head of counterintelligence James Jesus Angleton who would retain responsibility within the CIA for the Mossad relationship (the 'Israel Desk') until his retirement in 1973.¹⁵⁶

In the early 1950's, the United States had little information about what was happening behind the Iron Curtain. The US signals intelligence coverage of the USSR was so bad that the period was known as "the dark ages of communications intelligence."¹⁵⁷ The Israelis, with a large Jewish diaspora residing behind the Iron Curtain had a significant potential source of human

¹⁵⁵ The CIA generally had a coordination and preparation role. However, the view presented in the NIE was a combined view of all US intelligence agencies, what is sometimes referred to collectively as the Intelligence Community.

¹⁵⁶ Ephraim Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 14, no. 3 (2001), 410.

¹⁵⁷ NSA. National Security Agency Releases History of Cold War Intelligence Activities. November 14, 2008. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm>. Last accessed on 29 November 2020.

intelligence, humint. Indeed, one of the US Intelligence Information Collection Program - known, confusingly for my research, as the Periphery Reporting Program - maintained a reporting unit based in Tel Aviv charged with interviewing 'refugees and recent emigres from Iron Curtain countries.'¹⁵⁸ The interviewees provided rich knowledge and experience of life in the Soviet Bloc. Throughout the 1950's the CIA had established a working relationship with the Mossad based on Israel's humint network in the Soviet Bloc and immigration from there to Israel. Israel again sought to use its humint capacity as a selling point when trying to persuade the United States to support the Periphery Pact. In a meeting with US Secretary of State on July 21, 1958, Israeli ambassador to the United States Abba Eban, sought to convince the benefit of the Israel's humint capacity as follows:

Israel felt that more coordination on security policies was needed between it and the West. Israel could contribute to such a process particularly in the field of intelligence. Israel intelligence on the coup in Iraq had been no better than that of anybody else. The Israelis had noticed the plans that had been made against the regime in Jordan. The closer the Arab states were to Israel the better Israel's intelligence. The final matter was that of cohesion among the remaining friendly states in the Middle East. In the Arab world, the U.S. position has been reduced to beachheads in Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf. It would be useful if cooperation were encouraged between Israel and the other nations of the area, such as Turkey, Iran and the Sudan.¹⁵⁹

Israel was actively pushing its intelligence (humint) capacity to the United States when selling the Periphery Pact. Given this close working relationship between the CIA and Mossad, it is unsurprising that the CIA was aware of the Periphery Pact and its intelligence sharing

¹⁵⁸ 'Paper by James Q. Reber of the Planning and Coordination Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency: Intelligence Information Collection Program and the Coordination of Requirements' in *FRUS*, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, eds Douglas Kean and Michael Warner (Washington DC, 2007), document 202, attachment, paragraph 2.

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 21, 1958: *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, document 29

arrangement, Trident.¹⁶⁰ A CIA report analyzing the workings of Israel's intelligence services, described how the Trident arrangement worked, the intelligence-sharing objectives and semi-annual meetings between the agencies. This document represents an historical recording of the CIA's knowledge of the Trident activities. There are indications that the CIA had contemporaneous knowledge of Trident and supported it financially. Ephraim Halvey, a former head of Mossad, claimed that the CIA financed the building of a headquarters for Trident outside Tel Aviv.¹⁶¹ Contemporaneous intelligence briefings of the CIA to President Eisenhower indicate the CIA was knowledgeable on the Periphery Pact/Trident arrangements.¹⁶² Although these three Bulletins were only released by the CIA in early 2020, some text remains classified meaning that the intelligence value of the Trident/Periphery Pact arrangement to the US as assessed by the CIA is not yet clear. It may be that Israel continued to use the strength of its humint capacity - this time in the Middle East region - to support a continued intelligence relationship with the US. Israel did have a significant humint network in the Arab countries.¹⁶³ Lastly, it is worth considering whether Israel was exploiting inconsistent attitudes towards Israel from US institutions. The history of Israel's relationship with US diplomatic institutions of the Eisenhower administration suggests one continuing struggle, when viewed from an Israeli perspective, what Shiloah's biographer referred to as the

¹⁶⁰ The Trident Agreement usually refers to the intelligence-sharing arrangements between the foreign intelligence services of Iran (Savak), Israel (Mossad) and Turkey (TNSS) from 1958. The Periphery Pact usually refers to the broader idea of the relationship between these countries. The terms are sometimes used interchangeably.

¹⁶¹ Interview Ephraim Halvey in Alpher, *Periphery*, 12

¹⁶² See for example: CIA "Central Intelligence Bulletin 5 August 1958," page 4. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/03169512>, "Central Intelligence Bulletin, 10 November 1958," page 4 available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/06232635>.

"Central Intelligence Bulletin 31 December 1958", page 4. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/03000011>. All accessed on 19 July 2020.

¹⁶³ Documents from the US Espionage Den "1979 CIA report on Israeli Foreign Intelligence and Security Services", document 11, page 24 of CIA report,

Available at: <https://archive.org/details/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen>. Last accessed on December 30, 2020.

“Terrible Fifties.”¹⁶⁴ The US intelligence community in contrast had established a good working relationship with Israel.

Conclusion

The diplomatic policies of the Eisenhower administration towards Israel can be defined as an attempt by the US to adopt an impartial role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Impartiality was the key to resolving the dispute and reversing the anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populations of the region. Much of the mundane diplomatic activity between the two countries in the period related to American insistence on and Israeli resistance to US proposals to resolving the Palestinian refugee issue and to Israeli modus operandi in dealing with border disputes with its Arab neighbors, the most serious of which was against Egypt in 1956. Israel's policy of supporting Jewish immigration to Israel, even on a humanitarian basis, was denounced by the US diplomatic arm as adding to Arab fears of an expansionist Israeli policy. The Middle East crisis of 1958 was something of a turning point for the relationship between Israel and the US. US hopes of getting Nasser to their side were dashed by the developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan. These developments and Israel's support in the Jordan operation of July 1958 provided an opportunity to Israel to pursue US security guarantees (received, in the context of the Eisenhower doctrine) or US military supplies (some concessions made). Noa Schonmann has concluded that Ben-Gurion's strategy in the summer of 1958 was to use Israel's overflight concessions to Israel's own strategic alliance with the Periphery Pact countries and by doing so strengthen Israel's claim to be a strategic partner of Western powers.¹⁶⁵ Her conclusion, that Ben-Gurion was unsuccessful in this quest, is borne out by the subsequent US rejections of substantial arms support to Israel. Despite these rejections, Israel continued to chip away at the US non-armament policy, with some success. Israel, actively stimulated by the US, turned to other Western countries, for its supply of heavy/offensive military equipment. The crisis of July 1958 provided Israel with an opportunity to showcase the Periphery Pact and look for US financial and diplomatic support. Ben-Gurion briefly informed Eisenhower in March 1960 on progress of the intelligence-sharing arrangements with

¹⁶⁴ Haggai Eshed *Reuven Shiloah - The Man Behind the Mossad: Secret Diplomacy in the Creation of Israel* (New York: Routledge, 2012), Chapter 14.

¹⁶⁵ Schonmann, “Fortitude at Stake,” 642

Iran and Turkey. Although there is some suggestion that Secretary Dulles was not unfavorable to the idea, there is little reference to the Pact in the diplomatic archive. The US was at best neutral. This is not surprising as US support for the Periphery Pact would counteract its desire to maintain neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neither does Israel have the same strategic location as Turkey or Iran. Most importantly the US was interested in supplying arms to defend against Soviet aggression, while Israel's arms request were to defend against the Arab threat.

A strong relationship between the CIA and the Mossad blossomed during the 1950's based on the ability of Israel to employ humint from the Jewish diaspora residing in the Soviet Bloc. The resulting information flow was beneficial for the US in understanding what was happening behind the Iron Curtain in an era when aerial/spatial reconnaissance technology was still being developed. The US was aware of the intelligence cooperation between the Periphery Pact countries, supported it financially and kept the President informed directly of its progress. The Israeli's may have used their humint capacity within the Arab world to convince the US of the continued benefit of intelligence led cooperation. Whether developing technology (U2 spy planes) or easier accessibility for CIA, made the Israeli offer less advantageous to the US is difficult to assess given the continuing censorship of CIA reports from that time. Frustratingly, where the Periphery Pact is mentioned in diplomatic cables, continuing censorship makes it difficult to conclude on what the CIA really thought about the Pact.

Chapter 4 The Cold War Contest for Iranian Natural Resources

Introduction

This chapter analyses US policy toward Iran during the Eisenhower presidency. Firstly, the Eisenhower administration's initial dealings with Iran centered on the overthrow of the Mosaddeq regime in 1953 and the subsequent resolution of the oil dispute between Iran and Britain. In this way, protection of the continuity of Iranian oil supplies to Western economies emerged as a defining characteristic of US policy towards Iran in this period. A second aspect of US policy relates to Iranian economic development and its reliance on US financial assistance throughout the period. The third major US policy objective was cementing Iran's Western orientation and securing Iran's position in a regional defense organization. A final consideration was the diplomatic concern about dealing with a progressively autocratic and idiosyncratic Shah.

This chapter is structured to develop these themes chronologically. Firstly, Iran's strategic position that rendered it indispensable to both the USSR and the United States at the outset of the Cold War is considered. Thereafter the consequences of the 1953 Anglo-Iranian oil dispute resolution for the United States during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration are reviewed. The next section deals with US economic support to the Iranian economy lacking an operating oil industry and thereafter Iran's participation in the regional defense organization. The following section deals with the US concerns about dealing with the Shah and his military aid requests. The penultimate part surveys how the relationship between Iran and Israel was documented in the US diplomatic archives. The conclusion paragraph completes the chapter.

Iranian Strategic Location and Natural Resources

In 1901 the Iranian Government granted an oil exploration concession given to a British citizen, William Knox D'Arcy, so initiating the British involvement in the Iranian oil industry.¹⁶⁶ When

¹⁶⁶ Homayoun Mafi. "Iran's Concession Agreements and the Role of the National Iranian Oil Company: Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity". *Natural Resources Journal* (2008), 409.

oil was discovered, the British government, interested initially in Iranian oil to fuel the Royal Navy, acquired D'Arcy's concession and became the key actor in the Iranian oil industry through the Anglo Iranian Oil Company ¹⁶⁷(AIOC) that managed the oil production process from exploration to refining. In subsequent decades, expanding oil production made Iran the fourth biggest oil producer controlling 5% of world oil resources and AIOC developed in to one of the seven major oil companies in the world. Prior to 1950, Iran had become a British vassal state with complacent and compliant Iranian governments supporting British control and expansion of Iranian oilfields. During World War II, Britain occupied southern Iran to protect British oil interests. After the war, AIOC had become a significant financial resources for the British economy through taxes and dividends whilst the royalties accruing to Iran under the original concession were by comparison, much less.¹⁶⁸ This inequality of the British exploitation of Iranian oil resources became an international issues when the new government of Mohamed Mosaddeq nationalized the Iranian oil industry in 1951.¹⁶⁹ Faced with the demise of its oil source and the loss of Treasury revenue, Britain imposed economic sanctions and a naval blockade against Iran so starting the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Resolving this oil dispute was one of the first Iranian policy issues to face the Eisenhower administration.

Iran occupies a strategic geographic in the region. It occupies one side of the Straits of Hormuz, a chokepoint that gives access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. Secondly, it has a long border with the USSR, making it vulnerable to either a Soviet invasion or pressure to develop a pro-Soviet stance in an attempt by the Soviets to deny western access the region's oil resources. The destination of Iranian oil resources and an ambition to protect Iran from Soviet influence or aggression became central to US policy towards Iran.

¹⁶⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern US-Iranian Relations* (New York: The New Press, 2013), 11.

¹⁶⁸ Between 1940-50 British taxation was more than twice the royalties paid by AIOC to the Iranian government: Kamiar Mohaddes & M. Hashem Pesaran, "One Hundred Years of Oil Income and the Iranian Economy: A Curse or a Blessing"(Working Papers 771, *Economic Research Forum*, 2013), 6.

¹⁶⁹ Mohaddes & Hashem Pesaran, "One Hundred Years of Oil Income," 6.

Communist Denial?

The Truman administration 1952 policy on Iran, set out in NSC 136/1, remained in operation during 1953. This policy presupposed that Iran would continue to be an objective of Soviet expansion because of its oil resources, strategic position, and vulnerability to USSR attack or political subversion. The policy document assessed that the Mosaddeq government was vulnerable to the communist Tudeh party as it had not restored the (government income stream from the) oil industry following nationalization in 1951. The United States was concerned about a possible communist take-over and loss of Iran to the free world. Preventing Iran from coming under communist control became central to US policy objective.¹⁷⁰ NSC 136/1 established alternative courses of action for the US in scenarios where (partial) communist control of Iran was imminent or where the USSR attacked Iran. These alternative courses of action were widely defined to give the competent US agencies broad powers to take measures preventing a communist takeover.¹⁷¹ The policy objective of preventing control in Iran required the US assisting in a speedy and fair resolution of the oil dispute with Britain, assistance in restarting the oil industry and providing budgetary assistance to prevent any worsening of the financial and political situation before the oil industry has resumed. The US policy anticipated embracing the strong nationalist sentiment as a means of resisting communist pressure. Military assistance should continue, and US planners should anticipate Iran joining a Middle East defense organization.¹⁷²

In June 1953, the Mosaddeq government was overthrown by a coup, sponsored by the CIA and British secret services, and the Shah was restored to power. There is still some debate between historians as to the US and British objectives in engineering this coup. One group of historians highlights the original oil dispute as a clash between Iranian nationalism and British imperial machinations. The coup should then be seen as a reversal of Iranian nationalist achievement by an imperial power with assistance from the US. The alternative view sees the actions of the US with respect to Iran as being driven primarily by the Cold war and the wish to deny communist

¹⁷⁰ Statement of Policy on the Present Situation in Iran, November 20, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951–1954, eds Carel N. Raether and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC, 1989), document 240, paragraph 3.

¹⁷¹ Statement of Policy, November 20, 1952, *FRUS*, Volume X, document 240, paragraph 5, 6 & 7.

¹⁷² Statement of Policy, November 20, 1952, *FRUS*, Volume X, document 240, paragraph 4.

power in Iran or access to Iranian oil by USSR.¹⁷³ The diplomatic history as recorded in *FRUS* places the 1953 coup in the context of the anti-Soviet communist threat narrative. A significant involvement of US oil companies in resolving the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, as discussed below, suggest that the US, like the UK, wished to main some element of control over Iranian oil resources.

US Economic Assistance to Replace Delayed Oil Revenues

The second iteration of US policy towards Iran of the Eisenhower administration was NSC 5402 in January 1954. The primary objective of the policy, maintaining an independent Iran free of communist control, did not change.¹⁷⁴ However, with the Shah now installed at the head of a pro-western regime and oil nationalization no longer a consideration, attention turned to two policy areas: US military assistance to Iran (addressed in the next paragraph) and the question of Iranian economic development and US financial assistance.

Despite the 1953 coup, the oil dispute between Britain and Iran remained unresolved. The new policy document concluded that a permanent resolution to this oil dispute with Britain and the reopening of Iranian oil production were important to the US national interest. Firstly, Europe's dependence on Middle East oil, 75% of which is consumed in Europe, links Iranian oil production indirectly to US national security. Secondly, a resolution to the oil dispute with the UK was needed so that oil production, which had come to a standstill, could restart. The Iranian government was dependent on oil revenues which accounted for in excess of 50% of Iran's foreign exchange income and more than one third of government revenue.¹⁷⁵ The policy reflected the reality that Iran's non-oil economy was an underdeveloped rural economy, with over 80% of the population dependent on agriculture for their existence.¹⁷⁶ Having no oil revenues due to the production shutdown, the Iranian government was dependent on outside

¹⁷³ For more on the alternative explanations see: Ahrhamian, *The Coup*, 3-4.

¹⁷⁴ Statement of Policy by the National Security Council. January 2, 1954. *FRUS*, Volume X, document 403.

¹⁷⁵ Statement of Policy by the NSC. January 2, 1954. 'FRUS, Volume X, document 403, Financial Appendix: Part 1, paragraph 6.

¹⁷⁶ Statement of Policy by the NSC. January 2, 1954. 'FRUS, Volume X, document 403, Financial Appendix: Part 2, paragraph 1.

financial assistance to fund current expenditure and investment in the development of its non-oil sector. The US recognized that it needed to provide such financial supports to bridge the gap until Iran's oil revenue came on-stream.¹⁷⁷ In 1954 an agreement was reached in the oil dispute and a consortium of oil companies, that included a 40% interest of the American oil multinationals, took over the AIOC concession activities.¹⁷⁸ The new concession increased royalties paid to the Iranian government, with a 50/50 profit sharing arrangement splitting profits between Iran and the consortium.¹⁷⁹ During the second half of the decade, Iranian oil production reached 50% more than pre-nationalization production levels..¹⁸⁰ This dependency on the US economic assistance continued for the rest of the decade. A significant portion of subsequent diplomatic correspondence dealt with Iranian requests for financial assistance. Importance as economic aid was to US-Iran relations during the Eisenhower administration; it was US military aid and the Shah's increasingly voracious appetite for military hardware that dominated US policy towards Iran during the second half of the decade.

¹⁷⁷ National Intelligence Estimate NIE-102. November 16, 1953 *FRUS*, Volume X, document 387.

¹⁷⁸ NSC 5504: U.S. Policy toward Iran. January 15, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955 - 1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq,. Document 291. Paragraph 3.

¹⁷⁹ Abrhamian, *The Coup*, 207.

¹⁸⁰ Mohaddes and Hashem Pesaran, "One Hundred Years of Oil," 7-8.

Regional Security and US Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

Following the 1954 oil settlement, the nature and cost of US military engagement with Iran became more prominent in US policy. The predominant issue for US policy makers was to determine how to deal with Iranian requests for US support to modernize Iran's military capacity which for Iran was a precondition for its joining any regional defense organization.¹⁸¹

A 1955 study by the State and Defense departments concluded that US security interests continued to be best served by a Middle East regional defense organization and effective military capacity in that region.¹⁸² It recommended that US support to Iranian military programs should be offered as an inducement to Iran to join the Turk-Iraqi Pact, that would become known as the Baghdad Pact (in this chapter "the Pact").

Already in 1955, US policy makers were exercised about the role of Israel in such a defense arrangement. Reacting to the State-Defense study, the JCS concluded that due to Arab-Israeli tensions a comprehensive regional defense organization that included Israel should not be stimulated. Nor should a US-Israel defense pact be considered.¹⁸³ An NIE of June 1955 emphasized Israel's concern that her closest ally in the Middle East, Turkey, had entered into a defense arrangement with one of Israel's Arab enemies, Iraq. Israel maintained that any arms assistance to an Arab state would imperil Israel unless counteracted by military support or defense guarantees.¹⁸⁴ This issue of Israel relationship with a regional defense organization affected one of the central themes of US policy towards Iran in the coming years: whether the US would adhere to the Pact. US adherence would strengthen the regional confidence in and military strength of the to the Pact. On the other hand, the US calculated that adherence could

¹⁸¹ The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense. November 8, 1954. FRUS, , Volume X'. Document 503.

¹⁸² Memorandum from the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense. June 6, 1955. FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, eds Paul Claussen, Edward C Keefer, Will Klingaman and Nina J. Noring (Washington, DC, 1991), document 43.

¹⁸³ Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the secretary of Defense, June 16, 1955. FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 44.

¹⁸⁴ NIE 30-55: Middle East Defense Problems and Prospects, June 21, 1955. FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 46.

wreck its policy of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. If the US were to join the Pact, it would almost certainly be required by congress to give Israel the security guarantee it had been looking for and which the US did not wish to provide. Secretary Dulles feared that US adherence to the Pact would not be ratified by the US senate without such guarantees to Israel.¹⁸⁵

The formal policy of the US government then was not to adhere to the Pact. The State Department pushed for a *de facto* adherence in the form of US military aid to Pact members so as to “participate in pact as if member but without formal adherence”.¹⁸⁶ However, the amount of this military aid actually forthcoming was deemed inadequate by the State department. A 1955 State department memo lamented the inadequate military spending that the US Department of Defense had planned for the Pact countries noting that “if it is to be effective, the Baghdad Pact group must develop political unity as well as a sense of increased security and confidence through firm Western backing; they must, moreover, have a certain degree of real defensive capability.”¹⁸⁷ As outlined in the next section, US military institutions resisted requests for military aid to Iran on the basis of these being ineffective. The US military institutions actually supported of the US adhering to the Pact. The JCS expressed the view that early adherence to the pact would benefit the United States militarily.¹⁸⁸ The Secretary of Defense, concurred.¹⁸⁹ The State department resisted these impulses arguing that adherence would trigger discussions regarding military guarantees to Israel and without which the Pact

¹⁸⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State October 20, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 70.

¹⁸⁶ Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State April 9, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 114.

¹⁸⁷ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State November 28, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 84.

¹⁸⁸ Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. March 23, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 104.

¹⁸⁹ Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, April 5, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 109.

would not be ratified by Congress.¹⁹⁰ The issue of adherence resurfaced in November 1956 but faced continued resistance by the State department whose view prevailed.¹⁹¹ In January 1957 the JCS withdrew its objection to nonadherence in advance of the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine to Congress.¹⁹²

US encouragement for Iranian adherence to the Pact increased the focus on the capacity, strength and quality of the Iranian armed forces. Iran's long border and recent history with the Soviet Union (it had been occupied by the Soviet Union during World War II) rendered it vulnerable to a Soviet invasion. Despite this, Iran's military capacity was weak. A US review of Iranian military capacity concluded that the Iranian army could maintain internal security with a view to preserving the existing government. The capacity to resist any external aggression would be limited and certainly unable to repulse any Soviet attack for more than a short period of time. Its air force and naval capacities were weak.¹⁹³ This perception of a weak Iranian military was shared by other Pact members with Turkey and Pakistan taking "a very poor view of the military capabilities of the Iranian Army - in particular, of the capabilities of the Iranian officer corps."¹⁹⁴ The Shah was also cognizant of his military weakness and sought US financial assistance and military hardware to upgrade the defensive delaying capabilities of the Iranian military.¹⁹⁵ In the months leading up to Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact the nature and amount of this financial assistance divided opinion within the US government. The State department asserted that for political and psychological reason, beyond purely military

¹⁹⁰ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State. April 9, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 115.

¹⁹¹ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State November 18, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 145.

¹⁹² Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, January 10, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 185

¹⁹³ Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs: Iran, July 3, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 358.

¹⁹⁴ Memorandum of Discussion at the 231st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 13, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 290.

¹⁹⁵ Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of State. January 11, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 290.

reason, it was necessary to increase military aid to Iran if it was to participate in the regional defense organization.¹⁹⁶ The US Department of Defense did not want to increase military aid to Iran because of shortages of funds and equipment for its worldwide military aid program.¹⁹⁷ The position of the State Department largely prevailed when the formal US policy towards Iran was approved in 1955. However military aid was made dependent on Iran's ability to satisfactorily use existing military equipment and absorb additional equipment.¹⁹⁸ This notion of the Iranian military's "capacity to absorb new equipment" became a recurring theme in US-Iranian discussions on Iranian military aid requests in subsequent years. When Iranian requests for aid were for modern equipment, the US military often assessed that the Iranian army had insufficient competence and training to operate and maintain modern equipment. Spending money on such hardware, without the capacity to use it, was wasteful it was argued.

The adoption of the new US policy on Iran, NSC 5703/1 provided an opportunity to assess the US position towards Iran. There was concern with the mounting costs of mutual defense arrangements with Iran (in light of US financial commitments to other allies) and a decision not to make any new military commitments to Iran, pending a US military assessment of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁹⁹ A September 1957 OCB progress report on Iran expressed concern with the Shah's determination to "exercise strong direct and continuing control".²⁰⁰ Ambassador Richards, who was travelling the region promoting the new Eisenhower doctrine, appraised the Shah as being "vain, indecisive, inclined to meddle in details and unable to delegate

¹⁹⁶ Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of State. January 11, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 290.

¹⁹⁷ Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary of State. January 11, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 288.

¹⁹⁸ NSC Report. Note from the Executive Secretary to the NSC on U.S. Policy toward Iran, January 15, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 291.

¹⁹⁹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the NSC, February 7, 1957, FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 391.

²⁰⁰ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, September 7, 1957, FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 405.

authority.”²⁰¹ Secretary of State Dulles reported the Shah’s frustration that the lack of US military assistance was preventing him from securing a stronger position within the Pact. Dulles noted cryptically that the Shah “considers himself a military genius” and that the Iranian economy may suffer because of his “military obsessions”.²⁰² The Shah visited the US in June 1958 to meet Eisenhower, convinced that a personal appeal to Eisenhower would help his case for additional military assistance. The United States in turn wished to convince the Shah that the retaliatory power of the United States was a sufficiently strong deterrent towards the Soviet Union to justify a smaller Iranian military.²⁰³ Eisenhower informed the Shah of the difficulties in getting congressional approval for the mutual aid (military assistance) program.²⁰⁴

The coup d’état in Iraq in July 1958 triggered a reconsideration of US policy towards Iran. The consensus was that US policy should continue to support the Shah but should encourage him to institute the political, economic and social structural reforms that were necessary to forestall the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, as had befallen the Iraqi monarchy.²⁰⁵ In November 1958 a revised US policy on Iran was discussed and approved by the NSC. The participants noted the first small reforms initiated by the Shah and the discretionary power of the US President to provide military support to Iran in the event it was invaded by the USSR.²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant to the Department of State, March 28, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XII, document 399.

²⁰² Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, January 25, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 225.

²⁰³ Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, June 28, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 239.

²⁰⁴ Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, June 30, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 240.

²⁰⁵ See for example the US Intelligence Community’s assessment SNIE 34-58: Stability of the Present Regime in Iran, August 26, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 249.

²⁰⁶ National Security Council Report: NSC 5821/1, November 15, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 257.

The military demands of the Shah, accompanied sometimes by threats to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR continued in 1959.²⁰⁷ The NSC concluded that the Shah's requests were excessive and that the United States should not appease the Shah, described by one participant as "the best blackmailer he knew of."²⁰⁸ Eisenhower sent a personal letter to the Shah urging him not to fall into a trap by signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR.²⁰⁹ Shortly thereafter the Shah ended talks with the USSR and instead signed a bilateral agreement with the United States. The pattern of Iranian requests for military aid and/or military hardware and US denial continued for the remainder of 1959. In December 1959 the Shah presented Eisenhower, on a good will tour of the region at the end of his presidency, with his latest military threat assessment - a war with Iraq or Afghanistan acting as USSR proxies - and his expansive military hardware needed to counter these threats.²¹⁰

The final update to US policy toward Iran of the Eisenhower administration in July 1960 did not involve major changes to policy. The principal concern was the inability of the Shah's largely personal regime, to cope with the growing internal problems of Iran. US policy would be to maintain a delicate balance between persuasion and pressure to achieve reform. The military assistance requests of the Shah continued to be considered unrealistic.²¹¹

Iran's Relationship with Israel in the US Archive

Other than in the context of US refusal to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, Israel hardly featured in the diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Iran.

²⁰⁷ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, January 16, 1959, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 260.

²⁰⁸ Editorial Note, 22 January 1959, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 261.

²⁰⁹ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 30 January 1959, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 263.

²¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation: President's Goodwill Trip, 14 December 1959, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 281.

²¹¹ National Security Council Report: NSC 6010, July 6, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 293.

The question of Israel was briefly mentioned by the Shah in a meeting with Eisenhower during his Washington visit of July 1958. The Shah discussed Iranian attitudes towards Israel which were based on a realistic approach that Israel was there and should continue to exist. Israel's existence tamed Arab expansionism and Iran had "established certain relations with it."²¹² This meeting was less than a month prior to Ben-Gurion informing the United States.

Yossi Alpher argues that the anti-Semitic world views within the Iranian leadership included conspiracy theories of Jewish power and influence, particularly in the United States. This views convinced Iranian leaders that it was worthwhile developing its relationship with Israel to use this relationship to gain influence with the United States.²¹³

Conclusion

Oil featured prominently in US policy towards Iran during the Eisenhower administration, firstly in terms of the CIA supported overthrow of the Mosaddeq government in 1953 followed by a US brokered oil settlement in 1954. Although presented in the diplomatic archives as an anti-communist plot, other historians view US involvement in the 1953 coup as support for imperial exploitation of Iranian natural resources in face of a nationalist threat. That US oil conglomerates took a 40% share in AIOC after the coup supports this view.

The non-oil economy of Iran was insufficiently developed to support the economy necessitating economic financial transfers from the United States to Iran for most of the administration. United States policy was primarily driven by strategies to deny Soviet access to Iran's resources and strategic location either directly, through invasion or indirectly through a communist regime in Iran. Iranian participation in the Baghdad Pact was the primary vehicle for this policy. It has been argued that the United States developed a proxy state, rather than

²¹² Memorandum of Conversation, July 1, 1958, FRUS, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 242.

²¹³ Ty Joplin, 'When Iran and Israel were Friends'. July 18, 2018. Available at <https://www.albawaba.com/news/when-iran-and-israel-were-friends-1160616> Accessed on November 28, 2020.

close client state, relationship with Iran.²¹⁴ The position of US government finances influenced this: having a proxy military apparatus was always going to be less expensive than US ‘boots on the ground’. The distance in the relationship allowed the United States to delay, and often deny, Iranian requests for military assistance. Such positions appear to have been adopted by the Department of Defense often on the military merits of the requests but also based on the availability of US funds or commitments to other projects. The US observation of the Shah’s military obsession, dismissal of reforms and personal concentration of power, his desire to rule not reign, remained a concern to the end of the administration. A final diplomatic assessment was that “the Shah’s preoccupation with military matters, as well as his neglect of adequate economic and social reform through his concentration on such matters, has created difficulty for the United States as well as considerable urban discontent”.²¹⁵

The limited descriptions of the relationship between Iran and Israel, mostly referring to the existence of a relationship, in the diplomatic correspondence were infrequent. In policy terms, Israel’s expected request for US security guarantees in the event of US participation in a regional defense organization was mostly used to rule out such US participation.

The Iran case provided a deep insight into US policy making within the NSC structure. The military institutions (Department of Defense, JCS) featured prominently and often contrarily in the policymaking process. While the State Department often prevailed, the military institutions achieved sufficient escapes in the policy formulation to achieve their objectives. The Iran case also provided good examples of the influence of domestic policies on foreign policies: domestic fiscal concerns were used to downplay Iranian expectations of financial support and how support for Israel in the US Congress became the primary reason put forward for the United States not joining the Baghdad Pact.

²¹⁴ Suleyman Elik. “The United States’ Strategic Relationship with Iran and Turkey: Implications for Cold War and Post-Cold War Order” in *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From American Missionaries to the Islamic State* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 134.

²¹⁵ National Security Council Report: NSC 6010, July 6, 1960, FRUS, 1958 - 1960, Volume XII, document 293, paragraph 24.

Chapter 5 Managing the Cost of the Strategic Relationship with Turkey.

Introduction

This chapter concerns the relationship between the US and Turkey during the Eisenhower presidency, 1953-61. The chapter outlines how US policy towards Turkey was defined by an existing military relationship between the countries, through NATO, and an aspirational regional defense organization, the Baghdad Pact. US policy was also determined by the fiscal costs of US military and economic assistance to Turkey, in relation to the security provided by Turkey. The chapter concludes by considering how US policy makers dealt with the military coup in 1960 and the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Turkey.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: the first section discusses the strategic location of Turkey that secured its application to join NATO. The following section discusses how NATO membership influenced Turkey's role in regional defense arrangements. The sections thereafter deal, respectively, with the US provision of financial support to Turkey and the Turkish coup of 1960. The penultimate section addresses how Turkey's relationship with Israel appears, in a limited way, in the diplomatic and policy archives of the United States. The chapter finishes with a brief conclusion.

The Strategic Location and Geopolitical-orientation of Turkey

The Truman administration policy towards Turkey, NSC 109²¹⁶ remained in effect until 1955. Central to this, and subsequent policy statements, were Turkey's geographic position and Western orientation. Turkey occupied an important defensive location as a buffer for Western-orientated countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East against the Soviet Block. Turkey also controls the Turkish Straits through which Russian vessels must pass to gain access

²¹⁶ NSC 109, 'Statement of Policy proposed by the National Security Council: Turkey', May 24, 1951. *FRUS*, 1951, Volume V, the Near East and Africa, eds John A. Bernbaum, Paul Classen, Joan M. Lee, Carl N. Raether, Lisle A. Rose, Charles s Sampson, and David H Stauffer (Washington, DC, 1982), document 659. This legacy policy from the Truman Administration continued to operate Eisenhower until NSC 5510/1 was adopted in 1955.

to the Mediterranean.²¹⁷ In June 1945, the Soviet Union claimed joint-control over the Turkish Straits, something that Turkey, with strong US support, rejected.²¹⁸ Turkey felt threatened by these Soviet territorial claims and witnessed the reluctance of the USSR to withdraw its troops from Iran.²¹⁹ The “strong position” taken by the US, in the face of Russian demands, was followed by US support for Turkey’s 1951 request to join NATO, an application strongly supported by the US military.²²⁰ In Turkey, the Democrat Party won the 1950 general election and the new government, led by Adnan Menderes, conscious of a Soviet political and military threat, pursued pro-Western policies based on wide cooperation with the United States.²²¹

Turkey as the Backbone of Regional Defense

As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, prior to entering politics, Eisenhower acknowledged the potential of Turkish military to NATO, noting that “Turkish demonstrated determination to oppose Communistic aggression clearly makes her a valuable addition to NAT Organization (sic).”²²² The US supported Turkey’s application to NATO, in 1952, without any qualification²²³. US policy makers sought to encourage Turkey to develop better relations with other countries in the region, particularly Iran.²²⁴ The concept of a regional defense

²¹⁷ Turkish Straits is the collective name for the Dardanelles and Bosphorus seaway

²¹⁸ Gökser Gökçay. “The Ties That Bind: Postwar US Foreign Policy Toward Turkey,” in *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From American Missionaries to the Islamic State*, eds Geoffrey F. Gresh and Tugrul Keskin (New York: Routledge, 2018), 69.

²¹⁹ Khalilzad, “The Superpowers and the Northern Tier,” Outstanding page number.

²²⁰ NSC 109, May 24, 1951. FRUS, 1951, Volume V, document 659, paragraph 3 (a) and Footnote 2. Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

²²¹ Mahmut Bali Aykan. “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 1 (1993), 92.

²²² Cable from Eisenhower October 9, 1951, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, Volume 12, Part 3, Chapter 25, Document 423. Johns Hopkins University Press. Available at <https://eisenhower.press.jhu.edu/volume12/part3/chapter5/627> Last accessed on 15 November 2020.

²²³ Telegram Ambassador in Turkey to Department of State, January 21, 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, Volume VII Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, eds David M. Baehler, Evans Gerakas, Ronald D. Lands and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC,1988), document 459.

²²⁴ NSC 109, May 24, 1951. FRUS, 1951, Volume V, document 659, paragraph 2(d).

organization designed to thwart USSR attempts to influence or take over the Middle East was promoted by the US as the vehicle for improved relations in the region.²²⁵ Given its geographic position and having the principal military force in the region, the US welcomed Turkish willingness to participate in such a regional defense organization.²²⁶ By early 1954, Turkey took the lead in the formation of a regional defense organization but was not always sure of the strength of US support. The US ambassador in Ankara warned the State Department that the Turkish desire for a “completely confident collaboration” was not always reciprocated with consistent and dependable support from the US.²²⁷ Turkey’s first step in pursuit of the regional defense organization was to conclude a defense agreement with Pakistan. The US welcomed the indigenous character defense arrangement, noting in particular that “such arrangements could be effective lasting and only if it arose from the genuine convictions of the people of the area”.²²⁸ The United States and Turkey agreed that it was expedient to include Iraq and Iran in the defense arrangement when this was politically feasible.²²⁹ Iraq and Iran subsequently joined Turkey and Pakistan in the arrangement that became known as the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower administration’s first major revision to US policy on Turkey, NSC 5510/1 recognized the importance of Turkey’s regional defense role.²³⁰ The US did not join the Baghdad Pact explaining that to do so would require the US to provide offsetting defense arrangements to Israel, jeopardizing US neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Turkey was less insistent on US adherence to the Baghdad Pact than Iran. This can be explained by the military protection Turkey already enjoyed because of its membership of NATO, a

²²⁵ Initially referred to as the Middle East Command, thereafter (1952) the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), from 1955, the Baghdad Pact and, from 1959, CENTO.

²²⁶ Telegram Ambassador in Turkey to Department of State, January 21, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume VII, document 459.

²²⁷ The Ambassador in Turkey to the Department of State, January 21, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume VII, document 482.

²²⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, June 2, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume VII, document 487.

²²⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, June 2, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume VII, document 488.

²³⁰ NSC 5510/1, ‘Statement of Policy on Turkey’, February 28, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, eds Ronald D. Lands, Aaron D. Miller and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC, 1989), document 320.

position Iran did not have. The Baghdad Pact never developed the military command structure and resources that defined NATO's stature. Much of the US policy considerations with respect to military cooperation with Turkey occurred in the context of their membership of and respective roles within NATO. The (cost) implications of Turkey adhering to NATO-approved force levels and military equipment, the availability of military bases in Turkey and the positioning of US atomic missiles on Turkish territory were mutually discussed in a NATO context. The second Eisenhower revision to US policy toward Turkey, NSC 5708/2, specifically defined an objective to "review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements."²³¹ Turkey's geographical proximity to the USSR made it an obvious location for US air bases. In 1953 the Turkish government expressed the view that location of such a base in Turkey did not infringe Turkey's independence.²³² By 1959 this military cooperation, led to the Turkish government complying with a NATO decision to deploy US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (with nuclear warheads) in Turkey.²³³ The integration of Turkish military into the NATO command came at a cost to the United States in the form of economic and military (financial) assistance. In principle this aid was determined to be beneficial to US interests because of the security benefits it brought. As Eisenhower commented during a 1955 NSC meeting "The real criterion with respect to the level of US economic assistance was the security advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that US economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional US divisions."²³⁴

²³¹ NSC 5708/2. Statement of Policy on Turkey, 29 June 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XXIV, document 359.

²³² Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, Volume IX, Part 1, document 48.

²³³ Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower, 16 September 1959, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, eds, Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, William F. Sandford Jr., Sherril Brown Wells (Washington, DC, 1993), document 346.

²³⁴ Editorial Note January 5, 1955. *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XXIV, document 316.

The Turkish Economy in Crisis

US aid provided to Turkey during the 1950's was not solely directed at military goals. The United States wished to contribute to the development of a modern capitalist economy in Turkey, as an example of what Western capitalism could achieve for countries, even on the doorstep of the Soviet Block. The nature and extent of aid provided by the United States to Turkey was a regular cause of disagreement between these countries. The diplomatic correspondence between the countries includes extensive testimony to these discussions.²³⁵ There were also internal tensions within the US government regarding the nature of the commitments made to Turkey, or indeed, whether any commitments had been made at all.²³⁶

The tensions resurfaced when Turkey requested additional financial assistance from the US during an economic downturn in 1955. US officials did not wish to acquiesce to such requests as Turkey had not developed an adequate economic stabilization plan to deal with the economic crisis. This was in spite of the fact that Turkish military expenditure, encouraged by the US and essential to NATO defensive position, was partially the cause of Turkey's economic woes. The US policy predicament was illustrated by Secretary Dulles' remarks to a retiring Turkish ambassador:

When we go to the Hill on defense matters, the Secretary said, Turkey is our No. 1 exhibit. Probably Turkey has been foolish and over-ambitious in offering to carry a much larger defense burden than it should support, but in general we and NATO have eagerly accepted their proffers and shouted, "stout fellow." And Turkey might say, with some justification, that its efforts in

²³⁵ For example, military aid to Turkey was discussed Prime Minister Menderes' visit to Washington in June 1954. The US was willing to cover up to 25% of Turkish military expenditure needed to meet NATO goals. There was approximately \$ 500 million in spending already funded and programmed for Turkey. See: The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1954, *FRUS*, Volume VIII, document 489.

²³⁶ The nature of commitments made during the Menderes visit to Washington in June 1954 was still being discussed between the State Department and Defense in February 1955. State asked how commitments made to Turkey should best be executed while Defense was questioning if indeed any commitments had been made at all. Defense was very concerned about the impact of Turkish commitments to other defense budgets and questioned the technical ability of the Turkish military to absorb the military expenditure being proposed. See Memorandum of Discussion at the 238th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 24, 1955, *FRUS*, Volume XXIV, document 319.

another direction have made a start on Middle East defense arrangements - where the combined efforts of the US, the UK, and France failed miserably. Turkey is looked upon as our chosen vessel. If it falls flat on its face (and it makes no difference whether the US is “letting Turkey go bankrupt” or whether Turkey is going bankrupt because of its own bad management), other countries, particularly those of the Middle East, will wonder just how much US support is worth.²³⁷ It was not only Turkey’s survival at stake; it was also the reputation of the United States - the value of US commitments to other countries in the region.

Turkey’s economic woes continued in the years thereafter. The United States continued to resist requests for financial help unless Turkey engaged in financial stabilization measures. The US even involved NATO in attempts to curb Turkish military expenditure.²³⁸ There was US frustration that the Turkish government “devoted greater efforts to seeking foreign aid than to developing a stabilization program”.²³⁹ In August 1958, Turkey agreed an economic stabilization plan with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US government.²⁴⁰ By the end of 1959, the US observed that Turkey had been reasonably successful in implementing the stabilization plan but that it still needed to improve the planning and coordination of public sector investments.²⁴¹

²³⁷ Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State May 25, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, Volume XXIV, document 324.

²³⁸ Eisenhower wrote to the head of NATO expressing concern that Turkish troop levels had not decreased despite the protection Turkey enjoyed through NATO membership and ‘protection offered the growing US nuclear retaliatory capability’. Letter From the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe General Norstad, July 15, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, XXIV, document 360.

²³⁹ OCB Special Report: Turkey’s Current Economic Position, June 18, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 312.

²⁴⁰ This included loans grants and waivers of \$235 million from the US, \$100 million from OEEC and \$25 million from the IMF. Editorial Note, August 5, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 314.

²⁴¹ OCB Report on Turkey, December 16, 1959, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 352.

The Turkish Coup d'état of 1960

On May 27, 1960 officers in the Turkish army successfully stage a coup d'état following weeks of political unrest. A CIA assessment of April 1960 reported a divisive political situation in Turkey, investigations of subversion and question marks regarding the validity of the prior election results.²⁴² The US assessment was that the coup took place for internal reasons and not because of any anti-US sentiment.²⁴³ The US government recognized the new provisional government in Turkey on May 30, 1960 and the US ambassador engaged with the new regime and its leader Gursel on a number of occasions. It was assessed that the new government desired to live up to its international commitments (NATO, CENTO), would continue its pro-Western stance and intended to hold elections in the future.²⁴⁴ The US government expressed concerns that members of the previous government would be tried for corruption and executed. This would not go down well in the US court of public opinion.²⁴⁵ Secretary of State was even more concerned that any agreements made between US and the previous Menderes government would not be used to support the conviction of those former ministers on trial. The final update of US policy toward Turkey in October 1960, NSC 6015/1 reflected the regime change in Turkey and confirmed US policy of working with the regime as the legitimate government of Turkey.²⁴⁶

Turkey's Relationship with Israel

The issue of Israel was considered in US policy towards Turkey mainly in the context of the regional defense organization. In June 1953, the CIA reported that Turkey was advocating for the establishment of a MEDO that would be open to all states in the Middle East leading the

²⁴² Editorial Note, NSC meeting April 28, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 357.

²⁴³ Editorial Note, Telegram from Embassy Ankara. May 27, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 364.

²⁴⁴ Special National Intelligence Estimate 33-60, July 19, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 371.

²⁴⁵ Telegram from Embassy Turkey to Department of State, July 25, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 373.

²⁴⁶ See NSC 6015/1: Statement of Policy toward Turkey, *FRUS* 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 379.

CIA to observe that Israel could apply for membership.²⁴⁷ This was later rejected and consideration of Israeli adherence to the Baghdad Pact was at that time premature.²⁴⁸ Thereafter, the issue of Israel was hardly mentioned, although a 1958 intelligence estimate of Turkey's economic prospects predicted that Turkey was likely to increase cooperation with Israel in dealing with Middle East problems.²⁴⁹

Conclusion

Turkey's geographic location, political stability, and its strong anti-Soviet outlook made it a reliable US ally against the Soviet threat in the Middle East. The US cemented its military relationship through Turkey's membership of NATO. Support from this Western orientated ally defined a US policy approach guided by military imperatives but requiring a continuous reassessment of whether indirect funding through financial aid to Turkey was more efficient than a direct approach of maintaining more US military in the region.

The US backed Turkey's lead role in the regional defense arrangements that would become known as the Baghdad Pact. Turkey, through NATO, became more central to US military requirements when US military bases and atomic missile locations became operational. The existing military command structure of NATO, something that the Baghdad Pact never developed, was more attractive for US military planning purposes. It also provided a tool for the US to monitor and indirectly manage the financial aid it was providing and otherwise exercise influence.

Much diplomatic interaction between the countries centered on request for financial support by Turkey and US attempts to curtail its (partial) funding of projects, including military expansion, that it believed the Turkish economy could not sustain. In some cases, the domestic political and fiscal position of the United States influenced the discussion on financial

²⁴⁷ CIA, 'Central Intelligence Bulletin'. June 4, 1953. Page 6.

Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/02929519> Accessed on 16 November 2020

²⁴⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, June 2, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Volume VII, document 488.

²⁴⁹ NIE 33-58, December 30, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, document 324, paragraph 7.

assistance to Turkey.²⁵⁰ The precarious position of the Turkish economy towards the end of the 1950's contributed to Turkish army's overthrow of the democratically elected government in May 1960. The US government quickly recognized the new government and continued its relationship with the new government as before.

There appears to have been an openness on the Turkish side for Israel joining any regional defense organization in the early years of the decade, but it was decided that the time was not opportune. This United States itself did not join the Baghdad Pact anxious that this was trigger a security guarantee from Israel. Consideration of Israeli participation in a regional defense arrangement that included Turkey played an indirect role in US policy towards Turkey during the Eisenhower administration.

²⁵⁰ One Turkish official arguing for additional US assistance noted that the Turkish government needed funds as it faced an election the following year. His American interlocuter point out that the US election was this year.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Research Question Revisited

This research set out to answer the question: What factors determined the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Presidency (1953-61) towards the 1958 Periphery Pact arrangement between Iran, Israel and Turkey? The research question is supported by three sub questions: What was the regional and global foreign policy of the Eisenhower Presidency towards the Periphery Pact countries and international relations between them? What was US policy towards the 1958 Periphery Pact itself? What was the contribution of the State Department and the CIA in formulating these policies? The following paragraphs provide an answer to these questions based on the research undertaken.

US Policy Toward the Periphery Pact countries

The US policies towards the Middle East during the Eisenhower administration were defined by its geopolitical stride with the USSR. The United States wished to contain Soviet expansion and deny the USSR access to the Middle East, an area crucial to US national interests because of the region's oil resources. These oil resources were vital to the economies of US allies in Western Europe. My research has identified three broad US policy choices that defined its policy towards the Periphery Pact countries. Firstly, the United States defined a policy objective of being (seen to be) neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US government support for the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 led to a strong anti-US sentiment amongst Arab states. Although an armistice was agreed to end this war, the Arab-Israeli conflict continued. These Arab states, in the process of gaining independence from the colonial powers, viewed the creation of Israel, with US backing, as a form of imperialism. The Eisenhower administration, not wanting these Arab states to become aligned with the Soviet Union, was anxious to reverse the anti-American sentiment in these states. The US policy choice to achieve this was to establish a neutral position of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This US neutrality objective clearly affected US policy towards Israel.

It also affected the implementation of the second US policy choice relevant to my research, the creation of a regional defense organization. A regional defense organization in the Middle East was part of a US strategy contain the USSR and deny it access to Middle East oil resources.

Such a defense organization was designed to bolster US allies by creating military defense buffers at the extremities of the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the Northern Tier strategy envisaged a military firewall from Turkey to Pakistan, incorporating Iran and Iraq. This Northern Tier concept was embodied in the form of the Baghdad Pact, a mutual defense arrangement between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

My research indicates that US policy towards the Baghdad Pact was its ultimate downfall. The US wanted the pact to be broad-based and incorporate as many Arab countries that would be willing to join. However, the United States refused to join the Baghdad Pact itself using the argument of neutrality: if the US were to ratify the Baghdad Pact, it would have to provide Israel with arms and/or a security guarantee in order to get Congressional approval for the ratification. Such a guarantee would be contrary to its desired position of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The position taken by the State Department was that the United States should not adhere to the Baghdad Pact, but should assist and support it by providing military aid to individual Pact members. The US Department of Defense saw a military advantage in this and pushed for adherence to the Baghdad Pact. By adherence, the US military could be involved in the military command structure and be in a better position to manage the resulting military expenditure. In the end, the State Department position prevailed in the policy formulation process.

In the implementation of this policy, however, US military institutions delayed and frustrated the policy by providing a minimum level of the military assistance that had been promised to Baghdad Pact signatories, in particular Iran. The motivation of the US military institutions for this stance was the pressure to reduce costs and restrict already overstretched military resources. US military institutions were not anxious to incur military expenditure on the Baghdad Pact organization that had no military command structure and lacked US military involvement. The US military institutions may have been assisted in justifying their position by the idiosyncrasies of the Iranian Shah who desired the most modern technology for the Iranian armed forces, at the expense of the US taxpayer, while the same armed forces were insufficiently trained to be in a position to absorb this modern equipment. Turkey was not impacted by the US military's attitude towards the Baghdad Pact. Turkish membership of NATO allowed US military institutions to exert influence and monitor military expenditure through the NATO command and control structure. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the US air-bases and nuclear armed missiles in Turkey provided concrete

evidence to Turkey of its place under the US security umbrella. US non-adherence to protect its neutrality policy objective and a preference for the military command structure of NATO above the Shah's pursuit of a trophy army, represented the death knell of the Baghdad Pact. The third policy area that defined US policy towards the Periphery Pact countries was the reality of US fiscal budgets. The diplomatic correspondence with the Periphery Pact countries is dominated by discussions on US financial, economic and military support. The diplomatic archive contains multiple examples of engagement by all Periphery Pact countries with the United States to maximize these financial flows, each country extracting their price for their invitations to play the role of superpower in the region.²⁵¹ Periphery Pact countries also sought to manipulate the Cold War situation to advance their individual security needs. Both Turkey and Iran viewed Israel as a 'diplomatic pouch', a conduit to a good hearing in Washington. Indeed their support for the Periphery Pact was to some extent based on their impression that a good relationship with Israel would encourage Israel to lobby for security guarantees on their behalf in Washington.

The US policy objective of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict reflected in existing literature as reviewed in chapter one. The contribution of my research to existing scholarship is that it demonstrates the importance placed by the State Department of this neutrality policy: they were willing to potentially jeopardize the regional security arrangement (the Baghdad Pact) for the sake of adherence to the neutrality policy.

The US policy of not openly supporting the Baghdad Pact is also reflected in existing literature. The contribution of current research is the revelation of the institutional struggle within the Eisenhower administration between the military and diplomatic wings in defining policy towards adherence to the Baghdad Pact. When the formal policy was to provide military assistance to Iran and Turkey as part of a policy of supporting the Baghdad Pact informally, the military institutions effectively ignored this. The US military was not going to surrender military control or scarce budgets to an entity it could not influence.

²⁵¹ The financial support extracted by each Periphery Pact country from United States to maintain its position as the dominant superpower, demonstrating the capacity of regional states to influence Cold War events. This perspective is similar to that set out in Ben Aharon, "Superpower by Invitation."

The US policy of financial and military support for its allies in the Middle East region is also not new. My research contributes to this understanding by highlighting the influence US allies exerted in maximizing their cash flows from the United States. It also demonstrates how the US domestic policy of budget deficit control reduction directly influenced US foreign policy by acting as a constraint on negotiations with US allies.

US Policy Towards the Periphery Pact

Existing literature highlights how the Periphery Pact countries, but in particular Israel, marketed the Periphery Pact to the United States. Schonmann recalls how Ben-Gurion used Israeli assistance in Britain's 1958 Jordanian intervention to make his case that Israel should be seen as a reliable ally in the region for the West.²⁵² My research confirms the communication to the United States of the Periphery Pact arrangement at diplomatic level and in person to President Eisenhower. Even as late as 1960, Ben-Gurion was promoting the ongoing intelligence-sharing activities of Israel, Iran and Turkey. The reaction to Ben-Gurion's sales pitch, as recorded in the diplomatic archives, lacked any great enthusiasm for the Periphery Pact. As Schonmann noted, Secretary Dulles' initial enthusiasm for the Periphery Pact was subsequently diluted at the behest of State Department officials.²⁵³

The on-line diplomatic archive does not explain why US diplomats were lukewarm. If we look at the US diplomatic experience in dealing with the Baghdad Pact, we can understand why the same diplomatic arm may have rejected the Baghdad Pact, despite there being some differences between the two.²⁵⁴ Firstly, like the Baghdad Pact, the United States was unlikely to, publicly at least, support the Periphery Pact as it would contradict its neutrality objective. Secondly, the United States was unlikely to support any Periphery Pact arrangement unless it had the ability to control the activities and related expenditure. Also the US military was unlikely to support the Periphery Pact as it had deemed Israel not to have been of strategic value to US military objectives. Most crucially, the Baghdad Pact failed despite its participants and the US having

²⁵² Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 642

²⁵³ Schonmann, "Fortitude at Stake," 640-641

²⁵⁴ The Baghdad Pact was a military alliance and public information. The Periphery Pact was, initially, intelligence sharing and covert.

a shared enemy, the USSR. In the case of the Periphery Pact, the enemy were the Arab states. Iran and Turkey apparently perceived these Arab states to be enemies, as potential sources of communist subversion. The United States did not yet fully share this threat assessment and there was some hope of reaching an accommodation with Nasser. Analyzing the US experience with the Baghdad Pact can help to explain the lack of interest for the Periphery Pact by the State Department. Another possibility is that the NSC and State Department were content to allow consideration of the Periphery Pact to take place between security agencies, to accept the CIA engaging in clandestine diplomacy. This might also explain the muted recording in the diplomatic archives and the continued censorship in some documents. This is the scenario envisaged by the third research sub question and is dealt with in the following paragraph.

The US Intelligence Community and the Periphery Pact

Recalling that the Periphery Pact was largely an arrangement between the intelligence and security services of Iran, Israel and Turkey, my research considered how the CIA may have been involved. The Pact was, after all, an intelligence sharing venture managed by intelligence agencies. It would be logical for the Pact countries' intelligence agencies to liaise with their US counterparts. This is particularly so for the Israeli intelligence services which had developed close ties with the CIA since the early 1950s. Existing accounts of the Periphery Pact are largely silent regarding a CIA involvement, except for Alpher who concludes that the CIA provided financial support, to finance a property in Tel Aviv to support to the Periphery Pact operations.²⁵⁵ The contribution of my research has been to confirm an awareness of the CIA of the Periphery Pact arrangements and regular reporting of this to President Eisenhower directly by the CIA. My research also revealed that one of the key elements of Israel's sales pitch in July 1958 was its intelligence gathering ability in the Middle East. Given that, earlier in the 1950's, the CIA had, benefited from Israel's intelligence gathering in Eastern Europe, it is plausible to conclude that the CIA may indeed have been persuaded by this approach. In March 1960, Eisenhower reacted to Ben-Gurion's review of the Middle East situation, including the Pact, by noting that he (Ben-Gurion) would be meeting with Allen Dulles (CIA

²⁵⁵ Alpher, *Periphery*,12.

Director) “on some other matters”.²⁵⁶ Regrettably for my research, there is no archived record available of what Ben-Gurion discussed with Dulles and continued (partial) redaction of references to the Periphery Pact in US archival documents leave a residual uncertainty as to the extent of US intelligence involvement in or views of the Periphery Pact.

Finally, it is appropriate to reflect on the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) method adopted in performing my research. Traditional FPA methods focus only on reviews of formal policy documents and diplomatic correspondence. More recently FPA analysis encourages consideration of the dynamics of bureaucratic rivalries in forming foreign policy and an assessment of the impact of non-state actors and domestic policies in determining foreign policy. My research has benefited from this approach. The NSC policy making process provided a rich insight into inter-institutional discussions that helped explain the Janus-like approach of the United States to the Baghdad Pact. The comments of Defense Department or JCS on proposed policies provided useful insight into the Cold War policy formulation. The question of repatriating the Jewish diaspora is an example of how foreign policy can be influenced by non-state actors. This issue was a foreign policy priority for Israel and was important in developing Iran-Israel relations, yet it was discouraged by US foreign policy. Lastly the consideration of US domestic policies, whether the anti-communist escapades of Senator Joseph McCarthy or the organizing abilities of Isaiah Kenen, enriched the understanding of US foreign policy towards the Periphery Pact. My original intention had been to supplement my research with oral history interviews from the Eisenhower Presidential Library and other oral history archives. Covid-19 travel restrictions precluded this avenue of investigation. Or, perhaps, just postponed this for a future research project.

²⁵⁶ Dwight D Eisenhower Library. ‘Summary of a White House meeting between President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, and other U.S. and Israeli government officials, 10 March 1960’. Pages 5, 9. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Gale.com, last accessed August, 28 2020

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