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## Shifting Subjects of Securitisation

Analysing Discourses & Performativity in the EU Response to  
Migratory Developments

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## 1. Introduction

Since, what is usually referred to as the 2015 refugee crisis, migration has become an often discussed topic in both the media as well as in political debates. This thesis sheds light on the construction of the European Union's (EU's) response to migratory developments. From an academic perspective, the policy response of the European Union to the refugee crisis has been researched by multiple scholars (Ghezelbash, Moreno-Lax, Klein & Opeskin, 2018, Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015, Zajac, 2015). Migration has often been analysed from a constructivist perspective by means of the framework of securitisation (Bigo, 2002, Buonfino, 2004, Ceccorulli, 2019). These approaches offer something distinctive to the understanding of both the policy as well as the discursive response of the EU to migratory developments. Yet, I would argue that there are still questions left unanswered about the relation between discourses and policies, and how this relation can be analysed. Specifically, I believe that this relation remains a blind spot in the literature, and I expect to fill this gap with the analytical approach to the performative effect of discourses that is proposed in this work.

The research is centred around the following question; *'Which political discourses can be identified in the EU response to migratory developments, and to what extent has the discourse a performative effect on the policy proposals?'*. I believe that this question is key to advance the existing literature as the conceptual and analytical gaps they represent have been pointed out by multiple scholars. Neal (2009) argues that the relationship between securitisation discourses and EU policies is under-researched. In broader academic literature on discourse analysis as well this problem is often pointed out. Van Ostaijen (2016) points to an *'...general under-operationalization in discourse analysis...'* (p.4). Building on these contributions, this research provides an extensive and explicit operationalisation of discourse and performativity in regards to policy proposals. Securitisation studies are taken as a starting point for this analysis, but the insights of this academic field are complemented by insights provided by a broader range of studies, such as migration policy studies (Van Ostaijen, 2016) and constructivist theory (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).

The case study subjected to this analysis is the response of the European Union to migratory developments, within two fixed timeframes in the years 2015 and 2020. The design using two fixed timeframes adds to the aim of the research to provide a better understanding of the construction of the EU's response, as it adds to the analysis a comparative element by focussing on the development of the EU's response over time and within different contexts.

The research relies on a discourse analysis which is extended by a policy proposal analysis to account for the performativity of the discourse.

The academic relevance of this research is threefold. Firstly, the research provides an in-depth analysis of the EU response to migratory developments, creating a better understanding of how this response has been constructed discursively as well as in terms of policies. It does so more than has been done in the past, by using extensive and new empirical findings from two critical years, 2015 and 2020. Secondly, the research holds theoretical relevance, as it contributes to literature addressing the link between discourse and policy practice. This relevance is strengthened, given that the research draws on theoretical insights from different academic fields in order to come to a better theorisation, conceptualisation and operationalisation of the under-analysed phenomenon. Both fields encounter similar academic problems with regard to the gap between discourse and reality, yet they barely draw on each other's insights. The originality of this work lies in its connection between securitisation studies and other academic fields such as migration policy studies. Thirdly, the research holds analytical relevance, as it provides new combinations of existing analytical strategies to come to an optimal operationalisation of the research aim.

Besides these contributions to academic literature, this study aims to make contributions on a societal and policy level. Following the tragic events in the Mediterranean in April 2015, the EU has repeatedly expressed its commitment to preventing further losses of life in the Mediterranean (European Council, 2015, European Commission 2015c). Nevertheless, the tragic deaths of migrants, being asylum seekers, refugees or economic migrants have continued to occur in the years to follow (Siegfried, 2019, IOM, n.d.). Migration scholars such as Castles (2004) have brought to light that migration policies repeatedly fail in achieving their objectives, or have unforeseen consequences. Scholten (2019) argues that the explanation for this failure can partly be subscribed to a failure to respond to the complexity of migration issues. I therefore believe that this research can contribute to the field of migration policy as it creates an in-depth understanding of the construction of the policy responses of the EU to migratory developments.

In terms of structure this thesis unfolds as follows: First, theory on securitisation, discourse, performativity and identity are discussed and gaps in the existing literature are highlighted. Building on these theories, an extensive operationalisation of the performativity of discourses proposed by this work is presented and clarified. Thereafter, chapter 4 presents the results from the discourse analysis. Chapter 5 subsequently presents the results from the analysis on the performativity of the discourse. Finally, in light of the empirical findings, the

concluding section reviews the key points of the subject matter and its theoretical relevance, as well as its importance for the European response to migration.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

In multiple academic fields, scholars have put effort in bridging the analytical gap between discourse and policies. Examples are the works of Baker-Beall (2014, 2016, 2019) on European counter-terrorism discourses and securitisation. Baker-Beall's (2019) research '*...bridges the divide between security theory and security policy...*' (p. 494). Van Ostaijen's (2016) publication on intra-European migration in the field of discursive policy analysis '*... opens up the discursive black box of discourse analysis and unravels the performative potential of certain discourses.*' (p.1). Theoretical insights from both these academic fields are combined to establish a theoretical framework, and operationalise the functioning of the political discourse of the EU in response to migratory developments. The theoretical framework used for this research is centred around four relevant concepts; securitisation, discourse, performativity and identity. All concepts are discussed subsequently.

### **2.1 Securitisation: Introducing Contextuality and Intertextuality**

In its core, securitisation can be seen as a process in which a political subject is moved into the realm of security politics (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). Securitisation theory thus provides a constructivist approach to security. In traditional securitisation theory, or Copenhagen School based research, the process of securitisation is assumed to occur through speech acts and it therefore studied by analysing the language of certain security actors (Buzan et al., 1998). The post-Copenhagen School approach to securitisation allows for a more lenient understanding of the concept. Post-Copenhagen research draws upon traditional securitisation theory, but it loosens the commitment to some of the core assumptions of the traditional approach, and it adds other factors that have to be taken into account (Croft, 2012, Baker-Beall, 2016). Croft (2012) summarizes the core commitments of Copenhagen based securitisation as an emphasis on speech acts, the perception of an existential threat to the survival of an in-group, the proceeding of extraordinary measures, and the focus of the state as a securitising actor. In line with the works of Croft (2012) and Baker-Beal (2016), this research adopts a post-Copenhagen approach to securitisation. In the continuation of this paragraph it is explained how adopting this approach allows for a better way to analyse how securitisation manifests itself in broader

contextual and intertextual structures, and how it makes securitisation theory more applicable in the context of the EU.

Firstly, post-Copenhagen scholars have argued that Copenhagen based research on securitisation overemphasises the importance of language (Balzacq, 2005, McDonald, 2008, Stritzel, 2012). As a result of this overemphasis on language, Copenhagen school based research devalues contextual factors (McDonald, 2008). Balzacq (2005) argues that Copenhagen securitisation theory is a ‘...*restrictive theoretical position...*’ (p. 172), as its established rules on the understanding of securitisation approach the concept as a fixed and unchanging practice. Post-Copenhagen theory is based on the assumption that speech acts must be analysed within the specific settings of the topic at hand in order to understand the process of securitisation (Stritzel, 2012). Adopting this approach to securitisation enables the researcher to identify how securitisation, or the perception of threat, is evolving over time. A post-Copenhagen approach to securitisation thus loosens the commitment to speech acts, shifts the understanding of securitisation from a fixed practice towards a process, and includes more contextuality.

Neal (2009) critically reflects on securitisation research in the context of the EU. Neal (2009) argues that ‘*Much of what is being done in the name of security is quiet, technical and unspectacular, in the EU intensely so, and just as much again does not declare itself to be in the name of security at all.*’ (p. 352). Therefore, securitisation by the European Union does not necessarily take place by describing an issue as an existential threat, securitisation can also take place ‘...*through the language and practice of everyday risk and insecurity...*’ (Baker-Beall, 2019, p. 440). Focussing only on existential threats ‘...*does not reflect the myriad ways in which security manifests itself on a regular basis, especially in the EU.*’ (Baker-Beall, 2016, p. 39). Neal’s (2009) work brings forward two important considerations. Firstly, it emphasises why especially within the context of the EU it is necessary to adopt a post-Copenhagen approach to securitisation, which loosens the commitment to focus on existential threats and exceptional measures. Secondly, Neal’s (2009) criticism shows the importance of intertextuality, which is emphasised by multiple post-Copenhagen scholars (Baker-Beall, 2016, Croft, 2012, Stritzel, 2012). It is argued that a discourse cannot only be reduced to language but also needs to be related to intertextuality (Baker-Beall, 2016). Stritzel (2012) provides the following description of the concept of intertextuality;

*‘At its core, intertextuality stresses that texts are always situated within and against other texts, which are in turn situated within and against other texts and meanings, and so on*

*indefinitely. From an intertextual perspective, the creation of meaning is thus read as being always located within broader structures of meaning and evolutions/sequences that are ultimately unlimited.*'' (p. 553)

Korkut, Terlizzi & Gyollai's (2020) research provides an example of why it is important to account for intertextuality in researching securitisation. Korkut et al. (2020) point to the existence of *'...a discursive nexus of humanitarianism and securitisation in effect to migration controls.'*'' (p.1). Meaning there is a simultaneous existence of humanitarian discourses and securitising discourses, in the political communication by EU member states (Korkut et al., 2020). In addition, Korkut et al. (2020) describe how securitisation can function as a condition for humanitarianism, showing the importance of approaching securitising discourses in relation to other discourses. Securitisation can thus take place in a less explicit way, and can exist within broader intertextual structures, in relation to other discourses. For this reason it is important to include intertextuality to an analysis of securitisation.

Based on these theoretical insights it is argued that, as is suggested by post-Copenhagen scholars, securitisation should be analysed within broader contextual and intertextual structures. This concretely means that the analytical approaches of this research will account for contextual factors and intertextual links. Or as is described by Strizel (2012) *'...speech acts need to be related to and analysed within the context of specific social settings and textual fields, as well as broader historical sequences and continuities.'*'' (p. 553). In addition, the reconceptualisation of securitisation as proposed by post-Copenhagen scholars is especially relevant in the context of the EU. Given that securitisation functions differently in the EU as opposed to the national level, as securitisation moves might be less explicit (Baker-Beall, 2019). Therefore in this research, rather than positioning securitisation theory at the core of the overall analytical framework, securitisation is seen as a concept part of the overall theoretical framework. This means that the discourse analysis is not only focussed on securitising discourses, but on the overall political discourse of the EU.

## **2.2 Discourse and Performativity**

In this paragraph it is firstly addressed how the concept discourse is understood in this research and how this understanding relates to performativity. Baker-Beall (2016) describes discourses as *'...systems of thought composed of ideas, beliefs and practices, or 'performative, meaning-making attempts to make sense of the world through words and language', that structure how*



*we think about a particular subject, topic or issue.*” (p. 31). Discourses in turn provide discursive spaces which are “...*concepts, categories, metaphors, models and analogies by which meanings are created.*” (Doty, 1993, p. 302). Discourses are not conceived to be fixed, they are always in the process of changing (Doty, 1993). This understanding of a discourse relates to the post-Copenhagen approach to securitisation, which interprets securitisation as an ongoing political process rather than an event (Baker-Beall, 2019). Discourses and social practice are seen as being “...*mutually co-constitutive.*” (Baker-Beall, 2016, p. 29). In this research the social practices under consideration are policy proposals. This understanding of discourse therefore means that policies are adopted based on discourses, yet discourses are also produced and reproduced by the creation of policies. In other words, “...*discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it.*” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, p. 92).

This conception of discourse has two important consequences on an analytical level. Firstly, it is important for the understanding of the relationship between discourses and policies. Discourses are ever-changing structures of meaning (Doty, 1993), they are mutually co-constitutive with policy reality (Baker-Beall, 2016), and therefore the relation between discourses and policy outcome is not understood in terms of causality. As is described by Baker-Beall (2016); “*I do not view discourses as causative. Discourses are constitutive, they are contingent, they are performative, they produce interpretive possibilities but they are not in any way causative or deterministic.*” (p. 41). Secondly, this means that discourses are not seen as strategic practices. As described by Baker-Beall (2016); “*Discourses structure the social world and the actors within it but importantly actors have agency to change the social world.*” (p. 42). In regard to actor’s agency this means that actors do have the agency to influence the social world via discourse, but in turn discourses structure the social world and the actors within it. This is what makes the analytical strategies adopted in this research different from, for example, analysis based on the concepts of framing, or strategic narratives. However, this does not mean that discourse analysis cannot address the performativity of language. It only indicates that this relationship is less straightforward and one directional. It is still a relevant relationship to explain by means of analysis, and it should not be left implicit.

The need for analyses addressing performativity in securitisation research is emphasised by Neal (2009). According to Neal (2009) there is an assumed link between linguistic discourse and policy outcome in securitisation research. Even though securitisation moves are identified in the EU’s discourse, it is not clear what this means for policy outcomes (Neal, 2009). Based on Neal’s (2009) criticism on securitisation theory, it is argued that the relationship between

securitisation discourses and EU policies is under researched. According to Neal (2009) ‘...*Although the statements and discourses of the EU institutions may be identifiable as securitizing moves, the relationship between that discourse and the reception, discussion, legitimation and actualization of policy proposals and changes is less clear.*’ (p. 336). Scholars such as Baker-Beall (2016, 2019), have attempted to overcome the gap between discourse and policy by adopting a post-Copenhagen approach to securitisation theory. The post-Copenhagen framework is a good starting point to address performativity of securitisation. This research supports the argument of post-Copenhagen scholars that including contextual and intertextual factors to securitisation research help to overcome the gap between language and policy outcome. However, it is argued that these approaches could gain from a more in-depth and explicit operationalisation of performativity.

By combining insights and operationalising strategies from post-Copenhagen securitisation literature and wider literature on discourse analysis, this research strives to analyse the performativity of discourse without leaving its operationalisation implicit or undermining its constitutive nature. For the larger part, the analytical strategies adopted in this research are based on the works of Van Ostaïjen (2016) and Baker-Beall (2016). Van Ostaïjen (2016) and Baker-Beall (2016) base their research on similar understandings of the concept of discourse, making it suitable to combine their insights, in order to come to a more comprehensive conceptualisation and operationalisation of performativity .

### **2.3 Constructions of Identities**

Both in securitisation research as in broader discursive policy analysis identity is an important and recurrent concept. This section addresses the concept of identity and elaborates on how addressing identity is relevant to this study. This is done by combining classical constructivist theory of Schneider & Ingram (1993) with conceptualisations of representation and identity in securitisation research.

Schneider & Ingram (1993) provide a theory on the social construction of target populations and its implications for policies. The theory provides useful insights for adopting an analytical strategy to constructively approach group identities and relate this to policy outcomes. The theory comes down to the question posed by Lasswell (1936): ‘*Who gets what, when and how?*’ (in Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 334) in politics. Social constructions of target groups include shared characteristics distinguishing a target group, and the attribution of positive and negative values to these characteristics (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). According to

Schneider & Ingram (1993); *‘Positive constructions include images such as "deserving," "intelligent," "honest," "public-spirited," and so forth. Negative constructions include images such as "undeserving," "stupid," "dishonest," and "selfish." ‘ (p. 335).*

What makes the theory of Schneider & Ingram (1993) both relevant and interesting for this research is that it provides a very measurable conceptualisation of identity, which can be easily related to policy analysis. *‘Social constructions of target populations are measurable, empirical, phenomena. Data can be generated by the study of texts, such as legislative histories, statutes, guidelines, speeches, media coverage, and analysis of the symbols contained therein.’* (Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Schneider & Ingram’s (1993) theoretical framework is aimed at groups in a democracy, the different types of social constructions they describe are both dependent on power of the target group as well as their positive or negative construction. Given that migrants or refugees are outsiders to the democratic states of the EU, only the groups with weak power are applicable to this research. This leaves two typologies of target groups, on the one hand there are dependents; *‘...Dependents might include children or mothers and are considered to be politically weak, but they carry generally positive constructions.’* (Schneider & Ingram, 1996, pp. 335-336) and on the other hand *‘Deviants, such as criminals, are in the worst situation, since they are both weak and negatively constructed.’* (Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Social constructions do not necessarily stay constant over a period of time and different actors can construct the same group in different ways (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). In addition, based on the example of immigration policy, Schneider & Ingram (1993) describe the phenomenon of subdivision; *‘Political debates may lead elected officials to make finer and finer distinctions, thereby subdividing a particular group into those who are deserving and those who are not.’* (p, 336). What is interesting for this research is the distinction between positive and negative constructions, and the allocation of positive and negative incentives. It is argued that the construction of a certain group can have a significant influence on the policies targeting this group, as it determines which groups are deserving and which are not (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Especially because this research aims to make the link between discursive constructions and policy practice, Schneider & Ingram’s (1993) theorisations are deemed suitable for this study.

In securitisation theory much attention is paid to representation and the constructions of identities as well. Baker-Beall (2016) describes how discourses are productive of identity, and identity is constructed through differentiation within discourses. Baker-Beall (2016) depicts representation as a framework through which identity can be accessed. In addition, just as

discourses are, identity is not something that is given, rather it is evolving and changing over time (Baker-Beall, 2014). The following description by Croft (2006) captures why identity is such an important part of discourse analysis, even more so in the context of securitisation;

*‘Discourses create and reflect identities, and thus they construct those who are our allies and those who are our enemies. When not in flux, they settle who ‘we’ are, and who ‘they’ are; what ‘we’ stand for, and what ‘they’ mean to ‘us’.’* (p. 1)

Central within the construction of identity in securitisation research is the construction of ‘the other’. Not only certain phenomenon can be portrayed in terms of threats, so can identities. Croft (2012) addresses ‘...the securitisation of identities...’ (p. 73) or ‘...the securitisation of subjectivity...’ (p. 72). According to Croft (2012) securitisation moves can lead to the construction of, or the reconstruction of, identities. However, not all identities are necessarily based on securitisations (Croft, 2012). Based on Hansen’s (in Croft, 2012) typologies of Self-Other constructions, Croft (2012) describes how securitisation can manifest itself in the construction of identities. An example is the manifestation of securitisation by the construction of the Radical Other, which represents a threatening form of an *other* as opposed to the *self* (Croft, 2012). Baker-Beall’s (2016) research goes into the construction of the other as well, it describes how internal and external ‘others’ are constructed as security threats in the discourse of the EU on counter-terrorism policy. Croft (2006) relates the creation of ‘we’ versus ‘they’ constructions to crisis situations;

*‘The creation and expansion of such constructions is mostly played out in and through a crisis, and it is crises that are the engines of radical discursive change. Crises often mark the origins of a particular discourse, and a discourse that emerges with credibility in a crisis – in a sense, that which gives the crisis meaning – will soon take on the hallowed status of ‘common sense’ amongst those concerned with the issues both raised and threatened by that specific crisis.’* (p.1)

In conclusion, Schneider & Ingram (1993) address the social construction of target groups and how distinctions can be made between negatively and positively described groups, or deserving and non-deserving groups. Their theoretical approach also provides useful insight into how the analytical link can be made between discourse and policy practice by looking at negative and

positive policy incentives. In securitisation research the main consideration in analysing identity regards the construction of the other, which can be internal as well as external (Baker-Beall, 2016). In addition, it is pointed out that identities can be securitised and how crisis can serve as the origin of securitising discourses (Croft, 2006, 2012).

### **3. Methodological Framework**

This chapter firstly describes the research design, methods, and data selection used for this analysis. In the previous chapter the concepts of securitisation, discourse, performativity and identity have been described. In this chapter these theoretical insights are used to come to an operationalisation of an analysis of the EU's discourse and its performativity in the response to migratory developments.

#### **3.1 Research Design and Methods**

The aim of this study is to analyse the discursive response of the EU to migratory developments and the performativity of this discourse on policy proposals. The research takes an analytical approach, meaning that the focus of the research is less about the causative relationships and more about the mechanism at play which create certain outcomes and non-outcomes. The relevance of the research therefore lies less in its predictive quality, and more in its theoretical and methodological contributions to both the field of securitisation and discursive research in general. The research is designed as a single case study, which is descriptive and analytical in nature. Descriptive case studies are about describing characteristics of phenomena in their contexts, and can be used for theory and framework building (Baškarada, 2014). An empirically rich, in-depth understanding of the case study at hand is provided. In addition, the research provides relevant contributions to the understanding of discourses, securitisation and performativity in a more general sense. The theoretical insights and operationalisation described in this research can be generalised in other case studies on official discourses and performativity.

The case study subjected to this analysis is the response of the European Union to migratory developments, within two fixed timeframes. The timeframes contain the period ranging from the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2015, until the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, and the period ranging from the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2020 until the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2020. The design using two fixed timeframes adds to the analysis a comparative element by focussing on the development of the phenomenon over time and within different contexts. Especially the previously discussed

understanding of discourses as ever-changing structures of meaning, and the post-Copenhagen understanding of securitisation as an ongoing process, makes it relevant to look at one case in two frameworks. In this regard, the selected timeframes are especially interesting, because of their diverging contexts. Interesting about these specific timeframes, is that in the first timeframe the migratory developments in the Mediterranean were a more relevant topic on the EU's agenda. In contrast, in the 2020 timeframe, when the COVID pandemic constitutes a more prevalent topic on the EU's agenda, the topic of migration is less of a priority. In addition, the 2015 timeframe already is an often discussed case in literature, this research adds more recent empirical findings, in the form of the 2020 timeframe.

The methods used in this research consist of a discourse analysis which is extended by a contextual analytical strategy to account for the performative potential of the discourse. There are various forms of discourse analysis, such as critical discourse analysis, discursive practices approach and discourse theoretical analysis (Baker-Beall, 2016). The type of discourse analysis is mainly a result of the theoretical understanding of discourse itself. Scholars adopting critical discourse analysis are Balzacq (2005) and Stritzel (2012). Research adopting critical discourse analysis understand securitisation as a strategic practice (Balzacq, 2005). However, in this research discourses and policies are to be understood as being mutually constitutive (Baker-Beall, 2016). This research therefore adopts a type of discourse analysis used in discursive practices approaches (Doty, 1993) and discourse theoretical analysis (Sheperd, 2008). Paragraph 3.3 goes further into the design of the discourse analysis and the further analytical strategies used.

### **3.2 Data Selection**

The focus of the research is on the official discourse of the EU and the actor studied is the EU. The texts that have been selected for the analysis constitute the EU's discourse on migratory developments. In other words, they are seen as being representative of the construction of the EU's common language on migration. The selected texts are produced by the EU institutions responsible for EU-level policy making, which are the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Annex II provides a list of all texts which have been subjected to the discourse analysis.


Data has been collected within the two fixed timeframes of the case study, which consists of the period ranging from the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2015 until the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, and the period ranging from the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2020 until the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2020. Key texts

produced by the commission were collected by searching for the word '*migration*' in the '*search press material*' option available on the commission's website. This was followed by a selection, filtering out all non-relevant texts such as meeting calendars, non-English documents, and texts containing the word 'migration' but not related to the objective of this study. Texts produced by the Council of the European Union were collected by searching for a broader range of key words, such as '*migration*', '*Mediterranean*', and '*refugee*'. This search was conducted in both the register as in the '*search for press releases and statements*' options available on the councils' website. The reasons for the broader search of key words compared to the search for commission texts, is that the tools for searching documents on the Councils' site only search for key words in titles, rather than also in texts. Subsequently, also the collected documents from the councils' websites were subjected to a selection based on relevance for this study as well.

The data selection resulted in 61 documents for the 2015 case, consisting of approximately 142 pages of texts, and 29 documents for the 2020 case, consisting of approximately 196 pages of text. The discrepancy between these numbers can be explained by the context of the timeframes. The 2015 case is characterised by a series of events usually referred to as the 2015 refugee crisis. The selected documents mainly consist of short texts, such as press releases, speeches, statements and announcements, and only two longer texts, a communication and a proposal. During the 2020 timeframe, the European Union produced less short texts, such as press releases etc. However, a significant larger amount of longer documents were produced, consisting of proposals, recommendations and communications centred around the publication of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Figure 1 visualises the spread of the documents over the two timeframes. The difference in the amount, nature, and spread of the documents published in the two timeframes already reveals something distinctive about the different contexts of the two timeframes. These differences are taken into account in the discourse analysis.

**Figure 1**

*Spread of documents over the two timeframes*



### 3.3 Operationalisation

This research adopts a two-staged analytical strategy, in order to include both an analysis of the EU discourse as well as the performativity of this discourse. Baker-Beall (2016, 2019), based on Shepherd (2008) adopts a two staged double reading strategy, in which the first reading is aimed at mapping the discourse, and the second reading consists of a wider contextual analysis. Van Ostaijen (2016) adopts a two-staged analytical strategy as well. Firstly, the governmental discourses are constructed, subsequently the performativity of the discourse on the policy proposals is analysed (Van Ostaijen, 2016). This research adopts and combines elements from both of these scholars, in order to come to an optimal operationalisation to achieve the aim of this analysis. Similar to the works of Baker-Beall (2016) and Van Ostaijen (2016), the operationalisation used in this research consists of a two-staged analytical strategy as well. The first part of the analysis aims at mapping the political discourse of the EU on migration development in the two selected timeframes. This part of the analysis relies on a discourse analysis by means of the software program NVivo. Nvivo provides a suitable tool for discourse analysis because it enables references to be clustered into categories and gives an overview of their characteristics. In addition, it gives the number of references, which provide a helpful tool to conclude which discourses are dominant and which are minor. This analytical part is referred to as *the discourse analysis* or *mapping the discourse*. In the second part of the analysis the results from the discourse analysis are related to an analysis of policy proposals. This part of the analysis is referred to as *the functioning of the discourse*. In the continuation of this paragraph methodological elements and operationalisations from both Baker-Beall (2016) as



from Van Ostaijen (2016) are described and it is discussed how these elements have been combined.

### 3.3.1 Mapping the Discourse

The discourse analysis is subdivided into two discursive levels, the supportive discursive level and the narrative discursive level. Within both levels different main strands of the discourse are distinguished. Strands are understood as discursive themes or categories (Baker-Beall, 2016). To more explicitly operationalise the analytical stages and the corresponding categories of discursive strands, a coding scheme (table 1) has been created. This has been done by means of a mixed strategy (Coticchia & D'Amato, 2018), or by the strategy of back-and-forth reasoning (Berg & Lune, 2004). This means that initially, based on the works of Baker-Beall (2016) and Van Ostaijen (2016), a concept driven, deductive, outline for the coding scheme was created. Thereafter, by means of an inductive, data driven approach, the scheme was complemented with subcategories. In other words, *“the researcher goes back and forth between theoretical concepts (the deductive grid) and the empirical findings.”* (Van Ostaijen, 2016, p. 8).

A question suggested by Baker-Beall (2016), which is central to the first part of the discourse analysis is *“What are the key words, terms, phrases, labels, metaphors, beliefs and assumptions, which are central to each of the texts?”* (p. 43). Distinguishing these elements serves the purpose of *“... highlight the key themes upon which the discourse rests ...”* (Baker-Beall, 2019, p. 411). Though not fully similar, but with significant overlap, these questions posed by Baker-Beall (2016) can be related to what Van Ostaijen (2016) defines as *“...poetic elements...”* (p. 4), which are *“...concepts, metaphors, myths and numbers...”* (p. 4). In this research these discursive spaces are seen as supportive of the main narrative of the discourse, and therefore they are referred to as supportive discourses. As can be seen in table 1, the supportive discursive level consists of 6 main categories. These categories have been established inductively, and constitute 6 themes which support the narrative of the discourse.

Baker-Beall's (2016) analytical approach subsequently addresses how the discourse constructs particular subjects and objects, and how relations between subjects and objects are established. Similarly, this part of the discourse analysis is described by Van Ostaijen (2016) as storyline elements or narrative components of the discourse, which in turn can be specified by objectives and subjectives. Van Ostaijen (2016) describes the objective to refer to the definition of the problem and the subjective to the targeted populations. This discursive level constitutes the main narrative of the discourse and is therefore referred to as the narrative discursive level. The narrative discursive level consists of two main categories; the problem

definition and target group construction. These main categories have been established deductively, based on the works of Baker-Beall (2016) and Van Ostaijen (2016).

The discursive level addressing the subjectives of the discourse specifically incorporates Schneider & Ingram's (1993) social construction of target populations framework. It is established which groups are constructed and whether they are described as deserving or non-deserving. This approach is chosen to already make a connection to the subsequent analytical part assessing the functioning of the discourse.

Securitisation theory is not explicitly positioned within the operationalisation of table 1. Instead, the complete political discourse of the EU is mapped and it is analysed how securitisation manifest itself in this overall discourse. This responds to the theoretically established need for intertextuality. Securitisation is analysed by the use of several indicators, reflecting the presence of the concept in texts. Stritzel (2012) describes different types of securitising speech acts such as; claims that something is dangerous or is an existential threat, a warning that something has to be done, a demand that something should be done, and proof in support of the claims, warnings or demands.

### **3.3.2 Functioning of the Discourse**

The second analytical stage is aimed to move beyond the linguistic part of the analysis in order to analyse its performativity. This part of the analysis is aimed to assess the functioning of the discourse. Baker-Beall (2016) argues that adding a second stage to the analysis is relevant given that a linguistic analysis alone is insufficient to analyse the relationship between discourse and policy practice (Baker-Beall, 2016). Baker-Beall (2019) adopts a *"...a wider contextual analysis highlighting the ways in which the discourse structures the policy responses to the issues that it describes."* (p. 441). The purpose of this analytical stage is to analyse the ways in which the discourse makes political practices possible (Baker-Beall, 2019). Baker-Beall (2016) proposes several questions to be addressed in this analytical stage. The first question is; *"How does the discourse structure and/or fix the meaning, logic and policy response to the groups and/or the events that it describes?"* (p. 45). Thereafter the following question is to be answered; *"What knowledge and/or practices are legitimised by the discourse and what knowledge and/or practices are excluded by the discourse?"* (Baker-Beall, 2016, p. 45). Van Ostaijen (2016) designs a second analytical stage as well, aiming at explicitly operationalising the performativity of the discourse. Van Ostaijen (2016) describes this as; *"Thirdly, by putting explicit attention to the performative element of discourses, contributing to go beyond mere descriptive-analytical accounts on metaphor or discourse analysis."* (p. 5). Van Ostaijen

(2016) specifically focusses on the course of action implied in policy proposals. This study adopts Van Ostaïjen's (2016) approach to focus the second analytical strategy on policy proposals. The aim of this second stage of the analysis is to analyse the functioning of the discourse by looking at its performative elements. It is analysed what course of action is implied in policy proposals and how this relates to the supportive and narrative discursive strands analysed in the first stage of the analysis. In relation to the analysis of the subjectives, specific attention is paid to negative and positive policy incentives to certain target groups which have been discursively constructed. The timeframes under analysis within the broader case study of this research both contain the introduction of a package of proposals. The European Agenda on Migration in the 2015 timeframe and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in the 2020 timeframe. These two packages of proposals are under analysis in analysing the functioning of the discourse.

**Table 1***Coding scheme*

<b>Mapping the discourse : Supportive discursive level</b>		
<b>Main Strands</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Subcategories</b>
Problem association	What is the problem associated with?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Internal border control</li> <li>&gt; External border control</li> <li>&gt; Trafficking/smuggling</li> <li>&gt; Irregular/illegal migration</li> <li>&gt; Opportunities/benefits</li> <li>&gt; Humanitarian considerations</li> <li>&gt; Return</li> <li>&gt; Root causes</li> <li>&gt; Legal migration</li> <li>&gt; Crisis preparedness</li> <li>&gt; Health Concerns</li> </ul>
Authority and legitimisation	Based on what authority? What rules are relevant?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; International law</li> <li>&gt; EU law</li> <li>&gt; Social authority and credibility</li> </ul>
Responsibility	Whose responsibility is the problem? Whose problem is it to solve?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; EU responsibility</li> <li>&gt; Member state responsibility</li> <li>&gt; International Community</li> </ul>
Cooperation and solidarity	References to cooperation and solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; External cooperation and solidarity</li> <li>&gt; Internal cooperation and solidarity</li> <li>&gt; Improving and rebuilding trust</li> </ul>
Urgency	Expressions of urgency, priority or commitment	
Recognition of failure	Expressions of recognition of failure	

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**Mapping the discourse : Narrative discursive level**


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<b>Main Strands</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Subcategories</b>
Problem definition	How is the problem described/defined?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; A crisis or a challenge</li> <li>&gt; A security challenge</li> <li>&gt; Tragedy or humanitarian crisis</li> <li>&gt; Normalisation of the problem</li> <li>&gt; Neutral or pragmatic description of the problem</li> </ul>
Target group construction	<p>To who is the problem related?</p> <p>Who is deserving, who is not?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Deserving – host communities</li> <li>&gt; Deserving – private actors</li> <li>&gt; Deserving – vulnerable or in need</li> <li>&gt; Neutral – general neutral descriptions</li> <li>&gt; Neutral – migrants</li> <li>&gt; Non-Deserving – criminals, traffickers, smugglers</li> <li>&gt; Non-Deserving – illegals, irregulars, no right to protection</li> </ul>

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**Performativity of the Discourse**


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Course of action	<p>What course of action is implied?</p> <p>On what logic is this proposed course of action based?</p> <p>How does the discourse structure the policy proposals?</p> <p>Which target groups enjoy negative or positive policy incentives?</p>
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### **3.4 Research Limitations**

Some limitations resulting from the design of this research need to be acknowledged and taken into account. The first limitation regards the scope of the analysis of performativity. The analysis assesses performativity on policy proposals which constitute only the first stage of the policy process and not the entire policy process. Nevertheless, as is explained by Van Ostaijen (2016), policy proposals are signposts or precursors to policy outcomes. Therefore, they are seen as suitable objects of analysis when analysing performativity.

In terms of methodological limitations, it needs to be acknowledged that the data under analysis solely consist of texts, and for example, not of interviews. The effect of this limitation has been minimised by making the textual analysis as extensive as possible. Resulting in empirically rich evidence for the conclusion of this work. The limitations to the case selection has already been touched upon in the description of the research design. The case study does not speak to all cases but especially in analytical terms generalisation is possible in other cases in which the performative potential of official discourses is to be researched.

The last limitation regards viewing the EU as a unified actor. Even though, it can be discussed whether the EU is a homogeneous actor, it is possible to identify a common political discourse of the EU (Baker-Beall, 2019). In addition, as is explained by Baker-Beall (2016), by adopting a constructivist understanding of actorness, it can be argued that the EU can be analysed as a unified actor because it establishes itself as such in relation to the social world.

## **4. Analysis: Laying Out the Discursive Map**

This first analysis chapter describes the results of the analysis of the discourse of the EU on migratory developments. This is done along the lines of two discursive levels; the supportive and the narrative level. The discourse analysis has been conducted using the software programme Nvivo. The results of this analysis in terms of numbers are attached in Annex I. The amount of references made to a certain subcategory and the proportion of references made to a subcategory as compared to the overall category is used to determine whether a certain subcategory is dominant or minor. It is assessed how attention within the discursive strands is proportionally divided over the subcategory. In addition, the content and the linguistic characteristics of these references constitute an important part of the discourse analysis. Representative examples of references are used to elaborate on this. References from the discourse analysis are linked to the analysed texts by the use of footnotes. A list of all texts subjected to the discourse analysis is attached in Annex II. Mapping the discourse shows how


supportive discourses on problem associations and these such as solidarity and urgency, underly the narrative of the discourse, which establish the objectives and subjectives of the discourse. It is shown how securitising discourses manifest themselves with the broader discursive map. Furthermore, the discourse analysis show how the discourse develops over time, and how securitisation of subjectives shifts from the criminal other in the 2015 timeframe to the migrant other in the 2020 timeframe.

#### 4.1 Problem Associations

This paragraph addresses the problem association, which are the key themes and concepts with which the problem is associated. As can be seen in the coding scheme in table 1, 12 subcategories have been distinguished. The proportion of references made to these subcategories, as compared to the main category of problem association, have been visualised in figure 2. It is observed how humanitarian discourses, though declining in the 2020 timeframe, exist next to discourses on border control, criminality and illegal migration. In addition, minor discourses on legal migration, the opportunities of migration, and the root causes of migration exist. Discourses on crisis preparedness and health considerations seem to be new in the 2020 timeframe. These results will be discussed more elaborately in the subparagraphs.

**Figure 2**

*References made to subcategories within overall problem association in the 2015 and the 2020 timeframes*



### 4.1.1 Declining Humanitarianism

In both the 2015 as well as the 2020 timeframe humanitarian considerations are dominant themes within the discourse. References to humanitarian considerations constitute a larger proportion in the 2015 timeframe (33.7%) than in the 2020 timeframe (18.9%), compared to the overall references made to problem associations. Examples of references to humanitarian considerations from the 2015 case are expressions to ‘...prevent more people from dying at sea.’<sup>1</sup>, and increasing ‘...search and rescue efforts at sea...’<sup>2</sup>. In addition, humanitarian values play a role in the 2015 timeframe. For example, in September 2015, former Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos said; ‘We are in a country where humanism was born and became a universal value which is inseparable from the values of Europe.’<sup>3</sup>. Similar references to humanitarian considerations are found in the 2020 timeframe. In September 2020, President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen said about the European Pact on Migration that ‘It will take a human and humane approach...’<sup>4</sup>. As was the case in the 2015 timeframe, references are made to the need to save lives, and references include the ‘...protection and care...’<sup>5</sup> in this case specifically of unaccompanied minors, and the need to ‘...support the immediate humanitarian needs’<sup>6</sup> in this case for migrants as a response to the fires in the Moria refugee camp<sup>7</sup>. However, in the 2020 timeframe the majority of the references made within the subcategory of humanitarian considerations can be subscribed to texts on humanitarian admission, disembarkations following search and rescue, and the prevention of criminalization of humanitarian actors engaged in search and rescue. These are three extensively discussed topics in the 2020 timeframe. These references are less normative compared to the references to humanitarian values which constitute the larger part of the 2015 timeframe. Therefore, it is argued that the

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<sup>1</sup> Please note that the quotations used in this analysis should be seen as representative and relevant examples of the argument that is made. Further evidence for the arguments made can be found in Annex I. References resulting from the discourse analysis are referred to by the usage of footnotes. Further information on all texts subjected to the discourse analysis can be found in Annex II. Please note that the page numbering of references from online sources such as press releases and statements rely on the format of the PDF versions of these publications.

Council of the EU, April 23<sup>rd</sup> 2015, Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement. (p.1)

<sup>2</sup> European Commission, August, 6<sup>th</sup> 2015, Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos on the recent incident in the Mediterranean. (p.1)

<sup>3</sup> European Commission, September 4<sup>th</sup> 2015, Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at Kos Press Conference. (p.4)

<sup>4</sup> European Commission, September 20<sup>th</sup> 2020, Let's make change happen: op-ed article by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. (p.1)

<sup>5</sup> European Commission, July 8<sup>th</sup> 2020, Migration: Relocation of unaccompanied children from Greece to Portugal and Finland. (p. 1)

<sup>6</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Migration: A European taskforce to resolve emergency situation on Lesbos. (p.1)

<sup>7</sup> Referring to the fires which broke out on Tuesday September 8<sup>th</sup> in the Moria asylum centre, on Lesbos Greece.



humanitarian discourse in the 2015 timeframe is more dominant in comparison to the 2020 timeframe.

#### 4.1.2 Continued Border Securitisation

External border control constitutes another substantial discursive subcategory apparent in both timeframes. Total number of references is again larger in 2020 (185) compared to 2015 (104), but percentages are comparable (14.3% for 2015, 11.4% for 2020). External border control is depicted as a crucial element associated with migration policy. In a press release by the European Commission in September 2015 it is stated that *‘The external border remains the most important single point for establishing the stability of asylum and migration policy as a whole.’*<sup>8</sup>. The importance border management is repeatedly stressed. Many references are made to the need to *‘...strengthen...’*<sup>9</sup>, *‘...protect...’*<sup>10</sup> and *‘...securing...’*<sup>11</sup> borders. The usage of such words raises the impression that the external border is under threat, even though this is not explicitly stated. In the 2020 timeframe similar references are made. In a speech on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in September 2020, Vice-President of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, states that the New Pact comprises *‘Robust management of our external borders...’*<sup>12</sup>. In addition, in the 2020 timeframe, references are made to policies on introducing a *‘...screening procedure at the external border.’*<sup>13</sup>. These references describe the border being under threat and include warnings that something needs to be done responding to these threats, based on the works of Strizel (2012) this can be distinguished as securitising speech acts. Thus, it can be concluded that there is a securitisation of the EU external border which continues throughout both timeframes.

Associating migration to external border control is related to the subcategory referring to the internal border. This is a minor discourse apparent in both timeframes (1.2% for 2015, 2.1% for 2020). In a press release by the European Commission in September 2015 it is stated that *‘It is a strong external border which allows us to free up our internal borders through the Schengen area, and to guarantee free movement of people. So we must work more closely together to manage our external borders.’*<sup>14</sup>. The relation between external and internal border control is also expressed in the 2020 timeframe. In addition, in both timeframes the (potential)

<sup>8</sup> European Commission, September 29<sup>th</sup> 2015, Communication: Managing the refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration. (p.13)

<sup>9</sup> European Commission, September 17<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after his visit in Rosenheim. (p.1)

<sup>10</sup> European Commission, September 24<sup>th</sup> 2015, Refugee crisis: Commission satisfied with results of summit meeting. (p.1)

<sup>11</sup> European Commission, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, A European Agenda on Migration. (p.6)

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Speech by Vice-President Schinas on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. (p.1)

<sup>13</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, On a New Pact on Migration and Asylum. (p.9)

<sup>14</sup> See footnote 8. (p.13)

reintroduction of internal border controls are depicted as important considerations. There is a need for ‘...*protecting the Schengen area...*’<sup>15</sup>. Constructing the external border as conditional to the Schengen area, which is also depicted as being under threat, thus strengthens the securitisation of the border.

#### 4.1.3 Securitisation: Criminality and Illegality

In both the 2015 as the 2020 timeframes migration is associated with criminal activities such as trafficking and smuggling. The amount of references in the two timeframes is the same (both 69 references) but in terms of percentages compared to the main category of problem association, relatively more attention is paid to criminal activities in 2015 (9.5%) as compared to 2020 (4.3%). A need is described to ‘...*prevent and counter...*’<sup>16</sup>, ‘...*fight...*’<sup>17</sup> or to ‘...*combat,*’<sup>18</sup> these activities. Again, the usage of these words indicate a dangerous situation or even a threat. In addition, they include a warning that something needs to be done and thus point to securitisation (Strizel, 2012). In addition, strong negative values are added to these criminal activities. In a statement in May 2015, Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans said; ‘*We are taking measure to disrupt the brutal people smuggling trade...*’<sup>19</sup>, in a different statement in August 2015, trafficking and smuggling activities are described as ‘...*sinister, criminal acts...*’<sup>20</sup>.

Another negatively loaded discursive subcategory is that of irregular and illegal migration which is occurrent in the discourses of both timeframes. The amount of references is significantly larger in 2020 (179) as compared to 2015 (52) and the percentage is slightly larger in 2020 (10.7%) as compared to 2015 (7.2%). Despite the fact that irregular and illegal migration are different concepts, they are deliberately clustered into one subcategory. In the glossary of the European Commission, the distinction between these concepts is described as follows;

*‘Due to this and the association with criminality the term ‘illegal migration’ should be avoided, as most irregular migrants are not criminals. [...] ‘illegal’ is preferred when*

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<sup>15</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817. (p.2)

<sup>16</sup> European Commission, May 27<sup>th</sup> 2015, Commission fulfils its commitment to act swiftly on migration. (p.2)

<sup>17</sup> Council of the EU, May 18<sup>th</sup> 2015, EU-Turkey Association Council. (p.1)

<sup>18</sup> See footnote 1. (p.1)

<sup>19</sup> European Commission, May 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, Opening Statement by First Vice-President Timmermans at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the European Agenda on Migration. (p.1)

<sup>20</sup> European Commission, August 27<sup>th</sup> 2015, Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos. (p.1)

*referring to a status or process, whereas ‘irregular’ is preferred when referring to a person.’* (European Commission, 2019, Note(s) section, para. 3).

Even though the EU itself recognises the distinction between these concepts (European Commission, 2019), the terms are used alternately in similar linguistic structures. In the 2015 timeframe a need is described to ‘...prevent ...’<sup>21</sup> and ‘...fight...’<sup>22</sup> irregular and illegal migration, again indicating securitising discourses (Strizel, 2012). In addition, illegal and irregular migration are linked to external border control as there are expressions of concern about ‘...illegal border crossings...’<sup>23</sup> and ‘...irregular border crossings...’<sup>24</sup>. Besides the objective to fight irregular and illegal migration references are made to a ‘...fight against abuses of the asylum system.’<sup>25</sup>. Abuses of the asylum system are described as follows;

*‘Strengthening the Common European Asylum System also means a more effective approach to abuses. Too many requests are unfounded: in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asylum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of Member States to provide swift protection to those in need.’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 12)

Abuses of the asylum system are included in this subcategory as the discursive approach to this phenomenon is similar to that of illegal and irregular migration. They are both activities conducted by the migrants themselves and they are negatively described within the EU’s discourse, in so far that there is a need to fight these phenomena. In the 2020 timeframe, where both the amount and proportion of references made to irregular and illegal migration is larger compared to the 2015 case, similar discursive patterns are recognised. An example reference in the 2020 timeframe is; ‘...the need to ensure that asylum systems of the Member States are not abused by applicants...’<sup>26</sup>. In addition, in the 2020 timeframe there is an increased focus on onward movements by migrants in the European Union. This phenomenon is again described

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<sup>21</sup> European Commission, April 24<sup>th</sup> 2015, EU leaders agree actions to tackle Mediterranean tragedy. (p.1)

<sup>22</sup> See footnote 11. (p.6)

<sup>23</sup> European Commission, September 9<sup>th</sup> 2015, Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action. (p.1)

<sup>24</sup> See footnote 23. (p.1)

<sup>25</sup> See footnote 11. (p.14)

<sup>26</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU. (p.7)

in the context of the need to ‘...combat unauthorised movements within the EU...’<sup>27</sup>, and ‘...decrease the risk of applicants absconding or performing unauthorised movements.’<sup>28</sup>.

Both in terms of number of references as well as percentage compared to main category, the discourse on the necessity and importance of return policy associated to migration is more dominant in the 2020 timeframe (393 references, 24.3%) compared to the 2015 timeframe (88 references, 12.1%). References are made such as ‘...ensuring effective return and readmission...’<sup>29</sup>. The characteristics of the references themselves do not differ substantially in both timeframes, it is only the proportion of references made to return policy that differs.

#### 4.1.4 New and Minor Discourses

Legal migration is a minor discourse in both timeframes. The amount of references is similar (48 for 2015, 55 for 2020), the proportion of references made is slightly larger in the 2015 timeframe (6.6%) compared to the 2020 timeframe (3.4%). In both timeframes there is recognition that legal migration should be offered as an alternative to irregular/illegal migration. In a speech in April 2015 former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said;

*‘...we must, in all urgency, address the questions surrounding the concept of legal migration. If we do not open the door, even if only a little, we should not be surprised when less fortunate people from across the planet try to break in through the window. We must open the door to stop people coming in through the windows.’*<sup>30</sup>.

Similar trends are found in the 2020 timeframes, there is a need for ‘...offering credible alternatives to irregular movements...’<sup>31</sup>.

Another minor discourse in both timeframes, with similar proportions of references (4.4% for 2015, 3.9% for 2020) is associating migration policy with opportunities and benefits. In the 2015 European Agenda on Migration the following is stated;

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<sup>27</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of biometric data for the effective application of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management] and of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Resettlement Regulation], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818. (p.8)

<sup>28</sup> See footnote 26. (p.9)

<sup>29</sup> Council of the EU, July 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, Council conclusions on migration. (p.1)

<sup>30</sup> European Commission, April 29<sup>th</sup> 2015, Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the European Parliament on the conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April: 'Tackling the migration crisis'. (p.1)

<sup>31</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, on legal pathways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humanitarian admission and other complementary pathways. (p.3)

*'The EU is also facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy.'*<sup>32</sup>.

A similar discursive trend is observable in the 2020 timeframe. It is claimed that *'...the EU is currently losing the global race for talent.'*<sup>33</sup>.

Migration management is associated with the need to address its root causes. However in the 2020 timeframe this trend is very minor (0.9%). The need to address the root causes of migration causes is more dominant in the 2015 timeframe, both in terms of total amount of references made to the subcategory (62) as well as the percentage (8.5%). In May 2015, Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini said; *'But we all know that a real, long term response will come only from fixing the root causes; from poverty to instability caused by wars, to the crises in Libya and Syria.'*<sup>34</sup>. So, the root causes of migration are depicted as something that needs to be fixed, or to *'...tackle the root causes of irregular migration..'*<sup>35</sup>. Similar references are less prevalent in the 2020 timeframe.

References made to fairness and equality for the migrants are in both timeframes very minor. Though, they are slightly more prevalent in the 2020 timeframe (1.7%), they might even neglectable in the 2015 timeframe (0.6%). In the 2020 timeframe references are made to the need for the *'...same fair treatment to asylum seekers throughout Europe...'*<sup>36</sup>.

There are two subcategories of problem associations which do not play a large role in the 2015 timeframe, but do in the 2020 timeframe. Associating migration policy to crisis preparedness is a quite prevalent discursive space in the 2020 case (12.4%). It is very minor in the 2015 case (1.7%). This result is further addressed in paragraph 4.1.3 where the definition of the problem as a challenge or crisis is discussed.

Another discursive strand is associating the problem with health concerns. Quite obviously, this is a discursive space arriving in the 2020 timeframe in the context of the 2020

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<sup>32</sup> See footnote 11. (p. 14)

<sup>33</sup> See footnote 13. (p. 25)

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration. (p.1)

<sup>35</sup> Council of the EU, May 18<sup>th</sup> 2015, Council establishes EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean. (p.1)

<sup>36</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum. (p.2)

COVID-19 pandemic and constitutes 5.9% of references in comparison to the overall amount of references. Firstly, references are made to the effects of the pandemic on migration policy. In April 2020 Vice-President Schinas said; *“The pandemic has direct consequences on the way EU asylum and return rules are being implemented and a disruptive effect on resettlement.”*<sup>37</sup>. In addition, in the 2020 timeframe the need for health checks, not explicitly mentioned in the context of the pandemic, becomes a reoccurring theme. There are proposals made for *“...health screening at the external border..”*<sup>38</sup>.

What can be concluded from looking at supportive discourses on problem associations, is that a discourse on humanitarian considerations exist next to securitised discourses on external border control, criminality but also on irregular- and illegal migration, abuses of the asylum system, and specifically in the 2020 timeframe unauthorized movements. In the 2020 timeframe there is more focus on return policy. Minor discourses exist on internal border control, legal migration, opportunities and benefits associated with migration, and fairness and equality. In the 2015 timeframe more attention is paid to the root causes of migration, and in the 2020 timeframe more attention is paid to crisis preparedness and health concerns. The following paragraph will describe other supportive discursive themes.

## **4.2 Supportive Themes**

Besides the problem association discursive strands there are some other supportive discourses recognisable in both of the discourses. Five themes underlying the discourse are distinguished. The main findings state that there is more attention to member state responsibility in the 2020 timeframe. Cooperation and solidarity are prevalent themes in both timeframes, with the subcategory of internal cooperation and solidarity being a dominant discourses in both timeframes. There are discourse assigning authority and legitimisation based on EU law, international law, and also on social legitimisation. The latter especially prevalent in the 2015 timeframe.

### **4.2.1 Assigning Responsibility**

Firstly, responsibility is a key theme underlying the discourse on European migration policy. This discursive strand addresses the questions; whose responsibility is the problem? and whose problem is it to solve? This discursive category contains three subcategories. Firstly, in the 2015 timeframe there are more expressions of the EU taking responsibility for migration management

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<sup>37</sup> European Commission, April 16<sup>th</sup> 2020, Coronavirus: Commission presents guidance on implementing EU rules on asylum and return procedures and on resettlement. (p.1)

<sup>38</sup> See footnote 26. (p.21)

(36.9% as compared to 4.9% for 2020). In September 2015 Commissioner Avramopoulos says; *‘Europe has a duty to protect those in need.’*<sup>39</sup>. In addition, references are made pointing at Europe’s responsibility to do something about migration related problems such as *‘Europe will not turn a blind eye.’*<sup>40</sup>. Fewer of such references are made in the 2020 timeframe.

The above discusses subcategory specifically points towards responsibility assigned to the EU as a whole. A second subcategory contains references emphasising the shared responsibility of EU member states. In both timeframes the responsibility of member states as an important theme (68 references in 2015, 96 references in 2020). In May 2015 High Vice-President Mogherini said; *‘Migration is a shared responsibility of all Member States.’*<sup>41</sup>. In September 2020 President von der Leyen said; *‘Everybody has to step up here and take responsibility.’*<sup>42</sup>. In addition many references are made in the 2020 timeframe to the *‘...fair sharing of responsibility.’*<sup>43</sup>.

A third subcategory constitutes references to the responsibility of the international community. In both timeframes this discursive strand is very minor, in the 2020 timeframe (1.9%) even more than in the 2015 timeframe (6.3%). In a speech in May 2015 Commissioner Avramopoulos refers to the responsibility of the international community by stating that *‘...managing migration is a shared responsibility across the world.’*<sup>44</sup>.

#### 4.2.2 Cooperation & Solidarity

Next to, but closely related to the discursive strand on responsibility, there is a discursive strand on cooperation and solidarity, which again contains three subcategories. The first category consists of expressions of the need for internal cooperation and solidarity, meaning within the EU, between member states. This is a very dominant theme in both timeframes (67.7% and 384 references in 2015, 64.9% and 489 references in 2020). The need to *‘...act as a true Union...’*<sup>45</sup> is important in the discourse on internal cooperation and solidarity. In September 2015 President Juncker states that; *‘If ever European solidarity needed to manifest itself, it is on the question of the refugee crisis. It is time to show collective courage and deliver this European response now.’*<sup>46</sup>. Based on such quotes, it can be argued that de internal cooperation

<sup>39</sup> European Commission, September 7<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos following his visit to Austria. (p.1)

<sup>40</sup> European Commission, June 19<sup>th</sup> 2015, Joint Statement ahead of World Refugee Day on 20 June. (p.1)

<sup>41</sup> European Commission, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration. (p.1)

<sup>42</sup> See footnote 13. (p.1)

<sup>43</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund]. (p.4)

<sup>44</sup> See footnote 19. (p.1)

<sup>45</sup> European Commission, September 7<sup>th</sup> 2015, Acting as a Union in the Refugee Crisis – Commission supports Austria. (p.1)

<sup>46</sup> See footnote 23. (p.1)

and solidarity discourse creates the impression that a European solution to migration is the only (effective) solution. Similar references to, and dominance of, this subcategory are apparent in the 2020 timeframe.

Cooperation and solidarity on the one hand, and responsibility on the other hand, are closely related. In May 2015, First Vice-President Timmermans states that *‘Solidarity goes hand in hand with responsibility’*<sup>47</sup>. In addition, solidarity and responsibility are depicted as core principles of the EU by expressing; *‘Based on the overarching principles of solidarity and a fair sharing of responsibility...’*<sup>48</sup>.

A second subcategory within the main category of cooperation and solidarity contains references to improving and rebuilding trust. References to this subcategory are minor but a larger proportion of references made to rebuilding and improving trust is apparent in the 2020 discourse (4.0%) compared to the 2015 timeframe (1.9%). In state of the Union in September 2015 President Jean-Claude Juncker states;

*‘There has been a lot finger pointing in the past weeks. Member States have accused each other of not doing enough or of doing the wrong thing. And more often than not fingers have been pointed from national capitals towards Brussels.’*<sup>49</sup>.

In the 2020 timeframes similar calls are made, for example references are made to the need to *‘...promote mutual trust among Member states.’*<sup>50</sup>. This discursive subcategory has an underlying assumption that internal solidarity and trust might be at stake.

A third subcategory is expressing the need for external cooperation and solidarity, which is a dominant discursive strand in both timeframes (30.3% for 2015, 31.2% for 2020). In May 2015 Commissioner Avramopoulos expressed the need to *‘...showing much needed solidarity with our neighbours who are already taking the brunt of the crisis in Syria and in Libya.’*<sup>51</sup>. In addition, he expresses the need to *‘... working closely with key international organisations...’*<sup>52</sup> is recurrent. These expressions to external cooperation and solidarity are also occurring in the 2020 timeframe.

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<sup>47</sup> European Commission, May 27<sup>th</sup> 2015, European Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration. (p.1)

<sup>48</sup> See footnote 15. (p.1)

<sup>49</sup> European Commission, September 9<sup>th</sup> 2015, State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity. (p.3)

<sup>50</sup> See footnote 27. (p.1)

<sup>51</sup> See footnote 19. (p.1)

<sup>52</sup> See footnote 8. (p.2)



### 4.2.3 Authority & Legitimization

Another supportive discursive strand is that of authority and legitimisation. References made to this discursive strand addresses the authority on which certain actions are based and the rules which are relevant. The first subcategory within this discursive strand is that of references to international law. This is more dominant in the 2020 timeframe (68.5%) compared to the 2015 timeframe (23.4%). Such references include expressions that rules or actions are ‘...in full compliance with international law, including humanitarian and refugee law and human rights.’<sup>53</sup> or ‘...the fundamental rights of the persons concerned should be protected...’<sup>54</sup>.

References to the subcategory of EU law are more dominant in the 2015 timeframe (46%) compared to the 2020 timeframe (22.1%). This mostly contains references regarding the compliance with and implementation of EU law. Such as ‘...ensure that the Charter of Fundamental Rights and other EU and international obligations are complied with...’<sup>55</sup>.

A third subcategory is that of references to social authority and credibility, which is more dominant in the 2015 case (30.6%) compared to the 2020 case (9.4%). In the response to the deaths in the Mediterranean in May 2015, Vice President Timmermans states that ‘Our citizens expect Member States and European institutions to act to prevent this tragedy from continuing unabated.’<sup>56</sup> Not only are references to social authority and credibility made in the context of humanitarian considerations, they are also made in reference to more general migration policy considerations such as in other statements made by Vice President Timmermans such as ‘This is essential for migration policies to be well accepted in society.’<sup>57</sup> In the 2020 timeframe references made to social authority and credibility are also made in relation to return policy. In the New Pact on Migration and Asylum it is stated that;

*‘EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned. Currently, only about a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. This erodes citizens’ trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration.’<sup>58</sup>*

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<sup>53</sup> Council of the EU, June 22<sup>nd</sup> 2015, Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean. (p.1)

<sup>54</sup> See footnote 15. (p.3)

<sup>55</sup> See footnote 15. (p.11)

<sup>56</sup> See footnote 34. (p.1)

<sup>57</sup> See footnote 46. (p.1)

<sup>58</sup> See footnote 13. (p.7)

#### 4.2.4 Urgency & Recognition of Failure

Another supportive discursive strand is that of expressions of a sense of urgency, priority, and commitment. This discursive strand is way more dominant in the 2015 case (402 references) compared to the 2020 case (163 references). In September 2015 President Juncker states that; *‘‘It is time for further, bold, determined and concerted action by the European Union, by its institutions and by all its Member States.’’*<sup>59</sup>. Other examples of such references are *‘‘...urgent action is needed...’’*<sup>60</sup> or *‘‘... we have been working day and night ...’’*<sup>61</sup>. Similar expressions are made in the 2020 timeframe, but to a lesser amount.

A minor theme is that of recognition of failure, which is prevalent in both timeframes, but more references are made in the 2020 timeframe (35 references) compared to the 2015 timeframe (32 references). In April 2015 President Juncker states that; *‘‘It was a serious mistake to bring the Mare Nostrum operation to an end. It cost human lives.’’*<sup>62</sup>. In the 2020 timeframe similar references are made such as a reference made by Vice-President Schinas that *‘‘Because the clock has run out on how long we can live in a house half built’’*<sup>63</sup>.

This part of the analysis shows that besides problem associations, there are other supportive discourses which reveal the themes underlying the EU’s discourse on migration. There is a recurrent expression of EU responsibility and member state responsibility which goes hand in hand with a dominant discourse appealing to internal cooperation and solidarity. Especially in the 2020 timeframe this seems to be supplemented by references made to the need to rebuild and improve trust which creates the impression that solidarity might be at stake. In both timeframes external cooperation and solidarity are a prevalent theme. Authority, rules, and legitimisation are also important underlying themes. There is more referral to international law in the 2020 timeframe. In the 2015 timeframe more attention is paid to EU law and social authority and subsequent credibility. In the 2015 timeframe, expressions of urgency, priority, and commitment constitute a very dominant discourse, which is less prevalent in the 2020 timeframe. Recognition of failure by the EU is prevalent in both timeframes but this discursive trend is minor. This concludes the supportive discursive level, the subsequent paragraphs will discuss the narrative on the objectives and subjectives of the discourse.

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<sup>59</sup> See footnote 8. (p.1)

<sup>60</sup> See footnote 23. (p.1)

<sup>61</sup> See footnote 39. (p.2)

<sup>62</sup> See footnote 30. (p.1)


<sup>63</sup> See footnote 12. (p.1)

### 4.3 Defining the Problem

The narrative of the discourse is about objects and subjects, or in other words, the problem definition and target groups. In this paragraph the definition of the problem within de discourse is addressed. Figure 3 visualises the proportion of references made to the five subcategories compared to the overall category of problem definition. This part of the analysis shows a shift from defining the problem as a crisis in the 2015 timeframe to crisis preparedness in the 2020 timeframe. In addition, a decline in describing the problem as a problem of humanitarianism is observed. Furthermore, more neutral problem definitions are found in the 2020 timeframe compared to the 2015 timeframe. These results are each discussed subsequently.

**Figure 3**

*Proportion of references made to subcategories within overall problem definition in 2015 and 2020 timeframes*



#### 4.3.1 From a Crisis Situation to Crisis Preparedness

In both 2015 and 2020 the problem is not expressively constructed as a security problem or challenge. The discursive spaces that do address security in the 2015 timeframe (2.1%) are implicit. They, for example relate security to external border control or crime prevention. The majority of the references to security challenges made in the 2020 timeframe (15.5%) relate to the proposal to introduced mandatory security checks at the border. A proposal by the commission in September 2020 describes how security objectives are part of the proposal;

*‘‘Therefore, the proposal also reinforces the security objective provided for in the proposal for a Screening Regulation, under which such a security check will be mandatory.’’*<sup>64</sup>. In addition, there is attention to regulations to prevent persons to enter to EU who *‘‘...present a danger to national security or public order.’’*<sup>65</sup>. The introduction of security checks, which is part of the package of proposals under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, explains the relative large proportion of references made to security challenges in the 2020 timeframe compared to the 2015 timeframe. There this is no explicit securitisation in either timeframe, but more security considerations are prevalent in the 2020 problem definition.

In 2015 (63.8%) as compared to 2020 (29.7%) there is a significantly more dominant discourse describing the object as a crisis or a challenge, which is putting pressure on member states. In August 2015 Commissioner Avramopoulos stated; *‘‘Today the world finds itself facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. And Europe finds itself struggling to deal with the high influxes of people seeking refuge within our borders.’’*<sup>66</sup>. References in the 2015 timeframe’s discourse analysis repeatedly include expressions such as *‘‘Member States’ asylum systems today face unprecedented pressure...’’*<sup>67</sup> or even stressing the severeness of the situation to a bigger extend; *‘‘...deal with a situation that it would be an understatement to describe as challenging.’’*<sup>68</sup>. The use of language in this subcategory emphasises that there is a very severe, exceptional, crisis situation, which leads to the conclusion that there is a need to take *‘‘Short term actions to stabilise the current situation...’’*<sup>69</sup>. This is supported by the discursive strand referring to the need of cooperation and solidarity. For example by a remark made by Commissioner Avramopoulos in September 2015; *‘‘We can only face and overcome this crisis if we act as a true Union, in full solidarity.’’*<sup>70</sup>. This type of problem definition in combination with references to cooperation and solidarity further strengthens the earlier discussed assumption that a European solution is the only solution. In addition, strong language is used expressing the severeness of the situation for individual member states, such as; *‘‘...the most affected Member States...’’*<sup>71</sup>. Moreover, there is repeated use of the word frontline, such as in the following reference, *‘‘...the Member States most exposed, on the frontline.’’*<sup>72</sup>. Which is notable, given the war-like nature of the phrase. Further references stress the exceptionality

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<sup>64</sup> See footnote 42. (p.7)

<sup>65</sup> See footnote 42. (p.22)

<sup>66</sup> European Commission, August 14<sup>th</sup> 2015, "A European Response to Migration: Showing solidarity and sharing responsibility". (p.1)

<sup>67</sup> See footnote 11. (p.4)

<sup>68</sup> See footnote 65. (p.1)

<sup>69</sup> See footnote 8. (p.1)

<sup>70</sup> See footnote 3. (p.4)

<sup>71</sup> See footnote 8. (p.1)

<sup>72</sup> See footnote 65. (p.1)

of the situation and create the impression that something is at stake. Such as the quote by First Vice-President Timmermans in September 2015; *‘Ladies and gentlemen, we are facing a moment of truth in European history. We can succeed jointly and united or we can fail each in our own way, in our own country, on our own islands.’*<sup>73</sup>. Not only emphasising the exceptionality of the situation but also again referring to the need for cooperation. Or as said by Commissioner Avramopoulos in September 2015; *‘We are in the midst of one of the most challenging moments for Europe and for its Member States.’*<sup>74</sup>.

The dominant discourse in the 2015 timeframe defining the problem as a crisis or a challenge can be related to the dominant supportive discourse of expressions of urgency, priority, and commitment. The discourse in the 2015 timeframe creates the impression that the situation is exceptional, there is a sense of urgency, and there are warnings and demands that something needs to be done. This corresponds to the indicators of securitising speech acts as presented by Strizel (2012). Croft (2006) points to the role of crisis situations in the development of discourse. Croft (2006) describes how discourses can gain credibility in a crisis, and subsequently the logic of the discourse can become common sense amongst those threatened by the crisis.

With these insights in mind the development of the crisis discourse in the 2020 timeframe are considered. In 2020 defining the problem as a crisis is less present and so is the discursive trend of expressing urgency. There is however, as has been touched upon, a strong association of the problem with crisis preparedness and the risk of a new crisis. Instead of defining the current situation as a crisis, crisis still is an important theme in the 2020 timeframe in terms of expressing the necessity of crisis preparedness. It is stated that *‘...the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected.’*<sup>75</sup> and needs *‘...protection against the risk of crisis situations.’*<sup>76</sup>. In addition, a differentiation is made between these two situations; *‘In these discussions, several Member States stressed the need to distinguish between regular and crisis situations and expressed a preference for accommodating them in different instruments.’*<sup>77</sup>. Thus, the urgency and crisis discourse established in the 2015 timeframe thus still play a role in the 2020 timeframe.

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<sup>73</sup> See footnote 3. (p.1)

<sup>74</sup> See footnote 39. (p.1)

<sup>75</sup> See footnote 13. (p.10)

<sup>76</sup> See footnote 13. (p.10)

<sup>77</sup> See footnote 36. (p.10)

### 4.3.2 Normalisation, Humanitarianism and Neutrality

What seems to be a new discursive trend in the 2020 case study is the recognition that migration is a constant factor (4.0% in 2020 compared to 0.9% in 2015). This might point to a normalisation of migration in the discourse in the 2020 case study compared to 2015. In September 2020 Commissioner Johansson states that; *‘Migration is normal- migration has always been here, migration will always be here.’*<sup>78</sup> . Similarly, President von der Leyen describes that; *‘Migration has always been a fact for Europe – and it will always be. Throughout centuries, it has defined our societies, enriched our cultures and shaped many of our lives. And this will always be the case.’*<sup>79</sup>.

Describing the problem as a tragedy or a humanitarian crisis is more prevalent in the 2015 case (10.5%) compared to the 2020 case (2.6%). This discursive subcategory differs from associating the problem with humanitarian considerations as it explicitly states the problem is a tragedy or humanitarian in its core and not only includes humanitarian considerations and concerns. However, the subcategories can be related. It is observed that both the supportive discourse, making associations with humanitarian considerations, as well as the narrative that the situation is a humanitarian crisis, are more prevalent in the 2015 case. An example is; *‘This is first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity.’*<sup>80</sup>. In September 2015, Commissioner Thyssen describes how; *‘The challenges we face have exponentially grown, as the ongoing refugee crisis is escalating into a humanitarian one.’*<sup>81</sup> . The larger proportion of references describing the problem as a tragedy or as being humanitarian in nature in the 2015 timeframe can be explained by the occurrence of events in the Mediterranean and the large media attention to these events. In the 2020 timeframe such problem definitions are less prevalent, and they mostly refer specifically to the situation in Moria refugee camp. As has been stated previously, the context of the two timeframes influences the nature of the texts produced. In 2015 there were more events in the context of migration that needed a quick response by the EU in the form of press releases. Such events were less prevalent in the 2020 timeframe.

The last subcategory in the overall category of problem definition includes neutral or pragmatic definitions of the problem. In relation to the 2015 timeframe (22.7%), such descriptions are more dominant in the 2020 timeframe (48.2%). Examples of neutral or

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<sup>78</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Speech by Commissioner Johansson on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. (p.1)

<sup>79</sup> European Commission, September 16<sup>th</sup> 2020, State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary. (p.11)

<sup>80</sup> See footnote 48. (p.2)

<sup>81</sup> European Commission, September 25<sup>th</sup> 2015, Speech by Commissioner Marianne Thyssen: EU funds in support of the refugee crisis. (p.1)

pragmatic descriptions are ‘...*the issue of migration...*’<sup>82</sup>, ‘...*management of migration...*’<sup>83</sup> or ‘...*addressing these realities...*’<sup>84</sup>. In the 2020 timeframe another recurrent approach to the problem, which does not necessarily carry any value or load, is that of a ‘...*fresh start on migration...*’<sup>85</sup> which is often repeated.

By looking at the narrative discourse of defining the problem, it can firstly be concluded that there is no explicit discourse defining the object as a security challenge. However, in the 2015 timeframe there is a dominant discourse defining the problem as a challenge or crisis. Especially considering the dominant discourse on urgency in the 2015 timeframe, the impression is created that the situation is exceptional and that something is at stake. In 2020 these discourses are less dominant, however crisis still is an important theme in this timeframe in the sense of crisis preparedness. The risk of a crisis is still present on the background within the 2020 discourse. The importance of the crisis theme can be related to Croft’s (2012) argument that crisis situations often stand at the beginning of securitisation trends. Opposite to these crisis discourses, there seems to be a new discourse normalising migration in the 2020 timeframe, yet this discourse is very minor. Humanitarian definition of the subject is more dominant in the 2015 timeframe, neutral, and pragmatic problem definitions are more dominant in the 2020 timeframe. The following paragraph will lay out how the narrative on the subjectives of the discourse is constructed.

#### **4.4 Constructions of Target Groups: Shifting Subjects**

This last part of the discourse analysis focusses on the construction of the target groups of European migration policy. It is addressed which groups are distinguished, whether they are seen deserving, non-deserving or neutral, and how they are described. Distinguishing between deserving and non-deserving trends already created a link from the discursive level to the performative level. This is further set out in chapter 5. There are 7 target groups that are related to the problem. The discursive strands determine which of these groups are deserving and which are not. Figure 4 visualises the proportion of references made to the subcategories of target group descriptions. The main finding in this stage of the analysis is the shift in focus from criminals as a non-deserving group in the 2015 timeframe, to illegal and irregular migrants in the 2020 timeframe.

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<sup>82</sup> See footnote 52. (p.1)


<sup>83</sup> See footnote 8. (p.3)

<sup>84</sup> See footnote 27. (p.2)

<sup>85</sup> See footnote 27. (p.1)

**Figure 4**

*Proportion of references made to subcategories within overall target group description in 2015 and 2020 timeframes*



#### 4.4.1 The Criminal Other

The first distinguished target group represents criminals, such as traffickers and smugglers. They are categorised as non-deserving. The amount and proportion of, references made to this group is larger in the 2015 timeframe (122 references, 20.2%) compared to the 2020 timeframe (29 references, 3.0%). Firstly, in the 2015 timeframe there are multiple references in which the necessity for action against this group is described, such as ‘...*stepping up the fight against traffickers and smugglers...*’<sup>86</sup> and ‘...*disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean.*’<sup>87</sup>. Moreover, a war is repeatedly declared against smugglers and traffickers. This is captured in these examples of statements made by Commissioner Avramopoulos in September 2015; ‘*We must do everything in our power to win the war we have declared against the smugglers*’<sup>88</sup> and;

*‘As I have already stated, Europe is already at war with the criminal networks that exploit and often condemn to death innocent human beings. We will not stand idle. With*

<sup>86</sup> See footnote 8. (p.4)

<sup>86</sup> Council of the EU, May 18<sup>th</sup> 2015, Council establishes EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean. (p.1)

<sup>88</sup> See footnote 39. (p.2)



*strong political will and resolve, new means and additional resources, we will hunt them down and destroy their capacity.*''<sup>89</sup>.

In addition, there are multiple descriptions about the people within this group describing them as ‘...cruel...’<sup>90</sup>, ‘...opportunistic....’<sup>91</sup>, ‘...merciless’<sup>92</sup>, and ‘...with no scruples whatsoever.’<sup>93</sup>. In a report by former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in April 2015 it is stated that; ‘*We are going after the smugglers, who are the real culprits, in fact criminals and have already sent an important message about our readiness to act.*’<sup>94</sup>. Firstly, the usage of words such as fight, and even a declaration of war, indicate a securitising discourse. It relies on a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ construction (Croft, 2006) and demands are made that action has to be taken against them (Stritzel, 2012). Moreover, the description of the criminals depicts them as a radical other. Which is described by Croft (2012) as a threatening other, as opposed to the self (Croft, 2012). Thus, it can be concluded that the construction of the criminal other points to a securitisation of the identity of this group.

#### **4.1.2 The Migrant Other**

In the 2020 timeframe the attention paid to criminals, traffickers and smugglers is less dominant. However, there is a larger focus on another non-deserving group, which consists of illegal migrants, irregular migrants and people with no right to protection or no right to stay in the EU. Before elaborating on this specific group, firstly the distinction made within the migrant group itself, in terms of deserving and non-deserving, must be addressed. This distinction becomes clear in the following examples;

*‘It is true that we also need to separate better those who are in clear need of international protection and are therefore very likely to apply for asylum successfully; and those who are leaving their country for other reasons which do not fall under the right of asylum.’*<sup>95</sup>

Said by President Juncker in his State of the Union in September 2015.

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<sup>89</sup> European Commission, April 23<sup>rd</sup> 2015, Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the press conference in Castille Place, Malta. (p.1)

<sup>90</sup> See footnote 10. (p.1)

<sup>91</sup> European Commission, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans' Introductory Remarks at the Commission Press Conference. (p.1)

<sup>92</sup> See footnote 90. (p.1)

<sup>93</sup> See footnote 20. (p.1)

<sup>94</sup> Council of the EU, April 29<sup>th</sup> 2015, Report by President Donald Tusk to the European Parliament on the special European Council on migration. (p.2)

<sup>95</sup> See footnote 48. (p.4)

This clear distinction within the group of migrants is also made in another statement by Vice President Timmermans in July 2015. In this same statement, the need to distinguish between deserving and non-deserving migrants is related to credibility and abuse of the asylum systems, which are also recurrent themes in the supportive discourse;

*'I have to say if you ask me what is the difference between legal and illegal migration, clearly somebody abusing the asylum system because they want a better life in Europe, that's illegal migration. And asylum policy should be for people who flee because they have to fear for their lives. I think we have less support in Europe for asylum policy because many of our citizens know that the system is being abused and we are not able if we discover people abusing the system to make sure they return to the countries they came from.'*<sup>96</sup> By First Vice-President Timmermans in July 2015

This expression of a need to distinguish between deserving and non-deserving migrants is also repeated in the 2020 discourse. The discourse on migrant groups thus holds the assumption that there is a clear division within this group. This corresponds with Schneider & Ingram's (1993) description of the phenomenon of subdivision, in which politicians make finer and finer distinctions within a particular group, along the lines of who is deserving and who is not.

The non-deserving group within the overall migrant group consists of illegals, irregulars, and those with no right to stay. References to this groups are more prevalent in the 2020 timeframe (20.8%) compared to the 2015 timeframe (11.4%). Similar to the supporting discourse associating the problem with illegal and irregular migration, in this discursive subcategory, there is also a mixed use of *'...illegal migrants...'*<sup>97</sup> as well as *'...irregular migrants...'*<sup>98</sup> in similar linguistic structures. Other examples of descriptions of this non-deserving group in the 2015 discourse are *'...those who do not have the right to stay in the EU.'*<sup>99</sup> The group is categorised as non-deserving because it is repeatedly proposed to take *'...strong and targeted action for those who try to abuse our system.'*<sup>100</sup> In addition, the need to return these groups is repeated, for example in the following statement made by

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<sup>96</sup> European Commission, July 7<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans - Debate in European Parliament Plenary Session on 2016 European Commission Work Programme. (p.3)

<sup>97</sup> European Commission, July 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks of Commissioner Avramopoulos after the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 July 2015. (p.1)

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, June 16<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg. (p.1)

<sup>99</sup> See footnote 9. (p.1)

<sup>100</sup> European Commission, May 20<sup>th</sup> 2015, Opening Statement by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the European Agenda on Migration. (p.2)

Commissioner Avramopoulos in May 2015; *'We will strengthen Frontex so that migrants, who have no right to stay on European soil, will be repatriated. We need to be firm.'*<sup>101</sup> and as stated by Vice-President Timmermans in July 2015; *'...and that people who don't deserve asylum are sent back to where they've come from.'*<sup>102</sup> This non-deserving target group even further problematised in the following quote derived from A European Agenda on Migration;

*'But by the same token, the EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay. Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right.'*<sup>103</sup>

In the 2020 timeframe similar references to this non-deserving group are found, such as *'...for those who are not in need of protection...'*<sup>104</sup> or *'...persons who are unlikely to receive protection in the EU...'*<sup>105</sup>. In addition, there are also more specific descriptions and definitions of who does and does not fall under this non-deserving category. Examples are; *'...identify illegally staying third-country nationals and those who have entered the European Union irregularly at the external borders.'*<sup>106</sup> In addition, in the 2020 timeframe, there is a discursive trend representing certain groups of migrants as a burden. Examples of such references are found in the following quote;

*'These include an increasing proportion of applicants for international protection without genuine claims who are unlikely to receive protection in the EU with a resulting increased administrative burden and delays in granting protection for those in genuine need of protection as well as a persistent phenomenon of onward movement of migrants within the EU.'*<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> European Commission, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, Commissioner Avramopoulos' remarks at the presentation of the European Agenda on Migration. (p.1)

<sup>102</sup> European Commission, July 7<sup>th</sup> 2015, Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans - Debate in European Parliament Plenary Session on 2016 European Commission Work Programme. (p.3)

<sup>103</sup> See footnote 11. (p.7)

<sup>104</sup> See footnote 15. (p.1)

<sup>105</sup> See footnote 15. (p.1)

<sup>106</sup> See footnote 27. (p.6)

<sup>107</sup> See footnote 42. (p.10)

The shift of attention in the 2020 timeframe compared to the 2015 timeframe, towards non-deserving irregular and illegal migrants, is in line with the supportive discourse associating the problem with irregular and illegal migration. The combination of the problematisation of the irregular and illegal migrants, the discourse on fighting irregular and illegal migration, the perceived risk of abuses of the system and unauthorised movements, and the positioning of irregular migrations as threatening to credibility of the system, point to the construction of the migrant other and securitisation of this subjective.

As opposed to the non-deserving group of irregular and illegal migrants, there is a constructed deserving target group including vulnerable people or people in need. This subcategory is prevalent and quite dominant both in the 2015 timeframe (275 references, 45.6%) as in the 2020 timeframe (317 references, 32.9%). Examples of references to this target group are “...people in clear need of international protection...”<sup>108</sup> and “... the most vulnerable people in need of international protection.”<sup>109</sup>. This last reference again indicates the phenomenon of subdivision (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). There are even further divisions made within the deserving group of migrants in the sense that there are people in more or in clearer need of international protection compared to other deserving migrants. The terms asylum seekers and refugees are also used in the context of positive policy incentives as opposed to the terms irregular and illegal migrants. In the 2020 timeframe similar references can be found but there are also more specific descriptions making distinctions between the deserving group of migrants. Examples are “...children...”<sup>110</sup> and especially more attention is paid to “...unaccompanied minors...”<sup>111</sup>, but also “...most vulnerable groups of migrants...”<sup>112</sup>.

Within the deserving group of migrants attention is paid to those who are needed. This can be related to associating the problem with economic benefits. Commissioner Avramopoulos in May 2015 describes these two groups in the context of “...extend a helping hand to those in need and strive to attract those we need.”<sup>113</sup>. This is emphasised by the personification used by President von der Leyen in her State of the Union address in September 2020;

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<sup>108</sup> See footnote 96. (p.1)

<sup>109</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, on legal pathways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humanitarian admission and other complementary pathways. (p.2)

<sup>110</sup> See footnote 26. (p.10)

<sup>111</sup> See footnote 26. (p.23)

<sup>112</sup> See footnote 108. (p.8)

<sup>113</sup> See footnote 19. (p.2)

*‘‘They [people with a right to stay] have a future to build – and skills, energy and talent. I think of Suadd, the teenage Syrian refugee who arrived in Europe dreaming of being a doctor. Within three years she was awarded a prestigious scholarship from the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland. I think of the Libyan and Somalian refugee doctors who offered their medical skills the moment the pandemic struck in France.’’<sup>114</sup>*

So, the description of this target group does not only contain passive descriptions of vulnerable people in the sense that they need to be helped, but it also recognised that part of this groups is needed. However, in both timeframes these discourses are minor.

#### **4.4.3 Neutral and Minor Discourses**

References to hosting communities as a deserving target group are minor in both timeframes (2.0% in 2015, 1.6% in 2020). With hosting communities the communities receiving and hosting migrants and refugees are meant. Including host communities within the EU, such as *‘‘... solidarity with the people of Kos and Greece.’’<sup>115</sup>* or *‘‘...supporting host communities...’’<sup>116</sup>* outside the EU. Another minor discursive strand exists on private actors and NGOs as a deserving group. This subcategory is only prevalent in the 2020 timeframe. The references are made in the context of an event in which private actors engaged in search and rescue activities have been criminalized. Which is a theme that is discussed in the 2020 timeframe. An example of reference to this target group is included in the following text from a communication from the European Commission in September 2020; *‘‘Its core objective is to disrupt the business model of criminal organisations that put migrants’ lives at risk and threaten our societies’ security, while avoiding risks of criminalising those who provide assistance to migrants in distress.’’<sup>117</sup>*

There are also two categories of target groups that are neither described as deserving nor non-deserving. They are referred to as neutral target group descriptions. The use of the word *migrants* constitutes a slightly larger proportion of references in the 2015 timeframe (8%) compared to the 2020 timeframe (14%). The reason for this word being categorised as neutral is that it is used neither in the context of positive nor in the context of negative terms. Remainder neutral target group descriptions such are more prevalent in the 2020 discourse (32.%) compared to the 2015 discourse (12.8%). This subcategory includes descriptions such as

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<sup>114</sup> See footnote 78. (p.12)

<sup>115</sup> See footnote 3. (p.1)

<sup>116</sup> See footnote 12. (p.2)

<sup>117</sup> European Commission, September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2020, Commission Guidance on the implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. (p.1)

‘...*applicants for international protection*...’<sup>118</sup> or ‘...*third country nationals*...’<sup>119</sup> and also the use of the words person, people, or the use of numbers to describe groups of people.

The 2015 timeframe contains a securitisation of traffickers and smugglers. This is supported by the earlier described discourse on smuggling and trafficking activities. This discourse is less dominant in the 2020 timeframe. Within the descriptions of migrants themselves, there is a clear distinction between a deserving and a non-deserving group. With those in need of protection or refugees on the one hand and those with no right to protection or irregular migrants on the other. The increased dominance of this discourse in the 2020 case can be related to the more prevalent problem association of irregular and illegal migration as well as to the return policy in the 2020 case. Whereas in the 2015 discourse, the EU opposes itself to the non-deserving ‘other’ in the form of criminals. In the 2020 timeframe this opposition shifts. It is no longer targeted towards a non-deserving third party but toward a non-deserving group within the migrant population itself. Descriptions of the deserving group of migrants is dominant in both timeframes. However, it is more dominant in the 2015 case, which can be linked to the higher prevalence of humanitarian considerations in the 2015 timeframe. Within the deserving group of migrants there is a minor discourse on those who are needed by the EU. There are also minor discourses on hosting communities and private actors and NGOs as deserving groups. The latter is only prevalent in the 2020 timeframe.

This first analytical level has addressed which concepts and themes underly the discourse and how the problem and the target groups are described within the discourse. What is also shown in this part of the analysis is how supportive discourses underly the narrative of the discourse. The discursive comparisons made between the two timeframes shows how discourses are ever-changing structures of meaning. Given that the different aspects of the discourse differ over time. The subsequent chapter will describe the analysis of the policy proposals, and how the discourse underlies these policy proposals.

## **5. Analysis: Who Gets What, When and How?**

This second part of the analysis addresses the functioning of the discourse. In other words, it addresses how the implied course of action within policy proposals relates to the discursive trends described in chapter 4. This analysis relies on two packages of policy proposals central in both timeframes; the 2015 European Agenda on Migration and the 2020 New Pact on

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<sup>118</sup> See footnote 16. (p.1)

<sup>119</sup> See footnote 26. (p.23)

Migration and asylum. In addition, it includes several proposals which are published in relation to the main packages of proposals. This last analytical stage shows how the logic behind the course of action implied in policy proposals structures the policy proposals, and how constructions of target groups determine positive and negative policy incentives. In addition, it shows how differences in the dominance of discourses in the two timeframes also leads to different courses of actions in the policy proposals.

### **5.1 A European Agenda on Migration: Border Control & Targeting the Criminal Other**

The package of proposals in the 2015 timeframe consist of the European Agenda on Migration which was published on the 13<sup>th</sup> of May (European Commission, 2015a). The measures proposed in the European Agenda on Migration consist of immediate actions and four pillars to structurally manage migration better. In September a set of immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures was proposed to be implemented under the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015b). Another relevant policy response within this timeframe is the establishment and launch of the Naval operation EUNVAFOR Med, or later renamed; ‘operation Sophia’, by the European Council (Council of the EU, 2015a). In the continuation of this paragraph these policy responses and their relation to the discourse are addressed accordingly.

A first immediate action proposed in the European Agenda on Migration is to triple the budget of operations Triton and Poseidon, which are part of Frontex (European Commission, 2015a). Several discourses underly the logic behind this course of action. Firstly, the EU’s humanitarian obligation to save lives at sea structures the explanation of this proposal. This is captured in quotes such as; ‘*Europe cannot stand by whilst lives are being lost.*’ (European Commission, 2015a, p.3) . In addition, the policy proposal is based on the need for border management, and the need to respond to the pressure resulting from the crisis situation. In the European Agenda on Migration it is stated that ‘*Frontex can fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea.*’ (European Commission, 2015a, p.3). In chapter 4 it was described how an underlying discourse on urgency and a narrative discourse defining migration developments as a crisis, dominate the discourse of the 2015 timeframe. It is this discursive construction that also underlies the focus on Frontex operations in the proposed course of action. In the September 2015 proposals Frontex operations again are distinguished as an important priority action. In the following quote it is expressed how proposals on Frontex operations are also founded on the strong discourse on internal cooperation and solidarity;

*‘‘Another aspect of key operational support remains the Frontex joint operations Triton and Poseidon. This is an example of effective solidarity which will need to be extended and replicated further and Member States should respond quickly and actively to Frontex's requests to make available further equipment and experts.’’* (European Commission, 2015b, p. 5).

Another set of immediate measures to be taken as proposed in the European Agenda on Migration aim at targeting criminal networks and refer Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations (European Commission, 2015a). The logic underlying this proposal is the need to target criminals engaged in smuggling and trafficking. In addressing the narrative of the discourse it has already been established that both smuggling and trafficking activities as well as the target groups related to these activities are securitised. These discursive trends provide the logic behind the EU's proposals on the need to take policy measures against these activities and against this target group. As captured in the following quote, this need is subsequently related to the constructed deserving group; *‘‘The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted.’’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 3). In addition, it is legitimized based on international law; *‘‘Such action under international law will be a powerful demonstration of the EU's determination to act.’’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 3). Further measures against smuggling and trafficking are taken in the operation EUNAVOR MED. This policy response is founded on the same discursive logic as described before. See for example in the following quote derived from a publication of the council on the launch of EUNAVOR MED; *‘‘EU has never taken the issue of migration as seriously as we are doing now. With this operation, we are targeting the business model of those who benefit from the misery of migrants.’’* (Council of the EU, 2015b, p. 1). The securitisation of the border, of criminal activities and of the ‘criminal other’, in combination with the constructed exceptionality and urgency of the crisis situation in the 2015 timeframe, thus function as the underlying logic behind policy proposals in the field of border control and CSDP policies. This brings us back to the very basics of securitisation theory, as it is the relation between the discursive construction and the course of action that explains how the subject of migration has been moved into the realm of security (Buzan, Waeber, de Wilde, 1998).

Additional immediate measures proposed in the European Agenda on Migration regard a redistribution scheme, proposing the relocation of migrants (European Commission, 2015a). The perception that there is an exceptional situation of crisis which asks for immediate action



structures the logic behind this proposal. The sense of urgency and crisis legitimises the need for the proposed emergency response system which includes a redistribution scheme. This is captured in the following quotes in the European Agenda on Migration; *‘Member States’ asylum systems today face unprecedented pressure and, with the summer arriving, the flow of people to frontline Member States will continue in the months to come.’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4) and *‘The EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin.’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). These policies are directed towards the deserving migrant group, or *‘...those in clear need of international protection...’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). Relating this proposed course of action to the discursive construction of target groups, shows how this deserving group is indeed met with positive policy incentives. In addition, this policy proposal relies on the discourse on internal and external solidarity. Proposals on relocation under the European Agenda on Migration regarding resettlement are based on similar discursive constructions. The need for resettlement is based on the logic that *‘Such vulnerable people cannot be left to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers.’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). Similar to the proposal for relocation, the logic underlying the need for resettlement is that this is needed for the sake of the vulnerable group, which are met with positive policy incentives. Again, positively and negatively constructed groups are discursively opposed to each other, indicating that targeted action against the one is for the sake of the other.

Another immediate measure scheduled in the European Agenda on Migration is that of a hotspot approach and emergency funding (European Commission, 2015a). The logic behind these measures is that there is a need to distinguish between deserving and non-deserving groups. Subsequently, they are either deserving, and met with positive policy incentives in the form of protection, or they are non-deserving and they have to be returned. This policy proposal no longer addresses the non-deserving group of smugglers and traffickers, but the non-deserving group consisting of irregular or illegal migrants. See the following quote;

*‘Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular migrants.’* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 6).

The hotspot approach again proposed in September 2015 and its underlying logic is similar;

*“Staff deployed by EU agencies and other EU Member States will help identify, screen and register migrants on entry to the EU. This is the first step to a secure future for those in need, and an early opportunity to identify those who should be returned to their home countries.”* (European Commission, 2015b, p. 5).

This not only shows how the construction of a target group as positive or negative results in positive or negative policy incentives. But it also shows that the proposed policies are based on the discursively constructed assumption that there is clear subdivision between deserving and non-deserving groups within the overall group of migrants.

Besides these immediate measures to be taken, the European Agenda on Migration proposes four pillars consisting of policies to be established on the longer term. The first of these four pillars is *“Reducing the incentives for irregular migration...”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 7). A proposed course of action under this first pillar is addressing the root causes of displacement in third countries, by means of increasing the role of EU delegations and European migration liaison officers, and external cooperation assistance (European Commission, 2015a). The discursive foundation of this proposal is the importance of both external and internal cooperation and solidarity. Also in regard to the EU’s fight against traffickers and smugglers the EU proposes cooperation with third countries (European Commission, 2015a). In addition, the EU proposes assistance of member states on countering smugglers by EU agencies as well as an action plan against smugglers (European Commission, 2015a). Again, this proposal is based on the securitising discourse on traffickers and smugglers; *“Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks. It would also act as a disincentive to irregular migration.”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 8) and *“Agencies help identify smugglers, investigate them, prosecute them, freeze and confiscate their assets.”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 9). In addition measures are proposed on return, actions regarding third countries re-admission, the adoption of a Return Handbook, and the strengthening of Frontex’s role on return (European Commission, 2015a), which again target the irregular migrants as a non-deserving group.

The second pillar is *“Border management – saving lives and securing external borders...”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 10). Which again proposes to strengthen the role

of Frontex, and also the creation of a union standard for border management, increased cooperation of coast guards, a proposal on Smart Borders, and strengthening border management of third countries (European Commission, 2015a). What is notable about this proposal is that actions which are earlier described as immediate measures in response to a crisis situations, are in this pillar also proposed as longer term measures;

*“The measures described above to address the situation in the Mediterranean today have been developed as emergency measures in response to a specific crisis. It would be a illusion to believe that this is a short-term need which will not return. The reinforcement of Frontex and the setting up of new forms of cooperation with Member States should be seen as a level of support and solidarity which is here to stay.”* (European Commission, 2015b, pp 10-11).

The measures which are initially proposed based on the logic of exceptionality and securitisation are now also proposed to be established on the longer term. This also corresponds with the idea by Croft (2006) that a crisis can function as the origin of a discourse and that this discourse than can become “...*common sense*...” (p.1).

The third pillar is described as *“Europe’s duty to protect: a strong common asylum policy...”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 12). This pillar includes a new monitoring system of the Common European Asylum system in order to improve reception conditions and asylum procedures in member states. In addition it includes guidelines on preventing abuses of the system, the strengthening of Safe Country of Origin provisions, and an evaluation of the Dublin regulation (European Commission, 2015a). The main logic behind this policy proposal is to foster mutual trust between member states and to improve credibility of the system in terms of public opinion. The provision of positive policy incentives to the vulnerable constructed group is less of a focus point behind this proposal.

The fourth pillar proposes action on *“A new policy on legal migration...”* (European Commission, 2015a, p. 14). This pillar includes measures on regular migration, visa policy, integration, and development in countries of origin (European Commission, 2015a). It provides positive policy incentives for the part of the deserving group that are perceived to be needed.

Analysing the functioning of the 2015 discourse in relation to the proposals in the European Agenda on Migration provides several notable insights. Border control policies are put forward as a logical course of action based on humanitarian considerations and border

securitisation at the same time. This logic is strengthened by the sense of urgency and crisis dominant in the discourse. A broad range of measures are proposed addressing criminal networks. Such as the establishment of EUNAVOR MED under CSDP. This proposal relies on the securitising discourse on criminal activities. Target action is proposed against the criminal other. This is also based on the logic that these measures are necessary for the sake of the deserving group of migrants. Again, these proposals are founded on a sense of urgency and crisis. The same logic on the need to target criminal activities forms the basis of proposals on external cooperation. These sets of measures show how migration has been moved into the realm of security policy. Moreover, the initially proposed emergency measures, which are based on securitising discourses, are also proposed on the longer term. Furthermore, the discursively constructed assumption that there is a clear subdivision between deserving and non-deserving migrants shapes the logic behind proposals on measures regarding the hotspot approach. The following paragraph addresses the functioning of the discourse in the 2020 timeframe.

## **5.2 A New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Controlling & Returning the Migrant Other**

The package of proposals in the 2020 timeframe constitute the New Pact on Migration and Asylum which was published on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September (European Commission, 2020). The New Pact on Migration and Asylum is structured along the lines of 7 sets of measures, and many of these measures are further elaborated on in separate documents published simultaneously to the Agenda.

The first set of measures proposed in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum regard the establishment of ‘...a common European framework for migration and asylum management’ (European Commission, 2020, p.3). This includes a proposal on the establishment of a procedure on pre-entry screening at the external border (European Commission, 2020). The screening procedure will include health and security checks, identification, and fingerprint registration (European Commission, 2020). This proposed course of action is based on the problematising discourse on the non-deserving group of migrants, which is captured in the following quote;

*‘Asylum claims with low chances of being accepted should be examined rapidly without requiring legal entry to the Member State’s territory. This would apply to claims presented by applicants misleading the authorities, originating from countries with low*

*recognition rates likely not to be in need of protection, or posing a threat to national security.*” (European Commission, 2020, p. 4).

This policy proposal thus clearly targets the discursively constructed non-deserving group of migrants. Which is subsequently related to the necessity to return this group of people;

*‘For those whose claims have been rejected in the asylum border procedure, an EU return border procedure would apply immediately. This would eliminate the risks of unauthorised movements and send a clear signal to smugglers’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 4).

So, the legitimisation of the proposed screening procedures rests on the perceived need to take action against the securitised group of non-deserving migrants. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes a common EU system for Returns (European Commission, 2020). The underlying logic of this policy proposal is that the credibility of the system depends on the return of the non-deserving group; *‘EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 7). In addition, the New Pact proposes an upgrade of the Eurodac system (European Commission, 2020). The logic underlying this proposals regards the need to *‘...track unauthorised movements, tackle irregular migration and improve return.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 9).

Similar to the 2015 analysis, the policy proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum is based on the discursively structured assumption that there is a clear distinction between non-deserving and deserving migrants; *‘... addresses effectively mixed arrivals of persons in need of international protection and those who are not.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 5). Moreover, the policy proposals on the pre-entry screening includes positive policy incentives for the deserving group; *‘Special attention to the needs of the most vulnerable would include a general exemption from the border procedures where the necessary guarantees cannot be secured.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 4). As has been established in the mapping of the discourse, the construction of target groups in the 2020 timeframe does not only contains a subdivision between non-deserving and deserving migrants, but also a further division within the deserving group of migrants. This subdivision structures the logic behind some of the proposals within the border procedures. This is further apparent in the proposal on

the reform of EU rules on asylum and return; *‘The EU asylum and migration management system needs to provide for the special needs of vulnerable groups, including through resettlement’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 7). These positive policy incentives are targeted specifically at children as well as at women (European Commission, 2020). Similar to the 2015 timeframe, solidarity and responsibility function as important themes behind the proposals made in the 2020 timeframe. For example in the proposal on the introduction of a common framework for the sharing of solidarity and responsibility (European Commission, 2020).

The second set of proposals made in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum regards the establishment of *‘A robust crisis preparedness and response system.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 10). This includes the establishment of the *‘Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint’* and *‘A new legislative instrument [...] for temporary and extraordinary measures needed in the face of crisis.’* (European Commission, 2020, p.10). These policy proposals are based on the logic that the EU needs *‘... protection against the risk of crisis situations.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 10) and that *‘... the EU will always need to be ready for the unexpected.’* (European Commission, 2020, p.10). As has been established in the discourse analysis, crisis preparedness constitutes an important theme in the discourse of the 2020 timeframe. The logic behind these proposals is structured by the discourse on the looming threats and risks of a potential crisis.

A third set of proposals in the New Pact regards integrated border management and includes the implementation of the *‘...European Border and Coast Guard Regulation...’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 12) and the deployment of *‘...A standing corps with the capacity of 10 000 staff...’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 12). These proposals are founded on the security discourses on internal and external border management; *‘Integrated border management is an indispensable policy instrument for the EU to protect the EU external borders and safeguard the integrity and functioning of a Schengen area without internal border controls.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 11). In addition, the New Pact proposes the establishment of *‘...up-to-date and interoperable IT systems to keep track of arrivals and asylum applicants.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 12) which will be used for *‘...checking and keeping track of the right to stay of all third country nationals, whether visa-free or visa holders, arriving in a legal manner on EU territory, helping the work of identifying cases of overstaying.’* (European Commission, 2020, p. 12). Again, this policy is targeted at the negatively constructed, non-deserving target group, which constituted a dominant focus in the EU’s discourse in the 2020 timeframe. The problematisation and securitisation is reflected in

the focus of control and return of this group in policy proposals. In addition, similarly to the 2015 case, a proposal is made on search and rescue effort via Frontex operations, and this proposal is based on the logic of humanitarian consideration, targeting criminal activities and networks and solidarity.

The fourth set of policy proposals regards *'Reinforcing the fight against migrants smuggling.'* (European Commission, 2020, p. 15) which includes the proposal for a new EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling. This policy proposal is founded on a similar logic as was recognised in the 2015 timeframe. For example in the following quote; *'...Smuggling involves the organised exploitation of migrants, showing scant respect for human life in the pursuit of profit.'* (European Commission, 2020, p. 15). However, this course of action is less dominant in the 2020 package of proposal as compared to the 2015 package of proposals.

Furthermore, several proposals are made on external cooperation (European Commission, 2020). Measures are based on the idea that there is a need to provide the deserving migrants in third countries with positive policy incentives; *'Protecting those in need and supporting host countries..'* (European Commission, 2020, p. 19). Another motivation behind external cooperation is the need for return; *'Nevertheless, for those with no right to stay, an effective system of returns needs to be in place.'* (European Commission, 2020, p. 21) Legal migration and economic benefits of the EU are addressed in the proposal to develop EU Talent Partnerships in cooperation with third countries (European Commission, 2020). This last part also prevalent in the proposals on *'Attracting skills and talent to the EU...'* (European Commission, 2020, p. 24). Which includes measures such as a Skills and Talent packages, and developing an EU Talent Pool.

The analysis of the functioning of the 2020 discourse in relation to the proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum provides several notable insights. Again, the assumed subdivisions in the construction of target groups provide the logic behind the pre-entry screening measures. In addition, border securitisation and other securitizing discourses shape the logic behind responding to migratory development with security polices. The risk of abuse and unauthorized movement by irregular and illegal migrants legitimize return measures aimed at the non-deserving migrant group. In addition, the positive policy incentives are mostly targeted at specific groups within the overall deserving groups of migrants, reflecting the further subdivision in the construction of these groups. In addition, is shown how the urgency and crisis logic established in the 2015 discourse still play a role in the sense of crisis preparedness in the 2020 timeframe. The perceived risk of a new crisis situation structures the logic behind the

proposal of the Crisis Blueprint. In comparison to the 2015 timeframe, measures on border control and screening at the borders show how the EU has responded to migratory developments by means of security policies. Where in the 2015 case policy proposals focussed more on targeted criminality, in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum return policy plays a bigger role.

### **5.3 The Functioning of the Discourse in two Timeframes**

This concluding paragraph reflects upon the functioning of the discourse in the different contexts of the two timeframes. Similarities are that securitising discourses form the logic behind some of the most fundamental measures proposed in both the 2015 European Agenda on Migration as well as the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum. In addition, discursive subdivisions between target groups are reflected in the proposed negative as well as positive policy incentives in both timeframes. A difference is that there is further subdivision of target groups in the 2020 timeframe. Crisis plays an important role in both timeframes. In the European Agenda on Migration policy proposals are based on the urgency and crisis logic, and this logic is already translated into longer term policy proposals. In the 2020 timeframe this trend continues, the risk of a crisis situation forms an important factor in explaining the courses of action. Notable differences between the timeframes regard the subjectives of the discourse. Both timeframes address criminality as well as irregular and illegal migration. However, the shift in narrative from criminals as the securitized other to non-deserving migrants as the securitized other is reflected in the focus of policy proposals. In the 2015 timeframe policies such as Frontex operations and EUNAVOR MED targeting the criminal others are substantially dominant. In the 2020 timeframe, the focus of policies shifts toward targeting the migrant other, by means of an increasing focus on return policies and controlling and screening of irregular and illegal migrants.

An important consideration in this regard is that not only policy outcomes are important, but non-outcomes also have to be acknowledged. Dominant discourses, and more specifically securitising discourses, are most dominantly reflected in the logic behind policy proposals. A discursive focus on securitisation of the criminal other in the 2015 timeframe, is reflected in a focus on this target group in the proposals of the 2015 timeframe. Thus taking focus away from other target groups. Another example regards minor discourses. The normalisation of migration was distinguished in the discursive problem definition as a minor discourse. However, this discourse does not play a substantial role in the policy proposals. These considerations are in line with Baker-Beall's (2016) argument that dominant discourse do not only legitimise policy



outcomes, they also exclude other policy outcomes. This is a relevant insight to keep in mind when addressing the performativity of discourses.

## **6. Conclusion**

The main aim of this thesis was to identify the political discourses in the EU response to migratory developments, and the extent to which these discourses have a performative effect on policy proposals. In responding to these research objectives, the research shows the relevance of an extensive and conceptually substantiated analytical approach in the form of the coding scheme in table 1. On the supportive discursive level, the main associations, themes and legitimisation in terms of authority have been established. It is shown how these discursive strands support, or lay the foundations, upon which the narrative of the discourse rests. This narrative consists of the definition of the problem and the construction of the subjectives. Not only does this analytical approach enable to examine the interaction between these discursive levels, by adding a second analytical strategy, it enables to lay out the performative effect of discourses on policy proposals. It fills the gap between discourse and policy reality.

This has been achieved by building on insights from different academic fields which encounter similar analytical problems. More specifically, the study relies on, and combines, analytical strategies from a migration policy study by Van Ostaijen (2016) and securitisation research in the field of terrorism studies by Baker-Beall (2016, 2019). In addition, the study combines conceptualisations of identity construction by Schneider & Ingram (1993) with conceptualisations of identity in securitisation research. This shows how subjectives are discursively constructed, how divisions and subdivisions are made between deserving and non-deserving groups, and how identities are securitised. Connecting the insights from multiple academic fields to address the gap between discourse and policy shows the relevance of cross-disciplinary studies.

In regards to the case study, the research provides an in-depth understanding of the construction of the EU's response to migratory developments, and how securitisation manifests itself within this response. The case study on the EU turns out to be particularly interesting in this regard, as it shows how securitising discourses on border control, criminality, and irregular and illegal migration manifest themselves in relation to other discourses, such as humanitarian considerations. This stresses the importance of intertextuality in discourse analysis.

By analysing these phenomena within the two distinctive timeframes of the 2015 case and the 2020 case, it is shown how discursive constructions interact with their contexts. The

threat of an occurring crisis in the 2015 timeframe develops into the threat of a potential crisis in the 2020 timeframe. Another notable finding is the shift in focus from the securitised criminal other to the securitised migrant other. This confirms the importance of approaching discourses as ever changing structures of meaning, which are to be analysed in relation to their contexts.

In addition, it has been shown how discourses can have a performative effect on the proposed course of action in terms of policies. Securitizing discourses and identities construct the logic behind policy proposals in both timeframes. This shows how the dominance and focus of a discourse is reflected in policy outcomes and non-outcomes. In other words, discursive constructions and assumptions shape the logic behind a proposed course of action. Finally, the research shows that the construction of a target group is closely related to negative and positive policy incentives. It is therefore argued that the discourse shapes the logic behind the question; who gets what, when and how?

Notwithstanding, this research only has a limited scope, and therefore still leaves questions about the subject unanswered. Possible suggestions for further research entail the multiple-actor approach. Securitisation scholars such as Karyotis & Parrikios (2012) argue in favour of the inclusion of multiple actors in securitization research. For example, it would be interesting to explore the role of the media on the dominance of certain discourses and their performative effect on policy proposals. In regards to the generalisation of this research, it has been argued that the analytical approach proposed in this research can be adopted to study other cases. In addition, it is argued that applying this analytical framework to more studies on different cases would be beneficial for exploring its applicability. A last suggestion for further research is that the application of the analytical approach of this research could be interesting in a comparative case study, as this could potentially reveal even more about discourses and their performativity in different contextual and intertextual settings.

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## Annex I – Results Discourse Analysis NVivo

Main Categories	Subcategories	2015: Nr of references	2015: Nr of files strand occurs in	2015: Percentage*	2020: Nr of references	2020: Nr of files strand occurs in	2020: Percentage *
Problem association	Internal border control	9	4	1.2	34	8	2.1
	External border control	104	30	14.3	185	15	11.4
	Trafficking/smuggling	69	29	9.5	69	9	4.3
	Irregular/illegal migration	52	20	7.2	173	15	10.7
	Opportunities/benefits	32	12	4.4	63	8	3.9
	Humanitarian considerations	245	44	33.7	306	23	18.9
	Return	88	35	12.1	393	17	24.3
	Root causes	62	28	8.5	14	8	0.9
	Legal migration	48	18	6.6	55	11	3.4
	Crisis preparedness	12	5	1.7	201	6	12.4
	Health concerns	1	1	0.1	96	21	5.9
Fairness & equality	4	2	0.6	28	9	1.7	
Authority and legitimisation	International law	29	14	23.4	124	13	68.5
	EU law	57	23	46.0	40	13	22.1
	Social authority and credibility	38	16	30.6	17	6	9.4
Responsibility	EU responsibility	41	23	36.9	5	4	4.9
	Member state responsibility	63	28	56.8	96	19	93.2
	International Community	7	7	6.3	2	2	1.9
Cooperation & solidarity	External cooperation and solidarity	172	42	30.3	235	21	31.2
	Internal cooperation and solidarity	384	48	67.7	489	25	64.9
	Improving and rebuilding trust	11	6	1.9	30	11	4.0
Urgency		402	55		163	24	
Recognition of failure		32	12		65	11	
	Crisis or challenge	360	53	63.8	127	21	29.7



Problem definition	Security challenge	12	7	2.1	66	13	15.5
	Tragedy or humanitarian crisis	59	26	10.5	11	7	2.6
	Normalisation of the problem	5	4	0.9	17	8	4.0
	Neutral or pragmatic description of the problem	128	45	22.7	206	26	48.2
Target group description	Deserving: host communities	12	7	2.0	15	6	1.6
	Deserving: private actors, NGOs	0	0	0.0	37	4	3.8
	Deserving: vulnerable or in need	275	45	45.6	317	23	32.9
	Neutral: general neutral descriptions	77	27	12.8	308	18	32.0
	Neutral: migrants	48	20	8.0	57	14	5.9
	Non-deserving: criminals, traffickers, smugglers	122	37	20.2	29	9	3.0
	Non-deserving: illegals, irregulars, no right to protection	69	27	11.4	200	15	20.8

\* Amount of references subcategory compared to total amount of references in main categories

## Annex II – List of Data Subjected to Discourse Analysis

Day	Organisation	Type of Data	Title
April 14 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos on the situation in the Mediterranean at the LIBE Committee in the European Parliament
April 19 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	European Commission Statement on developments in the Mediterranean
April 19 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	Statement by European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos and Minister of Interior of Spain, Jorge Fernández Díaz
April 19 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration
April 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Statement	President Donald Tusk calls an extraordinary European Council on migratory pressures in the Mediterranean
April 21 <sup>st</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	African Union Commission and European Commission meet to bring new impetus to the EU-Africa partnership
April 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 - statement
April 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Statement	Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the special European Council meeting on migratory pressures in the Mediterranean
April 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the press conference in Castille Place, Malta
April 24 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Announcement	EU leaders agree actions to tackle Mediterranean tragedy
April 29 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the European Parliament on the conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April: 'Tackling the migration crisis'
April 29 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Speech	Report by President Donald Tusk to the European Parliament on the special European Council on migration
May 13 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration
May 13 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Communication	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIO - A EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION

May 13 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Commissioner Avramopoulos' remarks at the presentation of the European Agenda on Migration
May 13 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	First Vice-President Frans Timmermans' Introductory Remarks at the Commission Press Conference
May 13 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Meeting	Commission heralds Migration Agenda and CSRs
May 18 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	EU-Turkey Association Council
May 18 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	Council establishes EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean
May 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Opening Statement by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the European Agenda on Migration
May 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Opening Statement by First Vice-President Timmermans at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the European Agenda on Migration
May 27 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	European Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration
May 27 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Commission proposes draft EU budget 2016: focus on jobs, growth, migration and global action
May 27 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Press statement by Commissioner Avramopoulos on the first measures under the European Agenda on Migration
May 27 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Meeting	Commission fulfils its commitment to act swiftly on migration
June 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after the G6 meeting with Interior Ministers in Moritzburg
June 16 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg
June 19 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	EU budget: Council provides for additional resources to manage refugee flows
June 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean
June 26 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Announcement	European Council agrees on the fate of 60,000 migrants
June 19 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	Joint Statement ahead of World Refugee Day on 20 June
July 7 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans - Debate in European Parliament

			Plenary Session on 2016 European Commission Work Programme
July 9 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after informal Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg
July 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks of Commissioner Avramopoulos after the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 July 2015
July 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	Council conclusions on Migration
August 6 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos on the recent incident in the Mediterranean
August 10 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Managing migration and financing a safer and more secure Europe: €2.4 billion to support Member States
August 14 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	'A European Response to Migration: Showing solidarity and sharing responsibility'
August 20 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete: EU press briefing, Brussels, 20 August, 2015
August 27 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos
September 4 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Opening Remarks of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at Kos Press Conference
September 7 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos following his visit to Austria
September 7 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Announcement	Acting as a Union in the Refugee Crisis – Commission supports Austria
September 7 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Speech	Speech by President Donald Tusk at the Bruegel Annual Dinner
September 9 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action
September 9 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity
September 14 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	Statement of the European Commission following the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council
September 14 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	EUNAVFOR Med: Council adopts a positive assessment on the conditions to move to the first step of phase 2 on the high seas

September 17 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the EU's support for Western Balkans, Turkey and neighbourhood in the addressing the challenges of refugee crisis
September 17 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after his visit in Rosenheim
September 17 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	European Commission Statement following the vote of the European Parliament in favour of an emergency relocation mechanism for a further 120,000 refugees
September 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Statement	European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Statement	Informal meeting of EU heads of state or government on migration, 23 September 2015 - statement
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	More Responsibility in managing the refugee crisis: European Commission adopts 40 infringement decisions to make European Asylum System Work
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2015	European Commission	Meeting	Management of the refugee crisis: Commission shows the way forward
September 24 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Announcement	Refugee crisis: Commission satisfied with results of summit meeting
September 25 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Speech	Speech by Commissioner Marianne Thyssen: EU funds in support of the refugee crisis
September 28 <sup>th</sup> 2015	Council of the EU	Press release	EUNAVFOR Med: EU agrees to start the active phase of the operation against human smugglers and to rename it "Operation Sophia
September 29 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Communication	COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Managing the refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration
September 30 <sup>th</sup> 2015	European Commission	Press release	Managing the Refugee Crisis: Budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration
April 17 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Coronavirus: Commission welcomes Parliament's quick green light for proposed new resources to protect lives and livelihoods
April 16 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Coronavirus: Commission presents guidance on implementing EU rules on asylum and return procedures and on resettlement

April 15 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Migration: First unaccompanied children relocated from Greece to Luxembourg
April 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Proposal	Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Decision (EU) 2020/265 as regards adjustments to the amounts mobilised from the Flexibility Instrument for 2020 to be used for migration, refugee inflows and security threats, for immediate measures in the framework of the COVID-19 outbreak and for reinforcement of the European Public Prosecutor's Office
May 28 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Operation IRINI: Council appoints new Force Commanders
June 26 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: EU mobilises almost €100 million to support the most vulnerable in the Horn of Africa
June 24 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: the EU mobilises €52.5 million to support resilience, jobs and stability in the Sahel and Lake Chad region
July 8 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Migration: Relocation of unaccompanied children from Greece to Portugal and Finland
July 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: New assistance package to support vulnerable groups and address COVID-19 in North Africa
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Speech	Speech by Vice-President Schinas on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Speech	Speech by Commissioner Johansson on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	A fresh start on migration: Building confidence and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Communication	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	Migration: A European taskforce to resolve emergency situation on Lesbos
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Statement	Press statement by President von der Leyen on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum
September 20 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Announcement	Let's make change happen: op-ed article by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission

September 16 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Speech	State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary
September 16 <sup>th</sup> 2020	European Commission	Press release	President von der Leyen's State of the Union Address: charting the course out of the coronavirus crisis and into the future
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Communication	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Commission Guidance on the implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Recommendation	COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 23.9.2020 on cooperation among Member States concerning operations carried out by vessels owned or operated by private entities for the purpose of search and rescue activities
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Recommendation	COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 23.9.2020 on legal pathways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humanitarian admission and other complementary pathways
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Recommendation	COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 23.9.2020 on an EU mechanism for Preparedness and Management of Crises related to Migration (Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint)
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Proposal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Amended proposal	Amended proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of biometric data for the effective application of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management] and of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Resettlement Regulation], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Amended proposal	Amended proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU

September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Proposal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817
September 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2020	European Commission	Proposal	Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund]
September 15 <sup>th</sup> 2020	Council of the EU	Statement	Remarks by President Charles Michel at his meeting with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis in Athens
September 15 <sup>th</sup> 2020	Council of the EU	Statement	Remarks by President Charles Michel after his visit to Moria Camp in Lesbos
September 16 <sup>th</sup> 2020	Council of the EU	Statement	Remarks by President Charles Michel after his meeting with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades in Nicosia