Chinese COVID-19 propaganda

To what extent is state propaganda with regard to COVID-19 comparable to state

propaganda published between 1949 and 1989?

Name: D.M.N. Smeets

Program: MA Asian Studies

Student number: s1468758

Thesis instructor: Prof. dr. H.G.D.G. De Weerdt

Date: 28 January 2021

Number of words: 14618

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I aim to explore contemporary state propaganda regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, and compare it to propaganda that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published between the start of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989. Propaganda fulfilled an important role during these eras, especially during events such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the modernisation era by Deng Xiaoping. The demonstrations of April until June of 1989 took place because the Chinese propaganda sector liberalised too far and that a re-establishment was necessary (Brady 2009, 44), which is the reason I have chosen 1989 as the end of the era that I will use as a comparison for this thesis research. The CCP published propaganda mainly in the form of posters, and sometimes in the form of other art such as literature, poetry or paintings. The art was meant to entertain, but the CCP also expected it to educate the masses on what was right or wrong (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). The publishing methods changed throughout the years. Currently, the state still produces posters, but the focus of propaganda publications has shifted to television and commercial advertising (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008), as well as the Internet (Creemers 2017, 89).

In December 2019, a new coronavirus appeared in China. In the first months of 2020, the virus spread through the rest of the world and evolved into a worldwide pandemic. The Chinese government distributed propaganda publications on their website regarding the coronavirus (COVID-19) and how General Secretary Xi Jinping and the government handled the situation. I have chosen two of the state propaganda publications that will serve as case studies for this research. The case studies are visually quite different from

each other, but the propaganda from 1949 until 1989 had visual alterations as well throughout the years. The visual differences are therefore a useful addition to this thesis research. I will analyse the case studies in chapter 1 and chapter 2. In chapter 1, I will focus on an interactive *lianhuanhua* (连环画). The original *lianhuanhua* is an illustrated story book, which became popular in early 20th century Shanghai (Lent 2001, 100-101) and China in general (Altehenger 2013, 81), and can also be translated as "linked pictures" (Gravett 2017, 30). The *lianhuanhua* is similar to a cartoon, but because of the interactive interface – which is only usable on smartphones – the viewer is able to scroll through the scenes by themselves. I have chosen this particular publication as a case study because it contains many visual aspects, such as cartoon models, text, and video clips, but also spoken text. It therefore has many aspects that I am able to analyse and compare to the earlier 1949 until 1989 propaganda publications. In chapter 2 I will analyse the second case study, which is an interactive online poster where the viewer is able to click through different subjects regarding the response and approach of the CCP to the prevention and control of COVID-19. The interactive poster mainly includes text and does not include any cartoon models, video clips or spoken text, like the *lianhuanhua* does. The poster includes enumerations summing up different strategies which the CCP executed to prevent and control the coronavirus. The viewer is able to view the subjects in order of appearance and click through the different slides, but they are also able to randomly choose a subject and only watch the content that is included in that particular link. There is less guidance than compared to the *lianhuanhua* and the viewers are expected to make their own choices. Chapter 3 focuses on the comparison of the two case studies with propaganda from 1949 until 1989. I will discuss and compare the same aspects of the posters and the case studies as I will in chapter 1 and chapter 2. That includes the text and discourse, and the visual aspects such as colours and models.

The aim of this research is to find out to what extent propaganda has changed throughout the years. Although currently the Internet influences propaganda and provides a new platform for propaganda to be spread on, in this thesis I will research whether propaganda is still similar to propaganda from 1949 until 1989 or if there are severe differences, even though the means of propagating have changed. The case study analyses in chapter 1 and chapter 2 will focus on the different characteristics of the propaganda publications, and in chapter 3 these characteristics will be compared to characteristics of propaganda from 1949 until 1989. The study is mainly literature based: it includes a literature review, analyses of two case studies and a comparison chapter. The information on the analyses in the three main chapters is derived from existing literature about propaganda poster and cartoon analyses. The study is systematically divided into subjects, such as a text analysis and a visual analysis.

This thesis research is a relevant study because it will provide a perspective on the changes in Chinese state propaganda throughout the years. As I will show in the literature review, there is a reasonable amount of literature available on propaganda that the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989. After 1989, however, propaganda played a less prominent role and there is thus a smaller amount of literature that covers this period. It is therefore an addition to the existing literature to analyse propaganda that is published after 1989. Unfortunately, I am not able to include an extensive amount of propaganda from the period 1989 until now in this study, due to a time limit and the scope of the thesis. The time limit and the scope of the thesis both are the reasons why I chose to do a qualitative study and include two recent state propaganda publications. In order to find out the importance of propaganda, I will compare the case studies to earlier propaganda that the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989. Due to the fact that during this period propaganda played an important role in

society, similarities between propaganda from the two periods are a good criterion to measure the role of propaganda in contemporary society. Does the Chinese government still use the same propaganda methods as a few decades ago? What does this tell us about the propaganda goals of the government? The two case studies are applicable to this research because the Chinese government published them during a worldwide crisis and thus show the response to a politically sensitive situation. This is similar to the situations that occurred during 1949 until 1989, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the modernisation period under Deng Xiaoping's rule. The results of this study will provide a perspective on the changes in Chinese propaganda throughout the years. This thesis will provide an answer to my research question: "To what extent is contemporary state propaganda with regard to COVID-19 comparable to state propaganda published between 1949 and 1989?"

Literature review

Propaganda is one of the main methods for the Chinese Communist Party to propagate their message to the masses. Although propaganda posters have gained popularity throughout the years, few researchers have done extensive research on the topic. Most researchers focus on other aspects of propaganda, for example political communication in general, the effect of propaganda or how new media today such as the Internet have played a role in spreading propaganda.

State propaganda is a form of political communication. According to Brian McNair, political communication has five functions: to inform, educate, provide a platform for discourse, give publicity to governmental and political institutions, and serve as a channel for advocating political points of view (McNair 2018, 24-25). Media are also able to alter the message and are thus political actors as well (McNair 2018, 33). So how does

propaganda fit into political communication, besides the fact that state propaganda conveys a message that the government propagates? Han Rongbin argues that the Chinese government has taken advantage of the Internet to spread the discourse they prefer Chinese citizens to know (Han 2018, 14) and that the Internet is even able to empower the Party ideology (Han 2018, 2). In addition, Creemers states that the Chinese propaganda authorities appreciate online media as an extensive tool for propaganda (Creemers 2017, 89). Furthermore, a shift occurred in the understanding of the media. Media primarily started as a propaganda mouthpiece of the Party, but the media's role now shifted towards being a way to popularise the Party and its leader (Qin 2019, 76). The medium for propagating changed throughout the years, as becomes clear in an essay by Stefan Landsberger and Marien van der Heijden (2008). Landsberger and Van der Heijden argue that the Chinese government used propaganda posters – and other forms of art such as literature, poetry, and songs – to educate people in what was right or wrong, television and commercial advertising have gotten a more prominent role, although the Chinese state still produces propaganda posters today (Landsberger and van der Heijden 2008). The common theme in the literature regarding political communication in the form of the Internet and media is that they both play an important role in spreading messages from the Chinese government to the masses and in spreading its ideology.

Although at present new media such as the Internet have become an important medium for propagating state ideology, propaganda posters used to fulfil this role before the Internet era. Stefan Landsberger has done extensive research on propaganda posters from approximately 1949 until the late 1980s and states that using propaganda art the Party would show the Chinese people how the state expected them to behave (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). In another study, Landsberger specifically focuses on the analysis of propaganda posters from 1949 until

1989. His analyses are clear and structured due to his use of demarcated methods. For example, he has divided his analyses into an analysis of "general subjects" (Landsberger 1995, 100), "target groups" (Landsberger 1995, 132) and "symbolism and imagery" (Landsberger 1995, 169). The models set an example of how people should behave (Landsberger 1995, 27). He adds that the CCP portrayed the models as "heroes", boldly outlined (Landsberger 1995, 41-44) and with little differences between male and female bodies (Landsberger 1995, 44). In propaganda from 1949 until 1989, Mao Zedong was the most prominent representation in the posters. He was often depicted as a "god-like" figure and excluded other models (Landsberger 1995, 44). Tony Lee argues that Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping share the same characteristics regarding political behaviour and their style of leadership (Lee 2018, 473), which is interesting because this could be a reason for Xi to portray himself in propaganda similar to how Mao was depicted. Landsberger adds that models were sometimes given another profile or perspective in propaganda posters. For example, when Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were given a higher profile through editing a photograph (Landsberger 1995, 102) or by showing medical personnel in white coats and spectacles – similar to Western medics – to stress their position in Chinese society (Landsberger 1995, 150), although they would not usually wear white coats and spectacles. In another study, Landsberger states that the CCP also adapted photographs according to their reality and that they were not afraid to even remove people from a photograph who had a sensitive political position (Landsberger 2001, 545). With regard to other visual aspects of propaganda posters, Landsberger argues that the colours of a poster affect the viewer because they have an underlying meaning. For example, the CCP used a lot of red in the propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989, mainly because red was a "life-giving" colour and stood for wealth, joy and festivities. It also symbolised the Party itself. The CCP often used vibrant colours, such as

green, magenta and cyclamen, especially during the Cultural Revolution. During the Four Modernisations, a few decades later, the colours became flat and less lively (Landsberger 1995, 191). Currently, in addition to propaganda posters, the Chinese government often uses cartoons to educate, propagate and raise social awareness. According to John A. Lent and Xu Ying, cartoons are also colourful and include symbolic language (Lent and Xu 2017, 147-149), which is similar to propaganda posters. Jennifer Altehenger adds that cartoons could provide a visualisation and reflection of state policies and agrees with Lent and Xu that cartoons could raise awareness (Altehenger 2013, 92-93). It is, however, only since the last twenty years that comic art is recognised as an important player in a country's politics and culture (Lent and Xu 2017, 195). As an example of the effects of cartoons, Bai Shi argues that a cartoon about Xi Jinping – which is discussed in his article – is suspected to be made by the government, and that the cartoon relays the story that the Chinese political system is "funny and approachable" (Bai 2013). The literature shows that the CCP used several methods to alter the focus of a poster according to their ideology, whether it included removing people from a scene, depicting the leader as a god-like figure to focus on the leader only or using particular colours to try and provoke the viewer into a positive attitude towards the poster and its message.

Text and discourse are important aspects of propaganda analysis as well. Landsberger and Florian Schneider both cover text and discourse analysis in their books. Landsberger mainly focuses on text on propaganda posters from approximately the early 1950s until the late 1980s. According to him, the text – that often included the message of the publication – was generally given both in Chinese characters and in pinyin, and sometimes even in (misspelled) English (Landsberger 1995, 198-200). Unfortunately, viewers often did not read the slogans on a poster and were only attracted by the visual content. In this situation, the message of a poster was transmitted subconsciously (Landsberger and van

der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). In addition, Landsberger states that from 1980 onwards the propaganda became less heroic and therefore the slogans had a less aggressive tone compared to propaganda from the preceding decades (Landsberger 2001, 544). Schneider's findings focus on a general discourse analysis rather than specifically on text and discourse on propaganda posters. He mentions in his draft chapter on political communication that "words are able to provoke associations and emotional reactions" (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 4-5) and that we are able to frame the topics we talk about in order to make people understand them the way we would like them to (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 7). Schneider also argues that the Chinese government framed the SARS outbreak in 2002 by shifting the blame towards the virus by creating a conflict between "good" (the authorities) and "evil" (the virus) (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 10). His arguments are relevant to the analysis of posters, because propaganda posters often contain a great amount of text. It is therefore necessary to examine if the state framed the text that is used in a propaganda publication is framed in a certain way to influence the reader.

Prior studies failed to thoroughly identify what the effects of propaganda in China are. For example, in 2001, Landsberger attempts to research the effect of propaganda by conversing with various Chinese people from different life stages over the preceding decades, but in the end he concludes that he has no real evidence to state whether propaganda is effective or not (Landsberger 2001, 544). I agree with his conclusion, because he states that although people often told him nobody was interested in propaganda posters, Landsberger found out that propaganda posters were displayed in both urban and rural areas, many posters had a handwritten inscription that showed that they had been presented to others on a special occasion and some Chinese citizens had personally told him that their behaviour changed because of propaganda posters

(Landsberger 2001, 544). Although Landsberger presents information for the effectiveness of propaganda in China, this method fails to provide relevant evidence because it focuses on Landsberger's own interpretation of several conversations and does not include a thoroughly set up research study. In 2019, however, Chen Dan published her research including an online survey experiment on the effects of propaganda in China, which she carried out in May 2016. Chen exposes that there is not a direct propaganda effect among Chinese netizens and that there occurs a so-called "contextual priming effect", which means that when propaganda publications have a certain sense of validity, they are more persuasive to politically informed citizens (Chen 2019, 464). She also states that propaganda can only be effective when the message supports current events and does not contradict the viewer's personal experiences (Chen 2019, 466). In fact, Chen argues that propaganda has to include a certain level of validity, because otherwise the propaganda will have the opposite effect and lower the trustworthiness of the Party. Mainly in authoritarian states, propaganda is most effective if reality affirms its message (Chen 2019, 478). In addition, in her research Chen addresses a variety of different aspects of propaganda, which can be associated with the case studies in this thesis study. She argues that leader praise, economic achievement and nationalism are three important themes in propaganda. Leader praise, which should improve the opinion about the current leader of the CCP (in this case Xi Jinping) and nationalism, which should enhance opinions on the CCP's handling of (international) crises (Chen 2019, 467), are the two themes that are most in line with the two case studies in this thesis. Chen focuses in her research on politically informed people who are selected through a system where they have to answer two questions on international politics correctly before they are guided towards the survey itself. She also excludes the participants who complete the survey too fast according to the time which is needed to read the questions and answers (Chen 2019,

469). The primary strength of the research Chen has conducted is that she focuses on a large group of participants who are already politically informed and therefore have knowledge of the purpose of propaganda already. The execution of Chen's research is more reliable than Landsberger's research. Even though David Shambaugh argues in Yang (Yang 2009, 14) that the ability of the Party to control information through propaganda has decreased, especially because of media commercialisation, globalisation, technology and the public's increased awareness, according to Chen's research this would not necessarily mean propaganda is not effective. Chen shows that the CCP has to consider the message of the propaganda publication more carefully in order to speak to its viewers.

Through China's slow reaction to the SARS outbreak in 2002, the CCP learned that releasing information– even if it may not be complete yet – will not lead to instability in China. In contrast, it will likely show that the CCP does not only publish a cover-up story for a crisis situation (Zhang 2011, 106-107). There are several white papers and news articles that refer to the coronavirus and the CCP's approach and how the Chinese people respond to their government. In a white paper which the Chinese government released, the state refers to COVID-19 as a "war that humanity has to fight and win" and that "China launched a resolute battle to prevent and control its spread" (Fighting Covid-19: China in Action 2020). The choice of words in the white paper correspond to Schneider stating in his draft that by referring to a situation using the word "war", it creates a frame of reference that addresses the situation as extraordinary (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 10). Although top leaders – for example, former US president Donald Trump – blame China for the COVID-19 crisis and blame them for suppressing early reports of the outbreak, Chinese officials contradict the blame by saying the release of information about COVID-19 was not delayed (China Defends Its Coronavirus Response 2020). Marije Vlaskamp partially agrees with the latter by stating that the coronavirus

denial only lasted for three weeks compared to four months during the SARS outbreak in 2002. Interestingly, a survey conducted in China in April 2020 shows that the satisfaction of Chinese citizens towards the government during the pandemic is very high (Wu 2020), which means that citizens have not (yet) lost trust in their government.

At this point, the literature regarding propaganda is relatively one-sided. This is especially because mainly Stefan Landsberger has done extensive research on propaganda posters from 1949 until approximately 1989. His study, however, is comprehensive and illustrates the analysis of Chinese propaganda posters well, and a comparison with other studies is therefore in essence not necessary. On the other hand, another study on propaganda poster analysis would be helpful to further elucidate the subject. The evidence shows that there is still not only a gap in further research on propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989, but also on the case of propaganda regarding COVID-19. The latter is to be expected, because the COVID-19 crisis is a continuing problem. Research on propaganda regarding the coronavirus and the approach of the CCP is therefore unavailable yet and it is thus a relevant subject to do (further) research on.

Methodology

I am primarily going to focus on literature and case studies in this thesis. I will include two propaganda case studies which the CCP published in May 2020 which will help me answer the research question: "To what extent is contemporary state propaganda with regard to COVID-19 comparable to state propaganda published between 1949 and 1989?". The case studies both focus on the response of the Party with regard to COVID-19, and they both show a propaganda publication, but are different in approach and visual aspects. I am going to concentrate on analysing the case studies and what aspects the CCP uses to propagate the message of the propaganda publication. I have chosen to do a qualitative

study, and therefore I will focus on only two case studies. This choice allows me to analyse the case studies thoroughly and focus on details, instead of focusing only on a general picture. The downside of a qualitative study is that there are only two studies to compare to propaganda from 1949 until 1989. To decide whether contemporary propaganda regarding the coronavirus truly is comparable to propaganda from 1949 until 1989, it is necessary to do more research on propaganda publications focusing on the subject of corona. For the scope of this thesis, however, I will provide a look upon the subject, especially because there has not been done any research on COVID-19 propaganda in particular.

1| CASE STUDY 1: CCP'S INTERACTIVE *LIANHUANHUA*

In May 2020, the CCP published a "long interactive *lianhuanhua*" (长幅互动连环画 *chang fu hudong lianhuanhua*) on their official website (战"疫"的刻，总书记和人民在一起 2020). The interactive cartoon was one of the first state publications responding to the new coronavirus, which first appeared in China in December 2019 and slowly gained ground in the rest of the world. Paul Gravett translates *lianhuanhua* as "linked pictures" in his book *Mangasia* (Gravett 2017, 30). There are other translations that cover *lianhuanhua*, but this translation corresponds in the best way possible to the interactive cartoon which the CCP published in May 2020, mainly because the publication includes several scenes where the viewer can scroll through and which are therefore linked to each other. The scenes also include buttons for the viewer to click on, which either show a video clip of Xi Jinping or let the viewer listen to one of Xi's speeches. The fact that viewers are able to choose whether to click on the buttons themselves generates the interactive identity of the *lianhuanhua*. There are certain aspects of the *lianhuanhua* I will analyse, namely the visual aspects, the text, and the video clips and sounds that are included in the *lianhuanhua* itself. Be aware that when the term *lianhuanhua* is used in the rest of this chapter, it refers to the case study of this chapter. When I make a reference to the term *lianhuanhua* in general, I will clearly declare so.

Text and discourse analysis

Florian Schneider states in his manuscript that "they [words] evoke associations and prompt emotional reactions" (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 4-5). It means that text and discourse can have a certain effect on the reader and create a frame in which a reader interprets a text and its meaning. A word cloud is able to show which words occur most often in a text. The more a word occurs, the more a word is able to

frame the text and the more influence it will have on the reader. To get an inclusive point of view, I have included an English translation in the Appendix. Although translating from Chinese to English can include minor interpretation differences, the translation will provide a perspective on the contents of the *lianhuanhua*. I will use both the original Chinese text and the English translation to make up a word cloud (see Figure 23 and Figure 24). The English translation is not an official translation by the Chinese government, and therefore it is possible that the translation includes certain words that the CCP would or would not have chosen. To avoid having a substantial difference between the two word clouds, it is thus valuable to see whether the Chinese characters and English words that occur most often are compatible with each other. The reason a word cloud is included in this thesis research is because it can give an indication of the approach of the Chinese government regarding COVID-19. In his draft about political communication, Florian Schneider utilises an example about the "severe acute respiratory syndrome" (SARS), an epidemic that had its outbreak in South China in 2002 and quickly spread to the rest of China and the world. Schneider states that the Chinese government first tried to keep the outbreak a secret, but after a leak of information the CCP had to find a way to communicate about SARS and their policy regarding the virus (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 9). It is interesting, because Schneider unknowingly stated an example that now can be compared to the situation around COVID-19, stating that the Chinese government present their efforts to reduce the virus as a "war on SARS". The CCP presented medical practitioners and army personnel as "combatants" in this war (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 9). Schneider states that because reducing SARS was presented as an extraordinary concept such as war, the frame of reference became extraordinary as well. In addition, the measures that had to be taken were extraordinary as well, which allowed China's propaganda system to frame the

2

conflict with a clear difference between good and evil, or heroes and villains, according to Schneider. The heroes being the authorities and medical personnel, the villains is the metaphor for SARS. Schneider adds to this that this frame creates stigmatisation to those who were infected, because the blame will shift to the infected and regarding them responsible for their own situation (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 10). A frame is therefore important for the way a reader comprehends information.

The Chinese word cloud (Figure 23) and the English word cloud (Figure 24) explain which words are used most often. There are several Chinese characters that are left out, including 的 (*de*, a character that indicates a possession), 是 (*shi*, the verb 'to be'), 在 (*zai*, indicates being at a location or an action in progress), 日 (*ri*, day, is used to indicate the day in a date notation) and 月 (*yue*, month, is used to indicate the month in a date notation), and a variety of measure words.[1] Remarkable is that in both word clouds the following words and Chinese characters occur most often: *Xi Jinping*/习近平, *Wuhan*/武汉, *people*/人民, *Hubei*/湖北, *victory*/胜利 *or* 必胜, and *China*/中国. The fact that the English words and Chinese characters that occur most often correspond to each other suggests that both the Chinese and the English text have the same focus. It also corresponds to Schneider's view upon the SARS outbreak in China in 2002, because interestingly, the way the Chinese government operates during the COVID-19 crisis is similar to the situation during the SARS outbreak. For example, the text in the *lianhuanhua* focuses on "victory", which implies there is something to win; in this case, conquering the coronavirus. In addition, the rest of the words such as "people", "Wuhan", "Hubei" and "China" all correspond to a

---

[1] These words are excluded from the word cloud, because they are commonly used words in the Chinese language but they do not have any academic relevance for this study. It was not necessary to exclude words from the English word cloud, because the word cloud program automatically filters the words. The program is used to English texts, but not to Chinese texts.

common nationalist feeling: it is only possible to conquer the virus if we conquer it together with the whole nation. Lastly, Xi Jinping's name is prominently visible on both word clouds as well. Although the *lianhuanhua* is produced by the CCP, their name is only mentioned in the last scene. In the rest of the cartoon only Xi's name is mentioned, which indicates that he – as the General Secretary – is the personification of the Chinese government. Why does the government choose to concentrate on themselves? The CCP wants to notify the Chinese people that they are concerned with them and will help them during this crisis, which adds to the nationalistic character of the cartoon. Although the English word cloud does not show it, the Chinese word cloud also shows that "我们" (*women*, we) has a relatively large role in the text. This shows again that the focus of the *lianhuanhua* is on the collective culture of China against the coronavirus, especially because there is no use of the word "我" (*wo*, I), which would indicate a more individualistic approach of the virus.

Video and spoken text analysis

Video analysis

In the video analysis, the two clips from the *lianhuanhua* are both arranged per scene, which means that there is a screenshot every time the camera changes to a new angle. It is obvious that the *lianhuanhua* is inspired on the video shots (in combination with the official photographs taken that day by Xinhua, which will be covered in the paragraph Visual analysis), because the content in the shots corresponds to the scenes in the cartoon. The original people that Xi Jinping met on his visit to Wuhan are caricatured and they are used for the *lianhuanhua* scenes. The video clips do not offer new information for the viewer, because the still images in the *lianhuanhua* itself correspond to the videos.

Spoken text analysis

The audio that is included in the *lianhuanhua* is solely Xi Jinping speaking. The audio corresponds to the scene in which the audio button is implemented. The *lianhuanhua* is based on the true events of Xi's visit to Wuhan, and therefore the audio is his genuine response that he gave in real life. It is an addition to the information the viewer already acquires from the visual and textual content from the *lianhuanhua*. Although most of Xi's speech is written on the *lianhuanhua* in text as well, the audio also gives the viewer new information that is not written down in the scenes of the cartoon. Corresponding to the text analysis, the spoken text shows a large utilisation of words such as "victory" (胜利 *shengli*) and "confidence" (信心 *xinxin*), as well as the use of the word "we" (我们 *women*). "Victory" and "confidence" both establish positive connotations towards "conquering" COVID-19, which ensure the viewer to start developing positive feelings towards the government's approach to the coronavirus.

Visual analysis

"To analyse is to break a thing down into its constituent elements" (Bell 2004, 15). Pictures and comics are an important aspect of a *lianhuanhua*, and a visual analysis is therefore inevitable. According to Bell, "visual/verbal units of meaning which are the objects of content analysis are defined by the medium in which they are produced as isolable, self-contained or separate, like paragraphs, framed images, pages or news photographs" (Bell 2004, 15). In the following paragraphs I will analyse the visual aspects of the (framed) images of the lianhuanhua as an addition to the text analysis.

Colours

Colours are an important aspect of a visual publication, because colours can create a different atmosphere for the viewer. A quick glance at the screenshots shows that the CCP

chose to mainly utilise pastel versions of the three primary colours: red, blue and yellow. These colours are largely used for the background colouring and as a main focus for the text in Figure 17 and Figure 18. Variations of these colours are used as well, for example a dark midnight blue background in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5, or an orange background in Figure 12 and Figure 13. Because the primary colours all have a pastel undertone, the backgrounds mainly include light blue, beige yellow and light red or pink. The detailing in the *lianhuanhua* mainly includes white or black for the outlines, or black, red and white for the clothing of the models. Exceptions are the soldier models in Figure 2 and Figure 3, who wear army green clothing, and the medical personnel in Figure 12 and Figure 13, who wear bright blue aprons. The colour scheme is simple, which reflects on the *lianhuanhua* not having too many details for the viewer to come across, which could distract the viewer. This could therefore be an indication that the simplicity of the *lianhuanhua* leaves more room for the viewer to apprehend the true meaning behind the cartoon, and focus on the content instead of the visual aspects. Lastly, the *lianhuanhua* has a particular sequence of colours. The colours start rather dark, for example the dark blue in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5. The dark colour is a reference to the "dark times" of the start of the coronavirus. In addition, the colour blue is often used to describe "sadness" (Meier 2015, 422). Gradually, the colours become lighter. Figure 19 shows the back of a medical practitioner and a patient lying in the hospital bed, both looking into the distance. The viewer is able to see where they are looking at, namely a skyline and a bright circle of light in the far distance. It is a visual metaphor for "light at the end of the tunnel", which indicates positivity. The fact that this scene is shown as one of the last scenes of the *lianhuanhua* illustrates that there is hope and that China and its people will overthrow the virus. The background of the last scenes shows a vibrant red colour. Although in most countries the colour red is often associated

6

with "anger" (Meier 2015, 422), red is a traditional and national colour in China that, for example, is used to dress brides in (Hutchings 2015, 348). According to Stefan Landsberger, the colour red is employed to be a traditional communist colour, which in China is seen as a "life-giving" colour, that stood for wealth, joy and festive occasions (Landsberger 1995, 191). It is thus safe to say that the CCP did not want the viewer to associate the colour red with anger, but rather with joy, wealth, and communism.

Background

Even though the *lianhuanhua* also includes text, videos, and spoken text, images can independently tell a story as well. The viewer is expected to scroll down the *lianhuanhua*. Noticeable is that although the *lianhuanhua* is a total product, it is also divided into different scenes. The viewer can identify the scenes by looking at the background colours, which transfer to a different colour as soon as a new scene is introduced. Examples of this can be seen in Figure 6, Figure 8, Figure 10, Figure 18, and Figure 20. An interesting aspect is that the CCP chose to vary between having a gradient colour separation (e.g. Figure 6, Figure 10, Figure 18, and Figure 20) and a sudden colour separation (e.g. Figure 8). Despite the fact that both separations introduce new scenes, the sudden separation is more drastic than the subtle gradient. The subtle gradient gives the viewer the impression you "scroll into" the new scene, whereas the drastic separation shows a clear border between two scenes. The feeling of "scrolling into" a new scene is enhanced because the viewer is only able to watch the *lianhuanhua* on his or her smartphone and will therefore "scroll into" a new scene by swiping their fingers across the screen. It thus seems as if the background changes with every swipe of the finger.

Models and composition

The *lianhuanhua* introduces a variety of different models. Xi Jinping is the most prominent and important character, because he is portrayed in seven scenes out of twenty-two screenshots, excluding the double portrayal when a screenshot overlaps another. Figure 13 and Figure 21 are therefore excluded, because they show the same Xi Jinping as on Figure 12 and Figure 20. In addition, there are several minor figures in the *lianhuanhua* who play a role as well: soldiers, medical personnel, COVID-19 patients, and Wuhan inhabitants. The portrayal of the models is interesting, because the still images are all inspired or extracted from on the corresponding photographs by Xinhua News Agency, made on March 10 2020, when Xi Jinping visited Wuhan in Hubei province. Although it can be rather difficult to see whether the *lianhuanhua* is animated or not because the images are life-like, when comparing the *lianhuanhua* to the original Xinhua photographs, the differences are obvious. It is, however, probably an animated layer upon the original photograph, because it is noticeable that most of the cartoon images in the *lianhuanhua* are precisely the same as its corresponding photograph. Nonetheless, there are several differences. For example, in all of the figures the background is edited and changed according to the pastel primary colour scheme that is used throughout the *lianhuanhua*. Several bystanders are edited out of the picture, which generates more focus on the models. This can be seen in Figure 25 and Figure 28, which both show animated houses as a background and have abandoned several models in order to keep the focus on Xi Jinping and the Wuhan residents he is speaking to. Another aspect is that this comparison shows that the composition of the original photographs is altered for the corresponding cartoons. For example,

Figure 26 shows the cartoon version of the real-life event. The original Xinhua photograph shows Xi Jinping in a black, long coat, surrounded by two military workers and three people in black clothing. They are all standing in a large hall with red curtains and a brown coloured carpet with a busy print. Alternatively, the *lianhuanhua* shows the

cartoon version of the photograph. Noticeable is that Xi Jinping and the people surrounding him are all wearing white surgical coats instead of the military clothing or black clothing, to stress the position of medical personnel (Landsberger 1995, 150) and the specialised expertise which ensures people to take Xi and the people surrounding him more seriously (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 33-34). The surroundings are changed into a light blue background and the screen – which shows the Huoshenshan hospital personnel – has moved closer to Xi Jinping and the rest of the attendees. It also seems larger, because it covers the total left side of the cartoon image and is therefore more prominent in the scene. It is interesting how effective these changes are and what their effect can be on the viewer of the *lianhuanhua*. The viewer's attention is immediately drawn to Xi Jinping watching the screen and talking to the medical personnel through video calling, because the surroundings of the cartoon are calm. The fact that Xi is wearing a white doctor's coat in the *lianhuanhua*, although he was not wearing it in the original Xinhua photograph, means that it was a deliberate choice to make him wear one in the cartoon. It gives the viewer a sense of trust and safety in Xi and his approach of the virus, because a claimed expertise ensures people to be taken more seriously (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 33-34). It is, however, contradictory that Xi is not wearing the white coat in other scenes of the *lianhuanhua*. For example, Figure 27 shows a collage of Xi and medical personnel and a COVID-19 patient on the screen. It does not show Xi in the same way as on the original Xinhua photograph, because he is not watching the screen. The layout of the cartoon is different and it ensures that the viewer's focus is on Xi's speech (the viewer can listen to the speech by clicking on the speaker icon in the *lianhuanhua*). Changing the layout of a scene shows that the models are given a different profile than what the original scene would suggest. Changing a scene is something that was done already in propaganda posters and photographs of the

1980s (Landsberger 1995, 102). Figure 29 is another example of the difference in composition. The photograph taken from a movie clip from CGTN shows Xi Jinping sitting in front of Wuhan residents and talking to them about the virus. The photograph is taken from a distance and the building is dark coloured. The cartoon in the *lianhuanhua* is composed of lighter background colours, which immediately have a lay more focus on the models instead of the dark building. The composition is also different from the original photograph, where Xi is sitting in front of the residents. The *lianhuanhua* shows a "cut out" of Xi that takes up around one third of the space in the *lianhuanhua* scene. As a result, the focus of the viewer will mainly be on Xi again. Given the above, the *lianhuanhua* producers chose to focus on Xi visiting Wuhan and seeing the situation with his own eyes, instead of focusing on the prevention of the virus. If prevention had been the focus of the *lianhuanhua*, more attention would have been drawn to – for example – wearing face masks, using disinfection fluids, and listening to what the medical personnel has to say about the status of the virus.

Even though the models are realistically animated, it is also obvious that the animators wanted to hold on to the original idea of a *lianhuanhua*, namely *pictures* or *cartoons* that are linked. The animators chose to outline all of the models in this *lianhuanhua* with white or black lines, which ensures the models to look "heroic" and corresponds to the so-called *Zhongguo hua*-style (Landsberger 1995, 41-44). In addition, not only the models are outlined, but most of the attributes in the pictures as well. For example, the airplane (Figure 2), the ambulance (Figure 5), and the tripod (Figure 9) are all outlined with a white line. The outlines give the overall *lianhuanhua* an animated appearance. Besides the appearance of the models, Xi Jinping's body posture is remarkable as well, especially his hand gestures. For example, he is waving in four scenes of the *lianhuanhua* (Figure 7, Figure 10, Figure 15, and Figure 20/Figure 21), out of a total of seven scenes in which he

is portrayed. Through waving his hand (at medical personnel or Wuhan inhabitants) Xi Jinping shows amiability, and because of the fact that this portrayal is shown in more than half of Xi's scenes, it shows that amiability (towards the people) is an important aspect of the ideological thought behind the *lianhuanhua*. Correspondingly to the previous paragraph, this shows again that Xi Jinping plays a dominant role in the cartoon. The purpose of the *lianhuanhua* could therefore be to convince the viewer that both Xi Jinping and the Party are very committed to supporting China's people.

In summary, the *lianhuanhua* is a propaganda publication that consists of a great variety of features, both visual and textual. Through the analysis in this chapter, I have shown that the *lianhuanhua* mainly focuses on the approach of the Chinese government regarding COVID-19, with a focus on General Secretary Xi Jinping visiting Wuhan during its lockdown. The *lianhuanhua* shows a caricatured version of reality in which Xi Jinping visits Wuhan, talks to its residents and to COVID-19 patients and medical personnel. The *lianhuanhua* includes colourful and visually attractive scenes which include video clips and audio fragments of Xi's speech as well. The interactive interface of the *lianhuanhua* enables the viewer to scroll through the cartoon and watch, listen or read the excerpts they choose to click on. Since the focus of the *lianhuanhua* lays on Xi Jinping and the Chinese government's approach to COVID-19, the goal of the *lianhuanhua* is to convince the viewer that the CCP is concerned with the prevention and control of the virus.

2| CASE STUDY 2: CCP'S INTERACTIVE POSTER

In May 2020, the CCP released an additional propaganda publication regarding the coronavirus on their official website (大方略，强布局！习近平这样领导中国战"疫"--专题报道--人民网 2020). This publication is considerably different from the *lianhuanhua*, which the government published earlier in May, because it does not include as many visual aspects as the *lianhuanhua* does. I have chosen to name the publication an "interactive poster" for this research, because the CCP did not name it officially as they did for the *lianhuanhua*. In addition, although the poster does not look like a traditional propaganda poster as we know from the period 1949 until 1989, it does include a lot of textual information which the CCP wants to propagate to the masses, so the title "interactive poster" seems to cover a lot of its features. As mentioned above, the interactive is quite different to the *lianhuanhua* in many aspects. For example, the CCP chose to not utilise any cartoon models, photographs, video clips or spoken text in the interactive poster. Whereas in the *lianhuanhua* the viewer was able to see caricatured situations from Xi Jinping's visit to Wuhan, the interactive poster seems to mainly focus on statistics instead of portraying situations. The analysis in this chapter will only cover visual and textual aspects of the poster. Despite the fact that the analysis will not be entirely comparable to the *lianhuanhua* because of the differences between the two cases, the poster will also give an interesting point of view of the CCP's focus during the corona pandemic.

Text and discourse analysis

The text analysis of the interactive poster will– similar to the first case study – partially be based upon a word cloud (see Figure 68 and Figure 69). Both a Chinese and an English word cloud will help interpret the text and the translation of the interactive poster. A

Chinese word cloud is especially important in this case study because the interactive poster includes remarkably more text compared to the *lianhuanhua*, which leaves more room for a free interpretation and translation of the text. To ensure the Chinese and English texts do not differ excessively, they will both be compared to one another. It must be added that the Chinese text has had some adaptations, because there were many characters that are not necessary to look into during this study. The following Chinese characters were excluded from the Chinese word cloud: 在 (*zai*, indicates being at a location or in an action in progress), 日 (*ri*, day, is used to indicate the day in a date notation), 月(*yue*, month, is used to indicate the month in a date notation) and 年(*nian*, year, is used to indicate the year in a date notation), 了 (*le*, completed action marker), 和 (*he*, and), 个 (*ge*, measure word for people or general objects), 的 (*de*, a characters that indicates a possession), 并 (*bing*, (not) at all), 等 (*deng*, et cetera), 这 (*zhe*, this), 为 (*wei*, to take something as), 对 (*dui*, right *or* towards), 各 (*ge*, each), and 以 (*yi*, by means of).[2]

The English word cloud shows that the word "war" is relatively smaller than other words, which means that "war" is not used as often. The word "war" does imply that the Chinese are "fighting a common enemy". For example, Figure 36 shows an "expert interpretation" in which professor Zhu Lijia refers to the situation as a ""wartime" of the epidemic situation", in which "wartime" is marked with quotation marks in the original text as well. The latter implies that it is an unusual word. Figure 66 shows professor Dong

---

[2] A greater amount of characters are excluded compared to the *lianhuanhua*, mainly because the word cloud was particularly affected by the previous Chinese characters being prominently present and blocking out other characters. Excluding Chinese characters can cause the word cloud to change, which thus changes the outcome of the text and discourse analysis as well. There could even be a reason for the utilisation of the excluded characters, which therefore have a certain effect on the analysis of the text. Even though the exclusion can affect the outcome of the analysis, for this study the value of other Chinese characters and the amount in which they are used are more relevant than the excluded characters. In addition, in an English word cloud words such as articles are excluded automatically. The program, however, does not recognise Chinese characters and the exclusion has to be done manually.

Zhaoxia talking about "China's war against the "epidemic" situation", which includes quotation marks around the word "epidemic", however, not around "war". This implies that the professor does not find "war" referring to the epidemic situation an unusual illustration. The annotation to "war" is similar to Florian Schneider's argument about the way the Chinese government portrayed the control of SARS in 2002. The government compared fighting SARS to fighting in a war (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 9). According to the English word cloud, the combination "prevention and control of the epidemic situation" occurs most often in the translation of the interactive poster. The translation includes several examples of the fact that the words most often occur in this combination. Examples include "(…) the Party Central Committee has held many important high level meetings about the prevention and control of the epidemic situation" (Figure 34), "prevention and control of an epidemic situation is a complicated systematic undertaking" (Figure 40), "the prevention and control of the epidemic situation is a unique way to manifest the immense dominance and power of the "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" system (…)" (Figure 56) or "if the prevention and control of the epidemic situation is viewed long-term, a system that ensures stability and effectiveness is absolutely necessary" (Figure 61). "Prevention and control of the epidemic situation" (or 疫情防控 *yiqing fangkong* in the Chinese word cloud) are the most prominent words in the word cloud shows that the Chinese government frames the COVID-19 situation in a certain way. Namely, they want to show the reader of the interactive poster that the government is doing everything they can to prevent the coronavirus from spreading and they control the situation as much as possible. The reader will associate the approach with the CCP, because "Party" and "Xi Jinping"[3] are second

---

[3] "Xi" and "Jinping" are two separate words in the English word cloud because the word cloud does not connect them automatically, but they are equally large. In addition, they are large in the Chinese word cloud as well, where they are connected to each other.

most prominent in the word cloud. It is necessary to know what is in the actual text as well. For example, the English word cloud shows that "president" is a large word and therefore has been utilised numerous times in the translation. In addition, the Chinese word cloud shows that 总统 *zongtong*, the Chinese characters for "president" are rather large as well and therefore correspond to the English word cloud. When looking at the translation (see the translation of Figure 63, Figure 64, and Figure 65 in the Appendix), it can be understood that the word "president" is mainly used to indicate which countries and their leaders – often referred to as "presidents" – Xi has spoken to about the prevention and control of the coronavirus. This is important in the way that it shows specific numbers and situations which directly relate to the prevention and control of the virus, but the word "president" in the word cloud does not refer to Xi Jinping himself, which a viewer could assume it would when looking at the word clouds on its own. In addition, in the Chinese culture the leader of the CCP is not referred to as "president". In China, Xi is always referred to as 总书记 *zongshuji* or "General Secretary" in formal situations or as 同志 *tongzhi* or "colleague" in more amical situations (for example, see Figure 31 and Figure 38 where *tongzhi* is used in combination with Xi's name). On that note, it is interesting that the CCP chose not to use *zongshuji* when referring to Xi, but they only refer to him as *tongzhi*. As a result, the informal designation ensures the viewer of the interactive poster to feel less distanced from Xi, as if he is a close friend to them.

The approach of the interactive poster is different from the visual approach of the *lianhuanhua*, because the poster mainly focuses on text. The viewer will therefore have to read the text to obtain information instead of just scrolling and clicking through the poster. The information on the interactive poster has varied themes. Subjects, such as the amount of meetings and conferences about the prevention and control of the epidemic situation

(Figure 34 and Figure 35), statistics about the number of participants who enter video conferences (Figure 50 and Figure 51), and enumerations of Xi's video conference calls with foreign political leaders (Figure 63, Figure 64, and Figure 65), which all especially focus on numbers and statistics. These enumerations with varied topics provide the viewer of the poster with a great amount of information about what exactly the Party and Xi do to prevent and control the epidemic. In addition, the interactive poster informs about the following subjects as well:

- Strategy patterns about mobilisation, deployment of medical personnel and work reinforcement (Figure 38 and Figure 39);
- The different stages of the "epidemic" war (the location of the quotation marks is taken literally from the Chinese text) and its target requirements (Figure 42 and Figure 43);
- People's livelihood including, for example, subsidies, employment, helping people and small companies (Figure 46 and Figure 47);
- How the mobilisation of the Party, army and every person in the country helped to prevent and control the epidemic (Figure 54 and Figure 55);
- How Xi Jinping has come up with deployments and a system of institutional construction for the prevention and control of COVID-19 to work against the shortcomings of the system. Xi also stated that the leadership of the Party is the reason why the country is capable of the prevention and control of an epidemic in the first place (Figure 58, Figure 59, and Figure 60).

Interestingly, all of the subjects include positive allegations towards the Party and Xi himself, except for last figures (Figure 58, Figure 59, and Figure 60) which start with the shortcomings of the system. It is a fascinating approach, because in a propaganda poster

16

you would not expect a critical mark from the Chinese government. On the other hand, it is quickly contradicted by enumerating what Xi has deployed to improve the shortcomings of the system and how the leadership of the Party is the sole reason for capability of prevention and control. Furthermore, the message that the CCP propagates through the interactive poster is a typical propaganda message, because – according to Florian Schneider – it focuses on a conflict between good and evil and it is a story filled with heroes and villains (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 10), as was mentioned in the previous chapter as well. Although Schneider's example refers to the SARS virus of 2002, it is possible to relate it to the coronavirus as well. Currently, the good and evil relate to the authorities as the good actor and the virus as the evil actor. The heroes and villains refer to the medical personnel and the authorities who aim to prevent and control the virus being the "heroes" and the virus itself being the "villain". It is a frame the government adapted to the interactive poster to guide the viewer towards shifting the blame of the coronavirus outbreak away from the Chinese government themselves.

The Chinese government chose to add another aspect to the interactive poster, namely an "expert interpretation" or 专家解读 *zhuanjia jiedu* (see Figure 36, Figure 40, Figure 44, Figure 48, Figure 52, Figure 56, Figure 61, and Figure 66). Government officials, teachers, and doctors only have authority because people give them authority. The "expert interpretations" are most often written by professors who teach at the Central Party School. The fact that the abstracts are called an "expert interpretation" shows that the CCP regards the professors to be "experts" and guides the viewer towards trusting their interpretation of the text. All of the eight subjects have their own "expert interpretation" regarding the subjects the CCP writes about, either written by one or two "experts". Correspondingly, in his draft chapter on political communication and discourse analysis,

Florian Schneider talks about power and authority. He states that people or institutions with a level of authority can claim a specialised expertise and get taken more seriously than people who do not have authority. He mentions that this includes, for example, government officials, teachers, and doctors (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 32), which are exactly the type of people the Chinese government chose for the interactive poster as well. Authority also gets constructed, according to Schneider, through society (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 33). The interactive poster thus includes a form of framing authority in order to let the viewer trust and believe in the Party and the intellectuals of the "expert interpretation".

Visual analysis

The visual aspects of the interactive poster are different from the *lianhuanhua*, and therefore I will not discuss all of the aspects which were treated in the previous chapter. The most important visual aspects of the interactive poster are the layout, colours, and the background.

Layout

The interactive poster is on many layers different from the *lianhuanhua*. Whereas the *lianhuanhua* truly was a cartoon with vibrant colours and different visual presentations of real-life situations, the interactive poster is an information platform where the viewer can click through different topics and read about them. There are several interesting aspects of the poster. First of all, the CCP chose to not use any cartoon models, photographs, spoken text or video clips to portray the goal of the interactive poster. Secondly, the poster contains a lot of text. It is obvious that the goal of the poster is to read the information on it, and not to quickly see what the content is about. If the latter would be the case, the producers would have chosen to use less text, so that the viewer can see

in one glance what the topic of the poster is. Thirdly, the poster expects the viewer to click

through it by themselves. Compared to the *lianhuanhua*, it is more focused on the acts of

the individual. The *lianhuanhua* was designed for the reader to scroll through and click on

videos or spoken text along the way. The viewer did not have to think about which button

to click, because they would appear automatically as they scrolled further to the end of

the cartoon. The poster, however, shows eight squares which all show the topics of the

posters that the viewer will see after they click on the square (Figure 32). It is not

necessary for the viewer to go through them in a particular order. The viewer is able to,

for example, first choose to view the third square and then go back to the first one, or

choose to click a random other square. In addition, it is also not necessary to view all of

the squares, so the viewer can also only choose the information they would like to know

more about. This is characteristic of the "interactive" essence of the poster. When the

viewer clicks the square of choice, they are directed to a new page of the poster. Firstly, it

shows a title page (Figure 33, Figure 37, Figure 41, Figure 45, Figure 49, Figure 53, Figure

57, and Figure 62), but after a click on a random spot in the poster, the viewer is directed

to the information page (Figure 34/Figure 35, Figure 38/Figure 39, Figure 42/Figure 43,

Figure 46/Figure 47, Figure 50/Figure 51, Figure 54/Figure 55, Figure 58/Figure

59/Figure 60, Figure 63/Figure 64/Figure 65). After reading the information, they get to

make a new choice. They can click on the circle in the left-hand corner to go back to the

main screen (Figure 32), or they can choose one of the three options on the bottom of the

poster, which are similar for every information page. The three options are either to go

further to the "expert interpretation", to click through to the next "strategy" – which

directs the viewer to the next square on the general page, or to share the information page

with their friends through sending them a QR code (Figure 67 is an example of one of the

"sharing screens" with the corresponding QR code). The interface is therefore

straightforward and easy to understand for the viewer. The only guidance the poster includes is to direct the viewer towards the next information page if the viewer clicks on the "next" button. The button that leads the viewer to the "expert interpretation" shows one or two quotes from experts (mainly professors, see the translation in the Appendix).

Colours and background

The main colours that the CCP used are light blue, dark blue, black, white, yellow gold and a burgundy red colour. The text is mainly written in black, but the titles are often written in dark blue with yellow gold. This case study does not include any models and is mainly focused on the text that is shared on the poster. The colours are therefore even more important than in the previous study, because there are less other aspects that influence the viewer. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the colour blue is often used to describe "sadness" (Meier 2015, 422), which is interesting because the colour blue is prominently present in the interactive poster. A bluish colour also tends to give the viewer a cool feeling (Ou 2015, 403). It is thus interesting whether the interactive poster is supposed to give the viewer a sad, cool feeling towards the measurements the CCP took in protecting China and the world against the coronavirus, because all things considering, that is probably not the reaction they would want the viewer to have. On the contrary, the world has accused China of responding too slow to the coronavirus outbreak when authorities found out in December 2019, although they were in the same situation when SARS broke out in 2002 (Vlaskamp 2020). And even though they received many accusations, the Chinese government tried to defend its response towards the coronavirus (China Defends Its Coronavirus Response 2020), which indicates that the government does not want the viewer of the interactive poster to have a sad and cool feeling towards the measurements, instead of a feeling of trust. It is, however, complex to exactly know what feeling certain colours evoke in a viewer when looking at the poster,

without consulting the viewer himself. The (pastel) blue colour – which is the main colour in the interactive poster – is mostly used in the background combined with white. The background consists of watercolour painted sceneries of mountains and clouds – the latter moves across the screen and makes the poster dynamic. The painting style of the background is similar to the *Zhonghua* painting style (Landsberger 1995, 194), which is a traditional Chinese painting style and the poster therefore has a direct connotation to the past. The interactive poster has a more traditional approach compared to the *lianhuanhua*, because it is inspired on ancient paintings from the Song dynasty instead of the more modern cartoon images. For example, the painting *Dream Journey over XiaoXiang* by Mr. Li of Shucheng, which is painted during the mid-twelfth century, has similar, light-painted mountains on scroll as in the background of the interactive poster (Murck 2000, 230-231). An obvious difference is that Mr. Li of Shucheng's handscroll is painted in black and white, whereas the background of the poster is painted in a light blue colour.

In summary, the interactive poster mainly consists of text instead of visual aspects, as is the case in the *lianhuanhua*. The text focuses on strategies, requirements and the mobilisation of the army, the Party and other individuals to prevent and control the epidemic. In addition, it also consists of Xi's approach to the situation, for example, with which world leaders he discussed the COVID-19 crisis. The fact that the poster contains a lot of text and so little visual aspects expects the viewer (or: reader) of the poster to be able to read Chinese. Whereas visual propaganda is able to speak to illiterates as well and subconsciously transfer a political message, the interactive poster is not. Since the focus of the poster lays on text, its goal is to inform the viewer and give them the possibility to click through the poster's information themselves.

3| COMPARISON WITH PROPAGANDA FROM 1949 UNTIL 1989

The Chinese government published many propaganda posters between 1949 and 1989. Propaganda posters contained a political message and the state often utilised them for educating the masses on correct behaviour. The posters had to contain a relatively realistic situation, in order to portray the future and demonstrate "life as it ought to be" (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). The CCP used propaganda posters to demonstrate how people should interpret their policy announcements (Landsberger 1995, 102-103). Chinese propaganda posters were often known for their colours and visual contents (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008) and were quite popular up until approximately 1989. In this chapter, I will analyse to what extent propaganda posters that the Chinese government produced between 1949 and 1989 are comparable to contemporary propaganda. Contemporary propaganda will include the two case studies in this thesis, regarding state propaganda on COVID-19. Comparing the two case studies of Chinese state propaganda will tell whether propaganda has undergone changes throughout the years. Similarities and differences will reveal whether the contemporary propaganda case studies are considerably different from propaganda that the CCP produced in the period between 1949 and 1989, or if "history repeats" itself. I will focus on several aspects in this comparison, including the visuals, models, and text. The outcome of the comparison to propaganda from 1949 until 1989 will not always be consistent between the two case studies, considering that they both case studies have contradicting features as well. In this chapter, the two case studies that I discussed in the previous chapter will be either referred to as "case studies" or as "contemporary propaganda" in general.

Text and discourse

Propaganda publications either use text, symbolic language (using visuals), or both. The Chinese government used to ensure that propaganda posters consisted of symbolic language as the most important aspect, because it enabled illiterates to understand the message of the poster as well (Lent and Xu 2017, 147-149). Although the government sometimes chose to include the message for a great part in Chinese characters and pinyin only, which made it more challenging for the viewer to understand the message of the poster (Landsberger 1995, 198). The CCP thus altered the way in which they transferred the message of the propaganda publication. The two case studies in this thesis both represent different views as well. The *lianhuanhua* includes small quantities of text which inform the viewer about what is happening in the scene. It is, however, not necessary to be able to read the Chinese text, because the CCP focused their attention on the visual aspects of the *lianhuanhua*. The message of the cartoon can be comprehended by watching the visual contents, because they have an underlying meaning as well. Text is often only used as a transcription of what can be seen in the cartoon. Although the CCP used Chinese characters in the *lianhuanhua* as well as visual messages, it is still moderately different from propaganda from the era between 1949 until 1989, because the posters did not include a pinyin transcription. Sometimes propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989 also contained English – although often misspelled – messages combined with Chinese characters (Landsberger 1995, 200), which also does not correspond to the two contemporary propaganda case studies, where the Chinese language in characters plays the main role. Although Landsberger argues that propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989 often contained (misspelled) English, there is only one example of this phenomenon in his book. It shows the title "Bette[r] birth and upbringing, sturdily growing", which misspelled the word "better" (see Figure 72). Regarding the tone of the text in propaganda

that the state published around the Cultural Revolution era, Landsberger (2001, 544) states that the Chinese government used to utilise "strident" and "aggressive" tones in their slogans. The tone became less strident and aggressive around the 1980s during the Four Modernisations era. Especially the "aggressive" tone of Cultural Revolution propaganda is visible in the tone in the *lianhuanhua*. For example, the CCP utilises a rather "aggressive" tone in the *lianhuanhua* to speak to the viewer. Figure 17 and Figure 18 show short slogans comparable to propaganda from 1949 until 1989, where the slogans also were a way to mobilise (Landsberger 2001, 544). As an example, see Figure 73, where the slogan "The 3 July and 24 July proclamations are Chairman Mao's great strategic plans! Unite with forces that can be united with to strike surely, accurately and relentlessly at the handful of class enemies" shows that people are expected to unite (or mobilise) to strike enemies. The quotation marks suggest that the slogans are quotes, perhaps from the Chinese people, although it is not clear from the poster who the original speakers are. Noticeably, the slogans in Figure 17 and Figure 18 show a variety of grammar voices. First of all, the imperative voice is used most often in this particular scene. "Go Wuhan! Go Hubei! Go China!", "(…) Please keep on going!", and "Serve the masses, do not do it very direct" are examples of slogans which use the imperative voice, where – in this case – the viewer of the *lianhuanhua* is directly commanded or requested to do something. The commands and requests in the *lianhuanhua* are similar to the goal of propaganda posters that the CCP published between 1949 and 1989. As stated before by Stefan Landsberger, the posters also were a method to mobilise the viewer of a poster. Second of all, a number of quotes include verbs like "should", which allow actors to make normative claims (Schneider (forthcoming) unpublished manuscript, 70). This is comparable to the fact that propaganda had an educational function towards the people so they would know what

was considered right and wrong (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008).

On the other hand, there are some textual differences between propaganda from 1949 until 1989 and contemporary propaganda as well. People liked propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989 because of the visual aspects, which established people to not pay a lot of attention to the slogans. The political message was therefore often communicated through people's subconscious (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). Although the text does not play an important role in the *lianhuanhua* – in which visuals are more important – the interactive poster is a mainly text-based publication. The message of the interactive poster will only be transferred through the text, so the viewer must read the text in order to understand the CCP's message. Whereas propaganda from 1949 until 1989, as seen before, was also suitable for illiterates (Lent and Xu 2017, 147-149), the interactive poster, as one of the examples of contemporary propaganda, definitely is not.

Visuals

As stated in the previous paragraph, the visual content of a propaganda publication is relatively important, because it often distributes a subconscious message (Landsberger and van der Heijden, Chinese propaganda posters 2008). In this paragraph I am going to have a look to what extent the visual content of propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989 is comparable to the case studies in this thesis, two examples of propaganda regarding COVID-19.

Colours

Colours are an important aspect of the visual content of propaganda publications. Propaganda that the Chinese government published between 1949 until 1989 had

different stages of the utilisation of colour. In general, propaganda posters from this era contained a wide variety of colours, but especially the colour red had a prominent role. According to Landsberger (1995, 191), the colour red had traditional properties and often stood for "live-giving", wealth, joy, festive occasions and expelling damaging influences. In addition, red also stood for the Communist Party of China and its publications (Landsberger 1995, 191). Interestingly, there was a difference between propaganda publications from the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) and the Four Modernisations (1978 – 1989). During the Cultural Revolution, the propaganda publications contained a great amount of vibrant colours, especially rice-roots green, magenta and cyclamen, which is often called the "*Zhongguo hua*"-style. Propaganda that was published during the Four Modernisations had another perspective on colours and contained less vibrant colouring than the Cultural Revolution propaganda (Landsberger 1995, 191). During the 1980s, some propaganda was even published in black-and-white instead of in colour (Landsberger 1995, 194). The visuals of both case studies in this thesis can be compared to either the Cultural Revolution or the Four Modernisations era. First of all, the visual aspects of the *lianhuanhua* are comparable to those of Cultural Revolution propaganda. Cultural Revolution propaganda contained many vibrant colours, which are also visible in the *lianhuanhua*. As seen in the analysis in Case study 1: CCP's interactive *lianhuanhua*, the colour red is prominently present in the cartoon and has the same positive connotation as during the Cultural Revolution. Although the background colours include mainly pastel hues, the models and text have vibrant colours. For example, the orange text in Figure 6 and the red, blue, orange and green text in Figure 17 and Figure 18 are bright colours. In the rest of the scenes the colour red is also used as a text colour, in addition to the background colouring that includes red as well (in Figure 19, Figure 20, Figure 21, and Figure 22). Alternatively, the *lianhuanhua* does not use the "traditional" "*Zhongguo hua*"-

style (see Figure 74 for an example of the *Zhongguo hua*-style) – which was often used during the Cultural Revolution and which mainly includes colours like rice-roots green, magenta and cyclamen (Landsberger 1995, 191). Although vibrant colours are an important aspect of the *lianhuanhua*, the colours itself are somewhat different from state propaganda which the Chinese government published in the *Zhongguo hua*-style. The interactive poster, however, does not contain any vibrant colours and is therefore comparable to the propaganda that was published during the Four Modernisations, because this propaganda was also known for its less strident colouring (Landsberger 1995, 191). For example, Figure 70 and Figure 71 show two examples of propaganda posters from during the Four Modernizations. Figure 70 shows a very light-coloured poster, where the model is wearing white clothing and the background is white as well. Only the text – which is written in purple and blue – and the oranges have a more vibrant colour. Figure 71 shows a model weighing and selling fruits. The overall colour scheme includes more colours than the previous example, but the colours are soft and provide a dreamlike experience (Landsberger 1995, 198). Although the poster includes a lot of white and (light) blue and is therefore colourwise more similar to Figure 70, the light colours provide a dreamy perception as well.

Models

"Models are the concentrated and systematic version of the scattered and unsystematic ideas of the masses, and convey the idea of certain behaviour roles", which was Mao Zedong's view upon the utilisation of models in state propaganda (Landsberger 1995, 28). The CCP used models with the idea that models were able to provide examples of how people should behave. They were someone whom the viewer would be able to identify with, but whose characteristics were exaggerated (Landsberger 1995, 27). Although models were an important aspect of propaganda posters from 1949 until 1989, models

27

are not a necessity anymore to propagate the message of a publication, as demonstrated by the two case studies. For example, the interactive poster uses a limited amount of visuals and focuses more on text. The CCP did not use a single model in the poster. On the other hand, the *lianhuanhua* does include models. The *lianhuanhua* and thus its models are based on real-life events. The CCP has not altered the appearance of the models to make them more idealistic, like they used to do in propaganda that they published between 1949 and 1989 (Landsberger 1995, 39). In some scenes the CCP only chose to alter the composition of a scene to give certain models a more prominent role (see Models and composition in Case study 1: CCP's interactive *lianhuanhua*). The alteration of composition in propaganda is in harmony with propaganda from 1949 until 1989 as well. For example, the CCP used the "airbrush technique" to remove people from a photograph who had sensitive political annotations, or to connect the content of the photograph and the reality at that moment (Landsberger 2001, 545). Landsberger also gives another example of a photograph where Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun have been added to in order to give them a more important position on the photograph (Landsberger 1995, 102). In addition, in propaganda from 1949 until 1989 the government portrayed Mao Zedong as a "god-like" figure, who either was a statesman, a leader or a great teacher, according to Landsberger (1995, 44). Mao's ideology had a prominent role in the propaganda, and this often led to exclusion of other models (Landsberger 1995, 44). This phenomenon is very similar to the way the CCP portrayed Xi Jinping in the two case studies. First of all, in the *lianhuanhua* Xi often has an important role in the scenes, whether talking to COVID-19 patients, Wuhan residents or medical personnel. Case study 1: CCP's interactive *lianhuanhua* shows that Xi was positioned in an effective way – often not the same as the composition in the original photograph – to emphasise his leadership during the corona crisis. Second of all, as stated before, the interactive poster does not contain any visual

models like the propaganda publications published between 1949 and 1989 and the *lianhuanhua*. It does, however, contain text which says a great deal about the message the CCP wants to propagate. Case study 2: CCP's interactive poster shows that in both the original Chinese text and the English translation the words and Chinese characters for "Xi Jinping" are used to a great extent. The fact that Xi's name is often mentioned proposes that he is an important subject of the text and the message the CCP wants to propagate with the help of the interactive poster. Whereas the admiration of the leader is a common feature in both propaganda from 1949 until 1989 and contemporary propaganda publications, it is not possible to compare the depiction of men and women. For example, in Cultural Revolution propaganda it essentially meant that the physical differences between men and women disappeared "in order to portray every subject as a hero". The models were stereotyped and had standard bodies and heads without big differences between men and women (Landsberger 1995, 44). At the end of the 1970s the depiction of women changed. According to Landsberger, women were often portrayed again in their "more traditional roles of servants or waitresses, mothers and child-rearers", which were "non-threatening to male activities and positions" (Landsberger 1995, 144). Male portrayals, on the other hand, were often used to "discourage undesirable behaviour" and had negative associations (Landsberger 1995, 141). The portrayal of men and women in contemporary propaganda publications is different to their portrayal in propaganda from 1949 until 1989, mainly because – taking the case studies as examples – the *lianhuanhua* does not focus on the models as much as propaganda from 1949 until 1989 does. Despite the fact that Xi Jinping has a prominent role in most of the *lianhuanhua* scenes, the rest of the men and women are not portrayed in a different way compared to the original photographs on which the *lianhuanhua* is based upon. They are not represented extremely feminine or masculine, which implies that the focus in the *lianhuanhua* is not

on their appearance or their gender. Unfortunately, it is not possible to have a look at the visual representation of men and women in the interactive poster, because of the lack of visual portrayals. Although men and women are not represented in a particular way in the contemporary propaganda case studies, other models are enhanced. For example, in the *lianhuanhua* there are several representations of soldiers and medical personnel. The propaganda which the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989 did contain soldiers in revolutionary scenes, but around the 1980s the representation of soldiers gradually disappeared (Landsberger 1995, 156). Medical personnel and intellectuals also had a significant role in propaganda from 1949 until 1989. The medical personnel wore white coats, just like they did in Western advertisements and the intellectuals were shown in political propaganda, together with peasants, soldiers, and workers. Both intellectuals and medical personnel had an increasingly crucial role in society and by representing them in propaganda, their position in society was emphasised (Landsberger 1995, 150). In the *lianhuanhua*, the medical personnel is presented in the same way as in propaganda publications from 1949 until 1989, wearing white coats and showing their important tasks during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the fact that the interactive poster does not include any visual representations of intellectuals, it does contain the "expert interpretation", which is often written by intellectuals. They are thus integrated in the propaganda as well, and because they are linked to the "expert interpretation" it is implied that the intellectuals are experts too. Both the *lianhuanhua* and the interactive poster include medical personnel or intellectuals in a vital role in the propaganda, comparable to the propaganda published between 1949 and 1989.

In conclusion, both the *lianhuanhua* as the interactive poster have similar characteristics compared to the propaganda that the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989. The *lianhuanhua* shows a great variety of similarities to

propaganda that was published during and around the Cultural Revolution era. It has similar colourful visual features as well as the "aggressive" tone in the text on the publications, which had to mobilise or persuade the viewer of the political message of the publication. The interactive poster, on the other hand, has similar features to the propaganda from the Four Modernisations era, which is often known for its less vibrant colouring and less aggressive tone of speech compared to Cultural Revolution propaganda. Although the difference between the *lianhuanhua* and the interactive poster mainly lays in the visual aspects, they both show a great focus on Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China, as both the visual aspects of the *lianhuanhua* as the textual information on the interactive poster share the same focus. This is similar to propaganda from 1949 until 1989 as well, in which the leader and the Party and its political message often were the focal point. Although there are minor differences between the two case studies and the earlier propaganda from 1949 until 1989, the similarities are in abundance.

CONCLUSION

In this study I aimed to analyse whether contemporary state propaganda with regard to COVID-19 is comparable to propaganda which the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989. Based on qualitative literature and case study research, it can be concluded that contemporary state propaganda and propaganda from 1949 until 1989 – although having some minor differences – are congruent. The analyses demonstrate that both the *lianhuanhua* and the interactive poster have characteristics that propaganda from 1949 until 1989 focused on as well. The analyses illustrate that the visual aspects of the *lianhuanhua* are similar to propaganda publications that the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989. For example, the vibrant colours and the depiction of Xi Jinping as a leader for the masses in difficult times are identical to the colours and the depiction of Mao Zedong on – mainly – posters of the Cultural Revolution. Although the interactive poster is remarkably different from the *lianhuanhua*, the poster is also comparable to propaganda from 1949 until 1989, because this era knew a great variety of propaganda posters as well. The interactive poster has similar visual characteristics as propaganda published during the Four Modernisations, which used flat and more dream-like colours instead of the vibrant colours of the Cultural Revolution era. Text is an important aspect of both the *lianhuanhua* as the interactive poster. Both have textual similarities to propaganda posters that the CCP published between 1949 and 1989, mainly in the form of the tone of the text – which in some cases is imperative – or in the form of the tone of the text – which focuses on either expertise, CCP's leadership or positive slogans.

The limitations of this study can be found especially in the fact that it is a qualitative study, because there are only two case studies that have been analysed thoroughly. A

definite conclusion is complex to achieve to prevent generalisation, and it is therefore necessary to analyse more state propaganda publications regarding the coronavirus in the preceding months to deduct a binding conclusion. However, given that this thesis is a limited research in both time and scope capacity, two case studies were the best option to achieve the best outcome possible. Both case studies represent a different form of state propaganda: whereas the *lianhuanhua* is an interactive cartoon, which contains a lot of visual aspects that propagate the message such as cartoon models and video clips, but text and speeches as well, the interactive poster mainly contains text and is therefore more transparent in delivering information to the viewer compared to the *lianhuanhua*. Although further research is needed to determine the exact relationship between state propaganda that the Chinese government published between 1949 and 1989 and state propaganda regarding COVID-19, this thesis study does provide well-considerable evidence for the research question. Further research may include other propaganda publications regarding COVID-19. In addition, propaganda on other viruses, such as SARS, could be included as well. To have an even completer perspective of contemporary propaganda, other propaganda publications from preceding years should be added too, disregarding the subject.

This thesis study has had a contribution to the field, because COVID-19 is a relatively new coronavirus that has been discovered in December 2019. At the moment of writing, the virus still has a great influence on the world and there has therefore not been done any research on state propaganda regarding this particular coronavirus.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altehenger, Jennifer. "A Socialist Satire: Manhua Magazine and Political Cartoon Production in the PRC, 1950-1960." *Frontiers of History in China* 01 (2013): 78-103.

Bai, Shi. "Cartoon of President Xi Jinping Proves Online Hit - Cartoon of President Xi Jinping Proves Online Hit." *北京周报：英文版*, 2013: 42.

Bell, Philip. "Content Analysis of Visual Images." In *The Handbook of Visual Analysis*, by Theo van Leeuwen and Carey Jewitt, 10-34. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004.

Brady, Anne-Marie. *Marketing dictatorship: propaganda and thought work in contemporary China.* Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009.

Chen, Dan. "Political Context and Citizen Information: Propaganda Effects in China." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 31, no. 3 (2019): 463-484.

China Daily Global. "Fighting Covid-19: China in Action." 8 June 2020.

Creemers, Rogier. "Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century." *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 103 (2017): 85-100.

Gravett, Paul. *Mangasia: The definitive guide to Asian comics.* New York: Thames & Hudson Inc., 2017.

Han, Rongbin. *Contesting Cyberspace in China: Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.

Hutchings, John B. "Symbolic use of color in ritual, tradition, and folklore." In *Handbook of Color Psychology*, by Andrew J. Elliot and Anna Franklin Mark D. Fairchild, 340-356. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Landsberger, Stefan. *Chinese propaganda posters: from revolution to modernization.* Amsterdam: The Pepin Press, 1995.

Landsberger, Stefan. "Learning by What Example? Educational Propaganda in Twenty-First-Century China." *Critical Asian Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 541-571.

Landsberger, Stefan, and Marien van der Heijden. *Chinese propaganda posters.* Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 2008.

Lee, Tony C. "Can Xi Jinping be the next Mao Zedong? Using the Big Five Model to Study Political Leadership." *Chinese journal of political science* 23, no. 4 (2018): 473-497.

Lent, John A. *Illustrating Asia: comics, humour magazines, and picture books.* Richmond: Curzon, 2001.

Lent, John A., and Ying Xu. *Comics Art in China.* Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2017.

McNair, Brian. *An Introduction to Political Communication.* London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

Meier, Brian P. "Do metaphors color our perception of socia life?" In *Handbook of Color Psychology*, by Andrew J. Elliot, Mark D. Fairchild and Anna Franklin, 419-432. Cambrigde University Press, 2015.

Murck, Alfreda. *Poetry and painting in Song China: the subtle art of dissent.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.

New York Times. "China Defends Its Coronavirus Response." 6 June 2020.

Ou, Li-Chen. "Color emotion and color harmony." In *Handbook of Color Psychology*, by Andrew J. Elliot, Mark D. Fairchild and Anna Franklin, 401-418. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Qin, Lei. "From "Propaganda" to "Guided Communication". Animating Political Communication in Digital China." *Lingue Culture Mediazioni* 5, no. 2 (2019): 73-95.

Schneider (forthcoming), Florian. "Studying Political Communication in East Asia." Leiden: Leiden University, unpublished manuscript.

Vlaskamp, Marije. "Van Sars naar corona: hoe kan het dat China het weer niet voor elkaar heeft?" *Volkskrant*, 27 January 2020.

Wu, Cary. "How Chinese citizens view their government's coronavirus response." *The Conversation*, 4 June 2020.

Yang, Guobin. *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Zhang, Xiaoling. *The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From Propaganda to Hegemony.* Singapore: World Scientific, 2011.

大方略，强布局！习近平这样领导中国战"疫"-- 专题报道-- 人民网. 2020. http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/GB/432138/index.html (accessed October 2020).

战"疫"的刻，总书记和人民在一起. 2020. http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/GB/432409/index.html (accessed September 2020, 14).

APPENDIX

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 8

Figure 9

Figure 10

Figure 11

Figure 12

Figure 13

Figure 14

Figure 15

Figure 16

Figure 17

Figure 18

Figure 19

Figure 20

Figure 21

Figure 22

Figure 23: Word cloud in Chinese characters of the *lianhuanhua*

Figure 24: Word cloud in English of the *lianhuanhua*

Figure 25: Xi Jinping greets the residents of Wuhan, Hubei province. Source: Xinhua

Figure 26: Xi Jinping talks to medical personnel in Huoshenshan Hospital, Wuhan, Hubei province. Source:

Xinhua

Figure 27: Xi Jinping talks to a COVID-19 patient and his medical carers in Huoshenshan Hospital, Wuhan, Hubei province. Source: Xinhua

Figure 28: Xi Jinping waves at quarantined residents in their flats in Wuhan, Hubei province. Source: Xinhua

Figure 29: Xi Jinping talks to residents of Wuhan, Hubei province. Source: CGTN

Figure 30

编者按

　　新冠肺炎疫情发生以来，在以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下，举国上下同心协力，谱写了一曲共克时艰的"战疫"之歌。中国的防疫举措也得到世卫组织及许多国家的充分肯定和高度评价。当前，以武汉市为主战场的全国本土疫情传播已基本阻断，在这场突如其来的"大考"中，中国如何"答卷"？人民网·中国共产党新闻网为您梳理。

（点击页面开始浏览）

Figure 31

Figure 32

Figure 33

Figure 34

Figure 35

举旗定向、以快打快

< 目录

专家解读：

疫情防控"战时"状态下中央连开数次高层会议，这在党史上非常罕见，体现了应对突发紧急事态的领导力、组织力和动员能力。基于快速发展变化的疫情，高层正作出以快打快的战略战术部署。

上述脉络可以看出，会议主题即反映了防疫取得的进展和现实工作的需要，体现了实事求是的精神。

——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授竹立家

方略详情　　下一方略　　分享方略

Figure 36

Figure 37

Figure 38

Figure 39

善谋全局、同舟共济

专家解读：

疫情防控是一项复杂的系统工程，要坚持系统思维，运用系统科学的方法，把全国的疫情防控工作看作一个有机整体，坚持全国一盘棋，从整体出发，才能有效防控，科学防控，坚决打赢这场疫情阻击战。

——陕西省中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心特约研究员李永胜

"一省包一市"对口支援工作机制的启动，其重大意义可概括为三个方面：一是彰显了全国一盘棋的防控思路、二是彰显了社会主义集中力量办大事的制度优势、三是彰显了一方有难八方支援的兄弟情谊。

——中央党校（国家行政学院）经济学部教员、副教授周跃辉

方略详情　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 40

62

Figure 41

Figure 42

Figure 43

＜目录　审时度势、精准落子

专家解读：

中央部署虽各有侧重，但都建立在对不同阶段问题进行及时、准确分析的基础上，注重"落子"在关键处。例如当疫情得到一定程度遏制后，2月23日会议强调不获全胜决不轻言成功，就是一次适时的提醒。

——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授戴焰军

方略详情　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 44

Figure 45

Figure 46

稳定民生、黎元为先

医务人员

● **保障供应：** 建立联保联供协作机制，9省区市联手保证湖北武汉市场供应；管好"菜篮子""米袋子"；做好煤电油气等供应等

● **稳定物价：** 做好生活必需品保供调度，防止物价过快上涨等

● **稳定就业：** 支持多渠道灵活就业；注重高校毕业生就业工作；落实好社保费阶段性减免、失业保险稳岗返还、就业补贴政策等

● **帮扶困难群众：** 对患者家庭或者隔离的困难家庭重点照顾；帮助贫困劳动力有序返岗等

● **帮扶小微企业：** 研究出台阶段性、有针对性的减税降费政策；单列信贷规模，提供专项信贷额度等

......

专家解读　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 47

稳定民生、黎元为先

〈目录

专家解读：

民生问题历来是一个根本性问题。高度关注民生，是我们社会制度的本质所决定的。在这次疫情爆发的特殊时期和特殊情况下，解决好事关民生的各种具体问题显得更加重要。所以，这次疫情防控中，中央始终把解决好这个问题放在极其重要的地位，反复加以强调，并从实际出发，针对不同群体所面临的突出需求，分类实施各种及时而有效举措，从而不但解决了防控一线工作人员的后顾之优，保证了一线队伍的战斗力，而且保证了疫情防控工作以来整个社会稳定和广大人民群众正常生活的有序进行。应该说，这是我们这次疫情防控中一个非常重要的经验。

——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授戴焰军

方略详情　　下一方略　　分享方略

Figure 48

Figure 49

Figure 50

高效传导 直通基层

● 分会场：

各省区市和新疆生产建设兵团以及各市（地、州、盟）、县（市、区、旗），中央和国家机关各部门、各人民团体，解放军和武警部队团级以上单位。

★ 3月6日，习近平出席决战决胜脱贫攻坚座谈会并发表重要讲话。据介绍，这是**十八大以来脱贫攻坚方面最大规模会议**，以电视电话会议形式召开。

● 出席人员：

部分中共中央政治局委员、中央书记处书记，国务院扶贫开发领导小组成员单位有关负责同志。

● 分会场：

各省区市和新疆生产建设兵团以及中西部22个省区市所辖市（地、州、盟）、县（市、区、旗）。

专家解读　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 51

高效传导、直通基层

〈目录

专家解读：

　　一般而言决策部署是从中央传至省部级，再到县团级。考虑到基层干部在平衡防疫与复工复产方面发挥的关键作用，电视电话会议避免了中间环节传导可能存在的信息流失，尤其是保证了关键信息传播的有效性，有助于提升基层干部的治理信心。

　　　　　——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授竹立家

方略详情　　下一方略　　分享方略

Figure 52

Figure 53

夯实堡垒、万众一心

〈目录

★ 疫情发生后，党中央审时度势作出全面部署，鼓舞和动员全党全军全国各族人民万众一心、众志成城，切实做好各项防控工作——

● 成立**中央应对疫情工作领导小组**，及时研究部署工作。

● 向湖北等疫情严重地区**派出指导组**，推动加强防控一线工作。

● **国务院联防联控机制**及时协调解决防控工作中遇到的紧迫问题。

● **各级党委和政府**积极作为，**各级党组织和广大党员、干部**冲锋在前、顽强拼搏，充分发挥了战斗堡垒作用和先锋模范作用。

● **军队**积极支援地方疫情防控，人民解放军指

专家解读   下一方略   分享方略

Figure 54

夯实堡垒、万众一心

部署工作。

● 向湖北等疫情严重地区**派出指导组**，推动加强防控一线工作。

● **国务院联防联控机制**及时协调解决防控工作中遇到的紧迫问题。

● **各级党委和政府**积极作为，**各级党组织和广大党员、干部**冲锋在前、顽强拼搏，充分发挥了战斗堡垒作用和先锋模范作用。

● **军队**积极支援地方疫情防控，人民解放军指战员和武警部队官兵闻令而动、敢打硬仗。

● **广大群众**守望相助，纷纷捐款捐物表达爱心；响应党中央号召，自觉配合疫情防控工作，共筑群防群治严密防线。

● **相关部门**各司其职，**人大、政协以及各人民团体**等主动担责。

专家解读　　下一方略　　分享方略

Figure 55

夯实堡垒、万众一心

〈目录

专家解读：

　　为打赢这次疫情，全国上下携手并肩迎战，上有党中央举旗定向、统筹部署，下有各级党组织贯彻落实、协调联动。此次中国应对疫情的行动之快、力度之大、动员之广世所罕见，这是集中力量办大事这一制度优势最硬核的生动展现。这场疫情防控阻击战，以一种独特的方式彰显出中国特色社会主义制度巨大优势和强大威力，让我们看到了中国特色社会主义制度优势是我们应对各种风险挑战、驾驭各种复杂困难局面的不二法宝，是对中国特色社会主义制度优势的一次有力注解。

　　　　——山东大学马克思主义学院副院长郑敬斌

方略详情　　下一方略　　分享方略

Figure 56

Figure 57

< 目录　见叶知秋、放眼长远

这次疫情是对我国治理体系和能力的一次大考，暴露出一些体制机制等方面存在的明显短板，对此习近平多次作出重要部署——

★15个体系9种机制4项制度

2月14日，在中央全面深化改革委员会第十二次会议上，习近平连提15个体系、9种机制、4项制度。习近平指出：

　　既要立足当前，科学精准打赢疫情防控阻击战，更要放眼长远，总结经验、吸取教训，针对这次疫情暴露出来的短板和不足，抓紧补短板、堵漏洞、强弱项，该坚持的坚持，该完善的完善，该建立的建立，该落实的落实，完善重大疫情防控体制机制，健全国家公共卫生应急管理体系。

专家解读　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 58

Figure 59

见叶知秋、放眼长远

攻关等方面指挥、行动、保障**体系**。

● 要**完善关键核心技术攻关的新型举国体制**，加快推进人口健康、生物安全等领域科研力量布局，整合生命科学、生物技术、医药卫生、医疗设备等领域的国家重点科研**体系**。

★**党的领导和我国社会主义制度优势**

4月27日下午，习近平主持召开中央全面深化改革委员会第十三次会议并发表重要讲话。习近平强调：

我国疫情防控和复工复产之所以能够有力推进，**根本原因是党的领导和我国社会主义制度的优势发挥了无可比拟的重要作用**。发展环境越是严峻复杂，越要坚定不移深化改革，健全各方面制度，完善治理体系，促进制度建设和治理效能更好转化融合，善于运用制度优势应对风险挑战冲击。

专家解读　下一方略　分享方略

Figure 60

Figure 61

Figure 62

Figure 63

开放合作、大国担当

- **会见会谈5次**

世界卫生组织总干事、柬埔寨首相、蒙古国总统、巴基斯坦总统、欧洲理事会主席米歇尔、欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩

- **通电话62次**

法国总统(4次)、德国总理（3次）、沙特国王（2次）、美国总统（2次）、印尼总统（2次）、卡塔尔埃米尔、马来西亚总理、英国首相（2次）、韩国总统（2次）、巴基斯坦总理、阿联酋阿布扎比王储、埃塞俄比亚总理、古巴国家主席、智利总统、联合国秘书长、意大利总理、西班牙首相、俄罗斯总统（3次）、埃及总统、巴西总统、哈萨克斯坦总统、波兰总统、比利时国王、老挝国家主席、纳米比亚总统、南非总统（2次）、土耳其总统、委内瑞拉总统、墨西哥总统、塞尔维亚总统、吉尔吉斯斯坦总统、芬兰总统、尼泊尔总统、伊朗总统、捷克总统、秘鲁总统、古兰....

专家解读　　　　分享方略

Figure 64

总统

● **致函回信4次**

塞内加尔总统、比尔·盖茨、世界卫生组织总干事、阿根廷总统

● **互致口信2次**

朝鲜劳动党委员长、朝鲜国务委员会委员长，老挝人革党中央总书记、国家主席

（注：沟通对象按公开报道时间排序，相关数据统计截至2020年7月15日）

★ 最新数据显示，中国政府已经或正在向150多个国家和国际组织提供急需的医疗物资援助。此次对外抗疫援助是新中国成立以来，援助时间最集中，涉及范围最广的一次紧急人道主义行动。

专家解读　　　　　分享方略

Figure 65

开放合作、大国担当

<目录

专家解读：

中国始终是一个懂得感恩的国家，我们经济发展受益于国际社会，就会反哺国际社会，面对疫情也一样。这既体现了中方的人类命运共同体理念，更是一种人道主义精神，也是中国性格的体现。

——中国现代国际关系研究院世界经济研究所原所长陈凤英

"中国速度""中国效率"为阻滞疫情蔓延和传播做出了巨大贡献，同时，给予世界多国以大量的人力、物力、财力援助，彰显出中国作为负责任大国兼济天下的世界情怀。毫无疑问，中国战"疫"再一次向世界表明，中国以实际行动践行着"人类命运共同体"理念。

——四川师范大学教授董朝霞

方略详情   分享方略

Figure 66

88

Figure 67

Figure 68: Word cloud in Chinese characters of the interactive poster case study

Figure 69: Word cloud in English of the interactive poster case study

Figure 70: I am enthusiastic and fair, I hope to see you every day (1984). Source: chineseposters.net

**Figure 71: Selling the fruits of a bumper harvest in a friendly matter (1978). Source: chineseposters.net**

Figure 72: Bette[r] birth and upbringing, sturdily growing (1986). Source: (Landsberger 1995, 198)

Figure 73: The 3 July and 24 July proclamations are Chairman Mao's great strategic plans! Unite with forces that can be united with to strike surely, accurately and relentlessly at the handful of class enemies (1968). Source: chineseposters.net

Figure 74: Criticise the old world and build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon (1966). Source: chineseposters.net

Translation chapter 1

Figure	Written text in characters	Translation
Figure 1	这是新中国成立以来 传播速度最快 感染范围最广 防控难度最大 的重大突发公共卫生事件	This is the fastest spread, widest range of infection, the most difficult prevention and control, and the greatest public health outbreak since the founding of the New China
Figure 4	武汉封城 各地封路	Wuhan is in lockdown, in all parts of the country the roads are closed
Figure 5	人民生命安全受到威胁 经济社会发展遇到困难 在这个非常时期 领袖与人民在一起	People's lives are threatened and the economic societal developments meet difficulties. In usual time, the leader is with the people
Figure 6	一个月	One month
	两座城市	Two cities
	三次调研	Three investigations

	他说 --	He said --
	武汉必胜！	Wuhan will be certain of victory!
	湖北必胜！	Hubei will be certain of victory!
	全国必胜！	The whole country will be certain of victory!
Figure 7	安贞街道安华里社区委员会	Anzhen Street, Anhuali Community Committee
	2 月 10 日 习近平来到北京市朝阳区安贞街道安华里社区	February 10 Xi Jinping came to the Anhuali Comminity on Anzhen Street, Chaoyang District, Beijing
	他同社区居民交流，询问菜价怎么样	He communicated with the community's residents and asked them about the price of food
	"非常时期就不握手了。但是咱们一定要有信心，一定可以克服这场疫情"	"In unusual times we do not shake hands. But we must have faith, and we must certainly try to overcome this epidemic situation"
Figure 8	居民们异口同声 "一定能打赢！"	The residents simultaneously said "We will definitely win!"
	点击查看视频	Click to watch the video

	北京地坛医院	Beijing Ditan Hospital
	习近平视频连线正在病房值班的医务人员	Xi Jinping video calls the medical personnel who are on duty in the hospital
Figure 10	"我们一定要树立信心，一定会胜利的"	"We must establish confidence, it will certainly mean victory"
Figure 11	一个月后	One month later
	习近平来到了遭受疫情影响最严重的"风暴之眼"	Xi Jinping came to visit the "eye of the storm" (Wuhan), where people suffer the most from the influence of the epidemic
	武汉	Wuhan
Figure 12	3 月 10 日 习近平来到武汉	March 10 Xi Jinping came to Wuhan
	一下飞机就签往火神山医院	After he got off the plane, he went straight to Huoshenshan Hospital[4]
	他同正在接受治疗的患者交流鼓励他们坚定信心	He talked to the patients that received treatment at that time and he encouraged them to have faith.

---

[4] Huoshenshan Hospital is an emergency hospital built between 23 January and 2 February 2020, especially for COVID-19 patients

Figure 13	"武汉必胜、湖北必胜、全中国也必胜！"	Wuhan will be certain of victory, Hubei will be certain of victory, the whole country of China will be certain of victory!"
Figure 14	离开火神山医院	Leaving Huoshenshan Hospital
	习近平来到东湖新城社区隔着楼宇	Xi Jinping went to Donghu New Town Community, which is separated from the building
	是居民们一声声亲切的问候	It is a friendly greeting from the inhabitants
	点击查看视频	Click to view the video
Figure 15	"总书记好！"	"Hello General Secretary!"
	"习主席你幸苦了！"	"Chairman Xi, you work hard!"
	"你们幸苦了"	"You work hard"

Figure 16	在东湖新城社区党群服务中心	In Donghu New Town Community, Xi Jinping and the temporary community staff communicated that the whole nation is on the front line together and they expressed their sympathy and heartfelt gratitude
	习近平同临时的"小巷总理"们交流	
	代表党中央向他们	
	并向全国在一线的社区工作者	
	致以诚挚的慰问和衷心的感谢	
Figure 17 and Figure 18[5]	"谁愿意老闷在家里啊！"	"Who wants to be shut indoors all the time!"
	"武汉市是多么好的一座城市！"	"Wuhan is such a great city!"
	"武汉人喜欢吃活鱼，在条件允许的情况下应多组织供应"	"People from Wuhan like to eat fresh fish, they should organise more supply when the conditions permit it"
	"武汉加油！湖北加油！中国加油！"	"Go Wuhan! Go Hubei! Go China!"

---

[5] Both figures are considered in one table, because the text on the figures overlaps.

	"坚持就是胜利。请大家在坚持一下！"	"Perseverance is victory. Please keep on going!"
	"民生稳，人心就稳，社会就稳"	"If people's lives are stable, the will of the people will be stable and society will be stable"
	"我们取得这场斗争胜利靠任民群众"	"To acquire victory of this struggle, we rely on the people"
	"给人民群众当服务员，不能干巴巴、硬邦邦的"	"Serve the masses, do not do it very direct"
	"党和人民感谢武汉人民！"	"The Party and the people should thank the people of Wuhan!"
	"武汉加油！湖北加油！中国加油！"	"Go Wuhan! Go Hubei! Go China!"
	"坚持就是胜利。请大家在坚持一下！"	"Perseverance is victory. Please keep on going!"
	"我们取得这场斗争胜利要靠任民群众"	"To acquire victory of this struggle, we rely on the people"

	"党和人民感谢武汉人民！"	"The Party and the people should thank the people of Wuhan!"
	"谁愿意老老闷在家里啊！"	"Who wants to be shut indoors all the time!"
	"武汉市是多么好的一座城市！"	"Wuhan is such a great city!"
	"武汉人喜欢吃活鱼，在条件允许的情况下应多组织供应"	"People from Wuhan like to eat fresh fish, they should organise more supply when the conditions permit it"
Figure 19	4 月 8 日 武汉"解封"	April 8 Wuhan's lockdown is cancelled
	4 月 17 日 中共中央政治局召开会议强调在常态化疫情防控中全免推进复工复产	April 17 The politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China hold a conference to emphasise that during the normalised epidemic prevention and control everyone should return to work again and resume production
	4 月 22 日	April 22

	31 个省区市和新疆省产建设兵团现有确诊病例降至 1000 例一下	The number of confirmed cases Xinjiang Province has dropped below 1,000
	4 月 26 日 武汉在院新馆肺炎患者清零	April 26 Pneumonia patients are cleared from the new hospital in Wuhan
Figure 20	战"疫"时刻	"Epidemic" war
	党和人民在一起	The Party and the people together
	领袖和人民心贴心	The leader and the people are close
	回望 2020 年已过区的 4 个月	Looking back at the past 4 months of 2020
	习近平反复强调的一句话更加响亮 ––	A saying that Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasised is even louder ––
Figure 21	始终把人民群众生命安全和身体健康放在第一位	Always put the people's safety and physical health first
	分享好友	Share with your friends
	中国共产党新闻网	Communist Party of China News Agency

Figure 22	出品人：叶蓁蓁	Producer: Ye Zhenzhen
	总策划：罗华	General producer: Luo Hua
	总监制：孙海峰、姚奕、李鉴	Directors: Sun Haifeng, Yao Yi, Li Jian
	文案：任佳晖、李源	Copywriters: Ren Jiahui, Li Yuan
	设计：陈鑫	Designer: Chen Xin
	技术: 杨斌	Technician: Yang Bin

Video analysis

	Image	Visual image	Image content	Commentary/written text (Chinese)	Commentary/written text (English translation)
1		Ground perspective view of apartment buildings and people hanging out of their windows waving.	The people hanging from their windows are all quarantined in their house.	*None*	
2		Xi Jinping waves at the people in the windows. He is wearing a face mask.		"大家好。"	"Hello everyone."

| 3 | | People wear a face mask and winter clothing. Some of them look at Xi Jinping, a woman waves. | | *None* | |
| 4 | | Xi Jinping waves. In the background it shows people wearing face masks as well. The camera zooms in and out on Xi Jinping, showing him talking to Wuhan residents. | | [muffled speech because of the face masks] "在家怎么样？" [muffled response] | "How is it at home?" |

| 5 | | Wuhan residents listen to Xi Jinping's speech. | | *None* | |
| 6 | | The camera shifts back to Xi Jinping again. There are more people wearing face masks in the background now. Everyone is listening to Xi Jinping. He puts his thumbs in the air. | | "非常舍己的握手了。" [muffled speech] "(…)一点儿有信心。(…)" | "It is a very sacrificing handshake." "(…)Have a little confidence. (…)" |

| 7 | | The camera gives an overview of Xi Jinping talking to some Wuhan residents. The two women on the right (from the viewer's perspective) react to his speech by putting their fists in the air. | | [muffled speech]

"(…) | |
| 8 | | The camera shifts to a close-up of Xi Jinping. He puts his fists up in the air as well. | | | |

| 9 | | A short close-up of Wuhan residents before the video stops. | | | |

	Image	Visual image	Image content	Commentary/written text (Chinese)	Commentary/written text (English translation)
1		Xi Jinping waves. There are people wearing masks who walk behind him. Xi Jinping is wearing a face mask as well.	Xi Jinping waves at the Wuhan residents in Donghu New Town Community. This community is very close to the		

			Huoshenshan Hospital in Wuhan, Hubei.		
2		A ground perspective from a woman who is waving from her window. She is wearing a face mask.			
3		A close-up from Xi Jinping. He is waving and looking up.			

Spoken text analysis

Figure	Spoken text in characters	Translation	Speaker
Figure 10	"我们一定要树立信心，一定会胜利的"	"We must establish confidence, it will certainly mean victory"	Xi Jinping
Figure 13	"我们大家共同来坚定信心。一定会打赢这一场战役。	We all come together firm and confident. We will definitely win this battle.	Xi Jinping
	武汉必胜、湖北必胜、全中国也必胜！"	Wuhan will be certain of victory, Hubei will be certain of victory, the whole country of China will be certain of victory!"	
Figure 16	"我代表党中央，向你们并通过你们，向我们全国的社区工作者和全国在抗议一线的工作者致以诚挚的慰问和	"On behalf of the Party Central Committee, I would like to express sincere sympathy and heartfelt gratitude to you and through you, to all of the country's community workers and the protest front line workers."	Xi Jinping

	衷心的感谢。"		

Translation chapter 2

Figure	Written text in characters	Translation
Figure 30	人民网 中国共产党新闻网	People's Daily Online Communist Party of China News Agency
	大方略 强布局	Expert strategy Strong arrangement
	习近平 这样领导 中国战"疫"	Xi Jinping This kind of leader China's "epidemic" war
	点击页面开始浏览	Click on the page to start browsing
	趣动全媒体工作室	Qudongquan Media Studio
Figure 31	编者按	Editorial note
	新冠肺炎疫情发生以来，在一习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下，举国上下同心协力，谱写了一曲共克时艰的"战役"之歌。中国的防疫举措也得到世卫组织及许多国家的充分肯定和高度评价。当	Since the outbreak of COVID-19, under the strong leadership of comrade Xi Jinping the entire nation works as one and composed a song about the difficulty of the "military campaign". China's disease prevention actions have received sufficient affirmations and high evaluations from the World Health Organisation and many countries. Currently, Wuhan mainly relies on the whole nation blocking the

	前，以武汉市为主战场的全国本土疫情传播已基本阻断，在这场突如其来的"大考"中，中国如何"答卷"？人民网·中国共产党新闻网为您梳理。	dissemination of the epidemic. At this sudden "final exam", how does China "complete the exam paper"? People's Daily Online · Communist Party of China News Agency will sort it out for you
	点击页面开始浏览	Click on the page to start browsing
Figure 32	举旗定向 以快打快	Raise the flag to orientate[6] Take actions fast
	善谋全局 同舟共济	Plan the situation well, and have common interests
	审时度势 精准落子	Take stock and watch it with precision
	稳定民生 黎元为先	Stabilise livelihood and Li Yuan comes first
	高效传导 直通基层	Efficient conducting directly leads to the basic level
	夯实堡垒 万众一心	Ramming the fort unites the people

---

[6] In the current situation, the meaning is to find out where the origin of the infection is and how to take action

	见叶知秋 放眼长远	One falling leaf is indicative for the coming of autumn[7] Look at the long term
	开始合作 大国担当	Start working together Take the power yourself
Figure 34 and Figure 35	★ 自 1 月 25 日至今，党中央围绕疫情防控等多次召开重要高层会议—— ● **14次**中央政治局常委会会议 ● **4 次**中央政治局会议 ● **2 次**全面深化改革委员会会议 ● **1 次**全面依法治国委员会会议	★ Since the 25th of January, the Party Central Committee has held many important high level meetings about the prevention and control of the epidemic situation —— ● **14** meetings of Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ● **4** meetings of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party ● **2** meetings of the all-round Intensifying Reform Committee ● **1** meeting of the all-round Rule according to Law Committee ● **1** meeting to carry forward a plan to prevent and control the coronavirus epidemic situation and the economic and social development and work deployment

---

[7] One small thing such as a leaf can let you know what is to come

	● **1 次**统筹推进新冠肺炎疫情防控和经济社会发展工作部署会议 ● **1 次**决战决胜脱贫攻坚座谈会 ● **1 次**党外人士座谈会 ● **1 次**中央外事工作委员会会议 ● **1 次**中央网络安全和信息化委员会会议 ● **1 次**专家学者座谈会 （注:上述相关数据统计截至 2020 年 6 月 3 日）	● **1** conference about fighting poverty ● **1** non-Party members conference ● **1** meeting of the Foreign Affairs Working Committee of the Communist Party of China ● **1** meeting of the Internet Safety and Informatization Committee of the Communist Party of China ● **1** conference with experts and scholars (Note: the abovementioned relevant statistics are of 3 June 2020) ★ To go along with the rapid tempo, the meetings will be gradually adjusted —— From the sole topic of prevention and control of the epidemic situation, to the mention of the problem of going back to work and production, reform, development and stability, and again to a plan to prevent and control the epidemic situation and the economic and social development.

	★ 与快节奏相一致的，是会议主题的逐渐调整—— 从**疫情防控**的单一主题，到提及**复工复产**等改革发展稳定问题，再到**统筹推进疫情防控和经济社会发展工作**。	
	专家解读 下一方略 分享方略	Expert interpretation Next strategy Sharing strategy

| Figure 36 | 专家解读：

疫情防控"战时"状态下中央连开数次高层会议，这在党史上非常罕见，体现了应对突发紧急事态的领导力、组织力和动员能力。基于快速发展变化的疫情，高层正作出以快打快的战略战术部署。

上述脉络可以看出，会议主题即反映了防疫取得的进展和现实工作的需要，体现了实事求是的精神。

——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授竹立家 | Expert interpretation:

During the "wartime" of the epidemic situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held several high level meetings, which is a rare thing in the history of the Party, and it embodies the response outburst of emergency of the leader's strength in this situation, the organizational power and ability to mobilise. Based on the rapid development of the epidemic situation, high level officials even more rapid come up with strategies and tactics.

From the above-mentioned context can be seen that the theme of meetings reflect the progress of the prevention of the disease and the reality of wanting to go back to work. It embodies the spirit of being practical and realistic.

——Professor Zhu Lijia of the Central Party School (National School of Administration) |

Figure 38 and Figure 39	★ 以习近平同志为核心的党中央提出三个"全面"战略格局：全面动员、全面部署、全面加强工作，并对疫情防控作出具体部署—— ● **战略思路**：全国一盘棋 ● **总要求**：坚定信心、同舟共济、科学防治、精准施策 ● **防控要求**：早发现、早报告、早隔离、早治疗 ● **救治要求**：集中患者、集中专家、集中资源、集中救治	★ The Central Party Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core will put forward three "comprehensive" strategy patterns: comprehensive mobilisation, comprehensive deployment and comprehensive work reinforcement, and specific deployment regarding the prevention and control of the epidemic situation —— • **Strategic thinking:** a national game of chess • **General requirements:** firm confidence, having common interests, scientific prevention and control, accurate policy • **Prevention and control requirements:** early discovery, early reporting, early isolation, early treatment • **Treatment requirements:** focus on the patient, focus on the experts, focus on the resources, focus on the treatment • **Outstanding tasks**: improve the treatment rate and cure rate, lower the rate of infection and mortality rate • **To start a fitting supporting mechanism**: arrange an overall plan to let the **19**

	● **突出任务**：提高收治率和治愈率、降低感染率和病亡率 ● **启动对口支援机制**：统筹安排 **19 个**省份对口支援湖北省除武汉市外的 **16 个**市州及县级市 ★ 从 1 月下旬开始，各地医疗队驰援武汉，这是同舟共济、众志成城的力量汇聚—— ● 截至 3 月中旬，全国已经有 **346 支**医疗队抵达武汉和湖北。	provinces support the **16** cities, prefectures and county-level cities in Hubei province except for Wuhan ★ Beginning from late January, all parts of the country rushed to the rescue of Wuhan with medical treatment groups, this is having common interests and the power of unity • By mid-March, up to **346** medical treatment teams had arrived in Wuhan and Hubei • The number of people reached **42,600**, among them **19,000** medical personnel specialised in acute care • There are **2,800** female medical personnel, taking up **2/3rd** of the entire medical treatment team • It usually takes no more than **2 hours** between receiving the medical command and complete setting up a medical team. It usually takes no more than **24 hours** between assembling a medical team and arriving in Wuhan.

	● 人数达 **4.26 万人**，其中重症专业的医务人员达到 **1.9 万人**。 ● 女性医务人员有 **2.8 万人**，占到了整个医疗队医务人员的 **2/3**。 ● 从医疗机构接到指令到医疗队组建完成，一般不超过 **2 个小时**。从医疗队集结到抵达武汉，一般不超过 **24 小时**。	
Figure 40	专家解读： 疫情防控是一项复杂的系统工程，要坚持系统思维，运用系统科学的方法，把全国的疫情防控工	Expert interpretation: Prevention and control of an epidemic situation is a complicated systematic undertaking. It demands systematic thinking, it uses systematic scientific methods, and the whole country regards the prevention and control of the epidemic situation as an organic whole, as a

作看作一个有机整体，坚持全国一盘棋，从整体出发，才能有效防控，科学防控，坚决打赢这场疫情阻击战。 ——陕西省中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心特约研究员李永胜 "一省包一市"对口支援工作机制的启动，其重大意义可概括为三个方面：一是彰显了全国一盘棋的防控思路、二是彰显了社会主义集中力量办大	game of chess, as a whole. Using talent and scientific knowledge to effectively prevent and control, we are definitely able to stop the epidemic situation and win the battle. ——Li Yongsheng, special researcher of Shaanxi Research Center for the theory "Socialism with Chinese Characters" The important meaning of the launch of the "One province embraces one city" support mechanism can be summarised in three aspects: firstly, it manifests the whole nation in reasoning about the prevention and control as a game of chess. Secondly, it manifests socialism focusing on power to manage the dominant system of the major political event. Thirdly, it manifests the brotherhood supported by all parties in difficulty. ——Zhou Yuehui, faculty member and associate professor of the Economics Department of the Central Party School (National School of Administration)

	事的制度优势、三是彰显了一方有难八方支援的兄弟情谊。 ——中央党校（国家行政学院）经济学部教员、副教授周跃辉	
Figure 42 and Figure 43	★ 在战"疫"的不同阶段，疫情防控工作重心、防控重点随之调整，从前期的"内防扩散、外防输出"到现阶段及时切换到"外防输入、内防反弹"。此外，各个阶段，习近平都有针对性地提出要求——	During different stages of the "epidemic" war, the focus of the prevention and control of the epidemic situation has subsequently been adjusted, from the early stages of "prevent internal spreading and guard against the outside" to "guard against import from the outside, prevent internal backlash". In addition, in every stage, Xi Jinping has put forward target requirements —— • **When the epidemic first broke out** —— it was emphasised that the epidemic situation

	● **疫情暴发之初**——强调疫情就是命令，防控就是责任	was the order, the prevention and control was the responsibility
	● **胶着对垒之时**——强调采取更大的力度、更果断的措施，坚决把疫情扩散蔓延势头遏制住	• **During checkmate** —— it was stressed that carrying out even more big efforts and firm measures, to resolutely contain the spread of the epidemic • **The crucial stage** —— reminding to be highly alert on paralysing thoughts, loathe fighting the state of mind, wishful thinking, loosen the attitude of the heart, to alert in various regions to tense the prevention and control of the epidemic situation and do not relax
	● **吃劲关键阶段**——提醒高度警惕麻痹思想、厌战情绪、侥幸心理、松劲心态，警示各地要紧紧绷住疫情防控这根弦不放松	• **When the proactivity towards a good situation is expanding** —— the overall deployment to carry forward the prevention and control of the epidemic situation and the economic and social development • **When the prevention and control of an epidemic situation enters a crucial stage** —— it is required to not paralyse, not object to fight, not relax and pay close attention to prevention and control work. We will

	● **积极向好的态势正在拓展时**——全面部署统筹推进疫情防控和经济社会发展各项工作 ● **在疫情防控斗争进入关键阶段**——要求不麻痹、不厌战、不松劲，毫不放松抓紧抓实抓细各项防控工作，坚决打赢湖北保卫战、武汉保卫战 ● **全国疫情防控形势持续向好、生产生活秩序加快恢复的态势不断巩固和拓展时**——强调要毫不放松	resolutely win the war of defending Hubei and Wuhan. ● **When the prevention and control of the epidemic situation continues to improve, the sequence of life accelerates and is continuously strengthened and expanded** —— it is emphasised to not loosen your grip and pay attention to the prevention and control work, when the situation gets better, we need to prevent and control to avoid that the good situation turns back into a worse situation. ● **When our country is on guard to the import pressure of the continuous increase of the epidemic, and when returning to work and production and the economic and social development will be confronted with new difficulties and challenges——** To point out the bottom line of thought, we must be prepared for a long time of changing environment and work preparation ● **When the prevention and control of the epidemic situation is normalised ——**

	抓紧抓实抓细各项防控工作，决不能让来之不易的疫情防控持续向好形势发生逆转 ● **我国防范疫情输入压力不断加大，复工复产和经济社会发展面临新的困难和挑战时**——指出要坚持底线思维，做好较长时间应对外部环境变化的思想准备和工作准备 ● **常态化疫情防控之时**——督促落实常态化疫情防控举措，外防输入、内防	supervise the implementation of normalisation of prevention and control of the epidemic situation. Foreign defences import, internal defences backlash, we must not slack in all work to strengthen the results of the prevention and control of the epidemic situation, it is simply not possible to waste all one's efforts.

	反弹，要毫不懈怠抓好各项工作，巩固疫情防控成果，决不能前功尽弃	
Figure 44	专家解读： 中央部署虽各有侧重，但都建立在对不同阶段问题进行及时、准确分析的基础上，注重"落子"在关键处。例如当疫情得到一定程度遏制后，2月23日会议强调不获全胜决不轻言成功，就是一次适时的提醒。 ——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授戴焰军	Expert interpretation: Although there is a particular emphasis on the central deployment, in different stages issues will establish that are carried out in time, accurately analyse the foundation and pay attention to the crucial point of the decision. For example, after the epidemic was contained to a certain degree, the meeting of the 23rd of February emphasised not to lightly talk about total victory and success, for it was a timely reminder. ——Dai Yanjun, professor of the Central Party School (National School of Administration)

Figure 46 and Figure 47	★ "民生稳，人心就稳，社会就稳。"疫情发生以来，习近平多次亲临一线看望慰问群众并数次就民生话题作出重要部署。各级党委、政府闻令而动、积极作为——	★ "People's livelihood is stable, the will of the people is stable, and so society is stable." Since the epidemic happened, Xi Jinping has visited the front line many times in person to express his sympathy to the people, and people's livelihood repeatedly was deployed as an important subject. When they heard the orders, all levels of the Party Committee and the government proactively acted.
	● **医疗补贴**：新冠肺炎免费治疗政策扩大至疑似病人	● **Medical treatment subsidies**: the free treatment of COVID-19 policy expands to people who are suspected to be ill.
	● **尊医重卫**：从薪酬待遇、工伤认定、职称评聘等 10 个方面出台措施，进一步保护关心爱护医务人员	● **Respect for medical care:** from salaries, determining work injury, job title evaluation, etc. These 10 aspects official launch measurements, to move forward a step to protect and cherish medical personnel. ● **Guarantee of supply:** establishing a joint guarantee to provide a cooperation mechanism, and 9 provinces, regions and cities will work together to guarantee the supply of the markets in Wuhan and Hubei;

	● **保障供应**：建立联保联供协作机制，9 省区市联手保证湖北武汉市场供应；管好"菜篮子""米袋子"；做好煤电油气等供应等	to manage the "food basket" and the "supply of grain to the public"; do a good job in supplying coal, oil and gas, etc.
		• **Stable prices:** to do a good job in providing life's essentials and to prevent the prices from quickly going up, etc.
		• **Stable employment:** support flexible jobs in irrigation; pay attention to university and college graduates getting a job; to carry out an insurance premium specifically to reduce, an unemployment tax restitution, employment subsidy, etc.
	● **稳定物价**：做好生活必需品保供调度，防止物价过快上涨等	• **Help the masses in difficult situations:** Focus on and look after suffering families or families in isolation; assist impoverished labour workers to orderly return to work, etc.
	● **稳定就业**：支持多渠道灵活就业；注重高校毕业生就业工作；落实好社保	• **Help small companies:** research and introduce focus on tax cut policy; arrange credit scopes, and offer a special credit quota, etc.

费阶段性减免、失业保险稳岗返还、就业补贴政策等	
● **帮扶困难群众**：对患者家庭或者隔离的困难家庭重点照顾；帮助贫困劳动力有序返岗等	
● **帮扶小微企业**：研究出台阶段性、有针对性的减税降费政策；单列信贷规模，提供专项信贷额度等	

Figure 48	专家解读：	Expert interpretation:
	民生问题历来是一个根本性问题。高度关注民生，是我们社会制度的本质所决定的。在这次疫情爆发的特殊时期和特殊情况下，解决好事关民生的各种具体问题显得更加重要。所以，这次疫情防控中，中央始终把解决好这个问题放在极其重要的地位，反复加以强调，并从实际出发，针对不同群体所面临的突出需求，分类实施各种及时而有效举措，从而不但解决了防控一线工作人员的后顾之	People's livelihood has always been a fundamental problem. To highly pay attention to people's livelihood is decided by the essence of the social system. Particularly the period of the outbreak of the epidemic and the special circumstances, resolving all kinds of concrete issues regarding people's livelihood appear to be even more important. So, in this prevention and control of the epidemic situation, the authorities have all along put the resolving of these issues in an extremely important position, repeatedly made an effort, and from the actual start they focused on different communities confronted with the outstanding requirements and carrying them out in all kinds of timely and effective manners. Thus not only resolving looking after the prevention and control of the front line workers, and guaranteeing the fighting strength of the front line troops, but since the epidemic prevention and control work, it also ensures the stabilisation of the entire society and the order of people's ordinary lives. It

	优，保证了一线队伍的战斗力，而且保证了疫情防控工作以来整个社会稳定和广大人民群众正常生活的有序进行。应该说，这是我们这次疫情防控中一个非常重要的经验。 ——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授戴焰军	should be said that this is our most important experience in this epidemic situation. —— Dai Yanjun, professor of the Central Party School (National School of Administration)
Figure 50 and Figure 51	疫情发生以来，党中央连续两次召开规模罕见的电视电话会议，打破信息传导层级，直通基层——	Since the outbreak of the epidemic happened, the Party Central Committee held two consecutive rare video conference calls, breaking the information conduction level and leading directly to the basic level ——

132

	★2月23日，习近平出席统筹推进新冠肺炎疫情防控和经济社会发展工作部署会议并发表重要讲话。据了解，这是**一次面向17 万人的电视电话会议。** ● **出席人员：** 中央政治局常委、委员、书记处书记、国务委员，中央应对疫情工作领导小组成员、中央赴湖北指导组有关同志、国务院应对疫情联防联控机制各成员单位主要负责同志。	★ On the February 23rd, Xi Jinping attended the meeting to hold an important speech about an overall plan to prevent and control the COVID-19 epidemic and deploy social and economic development. It is understood that this was **a video conference call for 17,000 people.** • **Participants**: members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, committee members, secretariat members, and members of the State Council and members of the Leading Small Group (LSG) respond to the epidemic situation, the central authorities guidance group visit Hubei and the State Council respond to the main responsible colleagues of every member unit of the epidemic situation defence mechanism • **Sub-venues**: every province, district, city and Xinjiang production and construction unit as well as every city (prefecture, leagues), county (city, district, county), the authorities and every department of the national mechanism, every people's

● **分会场：** 各省区市和新疆生产建设兵团以及各市（地、州、盟）、县（市、区、旗），中央和国家机关各部门、各人民团体，解放军和武警部队团级以上单位。 ★ 3 月 6 日，习近平出席决战决胜脱贫攻坚座谈会并发表重要讲话。据介绍，这是**十八大以来脱贫攻坚方面最大规模会议，**	organisation, or unites above the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police. ★ On March 6, Xi Jinping attended a conference on the decisive battle to obtain victory and lift oneself out of poverty and held an important speech. According to the introduction, this was **the largest conference held on poverty alleviation since the 18th National Congress**, and it was held in the form of a video conference call. • **Participants**: a selection of members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, secretariat members, and members of the Leading Small Group (LSG) of the State Council that are responsible for poverty alleviation • **Sub-venues**: every province, district, city and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, as well as the 22 midwestern provinces, districts, cities (prefectures,

以电视电话会议形式召开。 ● **出席人员**： 部分中共中央政治局委员、中央书记处书记，国务院扶贫开发领导小组成员单位有关负责同志。 ● **分会场**： 各省区市和新疆生产建设兵团以及中西部 22 个省区市所辖市（地、州、盟）、县（市、区、旗）。	autonomous prefectures and leagues), counties (cities, districts and counties)

Figure 52	专家解读：	Expert interpretation:
	一般而言决策部署是从中央传至省部级，再到县团级。考虑到基层干部在平衡防疫与复工复产方面发挥的关键作用，电视电话会议避免了中间环节传导可能存在的信息流失，尤其是保证了关键信息传播的有效性，有助于提升基层干部的治理信心。 ——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授竹立家	Generally speaking, the strategic deployment is from the central authorities to the province level, and then to the county level. Considering the key role of the basic level in balancing disease prevention and going back to work and production, video conference calls avoid possible intermediate information loss, and especially ensure the spread of validate information, and contributes to promoting the confidence in basic level governance. —— Zhu Lijia, professor of the Central Party School (National School of Administration)

Figure 54 and Figure 55	★ 疫情发生后，党中央审时度势作出全面部署，鼓舞和动员全党全军全国各族人民万众一心、众志成城，切实做好各项防控工作——	★ After the outbreak, the Party Central Committee judged the hour and sized up the situation about the overall deployment, to boost and mobilise the Party and the army and every person in the country will work together, to do a good job in prevention and control ——
	● 成立**中央应对疫情工作领导小组**，及时研究部署工作。	• Establishing a **Leading Small Group to respond to the epidemic situation**, in time to research the deployment.
	● 向湖北等疫情严重地区**派出指导组**，推动加强防控一线工作。	• **Send a guidance group** to the severe epidemic area Hubei, to promote the strengthening of prevention and control in the front lines
		• **The State Council's prevention and control mechanism** timely coordinated a resolution of the pressing problems encountered in the prevention and control work.
		• **Party committees and governments at all levels** actively acted. **Party organisations of all levels and numerous party members** assaulted in the past, are hard to

	● **国务院联防联控机制**及时协调解决防控工作中遇到的紧迫问题。 ● **各级党委和政府**积极作为，**各级党组织和广大党员、干部**冲锋在前、顽强拼搏，充分发挥了战斗堡垒作用和先锋模范作用。 ● **军队**积极支援地方疫情防控，人民解放军指战员和武警部队官兵闻令而动、敢打硬仗。	defeat and adequately develop to act like fighting a fort and act like an example. ● The **army** actively support regions in preventing and controlling the epidemic situation. The commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army and the officers and men from the People's Armed Police are well-known for their commands and actions and their daring to resolutely fight a war. ● **Numerous people** join forces to defend against external aggressors, continuously donate money and goods to express compassion; to responds to the Party Central Committees appeal, consciously correspond to the prevention and control of the epidemic situation, and generally construct people protecting people to control the strict defensive line. ● **Relevant departments** all take charge of their duties. **The National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as well as various people's organisations**

	● **广大群众**守望相助，纷纷捐款捐物表达爱心；响应党中央号召，自觉配合疫情防控工作，共筑群防群治严密防线。 ● **相关部门**各司其职，**人大、政协以及各人民团体**等主动担责。	take the initiative to carry out responsibilities.
Figure 56	专家解读： 为打赢这次疫情，全国上下携手并肩迎战，上有党中央举旗定向、统筹部署，下有各级党组织贯彻落实、协调联动。此次中国应对疫情的行动之	Expert interpretation: To win this epidemic situation, the whole country should meet the enemy hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder, with the Party Central Committee holding up the flag, deploying an overall plan. There are Party associations at all levels carrying out and coordinating actions. This time, China responded quickly and powerful to the epidemic situation, mobilising the world as rarely seen. This is a vivid

| | 快、力度之大、动员之广世所罕见，这是集中力量办大事这一制度优势最硬核的生动展现。这场疫情防控阻击战，以一种独特的方式彰显出中国特色社会主义制度巨大优势和强大威力，让我们看到了中国特色社会主义制度优势是我们应对各种风险挑战、驾驭各种复杂困难局面的不二法宝，是对中国特色社会主义制度优势的一次有力注解。 | demonstration of the system's dominant and powerful hard core focusing on major events. The prevention and control of the epidemic situation is a unique way to manifest the immense dominance and power of the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system, which permits us to finally see how the system responds to all kinds of challenges and deals with complex and difficult phases. It is a powerful annotation of the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system.

—— Zheng Jingbin, Vice President of School of Marxism, Shandong University |

	——山东大学马克思主义学院副院长郑敬斌	
Figure 58, Figure 59 and Figure 60	这次疫情是对我国治理体系和能力的一次大考，暴露出一些体制机制等方面存在的明显短板，对此习近平多次作出重要部署—— ★**15 个体系 9 种机制 4 项制度** 2 月 14 日，在中央全面深化改革委员会第十二次会议上，习近平连提 15 个	This epidemic is a big test of our country's system and capabilities, it exposes a few clear shortcomings of the system. Xi Jinping has repeatedly come up with important deployments. ★**15 systems, 9 mechanisms, 4 institutions** On February 14, at the second central all-around intensifying reform committee meeting, Xi Jinping mentioned the "15 systems, 9 mechanism, 4 institutions". Xi Jinping indicated: Since the current establishment, to let scientific knowledge accurately win the epidemic war, it is important to view the long-term, sum up experiences and draw lessons. Focus on exposing the shortcomings and inadequacies of this epidemic situation, pay special attention to the shortcomings, loopholes and strengths and

体系、9 种机制、4 项制度。习近平指出:	weaknesses. Perseverance, improvements, establishments, implementations, the excellent major prevent and control system of the epidemic and the robust national publish health emergency supervising system.
既要立足当前，科学精准打赢疫情防控阻击战，更要放眼长远，总结经验、吸取教训，针对这次疫情暴露出来的短板和不足，抓紧补短板、堵漏洞、强弱项，该坚持的坚持，该完善的完善，该建立的建立，该落实的落实，完善重大疫情防控体制机制，健全国家公共卫生应急管理体系。	**★ Improving a new national system for key skill strategies** On March 2nd, when Xi Jinping inspected the prevention and control research of COVID-19 in Beijing, he mentioned the following system and institutional construction: • Speed up establishing companies on which can be relied on and integrate the research and development of a vaccine and industrialisation **system**, to establish the national vaccine reserve **institution**. • Strengthen the prevention and control and public health research **system** and capability construction. It is important to coordinate every aspect of the scientific research

	★完善关键核心技术攻关的新型举国体制 3 月 2 日，习近平在北京考察新冠肺炎防控科研攻关工作时提及以下体系及制度建设： ● 加快建立以企业为主体、产学研相结合的疫苗研发和产业化**体系**，建立国家疫苗储备**制度。** ● 加强疫病防控和公共卫生科研攻关**体系**和能力建	strength and improve the **system's** capability and level. ● It is necessary to research and establish a scientific research to command, operate and safeguard **system** after the epidemic has extended into a state of emergency. ● It is necessary to **improve new national system key core technology**, accelerate advancing people's health and biosecurity in the scientific research domain, and the national scientific research **system** to integrate life sciences, biotechnology, medical health, and medical treatment. **★ The leadership of the Party and our nation's socialist system superiority** In the afternoon of April 27, Xi Jinping presided over the 13th meeting of the central overall intensifying reform committee and held an important speech. Xi Jinping emphasised: The reason why our country is capable of preventing and controlling the epidemic

设。要统筹各方面科研力量，提高**体系**化对抗能力和水平。 ● 要研究建立疫情蔓延进入紧急状态后的科研攻关等方面指挥、行动、保障**体系**。 ● 要**完善关键核心技术攻关的新型举国体制**，加快推进人口健康、生物安全等领域科研力量布局，整合生命科学、生物技术、医药卫生、医疗设备等领域的国家重点科研**体系**。	situation and returning to work and production is **fundamental because the leadership of the Party and the superiority of our country's socialist system express that they played an incomparable significant role**. The more severe and complicated the development circumstances are, the more important intensifying reform is. Every aspect of the system, improving the governance system, promoting the system construction and managing the effectiveness transformation even more, and to be good at using the system's superiority to response to the risks and challenges.

	★党的领导和我国社会主义制度优势 4月27日下午，习近平主持召开中央全面深化改革委员会第十三次会议并发表重要讲话。习近平强调： 我国疫情防控和复工复产之所以能够有力推进，**根本原因是党的领导和我国社会主义制度的优势发挥了无可比拟的重要**	

	作用。发展环境越是严峻复杂，越要坚定不移深化改革，健全各方面制度，完善治理体系，促进制度建设和治理效能更好转化融合，善于运用制度优势应对风险挑战冲击。	
Figure 61	专家解读： 　　疫情防控工作如果放眼长远，稳定有效的制度保障必不可少。习近平总结疫情防控的表述并非"就事论事"，而是针对暴露出来的短板着手于当前，着眼于长远。健全疫情防控体系并非一朝一	Expert interpretation: If the prevention and control of the epidemic situation is viewed long-term, a system that ensures stability and effectiveness is absolutely necessary. Xi Jinping concluded that the formulation of the prevention and control of the epidemic situation really is not able to "discuss something on its own merits", but it rather focuses on exposing the current shortcomings and concentrating on the long-term. The prevention and control system of the epidemic really does not happen overnight, but it is adopted through a careful deployment, and

	夕，通过完整周密的部署对于着眼长远具有根本性意义。 ——中央党校（国家行政学院）教授戴焰军 这些部署关乎顶层设计，旨在尽快补上疫情暴露的"短板"，从全局、基础和源头层面提高应对重大突发公共卫生事件能力和水平，保障国家生物安全。通过科学预见形势、发展走势，发现隐藏其中的风险挑战，形成对	careful deployment is concerned with the fundamental significance of long-term perspective. ——Dai Yanjun, professor of the Central Party School (National School of administration) These deployments relate to top floor designs and aim to make up for exposing the "shortcomings" of the epidemic situation as soon as possible and improve the ability and level of responding to the great sudden outburst of public health incidents from the overall situation, and it ensures national biosecurity. Through scientifically predicting circumstances and the development trend, you will discover hidden risks and challenges. They form a "full chain" of risks to manage. In the future, recognising the risks' causes will be more alert and accurate. Predictions will be better and the response to risks will be more active. —— Xue Lan, Professor at Tsinghua University

	风险的"全链条"管理，今后对风险成因的认识会更警觉、更准确，预见性更强，应对风险也会更主动。 ——清华大学教授薛澜	

| Figure 63, Figure 64 and Figure 65 | ★ 疫情发生以来，习近平密集与外国政要和国际组织领导人通电话、通信和会面等，出席了 G20 历史上首次举行的领导人视频会议，在第 73 届世界卫生大会视频会议开幕式上致辞，主持中非团结抗疫特别峰会并发表主旨讲话，介绍"中国经验"，阐述"中国主张"，提出"中国倡议"——

● 会议 3 次
3 月 26 日，在北京出席二十国集团领导人应对新冠肺炎特别峰会并发表题为《携手抗疫 共克时艰》的重要讲话 | ★ Since the epidemic outbreak, Xi Jinping has intensively phoned with foreign political leader and international organisations and has communicated at a peace conference meeting. He attended the first video conference meeting of G20 leaders in history, held a speech at the videoconference opening ceremony of the 73rd World Health Assembly, managed the China-Africa unity summit meeting to fight the epidemic and published his ideas in a speech, introducing "China's experience" and elaborating "China's point of view" and proposing "China's suggestions" ——

• **Meeting 3 times**
On March 26, he [Xi Jinping] attended the G20 leaders special summit meeting in response to COVID-19 in Beijing and held an important speech about the topic "holding hands in fighting the epidemic and overcoming the hardship"

On May 18th, on the seventy-third video conference opening ceremony of the World |

	5月18日，在第七十三届世界卫生大会视频会议开幕式上发表题为《团结合作战胜疫情 共同构建人类卫生健康共同体》的致辞	Health Assembly, he [Xi Jinping] held a speech, titled "Solidarity and cooperation will defeat the epidemic situation and together build a community of human health"
	6月17日，在北京主持中非团结抗疫特别峰会并发表题为《团结抗疫 共克时艰》的主旨讲话

● **会见会谈 5 次** | On June 17th, he [Xi Jinping] held a speech at the Beijing China-Africa solidarity anti-epidemic summit meeting, titled "Solidarity in fighting the epidemic and commonly overcome the hardship"

- **5 meetings and talks**
  General Secretary of the World Health Organisation, prime minister of Cambodia, president of Mongolia, president of Pakistan, chair of the European Council George Mitchell, chair of the Commission of European Union Ursula von der Leyen

- **62 phone calls**
  President of France (4 times), prime minister of Germany (3 times), king of Saudi Arabia (2 times), president of the United States (2 times), president of Indonesia (2 times), |

世界卫生组织总干事、柬埔寨首相、蒙古国总统、巴基斯坦总统、欧洲理事会主席米歇尔、欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩 **● 通电话 62 次** 法国总统(4 次)、德国总理（3次）、沙特国王（2次）、美国总统（2次）、印尼总统（2次）、卡塔尔埃米尔、马来西亚总理、英国首相（2次）、韩国总统（2次）、巴基斯坦总理、阿联酋阿布扎比王储、埃塞	Emir of Qatar, prime minister of Malaysia, prime minister of the United Kingdom (2 times), president of South Korea (2 times), prime minister of Pakistan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi of the United Arab Emirates, prime minister of Ethiopia, president of Cuba, president of Chile, General Secretary of the United Nations, prime minister of Italy, prime minister of Spain, president of Russia (3 times), president of Egypt, president of Brazil, president of Kazakhstan, president of Poland, king of Belgium, president of Laos, president of Namibia, president of South Africa (2 times), president of Turkey, president of Venezuela, president of Mexico, president of Serbia, president of Kyrgyzstan, president of Finland, president of Nepal, president of Iran, president of the Czech Republic, president of Peru, president of Uzbekistan, president of Portugal, president of Sri Lanka, prime minister of Hungary, president of Myanmar, prime minister of Bangladesh, president of Costa Rica, president of the Philippines, president of

俄比亚总理、古巴国家主席、智利总统、联合国秘书长、意大利总理、西班牙首相、俄罗斯总统（3次）、埃及总统、巴西总统、哈萨克斯坦总统、波兰总统、比利时国王、老挝国家主席、纳米比亚总统、南非总统（2次）、土耳其总统、委内瑞拉总统、墨西哥总统、塞尔维亚总统、吉尔吉斯斯坦总统、芬兰总统、尼泊尔总统、伊朗总统、捷克总统、秘鲁总统、乌兹别克斯坦总统、葡萄牙总统、	Belarus, president of Ecuador, president of Tajikistan, prime minister of Singapore, prime minister of Thailand • **10 phone calls to express sympathy** Chair of the European Council, Chair of the Commission of European Union, president of South Korea, president of Iran, president of Italy, president of France, prime minister of Germany, king of Spain, president of Serbia, president of Belarus • **4 replies to letters** President of Senegal, Bill Gates, General Secretary of the World Health Organisation, president of Argentina • **2 times exchanging messages** Head of the Workers' Party of Korea, head of the Affairs of State of North Korea, General Secretary of Laos, president (Note: the communications are published at a sorted time, and relevant statistics are as of July 15, 2020) ★ The latest data shows that the Chinese government offers urgently needed medical

	斯里兰卡总统、匈牙利总理、缅甸总统、孟加拉国总理、哥斯达黎加总统、菲律宾总统、白俄罗斯总统、厄瓜多尔总统、塔吉克斯坦总统、新加坡总理、泰国总理 ● 致慰问电 10 次 欧洲理事会主席、欧盟委员会主席、韩国总统、伊朗总统、意大利总统、法国总统、德国总理、西班牙国王、塞尔维亚总统、白俄罗斯总统	treatment supply aids to more than 150 countries and international organisations. This foreign anti-epidemic aid is established since the New China and is mostly concentrated on support and it involves a wide range of first emergency humanitarian action.

153

● 致函回信 4 次 塞内加尔总统、比尔·盖茨、世界卫生组织总干事、阿根廷总统 **● 互致口信 2 次** 朝鲜劳动党委员长、朝鲜国务委员会委员长，老挝人革党中央总书记、国家主席 （注：沟通对象按公开报道时间排序，相关数据统计截至 2020 年 7 月 15 日）	

	★ 最新数据显示，中国政府已经或正在向 150 多个国家和国际组织提供急需的医疗物资援助。此次对外抗疫援助是新中国成立以来，援助时间最集中，涉及范围最广的一次紧急人道主义行动。	
Figure 66	专家解读： 中国始终是一个懂得感恩的国家，我们经济发展受益于国际社会，就会反哺国际社会，面对疫情也一样。这既体现了中方的人类命运共同体理念，更是一种人道主义精神，也是中国性格的体现。	Expert interpretation: China has all along known how to be a grateful country and our economic development benefits from the international community and balances the international community. It is the same as facing the epidemic situation. This embodies the Chinese side of human fate and it is even more a type of human spirit, as well as it is China's embodiment. ——Chen Fengying, former director of the Institute of World Economics, China Institute of Modern International Relations

	——中国现代国际关系研究院世界经济研究所原所长陈凤英

"中国速度""中国效率"为阻滞疫情蔓延和传播做出了巨大贡献，同时，给予世界多国以大量的人力、物力、财力援助，彰显出中国作为负责任大国兼济天下的世界情怀。毫无疑问，中国战"疫"再一次向世界表明，中国以实际行动践行着"人类命运共同体"理念。 | "China's speed" and "China's efficiency" have made immense contributions to stop the spreading of the epidemic. At the same time, it has given a lot of manpower, physical resources, and financial aid to the world, to manifest China taking responsibility to aid the world. Certainly, China's war against the "epidemic" has once again indicated that China has put the idea of a "human fate community" into practice.

—— Dong Zhaoxia, Professor of Sichuan Normal University |

	——四川师范大学教授董 朝霞	157